Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 2

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 2 Editor-in-Chief Jørgen S. Nielsen Editors Sami...

Author: Jørgen S. Nielsen | Samim Akgönül | Ahmet Alibašić | Brigitte Maréchal and Christian Moe

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Yearbook of Muslims in Europe

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 2 Editor-in-Chief

Jørgen S. Nielsen Editors

Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Brigitte Maréchal Christian Moe

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

Published with the support of

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Detailed Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data are available on the Internet at http://catalog.loc.gov

ISSN 1877-1432 ISBN 978 90 04 18475 6 Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS The Editors .......................................................................................... Editorial Advisers .............................................................................. Foreword .............................................................................................

ix xi xiii

PART I

COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet Alibašić and Brigitte Maréchal Introduction ........................................................................................ Country surveys: Albania ............................................................................................ Armenia .......................................................................................... Austria ............................................................................................. Azerbaijan ....................................................................................... Belarus ............................................................................................. Belgium ........................................................................................... Bosnia and Herzegovina .............................................................. Bulgaria ........................................................................................... Croatia ............................................................................................. Cyprus ............................................................................................. Czech Republic .............................................................................. Denmark ......................................................................................... Estonia ............................................................................................. Finland ............................................................................................ France .............................................................................................. Georgia ............................................................................................ Germany ......................................................................................... Greece .............................................................................................. Hungary .......................................................................................... Iceland ............................................................................................. Ireland ............................................................................................. Italy .................................................................................................. Kosovo .............................................................................................

3 7 19 29 43 57 67 89 107 115 125 141 151 167 173 183 203 217 233 245 251 259 273 289

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contents Latvia ............................................................................................... Liechtenstein .................................................................................. Lithuania ......................................................................................... Luxembourg ................................................................................... Macedonia ...................................................................................... Malta ................................................................................................ Moldova .......................................................................................... Montenegro .................................................................................... Netherlands .................................................................................... Norway ............................................................................................ Poland .............................................................................................. Portugal ........................................................................................... Romania .......................................................................................... Russia ............................................................................................... Serbia ............................................................................................... Slovakia ........................................................................................... Slovenia ........................................................................................... Spain ................................................................................................ Sweden ............................................................................................ Switzerland ..................................................................................... Turkey ............................................................................................. Ukraine ............................................................................................ United Kingdom ............................................................................

303 311 317 325 335 343 351 361 367 387 401 413 423 435 457 467 473 481 497 511 521 535 545

PART II

ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Christian Moe Alevi communities in Western Europe: Identity and religious strategies .......................................................................................... Elise Massicard Islam, shopping, recognition: London’s Islamic markets in a European perspective .................................................................... Johan Fischer Islamic higher education in the Balkans: A survey ..................... Ahmet Alibašić Islam and religious education in Bulgaria: Local tradition vis-à-vis global change .................................................................. Simeon Evstatiev and Plamen Makariev

563

593 619

635

contents Applying Shari’a in Europe: Greece as an ambivalent legal paradigm ......................................................................................... Konstantinos Tsitselikis Islamic finance in Western Europe ................................................ Ibrahim Zeyyad Cekici

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663 681

PART III

BOOK REVIEWS Edited by Christian Moe and Samim Akgönül Laïcité en débat: Principes et représentations en France et en Turquie. Ed. Samim Akgönül. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2008 (Ahmet T. Kuru) ............. Islam in Inter-War Europe. Ed. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain. London: Hurst, 2008 (Christian Moe) ............ Mutual Misunderstandings? Muslims and Islam in the European Media. Europe in the Media of Muslim Majority Countries. Ed. Kerem Öktem and Reem Abou-El-Fadl. Oxford: European Studies Centre, St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford, 2009 (Katharina Nötzold) .................... Crime and Muslim Britain: Culture and the Politics of Criminology among British Pakistanis. By Marta Bolognani. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009 (Basia Spalek) .................................. The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Ed. Maurice Crul and Liesbeth Heering. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008 (Thijl Sunier) ........................................................................ Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization. By Ayhan Kaya. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 (Niels Valdemar Vinding) ............................

695 696

699

702

705

708

THE EDITORS Jørgen S. Nielsen is a Danish National Research Foundation Professor of Islamic Studies and Director, Centre for European Islamic Thought, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Previously at the University of Birmingham, he has been researching and writing about Islam in Europe since 1978. He is the author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 3rd edn 2004) and co-editor of Sharia as Discourse: Legal Systems and the Encounter with Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010). Samim Akgönül, is Associate Professor at Strasbourg University and researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). He also teaches Political Science at Syracuse University and International Relations at Galatasaray University. Among his recent publications are Religion de Turquie, religions des Turcs: Nouveaux acteurs dans l’Europe élargie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006), and, as editor, Laïcité en débat: Principes et représentations du concept de la laïcité en France et en Turquie (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2008). Ahmet Alibašić holds an MA in Islamic Studies, Political Sciences and Islamic Civilisation from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in SE Europe and interreligious relations. Brigitte Maréchal is Professor in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, and Director, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. She is in charge of the programme ‘Religious Sciences: Islam’. She is editor, with Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jørgen Nielsen, of Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and author of The Muslim Brothers: Roots and Discourse (Brill, Leiden, 2008).

x

the editors

Christian Moe is a PhD candidate in the history of religion, University of Oslo, and works as a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights, and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009).

EDITORIAL ADVISERS Dr Xavier Bougarel, Etudes Turques et Ottomans, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Prof. Felice Dassetto, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Prof. Silvio Ferrari, Faculty of Law, Universities of Milan, Italy, and Leuven, Belgium Dr Franck Frégosi, Maison Inter-universitaire des Sciences de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Alsace, and Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix en Provence, France Prof. Fikret Karčić, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Assoc. Prof. Talip Küçükcan, Adviser to the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), Ankara, Turkey Dr Lene Kühle, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark Dr Nico Landman, Department for Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Netherlands Prof. Dr Jamal Malik, Chair of Islamic Studies, University of Erfurt, Germany Prof. Tariq Modood, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, United Kingdom Dr Ferid Muhic, University of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Macedonia Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk, Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland Prof. Alexandre Popovic, Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials (EHESS), Paris, France Dr Nina Clara Tiesler, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal Dr Kari Vogt, Associate Professor, Institute of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway Dr Antonina Zheliyazkova, Director, International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria

FOREWORD The presence of Muslims in Europe has attracted increasing attention over the last two decades. Researchers started devoting attention to the subject during the mid- and late 1980s. During the following decade it attracted growing political attention, sparked especially by the ‘affairs’ of 1989—Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in Britain and the foulards (headscarves) in France—and sustained by the critical geopolitical focuses on Islam and Muslims through crises in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya added to existing ones—Palestine, Sudan, Kashmir—where Islam was an ever more forcefully expressed dimension. The events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington DC, followed by a number of other terrorist attacks, especially those in Madrid and London, raised the profile in Europe yet further, now often driven by security considerations. That smaller countries could not escape the attention was demonstrated by the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004 and the international impact of the cartoons of Muhammad published in Denmark at the end of September 2005. Throughout these events it has become clear that researchers, policy makers, journalists and other opinion formers have found it difficult to obtain with ease reliable information about the situation of Muslims in individual European countries. Nowhere has it been possible to find answers to the simple questions such as “How do other countries deal with Muslim burial?”, “In which countries are there Islamic schools, and how do they function?”, “Do any other countries make space for Islamic family law?”, etc. An attempt to establish an overview of both the data and the research was undertaken almost ten years ago at the behest of the Presidency of the European Union.1 This project was expanded into a major publication, which set out to take stock of both the state of research in the field and the data.2 The country data

1 Dassetto, F., B. Maréchal and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Convergences musulmanes: Aspects contemporains de l’islam dans l’Europe élargie (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2001). 2 Maréchal, B., S. Allievi, F. Dassetto and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

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were synthesised and published separately3 in a format that was later updated for the European Parliament.4 It was rapidly becoming clear that events were moving fast and published data was quickly becoming out of date. At the same time, it was also clear that much data was being interpreted without reference to the context to which it belonged. In particular, too much authority was being given to statistics that, by their very nature, were unreliable. So when the publishers Brill approached the editors of their book series Muslim Minorities, which had started appearing in 2003, with the suggestion that a Yearbook of Muslims in Europe would be timely, the response was positive. An editorial team was assembled, which took on the project both positively and with trepidation, knowing very well how much work would be involved, especially in the first year. The compilation of the first volume progressed successfully, and we can now present the second volume. To meet our assessment of the needs of the users, the volume is divided into three main parts. The largest is the Country Reports, which cover 46 countries in western and central Europe. The second part comprises analytical articles on topics that, in one way or another, are of current interest, while the third part—which we expect to see expanding in future years—collects reviews of important books published during the period covered in the volume, essentially 2009. Our thanks are due to the many researchers who have contributed to the volume—some of the authors of the country entries have in effect produced here the first account in English of the situation of Muslims in their countries. We are particularly indebted to staff at Brill, who first had the idea and then have supported it actively all the way through: Nicolette van der Hoek, Sasha Goldstein, and Joed Elich, and to Carol Rowe for her as ever meticulous copy editing. In Copenhagen, student assistants Niels Valdemar Vinding and Line Stæhr have been enthusiastic and committed in helping to ensure that the process

3 Maréchal, B. (ed.), L’Islam et les musulmans dans l’Europe élargie: Radioscopie (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2002). 4 Dasetto, F., S. Ferrari and B. Maréchal, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Culture and Education (IP/B/CULT/IC/2002_061), 2007), pp. 81–175.

foreword

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has gone surprisingly smoothly. We can now but hope that the volume will be found useful. The Editors Copenhagen, Ljubljana, Louvain, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, May 2010

PART I

COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet Alibašić and Brigitte Maréchal

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this first main part of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe is to provide essential data about the place of Muslims within each of the countries covered, in principle for the year 2009. In this second volume the country coverage has been expanded to include all of Europe to the Urals and the southern Caucasus, 46 countries in all. They include all the member countries of the Council of Europe, omitting the four mini-states (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican) but including Belarus. A section on interreligious relations has been added to each country report. The information is structured in the same way for each country, so that users who wish to make comparisons across countries can quickly find the information they seek within the same numbered section of each country report. Although, of course, much of the material is of a more general nature, special attention is given to developments during the year. The statistics provided in the first section usually state clearly which year they apply to, which is not necessarily 2009, as there are many countries where such statistics are not gathered regularly. Any significant developments that have taken place in a country since the beginning of 2010 have been held over to the next volume. In the process of copy editing, all the web sites cited in source references were tested, and they were functioning at the beginning of April 2010. It is in the nature of such a presentation of data that some of the information acquires a rather more authoritative character than is justified. This is particularly problematic in a volume which seeks to present ‘facts’ about Muslims in Europe. For a start, the mere use of the term ‘Muslim’ begs questions. Both the research tradition and much public debate on the subject tend to start from an assumption that anyone from a Muslim cultural tradition is Muslim—e.g. if their names are Muhammad or Fatima, and they are Turkish of origin, they must be Muslims. As many of the country reports indicate, this is too simplistic: there are ‘Muslims’ who have no practical relationship to Islam, its rites, institutions or organisations. The term ‘cultural Muslims’ has come into use to deal with this, while ‘practising Muslims’ is then intended to cover those who engage in some form of Islamic practice. None of these solutions is satisfactory. Nadia Jeldtoft

4

introduction

discussed this problem in her article in the first volume (‘On defining Muslims’, pp. 9–14). The problem is reflected in the attempts to ascertain demographic data in section 1 of each of the reports. In some countries, official statistics register religious adherence, usually self-defined, but in many countries researchers have had to use data on nationality and/or ethnicity to deduce some form of reasonably reliable estimate. In a few countries, the law on civil associations requires that a register of members be kept, and this can also be a source of statistics on religious allegiance. Occasionally, Muslim organisations themselves give figures, but their reliability is also often open to question. Each country report sets out the nature of the basis for the demography provided. We have deliberately not tried to provide any summary statistical table, as this is liable to acquire an unjustified authority. So we apologise to those users who thought they might get some quick answers! It goes without saying that the situations in the various countries differ enormously in terms of numbers, complexity and occasionally the peculiarity of one aspect or another, usually to do with legal status. We have therefore not imposed any strict guidelines for the length of individual country entries, except to keep within a guideline maximum—and even that we have had to breach in certain, in our view, justified cases. Sections 1–12 in each country report have a focus that allows for the presentation of factual data, but it is inevitable that, in deciding what information to include and what to exclude, judgments have had to be made. This is the case especially in section 3, where we have had to choose which national Muslim organisations to include. In countries with smaller populations, two organisations may be all that exist in the country, while in other, larger countries some provincial organisations may have national impact. The same goes for Muslim media, covered in section 12. On the other hand, the last three sections, 13–16, are more evaluative in their intent. Given that the situation is so varied among the countries covered, section 13, on family law, can only touch very briefly on those aspects that are particular to the country in question and which especially impact on Muslims and on public awareness. Readers interested in more detail will need to go to the extensive and technical legal literature. To help readers use the country reports, especially if they intend to make thematic comparisons across Europe, a more detailed indication

introduction

5

of what each section of the country reports is intended to include may be helpful: 1. Muslim populations: Muslim populations including their history within the country and ethnic composition, including overview statistics covering current numbers and ethnic and geographical distribution. This will include, as appropriate, an indication of the nature of the sources and a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the statistics. Any statistics here and later, should specify the basis on which they have been worked out, including reference to ranges of uncertainty. 2. Islam and the state: A summary of the general relation between state and religion, including questions of official recognition where relevant, and data on the place of Muslims and Muslim organisations within this structure, their place in the public sphere, and access to public funding. 3. Main Muslim organisations: Identification of the main national and, if relevant, regional or ‘sectarian’ Muslim organisations, including contact details, indication of their relative importance and ethnic, religious (Sunni, Shi’i, Sufi, and other theological trend) and national allegiance. This will include as appropriate charities, cultural organisations, political parties and links with transnational and/or foreign organisations and movements. 4. Mosques and prayer houses: This section will provide an overview of mosques and prayer houses, including identification and locations of the main concentrations and overall numbers analysed according to local practice. Legal issues, especially as regards official planning processes, will be referred to when relevant. 5. Children’s education: The place of Islam and Muslims in the general education system, including the teaching of Islam within the curriculum, any special arrangements for Muslim pupils, and provision for separate (private or public) Muslim-owned or -managed schools. 6. Higher and professional education: The history and place of Islamic studies in further and higher education institutions, including the provision of private or public professional training for imams. 7. Burial and cemeteries: Provision of facilities for Muslim burial both in terms of meeting ritual expectations and provision of space for Muslim cemeteries.

6

introduction

8. ‘Chaplaincy’ in state institutions: Provision of Muslim religious counseling and/or ritual services for Muslims in public institutions such as health services, prisons, and the armed forces. 9. Religious festivals: The status of the main Muslim religious festivals, how they are celebrated, and the extent to which they are publicly recognised, for example, in employment law or school holiday arrangements. 10. Halal food: Access to halal food, whether halal slaughter is permitted, and whether halal food is available in public institutions. 11. Dress codes: How far—and where—Muslim dress, especially for women, hijab (head scarf) and niqab (face covering), is permitted and practised. 12. Publication and media: A survey of the main Muslim print and electronic media. 13. Family law: The practice of elements Islamic family law, whether formally in the official legal systems or informally within local social environments. 14. Interreligious relations: National interreligious councils and Muslim members, if any; interreligious events with Muslim participation (e.g. public celebrations/programmes, statements). 15. Public opinion and debate: Main features of the public debate about Islam and Muslims, including reference to the results of significant public opinion polls. 16. Major cultural events: Reference to any significant cultural events at which Islam or Muslims as a religious or cultural group have been a focus, whether organised by Muslims or by others. The editors have entered into extensive correspondence with the country authors to seek clarification and to try to ensure that the information provided is as comparable across countries as possible. The form in which each country report is published is often the result of several exchanges back and forth between the author and the editors. A final comment is necessary regarding the order of the countries. Rather than trying to be legalistic or carefully diplomatic, we use the names of the countries that are in common use in English as the basis for the alphabetical order.

ALBANIA Olsi Jazexhi1 1

Muslim Populations

There are no reliable statistics about religious affiliation in Albania at the present time. During the past decade a number of intellectuals have called for a national survey on the subject, but Albanian politicians have so far refused. As a result, the only official statistics available are from 1937, when Muslims were estimated to be 69.3% of the total population, and 1945 when they made up 72%.2 After the fall of Communism, figures on the percentages of Muslims have been disputed by some Christian organisations, clergy and academics, as well as by Muslim organisations.3 Christians claim that Muslims no longer constitute the majority in Albania, but Muslims dispute this. The best contemporary source for population distribution by religion in Albania is the US Department of State Committee on Religious Freedoms report (17 September 2006), which estimates that citizens of Muslim background make up the largest traditional religious group in Albania, amounting to 65% to 70% of the population.4 Acording to a study conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) and UNICEF in 2005, Muslims were found to constitute 80% of the population.5 1 Olsi Jazexhi is a PhD researcher on Islam and modern Albanian identity at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. He holds degrees in Communication and Islamic Civilisation and has researched on Muslims in Albania from the time of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Dela Roka, Roberto Moroko, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri 1920–1944 (Tirana: Eleni Gjika, 1994), p. 19. 3 For the debates over the number of Muslims in Albania, see the Press Release of the Muslim Forum of Albania: “MFA denounces the intrigues of evangelist organizations with the religious percentages of Albania”, http://forumimusliman.org/english/ encyklopedia.html, accessed 7 March 2009; the interview with the Christian Orthodox Archbishop Yanolatos, “Janullatos: Nuk jeni komb tipik musliman”, Gazeta Shekulli, 18 May 2007, http://www.shekulli.com.al/news/44/ARTICLE/10080/200705-18.html, accessed 3 March 2010. 4 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania (17 September 2006), available at http://tirana.usembassy.gov/06pr_0915a.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 5 See: “Albania’s Population 80% Muslims”, Balkan Insight, 13 October 2009, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/22817/, accessed 10 December 2009.

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olsi jazexhi

Most of the Muslims of Albania are believed to be Sunnis, and there is also a Bektashi minority. The Muslims of Albania are generally classified as ethnic Albanians. However, after the fall of Communism, many Muslims have defined themselves as Bosnians, Gorans, Gollobordas, Turks, Roma and Egyptians. During Ottoman times, Sunni Muslims were usually concentrated in the towns, particularly Gegëria, in the centre and north of the country, while the Bektashis were concentrated in the south,6 but since 1991, many Muslims, following a national trend, have moved towards the capital, Tirana. Islam is believed to have entered the regions that constitute modernday Albania in the ninth century,7 while the real Islamisation started after the seventeenth century, largely thanks to the privileges that the Albanian-speaking populations gained from the Ottomans.8 However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the numbers and positions of Muslims changed markedly and when Communism was established after World War II and Albania was declared an atheist state (from 1967 until 1991), the religious identity of both Muslims and Christians was suppressed. As a result of many decades of rigidly enforced atheism, the majority of the citizens of Albania today are secular in orientation. No reliable data are available on active participation in formal religious rites, but estimates range from 25% to 40%.9 2

Islam and the State

Albania is a secular parliamentary republic, in which the state guarantees freedom of religious belief. The Constitution of Albania recognises the equality of all religious communities and the state is neutral in questions of faith.10 However, the Sunni Muslims (known as muslimanët), Bektashi Muslims (known as bektashijtë), Catholic Christians, and

6 Jazexhi, Olsi, “The Bektashi Tarikah of Dervishes”, paper presented at the Colloque International ‘soufisme-culture-musique’, Centre National de Recherches Préhistoriques, Anthropologiques et Historiques, Algiers, September 2007. 7 Basha, Ali M., Nëpër gjurmët e Islamit (Tirane: no publisher stated, 2005), pp. 48–52. 8 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, p. 20. 9 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania (September 17, 2006), http:// tirana.usembassy.gov/06pr_0915a.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 10 Constitution of Albania/ Chapter I General Provisions/ Article 10, http://www .parlament.al/dokumenti.asp?id=855, accessed 10 October 2008.

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Orthodox Christians are ‘recognised’ as the four traditional religious communities and their representatives are often invited to national ceremonies and celebrations. Other faith communities include the Protestants, mostly associated with the Albanian Evangelical Alliance (VUSH), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Bahais, the Holy Waqf of the Holy League,11 and other minor groups. Like the other traditional communities, Muslims do not receive any funding from the state. Albanian governments have indicated their desire to fund the religious communities,12 but nothing has so far been done in this direction, except providing tax reductions for religious organisations. 3

Main Muslim Organisations

The Muslim Community of Albania (MCA, Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, Rruga “Punëtorët e Rilindjes”, nr. 50, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 42 269123/04 22 37 01/23 04 92, http://www.kmsh.al) is the largest Sunni Muslim organisation in Albania, and is recognised by the state as a national organisation. It administers most of the mosques and is perceived to be the main representative of Sunni Islam in the country. It was originally founded in 1923, when the Sunnis of Albania were officially separated from the Caliphate in Istanbul.13 After being abolished during the Communist era, the MCA was reorganised in 1991. The World Headquarters of Bektashism (Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane, Rruga “Dhimiter Kamarda”, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 4 355 227/+355 4 355 090, http://www.komunitetibektashi.org/) is the largest Sufi tariqa organisation in Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane is recognised by the state as a national organisation, and as a separate religious community. The Bektashis claim that their headquarters is the World Headquarters of Bektashism, but this is disputed by Bektashis living outside Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane was transferred from Turkey to Albania in 1931, after the prohibition of the order in Turkey

11 The Holy Waqf of the Holy League is an indigenous Albanian sect, headed by Eleonora Bregu, who calls herself the Lady of the Soul. 12 Kryeministri Berisha merr pjesë në ceremoninë e nënshkrimit të marrëveshjes mes qeverisë shqiptare dhe komuniteteve fetare në Shqipëri, dated 24 October 2008, http://www.keshilliministrave.al/index.php?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=9609, accessed 7 March 2009. 13 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, pp. 24–27.

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in 1925.14 In 1946, the tariqa was separated from mainstream Islam (at the instigation of the Communist regime) and became a separate religious community.15 Apart from the officially recognised organisations, a number of other Muslim bodies are active in the country. The most important is the Sufi Union Drita Hyjnore (Divine Light) which is an umbrella organisation for the Sufi tariqas of Rifa’is, Qadiris, Sa’dis, Khalwatis and Tijanis. The Muslim Forum of Albania (Forumi Musliman i Shqipërisë, (Rruga Sami Frashëri, P. 20/3, Ap. 1, 1010, Tirana, Albania, http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/) was established in 2005 as a lay Muslim organisation with the aim of combating racism, Islamophobia and xenophobia. 4

Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2007, the MCA reported that some 498 mosques16 existed in the country. As of 2009, this number has increased to 520.17 Apart from the mosques, a small number of prayer houses (masjids—small mosques without minarets), operate throughout the country. The Ahmadiyya community runs one mosque on the outskirts of Tirana. The Rifa’i tariqa also has one masjid in Tirana.18 The Bektashis have some 137 tekkes (Sufi lodges) throughout Albania,19 and the Sufi tariqas (Rifa’i,

14

Jazexhi, “Bektashi Tarikah”. Kalicani, Baba Selim, Bektashizmi si sekt mistik islam (Tirana: KOHA, 1999), pp. 228–229. 16 Since most of the mosques in Albania were destroyed during the Communist period, after the collapse of Communism new mosques were constructed, funded by Arab NGOs and private donations. 17 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults, December 2009. 18 The exact number of mosques and masjids in Albania is difficult to establish. In an interview on 16 August 2008, the deputy head of the Muslim Community declared that 568 mosques operate in Albania, but this contradicts data obtained from the State Committee on Cults, which also relies on the Muslim Community of Albania for its information. For more see “Raport ekskluziv / Në Shqipëri ka 638 xhami dhe 1119 kisha”, Gazeta Tirana Observer, 16 August 2008. 19 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults, November 2009. 15

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Qadiri, Khalwati, Tijani and others) have altogether an estimated 285 tekkes, turbes, maqams20 and zawias.21 5

Children’s Education

Religious education was prohibited in Albania under Communism, and religion was attacked in the educational system. After the fall of Communism, state school textbooks22 have adopted a more positive stance towards religion, but Islam is not always portrayed in a neutral manner.23 Islam and other religions are not taught in Albanian public schools, but the MCA and some other Albanian and foreign Muslim NGOs run a number of Muslim schools (madrasas). The schools run by the MCA include eight high schools, two primary schools and five part-time courses that teach Qur’an and Islamic religious education.24 Mosques and some Muslim NGOs also provide Islamic instruction outside school hours. The Bektashi Community and the Sufi organisations have no registered schools or courses for teaching religion. 6

Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic organisations of Albania have no institute of higher education and are dependent on institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world for training their staff. Since the Catholic and Orthodox Churches run their own institutes of higher education, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised in Albania since 2005.25 The MCA has repeatedly asked the state for permission to open an Islamic university and have received positive responses, but no university has yet been established.

20

Maqams are small Islamic holy places where Sufis believe that saints or holy men have passed, slept or jumped and left their footprint. 21 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults, November 2009. 22 See Jazexhi, Olsi, “Depicting the enemy: the image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albania’s high school textbooks”, Islam in South East Asia Forum ISEE Paper, No. 1, July 2008. 23 Jazexhi, “Depicting the Enemy”. 24 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults and reported by the Muslim Community of Albania. See also: “Medrese dhe Kurset Fetare”, http:// www.kmsh.info/medresete.html. 25 Kulla, Ilir, “Pse-te e universitetit islam!”, Gazeta Korrieri, 23 January 2005.

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Burial and Cemeteries

Due to the Communist legacy, separate Muslim cemeteries are not common in Albania. In graveyards established during the Communist era, such as those in Tirana, graves are allocated irrespective of religion. Outside Tirana, however, a number of cemeteries exist where Muslims are buried separately from Christians. 8

‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ is not legally recognised in state institutions, although religious preachers may have access to prisons for teaching religion to inmates. Religious chaplains are strictly prohibited in public schools, but they can be found in private Christian hospitals. 9

Religious Festivals

The state recognises two Sunni religious festivals as national holidays in Albania. They are Bajrami i Madh (the Great Bayram, ‘Id al-Fitr) celebrated at the end of Ramadan and Kurban Bajrami or Bajrami i Vogël (Qurban Bayram or Little Bayram, ‘Id al-Adha) celebrated on 10 Dhu’l Hijja. Apart from the Bayrams, Sunni Muslims celebrate the month of Ramadan and five particularly sacred nights. In recent years the MCA has celebrated the birthday of Prophet Muhammad in the third week of April by organising a big concert in Tirana.26 Apart from the Sunni festivals, the Albanian state recognises as a national holiday the ‘Day of Sultan Nawruz’ on 22 March, celebrated by the Bektashis in memory of the birth of Imam ‘Ali. In addition, Bektashis celebrate the day of ‘Ashura in memory of the massacre at Karbala, and some local festivals, such as their pilgrimages to local saints’ shrines and tombs.

26

The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad is usually celebrated on the third weekend of the month of April and the organisers follow the solar rather than the lunar calendar. The initiators and organisers of this concert are the Nurcu tariqa, which has developed a strong influence among the Muslim Community of Albania since 2005.

albania 10

13

Halal Food

Halal food and slaughter are permitted and are gaining popularity among the practising Sunni Muslim population of Albania and halal food is available in halal shops, pizzerias and restaurants in major cities. However, there is no central institution for halal certification in Albania. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public places or for pupils in school. However, there have been a number of incidents in recent years involving girls wearing hijab being expelled from schools and universities or being required to remove their headscarf. The latest case occurred in March 2008, when two girls were expelled from a middle and high school in Tirana.27 Although the state does not officially prohibit Muslim women from wearing hijab, in most public institutions this practice is barred under the umbrella of compliance with internal uniforms and regulations, or with the claim that the secularity of the state must be maintained. 12

Publication and Media

The main Muslim newspapers and magazines in Albania are: Drita Islame (The Light of Islam), the official monthly journal of the MCA. It offers information about Islam, the Muslim World, the MCA, Albanian nationalism, the role of ulamas in it etc.; Gazeta e së Premtes (Friday Journal), an occasional journal of the Message society. It is published by members of the Dina Hoxha mosque and offers information about Islam in Albania and worldwide, and issues within the MCA; Drita e Ehlil Bejtit (The Light of Ahl al-Bayt), a monthly journal of the Qadiri tariqa. It offers information about Islam, Ahl al-Bayt, Qadiris, Shiism etc.;

27 “Mbanin ferexhe, drejtoresha përzë dy vajza nga shkolla”, Gazeta Shqip, 5 March 2008, http://gazeta-shqip.com/artikull.php?id=37966, accessed 7 March 2009.

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Dashuria për Ehlil Bejtin (The Love for Ahl al-Bayt), a periodical journal of the Rifa’i tariqa. It provides information about Rifa’is, Islam, Ahl al-Bayt, Shiism, etc.; Urtësia (Wisdom), the official periodical of the Bektashi Community. It provides information about Islam, Bektashism, Shiism, Albanian nationalism, etc.; Drita e Kuranit (The Light of the Quran), a quarterly magazine of the Qur’an Foundation. It provides information about Islam, Shi’ism, the Muslim world, etc.; Njeriu (The Man), a periodical magazine of the Divine Light League of the Sufi tariqas. It provides information about Islam, Sufism, history of Sufism in Albania, etc.; Besimtari (The Believer), an occasional journal of Shkodra’s Charitable Society. It provides information about Islam, Muslims in Albania, issues of discrimination, and the Muslim world; Drita e Dijes (The Light of Knowledge), a monthly journal of Drita Cultural Club of Shkodra. It provides information about Islam, Muslim in Albania and the Muslim world; Familja (The Family), a monthly magazine published by the women’s association, Shoqata Kulturore “GRUAJA”. It deals with issues about Albanian society, women, Islam and the Muslim world. Apart from the above publications, there are a number of Muslim publishing houses and organisations that produce a variety of books, mainly translations from Arabic and Turkish. The most prominent are the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (www.aiitc .org), “Prizmi” Publishing House (http://prizmi.com), Jehona Association, Tradita Association, Future’s Youth Organization, the ALSAR association and the Ardhmëria association (http://vizion-islam.com/). 13

Family Law

Albanian courts do not recognise any religious law in their juridical practice. The Sunni Muslim community recognises the practice of nikah (religious marriage), but this is not often practised and only few people marry by having a nikah administered by an imam.

albania 14

15

Interreligious Relations

Even though Communist Albania was one of the most ruthless regimes in Eastern Europe with regard to suppressing religious freedoms, the official myth that state politicians have adopted in Albania after the fall of Communism is that Albania is a country of religious tolerance and harmony.28 In recent decades a number of projects for fostering interreligious relations have been sponsored by Western agencies such as USAID and Religions for Peace. On 22 October 2009, the four heads of the Muslim, Bektashi, Orthodox and Catholic communities established in Tirana the Interreligious Council of Albania, whose aim is to foster coexistence through cooperation and dialogue. The council was legally registered on 25 October 2009.29 15

Public Opinion and Debate

A number of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam attracted media attention in Albania during 2009. The most prominent was the arrest of a Salafi imam, Artan Kristo, on 12 October 2009 on charges of inciting terrorist acts. Artan Kristo, also known as Muhamed Abdullah, and his lawyer, Ilir Malindi, accused the authorities of framing him, taking the words of one of his sermons out of context,30 and punishing the imam for refusing to be recruited by the Albanian secret service as their spy.31 The Muslim Forum of Albania expressed its disappointment at the news of Kristo’s arrest on unfounded charges and the attempts of the Albanian secret service to use psychological blackmail on the

28

Bamir Topi, “Presidenti Topi përshëndet Konferencën e hapjes së Këshillit Ndërfetar të Shqipërisë,” 22 October 2009, http://www.president.al/shqip/info.asp?id=5397, accessed 11 December 2009. 29 “Këshilli Ndërfetar Shqiptar: Toleranca jonë, shenjë e bashkëjetesës së katër besimeve fetare”, Gazeta 55, 22 October 2009, http://www.gazeta55.net/index .php?artikulli=9081, accessed 11 December 2009. 30 Likmeta, Besar, “Arrested Imam Claims Entrampment”, Balkan Insight, 23 October 2009, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/23122/, accessed 10 December 2009. 31 “Masa; Akuze prokurorit se s’kupton fjalimin e tij, gjykata le ne burg Kriston”, Gazeta Standard, http://www.standard-al.com/news_info.php?idp=5345, accessed 24 October 2009.

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Muslims of Albania.32 Kristo’s innocence was publicly supported by 41 imams.33 Other issues that attracted media attention were the removal of the deputy head of the MCA, Saimir Rusheku, from his post by the head of the MCA. Rusheku protested against his removal and accused the leadership of the MCA of being corrupt and controlled by the “mafia of construction”.34 The MCA was also not happy with the confiscation and loss of its properties (waqfs) to the Albanian state and private individuals. On 10 November 2009 the court in Tirana confiscated a shop belonging to the MCA in the centre of Tirana and gave it to the private company, Suisse Management.35 Also, in collaboration with the Orthodox, Catholic and Bektashi communities, the MCA supported the other religious communities of Albania in publicly demanding that the government stop any attempt to legalise marriages between homosexuals.36 16

Major Cultural Events

Major annual cultural events organised by Muslims in Albania are: – the concert for the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad organised on the weekends around 20 April in Tirana by the MCA; – public celebrations and prayers organised during the Bayrams and Ramadan throughout the country;

32 “The MFA is concerned by the pressure exerted on Muslims by the Albanian Information Service (SHISH).” Press Release 30 October 2009, http://forumimusliman.org/english/kristo.html, accessed 10 December 2009. 33 “Deklaratë e 41 imamëve të xhamive në vend”, Gazeta Shekulli, 18 November 2009, http://www.shekulli.com.al/2009/11/18/deklarate-e-41-imameve-te-xhamive-ne-vend .html, 10 December 2009. 34 Klodiana, Lala, “Muslimanet denoncimi: Delijorgji bente ‘ligjin’ ne zyren e Muces”, Gazeta Shqiptare, 27 October 2009, http://www.balkanweb.com/gazetav5/ artikull.php?id=67913, accessed 10 December 2009. 35 See: Klodiana, Lala, “Myslimanët: Drejtësia na vjedh pronat”, Gazeta Shqiptare, 11 June 2009, http://www.balkanweb.com/gazetav5/artikull.php?id=60847, accessed 10 December 2009; and “Shtetëzohet prona e Komunitetit Mysliman”, Gazeta Shqiptare, 17 October 2009, http://bw.balkanweb.com/bw_lajme.php?IDNotizia=360&ID Categoria=2685, accessed 10 December 2009. 36 Inter-Religious Council of Albania, “Letër E Hapur”, 20 August 2009, http://www .orthodoxalbania.org/Shqip/Shtypi%20&%20Publikimet/Year09/DEKLARATE%20 PER%20SHTYP%20KNFSH%2020Gusht2009.pdf, accessed 10 December 2009.

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– the celebrations of Sultan Nawruz on 22 March by the Bektashi Community; – Bektashi pilgrimages in the Tomori Mountain on 20–25 August in memory of the Shi’i saint Abbas Ali.

ARMENIA Sevak Karamyan1 1

Muslim Populations

The National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia has never conducted a census of Muslims or followers of any other religion in Armenia. The 2001 census2 included a question on ethnicity according to which there were small numbers from traditionally Muslim ethnic groups, more specifically, 29 Azerbaijanis,3 123 Tatars, 158 Ingushes, 322 Abazines, 326 Persians (Iranians), 1519 Kurds, in total, 2477 people,4 constituting 0.08% of the population.5 According to various research publications, as well as the information provided by nongovernmental organisations, the number of Muslims in Armenia is about 8,000, and 80% of them are non-residents who stay in Armenia for extended periods of time. The majority of Muslims are from Iran, others come from the Middle East and India and most are businessmen, students and diplomats. The ratio of Shi’is to Sunnis is about 3:1. There is some contradictory information concerning Kurds in Armenia. There are more than 60,000 Kurdish-speaking people, but

1 Dr Sevak Karamyan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration, Yerevan State University. 2 www.armstat.am/en/?nid=52, accessed on 15 October 2009. 3 But according to specialists, the number of Azerbaijanis is probably more, and it is possible that during the census many of them hid their Azerbaijani origin. For example, according to H. Kharatyan, Head of the Chair of Inter-Cultural Communication at Yerevan State Linguistic University after V. Brusov, there are about 120 Azerbaijanis in Armenia. 4 Mkrtumyan, Y., H. Sargsyan and A. Tadevosyan (eds), ӫԉԝԉԥԧԉԞԓӫԉԞԨԉ ԢԍԧԠԪԑԝԉԞ ԉԎԋԉԝԓԞ ԫԠԬԨԉԜԉԥԞԠԪԑԝԠԪԞԞԍԨԐ ԬԉԚԉԬԉԩԓԉԗԉԞ ԘԉԥԨԉԗԉԠԪԑԝԉԞ ԗԉԝԉԩԜԉԞ ԉԨԌԓ ԢԉԝԜԉԞԞԍԨԠԪԜ (National Minorities of the Republic of Armenia in the Present Conditions of Formation of Civic Society), vol. 2 (Yerevan: National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, Gitutyun Publishing, 2005), pp. 220–221 (in Armenian). 5 According to the 2001 census, the population of Armenia was 3,210,000. According to the Statistical Yearbook of 2009, it has increased to 3,238,000; www.armstat.am/ file/doc/99458058, accessed 15 January 2010.

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the majority of this group identify themselves as Yezidis,6 who detach themselves from Islam in terms of religion and from the Kurds in terms of ethnicity.7 Their language is Kurmanji, a Northern Kurdish dialect, although Yezidis call their language Ezdiki in order to underscore their separate identity. It should be mentioned that some Yezidis identify themselves as Kurds or Yezidi-Kurds on the basis of language, traditions and customs.8 According to the Head of the Kurdish National Council of Armenia, K.Hasanov, there are about 300 Kurds in Armenia who do not have a strong religious identity, and who are distinguished from Armenians mainly by the fact that they do not eat pork. Other sources give the number of Muslim Kurds in Armenia as about 1,000.9 Islam reached Armenia shortly after the foundation of the religion. The first Arab invasion of Armenia took place in 640 CE and thereafter Armenia was under Arab rule for more than 200 years. After some centuries of changing fortunes including periods of independence interspersed with Seljuq Turkish, Armenia was invaded in 1386 by Tamerlane, whose rule over Armenia continued till his death (1403). Throughout the fifteenth century Armenia was under the rule of two Turkoman tribes, the Ak Koyunlu or Aq Qoyunlu (the White Sheep) Turcomans, and Kara Koyunlu (Black Sheep) Turcomans. From the sixteenth century, Armenia was divided between two Muslim powers, Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Iran (Persia). The situation changed after the Russian-Persian wars of the nineteenth century, when some Armenian territories (including the territory of today’s Republic of Armenia) passed to the Russian Empire. In spite of the long presence of Islamic authority, the Armenians remained strongly attached to their church and did not change their Christian religion, which the Armenian state had first adopted officially in 301 CE. During the

6

An ethno-confessional group, whose main identity is religion—Yezidism or Sharfadin. Yezidism is a syncretic doctrine which combines the belief in the One God with the veneration of a Holy Trinity—Malak Tawus (Peacock angel), Shaykh ‘Adi and Sultan Yezid (all being incarnations of God), as well as an extensive popular pantheon that includes a number of divinities, saints and patron-deities having parallels with both Iranian and Semitic traditions. 7 Asatryan, G. and V. Arakelova, The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia (Yerevan: Publishing Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies 2004), p. 10. Also available at http://www .hra.am/file/minorities_en.pdf. 8 Sardar, A., ӿԨԌԍԨԐ ӫԉԝԉԥԧԉԞԠԪԜ (Kurds in Armenia) (Yerevan: Hayastan Press 1996), p. 59 (in Armenian). 9 Asatryan and Arakelova, Ethnic Minorities, p. 14.

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period of the First Armenian Republic, from 1918 to 1920, as well as in the following period of the Soviet Republic, the number of Muslims (Muslim Turks later called Azerbaijanis 10 and Kurds) was high—about 80,000,11 and according to 1989 statistics, there were 84,860 Azerbaijanis and 4,151 Kurds12 in Armenia. The majority of these Azerbaijanis left the country during the conflict with Azerbaijan that began in 1988, particularly after the violence against the Armenian population in the Azerbaijani cities of Sumgait and Baku. Kurds who used to live in Azerbaijani enclaves in Armenia by virtue of confessional and cultural relatedness (children attending Azerbaijani schools, mixed marriages, etc.) left Armenia along with the Azerbaijanis. Most Azerbaijanis and Kurds went to Russia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Turkey, as well as Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some traditionally Muslim ethnic groups living in the former Soviet Union, such as Abazines and Ingushes, as well as Iranians, have tended to migrate to Armenia. Iranian Muslims in Armenia continue to communicate among themselves in Persian, but switch easily to Armenian with other members of Armenian society. Similarly, ethnic groups from the former Soviet Union use Russian among themselves but Armenian in the wider society. Muslims mainly live in the capital city and major towns. 2

Islam and the State

According to the Article 8.1 of the Constitution of Armenia, The church shall be separate from the state in the Republic of Armenia. The Republic of Armenia recognizes the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a national church, in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia. Freedom of activities for all religious organizations in accordance with the law shall be guaranteed in the

10 After 1929, this group began to be called Azerbaijanis in official documents (where they were formerly called Turks). See Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926г. (Census of the Population in 1926), Vol. 14 (Moscow: CSU Publishing 1929), pp. 8, 13 (in Russian). 11 Mkrtumyan et al., National Minorities, p. 151. 12 Ibid., pp. 160–161.

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sevak karamyan Republic of Armenia. The relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church shall be regulated by law.13

In 1991, a law was adopted on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (amendments and additions were made to it in 1997 and 2001), which guarantees the equality and freedom of religious organizations, as well as defining the process for their registration.14 Before becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 2001, Armenia had already signed and ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which guarantees such freedom. In practice, the Armenian Apostolic Church has some privileges. It has its own television channel, and History of Armenian Church is a mandatory subject in Armenian secondary schools. A picture of the Catholicos (Patriarch) of All Armenians is required to be hung in schools, along with other national symbols such as the flag and coat of arms. There is a Council of National Minorities under the President of Armenia, coordinated by one of the advisors to the President. The council is comprised of the representatives of the main minorities and their organisations in Armenia, but does not include any religious organisations. There is a Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs in the Government of Armenia (headed by Vardan Ascatryan, tel: +37410 51 57 40), which deals with issues concerning the minorities and religions and provides recommendations and expert evaluations regarding the registration of religious organisations. There is no law or any other legal act that applies specifically to Islam. Muslim monuments are included in the list of sites of historic and architectural value that are protected and maintained by the state. 3


There are no officially registered Muslim organisations in Armenia, but there are organisations that carry out religious activities. The main organisation in Armenia is the Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (14, Baghramyan 2nd lay, tel: +37410 229053,

13

The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, Article 8.1, http://www.president .am/library/constitution/eng/?pn=1, accessed 10 October 2009. 14 www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=2041&lang=eng, accessed 10 October 2009.

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+37410 229054, fax. +37410 269160, http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre is a branch of the Iran-based Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (www.icro.ir) and was established in 1999. The head of the Centre is Mohammad Shakiba who is also the cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Armenia. The activities of the Centre include free Persian language courses, translation of Persian and Islamic literature into Armenian (in 2006, the Qu’ran was published in Armenian), exhibitions and conferences. There are also a variety of organisations attached to Muslim ethnic groups which do not have any religious activities. They are: The Association of Iranian Students (12, Mashtoc Ave., Yerevan, tel: +37410 525730); The National Kurdish Council (Hatis Str., Cinema building, Abovyan, tel: +374222 2 04 56); Kurdistan Committee (62/19, Terian Str., Yerevan, tel: +37410 582 207); The Kurdish Council of Intellectuals (2, Arshakuniats Ave., 12th floor, Yerevan, tel: +37410 529 612). The activities of the Kurdish organisations mainly cover the issues of language, culture, and traditions, but not religious affairs. There are no Muslim political parties or political organisations in Armenia. 4


There is a Shi’a mosque in the centre of Yerevan called the Blue Mosque (founded in 1798). There is no permanent imam and nor are there regular calls to prayer, although an imam comes from Iran and provides services during religious festivals. In the absence of an imam, the most educated individuals in the congregation perform the functions of imam. Apart from this mosque, Muslims use one unofficial place of worship, which is located in a room in the dormitory of Yerevan State Medical University (10, Davit Anhakht, Yerevan). This location is more convenient for the mainly Sunni students. The role of the imam there is performed by one of the Muslim students who knows the Qur’an well. 5


The only school that provides optional Islamic education is the Iranian School of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Yerevan (8, Lvovyan str., tel: +37410 633718). Besides the children of the diplomatic staff, the school is attended also by the children of Iranian residents. The

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staff of the school are mainly from Iran and are of both Persian and Armenian origin. The school operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels. 6


More than 30 academic courses on Islam are offered at the Yerevan State University (YSU) within the departments of Arabic, Turkish and Persian Studies (Faculty of Oriental Studies), including BA, MA and PhD programmes. The YSU is developing relations with the similar departments at universities in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iran, UAE and other countries. Each year more than 40 students from the YSU spend one year at universities in these countries. The faculty has offered a Masters in Islamic Studies since 2005. There are many Muslim students at Yerevan State Medical University from Arab countries, India and Iran. The international University ‘Aria’ in Yerevan is accredited by the Iranian State University Payame Nor (www.pnu.ac.ir) and specialists from Iran teach some courses there. There is no institution for imam training in Armenia. 7


There are some Azerbaijani and Kurdish cemeteries, particularly in the regions of Masis, Ararat Marz, and in the villages where Azerbaijanis and Kurds used to live in greatest concentrations. There is a medieval Turkoman mausoleum in the village of Argavand (Armavir Marz) built by Kara Koyunlu emir Sadayi and dating back to 1413. The majority of Muslims living in Armenia on a non-permanent basis usually send the bodies of deceased relatives to their homeland for burial. 8


There are no imams in the Armenian armed forces or any other state institutions such as hospitals, schools, prisons, etc.

armenia 9

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Religious Festivals

No Muslim festival is incorporated in the official calendar of the Republic of Armenia. The Iranian community celebrates its main Shi’a events such as Ramadan and Muharram. An imam comes from Iran and provides the services for these celebrations. The communities of Muslims from the Middle East and India, mainly consisting of students, organise their celebrations in their dormitories. 10

Halal Food

There are at least two halal butchers in Yerevan. One is located in an agricultural market, the second offers halal meat at the Blue Mosque once a week. Muslim students report that many of them receive food from home. Frozen halal meat and other halal foods are also available in most supermarkets as well as in some smaller shops in Yerevan and other cities. There are also numerous restaurants in Yerevan and in other cities where the cooks come from Iran or Arab countries and offer a wide range of traditional Muslim dishes. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. In the streets of Yerevan as well as the regions bordering with Iran, the hijab and other Muslim dress elements can be seen very occasionally; they are mainly worn by students, tourists, or employees (and their family members) of diplomatic missions from Muslim countries. 12


There are at least two magazines, Mihr and Parsian, published by the Iranian Cultural Centre. They are not officially religious, but are rich in Islamic content. The former is published twice a month, the latter once a month and both are published in Persian and Armenian. The Centre also posts its information on its website (http://yerevan. icro.ir). The Centre has published a number of books and brochures with religious content. In 2006 the Qur’an was published in Armenian (Hayastan Press). There are two Kurdish tabloids, Ria Taza (in

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Kurdish) and Zagros (mainly in Armenian with one or two pages in Kurdish), which have no religious content. Apart from the newspapers, there is a 30–minute daily radio programme in Kurdish on public radio, but it too is without any religious content. 13

Family Law

Armenian legislation does not recognise religious marriages, including those contracted at the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church; nor does it recognise religious documents pertaining to such marriages or divorces. Only civil marriages are recognised by the state. 14


No activity to report. 15


For many centuries Armenia was neighbour to Muslim countries such as the Arab Caliphate, Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Iran, from time to time falling under the rule of these powers. The history of relations with the surrounding Muslim states and nations saw many wars and rebellions, as well as peaceful coexistence. The situation deteriorated with the formation of the Ottoman Empire, when already existing mechanisms became inefficient. The ‘religious gap’ grew wider after the Armenian Genocide during the First World War, which became the main reason for negative perceptions of Islam in Armenian society. The association of Turks with Muslims sharpens negative opinion and the Karabakh conflict made Armenian perceptions of Muslims even more hostile. On the other hand, there are positive attitudes toward Arabs (particularly those from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, etc.) and Iranians because of the existence of huge Armenian communities in these countries and the favourable treatment they have received from the respective governments in respect of preserving their cultural values. A huge Monument of Gratefulness and Friendship of Armenian and Arab Peoples is currently being built in the Armenian capital. Most Muslims, when questioned, say that they feel very comfortable in Armenia.

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The local media very rarely cover issues concerning Muslims living in Armenia. However, the coverage of the situation in Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as the conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, is considerable. From time to time, the media publish speeches made by ambassadors of Muslim countries in Armenia, as well as reports from the Muslim countries with Armenian communities. The media become particularly active at the time of official visits by leaders from Muslim countries. If a leader of a Muslim country does not visit the Armenian Genocide memorial in Yerevan, the media and the public discourse often interpret it as a sign of the solidarity of that particular leader and his country with the Turks. 16


The Iranian Cultural Centre occasionally organises sports events and other social activities such as conferences, exhibitions and debates and an Iranian cultural week was held 1–11 December 2009. It consisted of exhibition of Iranian culture and civilization, a book exhibition, performances of traditional music, theatre productions and film showings. There were also some programmes for discussion about religious topics and the two countries’ shared moral values.15 The Kurdish community celebrates nawruz on 21 March. Numerous performances of music and dance are staged during the celebration and the events are attended by many guests.

15 http://en.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=257&pageid=11747&newsview=542682, accessed 20 November 2009.

AUSTRIA Ednan Aslan and Petra Heinrich1 1

Muslim Populations

Groups of Hungarian Muslims settled in the Habsburg territories from the eleventh to the thirteenth century.2 With the peace treaty of Passarowitz (16 August 1718), subjects of the Ottoman Empire received full permission to establish settlements and factories, although it was mostly Jews and Armenians who took advantage of this.3 In 1878, the former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austrian troops and were annexed in 1908. For the first time, the Habsburgs then assumed authority over a large consolidated Muslim population. With the collapse of the monarchy in 1918, most of the Muslims emigrated from Austrian territory because of the insecurity of economic and political conditions and only around 100 unorganised Muslim individuals stayed. After World War II, the number of working immigrants (Gastarbeiter) from Yugoslavia and Turkey grew as a result of special agreements with Turkey in 1964 and with former Yugoslavia in 1966, and because of a labour shortage in Austria. Austria also received political refugees and students from Islamic countries. Immigration reached its peak during the 1960s–1970s4 with the

1 Petra Heinrich is a PhD Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, Institute for Educational Sciences, Department for Islamic Religious Education, Vienna. Dr Ednan Aslan is Professor of Islamic Education in the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Vienna. The text has been updated for this volume by Dr Thomas Schmidinger, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna. 2 Aslan, E., “Muslime und ihre Zukunft in Österreich”, in A. Kohl, S. Karner and D. Halper (eds), Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 258–272. 3 Potz, R., “Die Anerkennung der islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich”, in J. Schwartländer (ed.), Freiheit der Religion: Christentum und Islam unter dem Anspruch der Menschenrechte, Forum Weltkirche, vol. 2 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1993), p. 135. 4 Schakfeh, A., “Die rechtliche Situation der Muslime in Österreich”, in T. Schneiders and L. Kaddor (eds), Muslime im Rechtsstaat (Münster: LIT Verlag , 2005).

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arrival of large numbers of Gastarbeiter working hard for low wages. After the first oil crisis in 1974, a stop was put to the arrival of migrant workers because of the worsening economic situation. This changed in the 1980s when diplomats, businessmen and students, as well as OPEC and UN employees, came to Austria. In 1986, a second wave of migrant workers began to arrive as a result of new economic and political problems in Yugoslavia and with the outbreak of war there in 1990. In the 2001 census, about 339,000 Muslims were registered, representing 4.3% of the total population of 8,032,926.5 Since then, the number of Muslims has increased. A new assessment based on the 2001 census suggests that in 2009 there were slightly more than 500,000 Muslims in Austria, making up approximately 6% of the total population.6 Due to naturalisation, 49% of the Muslim population in 2009 were Austrians,7 but not all of them are religious and the number includes all the Islamic sects of Islam, including heterodox groups such as the Alevis. At the last census in 2001, the biggest group of Muslims in Austria were Turkish citizens (123,000), followed by Austrians (96,000), Bosnians (64,628), Yugoslavs (now Serbia and Montenegro) (21,594), Macedonians (10,969) and Iranians (3,774). Their distribution across the Austrian states varied according to local employment and economic conditions. The 2001 figures are: Vorarlberg 29,334; Vienna 121,149; Salzburg 23,137; Upper Austria 55,581; Tyrol, 27,117; Lower Austria 48,730; Kärnten 10,940; Steiermark 19,007; and Burgenland 3,993.8

5 See “Bervölkerung 1971 bis 2001 nach ausgewählter Staatsangehörigkeit und Bundesländern”, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_1971_bis_2001_ nach_ausgewaehlter_staatsangehoerigkeit_und_bun_022887.pdf, accessed 10 December 2008; “Bevölkerung nach dem Religionsbekenntnis und Bundesländern 1951–2001”, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_nach_dem_religionsbekenntnis_ und_bundeslaendern_1951_bis_2001_022885.pdf, accessed 10 December 2008. 6 Marik-Lebek, Stepan, “Die muslimische Bevölkerung Österreichs: Bestand und Veränderung 2001–2009 (The Muslim population of Austria: state and changes 2001– 2009)”, in Mathias Vogl and Alexander Janda (eds), Islam in Österreich (Islam in Austria) (Vienna: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, 2010), pp. 5–9 (5). 7 Ibid. p. 6. 8 Rohe, M., Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich (Erlangen: Ministry of the Interior, 2006), available at http://www.bmi.gv.at/downloadareas/asyl_fremdenwesen/Perspektiven_Herausforderungen.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008).

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Islam and the State

The 1874 law concerning the recognition of religion, RGBl Nr 68, included the Islamic religion in the Austrian Empire.9 Today Austria is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute the majority (73.6% according to the latest [2001] census) of the population and officially registered religions, such as the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Jewish community and the Muslims do have some privileges. The Muslim population is today the third largest religious community in Austria. The current equal status of Muslims in Austria is founded on the Staatsgrundgesetz (Basic Law of the State) of the Austrian Empire of 1867 (arts. 14, 15, 17) concerning freedom of faith, freedom of culture and freedom of knowledge and education. The Islamgesetz of 1912 recognises adherents of Islam as a religious community according to the ‘Hanafite rite’. The Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ—Islamic Religious Community in Austria)10 appoints a Mufti in Vienna. Islamic religious teachers are paid by the Stadtschulrat (School Agency) and are governed by a special section of the Stadtschulrat, the Islamisches Schulamt.11 There is no public funding for Muslim religious associations, but the state does provide funding for certain projects and for cooperation between, for example, the Muslimische Jugend Österreich (MJÖ—Muslim Youth Organization)12 and the Catholic Youth Organization. The MJÖ generates money through membership fees and private sponsors. A major MJÖ project is the ‘umra (pilgrimage to Mecca) in April, as well as current projects for sports, summer and winter camps, Arabic courses, etc. 3


The officially recognised Islamic religious community is the Islamic Faith Community in Austria (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ), Bernardgasse 5, 1070 Vienna; tel. +43 (0)1 526 31 22; www.derislam.at), which was recognised by the government

9 10 11 12

Potz, “Die Anerkennung der islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft”, p. 135. www.derislam.at. www.schulamt-islam.at. www.mjoe.at.

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in 1979 as a corporation under public law on the basis of the 1912 Act. The IGGiÖ is dominated by Sunnis (although from the point of view of the Austrian administration it officially represents all Muslims in Austria). The affairs of the Muslim community are governed by: 1. local councils; 2. four regional committees; 3. the chief Imam; 4. spiritual counsellors; then, specific to the IGGiÖ: 5. the Shura Council; 6. the Supreme Council; 7. the Advisory Committee; 8. the Mufti of the IGGiÖ; and 9. the Arbitration Tribunal. The Muslim community is led by a president, who should be elected every five years and who is at the same time the chairman of the Supreme Council (Executive Body) of the IGGiÖ. However, the last elections were in 2001 and the current president, Anas Schakfeh, who announced his intention to resign in 2007, has extended his mandate until the next elections take place. The Supreme Council consists of twelve people who are elected by the Shura Council every five years. This is an important Islamic legislative body which also elects the Mufti. The Shura Council consists of a minimum of sixteen members who are elected by the chairmen of the regional committees. These regional committees, which have six members, are elected by the local councils in the provinces of Austria.13 Financial affairs are regulated by the Shura Council and the income of the IGGiÖ is a combination of donations, membership fees and Solidarbeitrag (solidarity fee) paid by teachers. After long debates about representation, political orientation and internal democracy, the IGGiÖ acquired a new constitution in 2009.14 For 2010, new elections are planned. In the future, the four regional religious communities will be reorganised and there will be one for each federal state. The process of registration of the members of the IGGiÖ in preparation for the elections began in February 2010.15 It is not yet clear how many members the IGGiÖ really has. Muslim associations exist throughout Austria,16 with approximately 260–280 registered. There are no reliable details about the number

13 “Die Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich stellt sich vor: Geschichte, Struktur und Arbeitsfelder”, http://www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen&pa= showpage&pid=3, accessed 12 May 2009. 14 Kocina, Erich, “Neue Verfassung für Muslime”, http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/524774/index.do, accessed 16 March 2010. 15 “Wahlen in der Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft”, http://www.derislam.at/ haber.php?sid=172&mode=flat&order=1, accessed 16 March 2010. 16 Schmidinger, T., “Islam in Österreich—zwischen Repräsentation und Integration”, in Kohl, A., S. Karner and D. Halper (eds), Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 235–254 (242).

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of Muslims who belong to associations, since this is not covered by the census. Most Alevi associations are represented by the Alevi Federation in Austria (Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich (AABF), Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien-Austria; email: [email protected]; www.aleviten.or.at), and most Shi’ite associations are represented by the Ahl-ul-Bayt Österreich (Mollardgasse 50, 1060 Wien). Of national associations, the greatest number are Turkish-speaking (e.g., Islamische Föderation in Österreich (Milli Görüş);17 Türkisch Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit in Österreich-ATİB,18 Union islamischer Kulturzentren;19 Dachorganisation Türkischer Kultur und Sportgemeinschaft), followed by by the Bosnian Dachverband der Bosniaken in Österreich.20 In Vienna and some other larger cities there are also some Arab21 associations (e.g., Gesellschaft für Zusammenkunft der Kulturen; Liga Kultur; Schura Moschee) and a number of transcultural, supra-regional Muslim associations (e.g., Initiative muslimische ÖsterreicherInnen IMÖ,22 Kulturverein Al-Andalus,23 Liga Kultur Verein für Multi-Kulturellen Brückenbau).24 Some of these Associations are connected with the IGGiÖ, while others are not. The ATİB is run by the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı and is therefore attached to the Turkish embassy. The Dachverband der Bosniaken in Österreich is loosely affiliated with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna there is also a small community of the AhmadiyyaMuslim-Jamaat.25 4


There are five mosques with minarets in Austria (Vienna, 21st district; Telfs and Innsbruck, Tyrol; Saalfelden, Salzburg; and Bad Vöslau, NÖ), but only in the mosque at the Integrationshaus in Innsbruck, a home for refugees run by the Catholic Church, is the minaret also used for the adhān. The approximate number of prayer rooms is 250–260

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

www.ifwien.at. www.deutsch.atib.at. www.uikz.org. www.izb-dachverband.com. www.aawleague.org. www.islaminitiative.at. www.andalus.at. www.alnur.at. www.ahmadiyya.at.

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spread throughout Austria, most of them in private buildings often combined with a tea room. The biggest mosque, with a minaret 32m high, was built in the 1980s in Vienna, financed by the king of Saudi Arabia. The construction of mosques and prayer rooms is a right under the principle of freedom of religious practice, but is also subject to local building regulations. The construction of minarets is regarded in law as a form of worship.26 Two Austrian provinces (Carinthia and Vorarlberg) have tightened their building regulations in such a way that, although there is no explicit prohibition on building mosques, in practice, applications face many legal difficulties and interminable negotiations. 5


Under the Religious Education Act 1949 (sections 4.1 and 6.1), the state pays for Islamic education in state schools. Islamic education is taught in Austria in 2,109 schools by 381 teachers. There are eight inspectors who manage and supervise teachers in schools. The Religionsunterrichtsgesetz of 1949 (with additions and renewals) says that religious education (§ 2. (1)) is conducted in cooperation with and under the supervision of the specific recognised religious community. The curricula for religious education (hours of teaching and content) are announced by the federal minister but recognised religious communities have responsibility for content (Art § 7 d). Only teaching materials that do not conflict with civic education are permitted. There are six private Islamic schools in Vienna, which are financed by Islamic associations. According to research by the Islamic Schools Agency, about 47,000 pupils go to Islamic religious classes in schools, of whom 83.3% (39,160) attend primary and lower secondary schools for at least nine years, 8% (3,770) attend high schools and 8.7% (4,075) go to professional schools (Berufsbildende mittlere und höhere Schuleni—BHMS). Most of the pupils follow an apprenticeship and only a very low and statistically untraceable percentage go to university. The Private Academy for Islamic Education (Islamische Religionspäda-

26 Greimel, Stefan, “Minarette: Warum Bauverbote unzülessig sind”, http:// diepresse.com/home/recht/rechtallgemein/327607/index.do?_vl_backlink=/home/ recht/index.do, accessed 16 March 2009.

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gogische Akademie—IRPA)27 was founded in 1998 in Vienna by the IGGiÖ and is also funded by the state. The curriculum lasts six semesters, leading to a Bachelors degree, and the course can be attended by primary school teachers. At present, 120 students attend the IRPA, and there have been approximately 100 graduates since its establishment.28 After graduation, they work as teachers of Islamic religious education in primary, secondary and special schools. In 2009, a study by the Muslim theologian and sociologist Mouhanad Khorchide demonstrated problems in the attitudes of some Islamic religion teachers in public schools. For example 21.9% of Khorchide’s sample agreed that they objected to democracy because it was un-Islamic.29 A passage in a school book with an illustration that called for jihad also became the subject of public debate. After controversial discussion and public pressure on the IGGiÖ, Anas Schakfeh signed an agreement with the ministry of education to improve religious education in schools. Under their new employment contracts, teachers have to sign a commitment to democracy.30 The controversy about the religious education run by the IGGiÖ nevertheless continued, because of attacks on Khorchide by IGGiÖ officials and the suspension of Aly El Ghoubashy, a teacher of religion from Feldkirch (Vorarlberg) who criticised the leadership of the IGGiÖ for the weakness of its training for teachers of religion.31 6


The University of Vienna has had a tradition of teaching Oriental Languages since 1535 and in 1674 Giovanni Podesta was permitted to teach Turkish, Persian and Arabic there, as well as ‘Qur’anic law’.32 Since

27

www.irpa.ac.at. Information provided by the IRPA, 20 December 2008. 29 Khorchide, M., Der islamische Religionsunterricht zwischen Integration und Parallelgesellschaft. Einstellungen der islamischen ReligionslehrerInnen an öffentlichen Schulen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), p. 135. 30 “Islam-Lehrer per Vertrag zu Demokratie verpflichtet”, http://diepresse.com/ home/panorama/religion/449134/index.do, accessed 16 March 2010. 31 “Lernen für das Leben in der Isolation”, http://derstandard.at/1234507814198/ Islamunterricht-Lernen-fuer-das-Leben-in-der-Isolation, accessed 16 March 2010. 32 Aslan, E., “Islamunterricht und Europa”, in R. Heidrich-Blaha, M. Ley and R. Lohlker (eds), Islam in Europa. Favorita Papers 01/2007 (Vienna: Diplomatische Akademie, 2007), pp. 77–99. 28

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2006, the University of Vienna has offered a Masters degree in Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP)33 and this will be a required qualification for teaching Islamic religious education in Austrian high schools. The Masters course is linked to the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Science. The course lasts for four semesters and is currently attended by 50 students, six of whom are preparing to present their Masters thesis. Most of the students are either alumni of the IRPA, students from abroad (Turkey, Germany, Egypt) or students who grew up in Austria/Germany and attended high school. A Masters degree for imams will be offered by the University of Vienna from 2010. The target group are imams who have already trained in their homeland and want to come to Austria to work in the religious community there. In cooperation with the IGGiÖ, the imams will be taught mosque management, European politics, and financial and educational skills. A qualification in German language is a prerequisite. The courses will last for four semesters and will be accessible by full-time study or through evening classes. 7


The historic cemetery close to Graz provides evidence of an early encounter of Eastern and Western attitudes and respect for diversity. For three decades, a section of the main Vienna cemetery has been reserved for Muslims and approximately 500 burials have taken place there. In Linz and some other larger cities there are also Muslim sections of public cemeteries. A high proportion of most Turkish families still return the bodies of their dead to their former homeland for burial, but every year some 100 Muslims are buried in Austria and, as burials according to the Islamic rite are permitted, this number will increase. An Islamic cemetery was established in 2008 in the 23rd district of Vienna and another is due to be opened in 2011 in Vorarlberg.34

33

See the department’s website: http://islamische-religionspaedagogik.univie.ac.at/, accessed 10 December 2008. 34 http://www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen&pa=showpage&pid=227, accessed 10 December 2008.

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Catholic religious services are provided in state institutions and the right to practise one’s faith freely extends to chaplaincy services in state institutions for all religious communities. The Islamic chaplaincy service is provided and governed by the IGGiÖ and the chaplains (SeelsorgerInnen) are selected by the IGGiÖ Supreme Council. Muslim chaplains are required to have a qualification from an Islamic higher education establishment or adequate practical experience in chaplaincy work recognised by the IGGiÖ. They have free access to state institutions, such as prisons, hospitals and the army. There is no permanent imam for the army, but two volunteer imams work in Vienna and Salzburg. Since 2004 there has been a prayer room in the Maria Theresien barracks in Vienna35 and the Austrian army seeks to ensure that Muslims do their military service there. The Islamischer Besuchsund Seelsorgedienst (IBS, Islamic Visit and Chaplaincy Service) was founded in 2000 by the IGGiÖ. It coordinates chaplaincy issues (for the army and prisons, as well as hospitals) and the 2006 statistics show that 6,160 patients in the Vienna General Hospital made use of its services. There are two permanent IBS posts, in the Vienna General Hospital and the Franz Josef Hospital, and other medical institutions are visited by request. Members of IBS staff must be theologically and personally qualified and are obliged to attend courses of instruction and continuing professional development. The organisation now has three regular members of staff, six on call and many volunteers. In prisons, chaplaincy is increasingly in demand and there are ongoing efforts to formalise the presence of an imam responsible for state prisons. In January 2010, the ministry of Justice signed a contract with the IGGiÖ on the future organisation of the chaplaincy in prisons, which will be run by the IGGiÖ.36

35 “Muslimische Seelsorger für Bundesheer im Frühjahr: Zwei Imame betreuen mehr als 1000 Wehrpflichtige”, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/351965/ index.do?direct=351928&_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/351928/index. do&selChannel=, accessed 13 March 2009. 36 “Islamische Gefangenenseelsorge”, http://www.derislam.at/haber.php?sid=174& mode=flat&order=1, accessed 16 March 2010.

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Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals have no legal status in Austrian law and there are no state regulations concerning daily prayers, Ramadan or Hajj. Where necessary, employees must make private arrangements with their employers to make it possible for them to fulfil their religious obligations. Since April 2006, the IGGiÖ has been negotiating with labour market partners about the recognition of Islamic holidays, but no satisfactory compromise has yet been found. School pupils may apply for days off at school for Islamic festivities. 10

Halal Food

As yet there are no halal abattoirs, but in Turkish and Arab stores it is possible to buy halal food. Ritual slaughter is legally connected to the fundamental right of freedom of religious practice and thus comes under Article 14 StGG, article 63, paragraph 2 Staatsvertrag of St Germain and article 9, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 1999, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment that halal slaughter was not forbidden, referring to both Austrian law and Article 9 of the ECHR. According to federal legislation on animal protection passed in 2004, an official licence is required for ritual slaughter including the provision that the animals are stunned instantly before being killed.37 11

Dress Codes

The wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public places (schools, hospitals, etc.) or in employment or public service has not yet been the subject of a legal ruling, but in 2009 there was a public debate on banning the ‘burqa’—a term often wrongly used in the media for the hijab. Concerning schools, the Federal Ministry for Education, Arts and Culture has decided that wearing a headscarf for religious reasons comes under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion and

37 Potz, R. and B. Schinkele, Religionsrecht im Überblick (Vienna: Facultas Verlag, 2007).

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is therefore permitted. Dress in physical education and swimming lessons may also comply with religious rules and regulations.38 12


There is currently no Islamic newspaper in German in Austria, but the IGGiÖ sends information bulletins to its members. There are several weekly and monthly Turkish newspapers, which focus on Turks living in Austria and discuss Austrian affairs as well as global events. Some of these newspapers, such as Zaman Avusturya and Pusula, are affiliated to Islamic networks close to the Turkish AKP or to Milli Görüş and the Saadet Partisi. Besides Turkish, there are also a few newspapers in some of the other languages of Muslim immigrants, such as Bosnian, Kurdish and Russian, but many of them are completely secular and are not named as Muslim newspapers. The Islamic presence on radio and television is uneven and centres around certain topics, such as Ramadan, the Islamic headscarf debate and festivals, but there is no Islamic radio station. No specifically Muslim television programmes are broadcast on Austrian television (ÖRF). Islamic matters are covered by religious programmes such as Orientierung, Kreuz und Quer, and current topics are discussed in various debates, news and reports, such as Zeit im Bild, Offen Gesagt, Bundesland heute, Thema and Im Zentrum. Among the most used Islamic websites are Kismet Onlinemagazin: www.kismetonline.at; Carima: www.carima.at; Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich: www.derislam.at; Ummah: www.ummah.net; Islamischen Bildungs- und Kulturzentrums—Österreich: www.ibikuz.net; and Ahmadiyya Muslim Gemeinde Österreich: www.ahmadiyya.at. 13

Family Law

The majority of legal decisions relevant to Islam concern family law. Since a fundamental decision of the Supreme Court (SZ59/128/1986), the ban on forced marriage and polygamy is seen as part of public

38 Schakfeh, A., “Die rechtliche Situation der Muslime in Österreich”, in T. Schneiders and L. Kaddor (eds), Muslime imRechtsstaat (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005).

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policy (ordre public), and divorce by the unilateral repudiation of a wife (talaq) under Islamic law is not recognised. Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, but this is a traditional rather than a legal act and marriage contracts must be signed in a civil registry office in order to be legal. The legal and court system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in any litigation. 14


There are various interreligious events at local, regional and national levels. Muslims are invited by churches and NGOs for interreligious discussions. Muslims participate in TV-debates and organise public iftars during Ramadan. On the national level the IGGiÖ also participates in political debates concerning integration, migration and political Islam. But also Muslim critics of the official IGGiÖ take part in these debates. In 2008 the IGGiÖ participated in the so called Integrationsplattform of the Austrian government. Together with the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant churches and the Jewish Community it issued a paper of the religious communities concerning integration.39 Interreligious relations between Muslims and Christians are generally relaxed, but there were some conflicts around an anti-Islamic statement of the Bishop of Feldkirch in 2008.40 Although the official representatives of the IGGiÖ and the Jewish Community highlight their good relation, the Middle East conflict sometimes overshadows MuslimJewish relations. 15


The most important recent public discussion concerning Islam was about the building of a mosque close to Vienna in 2008, when compromises were found that were acceptable to all parties. Also, some election campaigning by the extreme-right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was explicitly directed against Muslims. Plans to expand

39 http://religion.orf.at/projekt03/news/0805/ne080530_integration_fr.htm, accessed 15 February 2010. 40 http://oesterreich.orf.at/vorarlberg/stories/264428/, accessed 15 February 2010.

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an existing prayer house in Vienna aroused aggressive public protests,41 supported by the FPÖ and other extreme right wing groups. On the other hand, left-leaning and liberal groups support Muslim activists. Recent polls show that Austrians have a mostly positive or neutral attitude towards the integration of Muslims, while 24% express sceptical opinions and 16% disapprove of attempts at integration efforts. There is a generally high level of acceptance of religious symbols in public places (only 20% against), but there is a clear dislike of ‘religious clothing’, with 40% of those interviewed disapproving of, for example, wearing hijab in public buildings.42 16


There are no typically Austrian-Muslim events, but the major Muslim festivals such as ‘Ashura (Martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn), Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), Laylat al-Isra (the Prophet’s ascension), Ramadan, Laylat al-Qadr (the night of reflection), ‘Id al-Adha and al-Hijra (New Year) are celebrated partly in public with the participation of public figures and politicians. For example, the mayor of Vienna is invited to iftar (fast breaking) at the end of Ramadan.

41

http://www.moschee-ade.at. Rohe, M., Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich. Studie im Auftrag des BMI. und SIAK (Erlangen: Ministry of the Interior, 2006). 42

AZERBAIJAN Bayram Balci and Altay Goyushov1 1

Muslim Populations

Azerbaijan is a secular country with an overwhelmingly ethnic Muslim population. Roughly 96%2 of Azerbaijan’s 9 million3 inhabitants are estimated to have a Muslim background. The large majority are still strongly attached to their Islamic identity and consider it as an inseparable part of their self-image, but no accurate data is available on the exact number of men and women who regularly practise religious rites and there is no doubt that the number who practise is much lower than the number of nominal Muslims. According to a recent Gallup poll, Azerbaijan is one of the least religious countries in the world and only 21% of Azerbaijanis consider religion to be an important part of daily life.4 Some sources say that less than 15% of nominally Muslim Azerbaijanis perform prayers on a daily basis.5 Exceptions are the months of Ramadan and Muharram in the Muslim calendar, when the number of active worshippers has been visibly increasing in the

1 Bayram Balci is director of the Institut Français d’Etudes sur l’Asie Centrale, (IFEAC) in Tashkent. He holds degrees in Political Science and Arab-Islamic Civilisation (Sciences-Po, Grenoble and Aix en Provence) and a PhD in Political Science for a dissertation about Turkish missionaries in Central Asia. He is the author of Les missionaires de l’Islam: Les ecoles turques de Fethullah Gulen and is also an associate researcher with the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), in Paris. Altay Goyushov is a professor in the Department of Turkic and Caucasus People’s History at Baku State University and currently visiting professor at the University California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He has a PhD in History of Islam from Baku State University, Azerbaijan. For the last decade his research interests have been focused mainly on the issues related to national independence movements, political Islam and Islamic education in the Volga basin, Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia. 2 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom, US Department of State, Azerbaijan: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127299.htm, accessed 8 March 2010. 3 http://www.news.az/articles/6661, accessed 8 March 2010. 4 GALLUP WorldView: http://www.gallup.com/poll/114211/Alabamians-IraniansCommon.aspx, accessed 8 March 2010. 5 Social Sciences in the Caucasus: http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2009/02/gal lup-azerbaijan-is-one-of-least.html, accessed 8 March 2010.

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years since the country’s independence in 1991, particularly among the younger generations. Since the mid seventh century CE, the territory of modern Azerbaijan north of the Araxes River has been included within the boundaries of the Caliphate. It took almost 200 years for Islam to finally become the undisputed dominant religion, adopted by the vast majority of the local population along with the ruling elites. In the eleventh century CE, Azerbaijan fell under the rule of Muslim Seljuk Turks. Migration from Central Asia triggered a major shift in the ethnic composition of the country’s population by making Turkic-Oghuz tribes its prevailing constituent, although significant ethnic minority populations remain. Currently, according to the last census, carried out in 1999, Azerbaijanis of Turkic origin comprise the overwhelming majority of the population with a nearly 90% share. The other ethnic groups of Muslim background are Sunni Lezgins (2.2%), Avars (0.6%), Tsakhurs (0.1%), and Rutuls (0.1%), who mainly live along the Russian border in the northern Gusar-Xachmaz and Zagatala-Balaken regions of Azerbaijan. Mainly Shi’i Tats (0.1%) are another ethnic minority group who populate the northern Baku, Xizi, Devechi, Guba and Ismayilli regions. Ethnic minorities of Muslim background also include Shi’i Talyshes (1%) who live along the Iranian border in the southern regions of the republic.6 During the reign of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1732), mainstream Shi’ism (Twelver) gradually became the leading religious branch of Islam in Azerbaijan. Since then Shi’is have been predominant in the regions of Nakhichevan, Qarabakh, Apsheron, Ganja, Mil’, Mugan and Lenkoran, while in the regions of Sheki-Zaqatala, Quba-Qusar and Shamakhi-Qabala, Sunnism has remained prevalent. With the Sovietization of Azerbaijan in 1920, Shi’is made up more than 60% of the population of Azerbaijan.7 Azerbaijani Shi’is also use the term Ja’fari for self-identification purposes. The majority of Azerbaijani Sunnis belong to the Hanafi school (madhhab), which is followed mainly by those with a Turkic ethnic background, while the non-Turkic native Muslim minority follow the Shafi’i school. Throughout the nineteenth

6 Official webpage of the President of Azerbaijani Republic: http://www.president .az/browse.php?sec_id=51&lang=en, accessed 8 March 2010. 7 Ali Abasov, “Islam v sovremennom Azerbaidzhane: Obrazy i realii”, in D.E. Furman (ed.), Azerbaidzhan i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudarstva (Moscow, 2001), pp. 280–310; http://www.sakharov-center.ru/publications/azrus/az_009.htm, accessed 7 April 2010.

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century, the Sufi Naqshbandi movement achieved signficant popularity among both Hanafi and Shafi’i Sunnis. After the collapse of the atheist Soviet state, a revival of Islam began and stimulated significant changes in the religious life of Azerbaijan. Most notably, various branches of Sunni Islam, such as Salafism and the Nurcu movement, have attracted many young urban Azerbaijanis, including those of Shi’i origin, while conversions to Shi’ism by members of Azerbaijan’s Sunni minority have been negligible so far. In general, Muslims practising today can be divided into three main groups, which have smaller subdivisions. These are: a) Shi’is who are followers of such religious authorities as the Grand Ayatollahs Khamenei, Sistani and others; b) mainstream Sunnis who are followers of various Turkish Sufi-oriented communities, such as the Nurchu, Naqshbandi, Suleymanchi and others; c) and finally the so-called Salafis/Wahhabis. 2

Islam and the State

Article 6 of the Constitution states that Azerbaijan is a secular state. Article 19 affirms the separation of state and religion, while Article 37 guarantees freedom of belief and the equality of all religions before the law. The law on freedom of conscience and religious worship, which regulates relations between religion and the state, was adopted in August 1992. Significant amendments to this law were made in 1996, 1997, 2002 and 2009. After the law “On the freedom of conscience and religious worship” was significantly amended in 1996, Muslim religious organisations were no longer allowed to function under the direction of foreign religious organisations. Furthermore, active clerics were denied the right to become elected officials in state institutions. According to the latest amendments to this law, made in 2009, mosques can appoint preachers only with the official consent of the executive branch of government. Also, only those Muslim clerics who have obtained their religious education in Azerbaijan are allowed to lead religious ceremonies. Although, under the Constitution, religion and the state are separate, in 2001 the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA)8 was created explicitly to

8 There have been two official webpages: http://www.dqdk.gov.az/ and http://scwra .gov.az.

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regulate religious life. According to the latest constitutional amendments made in 2009, only those communities officially registered with the SCWRA are permitted by law in Azerbaijani territory. 3

Main Muslim Organizations

The latest changes to the law “On the freedom of conscience and religious worship” require the re-registration of religious communities. Before the current re-registration, 534 communities had received their confirmation certificates, of which 502 were Muslim.9 According to state officials, approximately 300 communities were functioning without registration.10 As of March 2010, nearly 800 communities have applied for fresh or renewed registration and 432 applications have already been approved, of which 419 of them are from Muslim groups.11 The law requires all Muslim communities to accept the authority of the Caucasus Board of Muslims (CMB)12—a semi-official religious institution established by the Soviet leadership in 1944 as the highest spiritual authority. In order to be registered as a Muslim community, petitioners must address their application to the CMB, which in turn, after thorough consideration, has to petition the SCWRA for the registration of that community. The CMB has sole official responsibility for the appointment of clerics to mosques (although official consent from the executive branch of government is also required) and the organisation of the hajj pilgrimage. Described in the law as the Historical Centre of Azerbaijani Muslims, until the early 1990s this institution operated under the name of the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims. The current head of the board, the Shi’i cleric Allahshukur Pashazade, became its leader in 1980. His first deputy, with the religious title of Mufti, is responsible for relations with Sunni communities. Although registered communities are compelled to accept the formal leadership of the CMB, in reality many of them deny its spiritual 9 The Azeri-Press News Agency (APA), citing the head of the SCWRA: http:// az.apa.az/news.php?id=156859, accesses 12 June 2009. 10 APA: http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=153056, accessed 29 April 2009. 11 The Azeri Service of Radio Free Europe, citing an official of the SCWRA: http:// www.azadliq.org/content/article/1978720.html, accessed 9 March 2010. 12 http://www.qafqazislam.com/, accessed 13 May 2010.

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authority. In addition, some unregistered communities describe the imposition of the CMB’s leadership by the state as the main reason for their unwillingness to apply for official registration. Until recently, the Abu-Bakr Mosque, located in the Narimanov district of Baku, was regarded as an unofficial centre of Salafi-Wahhabi religious life, while the unofficial head of the mosque, Hadji Gamet, was considered to be the leader of the Salafi community. The community’s re-registration is under court consideration. The mosque was closed in August 2008 by the state authorities after a terrorist attack that killed two and injured ten, including Hadji Gamet himself. The leader of the former Juma Mosque13 community, Iranian educated Hadji Ilgar, is the best known Shi’i preacher in Azerbaijan. This community refused to apply for re-registration in 2001 after the establishment of the SCWRA and was expelled from its headquarters in the capital city’s historical centre in 2004. Community leader Haji Ilgar spent several months in jail after the disputed 2003 presidential elections. The Mosque of Martyrs in Baku, built in the early 1990s by the state of Turkey, serves as the official residence of the religious attaché of the Turkish Embassy, and until recently was the main place of worship for various religious communities of Turkish orientation. The mosque was closed in April 2009. Renovations were cited as the official reason. The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, which came into being just after collapse of the Soviet Union, was stripped of its official registration in the mid-1990s when party leaders were convicted on espionage charges. Although this party continues to function even without registration, its share in public and political life is minimal. 4


According to state officials, while there are 1,802 mosques in Azerbaijan,14 only approximately 800 of them operate on a daily basis and 150 more serve worshippers seasonally, during Muslim holidays

13

Situated in the historical Old City in the capital. The APA, citing the head of the SCWRA: http://az.apa.az/xeber_Hidayet_ Orucov:_“Bir_qrup__174585.html, accessed 9 March 2010. 14

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and events.15 The overwhelming majority of existing mosques were constructed before the Soviet period and reopened after the fall of USSR. Since the declaration of independence in 1991, 92 new mosques have been built with the financial support of foreign charities, foreign religious organisations and foreign state institutions. Of these, 63 were constructed with the financial support of Kuwaiti sources, 24 with Turkish funds, 3 supported by Saudi Arabia, 1 by Qatar and 1 by Iran. The exact number of mosques constructed with local funding is unknown.16 According to some officials, since the fall of the Soviet Union more than 100 Muslim prayer houses have been built with the support of local individuals and communities.17 In addition to mosques there are an undefined number of so called hudjras, husayniyyas and dershanes serving small groups of believers, which are mainly located in private houses and apartments. There are also more than 300 socalled pirs—holy sites and graves of saints—which attract thousands of pilgrims each year. The recently renovated Taza-Pir mosque in Baku serves as the official headquarters of the CMB and its head Sheykhulislam Allahshukur Pashazada. 5


Separate religious classes are not offered in public schools, although some basic religious information is provided by the curriculum within the subject called ‘life skills’. Since the early 1990s, dozens of Turkish private schools have opened in Azerbaijan where the basics of Islam are taught as part of the official curriculum (‘culture and religion’ and ‘ethics’ classes). These officially registered and popular private schools are mainly managed by followers of Fethullah Gülen, a prominent Turkish Islamic preacher.18 There is also one Iranian secondary school in Baku, which has officially been opened to meet the needs of citizens of that country who are tempo-

15 The APA, citing the head of the SCWRA: http://az.apa.az/print.php?id=153745, accessed 9 March 2010. 16 Ibid. 17 Information is provided by Elchin Askerov, the First Deputy-Chief of the SCWRA, in March, 2010. 18 Official webpage of Turkish-Azerbaijani schools: http://www.cagoyretim.com/, accessed 9 March 2010.

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rarily in Azerbaijan, although local children are also allowed to attend this school. Until recently, there was official mosque education, called ‘Qur’an courses’. In 2007, the last 19 of them were closed by decision of the SCWRA.19 According to Azerbaijani officials, however, they will be reopened, although they will only be able to operate under strict state regulations.20 Despite the touch stance of government agencies on the issue, unofficial mosque education, as well as so-called home education provided by local clerics, does exist to a significant extent. Before the recent re-registration of religious communities, five religious primary schools (madrasa) officially functioned in different parts of Azerbaijan, including Baku. 6


The Baku Islamic Madrasa was founded in 1989 on the decision of the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims as the first official institution of Islamic education in Azerbaijan. In 1992, it was renamed the Islamic University of Baku (IUB). Only in 2009 did the Ministry of Education officially grant the IUB a licence as an Institution of Higher Education. The IUB has four branches in different regions of Azerbaijan and one in the city of Derbent in the Dagestani Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation. As of August 2009, the total number of students enrolled in all IUB campuses exceeded 1,000.21 So far, Zagatala campus in the north of Azerbaijan has been both academically and financially the most advanced branch of IUB.22 Since 1992, the Faculty of Theology at Baku State University,23 founded on the basis of an agreement between the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Diyanet), has been providing undergraduate and graduate levels of religious education, but there has

19

http://news.qaynar.info/?mod=view&id=7701, accessed 9 March 2010. Azeri Service of Radio Free Europe, citing an official of the SCWRA: http://www .azadliq.org/content/article/1955460.html, accessed 9 March, 2010. 21 APA: http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=160838, accessed 9 March 2010. 22 Official webpage of Baku Islamic University’s Zagatala campus: http://zaqata lailahiyyat.edu.az/. 23 Official webpage of Baku State University’s Faculty of Theology: http://theology .bsu.edu.az/en. 20

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always been uncertainty regarding the future professional careers of the faculty’s graduates. Initially, it was planned that the faculty would mainly provide public secondary schools with teachers of the subject ‘basics of religion’, which had been proposed as part of the curriculum. Since this subject has never been officially introduced into public schools programme, most of the faculty’s graduates are currently working as teachers of Arabic. Some others are pursuing academic careers or working for official state institutions. The private Khazar University,24 through its Eastern languages and Religious Studies Department (formerly Department of Oriental and Islamic Studies), also provides courses on various Islamic topics and offers interdisciplinary graduate degrees. Another private university, Caucasus University (unofficially affiliated with the prominent Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen) was opened in 1993, although since 2002 the university has not been offering admissions to its Faculty of Theology. The university leadership has not provided any official explanation for this, but rumours attribute it to an informal decision of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Education. There are also dozens, if not more, of Azerbaijani students abroad, mainly in Iran, Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. It is widely accepted that Azeri institutions are not able to provide quality religious education because they lack qualified staff and experience and this is why many graduates of Azerbaijani religious education institutions prefer to continue their studies abroad. 7


Funerals are the most visible signs of Muslim tradition in Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union’s attempt to get rid of traditional funerals and replace them with so-called ‘citizen’ funerals very much failed. Mass commemorations of the first, third, seventh and fortieth days after death, as well as every Thursday between the burial and the fortieth day, are a common phenomenon, including in urban areas. Visits to the deceased person’s grave on these days continue, along with vast ceremonial dinners. In addition, the family members of the dead avoid 24 Official webpage of Khazar University: http://www.khazar.org/, accessed 9 March 2010.

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attending any parties or celebrations, particularly weddings, until the first anniversary of the death. All ceremonies include the obligatory presence of the local mullah, recitations from the Qur’an and other Islamic rituals. The attendance of funerals by the friends, neighbours and relatives of the deceased person’s family is an almost binding duty. Some neighbourhoods have buildings specifically constructed to accommodate the community’s funeral ceremonies. Despite the fact that this extensive funeral ceremony tradition stems from the local population’s very Muslim identity, some elements of it contradict the basics of Islam, such as the depiction of deceased person on the tombstone, which since the mid-1960s has become widely observed. 8


After the declaration of independence and the reconstruction of the armed forces, a chaplaincy institution in the military was introduced and existed until the mid-1990s. Now there is no longer any kind of chaplaincy in the state institutions of Azerbaijan. 9

Religious Festivals

Both ‘Id al-Adha (Qurban bayrami in the local langugae) and ‘Id alFitr (Orucluq bayrami) are national holidays, usually with three to five days off work allocated by the government each year. Animal sacrifices and accompanying ceremonies are an essential part of ‘Id al-Adha. Small charitable donations are considered vital to the commemoration of ‘Id al-Fitr. Tens of thousands attend early morning holiday prayers each year. 10

Halal Food

Currently, food is certified as halal by the CMB. Recently the State Agency on Standardisation, Metrology and Patent of Azerbaijan Republic (SASMP)25 challenged the CMB’s right to certify the halal label, insisting that the CMB does not have the necessary equipment

25

http://www.azstand.gov.az/index.php?lang=en, accessed 5 March 2010.

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to conduct appropriate laboratory work and that the SASMP has sole responsibility for any kind of standardisation by the laws of the state.26 11

Dress Codes

Officially, Muslim dress is not restricted in public or in educational institutions, although there have been some attempts to impose restrictions on headscarves and coverings by the administrations of certain schools and universities. The recent implementation of public school uniforms by the Ministry of Education is expected to challenge the current status quo. For decades some religious groups have been calling for the lifting of restrictions imposed by government agencies on photographs taken for national passports and identification cards which require the face and head to be uncovered. 12


Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, dozens of Islamic print media outlets (sometimes very popular) have appeared on the scene, although none of them have proved to be capable of lasting. From 1990 to 1994, the CMB published the newspaper Islam, and it was recently announced that the CMB was going to resume its publication. In 1993, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan began to issue its first publication, Islamın sesi (The Voice of Islam). Later it was renamed Islam dünyasi (Islamic World) but shortly thereafter its publication was discontinued. Currently the newspaper Nabz (Pulse) is published under the unofficial supervision of the Islamic Party. From 1999 to 2005, the Centre for Religious Research published its bilingual (in Azerbaijani and Russian) quarterly journal Qütb (Pole). Several television channels, including state and public stations, currently broadcast weekly religious programmes. Internet media and social networking sites are actively used by local religious groups. They include http://www.deyerler.org, http://juma-az.org/eng, affiliated with the Shi’i preacher Hadji Ilgar, widely cited by local and international

26 Azadinform News Agency, citing the head of the SASMP: http://www.azadin form.az/index.php?dn=news&to=art&id=1594, accessed 9 March 2010.

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media; and http://www.islam.az, a popular web portal of the Centre for Religious Research. The views of Azebaijani Salafis are represented on the web by sites such as http://islam.azeriblog.com/ and http:// www.abubakr-mescidi.com. The Azerbaijani branch of the Turkish Naqshbandi Mahmud Hudai Foundation has http://www.gyf.org.az/. The recently launched http://www.milletiibrahim.com is the website of a radical jihadist group connected to Northern Caucasus rebels. 13

Family Law

The CMB requires all local mullahs to perform nikah ceremonies only if official proof of a state-issued registration of marriage is provided. Some reports suggest that a few mullahs, by breaking this regulation, are paving the way for underage marriage and polygamy, which are very uncommon in Azerbaijani society. 14


Azerbaijan’s unique multi-religious demographic is a testament to this country’s long history of religious tolerance. This is reflected in the public discourse and the narrative promoted by the government. The northern region of Azerbaijan has been home to Jewish settlers for more than a thousand years, as well as to the indigenous Udin Christians. The government has made great efforts to depict Azerbaijan as a non-violent multi-religious country, underscored by the many government-sponsored conferences and workshops that have been held since independence in 1992. The most recent, in November 2009, was titled “Interreligious dialogue from mutual understanding to joint cooperation” and celebrated the sixtieth birthday of Sheykhulislam Pashazadeh.27 In July 2009, a workshop under the title “Interreligious dialogue of the youth-bridge to Europe” was sponsored by local youth NGOs.28 It is not uncommon to see the Sheykhulislam accompanied by both the Rabbi of the Jewish Mountain Community and the head of the 27

Official webpage of Caucasus Muslim Board: http://www.qafqazislam.com/ xabar25.html, accessed 10 March 2010. 28 Radio Free Europe Azeri Service: http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1764906 .html, accessed 10 March 2010.

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local Russian Orthodox Church on state sponsored events and local media. In 2007, the head of the SCWRA initiated the establishment of the interreligious Special Advisory Board under his own chairmanship. The deputy-chief of the CMB and leaders of both the Ashkenazi and Jewish Mountain communities and the local Catholic and Orthodox churches became its permanent members.29 However, the official discourse makes a distinction between the so-called traditional and non-traditional religions. As far as Christian organisations are concerned, most of the Protestant churches are labeled non-traditional missions and this negatively impacted their acceptance by the Azerbaijani public. Since Pope John Paul’s visit to Azerbaijan in 2002, the Catholic Church has enjoyed a privileged status in comparison with Protestant groups. Occasionally, some of these Protestant churches have joined forces with the defiant Juma Mosque community to protest against restrictions imposed by the local government and the persecution of their adherents.30 The head of this Muslim community also leads a local religious rights advocacy group called DEVAMM (“Dini Etiqad ve Vicdan Azadlığını Müdafiә Mәrkәzi” (Centre for the Protection of Freedom of Religious Beliefs and Conscience). 15


Independent religious organisations play a relatively active part in public life in Azerbaijan. Some independent Islamic community leaders are vocal in their comment on both international and internal political issues and have become very popular public figures. The CMB’s leader also frequently appears in the media, commenting on urgent international and domestic matters. His interference in presidential elections has been called inappropriate by some local observers.

29 Azadinform News Agency: http://www.azadinform.az/index.php?dn=news&to= art&id=1902, accessed 10 March 2010. 30 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Human rights report: Azerbaijan”: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136020.htm, accessed 10 April 2010.

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The yearly celebration of the Nawruz holiday on 21 March is historically the biggest event in the cultural life of Azerbaijanis. The tradition stems from the Zoroastrian past and commemorates the new year which, according to Zoroastrian tradition, comes in spring. Annual mass commemorations of ‘Ashura (the death of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn) are another very significant event directly related to the Shi’i Muslim identity of the majority of Azerbaijanis. Traditionally the public avoids celebrating weddings during the Islamic month of Muharram, when ‘Ashura falls, even in the capital city Baku and, as surveys show, the consumption of alcohol also drops significantly during that month.

BELARUS Daša Słabćanka* 1

Muslim Populations

Islam came to the territory of modern Belarus in the fourteenthfifteenth centuries. In winter 1397 several thousand Tatar families (mostly from the Crimea and the Golden Horde) were invited to serve in the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania1 and, under the terms of their settlement, they were allowed to build mosques and madrasas. In the middle of the sixteenth century, Muslims were permitted to marry Christians and also received a wide range of privileges and noble titles. By 1591, about 100,000 Tatars2 lived in the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included today’s Belarus, and about 400 mosques had been built. Belarus was taken over by Russia in 1795, but already from the early seventeenth century attitudes towards Muslims had changed for the worse and many of them moved to the Crimea and to Ottoman territories. Wars also accounted for a high casualty rate. Within a century, the population had fallen to about 30,000, and by 1914 there were only 14,000 left.3 By 1939, Soviet anti-religious policies led to there being only three mosques left. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990, a new situation has arisen characterised particularly by Tatar national renaissance, of which one of the main initiators was Dr Ibrahim Kanapatsky (1949– 2005), the author of many articles, publications and books about Belarusian Tatars. He was also the editor of and contributor to newspapers and magazines about Tatars and Islam.4

* Daša Słabčanka holds a Masters degree in international finance. She currently works for a human rights and education NGO in Belarus and is a researcher at the Centre for Social and Economic Research Belarus. 1 Pashkow, G.P., Вялікае княства Літоўскае Энцыклапедыя (Grand Duchy of Lithuania Encyclopedia), 2 vols (Minsk: BelEn, 2007), vol. 1, p. 688. 2 These Muslims now are often referred to as ‘Lithuanian Tatars’, and include members of the Belarusian, Lithuanian and Polish Tatar diasporas. 3 http://tatarica.narod.ru/archive/09.2003/07_01.09.03.htm, accessed 1 September 2009. 4 Magazines :Байрам (Bairam) from 1999 and, in Belarusian, Аль-Ислам (Islam); newspapers: Жизнь (Life) and Жыццё татарскае (Tatar Life).

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Islam in Belarus today, however, is not only represented by Tatars but also by as many as 32 ethnic groups. Besides the 10,146 Tatars, the most numerous are immigrant groups of Turks, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Afghans and Iranians. There are no official statistics on the numbers of Muslims as a question on religion was excluded from the official census in the Stalin period, from 1937, so estimates of the Muslim population are made on the basis of data on nationality, which cannot, of course, be reliable, as there are Christians among the Tatars, for example, and Muslims among the Belarusians. Bearing that in mind, estimates based on the most recent census of 19995 suggest there are around 30,000 Muslims in Belarus. The final results of the 2009 census will be published in October 2010. The mass media tend to estimate the number of Muslims at 80,000–100,000 and in November 2009 Mufti Shabanovich referred to a figure of 120,000,6 although, according to Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich, there are about 50,000 Muslims, including about 300 Belarusian converts.7 Most Muslims in Belarus are Sunnis, while the Azerbaijanis and Iranians are Shi’is.8 2

Islam and the State

The state policy towards all religions changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Republic of Belarus is now a secular state; there is no state religion, and religious freedom is guaranteed in the Constitution. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Constitution and relevant international and domestic legislation. The legal basis of state-religion relations is presented in the collection of documents Вопросы совести и религиозных организаций в Республике Беларусь (Questions of Conscience and Religious Organisations in the Republic of Belarus).9 According to the 1992 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, all religions are

5 Public Census 1999, main results, http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/main. php, accessed 20 September 2009. 6 У Беларусі жывуць 120 тысяч мусульман, Наша Ніва, http://nn.by/index. php?c=ar&i=31566, accessed 11 November 2009. 7 Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 11 November 2009. 8 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.by/ru/republic/ cultrel/, accessed 5 November 2009. 9 Available at http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/literat/vopr, accessed 20 September 2009. Also contains the outlook of history and modern status of different confessions.

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equal before the law. Citizens have the right freely to determine their attitude towards religion, as well as the right to individually or collectively practise any or no religion. Legislation also defines the rights of religious organisations and the procedures for their establishment and management. According to the Constitution (adopted in 1994, amended in 1996), Article 15, the state is responsible for the preservation and development of the country’s historical, cultural and spiritual heritage. Article 16 stipulates that all religions and confessions are equal before the law and relations between the state and religions are regulated by the law. There are restrictions on the activities of religious organisations (e.g., on activities against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus or connected with violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms). Article 31 proclaims individual and collective freedom of conscience. In 2002 the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations was amended. One of the most significant additions is the Preamble, where the role of various religions in Belarusian history, including Islam, is described and emphasised. There is no concept of ‘religious minority’ in the legislation, as all religions are equal. A special separate body called the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs is in charge of the implementation of the state confessional policy.10 3


Shortly before the end of the communist period there was only one Muslim organisation in Belarus. The First Belarusian Congress of Muslims, held in 1994 in Minsk, initiated the creation of Muslim organisations. At that time, Мусульманскае рэлігійнае ўпраўленьне у Рэспубліцы Беларусь (the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of Belarus) was established, with the Mufti as its head. According to state statistics as for 1 January 2009, of 25 Muslim organisations operating in Belarus, two are in the Brest region, four in the Vitsyebsk region, one in the Homyel region, eight in the Hrodna region, one in the Mahilyow region, six in the Minsk region, and three in the city of Minsk.11

10

Приветствует Беларусь (Belarus Welcomes), http://www.belarus21.by/en. http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/relig_org/new_url_165545634, accessed 2 September 2009. 11

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Today, the two major Muslim organisations are: 1) The Muslim Religious Association of the Republic of Belarus12 (email: [email protected], tel: +37517 3285554), whose mufti is Abu-Bekir Shabanovich (tel: +37529 6528217); and 2) The Spiritual Headquarters of Muslims in Belarus (email: [email protected], www.islam.by), whose mufti is Varanovich Ismail.13 Both muftis are members of the Interethnic Advisory Board.14 By the end of 2009, nineteen Muslim organisations were included under the umbrella of the first, and four were members of the second. One organisation, in Hrodno, is autonomous. Less formal but with some spiritual influence is The Light of Islam (Святло Ислама), a member of the Spiritual Headquarters of Muslims in Belarus (Zav. Paunochny 17, room 203, Minsk, tel: +37517 2006615, www.islam.by). The head of the community is Varanovich Ismail. The Light of Islam operated from 2001 till 2004 and then restarted in 2008. It provides classes in Qur’an and Arabic language and assistance with funerals, weddings, etc. Among regional Muslim communities, one of the newest, in Homyel, is especially active (Syalanskaya-st 1, room 300, Homyel). Most Muslim organisations have been established by Tatars. The two major ones by the national criterion are Zikr ul-Kitab and Chimsha. Zikr ul-Kitab was created as the Community of Muslim Tatars, with the name Al-Kitab, in 1991 and was at the forefront of a Tatar national renaissance. It changed its name in 2001, when it was granted the status of an organisation of the Republic.15 Chimsha was founded in 1998 by citizens of Bashkir and Tatar heritage. It is mainly a networking organisation; it has close links with many foreign organisations and is a member of the World Congress of Tatars.16 It has a principally cultural, educational ethos and anyone who shares its values and ideas can become a member, regardless of religion.17 Traditionally, the leading positions in Muslim organisations were held by Tatars. Exceptions today are the organisation in Vorsha, where the head is an Ingush, and Homyel, where the leader is a Belarusian.18

12

Мусульманскае рэлігійнае аб’яднаньне ў Рэспубліцы Беларусь. Духоўнае ўпраўленьне мусульман у Беларусі. 14 Міжэтнічная кансультатыўная рада, http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/ nationalities/consultation_centre/new_url_1285022831, accessed 2 September 2009. 15 http://www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 14 September 2009. 16 http://tatar-congress.org. 17 http://www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 14 September 2009. 18 According to Mufti Varanovich, interviewed 11 November 2009. 13

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A list of organisations associated with the various ethnic minorities can be found at www.ngo.by.19 Updated news about Belarusian Muslims may be found at the website of Belarusian Muslim Youth.20 4


As of 1 January 2009, there were six active mosques in Belarus, in Iwye, Vidzy, Navahrudak, Slonim, Maladzyechna, Klyetsk and Smilavichy (i.e., one in Vitsebsk region, four in Hrodna region, and one in Minsk region.21 There are also three prayer houses, in Ashmyany, Maladzyechna and Lowchicy. A new mosque in Minsk has been under construction since a building permit was issued in 1998. It replaces one completed in 1901 and demolished in the 1960s, and is located on the site of an older timber-built mosque.22 From 2005, under Decree No. 571, religious organisations have been exempt from land and real-estate taxes and, in a 2007 addition to the Decree, religious organisations were also exempted from land tax on land where religious buildings are under construction.23 5


Schools are separate from the church and pupils receive a secular education. Material about religion is included in courses on ‘world history’ and ‘man, society and state’.24 Legislation provides for religious organisations to set up groups or weekend schools for religious

19 http://www.ngo.by/database/ngo/tag/national-minorities/, accessed 25 September 2009. 20 http://islam.by/, created in 2003, currently belongs to the Spiritual Headquarters of Muslims in Belarus. 21 http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/relig_org/new_url_140683 5477, accessed 2 September 2009. 22 http://tatarica.narod.ru/archive/09.2003/07_01.09.03.htm, accessed 13 September 2009. 23 Указ Президента Республики Беларусь № 571 Об освобождении религиозных организаций от обложения земельным налогом и налогом на недвижимость, 1 December 2005, http://law.sb.by/329/. 24 Kharin Yu, Человек. Общество. Государство: Учеб. пособие для 11–го кл. общеобразоват. учреждений с рус. яз. обучения. В 4 кн. Кн. 4. Человек в мире культуры (Minsk, Narodnaya Asvyeta [Public Education], 2002) (Man. Society. State: Study guide for pupils of 11th grade in 4 Volumes, Vol. 4 Man in the world of culture) pp. 92–123.

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education. Currently there are five Muslim weekend schools, which represents a decline in numbers. 6

Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are no university courses on Islam or Oriental Studies, and no imam training courses. However, at the Belarusian State University25 students can specialise in the History of the Middle East and North Africa, Arabic, Turkish and Persian languages, literature, mythology and religion, and the art of the Middle and Far East, as well as ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ (Humanities Faculty, Department of General Sciences).26 There are also Arabic, Persian, Turkish language courses in the Faculty of Translation at the Minsk State Linguistic University.27 Some other universities also provide opportunities to study Arabic. Belarusian Muslims undergo imam training abroad. At the beginning of 2008, two persons were studying in Kazan, Russia, one had completed studies in Jordan, and another in Tripoli Islamic University, Libya. One imam of the Hanafi school has been invited from Turkey.28 7


The law grants the right for burial to take place in accordance with religion and traditions. Religious organisations can request the establishment of a religious cemetery and plots for religious burial may also be provided in public cemeteries.29 However, there is still no Muslim cemetery in Minsk.

25

http://www.bsu.by/. Department of General Sciences, Humanities Faculty, http://www.bsu.by/ru/ main.aspx?guid=6831, accessed 19 April 2010. 27 http://mslu.by/. 28 http://sb.by/print/post/62783/, accessed 12 October 2009. 29 Закон Республики Беларусь от 12 ноября 2001 г. № 55–3 O погребении и похоронном деле (The Law of the Republic of Belarus 12 November 2001 No. 55–3 On Burial and Funeral), Articles 3, 16, 22. 26

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There is no Muslim ‘chaplaincy’ in state institutions, but the Penal Code30 guarantees freedom of conscience for prisoners and their right to practise their religion. A separate space should be provided for religious needs, so long as it does not disturb general order and in some cases, an imam may be invited. However, it is difficult to assess the implementation of such provisions. 9

Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals are not public holidays. However, the law provides that Muslims may ask for one day off work without pay to celebrate each of the two main festivals and Mawlid.31 In 2009, there was a joint celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr together, by all Muslim organisations, both Sunni and Shi’a. The celebrations took place in Minsk, in the mosque that is under construction and in a concert hall, and were attended by government officials.32 10

Halal Food

Halal food is not widely sold in Belarus, but demand is growing. There are already some kebab restaurants, and in 2008 a private company, Sibveran,33 launched a line of halal products. The production process was examined and approved by the Spiritual Headquarter of Muslims in Belarus. Halal food is not provided in hospitals, the army or prisons.

30

Article 12, http://www.levonevski.net/pravo/norm2009/num36/d36268/index. html, accessed 3 September 2009. 31 Постановление Совета Министров РБ от 22 января 1992 г. № 30 О порядке определения нерабочих дней для верующих нехристианских религий в связи с их праздниками (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 22 January 1992, No 30, On the specifying of holidays for non-Christians based on their festivals). 32 http://www.interfax.by/article/51885, accessed 21 September 2009. 33 http://chicken.by/.

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Dress Codes

There are no rules or legislation restricting the wearing of hijab and increasing numbers of women are wearing head scarves. Attitudes to them at work and in universities are varied, but in most cases there are no problems. Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich states that in Minsk there have been cases of women being allowed to wear hijab for passport photographs, although this is forbidden. He estimates that around 100 women wear hijab in Belarus today.34 12


The topic of Islam is quite rarely covered in the mass media. Mentions in the press are mostly related to events in other countries. Material about Belarusian Muslims mainly stresses interfaith concord and usually has a descriptive character. Some Muslim organisations distribute their own magazines and newspapers. 13

Family Law

All residents in the territory of the Republic of Belarus are subject to the law of the country and Shari’a norms are not officially recognised. However, Islamic family law norms can be followed unofficially as long as they do not conflict with current legislation. Many Muslims therefore enter into a Muslim marriage contract as well as a civil marriage. In general, Shari’a norms do not contradict Belarusian legislation. Ali Varanovich gives as exceptions the need for permission from the local authorities to hold religious meetings of more than two persons and the prohibition of polygamy in the Criminal Code.35 14


In 2008, the Interethnic Advisory Board was created under the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs.36 The Board consists of rep-

34

Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 11 November 2009. Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 11 November 2009. 36 Консультативный межэтнический совет при Уполномоченном по делам религий и национальностей, http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/nationalities/ 35

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resentatives of major religious organisations, including Muslim ones. The Board aims to maintain and strengthen interfaith concord, create opportunities to enjoy the right to freedom of conscience guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution, and facilitate the realisation of socially important initiatives by religious organisations.37 An annual interfaith conference has been held since 2002. Its topic in 2007 was ‘Dialogue between Christianity and Islam under Globalisation’.38 The conference was attended by the president of the Republic of Belarus, who focussed on interfaith concord in the country. In December 2006, Mufti Abu-Bekir Shabanovich participated in a round table which established the Committee of Religious and Ethnic Organisations Against Extremism and Neo-Fascism.39 On 11 November 2009, Mufti Shabanovich made a speech at a conference on Christian-Jewish dialogue in Minsk, where he stressed interconnections between religions and the need to live together peacefully.40 15


The Muslim community in Belarus is not big enough to be the subject of broad public debates. Traditional Belarusian Muslims, Tatars, their religion and culture are perceived as part of Belarusian history. Probably the biggest recent public discussion was in 2008, when a deputy editor of the opposition newspaper Zhoda, Aliaksandr Zdvizhkou, was sentenced to three years’ hard labour and the newspaper closed for reprinting the Danish cartoons that were the subject of the 2005 controversy. Later the sentence was reduced to three months. In the subsequent debate at home and abroad the judgment was generally regarded as having been motivated by domestic political factors.41 At the beginning of 2009, there were reports of threats to Belarus and

consultation_centre/new_url_1285022831, accessed 2 September 2009. The contact details for the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs may be found at http://www.belarus21.by/en/office_comm. 37 http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/sotr/new_url_333730627, accessed 2 September 2009. 38 http://www.church.by/resource/Dir0301/Dir0302/Page1726.html, accessed 20 October 2009. 39 http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/776377.html, accessed 20 October 2009. 40 http://nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=31566, accessed 11 November 2009. 41 Publications by Human Rights Centre Viasna on the Aliaksandr Zdvizhkou case http://spring96.org/en/?cx=009573675624945573642%3Amc6jc_30tac&cof=FORID% 3A9&rls=en&hl=en&q=zdvizhkou&sa=Search#926, accessed 20 October 2009.

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Ukraine from al-Qa’ida,42 but this news was seen as pure provocation and did not lead to significant public discussion. 16


The Muslims of Belarus organise various cultural events throughout the year, among which are Qur’an recitation competitions, literature evenings, music festivals, and presentations of national cultures. There are also a number of more specifically ethnic events, which have no religious dimensions.43

42 http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2009/01/13/ic_articles_112_160728/, accessed 13 September 2009. 43 http://www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 14 September 2009.

BELGIUM Nadia Fadil, Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz1 1

Muslim Populations

While the first reports indicating the presence of Muslims in Belgium date from the nineteenth century,2 their presence only becomes an issue in the second half of the twentieth century.3 Most Muslims in Belgium are descendants of migrant workers who came from the Mediterranean basin from the 1960s. In 1970, some 65,000 Muslim immigrant workers and their families lived in Belgium, and by 1985 this number had risen to 200,000. The exact number of people of Muslim culture or

1 Nadia Fadil is a postdoctoral fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research (FWO) at the Centre for Sociological Research at the KULeuven. Ural Manço is senior researcher at the Centre d’Etudes Sociologiques, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, in Brussels, where he leads the research team ‘Migrations, multiculturalité et appartenances ethnoreligieuses’. Meryem Kanmaz has a PhD in political and social sciences from the Centre for Islam in Europe, University of Ghent, and currently works at the newly founded Expertise Centre of Muslim Cultures in Flanders. 2 In 1828, the Turkish Consul of Antwerp, Ismaël Hakki Bey Tevfik reported the presence of 5751 Muslims, half of them of Algerian background and the other half of Asian background; see Panafit, Lionel, Quand le droit écrit l’Islam. L’intégration juridique de l’Islam en Belgique (When Law Writes Islam. The Juridical Integration of Islam in Belgium) (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999), p. 15. 3 In contrast with neighbouring countries—France and the Netherlands—there was little contact between Belgian officials and Muslims during the colonial era as only a small number of Congolese were Muslims. An aspect of Belgian colonial history that is often forgotten, however, is the negative representations of the ‘Arab elites’ existed at the beginning of the twentieth century as a consequence of their activities as slave traders. In addition, their presence in valuable mining areas in East Congo became a particular source of tension with Belgian officials, which resulted in a war at the end of the nineteenth century before the appropriation of the Congo by the Belgian King Leopold II (Congo Free State). The idea that the Belgian colony was established in order to liberate the Congolese from Arab slave traders figured as an important, though often forgotten, legitimising discourse of the colonial enterprise in monuments and schoolbooks throughout the first half of the twentieth century. For an analysis of this discourse in schoolbooks, see De Baets, Antoon, “Gedaantewisseling van een heldendicht: Congo in de Geschiedenisboeken (Transformations of a hero’s poet: Congo in the History Books)”, in Jacquemin, J.P. (ed.), Racisme, donker continent: clichés, stereotiepen en fantasiebeelden over zwarten in het Koninkrijk België (Racism, a Dark Continent: Clichés, Stereotypes and Fantasies about Blacks in the Kingdom of Belgium), Brussel: NCOS, 1991), pp. 45–56.

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Islamic faith living in Belgium today is difficult to determine, as there is no official registration of the population’s ethnic and religious ties. Until a few years ago, citizenship figures yielded a satisfactory approximation, since the overwhelming majority of the country’s Muslims were foreign nationals. Between 1990 and 2002, however, a series of legal reforms liberalised the acquisition of Belgium citizenship. As a result, more than two-thirds of Belgium’s Muslim population are now Belgian citizens. The latest generally accepted estimates put the Muslim population at between 410,000 and 450,000, which amounts to at least 4% of the country’s population.4 Today, Moroccan and Turkish ethnic groups account for 80% of the country’s Muslim population. The remaining 20% are other immigrants (and their descendants) from Algeria and Tunisia and more recent arrivals, such as refugees and immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo and Albania), South Asia (Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans, and Iranians), and Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Senegal and Mali). The overwhelming majority of these Muslims are Sunnis and the Shi’is are very much in the minority, although there are indications that some Moroccan Sunnis have been converting to Shi’ism since the beginning of the 1980s.5 Moroccan Sunnis belong to the Maliki madhhab, while the Turks are Hanafis (although some Kurds follow the Shafi’i school). There are also some Alevi Turks and Kurds. The geographic distribution of the country’s Muslim population is very uneven. More than 40% of Belgium’s Muslims live in the BrusselsCapital Region, where they are concentrated in six central boroughs (City of Brussels, Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse/Sint Jos, and Saint-Gilles/Sint Gillis). It should be noted that Muslim residents account for 17% of the Brussels Region’s population. This makes Brussels, which is the capital of both Belgium and the 4 Estimates by Manço and Kanmaz (Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1) on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics (foreign population from countries with a Muslim majority) and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Against Racism (official data on naturalisations by country of origin). 5 There are no exact figures and estimates vary from a minimum of 1,000 (estimates of the Belgian security services in 2001) to a maximum of 8,000–10,000 (estimates by the imam of the main Shi’i mosque of Brussels). We are grateful to Imane Lechkar (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) for these figures. For an anthropological account of Moroccan Sunni conversion to Shi’ism, see Lechkar, Imane, “How to understand Sunni Moroccan Belgians becoming Shi’i”, in Maréchal, B. and F. El Asri (eds), Islam Belge (forthcoming).

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European Union, one of the cities in the Western world with the largest Muslim population. The Muslim presence in the rest of the country is more modest. Only 3% of the population in Flanders, the northern, Dutch-speaking half of the country, are Muslims, representing some 39% of the country’s Muslim population or about 175,000 Muslims. They are mainly distributed between the region’s two major towns (Antwerp and Ghent) and the former mining province of Limburg. Similarly, in Wallonia, the southern, French-speaking region of the country, Muslims also make up about 3% of the population, living mainly in the industrial areas of Charleroi, Liège, and Mons. They number around 94,000 (or about 21% of the kingdom’s Muslim population). The average age of Belgium’s Muslim population is lower than the national average and it is generally estimated that a third are under 18. Despite a noticeable improvement in the socio-economic situation of some members of the Muslim community since the turn of the century, when it comes to higher education, home ownership and selfemployment, a large proportion of Muslims continues to grapple with social problems such as low educational achievement and unemployment. The poverty rate among the Moroccan and Turkish minorities is estimated at around the 55.56% for the Moroccans and 58.94% for the Turks, and unemployment hovers at around 38%.6 Both communities also belong to the least educated segment of the Belgian society, with 63.1% of Turks and Moroccans not having graduated from high school and only 6.1% of Turks and Moroccans in higher education.7 Their precarious socio-economic position is also enhanced by active and passive forms of discrimination in various social areas, such as housing, education and the job market. Albert Martens et al. have recently observed that within a sample of 321 job applicants (European and non-European) followed for a period of three months in the region of

6 Van Robaeys, B. Et al., De Kleur van armoede. Armoede bij personen van buitenlandse herkomst (The Colour of Poverty. Poverty among People of Foreign Origin) (Leuven: Acco, 2007), pp. 26, 31. This is the first comprehensive study on the poverty level of minorities from Turkish, Moroccan and Italian background. Data have been taken from the national household survey, which allows for a specific measurement on the basis of ethnic background rather than nationality. These estimates on the risk of poverty have been measured on the basis of income, taking the EU poverty line (60% of the median income) as a threshold: i.e. €777/month per household for Belgium. 7 Ibid., pp. 31–32.

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Brussels, 27% of the non-European respondents had encountered various forms of discrimination during their application process.8 Immigrants of Muslim heritage and their descendants who have acquired Belgian nationality make up part of today’s electorate. Their participation can be important in the municipalities that have a substantial population of immigrant origin, noticeably in Brussels.9 As a result, candidates and elected officials of Muslim culture may be found in all the political parties and in all the elected assemblies. Since the end of the 1990s, some ministerial positions in regional government have been held by members of minority communities, and several local councillors of Muslim origin have been active in political life.10 None of these politicians publicly favour their religious over their ethnonational identity (Turkish or Moroccan). Indeed, it seems that a significant number of the Muslim electorate tends to vote for candidates according to their national origin. There have been several attempts to create an explicitly Islamic party during the last decade, but none has yet succeeded in gaining a seat at a communal, regional or federal level.11

8 Martens, Albert et al., Etnische discriminatie op de arbeidsmarkt in het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest. Onderzoek in het kader van het Sociaal Pact voor de Werkgelegenheid van de Brusselaars (Ethnic Discrimination in the Job Market in the Brussels Regional Capital: A Survey in the Context of the Social Pact of Employment for the Residents of Brussels) (Brussels: BGDA, 2005), p. 34. 9 Pierre-Yves Lambert notes that, since the last 2006 municipal elections, there are 147 municipal representatives from minority communities (unequally spread over the 19 Brussels communes), of whom 94 are Moroccans, 22 Turks, 2 Algerians and 1 Tunisian, http://suffrage-universel.blogspot.com/2006/11/combien-dlus-allochtonesdans-les.html, accessed 5 January 2010. 10 Fadila Laanan, the current Minister of Culture in the Government of the Francophone Community, is the only minister of Muslim background in any of the Belgian regions. 11 On the French speaking side, the best known of these Islamic political parties is the Brussels based Young Muslim Party (Parti des Jeunes Musulmans, http://www .mvjm.be/), led by the convert Jean-François Abdullah Bastin, which has been standing in elections since 2004, when it gained 0.93% in the regional elections in Brussels and 3.38% in the local elections in the Brussels commune of Molenbeek St Jean. In Flanders, the Arab European League launched the Muslim Democratic Party (Moslim Democratische Partij, MDP) at the regional elections in 2004, gaining 0.42% at the Flemish level (the party only ran in the Flemish provinces of Antwerp and OostVlaanderen).

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Islam and the State

Relations between the state and religions in Belgium are based on constitutional provisions adopted in 1831. Article 19 of the Constitution establishes the principle of freedom of religion and Article 21 the separation of church and state, which is considered to be a relationship of reciprocal non-interference. These provisions reflect the Belgian state’s spirit of neutrality regarding religious affairs, different from the concept of laïcité or secularism, which assumes a strict separation between the state and religion(s). The Belgian law allows the public authorities to recognise and finance various religions and, since the state reform of 2001, this has partly become a regional responsibility. While the federal government retains responsibility for the salaries of ministers of the recognised faiths, including its prison and army chaplains, in 2001 the upkeep of religious buildings became the responsibility of the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital). Recognised religions are given time slots on state networks for religious broadcasts, which are organised on a regional level, while public schools must provide religious education in the recognised religions if requested by parents. The teachers and inspectors of these classes are employed and paid by the Flemish Region (which has been merged with the Flemish Community) and the French-speaking Community, whose responsibilities include education and cultural affairs. At a local level, municipalities also play an important role in dealing with certain aspects of Islamic religious practices. Issues such as mosque planning, Islamic sections in cemeteries, infrastructural organisation for the sacrifice of sheep at ‘Id al-Adha and the provision of halal food in public schools, are dependent on local regulations and may thus differ widely between localities.12

12

Corinne Torrekens gives a detailed account of the relationship between local officials and representatives of mosques and Muslim organisations in the public management of mosques (and the building of minarets), the organisation of ‘Id al-Adha and halal food in schools. See Torrekens, Corinne, La visibilité de l’islam au sein de l’espace public bruxellois. Transaction, reconnaissance et identité (The visibility of Islam in the public space in Brussels. Transaction, recognition and identity) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Université Libre de Bruxelles/Université Catholique de Louvain, 2008). For more information on the local management of the Muslim presence in the Brussels borough of Schaerbeek, see Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “From conflict to co-operation between Muslims and local authorities in a Brussels borough: Schaerbeek”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1105–1123, and for the case of Ghent, see Kanmaz, M., Moslims in Gent: De ontwikkeling van

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Six religions (in addition to the humanist Ethical Movement) are currently recognised. They are the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant churches, Islam and Judaism. Belgium is the first European country to have granted Islam official recognition (by a law passed on 19 July 1974). In order for a religion to be officially recognised, the Belgian state requires that a head of the faith be designated, who will become its spokesman in matters of the religion’s secular administration and will be the representative of its followers. The question of representativeness remains a thorny issue in the case of Islam. The establishment of a representative body that would meet Belgium’s constitutional requirements has been a constant source of tension, both in relations between the state and the Muslim communities as well as within the Muslim communities themselves. The question of a Belgian representative body for Muslims only became an important political matter in the second half of the 1980s. Until then, the Moroccan and Turkish embassies and the Saudi-funded Islamic Cultural Centre acted as the main interlocutors for the Belgian government. Mosques and imams were largely financed by the countries of origin, donations from Saudi Arabia, or the local Muslim communities themselves. During the eighties, however, there was a shift in perspective on the part of the Belgian authorities: Islam was no longer regarded through a ‘foreign’ lens, but became increasingly linked with domestic concerns about the integration of Muslims. The need for a body that would act not only as a representative of Belgian Muslims, but also as direct interlocutor with the Belgian government on issues of integration, became an important domestic preoccupation from the 1990s. The establishment of what would come to be known as the Executive of Muslims in Belgium thus not only emerged from an administrative need for an institutional body that would regulate the operation of the Islam, but also from the quest by the Belgian authorities for an official spokesperson of the Muslim community.13 This convergence of different agendas turned the establishment of this administrative body into a highly delicate enterprise. Whereas the various ethno-cultural components of the Muslim communities wanted

gebedsruimtes, moskeeën en islamitische centra (Muslims in Ghent. The Development of Worship Places, Mosques and Islamic Centres) (Ghent: Academia Press, 2009). 13 This is the line of argumentation was developed by Lionel Panafit following his thorough historical account and analysis of the institutional recognition of the Islamic cult. See Panafit, Quand le droit écrit l’Islam.

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a balanced representation of their (often conflicting) needs, Belgian officials were looking for representatives able to transcend these different agendas and uninvolved in ‘radical’ networks, which they tried to control through security screening. Because of the absence of a proper ‘representative’ head, Muslim communities could not access state financing until 1996, when provisional representatives were appointed to prepare for general elections in order to nominate a new representative body.14 In 1998, elections were held which resulted in an executive body for the Islamic faith, called the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium (Executif des Musulmans de Belgique/Executief van de Moslims van België, EMB). The creation of this body did not settle the matter, however. It was afflicted by various internal crises, whose causes are linked to the EMB’s heterogeneous composition (both ethnic and philosophical), internal competition between the various ethnic groups and attempts by the Belgian government and foreign (Turkish and Moroccan) diplomatic authorities to meddle in its affairs. The second election to elect a new EMB, organised by the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in March 2005, was largely boycotted by the Moroccan community (especially in Brussels),15 and its political and legal aftermath has led to a situation in which internal conflicts and allegations of corruption against some board members regularly paralyse the EMB’s functioning. Nevertheless, the institutional organ continues to fulfil its administrative functions and to accompany the mosques and imams in their recognition processes, despite the current uncertainty about the modalities for a renewed composition of the EMB’s board and general assembly.16

14 The Royal Decree of 3 July 1996 provided for a modest subsidy for the material organisation of Islam (€74,500 in 1996, €495,000 in 2000, €1,180,000 in 2005 and $996,000 in 2007) (figures from Husson, Jean-François, “Le financement du culte islamique en Belgique” (2007), http://www.cil.be/files/PC7%20Le%20financement%20 du%20culte%20islamique%20en%20Belgique%20JF%20Husson.pdf, accessed 6 January 2010. 15 Although a large segment of Moroccan civil society in Brussels called for a boycott of what it viewed as ‘illegitimate’ elections imposed by the state, a large fraction of the Turkish communities, which made up the majority of the General Assemble in 2005, and some segments of the Moroccan community did vote. See Crivellaro, Rachel, “Les Turcs raflent la majorité des sieges (Turks obtain the majority of seats)”, La Libre Belgique, 24 March 2005. 16 The mandate of the current Executive only lasted until the end of 2009, but the current board has been granted an extension of six months to come up with a consensus on a procedure for the designation of new board members. At the time of writing no consensus has been reached. While the idea of a general election seems

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Aside from the official body for the Islamic faith, the EMB, ethnic socio-cultural associations and federations of all sizes make up a very dynamic Muslim civil society.17 These associations are mainly organised along ethnic lines. Among the Turks there are a number of federations (which sometimes encompass a large number of local mosques) which express competing ideological and religious tendencies brought in from Turkey. Moroccan civil society is, in turn, composed of a number of federations, and a myriad of associations, including many run by independent mosques and denominational associations that cater, for example, for young people or teachers of religion. The best-organised and consequently most influential Turkish Islamic movement is the Belgian branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Belçika Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfi), known as Diyanet (Chaussée d’Haecht 67, 1210 Brussels, Belgium, tel. +32 2 218 57 55, fax. +32 2 223 01 52, http://www.belcikadiyanet.be). Today, the Diyanet unites close to two-thirds of the Turkish mosques in Belgium and receives imams and Islamic teachers trained in Turkey and financed by the Turkish government. The second Turkish Islamic group is the religious political movement Millî Görüs represented by the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Belçika İslam Federasyonu, Chaussée de Haecht, 125, 1030 Brussels, Belgium, tel. +32 2 219 80 79, fax. +32 2 218 20 49, http://www.fibif.be), the parent chapter of which was founded in Germany in 1973. Millî Görüs maintains ties with nonTurkish Islamic groups and various European public authorities and close to a third of the Turkish mosques in Belgium belong to this group. There are some other Turkish Islamic communities, but they are markedly smaller. The Islamic reform movement known as the Gülen movement (Boulevard Auguste Reyers 207–209/3, 1030 Brussels, tel.

to be discredited and will probably be abandoned, the propositions currently being examined are: a system of representation based on organisations, a delegation of members of the recognised mosques, or a delegation of one elected member from each of the 333 mosques, plus co-opted representatives of women and converts (Le Soir, 8 December 2009). 17 For an overview of the various (Islamist) networks, movements and organisations within the Muslim community of Belgium, see Maréchal, B., “Courants fondamentalistes en Belgique (Fundamentalist tendencies in Belgium)”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal_fr/2008/ issue1/jv3no1a5.html, accessed 16 May 2009.

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+32 2 736 90 11, fax. +32 2 742 30 11, http://www.idp-pdi.be) is the third group. It runs six primary and secondary schools (the Dutchlanguage Lucerna Colleges and French-language Ecoles des Étoiles), boarding schools, and religious training centres. Its vision centres on the creation of an economic and intellectual elite of believers, although its officers refuse to call its establishments ‘Islamic’. The Belgian Federation of Alevi Associations (Belçika Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, Bergensesteenweg 432/Chaussée de Mons 432, 1070 Brussels; http://www .babf.be/) represents the heterodox Shi’i variant of Turkish Islam in Belgium, which favours a humanist culture. Moroccan religious associations and mosques in Belgium are not organised along such clear ideological lines. Groupings do exist, but they are formed more by individual Muslims who identify with a certain religious and ideological orientation rather than clear-cut lines adopted by the mosques. It is thus difficult to give an accurate picture or clear estimates of the spread of various ideological tendencies within the Maghrebi community. A large proportion of Belgium’s Moroccan migrants adhere to a traditional Maliki rite, which is also close to the Moroccan monarchy and is followed by most traditional mosque leaders. Religio-political groupings, such the Moroccan Al Adl wal Ihsane, or the reformist tendencies of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,18 are also represented, mostly among the better-educated segments of the community. The same also applies with regard to Sufi spiritual traditions, such as the Moroccan Boutchichiyya tariqa. Piestic movements such as the Tabligh are mostly found among less-educated Moroccans. Salafi tendencies, mostly from Saudi-Arabia, exist among some young Muslims and converts. The Moroccan religious associations and mosques are organised in provincial federations. The Antwerp Union of Mosques and Islamic Associations (Unie des Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen, UMIVA, Plantin Moretuslei 202, 2018 Antwerp, tel.+32 3 235 48 33, [email protected]) for the Dutch-speaking part and the Union of Mosques of Brussels-Brabant Wallonia (Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles-Brabant Wallon, UMBB, rue François-Joseph Navez, 60–64, 1000 Brussels, [email protected]) for

18 For a recent analysis of this movement in Belgium and in Europe, see Maréchal, B., The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

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the French-speaking part of the country, are the oldest.19 In 2002, the provincial unions came together to form the Federation of Mosque Unions (FUM). These unions act as the main representatives of locally based mosques and as interlocutors with local authorities. In the Flemish part of the country, the Moroccan community is also organised into federations, such as the Federation of Moroccan Associations (Federatie voor Marokkaanse Verenigingen, FMV), which has its main activities in Antwerp, and the Federation of Moroccan Democratic Organisations (Federatie voor Marokkaanse Democratische organisaties, FMDO), with its main activities in Brussels and the province of Limburg. The Union for the Development and Emancipation of Muslims (Vereniging voor Ontwikkeling en Emancipatie van Moslims, VOEM) adopts a mid-way position, profiling itself as both an Islamic and socio-cultural organisation. These ethno-cultural federations fulfill similar functions to the Islamic federations, but with a focus on organisation on an ethno-cultural rather than religious basis. The Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Belgique, ICC, Parc du Cinquantenaire, 14, 1040 Brussels, tel. +32 2 735 21 73, http://www.centreislamique.be), known as La grande mosquée, housed in the grand mosque of Brussels since 1969, is a historical player on Brussels’ Arab Islamic stage. It is a creation of the World Muslim League, controlled by Saudi Arabia, and played a decisive role in Belgium’s official recognition of the Islamic faith up until 1996. The ICC continues to have religious authority among some parts of the North African population, and also with the majority of converts. It provides statements of religious advice (fatwas), grants conversion certificates and organises Arabic language classes and courses in Islamic theology. In addition to mosque-based organisations, there are also a number of Islamic socio-cultural organisations which are not necessarily linked to mosques but provide cultural initiatives from an Islamic perspective and organise conferences on questions of Muslim identity and citizenship on a more local basis. They include the Muslim Presence (Présence Musulmane) network in Brussels and the francophone part of Belgium. 19

For an account of the socio-cultural activities of the youth group of the UMIVA, see Fadil, N., “ ‘We have to be walking Qur’ans’. The making of an Islamic political subject”. in Amiraux, V. and G. Jonker (eds), The Politics of Visibility. Young Muslims in European Public Spaces (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2006), pp. 53–78.

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According to recent estimates, there are 333 mosques and prayer houses in Belgium, all self-financed and with the formal legal status of non-profit associations.20 Flanders accounts for half of the places of worship, with 167 mosques and prayer houses. There are 89 in Wallonia and 77 in the Brussels Region. Close to half the mosques are attended and managed by Moroccans, while Turkish mosques account for 42% of the total. The remaining 10% belong to Albanian, Bosnian, Pakistani and other Muslim groups. Mosques are generally prayer houses converted from schools, shops or industrial premises. Only four mosques in Belgium are purpose-built in accordance with classical mosque architecture, with one or two minarets and a dome. Twelve others mosques have added a minaret to converted buildings. This possibility of erecting minarets depends on building regulations and the political will of the local authorities.21 The amplified broadcasting of calls to prayers is generally prohibited in most municipalities, but there are some exceptions.22 The official recognition and funding of mosques became a regional responsibility in 2001. Conditions for finance are fixed by the regional authorities and mostly refer to the size of the building, the number of members and the administrative structure. Applicant mosques must declare that they will comply with the Belgian Constitution and human rights, and their recognition also depends on a positive report on their activities by the Belgian security services. Flemish recognition criteria are stricter than those applied in the rest of the country: the imams who draw salaries in recognised mosques in Flanders must take courses in ‘citizen-building’ (inburgering) organised by the regional authorities, and Dutch must be the mosque’s official administrative language. 20 “Report on mosques, imams and Islam teachers in Belgium”, http://www.kbs-frb .be/publication.aspx?id=178192&LangType=1033, accessed 16 May 2009. 21 For some examples of local tensions around mosques, see Allievi, S., Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy Issues and Trends, NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009), http://www.nefic .org/docs/projects/NEF%20RelDem%20–%20RELIGION%20&%20MOSQUES%20 –%20Final.pdf, accessed 27 April 2010. 22 In the small francophone town of Visée, the Turkish mosque Mimar Sinan at Cheratte-Bas has been calling to prayer three times a day since its establishment in 1981. See Dorzee, Hugues, “Le chant du muezzin au pied des terrils (The call of the muezzin in the region of Terrils)”, Le Soir, 19 December 2009, p. 19.

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Recognition by the regions leads to the regional authorities’ commitment to maintain the buildings, and the federal government, for its part, is responsible for paying the salaries of the imams who officiate regularly in recognised mosques (some mosques enjoy the services of more than one imam). There are currently 43 mosques recognised by the Walloon regional government, 15 by the Flemish government and 5 by the Brussels Regional government,23 and 18 imams are recognised by the federal authorities.24 5


The country’s public primary and secondary schools offer two hours a week of religion classes for the recognised religions, or non-denominational ethics classes. Under this general framework, classes in the Islamic religion have been organised in both Dutch- and Frenchspeaking public education since 1975. The teachers of these classes are paid by the public authorities of the relevant language systems. For a considerable period, these teachers came from the immigrants’ home countries and often had insufficient teacher training and/or Dutch or French language skills. Specific teams of inspectors (three Dutchspeaking and three French-speaking inspectors) were appointed in 2003 but close to 700 Islamic religion teachers still do not have a clear occupational status. It can thus be assumed that no standard curriculum exists and that there are inequalities when it comes to payment, seniority, appointments and pensions compared with other teachers in the educational system. Islamic religion classes are given in some 800–900 public primary and secondary schools and are taken by an estimated 30,000 pupils (the general consensus is that this accounts for half of the potential Muslim student body). Belgian legislation allows the creation of private denominational schools, which are eligible for public funding provided they meet certain legal conditions. The first such denominational Muslim school was the Al-Ghazali School, founded in 1989 and run by the ICC. At the time, its creation triggered major political and media reaction. A second initiative was taken in September 2007 with the opening of the

23

Data from the regional authorities, January 2010. Sixteen in Wallonia, one in Flanders and one in Brussels-Capital Region (EMB, December 2009). 24

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Avicenne Islamic Secondary School for only a score or so of pupils in a borough of Brussels (Molenbeek) with a large Muslim population. Besides the classes in Islam given in public schools, some Flemish Catholic schools and the few Islamic schools in Brussels, Belgian mosques generally provide Qur’anic study classes in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Dutch, mostly on Wednesday afternoons and at weekends. 6


Almost all imams who officiate in the Turkish mosques have been trained in theological schools in Turkey. Whilst their level of religious training is satisfactory, their French or Dutch language skills are often very poor and, most importantly, they are not familiar with the socio-cultural context of Belgian society or the economic, social and cultural conditions in which the Muslim populations of immigrant descent live. The situation of the imams in the Moroccan mosques is more complex. In the early years of immigration, imams would be appointed by the members of the community on the basis of their knowledge of the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. They would also often be men from the same regions in Morocco as the community members, who had often had minimal training in religious institutions (al-ma’ahid al-diniyya) or local mosques in their home country.25 The function of these first imams was mostly to lead the prayer and act as administrators of the mosque. The Moroccan authorities also provided imams, either occasionally (especially during ‘Id festivities) or on a permanent basis. Over time, however, the Moroccan Muslim community—especially the second generation—became more demanding of their imams. Their knowledge of the Islamic tradition and capacity to engage with the daily needs of the community became an important factor for their authority and credibility. This also explains the higher authority granted to imams trained in Egypt or Saudi-Arabia, who are considered to have benefited from the best training possible. The capacity to engage with the problems emerging from the reality of

25 Kanmaz, M. and Mohamed El Battiui, Moskeeën, Imams en Islamleerkrachten in België (Mosque, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium) (Brussels: Koning Boudewijn Stichting, 2004), p. 26.

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Muslims living as a minority in a non-Muslim context also became an important criterion of evaluation. Non-Muslims as well as Muslims have also taken an increasing interest in the functioning and training of imams, especially after 9/11. Non-Muslim officials and social actors view them as central and influential figures, whose conduct and statements impact upon the integration of the Muslim community. Whether this perspective is valid is a matter of debate.26 Both the Muslim community’s need for locally trained imams and Belgian officials’ fear of ‘radical imams’ thus underlie a number of pilot projects to train Islamic religious personnel. In the French-speaking part of the country, the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) has been offering courses on Islam since 2007 open to all, both Muslims and non-Muslims.27 The ‘Observatory of the Relations between Religion, organised Secularity and the State’28 started training for ministers of religion of foreign origin in Charleroi in 2007 with the assistance of federal public funds and the support of the government of the Walloon region.29 In Flanders, the University of Antwerp has started a programme for Islam teachers in collaboration with the EMB,30 and is studying the possibility of creating a new programme to train Muslim executives in the broadest sense (imams and other representatives). The ICC has long offered theology courses taught in Arabic in order to train Islamic personnel. A number of Islamic theological institutions have also been created in both Arabic and Turkish-speaking circles, but none of these initiatives has so far received official recognition.31

26 Several scholars have argued that the social role of the imam is often overestimated by the local authorities as a result of the projection of the moral role played by priests upon the figure of the imam. See Kanmaz and Battiui, Moskeeën, and Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Nederland. Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (The Imam in the Netherlands. Views of His Religious Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert De Bakker, 2007). 27 http://www.uclouvain.be/38784.html. 28 http://oracle.cifop.be/. 29 http://oracle.cifop.be/#form, accessed 16 May 2009. 30 “Universiteit Antwerpen Leidt Islamleerkrachten op”, De Standaard, 8 October 2009. 31 For example: Islamitische Universiteit van Europa-Afdeling Gent (European Islamic University, Section of Ghent), http://www.ifeg.be/ifeg/x; Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles, http://www.faculte-islamique.be/; Académie Européenne de Culture et de Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles, http://www.alkhayria.com/index.htm.

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The bodies of most Muslims who die in Belgium, even those who have acquired Belgian citizenship, are sent back to their countries of origin for burial.32 In order to pay for this, most Muslim families contribute to either commercial or association funds. There are no Islamic cemeteries per se in Belgium. Cemeteries are managed by the municipalities and some of those that have large Muslim populations have set aside specific areas for Islamic burials. There are nine such sections in Flanders,33 three in Wallonia, and two in the Brussels Region. 8


Islamic counsellors have been able to visit patients in hospitals and inmates in prisons (a third of inmates in Belgium are Muslims) for years. There are currently 22 chaplains who are recognised and financed by the Belgian authorities: 9 Dutch-speaking and 13 French-speaking.34 Hospital counsellors are not paid by the state. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslim religious holidays are not granted any official status by the Belgian authorities but are observed by individual Muslims. While most of these holidays generally pass unnoticed, some do become visible and require a minimum of support by the local authorities. This is especially the case for ‘Id al-Adha. Slaughtering animals at home is illegal in Belgium and the majority of the country’s Muslims obey this law. Municipalities with large Muslim populations have been trying to organise the ritual sacrifice of ‘Id al-Adha since the late 1990s. They set up temporary slaughterhouses (where EMB-approved halal butchers officiate) and arrange for the sacrificed animals’ carcasses to be collected, but organisational set-backs emerge in certain municipalities 32 There are no exact data on this question, but it is fair to say that the large majority of the bodies of first generation Turkish and Moroccan Muslim immigrants are transferred to the country of origin. The picture is less clear with regard to the younger generations, and it remains an open question as to what extent they will be buried in Belgium rather than in their parents’ (or grandparents’) home country. 33 http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/archief/docu3.htm. 34 Figures from EMB.

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each year. Butchers and breeders are also allowed to make their services available to Muslims at such times. The EMB provides slaughtering certificates during ‘Id al-Adha for both professionals and, provided that certain conditions are met, individuals. ‘Id al-Adha provokes annual protests by animal rights movement and the far right. The EMB has set up a working group on the slaughtering of cattle and sheep which examines slaughtering methods that are religiously acceptable and take account of the animals’ well being. The widespread absence of Muslims from school or work is generally felt during the two main holidays ‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr. This has led some to advocate the recognition of those religious festivities as national holidays, but this idea has not been seriously considered and meets with resistance. There are therefore no official or uniform regulations on these issues. Muslim pupils and students stay at home, either without permission or on presentation of a sick note, and this is tolerated by the authorities to a certain extent. Workers and employees use a day’s leave to participate in each of these two main holidays. 10

Halal Food

There is a wide range of halal butchers and halal products in the main Belgian towns where most Muslims live, but halal labels on food only partially reflect the reality. While the EMB has the authority to grant a certificate to Muslim butchers who request it, it has neither the resources nor the authority to issue halal labels for food products (meat and others), or to control supply chains or production processes. This issue is currently being examined by a working group set up by the EMB.35 11

Dress Codes

The issue of wearing headscarves in school has been on the Belgian agenda since 1989 and passionate discussions continue. Until 2009, the wearing of a headscarf or hijab in school was not regulated in the country’s Communities and Regions, and the governments left school principals free to decide on this matter. But in September 2009, Flem-

35

Information from the EMB.

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ish communal schools adopted a general and controversial regulation for all its schools (25% of Flemish schools) prohibiting the wearing of visible religious symbols by pupils; this will take effect in September 2010. In the French-speaking part of the country, 90% of public secondary schools prohibit hats, hijab and ‘obvious’ signs of religious affiliation on school premises. With regard to employment, there are no regulations concerning the hijab and employers in both the public and the private sectors are free to decide on the matter. Women in white-collar positions in both the private and public sectors are often prohibited from wearing headscarves at work. Four major towns in Flanders (Antwerp, Ghent, Ninove and Lier), for example, explicitly banned the wearing of the headscarf in 2007 and 2008 by female civil servants working in contact with the public. However, one finds female factory workers and cleaners who do wear headscarves.36 Wearing hijab for photographs for identity documents is allowed by the Belgian authorities if the face is visible between the forehead and the chin. 12


There are several Islamic publishing houses and book stores in Belgium which sell mostly traditionalist or Salafi publications. They include Al-Imen (Brussels), Editions al-Hadith, Iqra, etc. In addition, some French publishers also distribute publications such as Editions le Savoir, Editions Tawhid or Maison d’Ennour, in French-speaking areas. The Dutch publisher Al Bulaaq also distributes its materials in the Dutch speaking regions. A quota of time for broadcasting in the public media is granted to all recognised religions, but Islam is the only one that does not fully benefit from this right. The Brussels-based Radio Midi 1 has started allocating two hours a week to the EMB, but the national broadcasting services, both French and Dutch, have yet to grant Muslims broadcasting time.

36 The most famous example is that of Naima Amzil, who worked for a food company and wore her headscarf since it was compatible with the hygiene rules imposed on all workers, who had to cover their hair. Between November 2004 and March 2005, Amzil’s employer, Rik Van Nieuwenhuyse, received seven letters threatening to kill Van Nieuwenhuyse if he did not dismiss her. A massive solidarity movement emerged and petitions were drawn up in solidarity with the threatened employer. After a while, the letters ceased and their author was never found.

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Reasons include the recent difficult start of the EMB, which has not been able fully to take up this issue, local regulations concerning the allocation of broadcasting time, and the reluctance of the national broadcasting services to make the required allocation.37 13

Family Law

There is no arrangement for local arbitration by Muslim institutions to take effect under the national law in Belgium, but Islamic law (Shari’a) does, however, regularly intersect with Belgian national regulations, mainly because of the foreign or dual nationality of most Muslim citizens. Mudawwana (Moroccan personal and family law) regulations affect the Moroccan-Belgian community as a large proportion of Muslims of Moroccan origin, even the second and third generations, contract their marriages in Morocco or at the Moroccan consulate. While this dual legal status does not always pose problems, there are sometimes conflicts with the Belgian legal system. Examples are divorce by repudiation, polygamy, matters of inheritance and guardianship in cases of divorce, where important differences exist between Moroccan and Belgian law. The Belgian and Moroccan authorities have been working on bilateral agreements to settle these points of conflict,38 but the absence of concrete guidelines and regulations has resulted in a situation where there is no consistency in the way these matters are dealt with in the courts. They are mostly left to the assessment of individual judges and their knowledge of the International Private Law regulations. Some studies show that most judges refer only to Belgian law. The few who engage with Moroccan law refrain from doing so in cases seen to conflict with Belgian public order (especially regarding equality between men and women, which is seen to conflict with practices such as polygamy and repudiation).39 Nevertheless, there are

37 See “Moslims vragen zendtijd bij de VRT (Muslims ask for broadcasting time at the VRT)”, De Standaard, 24 October 2006 and “Zendtijd voor Moslims ten vroegste in 2010 (Broadcasting time for Muslims at the earliest in 2010)”, Het Nieuwsblad, 24 October 2006. 38 For a detailed account of this problem, see the works of the Belgian legal scholar Marie-Claire Foblets. 39 See Verhellen, Jinske, “Entretiens avec des juristes practiciens et travailleurs sociaux (Interviews with legal practitioners and social workers)”, in M.C. Foblets (ed.), Femmes marocaines et conflits familiaux en immigration. Quelles solutions juridiques

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cases where judges simply follow the foreign regulations, even when conflicts arise with Belgian principles.40 Apart from institutionally recognised and visible intersections, Islamic normative principles also impact on Muslims’ daily lives in more invisible or informal ways. Pious Muslims often seek fatwas from respected religious scholars or imams before entering into a contract for a mortgage, and there are cases where civil arrangements are left aside, for example in the formalisation of Islamic marriages. 14


There are numerous interreligious initiatives which aim at fostering ties between Muslims and Christians and striving towards better mutual understanding. Some examples are the working group Relatieopbouw Christenen en Moslims (Constructing Christian-Muslim Relations) of the Flemish organisation Kerkwerk Multicultureel. On the Francophone side, the organisation El Kalima (www.elkalima.be) organises conferences and seminars on a regular basis to foster Christian-Muslim relations. 15


Since the end of the 1990s, and especially since 2000, there has been a new turn in the multicultural debate, especially in the Flanders, largely centred on the presence and integration of Muslim minorities.41 The electoral successes of the right wing as well as the explosion of the appropriées? (Moroccan women and family conflicts in migration. What appropriate juridical solutions?), (Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 1998), pp. 149–211. 40 An example is a decision by the court in Brussels in 1986. A woman of Moroccan nationality sued her ex-husband for moral harm caused by the fact that he repudiated her and remarried under Moroccan law. The judge decided against the plaintiff, arguing that her ex-husband’s actions ware in concordance with Moroccan law and did not have any harmful intention. Marie-Claire Foblets has questioned this decision, arguing that the judge failed to question the unequal status of men and women implied in the case: Foblets, Marie-Claire, Familles – Islam – Europe. Le droit confronté au changement (Family, Islam, Europe. Law confronted with change) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996), pp. 141–142. 41 The end of the nineties saw the emergence of Pim Fortuyn, a charismatic politician who denounced the non-integration of Muslims and linked it with what he saw as the backwardness of Islam. In the same period, leftist intellectuals such as Paul Scheffer denounced what they considered a ‘multicultural drama’, which was attributed to

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debate in Holland, has significantly influenced Flemish public debate. Several journalists and commentators, as well as politicians, emphasise the need to acknowledge the problematic aspects of multicultural society and tackle them head-on. These discussions are also fed by the growing visibility of Muslims in the public sphere. International events, most recently the Swiss vote against minarets, have also impacted upon the tone of the debate, which is often passionate and polarized, with little room for nuance. More locally, the involvement of some Belgian Muslims (such as Abdessatar Dahmane or Muriel Degauge) in suicide operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has also fed fears and suspicions of the existence of terrorist networks in the capital. Such polarised discourses, which focus on the ‘integration’ of Muslims, also have an effect upon the ways non-Muslims view their Muslim fellow-citizens. According to an investigation carried out by the Institute for Social and Political Research (ISPO) of the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) and published in January 2008, 48% of the Flemish population believe that the values of Islam constitute a threat to Europe, and 37% believe that the majority of Muslims do not respect the European culture and lifestyle. 16


Over the past few years, a number of large scale cultural activities have been organised by Islamic organisations. Since 2006 a consortium of European Muslim organisations called the European Association of Art and Culture has run a number of cultural festivals in the Brussels conference centre, the Heysel, which attract hundreds or even thousands of Muslims.42 In May 2007, over 5,000 participants attended a cultural festival that lasted for two days, including lectures on the presence of Muslims in Europe given by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, as well as a concert by the well-known Muslim artist Sami Yusuf. In February 2006 and May 2008 the European Festival of Anasheed and Spiritual Songs was organised by the same consortium in the same place in Brussels. These cultural gatherings have a double significance,

unwillingness to address the socio-economic deprivation experienced by Muslims, as well as their cultural particularity. 42 The Consortium is a group of Muslim organisations from various European countries which are linked to the Moroccan Al Adl Wal Ihsane movement.

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as they seek not only to entertain the Muslim community but also to present Muslim ethics through art and culture. The performances follow specific Islamic ethical principles in both their message and their format. In recent years, not only Muslim organisations but also individual Muslim entrepreneurs have been organising similar cultural festivals. An example is the annual Rencontre Culturelle et Islamique, organised since 2007 by the Brussels collective Les disciples du style, and which mostly attracts young Muslim women.43 An important cultural development is the emergence of a Muslim hip-hop and R&B scene which has become popular among Muslim youngsters, mostly in urban areas through local artists such as Manza and Rival in Brussels or French artists such as Kery James, Médine and Abd Al Malik.44 According to El Asri, it is distinct from other forms of hip-hop because of the inclusion of Islamic ethics and aesthetics in its form and content,45 both in the choice of themes (often a socially engaged lyrics affirming Muslim identity and in the conduct of the artist.46

43

We are grateful to Farid El Asri for this information. El Asri, Farid, “Au croisement des mondialisations. Le cas de Sami Yusuf” (At the crossroad of globalization. The case of Sami Yusuf) in Recherches Sociologiques et Anthropologiques, Louvain-La-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, 2006/2, pp. 79–91. 45 El Asri, Farid, “L’Expression musicale de musulmans européens: Créations de sonorités a l’épreuve de la normativité religieuse” (The Musical expression of European Muslims. Creating sound challenged by the religious norm), Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 25, no 2, 2009, pp. 35–50. 46 Starting two years ago, the Brussels collective Rival has organised a yearly benefit called ‘hip-hop(e)’ each December in Brussels which consists of a hip-hop festival gathering a large part of the Belgian hip-hop scene. All profits goes to specific charitable causes. 44

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Mirnes Kovač1 and Aid Smajić2 1

Muslim Populations

According to the last official census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BH or Bosnia), conducted in 1991, 1,902,956 (or 43.5%) of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the country declared themselves as ‘Muslims’ by nationality.3 Since ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent in the case of all three constituent ethnic communities in Bosnia, this figure is usually taken as indicative of the number of adherents of Islam, just as most Croats are usually considered Roman Catholic and most Serbs are considered Orthodox Christians. ‘Muslims’ were recognised as one of the Yugoslav nationalities in the late 1960s. In 1993, the term ‘Muslims’ was replaced by ‘Bosniaks’ as the national name for Bosnian Muslims. Before the 1992–95 war, a significant number of Muslims declared themselves to be ‘Yugoslavs’.4 Due to war-related death, expulsion and internal and external migration, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic groups within BH have significantly changed. A new census proposed for 2011, which may include questions on ethnicity, religion or language, is a sensitive political issue opposed by some Bosniak and Croat politicians because of the fear of 1 Mirnes Kovac is the editor of the bi-monthly Preporod Islamic magazine, published by the Supreme Council of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH). He graduated in Islamic Studies from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and has an MA in International Relations from the University of Sussex, UK. He is the author of Islam: Globalni izazov? (Islam as a Global Challenge) (Zenica: IPA, 2004). 2 Aid Smajić holds BA degrees in Islamic Studies and Psychology and an MA in Islamic Civilization both from the International Islamic University in Malaysia and International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in Kuala Lumpur. He is a senior assistant lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and has published several articles on interreligious relations and tolerance. 3 See details at http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm, accessed 7 November 2009. 4 For more about history behind and debates surrounding the question of national identity of Bosniaks see Kamberović, Husnija (Ed.), Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka: Zbornik radova (Debates about National Identity of Bosniaks: Collection of Papers) (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2009).

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implicitly ‘legitimising’ the new ethnic map created by genocide and ethnic cleansing during the 1992–95 war and post-war obstruction of refugee return, especially in the Republika Srpska, where many areas were completely cleansed of non-Serbs.5 According to estimates by the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population of the country is 3,842,265,6 while the CIA World Factbook estimates the total number of Bosnian citizens in 2008 at 4,613,414, of whom 48% are said to be Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats and 0.6% others,7 including more than 1.3 million living abroad.8 It is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman armies in fifteent century. Bosnian Muslims are mainly descended from Christians (Catholics, Orthodox, or adherents of the extinct Medieval Bosnian Church) who converted to Islam during the four centuries of Ottoman rule from the middle of the fifteenth century until 1878, when Bosnia became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and remained so until 1918. From 1918 to 1992, the territory that makes up today’s Bosnian state was part of three countries, including the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41), the Independent State of Croatia (1941–45), and Communist Yugoslavia (1945–92).9 A referendum on independence from Yugoslavia, already declared by Slovenia and Croatia, was held in Bosnia in February 1992 and was boycotted by most Bosnian Serbs, whose forces, assisted by Belgrade, initiated a bloody war in 1992–95. For about a year during 1993–94, the army of BH also fought Croat forces on most fronts. In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats signed an agreement creating a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of BH. After the war atrocities culminated in 5 More detailed analysis of atrocities and genocide committed against Bosniaks during the 1992–95 war could be found in Cigar, Norman, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995). 6 Estimated data as of 30 June 2008. For details see http://www.bhas.ba/new/, accessed 8 November 2009. 7 Estimated data as of July 2009. For details, see https://www.cia.gov/library/publi cations/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html, accessed 8 November 2009. 8 See Svjetski Savez dijaspore Bosne i Hercegovine (World Association of the Diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.bihdijaspora.com). 9 See Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1999) and Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996). More detailed accounts of the history of the Bosniaks and the spread of Islam could be found in Imamović, Mustafa, Istorija Bošnjaka (History of the Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998) and Filipović, Nedim, Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini (Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Tešanj: Centar za kulturu i obrazovanje, 2005).

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the Srebrenica genocide10 in July 1995, and in December of the same year a peace agreement was signed in Dayton (USA), thus ending over three years of bloodshed and dividing BH into the Federation of BH (a Bosniak and Croat dominated entity covering 51% of the territory), and Republika Srpska (a Serb dominated entity covering 49% of the country), with the strategic town Brčko in the north as a separate district.11 Estimates of the death toll of the war have ranged from 25,000 to 300,000, with about 200,000 being the accepted figure until 2007, when a three-year investigation of the Research and Documentation Centre put the total number of direct victims at 97,207, of whom 64,036 were Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims. The study also revealed that more than 83% of civilian deaths were Bosniaks, rising to nearly 95% in Eastern Bosnia, and that more than two million people fled their homes during the war, including over one million to neighbouring states and the West.12 According to the latest estimates by the UNHCR, around 200,000 Bosnians still have the status of refugees and internally displaced persons, who face many obstacles when returning to their prewar homes.13 Bosnian Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunnis who follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law and Maturidi school of Islamic doctrine. During and after the 1992–95 Bosnian war, the first Salafis, locally known as ‘Wahhabis’, emerged. Their exact number is not known and, contrary to general belief, they control no mosques and their initial public presence has been steadily weakening. There are very few Shi’a Muslims and no Shi’a mosques, although there are several pro-Shi’a associations. For many Bosniaks, however, their Muslim identity has much

10 In 2007, the International Court of Justice issued a ruling that explicitly labeled the crime committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 as an act of genocide. For details see: ICJ, Press Release 2007/8, 27 February 2008, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index .php?pr=1897&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1, accessed 8 November 2009. 11 For details about the history and socio-political forces behind the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, see Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). 12 For details see Rezultati istraživanja ‘Ljudski gubici 91–95’ (Results of the Research on Human Losses in 91–95) (Sarajevo: Research and Documentation Center, 2007) at http://www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid =126&lang=bs, accessed 8 November 2009. 13 See http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766, accessed 8 November 2009.

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more to do with cultural roots than with religious beliefs. There are no reliable data on active religious practice.14 2

Islam and the State

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. The state has defined its relations with churches and religious organisations in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in BH passed in 2004.15 The law provides for freedom of religion and religious non-discrimination, the legal status of churches and religious communities, and the establishment of relations between the state and religious communities. In 2006 the Catholic Church, and in 2008 the Serbian Orthodox Church, signed basic agreements with the state, while the Islamic Community in BH (hereafter ICBH), after initial hesitation, is preparing to sign a similar agreement. Individual religious communities, including the ICBH, receive ad hoc funding for their projects, especially for the (re)construction of religious sites. Most of about a dozen religious schools, including Islamic ones, are also regularly supported by public funds. However, the Law on Religious Freedom envisages the possibility of public funding for other expenses too. Apart from concerted efforts by all religious communities to solve the issue of their property that was nationalised under Communist rule, the ICBH together with Catholic and Orthodox Church is currently appealing to respective state ministries to take over paying for pension and health care insurance for their imams, priests and pastors.16

14

For some modern changes in the landscape of Islamic religiosity in BH, see Ahmet Alibašić, “Globalisation and its impact on Bosnian Muslims practices”, available at http://www.bosanskialim.com/, accessed 23 March 2010, and Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka (Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u BiH, 2008). 15 For the complete text of the Law, see http://www.mpr.gov.ba/userfiles/file/Biblioteka/zakoni/bh/ZAKON%20O%20SLOBODI%20VJERE/ZAKON%20o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf, accessed 8 November 2009. 16 See “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)” made in 2009 by the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at http://mrv.ba/site/index.php?option=com_ frontpage&Itemid=1, accessed 15 November 2009.


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In post-war Bosnia, the increased presence of religion in the public arena is evident. Some welcome the religious revival as a healthy assertion of identity after the decades long de-Islamisation process during the Communist period, while others see it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state. A survey conducted in 2006 and 2007 of attitudes of parents and students in Bosnia towards the content of education curricula, including religious education, showed that more than 90% were of opinion that religious education in some form should be taught in public schools.17 Increased public visibility has also exposed religious communities to new challenges arising from publicity and public critique. In the postwar period, the ICBH has been strongly and regularly criticised by the media, often in a manner it finds unacceptable (see section 15 below). Together with other religious leaders, the representatives of the ICBH are regularly invited to attend official ceremonials and celebrations at all levels.18 However, unlike Orthodox priests in Republika Srpska Muslim clergy never consecrate new public buildings and no Islamic symbols are present in public premises. 3


The main Muslim organisation in Bosnia and Herzogivina is the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH—Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Zelenih beretki 17, Sarajevo, 71000, tel: +387 33 533 000, fax: +387 33 441 800, www.rijaset.ba). The ICBH is, according to its Constitution, “the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of

17 Trbić, Dženana and Snježana Kojić Hasanagić, Obrazovanje u Bosni i Hercegovini: Čemu učimo djecu? Istraživanje stavova roditelja i učenika o vrijednostima u nastavnim planovima i programima i udžbenicima (Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What Do We Teach Children About? Survey on Attitudes of Parents and Students towards Values in Education Curricula, Programmes and Textbooks) (Sarajevo: Open Society Fund BH, 2007). 18 For more on the status of Islam in BH as a secular state, see article by Dr Fikret Karčić, one of leading Muslims thinkers in the country, “Islam u sekularnoj državi: primjer Bosne i Hercegovine (Islam in a secular state: Example of Bosnia and Herzegovina)” available at http://mri.ba/files/docs/Karcic-Islam_u_sekularnoj_drzavi.pdf, accessed 11 November 2009. Also see Kovačević, Emir, “The legal position of churches and religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Silvo Devetak et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 63–68.

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other Muslims who accept it as their own. The autonomy of ICBH is based on the religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”19 The ICBH is recognised by the state as the institution that has traditionally represented Islam in BH. It is independent in regulating its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property, and is financed mainly through waqfs, membership fees, zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, qurban, the revenue of its profit-generating agencies, donations and legacies. The oganisational structure of the ICBH consists of jama’as (community of at least 100 households), majlisas (usually a group of not less than seven jama’as in one municipality or city), 9 muftiates (mufti offices, covering the area of a canton) in Bosnia, including a military one as an extraterritorial muftiate, and 5 meshihats (organisation units gathering Bosnian Muslims living in a country abroad), including meshihats in Slovenia, Croatia, Sandžak in Serbia (Sanjak), Germany and Australia, as well as many other umbrella organisations gathering Bosnian Muslims on the basis of their ethno-religious identity in the USA, Austria and other European countries. The Riyasat, as the highest religious and administrative organ, is the main executive body of the ICBH and is headed by Rais al-ulama (the President of the Riyasat and the Grand Mufti or supreme authority in the ICBH), a position held by Dr Mustafa Cerić since 1993. The Council of the ICBH (Sabor or the ICBH’s assembly) is the highest representative and legislative body of the ICBH.20 Apart from the Office for the Bosniak Diaspora, Office for Hajj and Office for Relations with Islamic World as departments of the Riyasat, the main institutions of the ICBH include the Waqf or Endowments Directorate (Vakufska direkcija), El-Kalem publishing centre, the Center for Islamic Architecture, the Muslim News Agency (MINA), the Agency for Halal Quality Certification, the Gazi Husrev Bey Library, the Association of Islamic Scholars (Ilmija), the Tariqah Centre and 19 Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina, ed. Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1997), Articles 1–4, available at http://www.rijaset.ba/en/images/stories/Constitution.pdf, accessed 9 November 2009. 20 For more about the organisation of the ICBH, see Karčić, Fikret, “Administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Islamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (1999), pp. 535–561.


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the recently established BIR Radio Station. Educational institutions managed by the ICBH include six Islamic high schools or madrasas, a secular high school (Bošnjačka gimnazija) and three faculties (see below). All contact details can be found on the ICBH website, www .rijaset.ba. Several Sufi orders, mainly Qadiris and Naqshibandis, are active in the country, while Tarikatski centar (the Tariqa Centre) in Sarajevo, as an institution of the ICBH, is responsible for coordinating Sufi orders as part of the ICBH. In addition to the ICBH, there are other relatively small faith-based Muslim and Islamic associations with a variety of aims and orientations. Some are missionary, others cultural, scientific, charitable, student or exclusively female. The most significant Islamic charity is the Muslim Charitable Society ‘Merhamet’ (Muslimansko dobrotvorno društvo ‘Merhamet’, Azize Šaćirbegović 112, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 526 101, fax: +387 33 526 101), founded in 1913, banned 1946 and re-established 1990, which has been very active in collecting humanitarian aid, especially during the Bosnian war. Two of the main NGOs for Muslim women are the Women’s Education Centre ‘Nahla’ (Ženski edukacioni centar ‘Nahla’, www.nahla.ba), founded in 2000 in Sarajevo, and the Women’s Education Organisation ‘Kewser’ (Ženska edukaciona organizacija ‘Kewser’, www.kewser-zehra.com.ba), founded in 1994 in Zenica. The latter publishes a bi-monthly family magazine, Zehra. 4


There are approximately 1,700 mosques and masjids21 in BH, all run by the ICBH. Most Muslim villages and towns with significant Muslims communities have a mosque or masjid, either dating from Ottoman times or constructed by the local residents. In larger towns, such as Sarajevo, Zenica and Bugojno, a number of mosques were built after the war as a gift from friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Many mosques are still under reconstruction after being destroyed or damaged during the

21 In the Bosnian context, a mosque (džamija) is usually expected to have a minaret and a full-time imam. A masjid (mesdžid) is a smaller place for prayer, usually with part-time service and in most cases without a minaret.

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war, while others are new builds. The ICBH reports that 613 mosques, 218 masjids, 69 maktabs, 4 zawias, 37 turbes and 405 various other waqf properties were completely destroyed in the war of 1992–95.22 In at least one case (Divič), an Orthodox church was constructed on the site of a destroyed mosque. After years of negotiation, in 2008 the ICBH and Serbian Orthodox Church reached an agreement that the former would cover the cost of the ‘displacement’ of the church, which eventually took place in March 2009. The first attempt to start reconstruction of the sixteenth-century Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka on 7 May 2001 ended tragically with one Muslim believer being stoned to death by violent Serbian youths trying to stop the reconstruction. On 8 December 2008, a mosque in the Muslim village of Kula, in south eastern Republika Srpska, was destroyed by fire. According to the Republika Srpska authorities, this was caused by an electrical fault, while the Muslim community believes that it was arson. 5


Although the status of confessional religious education (CRE) in Bosnian public schools, including Islamic religious education, has varied over time, from canton to canton and entity to entity, today generally it is an elective course taught one hour a week in the first two grades of secondary school and one or two hours a week in all grades of primary school. Islamic teachers are trained and approved by the ICBH but employed and paid by public schools. While the status of CRE in Bosnian public schools is no longer questioned, the issue remains of how and in what form to introduce non-denominational religious studies, locally known as Culture of Religions, or History of Religions, in schools. For years, local and international organisations led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been trying to introduce such a one-year mandatory course, but with limited success. Progress is being made but the course is still at an experimental stage.23 In 2008, reli22

For more details see Omerdić, Muharem, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (Addendum to Study of the Bosniak Genocide) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), pp. 15–25, 461–463, 473, 476. 23 For more on the status and challenges of religious education in Bosnian public schools, see Open Society Fund BH, Religija i školovanje u otvorenom društvu: Preispitivanje modela religijskog obrazovanja u Bosni i Hecegovini (Religion and Education in Open Society: Assessing Religious Education Model in BH) (Sarajevo, 2009).


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gious education was also introduced as an optional course in public pre-school kindergartens in Sarajevo. The ICBH runs six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (the oldest, founded in 1537) in Sarajevo, Behrambey Madrasa (founded in 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (founded in 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik, Madrasa Osman-ef. Redžović (founded in 1992) in Visoko, Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (founded in 1993) in Cazin, and Karađoz-Bey Madrasa (founded in 1557, re-established in 1995) in Mostar. The madrasa programme has changed significantly over the past ten years, transforming them from institutions for training imams and teachers of Islamic religious education into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Around 400 students (roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools, and most of them go on to study at public universities. Only 10%–15% opt for Islamic studies in BH and abroad, usually in order to work as imams in jama’as and teachers of Islamic religious education in public schools, or possibly to go into other jobs at the ICBH and its institutions. 6


The Islamic Community has three major institutions of higher learning. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo (Ćemerlina 54, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 251 011, fax: +387 33 251 044, www.fin.ba), founded in 1977, today offers three different study programmes, including Islamic theology, religious education, and imam training. Some 300 full-time students and a similar number of part-time students are enrolled at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, with Bosnian being the language of instruction. So far, some 580 male and female students have graduated from the faculty in addition to 25 Masters and 15 PhDs. The Faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic Studies, a three-month non-degree programme in Bosnian and English for laymen and women. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic education academies with two-year programmes to train teachers for Islamic education in public schools. Both acquired the status of university faculties in 2006. The Faculty in Zenica (Juraja Neidharta 15, 72000 Zenica, tel: +387 32 402 919, fax: +387 32 402 919, www.ipf.unze.ba) now offers three-year

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programmes in three different departments, leading to BAs in Islamic education, social education and pre-school education. The Faculty in Bihać (Žegarska aleja, 77000 Bihać, tel: +387 37 220 162, fax: +387 37 228 160, www.ipf.unbi.ba) is the smallest of the three and currently offers only a BA in Islamic education. So far, about 600 students have graduated from the Faculty in Zenica, while the Faculty in Bihać has produced around 291 graduates. The faculties in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać have recently become associate institutions of the universities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać respectively.24 7


It has been standard practice to have separate cemeteries for the different religious communities for a very long time. In villages, burial practices have continued to observe the traditional separation, with many cemeteries located near the village mosque. In larger cities, there are mixed cemeteries with separate sections for adherents of different communities. Atheists and non-religious people are mostly buried in mixed public cemeteries. As a consequence of the war, many new shahid graveyards have been designated for the burial of both civilian and military Muslim dead. The Potočari Memorial Complex in Srebrenica is the biggest of all. 8


‘Chaplaincy’ in the armed forces is organised at all levels of military service for all the main religious communities. The Islamic service for the military is managed by the Military Muftiate (established in 1999), headed by the military mufti, who is nominated by the Rais al-ulama. The military mufti appoints the military imams and chief imams, subject to the approval of the Rais al-ulama.

24 For more on current Islamic education in Bosnia, see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009). For a history of Islamic education, see Kasumović, Ismet, Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave (Schools and Education in Bosnian Eyalet during the Ottoman Administration) (Mostar: Islamski kulturni centar, 1999).


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While there is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities, weekly visits and Friday prayers are organised in some detention centres, mainly by the local branches of the ICBH. Chaplaincy in health institutions does not exist, but in some larger hospitals prayer rooms are available. 9

Religious Festivals

Irrespective of the fact that BH does not yet have a law pertaining to public holidays, two ‘id or bayram festivals, as well as two (Catholic and Orthodox) Christmases and Easters, are celebrated as public holidays in BH. Both the religious and the secular media cover the celebrations of bayram, with state television broadcasting live from the Gazi Husrevbegova mosque in Sarajevo, where ‘id prayer is led and the khutba is delivered by the Rais al-ulama or his deputy. Local television stations also often broadcast all-day programmes devoted to bayrams and other traditional festivals. Muslim religious authorities arrange bayram receptions for public and diplomatic dignatories. The second day of Ramadan bayram is designated as the Day of Martyrs (shuhada’) in remembrance of those killed in the Bosnian war of 1992–95. On this occasion, martyrs’ cemeteries are visited and commemorative programmes are organised by the local authorities and the Islamic Community. The ‘id celebrations are famous for their bayram meals (Turkish: Bayram sofra). 10

Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted and many Muslims slaughter animals privately following halal practice. There are also a number of halal abbatoirs throughout BH. In February 2006, the ICBH established the Agency for Halal Quality Certification (Turalibegova 39, 75000 Tuzla, tel: +387 33 258 427, fax: +387 35 258 427, www.halal.ba), which certifies the compliance of food products with Islamic rules and the Halal Standards Rulebook. In 2009, the agency was successfully establishing its representative branches in other Balkan countries, while the state institutions in Bosnia agreed to fully subsidise the costs of issuing the halal certificate for local companies.

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mirnes kovač and aid smajić 11

Dress Codes

There are no special rules on dress code in any institution of learning or public offices that would affect the wearing of hijab, although there is evidence of discrimination against hijab-wearing women, especially in some areas of employment.25 After the 1992–95 war, it has become more common for Muslim women to wear hijab in public, and some women, mostly those who incline to the Salafi interpretation of Islam, wear niqab, although this has not traditionally been very common in Bosnian Muslim tradition since it was banned by the Communists in 1949. 12


The oldest printed periodical is Glasnik (the Herald), a bi-monthly official journal of the ICBH (founded in 1933, circulation 2,200). The largest and most influential newspaper is the ICBH biweekly Preporod (the Revival, founded in 1970, circulation around 25,000, www.pre porod.com), which mostly covers current events within the ICBH, as well as more daily news concerning Islam and Muslims in BH and abroad. The ICBH publishes the annual Takvim, a hijri calendar with accompanying intellectual articles on current issues in religion, culture and society (circulation 50,000). The Association of Ulama publishes a quarterly education magazine Novi Muallim (New Muallim, circulation 2,000). The Faculty of Islamic Studies publishes Zbornik FIN-a, an annual collection of scholarly papers mainly written by its staff (first published in 1989, circulation 300). The Islamic faculties and madrasas also have their own student magazines, the oldest being Zemzem, the student magazine of Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (first published in 1968, circulation around 1,000). The Gazi Husrev Bey Library (founded in 1537, with a collection of over 10,000 oriental manuscripts) publishes annals (Anali, first published in 1972, circulation around 500), which

25

For more on the issue as well as the current practice and perception of hijab in Bosnia, see Šeta, Đermana, “Hidžab na tržištu rada: izazov konceptu univerzalnih ljudskih prava” (Hijab in the Job Market: A Challenge to the Concept of Universal Human Rights) (unpublished MA thesis, University of Sarajevo, 2009).


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include studies and texts in the fields of Islamic studies, history and bibliography. Two independent Islamic magazines are published in Zenica: Novi Horizonti (New Horizons, founded in 1997, circulation around 3,000) and the pro-Salafi Saff (the Line, founded in 1998, circulation around 5,000). There are also a few Sufi publications: the quarterly magazine Kelamu-l-šifa (first published in 2004, with a variable circulation) and the older periodical, Šebi arus (first published in 1982). In November 2006 the ICBH established a radio and television station BIR, which has so far produced only radio programmes. 13

Family Law

Since the abolition of the Shari’a courts in 1946, only civil marriages are legally valid. However, it is very common to perform a so-called ‘Shari’a wedding’ after the civil ceremony and in the presence of local imam. This procedure is recommended by the ICBH authorities at all levels. With regard to inheritance, only civil courts have jurisdiction in the distribution of the property, debts and obligations upon an individual’s death.26 14 Interreligious Relations The Bosnian war was first and foremost an act of aggression from outside but it also had elements of a civil war fought along the lines of ethno-religious identities and interests and interreligious relations in the country have suffered as a result. Consequently, BH has become a focus point for various interreligious activities and projects, generally initiated jointly by various local and international actors. The ICBH is a co-founder and member of the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the IRC, Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 666 217, fax: +387 33 550 060, www.mrv.ba), which was

26 Hasani, Mustafa, “Tumačenje i primjena normi šerijatskog prava o mješovitim brakovima u BiH u periodu 1930.–1940” (Interpretation and application of norms of Shari’a law concerning mixed marriages in BH during 1930–1940 period, unpublished PhD dissertation, Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo) offers a more detailed account and reference sources on the issue of applying Islamic law in family matters.

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established in 1997 with the joint participation of the representatives of the four traditional religious communities in BH, namely the Catholics, Orthodox, and Jews in addition to the Muslims, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and reconciliation as well as to represent the common interests and activities of religious communities in Bosnia to the state. The current representative of the ICBH in the assembly of the IRC is Sarajevo mufti Husein Smajić. According to the Protocol of Cooperation signed between the IRC and the Council of Ministers of BH in 2008, the government took upon itself to provide regular annual financial support for the activities of IRC.27 Representatives and members of the ICBH are also active at the Interreligious Institute in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel/fax: +387 33 666 776, www.mri.ba), established in 2007 with the main aim of facilitating communication and cooperation between religious communities in the country and the wider society. The International Forum Bosna (Sime Milutinovića 10, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 217 665, fax: +387 33 206 484, www.ifbosna.org .ba) and other similar NGOs are organisations within which Muslims are active in rebuilding interreligious trust and relations. The contribution of Dr Mustafa Cerić, acting Rais al-ulama, to interreligious dialogue and understanding has been especially recognised. The awards he has received for his efforts in that regard include the UNESCO Felix Houphouet Boigny Award in 2003, the Sir Sternberg Award by the Interreligious Council of Christians and Jews in 2004, the Theodor-Heuss-Award in 2007 and the Eugen-Biser-Award in 2008. In addition, he is one of the 38 co-signatories of the “Open letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI”, in response to the Pope’s Regensburg speech (13 Oct 2006), and co-signatory of “A common word between us and you”—an appeal addressed by 138 Muslim individuals and organisations on 13 October 2007 to the Christian churches, for dialogue on the basis of love of God and love of neighbour.28 Dr Cerić also led an international Muslim delegation at the Catholic-Muslim forum in November 2008 in the Vatican. At the more grass-roots level of daily life, the quality of Muslim relations with the other two constituent peoples, namely the Croats and the Serbs, generally depends on the area that is considered, with

27 The Protocol is available at http://mrv.ba/site/index.php, accessed 14 November 2009. 28 http://www.acommonword.com/


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the places in parts of Republika Srpska and the Federation where ethnic cleansing and mass crimes against Muslims took place being more tense. The relations of Muslim returnees with Bosnian Serbs and Croats are also influenced by the fact that they often face obstacles to returning to their pre-war homes and reclaiming their private property. For example, Fata Orlović from Konjević Polje in Republika Srpska has been appealing without success to various courts for about ten years in an attempt to have removed from the courtyard of her house an Orthodox church built there illegally after the war in1997.29 On the other hand, in 2008 the Party of Democratic Action, which is the biggest Bosniak political party, nominated a Catholic priest and professor at the Faculty of Catholic Theology, Franjo Topić, to be mayor of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, which is predominantly inhabited by Muslims.30 According to one survey, over 90% of Bosniak citizens of Sarajevo approved this nomination, although Dr Topić eventually declined the offer, citing Church rules.31 15


Public debates about Islam, often initiated through the publications and media of the ICBH or the secular mass media, are noticeably present in Bosnian society. They are usually dominated by themes: the presence of Islam in the public sphere, discrimination against certain Islamic practices (such as wearing hijab), and Muslims generally, as well as new emerging orientations in the understanding and practice of Islamic teaching. For example, even though the law provides for religious education in kindergartens, its introduction in Sarajevo in 2008 sparked a heated debate in the secular-oriented media, with echoes that lasted till the beginning of 2009. Similar debates arose in 2008, when plans

29 For more on the obstacles often faced by Muslim returnees, see the previously mentioned “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)”. 30 See http://www.ezadar.hr/clanak/hrvatski-svecenik-novi-gradonacelnik-sarajeva, accessed 15 November 2009. 31 http://www.ktabkbih.net/info.asp?id=18241, accessed 4 December 2009. However, for more about challenges and prospects of interreligious dialogue in BH, see Zovkić, Mato, Međureligijski dijalog iz katoličke perspective u Bosni i Hercegovini (Interreligious Dialogue from Catholic Persepctive in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Sarajevo: Vrhbosanska katolička teologija, 1998).

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for building of new mosques in Sarajevo were revealed. Although the issue of Salafism and Wahhabism has recently subsided, it re-emerged with the killing of a Salafi-oriented Muslim on his way to a mosque in Mostar on 15 July 2009. A heated debate has been also sparked by the ICBH initiative to start building its headquarters in Sarajevo and the decision of several Bosniak businessmen to support the project financially. In addition, the presence of the ICBH in politics and state affairs seems to be a constant matter for debate, within which the Rais al-ulama is especially exposed to fierce and very often libellous attacks by some of the secular media. As a result, Islamophobia in the Bosnian media has been an issue throughout the past year. The most recent public discussion, however, has been concerned with the revelation of a document from the Office of the High Representative, which analyses alleged political and financial crime connected with prominent Bosnian Muslim political, religious and business personalities. 16


Religious festivals held annually at places called dovišta, ‘supplication sites’ or places for prayer, linked in local legends to miraculous events, attract thousands of men and women from around Bosnia and neighbouring countries. The most important of them is the annual gathering of Muslims at the Ajvatovica plateau near the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno in the last week of June, with a two-week cultural, religious and tourist programme. Other prayer sites include Djevojačka pećina (Maiden’s Cave) near Kladanj, Lastavica near Zenica, and the Musalla plateu near Sanski Most. Concerts and festivals of spiritual music and nasheeds are organised throughout the country by the ICBH and other Muslim civic associations on the occasions of religious holidays or Ramadan. An event called Mošus Pejgamberov is organised annually by the women’s association, Kewser, in memory of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, who is very much revered by pious Bosnian Muslim women. Early in May of each year the Sufi orders have their own central gathering in the form of a great mawlid in Blagaj at the spring of the Buna river.32

32 For more on the cultural particularities of Islamic life in Bosnian rural areas, see Bringa, Tone, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).


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Since the genocide in Srebrenica, 11 July is commemorated as Srebrenica day. During the ceremony, the collective funeral prayer (janaza) attended by tens of thousands is performed at the Memorial Centre in Potočari, and newly identified victims of the genocide are buried.33

33 As a sign of recognition of the Srebrenica massacre as an act of genocide, on 7 January 2009 the European Parliament passed a resolution proclaiming 11 July the European Commemorative Day for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 1995. The text of the resolution is available at http://www.europarl .europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0027&language=EN, accessed 11 November 2009.

BULGARIA Ina Merdjanova1 1

Muslim Populations

At the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans conquered the disintegrating medieval Bulgarian kingdom. Subsequently, Islam spread through the mass resettlement of Anatolian Turks, on the one hand, and through the conversion of the local Christian population, on the other. Ottoman rule lasted until 1878, when Bulgaria gained territorial autonomy.2 A mass exodus of Muslims followed. In 1881, an estimated 578,000 Muslims still lived in Bulgaria, comprising 28.8% of the total population.3 In 1900, the number of Muslims was 643,300, or 17.18% of the population, while in 1946 the number of Muslims had risen to 938,418, although in terms of percentage of the population, they were only 13.3%.4 According to the 2001 census, there are 966,978 Muslims in Bulgaria, comprising 12.2% of the population.5 The majority of Muslims are Sunnis of the Hanafi school. An earlier census (1992), which also included data on the population by ethnic and sectarian affiliation,

1 Dr Ina Merdjanova is Director of the Centre for Interreligious Dialogue and Conflict Prevention at the Scientific Research Department, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. 2 For the history of Islam in Bulgaria in general, see: Zhelyazkova, Antonina, Bozhidar Alexiev and Zhorzheta Nazarska (eds), Myusulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite i v Bulgaria [Muslim Communities in the Balkans and in Bulgaria] (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), 1997); Gradeva, Rossitsa (ed.). Istoriya na myusyulmanskata kultura po balgarskite zemi (History of Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands) (Sofia: IMIR, 2007). 3 Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 71. 4 http://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm, accessed 17 May 2009. 5 http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm, accessed 17 May 2009. For studies on Muslim minorities in Bulgaria, see: Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities; Neuburger, Mary, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ghodsee, Kristin, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

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indicated that 7.7% of Muslims were Alevis (also called Aliani or Kizilbashi).6 As far as ethnic groups are concerned, the Turks7 are concentrated in the south-east and north-east of Bulgaria and account for 75.3% of all Muslims in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule), also known as Pomaks,8 are concentrated in the central and western Rhodope mountains in southern Bulgaria and make up 13.5%; the Roma (dispersed throughout the whole country), some 40% of whom are Muslims, amount to 10.5%. The tiny Tatar community has some 4,500 members living in north-eastern Bulgaria. The 2001 census indicated that Muslims are the majority population in Kurdzhali district in south-east Bulgaria (69.9%) and in the Razgrad district in north-eastern Bulgaria (53.7%). Most Muslims live in rural areas, and have been seriously affected by the economic crisis following the collapse of communism. The results of the two censuses showed that between 1992 and 2001 the number of Muslims decreased by 143,317. This has been explained by the emigration of Muslims to more prosperous countries (Turkey and various Western countries are preferred destinations rather than the Arab world) and, to a much lesser degree, by the conversion of some Pomaks to Orthodox Christianity and to various Protestant denominations.9

6 On the Aliani/Kizilbashi, see De Jong, Frederick, “Problems concerning the origins of the Qizilbas in Bulgaria: remnants of the Safaviyya?”, Accademia Nationale dei Lincei, vol. 25 (1993), pp. 203–15. 7 On Turks in Bulgaria, see Popovic, Alexandre, “The Turks of Bulgaria (1878– 1985)”, in Central Asia Survey, vol. 5, no. 2, (1986), pp. 1–32; Höpken, Wolfgang, “From religious identity to ethnic mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria before, under and since communism”, in Poulton, Hugh and Suha Taji-Faruki (eds), Muslim Identity and the Balkan State. (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 54–82; Yalamov, Ibrahim. Istoriya na turskata obshtnost v Bulgaria [History of the Turkish Community in Bulgaria] (Sofia: IMIR, 2002). 8 On Pomaks, see: Todorova, Maria, “Identity (trans)formation among the Pomaks in Bulgaria”, in Kürt, Lásló and Juliet Langman (eds), Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 63–82; Georgieva, Tsvetana, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians”, in Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (2001), pp. 303–16. 9 Eminov, Ali, “Social construction of identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria” (2007), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/2–2007-Eminov.pdf, accessed 17 March 2009, p. 6.

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Islam and the State

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with no state religion, although the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the ‘traditional’ religion (82.64% of the population belong to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, although the number of regular church-goers is extremely low). Each year, the Religious Confessions Directorate at of the Council of Ministers allocates financial support from the state budget to several denominations with a longer historic presence, mainly for the renovation of their religious sites and to cover some of their running expenses. In 2009, the Islamic community received 250,000BGN (around €130,000).10 Overall, Muslims are well represented in the public arena, both religiously, through the Muftiate, and politically, through the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. This party was established in 1990 and has been represented in every post-communist parliament since. It has drawn support primarily from Turks and other Muslims, although its political leaders have been very careful to preclude any identification with Islamist or pan-Turkist ideas. 3


The Bulgarian Muslim community, called officially the Muslim Confession (Myusyulmansko izpovedanie), has well developed structures. It is administered by the Supreme Muslim Council (Vissh Duhoven Savet), with its core institution, the Chief Muftiate (Glavno Myuftiistvo, Bratia Miladinovi Str. N. 27, Sofia 1301, tel.: ++359 2 981 60 01, http://www.genmufti.net/). The Chief Muftiate presides over all the Muslims in the country, irrespective of their ethnic or intra-Islamic divisions. Twelve regional muftis are responsible for the administration of the community at the provincial level. The current Chief Mufti is Mustafa Alish Hadji.

10 Information obtained from Georgi Krastev, chief expert at the Religious Confessions Directorate, 8 October 2009.

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There are 1,217 mosques, where Friday prayers are conducted, as well as 240 masjids, and some 50 tekes and turbes, most of which date back to Ottoman times. Around 350 of the mosques have been constructed since the fall of communism. 5


Optional classes in Islam were introduced in public schools in 2000. Students use textbooks proposed by the Muftiate and approved by the Ministry of Education. The classes are conducted in Bulgarian once a week and are supported by the Muftiate. There are three Islamic secondary schools, in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad, which follow the general curriculum for state secondary schools, with extra classes in Islam. The graduates from these schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any discipline they choose. There is a growing tendency for imams to pursue higher education in the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. Apart from these three state accredited schools, the Muftiate organises Qur’an courses for children every summer. In 2009, over 500 such courses, Qur’anic ’schools’, were held throughout the country. 6


About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of the Muslim population. Most of the imams are elderly and privately educated, as no religious training was available under communism. The younger imams were educated in the three secondary schools mentioned above, and very few of them were trained in the Qur’anic schools. Some of the imams have diplomas from the Higher Islamic Institute or from various Islamic schools in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. According to the Muftiate, around 100 students sent by them have graduated from various Islamic schools abroad. The number of students who have pursued studies abroad through private channels outside the Muftiate is impossible to verify, although it does not seem to be very high.

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The Islamic Institute was founded in 1991 as a semi-higher institution, and became a higher institute in 1998. It offers courses in Islamic theology and is currently working towards state accreditation. Academic courses on the history and culture of Islam and the Middle East are offered on a regular basis by the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies at Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”. 7


Muslims are free to perform the traditional funeral rites, and separate cemeteries or separate burial plots for Muslims are available. 8


Imams have access to prisoners and may also visit patients in hospitals, although no special regulations exist. Imams (as well as Christian clergy) are not allowed in the armed forces, as military law bans any religious activities on military premises as well as ministry to the armed forces. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslims regularly celebrate their religious festivals. The chief mufti announces the beginning and the end of the month of Ramadan on national television and greets the believers at Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr). Greetings are also offered on television on the occasion of Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha). Muslims are officially entitled to a day’s holiday for these festivals. 10

Halal Food

Muslims have access to halal food through local shops, which are supplied by two local firms that perform ritual slaughter. Private slaughter is not forbidden. Halal food is not available in public institutions.

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Dress Codes

There are no formal regulations prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress, including hijab, in public places. There have been occasional bans on the hijab in state schools that require school uniform. 12


The Muftiate publishes a monthly bilingual journal Myusyulmani (Muslims) in Bulgarian and Turkish. The Fethullah-Gülen related Zaman Foundation publishes the newspaper Zaman (in Bulgarian and Turkish), some 20% of the content of which is devoted to religious issues. Other publications have occasionally appeared, but these have either been short-lived or achieved very limited circulation. There are no separate Muslim television or radio channels. Since the 2000 introduction of daily Turkish language programmes on national television and radio, national radio broadcasts a three-hour programme on Islam every Friday. Religious programmes are also available on some commercial television channels. 13

Family Law

Under communism, Muslims could only hold religious weddings privately, usually without a certificate being issued. Islamic marriage is practised mainly in the villages, after the couples have been married according to the civil law. At the present time, imams can issue certificates to those who conclude an Islamic marriage, but the state recognises only marriages contracted in a civil registry offices. The Islamic regulations on marriage, divorce and inheritance are followed unofficially, and the function of the spiritual court at the Muftiate is limited to hearing cases of clerics’ misdemeanours.

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Interreligious Relations11

Since 1989, Bulgaria has made significant progress in the (closely related) areas of interethnic and interreligious relations. It has reversed communist assimilation campaigns and introduced mother-tongue education for minority children and religious education. Moreover, it has adopted a number of important legislative documents, such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (both ratified in 1999) and the Law on Protection against Discrimination (in 2004). However, changes in policy and legislation have not always been followed through and put into practice. Generally, religious communities remain relatively closed and focused on their internal problems, preserving the boundaries between them and interacting mostly along the lines of what can be described as ‘negative tolerance’.12 In 2008, a new association, the National Council of the Religious Communities in Bulgaria, was established on the initiative of the Religious Confessions Directorate of the Council of Ministers. The Council includes the leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Islamic community, the Central Israeli (Jewish) Spiritual Council, the Catholic Church and the United Evangelical churches. The Council pledges to represent the Bulgarian model of religious tolerance to Europe and to the Balkans, and to develop interreligious dialogue as a means of improving understanding, preserving religious harmony and the preventing intolerance. Its impact on interreligious relations in the country remains to be seen. 15


In March 2009, after the complaint of a rightist politician, the security services launched an investigation into a local mayor and a teacher of

11 For a general overview, see Zhelyazkova, Antonina, Jorgen Nielsen and Gilles Kepel (eds), Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria: A Collection of Articles (in English and in Bulgarian) (Sofia: IMIR, 1995). 12 See Merdjanova, Ina, “Uneasy tolerance: Interreligious relations in Bulgaria after the fall of communism”, Religion, State and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (2007), pp. 95–103.

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Islam in the village of Ribnovo in western Rhodope on suspicion that they had been spreading radical Islam among the Pomak population there. No charges have been filed. In September 2009, a newly established Muslim-Democratic Union (Myusyulman-Demokratichen Sayuz) in Slavyanovo village in northeast Bulgaria stirred heated public debates. The founders were investigated following accusations that they were setting up a political party based on religious grounds, which is prohibited by the Bulgarian Constitution. The Chief Muftiate issued an appeal to the media, complaining about the negative presentations of Muslims by politicians and journalists. Sensationalist and mostly unverified press releases about alleged Islamic extremist organisations and activities in the country do often provoke tension and foster intolerant attitudes in society. A few cases of mosque desecration were reported in 2009, and the construction of two new mosques, one in Sofia and one in Bourgas, was vetoed. 16


The week of the Prophet’s birthday is celebrated annually with both religious sermons and various musical performances, plays and conferences. There is an annual Islamic Education Week in the last week of Ramadan. Both events are organised nation-wide by the Chief Muftiate and are very well attended.

CROATIA Dino Mujadžević1 1

Muslim Populations

The last national census for the Republic of Croatia, in 2001, provides very reliable data on the number and dispersion of the Muslim (as well as other religious) population, as well as ethnic groups. The census recorded 56,777 people who identified themselves as Muslims (1.28% of the total population of 4,437,460). This is a small increase from the 54,814 recorded in the 1991 census. When counted by administrative division, the largest numbers of Muslims live in the City of Zagreb (16,215—2.08% of the population) and following counties (županije):2 Primorsko-goranska (Rijeka: 9,029—2.96%), Istarska (Pula: 8,623—4.18%), Sisačko-moslavačka (Sisak: 3,887—2.10%), Dubrovačkoneretvanska (Dubrovnik: 2,986—2.43%), Vukovarsko-srijemska (Vukovar: 2,843—1.39%), Karlovačka (Karlovac: 1,984—1.40%).3 Thus, Muslims are largely concentrated in urban areas, most notably in the capital and largest industrial centre Zagreb, and other major towns and industrial centres in mainland Croatia. Muslims are also significantly present in ports and the industrial and tourist centres on the northern Adriatic. The historic city of Dubrovnik on the southern Adriatic also has a relatively large Muslim population.4 Smaller concentrations of Muslims live in rural communities situated along the state border with Bosnia and Herzegovina5 1 Dr Dino Mujadžević is a research assistant at the Croatian Institute for History in Slavonski Brod and a lecturer in Islamic civilisation in the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb. 2 Županija (pl. županije) is the Croatian term for administrative region, sometimes translated as district or county. 3 From the official website of the State Statistical Institute: http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/ censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04.html, accessed 1 October 2009. 4 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04_ zup08.html;http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/ H01_02_04_zup18.html;http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/ H01_02_04/H01_02_04_zup19.html, accessed 1 October 2009. 5 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04_ zup16.html;http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/ H01_02_04_zup04.html, accessed 1 October 2009.

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The largest Muslim ethnic group in Croatia are Bosniaks (20,755— 0.47% of the total Croatian population). This traditionally exclusively Muslim group is composed of immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, who arrived largely in the second half of the twentieth century, and their descendants. In addition, according to the 2001 census, 19,677 people identified themselves as ‘ethnic Muslims’. This term was used until 1993 as the official term for Bosniaks in Bosnia and elsewhere and, sometimes, for other Slavic Muslims in Macedonia and Kosovo. The 1991 census records 43,000 ‘Muslims’ in Croatia. It is fair to assume that the almost all the ‘Muslims’ in the 2001 census are of Bosniak origin, but due to various factors—such as ignorance about the changed terminology or desire to assimilate into Croatian society by accepting a more neutral ethnic identification—they did not identify themselves as Bosniaks.6 Albanians also account for a large number of Muslims in Croatia (15,082—0.34% of the total population), the community mainly consisting of immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia who settled in Croatia in the second half of the twentieth century, and their descendants. A large number of Albanians in Croatia are also Catholic Christians, but there are no reliable data to establish the exact number of adherents of both religions in this group. A significant part of the Roma population (9,463—0.21%) has Muslim roots, but the exact number of those who identify themselves as Muslims is unknown. The Muslim part of the Roma population in Croatia are immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, who arrived in the second half of the twentieth century, and their descendants. According to census data, there are also 300 ethnic Turks, immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia, and their descendants. It is fair to speculate that smaller numbers of Muslims, who have ethnic origins in all the above-mentioned ethnic groups, are ethnically assimilated and declare themselves as belonging to the Croat ethnic majority.7 Muslims in Croatia are almost exclusively Sunnis and belong to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, with very small numbers of adherents to the Naqshabandi, Qadiri and Bektashi Sufi orders. 6 Tanković, Šemso, Bošnjaci u Republici Hrvatskoj (Bosniaks in the Republic of Croatia) (Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 1997); http://www.dzs .hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html;http://www.index .hr/vijesti/clanak/bosnjacka-nacionalna-zajednica-hrvatske-poslala-zahtjev-drzavnomvrhu-da-se-muslimani-prevedu-u-bosnjake/201295.aspx, accessed 1 October 2009. 7 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html, accessed 1 October 2009.

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Islam in Croatia has a very long but broken history. The settlement of Ismaeliti—a Muslim population of unknown origin—is documented in 1196 in Osijek. This population, as well as Ismaeliti and similar groups of Muslims in neighbouring Hungary, was religiously and ethnically assimilated under pressure from Catholic Church in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.8 During the sixteenth century, the Ottomans established their rule in the eastern parts of country (Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, inner Dalmatia), covering roughly half of what is now Croatia. According to reliable estimates, during the sixteenth century around a quarter of the population of Slavonia, the largest and most populous province under Ottoman rule, were Muslims, living mostly in the towns. Among them, the cities of Osijek (with 1,500 mostly Muslim households in the late seventeenth century) and Požega (1,150 Muslim and 200 Christian households in the late seventeenth century) were the largest Muslim settlements. The Muslim population in Slavonia mainly originated from other parts of the Ottoman Empire, chiefly Bosnia, and the number of indigenous converts to Islam was relatively small. There are no reliable estimates about the Muslim population for other parts of Croatia. Islamic religious infrastructure, such as mosques, tekkes and waqfs, was fairly developed in towns and some villages, especially in Slavonia and inner Dalmatia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, there were 14 mosques in Požega alone.9 Ottoman rule in Croatia ended after the Habsburg and Venetian conquest at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. The entire Muslim population left these areas or was expelled, killed or enslaved. Small numbers of Muslims in Lika converted to Catholicism. All the Islamic religious infrastructure, including cemeteries, was destroyed or used for other purposes.10 Muslims started to return to Croatia only two centuries later, from 1878, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy occupied present-day 8 Mažuran, Ive, Srednjovjekovni i turski Osijek (Mediaeval and Turkish Osijek) (Osijek: Zavod za znanstveni rad u Osijeku HAZU, 1994), p. 50. 9 Moačanin, Nenad, Slavonija i Srijem u razdoblju osmanske vladavine (Slavonija and Srijem in the Age of Ottoman Rule) (Slavonsti Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest 2005), p. 43.; idem, Turska Hrvatska (Turkish Croatia) (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska 1999), pp. 146–147, 178–179. 10 For the plight of the Muslim population in lands reconquered by the Habsburgs, including Croatia, see the autobiographical accounts of Ottoman prisoners in Habsburg captivity: Osman-aga of Temisoara, Der Gefangene der Giauren. Die abenteuerlichen Schicksale des Dolmetschers Osman Ağa aus Temeschwar, von ihm selbst erzählt (Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Verlag Styria, 1962).

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Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this new modern environment, Bosniaks (the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina) were able to travel, study and settle in other parts of the monarchy. According to the 1910 census, only 204 Muslims lived in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. The Austrian part of the monarchy recognised Islam as an official religion in 1912, while the Hungarian and Croatian parliaments did the same in 1916. It is also important to emphasis that, in the first half of the twentieth century, the Croatian political elite, and especially the nationalist opposition, considered Bosniaks to be part of the Croat nation and accepted Islam as part of the national heritage. This enabled the Muslim community in Zagreb to work in a relatively friendly environment and to establish themselves socially. After the establishment of the South Slavic state (later Yugoslavia) in 1918, Muslims of different professions and social strata, mostly Bosniaks, began to settle permanently in larger numbers in Zagreb. According to the 1931 census, there were 4,750 Muslims in Croatia, around 3,000 of them in Zagreb. In 1919, a Muslim religious community (džemat) headed by an imam was officially founded in Zagreb and, in 1922, the imam of Zagreb was given the title of mufti. Previously independent, this community officially became part of Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community (Islamska vjerska zajednica) in 1934. A Shari’a court was established in Zagreb in 1935, adjudicating in legal issues relating to Muslim marriage, family and inheritance. An initiative to build a mosque in Zagreb was announced in 1938, but realised only in 1944 under the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustaša regime, which used it for propaganda purposes. The Ustaša regime was given control of Croatia and Bosnia by the Axis powers and, in order to assimilate Bosniaks into the greater Croatian nation, Ustašas sought to attract Muslim leaders in Croatia and Bosnia. Some imams in Croatia collaborated with the regime and, in 1945, when the Communists came to power, they were severely punished by execution or imprisonment. Most prominently, the mufti of Zagreb, Ismet Muftić, was arrested and executed. In 1946, after legal reforms in Yugoslavia, the Shari’a court in Zagreb was suspended. In 1948, in order to erase what they saw as the Ustaša legacy, the Zagreb city authorities closed the mosque built in 1944, destroyed the minarets and demolished the interior. Under the socialist regime (1945–90), Muslims in Croatia, headed by the mufti of Zagreb, continued to operate in a renewed Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community, and several Muslim communities in other Croatian towns were founded. After Croatia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, the Yugoslav Islamic

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Religious Community was dismantled and the Islamic Religious Community in Croatia, later the Islamic Community in Croatia (Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj, ICC) started to operate independently.11 2

Islam and the State

Croatia is a parliamentary democracy. According to the Constitution all religious communities are equal before the law and are separate from the state (Article 41).12 The legal status of religious communities is regulated by a law promulgated by parliament in 2002,13 according to which the government defines its relations with religious groups through special agreements. The agreement with the ICC—which is currently the only official Islamic community in Croatia—was signed in 2002. It stipulates the rights of the ICC with regard to mosque construction, freedom of speech and publishing, religious education in public schools, financial arrangements, chaplaincy in prisons, armed forces, police, etc. It also gives the ICC the right to register marriages. Imams’ salaries, healthcare and pension contributions are fully paid by the government. The government also supports ethnic minorities through projects such as seminars, publications and other activities. 3


The Islamic Community in Croatia (Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj, ICC, Gavellina Street bb, 10000 Zagreb, http://www.islamska-zajednica .hr) is the only officially registered Islamic religious community in the country. The ICC has established cooperation with government, city and municipal authorities and relations with other religious communities. It

11

For the history of the modern Muslim community, see Omerbašić, Šefko, Islam i muslimani u Hrvatskoj (Islam and Muslims in Croatia) (Zagreb: Mešihat Islamske zajednice u Hrvatskoj, 1999); Hasanbegović, Zlatko, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878.– 1945. Doba utemeljenja (Muslims in Zagreb, 1878.–1945. The Founding Period) (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu i Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007); Marinović Bobinac, Ankica and Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Vjerske zajednice u Hrvatskoj (Religious Communities in Croatia) (Zagreb: Prometej, 2008), pp. 285–286. 12 The latest version of the Constitution of Republic of Croatia is available at http:// www.sabor.hr. 13 Text of this law is available at http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/309118 .html, accessed 1 October 2009.

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consists of an Assembly (Sabor), an executive body called the Mešihat, the Mufti of Zagreb and his office, local Muslim communities in various towns (medžlisi) and the Zagreb Islamic high school (Islamska gimnazija). The current mufti of Zagreb and president of the Mešihat is Ševko Omerbašić. The ICC is in practice an independent religious institution, despite its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby the ICC recognizes its leader (Reisu-l-ulema) in Sarajevo as the supreme religious leader, while the Reisu-l-ulema confirms the mufti as the head of the ICC. 4


There are two purpose-built mosques in Croatia, one in Zagreb and the other in the village of Gunja . The Muslims of Zagreb decided to build a new mosque in 1961 and began construction 20 years later. The mosque was officially opened in September 1987 and since then has been the centre of Islamic life in Croatia. It is part of an Islamic centre which comprises prayer facilities, a library, offices, apartments for imams, classrooms, a restaurant, a youth club, a theatre, Islamic high school premises, etc. In 15 other cities there are prayer facilities (masjids). Construction of a new mosque and Islamic centre in the city of Rijeka started in September 2009. 5


Muslims have the right to organise confessional religious education in all public schools where there are seven or more Muslim pupils in a class. The Islamic community in Zagreb has been running an Islamic religious school, the Dr Ahmed Smajlović madrasa, since 1992. In 2006, due to low enrolment of new pupils, it was converted to a general Islamic high school. The school’s curriculum is in line with that of the state high schools. It includes Islamic subjects, but a graduate does not receive the title of imam.14

14

See also: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka and Marinović Bobinac, Ankica, “Islamische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in Ednan Aslan (ed), Islamische Erziehung in Europa / Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 239–258; http://www.zg-medresa.hr, accessed 1 October 2009.

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Universities do not offer Islamic studies. Plans for an Islamic Faculty as part of the Islamic Centre in Zagreb have been initiated, but little progress has been made. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia, but also to Turkey and Arab countries. Influence of conservative Islamic trends from these countries is very limited among these cadres. 7


Muslims have the right to be buried according to Islamic rites. In Zagreb, Muslims have a separate section in the Mirogoj cemetery. In other cities, Muslim graves are usually mixed with those of non-Muslims. 8


Imams have the right to visit and ask for a separate room for prayer in all public institutions, including the police, the armed forces, prisons and hospitals (article 17 of the Agreement). Muslims serving in the armed forces have the right to ask for pork-free food, and to be transported to the nearest mosque on Fridays to perform the prayer. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslims have the right to a day’s holiday on both major festivals, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha. In practice, private companies are less likely to grant this right. The ‘Id prayers are broadcast live by the national television and radio stations. On the days of ‘Id, a prominent politician (the president of the Republic, prime minister, or the mayor of Zagreb) will usually visit the Zagreb mosque to greet Muslims and their leaders. 10 Halal Food The Halal Quality Agency of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has so far awarded 22 Croatian companies the halal quality certificate. (The full list is available at http://www.halal.ba.) However, not all companies have all their products halal certified, and certified

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products still do not carry the halal logo, which makes them difficult to identify. Certified companies were obliged to label their halal certified products with the logo by 1 July 2009. Restaurants and fast food outlets are not halal certified. The ICC recently opened a butcher’s shop on the mosque premises, but it had to be closed for lack of custom, as most Muslims live far from the mosque and found it difficult to buy there. Unlicensed slaughter is strictly prohibited, while qurban slaughter is organised by the Islamic Community in cooperation with a local meat company. 11

Dress Codes

Civil law does not prohibit Muslim women from wearing hijab, though only a few do so. Wearing hijab is permitted in photographs for official documents. 12


The ICC is involved in publishing Islamic books and books related to the Muslim heritage in Croatia, and also publishes an occasional almanac (Takvim) and bulletin (Bilten). News about the ICC is published on its website: http://www.islamska-zajednica.hr. Muslims usually read religious newspapers imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imams regularly broadcast sermons on national television and radio stations. 13

Family Law

All family legal issues, except registration of marriage, are referred to the civil courts. 14


The mufti and other leaders of the ICC participate regularly in interreligious conferences with senior representatives of religious communities in Croatia. Representatives of the ICC also participate regularly in interreligous meetings for prayer organised in Croatia. There is good and continual cooperation between the ICC and the Council for Ecumenism and Dialogue of the Croatian Bishops’ Conference.

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As a result of the cultural proximity of Croatian Muslims with the Christian majority, there are no social tensions and Muslims are well integrated in Croatian society. Nevertheless, negative prejudices towards Muslims, increased by ethnic war between Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia in 1993–1994, still have some influence on public opinion, which was visible in the resistance of part of the local population to the building of the Islamic Centre in Rijeka. On the other hand, major political groupings and the relevant media tend to be supportive and open to the ICC and Muslims. 16


The ICC organises an annual European competition in Qur’an recitation in conjunction with the celebration of the anniversary of the opening of the Zagreb mosque.

CYPRUS Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay1 1

Muslim Populations

The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates from the seventh century, but Islam took root, grew, and was institutionalised on the island during the period of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960, when the island gained its independence and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was formed. The RoC was based on a consociational system of power-sharing between the Turks and Greeks of the island, each community dealing with its own religious affairs. However, this power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963, leading to a period of intermittent inter-communal violence over the next decade. During this period, the RoC came under the sole control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots established their own administration in armed enclaves. A Greek-sponsored coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention in 1974 ultimately led to the island’s present division. Greek Cypriots residing in the north fled to the south of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the south to the north. By 1979, there were only around 1,000 Greek Cypriots remaining in the north (out of an original 142,000) and only 150 Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south (out of an original 55,000).2 After the division of the island, the RoC, under Greek-Cypriot control, in the south, became the only internationally recognised government of the island. Turkish Cypriots in 1983 proclaimed a state in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains unrecognised to this day by any country other than Turkey.

1 Ali Dayıoğlu is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations, Near East University, Northern Cyprus. He researches the Turkish-Muslim minority in Bulgaria and Greece and the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Mete Hatay is Project Leader at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Cyprus Centre, Nicosia. 2 Gürel, Ayla and Kudret Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, PRIO Report 3/2006 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2006), pp. 3–4.

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Although the RoC is constitutionally a bicommunal state, in 2004 it became a member of the European Union without its Turkish Cypriot partners. Turkish Cypriots may carry European passports via the RoC, but the northern part of the island was excluded from the EU’s acquis communautaire. According to the 2006 Demographic Report of the RoC’s Statistical Service department, the current population in the south, under the RoC-controlled area, is 778,700. Of these, 118,100 are foreign residents who do not have Cypriot citizenship. Some reports also claim that there are 20,000–30,000 illegal or unrecorded foreigners living in the south.3 Of these, an estimated 15,000–20,000 are Muslims of various nationalities. During the civil war in Lebanon, many Lebanese fled and settled in Cyprus, and Cyprus is today an important receiving country for economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from nearby Muslim countries, South East Asia and Africa. According to UNHCR, 900 refugees and more than 10,000 asylum seekers are currently living in Cyprus, the majority of whom are Muslims. Cyprus is also home to a number of private universities and colleges, which attract international students, many from Bangladesh and Pakistan.4 Apart from this immigrant and student population, a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots, mostly of Roma origin, moved from the island’s north to the south after the 2003 opening of the ceasefire line that divides the island, especially since Cyprus’s 2004 European Union accession. However, according to a recent study, the Muslim population of Turkish Cypriot extraction living in the south still does not exceed 1%.5 In the north, the total population, according to the 2006 census, is 256,644, although this census does not include the rotating population of Turkish military, which is estimated at 30,000–35,000 at any one time. Of the total recorded population, 178,031 are citizens of the TRNC, although 27,333 of these gave their birthplace as Turkey. Although religion was not listed on the census, and even though the majority of the population is fundamentally secular, Turkish Cypriots are officially considered to be Muslims. There are also 70,525 immi3 Trimikliniotis, Nicos and Corina Demetriou, Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Cyprus, Cyprus Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS (Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg, 2005), p. 8, http://www.politis-europe .uni-oldenburg.de/download/Cyprus.pdf, accessed 26 April 2010. 4 Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, Statistics of Education 2005/2006, Nicosia 2007, available at www.mof.gov.cy. 5 Directorate General Internal Politics of the Union, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?”, IP/B/CULT/IC/2006_061.

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grants, who are nationals of the Republic of Turkey, recorded in the census, almost all of whom are Muslims. The majority of this group are either studying in the universities of north Cyprus or working in the island’s growing construction, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Amongst the latter group there are many Kurdish and Arabic speakers. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi or Shafi’i schools. In addition, there is a large Alevi immigrant population, approximately half of them Kurdish and half Turkish. The president of the largest Alevi association has claimed that they number around 4,000–5,000. The majority of Arabic-speaking Turkish nationals are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, but there is also a small population of Alawites or Nusayris (different from Alevis), most of whom are from the Hatay area of southern Turkey. The remaining 8,088 foreign residents are listed in the census as being of other nationalities, including the UK, Pakistan, Bulgaria and African countries. Of these, approximately half are Muslims.6 2

Islam and the State

Article 18 of the 1960 Constitution of the RoC guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone. It also provides in principle that the administration of the RoC, in the application of the law, will not discriminate against any religion or religious institution. Because of the bi-communal nature of the RoC, provisions are made in the Constitution for the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the institution of waqf and the Laws and Principles of awqaf (Ahkamül Evkaf ). These religious foundations are among the principle institutions of the Turkish Cypriot community, and historically the Evkaf was one of the largest landholders in the island. In the past, funds generated from these properties supported schools and other public works and religious institutions. Article 110 of the RoC Constitution confirms that the control of these properties and their funds belongs solely to the Evkaf, and any laws and regulations shall be enacted by the Turkish Communal Chamber, which during its years of operation (1960–1963) was comprised of elected Turkish Cypriot deputies.

6 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of Cyprus in the light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census, PRIO Report 2/2007 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007).

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Article 23 of the Constitution secures properties belonging to mosques and other Muslim religious institutions. According to this article, no confiscation, restriction or limitation of ownership rights may take place with regard to such movable or immovable properties without the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and for the purposes of town and country planning. Muslim institutions are exempt from taxes and are eligible for government subsidies. However, after 1974, the Evkaf lost control over all its properties in the south and operates only in the north. As with all other Turkish Cypriot property in the south, Evkaf property has been placed under the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management Service, an institution established after the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the south. Despite the provisions in the Constitution, many complaints have been lodged pertaining to violations in the form of acquisitions made by the RoC in respect of waqf properties. After the proclamation of their own state in 1983, Turkish Cypriots approved a constitution by referendum. Article 1 of the TRNC Constitution stresses the secular character of the state, while Article 23 guarantees freedom of faith and conscience. Provisions have been made regarding acquisitions, requisitions, restrictions and limitations relating to waqf properties in Article 42. According to this article, matters relating to acquisitions and requisitions of waqf properties are to be regulated by law enacted in accordance with the Laws and Principles of Evkaf. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, all matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of waqf or any Muslim religious institutions shall exclusively be subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf, the legislation in force and the laws to be enacted by the Parliament. The same article further provides that properties belonging to the waqf institution shall be exempted from any form of taxation. 3


Historically, the two primary Muslim organisations in Cyprus are the Evkaf (Vakıflar İdaresi, Nicosia, PO Box 118, via Mersin 10, Turkey), which manages the affairs of land and business holdings that have been donated for religious purposes, and the Müftü (or Mufti) (KKTC Din İşleri Başkanlığı, Müftü Raci sokak No. 24, Nicosia via Mersin 10, Turkey, http://www.kktcdinisleri.com/baskanligimiz.html ), who is the official

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spiritual head of the community. As explained above, as representative of Muslims in Cyprus, the Evkaf Administration, currently called the Evkaf and Religious Affairs Office (Vakıflar ve Din İşleri Dairesi), owns all the island’s mosques, cemeteries, tekes and turbes (shrines). As explained above, following the 1974 division of the island, the Evkaf lost control of all holdings in the south, both religious and commercial, and operates solely in the north. Similarly, although the mufti is the official spiritual head of the Muslim community in Cyprus, after 1974 his office moved to the north, and he is effectively without power in the south. Because Muslim organisations controlled by Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after 1974, no such Muslim-controlled organisations remained in the south to provide religious personnel and ensure the maintenance and upkeep of mosques. The need to provide such services, especially for immigrant Muslims, is currently being met by the World Islamic Call Society, an organisation based in Libya. As explained above, the Evkaf was the most important institution responsible for religious affairs in Cyprus. The mufti, once the spiritual leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, lost his influence during the twentieth century, as the Turkish Cypriot community was increasingly secularised. While once influential in legal and educational matters and in areas such as marriage and divorce, the mufti lost his historical title and privileges in the 1980s and became the director of religious affairs (DRA) under the control of the Evkaf Administration, which is run by a board appointed by the prime minister. In addition, the DRA has authority only in the north. Because of the isolation and non-recognition of the north, these institutions receive significant financial contributions, personnel and guidance from Turkey. In addition to these official institutions, two associations, the Association of Universal Love and Brotherhood (Evrensel Sevgi ve Kardeşlik Derneği, http://www.eskad.org.tr) and the Cyprus Turkish Islam Association (Kıbrıs Türk İslam Cemiyeti, Cubuk Sokak, No. 1 Kucukkaymakli/Lefkosa. North Cyprus via Mersin 10, Turkey, tel: +90 392 229 13 24, www.kibristurkislam.org) sponsor various activities and programmes, mainly for students from Turkey studying on the island. The former was founded by the former mufti, who was educated in Saudi Arabia and espoused a particular interpretation of Islam that emphasised universal peace. The latter was influenced by the Turkish-Islam Synthesis, popular in Turkey in the 1980s, which attempted to combine nationalism and Islam.

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Certain tariqas also operate in north Cyprus, the most important being the Naqshbandi tariqa, whose leader, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısi (Nazim al-Qubrusi), has many followers in Europe and the Americas. His main dergah is based in the small town of Lefke, where he regularly receives disciples visiting from abroad. Along with the Sunni Muslim institutions, there are two Alevi associations, whose members are immigrants from Turkey. The larger of the two, Hacı Bektaşi Veli Derneği (Baf Sokak, No. 105. P.K: 359, Lefkosa. North Cyprus, via Mersin 10, Turkey; tel. +90 392 228 11 59, http://www.kktcalevileri.org/) has recently acquired land from the government to build a cemevi, or Alevi place of worship. Currently, they use the association’s building for their rituals and gatherings. 4


Prior to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from their villages, either during the period of conflict in the 1960s or after 1974, there were 102 mosques in the south as well as four tekes and 148 cemeteries. According to a 2006 report prepared by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, 16 of these mosques have been completely destroyed, only 25 are in good condition, and the rest are neglected or partially ruined. Of the cemeteries, 43 have been totally destroyed; three are in good condition, and the rest are in a very poor state.7 Since the island’s division, these properties have been under the control of Turkish Cypriot Properties Management, an institution established by the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC after 1974. Although there is provision in this department’s budget for the repair and management of Muslim religious sites, until 2003 few repairs had been carried out. Until 1990, only €206,120 had been spent on the upkeep of Muslim religious sites. During the RoC’s EU accession process between 2000 and 2003, this amount was increased to approximately €100,000 per year. This increase followed the publication of a Council of Europe report that cited these religious sites’ state of disrepair.8 The amount

7 Erasing the Past: Turkish Cypriot Culture and Religous Heritage under the Control of the Greek Cypriot Administration (Nicosia: Political and Cultural Researches Department of the TRNC Presidency, 2006). 8 http://moi.gov.cy/new/admin/sections/filedepot/uploaded/file/PDF_FILES/ PDF_1st_OP_Cyprus.pdf, accessed 17 May 2009.

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then increased significantly in 2004, following the opening of Cyprus’ checkpoints, the subsequent return of many Turkish Cypriots to visit their villages, and the May 2004 accession of the RoC to the EU. From 2004 to 2006, the RoC spent approximately €500,000 each year for the upkeep of Muslim religious properties, and this was estimated to have increased further in 2007, to approximately €750,000.9 A more recent (2008) UNDP-funded project to list and evaluate religious sites found that 60 mosques in the south were in good condition after repairs.10 Today, only five of the above mentioned mosques in the south are in use, and these are in towns with immigrant Muslim populations. The mosques in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol are maintained and run by the Islamic Call Society of Libya. Another small mosque in Limassol has been recently renovated at the request of the growing Turkish Cypriot Muslim community there (mainly Roma). A Turkish Cypriot imam travels from the north to this mosque every week for the Friday prayers, and also on religious festivals. It should be noted that the largest Muslim immigrant community lives in Nicosia, where there is only one functioning mosque. Although two other mosques have been renovated and could be used, they have not been opened for use. The authors observed that the one operational mosque is not sufficient to meet the increasing demand of practising Muslims, especially for Friday prayers. The one functioning mosque accommodates 750 worshippers, according to the mosque’s imam, but during Friday prayers the authors observed that at least that number had overflowed to fill the mosque’s garden and even its car park, where worshippers used rolls of paper to cover the ground for prayers. In the north, according to data provided by the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA), Yusuf Suiçmez, there were 182 functioning mosques in 2009. Of these, 84 existed before the island’s division, while 48 were churches that had been converted to mosques after 1974. In addition, four buildings previously used as cinemas or schools had been converted into mosques. Suiçmez also stated that between 1974 and 2009, 39 new mosques had been built, and of these 31 were financed by the religious affairs counsellor of the Turkish

9 http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_doha.nsf/misc_en/8367AC21D2 B39069432572E400246FC3?OpenDocument, accessed 17 May 2009. 10 See http://www.cyprustemples.com.

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Embassy. He further stated that the construction of nine mosques was on-going in 2009 and that another seven mosques were being planned.11 In addition, the DRA and the Nicosia Turkish Municipality agreed in 2009 to jointly construct a large new mosque in the capital, Nicosia. Various trade unions, but especially, the teachers’ unions opposed the plan, arguing that as there are 182 mosques but only 161 schools, it would be more appropriate to build more schools. In recent years, in view of Greek Cypriot and international reactions against the conversion of churches into mosques, more weight has been given to building new places of worship. Mosques in Northern Cyprus belong in law to the Evkaf Administration. Although the Evkaf collects considerable revenue from its various properties, only 10% of the cost of mosque upkeep and clerical salaries is provided by this Administration. The remaining 90% comes from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn requests this amount from Turkey, so the cost of mosque maintenance and staffing, like much of the infrastructure in the north, is provided by Turkey. For instance, the religious affairs counsellor of the Turkish Embassy set aside a sum of 13 million Turkish Liras (approximately €6.5 million) in the 2009 budget to be utilised for building, repairing and maintaining mosques and lodgings and for other religious purposes. 5


There are no state-supported Islamic schools in either part of Cyprus. In the south, instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. However, parents of different faiths may submit a written request for their children to be exempted from this subject. Turkish Cypriot pupils who attend schools in the south, if there are reasonable numbers of them, may receive religious instruction in their own language. Currently, a Turkish Cypriot teacher gives religious lessons in Turkish in Limassol, where most Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by the RoC live. It must be noted, however, that, despite the provisions of the Constitution of the RoC and repeated assurances by the RoC administration to the United

11 Ernur, Ergül, “16 Yeni cami için 13 trilyon (13 trillions for new mosques)”, Kıbrıs, 7 May 2009.

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Nations Secretary General, to date no Turkish primary school has been opened in the south of the island.12 According to the TRNC Constitution, “Religious education and instruction shall be under the supervision and control of the state.” Until 2005, primary and secondary schools had compulsory religious instruction under the title ‘religious culture and morality (ethics)’. Lessons included instruction about monotheist religions in general, with concentration on the Hanafi branch of Sunni Islam. However, most schools had for years suffered from a lack of competent teachers and so these lessons were often neglected.13 New regulations in 2005 allowed each school management committee to decide on the provision of religious instruction at the secondary level. Following this decision, many schools have chosen not to include religion lessons in their curricula. Traditionally, families who wish their children to receive religious instruction have sent them to summer courses in local mosques. In recent years, however, these summer courses have been a source of controversy, and twice prevented by laws forbidding the teaching of religion outside school. In other words, imams in mosques are allowed to preach but not to teach. Until 1997, these courses were provided in mosques where more qualified imams were employed, especially from Turkey. Following reactions in Turkey against the rise of the Islamicbased Refah Party, these courses were prohibited in north Cyprus, but as a result of heavy demand by families, especially in areas of the north primarily occupied by immigrants from Turkey, courses were re-instituted in 2004, with the support of the religious affairs counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. In all probability, this may be attributed to the 2002 rise to power in Turkey of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has a conservative religious base. However, opposition to these courses continued amongst Turkish Cypriots, and they have been periodically prohibited ever since.

12 On this subject, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta okullar sorunu II: Limasol Türk ilkokulu (The school problem in Cyprus II: The Limassol Turkish primary school)”, Kıbrıs Yazıları, no. 2, (Bahar 2006), pp. 56–69. 13 Atalay, Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Yaygın Din Eğitimi ve Cami Hizmetleri, p. 240.

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There are no institutions of higher education that offer training for imams and other religious professionals in the south. The clergy operating and performing their duties in north Cyprus are attached to two authorities, DRA (under the control of Evkaf), which is an institution of the TRNC, and the religious affairs counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. There are no faculties of theology or imam-hatip lycées. Only one university, the Anadolu University, a Turkish university that also has a campus in north Cyprus, has an Open Faculty, where there is a theology department at undergraduate level. Most of the imams and muezzins attached to the DRA have received their education in private or official Qur’an courses run by the DRA. The education level of the 270 mosque employees under the DRA is therefore quite low, and only 10% of them are full-time employees, with the rest working on a temporary or part-time basis. However, since 2007, 64 imams from Turkey have been employed in north Cyprus mosques on fouryear contracts, through auspices of the religious affairs counsellor of the Turkish Embassy. They are at least imam-hatip lycée graduates, and quite a number are graduates of theology faculties.14 In 2009, the Higher Education Council governing Turkish universities announced that for the first time it would include Turkish Cypriots in its quotas for entrance to faculties of theology at university level. Furthermore, the Turkish university quota for admission of Turkish Cypriots to PhD programmes allocated three positions to be distributed amongst departments of religious education, religious psychology and history of religions. 7


As noted above, only three of the 148 Muslim cemeteries in the south are in good condition. In April 2005, a Turkish Cypriot cemetery in Larnaca, which had recently been rehabilitated under a US-funded project aimed at improving bi-communal relations, was vandalised. In 2005, there were also reports of Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the south being destroyed for the construction of roads and other development. In

14

Ibid., p. 162.

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the north, there are over 150 Muslim cemeteries. The land is owned by the Evkaf Administration, which also provides for services conducted in these cemeteries. Maintenance is provided by municipalities. 8


There are no rules governing religious assistance in health facilities, prisons or the armed forces in either part of the island. Religious support is usually provided on an ad hoc basis according to need. Moreover, Muslims are not allowed to join the military in the south. The armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. Clergy visit Nicosia Central Prison, the only prison in north Cyprus, for special activities, especially during the month of Ramadan. 9

Religious Festivals

While no Islamic festivals are recognised in the south, all Islamic festivals are recognised in the north. Because Turkish Cypriot society is for the most part secular, most Turkish Cypriots take part in religious activities primarily during religious festivals, especially the major festivals of Ramadan and ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı). Although there have been no surveys on the extent to which fasting is practised during Ramadan, it is the authors’ observation that most of those who fast are elderly Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Most people, however, actively participate in traditional ways in festivities associated with the bayrams. Beginning approximately ten years ago, Turkish Cypriots began to celebrate the Mevlid Kandili, or the anniversary of the Prophet’s birth, as Kutlu Doğum Haftası, or the Week of the Holy Birth. Mevlid-i Nebi, the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, is fixed as the twelfth day of the third month (Rebi‘ ul-Evvel/Rabi‘ al-Awwal ) of the Hijri calendar. It was usually celebrated with mosque illuminations and preparation of special sweets. Although Mevlid Kandili was celebrated before, under the influence of trends from Turkey, this one-day event became a week-long festival, with religious educational activities, including conferences and seminars. In addition, clergy employed by the DRA are requested to visit the homes of people within their communities and to offer them a rose and a book about the Prophet Muhammad.

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Several minor Muslim festivals are also celebrated in north Cyprus, including Regaip Kandili, celebrating the night of Muhammad’s conception, Miraç Kandili, celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent into heaven; and Berat Kandili, the Day of Forgiveness. On these days, the main mosques in the cities are illuminated and the clergy offer special prayers in the mosques. Alevis also freely celebrate their festivals such as ‘Ashura and qurban. During the celebrations many dedes and traditional ashik, or minstrels, are brought from Turkey. 10 Halal Food Halal food is available in the south because of the immigrant Muslim population. One halal meat provider in Nicosia told the authors that he had reached an agreement with the government slaughterhouse to allow him to slaughter his own meat at this government-monitored area. He estimates that he slaughters approximately 25–30 large animals each week. All meat slaughtered in north Cyprus under the control of municipal slaughterhouses is halal. 11

Dress Codes

There are no laws or regulations concerning dress codes and hence no prohibitions of the hijab in workplaces in the south, though there have been some discussions about headscarves in private schools. In north Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots generally do not wear headscarves, and there are no laws regulating dress. However, in Turkey the headscarf has long been forbidden in universities and other public institutions, and implementation of the prohibition intensified from 1997. As a result, many young women from Turkey who wish to wear the headscarf come to north Cyprus to study. 12


The media operate freely in the south, though local media sources do not publish or air informative content about Islam. Muslim immigrants in the south tend to read newspapers imported from abroad, listen to

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radio stations from neighbouring Arab countries, and watch Arab and Turkish television via satellite. In north Cyprus, there are no visual or printed media that consistently address religious issues, though some newspapers provide space on Fridays for articles on religion. Also, during the main religious festivals, local television and radio stations air religious programmes. On the other hand, all religious publications including newspapers and periodicals that are published in Turkey are available for sale in the north and it is possible to view television channels with religious content via satellite. 13

Family Law

Until 2004, it was prohibited in the south for Christians to marry Muslims. With the RoC’s accession to the European Union, however, this law has been changed, and interfaith marriage is technically allowed. Both civil and church marriages are recognised by the state, though marriages performed by Muslim clergy are not recognised. In north Cyprus, only civil marriages are recognised by the state. Some Muslims in the north choose to perform religious ceremonies, but these must be accompanied by a civil marriage in order to be officially recognised. Most of those who choose religious ceremonies are immigrants to the north, primarily from Turkey. Only people who have been married in a civil ceremony recognised by the state may inherit from each other. Although other forms of conjugal relationship are not recognised as grounds for inheritance between the couple, children of unmarried couples may inherit from both parents. 14


Since the beginning of the conflict in 1963, religious leaders of the Greek Orthodox and Turkish Muslim communities of Cyprus have had little contact with each other. During the height of the conflict, many religious sites suffered damage or destruction. After 1974, there was little or no access to religious sites on the other side of the divide. Until 2003, when the ceasefire line dividing the island opened, the only inter-communal contacts were carried out by non-governmental organisations as Track II of internationally sponsored diplomatic activities, usually in the Nicosia buffer zone or outside the island. None of the religious leaders

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participated in these bi-communal meetings. However, since 2003 some minimal communication has been established between Orthodox and Muslim religious leaders in the island. The Bishop of Morphou has been especially active in reconciliation activities, trying to reach out to the other community by crossing to the north, visiting religious sites, and meeting with civil society leaders. Also the previous and current heads of the DRA have had some unofficial meetings with Orthodox representatives and have expressed their desire to have increased interreligious dialogue, but to date nothing concrete has resulted. 15


According to the 2009 US State Department report, the Future Worlds Center reported that Muslim construction workers complained of not being able to stop work for prayers. The same centre also received complaints that Muslim asylum seekers had been refused benefits by the Office of Social Welfare when they refused to work on pig farms for religious reasons.15 In addition, during Ramadan in September 2009, overcrowding in Nicosia’s single functioning mosque led to clashes between Muslim sects.16 As reported above, Nicosia has received an influx of Muslim refugees and immigrants, and the single mosque’s capacity is insufficient for them. By the end of September, the municipality was considering opening other mosques, including existing mosques that are not functioning, but there have so far been no further developments on the issue.17 In April 2009, the government changed in Cyprus’ north, and following the change of government there was an attempt to make optional religious education compulsory. Teachers’ unions vehemently reacted against this move, and in some of their demonstrations were publicly disrespectful of religious observance.18 Religious leaders led a counterdemonstration against the disrespectful behaviour of the teachers’

15

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127305.htm, accessed 26 April 2010. Charalambous, Charles, “Clash at Omeriye Mosque,” Cyprus Mail, 2 September 2009, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/clash-omeriye-mosque, accessed 26 April 2010. 17 Millett, Lucy, “Meeting weighs options over Nicosia mosques”, Cyprus Mail, 25 September 2009, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/meeting-weighs-options-overnicosia-mosques, accessed 26 April 2010. 18 http://www.yeniduzen.com/detay.asp?a=10741, accessed 26 April 2010. 16

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union. Although compulsory religious education for one hour per week was brought into force, it has not so far been implemented. The new government’s programme also proposed summer religious courses, which including Qur’an lessons. This new proposal also produced vehement reactions amongst some fundamentally secularist Cypriots,19 although Head of DRA Suiçmez stated that over 2,000 applications for the courses had been received, most coming from Turkish immigrants living in Cyprus.20 Nevertheless, continuing opposition to the courses on the part of teachers’ unions and other associations, primarily Alawite, prevented the courses from taking palce. As a result, families that wished to give their children religious and Qur’an education continued to apply to the DRA for summer courses, in this case asking that their children be sent to Turkey. According to the DRA, the number of applications for summer religious courses rose from 200 in 2008 to 300 in 2009.21 Debates about whether the courses should or should not be allowed continued until the end of 2009, bearing no fruit. 16


The usual religious holidays were celebrated in both sides of the island. There were no other cultural events during 2009. The Rumi Institute, which was founded in 2002 at Near East University in Nicosia, North Cyprus, organised the first sema since it was held last time in 1956. Also, academic conferences and symposiums on Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi’s teachings have been conducted since 2002.The last symposium was held in December 2009 at the University.

19 Özuslu, Sami, “Kuran kursu değil, hafız kursu! (2) It is not Qur’an courses, it is hafiz courses]”, Yenidüzen, 23 September 2009. 20 Moral, Aral, “Kura’an kursu için kuyruk (Queue for Qur’an courses)”, Havadis, 17 June 2009. 21 Yenidüzen, 31 May 2009; see also Çağıl Günalp, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Kursu [Qur’an Courses in Turkey]”, Yenidüzen, 13 August 2009.

CZECH REPUBLIC Štěpán Macháček1 1

Muslim Populations

In the last Czech census in 2001 about 3,700 individuals indicated Islam in response to the option to enter their religious affiliation.2 However, the actual number of Muslims is higher, estimated at around 10,000,3 for many of them feel uncomfortable about identifying with the Islamic faith in official documents. No newer official figures on believers of different faiths are available. The territory that is today’s Czech Republic has never been under direct Islamic influence or rule so there is no indigenous Czech Muslim community. Three categories of Muslims in the Czech Republic can be defined: ethnic Czech converts, Czech citizens of foreign origin, and foreigners who live in the Czech Republic with permanent or temporary residence permits. There are only about 400 Czech converts, but they are very active in Muslim organisations. The second group consists of former students who came from then socialist-oriented developing countries to study in the former Czechoslovakia. Some stayed after their graduation and married and obtained citizenship. Most of them came from Arab countries, particularly Syria, Libya, Democratic Yemen, Iraq and Sudan. Muslims in the third category mostly arrived

1 Štěpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 A figure given by the Czech Department for Statistics (Český statistický úřad), available at http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/o/4110-03--obyvatelstvo_hlasici_se_k_jednotlivym_cirkvim_a_nabozenskym_spolecnostem, accessed 18 May 2009. 3 An estimate widely accepted by both the Czech authorities (see Rýdl, Karel and Marika Uiberlayová, “Education and Muslim minorities in the Czech Republic”, in Holger Daun and Geoffrey Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 247–261 (253), and the Czech Muslim community (see Mendel, Miloš, Bronislav Ostřanský and Tomáš Rataj, Islám v srdci Evropy (Islam in the Heart of Europe) (Prague: Academia, 2007), p. 408).

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after 1989 as students or entrepreneurs, mainly from Arab countries (especially Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia), but also from other countries (Chechnya, Turkey, Afghanistan, etc.). Muslims are also represented among asylum seekers. According to Ministry of Interior figures, out of 3,016 applicants in 2006, several hundred came from Muslim countries, the most numerous being Egyptians (422 persons). Other applicants were from countries including Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria and Sudan. Muslims were relatively more successful than non-Muslim asylum seekers in being granted asylum, the highest numbers of successful applicants being Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Kazakhs.4 2

Islam and the State

Until 1918, the territory of today’s Czech Republic was subject to the laws of the Habsburg Empire (see Austria). Today the Czech Republic has no state religion and the constitution provides for freedom of religion. In comparison with other European countries, a high proportion of Czechs, 59% according to the 2001 census, do not profess any religion.5 Since religious affiliation was an optional entry in the 2001 census forms, all figures are only approximations. Most Czech Muslim organisations are registered with the Ministry of Culture as cultural or social organisations, which does not entitle them to any public funding. In 2004, the umbrella organization the Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities (Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí, UMO) succeeded in registering as a religious community and, for the first time since the end of World War I, Czech Muslims were officially recognised as such by the state. For more privileges, such as the right to public funding or running religious schools, there are requirements that the UMO is unlikely ever to be able to fulfill (for example, established believers must form at least 0.1% of the total population, i.e. 10,000 for the Czech Republic). The UMO has been asking the authorities for exemption from this rule since 2002,

4 5

Mendel et al., Islám v srdci Evropy, pp. 408–410. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/p/4110-03, last accessed 21 May 2009.

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but the request has so far been refused.6 The UMO and other Muslim activities are funded by local and foreign believers’ contributions and donations. 3


The Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities (Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí, UMO) is a Muslim umbrella organisation. Its chairman was, until his death in March 2008, Mohamed Alí Šilhavý (born in 1917), a legendary Czech convert and symbol of Czech Muslims. The organisation is now led by another Czech convert Dr Vladimír Sáňka (for many years a very active and influential person in the Czech Muslim community) and Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi (of Iraqi origin). The core of the UMO is an executive council on which every Czech Muslim organisation is meant to have a representative. The UMO is now based in the Prague mosque (Blatská 1491, 198 00 Praha 9—Kyje, islamcz@ islamcz.cz), having moved there from the town of Třebíč. Before the UMO was registered with the Ministry of Culture in 2004, several Muslim groups registered as ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ organisations formed a platform for Muslim activities. Some of them have continued functioning until today and have become members of UMO. The Islamic Foundation in Prague (Islámská nadace v Praze) has developed since 1989 with the aim of establishing a mosque in Prague and was registered in 2001. After having managed a small prayer room from 1992 to 1999, it succeeded in opening the first mosque ever built in Prague in 1999 (www.praha.muslim.cz). Since 2003, the Islamic Foundation has run an information centre in the centre of Prague (Politických vězňů 14, 110 00 Praha 1) and since 2004 has managed an Islamic centre, with a prayer room, in the spa city of Teplice in northern Bohemia. The Islamic Foundation in Brno (Islámská nadace v Brně) was registered in 1994 as a charitable society with the aim of establishing a mosque in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic. An Islamic centre, with a mosque, was opened in 1998 and this was the

6

According to Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of the UMO, published on the internet news site Novinky.cz on 23 February 2009, http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/162064muslimove-a-krisnovci-se-zlobi-nedosahnou-na-miliony-od-statu.html, accessed 2 April 2009.

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first mosque to be built in the country. The Islamic Foundation is based at the mosque (Vídeňská 38a, 693 00 Brno, www.mesita.cz). The Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic (Svaz muslimských studentů v ČR, www.svazmuslim.cz) was founded by a Sudanese student, Muhammad Abbas al-Mu‘tasim, and provides a platform for foreign Muslim students studying in the Czech Republic. It manages prayer rooms in student dormitories and publishes the web magazine Muslimské listy (Muslim News, www.muslimskelisty.cz). The Muslim Union (Muslimská unie) is another Muslim organisation in Brno (Chmelová 2893, Brno, www.muslim-inform.cz), whose website is a good source of information. Generally speaking, these organisations do not have a specific ethnic, national or religious ethos. Their members include both Czech converts and Muslims of foreign origin, apart from the Union of Muslim Students, whose members are foreign students, or former foreign students, from various Muslim countries. In 2009, however, it was reported that Muslims in Brno who are disappointed with Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi’s appointment to the UMO chairmanship have formed Alfirdaus Language School. There are indications that this group are mostly Shi’a Muslims, unlike most of those connected with the Brno mosque and Al Rawi.7 4


Since 1989, Czech Muslims have come up with several mosque-building projects, but most have been rejected by the local authorities who ‘responded to the will’ of local inhabitants (on the basis of protest petitions against a mosque in a neighbourhood or city and supported in some cases by the stance of local church representatives). Such was the fate of two projects for mosques or Islamic centres in the spa city of Teplice in 1995 and 2004. Both were to be financed by donors from the United Arab Emirates— there are always tens or rather hundreds of patients from Arab countries staying in Teplice for treatment at the spa. Another mosque project in another spa town, Orlová in northern Moravia, although it attracted less attention, was rejected by the local authorities in 2004.

7 A report on this split was published in the local daily Brněnský deník on 18 April 2009, http://brnensky.denik.cz/zpravy_region/sef-muslimu-novodoby-diktator-zbrna20090418.html, accessed 16 November 2009.

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Czech Muslims, however, finally succeeded in establishing mosques in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno. In Brno, after a struggle with the local authorities, local Muslims were allowed in 1996 to build the first mosque in the Czech Republic and it was inaugurated in 1998. One year later, a mosque was inaugurated on the outskirts of the capital and this is the only Czech mosque with a professional imam. From 2002 to 2006, the imam was Karam al-Badawi, an Egyptian graduate of al-Azhar University and the Islamic University in Medina. Since 2006 the imams have been a Bosnian, Emir Omić (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in Amman), and Sheikh Ahmad (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in San‘a). In addition to these two mosques there are nine prayer houses, mostly associated with student accommodation. There are no special regulations in Czech law concerning the construction of places of worship. Like any other construction project, a mosque must be approved by the local council’s planning department. A project may be rejected on the basis of technical defects but also in consideration of opposition by local people. Approval of a project by local authorities may be conditional on certain modifications—for ‘aesthetic reasons’, for example. The approval of the Brno mosque project, for instance, depended on the exclusion of characteristic features “alien to surrounding architecture”, i.e. a minaret. 5


There are no Muslim or Islamic schools in the Czech Republic. According to the 2002 Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zákon o církvích a náboženských společnostech), on the basis of which the UMO was finally registered in 2004, religious communities have the right to establish their own, state-recognised schools ten years after their registration, but only if they can prove they have at least 10,000 believers in the Czech Republic. The UMO does not meet these requirements. For the same reason, Muslim children do not have a right to religious education in primary and secondary schools. Courses in Islam and Arabic are organised in the two Czech mosques by the Islamic Foundation in Prague and the Islamic Foundation in Brno. The courses in Islam (similar to catechism) are attended by several dozen children at weekends (about 30 children attend in Prague on Saturdays). The Arabic courses are open to non-Muslim members of the public.

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There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in the Czech Republic. Imams serving in Czech mosques obtain their qualifications abroad. Arabic and Islamic Studies programmes are offered at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, where Islam is studied from the religious, sociological and historical points of view. Arabic, Turkish and Persian language courses are also available there. In recent years, Arabic and Islamic Studies have been introduced at the Faculty of Arts at Western Bohemian University (Západočeská univerzita) in Plzeň and there are also classes in Islam in the religious studies programme at Masaryk’s University (Masarykova univerzita) in Brno. 7


There are two Muslim cemeteries in the Czech Republic. The older one, with about 50 burial places, was established in 1994 in the town of Třebíč, where the UMO formerly had its headquarters. Ten years later, another Muslim cemetery with a capacity of around 100 burial places, was established in Prague in a section of the large cemetery in the suburb Olšany. The ritual washing of the deceased is organised by the Islamic Foundations in Brno or Prague in hospitals or cemeteries at the request of the relatives and prayers for the deceased person are performed. No other special burial facilities or services are available. According to Czech civil law, Muslims, like everyone else, must be buried in a coffin. 8


There are no imams in the Czech army, prisons or hospitals, although Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominationally decorated space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Islamic Foundation in Prague has succeeded in opening a small Islamic prayer room in the Ruzyně prison in Prague, where the Foundation arranges the provision of a Friday sermon. In the spa towns of Dubí and Darkov, there are prayer rooms designated mostly for the Arab Muslim clientele of the spas.

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Religious Festivals

Islamic religious festivals are generally not much publicised, and their celebration is limited to private homes, embassies, and mosques in Prague and Brno. In 2008, the Islamic Foundation in Prague hired a sports hall in Riegrovy sady for the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha because the mosque was not big enough for the 1,000 Muslims who attended. Representatives of Christian churches frequently come to the celebrations to greet the Muslims. On average, 30 Muslims from the Czech Republic every year perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. Typically, the pilgrims travel at their own expense and use specialist travel agencies in neighbouring Germany or Austria. In 2008, exceptionally, about 65 people traveled to Mecca in response to the king of Saudi Arabia’s offer to cover pilgrims’ expenses. 10 Halal Food There are few opportunities for Czech Muslims to obtain strictly halal food. In Prague and Brno, several grocers and butcher’s shops sell halal products and meat. Since its registration in 2004, the UMO has been exempt from veterinary regulations and has been allowed to appoint a Muslim butcher to slaughter animals in a slaughterhouse. This exemption is particularly exercised at ‘Id al-Adha. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or in schools. Although some Muslim women (including Czech converts) regularly wear hijab, no dress code incidents have been recorded. There is as yet no record of Muslim women wearing niqab in the Czech Republic. 12


The only periodical published by Czech Muslims is Hlas (The Voice), the magazine of the UMO, published in Czech three or four times a year. Hlas was revived in 1991 after first being published from 1937 to 1945. The editorial office is in the Prague mosque and the members of

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the editorial board are Dr Vladimír Sáňka, Muneeb Hassan, Jalal Atassi and Lazhar Maamri. There are several Czech Islamic websites. The UMO runs www .islamweb.cz to provide practical information for believers, and the Muslim Union has its own website, www.muslim-inform.cz. Other Czech Islamic websites include www.muslimskelisty.cz, which presents world news from an Islamic standpoint, and www.infomuslim .euweb.cz which provides practical information. Czech Muslims also translate and publish books and booklets with the aim of providing information about the faith for Czech Muslim believers. There are three Czech translations of the Qur’an, and translations of works by the Bosnian Muslim intellectual Ali Izetbegović, as well as few booklets promoting Islam, have also been published by Czech Muslims in recent years. 13

Family Law

Islamic religious marriages are not recognised by the state. Muslims must have a civil marriage in order for it to be legally registered. They can arrange an Islamic marriage in the mosque in addition to this, but it has no legal standing. The Islamic Foundation in Prague arranged and registered about 15 Islamic marriages in 2008 and keeps copies of all Shari’a marriage contracts in its archive. 14


Relations between Czech churches and Czech Islamic organizations, as well as between believers of other faiths, are generally very good. The UMO and the Islamic Foundations in Prague and Brno organise ‘dialogue meetings’ with representatives of churches and Christian believers, where it is usual for there to be an atmosphere of mutual recognition and understanding.8 The Czech Islamic organisations and the Czech

8 For example, Czech Muslim community representatives took part in the European Christian Youth Meeting in Jičín on 16 August 2009 (for details, see http:// www.mesita.cz/node/48, accessed 5 May 2010). Another discussion meeting took place on 17 October 2009, in Nosislav (see http://www.mesita.cz/node/68, accessed 5 May 2010).

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Muslim community as a whole try to maintain amicable relations with Czech churches and Christian believers. The Islamic Foundation in Brno, for example, sent a gift to Pope Benedict XVI on the occasion of his visit to the Czech Republic in September 2009.9 The approach of Christian churches towards Czech Muslims is usually polite, with some local exceptions when there are plans to build a mosque. On the occasion of his retirement, the former highest Czech Catholic authority, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk, said that Europe was open to Islamisation because Christians were weak in their faith. His words were largely understood as a critique of European (and particularly Czech) Christianity and a compliment to the state of Muslim religious life.10 15


In 2009, several articles on Czech Muslims were published in Czech periodicals. The plans of the Brno based Islamic Foundation to build a new, larger mosque for up to 500 believers, closer to the city centre provoked mixed reactions. Representatives of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťansko demokratická unie–Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL), a Czech Christian parliamentary party, criticised this project for “endangering our culture and traditions”, although the media were rather critical of the party’s stance.11 An influential weekly magazine, Reflex, published an article comparing the moderate opinions of a Czech Muslim representative, Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi, with those of a People’s Party politician, and concluded that Czech Muslims were, unlike Muslim communities in some West European countries, a well-educated and integrated minority that posed no danger to Czech society.12 A web version of the most widely read daily, Hospodářské noviny, carried an amiable article, “Muslimský průvodce Prahou (The Muslim guide to Prague)”, giving information

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See http://www.mesita.cz/node/63, accessed 5 May 2010. Information on his speech and a link to the full text is available from the respected Czech daily Hospodářské noviny, http://domaci.ihned.cz/c1-39729060-kardinal-vlkpri-cekani-na-sveho-nastupce-varuje-pred-islamizaci-evropy, accessed 3 May 2010. 11 The leftist daily Právo, “Lidovci jsou proti větší mešitě v Brně (The People‘s Party is against a larger mosque in Brno)”, 28 July 2009, p. 3; Hospodářské noviny, “Brno plné minaretů (The City of Brno Full of Minarets)”, 29 July 2009, p. 8. 12 Reflex weekly 35, 27 August 2009, pp. 30–34: Máme se bát mešit? (Shall We Be Afraid of the Mosques?). 10

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about classes in Arabic and Islam, where to eat halal food and where to buy halal meat in Prague.13 There are several rather anti-Islamic web sites, the most prominent being http://www.eurabia.cz, which regards Islam as a danger to Europe. 16


No data.

13 Available at: http://cestovani.ihned.cz/c1-38648770-muslimsky-pruvodce-prahou-kde-se-najist-nakoupit-nebo-naucit-arabsky., accessed 3 May 2010.

DENMARK Brian Arly Jacobsen1 1

Muslim Populations

The earliest information we have on Muslims in Denmark is from the census in 1880, when eight ‘Mohammedans’ were counted.2 Subsequent censuses (the last was in 1970) have not referred to Muslims, either because there were none or because they were part of the category ‘other faiths’. Data summaries extracted from the central person data registry (Folkeregisteret) and published since 1970 only give figures for members of the official Lutheran church. As a result of active mission in Denmark, Ahmadis from a Pakistani background succeeded in establishing an Ahmadiyya community, which in 1966–67 constructed the first purpose-built mosque in Denmark, the Nusrat Djahan Mosque in Hvidovre (Copenhagen). The present Ahmadiyya community in Denmark consists mainly of Pakistani immigrants and their descendants and numbers around 600 according to their own estimates.3 From the late 1960s, the numbers of Muslims in Denmark became more significant, primarily as a result of immigration. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s people came to Denmark as migrant workers from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey, and then, from the mid-1970s till today, immigrants have been mainly refugees and the families of migrant workers already in the country. The waves of refugees have had various causes:

1

Brian Arly Jacobsen has a PhD in Sociology of Religion and is a research assistant in the Department of History of Religions, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research is mainly in the area of religion and politics and religious minority groups in Denmark. His publications include Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Dry numbers on faith: demography of religion in the 21st century), coedited with Margit Warburg (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007) and “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 2 Statistiske bureau, Det (1883), Folkemængden i kongeriget Danmark, den 1ste februar 1880 [The statistical Bureau (1883) The Population in the Kingdom of Denmark, 1st of February 1880] (Statistisk Tabelværk IVR Serie A3 [Statistical Table Work IV R, Serie 3]). 3 Cf. www.islam-ahmadiyya.dk.

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the civil war in Lebanon (1975–90), the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991–1999), the war in Afghanistan (2001–present) and the Iraq wars (1991 and 2003–present).4 The number of Muslims has increased significantly since 1980— from 29,300 (0.6% of the population) in 1980, to an estimated 225,600 (4.1%) in 2010.5 The Danish authorities do not register individuals’ religious beliefs, so it is generally difficult to gather reliable information on individual religious affiliation. An estimate of the number of Muslims in Denmark must therefore be based on a number of assumptions about correlations between nationality, ethnicity and religion. Research conducted regularly since 1999, for example, has suggested that only 92% of Turkish immigrants and their descendants regard themselves as Muslims.6 The largest ethnic group is Turks (24.7% of all Muslims), followed by Iraqis (12%), Lebanese (10.8%), Pakistanis (8.2%), and Somalis (7.6%). The calculation also includes an estimate of converts and third generation Muslim immigrants. Estimates of the number of Danish converts to Islam range between 2,000 and 5,000, and can be reasonably put at 2,100–2,800.7 This estimate does not take account of internal religious differences within Islam and includes groups such as Alevis, Shi’ites and Sunnis. A survey from 2007 distributes eight different ethnic groups from predominantly Muslim countries as follows: 49% Sunnis, 13% Shi’is, 19% ‘Islam, other’, which may include Ahmadis, Alevis and heterodox Sufis (most Sufis consider themselves to be Sunnis).8 The remaining percentage is accounted for by people who said they belonged to other religions or no religion. It is estimated that 20%–25% of Muslims in Denmark (roughly 45,100–56,400

4 Colemann, David and Eskil Wadensjö, Indvandringen til Danmark (Immigration to Denmark) (Viborg: Spektrum, 1999), and Jacobsen, Brian, “Muslimer i Danmark: en kritisk vurdering af antalsopgørelser (Muslims in Denmark: A critical assessment of estimations)”, in Warburg, M. and B. Jacobsen (eds), Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 143–165. 5 1980 is the first year in which Statistics Denmark has information on both immigrants and their descendants (Statistics Denmark 2010, www.dst.dk). 6 For background data, see Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1. halvår 2004 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2004) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2004). 7 Jensen, Tina and Kate Østergaard, Nye muslimer i Danmark: møder og omvendelser (New Muslims in Denmark: Meetings and conversions) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 30f. 8 Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1999–2007 (The status on integration 1999–2007) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2008), p. 12.

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people) are associated with a mosque association,9 although formal membership numbers are much lower. 2

Islam and the State

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contribute to the generally free practice of religion, although the Evangelical Lutheran Church, as the national church, enjoys some privileges not available to other religious groups. The national church is the only religious organisation that receives state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system, but government does grant official status to other religious groups. Prior to 1970, a total of 11 religious communities were ‘recognised’ by royal decree. Since then, the state has ‘acknowledged’ more than 100 additional religious communities under the Marriage Act, by which the Minister of Justice can authorise clergy within non-recognised religious communities to conduct marriages. In November 2009, 22 Muslim communities were ‘acknowledged religious communities’.10 In April 2007, the Liberal-Conservative government passed legislation that required all foreign religious workers (missionaries, imams, etc.) to pass a Danish language test within six months of entering the country. The intention of the law is said to be to restrict the entry of Muslim clerics, whose number had already been restricted under a 2004 ‘Imam Law’ that requires the number of religious residence visas to be reasonably proportionate to the size of the religious community in question.11 3


There are many different kinds of Muslim organisations in Denmark. The ethnic-religious associations dominate in terms of members and number. They were the first to be established in Denmark and are often

9 Kühle, Lene, Moskeer i Danmark: Islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Denmark: Islam and Muslim places of prayer) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2006), pp. 39, 47. 10 Alevis are not included in this category. The six current Alevi associations are categorised as ‘other congregations’ (see www.familiestyrelsen.dk/11/godkendte-trossamfund, accessed 10 November 2009. 11 See “Integration: Omstridt danskprøve til præster og imamer skaber splid i Venstre (Disputed Danish test of imams and priests create conflicts in Venstre)”, Politiken, 8 January 2007.

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related to a mosque. There are also a number of religious organisations, such as Sufi orders, that transcend ethnicity, and finally there is a growing number of politically oriented associations. In the last decade, some Muslim organisations have started to organise themselves in Muslim umbrella organisations so that they can speak with one voice on issues affecting Muslims in general, such as the establishment of burial grounds. Ethnic religious associations include the following. The Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse, H. C. Ørsteds Vej 29, 1879 Frederiksberg C, tlf. +45 33238127) is part of Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi (www.diyanetvakfi.dk). It is indisputably the largest Muslim organisation in Denmark and almost two out of three Danes of Turkish descent are members of the Diyanet funeral foundation (which has around 31,000 members). It was established in Denmark in 1985 and the Foundation’s local mosque associations were recognised as religious communities in 2006.12 In 1986, various local Turkish mosque associations formed the Union of Muslim Immigrant Associations (Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler Teşkilatı, DMGT, www.dmgt.dk). The DMGT runs six Turkish mosques in Denmark and between 500 and 750 Muslims in total attend Friday prayers in these mosques. The DMGT website says that 42 different associations are members of the union. The movement is regarded by some observers as being linked to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement.13 Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran Denmark (Rugårdsvej 117, Tarup, 5000 Odense C, tlf. +45 63123463, www.minhaj.dk) was founded in 1987 as a Sunni educational and cultural centre in Copenhagen. It has around 1,200 members, including children. Its current Chairman is Muhammad Sarwar.14 Minhaj Denmark and all its units operate according to the Minhaj-ul-Quran movement’s constitution in Pakistan. Several of their mosques are recognised as religious communities. Non-ethnic religious associations include the following. The Alevi association in Denmark (www.alevi.dk) was founded in 1994 in Aarhus. Its current Chairman is Başkan Feramuz Acar and there are today seven local associations and a national youth association. The Alevi associations in Denmark have approximately 1,000 members 12 In July 2009 there where 28 ‘acknowledged’ local mosque associations associated with the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (cf. http://www.familiestyrelsen.dk/11/ godkendte-trossamfund/islamiske-og-islam-inspirerede-menigheder/). 13 Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 90–91. 14 Cf. http://www.pakstop.com/minhaj/MYL/imq/valby/imqbestyrelse.htm. http:// www.pakstop.com/minhaj/MYL/IMQ%20Forside.htm is another website of Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran Denmark.

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but some estimates put the number of Alevis in Denmark at about 6,500.15 Six local Alevi associations were approved as religious communities by the state in 2007.16 Many Sufi movements are currently experiencing success, especially among Pakistanis and Turks. They largely keep to themselves. Examples are Tariqa Burhaniyya, Al-Murabitun and Sufi-oriented Turkish groups such as Nurcu groups and Dialog Forum (www.dialogin.dk), established in 2002, which is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement. The Islamic Religious Community (Islamisk Trossamfund) or Wakf (Dortheavej 45–47, 2400 København NV, tel. +45 38112225, fax +45 38112226, www.wakf.com) was founded in 1996, when Palestinians in Copenhagen, headed by the charismatic imam Ahmed Abu Laban, who died in 2007, collected money to build their own mosque in Copenhagen. Its current Chairman is Bilal Assaad and the association is primarily made up of Sunni immigrant groups from various countries. According to its own figures, it has approximately 800 paying members and around 1,000 people attend the khutba every Friday. Wakf is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and has strong ties to Egypt. Its perception of Islam is closely identified with Arab culture. A Muslim youth movement, Young Muslims in Denmark (Muslimske Unge i Danmark, MUNIDA, www.munida.dk), related to Wakf, was established in 1995. This is a trans-ethnic movement that aims to provide information on Islam and social activities for its members. The first Shi’is in Denmark were Twelvers and Isma’ilis of Pakistani descent. The Isma’ilis established an association in 1969 (and a mosque from 1970 in Copenhagen) and in 1981 the Islamic Centre Jaffariya (Rådmandsgade 56, Copenhagen N.) became the first mosque of the Twelver branch. The massive migration of refugees with Shi’i backgrounds fleeing from civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war led to new organisations and mosques being established from the mid1980s onwards. There are around ten Twelver mosques in Denmark, with related associations. There are also a number of Shi’i oriented organisations. Salam (www.salam.nu) is an association established in 2005, headed by young women of various ethnicities and educational

15

Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 138. See also Jørgensen, Martin Bak, National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, PhD dissertation, Aalborg University, 2006, pp. 195–218. 16

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backgrounds with the aim of promoting Islam. The number of its members is not known. Politically oriented associations include the following. Hizb utTahrir in Denmark (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk) is part of the international ‘caliphate’ movement. It gets a lot of media coverage but is difficult for outsiders to contact. Its spokesperson is Fadi Abdullatif. Its members are estimated to number somewhere between 50 and 500.17 Some of their public meetings in Copenhagen have attracted crowds of about 1,000. In November 2009 the first Muslim party in Denmark, Muslims of Denmark (Danmarks Muslimer), was founded by the Danish convert Ras Anbessa (see ‘Danmarks Muslimer’ on www.facebook.com). Their political agenda is to fight for socially marginalised people. They will aim to address both Muslims and the most vulnerable groups in society, such as the homeless, disabled, young people and elderly to gain more political influence. At the present time, they have only presented the party and a minor statement on their policy on a Facebook group with 1,300 members. According to the Facebook group, they consider themselves as ‘a Muslim grassroots movement’—not a ‘religious party’ but ‘a people’s movement’, according to their website. Their primary goal is to show that ‘Muslims make proposals for political solutions’. According to Ras Anbessa, they will present their political programmes in more detail during 2010. There are also a number of Muslim networking organisations. The United Council of Muslims (Muslimernes Fællesråd, www.mfr.nu) was formed in 2006, born of a desire for a shared representation of Muslim organisations in Denmark. Its chairman is Asmat Mojaddedi and its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain, and it currently acts as an umbrella organisation for 13 assorted Muslim associations, with a combined membership of up to 33,000. The Danish Muslim Union (Dansk Muslimsk Union, Nørrebrogade 186,1, 2200 Copenhagen N, tel.+45 35364700; www.dmu.nu) is also an umbrella body, consisting of approximately 30 Danish Muslim organisations. It was formed in March 2008 and the Union’s ambition is to create unity among Muslims across ethnic, cultural, political and religious divides. Its spokes17

Estimated by the researcher Kirstine Sinclair in the newspaper Information, 4 March 2003 and Grøndahl, Malene, Torben Rugberg Rasmussen and Kirstine Sinclair, Hizb ut-Tahrir i Danmark: Farlig fundamentalisme eller uskyldigt ungdomsoprør? (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003) pp. 16, 29, 31.

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person is Osman Öztoprak. Muslims in Dialogue (Muslimer i Dialog, www.m-i-d.dk) was formed by a Minhaj ul-Quran breakaway group in 2003 and organises dialogue activities between Muslims and non-Muslims. Its chairman is Fatih Alev and spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain. It is a Sunni association with 440 members, according to its own figures. The Danish Islamic Council (Det danske Islamiske Råd, www .disr.dk) is an independent charitable institution, which is co-founder of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe. Its purpose is to bring together Muslim associations to lobby on joint Islamic issues. Its instigator was the politician Hamid El-Mousti and the first meeting, in 2000, was attended by approximately 30 Muslim associations. In 2001, a practising Muslim woman and a male non-Muslim social researcher took the initiative in forming the association Forum for Critical Muslims (Forum for kritiske Muslimer, www.kritiskemuslimer.dk). Its website describes its purpose as to ‘work for a democratic and pluralistic approach to Islam, with particular focus on the visibility of women as agents and public figures in Islam’ and, according to its spokesperson, Sherin Khankan, it currently has around 130 members. A survey in 2006 showed the following support for various major Muslim associations among Muslims in general: Islamisk Trossamfund: 5.4%; Demokratiske muslimer: 8.9%; Diyanet: 9.1%; Muslimer i Dialog: 6.0%, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: 0.7%, Milli Görüs: 2.9% and Forum for kritiske muslimer: 0.9%.18 Some of these figures are no longer reliable. 4


According to a study in 2006, there are about 115 mosques in Denmark, eleven of them being Shi’i.19 The Shi’ite Isma’ilis claim to have acquired rooms for prayer in 1969/70, and the first Sunni mosques were established at the beginning of the 1970s, the first being the Islamic Cultural Centre (Islamisk Kulturcenter) in Brønshøj (Copenhagen) in 1972.20 Today, there are mosques all over Denmark, but they are most numerous in the major cities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Odense. Most mosques are located in former office and factory buildings and are often

18

Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1. halvår 2006 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2006) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2006), p. 39. 19 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 65. 20 Ibid.

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not big enough to accommodate all the people who want to participate in Friday prayers or other religious activities at the mosque. Three mosques are purpose-built, namely the mosque built by the Ahmadis in 1967 and two Turkish mosques on Funen, one built in Odense in 1991 and the other in Svendborg in 2000.21 Several more local groups are planning to build mosques. One of the most controversial plans for a mosque is that for a central mosque in central Copenhagen. In 1981, the state leased a building lot to the Honourable Islamic Committee (Ærværdige islamiske komité). It was a 50-year lease with an annual rent set at 1,000 Danish kroner (roughly €134)—a minute amount for a lot with a central location in the municipality of Copenhagen. The Danish state has a long tradition, going back to the period of absolute monarchy, of handing over building lots to religious communities unconnected to the national church, but politicians from various parties and public bodies have regularly and increasingly forcefully attacked the state’s agreement with the Committee for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Copenhagen, so the lot remains undeveloped.22 In June 2009, the Municipality of Copenhagen in accepted the United Council of Muslims as the organisation in charge of the finances and operation of a grand mosque in Copenhagen. In August 2009, the Shi’i association AhlulBait in Denmark was also granted permission by the Municipality of Copenhagen to build a mosque in the existing premises of the Imam Ali Islamic Centre on Vibevej in Copenhagen’s Nordvest district.23 In October 2009, the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation presented plans for a new purpose-built mosque in Aarhus and most of the parties in the municipality of Aarhus have until now backed the plan.24 5


Religious education in primary and secondary schools in Denmark is termed ‘Christian studies’, and the subject has traditionally been taught on an Evangelical Lutheran basis, with the addition of elements about other religions, including Islam. Parents have the right to withdraw 21

Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 63. Jacobsen, Brian A., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 23 Cf. http://islamdk.dk/indlaeg/imam-ali-moske/ 24 “Bred støtte til moské-planer i Århus” [Broad support for the mosque plans in Aarhus], Jyllands-Posten, 5 November 2009. 22

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their children from Christian studies on religious grounds, and some Muslim parents do so. Since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been possible for a group of parents to establish ‘independent schools’, which are entitled to state support to cover most of their budget. The first Muslim independent school was established in 1978 and since then over 30 such schools have opened.25 Many of them offer Arabic and Islamic studies. In the school year 2006–07, there were 22 independent Muslim primary schools with a total of approximately 3,600 pupils, all with Muslim backgrounds.26 This means that the majority of Muslim pupils go to public school. The Ministry of Education carried out a study in 2006 which showed that 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into upper secondary school, whereas the national average was only 26%.27 Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours. 6


Islamic studies are offered as part of Arabic and Middle Eastern studies programmes and at the departments of religious studies at the universities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Southern Denmark. Discussions about possible imam training have surfaced on a couple of occasions in recent years, but have not led to any formal proposals. In May 2008, a meeting of Muslim organisations from Norway, Sweden and Denmark took place in Copenhagen to consider possible common approaches to imam training. During 2008, the Islamic Religious Community reached an agreement with Al-Azhar University, Cairo, to offer accredited courses

25 Shakoor, Tallat, “Formål for muslimske friskoler i Danmark: udviklinger i formålserklæringer og vedtægter i danske friskoler for muslimske børn (Purpose for Islamic free schools in Denmark: Developments of purpose statements and regulations in Danish free schools for Muslim children)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 3 (2008), pp. 29–43. Some of these schools have since closed again. 26 Ihle, Annette H., Magt, Medborgerskab og Muslimske Friskoler i Danmark: Traditioner, idealer og politikker (Power, citizenship and Muslim free schools in Denmark: Traditions, ideals and policies) (Copenhagen: Research priority area Religion in the 21st Century, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007), p. 7. In a feature in Jyllands-Posten (5 August 2009) the Minister of Educational Affairs, Bertel Haarder, stated that the number of Muslim free schools now was 20. 27 “Muslimske friskoler sender flest i gymnasiet (Muslim independent schools send most of the pupils to upper secondary school )”, Jyllands-Posten, 16 August 2007.

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that would lead to qualification from Al-Azhar University. According to the Islamic Religious Community they are still in the process of planning. 7


Sections within 15 existing municipal cemeteries (all Christian consecrated) have been reserved for Muslim use since 1975. Danish rules on funerals are based on a law of 1975, according to which the authorities can assign burial places for other religious groups. Religious groups also have the right to acquire land for burials. In 1996, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs gave cemetery boards permission for an exemption for the specific funeral rituals of faiths other than the national church. In 2006, a separate Muslim cemetery owned by the Danish Islamic Burial Fund was established outside Copenhagen after some years of lobbying. According to a committee member, about 200 Muslims die each year in Denmark, and the bodies of about half of them are flown back to their country of origin to be buried.28 In April 2008, the municipality of Herning agreed to sell a plot of land for the establishment of a Muslim cemetery in the town, and in October 2008 the municipality of Roskilde also agreed to the establishment of a Muslim cemetery near the city. 8


During the 1990s, there were some short-term projects to establish some form of religious counselling for Muslims in hospitals and prisons, but only in recent years has this been more firmly formalised. There are no imams in the armed forces. According to Danish and European law, prison inmates have the right to participate in worship with a priest or the equivalent of their own faith. The first proper ‘prison imam’ financed by the Danish state was appointed on 1 May 2002.29 In 2008, the state budget allocated an amount of 1.5 million kroner per year in 2008 and 2009 and 2 mil-

28 “Gravplads: Religionsfrihed i praksis (Cemetery: Religious freedom in practice”, Jyllands-Posten, 22 September 2006. 29 “Imam Hansen fra Hatting (Imam Hansen from Hatting)”, Nyt fra Kriminalforsorgen (News from Danish Prison and Probation Service), no. 3 (2002).

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lion per year thereafter for special approval procedures for imams and closer supervision of religious activities in prisons, with the hiring of up to 20 ‘prison imams’.30 In 2005, the first Muslim prayer room was appointed at Rigshospitalet (Copenhagen University Hospital) and the first hospital imam began to provide pastoral care for patients. Today, there are several imams affiliated to hospitals in major cities in Denmark. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated in mosques and sports centres all over the country. Several schools and kindergartens in the major cities that have a large number of pupils from ethnic minorities either plan holidays during Ramadan or else take it into account in their activities. In recent years, Shi’is have organised parades through the streets of Copenhagen in connection with ‘Ashura, with 500 to 1,000 people taking part. These have avoided political statements and mostly call for action against disease and war. 10 Halal Food Halal slaughter is permitted. Halal food is widely available and Denmark is a major exporter of halal meat to the Arab world.31 There have been political attempts from right- and left-wing parties to prohibit ritual slaughter since the mid-1990s.32

30 See “Flerårsaftale for Kriminalforsorgen 2008–2011 (Multi-year agreement for The Prison and Probation Service for 2008–2011)” on the Prison and Probation Service homepage: http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk. 31 Cf. Jønsson, Signe, “Mod på eksport til Mellemøsten” [Minding export to Middle East] i: Eksport Fokus, no. 1, 14 May 2007, Udenrigsministeriet Danmark [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark]. 32 Jacobsen, Brian A., Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. En sammenligning af italesættelser af jøder i Rigsdagstidende 1903–45 og muslimer i Folketingstidende 1967–2005 (The construction of otherness in the Danish Parliament: A comparison of the discussions about Jews and Muslims in the Parliamentary records from 1903–45 and from 1967–2005 respectively), PhD dissertation, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen, 2008, pp. 202–206.

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Dress Codes

Hijab and the like are permitted in public schools and services. The Supreme Court, in a verdict in January 2005, upheld the right of retailers and others to insist on uniform codes without the female headscarf for employees dealing with the public. The Danish People’s Party tried to ban the wearing of the headscarf in Parliament in the spring of 2007, but failed. In August 2009 The Conservative People’s Party called for a ban on the burqa. Venstre (the Liberal Party)—their partners in government—rejected a ban, but pressure on the government from both the Social Democrats and the Danish Peoples Party made the government set up a committee with the purpose of looking at ways to restrict the wearing of the burqa and other similar garments in Danish society. The Conservatives have since then revoked their own call for a ban on the burqa. The committee report is expected to be published in early 2010. In the spring of 2008, there was a major political debate about whether female Muslim judges and other public authority figures should be allowed to wear the headscarf with judicial attire. In December 2008, the government proposed legislation that would ban judges from wearing religious or political symbols in court. The law has come to be called the ‘headscarf act’, because its real purpose is to ban Muslim women from wearing headscarves when acting as judges or jurors. The government and Danish People’s Party passed the act in May 2009, although the proposal has been met with strong opposition from judges’ and lawyers’ associations. 12


There are no Muslim newspapers in Danish, but there are a number of Internet sites where Muslims (and non-Muslims) exchange information of various kinds. The largest Internet forum is Denmark’s United Cyber Muslims (Danmarks Forenede Cybermuslimer, http://uk.dir .groups.yahoo.com/group/dfc/), formed in 1998, which currently (January 2009) has 455 members. This forum is related to one of the oldest websites established to inform Muslims and non-Muslims about Islam in Denmark (www.islam.dk). In 2004, a web-based Muslim newspaper, Sahafa, was launched, but it did not last. There are also Muslim publishing firms, the oldest of which, Alif Bogforlag, which began to publish books of specific Muslim interest in 1983.

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Family Law

Danish courts can only refer indirectly to Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. There is only limited scope for the courts to take variations in cultural customs into account in individual cases. According to observers, Shari’a is practised in some Muslim communities in Denmark in, for example, matters of family law, divorce and child custody. There are no official Shari’a courts in Denmark.33 14


In 1996 Islamic-Christian Study Centre was established by a group of Christians and Muslims.34 It has an equal number of Christian and Muslim board-members and is currently supported by a number of Christian and Muslim organisations and societies. The purpose of Islamic-Christian Study Centre is through cooperation to build positive relations between citizens with Christian and Muslim background and to work for equal citizenship. The organisation cooperates on various projects such as courses on counselling for pastors and imams, conferences, lectures, study groups, tours and publications. The centre has co-operation with a number of research and educational institutions, with Christian and Muslim organisations and other NGOs in relation to activities in Denmark and internationally. In 1998 the bishops of the Evangelical Lutheran Church appointed a committee whose task was to write a report on the relationship between the church and Islam. The report, Conversation Promotes Understanding, was submitted in 2000 and there was particular emphasis on the need of the state church to incorporate a dialogue with Islam at all levels, and they emphasised that it would require more resources, including diocesan priests, for strengthening dialogue. The Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs at that time, Margrethe Vestager (Social Liberal) supported the report and the demand for more resources. One of the lasting results from the committee’s work is the church’s

33 Cf. “The executioners of Sharia” (editorial ), Jyllands-Posten, 31 October 2008, and “Religion and law: The legal system must move with the community”, interview with Jørgen S. Nielsen, Information, 9 September 2008. 34 Cf. Islamisk-Kristent Studiecenter (IKS) (Islamic-Christian Study Centre), www .ikstudiecenter.dk/.

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sub-organisation Church and Religious Encounter (Folkekirke og Religionsmøde, www.religionsmoede.dk) which works for interreligious dialogue between Lutherans and other religions especially Muslims.35 Some of the main activities are that church leaders, including bishops from the state church and imams from Muslim communities in Denmark annually meet in a Christian Muslim Conversation Forum (Kristen-Muslimsk Samtaleforum) and that Christians and Muslims in Denmark invite each other to friendship dinners at Ramadan and Christmas. 15


Questions about the Muslim presence in Denmark are frequently and eagerly debated in the Danish media. A series of studies show a population that is very sceptical about the prospects for peaceful coexistence with Muslims. Some opinion polls from 2008 showed that only 38% of Danes would have a positive attitude towards their children marrying Muslims, while 48% of Muslim parents would welcome their children marrying Danes. A report published in January 2008 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) showed that 79% of Danes see greater interaction with the Muslim world as a threat. The Danes are the most sceptical of the nations surveyed. The Hells Angels biker club and its support group AK81 have long been linked to an on-going battle for control of the criminal trade with criminal gangs with many immigrants. Spokesman for Hells Angels Denmark, Jørn ‘Jønke’ Nielsen, published a four-page “Jackal Manifesto” on 30 June 2009, using the term to describe people it says are often Muslims, or of Arab background, and who ‘hate Danes, their mentality, lifestyle, Christianity and its symbols’. Nielsen defended the manifesto as neither racist nor aimed at people of a certain skin colour or religion, and said that the club would no longer tolerate the ‘jackal’ mentality in Denmark. Justice spokespeople for the Danish People’s Party, the Social Democrats and the governing Conservatives all wrote off the manifesto as rhetoric designed to divide the public by creating an ‘us versus them’ mentality. But several politicians from both the Liberal Party and the Danish People’s party supported the “Jackal 35 Cf. Folkekirke og religionsmøde, www.folkekirken.dk/folkekirkens-arbejde/folkekirkeog-religionsmoede/. This is a different site from the one mentioned in the text.

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Manifesto” ’s description of the tensions between young immigrants of Muslim or Arab background and young Danes. Tensions between the gangs have intensified recently after daylight attacks, sometimes on innocent bystanders. Hells Angels were not the first to link the ongoing gang conflict with Muslim immigrants in Denmark. The Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, Birthe Rønn Hornbech, made an appeal earlier in 2009 to the country’s imams: “I would appeal to the imams that they now go out and say that the shootings are bad Islam.”36 The imams reacted with surprise. As Imam Mostafa Chendid of the Moroccan Cultural Centre in Copenhagen put it: “Of course it is my duty as an imam to warn young people. But shootouts are not only bad Islam. It is also bad in other religions.”37 The mosque project organised by the Ahlul Bait Association project was a major news story in 2009. The mosque is expected to cost 50 million kroner. It was first thought that the mosque would be funded solely by private donations from Danish Muslims, but the Danish newspaper Kristeligt Dagblad (The Christian Daily) reported that 15 million kroner where donations from two or three Iranians with close Iranian state contacts.38 The Danish People’s Party has been a critic of the project from the outset and has called for the building of the mosque to be halted. The other parties will not stop the building of the mosque but call for transparency about fundraising for it and for other religious building projects. 16


The celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr has become a major event for thousands of Muslims in Denmark. It is celebrated in mosques and sports centres and the like and has grown in size throughout the last couple of decades. Many public schools with Muslim pupils also celebrate ‘Id al-Fitr.

36 “Interview: Rønn: Udvisninger et klart signal (Interview: Rønn: Expulsions is a clear signal )”, Politiken, 6 March 2009. 37 “Præstekritik af Rønns appel til imamer (Pastor’s criticism of Røns’ appeal to imams)”, Kristeligt Dagblad, 7 March 2009. 38 “Ny moské opføres for penge fra Iran (New mosque is being built with money from Iran)”, Kristeligt Dagblad, 1 September 2009.

ESTONIA Egdūnas Račius1 1

Muslim Populations

The total number of nominal Muslims in Estonia in 2009 could be as high as 4,500, but regularly practising Muslims would hardly exceed several hundred. The overwhelming majority of Estonia’s Muslims are said to be located in and around the capital city Tallinn (information from the Estonian Institute, February 1997). The last official 2000 census returned 1,387 Estonian residents as Muslims, of whom 754 identified themselves as Tatars (the total number of Tatars in Estonia according to the 2000 census was 2,582 of whom only 760 were Estonian citizens while 681 were Russian citizens), 83 as Estonians and 79 as Russians, while 455 Muslims came under the category ‘other ethnic nationalities’. The number of those who identified themselves as Azeri (Azerbaijani) was 880 (of whom only 162 were Estonian citizens), but there are no figures for Azeris who identified themselves as Muslims. Azeris are the second largest community (after the Tatars) who come from a Muslim background. Up to 500 people (132 Uzbeks, 127 Kazakhs, 48 Chechens, 24 Turks, 19 Arabs, 15 Kurds and others) identified themselves as being of ethnic groups traditionally associated with a Muslim background. Though in the official census only 30% of the Tatars and none of the Azeris, traditionally Shi’ites, indicated that they were Muslims, many if not most of them potentially could be considered at least nominally so. By 2009, the number of Muslims in Estonia should have somewhat increased due to the immigration of several hundred people of Muslim background and to conversion. Several public sources provide

1 Egdūnas Račius is Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim communities in the Baltic States.

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ungrounded estimates of 10,0002 or even 20,0003 Muslims in Estonia, but these are evident exaggerations. A more likely figure of 4,000 is indicated in Islam in Estonia published with the active participation of Estonia’s Muslims in 2008.4 The majority of Estonia’s Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. On the other hand, there was a nascent Muslim community (around 170 strong according to a 1934 census) in the pre-Soviet independent Estonia, composed mainly of Tatar immigrants from Russia. 2

Islam and the State

Estonia is a secular republic with no state religion or dominant faith. Traditionally, Estonians were Lutherans, but today only a small percentage of the Estonian population identify with the Lutheran faith. Relations between the state and religious organisations are regulated in accordance with the Churches and Congregations Act (passed in 1993, new version adopted in 2002), which confirms the constitutional right of freedom of belief and religious practice. All faiths are deemed equal (there is no formal distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ faiths) in the eyes of the state. Religious communities are required to register formally with the state through local courts (until 2002 through the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Interior). Unregistered religious communities are free to practise their religion as long as it does not violate public morals and/or disturb public order, but have neither the status nor the rights of a legal person. Registered religious organisations acquire tax exempt status, the right to conduct marriages with civil validity and the right to establish private schools. Muslims (like all other faith communities) have no public representation in state institutions and there is no public funding for their activities. (The state may only fund cultural activities of ethnic minority groups, such as Tatars and Azeris.) 2 Huang, Mel, “A mosque with a view”, Central Europe Review, 2001, http://www .ce-review.org/01/3/amber3.html, accessed 12 November 2009. 3 Muslims in Estonia, Muslim American Society, 2003, http://www.masnet.org/ news.asp?id=687, accessed 12 November 2009. 4 Abiline, Toomas (comp.), Islam Eestis. Islam in Estonia. Ислам в Эстонии (Tallinn: Huma 2008).

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The first Muslim congregation officially registered in 1928 in Narva but, along with its sister organisation (registered in 1940) in Tallinn, it was dissolved in 1940 by the Soviets. The Estonian Islamic Congregation (Eesti islami kogudus), then comprised mainly of Tatar, Azeri, Kazakh and Uzbek elements, re-established itself in 1989 and was officially registered in 1994. In spring 2009, it moved to its permanent headquarters at Keevise Street 9 in the Tallinn suburb of Ülemiste where a 1,000m2 former office building purchased with a Saudi sponsor’s money houses the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath” (with rooms for lectures, a tiny library and a reading room), the office of the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation, and a prayer hall open daily between 0900hrs and 2200hrs. It is headed by the imam Ildar Muhhamedshin (tel: +370– 559–47689, www.islam.pri.ee). In 1995, a small splinter organisation, Estonian Muslim Sunni Congregation (Eesti Muhameedlaste Sunniitide Kogudus) was formed. There also is a Tatar dominated congregation in Maardu town not far from Tallinn. 4


Between the world wars, a house-turned-mosque in Narva served the needs of the Muslim congregation in that town, while in Tallinn the congregation rented an apartment to use for prayers. Since summer 2009, the Muslims of Tallinn have had a prayer hall on the premises of the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, which serves as the main Tallinn mosque. Communal Friday prayers are also held in makeshift mosques in the Kopli suburb of Tallinn and the nearby town of Maardu. It was announced in 2008 that the Sharjah Emirate had communicated its intention to finance the building of an Islamic religious and cultural centre (housing a mosque) in Tallinn, but with the movement of the Estonian Islamic Congregation to its current headquarters the need for such a space appears to have been at least temporarily alleviated. 5


Religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general spirit is Christian. Some history of Islam and the Middle East

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is taught within the history curriculum. Confessional religious education conducted by a clergyman of the denomination can be requested if there are at least 15 pupils in a class who wish it, but so far no class with this number of Muslim pupils exists. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, teaching of Islam is entirely extra-curricular, offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend ‘schools’ (in Tallinn and Maardu). At the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, a dozen or so children attend Arabic language and Islam classes on Saturdays. 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are continuously offered at the University of Tartu (Arabic language, Introduction to Islamic studies, both in the Department of Theology). Recently Tallinn University has started offering some instruction in Arabic and Turkish languages as well as an introduction to Turkish culture. Elsewhere (Tartu Theological Seminary) teaching about Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Estonia. Two of the four active imams received their higher religious education abroad (in Russia and Saudi Arabia) and the remaining two are self-taught. It is unlikely that any need for local imam training will arise in the foreseeable future. 7


During the tsarist period, Estonian Muslims (Tatar settlers from inner Russia) maintained their separate cemeteries in Narva, Rakvere and Tallinn. In the first years of the Soviet occupation they were closed and later destroyed. Since then, Estonian Muslims have been using general cemeteries for burial, where they have a separate section. No need for a separate Muslim cemetery has yet arisen. 8


The imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation officially serves as an imam in the Estonian armed forces and is occasionally invited to prisons or hospitals to perform rites.

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Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-fitr and ‘Id al-adha celebrations in Tallinn, Maardu and Narva, which are open to the public. The ‘Id al-fitr communal prayer is said to be attended by several hundred or so Muslims and ‘Id al-adha is attended by up to 500 persons. 10 Halal Food No halal butchers have yet opened. Some individual Muslims (among them the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation) perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers, and afterwards sell it to others. This practice is not prohibited by law. Some imported halal food (frozen meat and meat products, along with canned vegetables and sweets from Middle Eastern producers, imported from Finland) is available at Friday prayers in the Islamic Cultural Center “Turath”. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. No niqab-wearing Muslim women have yet been observed. Since 2002, women have been allowed by law to submit personal photos with the headscarf for official documents. 12


There is no Muslim printed media in Estonia and the only website is http://www.islam.pri.ee/ (in Estonian and Russian languages), which is run by Estonian Muslims. In August 2009, it started posting a monthly on-line Islamic magazine, Iqra, in Estonian (though prospective authors are also encouraged to submit texts in Russian). A multilingual website, http://azeri.ee, is run by the Azerbaijan Cultural Centre of Estonia (Eesti Aserbaidžaani kultuurikeskus), which is only indirectly related to Islamic issues (mainly through the history of the Muslim presence in Estonia).

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Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques, and the marriage is then registered with a municipal civil registry office. An imam wishing to serve as a state registrar has to obtain official certification after attending special training. No Estonian imam is yet certified to serve as a state registrar. Annually up to five marriage contracts (nikah) are signed under the supervision of an imam. Inheritance can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations provided it is accepted by all parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in litigation. 14 Interreligious Relations In an overwhelmingly secular society, it is extremely rare for Estonian imams to be invited to multi-religious events and they themselves are not eager to organise such functions. There seems to virtually be no interreligious dialogue in Estonia. 15


There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Estonia in the local media. Occasionally, local Muslim leaders are approached by the media to comment on events and processes involving Muslims abroad or Estonia itself. In 2009, several local newspapers ran small articles on the presumed concern of the Estonian security services about a possible rise of Islamic radicalism among Estonian Muslims. Tablighi Jamaat was identified as the organisation whose activities in Estonia are under closer scrutiny from the security services. 16


Sabantuj is an annual gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs. It takes place over several days with various festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious occasion, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered.

FINLAND Tuomas Martikainen1 1

Muslim Populations

The annexation of Finland from Sweden by imperial Russia in 1808 led gradually to the permanent settlement of Muslims. As early as the 1830s, there were Muslim soldiers, including Kazakhs and Tatars, among the Russian military in several garrisons. They practised their religion and were served by an imam. From the 1870s, Tatar Muslims from the Nizhni Novgorod region started to arrive, and they eventually became the first permanently settled Nordic Muslim community. After Finnish independence (1917), Muslims were granted citizenship (1920 onwards) and they were able to organise officially as a religious community when the Freedom of Religion Act came into force in January 1923. By the mid-1920s, the main wave of migration ended following the closure of the Soviet borders.2 Muslim migration remained low, but the population grew gradually through marriage, work, study and international tourism in the post-World War II period. The Muslim population started to grow rapidly at the turn of the 1990s as the number of UNHCR quota refugees and asylum seekers from Muslim countries grew, alongside other forms of migration. Currently, the largest groups are Somalis, Arabs (mainly from Iraq), Kurds, Kosovo Albanians, Bosnians and Turks. The majority of Muslims in Finland are Sunni and about a tenth Shi’i.3 By 2007, an estimated 45,000 Muslims were living in Finland,

1 Tuomas Martikainen is a postdoctoral researcher at the Academy of Finland in the Department of Comparative Religion, Åbo Akademi University. He has researched and published widely on contemporary religious and ethnic diversity in Finland and is the author of Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in the City of Turku (Åbo Akademi University Press, 2004). The author would like to thank Isra Lehtinen for commenting this article. 2 Leitzinger, Antero, Suomen tataarit: Vuosina 1868–1944 muodostuneen muslimiyhteisön menestystarina (Finland’s Tatars: The Success Story of the Muslim Community Formed during 1868–1944) (Helsinki: East-West Books, 2006). 3 Martikainen, Tuomas, “Finland”, in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 76–89.

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that is, 0.8% of the total population of 5.3 million.4 The Muslim average age is very young and about half are under the age of 20. This estimate of the total number of Muslims in Finland is conservative, and higher figures can be suggested. The Muslim population broadly consists of four parts. (1) The majority (about 30,000) of Finnish Muslims are first generation migrants. This number is based on data for the country of birth of migrants from Muslim majority countries,5 reduced by a fifth to exclude non-Muslim migrants.6 (2) The second generation and children of mixed marriages are increasing in number and currently number at least 10,000. This figure is based on their parents’ country of birth data with either a fifth (migrant-migrant parents) or half (migrant-native parents) deducted from the number (data from Statistics Finland).7 (3) Isra Lehtinen, a long-standing Finnish Muslim activist, estimates the number of converts to be 1,000.8 (4) The two Tatar congregations have 651 members, according to official membership statistics provided by the Population Register Centre. There are no representative surveys regarding identification as Muslim, nor are the majority of Muslims registered in official Muslim communities. Little is known about the religious activity and participation levels of Finnish Muslims, but it has 4 In Finland, people are registered according to their official membership of staterecognised religious organisations (rekisteröity uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). These figures significantly under-report religious affiliation among all migrant groups, including Muslims, and there is no survey or census data (the last census was conducted in 1985) that provides accurate information on the religious affiliation, adherence or identity of immigrants. As a result, numbers of Muslims need to be estimated by using less reliable and direct means. As the majority of Muslims in Finland are first generation migrants, country of birth statistics are the best available starting point. Comprehensive statistical data on the second generation are still missing. See Martikainen, Tuomas, “Maahanmuuttajat ja uskonto: tausta, jäsenyys, yhdyskunnat (Immigrants and religion: Background, membership, communities)”, in Aappo Laitinen (ed.), Kristinusko Suomessa (Christianity in Finland) (Helsinki: Suomalainen Teologinen Kirjallisuusseura), pp. 205–240. 5 The estimate includes the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Ethiopia, former Yugoslavia, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen (information from StatFin online service, Population Structure, http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak_en.asp. 6 The proportion of non-Muslims varies significantly between countries of origin, thus to deduct one-fifth is somewhat arbitrary, but the intention is to avoid the temptation to overestimate the number of Muslims and also to provide a general rule for estimates. 7 These reductions are somewhat arbitrary (see, n. 7) but nevertheless provide a clear standard that can be corrected when more reliable data becomes available. 8 Isra Lehtinen, personal communication, 4 December 2009.

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been estimated that around one third are in contact with the mosque communities. The majority of Finnish Muslims live in the area of the capital and other large cities, most notably in Turku and Tampere. The geographical distribution between different ethnic groups is, however, very different. 2

Islam and the State

Freedom of religion was added to the Finnish Constitution in 1919 (revised 1999). The Freedom of Religion Act (1922, revised 2003) provides more detailed regulations on the matter. The Evangelical Lutheran and Finnish Orthodox Churches enjoy a special status as religious organisations with their own legislation. All other religious organisations are dealt with under the Freedom of Religion Act as recognised religious bodies, or under the Association Act as voluntary associations.9 Muslims are organised in both ways, and there are also informal groups. In November 2009, there were 24 Muslim communities registered as religious organisations, but not all of them were active.10 Local organisations have to a varying degree been able to receive public funding, and the Ministry of Education started to fund minority religions that met certain criteria from 2008 onwards. The Muslim umbrella organisation, the Islamic Council of Finland (Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto, SINE, www.sine.fi) receives its funding from the Finnish state and member organisations. Muslim organisations have little national, public visibility, although they are often consulted by the local authorities in many issues.11 3


Altogether, there are today about 40 mosque associations and 20–30 other Muslim associations focused on specific issues, including women, youth and charity. Until recently, the focus of Muslim activity in Finland

9 Heikkilä, Markku, Jyrki Knuutila and Martin Scheinin, “State and church in Finland”, in Gerhard Robbers (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 519–536. 10 National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland, 27 November 2009. 11 Martikainen, Tuomas, “The governance of Islam in Finland”, Temenos, vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), pp. 243–265.

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was mainly local or, in some cases, directed at the countries of origin. SINE was established in November 2006 and functions as an umbrella organisation for the representation of Muslims in Finland. In December 2008, SINE had 19 member organisations and it is currently funded by the Finnish state. The activities of SINE are still developing, but the society is working, among other things, on issues related to burial and cemeteries, Islamic law, media, religious education and youth. The council represents the main mosques (with the exception of the two Tatar communities) and the majority of registered Muslims in Finland. The main division of mosques in Finland is between Sunni and Shi’i, and the Sunnis are further divided between Tatars and newer arrivals. Little information is available about the religious orientations of new mosque communities, but most of them follow a traditionalist understanding of Islam. Tablighi Jamaat is prominent in some mosques. In 2007, the Finnish Islamic Party (Suomen Islamilainen Puolue, www.suomenislamilainenpuolue.fi) was founded, but by the end of 2009, it had failed to collect enough support to be formally registered as a political party. The party represents Salafist Islam. 4


There are around 40 mosques in Finland, of which two are purposebuilt and owned by the Tatar community. A wooden mosque was built in Järvenpää in 1942 and a house with one floor set aside as a mosque in downtown Helsinki in 1960. The Tatars have five mosques (Helsinki, Järvenpää, Kotka, Tampere, Turku). Since the early 1990s, several new prayer-rooms have been established. New Sunni mosques exist in Espoo, Helsinki, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Järvenpää, Kajaani, Kotka, Kuopio, Lappeenranta, Lahti, Lohja, Oulu, Pori, Tampere, Turku, Vaasa and Vantaa. New Shi’i mosques are to be found in Helsinki, Lempäälä, Tampere and Turku. Some of the mosques have had problems with neighbours, including complaints of noise and increased traffic, and have moved to new locations. Generally, mosque communities have positive relations with municipal authorities. There have been plans to establish new purpose-built mosques in several locations, but so far these have failed for lack of funding. In December 2009, the Islamic Society of Turku announced plans to build an Islamic cultural centre with funding from Kuwait in the City of Turku, located in Southwestern Finland.

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Most education in Finland is provided by the state and there are very few private schools, although the Tatars had their own primary school from 1948 to 1969. In general, Tatars have participated in regular school education. Religious education (RE) in Finnish schools is non-confessional, but instruction is given in the religion of the pupils. This means that RE is focussed on providing information about religion, not confessional instruction. Religious practice in schools is not permitted. Due to the rise in the number of Muslim pupils in the 1990s, several Finnish cities established Islamic RE in local schools. The Religious Freedom Act of 2003 made it obligatory to organise RE in Islamic and all other minority faiths if at least three pupils asked for it within a municipality. In practice, the situation varies greatly between municipalities, but Islamic RE is already well established in all the larger cities. The Islamic Society of Finland had a private religious school in Helsinki from 2001 to 2005, but the school did not gain official status and was not financially viable. There are, however, some Muslim kindergartens. Issues related to the practice of Islam have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis and this is only gradually becoming more systematic, but diverse local guidelines have been created. The City of Helsinki guidelines are the most comprehensive, and provide detailed recommendations on how to deal with many issues.12 6


Islamic theology and law cannot be studied in Finland. Arabic and Islamic Studies are offered at the University of Helsinki. In addition, courses on Islam can be found in several disciplines in Finnish universities, most notably in comparative religion at the Universities of Helsinki and Turku and in Åbo Akademi University. No discussions about imam training in higher education have taken place, but education of minority faith RE teachers at the Department of Comparative Religion, University of Helsinki, has been on-going since 2007. This consists of

12 Lehtinen, Isra, “Miten viranomaiset huomioivat muslimit (How the authorities take into account the needs of Muslims), Uskonnontutkija, no. 1 (2007), available at www.uskonnontutkija.fi/arkisto/2007_1/lehtinen.pdf, accessed 27 November 2009.

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both pedagogical and Islamic studies and leads to formal qualification as an RE teacher in Finland. In autumn 2008, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) organised a course entitled “Integration: A multifaith approach”, which aimed to improve the integration of foreign-born religious leaders and their communities. Several Muslims participated in the course. 7


The Evangelical Lutheran Church takes care of most cemeteries in Finland. The Tatar Muslims have two cemeteries in the cities of Helsinki and Turku which are not open for use by other Muslims because the Tatars have reserved them for their own members. Discussion of the need for more Muslim burial sites has been taking place since the early 1990s, but no long-term solution has been found. Practices have varied between municipalities and a process involving the Ministry of Education, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and SINE is taking place to solve the problem. 8


Chaplaincy in state institutions has traditionally been organised by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which has, among others, full-time hospital, military and prison chaplains. In addition, the Finnish Orthodox Church and other minority Christian religions have been active. Islam is increasingly recognised as a religion to be noted in chaplaincy, although Muslim organisations have not provided chaplaincy systematically in these institutions. Several state institutions, including the police, the armed forces and health care providers, often together with publicly funded immigrant projects, have produced guidelines and information booklets on Islam, but it is currently unclear to what extent these are followed and the quality of these guidelines is very variable. 9

Religious Festivals

Religious festivals are customarily organised by cultural and mosque organisations in places with larger Muslim populations. Apart from Muslim organisations, various government ministries have arranged

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invitation-only iftar dinners during Ramadan since 2001. All these events have been open either to Muslims only or, by personal invitation, to non-Muslim friends, researchers and others. Time off to celebrate the main festivals is not a legal entitlement. 10 Halal Food In earlier times, Finnish Muslims used the services of a Jewish shop in Helsinki, and later halal food was imported into Finland and sold at outlets in mosques and ethnic stores. Today, fresh halal meat is available in Helsinki and some halal shops currently sell meat slaughtered in Finland. Halal slaughter has occasionally been discussed in the Finnish media and, in 1996, the Animal Protection Act provided guidelines for approved halal slaughter in Finland, which require the animal to be stunned simultaneously with the slaughter. 11

Dress Codes

So-called Muslim clothing, including head scarves, has not been a major topic of public discussion in Finland. For example, girls have the right to wear a scarf at school, even though modifications may be required for sport and other activities for safety or hygiene reasons. Employers are increasingly having to face the issue and some have provided guidelines regarding acceptable clothing at work—for example, in public health care. 12


The media image of Islam is conflict-oriented and gives an impression of Islam as violent and aggressive, as has been noted in many studies over the years. This applies particularly to foreign news reporting, while Finnish Muslims are more often represented in a multicultural framework. Popular literature on Islam was scarce until the 2000s, but more has been published since then. The professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, has been especially active and has produced more than a dozen popular books on various topics relating to Islam. Few books written by Muslims are

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published. The Qur’an has been translated into Finnish three times (1942, 1957 and 1995). Mosque communities and other Islamic associations increasingly distribute Finnish-language literature and leaflets, which are often translated from other languages. There are two Finnish-language Muslim periodicals. A Sunni journal, An-Nur, has been published by the Islamic Society of Finland (http://www.rabita.fi/) since 1994 and a Shi’i journal, Salam, by the Resalat Islamic Community (Resalat Islamilainen Yhdyskunta, http:// www.resalat.fi/ since 2007. They contain both theological articles and discussions of current affairs. Tatars have published a newspaper called Mähallä Habärläre in the Tatar language since 2004. In addition, several ethnic communities produce journals including religious material, although this is not their primary focus. Beyond print media, the Internet provides several information and discussion forums for Muslims and on Islam, including the Path of Sunna (Sunnapolku, www.sunnapolku.com), a Finnish-language information and discussion forum on Islam, and Islam in Finland (Islam Suomessa, www.tulevaisuus.org), a Finnish language information portal on Islam. In addition, a global, high-volume and non-religious site for Muslims, Muxlim—Enhancing the Muslim Lifestyle (www.muxlim.com), has been run in Finland since 2007 by Mohamed El-Fatatry who moved from the United Arab Emirates to Finland to study computing in 2004. 13

Family Law

The relationship between family law and Islamic laws and traditions is still taking shape in Finland. Mosques and imams provide consultation in family matters, but there is no overview of how this takes place. There have been reports of clashes between civil divorce processes and informal Islamic practice. In 2007, the Finnish League for Human Rights published a survey of the relationship between Finnish and Islamic laws,13 according to which the majority of Finnish Muslims view Shari’a as a general moral guideline, but in practice follow national legislation. Only a small minority view Shari’a as the primary normative code.

13 Kouros, Kristiina, Suomessa asuvien muslimien suhtautumisesta perhearvoihin ja perhelainsäädäntöön (The relationship of Muslims living in Finland to family values and family law) (Helsinki: Ihmisoikeusliitto, 2007).

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Male circumcision has been a topic of heated public discussions, and some Finnish NGOs as well as the majority of Finnish medical doctors oppose the practice when carried out solely for religious or cultural reasons. Despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2003), the position of male circumcision in public health care remains ambivalent and this has led to circumcisions being carried out at home, with consequent medical complications.14 14


Muslim-Christian dialogue has been taking place since the 1990s. Sporadic one-off events are gradually being replaced by more organised forums. The longest standing activity has been the biannual dialogue between the Evangelical Lutheran Church and several Muslims organisations, which was established in 1997. The events focus on religious questions and have gathered 20–50 participants on a regular basis. Another forum to note is the activities of United Religions Initiative in Helsinki. The Islamic Council of Finland is represented in the Cooperation Forum of Religions in Finland, which is an evolving high-level interfaith network. Also, Muslim organisations are and have been represented on the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta, ETNO), whose aim is to incorporate minority voices into state administration. Interreligious relations have been moving in a more proactive direction in recent years and, since 2001, the President of Finland has been meeting leaders of Christian, Islamic and Jewish communities on a regular basis. 15


Finnish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims is generally cautious and negative and similar to general attitudes towards Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and Scientology. About half the population express a negative stance, and this view seems to have stabilised over the years.

14 Sakaranaho, Tuula et al., “Religion in migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in Vesa Puuronen et al. (eds), New Challenges for the Welfare Society (Joensuu: University of Joensuu, Karelian Institute, 2004), pp. 124–139.

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The latest opinion poll was conducted in 2006 and found that 56% of Finns view Islam negatively and 9% positively.15 Islam in Finland continues to be an ongoing part of public debate. In 2009, the key debate was the trial and prosecution of Dr Jussi Hallaaho, a city councillor and Internet blogger (http://www.halla-aho.com/ scripta/) from Helsinki, for violation against the sanctity of religion. He had published a blog in June 2008, where he had written provocatively about the Prophet Muhammad. The public debate was related to freedom of expression and xenophobia. Halla-aho was sentenced to fines but has appealed the decision.16 16


Local cultural centres and cultural and religious organisations have run several, small-scale events on Islamic culture since the 1990s. The first major national cultural event on Islam, the “Call of the minaret” (Minareetin kutsu), was organised with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004–2005. It was part of a campaign called “A thousand and one steps” (Tuhat ja yksi askelta), which aimed to inform Finns about global Islam. The first major event organised solely by Finnish Muslims took place in November 2008, when the Islamic Council of Finland put on a two-day “Islam-Expo” in Helsinki. This included panel presentations, exhibitions about Muslim communities and displays of Islamic products, and attracted around 200 visitors. No major public cultural events took place during 2009.

15

Monikasvoinen kirkko: Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko vuosina 2004–2007 (The Church with many faces: The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland in 2004– 2007) (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2008). 16 Mika Illman, personal communication 4 December 2009.

FRANCE Anne-Laure Zwilling1 1

Muslim Population

Figures concerning the numbers of Muslims in France are very difficult to provide. Since 1872, it has been prohibited for a census to identify people according to religious affiliation. Article 8 of the revised law of 6 January 1978 forbids the collection of any data providing personal information on racial or ethnic origin, or philosophical, religious or political belief or affiliation.2 The French National Institute of Statistical Information (INED) therefore provides no such information and it can only be obtained from surveys carried out by companies such as BVA (www.bva.fr), IFOP (www.ifop.com/europe), CSA (www.csa-fr .com), IPSOS (www.ipsos.fr) and TNS-Sofres (www.tns-sofres.com) for newspapers or magazines, or from European surveys that include sections on France.3 Since the methods and techniques used in these surveys are diverse, results can sometimes vary significantly, and are always difficult to compare. It is also a sensitive issue, as there are sometimes political, religious or personal motives for exaggerating or downplaying figures about Muslims. For all these reasons, only a general picture of the Muslim presence in France can be given. In 2000, the High Council for Integration estimated the number of Muslims in

1 Anne-Laure Zwilling is research assistant at the research centre PRISME—Société, Droit et Religions en Europe (Society, Law and Religions in Europe), Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Strasbourg. She holds MA degrees in Philosophy and Religious Studies and a PhD in Theology. She works in the field of religious minorities in Europe. 2 “Il est interdit de collecter des données à caractère personnel qui font apparaître, directement ou indirectement, les origines raciales ou ethniques, les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses ou l’appartenance syndicale des personnes, ou qui sont relatives à la santé ou à la vie sexuelle de celles-ci.” 3 European Social Survey, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, European Values Studies, http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/, Eurobaromètre, http://cdsp.sciencespo.fr/enquetes.php?idTheme=2&idRubrique=enquetesINT&lang=ANG, or Religions Monitor, http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-0A000F14-340C6D4F/ bst/hs.xsl/85217_85220.htm?suchrubrik, for instance (last access 12 November 2009).

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France to be 4 million.4 Other estimates followed, the figures steadily increasing, up to 6 or 7 million. In 2003, the demographer Michèle Tribalat criticised the lack of serious work in this field, and provided her own result, based on a demographic analysis taking into account the ethnic origins of the population: 3.7 million (or 4.1 million if one includes the Harkis—Muslim Algerians who sided with the France during the Algerian war of independence), although she underlines that, like all the other statistics about Muslims in France, this can only suggest the number of ‘possible Muslims’, not of ‘actual Muslims’. The National Institute of Statistics stated in 2007 that Muslims made up 7.1%5 of a total population of 63,392 million.6 France remains a very Catholic country: 69% of French people aged over 15 say they have a religious affiliation—59% claim to be Catholics, 3% Muslims, 2% Protestants, 1% Jews and 1% Buddhists.7 Muslims in France are predominantly Sunnis. According to a survey led by IFOP in 2009,8 5.8% of the population claim to be Muslims. This Muslim population is younger than the average (35% are 15–24 years old, against 16% for the population of France in general). The Muslim presence in metropolitan France is mainly the result of immigration.9 The starting point for the noticeable presence of Muslims in France is the end of World War I. Men from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia served in the French army and this led to the arrival in France of immigrants from these countries. These immigrants were estimated to number 120,000 in 1920, of which 100,000 were from Algeria, then a French colony, Tunisia and Morocco, which were only French protectorates. From then on, with a marked increase after World War II,10 Muslim immigrants were mostly men, responding to the demand for 4 L’islam dans la République (Islam in the French Republic), November 2000, available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/014000017/0000.pdf, last access 12 November 2009. 5 French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), 2007, available at http://www .insee.fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm, last access 12 November 2009. 6 INSEE, 2008. 7 TNS-Sofres survey, “Les enjeux du quotidien”, 2007, http://www.tns-sofres.com/ etudes/pol/050407_religion.htm, accessed 12 November 2009. 8 “Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam de France”, IFOP survey, 2009, http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 9 Godard, Bernard and Sylvie Taussig, Les musulmans en France—courants, institutions, communautés: Un état des lieux (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2007). 10 Blanchard, Pascal et al., “L’immigration: L’installation en métropole des popula-

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cheap labour. During the Algerian war of independence, up to 160,000 Algerians were soldiers in the French army. When the war ended in 1962, there were widespread reprisals against those who remained in Algeria, and many tried to find refuge in France. It is usually estimated that the number of these ex-soldiers, called Harkis, and their families, who arrived in France between 1962 and 1968, amounted to 91,000. Unfortunately, not much effort was made to welcome them: they were lodged in settlements near existing urban centres, in isolated purposebuilt hamlets in the rural south, or in so-called temporary camps, some of which had formerly housed refugees and political prisoners. After France and the Turkish government signed a labour agreement in 1964, a large number of Turks began to migrate to France leading to a population of 18,000 in 1970, 200,000 in the early 1990s and 450,000 by 2005. Finally, a number of immigrants came from former French colonies and other countries with a Muslim population, such as Senegal and India. After the 1970s, the immigration from Morocco and Turkey began slowly to increase and in 1974 the government passed a law allowing the families of immigrants to join them, so many children and wives moved to France. As a result of all these factors, the Muslim population in France is currently made up predominantly of people from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa and their children born in France. There are also South Asians (Tamils and Gujaratis for example)11 and people from the Middle East and, since the Yugoslav wars (1991–2001), Bosnians and Albanians. The concentration of the Muslim population is high in socially deprived areas, major urban centres and suburbs. Many are in the region around Paris (Muslims make up more than 10% of the population in the departments of Val d’Oise, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val de Marne); they are also found in the region of Lyon and Bouchesdu-Rhône and in eastern France. Because many immigrants came to France for work, the number of Muslims is high in former industrial and mining areas such as the north or Haut-Rhin, as well as along the Mediterranean coast, geographically close to North Africa. Turkish

tions du Maghreb”, in Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire (eds.), Culture impériale 1931–1961 (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2004). 11 Moliner, Christine, “L’immigration sud-asiatique en France: discrète et exemplaire?”, Infos Migrations 12, November 2009, http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/ pdf/IM_12.pdf, accessed 9 January 2010.

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people living in France are mostly concentrated in Paris, Alsace and Lorraine12 and the region of Nord-Pas de Calais, where they live mainly in the cities of Calais, Lille and Roubaix.13 Very few Muslims live in rural areas.14 The first generation of Muslim immigrants, now retired from the workforce, often applied for French nationality before retiring in France. Many live alone on housing estates and have lost their ties with their countries of origin. The second generation, and now a third generation, of Muslims find integration difficult, though this may be highly dependent on their family origin.15 In 1975, the Harkis protested publicly against what they described as years of official amnesia, neglect and marginalisation by the French authorities: in 1974 more than 14,000 Harkis were still living in the camps set up as a ‘temporary solution’ in the 1960s. The second generation, being born in France, are French citizens, but a reform of the nationality law in 1992 delayed the granting of French nationality until it was applied for in adulthood. (It had previously been granted automatically.) According to the 2005 data from the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies,16 unemployment among people of French origin was then 9.2%, while for those of foreign backgrounds the rate was 14% (statistics adjusted to take account of educational qualifications). Furthermore, there was a 5% overall unemployment rate for graduates of French origin, but 26.5% of university graduates of Northern African origins were unemployed. All this has led to growing dissatisfaction among second- and third-generation Muslims.17 Muslims account

12 Akgönül, Samim et al., 40 ans de présence turque en Alsace: Constats et évolutions (Strasbourg: Néothèque, 2009). 13 IFOP survey on the geographical distribution of religions in France, 2009, http:// www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 14 Cartographie des musulmans et des sans religions en France, http://www.lemonde .fr/societe/infographie/2007/03/02/l-islam-affiche-une-presence-moyenne-de-3-dansde-nombreux-departements_878171_3224.html, accessed 12 November 2009. 15 Alba, Richard and Roxane Silberman, “Decolonization immigrations and the social origins of the second generation: the case of North Africans in France”, International Migration Review, vol. 36, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1169–1193. 16 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/IP1042.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 17 Lopez, Alberto and Gwénaëlle Thomas, “L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail: Le poids des origines socioculturelles”, in Données sociales: La société française (Paris: INSEE, 2006), pp. 293–305.

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for an estimated 50% of the population of prison inmates in France (and in some jails in the Paris and Marseille regions, up to 80%).18 According to a CSA survey in 2006, 88% of people claiming to be Muslims fast during Ramadan; 43% pray five times a day; 20% read the Qur’an at least once a week; 17% attend mosque at least once a week, and 8% at least once a month.19 Religious practice seems to be on the increase: another survey published in 2009 by IFOP shows that mosque attendance is on the increase: 23% of Muslims claimed to attend mosque regularly, compared with 16% in 1989; 70% said they observed the fast during Ramadan, compared with 60% in 1989; and 6% had performed the pilgrimage to the Mecca, compared with 4% in 1989.20 Religious practice, however, remains more characteristic of the older generation: 28% of young people (18–24 year-olds) claim to pray once a day, compared with 35% of 40–50-year-olds, and 64% of those over 55, and 41% of men over 55 attend mosque on Fridays, compared with only 23% of 18–25-year-olds. According to a survey by the Interior Ministry, more than 1,000 men are currently working as imams in France,21 of whom only 9% are French, while 40% are Moroccans, 24% Algerians, 13% Turks and 5% Tunisians; the others are from various countries in Africa, the MiddleEast, etc.22 2

Islam and the State

The main regulation pertaining to religion in France is the separation between religion and the state (laïcité). It is defined by the law of 9

18

Beckford, James A., Danièle Joly and Farhad Khorsokhavar, Muslims in Prison: Challenge and Change in Britain and France (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2007), pp. 276–279. 19 “Portrait des musulmans (Portrait of Muslims)”, http://www.csa-fr.com/dataset/ data2006/opi20060823b.htm, accessed 12 November 2009. 20 “Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam de France (Survey on the integration and evolution of Islam in France)”, IFOP survey, 2009, http://www.ifop.fr/ media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 21 Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, “L’islam dans la République”, 2000, http://www .ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/014000017/index.shtml, accessed 12 November 2009. 22 See Mondot, Jean-François, Imams de France (Paris: Stock, 2009).

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December 1905,23 which stipulates that the French Republic “guarantees freedom of conscience” and “the free exercise of religion”, while the state “does not recognise, pay a wage to or subsidize any religious denomination”. This law did not establish any kind of religious status or regime, but does provide for support mechanisms such as the possibility of creating religious associations, tax exemptions, chaplaincies in the army and financial support for the maintenance of places of worship,24 available to churches and religions that requested them. Because of their previous legal status as “recognised religions”, Catholic dioceses and, to a lesser extent, Protestants and Jews, automatically enjoyed the advantages provided for in this law. This regime does not apply in the Rhin-and-Moselle departments (Alsace and Moselle), which were part of Germany in 1905, and where recognised denominations are organised within the framework of public law and financed by the state and the towns. Non-recognised religious groups are organised within the framework of private law. Local law also applies to the organisation of religion in the overseas territories and one of the overseas departments.25 In March 2005, the Foundation for the Works of Islam in France (Fondation pour les Œuvres de l’Islam de France) was established to be responsible for collecting all donations and distributing funds for the construction and renovation of places of worship and to support the training of imams, as well as for financing the CFCM (see below in 3). Two official reports provide information on the legal situation of Islam in France. One specifically concerns French Muslims and was issued in 2000.26 The other is a full report issued in 2006 by the Ministry of the Interior, providing up to date information on relations between religious groups and the authorities in France.27 Islamic finance (banking products and services compatible with the Qur’anic prescriptions) is currently gaining importance in France, and an offi-

23 Text available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00 0006070169&dateTexte=20090401, accessed12 November 2009. 24 Frégosi, Franck, Penser l’islam dans la laïcité (Paris: Editions Fayard, 2008). 25 Curtit, Françoise and Francis Messner, Droit des religions en France et en Europe: Recueil de textes (Paris: Editions Bruylant, 2008). 26 Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, “L’islam dans la République”. 27 Machelon, Jean-Pierre, Les relations des cultes avec les pouvoirs publics: Rapport au ministre de l’Intérieur et de l’Aménagement du Territoire, 2006, http://lesrapports .ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/064000727/0000.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009.

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cial report on this matter was issued in 2008 by the Commission of Finances.28 An “Institut français de finance islamique” was created in December 2009, in partnership with the Islamic Development Bank. However, Islamic financial products are still not permitted in France, and the Conseil Constitutionnel has banned a law intended to authorise sukuks (Islamic bonds) in France (14 October 2009), several deputies believing that this would not be compatible with the principles of laïcité. 3


Muslim groups and associations are organised according to the law of associations (1901) and a large number of Muslim associations are therefore registered. The majority of them are small and only of local interest, but a few associations are of national importance. The Union of Islamic Organisations in France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, UOIF),29 often said to have links with the Muslim Brotherhood, aims to bring together all French Muslims, but many of the main Muslim organisations in France reflect countries of origin: Algerian Islam is represented by the Grande Mosquée de Paris (GMP),30 and the National Federation of Muslims in France (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France,31 FNMF) is the organisation of Moroccan Islam. After an internal dispute, the FNMF split in 2007 and a second organisation of Moroccan Islam, the Assembly of French Muslims (Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, RMF),32 was then created. Turks are gathered under the Coordination Committee of Turkish Muslims in France (Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs

28 Arthuis, Jean, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la Commission des finances, du contrôle budgétaire et des comptes économiques de la nation sur la finance islamique, 2008, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r07-329/r07-3291.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 29 Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, 20 rue de la Prévôté, 93120 La Courneuve, +33 (0)1 43 11 10 60, www.uoif-online.com. 30 Grande Mosquée de Paris, 2, bis place du puits de l’Ermite, 75005 Paris, +33 (0)1 45 35 97 33, www.mosquee-de-paris.org. 31 FNMF, 33, rue Polonceau 75018 Paris, contact presse +33 (0)6 76 37 07 24. 32 Rassemblement des musulmans de France, 11–13 Rue de l’Escaut, 75019 Paris, http://www.lermf.com/.

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de France,33 Millî Görüs (CIMG France)34 is also an important structure, covering almost 30% of French-Turkish mosques,35 and Turkish brotherhoods, such as the Süleymanci and Fethullahçi,36 have networks in France too. The French Federation of Islamic Associations of Africa, the Comoros and the Antilles (Fédération française des associations islamiques d’Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles, FFAIACA), created in 1989, brings together Muslims from Africa and the Antilles. The group Faith and Practice (Foi et pratique)37 created in 1972, is the French Jama’a at-tabligh and there are substantial numbers of Sufi orders in France, including groups such as the Murid tariqas38 and the Tijaniyyah from Senegal and Mali, the Naqshbandis (www .naqshbandi.fr, mostly Turkish) and the ‘Alawiyya tariqa, which is of Algerian origin. There are also several youth associations, the main one being Young Muslims of France (Jeunes Musulmans de France, www.jmf.asso.fr), founded in July 1993 with the support of the UOIF. The French Muslim Scouts (Scouts musulmans de France),39 created in 1991, were integrated into the official association Scoutisme français in 1994. The French Council of the Muslim Religion (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM)40 was founded in 2002 at the request of the French authorities as a body whose aim is to represent Muslims to the government and communicate the views of the state to Muslims. It is concerned with issues such as the construction of mosques, sections for Muslim burial in cemeteries, halal slaughter, nomination of chaplains and the training of imams, but it has neither real prerogatives nor any executive power. It was set up to represent Islam on

33

CCFTF, 17 place de la nation, 75011 Paris, +33 (0)1 44 64 77 77, ccmtf@yahoo

.fr. 34 Communauté Islamique du Milli Görüş de France, 64 rue du Faubourg SaintDenis, 75010 PARIS, + 33 (0)1 45 23 55 12, www.cimgfrance.com. 35 See Akgönül, Samim, “Millî Görüs: Institution religieuse minoritaire et mouvement politique transnational”, in Samir Amghar (ed.), Recompositions contemporaines de l’islamisme en situation de diaspora (Paris: Lignes de Repères, 2006), pp. 63–86. 36 http://fr.fgulen.com/. 37 Foi et pratique, 79 rue Jean-Pierre Timbaud, 75011 Paris, 01 43 57 58 10, http:// www.foietpratique.org/. 38 http://touba-aix-marseille.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i d=51&Itemid=48, accessed 8 January 2010. 39 Scouts Musulmans de France, 12, Place Georges Pompidou, 93167 Noisy le Grand cedex, + 33 (0)1 45 92 95 86, www.scouts-musulmans.fr. 40 CFCM, 270 rue Lecourbe, 75015 Paris, +33 (0)1 45 58 05 73, http://www.lecfcm .fr/.

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a national level and is recognised by the French government,41 but its real capacity to represent French Muslims is often questioned by Muslims themselves. The main challenge to its legitimacy is that seats on the Council are granted according to the ground area of each mosque, which benefits affluent groups and is therefore not viewed as very democratic. The last elections took place in 2008, when 43 delegates elected Mohammed Moussaoui, vice-president of the RMF, as president of the CFCM. He decided to re-organise the CFCM in order to provide a better representation of all the different groups. Out of 17 members, 3 are RMF, 2 CCMTF, 2 UOIF, 2 GMP, 1 FFAIACA, 1 Faith and Practice, 1 FNMF and 5 are representives of the main mosques, although the FNMF refused the position they were offered. Some tensions exist between different confessional groupings. For example, in May 2009, the media reported a conflict between the vicepresident of the CFCM and the general secretary of the FFAIACA.42 Finally, the Conférence des Imams de France (Conference of French Imams), established in June 2009, brings together some 40 imams of the region of Paris.43 Its aim is to promote interreligious dialogue and “an open Islam”. 4


There were around 2,150 Muslim places worship in France in 2006, about 20 of which can accommodate more than 1,000 people.44 There are also some 20 mosques with minarets, the oldest being the Grande Mosquée de Paris. Some 120 buildings are dedicated solely to Muslim practice and activities, but most are not, being either private houses 41 See the report of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Muslim faith in France, September 2007, http://www.ambafrance-pk.org/france_pakistan/IMG/pdf/ muslim_faith.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 42 See Chartier, Claire, “Le CFCM excuse Hortefeux et se déchire en coulisse”, L’Express, 15 September 2009, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/religion/lecfcm-excuse-hortefeux-et-se-dechire-en-coulisse_786846.html, accessed 12 November 2009. 43 See Le Monde, 11 June 2009, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/06/11/ le-conseil-des-imams-de-france-emerge-face-au-cfcm_1205860_3224.html, accessed 14 February 2010. 44 See Frégosi, Franck (ed.), Les conditions d’exercice du culte musulman en France (Paris: Fonds d’Action et de Soutien pour l’Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations, FASILD, 2003).

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or sometimes former factories, garages and the like, that are used for worship.45 The number of building projects is on the increase and important mosques are being built in Marseille, Strasbourg, Nantes, Paris, Tours, Villeneuve d’Ascq, among other towns. The mosque in Créteil, which can accommodate 2,000 people, was inaugurated in December 2008. The mosque in Gennevilliers opened its doors for Ramadan (August 2009); it can host 2,500 people and is now the biggest mosque in the Paris region. Cultural centres, which can also host meetings and worship, are also to be built. The laïcité laws make it impossible for the state to fund the construction and these projects depend mainly on the involvement of the members of the community, although help is sometimes available from foreign donors. Some financial mechanisms do exist, allowing local authorities to charge very low rents, for example, or reduce the taxes. Religious groups sometimes manage to benefit from these structures. 5


State education, which in France means all public schools, does not include the teaching of Islam. This is because the French school system, in accordance with the principle of separation, does not allow any religious instruction in state schools. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of school in France:46 private schools without a contract with the state (écoles privées hors contrat), private schools with a contract with the state (écoles privées sous contrat d’association avec l’Etat), and public school (écoles publiques). Private schools without a contract receive no financial assistance from the state and they are free to organise as they wish (law Debré of 31 December 1959; code of education L 442). When private schools do have a contract with the state, they can receive public funding to cover up to a tenth of their costs, and possible official recognition of their curriculum and diplomas. They then have to comply with the Code of Education, Article L141-3 and Article

45 http://www.la-croix.com/illustrations/Multimedia/Actu/2006/10/25/carte1.jpg, accessed 12 November 2009. 46 For more detail, see Peiser, Gustave, “Ecole publique, ecole privée et laïcité en France”, Cemoti, no. 19: Laïcité(s) en France et en Turquie, http://cemoti.revues.org/ document1699.html, accessed 12 November 2009.

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R442-36, which states that religious education can be given either outside normal school hours, or as the first or last hour(s) of teaching for the day. Religious education must remain optional, and the school cannot discriminate about which students it accepts. Nearly all these private schools (90%) are Catholic schools. The same rules apply to both primary and secondary education. Chaplaincies can be created at secondary level (collèges and lycées), but not in primary schools. In Alsace and Moselle, where the legal status of religions is different, state primary schools and secondary and technical education establishments are secular, but all must include religious instruction in their curriculum. Students’ parents can have their children exempted from these classes upon request and, in primary schools, such pupils must attend classes in ethics. The content of religious instruction is left to the discretion of the relevant religious authorities. In practice, however, Christianity and Judaism are almost always the only possibilities, although the Archbishop of Strasbourg stressed in an interview with the Christian journal La Croix (12 December 2003), the necessity of allowing Islam to be taught in public schools along with the two other major religions. Three private Muslim secondary schools (receiving no public funding) have opened in France in recent years: in Aubervilliers (called La Réussite (Success), it is currently encountering significant financial difficulties), Lille (2003) and Lyon (2008). A private Muslim school with a contract with the state has existed since 1990 in La Réunion (French overseas department). On 10 March 2008, the Muslim private school Éducation et Savoir opened its doors in Vitry-sur-Seine (Val-de-Marne, Paris suburban region), a private lycée called Averroes opened in Lille in 2006, and the Al Kindi lycée opened near Lyon in 2007. Muslim children often attend Christian private schools to receive religious instruction, and some of these schools allow Muslim teachers for their Muslim pupils. In 2006, 317,000 pupils attended private schools for kindergarten, 565,000 at primary level, 655,000 in the first years of secondary school (collège) and 410,000 in the second part of secondary school (lycée).47

47 See the budget of the Ministry of National Education, http://www.performancepublique.gouv.fr/farandole/2007/pap/html/DBGPGMPRESPGMACTPGM139.htm, accessed 12 November 2009.

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Outside school, Muslim religious education in France is delivered in mosque associations and is therefore very much connected to the country of origin. 6


Muslim higher education and imam training is currently organised in France only by private institutions: the Institut Français des Etudes et Sciences Islamiques (Ile de France, www.ifesi.fr); the Institut Avicenne des Sciences Humaines (Lille, www.avicenne.eu); and the Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (close to Nevers, www.iesh.fr). The French branch of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT, www.iiitfrance.net) aims to offer a broad programme in Islamic studies ( fiqh, theology, ‘ulum al-din, etc.), including sociology of religions. At present, only the licence degree (a three-year programme equivalent to a BA) is available.48 This institute opened in 2000 and works as an open university (lectures are given in the afternoon or during the week end). It organises various workshops and Islamic meetings every year. The institute also publishes books on Islamic theology and jurisprudence (mostly translations from English to French). A specific programme for training imams opened in September 2008 in the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Institut Catholique de Paris, a private Catholic faculty. It is a Diplôme Universitaire course, meaning a two-year study programme at higher education level called Interculturalism, Secularism and Religions (Interculturalité, Laïcité et Religions). Although the Grande Mosquée de Paris is sending its imams there for further training, not all Muslim institutions find this situation acceptable. Finally, a Masters course in Law and Religious Studies with a specialisation in Islamic studies started at the Faculty of Law of the University of Strasbourg, in September 2009.49 This is the first degree programme in Islamic studies to be offered in a state university in France.

48

http://89.34.22.18/admstrv/Controls/FCKeditor/Image/Programme%20rectorat%20 L1%202009-2010.pdf, accessed 13 April 2010. 49 Master recherche “Sciences et droit des religions”, spécialité “islamologie: religion, droit et société”, Faculté de droits, sciences économiques et gestion de l’Université de Strasbourg, http://master-islamo.mineurel.info/, accessed 6 January 2010.

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Cemeteries, in France (except in Alsace-Moselle), are secular spaces: the Law of 14 November 1881 forbids the creation of separate spaces divided by a wall or a hedge to group graves according to religious affiliation. Circulars issued by the Ministry of the Interior (25 November 1975, 14 February 1991 and 19 February 2008) nevertheless recommended that prefects and mayors should reserve specific areas for Muslims in cemeteries, while avoiding any physical barriers. It is not up to the mayor to establish the religion of the deceased, which is determined only by the will of the deceased or his family, so a mayor cannot oppose a Christian asking to be buried in a Muslim section of the cemetery, for example. This is a problem for the Muslim community in France, though it suits families of mixed religious affiliation. There are three Muslim cemeteries in France, the oldest in Bobigny, close to Paris; its construction was allowed because it was initially built for the French-Muslim hospital there, and it became a public cemetery only in 1996. Around 70 Muslim sections in cemeteries have been opened in major cities such as Montpellier and Marseille; 25 of them are located around Paris. In October 2009, an agreement was signed by the Mayor of Strasbourg (Roland Ries), the president of the CFCM (Mohammed Moussaoui), and the president of the Conseil régional du culte musulman d’Alsace (Driss Ayachour) for the building of a publicly-run Muslim cemetery in Strasbourg. It is to open in 2010. One can only be buried in a Muslim grave if one has lived or died in the commune where it is located; the bodies of 85% of Muslims who die in France are still returned to their country of origin for burial. This practice is often encouraged by Arab countries, such as Tunisia, who cover the costs of the repatriation of their citizens. 8


The French law codes of education and health and the penal code permit the provision of chaplains, who mostly work on a voluntary basis and have no real legal status. The CFCM has nominated head chaplains for hospitals, schools and prisons, but this remains an internal arrangement. Chaplaincy has a legal status only in the army. Since March 2005, a Muslim head chaplain has been appointed by the Minister of Defence,

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along with the three existing head chaplains (Catholic, Protestant and Jewish). The head chaplains nominate and manage the military chaplains of their own religious groups. 9

Religious Festivals

Religious festivals are never organised by the state and Muslim religious holidays are not recognised by the state. As a result of the historical importance of Catholicism in France, public holidays follow the Christian calendar (Easter, Christmas, etc.). Official departments and agencies, state schools and employers nevertheless grant leave of absence to Muslims who wish to attend religious ceremonies on occasions such as ‘Id al-Adha, ‘Id al-Fitr and Mawlid al-Nabi, and the Discipline générale militaire (internal regulations of the army) now grants leave of absence for such religious festivals.50 10

Halal Food

Halal food is widely available in supermarkets. Specialist shops also exist and halal business seems to be doing well (with a value of around €3 billion). Muslim associations, however, often point out that, because there is no legal definition of halal, deception is quite common. Some claim, for instance, that over 90% of the meat sold under the halal label is not the result of ritual slaughter. As in most European countries, exceptions for ritual slaughter have been made to the Rural Law Code, and the state has given official consent for this to the Paris Mosque (1994) and Lyon and Evry (1995). Local authorities usually try to facilitate the organisation of halal slaughter. Private associations such as A Votre Service (AVS, www .halal-avs.com) ensure that halal practices are properly monitored and provide information concerning halal food. In 2007, the UOIF set up a control and certification service for halal food, “Halal Services”.

50 http://www.cofat.terre.defense.gouv.fr/PJ/Documents/VotreEspace/Savoirvivre/ references/decret_discipline_generale_militaire.pdf, accessed 5 February 2009.

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A survey issued by IFOP in December 200951 shows that some 59% of Muslims buy halal meat (71% for first-generation migrants, but only 47% for younger people), while 49% of consumers claim they “buy more halal food than a few years ago”. 11

Dress Codes

The head scarf issue suddenly emerged in the public arena during the 1980s with the increased use, or at least increased visibility, of various types of head coverings worn by young Muslim women in public places. Following on from local difficulties, the French President set up an investigative committee known as the Commission Stasi in July 2003. This Commission released a report on 11 December 2003, stating that wearing conspicuous religious symbols violated the secular principle of the French school system. On this basis, the law on secularism and religious symbols in state schools was passed in February 2004. Article 1 of the law states: “The wearing of symbols and apparel by which a student conspicuously expresses religious affiliation in public schools is prohibited. The rules of procedure provide for conciliatory dialogue before disciplinary action is taken against an offending student.” This decision was followed by extensive debate as to its interpretation and application, but passions have now settled. In 2004, another report was issued, on displaying of religious affiliation in schools.52 New regulations concerning photographs for passports and national identity cards required that the head must appear without any kind of cover, decoration or scarf; there are no exceptions. There were some protests, arguing that a woman wearing a headscarf should not appear without it, even in a photograph, but this did not lead to an intense public debate. In 2008 and 2009, after the head scarf, the face cover (burqa or niqab) became the object of public debate. An investigative committee

51

http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1045-1-study_file.pdf, accessed 5 February 2009. Obin, Jean-Pierre, “Les signes et manifestations d’appartenance religieuse dans les établissements scolaires”, Rapport au ministre de l’éducation nationale, 2004, juin 2004 (2004–115), ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/syst/igen/rapports/rapport_obin.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 52

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was set up in June 200853 and, in September 2009, the French Senate issued a report on “le port de la burqa dans les lieux publics (wearing the burqa in public places)”.54 The Ministry of the Interior tried to estimate the number of women wore a burqa; two notes give figures of 367 (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur) and 2,000 (Sousdirection de l’information générale). 12


The broadcasting of religious programmes on public television stations is covered by the law on the freedom of communication No. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986, article 56: France 2 shall schedule religious programmes devoted to the main religions practised in France on Sunday mornings. Said programmes shall be produced under the responsibility of the representatives of said religions and be presented in the form of the live transmission of cultural ceremonies or religious comments. The company shall bear the costs of production within the limit of a maximum amount set in the annual provisions of the terms of reference.

A 30-minute programme on Islam, Connaître l’islam (Knowing Islam)55 is broadcast every Sunday. A very large number of Muslim television channels are accessible by satellite. A number of printed publications concerning Islam have existed in France for some time, including La Médina, Hawwa-Magazine, Réflexions-Reflets de l’Islam en France, Colombus, Actualis (UOIF), Sézame, and Islam de France, but they have all ceased publication for financial reasons. It may be thought the future lay in electronic publications, but a blog such as Hanut-ul-muslim closed after less than a year. Muslim websites are increasing in number and importance. The best known are Oumma (www.oumma.com) and SaphirNews (www .saphirnews.com).

53 Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/voile_integral.asp, accessed 12 November 2009. 54 Wearing the burka in public spaces, http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc201/lc201.pdf, last accessed 12 November 2009. 55 France 2, 7 Esplanade Henri de France, 75907 Paris cedex 15.

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Family Law

The French legal system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is not relevant in legal matters. However, jurisprudence does sometimes take into account questions of religious affiliation and practice (in matters such as holidays for religious festivals, for example). In 2005, the French government raised the legal age of marriage for girls to 18 (it had been 15 for nearly 200 years). This was to counter the practice of arranged marriage. Chantal Brunel, a right-wing deputy (UMP— Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), proposed a law against polygamy in June 2004,56 and the issue regularly arises in public debate. This question will certainly have to be dealt with when Mayotte, which recognises polygamy since Muslim family law applies there, eventually becomes a French department (scheduled for 2011). 14


In June 2009, the Conference of French Imams (Conférence des Imams de France) was officially established. Its president is the former imam of Drancy, Hassan Chalghoumi. This group brings together some 40 imams of the region of Paris, and promotes interreligious dialogue and “an open Islam”. Religious dialogue initiatives of both national and local interest are too numerous to list. On the national level, examples are the IslamoChristian Research Group (Groupe de Recherche Islamo-Chrétien, http://www.gric.asso.fr), or the journal Chemins de Dialogue (Paths of Dialogue).57 Marseille-Hope (Marseille-espérance, http://www.marseille.fr/sitevdm/ jsp/site/Portal.jsp?page_id=689) is an interesting local initiative involving all the leaders of the various religious groups in the city, providing the mayor with one structure for dialogue with all the religions. Officially, there are no tensions between the religious communities in France. Difficulties certainly exist at the local level, but the official motto seems to be for all to “live together in peace and dialogue”.

56

http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/propositions/pion1645.asp, accessed 12 November 2009. 57 http://istr-marseille.cef.fr/pages/chemins-de-dialogue.htm, accessed 15 January 2010.

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The Palestinian conflict has given rise to tensions between Jews and Muslims, but national religious leaders, including the Chief Rabbi of France (Gilles Berheim), together with the president of the Bishops’ Conference, Monseigneur André Vingt-Trois, and the president of the Fédération Protestante de France, Reverend Claude Baty, took part in the supper organised by the CFCM for the end of Ramadan. 15


Public opinion has mostly focused on the question of religious symbols, specifically clothing. For example, the High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité, HALDE), recently had to deal with questions of wearing the burqa and of how to respond when some pupils’ parents wear a headscarf when taking part in school outings. Issues related to gender constantly arouse discussion (special opening hours in swimming pools for women or men only, for example). The question of religious practice regarding food is also an issue, especially in schools, but the debate is not very intense. Nevertheless, signs of tension between Muslims and non Muslims are noticeable. In a 2007 poll, 57% of French people said they would rather “not have a Muslim as a neighbour”.58 The Swiss debate on minarets generated some ripples in France. Minarets raise more passions than mosques. Several surveys were conducted,59 mostly showing that the French are divided on the question, 46% opposing construction of minarets and 40% accepting them, while 14% did not answer. Opposition to minarets was stronger than opposition to mosques, but tensions are seemingly on the increase. Only 19% of people said that mosques should be built if the Muslim community asks for them, compared with 33% in 1989; similarly, opponents in 2009 were 41%, compared with 38% in 1989, 31% in 1994, and 22% in 2001. The public visibility of Islam seems to challenge the French more than Islam itself. 58 Borooah, V.K., K. Vani, and J. Mangan, “Love thy neighbour: How much bigotry is there in Eestern countries?”, Kyklos, International Review for Social Sciences, vol. 60, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 295–317. 59 IFOP survey on the French and building minarets in France, http://www .ifop.fr/?option=com_publication&type=poll&id=1000&utm_ source=feedburner&utm_medium=email, accessed 15 December 2009.

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Given that Islam is very much connected to immigration, Muslims in France face some difficulties.60 Social and educational inequalities remain for young people with family origins in Northern or Sub-Saharan Africa, and their level of unemployment is high61—especially for those who do not acquire French nationality.62 16


The UOIF organises an annual meeting of French Muslims (Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France). The 26th meeting took place in April 2009 in Le Bourget and was attended by around 150,000 people. Some 115,000 people participated in 2008. In Marseille, the Muslim community organises a regular festival, L’Aïd dans la Cité (‘Id in the city) just before ‘Id. The sixth took place in November 2009, with concerts, art exhibitions, conferences, drama and many other cultural or artistic events.63

60 See the report of the Ministry of Labour, September 2005, http://www.travailsolidarite.gouv.fr/etudes-recherche-statistiques-drees/publications/etudes-resultats/ no-424-vecu-attitudes-intolerantes-ou-discriminatoires-par-personnes-immigreesissues-immigration.html, accessed 10 January 2010. 61 Dupray, Arnaud and Stéphanie Moullet, “L’insertion des jeunes d’origine maghrébine en France: Des différences plus marquées dans l’accès à l’emploi qu’en matière salariale”, Marseille: Céreq, 2004, http://www.cereq.fr/cereq/Net-Doc-6.pdf, accessed 6 January 2010. 62 http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/IM_7_ENL2.pdf 63 http://www.ufm13.org/accueil.html, last accessed 12 November 2009.

GEORGIA Satenik Mkrtchyan1 1

Muslim Populations

Georgia has been a majority Christian country for centuries and has remained so through periods of Muslim rule and longer periods of having immediate Muslim neighbours. Nevertheless, Georgia has long had a significant Muslim population.2 The first Muslims appeared in Tiflis as far back as the second half of the seventh century, at the time of the Arab conquests. For centuries (especially during the eighth to early-twelfth), Muslims played a leading political and economic role in the life of the city.3 In the Middle Ages and the early modern period, Islam has been widely introduced as a result of close contact between Georgia and the Islamic world. In addition, Turkic speaking Muslims began to move into the country—migrants who became known as ‘Tatars’ in the Tsarist era and would then be reclassified as ‘Azerbaijanis’ during Soviet times era.4 By the end of the imperial period, the population of Georgia was 20% Muslim. While the Russian imperial authorities were usually tolerant of Georgia’s Muslims, the Soviet authorities were considerably less so. The militantly atheistic Soviet state launched a campaign against religious institutions and ecclesiastical authorities in the 1920s and 1930s, but reached an accommodation with the USSR’s traditional religions during World War II. Of the four Muslim Religious Boards that oversaw Muslim affairs in the USSR, the one for the entire South Caucasus region was based in Baku (Azerbaijan).5 Anti-religious campaigns and activities of the Board and other official institutions throughout the 1 Satenik Mkrtchya is a PhD student at Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, and works as a researcher at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia. 2 Sanikidze, G. and Ed. W. Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia”, BPS Working Paper Series (Berkeley: University of California, 2004), p. 3. 3 Asatrian, G. and H. Margarian, “The Muslim community of Tiflis (8th–9th centuries)”, Iran and the Caucasus, vol. 8, no. 1 (2004), pp. 29–52 (29). 4 Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 3. 5 Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 46.

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Soviet Union resulted in Islam and Islamic practices being marginalised and Islam consequently became largely ‘unofficial’.6 Georgia, like other parts of the Soviet Union, witnessed a notable ‘Islamic revival’ in the Gorbachev era and the early post-Soviet period,7 mainly through a renewal of ties with foreign, especially Turkish and Iranian, Islamic organizations.8 Georgian scholars have estimated that the number of ‘Muslims’ in the republic in 1989 was as high as 640,000, or 12% of the total population at the time (5.4 million). However, the precise size of Georgia’s Muslim population has been difficult to estimate. The 1989 Soviet census did not inquire into religious identity or practices, and the number of Muslims used to be deduced by reference to the presence of people from traditionally Muslim nationalities in the republic. There are, however, other Muslims particularly Georgians in the Autonomous Republic of Ajara in Georgia’s southwest. The reliability of the later census conducted in 2002, which included a question on religion, remains questionable, given the extent of disorder in the country at the time,9 but gave the number of Muslims in Georgia as 433,784, or 9.9% of the total population.10 Apart from census data, various estimates are made by the mass media, the Muslim community and academics. According to one, the total number of Muslims in Georgia is 300,000,11 while the European Stability Initiative gives the number as 430,000,12 and the Azerbaijani mass media suggest a figure of 500,000 Muslims,13 the same as the number given by the Tbilisi mosque representative.14

6 Saroyan, M., “Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union location”, Global, Area, and International Archive (Berkeley: University of California, 1997), p. 12, http://www .escholarship.org/uc/item/2s90w4tw), accessed 14 April 2010; Balci, B. and R. Motika, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 26, no. 3 (September 2007), pp. 335–353 (341–342). 7 Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 46. 8 Balci and Motika, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, p. 335. 9 Sanikidze andWalker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 5; Balci and Motika, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, p. 338. 10 The 2002 census did not include the Abkhazia or South Ossetia regions. 11 Baindurashvili, Kh., “Ислам в посткоммунистическом Тбилиси (Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi)”, in in V. Partsvania (ed.), Человек постсоветсткого пространства (The Human Being of the post-Soviet Space) Сборник материалов конференции. Выпуск 3 / Под ред. В.В. Парцвания. (St Petersburg: Philosophical Union of St Petersburg, 2005), pp. 85–91 (87). 12 http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=321&country_ID=1&slide_ID=1, accessed 21 December 2009. 13 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 11 December 2009 14 Popuashvili, N. “islami (Islam)”, in Z. Kiknadze (ed.), ୤୘୞ଡ଼ୖଡ଼୘୕ଡ଼ ୥୔୩୔୤୛୙୘୞ୡ୬ଡ଼ (Religions in Georgia) (Tbilisi: Public Defender’s Office, 2008) pp. 336–364, (364).

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In Georgia, there are strong correlations between ethnic groups and religious affiliations, and often, geographic areas,15 which is significant in terms of defining the main characteristics of Islamic practices. This is most clearly the case with the Azerbaijanis, the largest of the Muslim communities (approximately 284,761, or 6.1% of the population according to the 2002 census), who comprise the largest ethnic minority group.16 They are largely Muslim and most of them live in the southeastern region of Kvemo Kartli, where they constitute a majority. Some 15,65417 live in Tbilisi, and 33,600 in the eastern region of Kakheti. The majority of Azerbaijanis in Georgia belong to the Shi’ite branch of Islam, although religion is rather weak in the Kvemo Kartli.18 The other major Muslim group consists of the ethnic Georgian Muslims of Ajara. According to 2006 estimates by the Department of Statistics, 63% of the Ajara population are Georgian Orthodox Christians and 30% Muslims, predominantly Sunnis. In addition to these two groups, there are other small Muslim ethnic groups: a portion of the Abkhaz population,19 Kists,20 Avars,21 Tatars, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks 15

US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report 2009: Georgia”, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127311.htm, accessed 23 March 2010. 16 Azerbaijani sources often speak of an Azerbaijani population of 500,000 in Georgia, based on ‘unofficial’ sources: http://en.trend.az/news/society/diaspora/1613337 .html, accessed 28 January 2010. 17 Although Sanikidze gives a figure of 18,000 (Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 21). 18 Weattley, J., “Obstacles impeding the regional integration of the Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia”, ECMI Working Paper no. 23 (February 2005), p. 5. 19 See Balci, B., “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili’s Christian Georgia?” [1/3], http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177, accessed 12 December 2009; Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia”, p. 21. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are currently outside the control of the central government, and reliable information from these regions is difficult to obtain, but in a survey in 2003, 16% of the respondents reported they were Muslims. There are no mosques in Abkhazia; active participation in Islam is low and Muslim practice is unobstrusive (see A. Крылов,, “Единая вера Абхазских ‘Христиан’ и ‘Мусульман’: Особенности религиозного сознания в современной Абхазии (Common face of Abkhazian ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’: Specifications of religious consciousness in modern Abkhazia)”, in N. Lejava (ed.), Роль православия в государствах и обществах Грузии и Росии (The Role of Orthodoxy in the States and Societies of Georgia and Russia) (Tbilisi: Heinrich Beoll Foundation, 2004) pp. 238–249 (238–241). 20 The Kists live mostly in and around the Pankisi Gorge villages in northeast Georgia: Jokolo, Birkiani, Omalo, Middle and Upper Xalatsani and Duisi. The 2002 census gives 7,110 as the number of Kists Georgia, while the 1989 census reports 5,455 (see N. Sardjveladze et al., Tolerance in Multiethnic Georgia: Training Methodology Manual for Educators (Tbilisi: Mtsignobari, 2009), p. 33). 21 The 1989 census reports about 4,230 Avars, the 2002 census gives the figure of 1,996, and the Dagestani mass media estimates about 17,000 people.http://www.ndelo .ru/one_stat.php?id=2091, accessed 15 March 2010).

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and Kurds. A population of some 100,000 Meskhets were deported, mainly to Central Asia, in the Stalinist era from the south-west during World War II. The 2001 census counted about 1,000 Meskhets, but it is expected that a 2006 law of repatriation will increase that number. There are also Muslims citizens of other countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, etc, who are in Georgia, mainly in the capital Tbilisi, working in diplomatic missions, business and tourism. 2

Islam and the State

The Georgian Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, thought, conscience, belief and religion, and prohibits persecution for the expression of opinions or ideas and for holding to any religion or belief (Article 19, paragraph 2). These freedoms are also protected by Georgia’s Criminal Code (Articles 115, 155 and 156), which also penalizes unlawful interference through violence, the threat of violence or misuse of authority in the setting up or activities of political, social or religious organisations (Article 166). However, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has a dominant position and a particular relationship with the State. Article 9 of the Constitution states that, “The state recognises the special importance of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) in Georgian history but also affirms complete freedom of religious belief and the independence of the church from the state.” The 2002 concordat between the government and the GOC gives the patriarch immunity, exempts GOC clergy from military service, allows only the GOC the right to staff the military chaplaincy, and grants the GOC a consultative role in government and other privileges denied to other religious denominations and groups. While the GOC is recognised and protected as both a church and a public entity, other religious groups can only register22 as non-governmental organisations or non-profit-making private-law associations. This means that religious organisations can register only as non-commercial entities, a status that some religious communities, among them the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church and the Muslims,

22

Registration of religious organisations became possible for the first time in 15 years when parliament approved amendments to the Civil Code on 6 April 2005, allowing religious communities to register with the Ministry of Justice. President Mikheil Saakashvili signed the amendments into law on 27 April.

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regard as demeaning. One Muslim organisation, the Congress of Georgian Muslims, received registration on 2 September 2005.23 Despite the provisions of the Constitution, local and national officials sometimes place obstacles in the way of minorities. For example, the Azerbaijanis report particular difficulties in their efforts to build and maintain mosques.24 The chief editor, Suleiman Suleimanov, of the Azerbaijani-language magazine Gurjistan, published in Tbilisi, has said these obstacles are not a part of a state policy, they sometimes come from particular groups and individuals,25 but Georgian experts regard it as a consequence of the events of 11 September 2001, which caused the Georgian government to keep a closer eye on the activities of Islamic organisations. Following this logic, the suspension of the construction of 11 mosques is seen as a result of government suspicions that some of them might have been financed by foreign fundamentalist organisations, which displeased the Azerbaijani community.26 3


In Tbilisi, the Iman (Faith) Foundation has an office opposite the Tbilisi Jumma mosque (35, Botanikuri str., Tbilisi 0105, tel. +99532 721786).27 It organises Islamic studies courses, houses a library of Shi’a literature translated from Persian and has a conference room where religious events take place. The director acknowledges the authority of a marja‘ al-taqlid, the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.28 A similar foundation, Ahli Beyt, is active in

23 F. Corley, “Georgia: Religious minorities still second-class faiths?”, Forum 18 News Service, November 2005, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=696, accessed 17 December 2009. 24 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 October 2009. 25 Interview conducted by the author, January, 2010. 26 G. Nodia (ed.), Ethnic-Confessional Groups and Problems of Civic Integration in Georgia: Azeri, Javakheti Armenian and Muslim Meskhetian Communities (Tbilisi: Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development), p. 18. 27 During a personal interview, the responsible person for the works of the organization in Georgia, Saderdi Fana, declared that the organisation acts independently, though he emphasised the close connections with the Iman Foundation and its strong support for setting up the local organisation (interview conducted by Irakli Pipia, 27 March 2010). 28 Balci, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344.

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Marneuli and has an office in Tbilisi (10, Kalandadze, Tbilisi 0114, tel. +99558 61–86–53, +99593 966966). In addition to courses in Arabic and Shi’ite theology, it offers lessons in English, computer literacy and Georgian in order to help young people to integrate into independent Georgia. It belongs to the international network of another marja’ altaqlid, the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hoseyni as-Sistani of Najaf.29 A Fund for Muslim Revival has been operating in Tbilisi with the aim of fundraising for the restoration of the mosque and addressing various needs of believers.30 Since the late 1980s, in Ajara as in other parts of the former Soviet Union and South-Eastern Europe, Turkish transnational religious movements blending trade, business and mission, have encouraged the re-Islamisation of the formerly Muslim peoples.31 Currently, most of these Turkish movements and Islamic institutions are not registered, either with the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus based in Baku, or with the Georgian Ministry of Justice, and have an ambiguous status, preferring to work with their local partners in small madrasas (locally known as medresses).32 In the early 1990s, in parallel with the existing Muslim Religious Board (dukhovnoe upravlenie) of Transcaucasia (with its centre in Baku), the Muslim Religious Board of Ajara-Muftiate was created, situated in the only mosque in Batumi, Kutaisi str. 33, Town Centre, to function independently from the Board of Transcaucasia. However, the Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia has not been officially disbanded, and its official representative currently lives in Tbilisi. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Ajaran Muftiate experienced restructuring and a change of leader. Since 2004, the Muftiate has been working on the legal basis of a new charter to establish a hierarchical structure of central, regional, and local muftis with their own staff and council (majlis).33 There is no Muslim political party in Georgia, though on 20 June 2006 a consultative meeting of the representatives of Muslims of

29

Ibid. Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi”, p. 90. 31 Balci, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–348. 32 For a description of the movements, called Süleymancıs with their Qur’anic schools, and Nurcus with their madrasa activities, in Tbilisis, Batumi and Kutaisi, see in Balci, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–349. 33 R. Baramidze, “Ислам в Аджарии (Islam in Ajara)”, Азербаиджан в Мире (Azerbaijan in the World) vol. 4, no. 6 (2006), pp. 86–93, (87–88). 30

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Georgia took place in Erzrum (Turkey) on the initiative of National Assembly of Azerbaijanis of Georgia. As a result of the meeting, they decided to form a working group to prepare the founding congress of the Muslim democratic party of Georgia.34 4


According to a 2008 publication by the Office of the Georgian Public Defender, there are 286 mosques and prayer houses in Georgia another five are under construction. However, some mosques (prayer houses) have been functioning unregistered and their status is unclear, which makes it difficult to give an accurate figure. Also, in some Muslim communities, such as the mountainous parts of Ajara, there are madrasas that serve as prayer houses (see details in section 5). Similarly, in Ajara around 100 other buildings serve as prayer houses.35 According to the chief editor of the Azerbaijani magazine Gurjistan, more than 30 mosques have been built in Georgia since independence and many others have been renovated, adding up to around 160 active mosques.36 Restitution of property confiscated under the Communist regime remained a contentious issue for religious groups other than the GOC. The main mosque and two synagogues in Tbilisi are operated by their respective religious communities but remain state property. The mosques in general are financially supported by donations from the believers and businessmen. The government has provided subsidies for the maintenance and preservation of mosques on the grounds that the buildings are national cultural heritage sites. Under an agreement with Turkey, the Ministry of Culture was expected to begin renovation of an Islamic prayer hall in Kobuleti during 2008 but had not begun by the end of the reporting period.37 In Tbilisi there is a mosque called Jumma, where both Shi’i and Sunni Georgian Muslims, as well as Muslim visitors to the capital 34 http://www.day.az/news/georgia/51617.html,http://jiaa.janes.com/public/jiaa/ features.shtml, accessed 11 January 2010. 35 R. Baramidze, “Ислам и его особенности в Аджарии (Islam and its peculiarities in Ajara)”, in N. Lajava (ed.), Идентичность, власть и город в работах молодых ученых Южного Кавказа (Identity, Power and City in the Works of the Young Scholars of the South Caucasus) (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2005), pp. 39–70 (48). 36 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. 37 US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report 2009: Georgia”.

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attend Friday worship.38 The mosque is under the Azerbaijani Muftiate. Like other communities, this mosque is supported by charities and donations.39 The embassies of Iran and Turkey also provide support, mostly in the form of religious literature, and the mosque has a madrasa attached.40 Another mosque is now being built in Tbilisi, at the entrance to the city. In Batumi (the regional centre of Ajara), there is one functioning mosque with a minaret built in the beginning of 2000s, which is open every day. However, many Islamic practices and rituals take place outside the mosque, in courtyards, fields or private homes.41 The website of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara refers to about 11 mosques in the Ajara, Khulo, Shuakhveri and Kobuleti regions.42 The Muftiate of Ajara, on the other hand, claims have 95 mosque schools, 41 mosques, 18 colleges (uchilish’a), and two others unspecified operating on four main levels in Ajara—central, regional, local and “seasonal mosques in those mountainous places, where people have a semi-nomadic way of life”.43 The Marneuli mosque, which opened a few years ago, is now the biggest in Georgia. In Mskhaldidi, a mosque built in 1985 was soon closed and turned into a warehouse, but it was reestablished in early 1990 and has been open for worship ever since. There are also mosques in other cities of eastern Georgia, including Mskhaldidi, Dmanisi and Bolnisi. There are five mosques in Pankisi.44 Villages populated by Avars typically contain unregistered mosques as well as cemetery chapels.45 Many Azerbaijani villages have to shrines and pilgrimage sites, and the veneration of saints (or holy people) is widespread. One such place of pilgrimage is the tomb of the Sufi saint, Isa Efendi, a native of

38 Up to 1996, Shi’is and Sunnis used to pray in the mosque separated by a curtain, but with the arrival of a new (Shi’i) imam, Ali Aliev, the curtain was removed. 39 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 1 December 2009. 40 Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi”, p. 89. 41 Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 5. 42 http://www.adjara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=about, accessed 23 March 2010. 43 R. Baramidze, ୥୔୥୧୞ଡ଼୘୤ୡ୥୔ୟ୧୥୞ଡ଼ୟ୔ୠୡୖ୔୘୤୛ଡ଼୔ୠ୘୕ଡ଼୥ୡ୤ୖ୔ୠଡ଼୚୔୮ଡ଼ଡ଼୥୔ ୗ୔ ୨୧ୠ୩୮ଡ଼ୡୠଡ଼୤୘୕ଡ଼୥ ୛୔୙ଡ଼୥୘୕୧୤୘୕୔ୠଡ଼ ୔ୱ୔୤୔୬ଡ଼ (Characteristics of the functioning and organisation of the Muslim Religious Union in Ajara), http://www .islam.ge/rf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11:2009-12-01-14-1308&catid=9:2009-09-30-07-11-30&Itemid=11&lang=ka, accessed 28 January 2010. 44 Sardjveladze et al., Tolerance in Multiethnic Georgia, p. 34. 45 Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 24.

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Dagestan who died in the 1930s. It is located in the village of Kabal, and is visited not only by Sunni Azerbaijanis, but also Muslim Kists from Pankisiand and by Shi’ite Azerbaijanis.46 There are five mosques in Pankisi.47 Villages populated by Avars typically contain unregistered mosques as well as cemetery chapels.48 5


There are both public and private schools in Georgia, including Georgian, Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian schools based on the language of instruction. Azerbaijanis have traditionally attended Russian and Azerbaijani rather than Georgian schools. According to Article 13 (2) of the Law on General Education 2005, religious indoctrination, proselytism and enforced assimilation are not permitted in schools. The Ministry of Education has decided to prepare new textbooks describing the various religions in neutral terms, and to carry out regular monitoring of the work of the teachers concerned49 to ensure full respect for the right to freedom of religion for minorities. Georgian law has no provision for regulating Muslim religious educational establishments and does not recognise documents and certificates issued by them, but there are, nevertheless a number of madrasas where people, mostly children, can receive some elementary Islamic education. The new brotherhood descended from the Nurcu movement founded by Fethullah Gülen is present in Ajara and functions autonomously. It has three schools, in Batumi, Tbilisi and Kutaisi. The main feature of the Gülen group is that is gives priority to a modern secular education with an emphasis on scientific subjects, computer studies and English language. In Batumi and the surrounding area, six small madrasas controlled by Georgians follow the ideas of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan’s ideas.50

46

Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 24. Sardjveladze et al., Tolerance in Multiethnic Georgia, p. 34. 48 Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 24. 49 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia. 50 The movement of the Turkish Islamist leader, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888– 1959), promotes “everything by the Qur’an, all for the Qur’an” and has actively campaigned for more Koranic schools across Georgia. 47

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In Soviet Georgia, Muslims who wanted an Islamic education had to choose between the colleges in Bukhara and Tashkent in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, students from Georgia (and from all over the Caucasus) could attend the faculty of theology aimed at Turkish Sunnis and an Islamic university with Iranian Shi’ite leanings in Azerbaijan.51 Some young Georgian Shi’ites headed for Qom or Mashhad or to a lesser extent to Tehran or Qazwin to study theology. The Islamic University of Baku, which is dependent on the Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus and follows the interpretations of Grand Ayatollah as-Sistani, also has Azerbaijani students from Georgia.52 In Tbilisi there is a religious college for girls where the teaching staff have studied basic Islamic studies in Qom (Iran).53 A small faculty of theology, founded by a charitable foundation from Iran and linked to the Iman Foundation, has reportedly been operating in Tbilisi, but no information has been found to confirm this. 7


Burial rituals are one of the few Islamic practices, somehow preserved during the Soviet period of ‘religious ignorance’.54 Georgian Muslims follow normal Islamic practice. All rural residential areas and towns with significant Muslim populations have their cemeteries. There are two cemeteries in Tbilisi. In Ajara, the graves of local families and tombs of famous individuals are often near the mosques, which are generally situated in population centres.55

51 Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili’s Christian Georgia?” [1/3]. 52 Balci, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 53 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 1 December 2009. 54 For issues concerning religiosity among Gerogian Muslims, see Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, pp. 6, 24, Saroyan, “Rethinking Islam”, p. 12, Balci and Motika, “Islam in post-Soviet Georgia”, p. 346. 55 For details of burial ceremonies, see Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, pp. 14, 20, 24. Baramidze, “Islam and its peculiarities in Ajara”, p. 49.

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The law does not currently permit the activities of Muslim clergy in the armed forces, hospitals or prisons. 9

Religious Festivals

After the Rose Revolution in 2003, it has become a common practice for the President of Georgia or other members of Government to visit mosques and meet with Muslims on the celebrations of ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban-Bairam), the most popular and widely celebrated Muslim festival. These visits are usually intensely covered in the mass media. President Mikheil Saakashvili has visited Gardabani and Marneui regions to mark their festivals. In Ajara, the chairman of the government of Ajara, members of the cabinet and other officials visit the mosque in Batumi or elsewhere. Such celebrations are usually marked by the ceremonial slaughter of animals. The Association of Aid for Georgian Youth, though not a Muslim organisation, provides meat so that poor families can take part. Nawruz is celebrated by the Azerbaijanis; although it is not a specifically religious occasion, it is mostly perceived as a Muslim holiday. No Muslim holidays are national holidays or officially recognised as non-working days. Other religious festivals and holidays are celebrated locally with different participation rates and publicity, either in mosques or separately in the families.56 Islamic practices in Ajara, according to Sanikidze, today fall into two categories: (1) purely religious rituals such as daily prayer, the recitation of the Qur’an, charitable donations (under different forms), sacrifice (qurban), and the celebration of the Prophets birthday (mevlud or dhyrk), which entails visiting the tombs of relatives and the celebration of important events in the life of a family; and (2) Islamicized Ajaran traditions such as circumcision (sunat), burial ceremonies (janazah), and marriage contracts (niqah, qalim, mahr), including the marriage of underage girls (Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 14).

56

See details in Sanikidze and Walker, “Islam and Islamic practices”, p. 14.

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satenik mkrtchyan 10 Halal Food

The modest to low level of religiosity among Georgian Muslims has had its impact on halal food norms among the Muslim population. However, in cases when families wish to obtain halal meat, they usually go to a market, where they would know who sells halal food. The rural population slaughter their own animals according to halal specifications. In Tbilisi there are several restaurants and food shops owned by Muslims, significantly Turks, that provide halal food. 11

Dress Codes

No Muslim dress code is practised and women in hijab are not seen in the streets of Tbilisi or other towns, unless they are guests or representatives of diplomatic missions. In the villages, women, particularly older women, usually have the habit of covering their head with a scarf. 12


The local media for the Azerbaijani population cover religion alongside other topics. A regional television channel called Marneuli TV has programmes in Azerbaijani, including a 20-minute weekly news programme. The Muftiate of Ajara publishes a daily magazine Rtsmena (Faith).57 There is one state-financed Azerbaijani-language newspaper, Gurjistan, which is a continuation of the Soviet tradition. It covers all the Muslim holidays and events and has a section on “questions and answers”. This is the most popular newspaper among Azerbaijanis in Georgia and has a circulation of 2,000.58 A small number of other occasional publications cover religious issues.59 In 2007, a website www.muslimgeorgia.org was set up by a group of Georgian Muslims living or studying in Turkey, the first website about Islam in Georgian. The website has also English, Turkish and Arabic versions. The other website about Islam is www.islam.ge, which claims

57 58 59

Popuashvili, “Islam”, p. 360. http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 01 November 2009. Interview conducted by the author, January 2010.

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it is “not only to preach the religion, but also to give information about Islam”.60 It has Georgian, Turkish and English versions. 13

Family Law

Muslim religious marriage is not recognised by the state and civil marriage registration is required. 14


The Imam of the Tbilisi mosque assesses relations with other religious communities as well established and friendly.61 The synagogue, mosque, and Georgian and Armenian churches situated side by side on one of the central street in Tbilisi, and this is often said to indicate religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence and cooperation in Georgian society. In 2005, two interreligious councils were established, one on the initiative of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, the other by the Public Defender of Georgia. The latter includes members of various religious groups and is a specific discussion forum for religious minorities to consider issues of preservation of identity, defining their needs and structuring their communication with the state.62 In places where the Muslim and Christian populations have had a long history of coexistence, popular forms of Islam have developed which include Christian and national (ethnic) elements.63 15


Generally speaking, individuals rank religiosity as quite important. According to a public opinion poll (2003) conducted by the International Centre on Conflict and Negotiations among the urban population of Georgia, 95% of the respondents considered themselves believers.64 The

60

http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 1 November 2009. http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 1 December 2009. Interview conducted by the author, December 2009. 62 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia. 63 Popuashvili, “Islam”, pp. 363–363. 64 G. Nizharadze et al., “Городское население Грузии о вопросах связанных с религией: Результаты социологическоги исследования (Urban population of 61

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2007 Data Initiative of the Caucasus Research Resource Centre showed that 72.1% referred to the importance of religion in life.65 Approximately 84% of the population identify themselves as members of the GOC and public opinion supports its special status. The same survey shows 65% of the respondents would agree to Orthodoxy being granted the status of state religion. Nevertheless, Islam is considered one of the ‘traditional’ confessions (together with the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholics and Jews).66 On 10 May 2004, President Saakashvili, during a visit to the Batumi mosque said that there are two main traditional religions in Georgia, Christianity and Islam.67 Similarly, the survey showed more tolerance towards Muslims and Jews than towards other Christian groups, called ‘sects’ in the mass media and society. Specifically, 49.1% of respondents reported a positive attitude towards Muslims, and 40.8% of the respondents were familiar with or had contacts with Muslims.68 16


No data available.

Georgia on issues related to religion: results of survey)”, in N. Lejava (ed.), Роль православия в государствах и обществах Грузии и Росии (Role of Orthodoxy in the States and Societies of Georgia and Russia) (Tbilisi: Heinrich Beoll Foundation, 2004) pp. 104–121 (106). 65 R. Charles, “Religiosity and trust in religious institutions: Tales from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)”, Summer 2009, p. 9, http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/2009-08-Charles.pdf, accessed 13 December 2009. 66 Nizharadze, “Urban population”, pp. 115, 119. 67 See in F. Corley, “Georgia: Religious freedom survey”, August 2004, Forum 18 News Service, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=400, accessed 8 January 2010. 68 Nizharadze, “Urban population”, pp. 108–109.

GERMANY Mathias Rohe1 1

Muslim Populations

There are no official statistics on the religious affiliation of the German population. According to figures based on representative polls published in June 2009 by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees and the German Islam Conference, there are between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims living in the country, including about 2 million German citizens, mostly of a migrant background. Most of the Muslims— including both German and foreign citizens—are of Turkish origin (ca. 2.5 million), more than half a million are from former Yugoslavia, over 300,000 from the Middle East (mainly from Iraq and Lebanon), around 300,000 from North Africa, 60,000 from other parts of Africa, around 180,000 from South/Southeast Asia and 70,000 from Iran.2 The number of German converts is unknown and estimates vary between 10,000 and 100,000. 2

Islam and the State

Secularism is the leading principle regulating relations between the state and religion, which means there is individual and collective freedom of religion, state neutrality in religious matters and separation

1 Mathias Rohe has studied law and Islamic sciences. He holds the chair of Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law at the University ErlangenNürnberg and is the founding director of the Erlangen Centre for Islam and the Law in Europe. He has been a judge at the Nürnberg Court of Appeal and was a member of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (working group on constitutional issues) from 2006 to 2009. 2 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge/Deutsche Islamkonferenz, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland, Nürnberg 2009, pp. 59 ss., 81, www.deutsche-islam-konferenz .de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/DIK/Downloads/Plenum/MLD-Summary,tem plat’Id=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/MLD-Summary.pdf; an English summary is available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/ DIK/Downloads/Plenum/MLD-Summary,templat’Id=raw,property=publicationFile. pdf/MLD-Summary.pdf, accessed 17 April 2010.

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between state and religion. A secular system with openness to religions prevails. All religious communities enjoy far-reaching rights to be active in the public arena and to participate and/or cooperate with the state on various levels. These principles apply across Germany as a whole, but Germany is a federal state consisting of 16 states (Länder), and the role of religion in the public sphere varies slightly from state to state. While the most important legislative responsibility is at the Federal level, the states are in general responsible for administrative affairs. In addition, they have prime legislative responsibilities in educational, cultural and police issues. Thus, in practice it is usually the states that are responsible for cooperation with Muslim communities. Some laws differentiate between legally recognised/registered religious communities, while others do not. In many cases it is sufficient to be registered as an association under private law, which is easily achieved and is therefore the case for most of the Muslim organisations, in particular those running mosques and Islamic cultural centres. The prerequisites for being recognised as a religious community according to the laws regulating cooperation between the state and such communities vary widely and are linked to the relative importance of each issue to the state. Art. 140 of the constitution set out the conditions for religious societies/communities to apply for the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). Communities that had this status when the Constitution came into force retained it. Others may apply for it and will be granted the same rights as existing societies with this status, if their byelaws and membership numbers give assurance of permanence. State administrations usually conclude that this is the case when an organisation has existed for at least 30 years and represents at least 0.1% of the state’s population (membership must be clearly regulated), but may accept lower criteria in some cases. Corporation status grants far-reaching rights and privileges, e.g. tax exemptions and the right to a ‘church tax’ collected by the state. On a federal level, in 2006 the Ministry of the Interior established the Deutsche Islamkonferenz (DIK, German Islam Conference) for a limited period to progress a more structured dialogue between Muslims and the state on significant issues. There is a council of 15 representatives of the state (federal, state and communal level ) and of 15 Muslim representatives. The latter are appointed by the Ministry; five of them represent the major organisations, and the rest are prominent individuals from various sectors of society. These appointments have (naturally) been disputed from the beginning: the organised Sunni Mus-

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lims complain of their ‘minority’ position compared with the ‘secular’ majority, while others would reject the participation of conservative Muslims, especially those under observation by the security services. Of course, everybody who was not invited has challenged the authority of the council to speak for Muslims. This is equally true with regard to the state representatives: none of them are members of parliament and this has led to criticism of the DIK for ‘lack of transparency’. The Ministry has clearly decided to begin in an informal manner rather than to enter into a broad political process from the beginning. Most of the practical work of the DIK takes place in three working groups on ‘German social order and consensus of values’, ‘Religious issues under the German constitutional order’ and ‘Economics and media as a bridge’, and one ‘dialogue circle’ covering security issues. The working groups each have 25 members, all appointed by the Ministry, although nominations by organisations are usually accepted. In addition to representatives of organisations and the state, ‘independent’ Muslims and scholars have been chosen to participate. Their propositions are discussed in the council and are usually accepted by it. There have been few immediate results, but the working group on constitutional issues has produced papers on the regular establishment of Islamic instruction in public schools, building mosques and establishing Muslim cemeteries etc., which are now being discussed in the states responsible for implementation and administration in these matters. There are plans to continue the work after the project ended with the federal elections in September 2009, but supposedly in a different organisational form and with different personnel. On the level of the states, ‘round tables’ have been established to promote specific projects, in particular regarding pilot projects for Islamic instruction in public schools. In most states, only some of the existing major organisations are involved; in some cases, local Muslim initiatives are accepted as preliminary partners for cooperation. 3


The vast majority of Muslim organisations are active at a local level, particularly in running mosques. Usually they are organised as associations under civil law.3 In some states, regional organisations 3 Cf. Rohe, M., “On the recognition and institutionalization of Islam in Germany”, in Marie-Claire Foblets, Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Alison Dundes

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have emerged in recent years. On the federal level, the major (umbrella) organisations are the following: – Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Türk İslam Birliği, DITIB, Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion, Subbelrather Strasse 17, 50823 Köln; www.ditib .de). The DITIB is currently establishing sub-organisations at state level. It is by far the largest Muslim organisation, running nearly 900 mosques all over the country. – Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, VIKZ, Vogelsanger Strasse 290, 50825 Köln, www.vikz .de). The VIKZ has 300 local member communities, more than half of whom own their own premises. – Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Osterather Strasse 7, 50739 Köln, www.islamrat.de). Its most important member is Milli Görüş, which is under surveillance by several German services for the protection of the constitution. – Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD, Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, www.islam .de). This is an umbrella organisation for 19 other organisations, most of them having only relatively few members. Some important member organisations, such as the Islamic Community of Germany (IGD), who are close in ideology to the Muslim Brotherhood, are under surveillance for the protection of the constitution. In 2002, the ZMD published an Islamic charter defining its positions with regard to the German state and society (an English version is available at http://zentralrat.de/3037.php, accessed 17 April 2010). These four organisations are loosely united in the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland KRM), which was created in parallel to the establishment of the German Islam Conference, attempting to create a unified cooperation partner for the German administration. However, its member organisations are far from united in their interests and goals. The

Renteln (eds), Cultural Diversity and Law: State Responses from around the World (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010).

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DITIB enjoys a right of veto within the Council. The KRM has no legal personality and does not have any infrastructure, such as a website, etc. News is usually published on the websites of the member organisations. The Alevi Community of Germany (Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschlands, Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu, AABF, Stolberger Strasse 317, 50933 Köln, http://www.alevi.com) is the federal umbrella organisation for local and regional Alevi communities. The AABF is the only organisation within the spectrum of Islam that has so far been recognised by the state as meeting the legal requirements of a religious community to attain corporation status. It is thus able to cooperate with the state in establishing religious instruction in public schools under to the legal system prevailing in all states except Berlin and Bremen. In March 2009, 110 Shi’i communities created an umbrella organisation called the Islamic Community of the German Shi’i Communities (Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinschaften Deutschlands, Winterhuder Weg 54, 22085 Hamburg, tel. +49 (0)40 280 029 02, www.igs-de.de). The extent to which these organisations represent Muslims in Germany is highly disputed. The government usually counts them as representing 15%-20% of Muslims, but they claim to represent the vast majority of practising Muslims. In recent elections in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia, a Muslim independent local party, the Alliance for Peace and Fairness (Bündnis für Frieden und Fairness), which arose out of the Council of Muslims in the city of Bonn, has gained two seats in the municipal assembly. This is the first time a Muslim organisation has succeeded in such an initiative. 4


Approximately 2,600 buildings are used as mosques, in addition to an unknown number of Alevi cem-houses. While most of them are established in former factory buildings, etc., some 180 have been built to more or less traditional mosque design, and another 150 of this type are under construction. The establishment of mosques and prayer houses is one of the religious freedoms guaranteed by art. 4 of the Constitution. Thus, in September 2009 the Administrative Court of

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Appeal of Koblenz (Rhineland-Palatinate)4 decided in favour of Muslim applicants for the construction of a mosque, despite the fears of some of its future neighbours that increasing traffic might infringe their property rights. In Germany, unlike Switzerland, it would be impossible to suppress the constitutional rights of a minority by a democratic majority decision. Nevertheless, the Swiss decision to ban the building of minarets has triggered a broad debate in the country. According to representative polls shortly after the Swiss referendum in September, 48% would reject such a ban, while 38% would support it. Interestingly, the figures are different in Eastern Germany where only few Muslims live.5 The DIK has issued a paper on the relevant legal framework, including advice on practical solutions to potential conflicts over mosque building.6 5


Art. 7 sect. 3 of the German Constitution, which applies in all federal states with the historical exceptions of Bremen and Berlin, according to Art. 141 of the constitution (“Bremen clause”), declares confessional religious instruction to be a compulsory subject in public schools,7 to be taught in cooperation between the state and the respective religious community. Since 2008–2009, the Alevi community has been recognised by several states (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hessen, Bavaria) to have a structure that enables it to cooperate with the state in this

4 Judgement of 02.09.2009, 8 A 10291/09.OVG (yet unpublished); cf. also the similar judgement of the Administrative Court of Berlin (19 A 355.04) of 18.02.2009 (unpublished). 5 Cf. “Mehrheit der Deutschen gegen Minarett-Verbot”, Der Westen, 5 December 2009, www.derwesten.de/nachrichten/Mehrheit-der-Deutschen-gegen-Minarett-Verbot-id2218413.html, accessed 17 April 2010. 6 www. www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1864622/SubSites/DIK/DE/ Moscheen/AG2Moscheebau/ag2–moscheebau-node.html?__nnn=true, accessed 26 April 2010. 7 Cf. the detailed study:Dietrich, Myrian, Islamischer Religionsunterricht (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2006), and more recently: Mohr, Irka-Christin and Michael Kiefer (eds), Islamunterricht—Islamischer Religionsunterricht—Islamkunde: Viele Titel—ein Fach? (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2009); Kuld, Lothar and Bruno Schmid (eds), Islamischer Religionsunterricht in Baden-Württemberg (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2009); Kiefer, Michael, Eckart Gottwald and Bülent Ucar (eds), Auf dem Weg zum Islamischen Religionsunterricht: Sachstand und Perspektiven in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008).

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manner.8 In the state of Berlin, Islamic instruction, including Alevism, has been established since the beginning of this decade. The state of Hamburg has introduced an inter-confessional model of “religion for all” under the supervision of the Protestant Church. Recognition as a religious community in terms of school law is a major goal of existing Muslim organisations at both the federal and regional level. Until now, a number of states (North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate) have introduced models of Islamic instruction, including two Alevi classes in Baden-Württemberg. The nature of such cooperation is very dependent on the particular state’s practices and expectations, but in all cases Muslims are intensely involved in developing curricula and appointing teachers. In March 2009, the state of Bavaria decided to establish Islamic instruction on a state-wide basis following the model developed in the city of Erlangen in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the Islamic Community of Erlangen and the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Other states are also planning to broaden their models, although some intricate legal problems relating to the organisation of Muslim communities remain to be solved. In 2008, the DIK published a detailed paper9 identifying these topics and suggesting solutions. Applications by Muslim pupils for exemption from obligatory swimming classes where the sexes are mixed have gone to court. According to a landmark decision in 1994 by the federal Administrative Court,10 they are entitled to such exemption if they have reached the age of puberty and the school is unable to arrange unisex classes. Currently, the courts are increasingly giving greater weight to the educational purposes of the school than to possibly conflicting religious needs, particularly in matters concerning younger pupils.11

8

Cf. Kaplan, Islamil, “Alevitischer Religionsunterricht an den Schulen”, Die Stimme der Aleviten, July 2009, pp. 28–32. 9 http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/ DIK/Downloads/Publikationen/2008-IRU-zwischenresumee-der-dik,templateId‘Id= raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/2008-IRU-zwischenresumee-der-dik.pdf, accessed 17 April 2010. 10 Bundesverwaltungsgericht DVBl. 1994, p. 168. 11 Cf. Administrative Court of Appeal Muenster (19 B 1362/08), decision from 20.05.2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Rechtsprechungsreport 2009, pp. 923; Administrative court of Gelsenkirchen (4 L 5267/08), decision from 11.08.2008; Administrative court of Augsburg (Au 3 E 08.1613), decision from 17.12.2008; Administrative court of Duesseldorf (18 K 301/08) from 07.05.2008). See also the

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A notable case occurred in the state of Berlin, where a then 15-year old Muslim pupil wanted to perform the ritual noon prayer in his free time in any available discreet space. The school director refused, on the basis of her understanding of secularism. The Berlin administrative court decided in September 200912 that the Federal constitution and the constitution of the state of Berlin alike follow a system of secularism open to religions and beliefs in private and public space. Since the school was unable to present any concrete arguments that this single pupil’s wish to pray would cause organisational problems or contribute to tensions among the pupils, there was no good reason to prevent him from doing so. This decision attracted enormous public interest. Reports often stated, wrongly, that the school would be forced to establish prayer rooms, which was obviously not required either by the pupil or by the court. The churches and moderate political voices from all sides supported the court’s decision, but the senate of Berlin has meanwhile appealed against the judgement. 6


The Universities of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Frankfurt (financed by the Turkish Republic), Münster and Osnabrück have established programmes to train teachers of Islam and appointed Muslim professors as core staff members. Some initial teaching materials have been developed and published,13 triggering a lively debate on modern Muslim religious education among traditionalist Muslims. The legal issues involved are similar to those referred to in section 5. In Erlangen-Nürnberg and Osnabrück the programmes were introduced on the basis of a broad consensus between Muslims and the authorities, but there are ongoing conflicts in Münster. After the holder of the chair publicly

recommendations of the DIK, www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/ Anlagen/DE/DIK/Downloads/Publikationen/2008-anhang-zwischenresumee-schulpraktische-fragen,templateId’Id=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/2008-anhangzwischenresumee-schulpraktische-fragen.pdf, accessed 17 April 2010. 12 VG 3 A 984.07 (not yet published); a short report is available at www.kostenloseurteile.de/Gebetsraum-fuer-islamisches-Gebet-in-der-Schule—Muslimischer-Schueler-darf-in-der-Schule-beten.news8539.htm, accessed 17 April 2010. 13 Kaddor, Lamya, Rabeya Müller and Harun Behr (eds), Saphir 5/6: Religionsbuch für junge Musliminnen und Muslime (Munich: Kösel, 2008); Erkan, Serap et al. (eds), Mein Islambuch (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009).

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declared his doubts about the historical existence of Muhammad, the major Muslim organisations advised students not to study with him any more, while respecting his academic freedom. There present capacity is far from sufficient, with a need for an average of 4,500 teachers to be trained to cover Germany as a whole in the future. Concerning imams, there are as yet no official training institutions, but the University of Osnabrück plans to start a provisional programme in 2010; in Erlangen-Nürnberg there are similar plans for 2011. Some Muslim organisations train their imams in intern programmes. State-funded political organisations and a number of the larger cities, such as Munich and Frankfurt, have also started to offer programmes for imams, in particular concerning citizenship issues. There is a widespread desire among Muslims to professionalise the training of imams, since their role among the non-Muslim majority societies is increasing. There is broad political support for this, but no solutions are in sight for the near future in terms of organisation and, more especially, financing. 7


Many Muslims still prefer to be buried in their country of origin because they have a sense of being more ‘at home’ there than in Germany, particularly the first generation of immigrants. The relatively high costs of burials in Germany and a lack of appropriate facilities for Muslim burials in their immediate area are also factors. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Muslims are being buried in Germany. There are only few Muslim cemeteries, but many cemeteries run by the state or by churches have set aside areas for Muslims. Facilities for washing the deceased’s body have been built, and there are increased (though costly) possibilities for maintaining a grave for more than the usually permitted time of 10–20 years. In addition, there is an increasing consensus that graves can be re-used, provided that the remains that still exist are buried in a lower stratum of the grave, as in many heavily populated regions in the Muslim world. Most states require corporation status (Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, cf. 2.) as a prerequisite for establishing a religious cemetery, which is difficult to obtain. But the State of Rhineland-Westphalia has eased these legal requirements, which might be unconstitutional. Other legislation has abolished the requirement to bury bodies in a coffin, allowing for traditional burial in a linen shroud.

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Chaplaincy in state institutions is run in cooperation between the state and the religious communities recognised as meeting the necessary organisational criteria. No Muslim organisation has yet achieved this status and there are so far only provisional solutions on a local level, particularly in hospitals. The city of Wiesbaden has started a model project funded by the EU for offering spiritual care and educating suitable volunteers in the main hospital and in the local prison. The legal basis for this is an ‘integration agreement’ between the municipality and most of the local Muslim organisations (the local DITIB branch was prevented from being involved by the central administration in Cologne for reasons that are not clear). 9

Religious Festivals

Political authorities increasingly take notice of Muslim religious festivals, sending messages of congratulation or issuing and/or accepting invitations in the month of Ramadan, for example. Muslim festivals are not recognised as public holidays like the major Christian festivals, but are legally protected to a certain extent. Employees are in general entitled to apply for leave during the major festivals, and pupils may stay away from school for a number of days (during ‘Id al-Adha and at the end of the month of Ramadan, ‘Id al-Fitr). The Labour Court of Cologne14 decided in favour of a Muslim woman working as a pupil attendant in school buses who wanted to perform the ritual pilgrimage to Mecca. The employer had refused her application for leave, telling her to wait for a year when school holidays and the pilgrimage season would coincide (after 14 years!), and ignoring the fact that her already elderly mother was able to care for her disabled granddaughter at present, but probably not in 14 years’ time.

14 www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/arbgs/koeln/arbg_koeln/j2008/17_Ca_51_08urteil 20080812.html, accessed 17 April 2010.

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10 Halal Food There are regular imports of halal food into Germany. According to a verdict of the Constitutional Court in 2002,15 Muslims are entitled to apply for an exemption from the general prohibition under to the Animal Protection Act of slaughtering without pre-stunning. Some Muslim butchers have applied for such exceptions, but have often been refused by the authorities or only granted under very restrictive conditions. The Federal Administrative Court has repeatedly decided in favour of Muslim applicants,16 but administrative and lower court resistance has not totally ceased. In September 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court,17 in an unusually clear judgment quashed decisions by the Administrative Court of Giessen18 and the Administrative Court of Appeal of Hesse19 that were unfavourable to the Muslim applicant. Nevertheless, in a doubtful decision in November 2009, the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal20 stated that a Muslim’s application to slaughter animals for ‘Id al-Adha was taken to be merely culturally based, so freedom of religion legislation would not apply. Interestingly, the Secretary General of the Central Council of Jews in Germany has said that orthodox Jews face similar problems from time to time.21 The DITIB called on believers to avoid unnecessary pain for the animals slaughtered at ‘Id al-Adha, declaring that there is no objection to the use electric stunning methods before slaughter.22 11

Dress Codes

Male Muslim dress codes pass practically unnoticed by law and by public debate, but the contrary is true of the female headscarf. There

15

Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vol. 104, p. 337. Federal Administrative Court judgment on 23 November 2006, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 461ff. 17 Decision of 28 September 2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Rechtsprechungsreport 2009, pp. 945ff. 18 Decision of 25 February 2009 (10 L 80/09.GI), www.vg-giessen.justiz.hessen.de. 19 Decision of 26 May 2009 (unpublished). 20 Decision of 26 November 2009 (9 CE 09.2917), not yet published. 21 Personal communication. 22 Cf. the message of the Secretary General Sadi Arslan (25 November 2009), http:// www.ditib.de/detail1.php?id=180&lang=de, accessed 17 April 2010. 16

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is a widespread rejection of the headscarf in German society, where it is perceived it simply as an instrument to oppress women and demonstrate male dominance. Extremists, including anti-Islam feminists such as Alice Schwarzer, have declared it to be “the flag of Islamism”, not distinguishing between actual cases of oppression23 and women wearing the headscarf voluntarily. Wearing the headscarf is allowed by law in public areas, including schools and universities—except for school teachers, under new legislation in eight states which have banned the wearing of ‘religious symbols’ in public office. Such regulations are neutral in their wording but are clearly aimed at the Muslim headscarf. In Baden-Württemberg, nursery staff are also targeted.24 The states of Hessen and Berlin25 have gone even further and included practically all state officials. Berlin has banned all kinds of religious symbols (including Christian and Jewish ones) in public buildings including schools. The Federal Constitutional Court26 has proposed two possible ways forward: either a general ban or general permission for religious symbols. It has stressed that in any case all religions have to be treated equally. In contrast, the relevant laws in some states include exceptions to the ban for culturally accepted (Christian or Jewish) symbols—a clear contradiction of the Constitutional Court’s verdict, which enjoys legal status according to German law. The Federal Administrative Court 27 has declared that this Baden-Württemberg law meets the constitutional requirements, but stressed that symbols of other religions have to be banned equally. In states that have banned headscarves, the courts must now enter into bizarre reflections on whether or not caps or wigs are to be considered in the same way as headscarves from the legal point of view.28 The Constitutional Court

23 Cf. for such cases, the judgment of the Administrative court of Karlsruhe (Az. 9 K 4270/07) of 30 April 2009 (residence permit for a recently-married Serbian woman who was forced to wear a headscarf by her Turkish husband (who had also unofficially entered into a polygamous marriage). 24 Cf. the judgment of the Labour Court of Appeal Baden-Württemberg on 19 June 2009 (7 Sa 84/08), not yet published. 25 Cf. the critical expert opinion of Susanne Baer, www.berlin.de/imperia/md/ content/lb_ads/neutrg_agg.pdf?start&ts=1257943367, accessed 17 April 2010. 26 Judgment on 24 December 2003 (2 BvR 1436/02), www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html, accessed 17 April 2010. 27 Judgment of 16 December 2008, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2009, p. 1289. 28 Cf. Federal Labour Court, judgment on 20 August 2009 (2 AZR 499/08); Administrative court of Cologne, decision on 17 November 2008 (3 K 2630/07). 24.

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will have to decide again following the Baden-Württemberg teacher’s appeal against the judgment of the Federal Administrative Court. The sometimes vicious propaganda from some quarters against any kind of headscarf may have contributed to the creation of a climate favourable for criminals attacks on Muslims. In a Dresden courtroom, a young racist stabbed to death Marwa el-Sherbini, a pregnant young Egyptian woman, after having called her a terrorist and Islamist and threatening to kill her young son after she had politely asked him to make room on a playground swing. He explicitly referred to her headscarf as a symbol of oppression and a sign of the “satan-god”. This case has caused broad feelings of insecurity among Muslims, both in Germany and abroad. The legal procedure and the court’s verdict against the murderer were very clear: he received the harshest possible punishment, a life sentence in aggravated circumstances, which means the culprit cannot be released from prison for at least 15 years. 12


Some Muslim organisations produce magazines and brochures on religious issues and maintain websites (cf. the references in section 3 above). Most of them reach only a limited number of readers. In addition, there are journals addressed to the Turkish Muslim community, notably Zaman, which regularly deals with religious topics and is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement. 13

Family Law

Islamic norms (as formulated in the laws of Islamic states) are primarily applicable according to the rules of private international law (PIL) within the limits set by public policy (art. 6 EGBGB).29 In family matters, German PIL still holds citizenship to be the main factor, thus obliging courts and administrations to apply foreign law to ‘foreigners’ living in Germany, even after several generations. It is therefore much more often necessary to apply foreign norms in Germany than in other European states that follow the principles of immigration

29 Cf. Rohe, M., Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), p. 349.

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countries, which usually use residence as the main factor. In practice, principles of public policy will lead to the non-application of Islamic legal norms in a considerable number of cases, especially the extent that they preserve traditional gender inequality and the inequality of religions. In 2009, a number of court decisions, following the PIL provisions, partly applied Islamic family law norms, for example, accepting dowry agreements,30 Pakistani law of divorce in favour of a husband, provided the wife agrees,31 and Iranian law of custody, since it leaves enough room for a decision to be made according to the best interest of the child.32 On the other hand, public policy (equal treatment of sexes and religions) prevented the application of Iranian succession law.33 Such norms may also be brought into German substantive family law, insofar as personal autonomy allows individual preferences to be enforced when there are no compulsory rules. Marriage contracts containing mahr provisions have been approved by the Federal Supreme Court.34 Little information is available about informal practices. Some mosques offer mediation in family conflicts. The Islamic Centre in Munich seems to offer further (semi-legal ) services concerning marriage and divorce.35 In a couple of cases, Muslim refugees from Iraq, unable to obtain from their home country the documents necessary for an official marriage, have resorted to religious marriages conducted by imams. These marriages have no legal status in Germany, but can cause problems if they are socially binding within a community living remote from the mainstream. Thus, some improvisation is required in cases where such ‘wives’ seek a divorce which cannot be granted by the courts in the absence of a legally valid marriage.

30 Court of Appeal Stuttgart, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-RechtsprechungsReport 2009, 585 in an Iranian case. 31 Court of Appeal Frankfurt am Main, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 2009, p. 1504. 32 Court of Appeal Koblenz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift—RechtsprechungsReport 2009, pp. 1014 (the court could thus decide in favour of the mother). 33 Court of Appeal Düsseldorf, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2009, p. 520. 34 Cf. Federal Supreme Court, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1999, p. 574; Court of Appeal Celle Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1998, p. 374. 35 Cf. www.islamisches-zentrum-muenchen.de/html/services_-_eheschliessungen .html, accessed 17 April 2010.

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Interreligious relations between Muslims and the major churches are well established and close. The Catholic and Protestant churches have appointed commissioners for Islamic affairs on a federal level and within their regional entities. The Roman Catholic church has issued a paper supporting the establishment of mosques in general, which met with some opposition and even the loss of some church members who rejected Islam. Interreligious festivals and mutual invitations are very common—but Muslims invite Christians to their festivals more often than vice versa. In some parts of the churches there are tendencies to perceive Islam as incompatible with the structure of a secular democratic state. Others would feel more solidarity with Muslims on the basis of a sense of broad shared convictions and interests and preservation of freedom of religion for everybody. For instance, people who reject the establishment of Islamic instruction in public schools (according to the German constitutional system, art. 7 sect. 3 basic law) usually also call for the abolition of the current Catholic and Protestant system of faith-based instruction, which is different from mere information about religious culture. In general, while openness is predominant, there is a marked shift from a ‘charitable’ approach toward migrants in need to a more competitive approach, which is not unnatural considering that Muslims are no longer perceived to be only temporary guest(worker)s in the country. There are very few inter-religious activities that include Muslims and Jews, either bilaterally or multilaterally and the Palestine conflict naturally overshadows attempts to bring the communities together. There are notable exceptions, e.g. the participation of the Secretary General of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Stefan Kramer, in the memorial for the murdered Muslim woman Marwa el-Sherbini in Dresden. 15


There are significant differences between official statements and widespread public opinion concerning Islam. Apart from some small rightwing and fundamentalist Christian extremist groups, all non-extremist political parties and state officials stress the need to distinguish between Islam as a religion and its political abuse. Within a broader debate

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on the integration of migrants, Muslims are often perceived to be the ‘most problematic’ group. In many cases, social, cultural and religious issues are simply confused. In general, the debate on Muslims is very often linked to matters of security. Thus, a broad majority in Germany perceive Islam to be backward, ill-prepared for the necessities of the twenty-first century and potentially violent. On the other hand, there is a lot of respect and mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims in daily life. Obviously the fear of Islam is much more abstract than related to concrete experiences. This is underlined by the fact that in East Germany, where very few Muslims live (except in the state of Berlin), the rejection is considerably more widespread than in regions of dense Muslim population. Generally, the mosque has replaced the headscarf in public debate as a core issue of potential conflict between Muslims and parts of the broader society.36 In particular, projects for major mosques in Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich have triggered protests by strange coalitions of extreme right-wing enemies of Islam, small groups of Christian fundamentalists and (former) left-wing personalities such as Ralph Giordano, all of them denouncing ‘Islam as such’ to be a problem for German society. Nevertheless, there is a very broad political majority that strongly and publicly supports the constitutional rights of Muslims. The former federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble repeatedly declared Islam to be an integral part of Germany and his successor Thomas de Maizière has continued this line. 16


There is a rich religious and cultural Muslim life in several parts of Germany. Many mosques use the public holiday on 3 October (Unification day) as an ‘open mosque’ day, inviting the public to find out about Islam. In some cities Muslim and other representatives of minority religions are invited together with their Christian colleagues to participate in celebrations on the occasion of the inauguration of public buildings.

36 Cf. Beinhauer-Köhler, Bärbel and Claus Leggewie, Moscheen in Deutschland (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009).

GREECE Konstantinos Tsitselikis1 1

Muslim Populations

At Greek independence (1830), Muslims constituted a very small group with almost no special institutional protection, but by 1881 and with the annexation of Thessalia, Muslim communities (numbering about 40,000 at that time) were protected as a minority by the Treaty of Constantinople. In effect, the Ottoman millet system (ethno-religious communal institutional autonomy) was preserved and the local muftis acquired quasi-juridical authority in personal status matters. Muslim schools and pious foundations (waqfs) were recognised in Greek law and were administered by local Muslim community councils. By the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–1213) and with the annexation of the New Territories by Greece, the same status was extended to more than 500,000 Muslims who opted to stay and become Greek citizens. The legal status of the Muslim communities was consolidated, community schools and the waqfs were kept under their authority, and the muftis acquired advisory jurisdiction on personal matters. After the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, a mutual population exchange took place under the Lausanne Convention (1923) and 450,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey. As an exemption, 92,000 Muslims with Greek citizenship remained in Thrace (Turkish-speakers and Bulgarian-speakers or Pomaks) and 26,000 Albanian-speakers in Epirus.2 The latter were forced to flee to Albania in 1945 at the end of the German occupation. In 1947, when the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece, a population of about 12,000 Muslims (Greek and Turkish speaking) became Greek citizens. Today, Muslims with Greek citizenship residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly 1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in international law and human rights and is co-director of the Study Series of the Minority Groups Research Centre (www.kemo.gr). 2 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402).

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concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000) and on Rhodes and Kos (Dodecanese Islands), with about 2,000 on each island. Another 15,000 have emigrated from Thrace for economic reasons to Athens or other Greek cities. For political and economic reasons in the context of GreekTurkish confrontations in the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of Muslims emigrated from Thrace to Turkey and Germany (more than 120,000 are estimated to live abroad).3 Muslims of Greek citizenship are mostly Turkish-speakers and express Turkish national feelings. About 20,000 of them have Pomak (a Bulgarian dialect) as their mother tongue, partly expressing an ethnic Pomak identity, often along with a Turkish (national ) identity, and about 5,000 speak Roma (partly expressing an ethnic Roma identity), although most of the Muslim Roma are monolingual Turkish speaking. The identity issue in Thrace has become controversial insofar as Turkish nationalism, backed by Turkey, attempts to absorb the Muslim minority into a Turkish identity, and Greek policies attempt to foster internal divisions. As religion and mother tongue ceased to be a question in the national census after 1951, all the above figures are rough estimates. Immigrant Muslims have had an important presence in Greece since 1990 as part of the general flow of migration.4 Muslim immigrants come from African and Asian countries, and from Albania. In 1998, 14% of Greece’s immigrants in the area of metropolitan Athens were Muslims from these regions. Sunnism is the most popular form of Islam and is followed by immigrants from Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Arab countries. Shi’ism is far less widespread, being found mainly in Kurdish, Pakistani and Iranian communities, while Alevism is found mostly among Turks and Kurds. In the 2001 census, immigrants exceeded 820,000, or 8% of the overall population. Around 200,000 of them were Muslims, not including

3 Hersant, J., Mobilisations politiques, co-gouvernementalité et construction ethnique: Sociologie du nationalisme turc à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Allemagne, Turquie) (Political motivations, co-governmentality and ethnic building : Sociology of Turkish nationalism with reference to the Turks of W. Thrace (Greece, Turkey, Germany)) (PhD diss., Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2007). 4 Marvakis, A., D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (eds), Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immigrants in Greece) (Athens: Ellinika Grammata 2001); Christopoulos, D. and M. Pavlou (eds), Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of immigration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2006).

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Albanians, the majority of whom are of Muslim background, but without expressed affinities with Islam.5 The estimated Muslim population in 2008 (Greek and non-Greek citizens) was 350,000, making 3.1% of the total population of 11,000,000. By 2009, according to Muslim leaders of immigrants with an Islamic affiliation, the Afghani community numbers 20,000, the Pakistani 70,000, the Bangladeshi 25,000, Palestinians and Jordanians 12,000, Syrians 15,000 and Egyptians, Iraqis and others more than 40,000.6 Such figures are highly unreliable, as there are a large number of clandestine immigrants and constant population mobility, and leaders of Muslim bodies are tempted to exaggerate community figures in support of political and social claims. 2

Islam and the State

According to the Greek Constitution (art. 3), the dominant religion is Greek Orthodoxy. Islam enjoys the status of a recognised religion. In Thrace, three muftiates (in Xanthi, Komotini and Didimotiho) function as public authorities, financed by the state. As a result of political confrontation between the Greek government and the pro-Turkish minority elite, there have been since the 1990s two ‘parallel’ (though not officially recognised) muftis, elected in Komotini and Xanthi, who exert a strong political influence.7 The imams serving in the mosques of Thrace should be employed by the government under Act 3536/2007. Until now, the imams hired in all the mosques in Thrace are appointed and paid (out of waqf income) by the three official muftis and partially by the two elected muftis, who are granted financial support from Turkey. After the Ministry of National Education and Religion advertised for the imam posts (Min. D. 106535/A3/12.8.2008, FEK G of 14.8.2008), the muftiates made their own selection and sent the list to the Ministry

5 13% of the immigrant population of metropolitan Athens come from Muslim Asian and African countries (Kavounidou, Tz. and A. Hatzaki, Αλλοδαποί που αιτήθηκαν προσωρινής άδειας παραμονής (Aliens who applied for temporary residence permits) (Athens: Ethniko Institouto Ergasias, 1999). 6 Data from leaders of the Muslim communities, To Vima, 31 May 2009. 7 Aarbakke, V., The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, 2 vols (PhD diss., University of Bergen, 2000). Two of the mufti offices have websites: the official one of Komotini (www .muftikomotini.com) and the unofficial/elected one of Xanthi (www.iskecemuftulugu .org).

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for approval.8 This became a political controversy. Moreover, the Ministry had also advertised vacancies in the secretariats of the three muftiates (Minis. Dec. 29424/A3 of 16.3.2009), but the advertisement was cancelled after a month (Min. Dec. of 16.4.2009). The waqfs of Thrace and of the Dodecanese are administered by management committees under the supervision of the local authorities and the government. A new law on the waqfs of Thrace (3647/2008), which provides for the election of these committees, has not yet been implemented. When requested (before a court, in parliament, or in the army), there is provision for an Islamic oath. Act 2190/1994 (as amended by Act 3647/2008) provides for a quota of 0.5% of appointments in the public sector to be allocated to members of the Muslim minority, but it has not yet been implemented. Members of the minority in Thrace actively participate in political life and are elected to the national parliament through the main political parties. In the 2007 elections, two such deputies were elected, both with the then opposition party PASOK. In the elections for the European parliament in June 2009, minority candidates were symbolically included on the lists of PASOK, Nea Dimokratia and SYRIZA, but not for electable positions. Tthe Consultative Committee of the TurkishMuslim minority of Thrace called on the members of the minority to submit blank votes in the elections as “there were no possibilities for minority candidates to get elected”, but fewer than 20% of minority voters followed this recommendation.9 With regard to the minority in Thrace and the observation of human rights standards, the UN rapporteur noted in 2009 that the “appointment by government of religious officials, such as Mufti, infringes on the right to persons belonging to the Muslim minority to effectively participate in the decision-making process that affects their daily lives”.10 Furthermore, in relation to minority education, he noted that “a commonly stated problem is the absence of bilingual kindergartens.

8 Announcement of the Mufti of Komotini: www.muftikomotini.com/index.php ?m=art&c=18&n=224, accessed 17 April 2010. 9 For a relevant discussion, see Azinlikça, June 2009, p. 30. 10 McDougall, Gay, Mission to Greece (8–16 September 2008), Report of the independent expert on minority issues, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, Human Rights Council, General Assembly, UN, A/HRC/10/11/Add.3, 2009, para. 95.

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This would allow better knowledge of both Turkish and Greek from an early age therefore providing benefits in terms of integration, and enabling greater choice of whether to go to minority or Greek public school”.11 Again regarding the jurisdiction of the Mufti in Thrace, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, recommended that Greece withdraw the judicial competence of the Mufti given the issues of compatibility with international human rights standards, strengthen the substantial review by domestic courts of the Mufti’s judicial decisions, and institutionalise an open and continuous dialogue with representatives of the Muslim minority.12 3


There is no central national Muslim organisation, but there are many associations both of Muslims of Greek citizenship and of immigrant Muslims. Very limited contacts are observed between minority and immigrant associations, and that only in Athens. In Thrace, there are a number of cultural, educational and sports associations that are Turkish in character, a few regarded as Muslim Roma, and one Pomak. There are also a few that may be identified as Bektashi or Alevi. Two of the most important associations led by the Turkish political and professional minority elite in Thrace are: • Association of University Graduates of the Minority of Thrace (Σύλλογος επιστημόνων μειονότητας Θράκης/Bati Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği, (Egnatias 75, 69100 Komotini, tel: 0030 25310 29705); president: Ahmet Kara. • Turkish Union of Xanthi (Τουρκική Ένωση Ξάνθης/İskeçe Türk Birliği, P. Ydras 2, 67100, Xanthi, tel: 0030 25410 23614), not yet registered; president: Ozan Ahmetoglu. Minority associations whose name includes the term ‘Turkish’ face a ban by the Greek courts which, since 1983, have held that such associations should be clearly defined as religious, not national. The Turkish

11

Ibid., para. 26. Hammarberg, T., Report on Human Rights. Following his visit to Greece on 8–10 December 2008, Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH(2009)9, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, <www.coe.int>, para. 59–60. 12

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Union of Xanthi is one of these associations that have brought their case before the European Court of Human Rights (Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, no. 26698/05). Although the Court in Strasbourg found a violation of the right to set up an association without such limitations, the Greek courts did not implement the judgment: the civil court of Xanthi simply reiterated the reasons why the Union should dissolve (Polymeles Protodikeio Xanthis 12/2009). In Athens, a number of national associations have been set up by immigrant communities, such as the Pakistanis (Pakistano-Greek Cultural Association, Ελληνο-πακιστανικός μορφωτικός σύλλογος), the Egyptians, etc. Two interrelated associations attempt to express a common Islamic identity for all Muslims, both immigrants and Greeks: – Arab-Hellenic Centre for Culture and Civilisation (Ελληνο-αραβικό Μορφωτικό Κέντρο, Kyprou 2 & Pireos str., Moshato 18346, Athens, tel: 0030 2106910492); – Association of Muslims in Greece (Ένωση Μουσουλμάνων Ελλάδας, 9 Galaxia str N.Kosmos, Athens, tel: 0030 2106916055), president: Naim Elghandour. Intra-Muslim dynamics are not obvious, as no clear discourse is articulated, but they are all united by concerns about practical problems regarding places for worship and cemeteries. Their survival strategy, faced with an indifferent Greek society and alien Greek Orthodox mainstream ideology, is to keep a low profile while supporting the national (Turkish) character of the minority. Internal divisions regarding fundamentalism, the application of Shari’a, Sunni and Shi’a Islamic practices, and ethnic origins, occur but without open conflict, under the shadow of the global tensions engendered by the 11 September 2001 event. With regard to Islam in Thrace, theological dialogue and attempts to discuss the application of Shari’a, or other subjects, are very weak. Religion is entrapped in Greek-Turkish politics. 4


About 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rhodes are officially open and more than 80 unofficial prayer houses function in greater Athens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities), run by immigrant

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Muslims.13 According to Act 2833/2000 (art. 7), a mosque should have been built in Paiania (a suburb of Athens) for the Olympic Games. When this was not implemented, a new Act 3512/2006 provided for the state-funded construction of a mosque in Athens (run by a foundation controlled by the state), but this has still not taken place. The issue has become of major importance for Muslim communities, especially in Athens. 5


Religious education in public schools is Greek Orthodox, to which are added occasional modules on world religions, Islam included. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from religious education. There are 208 elementary, two high schools and two madrasas (high schools with a full mainstream Greek curriculum plus extra Islamic subjects) that provide bilingual minority education in Thrace and are funded primarily by the state and also partly from waqf income. These schools, as well as five public high schools, all in Thrace, provide Islamic instruction.14 More than 100 Qur’an courses (kuran kursu) are offered outside school hours by private minority groups, and on Kos (Platani), the local imam has been offering kuran kursu since 1994. A foreign school run by Libya since 1979 (the “7th April School”) caters exclusively for pupils from Arab countries and provides Islamic religious education. In a few immigrant mosques and in the Greek-Arabic educational cultural centre in Athens, Islamic instruction is available to the vast majority of Muslims who cannot afford private school fees and attend Greek public schools, but very few students attend these courses.

13

Tsitselikis, K., “Θρησκευτική ελευθερία των μεταναστών: Η περίπτωση των μουσουλμάνων (Religious freedom of immigrants: The case of the Muslims), in Christopoulos and Pavlou, Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of migration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2004) pp. 267–302. 14 Baltsiotis. L. and K. Tsitselikis, “Η μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Θράκη: Νομικό καθεστώς, προβλήματα και προοπτικές (The minority education of Thrace: Legal status, problems and perspectives)”, in Fragkoudaki, A. and Th. Dragona (eds), Πρόσθεση όχι Αφαίρεση, Πολλαπλασιασμός όχι ∆ιαίρεση. Η μεταρρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην εκπαίδευση της μειονότητας της Θράκης (Addition vs. Subtraction, Multiplication vs. Division: The Reformative Intervention to the Minority Education of Thrace) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2008), pp. 57–87.

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Islam is offered for non-Muslim students as a subject in the theological schools of Greece over one or two semesters (Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki). Since 1997, due to a special quota, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Thrace (487 in 2007–2008).15 An imam training school was envisaged by Act 1920/1991, but this was never implemented. Some imams are graduates of one or other of the two madrasas of Thrace or from Islamic faculties in Turkey, while others are self-taught. 7


Islamic cemeteries exist only in Thrace, Kos and Rhodes, and the lack of a Muslim cemetery outside these areas causes serious hardship. The construction of a Muslim cemetery on the outskirts of Athens is planned, following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece. 8


No prayer facilities for Muslims are provided in state institutions or public buildings. Voluntary initiatives are permitted. 9

Religious Festivals

In Thrace, all Islamic religious festivals (şeker and kurban bayram, and the five kandils (festivals from the Ottoman tradition): ragayip, mevlut, berat, miraç and kadir) are celebrated and led by official and elected muftis. Minority schools also officially mark these Islamic religious holidays. In the rest of Greece, the state is neutral on the subject of Islamic celebrations. Employment law grants Muslim workers the right to free time for prayer and religious festivals, but implementation of this in practice is limited. Muslims immigrants face practical restric15 Hellenic Committee for Human Rights, Ετήσια έκθεση 2007 (Annual Report 2007) (Athens: National Printing House, 2007), p. 367.

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tions in the celebration of religious festivals, as there are not enough mosques, but they are free to organise celebrations as best they can using their own resources. 10 Halal Food Halal food is freely accessible in Thrace and there are no restrictions. Similarities with Christian Orthodox Easter slaughter practices make qurban (the slaughtering of animals for ‘Id al-Adha) socially acceptable. In Athens and other towns, access to halal food is dependent on personal networking. 11

Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on Islamic dress codes. In Thrace, the head scarf is widely worn, but pro-Turkish secularist circles tend to be intolerant of Islamic dress, especially as far as the wearing of the headscarf in minority schools is concerned. In Athens, as the active female Muslim population are very few in number, cases of intolerance have not been reported. 12


There are about 17 Turkish newspapers and magazines and about seven radio stations broadcasting in Turkish, run by and for the minority in Thrace. Some, such as Akide, edited by the Muftiate of Komotini (www .muftikomotini.com), have a Muslim ethos and some, such as Gündem (www.gundemgazetesi.org), have a pro-Turkish orientation. 16 There is one bilingual Greek-Turkish magazine, Azinlikca (www.azinlikca.net). Paratiritis, a Greek newspaper, contains some pages in Turkish. Local state radio broadcasts a limited news report in Turkish. In Athens, about five newspapers are published in Arabic and one in Urdu. Many more Albanian newspapers (mostly imported from Albania, but a few printed in Greece in the form of newsletters, circulate in Greece, but they make little, if any, reference to Islam. A few 16 Others include: www.rodopruzgari.com, www.millet.gr, www.batitrakya.net and www.birlikgazetesi.info.

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websites promote the discussion of issues related to Islam in Greece. The most important, Equal Society (www.equalsociety.com), is run by the Muslim Association of Greece and available in three languages (Greek, Arabic and English). Act 3592/2007 on “granting permits for media enterprises” provides that the broadcast and print media should use Greek as the main language, or translation into Greek. Both limitations burden Muslim minority and immigrant papers as they mostly do not use Greek and have low budgets. Issues regarding Islam are discussed by the mainstream media when a ‘problem’ arises, or out of curiosity about Islamic practices—such as celebrations held by Muslim immigrants in Athens, for example. 13

Family Law

In the context of minority protection, which stems from Greece’s international commitments dating from 1881, 1913 and 1923, Islamic law is applied by the muftis’ courts of Thrace (Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotyho). The muftis have jurisdiction (under Act 1920/1991) in specific family law disputes such as divorce, pensions, alimony (nafaqa) and custody,17 and their decisions are ratified by the Greek courts. Although Muslims are in theory free to choose between Greek civil courts and Islamic courts, the overwhelmingly majority of Muslim family cases are judged by the latter. Women rarely apply to the Greek courts while men overwhelmingly opt for the Mufti. There are no rules to deal with conflict of jurisdiction. Important issues of constitutional principle, especially with regard to gender equality, are not accommodated in the muftis’ courts. Greek courts adjudicating cases of Muslims from an immigrant background can apply Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. No instances of this have been reported so far.

17 Ktistakis, Y., Το ιερό ∆ίκαιο και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες πολίτες. Μεταξύ φιλελευθερισμού και κοινοτισμού (The Holy Law and the Muslim Greek citizens: Between communitarianism and liberalism) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), and Tsitselikis, K., “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: A legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in Aluffi, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132.

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Regarding the position and presence of Islam in Greece, in Thrace and of immigrant Muslims, the Greek Orthodox Church does not express a common voice. After years of opposing the establishment of a mosque in Athens the Church now tolerates the idea of a mosque which is not yet constructed. Moreover, certain metropolitan bishops (such as those of Thessaloniki and Kalavryta) voice hostile opinions about Muslims. The Archbishop keeps a moderate position and lately the Church offered a plot for the establishment of an Islamic cemetery. Moreover, no interreligious dialogue has ever been undertaken between officials of the Greek Church and representatives of the Muslim communities. 15


The issue of the lack of an official mosque and cemetery in Athens has become the most familiar topic of discussion. The issue of the minority in Thrace (and more rarely the Muslims in the Dodecanese) has more political connotations and is presented from this perspective by the media, often linked to the question of Greek-Turkish relations. In general the media reflect mainstream attitudes, which are quite indifferent, if not hostile to, Islam which is strongly linked with Turkey. Recent public debate on Islam in Greece has had two focuses: Thrace and immigrants. The former is related to the broader issue of the minority’s Turkish identity, while the latter occasionally appears in debates around Greece and its Orthodox character.18 Moreover numbers are used politically in support of rival views, exaggerating Islam as the potential ‘negative other’, the alien and a ‘cultural threat’ to Greece. The head of the ultra-right political party LAOS referred in early June 2009 to “two million Muslims living in the country”,19 implying that Greece was being invaded. A month later, along the same line, Bishop

18 Anagnostou, Dia and R. Gropas, 2009, “Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Political and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens”, in Prodromou, E., V. Makrides and V. Roudemetof (eds), The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transition (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009). 19 Giorgos Karatzaferis, debate between political leaders for the euro-elections, broadcasted by the national network, 2 June 2009.

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Anthimos of Thessaloniki stated; “It is awful that 600,000 Muslims live in Attica (greater Athens).”20 Deliberately nurtured Islamophobia thus ideologically disguises many aspects of the reality of dealing with immigration, such as the economic exploitation of immigrants, inability to satisfy fundamental rights and an absence of social integration policies. ‘Islam’ overshadows ‘immigration’ and politically transposes the issues from unwanted realities to ideology. After a period of almost 20 years when Muslim immigrants have remained in the shadow of social dynamics, by mid-2009, a movement was formed to claim rights for Muslim immigrants and protest against the Greek police after a policeman allegedly harassed a Muslim. On 22 June, the first ever march by Muslim immigrants and leftist sympathisers took place in Athens. A week later another march was organised by certain Muslim communities, while others preferred not to participate. The position of the Muslim immigrants in Greece attracted publicity and brought to light a series of crucial issues which had not been visible on the public agenda, such as the lack of a mosque and a Muslim cemetery in Athens. On the other hand, the state authorities did not take any immediate action in response to Muslims’ (and other immigrants’) complaints and disappointment. 16


Events are mostly related to traditional religious festivals. Apart from that, cultural events in Thrace include wrestling contests in the mountain areas, often related to the Alevi-Bektashi calendar.

20

“Eleytherotypia”, 9.7.2009.

HUNGARY Gyorgy Lederer1 1

Muslim Populations

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman rule over a part of Hungary was the country’s main contact with the world of Islam although a number of ‘Ismaelite’ immigrants, also known as ‘Káliz’, had served as the eleventh-thirteenth-century Hungarian kings’ taxcollectors, money-minters and guards. The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia in 1878 was the next major encounter with Muslims. This and the World War I alliance with Turkey led to the recognition of Islam by the Hungarian Parliament in Act 17 of 1916. Very few Hungarian Muslims are known from that period. The Bosniak refugees of the 1930s tried unsuccessfully to have their community legally registered. Currently, the majority of Muslims in Hungary are Arab and Turkish immigrants, including some naturalised Hungarian citizens, but the number of ethnic-Hungarian converts has grown. In the 2001 national census, 3,201 residents declared themselves to be Muslims, most living in or around the capital, Budapest. There are some much higher estimates, such as the widely suggested figure of 20,000, but these are difficult to prove. 2

Islam and the State

Hungary is a secular republic. The role of its few Muslims in public life has been limited in practice to their leaders’ declarations on matters such as international terrorism, perceived Islamophobia, the Muhammad cartoons and inter-religious dialogue. Religious communities can register, i.e., obtain recognition in court that they are covered by Act 4 of 1990 on Freedom of Conscience and Religion. Religious communities

1 Gyorgy Lederer is a Hungarian-Canadian Arabist. He has a PhD from the University of Budapest, where he currently runs a private foundation focusing on dialogue with, and research on, Muslims in post-socialist Eastern Europe.

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as such receive no direct public funding, although Hungarian residents can transfer 1% of their income tax to the religious community or church of their choice. A department of the Ministry of Culture is responsible for formal relations between government and religious leaders in general. 3 Main Muslim Organisations 3.1

Registered organisations

There are three registered Islamic religious communities, none of which has more than a few hundred active members: Zoltán Bolek, an ethnic-Hungarian who resides in Zala County, is the current national Chairman of Magyar Iszlám Közösség (MIK, www .magyariszlam.hu), founded in 1988 by Balázs Mihálffy. Its membership is primarily ethnic Hungarian. Its prayer house is run by Imam György Jakab at 104 Róbert Károly Körút, Budapest. It emphasises its Hungarian patriotism and strong disapproval of what it views as extremist ideas. MIK has been notably involved in national and international charitable activities. It cooperates closely with the Hanif Cultural Foundation (www.hanif.hu), led by the local representative of the Turkish Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Foundation (the Topbas tariqa), Ahmet Bariscil. Two further separate Islamic communities are registered under Act 4 of 1990, both led mainly by people of Arab or part-Arab origin: in 2000, Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza (MME, www.iszlamegyhaz .net), and, in 2003, Iszlám Egyház (IE, www.iszlam.hu), following a split within MME. IE is headed by Salafi-oriented Palestinian-Hungarian Tayseer Saleh, who also manages a charity, the Al-Rahma Iszlám Jótékonysági Alapítvány. MIK has contested the legality of his control. The charity was founded in the early 1990s by the Sudanese Elfatih Ali Hassanein, a well-known regional representative of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. Zoltán Sulok, an ethnic-Hungarian, serves as Chairman of MME. MME is member of, and ideologically associated with, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. IE’s Dar as-Salam prayer house is located at 29 Bartók Béla Út, while MME’s is at 43 Sáfrány Utca, both in Budapest. MME has branches in Szeged, which is the second city as regards the number of Muslims, and in Pécs.

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3.2 Civil organisations The country’s largest prayer room is maintained by the Egyptian Sheikh Abdu Abdel-Moneim at 21 Dobozi Utca, Budapest. He and his foundation are practically independent of the three registered communities. There are two tariqas in Budapest, the Süleymanci (6 Makk Utca) and the Fethüllahci (7 Nagydiófa Utca, www.dialogusplatform .hu). In cooperation with MIK, the Süleymancis also have a centre in Pécs, at 3 Borostyán Utca. On Fridays, the Muslims of Pécs are allowed to pray in the Yakovali Hassan Pasha Djami, a sixteenth-century Turkish historical building. The same applies to the Malkoch Bey Djami Museum of Siklós, Baranya County. The independent Aluakf Foundation operates its own prayer house in Miskolc, at 30 Huba Utca. 4 Mosques and Prayer Houses Apart from the few Ottoman historical buildings, there are no purpose-built mosques in Hungary, only ambitious projects envisioning an Islamic centre in the capital. MME, IE and the civil organizations each rent private facilities for prayer, about ten altogether in the whole country. MIK owns its own centre, which it purchased from the Municipality of Budapest. It is assumed that MME, IE and Sheikh Abdu receive financial support from the Arab Gulf States, while MIK does not. Hungary has a large Saudi visa quota for the Hajj pilgrimage. This has been administered separately by the three registered communities. 5


There are no Muslim religious schools. 6


MIK, MME and IE offer lectures on Islam and free Arabic language courses. There are no Muslim institutions of higher education. A few Hungarian Muslims study religion in the Middle East and Turkey. Oriental languages and cultures are taught at several Hungarian universities, particularly Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem (ELTE) in Budapest.

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Over the last twenty years, MIK has buried a number of Muslims near the World War I Turkish war cemetery, which it restored in Budapest’s Kozma Utca Cemetery. There is no separate Muslim cemetery. 8


On the basis of agreements with various government authorities, MIK has regularly arranged visits Muslims in refugee camps and prisons. Chairman Bolek of the MIK has been invited to explain Islam to the Hungarian military personnel sent on missions to Muslim countries. Upon request, MME also arrange visits to Muslim refugees and prison inmates. 9

Religious Festivals

All communities offer iftar meals at Ramadan and celebrate ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha. MME and IE do this together. 10

Halal Food

In Budapest, several Muslim-run shops and restaurants sell halal meat and one shop does so in Szeged. Halal slaughter has been arranged privately in the Hungarian countryside. 11

Dress Codes

Hijab is still a rare phenomenon in Hungary. The female members of IE and MME reportedly wear it and many female members of MIK do so too, although this is only expected when attending prayer. 12


The magazines of MIK (Hívó Szó) and MME (Új Gondolat) appear irregularly, sometimes with long interruptions. In addition to the web-

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sites referred to above, www.iszlam.com is another forum of Hungary’s online Muslim scene. All communities print proselytising literature, mostly leaflets of varying quality. The series of books published by the Hanif Foundation, including those of Sheikh Osman Nuri Topbas, are translations by Zsuzsanna Kiss Halima, the Head of MIK’s Women’s Section. The national press rarely reports on Hungary’s Muslims, apart from some coverage of MIK’s humanitarian activities abroad. 13

Family Law

Religious marriage, affiliation and belief have no relevance in civil law. 14


Public interest in Islam is limited. Most Hungarians discover it through the popular books of the late orientalist Hajj Abdul-Karim Julius Germanus (1884–1979). Post-9/11, anxieties have been obvious. In February 2007, someone shot into MIK’s then empty prayer house, through a window, from the street. IE Chairman Tayseer Saleh’s 70-day arrest in 2004 drew some public attention. He was wrongly accused of preparing to bomb the Budapest Jewish Museum. In 2008, the court awarded him rather modest compensation, with no formal apologies. Arabophobia has been noticeable, due mainly to racism and some immigrants’ earlier criminal activities. Anti-Islamic sentiment has been much weaker. Despite the 150-year Ottoman occupation of unpopular memory, some level of Turcophilia has emerged with time. This is rooted in other, more recent periods of Hungarian history, especially the late nineteenth century. Many Turks and some Hungarians regard each other as sister nations. 15


In addition to the ‘Id celebrations, community summer camps were held in 2008 by MIK in Uzsa, Veszprém County, and by MME near Szeged. In 2008, the Hanif Foundation invited MIK members to Istanbul for a summer course on Islam.

ICELAND Göran Larsson1 1

Muslim Populations

The data for this country report are primarily based on official statistics, online information published by the Association of Muslims in Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi) and media reports.2 There are hardly any academic studies of Islam and Muslims in Iceland, the main reason being that very few Muslims live in this geographically remote part of Europe. According to historical records and folklore traditions, the first contact Iceland had with Muslims goes back to the summer of 1627, when a group of so-called ‘Turkish pirates’, who had actually travelled from North Africa, raided settlements on the south-west coast, the Westman Islands and the eastern fjords. This episode is of no importance for the composition of the Muslim community in Iceland today, but is significant because it is the first recorded Icelandic contact with Islam and Muslims. According to information provided by the International Religious Freedom Report 2009,3 commissioned by the US Department of State, the great majority of Icelanders (79%) are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and 5% are members of the so-called free churches, out of a total population of about 309,000. The number of Muslims is estimated at approximately 800 to 1,200 individuals. The Muslim community is made up of immigrants of diverse ethnic and linguistic

1

Göran Larsson is Associate Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). 2 A more detailed overview is found in Larsson, G. and I. Svanberg, “The Faroe Islands and Iceland”, in G. Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009). Unless otherwise mentioned, the data for this entry are based on this book or the International Religious Freedom Report 2009 issued by the US Department of State. 3 US Department of State, “Iceland”, International Religious Freedom Report 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127315.htm, accessed 18 April 2010.

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backgrounds. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2009, “Muslims are concentrated in the capital area (although there are a number of Kosovar Muslim refugees in the small northern town of Dalvik).” 2

Islam and the State4

Even though the state provides for and guarantees freedom of religion, the official religion of Iceland is Lutheranism. It is, however, possible to start religious associations as long as they do not involve preaching or practices that are “prejudicial to good morals or public order” (Article 63). According to Article 62 of the Constitution of Iceland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state church. Consequently, the state pays the salaries of the church’s clergy, who are employed as public servants under the Ministry of Judicial and Ecclesiastical Affairs. All taxpayers over the age of 16 must pay a tax to the Evangelical Lutheran Church or to another accepted and recognised religious affiliation (for example, to one of the two Muslim organisations). If this is not possible or not desired by the taxpayer, the ‘religious tax’ is paid to the secular university of Iceland (Article 64). Even though the judicial and economic systems favour the Christian traditions (for example, by observing the days of the Christian calendar as national holidays) and grant the Lutheran Church a privileged position, most Icelanders are generally not interested in religion. Most children are baptised and people usually marry and hold funerals in church, but the Lutheran religion is primarily seen as an expression of Icelandic culture. 3


There are two organisations that promote Muslim interests. The Association of Muslims in Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi, Dalseli 34, 109 Reykjavík; http://www.islam.is/) was established in 1997 by a Palestinian immigrant, Salmann Tamini, and has 371 members. The Association has been in contact with Muslims in England, Sweden and Saudi

4 The Constitution of the Republic of Iceland (No. 33, 17 June 1944, as amended 30 May 1984, 31 May 1991, 28 June 1995 and 24 June 1999), http://government.is/ constitution/; see especially Articles 62, 63 and 64.

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Arabia. During Ramadan it invited the guest imam Sheikh Adel from Libya to read the taraweeh prayer.5 The other organisation, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Iceland (Menningarsetur múslima á Íslandi, Gardastræti 11, 121 Reykjavík) was registered in 2009 and has 213 members. 4


The Association of Muslims in Iceland and the Islamic Cultural Centre of Iceland have their own houses of worship, with daily prayer nights and weekly Friday prayers that attract a core group of approximately 30–50 and 60–70 individuals, respectively. There are no purpose-built mosques, and the two organisations use rooms for both prayers and meetings. The Association of Muslims in Iceland has not been allowed to erect a purpose-built mosque in Reykjavík, which some Muslims interpret as indicating that Muslims are treated differently from followers of other religions. 5


The teaching of religion is obligatory in public schools. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2009, teaching for grades 1–10 (ages 6–15) should be based on “the Christian heritage of Icelandic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human values”. The instruction is, however, open and there have been complaints that teachers have been indoctrinating pupils by overemphasising Christian traditions, even though non-Christian traditions, pluralism and multiculturalism all form part of the curriculum. It is possible for students to be exempted from so-called Christian classes, but there are no alternatives for Muslim pupils within the school system. Most schools are public institutions, and there are no independent or free Muslim schools.

5 This information is retrieved from the homepage of the organisation and its year report for 2003).

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The Theology Department of the University of Reykjavík has religious studies programmes with modules on the history or sociology of religions, but not on Islam as a separate subject. The Department has organised open lectures on Islam together with the US Embassy in Iceland.6 There is no training programme for imams in Iceland. 7


The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Iceland operates and cares for all cemeteries, to which all the recognised religious organisations and traditions have access. 8


Religious data are not kept in prisons, and there are no arrangements for Muslim pastoral services. 9

Religious Festivals

There is no detailed information about religious festivals, but the webpage of the Association of Muslims in Iceland contains basic information about the celebration and start of ‘Id al-adha in 2009. For 2006, the online news magazine Iceland Review published news reports on the celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr.7

6

“Imam holds open lecture on Islam in Iceland”, Iceland Review, 27 February 2008, http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_news/?cat_id=16539&ew_0_a_ id=301632, accessed 18 April 2010. 7 “Muslims in Iceland celebrate Eid al-Fitr”, Iceland Review, 24 October 2006, http:// www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/search/news/Default.asp?ew_0_a_id=239480, accessed 6 January 2010.

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10 Halal Food There is no specific information about the availability of halal food in Iceland but, according to Salmann Tamimi, the chairperson of the Association of Muslims in Iceland, there is one Pakistani restaurant in Reykjavík that serves halal food.8 The difficulty in finding halal food in Iceland is also confirmed by a question posted by a Muslim woman in a so-called live dialogue organised by the webpage IslamOnline.9 11

Dress Codes

Although there are no legal restrictions, there have been some earlier reports about discrimination against Muslim women wearing hijab but, according to the International Religious Freedom Report 2009, there were no reports for this year (i.e. 2009). 12


The website of the Association of Muslims in Iceland (www.islam .is) contains general information about Islam, the Qur’an and activities organised by the group. While activity on the homepage is low, the online discussion group for Muslim women (http://groups.yahoo. com/group/kvennafundir/) linked to the webpage is more active. The language used for communication is either Icelandic or English. Because there are so few Muslims in Iceland, there is no market for translations of Islamic books, and Islamic publications are therefore limited to online forums, especially those referred to above. 13

Family Law

No data available.

8 Iceland Review, 29 July 2008, http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/ search/news/Default.asp?ew_0_a_id=309477, accessed 6 January 2010. 9 Sheikh Muhammad Ali Al-Hanooti, “General fatwa session. Date Thursday, Jul 11, 2002”, http://www.islamonline.net/livefatwa/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=5527fC, accessed 12 January 2010.

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The state in Iceland does not directly support any interfaith programmes, but according to the International Freedom Report 2009 a number of churches and religious groups are involved in interfaith and dialogue groups. There are no national interreligious councils, but in 2006 the Forum for Interfaith Dialogue was set up to work for peaceful coexistence and tolerance in Icelandic society. The Evangelic Lutheran Church of Iceland supports this endeavour. The Forum consists of thirteen religious groups registered with the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs.10 15


Public debate about Islam and Muslims is informed by global and international events rather than by local Muslim affairs. Nonetheless there are indications that there are more negative opinions about Muslims than about immigrants in general.11 Plans to construct a purposebuilt mosque in Reykjavík have been covered by the media, and the Muslim community perceived the delay in issuing the building permit as a case of discrimination and Islamophobia. It is also alleged that Omega, a Christian television station, has broadcast negative opinions about Islam.12 16


No major cultural events are reported that concern Islam and Muslims in Iceland. However, a so-called ‘sound sculpture’ by art student Thórarinn Jónsson, echoing a recording of the Islamic prayer, was installed on the balcony of the Iceland Academy of the Arts in Reykjavík in 2008. According to the artist, the aim of the installation was

10 “Forum for interfaith dialogue created in Iceland”, The Lutheran World Federation, http://www.lutheranworld.org/News/LWI/EN/1969.EN.html, accessed 6 January 2010. 11 Strabac, Z. and O. Listhaug, “Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries”, Social Science Research 37 (2008), pp. 268–286, especially p. 278. 12 Larsson and Svanberg, “The Faroe Islands and Iceland”, p. 12, and International Religious Freedom Report 2009.

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to counterbalance the negative image of Islam that prevails in the society. Because of its controversial nature and because it disturbed public order, the installation was removed from the building and the school asked the artist to close it down.13

13

Roberts, R., “First interview with fake ROM bomber. Few regrets, and a new stunt in Iceland”, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/toronto/archive/2008/10/31/ first-interview-with-fake-rom-bomber-few-regrets-and-a-new-stunt-in-iceland.aspx, accessed 6 January 2010.

IRELAND Victoria Montgomery1 1

Muslim Populations

Ireland’s most recent census, carried out in 2006, showed that there were 32,539 Muslims in Ireland, which was a massive 69% increase on the 2002 census.2 However, in 2008 Imam Hussein Halawa, Chairman of the Irish Council of Imams, has put the figure at closer to 45,000, made up of 50 nationalities.3 Unlike the UK and France, where the Muslim communities are linked to their former colonies, there is no dominant national or ethnic background within the Muslim community in Ireland. The census does, however, show that the majority of Muslims are non-Irish, which obviously correlates to high levels of immigration.4 The vast majority of Muslims in Ireland are Sunnis; in 2007 the Shi’i Muslim community in Ireland was estimated to number approximately 5,000.5 While Muslims are found in every county in Ireland, more than half of them live in Dublin county and city, with Cork home to Ireland’s second largest Muslim community.6 There are no exclusively Muslim residential areas, even in Dublin or Cork. Muslim communities in Ireland are comparatively affluent, which is linked to patterns of Muslim settlement in Ireland. Sustained Muslim settlement from the 1950s until the early 1990s was made up primarily

1 Victoria Montgomery is a research fellow and teaching assistant in the School of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast. She has recently completed her PhD entitled, “Identity, Integration and Belonging: Muslims in Ireland”, and is the author of “Are you a Protestant or a Catholic Muslim? The path of Muslim integration into Northern Ireland”, in J. Rehman and S. Breau (eds), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 489–519. 2 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), www.cso.ie. 3 McGarry, P., “Muslim community in plea for more burial grounds”, The Irish Times, 30 August 2008, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0830/ 1220023440449.html, accessed 5 September 2008. 4 Those citing an Irish nationality in the 2006 census numbered 9,761 while nonIrish numbered 21,613. 5 Interviews with members of the Shi’i community in Ireland in 2007. 6 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), www.cso.ie.

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of students who came for higher education and then stayed, or individuals wishing to set up businesses, so they had solid educational and professional backgrounds. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) for example, estimates that there are more than 2,000 Muslim doctors in Ireland.7 However, Ireland’s economic boom since the 1990s has diversified the face of Muslim immigration. The early 1990s saw groups of Muslim refugees arrive from Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. Growing numbers of Muslim asylum-seekers have also arrived from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq, as well as large numbers of economic migrants from across the world.8 It is therefore likely that the socio-economic make-up of the community may alter in the coming years. There is a dearth of research and literature relating to the active participation of all minority ethnic groups in Ireland, although a report from 2005 did indicate that there was evidence of a growth in activism among immigrants in Ireland.9 While there are currently no Muslims in political office in Ireland, a group called the Muslim Community Lobby was established in May 2007 to encourage Irish Muslims to use their vote.10 In addition, the main Muslim organisations participate in government consultations on a wide range of issues.11 2

Islam and the State

Ireland is an independent republic based on representative democracy. Although the Irish Constitution originally contained a clause (Article 44) that made explicit mention of the special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, this was removed by referendum in 1973. The Constitution now guarantees freedom of conscience and freedom of profession and practice of religion (subject to public order and morality) to every citizen. It also guarantees that the state will not endow any

7

The Islamic Foundation of Ireland, www.islaminireland.com. Flynn, K, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 2 (2006), pp. 223–238 (231). 9 Ugba, A., Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Ireland (Oldenburg: POLITIS, 2005), http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Ireland.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 10 The Muslim Community Lobby: www.muslimcommunitylobbyireland.blogspot .com. 11 See Islamic Foundation of Ireland: www.islaminireland.com and Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland: www.islamireland.ie. 8

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religion or impose any penalties for religious belief.12 The Constitution also makes blasphemy a criminal offence, although this offence was not legally formulated till 2009. Despite the Law Reform Commission arguing in 1991 that blasphemy had no place in Irish law, the government decided that a referendum to change the constitution would be too costly. Consequently, in July 2009, the blasphemy law was passed in the Daíl as part of the Defamation Act.13 This makes it an offence to utter or publish matter that is grossly abusive or insulting thereby causing outrage among substantial numbers of adherents of a religion. Muslims are therefore protected under this law, although it should be stated that the majority of the Muslim community were not actively calling for it and have made little response to it. Religions and religious organisations are not publicly funded in Ireland with the exception that the state will fund denominational schools. However, religious organisations are eligible for charitable status, which allows for some tax exemptions. The IFI, for example, has been accorded the status of a Friendly Society (charitable status). Muslims are given legal protection from discrimination in Ireland. The Equal Status Acts 2000–2004 prohibit discrimination on religious (and other) grounds and aim to promote equality, while incitement to hatred legislation also applies to religious communities. In addition to these laws there are several state agencies which enforce equality and work on behalf of minority communities. These include the Equality Authority and the Garda Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO). Indeed, the GRIO has intervened in two cases where Muslim women were refused passports because they wore the hijab and resolved the cases in their favour.14 3


The first Islamic organisation in Ireland, the Dublin Islamic Society, was established in 1959. The name was changed in 1990 to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) (163 South Circular Road, Dublin,

12

Irish Parliament: http://oireachtas.ie. Ibid. 14 Islamic Human Rights Commission, “Briefing: Good practice on the headscarf in Europe”, 9 March 2004, http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=1030, accessed 20 May 2009. 13

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Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 4533242, www.islaminireland.com). The IFI established Ireland’s first mosque in 1976 and other branches of the IFI have been established throughout Ireland. The IFI has a written constitution and an elected council. Membership is open to all Muslims in Ireland and every Muslim is an honorary member. The IFI, on its own website, cites itself as the official representative of Muslims in Ireland. However, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) (19 Roebuck Road, Clonskeagh, Dublin 14, tel: +353 (0)1 2080000, www .islamireland.ie), which has a large purpose-built Mosque and Islamic Centre regularly welcomes politicians and other visiting groups, has become the public face of Islam in Ireland.15 The ICCI was established in 1996 with funding from Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the deputy ruler of Dubai. It performs a wide range of religious and social functions, such as translation services, marital and funeral services, a library, a gymnasium and a women’s section. A community welfare office was established in 2005, which facilitates conferences and workshops for service providers. There are no significant differences between the ways in which the IFI and the ICCI publicly represent Islam in Ireland, and while clearly the leadership of the two organisations differs, many Muslims tend to pray at both centres, depending on which is most convenient on a particular day.16 Representing Shi’i Muslims in Ireland is the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre (Milltown Bridge, Dundrum, Dublin 14, tel: +00353 (0) 1 2604491, http://homepage.eircom.net/~ahlulbyteassociation/). As well as being a mosque, the centre runs social activities and lectures and acts as the main point of contact for the Shi’i community in Ireland. In addition, the Bab-ul-Ilm Society (86 Beach Park, Easton Road, Leixlip, Co. Kildare, tel: +353 (0) 61 56922, www.babulilm.ie) is a recently established group, formed to help meet the needs of Shi’i Muslims in Ireland. Other Muslim organisations include the Galway Islamic Society established in 1978 (13 Sandyview Drive, Riverside, Galway, tel: +353 (0) 91 751621), the Cork Muslim society established in 1984 (Unit D, Sitecast Industrial Estate, Togher, Cork, tel: +353 (0)21 4320301, www .corkmosque.org), the Limerick Islamic Society (Old Dooraday Road, Limerick, tel: +353 (0) 61 635151) and the Waterford Islamic Society,

15 16

Flynn, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, p. 226. Interviews with members of the Muslim community in Ireland, 2006–2007.

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established in 1999 (Waterford Mosque, 1 Viewmount, Waterford). Like the IFI and ICCI, these organisations also perform religious and social functions but on a much smaller scale. All of these societies can also be contacted via the IFI. The Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland (163 South Circular Road, Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 8218485) is an organisation set up by Sheikh Shaheed Satardien. Despite his claim that 17 Muslim organisations are affiliated to the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland,17 Satardien’s unpopularity with the main organisations has meant that the council has not been particularly successful in establishing itself as the umbrella group for Muslims in Ireland.18 A religious body called the Irish Council of Imams was set up in September 2006, with the aim of representing both Sunni and Shi’i imams. (The council can be contacted via its secretary Ali Selim at the ICCI.) For young Muslims, the various universities in Ireland have vibrant Islamic societies and another group called Muslim Youth Ireland (www.muslimyouthireland.wordpress.com) established its website in May 2009, and has been active in organising activities for Muslim teenagers, including a summer camp. One final organisation, which has been attracting some publicity is the Muslim Public Affairs Committee Ireland (tel: +353 (0) 877 468706, http://mpac.ie), which describes itself as an empowerment system: defending Muslim interests and Islam in Ireland. 4


Ireland currently has three purpose-built mosques, the first of which, the Ballyhaunis Mosque in Co. Mayo was built in 1986 by a local Muslim businessman. The ICCI in Dublin is a large and impressive mosque, opened in 1996. Both are Sunni mosques. In 1996, Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre in Dublin was opened. Commonly referred to as the Husseinia, it is a mosque and Islamic centre for the Shi’i community

17 Satardien, S. “The great debate. Islamic reformation or counter-reformation” (2008), http://www.themuslimleader.info/documents/Islamic%20reformation.doc, accessed 1 October 2009. 18 Sheikh Satardien has been vocal about what he perceives as growing extremism among Ireland’s Muslim communities, which has been disputed by the IFI and ICCI. He has also accused the ICCI of inviting hard-line extremist clerics to preach: Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland Press Release, 29 October 2007.

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and is the only Shi’i mosque in Ireland. Shi’i Muslims outside Dublin tend to pray in private or rented houses or apartments. In addition, there is also the large Dublin Mosque and Islamic Centre which is run by the IFI and is currently raising money for an extension, for which planning permission has been granted. There are also rented or purchased houses used as mosques throughout Ireland.19 There has been some opposition to mosques in Ireland, usually related to traffic and planning issues. In Cork for example, the mosque was forced to shut in 2001 over a lack of planning permission for it to be used as a mosque. The community are now based in an industrial park, but are raising funds for a purpose-built mosque. Outside of Dublin therefore, the key issue is the lack of funds to build or acquire a suitable space to accommodate the growing numbers of Muslims.20 In addition to the mosques, there are also prayer rooms or halls in many hospitals and universities, such as the Royal College of Surgeons and Roscommon County Hospital. It is quite difficult to quantify the number of prayer rooms in Ireland, as the number is continually increasing and locations may change with circumstance. While the main mosques, particularly in Dublin, are attended by Muslims of all ethnic and national backgrounds, there are growing numbers of prayer rooms based on particular schools of thought or language.21 The Blackpitts Mosque in Dublin is a Deobandi mosque with preaching in Urdu, while the Tablighi Jamaat group are based around a mosque in Lucan (Dublin), and the Nigerian community worship in a business park in Dublin preaching what they term ‘African Sufism’.22 In addition to these groups, there have been unconfirmed links between the ICCI and the Muslim Brotherhood. While Sheikh Satardien, the leader of the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland, has made many such allegations in his publicised criticisms of the ICCI,23 this link may also be

19

The IFI website lists mosques in Galway, Dundalk, Carlow, Portlaoise, Mullingar, Waterford, Limerick, Kerry Cavan and Clare, as well as smaller prayerhalls and mosques in Dublin. 20 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland (Leiden: Brill, 2006) p. 307. 21 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, The Irish Times, 10 October 2006), http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/gageby/underthecrescent/identity.htm, accessed 2 November 2009. 22 Ibid. 23 Satardien, S., “Combating extremism in religion worldwide”, Metro Eireann, 8 and 15 November 2007, http://www.metroeireann.com/article/combating-extremismin-religion,791, accessed 20 May 2009.

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explained by the fact that the headquarters of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), established in March 1996 with the aim of guiding and meeting the needs of Muslims in Europe,24 is based at the ICCI. The president of the ECFR is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is seen as one of the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, although he claims no longer to be a member; he was offered the leadership of the Brotherhood in 2004, but declined it.25 5


There are currently two Muslim primary schools in Dublin, which are funded by the Department of Education. The Muslim National School was set up by the IFI in 1990 and the North Dublin Muslim School was established in 2001. They follow the Irish school curriculum but have an Islamic ethos, teaching Arabic and Qur’anic studies. The full-time teaching staff at the Muslim primary schools in Dublin are appointed by the Department of Education. In addition, there are part-time religious teachers who are privately appointed by the schools, and whose salaries are not met by the state. Plans have been put forward to the New Schools Advisory Committee to establish five new Muslim schools in Lucan, Clonee, Tallaght (Dublin), Tralee and Sligo, where Muslim populations have been growing rapidly.26 There are no Muslim secondary schools in Ireland, so most Muslim children in Ireland attend mainstream Irish schools, the majority of which are denominational. Religious education is a part of the school curriculum, and can often take the form of religious instruction. This is particularly the case at primary level where Catholic children are prepared for communion. However, in recent years there have been initiatives to organise Islamic instruction in some primary schools, or in a number of schools with large numbers of Muslim pupils, the school has invited someone from the mosque to visit on Fridays and give a khutba for the children.27

24

The European Council for Fatwa and Research: www.e-cfr.org. Belen Soage, A., “Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Portrait of a leading Islamic cleric”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 51–68 (55). 26 Department of Education and Science: http://www.education.ie. 27 Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam, pp. 404–405. 25

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Parents have the legal right to withdraw their children from religious education. There are numerous weekend schools for Muslim children run by the mosques and Islamic societies in Ireland. The ICCI established the Nur Al-Huda School in 1999 and has since extended it to two areas outside Dublin. There is currently a waiting list to attend the school. It also runs the Libyan school, which follows the Libyan curriculum recognised throughout the Arab world. The IFI runs the Al-Falah Islamic School as well as the Sunday madrasa. There are also weekend schools attached to mosques in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford, among others. These weekend schools are not supervised by the Department of Education. 6


University College Dublin offers modules in Islam, the Crusades and Politics of the Middle East. Middle Eastern Politics is also offered at Limerick University as part of its MA in Peace and Development Studies. Studies in Contemporary Islam form part of the Religions and Global Diversity Programme at University College Cork, where political Islam is studied within the Decolonization and Revolution module in the MA Politics programme, and the history department offers a course on the Crusades. The Near Eastern and Jewish Studies course at Trinity College Dublin charts the development of the Islamic religion and cultural traditions, while various modules on Islam including Medieval Islam and Islam and Gender are offered as part of the Religions and Theology course. The School of Ecumenics at Trinity College Dublin also offers courses in Muslim-Christian relations. In 2009, the School of Ecumenics and the School of Religions and Theology at Trinity College hosted a graduate seminar series entitled, “Encounters with Islamic Theology”. No institutions offer imam training in Ireland. 7


In 1976 the Dublin Islamic Society bought a section of the Mount Jerome cemetery in Dublin. However, this was full by the end of the 1980s and in 1990 the South Dublin City Council reserved a section of the Newcastle cemetery in Dublin for Muslim use only. The IFI and

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ICCI both arrange funerals and perform the religious rituals. There are no Muslim burial plots or cemeteries outside Dublin. 8


There are currently no Muslim chaplains within state institutions. However, within the prisons in Ireland and the health service, Muslim representatives will be contacted upon request. There are no Muslim chaplains in the universities in Ireland, although many universities do have Muslim prayer rooms. 9

Religious Festivals

The main mosques in Ireland organise their ‘Id celebrations separately, within the mosque if it is large enough. The ICCI, for example, has a large hall which is used for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, as well as breaking the fast during Ramadan. Outside Dublin, the largest ‘Id al-Fitr celebration takes place in Cork, where in 2006 more than 2,000 people attended. The community tends to rent space in order to accommodate such numbers.28 Apart from children attending Muslim primary schools and adults working for Muslim organisations, Muslims have no automatic legal right to take holidays during the main religious festivals. This must either be negotiated with schools and employers or, in the case of working adults, taken as annual leave if agreement cannot be reached. 10 Halal Food Ritual slaughter is legal in Ireland and there are many halal butchers in Dublin as well as other Irish cities. Frozen and tinned halal meat is also widely available. Indeed, in the recent past Ireland had a thriving halal industry which exported halal meat and dairy products to Muslims countries outside Ireland.29 However, the foot and mouth epidemic has negatively impacted on the halal slaughter industry in

28

Fitzgerald, “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”. Halal certification information is available from the Islamic Foundation of Ireland, www.islaminireland.com. 29

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Ireland, although lamb and increasing amounts of halal dairy produce, which are certified by the IFI, are still exported from Ireland. 11

Dress Codes

Issues to do with religious dress in schools are currently a matter for each individual school board, although guidelines state that policies should not act to exclude children of a particular religious background (for more information, see section 15). There are no rules limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public institutions, although in organisations such as the Gardaí (police) which have a uniform, Muslims must conform to that uniform, which at present does not include a hijab option. It is now quite common to see Muslim women and men in religious dress, particularly in Dublin. With regard to women, this is mainly the hijab and jilbab; women wearing the niqab on Ireland’s streets are quite rare. 12


No data is available on Muslim newspapers and magazines published in Ireland. However, foreign newspapers, including some in Urdu and Arabic, are widely available. The main organisations each have their own websites which contain extensive articles in English, Urdu and Arabic and audio and video resources available to download. There is also a website dedicated to the Shi’i community in Ireland, Shia Muslims in Ireland (www.shiamuslimsinireland.com). In addition, Muslims in Ireland are utilising more mainstream media. There is a weekly Islamic radio show on Near Fm (http://www.nearfm.ie) called Islam in Focus and there are regular pieces in Metro Eireann newspaper (www.metroeireann.com) on issues to do with the Muslim community. Many organisations such as Muslim Youth Ireland, the Cork Muslim Society and the Royal College of Surgeons Islamic Society, are using modern media resources such as Facebook, Bebo and You Tube to network and highlight their organisation.

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Family Law

Marriages can be conducted by an imam at mosques registered with the state; the married couple sign the official marriage register which the mosque returns to the appropriate Registrar in the area. However, beyond marriage, the legal system in Ireland is almost entirely secular. Catholicism played a central role in the identity and politics of post-independence Ireland and Catholic teachings became enshrined in law. Divorce, contraception and abortion are all illegal in Ireland. 14


Although there is no national interreligious council in Ireland, Muslims in Ireland participate in interfaith organisations and events and have good links with the Irish state. Ali Selim of the ICCI has argued that interfaith relations could be strengthened if leaders and people of various faiths were invited and encouraged to attend events of local and national significance.30 An important interreligious organisation is the Three Faiths Forum of Ireland which was launched in 1999 and aims to increase dialogue and break down prejudices between Jews, Christians and Muslims. It has had some impact, for example, in issuing a statement in 2003 concerning the war in Iraq, which helped to minimise hostility towards Irish Muslims.31 However, this organisation does not have links outside the three Abrahamic religions and so Muslims in Ireland have no official relations with other religions. The Turkish Irish Education and Cultural Society (TIECS) (6 the Drive Haydens Park, Lucan, Dublin, tel: +353 (0) 876 409 610, www.tiecs.ie) is a Muslim organisation which has been involved in interfaith dialogue through the organisation of conferences, Turkish language classes and trips to Turkey.32 Another form of interfaith dialogue has been through organised visits

30 Selim, Ali, Interfaith Relations in Ireland, (2008) available at http://islamireland .ie/print/439, accessed 1 September 2009. 31 Skuce, Stephen, The Faiths of Ireland (Dublin: Columba Press, 2006) p. 168. 32 For a full discussion of the activities and objectives of TIECS, see Lacey, Jonathan, ‘Exploring the transnational engagements of a Turkic religio-cultural community in Ireland’, Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review Vol. 2 (2007) pp. 153–174.

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to mosques for religious leaders and school children. In addition, a new multi-faith school is currently being set up in Co.Kildare which would come under Christian, Jewish and Muslim joint patronage.33 15


In spite of the Gardaí’s denial that Islamist extremism is rife in Ireland, several newspaper articles in recent years have linked the Muslim community in Ireland, particularly young Muslims, with extremism.34 However, much less media attention has been focused on Muslims in Ireland in 2009 with some of it, particularly within RTE the state media network, taking quite a positive focus.35 In the only poll of Irish Muslims, taken in 2006, while a minority of young Irish Muslims took a more negative view of Ireland, more than two thirds of Muslims overall felt Islam to be compatible with Irish life and 77% felt accepted.36 The main debate concerning Muslims in Ireland in 2008 centred on the issue of the hijab in schools, which gained international media attention after the education spokesmen from the two main opposition parties stated that public schools should not allow hijab.37 As a result, the minister for integration has issued guidelines that essentially confirm the status quo: individual schools should decide their own uniform policy but should not act to exclude students of a particular religious background. In practice therefore, this allows for the

33 “Multifaith school for Irish pupils”, Islam Online, 13 January 2008, http:// www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-News/ NWELayout&cid=1199279515166, accessed 5 June 2008. 34 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) (2006), “Challenging myths: The Muslim community in Ireland”, http://www.nccri .ie/pdf/ChallengingMyths-Muslims.pdf, accessed 30 August 2007. 35 Of note was a broadcast on 26 April 2009 called “Rebel city reverts”, about the Muslim community in Cork, which was to mark the 25th anniversary of the first mosque in the city (http://www.rte.ie/radio1/doconone/rebel_city_reverts.html); on 20 September 2009 a programme entitled “Hungry for God”, discussing Ramadan, was broadcast on RTE television, http://www.rte.ie/tv/worship/avspecials_1055822 .html?2613467,null,228, accessed 18 April 2010. 36 Lansdowne Market Research (2006), “RTE Primetime investigates Muslims in Ireland”, http://www.lansdownemarketresearch.ie/archives.html#2006, accessed 2 November 2009. 37 Heimani, Z., “Opposition in Ireland calls for headscarf ban”, The Muslim News, 27 June 2008, www.muslimnews.co.uk/paper/index.php?article=3580, accessed 10 October 2008.

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hijab in Irish schools, although it does not recommend clothing which obscured the face (i.e. burqa and niqab), which was deemed a barrier to communication.38 Another educational issue generated substantial media and public comment in June 2009, when an evaluation of the North Dublin Muslim National School was published by the Department for Education.39 It reported poor standards of teaching and a lack of welfare policies and highlighted that the school board had refused to implement the Irish curriculum fully, while spending too much time on Qur’anic and Arabic studies. Similar allegations were made against the other Muslim primary school in Dublin by some members of the Muslim community.40 This has led to the IFI publishing statements on its website alleging personal grudges by certain members of the Muslim community and setting out a programme of action to address the issues raised in the evaluation.41 16


The ICCI hosts an annual Qur’an competition attended by several hundred Muslim children from throughout Ireland. It also hosts an annual conference with a different theme each year, which is attended by Muslims from throughout Ireland, including Northern Ireland.42

38

A summary of the guidelines and other documents relating to this issue can be found on the IFI website: http://www.islaminireland.com. 39 Department for Education, Whole School Evaluation Report: North Dublin Muslim National School (June 2009), http://www.education.ie/insreports/report1_20152L .htm, accessed 10 July 2009. 40 The allegations were made on the Joe Duffy Liveline RTE Radio 1 show in June 2009. 41 Please refer to IFI website (www.islaminireland.com) to see relevant statements. 42 The 2009 conference was advertised on the websites of the two main Muslim organisations in Northern Ireland: the Belfast Islamic Centre (http://www.belfast islamiccentre.org.uk) and the Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association (http:// www.nimfa.org).

ITALY Stella Coglievina1 1

Muslim Populations

The history of Islam in Italy dates back to the seventh and eighth centuries, when the general expansion of Islam into Europe took place. In the ninth century, Muslim Arabs invaded Sicily and some regions in Peninsular Italy and Arab dynasties ruled Sicily until the Norman conquest (eleventh century). Arabic and Islamic art and science continued to be heavily influential in Sicily and some Arabic-speaking communities have survived in Sicily from that time (especially near Mazara del Vallo). Thereafter, Islam was almost absent until the 1970s. In the 1970s (and more consistently in the 1980s), Italy began to attract migrant workers, among them Muslims from North Africa (especially Morocco) and Albania. Today, Islam is the second largest religious presence in Italy, after Catholics (an estimated 87% of native-born citizens are nominally Roman Catholic).2 There is no official census of religious communities and little reliable data on the Muslim population in Italy. According to latest estimates, the number of Muslims, who are mostly Sunnis, is between 1.25 and 1.42 million (2% of a total population of just over 60 million3).4 According to a survey conducted in 2004,

1 Stella Coglievina is a PhD Fellow in Ecclesiastical and Canon Law in the Faculty of Law of University of Insubria (Como), where she is also a research assistant. Her research activity is focused on antidiscrimination law in the EU and on the status of religious denominations in the European Union. She is the editor of The Protection of Religious Freedom in Europe. Experiences and Challenges (Florence: CUSL, University of Florence, 2008). 2 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009 (Italy), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127317.htm, accessed 15 November 2009. 3 The total population, according to the official census, May 2009, was 60,157,551 (Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), www.istat.it). 4 According to the US International Religious Freedom Report 2009, Muslims in Italy are 1.25 million; Religious Intelligence, a research agency based in London, indicates a figure of 1,375,149 (http://www.religiousintelligence.co.uk/country/?CountryID=181, accessed 5 November 2009). Caritas Migrantes reports 1,202,396 Muslim immigrants and about 10,000 Italian Muslim citizens (Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007

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Muslims, defined by nationality, make up about 33% of immigrants; the main countries of origin in that year were: Morocco (253,238), Albania (177,185), Tunisia (68,287), Senegal (52,598), Egypt (48,724), Pakistan (34,253), Bangladesh (33,525), Algeria (20,311), Nigeria (14,903), and Turkey (10,003).5 Muslims in Italy are mainly registered residents without Italian citizenship. Only about 40,000–50,000 Muslims have Italian citizenship (including about 10,000 converts from Christianity).6 Italian citizenship laws are very strict, while obtaining work and residency permits is easier, so many immigrants who have lived in Italy for years cannot obtain Italian citizenship. The high number of Muslim non-citizens, including illegal immigrants, is one of the obstacles to their integration into Italian society: as immigration is a quite recent phenomenon in Italy, most foreign Muslims are still first-generation immigrants, living in poor socio-economic conditions. They rarely participate in public life and the number of family reunifications is still small. Muslims are often perceived as an extremely diverse community, without ties to Italy. Muslim groups have settled throughout Italy, but those in the major Italian cities such as Milan and Rome are the most known and visible. Recently, Muslims have begun to make a place for themselves in Italian politics, mostly at the local level, while there are two Muslim members of parliament.7 In contrast, even though they are a small group, Italian Muslims are very active in Islamic organisations and in political, cultural and social life and they contribute towards making Islam visible in public opinion and public policies.

[Immigration Statistical Dossier 2007] (Rome: IDOS, 2008), pp. 192ff. According to www.islamicpopulation.com Muslims number 1.42 million (data from 2008). 5 “Le religioni degli immigrati all’inizio del 2004: Gli effetti della regolarizzazione. Ricerca del Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, (Immigrants’ religions at the beginning of 2004: The consequences of regularization. Research of the Immigration Statistical Dossier Caritas/Migrantes”), http://www.csvbasilicata.it/Archivio/ Immigrazione/religio_immigra.htm, accessed 5 November 2009. 6 Open Society Institute, “Rapporto di monitoraggio della protezione delle minoranze nell’Unione Europea: la situazione dei musulmani in Italia, (Monitoring report on the protection of minorities in the European Union: the situation of Muslims in Italy)” (2002), http://www.abuondiritto.it/liberta/religiosa/pdf/rapporto_osi_italia.pdf, accessed 5 November 2009. 7 See http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/, accessed 5 November 2009. (Euro-Islam is a Research Network Sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS France and Harvard University.) It should be noted that immigrants who do not have Italian citizenship have no voting rights.

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Islam and the State

Italy is a secular republic with no state religion. Roman Catholics nominally constitute the majority (an estimated 87%) of the population and the Catholic Church enjoys privileges, stemming from the sovereign status of the Vatican and its historical political authority, which are not available to other religious groups. According to the Constitution (Articles 7 and 8), relations between the state and religious confessions are governed by bilateral agreements between the state and each confession: for the Catholic Church, the 1929 Lateran Pacts as amended in 1984; for non-Catholic confessions, separate accords (intese) with the government. The absence of an accord does not affect a religious group’s right to worship freely, but a religious community without an accord cannot benefit from direct financial support or obtain certain specific rights (such as automatic access by ministers of religion to state hospitals and prisons, the right of employees and students to observe religious holidays, etc.). Islam, like other confessions that have not signed an agreement with the state, is subject to the legislation of 1929 on Recognised Religions. Divisions among the country’s Islamic organisations, as well as the existence of multiple Muslim immigrant groups, have hindered the community’s efforts to sign an accord. Some attempts have been made over recent years to regulate relations between the state and Islamic communities. A decree of 10 September 2005 established a Consultative Council of Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam italiano)8 in the Ministry of Interior, which has a consultative role in discussing the status of Islam in Italy and the process of reaching an agreement with the state, but it seems that the work of this Council has slowed down considerably since the initial meetings. In 2007 (decree of the Minister of the Interior of 23 April 2007), the government published in the Official Gazette a “Charter of shared values for citizenship and integration”, prepared by the Minister of the Interior and presented to the members of the Consultative Council, with the aim of reaffirming the values of a secular state and freedom of religion.9 A Declaration of Intent (Dichiarazione di intenti per la

8 www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/religioni/sottotema003 .html, accessed 5 November 2009. 9 An English translation is available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration.pdf, accessed 5 November 2009.

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federazione dell’Islam italiano),10 prepared by representatives of Muslim groups and professors of law and presented on 13 March 2008, tries to pave the way for the institution of a federation of Islamic groups to facilitate reaching an agreement with the state. Despite the absence of an accord with the state, all religious communities, including the Muslim community, are eligible for access to public funds for the construction of places of worship. According to Italian legislation, it is for the regional and local administration to approve requests for such funding, as well as publicly owned land for their construction. There are no consistent data about what is happening at the local level: many Muslims report experiencing difficulties in building a mosque and obtaining funding because of political concerns (mistrust of some Muslim organisations; concerns about the improper use of mosques; objections to minarets near Christian churches or historic places of worship in order to preserve the ‘identity’ of Italian towns, etc.; see also below, section 4). Sometimes, funds for building mosques come from the governments of Muslim countries.11 3


As Italy’s Muslim community mainly consists of immigrants and various groups that are not ethnically homogeneous, scattered across diverse geographic areas, there are many Muslim organisations that represent only a fraction of Muslims living in the country. The relationships between them are not close and are sometimes even characterised by disagreements, leaving Italy’s Muslims without a unified leadership. The main Muslim organisations are: – Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia, UCOII, via Quattro Fontane 109, 00184 Roma, tel.: +39–06–48939934, www.islam-ucoii.it), established in 1990 and promoted by a former organisation, the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani d’Italia (Muslim Students’ Union in Italy, USMI), created in 1971 by the first Muslim

10 Text available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/ files/15/0679_DICHIARAZIONE_DI_INTENTI.pdf, accessed 5 November 2009. 11 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States (2007), p. 41, http://www .csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf, accessed 15 November 2009.

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Sunni groups in Italy. UCOII is the main Muslim organisation in Italy and the best known, being connected with the most important Islamic centres (such as the Mosque of Segrate). Its leadership includes politicians, professionals and other well-integrated people whose national origin (mainly Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian) is often different from that of the majority of Muslims living in Italy. Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy (Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia, viale della Moschea 85, 00197 Roma, tel.: +39–06–8082258, fax: +39–06–8079515, www.lega-musulmana.it). This is the Cultural Centre of the Mosque of Rome, connected with the embassies of Muslim states and with the Muslim World League. It has a central role in the organisation of cultural and prayer centres and in establishing relations with public authorities. Islamic Religious Community (Comunità Religiosa Islamica, Co.Re. Is., via Giuseppe Meda 9, 20136 Milano, tel: +39–02–8393340, fax: +39–02–8393350, www.coreis.it) is made up of Italian converts to Islam and active in the public debate. Islamic Union in the West (Unione Islamica in Occidente, UIO— Italian Branch of the World Islamic Call Society, WICS, via del Giorgione 18, 00147 Roma, tel.: +39–06 59606683/685, fax. +39–06– 59601150, www.wics-it.org), one of the first Muslims associations in Italy. It is connected with the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia and it organises some cultural initiatives (such as Arabic courses). Union of Muslims in Italy (Unione dei Musulmani in Italia, U.M.I., corso Giulio Cesare 6, 10152 Torino, www.umislaminitalia.com), founded in 2007 by Moroccan religious leaders in Torino. The aim of the group is to represent moderate Islam and to develop interreligious dialogue; it has good relationships with Co.Re.Is. and with Moroccan Government. Union of Italy’s Muslims (Unione Musulmani d’Italia, c/o Istituto Islamico, Corso Giulio Cesare 6, 10152 Torino; email: [email protected]), association leaded by the Italian convert Adel Smith, famous for his radical opinions and often provocative speeches (especially his polemic against the crucifix and some lawsuits against Italian writers and scholars): his aim is to constitute a sort of political party for Muslims in Italy. Today it seems that the group is less relevant than in the past.12

12

See Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR), Le religioni in Italia, http:// www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/islam_09.htm, accessed 6 November 2009.

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– Italian Muslims Association (Associazione Musulmani Italiani, AMI, via dei Sabelli 18, 00185 Roma, www.amimuslims.org) was established by Italian converts to Islam. Its importance has recently diminished. There are also many other smaller organisations (a review is available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/islam.htm), some organisations of young Muslims (e.g. Young Muslims in Italy, Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, GMI, www.giovanimusulmani.it) and, in several cities, centres connected with the main mosque. The majority of Muslims, however, participate only in the cultural and religious life of their own mosque or prayer house, and involvement in the activities of the various organisations is not widespread. 4


Places of Islamic worship in Italy are mainly ‘garage’ mosques, while there are only three ‘great mosques’: in Catania (no longer in use), Segrate (Milan) and Rome; another mosque, in the municipality of Colle Val d’Elsa (near Florence), is under construction, despite longrunning disputes and opposition by political parties and local inhabitants. There are over 200 places of Islamic worship (258, according to US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009; 774, including prayer houses and associations, according to the National Agency for Internal Information and Security—AISI);13 Muslim groups often gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (basements and garages). With regard to future construction, there are problems with funding and planning, often due to the lack of representation of Islamic communities and opposition by local authorities to granting permits to groups considered untrustworthy. In some cases (e.g., Lodi, Padua, Genoa, and also Colle Val d’Elsa), the municipality has decided to grant land for an Islamic place of worship, but mosque projects have been opposed, both by political parties14 and by the population. Sometimes municipalities impose

13

http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/ 033/004_RS/INTERO_COM.pdf, p. 69, accessed 15 November 2009 (data of 2007). 14 Many right-wing Italian politicians, especially those of the Northern League (Lega Nord, a party of the government coalition, wide spread in the North of the

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questionable conditions for the construcion of a mosque and the proposed plans for building or enlargement of places of worship are suspended (as in Bologna in 2008 and in Brescia in 2009); in other cases provisional adjustments are found, instead of developing a building plan (in Milan, some attempts have been made to provide an appropriate place for prayer to Muslims of the so-called ‘mosque of viale Jenner’, but the local authorities only grant a temporary site to celebrate Ramadan).15 5


As set forth in the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church, public schools provide Catholic religious education, which is optional. Non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class, which is also optional, or they can leave school during these lessons. A minority of pupils opt out of Catholic religious education lessons (around 9%, varying between regions and schools),16 but there is no data about their religious affiliation. Neither is data available on the numbers of Muslim pupils enrolled in schools: estimates by Caritas-Migrantes indicate that in 2006/2007 they were 184,861.17 All religious communities, including those without an agreement with the state, such as the Islamic community, may use the classrooms of state schools for classes on religious culture if there are substantial numbers of pupils of that religion, and when no places of worship are available (art. 23 of decree no. 289 of 1930). The costs of such teaching are met by the religious community, and a prior agreement with the Director of the Regional School Office is required. In practice, this

country), often make controversial remarks about the growth of mosques in Italy. The Northern League even proposed a ‘moratorium’ on the building of new mosques (see “Northern League pushes mosque debate in Italy”, Euronews 5 December 2008, http://www.euronews.net/2008/12/05/northern-league-pushes-mosque-debate-initaly/, accessed 15 November 2009, and the parliamentary debate of 11 May 2009 at: http://web.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenografici/sed174/SINTERO.pdf, accessed 15 November 2009). 15 About these and other examples see S. Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe (London: Network of European Foundations, 2009), http://www.nefic.org/docs/projects/NEF%20RelDem%20-%20RELIGION%20&%20MOSQUES%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed 6 November 2009. 16 Data of Italian Conference of Bishops, http://www.chiesacattolica.it/pls/cci_new/ consultazione.mostra_pagina?id_pagina=328, accessed 15 November 2009. 17 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007, p. 201.

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option has never been taken up by Muslims. In October 2009, some members of the government proposed to offer courses on Islam in public schools, as a possible alternative to Catholic religion classes. The proposal, according to the government parties, would be aimed at keeping young Muslim students away from ‘fundamentalist’ Islamic schools. No details were given, but it seems that this is not feasible at the present time. In Rome, on the initiative of the local School Office, a series of lessons about religions has been proposed, involving the participation of various religious leaders.18 Article 33 of the Constitution grants organisations and private citizens the right to found schools and educational institutions without state funding. No Islamic private schools have yet been established under Article 33, but several foreign schools have been founded by the governments of foreign states, including Libya (in Rome and Milan), Egypt (in Milan) and Tunisia (in Mazara del Vallo, near Trapani).19 These schools are authorised by Italian law but their curricula (including language classes) are set by the country in question, which may hinder the integration of pupils into Italian society. There is no data about how many pupils attend these schools.20 Some cases of ‘illegal’ Muslim schools (i.e., unauthorised private schools) have been reported.21 According to media reports (not official data), Muslim children sometimes attend this type of school instead of public schools.

18 http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/associata/2009/11/03/visualizza_new .html_993311827.html. 19 Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R., “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, in R. Aluffi Beck-Peccoz and Zincone G. (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 146. 20 Ferrari, A., “La scuola italiana di fronte al paradigma musulmano (The Italian school confronting multiculturalism)”, in A. Ferrari (ed.), Islam in Italia/Islam in Europa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 194ff. 21 The Ministry of Interior has reported 88 unauthorised Islamic schools (in Islamic cultural centres, etc.): see “In Italia 88 scuole islamiche rapporto segreto al Viminale”, La Repubblica, 21 September 2007, http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/ repubblica/2007/09/21/in-italia-88–scuole-islamiche-rapporto-segreto.html, accessed 10 November 2009. Some of these cases were reported in Parliament (among others, parliamentary question of 13 July 2006: http://legxv.camera.it/resoconti/resoconto_ allegato.asp?idSeduta=25&resoconto=bt47¶m=n4-00543#n4-00543, accessed 10 November 2009).

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There is no provision for imam training. In 1996, the Muslim Universities League approved a project to run a school to prepare imams and female social workers. The UCOII has also planned the establishment of an educational centre in Bologna to train imams, leaders of the Islamic community and teachers of Islam. However, none of these initiatives has come to fruition. Some media have reported that in 2008 a school for Italian imams was organised in Milan by a private agency for professional training.22 Recently a debate has developed about organising training for imams, with the aim of creating a common background for Muslim religious leaders (an “Italian Islam”); a proposed requirement towards this end is that imams should be able to speak and preach in Italian.23 7


Special and separate sectors of public cemeteries can be reserved for the burial of people belonging to religious minorities. Muslim communities have already taken advantage of this opportunity in cities such as Florence, Turin and Milan (where the cemetery is connected with the mosque of Segrate). There is also a Muslim cemetery in Trieste, which was established for Muslim subjects from the Balkans when the city belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As with the building of mosques, in some cases the establishment of Muslim sections in municipal cemeteries has faced opposition from local inhabitants (e.g. in May 2008 in Arezzo, Tuscany, where Muslim burial plans was approved, despite strong opposition by some residents). 8


Ministers of the religious denominations without an agreement under Article 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, including Islam, have access

22 http://www.repubblica.it/2008/02/sezioni/cronaca/scuola-imam/scuola-imam/ scuola-imam.html, accessed 12 November 2009; http://www.agenfor.it/images_upload/ CS_Corso_Imam.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 23 “Fini: Gli imam predichino in italiano (President Fini: imams should preach in Italian)”, La Stampa, 18 January 2009, http://www.lastampa.it/redazione/cmsSezioni/ politica/200901articoli/40153girata.asp, accessed 12 November 2009.

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to prisons and hospitals to give assistance to prisoners or patients who have requested it. They also have access to barracks to give pastoral care to soldiers who seek it. Local authorities and hospitals have specific jurisdiction to make provisions for religious support in the health service: in Tuscany, the Hospital of Florence (Careggi) has an agreement with the local Muslim community to arrange better provision for Muslim patients,24 and in Turin hospital a ‘silence room’ for prayer exists, open to patients of all religions. 9

Religious Festivals

Italian legislation recognises some Catholic festivals, and Sunday as day of rest. Two of the agreements signed between the state and non-Catholic confessions (the Jewish community and the SeventhDay Adventist Church) give the faithful the right to time off work for religious observance, with the proviso that employers’ needs must be taken into account, and allow pupils to be absent from school. Because there is not yet an accord with the state, current legislation does not cover the specific needs of Muslim workers or recognise any Islamic festivals. However, agreements have been reached between employers and the trade unions (mainly through collective agreements) to allow Muslim workers to take part in Friday prayers and to modify their normal working hours during Ramadan.25 As Ramadan started in August in 2009, when the weather was very hot, the national confederation of agricultural employers (Coldiretti) highlighted the risks to the health of Muslims farm workers who were fasting, but recommended employers to respect their religious practice. 10 Halal Food According to the laws currently in force, animals must be stunned before being slaughtered, but an exception has been made for ritual slaughter performed by Muslim (and Jewish) communities.

24 Text at http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=2226, accessed 10 November 2009 (OLIR.it, Osservatorio delle Libertà ed Istituzioni Religiose—Observatory for Religious Freedoms and Institutions, law research database, headed by professor Anotnio Chizzoniti, Catholic University of Piacenza). 25 For example in Ragusa (Sicily): http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=4357 (accessed 10 November 2009).

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With regard to the availability of halal products, there is a growing interest in so-called ‘ethnic marketing’ (including halal food and business), even though there is no formal regulation of the production and certification of halal products.26 Limited information is available about the provision of halal food in schools, hospitals, prisons and places of work, but religious needs are usually taken into account and an alternative meal for Muslims is offered on request. 11

Dress Codes

There is no ban on wearing headscarves in public buildings and schools. Under a circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (14 March 1995), Muslim women are allowed to wear their headscarves in identity document photos as long as their facial features are recognisable. A 1995 anti-terrorism law, amended in 2005, forbids the wearing of garments, such as the burqa, that can conceal the identity. Recently, some MPs from the government coalition presented a proposal to amend again the 1995 law and make wearing a burqa or a niqab explicitly illegal.27 This follows some incidents, especially in northern cities such as Milan and Verona, where women wearing the burqa have been asked to remove at least the face veil. In some cases, despite the lack of a general prohibition, some municipalities have been taking measures against the burqa in their police regulations. In summer 2009, there was a dispute about the ‘burkini’, a bathing costume that conforms with Islamic rules. Muslim women who have used swimming pools wearing ‘burkinis’ have been asked to leave on the grounds that these garments are unhygienic and unauthorised.28

26 “Mercato halal sempre in crescita. Anche in Italia attenzione ai mercati islamici (Halal market on the rise. Focus on Islamic markets grows in Italy)”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 24 November 2008, http://www.minareti.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=485&Itemid=9, accessed 15 November 2009. 27 “Italy: Proposal to ban burqa”, Islam in Europe, 6 October 2009, at http:// islamineurope.blogspot.com/2009/10/italy-proposal-to-ban-burqa.html, accessed 13 November 2009. 28 “Italy: Mayor bans burkini”, Islam in Europe, 19 August 2009, http://islamineurope. blogspot.com/2009/08/italy-mayor-bans-burkini.html, accessed 13 November 2009.

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There are several publications about Islam, mostly research and studies carried out by Italian scholars and writers. Some Muslim organisations publish books and journals about Islam in Italy (for example Co.Re. Is.: www.coreis.it/pubblicazioni); the cultural centre of the Mosque of Segrate (Centro Islamico di Milano) has an Islamic publishing house (Edizioni del Calamo, www.edizionidelcalamo.com), which has published several books and the collection “Quaderni Islamici”. Muslim periodicals include: Il Messaggero dell’Islam, published by the Centro Islamico di Milano; Il puro Islam, published in Naples by the Shi’i association Ahl al Bait. Both are in Italian, but not widespread and there is little data on the latest issues published. Il Puro Islam is now also an information agency, with a website (www.ilpuroislam.net) and radio broadcasting. A recent editorial project, that has gained quite wide visibility, is Yalla Italia (www.yallaitalia.it), monthly supplement of the magazine Vita (a journal of not-for-profit organisations), edited by a group of young Muslims (second-generation immigrants). Other journals about Islam are published by Catholic centres, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and mutual knowledge: the best-known and most widespread are Oasis (edited by the Oasis Foundation in Venice, http://www.oasiscenter.eu/it/rivista) and Il dialogo—Al hiwâr (by Centre Federico Peirone in the diocese of Turin (http://www.centro-peirone.it/Alhiwar/indiciAH.htm). Other periodicals have ceased publication or have published only a few issues: Rivista islamica (www.lega-musulmana.it/Rivista_Islamica/ islamica.htm), published by the Italian office of the Muslim World League; Azad, a Pakistani review written in Urdu (director: Ahmad Ejaz); Assadakah (www.assadakah.it), published by the League of Arab States in Italy (from 1999 to 2001, it included a supplement edited by Co.Re.Is., L’Islam in Europa); La porta d’Oriente (journal of the Europe-Near East Centre ENEC, director: F. Cardini; some issues available at www.enec.it/pdnet/). The most important online resources are: – Islam online, www.islam-online.it (administered by UCOII); – Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, www.giovanimusulmani.it (administered by the Organisation of Young Muslims in Italy); – Minareti, www.minareti.it, collects news and comments on Islam; its director is Khalid Chaouki, a Muslim journalist and former president of Young Muslims in Italy;

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– http://www.sufi.it, website on Sufism, with documents and news; – Mondo Arabo, www.mondoarabo.it. 13

Family Law

Religious marriages, recorded in the civil registry, are recognised in law in Italy if performed by a Roman Catholic priest (art. 8 of the Agreement of 1985 between Italy and the Holy See), or by a minister of a denomination that has an agreement with the state, or by ministers authorised by the Italian Ministry of Interior to perform a religious ceremony (articles 7–12 of Law n. 1159 of 1929). No Islamic ‘minister’ has so far been recognised by Italian legislation, so religious marriages celebrated in a mosque have no legal validity. Muslim couples who want their union to be legally recognised must go through a civil ceremony in addition to their religious marriage. Polygamy is illegal in Italy and repudiation (talaq) as a form of dissolution of marriage has no legal validity. However, some aspects of Islamic family law have acquired some relevance because most Muslims in Italy are foreign citizens, so their family status, as defined in their country of origin, can warrant consideration under private international law. Case law on this issue is very limited. Problems have arisen, for example, in some cases of reunification of spouses in polygamous marriages or in cases concerning inheritance.29 A directive of the National Institution of Social Security (INPS) states that Italy will not pay welfare benefits to multiple wives.30 Kafala (the Islamic legal institution analogous to foster care) has been recognized as a form of adoption.31 The Italian Conference of Bishops has, on some occasions, urged parish priests to discourage Muslim-Christian marriages.

29 Some examples can be found in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority”, pp. 150–155. 30 See http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=3927, accessed 15 November 2009. 31 See, among others, Judgement of Court of Cassation, 2 July 2008, http://www .olir.it/documenti/?documento=4749, accessed 15 November 2009.

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Most interreligious events in Italy take place between Muslim communities and the majority religion of the country, the Catholic Church; this is also due to the presence of the Vatican in Rome, where many international interfaith meetings are hosted. Every December an annual interfaith dialogue conference takes place, organised between the Vatican (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue) and the World Islamic Call Society. In 2008, the “Catholic-Muslim Forum” took place, formed by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and a delegation representing the 138 Muslim signatories of the open letter called “A common word”; its first seminar was held in Rome on 4–6 November 2008. Religious associations, such as the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, also promote meetings and try to spread a ‘culture of dialogue’ both at international and national level (e.g., the well-known meeting of Assisi between leaders of various religions). At the national level, Italian Muslim organisations often participate in meetings and debates with the Catholic and other Christian churches, and with Jewish communities.32 The Italian Federation of Protestant Churches (FCEI) has also established a special commission to promote mutual relations between Protestants and Muslims in Italy (“Churches’ Commission on Dialogue with Islam”).33 At the local level, many events are organised, mainly between Catholic groups or dioceses and local Muslim communities (among others, the diocese of Padua and Turin).34 There is also a “Day of Christian-Islamic dialogue”, organised by Il Dialogo (www.ildialogo .org), a Christian web magazine, and supported by dozens of groups and associations from both faiths. It was held in Rome and in other Italian cities in October 2009, is now in its eighth year. Despite all these initiatives, relations between Muslims and Catholics (or other faiths) are not always easy. For example, discussions have arisen between certain groups of Muslims and Catholic leaders over the building of mosques and proposals about Islamic courses in schools. There have also been events that have led both religions to polemics

32 See for example the activities of the Co.Re.Is.: http://www.coreis.it/frame2_dialogo%20interreligioso.htm, accessed 15 November 2009. 33 http://www.fedevangelica.it/en/comm/ccedi02.php, accessed 15 November 2009. 34 See respectively: http://www.padovaislam.it/index.html; http://www.centropeirone.it, accessed 15 November 2009.

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and criticism, the most notorious being in January 2009, when a group of Muslims organised prayers in the square in front of the Cathedral of Milan and demonstrated in favour of the Palestinians. The event received extensive media coverage and heightened public discussions about the supposed lack of integration and tolerance among Italian Muslims. Leaders of Milan’s Muslim communities later met with the archbishop of Milan and apologised for the incident. 15


There is good coverage of the situation of Muslims in Italy in newspapers and other media and many issues have recently been taken up by the media and public discussion, such as the building of mosques, the issue of religious symbols and the headscarf, and the status of Islamic communities in major Italian cities. However, the media often create erroneous ideas and negative stereotypes of Islam, alleging that a huge number of Muslims are fundamentalists. Some Muslim organisations (UCOII) are alleged to be connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and to support fundamentalism and terrorism. This view leads to widespread anti-Islamic feeling in the Italian population and, in some cases, to Islamophobia. Moreover, Muslims and Muslim leaders have little opportunity, compared with other religious communities (especially the Catholic Church) to be heard by the media and the general public. Those who succeed in being seen often represent a politicised and sometimes controversial Islam. Negative feelings towards Islam are also fuelled by some political discourse: initiatives and debates about Islam focus mostly on the most controversial cultural/religious practices (such as the burqa, the status of women, female circumcision, etc.)35 or on the linkage between Islam and international terrorism, contributing the stereotype of foreign Muslims as a danger to national security. Perceptions of Muslim-West relationships were measured in a poll conducted in 2007 by Gallup and the World Economic Forum. A majority of

35 For example, in September 2009 an incident occurred during the celebration of ‘I al-Fitr in Milan between a group of Muslims and extreme-right politicians, who protested against the wearing of the burqa: http://www.corriere.it/cronache/09_ settembre_20/santanche_milano_4bef004c-a5ca-11de-a2a4-00144f02aabc.shtml, accessed 15 November 2009.

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Italian respondents (67%) saw the interaction between the West and the Muslim world as a threat and only 40% considered Islam to be compatible with democracy and Western life.36 A 2005 poll was conducted for the Union of Jewish Communities in Italy (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane, UCEI) by La Sapienza University in Rome on intolerance among young people. More than 50% of the sample (sample size: 2,000, aged 14–18, from more than 100 different towns in Italy) stated that Muslims “support international terrorism” and have “cruel and barbaric laws”.37 A 2009 EU-MIDIS—Minorities and Discrimination Survey (issued by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency) provides data on how Muslims throughout the EU experience discrimination and racist crime in everyday life. It is said that Muslims of North African origin in Italy experienced the highest levels of discrimination. Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim respondents in Italy consider racial discrimination to be more widespread than discrimination on the basis of religion or belief.38 16


No data.

36 World Economic Forum, Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue, January 2008, http://www.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf, accessed 15 November 2009 (the World Economic Forum is an independent international organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland). 37 See http://www.e-brei.net/old/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=967) and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, 2006, p. 37, http://fra.europa. eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf, accessed 15 November 2009. 38 Fundamental Rights Agency, Data in Focus Report—Muslims, 2009, at http:// fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf, accessed 15 November 2009.

KOSOVO Besa Ismaili and Xhabir Hamiti1 1

Muslim Populations

Having declared its independence in 2008, Kosovo is the newest independent state in the Balkans. Kosovo was taken from the Ottomans by Serbia in the Balkan wars 1912–13, and in 1974 became an autonomous province and constitutive part of the Federation of Socialist Yugoslavia. Its autonomy was suspended in 1989 by the Milošević regime. After a decade of repression, an escalating armed conflict that started in 1997 between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian forces was ended by NATO intervention against Serbia in 1999. Kosovo came under UN administration pending talks on its final status and then, in February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo declared its independence. By February 2010, independent Kosovo had been recognised by 65 UN member states, including all but five EU members. No census has been carried out since 1981, and estimates of the total population vary widely, from 1.8 to 2.2 million.2 The majority of the population, about 90%, are ethnic Albanian, and the vast majority are Muslims. The Muslim community also includes other ethnic groups such as Bosniaks, Turks, Gorans and Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian community.3 The ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins are Orthodox Christians. Islam in Kosovo dates back to the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire in the late fourteenth century and the majority 1 Besa Ismaili holds an MA in English Literature and has been working as an interpreter with EU Missions in Kosovo since 2003. She also lectures English in the Faculty of Islamic Studies and University College “Dardania”. She is an active member of a Muslim women’s network. Dr Xhabir Hamiti is a lecturer in the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Prishtina, Kosovo, and the President of the Assembly of the Islamic Community of the Republic of Kosovo. 2 The CIA World Factbook estimated that the population would be 1,815,048 by July 2010 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html# People, accessed 22 May 2010), while the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates it at 2,180,686 (http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/eng/, accessed 22 May 2010). 3 Gorans live in the Gora region south of Prizren. They are Muslims and speak a local Slavic dialect. Roma, Ashkalis and Egyptians (‘Gypsies’) (often grouped as ‘RAE’) differ in their use of Romani or Albanian language and their narratives of origin.

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of the urban population, particularly the Albanians, became Muslims between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, but there are traces of Islam even earlier than that, such as a mosque from the thirteenth century in Mlina village in the region of Dragas, Kosovo South.4 The majority of Kosovan Muslims are Sunnis,5 most of whom belong to the Hanafi school. Some are affiliated to Sufi orders of which 12 are recognised as ‘authentic’ tariqas, and nine—the Rifa’i, Qadiri, Khalwati, Sa’di, Bektashi, Naqshabandi, Sinani, Mawlawi and Shadhili— were active before the start of the war in former Yugoslavia. Of these, the Khalwati, Sa’di, Qadiri and Rifa’i have large memberships with thousands of followers and wide networks of Sufi lodges.6 In the early 1980s there were claimed to be more than 50,000 dervishes in Kosovo, and in the late 1990s a figure twice as large was cited.7 2

Islam and the State

Kosovo is a secular republic with no official state religion.8 The Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) has been asking the government and the parliament to pass a law on religious communities that will clarify their legal status. Currently the state refers to Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy as traditionally present religions.9 In 2005, a law on religious freedoms was adopted whose provisions, if implemented,10 provide certain privileges to the traditional religious communities. Due to the non-implementation of the law, the ICK and the Catholic Church continue to function within the legal framework inherited

4

Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998). Norris, H.T., Islam in the Balkans (London: Hurst, 1993). 6 Duijzings, Ger, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2000), p. 114. 7 Ibid. 8 “The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 8). 9 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Chapter III, Article 57. 10 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo, in its regular reports on the implementation of legislation (http://www.osce .org/documents/mik/2008/09/32879_en.pdf, accessed 22 May 2010), continuously calls for a more effective implementation of legislation adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo. In line with this, Resul Regjepi, advisor to the ICK, has expressed serious complaints and remarks on the adopted Law on Religious Freedoms (http://bislame.net/web/ content/view/137/27/, accessed 22 May 2010). 5

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from the time of the former Yugoslavia, and several agreements have been reached between the government and the ICK.11 The Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosovo’s future status (the Ahtisaari Plan),12 in its chapter on decentralisation, foresees the establishment of Municipal Security Councils (MSC) for each Kosovo municipality, which would involve all security sector stakeholders, including religious community representatives. The ICK has been represented at MSC’s meetings, which are held three times a year. Apart from the ICK, many other Islamic based NGOs were registered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) after the 1999 war, but most have now ceased their activities.13 3


The main national Muslim organisation is the Islamic Community of Kosova (Bashkësia Islame e Republikës së Kosovës, ICK, rruga Bajram Kelmendi, no 84, 10000 Prishtina, tel: +381 38 224 024, fax: +381 38 245 700, http://www.bislame.net), which has been headed by Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava for the last six years. The ICK has 25 branches around the country (called regional Islamic councils).14 The ICK is the only independent religious community for all Kosovo Muslims (Albanians, Bosniaks, Turks and RAE communities), whether living in Kosovo or living and working abroad. It represents Islam vis-à-vis

11 Interview with the Grand Mufti Naim Ternava to Dituria Islame: http://bislame .net/web/content/view/139/27/, accessed 2 February 2010. 12 http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html, accessed 22 May 2010. 13 At the eighth joint meeting of Islamic civil society organisations held at the Hotel Grand in Prishtina on 30 November 2009, the participants pointed to several reasons for the fall in of the numbers of Islamic NGOs in Kosovo, particularly bad management, the hostile attitude of the authorities, and lack of legal protection mechanisms: http://www.khajansi.com/index.php/haberler/images/images/?option=com_content& view=article&id=766:perfaqesuesit-e-shoqatave-islame-jane-takuar-ne-kosove&catid =59:aktualitete&Itemid=110&fontstyle=f-smaller, accessed 3 February 2010. Nexhat Ibrahimi, a prominent Kosovo Islamic scholar, also emphasises “double standards” and “hostility and prejudices” against Islamic humanitarian organisations in Kosovo as reasons for this (“Fushata kunder organizatave humanitare ne Kosove”, http:// www.zeriislam.com/artikulli.php?id=751, accessed 1 March 2009). 14 Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës (Constitution of the Islamic Community of Kosovo) (Prishtina: ICK, 2003).

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the state. The ICK is the main institution responsible for the organisation and administration of Islamic educational institutions and other Islamic affairs. All mosques, imams and muezzins are under the ICK’s authority. There are two specialist departments within the ICK: the Department for Women (est. 2005) and the Department for Youth (est. 2007). The Grand Mufti regularly receives diplomatic representatives and heads of international missions and is invited to official state occasions.15 The budget of the ICK is mostly made up of donations by the Muslim population, such as zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, the hides of animals sacrificed during ‘Id al-Adha, and other forms of contribution. Since the ICK does not receive any support from the state budget, it depends solely on donations from the people in order to run its activities and cover the salaries of 1,200 employees.16 During a visit to Kosovo by Bosnian Grand Mufti Dr Mustafa Ceric in 2009, the ICK concluded a bilateral co-operation agreement with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The ICK actively reports on religious rights and freedoms to international organisations,17 and has on several occasions made public statements of protest and complaint.18 Several imams were beaten up during 2009, including ICK senior officials, the President of the Assembly of ICK, an administrative assistant at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, and an imam in Drenica region. The ICK publicly condemned these attacks and asked the authorities to deal with the perpetrators.19 As for other Islamic-based foundations and organizations, many of the NGOs have been taken over by Kosovan associations20 and there are also a large number of small local organisations that deal with

15

http://www.bislame.net. Interview with Grand Mufti on 28 January 2009. 17 UNO Human Rights Reporter Asma Jahangir on a fact-finding mission to Kosovo, met with the Grand Mufti on 6 May 2009: http://bislame.net/web/content/ view/271/9/, accessed 1 February 2010. 18 Interview with the Grand Mufti on RTK (Radio-Television of Kosovo), video available at: http://bislame.net/web/component/option,com_seyret/task,videodirectlink/ Itemid,/id,80/, accessed 30 January 2009. The Grand Mufti complained of the lack of support by the government, including its failure to clarify ICK’s legal status, provide prayer facilities for believers and introduce religious education in public schools. 19 http://bislame.net/web/content/view/251/9/, accessed 1 February 2009. These protests were reported by all national television stations and all daily newspapers, but all the cases remain unsolved by the Kosovo police and/or the courts. 20 EMTEC, sponsored by Yusuf Islam, had an international management team till 2005, and the centre is now run by the local Muslim women. Similarly, associations such as Sfera, Magbuleja, are currently run by local people with scarce funds. 16

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minor religious, educational and publishing activities. There is seldom, if ever, any well established cooperation or networking between these organizations, but a partial exception is the Association for Culture and Education (Asociacioni per Kulture Edukim dhe Arsim, AKEA) established as an umbrella association for Islamic charity organisations active in Kosovo prior to the war in 1999. During 2009 they have been quite active working with university students, women, and children.21 4


There are currently 750 mosques in Kosovo. In major cities, such as Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova and Peja, there are several monumental mosques built during the time and in the style of the Ottoman Empire. The biggest mosque in Kosovo is the seventeenth-century Sinan Pasha Mosque in Prizren, and the most beautiful is Xhami e Hadumit in Gjakova, built in the fifteenth century.22 During the 1997–1999 conflict, Serbian paramilitary and military forces destroyed and burned 218 mosques across Kosovo, most of which were historical monuments.23 Around 211 have been (re)constructed since 1999, thanks to the contributions of the local community and donors, including some from Islamic countries.24 Seven other mosques are located in the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, including one beside the River Ibar in Mitrovica North, which remains in ruins with little hope of ever being rebuilt. There are about 120 new mosques, which are particularly in evidence in the areas where the former Communist regime did not allow mosques, including major municipalities, such as Skenderaj, Gllogovc, Lipjan, Malishevë, Klinë, Istog, etc.25 Some non-Islamic NGOs and donors have contributed to the reconstruction of mosques in Kosovo, including the Italian INTERSOS, the Jewish community in the USA, Swedish organisations, Turkish TIKA, etc. All the mosques

21 More information available at: http://www.studentet.info/modules/ipboard/ index.php?showtopic=23034, accessed February 2010. 22 Drançolli, Fejaz, Xhamia e Hadumit në Gjakovë (Hadum Mosque in Gjakova), Arkivi i Kosovës Vjetari, vols 18–19 (Prishtina: Sh. Botuese Rilindja, 1984). 23 Barbaria Serbe ndaj monumenteve Islame ne Kosove (Serbian Barbarities against Islamic Monuments in Kosova) (Prishtina: Kryesia e Bashkesise Islame te Kosoves, 2000). 24 Interview with Sabri Bajgora, head of Kosovo imams, on 1 February 2010. 25 Barbaria Serbe.

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but one,26 as well as other gifted properties have been handed to ICK management. According to the Grand Mufti, more than 100 requests for the construction of new mosques have been submitted to the ICK by local congregations because there are insufficient places to pray. In the largest suburb of the capital, Dardania, there is a prayer hall in the building where the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (SRJC) is based.27 As the only place of worship for more than 80,000 inhabitants, it remains the most frequented mosque in Kosovo. 5


There is one Islamic high school, the Alaud-din Madrasa, established in 1952 (under the Communist regime). It is based in the capital, Prishtina, has two branches, one in Prizren and one in Gjilan, and provides education for both boys and girls. The curriculum combines religious and secular subjects and more than 1,300 students have graduated between 1952 and 2008.28 As of 2008, the Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) has been paying the salaries of its teaching staff and this has been much appreciated by the ICK and the Muslim community because of the financial difficulties they have been facing. An Institute of Hifz (memorising the Qur’an) was established in Gjakova/Djakovica in 2005 with the support of the Istanbul association, IIARC, which had about 20 students in 2009.29 On-going religious education programmes and Qur’an courses are run at almost all Kosovo mosques. Some NGOs provide free charge computer and language courses. There is only one private Islamic pre-

26 In Marina village, Drenica. The mosque and other facilities have been built by a British Islamic charity, Mercy-Rahma, and negotiations are under way to hand over this last mosque to ICK administration, according to the Grand Mufti speaking in cabinet on 28 January 2009. 27 The SJRC is an umbrella organisation representing several charities sponsored by the government of Saudi Arabia. The director, Mr. Khalid, in an interview by Ted Siefer (available at: http://www.tol.org/client/article/10177-heritage-or-sacrilege.html, last accessed on 15 January 2009) emphasised that in the SJRC’s humanitarian activities, the agency has spent over $100 million on caring for and resettling refugees, on rebuilding schools and houses, and on health care. Construction and restoration of mosques represents just one part of this investment in Kosovo’s social welfare” 28 www.medreseja.org 29 http://www.islamgjakova.net/aktivitete/drejtori_i_medreses_se_mesme_ alaudin_ne_prishtine_viziton_medresene_e_madhe_ne_gjakove.htm, accessed 15 January 2009.

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school education institution, which is in Pristina and is accredited by MEST.30 The ICK has undertaken several attempts to introduce confessional religious education in public schools on its own. With the start of the academic year 2009–2010, the Grand Mufti started meeting the heads of the political parties to discuss this matter,31 meeting first with the opposition parties, who promised him their support. 6


Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIS, www.fsi-ks.org) was established by the ICK in 1992, with the aim of giving the young an opportunity to study Islam in their mother tongue and in their own country. Students apply to this faculty from various parts of the Albanian territories in the Balkans, such as Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia and the Presheva Valley, as well as Kosovo. The teaching staff are Albanians (the vast majority men) who have completed their studies either in Kosovo or overseas. A four-year programme is offered. By the end of 2009, 140 male and female students had graduated from the Faculty,32 and their diplomas were accepted and recognised by MEST up to 2008. Due to changes in the higher education accreditation process and reforms in the education system, FIS is now left out of this process, despite submitting requests and meeting with MEST senior officials.33 The dean of FIS has asked for a special procedure to be put in place for the faculty and there have been several unsuccessful meetings with the Rector of the University of Prishtina and MEST to discuss including FIS under the umbrella of the public university.34 FIS has nevertheless reached agreements on mutual recognition and

30

http://www.lulishtjaedritave.com. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/web/index.php/artikujt/lexo/14578/C4/C13, accessed 10 September 2009. 32 http://www.fsi-ks.org/index_files/themelimi.htm, accessed 10 September 2009. 33 FIS, letter no. 26/08, dated 30 April 2008: letter requesting accreditation from FIS Dean Rexhep Boja to the Minister of Education, Science and Technology, Enver Hoxhaj. 34 FIS, letter no. 69/07, date 6 July 2007: letter no. 26/08, dated 30 April 08: letter to the Senate of the University of Pristina requesting the incorporation of the FIS under the umbrella of the University of Pristina. 31

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academic exchange and cooperation with several regional and European universities.35 Regular training courses for imams are held on various topics. In 2009, there were two major meetings of all imams serving in Kosovo at the headquarters of the ICK, and in March 2009, 32 ICK officials participated in training in Turkey organised by the Diyanet.36 There is also a capacity building training programme37 for accountants, cashiers and administrative staff of the ICK and related institutions. Teaching staff in madrasas attend training courses in didactics and methodology. As madrasas have been under the umbrella of the Ministry of Education since 2008, all the teachers are currently undergoing a three-month professional training programme along with other public secondary school teachers. For the second time, two activists from the ICK Women’s Department attended a three-week training programme in USA on “Faith Communities and Civil Society”, funded by the US State Department and implemented by ASU Melikian Center, Arizona.38 7


Most of the Muslim cemeteries in Kosovo are located alongside mosques, especially those in rural areas. Larger cities have their cemeteries in municipal or private ownership on land granted to ICK for this purpose. Cemeteries are under the control of municipalities, and Muslim cemeteries are separate from those of other religious communities (Catholics and Orthodox). There is a continuous need for more cemetery space.39

35

E.g., University of Vienna, Department of Educational Sciences (11 March 2008); Faculty if Islamic Studies in Skopje (15 November 2007); University of Helsinki, Institute for Asian and African Studies (13 October 2008), etc. 36 http://bislame.net/web/content/view/258/9/, accessed 1 February 2010. 37 “Trajnim per arkataret”, http://bislame.net/web/content/view/331/9/, accessed 1 February 2009. 38 The first delegation was sent in 2007, and the second in 2009. There was also a follow up visit to Kosovo by a US delegation in May 2009, http://melikian.asu.edu/ grants/faith_and_community, accessed 17 January 2009. 39 Interview with the Grand Mufti on RTK; video available at http://bislame.net/ web/component/option,com_seyret/task,videodirectlink/Itemid,/id,80/, accessed 30 January 2009.

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The law on religious freedoms40 guarantees the availability of spiritual counseling in hospitals, custody facilities, prisons and social care institutions, but there are no recorded cases of this provision being put in place by the authorities. Officially, ‘chaplaincy’ is still unknown in Kosovo and no imams are appointed to serve in public institutions, whether in the armed forces, police, prisons or hospitals. However, some informal activities are occasionally conducted by Islamic-based civil society organizations, individual imams or women activists in correctional centres, old people’s homes, kindergartens etc. 9

Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are organised every year. Both are recognised as official holidays by the state and all public institutions are closed. UNMIK introduced the practice of granting staff a holiday on the first day of Ramadan and other international missions have followed suit. Representatives of state authorities and international and diplomatic missions, and the heads of other religious communities, etc. attend the reception organised by the Grand Mufti on the day of ‘Id. The visits are broadcast, along with other ‘Id activities. During Ramadan, representatives of the government and the ICK visit each other for iftar, and the ICK organises a traditional Qur’an recitation competition, with an international flavour.41 The Women’s Department of the ICK runs a major annual multireligious and multiethnic religious and cultural event for women.42 Besides the two main festivals, the Sufis also celebrate two annual festivals: Sultan Nawruz at the vernal equinox, and the Day of ‘Ashura. The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad is another significant day for Kosovo Muslims and is celebrated in mosques in various parts of the country.

40 Law No.02/L-31, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/hrgi/docs/RE2006_48_ ALE02_L31.pdf, accessed 23 May 2010. 41 The Presidency of ICK in cooperation with the waqf office in Kosovo organised a Qur’an competition in Ramadan 2009 in Prizren: Dituria Islame, no. 218, p. 57. 42 http://bislame.net/web/content/view/307/9/, accessed on 15 January 2009.

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besa ismaili and xhabir hamiti 10 Halal Food

Halal meat is available in supermarkets in Kosovo since the majority of the population is Muslim, and this is not an issue that is raised in daily life. All food products are generally halal, but several private producers have recently begun marketing ‘halal’ labeled products. Halal slaughter is performed in most private butchers establishments. Madrasas collect money for collective halal slaughter for ‘Id-Al-Adha and distribute the meat to students in student hostels and to poor families.43 11

Dress Codes

The Kosovo Muslim community, regardless of ethnic background, has inherited a unique Islamic dress culture which was more visible prior to the war with Serbia. Women in both urban and rural areas used to wear headscarves and clothing that covered their body. This became unpopular under the Communist regime and in 1951, the headscarf was banned: women who wore it, including the Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish women, were excluded from public and social life, as well as education system.44 This unpopularity increased after the war with Serbia in the late 1990s when most cultural values moved aggressively towards so-called Westernisation and modernisation. As part of the Islamic revival which took place largely after the end of the totalitarian Milosevic regime in 1999, many young people returned to their religion and young women increasingly started to wear hijab. It is unlikely that any legislation will be introduced on the matter. Some girls wearing hijab have been discriminated against, but others have not and it depends largely on the ideology of the people in authority. With the adoption of the antidiscrimination law and the reaction of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties (KMDLNJ), the Ombudsman’s Office, and the ICK, all students and pupils are allowed to attend school wearing hijab. In recruitment for employment, how

43

“Dituria islame” no. 231, advertisement in the back cover page. Krasniqi, Milazim, “Lehtesia e padurueshme e intolerances (The unbearable easiness of intolerance)”, http://www.gazetashqiptare.eu/milazim/feja_islame.html, accessed 31 January 2009. 44

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ever, there are numerous complaints about discriminatory practices against women who wear the headscarf. Nevertheless, there is a small but representational number of women who wear hijab and work in both the public and private sectors, as well as in international organisations.45 12


The Presidency of the Islamic Community has published the monthly religious, cultural and scientific review Dituria Islame (Islamic knowledge) since 1986, the quarterly magazine Edukata Islame (Islamic education) since 1971, and an annual Islamic calendar, called Takvim, since 1970. Beside these official Islamic publications, there are some newspapers and magazines, such as Paqja (Peace) and Argumenti (The Argument), published by private organisations. Muslims from the non-Albanian minorities do not have Islamic periodicals in their own languages (Turkish, Bosnian, Serbian or Romani) published in Kosovo, but literature is received from abroad. Madrasas and the FSI have published around 30 titles for educational purposes and the ICK has published more than 50 books since 1999.46 In 2009, two private cable television stations were contracted by the ICK to broadcast Ramadan programmes. There is a very popular Islamic affiliated private weekly newspaper and television channel “BESA” (www.rtvbesa.com, tel: +377 44 150 049).

45 “Women wearing hijab have been employed by the following Kosovo institutions: Post Telecoms, Kosovo University Clinical Center, Ministry of Interior, the University of Pristina, Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo, Health House, and primary schools in rural areas; the international organizations who provide equal opportunities for women without showing any pressure or discrimination are OSCE Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Mission in Kosovo and the Ombudsman’s Office,” reports Suela Dibra, head of the Department for Women in ICK, in their 2008–2009 Report (Pristina: ICK, 2009). The report also refers to tens of cases of non-admission to schools, discriminatory attitudes during recruitment procedures, expulsion from work and psychological violence towards women with headscarves by various officials in Kosovo schools and institutions. 46 Interview with Sabri Bajgora, head of Kosovo imams, 1 February 2010.

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Family Law

Muslims may conclude marriage contracts in mosques and obtain a certificate of marriage and such certificates were recognised by the state authorities until 2003.47 The reason why they have ceased to be recognised is assumed to be the lack of joint tracking mechanisms and a database shared between the municipal and religious authorities. From 2000 to 2009, a total of 568 marriage contracts and two divorces were recorded at the Islamic Council of Pristina.48 The Muslim community usually concludes marriage contracts informally in private family environment. Members of all religious communities are obliged by law to obtain their marriage certificate from the state authorities. 14

Inter-religious Relations

The Kosovo Inter-religious Council was officially established on 13 April 2000.49 Several international meetings were held until 2006.50 Kosovo’s religious communities have complained that the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo favours the Serbian Orthodox community over others, and no attempt has been made to revive the relationship between the leaderships of religious communities. In addition, the Kosovo Serbian Orthodox Church leadership has been facing allegations of misuse of charity funds and Bishop Artemije, long known as the main authority who has been obstructing any political attempt to integrate the Serbian community in Kosovo, has been asked to resign.51 Special and focused women’s inter-religious groups are more active. The World Council of Religions for Peace (WCRP) has been the mediator for both women’s and men’s groups. Muslim and Catholic women have paid several visits to Orthodox women in Gracanica. Muslim and

47

Interview with Bahri Sejdiu. Interview with Bahri Sejdiu, who provided direct access to the register at the ICK in Pristina. 49 http://www.kosovakosovo.com/view_file.php?file_id=61, accessed 3 February 2010. 50 The last meeting was held on 2–3 May 2006 at Pec Patriarchate Monastery; information available at: http://www.kosovakosovo.com/view_file.php?file_id=61, accessed 3 February 2009. 51 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=02&dd= 16&nav_id=65221, accessed 17 May 2010. 48

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Catholic women’s groups regularly visit each other on major religious festivals.52 They have also been part of a joint working group against trafficking, and participated in the public hearing of the draft law on abortion.53 15


The public media in Kosovo devote little space to Islamic religious matters. Television stations do cover the main annual Muslim celebrations for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha and, during the month of Ramadan, national television and other privately owned stations provide some space for religious scholars to speak about religion. Apart from that, public discussion of contemporary religious issues is very unusual and Kosovo daily newspapers rarely report the activities and concerns of the ICK. However, as the recognition of Kosovo by Muslim countries is viewed as a vital national interest,54 2009 has been characterised by a greater media interest in Islam generally and the Muslim world. 16


The Kosovo National Archive and the Turkish Diyanet have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on archive cooperation. Consequently, in April 2009 a major international scientific symposium organised by Kosovo Archives and the Turkish association TIKA was held on “Kosovo and Ottoman Empire in the state archives”, and the opening speech was given by Rame Manaj, Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo.

52 Sterland, Bill, and John Beaurlerk, “Faith Communities as Potential Agents for Peace Building in the Balkans”, January 2008, http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/ Documents/Kirkens%20N%C3%B8dhjelp/Publikasjoner/Temahefter/Faith%20 Communities%20Balkans.pdf, accessed 3 January 2009. 53 http://www.msh-ks.org/en/legislation/27-listaeligjeveteshendetesiseqejanenefuqi .html, accessed 3 January 2009. 54 Only 15 out of 57 member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have recognised Kosovo. For more detailed information, see http://www .kosovothanksyou.com/statistics/, accessed 5 February 2010.

LATVIA Egdūnas Račius1 1

Muslim Populations

Though Muslims (mainly Tatar immigrants and other Muslims decommissioned from the Russian tsarist army) started arriving and settling in the then Russian ruled Latvia in the second part of the nineteenth century, the first Muslim congregation in Riga was established only in 1902. By World War I it had grown to around 1,000 members, but during and immediately after the war (by 1920) the Muslim community in the now independent Latvia had shrunk to a mere 150 and further declined to less than 70 by 1935. Today, most Latvian Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. The last Soviet census of 1989 reported more than 12,000 people of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc.) living in Soviet Latvia, although most of them did not practise Islam. It appears that the majority of them chose to leave Latvia after it regained independence in the early 1990s. A small Muslim congregation (less than 70 members) was re-established in Riga in 1993. In 1994, a congregation in Daugavpils founded the Daugavpils islāma centrs (Daugavpils Islamic Centre). These were soon followed by other (among them splinter) congregations. As the last official census did not include a question on religious identity, no official figures for the size of the Muslim community in Latvia are available. Unfounded estimates range between 500 and 10,000,2 but none of them distinguish between nominal (‘of Muslim

1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim communities in the Baltic States. 2 Banks, Elena, “Latvia’s Muslim community reaches out”, The Baltic Times, 29 July 2004, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/9385/, accessed 4 March 2009.

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background’) and practising Muslims. Islam in the European Union3 gives a figure of 5,000. In 2001, the head of the Latvian Islamic Community estimated the number of nominal Muslims to be in the range of 5,000 (indeed, according to the latest statistics, there are some 2,800 Tatars, 1,700 Azeris, and 300 Uzbeks currently living in Latvia), but added that only 10% were practising. The total number of nominal Muslims in Latvia for 2010 (taking into account the steady emigration of Russian-speaking Muslims from Latvia and the conversions to Islam of several dozen Latvians) could be as high as 5,000 (of whom only a tenth are citizens of Latvia), but Muslims practising on a daily basis would hardly exceed a few hundred. Religious festivals are said to be regularly attended by between 300 and 400 worshippers, but occasionally attract up to 500. The overwhelming majority of Latvia’s Muslims are located in and around the capital city Riga, and Daugavpils. 2

Islam and the State

Latvia is a constitutionally secular republic with no state religion, though Lutheran and Orthodox Christians nominally constitute the majority of the population. Moreover, the state makes a distinction between the ‘traditional’ faiths (Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish) and the ‘new’; Islam falls into the latter category. Under the Constitution, the state cannot finance religious organisations, nor can religious institutions or their representatives take part in governing of the state. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Law on Religious Organisations (adopted in 1995). Religious organisations registered with the Board of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice attain legal status and certain rights and privileges not available to those that chose to remain unregistered, but there is no compulsion for religious communities to register with the state. Religious organisations of ‘non-traditional’ denominations are required to re-register annually for the first ten years of their existence. Ten registered congregations of the same faith can form a religious association or union to represent that religion vis-à-vis the state. Only one such association

3 European Parliament, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at stake in the future”, 23 July 2007, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1582.html, accessed 4 March 2009.

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can register per religion. Currently Muslims in Latvia are in the process of registering new like-minded congregations in order to attain the required number of ten to be eligible to form an association. 3


The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia records 16 registered independent Muslim religious congregations as of 2008. The Latvian Islamic Community (Latvijas islama kopienas, Brivibas Street 104, Riga, tel: +371-292-12512, http://www.islam.lv/) includes the Islamic Information Centre and a prayer hall and is headed by Zufar Zainullin. It is the main Muslim organisation in the country and is dominated by Russian speaking Muslims (Tatars and those with origins in the former Soviet Central Asian republics). It has several affiliate (friendly) congregations established with the purpose of forming a union of Muslim congregations, for which the law requires a membership of ten registered congregations, each with at least 20 members. There are several rival congregations with minuscule memberships that oppose the establishment of the union under the leadership of the Latvian Islamic Community. In October 2009, a new congregation, Latvian Muslim Consultative Centre (Musulmaņu konsultatīvais centrs Latvijā), headed by the former imam of the Latvian Islamic Community, was established in Riga with a separate prayer hall on Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street 16–5, Riga (phone: + 371-268-83284, [email protected]). The second largest congregation is the Daugavpils Islamic Centre (Daugavpils musulmanu draudze “Idel”, Imantas iela 25, Daugavpils) also dominated by Russian speakers. The Hazrat Inayat Khan Sufism Study Circle also operates in Riga. This is a quasi-Muslim—its members in fact deny they are Muslims—syncretic, new-age-type offshoot of the traditional Chishtiya Sufi order, brought to the Baltics by an Englishman, James Burgess, in the mid-1990s. 4


In the early twentieth century, a prayer hall was opened in Riga but did not survive the Soviet period. A prayer hall in purchased premises in an apartment at Brivibas Street 104 was opened in 2005 by the Latvian Islamic Community. In October 2009, a new prayer hall on

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Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street 16–5 was opened by the former imam of the Brivibas Street prayer hall. There are at least two other locations in private homes in Riga where some Muslims occasionally gather for communal prayer. The Daugavpils and Ventspils communities have makeshift prayer halls. Since the early 1990s there has been much talk of constructing a purpose-built mosque in Riga, but no practical steps have been taken towards achieving this goal, and the leader of the Latvian Islamic Community acknowledged that for the time being there is no need for a new purpose built mosque. 5


Optional religious education (Christian and Jewish, e.g. of ‘traditional’ denominations) is part of the state schooling system. Islamic education (Islam being formally a ‘non-traditional’ religion) is not offered in state schools, but some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. The congregations in Riga and Daugavpils provide Islamic education for young people in improvised informal weekend ‘schools’. There are no private primary or secondary level schools run by Muslims. 6


Academic courses on the Middle East (especially Arabic language) are regularly offered at the University of Latvia (Department of Modern Language). There is no institution for imam training in Latvia. Apparently, all acting imams (a Palestian medical student at the Brivibas Street prayer hall, a Sudanese at the Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street prayer hall and several Russian speaking Tatars elsewhere) are self-taught. Teachers in schools who deal with Islamic history and/ or religious dogmas have either history or religious studies degrees and certificates but not specifically Islamic education. 7


Muslims have a separate cemetery in Riga dating back to the late nineteenth century. Though now rarely used for burial, it is still maintained

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by the Latvian Islamic Community. Muslims have been assigned separate sections in cemeteries in Riga and other major urban places. So far no need has arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery. 8


While Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic religious services are offered in the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, there are no imams because there are so few Muslims in need of their services. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ’Id al-Adha celebrations in Riga and Daugavpils take place in rented premises. The are open to the public and are attended by between 300 and 500 people. During ‘Id al-Adha, animals are slaughtered in rural areas. 10 Halal Food In the first part of 2009, at least three halal cafes opened in Riga: two, the Halal and the Taj Mahal on Brivibas Street 102 and Taj Mahal, on Brivibas Street, run by the same company, and an Noor on Kalēju Street, run by several Latvian converts to Islam. The last, however, was forced to vacate the rented premises and close down the business in October. In September 2009, the Latvian Parliament passed amendments to the Animal Rights Protection Law granting religious communities the right to slaughter animals according to their religious rites. Several Latvian meat processing companies have started practising halal slaughter (primarily for export to Sweden). Since then, at least one halal butcher’s shop has opened in Riga (on Stirnu Street). 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Latvian laws allow head coverings (including hijab) in photos on official documents. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab (and a few wear niqab), mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer.

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There is no regular Muslim print media in Latvia, though ethnic minorities, among them those of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris), do occasionally publish brochures and pamphlets with sections related to Islam. One of the few websites run by Latvian Muslims is www.islam.lv (in Russian). Since October 2009 Russian translations of the weekly khutba given at Brivibas Street prayer hall are posted regularly, but other information is rarely updated. The website has an on-line forum (also in Russian, but apparently rarely used). Another website is http:// www.islammuslim.lv/ (in Latvian run by Latvian converts to Islam) (apparently under prolonged construction as of November 2009) with a much more active forum in Latvian. A third site with limited material on Islam in Latvian at http://www.islamlv.netfirms.com/. 13

Family Law

Muslims, like others, have to register marriage at a municipal civil registry office as imams are not authorised to act on behalf of the state. A dozen or so marriage contracts (nikah) are signed every year under the supervision of imams in Riga. Inheritances can be apportioned according to Islamic norms if that is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in any litigation. 14


No information available. 15


Though there is generally very little coverage about Muslims in Latvia in the local media, since September 2009, when the Latvian Parliament (Saema) started deliberating amendments (namely allowing ritual slaughter) to the Animal Rights Protection Law, heated debates have taken place in the print media and television, with animal rights activists vehemently opposing the amendments. Politicians and journalists with anti-Islamic tendencies have also contributed to the debate, argu-

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ing against allowing Muslims to slaughter animals according to their rites. Muslims (especially Latvian converts to Islam) have also taken part in the debate in the media, defending the right of religious communities to practise ritual slaughter. Though the law was passed by the Saema and later upheld by the government, the protests (both physical and printed) were still on-going in November 2009. 16


Sabantuj is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious festival, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered.

LIECHTENSTEIN Thomas Schmidinger1 1

Muslim Populations

Islam in the Principality of Liechtenstein is a very recent phenomenon. Muslims immigrants arrived in the last 20 years, predominately from Turkey, Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. While in 1990 only 2.4% of the population were Muslims, in 2000 this had doubled to 4.8%, or 1,593 persons.2 It may be estimated that in 2010 this figure could double again. Exact numbers will only be known after the next census at the end of 2010. The large majority of Muslims in Liechtenstein are Sunnis. There is no mention of Shi’a Muslims in Liechtenstein, apart from some Alevis, whose numbers are uncertain. Until 2009 there was a family of Ahmadiyya Muslims in Liechtenstein. 2

Islam and the State

The legal relationship between the state and religion in Liechtenstein is still based on the laws set up by Prince Johann II in the nineteenth century, when Liechtenstein was nearly entirely Roman Catholic, and the Principality and the Catholic Church are closely related. Article 37 of the Constitution still defines the Roman Catholic Church as the official religion (Landeskirche) of the Principality, but also guarantees freedom of religion to other religious traditions. However, since the 1990s debates about separation between church and state have been taken place and the Principality is trying to establish a new, secular legal order with a new relationship between the state and the religious communities. While the Catholic and the Protestant churches are financially supported by the state, Islam is not regularly financed.

1 Thomas Schmidinger is a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna and works on the Middle East, Sudan, political Islam, state theory and migration. 2 Liechtensteinische Volkszählung 2000. Religion und Hauptsprache, vol. 2, p. 12. Vaduz, Amt für Volkswirtschaft, Abteilung Statistik, 2000.

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The government has announced that it would be willing to support an Islamic religious community if the two Muslim organisations would unite,3 but this has not yet been possible. In 2004, the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung) was established by the government, and since then the Muslim communities have also received some minor funding. The government issues a residence permit for one imam and a second visiting imam is permitted during Ramadan. 3


The Islamic Community in the Principality of Liechtenstein (Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein Postfach 16, 9485 Nendeln) is affiliated to the umbrella Association of Islamic Communities in the East of Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein (Dachverband islamischer Gemeinden der Ostschweiz und des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, DIGO Postfach 407, 9001 St. Gallen). The Liechtenstein Türk Birliği (Industriestr.32, 9495 Triesen, http://www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/), which runs the Yeşil Camii, is affiliated to the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. Despite the fact that a significant minority of the Muslims of Turkish origin in Liechtenstein are Alevis, there is no Alevi organisation in the Principality. Some Alevis from Liechtenstein participate in Alevi activities in nearby regions of Austria and Switzerland. Since 2009, missionary activities have been carried out by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat which calls its Swiss branch the Ahmadiyya Movement of Islam in Switzerland and Liechtenstein (Ahmadiyya Bewegung des Islams in der Schweiz und in Liechtenstein). In 2009, they organised several public lectures in the capital, Vaduz.4 According to the Ahmadiyya Movement of Islam in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the only Ahmadiyya Muslims in Liechtenstein were two exchange

3 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/132836.pdf, accessed 1 February 2010 4 See http://www.ahmadiyya.ch/cms/kalender/oeffentliche-vortragsreihe/details/43die-islamische-ehe.html, accessed 18 April 2010; “Der Imam missioniert persönlich”, Volksblatt, 27 June 2009; “Provozierendes Moschee-Flugblatt”, Volksblatt, 15 December 2009.

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students and one family of converts from Liechtenstein, who have all now left.5 The future of Ahmadiyya missionary activities is uncertain. 4


There are only two prayer houses in Liechtenstein. The Yeşil Camii (Green Mosque) in Triesen is affiliated to the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı and the Islamic Community in the Principality of Liechtenstein also runs a prayer house in Triesen. 5


In the school year 2007/2008, Islamic religious education started in five elementary schools. The curriculum was developed by the Institute for Interreligious Pedagogy and Didactics in Cologne (Germany). The government agreed to establish a pilot project on condition that the teachers would be trained educationalists, the language of instruction would be German, the curriculum would be supervised by experts, and the classes would be controlled by the Schulamt (Department of Education) in accordance with the laws and Constitution of Liechtenstein.6 An evaluation in 2008 demonstrated that these conditions were fulfilled and the project continued. It is not yet a regular school subject, but a voluntary project, taught in the afternoons after the regular school lessons. According to the Schulamt, 30 children attended the classes in the first year and 80 in the school years 2008/09 and 2009/10, which means that 45% of Muslim schoolchildren attend the Islamic instruction classes.7 The two teachers were trained in Turkey and Austria.

5 E-mail from Abdul Waheed Waraich from the Ahmadiyya Movement of Islam in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, 28 February 2010. 6 http://linewsletter.typo3web.net/fileadmin/newsletter/files/04_07/Islamischer_ Religionsunterricht.pdf, accessed 18 April 2010. 7 E-mail from Stefan Hirschlehner of the Schulamt, 2 March 2010.

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As a small country with only one small town, Liechtenstein has no long tradition of higher education. The first private university (http://www .ufl.li) opened only in 2000, and so far has no areas of study specifically relevant to Muslims. Neither has the state-run Hochschule Liechtenstein (http://www.hochschule.li) any sections that deal with Islam. 7


There is no Muslim cemetery in Liechtenstein, but when the construction of a Muslim cemetery in nearby Vorarlberg (Austria) was initiated a few years ago, a debate started in Liechtenstein about establishing a Muslim cemetery. In 2007, vicar-general Dr Markus Walser from the Catholic Archdiocese of Liechtenstein8 and Prince Hans-Adam II9 issued statements in favour of a Muslim cemetery. In 2008, an opinion poll showed that more than half the population of Liechtenstein favoured the opening of Christian cemeteries to Muslims, while only 35% wanted to see a separate Muslim cemetery in the Principality.10 So far, only a few Muslims have been buried in Christian cemeteries and most Muslims still return the bodies of their dead to their former homeland. 8


Islamic chaplaincy in the hospital and the prison in Vaduz is provided by the Yeşil Camii when required. As Liechtenstein abolished its army in 1868, there is no military chaplaincy. 9

Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals have no legal status in Liechtenstein, but they are celebrated in families and prayer houses.

8

http://www.erzbistum-vaduz.li/medien/20071105.htm, accessed 18 April 2010. http://de.welcome.li/news-513.html, accessed 18 April 2010. 10 Marxer, Wilfried, Religion in Liechtenstein. Umfrage im Auftrag der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein über Glauben, Religiosität, religiöse Toleranz und das Verhältnis von Staat und Religionsgemeinschaften. Beiträge 40/2008, Bendern, 2008, p. 59. Liechtenstein-Institut. 9

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10 Halal Food As a very small country, Liechtenstein has no infrastructure for ritual slaughter. Halal food has to be imported from abroad. 11

Dress Codes

There are no legal dress codes that prohibit Muslims from wearing the Islamic headscarf. 12


There are no Muslim newspapers in Liechtenstein. The Liechtenstein Türk Birliği (http://www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/), its Yeşil Camii (http://camii.turkbirligi.li/) and its Parents Association 9 http://oab .turkbirligi.li/) maintain websites. 13

Family Law

Polygamy and divorce by unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) under Islamic law are prohibited. Muslims are permitted to conduct marriage ceremonies in prayer houses, but only after a civil marriage is registered. 14 Interreligious Relations Interreligious activities are carried out by Catholic and Protestant parishes and the Catholic Archdiocese, the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung), the Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Liechtenstein-Institut. The Catholic Opus Dei-affiliated International Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein (http://www.iap.li) has been active in interreligious dialogue with Islamic organisations, such as the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, ISESCO.11

11 http://www.iap.li/files/Dialogue%20among%20Civilisations%20and%20Cultures_IAP_Oct_2002.pdf, accessed 18 April 2010.

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In Liechtenstein, as in many other European countries, debates on Islamic terrorism and the role of Islam in public has increased since 2001, but in contrast to other European countries, there is no right wing populist or right-extremist political party that mobilises against Muslims. There are minor adolescent neo-Nazi activities connected with networks in neighbouring Germany, Switzerland and Austria.12 In 2008, the Liechtenstein Türk Birliği protested against increasing attacks on Turks by these skinheads.13 A survey by the Liechtenstein-Institut demonstrated an overall climate of tolerance: 89% of the population agreed that all religions should be tolerated, and a large majority also supported the idea that the state should support all the larger religious communities.14 However, Islam is viewed more negatively than Christianity or Judaism.15 Islamic religious education in schools was supported by 51% of the population, and 55% were in favour of building a mosque in Liechtenstein.16 Prince Hans-Adam II has publicly supported the equal treatment of Islam and the right of Muslims to build mosques.17 16


There are no typically Muslim festivals or cultural events specific to Liechtenstein.

12 See: Davolio, Miryam, Eser Davolio and Matthias Drilling, Rechtsextremismus im Fürstentum Liechtenstein. Eine qualitative Studie zu Hintergründen und Herangehensweisen im Auftrag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Eine Studie im Auftrag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Basel: Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, 2009. 13 http://www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/component/content/article/1-sonhaberler/44-statement-der-tuerkischen-vereine-in-liechtenstein, accessed 18 April 2010. 14 Marxer, Religion in Liechtenstein, p. 26. see n. 11 and add inverted commas or italics. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 28. 17 http://www.llv.li/llv-portal-informationen/aktuelles.htm?reference=105520&chec kSum=5E6381E59871ADC55DBF1B511DD6A00D, accessed 18 April 2010.

LITHUANIA Egdūnas Račius1 1

Muslim Populations

The most recent official census, in 2001, included a question on religious identity and gave the following figures: 2,860 Sunni Muslims (no data on Shi’is are available), or 0.1% of the total population, of whom 1,679 (or 58.7%) were ethnic Tatars, 362 (12.6%) Azeris, 185 Lithuanians, and 74 Russians. Tatars have been living in Lithuania (especially the eastern part of today’s Republic of Lithuania) since the fourteenth century when they started settling in what was the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, primarily as mercenaries and political immigrants. They were given land by the Lithuanian rulers whom they served. Although over time Lithuanian Tatars lost their mother tongue, they retained their religion and survived as a distinct ethnocultural yet well integrated group. Most of the other Muslims in Lithuania are descendants of immigrants from the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics who settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period. By 2009, the number of Muslims in Lithuania would probably have increased due to immigration (around 1,000, mainly Chechens [Department of Migration data]) and conversion (between 150 and 250, mainly through marriage).2 In the official census, a substantial number (around half of Tatars and Azeris) of Lithuania’s inhabitants with Muslim background did not indicate their affiliation to Islam, but can potentially be considered nominal Muslims. This applies particularly to Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, who might have chosen not to identify with Sunnis but might nonetheless be practising. The total 1 Egdūnas Račius is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies department. His research interests include Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim communities in the Baltic States. Račius is the author of the chapter on Islam in Lithuania in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 116–132. 2 Data from observations of on-line Muslim Internet forums and personal experience of the author.

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number of nominal Muslims in 2009 could be as high as 7,000, but the number of Muslims practising on a daily basis is unlikely to exceed 500. Almost two-thirds (over 64%) of Lithuania’s Muslims are concentrated in the capital city Vilnius, the second largest city Kaunas and the districts surrounding these cities. Local media and Muslims generally accept the official figures but foreign (Muslim) sources sometimes produce unfounded numbers exceeding 10,000 (Islam Online in 2004 even gave a figure of 110,000!).3 2

Islam and the State

Lithuania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute a majority (79% according to the 2001 census) of the population. Sunni Islam (the traditional faith of the Lithuanian Tatars) is recognized by law (adopted in 1995) as one of the nine ‘traditional’ faiths in Lithuania, and the Muslim community, through its official representative institution, the Muftiate (first established in Vilnius in the inter-war period by the Polish authorities, who then controlled eastern Lithuania, including Vilnius, disbanded in the Soviet years, and re-established in 1998) is entitled to a modest annual state subsidy which is used for the maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings. Both the Muslim community and the Muftiate itself are dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. The leader of the Lithuanian Muslim community (the officially recognised mufti, who also is the imam of the Kaunas mosque) is routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations at the presidential palace and the parliament. Other Muslim denominations (such as Shi’is) have the right to freedom of religion and conscience but do not have the same official status as Sunni Muslims. There is as yet no specifically Shi’i religious congregation. Registered quasi-Muslim groups, such as the Sufism Study Circle enjoy legal rights and protection. Religious organisations affiliated to non-traditional denominations may seek official state recognition 25 years after registration.

3 Ahmed, Damir. “Lithuanian Muslims Fearful After ‘Terror’ Arrests”. IslamOnline. net, 22 July 2004. http://islamonline.net/English/News/2004-07/22/article01.shtml, accessed 16 November 2009.

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There are almost a dozen registered Muslim organisations all around Lithuania. The main one is the Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate (Lietuvos Musulmonų Sunitų Dvasinis Centras— Muftiatas, Vivulskio Street 3, Vilnius, currently headed by the mufti Romas Jakubauskas, tel: +370-674-17710), (re)established in 1998 and dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. The mufti is elected for a term of five years by representatives of local Muslim congregations, which up to now are exclusively Tatar. Though the Muftiate has been functioning for more than a decade, neither the current nor the previous mufti has engaged in the primary function of a mufti—issuing fatwas. The first incumbent (served 1998–2008) had a very limited religious education (and poor knowledge of Arabic), while the current mufti, although he has a reasonable level of education, has not yet established his status as a competent ‘alim. Most other Muslim organisations (also dominated by Lithuanian Tatars) are subordinate to the Muftiate. A much more active organisation is the Arab dominated Kaunas-based Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society (Lietuvos musulmonų jaunimo bendrija, Totorių Street 6, Kaunas) which is engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, organises and takes part in religious education for local Muslim youth. There is no other Muslim organisation of note, though some are engaged in propagating Islam via the Internet (e.g. a Klaipėda registered al-Tauhyd congregation). 4


Though a century ago there were well over a dozen purpose-built mosques, there are currently four (three wooden, built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and one brick, built in early 1930s), of which only the Kaunas (brick) mosque (Totorių Street 6) is regularly used for Friday prayers by both local Tatars and foreign (mainly Arab) students. The other mosques, in the villages of Raižiai, Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių, are open only during religious festivals. In addition, in the capital city Vilnius there is a prayer hall adjacent to the Muftiate, which is used by Tatars, Turks and others. A purpose-built mosque is expected to be erected in the near future on the outskirts of Vilnius, as the Vilnius City Municipality finally allocated a plot for that purpose in 2008. However, the Muslim

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community has not yet formally accepted the offer. It is known that some Muslim groups (presumably ethnically/nationally orientated) gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (in Vilnius, Klaipėda, Panevėžys). 5


Religious education in public schools is optional but exclusively Catholic (or, in ethnic Russian schools, Orthodox); non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class in ‘ethics’. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, Islamic religious education is entirely extra-curricular, occasionally offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend schools. 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are regularly offered at Vilnius University (at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science and the Centre of Oriental Studies) and the Lithuanian Military Academy. The Centre of Oriental Studies temporarily (between 2000 and 2006) offered a BA degree in Arabic Studies but this has been abandoned owing to lack of academic staff. Elsewhere (Vilnius Pedagogical University, Vilnius Catholic Seminary and Vytautas Magnus University) teaching on Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Lithuania. As of 2009, three of the five acting imams had received their formal education abroad (one in Lebanon, two in Russia) while the remaining two are self taught. 7


Tatars have had separate cemeteries since they first settled in Lithuania. Most Muslim cemeteries were located next to mosques. A dozen cemeteries (in the villages of Nemėžis, Raižiai, Keturiasdešimt totorių, and on the outskirts of Vilnius and elsewhere) have survived till the

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present and some (especially in Raižiai) still serve as burial sites for the community. A fair number of non-religious Tatars use general public cemeteries for burial. No need has so far arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery. 8


There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals, as there is virtually no need for their services. Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and most of them have a separate nondenominational space allocated for prayer and contemplation. Muslims can use these spaces for private prayer. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-fitr and ‘Id al-adha celebrations in Vilnius, Kaunas and Raižiai (Alytus district) are open to the public. In 2009, ‘Id alfitr was attended by over 100 worshipers in Kaunas and around 50 in Keturiasdešimt totorių, with similar numbers in Nemėžis and Raižiai. ‘Id al-adha is attended annually by up to 500 people, with several dozen animals being sacrificed in Raižiai. Permission has not been granted to sacrifice animals near the mosque in Kaunas. 10

Halal Food

There are as yet no halal butchers’ shops. Frozen halal meat (usually chicken) is available in several supermarkets. Several individual Muslims (among them the mufti) perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers and sell the meat to their coreligionists. The mufti has occasionally presided over the halal slaughter of animals destined for the meat export market at a small local butchery. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Muslim women wishing to be photographed in hijab for official documents need to supply the state authorities with certification

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from the Muftiate confirming that they belong to the Islamic faith. However, only a handful of Muslim women (chiefly converts) wear hijab in public, mainly on Fridays while attending prayer. Some foreign Muslim women (mostly Turkish exchange students) wear hijab in public on a daily basis. There is no record of women being observed wearing niqab. 12


The sole printed periodical (with an on-line version) is a 32-page monthly Lietuvos Totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars), which has a circulation of 800. It is in Lithuanian with inserts in Polish and Russian and is published by the Union of Lithuanian Tatars’ Communities (Lietuvos totorių bendruomenių sąjunga). It is ethnically focused with occasional articles on religion. The two main websites in Lithuanian run by Muslims for Muslims and people wishing to get acquainted with Islam are http://www .islamas.lt (administered by Lithuanian converts to Islam residing abroad) and http://www.musulmonai.lt (run by the Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society). The former has an extensive on-line forum. The Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society has published a range of translated books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice, which are distributed at Kaunas mosque. There is a separate Shi’i site at http://www.shia.visiems.lt/. 13

Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage in mosques. Such marriages are recognised (and should be promptly registered) by a municipal civil registry office. In 2009, over two dozen marriage contracts were signed under the supervision of the mufti. Inheritance, if accepted by all the parties involved, can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant.

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In May 2009, a public discussion “Islam today: tradition, images, challenges and opportunities for cooperation”, organized jointly by a Protestant minister, a Catholic priest and the mufti took place at the Kaunas Medical University. 15


There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Lithuania in the local media. Local Muslim leaders are occasionally approached to comment on events and processes involving Muslims elsewhere in the world, but otherwise Muslims avoid publicity. No opinion poll of relevance was conducted in 2009. 16


Sabantujus is an annual Tatar gathering, lasting several days, featuring singing, dancing, games and sports. There is an annual youth summer camp with a certain amount of religious instruction.

LUXEMBOURG Sylvain Besch1 1

Muslim Populations

It is impossible to assess the exact number of Muslims in Luxembourg, since the registration of religious affiliation is prohibited,2 but in May 2004 the Muslim population was estimated at 8,898 (1.48% of the total population).3 This estimate is based on the nationalities of people from predominantly Muslim countries (source: Répertoire Général des Personnes Physiques RGPP/The civil register) and on estimates from the Centre Culturel Islamique/Islamic Cultural Centre for the numbers of people of various nationalities who have converted to Islam. According to this estimate the ‘European’ Muslim population accounts for 79% of the total Muslim population in the country. As of 1 January 2009, on the basis of nationality alone, the largest Muslim groups were as follows: Bosnians—2,871; Moroccans—469; Turks—401; Albanians— 319; Iranians—303; Tunisians—233; Algerians—223 (source RGPP). The ‘nationality’ ‘Serbian-Montenegrin’ (7,909 people) includes many of Muslim background, particularly people from Sandjak and Kosovo.4 Muslims are concentrated in urban areas: 27% of the members of the biggest Muslim groups5 live in the city of Luxembourg, and 43% live in the four biggest cities (RGPP). The municipality of Wiltz, in the north of the country, has a significant Bosnian community (5.4% of the total population). The majority of Muslims arrived in Luxembourg in the

1

Sylvain Besch is head of research at the SeSoPI-Centre Intercommunautaire and a member of the Consultative Commission on Human Rights in Luxembourg. 2 Article 15 in the law of 31 March 1979 on the use of data in a databank forbids the collection and registration of data concerning individuals’ activities and opinions in the following fields: politics, trade union activities, philosophical and religious affiliation. 3 Estimates by SESOPI-CI and CCIL (Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg/ Islamic Cultural Centre); Besch, Sylvain. et al., Discrimination à l’emploi/Discrimination at the workplace, Cahiers PSELL no. 151 (Brussels: CEPS/INSTEAD, December 2005), pp. 91–92. 4 The number was estimated at 2985 persons in 2004. 5 Concerns the 7 nationalities mentioned above.

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1990s as war refugees. There have been several waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia: Bosnians from Bosnia, Albanians and other Muslims from Kosovo, Serb and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. By 2005, 13% of the Bosnians aged 18 years or over had registered on the electoral roll in order to be able to vote in the municipal elections that year. Currently about 300 adults attend Friday prayer regularly in the mosques. 2

Islam and the State

There is no state church in Luxembourg, although the Roman Catholic Church is the most important. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, freedom to exercise one’s religion in public and freedom to express religious opinions (art. 19). The Constitution allows the state to enter into agreements with the various religions6 (art. 22), which regulate the relationship between the state and the religions. The various agreements confer the status of legal personality on the religious communities. On 6 July 2007, the government approved a proposal for an agreement that will regulate the relationship between the state of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the Muslim community, represented by the Muslim Community of Luxembourg. In order to come into force, the agreement must be passed into law. Before this can take place, the Muslim community must adopt a satisfactory form of association, and this must be approved by the minister of religion on the recommendation of the government. The government’s political programme, issued in 2009, confirmed its continuing support for the principal of entering into such agreements with religious communities that have a significant presence in the country and commit themselves to respecting the Constitution, the rule of law and public order.7 Religions—whether recognised or not—are permitted to create profit and non-profit associations, which can obtain subsidies from

6

On 31 October 1997, agreements were made between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Council, the Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Orthodox Church of Greece, and these came into force on 10 July 1998. Later, agreements were made with the Romanian and the Serbian Orthodox Churches and the Anglican Church of Luxembourg and these came into force on 11 June 2004. 7 http://www.sante.public.lu/publications/systeme-sante/politique-nationale-sante/ programme-gouvernemental-2009/programme-gouvernemental-2009.pdf, p. 3, accessed 20 November 2009.

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the state and the municipality. Some of these associations have already benefited from this opportunity for the organisation of public events, particularly through grants from the state (Ministry of Family—Office Luxembourgeois de l’Accueil et de l’Intégration). The proposed agreement envisages that employed clergy, in this case a mufti, would have the status of a civil servant as in other recognised religions. The mufti’s nomination would be approved by the minister of religion after the mufti has taken an oath before him, five imams and a secretary. 3


The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg, CCIL, 2 rte d’Arlon, L-8210 Mamer, tel: 31 00 60, fax: 26 31 04 26) is the oldest (founded in February 1984) and the most important of the Muslim organisations. A regional branch of this centre was established on 1 February 2007 in Wiltz. It has about 600 paying members of 30 different nationalities, particularly Bosnians (2,500 people, including their families). The Islamic and Cultural Association in the South (44 rue de Luxembourg, L-4220 Esch-sur-Alzette, tel/fax: 26540788) was established on 1 March 2002, and its members are mainly Serbian and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North was created on 26 September 2000 and was initially named the Cultural Centre of Sandjak. Its main building is in Wiltz (26 rte de Noertrange, L-9543 Wiltz, tel. 26950680, fax: 26950681) and it is mainly frequented by Serb Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Religious and Cultural Center in the West in Differdange-Niederkorn (64 rue de l’Eglise, L-4552 Niederkorn) was established on 15 June 1999 as the Association of Muslims in Luxembourg. Its members are first and foremost Bosnians from Bosnia and Kosovo and Montenegrins from Sandjak. An Islamic association called the Middle Way (Le Juste Milieu, LJM [Al Wassat], 32 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, tel: 26 48 11 53) was established on 1 February 2008; its founding members are mostly people of Arab descent. Two other centres, have been created, both affirming their collaboration in the national Muslim structures in Luxembourg: the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ettelbruck (Centre Culturel Islamique Ettelbruck, 4 Chemin du Camping, L-9022 Ettelbruck), established on 18 October

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2008, with mostly Bosnian members as well as Serbs and Montenegrans from Sandjak, and the Luxembourg Islamic Centre (Centre Islamique au Luxembourg, 18 rue du Fort Wallis, L-2714 Luxembourg-Gare), established on 22 December 2008, with mostly Bosnian members. Apart from the Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (CCIL), all these centres are currently organised within the framework of the Shoura, the Council of the Muslim Religion, established in 2003. 4


There are six mosques/prayer houses associated with the above-mentioned associations, in buildings in Mamer, Differdange, Esch/Alzette, Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, Luxembourg-Gare and Wiltz. Two imams are currently employed in Luxembourg and they are paid by the community. 5


The Catholic Church benefits from an arrangement concerning religious education in primary schools.8 In elementary schools, the Catholic Church organises religious education and the archbishop is the employer of the religious education teachers and responsible for their training. Legislation also provides for religious education in postelementary schools. Pupils can choose at both levels to take lessons in either religion and ethics or ethics and civics. There is no third option. The religion and ethics syllabus in primary schools anticipates the inclusion of intercultural and interreligious topics.9 The major religions are covered in the syllabus for religion and ethics, ethics and civics and, in post-elementary schools, in history.10 All the Islamic organisations offer Islamic instruction for children and some of them also offer courses for adults. Currently 370 children participate in Islam education courses in the mosques.

8

Memorial A No. 67, 21 August 1998. Erzdiözese Luxemburg, Rahmenrichtlinien für Religionsunterricht in der Primärschule, August 1998. 10 Memorial A No. 184, 1 September 2009. 9

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Education in Islam is part of the basic education offered by the Institute for Higher Education of Teachers of Religion (basic theology and history). In 2008/09 the programme of further education for teachers of religion provides, among other things, religious instruction in the framework of religious pluralism and dialogue between Christians and Muslims.11 The Emile Mayrisch hospital in Esch/Alzette has produced guidelines for staff on meeting religious expectations related to death. Both of the imams in the principality were educated abroad. 7


There are no Islamic cemeteries in Luxembourg, but the Muslim community has at its disposal a parcel of land in the Merl cemetery in Luxembourg City and another in the Esch-Lallange cemetery in Esch-Alzette, so that they can bury their dead according to the Islamic rite. In 2001, the CCIL established a mutual insurance company12 and, when a member dies, an allowance is paid to meet the costs of the funeral service, which is carried out with the assistance of the imam from CCIL. The costs of transporting the coffin to the home country of the deceased can also be met. 8


Neutral prayer rooms and/or ‘farewell-rooms’ can be found in hospitals. In quite a few hospitals the nursing staff try to take account of the needs of the various religious communities. In Schrassig prison Islamic prayers can be organised and the imam visits regularly. The law on the creation and organisation of the detention centre13 for people without

11 Cf. Kirchlicher Anzeiger für de Erzdiözese Luxemburg, No. 6, July-August 2008, pp. 96, 101. 12 Memorial B No. 22, 2 April 2001. 13 See articles 3(1) and 12(3) in the law of 28 May 2009 on the creation and organisation of the detention centre, cf. Mémorial A No. 119, 29 May 2009.

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a residence permit specifically stipulates that the religious convictions of the detainees must be respected and provides for the availability of cultural, educational and spiritual activities. 9

Religious Festivals

Before ‘Id al-Adha, the Minister of Education informs teachers of the date of the holiday, and asks them to accept parents’ letters asking permission for their children to take a day off school. Employment legislation does not provide for any specific arrangements and employees need to book a day’s leave to participate in the religious holidays. A study of discrimination in the workplace shows that in some cases employers respect the religious diversity of the workforce and have taken account of employees’ religious practices and established facilities for them to practise their religion.14 In the public sector, flexible working hours give a better opportunity to combine the work with religious practices, such as the fast. 10 Halal Food Halal slaughter is forbidden in Luxembourg,15 but there are two Muslim butcher’s shops and about ten Balkan grocery stores that sell halal meat, which is also available in the Auchan supermarket in the city of Luxembourg. Muslims also buy halal meat in Belgium, France and Germany. Because of the prohibition of ritual slaughter, some Muslims send money to their home country so that people there who are less well off can make the sacrifice on their behalf, especially at ‘Id al-Adha. 11

Dress Code

In 2004, the Minister of Education drew attention to the regulations for student dress, which require that students should dress “correctly” and that “special clothes can be required for lessons in gymnastics,

14

Besch et al., Discrimination à l’emploi, p. 99. Article 8 in the law of 15 March 15 1983 on animal welfare forbids the killing of animals without anaesthesia, cf. Mémorial A No. 15, 19 March 1983. 15

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art and manual and practical classes”.16 There have been no cases of students refusing to participate in sport activities because of their religious convictions. The law on compulsory education17 stipulates that, with the exception of teachers of religion and ethics, teachers are not allowed to demonstrate their religious or political affiliation by means of conspicuous dress or symbols. 12


Al-Qalam (The Pen), the journal of the Muslims in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg has been edited by the CCIL and published six times a year since 1990. Current Islamic websites are: – The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand Duchy (http://www.islam .lu), in existence since 1 September 1997, in French and German; – The Islamic Cultural Centre in the South (http://dzematesch.zap.lu), in Bosnian. – The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North (http://www.ccin.lu) in French, German, English, Bosnian and Arabic. 13

Family Law

Civil marriage must precede religious marriage. Polygamy is forbidden. Luxembourg law provides a legal basis for the annulment of forced marriages. The recognition of a marriage can be refused if the marriage is clearly in violation of the laws of Luxembourg (if it involves polygamy, for example). All foreign legal decisions and acts not sanctioned under a treaty or an EU directive are subject to a formal process of recognition before they can be legally accepted in Luxembourg. Divorce by repudiation is considered to be in violation of public order. It is possible for partial legal recognition to be given; for

16

Article 10 in the regulation of 29 June 1998 on order and discipline in secondary and secondary professional schools. 17 Article 5 of the law of 6 February 2009, in Memorial A No. 20, 16 February 2009.

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example, an Islamic divorce may be recognised, but not necessarily its consequences, such as arrangements for the custody of children. 14


An informal interreligious group called Action Groupe Inter-religions (c/o SESOPI-Centre Intercommunautaire, 5 avenue Marie-Thérèse, L-2132 Luxembourg, tel: 44743–501, fax: 44743–515) has existed for 15 years. Every year it arranges meetings, debates and interreligious prayers. Since 2008, the Luxembourg Council of Christian Churches (Conseil des Églises Chrétiennes au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg) has organised, in collaboration with ING-Europe Marathon Luxembourg and AGIR, an InterFaith-Marathon for a United World in Luxembourg,18 which involves clergy and representatives of the world religions. The initiative ‘All together’ brings together young Muslims and Christians for a programme of sporting, cultural and religious activities and arranges meetings between the Catholic and Muslim communities. 15


There has not been any public controversy about Islam in 2009. The party political programmes for the June 2009 parliamentary elections raised the question of religious pluralism in the context of religious education in school. Some media sources have covered Ramadan19 and other topics related to Islam.20 Most media reporting has focused on developments outside the country, such as the Swiss referendum banning minarets. The financial market has an interest in the development of Islamic finance.

18 http://www.42zwei.com/web/redaktion_09/marz/mar20_inter_faith_luxembourg_marathon.htm, accessed 28 April 2010. 19 Quotidien, 21 August 2009. 20 RTL Tele, 24 February 2009, reporting on a Muslim marriage.

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Various Muslim organisations have organised events. The Shoura has invited various organisations, ministers and media representatives to programmes in connection with Ramadan and CCIL hosted ministers and representatives of other religions at its 25th anniversary celebration. The Islamic Cultural Centre in Mamer organises celebrations at the end of the school year.

MACEDONIA Muharem Jahja1 1

Muslim Populations

The most recent official census (2002) recorded 660,492 Muslims (mainly Sunnis), or around 31% of the total population (2,022,547). Of these, 509,083 (or 77%) were ethnic Albanians, 77,959 (12%) Turks, 53,879 Roma, and 17,018 Bosniaks.2 Albanians, who speak a different language from Macedonian, which is a Slavic language, started to become Muslims with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Turks are the descendants of immigrants from Ottoman times. By 2009, the number of Muslims in Macedonia has probably increased due to a high fertility rate (around 2.5%). Conversions are relatively rare and may number between 20 and 30 in total since the fall of Communism.3 In the official census, Macedonianspeaking Muslims, as they are officially labeled (also informally known as Torbeshi, Pomaks or Gorani, and increasingly likely to call themselves Turks or Albanians), are classified under the ‘other’ category of the census and are not included among the country’s Muslims, but they constitute a considerable number (around 20,000), so the total number of Muslims in 2009 is probably over 700,000. The number of Muslims practising on a daily basis might amount to 200,000 and another 300,000 might pray on Fridays and fast in Ramadan.4 Almost two thirds of Macedonia’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-western part of the country, in the capital city, Skopje, the second largest city, Tetovo, and in the districts surrounding these

1 Muharem Jahja is a researcher at the Institute for Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of Albanians, Skopje, and a lecturer in the Department for Oriental Studies at the State University of Tetovo. He holds a BA in Islamic Law and an MA in Islamic History. His research and writings relate to the sociology and history of Islam and Albanians in the Balkan region, specifically in Macedonia. 2 The State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 (Skopje: State Statistical Office, May 2005). 3 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 4 Interview with representatives of the IRCM in Macedonia, Skopje, January 2009.

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cities and others such as Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Kumanovo, Resne, Struga, and Ohrid. The rest live in the southern and eastern parts of the country in scattered communities. 2

Islam and the State

Macedonia’s Constitution describes it as a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority of the population, 66% according to the 2002 census, including the ethnic Macedonians, Serbs, and Vlachs who are Orthodox Christians. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for the right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others. The Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups (Komisija za odnosi so verskite zaednici i religiozni grupi, http://www.kovz.gov.mk), with a director appointed by the government, regulates the legal aspects of the position of the religious communities and religious groups, and relations between the state and the religious communities and groups. The Commission has the status of an autonomous state institution. Islam is recognised by the Constitution as one of the five main faiths and is officially represented by the Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, IRCM).5 The state does not fund religious communities, and all costs related to maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings, as well as the salaries of religious leaders, are paid from private and voluntary contributions of the members of the community and income from waqf institutions. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim community are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations by parliament and the government and at the presidential palace, but, unlike Orthodox clergy, they are not invited to openings or construction launches of infrastructure or buildings. Other Muslim denominations, such as the Bektashis and Shi’a, have freedom of religion and conscience but do not hold the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Beside the Bektashis, there are Sunni Sufi tariqas, such as the Khalwatis (mainly located in the cities of Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga), Malamis, Naqshbandis, Qadiris and Rifa’is (mainly in the capital Skopje).6 The 5 6

The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 19. The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 55.

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IRCM and other Muslim religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions by following a legally prescribed procedure. 3


The main Muslim organisation is the Skopje-based Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, IRCM, Çairska str. no 52, 1000 Skopje, tel: +389–2–3117410, fax: +389–2–3117883, http://www.bim.org.mk), (re)established in 1994 after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It is dominated by Macedonian Albanians. The IRCM, which follows the Hanafi legal school,7 is organised into 13 separate muftiates in the major cities around the country, each headed by a local mufti. The head of the IRCM is known as Rais al-ulama (the current Rais al-ulema is Sulejman Rexhepi). Other active organizations, including the Skopje-based Logos-A (http://www.logos-a.com.mk), are engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, generally on Islamic thinking and Islamic jurisprudence. The main charity is the Skopje-based El-Hilal. There are tens of political parties affiliated to the Muslim communities in the country, some of which take part in government coalitions and are represented in the parliament by more than 30 MPs. Their politics are ethnic rather than religious. 4


Currently, there are around 600 purpose-built mosques,8 some from the fifteenth century, of which 570 are regularly used. Twenty-one historic mosques have survived in the capital, Skopje, among which the most famous are those that date from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, namely the mosques of Yahya Pasha, Isa Bey, Mustafa Pasha, Murat Pasha, and Sultan Murat. Other famous mosques include: in Tetovo, the Aladja (painted) Mosque, and the Saat (clock) Mosque; in Bitola, the Isaac Mosque, Haydar Kadi Pasha and New Mosque; in

7 8

The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 1. Interview with representatives of the IRCM, Skopje, January 2009.

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Prilep, the Charshi Mosque; in Gostivar, the Saat Mosque; in Ohrid, the Hayati Baba Tekye and Ali Pasha Mosque. Purpose-built mosques continue to be constructed in a number of places. A number of waqf institutions that belonged to the IRCM were nationalised with the advent of Communism after World War II. Despite the de-nationalisation process after 1991, not all waqfs, including mosques, have been returned to the ownership of the community. There are also tekes that are used for prayer. The languages used for preaching include Albanian, Macedonian, Turkish, Bosnian and Roma. 5


The 2008 measure to introduce religious education as an option in public schools offered classes in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to 11-year-old pupils only, but was annulled in 2009 by the Constitutional Court. The constitutional judges decided that religious education in schools was contrary to Article 19 and the seventh amendment to the Constitution, which provide for the separation of state and church. According to the Court, the Constitution guarantees the right to practise religion, but citizens should not be influenced as to whether or how they should do so. Classes in ‘history of religions’ continue to be offered to 11-year-old pupils and some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. Due to language differences, ethnic groups attend separate classes in public schools, based on their native language, at both elementary and secondary levels. There is a Skopje-based private religious secondary school (Isa Bey Madrasa), established in 1984 and run by the IRCM. It provides Islamic instruction as a core curriculum subject and has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country, such as Tetovo, Gostivar and Shtip. Isa Bey Madrasa has the status of a secondary school under the auspices of the IRCM, but its curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education and Science or any other state agency, and as such it is funded not by the state but by the IRCM. However, the Ministry of Education and Science decided in 2009 that Isa Bey Madrasa would become a publicly funded school from 2010, under the Ministry of Education. The school will receive funding from the state

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budget, in addition to donations from other sources. The changes will also include alterations to the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. In addition, Muslim children aged 6–15 are sent to mosques or maktabs (facilities adjacent to mosques) to study the Qur’an and basic Islamic teachings as an extra-curricular voluntary activity. 6


The main higher Islamic educational institution is the Skopje-based Faculty of Islamic Sciences (Kondovo, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, http:// www.fshi.edu.mk), established in 1997 by the IRCM. In 2008, parliament enacted a law on higher education institutions of religious communities, providing for the Faculty of Islamic Sciences to be changed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. The Faculty will receive funding from the state, in addition to donations from other sources. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East in non-theological universities or faculties are provided on an ad hoc basis. In the 2009– 2010 academic year, the State University of Tetovo launched a degree course in ‘Orientalism’, with courses offered on the history, culture and literature of Islam. There is no separate institution for imam training in Macedonia. Imams receive their formal education from Isa Bey Madrasa, the Faculty of Islamic Sciences and/or from abroad (mainly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria). 7


Muslims have separate cemeteries in each town where they live. Most Muslim cemeteries were historically located next to mosques, but cemeteries have increasingly been established away from mosques as space has become limited. Special plots have been allocated for this purpose by Muslims themselves as waqf. Muslim Roma tend to use separate Roma Muslim cemeteries for burial. As the Muslim community grows, a need has arisen for new separate Muslim cemeteries around the country.

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There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. Though provided for by legislation, there has been no practice of chaplaincy involving any of the religions in the country. Effort are being made to build or allocate separate spaces for prayer in prisons. 9

Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr (ramazan bayram) and ‘Id al-Adha (qurban bayram) celebrations in major Muslim towns such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo. The first day of ‘Id al-Fitr is an official public holiday and the first day of ‘Id al-Adha is an official holiday for Muslims only. Bayram prayers are attended by the large majority of Muslims and are open to the public. In recent years, they have been attended by the president or prime minister (who are usually Orthodox Christians). ‘Id al-Adha is celebrated around the country, with thousands of Muslims attending qurban rites. Other festivals include the first day of Ramadan, Mi’raj Night, the Birthday of the Prophet, and the Day of Hijra. 10 Halal Food No specifically halal abattoirs have yet been opened, but a number of slaughter houses and local butchers do produce halal meat. Frozen halal poultry is available in several supermarkets, mainly imported from Brazil and Slovenia. Individual Muslims sometimes perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers. A number of restaurants owned by Muslims sell halal food using meat from animals they slaughter themselves. In 2009, the IRCM signed an agreement with the Bosnian Agency for Certification of Halal Quality (http://www.halal.ba) for the establishment of a unit within the IRCM that will issue halal certificates to companies producing halal food. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Neither are there rules against the wearing of hijab for photographs for ID cards. Approximately half of Muslim

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women, mainly the older generation, regularly wear hijab in public, while the rest wear it mainly when attending prayers or funerals. A few Muslim women in Skopje wear niqab. 12


The main periodical is the monthly El Hilal (Hena e re in Albanian), published in Albanian (formerly also in Macedonian and Turkish) by the IRCM. Its main focus is on Islamic religion. The mainstream Albanian-language print media (such as Koha, Fakti, Lajm) and electronic media occasionally include news on religion, particularly in the month of Ramadan or at the time of other Muslim festivals. Zaman Macedonia, part of the Zaman daily published in Turkey and associated with the Gülen movement, publishes a weekly local newspaper in both Albanian and Turkish and regularly includes articles on religion. The Asr publishing house produces Dritarja (Window), a children’s magazine with Islamic religious content. Websites such as http://www.bim.org.mk (administered by the IRCM), http://www.fri.org.mk (administered by the Islamic Youth Forum) and http://www.makislam.info are the main websites maintained by Muslims in Macedonia both for the Muslim public and for interested non-Muslims. The main media outlets owned by Muslims and dedicated to general daily political issues include AlsatM TV, ERA TV and TV2 Macedonian National Television. 13

Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques or muftiates. However, the mosque or mufti certificate is not an official document; the marriage must be registered with a municipal civil registry office. Muslims continue to conduct nikah (religious marriage contract) under the supervision of an imam, with two witnesses from the family and setting of the amount of mahr (dowry) before proceeding to sign a civil marriage contract at a municipal registry office. Inheritance is not usually apportioned according to Islamic rules, although some Muslims try to do so. Such arrangements are not recognised by the courts. The legal system is entirely secular and affiliation to any creed is irrelevant in legal matters.

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Inter-religious Relations

Parliament has a Committee for Inter-Community Relations consisting of 19 members of parliament, of whom seven members each are from the ranks of the Macedonian (Orthodox Christians) and Albanian (Muslims) members, and one member each from the Turks (Muslims), Vlachs (Orthodox Christians), Roma (Muslims), Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and Bosniaks (Muslims). The Parliament elects the members of the Committee, which considers and assesses issues in inter-community relations in the Republic and makes proposals for their solution. Parliament is obliged to take the Committee’s assessments and proposals into consideration and to make decisions regarding them. Similar committees also exist at the municipal assembly level. Polls show that overall public opinion about Muslims is positive: a representative survey (conducted by Gallup Balkan Monitor, http:// www.balkan-monitor.eu) shows that some 70% of ethnic Macedonians trust their Muslim neighbours, and also trust their own religious organisations. Another study carried out on the influence of the education system on inter-religious relations showed that 40% of secondary school students are influenced by their teachers’ opinion, 33% believed that their school did not do enough to establish positive inter-religious relations and more than 80% expressed an interest in extra-curricular activities with students from other religions. 15


The construction of a mosque in the main square in the capital, Skopje, was a major point of public debate during 2009, and the media devoted substantial attention to the issue. The discussion focused on the confrontation between civil society organisations and the government. 16


There are several ethnic cultural events, but no specifically Islamic cultural events, apart from Nawruz, which is celebrated only by Bektashis. Another major cultural event is Hidrelez, celebrated on 6 May by various ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims, in the country celebrating the rebirth of the plants and flowers.

MALTA Martin R. Zammit1 1

Muslim Populations

The National Statistics Office (NSO) of Malta has never conducted a census that records the numbers of Muslims in Malta.2 Malta’s main imam estimates that there are about 6,000 Muslims in Malta, that is 1.45% of the total population of 413,609.3 The majority are Libyan Sunnis, while most of the rest hail from North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’is worship with the Sunnis at the mosque of the Corradino Hill Islamic Centre (Paola). Around 1,000 Muslims hold Maltese citizenship. The same imam reports that about 300 native Maltese have converted to Islam. In addition, 1,001 of the illegal migrants who arrived in Malta during 2009, when asked about their religion, said they were Muslims; 879 were from Somalia.4 Islam reached Malta in 870 CE with the Aghlabid occupation of Malta. Under Norman rule (1091–1194), Muslims co-existed peacefully with the other inhabitants, but they were expelled by the Hohenstaufen King Frederick II of Sicily sometime before 1250. During the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam was practised in Malta by Muslim slaves captured during maritime raids. In modern times, Islam returned to Malta during the 1970s, with the establishment of close political and economic relations with the Arab world, particularly Libya. Muslims from various Arab countries settled in Malta and in 1982 the Islamic Centre at Paola was established. The 1992 United Nations sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie issue led to Malta

1 Dr Martin R. Zammit is a senior lecturer in the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Malta. 2 The inhabited islands of the Maltese archipelago (315.2km2) are Malta, Gozo, and Comino. Source: NSO. 3 NSO figures for 2008. See: http://www.nso.gov.mt/docs/population_table1.pdf, accessed 2 March 2010. 4 Information supplied by the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees in Malta (Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs). A number of illegal migrants chose not to disclose their religious affiliation.

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being Libya’s only gateway to the world, and the number of Libyans in Malta increased substantially. Since Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the number of Libyan visitors has fallen dramatically as a result of visa restrictions. In general, Arab Muslims in Malta retain Arabic as the language of communication among themselves, but switch to Maltese or English with other members of Maltese society. Although retaining their ethnic and cultural identities, Malta’s Muslims generally integrate well into the Maltese context. They live in various towns and cities on the island of Malta, with a minority living on the second island, Gozo. 2

Islam and the State

Malta’s Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, but provides for religious freedom.5 The main imam of the Islamic Centre is appointed by the WICS (see below, section 3) and his appointment is endorsed by the Maltese state.6 He enjoys substantial autonomy in the local affairs of his community, and he is the official point of contact between the Muslim community and the Maltese administration. In accordance with a protocol between the WICS and the government of Malta, the Islamic Centre and its officials enjoy diplomatic immunity. The imam maintains good relations with state and religious authorities, and has regular access to them. Nevertheless, Islam is not recognised by law, and so the Islamic Centre does not receive any state funds, nor do Muslims enjoy any educational, cultural, or social privileges. The state does allocate money to Catholic schools, however, which prompts the Muslim community to make representations to receive a similar treatment. 3


In 1984, the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) in Tripoli, Libya, established the Islamic Centre (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola PLA 9037, Malta, tel. 00356-21-697203, fax. 21697574). The Centre aims to provide services for the Muslim community, to acquaint the

5 6

About 95% of the Maltese are Roman Catholics. The imam is Sheikh Muhammad el-Sadi and he is of Palestinian origin.

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Maltese public with Islam, and to foster interfaith dialogue. It provides religious services in the mosque (which has an area of 225m2 and space for about 500 worshippers), organises seminars and meetings on interfaith dialogue, offers Arabic and English language courses, conducts marriages, assists the poor and needy (including prisoners and refugees), and arranges for the burial of the dead. Apart from the mosque, the Centre includes a conference hall, a library, offices, a playground, and the imam’s residence. The Centre is responsible for the translation and publication of religious literature, organises journeys to Mecca for the Hajj, and promotes a number of cultural and social activities, particularly during the month of Ramadan. In 1997, the Mariam Albatool School ([email protected]) was established within the Islamic Centre’s precincts. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is also represented in Malta. There are no Muslim political parties in Malta and migrant communities are not officially organised on an ethnic basis. A number of Muslims endeavour to participate in the Maltese political scene. 4


Apart from the official mosque at Paola, which is regularly frequented by both local and foreign Muslims, including students, Muslims use five other unofficial places of worship. 5


Roman Catholic religious education in state schools is compulsory, and neither state nor private schools include Islam in their curriculum. Muslim students are given the option of attending religious education classes or taking alternative subjects. This situation has prompted local Muslims to establish the Mariam Albatool School. It was opened in 1997 and is situated within the precincts of the Islamic Centre, Paola. A board of volunteer trustees administers the school, which operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels under Ministry of Education licenses (1998 and 2007). While following the Maltese national curriculum, the school also offers Islamic courses. The school accepts students from all national, religious, and cultural backgrounds and during the school year 2009–2010 the number of registered students reached 220, mostly Maltese nationals. The school

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employs around 20 members of staff, mostly Maltese Catholics and operates on a strictly charitable basis, with fees kept to a minimum. It receives no government funding and often faces financial difficulties, prompting the school authorities to apply for subsidies from the Ministry of Education. As yet, no government financial assistance has been secured. The school is constantly expanding and the WICS has requested the Maltese government to allocate additional land adjacent to the Islamic Centre. This matter is under government consideration. In addition, the Libyan Secretariat for Education maintains the AlFateh Libyan School at Ta’ Giorni, St Julians. This school is open to Arab students and follows the Libyan educational curriculum. Tuition is in Arabic. 6


The Department of Oriental Studies in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Malta runs academic courses on Islam and the Near East, including undergraduate, Masters and PhD programmes in Arabic and in Near Eastern Studies. Courses covering Islamic philosophy are also offered at the Faculty of Theology. Both the Islamic Centre and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat have donated books to the university library. Malta was one of the first countries to offer university scholarships to Palestinian students, and the University of Malta offers mentoring services to Arab students. There is no institution for imam training in Malta. Imams currently serving in Malta have received their formal education abroad. It is unlikely that the need for local imam training will arise in the near future. 7


In 1874, a Muslim cemetery was built in the town of Marsa at the expense of the Ottoman government—hence its appellation ‘the Turkish cemetery’. It replaces an older Muslim burial ground and is a fine example of Moorish architecture. Till the 1970s, in the absence of any other mosque, the Turkish cemetery was also used for Friday prayers. Between 1996 and 2006 a number of Muslim burials took place at the Maria Addolorata Catholic cemetery at Paola. Meanwhile, the Maltese

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government allocated a piece of land adjacent to the Islamic Centre in Paola to the WICS for burial purposes, although the land belongs to the Maltese state. The first burials took place there in 2007. 8


There are no imams in the Maltese armed forces. Maltese prisons and illegal migrants’ detention centres have spaces reserved for Muslim worship, and a space has been allocated for interfaith worship at the Mater Dei hospital. The imam of the Islamic Centre presides over prayers in Maltese prisons during the main feasts of the Muslim calendar. 9

Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated both communally, at the Islamic Centre, and privately. Even though the state does not recognise Muslim festivities, iftar is often attended by senior officials of the Maltese government, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of the Catholic Church and friends of the Muslim community. ‘Id alAdha is also attended by a substantial proportion of the Muslim community, and several dozen animals are slaughtered on local farms. 10

Halal Food

There are at least four halal butchers in Malta, and a local private company offers a variety of halal products. Some Muslims purchase livestock from local farmers, perform slaughter privately, and sell the meat to their co-religionists. Frozen halal meat and other halal foodstuffs are also available in most supermarkets and shops. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. The same applies to pupils in local state and private schools. The hijab is worn quite commonly by Muslim women, including university students. There are also a few cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab.

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The WICS weekly newspaper Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (‘The Islamic Call’) and the periodical Al-Tawasul (‘The Contact’) are regularly available at the Islamic Centre. The Centre has published a number of books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic belief and practice, including a Maltese translation of the Qur’an,7 and has regularly participated in the annual Malta Book Fair organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Islamic Centre is preparing an internet website and the private website http://www.islammalta.com/ offers information about various aspects of Islam. The imam and other members of the community often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. 13

Family Law

On the basis of a special agreement between Malta and the WICS, Muslims are allowed to contract Islamic marriages at the mosque of the Islamic Centre, although such marriages are not legally recognised. Later, or sometimes alongside the signing of the Muslim contract, an official from the Marriage Registry administers the civil marriage. The Maltese state only recognises this civil marriage. Islamic divorce documents are not recognised either. With regard to inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved, and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular law of the state. 14


In March 2009, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (Malta) organised an interreligious event called Religious Founders Day. Muslim (Ahmadiyya), Christian and Buddhist representatives delivered speeches about the life and work of the founders of these religions. In May 2009, the Islamic Centre at Paola, in collaboration with the Malta UNESCO Youth Associ-

7 Zammit, M.R. and M. el-Sadi, Il-Qoran Imqaddes (Tripoli: World Islamic Call Society, 2008).

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ation, organised a seminar on ‘Tolerance: A Multi-Religious Perspective’, in which members of the Muslim, Christian and Hindu communities participated. The imam participates regularly in interfaith events, including prayer meetings for peace, and other similar occasions. 15


The local media sporadically cover the situation of Muslims in Malta. Such coverage is often triggered by immigration issues. Occasionally, local Muslims are approached to comment on Middle Eastern issues, or events involving Muslims worldwide. The relationship between the Maltese public and the Muslim community is, in general, unproblematic. Muslims enjoy a substantial degree of tolerance, without, however, being immune (especially the Libyans) to some negative prejudice and racism.8 Such sentiments tend to surface when Arabs are arraigned in court on criminal charges, or when African, Arab or Asian illegal immigrants reach the Maltese islands on dilapidated boats, thus exacerbating an already critical situation at the various detention centres on the island. In general, the Maltese are uneasy with this situation, believing it to have potential negative long-term economic, social and cultural repercussions, especially in view of Malta’s limited size and resources. 16


During the month of Ramadan, a number of cultural, sporting and social activities are organised at the Islamic Centre, from early evening till late at night, including talks on various topics given by local and foreign guest speakers, as well as poetry evenings, which are very much appreciated by the members of the Muslim community.

8 According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EUMIDIS): Data in Focus Report 2: Muslims, published on 28 May 2009, 71% of young North and Sub-Saharan African Muslims in Malta feel discriminated against. The report states: “The high levels of experienced discrimination should be nuanced as they affect primarily asylum seekers, who enter the country in disproportionate numbers to those in other Member States and to the size of the country’s population, as UNHCR figures show” (p. 6). The survey can be accessed at: http://fra.europa.eu/ fraWebsite/eu-midis/eumidis_muslims_en.htm.

MOLDOVA Aurelia Felea1 1

Muslim Populations

The territory of the present Republic of Moldova, with the exception of land to the east of the River Nistru, was historically an integral part of the principality of Moldavia, which was constituted in the midfourteenth century. Contacts between the sedentary population of the region between the Nistru, Prut and Danube rivers and the Black Sea and populations originating in Central Asia (the Pechenegs [Patzinaks], Cumans, Tatars etc.), who later became Muslims, date back to the tenth-thirteenth centuries.2 The impact of Islam on the history of Moldavia increased particularly under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, which annexed extensive areas in the eastern part of the principality (the fortresses of Chilia, Akkerman, Tighina [called Bender by the Turks] and Hotin and the regions surrounding them) in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Here, Ottoman military, administrative and religious structures were established and consequently Turkish and Tatar Islamic populations settled there at various times.3 The new authorities built mosques and other buildings needed for Islamic religious practice and their remains were still evident in the first half of the twentieth century. The Dormition Church at Cauşeni is a Christian monument from those times.

1 Aurelia Felea is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences, State University of Tiraspol, Chisinau, Moldova. 2 Nesterov, Tamara, “Monumente de arhitectură musulmană la Orheiul Vechi (Monuments of Muslim architecture in Old Orhei)”, Sud-Est. Revistă de artă, cultură şi civilizaţie, vol. 2, no. 48 (2002), pp. 118–122; Chirtoagă, Ion, “Orhei”, Destin Românesc. Revistă de istorie şi cultură, vol. 1, no. 45 (2006), pp. 122–125. 3 Maxim, Mihai, “Principatele Române şi Imperiul Otoman (1400–1878) (The Romanian principalities and the Ottoman Empire [1400–1878])”, in Stephen FischerGalaţi, Dinu C. Giurescu and Ioan-Aurel Pop (eds), O istorie a românilor (A History of the Romanians) (Cluj-Napoca: Fundaţia Culturală Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1998), pp. 128–147; Chirtoagă, Ion, Sud-Estul Moldovei şi stânga Nistrului (1484–1699). Expansiunea şi dominaţia turco-tătară (The South-East of Moldova and the Left Bank of the Nistru (1484–1699): The Turkish-Tatar Expansion and Domination) (Bucharest: Fundaţia Culturală Română, 1999), pp. 89–103.

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The walls of the church, built in the second half of the eighteenth century in the region administered by the Tatars, are half-buried into the ground, in compliance with Ottoman laws, which forbad the building of Christian churches higher than mosques.4 As a result of the continuous expansion of the Russian Empire to the south, in the last quarter of the eighteenth early nineteenth centuries, Turkish and Tatar populations from the North Pontic area fled to the south of the Danube or were resettled in Russia by the tsarist administration. By the end of World War I, the region situated between the Nistru and the Prut (called Bessarabia during the period of tsarist domination) seceded from Russia and united with Romania. The census carried out by the Romanian authorities in 1930 registered 148 Muslims in the region, mostly of Turkish or Tatar descent.5 Bessarabia was occupied by the USSR on 28 June 1940. From 1940 to 1941 and 1944 to 1991, the Communist regime promoted an atheistic policy which deeply affected all religions. The census carried out in the Republic of Moldova on 5–12 October 2004 recorded 3,383,332 inhabitants.6 Two-thirds of Moldovans are of Romanian descent, the languages are virtually identical and the two countries share a common cultural heritage. With regard to religion, 3,158,015 people (over 93% of the total population) declared themselves to be Orthodox Christians and 1,667 people (0.05%) declared they were Muslims, of whom 1,075 were male and 592 female; 339 were children under 15. Most Muslims (1,353 people) live in urban areas, the majority in the capital of the country, Chişinău (995) and in the city of Bălţi (106); 314 live in rural areas.7 In addition, there are Muslims who are temporary residents, in the country for educational, business, cultural or personal reasons. The majority of the students from countries with a predominantly Muslim population (Saudi

4

Ciobanu, Constantin, Biserica Adormirii Maicii Domnului din Căuşeni (The Dormition Church from Căuşeni) (Chişinău: Ştiinţa, 1997). 5 Enciu, Nicolae, “Recensământul populaţiei din 29 decembrie 1930 (The population census of 29 December 1930)”, Destin Românesc. Revistă de istorie şi cultură, vols 3–4, no. 43–44 (2004), pp. 98–115 (105). 6 This report contains information only about the territories effectively controlled by the Government of the Republic of Moldova and does not refer to the situation in the separatist region of Transnistria, including the city of Bender, unless specifically stated. 7 Recensământul populaţiei 2004, vol. I Caracteristici demografice, naţionale, lingvistice, culturale (Population Census. Demographic, National, Linguistic, Cultural Characteristics) (Chişinău: Tipografia Centrală, 2006), pp. 476–485.

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Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Morocco, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yemen) study at the State Medical University Nicolae Testemiţeanu.8 The Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and of People Lacking Citizenship in the Republic of Moldova No. 275XIII of 10 November 1994 (with amendments adopted in 1998–2008) guarantees them freedom of conscience, opinion and expression. Also in late 1994 the Moldovan parliament granted autonomous status to the Turkic-language speaking Gagauz region in the southwest of the republic. It has powers over its own political, economic and cultural affairs. 2

Islam and the State

Moldova is a secular state with no state religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion. Law No. 125-XVI of 11 May 2007 on religions and their component parts stipulates the legal equality of religions and their equal status before the public authorities. However, the law emphasises “the special importance and the primordial role of the Christian-Orthodox religion, and particularly of the Moldovan Orthodox Church in the life, history and culture of the people of the Republic of Moldova”. The Metropolitan of Chisinau and of All Moldova is the only religious leader who regularly participates in national celebrations alongside state officials. Only Moldovan citizens are allowed to establish and lead religious organisations. Religious activities of foreign citizens in public places require prior permission from the local public authorities. The legality of most collective religious activity is, however, dependent on registration of a religious organisation. In the period 1998–2007, the registration of religious organisations was the responsibility of the State Service on Religious Issues, but in October 2007 this function was transferred to the Ministry of Justice.9 The Law on Religions regulates the registration process. Registration provides confessional groups with equal status, including permission to: acquire property; open bank accounts; receive, as legal entities, donations from physical and legal entities from within the country and from abroad; hire employees; and obtain authorisation for the building

8 http://www.vsvideo.md/refugiati/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& id=8&Itemid=26&lang=ro, accessed 12 February 2010. 9 http://rson.justice.md/organisations, accessed 12 February 2010.

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of religious institutions and places of worship. However, the law does not define clearly the right of a religious group to be registered as an official religious entity, including the possibility of acquiring full legal personality and the right to appeal against the rejection of an application for registration. The Ministry of Justice has so far rejected all applications for registration submitted by Muslim groups. A state body, the Bureau for Interethnic Relations (Alexei Mateevici street, 109/1, Chişinău MD-2009, tel./fax: 373 22 214080, http://www .dri.moldova.md/), is responsible for the promotion of state policy in the area of interethnic relations, including the granting and coordination of state funding. On 12 May 2009, the European Court of Human Rights gave its verdict in the case of a Moldovan citizen, Talgat Mashaev, who in 2004 was found guilty of practising a religion not registered by the state. In his application addressed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Mr Mashaev stated that the police had entered private premises, where he and a group of Muslims were praying, and dispersed them. He also stated that, on 9 March 2004, the Court of Appeal in Chisinau rejected his appeal without offering any compelling reasons and without inviting him to participate in the hearings. The ECtHR found in his favour.10 There have also been cases when the police, security and immigration officials have required Muslims to present their identity documents after Friday prayers. 3


People of Muslim ethnic background (Azeris, Tajiks, Tatars, Turks, Turkmens, Uzbeks) are entitled to express and develop their cultural and religious identity under the Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations No. 382-XV of 19 July 2001. According to this Law, representatives of ethnic/national minorities have the right to create educational, cultural, religious, and charitable associations and societies which are officially registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Moldova and have the status of public organisations. Active organisations include: the Organisation of the Tatar Community of the Republic of Moldova “Idel”, the Tatar Association of the Republic of Moldova “Tugan-tel”, 10 http://www.menneskeret.dk/files/DoekerPDF/CASE_OF_MASAEV_v._MOLDOVA.pdf, accessed 12 February 2010.

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the Cultural Centre of the Azeris of the Republic of Moldova “Azeri”, the Moldova-Azerbaijan Organisation for Cooperation, and the Uzbek Community of the Republic of Moldova.11 Mr Talgat Mashaev (see sect. 2 above) has founded the public association Gardens of Peace (Grădinile Liniştii), which organises Islamic activities (village Rezeni, district Ialoveni, MD 7727, phone 079156707). 4


There are at least three premises in the capital where Islamic worship takes place, attended by both Moldovan citizens and foreign residents, but, since Muslim groups have not acquired legal status, their activities are not transparent. Some reports indicate that financial support from abroad contributes towards the rent and maintenance of Muslim prayer houses. and that students and immigrants from Muslim countries perform the function of imams.12 5


During the Communist period (1944–1989), the educational system and the official statements presented a negative image of the “many centuries yoke of the Ottoman enslavers” compared with positive presentations of Russia and the “liberating” Russian army.13 Today, the Moldovan educational system and mass media are attempting to revise these descriptions of relations with the Ottoman Empire and evaluations of the RomanianTurkish military confrontations are more balanced. History textbooks cover religious, cultural and everyday life in the Islamic world.14 Under the Law on Education No. 547 of 21 July 1995, state education is secular. The Law also makes ‘moral-spiritual education’

11

http://www.bri.gov.md/md/lista_OEC.pdf, accessed 12 February 2010. Jurnal de Chişinău, no. 147, 12 September, 2002. 13 Russev, E., “Jugul otoman în Moldova (The Ottoman yoke in Moldova)”, in Enciclopedia Sovietică Moldovenească (Chişinău: Academia de Ştiinţe a Republicii Sovietice Socialiste Moldoveneşti, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 520–521; Dragnev, D. and P. Sovetov, Istoria RSS Moldoveneşti, manual pentru elevii claselor a VII–VIII–a (History of the Moldavian SSR. Textbook for 7th–8th grades) (Chişinău: Lumina, 1983), pp. 38–144. 14 Parasca, Pavel et al., Istoria românilor. Epoca antică şi medievală, manual pentru clasa a X-a, ciclul liceal (History of Romanians. The Ancient and Medieval Epochs. Textbook for 10th grade, lycée level) (Chişinău: Asociaţia Istoricilor din Republica Moldova, 2002), pp. 95–113. 12

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compulsory in state primary schools and optional at secondary and university levels. The textbooks and the materials used for this subject are mostly based on the Christian religion, though there are references to other religious systems, including Islam.15 Religious education in schools only takes place with the agreement of parents and depends on the availability of the necessary funds. 6


There are no Islamic theological institutes in Moldova. The Moldova State University, Ion Creangă State University of Education and the Free International University of Moldova offer courses that deal with the Muslim countries in their history departments. Turkey, which has a special interest in the southern area of Moldova, where there is a predominantly Gagaus population, offers scholarships for study in Turkish universities, supports the University of Comrat and Turkish language programmes, funds publications, cultural events (music festivals, concerts) and cultural institutions (libraries, museums) giving priority to the autonomous region of Gagauz Yeri.16 The Turkish state also contributes to the organisation of academic gatherings (conferences, symposia) in the field of history.17 However, none of these activities has a specifically religious dimension. 7


According to the Law on Religions and their Component Parts, only the officially registered religions have the right to their own spaces in public cemeteries. The procedures for creating, maintaining and dis-

15

Cara, Angela and Tatiana Niculcea, Educaţia moral-spirituală, manual pentru clasa a IV-a (Moral-Spiritual Education, textbook for the 4th grade) (Chişinău: Univers Pedagogic, 2005), p. 60. 16 Flux. Cotidian naţional, vol. 181, no. 380, 10 October 1998; Kišinevskij obozrevatel’, vol. 44, no. 370, 5 December 2002; Glasul Naţiunii, vol. 21, no. 31, 16 June 2005. 17 75 de ani de la proclamarea Republicii Turcia. Conferinţa ştiinţifică internaţională moldo-turcă, organizată de Catedra de Istorie Universală Contemporană a Universităţii de Stat din Moldova şi de Ambasada Turciei la Chişinău, 15 mai 1998 (75th anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. International scholarly MoldoTurkish conference organised by the Modern World History Department of Moldova State University and the Embassy of Turkey in Moldova, 15 May 1998) (Chişinău: USM, 1998).

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continuing cemeteries are stipulated in the government Regulations on Cemeteries. There are no Islamic cemeteries or distinct Islamic burial sections in the cemeteries belonging to other religious communities. The Muslim dead are usually buried in Orthodox Christians cemeteries. Difficulties arise in relation to the positioning of graves as, according to Islamic custom, the dead should lie facing Mecca, unlike the East-West positioning used in Orthodox cemeteries. Muslims complain that this means they have to pay for double or extended sites for their graves.18 8


The Law on Religions, in force since 2007, includes the right of religions to conduct worship in orphanages, homes for the elderly and disabled, in prisons, in medical and educational institutions, in police stations and other types of institutions, at the request of the people residing or detained there, and with the agreement of the administration of the respective institutions. So long as no Muslim religious organisations have been registered, Muslims do not have access to these rights. 9

Religious Festivals

Islamic religious celebrations are organised in private. Muslims and non-Muslims who are close to the hosts are invited to participate. Staff in educational institutions that have Muslim students from abroad report that they take account of the fasting practices of Muslim students during Ramadan and reduce homework in this period.19 10

Halal Food

In the main cities there are numerous establishments, including famous luxury restaurants, that serve traditional Turkish and Arab halal food.

18

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor International Religious Freedom Report 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127325.htm, accessed 12 February 2010. 19 Personal interviews conducted by the author.

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Dress Codes

Women wearing hijab can sometimes be observed in public places. These are Moldovan women married to Muslims or women who have come to Moldova from Islamic countries with their husbands. The authorities do not allow the Muslim women to be photographed wearing a headscarf for official documents. 12


Under the Law on Religions and their Component Parts, only religious institutions have the right to publish for their members, and to purchase, import, export and spread religious literature. Publishing and printing houses, radio and TV stations and publications can be owned by religious bodies. The situation for Muslims is ambiguous. On the one hand, because the Islamic religion is not recognised by the state, the believers cannot enjoy the same rights as religions registered as legal entities. On the other hand, Islamic literature brought from abroad (for example, published by Muslim organisations in Ukraine (Odessa, Kiev)) circulates freely and the authorities do not control or hinder this process. 13

Family Law

The Family Code, adopted by Parliament on 26 October 2000, includes monogamy in the range of principles on which family relations are based. To be legal a marriage has to be performed according to the civil regulations. Religious weddings have no legal standing. Men from Muslim countries frequently marry local women. Foreign citizens and people without citizenship enjoy the same rights and responsibilities in family relations as Moldovan citizens. 14


No available data. 15


Local magazines and newspapers occasionally debate topics connected with the Muslim presence in Moldova, and issues related to

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the situation of foreign students and intellectuals from majority Muslim countries temporarily resident in the country.20 Prestigious cultural journals (Contrafort, Sud-Est) have published numerous articles and even whole issues dedicated to Islamic teachings, literature and art. They have also focused on contemporary problems related to the Islamic world, especially in 2002–2003. The mass-media pay regular attention to the activities of foreign diplomats and businessmen. Events and topics presented by political analysts and local journalists about international Islam provoke serious discussions, and sometimes rather heated debates in these publications.21 16


The foreign students mark the national holidays of their countries on the premises of the universities where they study. The 9th Festival of Ethnicities of Moldova took place on 20 September 2009 and representatives of all the significant ethnic/national minorities in the country took part. The festival is organised by the ethno-cultural communities with the support of the local public administration and the Department of Interethnic Relations22 and features exhibitions of handcrafts, national cuisine and folk music and dance. The ethno-cultural associations of the Azeris, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, etc. organise impressive annual spring festivals. These initiatives are often supported by the diplomatic missions which represent the ‘historical’ or actual country of origin of the participants.

20 Interview with the Iranian artist, Ojan Shirozhan, who has been a professor in Moldova since 2004, in Axa, revistă de politică, cultură şi spiritualitate, no. 13 (2009), pp. 16–17. 21 http://www.flux.md/articole/7359/, accessed 12 February 2010. 22 Moldova Suverană, vol. 171, no. 774, 22 September 2009; Capitala, vol. 60, no. 940, 23 September 2009.

MONTENEGRO Omer Kajoshaj1 1

Muslim Populations

The last official census in Montenegro was in 2003, three years before the independence referendum, at a time of political and social turmoil. Its results are therefore contested today by many actors including the Islamic community. The first results of the census showed that 21% of a total population of 680,000 were Muslims, but after several reviews and corrections, the number dropped to 17.7% of a total population of 620,145. The next census will be held in 2011. Some Muslim estimates put the current number of Muslims at more than 750,000. They are divided into three main groups: Albanians, Bosniaks and Muslims ‘by nationality’. Albanians live mostly in the south-east of the country, while Bosniaks live mostly in the north. The smallest group—those who retain the name ‘Muslims’ on the basis of their nationality, a concept created in Tito’s Yugoslavia—are found mostly in the south-east and central region of the country. Although the nationalities of the majority of Montenegrin Muslims are associated with the neighbouring countries, Albania and Bosnia, they are indigenous people who embraced Islam, mostly during the time of Ottoman Empire. The history of Muslims in Montenegro can be divided into six periods: the first contact with Islam during the eighth and ninth centuries, when African-Arab sailors came to the Montenegrin coast for trade; the coming of the Ottomans and the Islamisation of the Balkans (fifteenth century); the expansion of the Montenegrin state to Muslim-inhabited areas in the 1876–78 war and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1917–1920); the Communist period (1945–1990); and the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia

1 Omer Halil Kajoshaj is Director of the Foreign Department, Islamic Community in Montenegro. He is also the Chairman of the NGO, Horizoti—Center for Cross Cultural Understanding. He is a graduate of the International Islamic University, Malaysia, Department of Communication and has published several articles on religion, society and politics in local and foreign newspapers.

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(1991–1995); finally resulting in Montenegrin independence in 2006. The end of the nineteenth century and the whole of the twentieth were tragic for the Muslims of Montenegro. They experienced persecution, exodus, assimilation, anti-religious policies and continuous discrimination. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the establishment of independent Montenegro are considered by many local Muslims to be a new beginning; more than 90% of the Muslim population are believed to have voted for independence in the referendum in 2006. 2

Islam and the State

Montenegro is a secular state. There is no state religion, religion is separated from the state, and religious communities are regarded equally (Montenegrin constitution, art. 14). Although the government assists religious communities financially, the funding available is insignificant when compared with their needs, especially in the case of the Islamic community, all of whose waqf properties were confiscated during the Communist period. 3


The Muslims of Montenegro are organised as one community through the Islamic Community in Montenegro (Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori, Ul. Gojka Radonjića 54, PF 42; 20000 Podgorica, tel.: +38220622408, fax: +38220623812, www.islam.org.me), which is divided into 14 regional committees. The headquarters of the Community is in the capital, Podgorica. The Mashihat of the Islamic Community (Mešihat Islamske zajednice) is the main administrative body that coordinates the activities of all fourteen regions. The Chief Mufti (Reis) is the president of the Islamic Community and is elected every six years. The current Chief Mufti is Rifat Fejzić, elected in 2003 at the age of 29 and the youngest Mufti in Balkans.

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Over five centuries of Muslim rule, 162 mosques were built2 on the territory of present-day Montenegro, of which 90 were destroyed in the first half of the twentieth century. During the 1980s, mosques began to be rebuilt and 48 new mosques had been built by 2008. Today there are 124 mosques including one of the most beautiful in the Balkans, the Husein Pasha Mosque, built in 1569 in the city of Pljevlja, and the biggest mosque, the Sultan Murat Mosque in Rožaje, rebuilt in 2008. One of the oldest mosques in the Balkans was the Mariner Mosque in the city of Ulcinj, said to have been built by African Arab traders in the fourteenth century, which was completely destroyed in 1931 and is now under reconstruction. The official opening is expected to be in summer of 2010. 5


The teaching of religion is not included in the public education system in any form. One reason remains the ongoing conflict between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, a conflict in which the government is trying not to be publicly involved. The primary teaching of Islam in Montenegro is performed by local imams in maktabs, classrooms close to or in mosques, and is attended on a voluntary basis. The first Islamic high school, the Madrasa, opened in 2008, is the only institution that provides confessional Islamic education at secondary level. The last school of its kind had previously been closed by the Montenegrin authorities in 1918. The curriculum is comparable to the state curriculum, with additional religious subjects. The school is regarded as the most important project of the Islamic Community in Montenegro. The school is recognised by the government but is still in the process of full integration into the governmental education system. It grants a high school diploma which allow graduates to enroll in any faculty at state or private universities. Currently, it has only male pupils but the Islamic Community is working on extending the building to establish a girls’ school. 2 Agović, Bajro, Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori (Islamic Community in Montenegro), (Podgorica: Mešihat Islamske zajednice, 2007), p. 71.

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There are no institutes of higher education which teach Islam. 7


Generally, in all villages, towns and cities where Muslims live there are separate Muslim cemeteries and almost all Muslims practise traditional Islamic burial. However, in some cemeteries, especially in urban centres, where religion was weakest during the Communist period, Muslim graves look more like Christian tombs or mausoleums. 8


Generally speaking, there are no ‘chaplaincies’ in state institutions. However, some exceptions have been made in recent years and in the main state prison, for instance, an imam nominated by the Mashihat has led the ‘Id (bayram) prayers. 9

Religious Festivals

The two ‘Ids (bayrams) are official holidays, and workers are granted two days’ leave for each in both the public and the private sector. 10

Halal Food

The concept of halal food is widely accepted among the Muslims of Montenegro. Moreover, after the signing of a cooperation agreement between the Islamic Community of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in August 2009, which extended the Halal Quality Certification Agency’s coverage to the territory of Montenegro, several Montenegrin daily newspapers have reported on halal food. Gradina Company in Rozaje, Mesopromet in Bijelo Polje, and Sahovic Company in Podgorica have so far applied for halal certification. However, they are not the only providers of halal meat, because private slaughter is widely practised. In the main cities and towns where Muslim live, several restaurants provide halal meals.

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Dress Codes

Although there are no specific rules restricting or prohibiting Muslim female dress, whether in the public or private sector, there are no known cases of women who wear it to work in the public sector, including studying in universities and schools, so the reaction of the authorities cannot be predicted. However, there are positive indications that upcoming laws and regulations will respect the rights of Muslim women. The new law on personal identity documents provide that any citizen who wears a hat or a headscarf for national or religious reasons may have ID photographs taken wearing the hat or headscarf.3 12


The main Muslim magazine is Elif, the periodical of the Islamic Community in Montenegro. The first nine issues were published in 1990– 1992 and it resumed publication in October 2004. By February 2010, 64 issues had been published in all. It is a 24-page bilingual monthly with 19 pages in Bosnian and 5 pages in Albanian. In addition, the Islamic Community has published several religious books, both original and translated, by prominent Muslim scholars, and its website www.islam.org.me also provides regular news and information. 13

Family Law

The law is secular and all family matters are referred to the civil courts. Marriage is legally acknowledged only after civil registration; however, Muslims conduct a parallel religious marriage ceremony (which is not recognised by the state). The religious marriage ceremony, with the fixing of the mahr, takes place before a local imam in the presence of relatives of the groom and bride. 14


No activities reported. 3

Službeni list Crne Gore (Official Gazette of Montenegro), no. 12/07.

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On 2 December 2009. during his two-day official visit to Montenegro, the Turkish President Abdullah Gül, accompanied by Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic visited the Madrasa. This was preceded by the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in July 2009. The media reported on these visits in positive terms, which gave a high credibility and a positive reputation to the Islamic Community and its current leadership. 16


At the time of the two ‘Ids and the mawlid, events are held in the local cultural centres and mosques in several towns (Bijelo Polje, Rožaje, Podgorica, Ulcinj). Religious concerts (ilahija) and nashids on the occasion of the Muslim new year are becoming common festivals for Muslims.

NETHERLANDS Martijn de Koning1 1

Muslim Populations

After the Dutch East Indies (1949) and Surinam achieved independence, a large number of immigrants came to the Netherlands from those countries. However, the largest groups of Muslims are migrants from Turkey and Morocco, who were recruited as labourers during the 1960s and 1970s, and their descendants. A large number of those from Turkey are Kurds. Other large Muslim groups have arrived later from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. Most of them are asylum seekers who were persecuted in their home country and/or fled because of violence there. A small group of asylum seekers fled to the Netherlands because of their political-religious activities in countries such as Egypt and Syria; five of them continue their activities in the Netherlands and are considered to be ‘radical’ imams. Earlier assessments by Statistics Netherlands provided estimates of Muslim numbers based on ethnic origins,2 but in 2005 and 2006 a new methodology was introduced that was based upon selfidentification surveys3 and this has led to a new assessment of the numbers. According to the 2007 figures, there are 857,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, of whom 318,000 are Turkish-Dutch, 297,000 are Moroccan-Dutch, and 12,000 native Dutch converts.4

1 Martijn de Koning is a post-doctoral researcher at Radboud University in Nijmegen. His PhD thesis (2008) was entitled “Searching for a ‘true’ Islam: Religious beliefs and identity formation among Moroccan-Dutch youth”. He has studied anthropology and his research focuses on Islamic movements, public religion and Muslim youth. See also http://religionresearch.org/martijn. 2 Phalet, Karen and Jessica Ter Wal, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureay, 2004). 3 Herten, Marieke van and Ferdy Otten, “Naar een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland (Towards a new estimate of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands)”, Bevolkingstrends, 2007, pp. 48–57. 4 Statistics Netherlands, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/ publicaties/artikelen/archief/2007/2007–2278–wm.htm, accessed 10 March 2009. For more on converts in the Netherlands, see Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Gender, conversion, and Islam. A comparison of online and offline conversion narratives”, in Nieuwkerk,

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Besides Sunni Muslims, there are also Shi’is, Alevis and Ahmadis. The Shi’i Muslims are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora, but it should be noted that they often have a secular outlook with little sympathy for the Islamic regime in Iran.5 Alevi Muslims form an important section of the Turkish-Kurdish community. Among the Surinamese Muslims, the Ahmadi-Lahore community is well represented and very active, with its own mosques and national organisation and very sympathetic press reviews, which present them as ‘liberal’ Muslims. Turkish migrants are divided along other lines: the Milli Görüş movement, the Nurçu and the Suleymançis all have strong networks in Dutch society. Most Muslims live in the west of the Netherlands, in the migrant areas of the so-called Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Several smaller cities in the east and the south also have relatively large Muslim populations (usually with either Moroccan-Dutch or Turkish-Dutch Muslims dominating), because of the labour intensive industries that used to operate there. Unemployment among Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch Muslims is high compared with native Dutch people. The recent economic crisis led to a significant growth in unemployment in 2009 (11%) among non-Western migrants (including Muslims) and their descendants compared with 8% in 2008 (8%) and 3% and 4% for native Dutch in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Unemployment among the non-Western population was highest in the age category 15−25, rising in one year from 5% to 19%. Notwithstanding this crisis, unemployment rates among female non-Western migrants are significantly lower than in the 1990s, although they remain particularly vulnerable because of their relatively low educational level and because many of them have flexible contracts.6

K. van (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 95–120; Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Biography and choice: Female converts to Islam in the Netherlands,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 19, no. 4 (2008), pp. 431–447. 5 Hessels, Thomas, Iraniërs in Nederland, een profiel (Iranians in the Netherlands, a profile) (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002), available at http://www.justitie.nl/images/Iraniers_in_Nederland_tcm74–38879_ tcm34–18120.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009; Ghorashi, Halleh, Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the US (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). 6 Statistics Netherlands, ‘More non-western immigrants unemployed due to recession’ CBS Webmagazine, http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/arbeid-sociale-zek-

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Since 1986, non-nationals have voting rights in municipal elections if they have been legally resident in the Netherlands for five years or more. The migrant turn-out rates at municipal elections are very diverse. The turn-out of immigrants in Rotterdam has increased in every election since 1994, while in Amsterdam it declined between 1994 and 1998 but seems to have recovered in 2006.7 The Hague has one Islamic party, the Islam-Democrats (Islam-Democraten, ID), which is represented on the municipal council. However, Muslim organisations have generally been involved in trying to protect specific rights, such as the wearing of headscarves by women and the establishment of Islamic schools.8 2

Islam and the State

The Netherlands does not have a state religion nor does it have a policy of officially recognising religious denominations. However, the relationship between the Dutch state and religion has always been characterised by extensive involvement of the state with religious expression in public life. In 1917, for example, the settlement of the ‘education struggle’ meant the passage of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, establishing full state funding for religious (Christian) schools and safeguarding the freedom of those schools to determine their curricula. With this settlement, the foundation for what is known as ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling) was laid.9 Society was deeply divided into distinct and mutually antagonistic religious and ideological groups, but the overarching cooperation of ‘pillarisation’ at the elite level and maximum autonomy for each group was what made stable democracy

erheid/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009–2965–wm.htm?Languageswitch=on, accessed 17 November 2009 7 Heelsum, Anja van, “Turn out and party choice in the local elections in the Netherlands”, 2006, available at http://users.fmg.uva.nl/avanheelsum/paperelections2006. pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 8 Koning, Martijn de, “Understanding the ‘others’: Salafi politics in the Netherlands”, in Amel Boubekeur and Olivier Roy (eds), Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam (London: Hurst, forthcoming). 9 Kennedy, James and Markha Valenta, “Religious pluralism and the Dutch state: Reflections on the future of article 23”, in W.B.H.J. van de Donk et al. (eds), Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (Religiosity in the Public Domain: Explorations of a Double Transformation) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 337–338.

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possible.10 Although the country has gradually moved towards a more secular model since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have been able use those parts of the ‘pillar’ model under which religious organisations were considered legitimate forms of representation and community organisation. Muslims have the same rights as other religious groups and, if they comply with the same principles as those applied to other religious groups, such as Christians, they can achieve recognition of their claims (although often after considerable struggle). In recent years, Islam has become increasingly politicised, which affects relations with the state in the public arena. In particular, the rise of the populist leader Pim Fortuyn in 2001 and 2002 contributed to making a hard line position on Islam more salient.11 Instead of pacifying Islam, several opinion leaders such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali argued for a more confrontational style in the public Islam debate, claiming the right to insult Muslims’ religious convictions and feelings, for example, and, with director Theo Van Gogh, made the film Submission I.12 Van Gogh was murdered and Hirsi Ali received numerous death threats and went into hiding for several weeks. Muslims’ attempts to participate in public life faced increasing difficulties after 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, with controversies over the building of large mosques in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the wearing of niqab, and other issues that are seen as symbols of the Islamisation of public life. This has not, however, led to policy measures forbidding the building of large mosques.13 3


There have been several attempts by both Muslims and the Dutch to establish a single representative body for all Muslims in Netherlands. Most of them have failed because of internal religious differences

10 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 11 Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents in the Netherlands (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 12 Leeuw, M. de and S. van Wichelen, “ ‘Please, go wake up!’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘war on terror’ in the Netherlands”, Feminist Media Studies, vol. 5, no. 3 (2005), pp. 325–340. 13 Maussen, Marcel, “Constructing mosques: The governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands”, PhD diss., Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 2009.

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among Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and between Sunni and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and because the Dutch authorities have refused to cooperate with associations that have emerged, considering then not representative enough of the general Muslim population. After several incidents— for example, when imams have given controversial opinions about homosexuality, and in particular after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim—pressure from the Dutch state for Muslim organisations to unite under one umbrella increased significantly. First, the Muslim Contact Agency (Contact Moslims Overheid, CMO, Koninginnegracht 63, 2514 AG Den Haag, Postbus 85518, 2508 CE Den Haag, http://www.cmoweb.nl) was established, but the Turkish and Moroccan Sunni organisations excluded the Ahmadiyya organisations. The CMO unites five Turkish organisations: Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN, Javastraat 2, 2585 AM Den Haag, http://www.diyanet.nl ), Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie, TICF, Afrikaanderplein 40, 3072 EC Rotterdam, http://www.ticf.nl ), both sections of the Milli Görüş movement, and the Foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, SICN Suleymanci, Van Lieflandlaan 3, 3571 AA Utrecht, www.sicn .nl). The CMO also includes the Union of Moroccan Mosque Organizations The Netherlands (Unie van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties Nederland, UMMON, Weesperzijde 74, 1091 EH Amsterdam, Postbus 94384), the Surinamese-Hindustani World Islamic Mission (WIM, Iqra Moskee, Hoogoord 257, 1102 CN Amsterdam, http://www.wimnet.org, http://www.worldislamicmission.nl), and the Shi’ite Association (Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging, OSV, Postbus 1113, 3260 AC Oud-Beijerland, http://www.shiaparlement.com), which is mainly Iraqi Shi’a. These organisations claim to represent 369 mainly Sunni mosques and about 500,000 Muslims. Later two other umbrella groups were established: the Contact Group Islam (Contact Groep Islam, CGI, Paul Krugerlaan 16, 2571 HK’s-Gravenhage), which includes Sunni, Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and the Dutch Muslim Council (Nederlandse Moslim Raad, NMR), a national Sunni organisation, Ahmadiyya Muslims and Alevi Muslims. The CMO and the CGI now both function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Minister of Integration and Immigration where the Dutch government consults and informs them. During the debate about Geert Wilders’ film Fitna, the CMO and CGI and their various member organisations played an

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important role in establishing dialogue between Muslims and Dutch civil society organisations and with local and national authorities. However, the CMO, CGI and their member organisations do not have much credibility among Muslim youth, who regard them as cliques of first generation men and see them as too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islam politicians.14 There are several other national organisations including Al Nisa, the national organisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands (Stichting Al Nisa, Postbus 9, 3500 AA Utrecht, http://www.alnisa.nl ), and the Association of Imams in The Netherlands (Vereniging van Imams in Nederland, VIN, Van der Vennestraat 20, 2525 CG Den Haag, http:// www.imamonline.nl), which has 110 members, mostly of Moroccan descent. Both are Sunni. Islam and Dialogue (Rochussenstr. 221–223, 3021 NT Rotterdam) and Dialogue Academy (Rochussenstraat 221, 3021 NT Rotterdam) are both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement. Ihsan (Dr. Cuyperslaan 51, 5622 MA Eindhoven http:// www.ihsannet.nl) is a social work organisation active at the national level. The Islamic Women’s Network (Landelijk Islamitisch vrouwennetwerk, LIVN, http://www.livn.nl) is particularly active in activities aimed at interreligious dialogue and the emancipation of women. Hizb ut Tahrir (http://www.kalifaat.org) aims at uniting Muslims in one state and reviving the caliphate, but does not seem to be a strong organisation, although they do get a lot of exposure because of particular actions, such as the campaigns against Geert Wilders’ Fitna. The Foundation Islamic Committee of Ahlu Sunnah (Stichting Islamitische Comité van Ahlu-Sunnah) is a Salafi foundation including As Soennah Mosque in The Hague (As Soennah Mosque, Fruitweg 5–9, 2525 KE Den Haag, http://www.al-yaqeen.com) and El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (El Tawheed Mosque, Jan Hanzenstr. 114, 1053 SV Amsterdam, http://www.eltawheed.nl ). Together with other

14 Koning, Martijn de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Searching for a ‘Pure’ Islam: Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Ketner, Susan, Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grond: Exploratie, bindingenen identiteitsstrategieën van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst (Moroccan Roots, Dutch Soil: Exploration, Belonging and Identity Strategies of Youth of Moroccan Descent) (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008).

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Salafi networks these organisations have become the most important targets of counter-radicalisation.15 4


The general policy framework on mosques is usually set by the state, but its implementation is a local matter and this means that there are wide variation between municipalities. For example, some municipalities have in the past funded social and cultural activities run by mosques, while in other cities such activities receive no funds.16 Plans to build large mosques in Rotterdam and Amsterdam have caused much debate.17 Resistance to mosques seems to be largely unrelated to the kind of mosque that is planned. Features such as the minaret

15 NCTb (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding [National Coordinator Counterterrorism]), Salafisme in Nederland (Salafism in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2008); AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst [General Intelligence and Security Service]), Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2006); Koning, Martijn de, “Changing worldviews and friendship: An exploration of the life stories of two female Salafists in the Netherlands”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 372–392; Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland (Home Grown Warriors: Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 16 Landman, Nico, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (From Rug to Minaret: The Institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1992); Koning, Martijn de, “Institutionele grenzen: De hulpverlening van RCJ/Het Woonhuis en moskee Nour (Institutional boundaries: The social work of RCJ/Het Woonhuis and the An Nour mosque)”, Sociale Interventie, vol. 11 (2002), pp. 5–14. 17 Eric Roose, The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-commissioned Mosque Design in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009); Landman, Nico and Wendy Wessels, “The visibility of mosques in Dutch towns”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1125–1140; Maussen, Marcel, Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research working papers series (Amsterdam: ASSR, 2005); Lindo, Flip, Heilige wijsheid in Amsterdam:Ayasofi a stadsdeel De Baarsjes en de strijd om het Riva terrein (Sacred Wisdom in Amsterdam: Ayasofi a City Area De Baarsjes and the Struggle for the Riva Terrain) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999); Sunier, Thijl, “The Western mosque: Space in physical place”, ISIM [Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World] Review, no. 18 (2006), pp. 22–23.

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or the call to prayer are negotiable and restrictions are usually already taken into account in the initial plans.18 Of the over 450 mosques in the Netherlands, 245 are affiliated to Turkish organisations (particularly Diyanet with 140 mosques, the Milli Görüş with 35 mosques and the Suleymancis with 38 mosques) and 150 are run by Muslims of Moroccan descent. The Surinamese community has 25 mosques, controlled by the World Islamic Mission (headquarters in Bradford, UK), which have a Hanafi Barelvi orientation. In the past they have been hostile to Ahmadiyya Muslims (also mainly of Surinamese descent), who have five mosques. Other communities, such as the Somalis, have also established their own organisations and have 62 mosques.19 Most research shows a decline in mosque attendance since 2000. Whether this points to secularisation is questionable. Among second-generation Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, going to a mosque for prayer is increasing since 2002 (while between 1998 and 2002 it was decreasing).20 5


There are 41 Islamic schools within the public education system, two secondary and the rest primary. This is 0.6% of all primary schools in the Netherlands, and they have a total of 7,500 pupils (0.5% of all the pupils in the Netherlands or 5% of all the pupils of immigrant origin). Like public schools and all other schools established by religious groups, they are funded by the state and come completely under the Dutch system of freedom of education and financial equality between confessional schools and public schools. The Islamic character of the schools is evident in their Islamic ethos, including Islamic religious education, Muslim festivals, prayer rooms and so on. The school cur-

18 Sunier, “The Western mosque”; Landman and Wessels, “The visibility of mosques”. 19 Douwes, Dick, Martijn de Koning and Welmoet Boender, Nederlandse moslims: Van migrant tot burger (Dutch Muslims: From Migrant to Citizen) (Amsterdam: Salomé/Amsterdam University Press, 2005). 20 See Phalet, Karen, Merové Gijsberts and Louk Hagendoorn, “Migration and religion: Testing the limits of secularisation among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands 1998–2005”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie vol. 48 (2008) pp. 412–436. Gijsberts, Merové and Jaco Dagevos, Jaarrapport Integratie (Annual Integration Report) (The Hague: Sociaal-Cultureel Planbureau, 2009).

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riculum is the same as in other confessional and public schools. There have been reports by the Ministry of Education for several years now about problems in Islamic schools with regard to the educational regime and in some cases problems with anti-integration content and suspicions of financial mismanagement.21 Public schools are not obliged to offer Islamic lessons to their pupils. However, if the parents submit a request for Islamic lessons, public schools have to comply and offer such lesson within the regular curriculum. The same applies for religious education for Christian children or others. External teachers provide these lessons. Religious lessons in public schools are financed by religious institutions (designated by municipalities as religious outreach organisations) but can be subsidised by municipalities as well, although this often is not the case. 6


After long discussions between Muslim organisations and the Dutch state, two mainstream academic centres for imam training were established in 2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Free University (VU) University Amsterdam, and the Theology Department of the University of Leiden.22 The Institute for Higher Vocational Studies in Amsterdam has its own vocational degree (HBO) programme for teacher training. All of the institutions cooperate with the national umbrella organisations, the CMO and CGI. Academic courses on Islamic and/or Middle East studies are offered at Utrecht University, Leiden University, University of Amsterdam and Radboud University Nijmegen. Several universities, such as VU

21 Driessen, Geert and M.S. Merry, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or marginalization”, Interchange, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 201–223; Driessen, Geert and P. Valkenberg, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Compromising between identity and quality”, British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 23, no. 1 (2000), pp. 15–26. 22 Landman, Nico, Imamopleiding in Nederland: Kansen en Knelpunten. Eindrapportage van een terreinverkenning in opdracht van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (Imam Education in the Netherlands: Opportunities and Bottlenecks. Final Report of an Exploratory Study on Behalf of the Ministery of Education, Culture and Sciences) (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1996); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Islamic religious education in the Netherlands”, European Education, vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 76–88. Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Nederland: Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands: Opinions about his Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007).

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University Amsterdam and Radboud University, have set up their own institutes for religious studies. There are two Islamic (Sunni) universities, the Islamic University of Rotterdam (associated with the Gülen movement) and the European Islamic University (also in Rotterdam), but they are not officially recognised as universities. In addition, Muslims have also set up several other institutes for higher learning, such as the Sunni Dar al Ilm in Amsterdam and Al Islah in Lochem (affiliated to Tabligh Jama’at). It is not clear how many people follow courses in these institutes. The courses are intended for people who want to increase their knowledge of Islamic traditions and use it in their personal lives. 7


In 1991 the Law on Disposal of the Dead (Wet op de Lijkbezorging) was amended to allow Muslims to bury their dead within 24 hours and without a coffin. Funeral rituals of Muslim migrants have changed since their migration.23 Parts of the ritual, such as the washing of the body, are performed in hospitals, the mosque or in the room where the funeral service takes place, rather than in people’s homes. In 2007, the Organisation of Cemetaries (Landelijk Organisatie van Begraafplaatsen) published a handbook for Islamic burials.24 There are more than 70 Islamic burial sites within municipal cemeteries. None of these sites are managed by Islamic institutions. The Islamic Burial Society (Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen IBw) is currently negotiating with local authorities for the founding of one or more dedicated Islamic cemeeries.25

23 Dessing, Nathal M., Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Marriage and Death among Muslims in the Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001). 24 Handboek Islamitisch Begraven (Handbook Islamic Burials), 2007 (see http:// www.begraafplaats.nl/publicaties, accessed 1 May 2010). 25 Wojtkowiak, J. and G.A Wiegers, “Moslims doen het helemaal zelf. Veranderende islamitische uitvaartrituelen in Nederland (Muslims do it all themselves. Changing Islamic burial rituals in the Netherlands)”, in H.J.M. Venbrux, M. Heessels and S.H. Bolt (eds), Rituele Creativiteit (Ritual Creativity) (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2008), pp. 31–44.

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There are Muslim chaplains (geestelijk verzorgers) in several hospitals, prisons and homes for the elderly. Several universities have prayer rooms for Muslims, paid for by the universities. In 2009, the Dutch army recruited two Muslim (one Moroccan-Dutch and one TurkishDutch) clerics to give spiritual support to both Muslims and nonMuslims in the army. They are civilian employees but are required to wear uniform. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are widely celebrated in Muslim circles. ‘Id al-Fitr has in recent years become a public event since most mosques have opened their doors to celebrate the iftar meal with nonMuslims. Several of these iftar events take place under the umbrella of the Ramadan Festival, a series of lectures, debates, music events and so on, coupled with the iftar meal. There have been discussions about making ‘Id al-Fitr a national holiday, but there are as yet no serious plans to implement this. The different dates of ‘Id in the various Muslim ethnic groups make it difficult to set one date for a national holiday and some political parties strongly oppose these plans, calling them the ‘(self-)islamisation of Dutch society’. 10 Halal Food Almost every city with a Muslim minority has at least one or two halal butcher’s shops. The total number is not clear, but the butchers’ trade association estimates that there are about 3,500 butcher’s shops in the country, of which 10% are halal butchers. Under Dutch law, animals must be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but exceptions are made for Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter. This is opposed by some political parties and animal rights groups. Numerous shops and restaurants sell halal food. Several of the larger supermarket chains have special shelves with halal products. There have been attempts to produce a unified certification for halal food, but they have not so far been successful and there are currently a variety of certifi cations, such as the Halal Feed and Food Inspection

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Authority (Halal Voeding en Voedsel, HVV/HFFIA, Postbus 16786, 2500 BT Den Haag, http://www.halal.nl ) and Halal Correct Certification (HCC, P.B. 179, 2300 AD Leiden, http://www.halalcorrect.com), which is active in the Netherlands and France. 11

Dress Codes

The headscarf is an important issue in public debate and with regard to Muslim women’s religiosity and identity.26 Muslim girls and women are allowed to wear hijab in public schools and public institutions (including for lawyers) and companies, except for the police force and law court officials. Under certain conditions, Christian schools may forbid the wearing of hijab by pupils and staff. There are cases of women who have been refused jobs because of wearing a headscarf. The Commission for Equal Treatment usually regards these practices as unlawful. The decisions made by the commission are not binding and are to be seen as advice based upon its interpretation of the law. In recent years, the headscarf issue has been linked with concerns over social cohesion, integration and national identity.27 In 2003, the Ministry of Education prepared an optional dress guideline, but in 2005 parliament supported a resolution to ban the public use of the burqa. The cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht have proposed cutting social benefits

26 Buitelaar, Marjo, “Negotiating the rules of chaste behaviour: Re-interpretations of the symbolic complex of virginity by young women of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 462–489; Duits, Linda and Liesbeth Van Zoonen, “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicultural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117; Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (Detroit MI: Free Press, 2006); Bartels, Edien, ‘Eén dochter is beter dan duizend zonen’: Arabische vrouwen, symbolen en machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen (‘One Daughter is Better than a Thousand Sons’: Arab Women, Symbols and Power Constellations between the Sexes) (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel, 1993); Bartelink, Yvon, Vrouwen over Islam: Geloofsvoorstellingen en praktijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in Nederland (Brabant) (Women on Islam: Beliefs and Practices of Moroccan Female Migrants in the Netherlands (Brabant)) (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit, 1994); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Muslim dress in Europe: Debates on the headscarf ”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35–61. 27 Saharso, Sawitri and Doutje Lettinga, “Contentious citizenship: Policies and debates on the veil in the Netherlands”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 455–480.

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to unemployed women wearing a burqa, on the grounds that it makes them unemployable in a non-Muslim country.28 12


There are two Islamic broadcasting companies: the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Moslimomroep, NMO, Postbus 418, 1200 AK Hilversum, http://www.nmo.nl ) and the Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep, NIO, Sumatralaan 45 1217GP Hilversum, http://www.nioweb.nl ). They are both so-called ‘39f-broadcasters’, under rules for the state allocation of broadcasting time to specific religious institutions based upon their (estimated) constituency. The NMO and NIO have decided not to renew their licence for the period 2010–2015 after years of antagonistic relations between them. Five organisations applied for the licence for this period: 1. Netherlands Foundation for Muslim Broadcasting (Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland, SMON) an initiative of several national Moroccan-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch Islamic organisations. 2. Broadcasting Company Universal Muslim Association (Stichting Academica Islamica/Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie (OUMA). OUMA appears to want to focus mainly on Muslims as Dutch citizens and less on the migrant-perspective (which is what they claim SMON does). 3. Foundation Muslim Broadcasting Company (not to be confused with SMON). 4. Dutch Islamic Media. 5. Foundation Cooperation Islamic Umbrella. In December the licence was given to SMON because this initiative is thought to be better equipped to serve all four main currents of Islam in the Netherlands: Sunni, Shia, Ahmadiyya and Alevi. OUMA joined SMON before the official decision, so they are now part of the new

28 For more on face-veil controversies, see Moors, Annelies, “The Dutch and the face-veil: The politics of discomfort”, Social Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 4 (2009), pp. 393–408.

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Muslim broadcasting organisation. SMON wants to serve younger Muslims more than they claim the NIO and NMO did in the past. There are several small circulation magazines, such as the Al Nisa Maandblad (Al Nisa Monthly, http://www.alnisa.nl ), produced by the Al Nisa women’s organisation, which also publishes Anti Wa Anta, a quarterly magazine for children and As Siraata (for young women over 16). Wij Moslims (We Muslims) is published by Momtazah Publishers, one of the publishers that also produce books about Islam in Arabic, English and Dutch. There are bookstores, such as Boekhandel Nour and Islam Boeken (http://www.islam-boeken.nl ), which sell books on the internet. Time Media Group (related to the Fethullah Gülen Movement) publishes Zaman Nederland (http://www.zamanhollanda.nl ), a free monthly newspaper distributed among researchers, universities, Islamic institutions, policy makers and so on. The Ahmadiyya branch has its own monthly magazine, Al-Islaam (http://www.ahmadiyyaislam.nl). Hizb ut Tahrir publishes Expliciet (http://www.expliciet.nl ) four times a year. There are several mailing lists, discussion sites and mosques sites on the internet. One of the best known Dutch weblogs is Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay, http://www.wijblijvenhier.nl ) and another important meeting place for discussions about Islam and Muslims is Marokko.nl (http://www.marokko.nl).29 13

Family Law

There are no demands by Muslims for the establishment of Islamic family law. So-called ‘informal marriages’ take place, which are not sanctioned by law. Although no imam is required under Islamic law for a marriage to be contracted, imams, particularly Salafi imams, do play a central role. Since these marriage contracts are not recognised

29 Brouwer, Lenie, “Dutch-Muslims on the Internet: A new discussion platform”, Journal of Muslim Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–55; Koning, Martijn de, Identity in Transition. Connecting Online and Offline Internet Practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth (London: London Metropolitan University, Institute for the Study of European Transformations (ISET), 2008), available at http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/ londonmet/library/c52116_3.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. For an overview of the most important Dutch blogs see: http:/religionreserach.org/martijn/blogview.

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by law, there is no right to alimony in the case of separation, and people do not automatically inherit if one of the spouses dies. Polygamy is not recognised by law, although it has happened that polygamous marriages contracted outside the Netherlands have been registered. If a polygamist wishes to acquire Dutch citizenship and nationality, he must divorce all his wives but one. It is possible for couples to record their relationship in a contract witnessed by a notary as a so-called ‘co-habitation agreement’ which in theory leaves open the possibility for multiple partners. It is possible to deal with inheritance in the same way, by registering a will.30 Following debates in the UK, in June 2009 a debate was launched about the presence of ‘Shari’a courts’ in the Netherlands. After a Dutch television programme reported that Shari’a law is being practised in the Netherlands, for example with regard to informal marriages, several politicians and opinion leaders took up the issue and called for zero tolerance towards of ‘Shari’a courts’. Leiden University and Radboud University Nijmegen will conduct research into the prevalence of Islamic arbitration. Also in 2009, explorative research was carried out into informal Islamic marriages. Reliable figures on the prevalence of such marriages could not be given although an increase was observed. According to the report, this is related to increased religiosity and fundamentalism, but also to the general trend towards informality in relationships. Respondents in the empirical study make very clear that the number of Muslim marriages in mosques in the presence of an imam is decreasing.31 14 Interreligious Relations Interreligious dialogue, in the sense of planned and/or organised forms of communication between two or more persons with different (religious or secular) worldviews, is a long-standing tradition in the 30 Berger, Maurits, “Sharia in Nederland is vaak keurig Nederlands”, Mens en Maatschappij (People and Society), vol. 57, no. 6 (2007), pp. 507–510; Dessing, Rituals of Birth; Dessing, Nathal M., “An Islamic wedding in a Dutch living room”, ISIM Newsletter, no. 31 (2002). 31 Leun, J. van der and A Leupen, “Informal marriages in the Netherlands: An explorative research”, http://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/het-voorkomenvan-islamitische-huwelijken-zonder-voorafgaand-burgerlijk-huwelijk-in-nederland. aspx?cp=45&cs=6796, accessed 13 November 2009.

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Netherlands.32 The number of Islamic institutions specifically focused on interreligious dialogue has remained stable over recent years, but there is an increase in general Islamic institutions that also engage in interreligious dialogue (although not always labelled as such). More than 75% of the mosques in the Netherlands have been involved in small-scale dialogue activities—during an open day, for example. Many Islamic organisations are also involved in local councils for religion and worldviews, which include Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Bahai and other organisations (depending on the local circumstances). Islamic student associations such as Mashriq in The Hague and Rotterdam, and the Muslim Student Association (Moslim Studenten Vereniging) also engage in dialogue activities. National organisations such as Islam and Dialogue, Dialogue Academy (both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement), Al Nisa, Ihsan, the Dutch Muslim Council and the Islamic Women’s Network are among the most important organisations sponsoring larger dialogue activities, which range from debates and iftars to publishing books. The Ramadan Festival is by far the most important countrywide initiative, and several Islamic organisations have participated in celebrating the Liberation anniversary (5 May, commemorating the liberation and end of World War II), the Day of Dialogue in November and the Charter of Compassion (based upon the idea that the principle of compassion lies at the heart of all religious, ethical and spiritual traditions: http://www.charterofcompassion.org). The Islamic University of Rotterdam organised a dialogue meeting with academics from the Free University of Amsterdam entitled “Jesus and Muhammad”. Recently a group of five Christian, Jewish and Muslim women started an initiative for interreligious dialogue between women of the Abrahamic faiths (http://www.hagar-sarah.nl/). Interreligious themes also feature prominently on Dutch Islamic websites: Wij blijven hier (http://www.wijblijvenhier), IslamWijzer (http://www.islamwijzer.nl), Maroc.nl (http://www.maroc.nl ), Marokko.nl (http://www.marokko.nl) and Hababam (http://www

32 This definition is derived from Greco Idema/Bureau Intermonde. Much of the information here is provided by G. Idema and J. Slomp. See also for the period before 2000: Slomp, J., “Christians and religious pluralism in the Netherlands”, in Martin Forward, Stephen Plant and Susan White (eds), A Great Commission: Christian Hope and religious Diversity. Papers in Honour of Kenneth Cracknell on his 65th Birthday (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 200–223.

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.hababam.nl). Interreligious websites such as Nieuwwij.nl (http:// www.nieuwwij.nl) and Bruggenbouwers (Bridgebuilders, http://www .bruggenbouwers.com) also are important in mediating and promoting interreligious dialogue. Important dialogue publications from Islamic organisations include Erasmus and Gülen (published by Dialogue Academy and the House of Erasmus) and It’s the culture, I believe, as well 15 articles about misconceptions pertaining to Muslim faith and culture (LIVN). The current Islam debate, in which anti-Islam politicians and opinion leaders feature prominently, has led to an increase in interreligious dialogue activities and, contrary to the past, many of these activities no longer involve only highly educated people. 15


Geert Wilders’ Popular People’s Party (PVV) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) have initiated a debate about women wearing the burqa or niqab. They are seen as a sign of lack of integration (or even refusal to integrate), demeaning to women, and a threat to safety in the public domain, which are all issues of wider debate in relations to Islam.33 In February 2009, Wilders was invited to show his movie Fitna in the UK parliament building, but was refused access to the UK on the basis that he was considered a threat to public safety. Wilders made the journey, but was detained and sent back. The event was criticised by supporters and opponents of Wilders and the Dutch government. The decision to ban him was overturned and he visited the UK in the autumn. Wilders’ film Fitna and his anti-Islamic comments led several Muslim organisations, the Dutch anti-discrimination group ‘The Netherlands Shows Its Colours’ and others to take legal action in 2007. In June 2008, their attempts to prosecute Wilders under Dutch anti-hate speech laws failed. The public prosecuter stated that Wilders’ comments contributed to the debate on Islam in Dutch society and had been made outside parliament. “That comments are hurtful and offen-

33 Cf. Vellenga, Sipco, “The Dutch and British public debate on Islam: Responses to the killing of Theo van Gogh and the London bombings compared”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations , vol. 19, no. 4 (2008), pp. 449–471.

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sive for a large number of Muslims does not mean that they are punishable. Freedom of expression fulfils an essential role in public debate in a democratic society. That means that offensive comments can be made in a political debate.”34 The decision not to prosecute was overturned in January 2009. The judges argued: “In a democratic system, hate speech is considered so serious that it is in the general interest to . . . draw a clear line” and that “The court also considers appropriate criminal prosecution for insulting Muslim worshippers because of comparisons between Islam and Nazism made by Wilders.”35 The court case will take place in January 2010. Second generation, highly educated Moroccan-Dutch Muslims in particular are worried about the perceptions of Islam amongst native Dutch people. More than Turkish-Dutch Muslims, Moroccan-Dutch Muslims state that native Dutch people have far too negative a view of Islam and lack respect for Islamic culture. As a result, the most integrated members of the Moroccan-Dutch Muslim community also have the most negative perception of Dutch society; a phenomenon that can be described as the integration paradox. There are signs that the negative attitude among native Dutch towards Islam and Muslims (and migrants in general) may be slowly decreasing, although research also shows that in 2007 more native Dutch people than before believed that Muslims easily resort to violence.36 In August 2009, Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan was dismissed by the City of Rotterdam, for which he worked as ‘integration adviser’, and Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), where he was a professor. They maintained that the airing of his programme ‘Islam and Life’ by Iran’s Press TV was “irreconcilable” with his responsibilities in Rotterdam. According to the EUR, it could imply that he was endorsing the Iranian regime. Ramadan had previously been criticised in the Dutch press and by Dutch politicians for allegedly voicing more conservative views with Muslim audiences than he does in the West. In particular his view on homosexuality caused a stir after it was picked up by a Dutch special interest group focusing on homosexuals.

34 New York Times, “Holland declines to prosecute anti-Islam politican”, New York Times, 30 June 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/ europe/30iht-dutch.4.14108722.html?_r=1, accessed 12 November 2009. 35 BBC News, “Islam film Dutch MP to be charged”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/7842344.stm, accessed 12 November 2009. 36 Gijsberts and Dagevos, Jaarrapport Integratie.

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The most important cultural event is the Ramadan Festival held throughout the country during the month of Ramadan (http://www .ramadanfestival.nl).

NORWAY Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik1 1

Muslim Populations

The first wave of immigration from Muslim countries arrived at the beginning of the 1970s. Although a general ban on labour immigration was introduced in 1975, family reunification and the continuing influx of refugees and immigrants have made for a steady growth in the Muslim population. In 1980, only 1,000 out of c. 10,000 immigrants had registered themselves as members of a Muslim organisation. In 1990, the number of registered Muslims had risen to 19,000 out of an estimated total of 36,000 immigrants with a Muslim background. Recent estimates indicate that in 2008 more than 160,000 Norway residents had a Muslim background.2 This means that Muslims (according to the widest definition) constitute 3% of a total population of 4.6 million.3 In 2009, 92,700 people (i.e. almost 60% of those with a Muslim background) had signed up as members of a Muslim organisation. Approximately half of these are resident in Oslo, which means that about 6%–7% of Oslo’s population (560,000) are now members of a Muslim organisation. A survey among youth in Oslo, conducted in

1 Christine M. Jacobsen is a senior researcher at IMER (International Migration and Ethnic Relations) at Uni Global. She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Bergen, and has researched and published on Muslims in France and Norway. Oddbjørn Leirvik is Professor of Interreligious Studies at the Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo. He is a specialist in the field of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, and his publications include Human Conscience and Muslim-Christian Relations: Modern Egyptian Thinkers on al-damir (London: Routledge, 2006). 2 Gunnlaug Daugstad and Lars Østby: “Det flerkulturelle Norge. Et mangfold av tro og livssyn (Multicultural Norway: Many faiths and life stances)”, Statistics Norway 2008. 3 These figures are based on estimates that calculate immigration statistics in relation to the percentage of Muslims in a given country of emigration. Statistics of this kind are highly problematic for a number of reasons, not least because they are increasingly arrived at on the basis of competing political arguments. For updated statistics about Islam in Norway, see the website edited by Oddbjørn Leirvik: “Islam i Norge. Oversikt, med bibliografi (Islam in Norway: Survey and bibliography)” (http://folk.uio.no/ leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html, accessed 2 May 2010). This page also contains an updated bibliography of relevant studies and research on Muslims in Norway.

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2006 among pupils in 9th, 10th and 11th grades, showed that 17.6% gave Islam as their religion, up from 13.2% in 1996.4 Among those Muslims who first came as migrant labourers and later experienced family reunification and growth in Norway, by far the most numerous group are those with a Pakistani background, who in 2009 amounted to 30,100. In the same year, Turks numbered 15,400 and Moroccans 7,800. Among those who came as refugees and asylum seekers, Iraqis (24,500) and Somalis (23,600) were the most numerous in 2006, followed by Bosnians (15,600), Iranians (15,600), Kosovo-Albanians (12,500) and Afghans (9,000).5 Converts constitute a small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of the Muslim community.6 The entire spectrum of Pakistani (Barelwi, Deobandi, etc.)7 and Turkish (Diyanet, Süleymanci, Milli Görüs) Islamic traditions is now well established, whereas the Bosnians and the Somalis represent radically different popular traditions.8 In 2006, 27% of Muslim respondents said in a Gallup opinion poll that they attended “religious ceremonies together with others” on a monthly basis or more frequently, while 31% stated that they never took part in such activities.9 In a different survey of the frequency of attending religious meetings organised by faith communities, Pakistanis reported an average of 31, Somalis 25 and Turks 23 times a

4 Øia, Tormod and Viggo Vestel, “Møter i det flerkulturelle (Multicultural encounters),” NOVA Rapport 21/07, pp. 162f. 5 These figures refer to country background, not to citizenship. Statistics Norway includes both people who themselves migrated to Norway and their children, regardless of their actual citizenship. Acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is regulated by a law of 2006 (http://www.udi.no/templates/Tema.aspx?id=7394), accessed 2 May 2010. 6 Roald, Anne Sofie, New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scandinavian Converts (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 7 See for instance Ahlberg, Nora, New Challenges—Old Strategies: Themes of Variation and Conflict among Pakistani Muslims in Norway (Helsinki: Finnish Anthropological Society, 1990). 8 For an overview of various tendencies, see Vogt, Kari, Islam på norsk (Islam in Norwegian) (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008 [2000]); Jacobsen, Christine M., “Norway”, in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009), pp 18–40. 9 TV2: Holdninger til integrasjon og internasjonale konflikter blant muslimer i Norge og den norske befolkningen generelt (Attitudes towards integration and international conflicts among Muslims in Norway and the Norwegian population in general) (Oslo: TNS Gallup, Politikk & Samfunn, April 2006), http://pub.tv2.no/multimedia/TV2/ archive/00248/TNS_Gallup_-_muslim_248757a.pdf, accessed 2 May 2010.

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year, whereas the corresponding figures reported by Iraqis were 7 and for Bosnians and Iranians 2.10 2

Islam and the State

Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a state church whose status in the Constitution (where Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity is stated to be the public religion of the state) is currently being reviewed. Since the 1960s, religious pluralism has been increasingly accommodated, and a 1964 supplement to the Constitution guarantees that “All inhabitants of the Realm shall enjoy free exercise of religion.” The Lutheran Church of Norway, to which 83% of the population belong, retains a dominant public position, and is almost fully financed from the public purse (including salaries for clergy and much of the running costs of parishes, including maintenance of buildings). Under compensatory measures introduced in 1969, every faith and (from 1981) life stance community that registers is entitled to public funding, including registered Islamic organisations.11 3


The Islamic Council of Norway (Islamsk Råd Norge, Pb. 658 Sentrum, 0106 Oslo, tel: +4722357613, http://www.irn.no/), founded 22 October 1993, is the umbrella organisation. An invitation from the Church of Norway to set up a Contact Group between Christian and Muslim leaders in Norway played some part in this process.12 As of 2008, it comprised the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations in Norway (according to the web-page around 40 member organisations, totalling more than 60,000 members). The political authorities have gradually established regular communication with the Islamic Council (as with other established faith communities and their umbrella organisations), and since 2007 the Council has also received a financial grant from

10 Statistics Norway (SSB), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005–2006 (Living conditions among immigrants in Norway)”, SSB Rapport 2008/5. The survey was based on interviews with 3,053 non-Western immigrants and descendants of immigrants. 11 Registration is easy and does not require a minimum number of members. 12 Vogt, Islam på norsk, p. 167.

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the government which enables the Council to pay a full-time general secretary. In addition to its function as an ecumenical body for intraMuslim consultation, the Islamic Council is a co-founder of the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities (www.trooglivssyn.no), in which all the major religious communities in Norway as well as the Humanist Association participate. Through the interfaith council and sometimes directly, it is regularly consulted by the government in matters pertaining to the politics of religion. The Council is also an active and visible participant in public debates about religion and society in Norway. Transnational movements such as Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and the Muslim Brotherhood, several different Shi’ite groups, and a small but active Ahmadiyya community also have a presence. From the mid1990s, separate youth and students’ as well as women’s organizations have been formed, largely independent of national background.13 4


The varieties of Norwegian Islam are evident in different kinds of adapted architecture.14 Most of the 40 or so Muslim prayer locations in Oslo are in converted flats, factories or office premises, but three mosques are purpose-built, all of them by Norwegian-Pakistani organisations. There have been no major problems with permissions. There are no purpose-built mosques outside Oslo, but there are numerous prayer locations in other cities and towns throughout the country (with concentrations in cities such as Stavanger, Kristiansand and Drammen). In 2006, the total number of registered Muslim congregations was 120. A list of mosques, including contact information, is available on the internet.15

13 See for instance Jacobsen, Christine M., Tilhørighetens mange former: Unge muslimer i Norge (The Many Forms of Belonging: Young Muslims in Norway) (Oslo: Unipax, 2002), and idem, “Religiosity of young Muslims in Norway: The quest for authenticity”, in Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot UK: Ashgate 2005), pp. 155–168. 14 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal, Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space (Oslo: Novus forlag/The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 2001). 15 See http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html#organisasjonar, accessed 2 May 2010, and http://www.islam.no.

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Private schools are relatively few in Norway and took in only around 2.2% of primary school pupils in 2006 (up from 1.7% in 2000), which reflects the extraordinary strength of the ‘one school for all’ (enhetsskolen) system. The Urtehagen Foundation runs a couple of Muslim kindergartens in Oslo, but there are currently no Muslim private schools. Most mosques offer some kind of Qur’an instruction.16 In public primary and lower secondary schools, a joint course on religion and ethics was made compulsory for all students in 1997 (called “Knowledge of Christianity with Information about Religions and Life Stances” and from 2002 “Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and Life Stances”).17 Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and secular humanists protested against this because of the strong emphasis on Christianity. After a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the government initiated a revision of religious education (renamed “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics”) and of the schools’ traditional statutory statement of Christian purpose. Islam has been given increasing space in the religion and ethics curricula for both primary/lower secondary and upper secondary/ high school, in line with its growing presence in Norwegian society. The subjects in question take a historical as well as doctrinal approach to world religions, the ideal being to present each religion on its own terms. Ethics is dealt with as a separate subject. In addition, both the ability to dialogue about religion and ethics and familiarity with modern criticism of religion are stated as competence aims. Any qualified teacher, of any background, may teach religion and ethics. 6


No initiative to establish a national training programme for imams has been taken in Norway, but the University of Oslo has discussed the possibility of establishing a ‘centre for Islamic studies’ and a proposal was presented to the University in 2007 by a committee which 16 For a discussion of Islamic nurture and education, see for instance Østberg, Sissel, Pakistani Children in Norway: Islamic Nurture in a Secular Context, Monograph Series (Leeds: University of Leeds, Community Religions Project, 2003). 17 See, for example, articles by Geir Skeie, Sissel Østberg and Heid Leganger-Krogstad in Jackson, Robert (ed.), International Perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003).

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included representatives of the Islamic Council. In 2007, the University of Oslo’s Faculty of Theology set up a programme for continuing education for imams, as well as for other religious leaders with a foreign background, under the heading “Being a religious leader in Norwegian society”. The Islamic Council is part of the reference group for this programme and largest groups of participants in the courses have been imams, but no imams have received their basic training in Norway.18 7


Several funeral agencies around the country offer assistance to Muslim funerals. There is also a Muslim funeral agency that provides Muslim funerals in a large part of the country. The Muslim funeral bureau Al-Khidmat is a member of the Islamic Council of Norway, which has a funeral working group to look into the issue of Muslim burial sites. Several ordinary undertakers have developed their competence in Islamic (and other religious) burial traditions. In Oslo hospitals, rooms are set aside for the ritual washing. Muslims in Oslo have been allocated burial sites within existing cemeteries. Many Muslim migrants are buried in the country of origin, but the proportion buried in Norway is increasing as people develop more important and permanent links with Norway.19 8


A study in 200320 concluded that, in spite of the fact that a growing number of prisoners and military personnel either are not members of any religion, or belong to other faiths, the Church of Norway retained its dominant position in military and prison chaplaincies. Up till now,

18 Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Islam and education in Norway”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic and education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau verlag, 2009), pp. 301–324. 19 Døving, Cora Alexa, Norsk-pakistanske begravelsesritualer: En migrasjonsstudie, (Norwegian-Pakistani Burial Rituals: A Migration Study) (Oslo: Unipub Forlag, 2007). 20 Furseth, Inger, “Secularization and the role of religion in state institutions”, Social Compass, vol. 50 no. 2 pp. 191–202.

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state institutions provide only Christian chaplaincy on a regular basis, although the need to provide chaplaincy for minority religions too has been addressed several times. In prisons, some imams have offered chaplaincy on a voluntary basis, but the Islamic Council in Norway as well as a number of other actors have called for a more permanent structure to offer Friday prayers and religious guidance to inmates. In 2008, the Soldiers’ National Conference (Soldatenes landskonferanse) decided to promote a religiously neutral military and to hire imams in the Field Corps, but this has not been followed up politically. The possibility of employing imams in Norwegian hospitals has also been discussed, but not yet implemented. 9

Religious Festivals

’Id al-Fitr and ’Id al-Adha are celebrated by Muslims throughout Norway. A law of 13 June 1969 guarantees those who are not members of the Norwegian Church two days’ leave from work or school per year on the occasion of religious festivals. No permission to sacrifice animals is given, and some Muslims send their qurban to Muslims in poorer parts of the world through relief organisations. 10 Halal Food The Islamic Council in Norway has worked actively for a number of years to secure access to halal food for all Muslims in Norway. In cooperation with existing slaughterhouses, methods that satisfy both Islamic and Norwegian regulations have been developed, and halal meat (including beef, lamb and chicken), as well as a range of halalproducts such as pizzas, burgers, sausages, and cheese is now available on the Norwegian market. Norwegian rules say that the animal must be anaesthetised before slaughter. In 2007, a group of imams issued a declaration that chicken produced in Norway was not halal and advised Muslims against eating it. This declaration did not oppose the use of anaesthesia as such, but was based on information that a small percentage of the chicken slaughtered died from the anaesthesia given before the cutting of the carotid arteries. The issue of anaesthesia was also debated in 2009 in relation to the revision of the Norwegian law on animal welfare and new EU directives on animal welfare and

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religious slaughter. The Norwegian law on animal welfare that comes into force in 2010 continues the prohibition on slaughtering without anaesthesia. Both Muslims and Jews have lobbied against this prohibition on the grounds that it limits religious freedom. Although halal meat is available in some public institutions (in state universities, for example), there is still a need to ensure access to halal meat in hospitals, prisons, etc. 11

Dress Codes

Occasional calls have been made to ban religious headgear and the niqab from (parts of) public space, but there are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for teachers or pupils in schools. In 2007, a debate occurred over the wearing of niqab in institutions of higher education, but the institutions have so far decided against the need for a ban. The right of employees to wear religious headgear is not explicitly regulated by Norwegian law, but nevertheless follows from the dominant interpretation of the Working Environment Act and the Gender Equality Act. The Norwegian Labour Inspectorate defines a refusal to allow religious headgear in the work place as discrimination, and several cases have been reported to the Equality and Discrimination Ombudsman. Hijab has been accommodated in combination with uniforms in the army, the health care system, and customs and excise, and in a few work places (notably IKEA, the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo, and Nortura) there is a hijab version of uniform. In 2008/2009 a debate occurred over whether religious headgear should be allowed in combination with uniforms in the police force. After initially signalling amendments to the police uniform regulations in order to accommodate hijab, the Ministry of Justice and the police decided not to revise the existing rules. On the basis of the debate about the hijab in the police, the Board of Directors of the National Courts Administration initiated a process to regulate the use of religious and political clothing in the court room. The National Courts Administration will make its decision in 2010, after relevant institutions and organisations have been consulted.

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Some Muslim organisations21 in Norway (including notably the Islamic Information Association, the Islamic Cultural Centre, the Ahmadiyya, and the Idara Minhaj ul-Quran) publish books and leaflets in Norwegian, most of which are translations. The Muslim Student has published the magazine Salam (previously Tankevekkende) since 1997, as well as booklets on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice. There are a number of online forums, of which the most significant is http://www.islam.no, which provides practical information (on prayer times, etc.), as well as information on ‘Muslim events’ and a number of Islamic issues, and has a very active discussion forum. Several mosques and organisations actively use the Internet, and there are also a number of private-initiative blogs and info-pages about Islam. With regard to state broadcasting, the issue of allowing other religions than Christianity access to broadcast devotional programmes is currently under discussion. 13

Family Law

By applying to the Fylkesmann (County Governor), mosques can obtain the right to conduct marriages, which are then registered with the City Recorder’s Office (byfogdembete) or the District Court (tingrett). The Norwegian marriage act guarantees the right to divorce, but divorces obtained under religious law or the law of other countries may not be recognised. A controversial 2003 amendment to the marriage act, targeting the problem of so-called ‘limping marriages’,22 introduced a new condition for the conduct of marriages, namely that

21 For contact information, see http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html, accessed 2 May 2010. 22 This is when a civil divorce has been granted but one party refuses to recognise it with reference to religious principles and thereby limits the possibility of the other party to remarry. For a discussion of the debates and political processes on ‘limping marriages’, see Ferrari de Carli, Eli, “Muslimske kvinner, haltende ekteskap og skilsmisse: Prosessen rundt politiske initiativ til lovendringer (Muslim women, limping marriages and divorce: The process around political initiatives to change the law)”, Norsk tidsskrift for migrasjons-forskning, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–26, and idem, “Shari’a-råd til diskusjon (Shari’a councils under discussion)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), pp. 58–72.

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spouses grant each other equal rights to divorce, a move that upset the Roman Catholic Church. Critics have argued that this amendment will have little practical impact on solving the problem of so-called limping marriages. The possibility of establishing a Shari’a council or a Muslim divorce council has also been discussed as options for dealing with these issues, but has met with considerable resistance from many quarters. Currently, several non-governmental organisations offer counselling on family-related conflicts, including ‘limping marriages’. Inheritance is regulated by the law of inheritance. Distribution of inheritance can be public or private; in the latter case the heirs themselves distribute the inheritance, but regulations covering minimum inheritance must be observed. 14


Interreligious dialogue is commonly regarded as rather well-established in Norway.23 Since 1993, the Islamic Council in Norway has taken part in regular bi- and multilateral dialogues with other faith and life stance communities in Norway. A Contact Group for the Church of Norway and the Islamic Council Norway was formed in 1992–93.24 Central issues on the Contact Group’s agenda have been religion in school; Muslim minority concerns in Norway; Islamophobia; the precarious situation of Christians in some Muslim countries; religion and violence; issues related to gender equality and the situation of women; freedom of expression and moral responsibility; homosexuality; and the question of conversion. In connection with the cartoon crisis in 2005–6, joint Muslim-Christian delegations from Norway went to the Middle East and Pakistan, symbolising a more conciliatory approach than that seen in neighbouring Denmark. In 2007, the Contact Group published a “Joint declaration on the freedom of religion and the right

23 See for instance Leirvik, Oddbjørn, Religionspluralisme: Mangfald, konflikt og dialog i Norge (Religious Pluralism: Diversity, Conflict and Dialogue in Norway) (Oslo: Pax, 2007), and “Christian-Muslim relations in a state church situation: Politics of religion and interfaith dialogue”, in Jamal Malik (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), pp. 101–114. 24 See http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/Kontaktgruppa.htm, accessed 2 May 2010. Cf. Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “15 år med kristen-muslimsk dialog i Norge (15 years of ChristianMuslim dialogue in Norway)”, Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon, no. 3 (2003), pp. 131–145, http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/Dialog15aarNTM03.htm, accessed 2 May 2010.

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of conversion”,25 which also received much attention internationally. In 2009, a “Joint Statement on Violence in the Family and in Close Relationships” was launched.26 Since 1996, the Islamic Council has also taken an active part in the multilateral Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities,27 which coordinates the faith communities’ interests vis-à-vis the authorities, works for mutual respect between different faiths and life stances (the Humanist Association is part of this council), and jointly addresses social and ethical issues of common concern. Muslim organisations also take part in a number of regional interfaith councils, for instance in the cities of Drammen and Stavanger.28 15


The coverage of issues related to the Muslim population and Islam is quite significant in the Norwegian media. Studies indicate that most of the coverage is problem-oriented and stereotypical. From the mid1990s, most media discussions have focused on women-related issues, such as arranged or forced marriages, the question of whether a Muslim woman may marry a non-Muslim man, female genital mutilation, and the headscarf.29 A particularly controversial theme from 2007 to 2009 has been the situation of homosexual Muslims and Islam’s position on homosexuality.30 This issue has partly come to the fore in connection with the gender neutral Marriage Act that was enacted from 1 January 2009, but also reflects also a strong focus on gay rights in the general media, as well as the emergence of a few gay Muslims who have decided to go public. After a two years’ media debate on the Islamic Council’s position on homosexuality, in September 2009 a news magazine reported “full reconciliation” between the Islamic Council and

25

See http://www.kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=149142, accessed 2 May 2010. See http://kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=265872, accessed 2 May 2010. 27 See http://www.trooglivssyn.no/. 28 See http://www.trooglivssyn.no/index.cfm?id=136727, accessed 2 May 2010. 29 For a discussion of debates on gender and Islam in Norway, see for instance Roald, Anne Sofie, Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Are Muslim women Oppressed?) (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 30 Gressgård, Randi and Christine M. Jacobsen, “Krevende tolerance: Islam og homoseksualitet. (Demanding tolerance: Islam and homosexuality”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 2008, pp. 22–39. 26

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the Norwegian Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Association,31 implying that the Islamic Council (notwithstanding their continuing moral reservations against homosexuality) denounced the harassment of homosexuals and took a clear stand against capital punishment for homosexuality in Muslim countries. Another significant debate has been on secularism and public religious expression, partly following a much debated essay about ‘secular extremism’ which was published by a young Muslim in one of the mainstream newspapers. Muslims representing a variety of positions increasingly initiate and participate in public debate. Among the general public, inclusive attitudes compete with mounting anxiety in relation to Islam and Muslims. In 2007, a liberal think tank launched a report32 based on a survey conducted by Gallup to find out what the general public thought Norwegian Muslim’s attitudes would be on a number of ethical, social and political issues. According to the think tank, the survey demonstrated that most people think Muslims are less liberal and less positive towards integration than a survey (conducted by TV2 the previous year) had in fact shown them to be. The report and its results were criticised on a number of methodological and political accounts. According to another survey, underlying the socalled ‘Integration barometer’ (IMDi 2007),33 eight out of ten respondents thought that the authorities should not further facilitate Muslim religious practices in Norwegian society. Half of the respondents opposed the building of mosques, and a clear majority the wearing of headscarves in public. Several indicators in the ‘Integration barometer’ point to an increase in negative attitudes towards Muslims. In the 2008 report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Norway was for the first time urged to take action against mounting Islamophobia. The report “strongly recommends that the Norwegian authorities monitor the situation as concerns Islamophobia in Norway and take swift action to counter any such manifestations as necessary. It encourages the Norwegian authorities to cooperate with representatives of the Muslim communities of Norway in order to find solutions 31 “Full forsoning (Full reconciliation)”, Ny Tid 11 September 2009, http://www .nytid.no/nyheter/artikler/20090911/full-forsoning/, accessed 2 May 2010. 32 Martin E. Sandbu for Liberalt Laboratorium, Hva vet vi om hverandre? (What do we know about each other?), Rapport/Report 02/2007 (October 2007). 33 Integreringsbarometeret 2006, Om befolkningens holdninger til integrerings- og mangfoldsspørsmål (On the population’s attitudes to questions concerning integration and diversity), IMDi Rapport/Report 7/2007.

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to specific issues of their concern.”34 Among the political parties, the populist right wing Progress Party (which received 22% of the votes in the 2009 parliamentary elections) repeatedly warned against ‘Islamisation’ during their electoral campaigns, most recently in 2009, when the party suggested that new and covert forms of Islamisation (snikislamisering—creeping Islamisation) could be identified in Norway. Similar Islam-critical stands have been voiced by groups associated with the New Christian Right, although their warnings against Islamisation have regularly been countered by mainstream Christian leaders.35 16


Since 2007, the Islamic Cultural Centre has staged an annual Eid Mela (festival) in Oslo, which attracts around 5,000 visitors. The event includes food, exhibition stalls, children’s activities, and concerts featuring popular nasheed (Islam-oriented songs) artists. There is also a yearly ‘multicultural’ Mela featuring music styles and artists from around the world. In the city of Stavanger, the regional Muslim Council stages an annual Ramadan festival with a broad spectrum of public events.

34 ECRI Report on Norway, 2008 (published 2009), paragraphs 91–92, http://www .coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Norway/NOR-CbC-IV-2009004-ENG.pdf, accessed 2 May 2010. 35 Cf. Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “The cartoon controversy in Norway: The new Christian right and liberal fundamentalism confronting Islam?”, in Mårtensson, Ulrika (ed.), Communicating ‘Fundamentalism’ in the Global Public Sphere. Vol. 3: Mass Media and Popular Culture (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

POLAND Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław Grodź1 1

Muslim Populations

The presence of Muslims in Poland goes back to the turn of fourteenth/fifteenth centuries when some Tatars (prisoners of war and refugees from the Golden Horde, officially Muslim from the thirteenth century)2 were settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at that time in a shared monarchy with Poland, later forming the Kingdom of Two Nations).3 By the sixteenth century, they had lost their mother tongue, but they retained their religion and customs.4 In the second part of the seventeenth century a new wave of Tatar settlers was given land in Podlachia (Polish Podlasie, present day north-east Poland).5 When the Polish state regained independence after the World War I, only 19 Muslim religious communities with their mosques and cemeteries existed within its new borders. After World War II and the move of Polish state borders westward, only a tiny part (about 10%) of the Tatar settlement territories remained within the new Polish state. Post-war migrations dispersed the Tatars, resulting in small communities living in Gdańsk, or Gorzów Wielkopolski, places far from their original settlements in the Białystok district (north-east of the country) and Warsaw. The Communist regime did not formally revoke recognition

1 Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk is Assistant Professor in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. Dr Stanisław Grodź teaches in the Department of the History and Ethnology of Religion, Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Lublin. 2 Borawski, Piotr and Aleksander Dubiński, Tatarzy polscy: Dzieje, obrzędy, legendy, tradycje (Polish Tatars: History, Rituals, Legends, Traditions) (Warsaw: Iskry, 1986), p. 15. 3 Tyszkiewicz, Jan, Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944 (From the History of the Polish Tatars, 1794–1944) (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2002), p. 15. 4 Borawski, Piotr, Tatarzy w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej (Tatars in the Erstwhile Commonwealth [of Poland and Lithuania]) (Warsaw: LSW, 1986), pp. 199–202. 5 Sobczak, Jacek, Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim (Legal Situation of the Tatar Population in the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania) (Waraw-Poznań: PWN, 1984), pp. 34–38.

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of religions but in practice, in an atmosphere generally unfavourable to religion, Tatar communities kept a low profile.6 Muslim foreign students began to arrive in the 1970s. Some of them married locally and stayed in Poland. After the changes towards democracy of the late 1980s, they were joined by Muslim refugees, traders and professionals.7 Some of the immigrants have become Polish citizens and some have residence permits. They come from the Arab world (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Yemen) and the Balkans and live mainly in cities that are academic centres (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kraków, Poznań, Opole, Łódź, Rzeszów). The refugees are mainly from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iraq.8 There are no official data on the total number of Muslims (the Constitution [sect. 7, art. 53] rules out asking a question about religious affiliation in the census). Estimates by various offices and organisations place the number within the range 15,000–30,000 (0.04%–0.08% of the total population). The latest firm figures on the Muslim Religious Union Muzułmański Związek Religijny, MZR) are from 2002 and give a membership of 5,123.9 The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, LM) claims about 120 registered members. There are also some Polish converts but no figures are available. 2

Islam and the State

The republic of Poland is a secular state and various acts of parliament regulate relations between the state and the main religions organisations.10 Other religious organisations must be registered in the gov-

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Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland: The past and the present”, Islamochristiana, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 229–230, 234. 7 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, p. 230. 8 Settlers, people on contracts and refugees are categorised according to their former/present citizenship, not their religious affiliation. 9 Mały rocznik statystyczny 2003 (Small Statistical Yearbook) (Warsaw: GUS, 2003), pp. 135–137. The statistical yearbooks from 2004 on do not contain any data on MZR membership. In a television programme in early March 2009, the Mufti said that there were about 12,000 Muslim Polish citizens and official residents. 10 There are 15 of these: 12 Christian churches, the Union of Jewish Religious Groups, the Karaim Religious Union and the Muslim Religious Union (the last two on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 governing recognition of religions).

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ernment register of churches and religious associations. On the basis of the law of 21 April 1936, Islam gained official recognition by the Polish state with the MZR (established in 1925) as the only Muslim organisation representing Muslims in Poland.11 This law stated that the Mufti (elected by democratic vote), imams and muezzins would receive their salaries from the state.12 The act was not repealed by parliament after World War II or after the democratic changes of 1989, though the 1997 Constitution overruled some of its regulations (relating to financial support from the state, the official seat of the MZR (until this point still formally located in Vilnius), and the obligation for Muslims in Poland to belong to it).13 The act still gives the MZR the right to conduct religious education in schools and provides for the teachers to be paid by the state. The state does not fund religious organisations, but they can obtain public funding for specific projects. For example, the MZR has reported on its webpage the acquisition of national and local government funding for cultural projects (e.g. workshops, social events for the general public on Muslim feast days, printing of calendars). The legal regulations created in consultations with Polish Muslims in 1936 made provision for only one official organisation to represent Muslims in Poland, i.e. the MZR. However, new legal regulations after 1989, made provision for the registration of new Muslim religious organisations; any religious group with at least 100 members can now register with the government. The MZR has thus ceased to have the monopoly, but has retained its privileged position.14 Two small Shi’i groups were registered in 1990 and a new Sunni

11 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Monitor of the Acts of the Republic of Poland), vol. 30 (1936), point 240. Sobczak, Jacek, “Położenie prawne polskich wyznawców islamu (Legal situation of Polish Muslims)”, in R. Baecker and Sh. Kitab (eds), Islam a świat (Islam and the World) (Toruń: Mado, 2004), pp. 186–197. 12 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of the New Acts), Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) 1432, p. 80. The Mufti received a salary equal to that of a diocesan bishop. 13 The Communist regime put an end to funding any religious body from the public purse. Vilnius, located within Polish state borders before World War II, was the official seat of the MZR. Compulsory membership of the MZR for Tatars was intended to ensure that there was only one Muslim organisation to represent Muslims vis-à-vis the state authorities. 14 Borecki, Paweł, “Położenie prawne wyznawców islamu w Polsce (Legal status of Muslims in Poland)”, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 2008), pp. 72–84 (73).

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organisation called the Muslim League (Liga Muzułmańska, LM) was registered in 2004.15 In 2009, consultations took place between the MZR and representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration on updating the regulations of the 1936 Act. This followed a petition submitted on 24 April 2007 by the MZR to the Polish government requesting new legislation to regulate the relationship between the state and the MZR. 3


Registered religious communities (związki wyznaniowe): – The Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland (Muzułmański Związek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, MZR, 15–052 Białystok, ul. Piastowska 13F, 42; tel: +48 85 664 3516, http://www.mzr.pl) is a Sunni organisation established in 1925. The Mufti and Chairman of the Highest Muslim Board is Tomasz Miśkiewicz, who was elected by the council of imams in March 2004 (the first council since World War II). Apart from his religious/legal functions, he assumes the role of the official representative of Muslims. Membership of the MZR is voluntary and open to Muslim Polish citizens and all Muslims who have permanent residence in Poland.16 – The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, LM, 01–046 Warsaw, ul. Niska 25/43, 15

Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, pp. 231–233; Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego (Legal status of Muslims in Poland and its influence on the organisation of their religious life)”, in A. Parzymies (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie (Muslims in Europe) (Warsaw: Wyd. Akademickie Dialog, 2005), pp. 232–233. 16 The MZR has traditionally been regarded as a mainly (at times almost exclusively) Tatar organisation, which in fact is not true—15% of members are non-Tatars (i.e. immigrants and converts). This fictitious exclusiveness led to the creation of other organisations and associations by non-Tatar Muslims, including Muslim students’ cultural organisations. Formation of the new religious organisation, the Muslim League (LM), was a step further taken by Muslims (of mainly Arab origin and Polish converts associated with them) around the turn of the century. Separate cultural associations continue to exist. Officially, the relationship between the MZR and the LM is amicable. The Mufti takes part in events organised by the LM and some prayer rooms are used by members of both organisations. The emphasis on ‘holding a residence permit’ is intended to maintain an orderly relationship with the state authorities. Both organisations were brought into existence by the will of members of the Muslim community and not at the instigation of or under pressure from any state authorities.

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http://www.islam.info.pl) is a Sunni organisation established in 2001 and registered on 6 January 2004. The chairman of the General Council is Samir Ismail. Membership is open to Polish Muslims, Muslims with Polish citizenship, and Muslims holding a permanent or temporary residence permit. Two quite small registered Shi’i organisations: – The Association of Muslim Unity (Stowarzyszenie Jedności Muzułmańskiej, 02–679 Warsaw, ul. Pieńkowskiego 4/91, http:// www.al-islam.org.pl) was registered on 31 January 1990 and is led by Zbigniew Żuk. – Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly (Islamskie Zgromadzenie Ahl-ul-Bayt, 05–840 Brwinów, Moszna 4a, http://www.abia.pl/) was registered on 17 December 1990 and its chief imam is Ryszard Ahmed Rusnak. Muslim cultural organisations: – The Muslim Students Society in Poland (Stowarzyszenie Studentów Muzułmańskich w Polsce, 60–272 Poznań, ul. Biedrzyckiego 13, (contact address; headquarters are in Białystok), http://www.islam .org.pl) has branches in Białystok, Poznań and Wrocław. – The Muslim Association for Cultural Formation (Muzułmańskie Stowarzyszenie Kształtowania Kulturalnego, http://www.mskkislam.8m.com). – The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland (Związek Tatarów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, 16–100 Sokółka, Bohoniki 24,) was established in 1992. Its president is Stefan Korycki. These organisations are involved in various ways in organising religious education for their members and for Muslim children, public lectures on various aspects of Islam, and publication of Polish translations of Muslim authors’ works (mainly on ‘religious’ topics). 4


There are three mosques (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in north-eastern Poland dating from the eighteenth-nineteenth century, and one in Gdańsk that opened in 1990). Muslims distinguish between so-called Islamic centres (places for prayer, plus offices, libraries, meeting halls)

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and small ‘prayer houses’ (places for prayer), which are almost unnoticeable from the outside. There are Islamic centres in Białystok (one running, and another under construction), Warsaw, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań and Katowice. There are prayer houses in Białystok, Suchowola, Łódź, Katowice and Poznań,17 but the total number of them is not known. Some of the Islamic centres and prayer houses named on the official websites of the MZR and LM are used by members of both organisations, or used by one but listed by both. 5


The MZR, as a religious organisation operating under an act of parliament, has the right to teach religion in public schools and its teachers are paid by the state. The ministerial regulation of 1992 states that a minimum of seven pupils having a particular religious affiliation in the same school is required in order for separate religious education classes to be provided. In 2004, the Ministry of Education approved a school curriculum for Muslim religious instruction prepared by the MZR. In Białystok and in nearby Sokółka, Islamic religious instruction is provided for Muslim children in public schools. In Warsaw, the LM runs an interschool group for Muslim religious instruction at primary school level for pupils from Mazowsze district (Warsaw area). In other parts of the country, religious education for Muslim children is provided by the local Muslim communities independently of the school system (weekend classes). At school, these children attend ethics classes together with all the others who do not wish to attend Roman Catholic or other religious instruction classes. There are no Muslim schools. 6


There are no facilities to train imams locally and no Muslim higher education institutions. Islam features in the academic curricula of several universities, but the courses are mainly run by non-Muslims. Courses on the history of the Muslim world, Arabic language, and

17

http://www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=16, accessed 4 May 2010.

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some aspects of Islamic doctrine are taught. Muslim religious education teachers and imams have to acquire their formal Islamic education abroad (formerly in Sarajevo, but now elsewhere). 7


Three Muslim cemeteries are currently in use (at Bohoniki, established in the second half of the eighteenth century; at Kruszyniany, established in the seventeenth/eighteenth century; and in Tatarska St, Warsaw, opened in 1868). Two more that existed from the late seventeenth century have been closed (Lebiedziew after World War I and Studzianka after World War II). Two other disused cemeteries still exist at Bohoniki (from the late seventeenth century in the village— the Bohoniki cemetery that is in use is located outside the village) and Młynarska St, Warsaw (in use from 1838 to 1868).18 Separate sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk. 8


There are no Muslim ‘chaplaincies’. This is due to the fact that numbers of Muslims are small and their needs can be met informally through the community, rather than to any official obstacles. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals are not public holidays. Muslims can take a day off provided they make the time missed. Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) is celebrated by MZR members in one of the north-eastern locations and is a public event. Sometimes non-Muslims are invited as guests. Ramadan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) has generally been celebrated more privately, though the LM has started the a practice of organising a so-called Wieczór ramadanowy (Ramadan evening), an iftar for representatives of Muslim communities and invited non-Muslims.

18

http://www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=18, accessed 4 May 2010.

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agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź 10 Halal Food

An Act of 17 May 1989 (art. 2, act 9) allows for exceptions from the approved method of animal slaughter (i.e. permits for not stunning animals prior to slaughter). Under the 1936 Act, the council of imams and the Mufti of the MZR had the sole right to issue halal certificates for food products in Poland. An agreement with the Chief Veterinary Officer in 2006 was based on that Act; see http://www.halalpoland .pl). This agreement was challenged by the LM as incompatible with freedom of religious practice and was recently revoked. At present, the LM also has the right to issue halal certificates, for which the food producers pay a fee. 11

Dress Codes

There are no regulations restricting the wearing of hijab or niqab. Some young Muslim women (mainly converts of Polish origin) wear hijab in public. Tatar women wear hijab only during prayers.19 12


Muslim periodicals cover various aspects of Muslim culture and religious matters. Those listed here are all in Polish: – Rocznik Tatarów Polskich is published by the Polish Tatar Union. It is academic in character and covers treats topics on Islam in general and particularly in eastern-central Europe; – Życie Tatarskie is published by the local action group Szlak Tatarski (Tatar Trail). It is a socio-cultural periodical and covers ethnic topics. There have been 96 issues since 1934, including 19 of the new edition since 1998. Przegląd Tatarski is similar in character and is published with financial support from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration.

19 Agata S. Nalborczyk, “Muslim women in Poland and Lithuania: Tatar tradition, religious practice, hijab and marriage”, in E. Adamiak et al. (eds), Gender and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe (Poznań: Wydział Teologiczny Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 2009), p. 66.

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– As-Salam (http://www.as-salam.pl) is published by the LM and 16 issues have appeared between 2004 and 2009. It addresses general and local socio-political and religious issues and is aimed at the general reader. Al-Hikmah is older but is distributed mainly among Muslims. Internet sites include: – http://www.mzr.pl—the website of the MZR – http://www.islam.info.pl—the website of the LM (contains links to local centres) – http://rada-imamow.pl—run by the LM imams and includes legal advice – http://www.tatarzy.tkb.pl/ or http://www.tataria.pl—a Polish Tatar site about Tatar history, religion and culture – www.muzulmanie.com—ownership not stated, but probably run by the members of the LM – http://poland-muslims.de.tl/Home.htm—a site on a German server providing information about Muslims in Poland; ownership not stated – http://sites.google.com/site/oislamie—a private independent initiative by a group of Polish Muslim women providing information on Islam using high quality translations and sources – www.arabia.pl—run by an association of alumni and staff of the Oriental Institute (now Faculty), University of Warsaw – www.islamweuropie.info—a private site about Islam in Europe administered by a doctoral candidate in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw – www.islamic.org.uk/polish—Polish version of the UK site Internet fora include: – http://www.islam.fora.pl – http://www.muslima.fora.pl 13

Family Law

Only marriages conducted in a state civil ceremony at a state registry office can be registered, so Muslims usually follow the civil ceremony

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with a Muslim ceremony on Muslim premises. Marriages of couples who are not Polish citizens are valid under international private law, but polygamy is illegal. 14


The Joint Council of Catholics and Muslims (Rada Wspólna Katolików i Muzułmanów, http://www.rwkm.pl) was established in 1997 with the aim of fostering friendly relations between Christians and Muslims, and disseminating reliable information about Christianity and Islam and their mutual contacts. The Council is headed by two co-chairpersons (a Christian and a Muslim). Its main achievement has been the introduction of the Islam Day in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which is celebrated on 26 January. This initiative was met by a positive response from the Polish Bishops’ Conference and has been incorporated into the church calendar of events. It is celebrated locally, especially in places where there is a Muslim community, but it is gradually receiving a wider acceptance. During the celebrations in 2009, the Council named Maciej Musa Konopacki ‘Person of Dialogue’; he is a senior member of the Tatar community and a long term active supporter of friendly Muslim-Christian relations. In November 2009, the Council, together with the Muslim community in Białystok and the Centre for Dialogue between Cultures and Religions, and in cooperation with the Groupe d’Amitié Islamo-Chrétienne (see www.semaineseric.eu) organised a session on “Festivals in Islam and Christianity”. “Assisi in Gdańsk”, an interreligious meeting held for the fourth time to commemorate the original event of 1986, gathers representatives of various religions for prayer and discussion on an agreed theme, which in 2009 was “Religions on wealth and poverty”). The MZR and LM often include an interreligious element in events they organise. Pictures from interreligious encounters feature on their websites and in their publications (e.g. the 2008 MZR leaflet, Przegląd Tatarski 1/2009). 15


Coverage of matters concerning Muslims is scarce. Instances of local reporting on Islam in Poland are often linked to interreligious encoun-

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ters (e.g. the Day of Islam in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland on 26 January). In February 2009, the media highlighted a statement by the LM condemning the killing of a Polish engineer held hostage in Pakistan. There was controversy in Poznań and the national media in June 2009, when a non-Muslim artist proposed the remodelling of an old factory chimney as a minaret for the annual theatre festival “Malta 2010” (which has the theme ‘cultural differences’). It has not yet been finally decided whether the installation will go ahead. 16


“Muslim Culture Days” (Dni Kultury Muzułmańskiej)—a series of occasional cultural events have been organised in various cities (Gdańsk, Białystok, Wrocław). They have included: – Sabantuj—an annual Tatar gathering (with songs, dance, games and sports); – Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe (Bayram Days in Podlasie RegionBiałystok region); In 2009, the 330th anniversary of Tatar settlement in Podlasie (northeastern Poland) was celebrated in Białystok in May. The Regional Museum in Sokółka (near Białystok) added a temporary exhibition: “The bow—a weapon or ritual object” to its permanent exhibits on the Tatar presence in the region. An International Summer Symposium of Knowledge about Polish Tatars was held on 7–9 August and the second Festival of Polish Tatar Culture and Traditions took place in Kruszyniany on 15 August.

PORTUGAL Nina Clara Tiesler1 1

Muslim Populations

Portugal has a rather small Muslim population which has grown mostly since decolonisation in 1974. Estimates of the communities themselves and by researchers suggest around 46,000–48,000 people, mainly Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin from Mozambique and numerically stronger, Sunni Muslims from Guinea-Bissau, but also including about 8,000 Isma’ilis. Other Muslim groups from Pakistan (3,500)2 and Bangladesh (4,000),3 have arrived more recently (noticeably since the early 1990s). Small numbers of Muslims originate from Morocco and Algeria (1,000–1,300), Senegal (1,000–1,500) and India (1,500). While small Muslim communities are established in the north (mainly in Porto and Coimbra), the south (in the Algarve) and on the island of Madeira, the overwhelmingly majority live in and around the capital city Lisbon, although the majority of Moroccan Muslims live in and around Porto and on the Algarve. In and around Lisbon, there is a certain (but not massive) geographical concentration in particular 1

Nina Clara Tiesler is a senior researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (Centre of Excellence) and coordinator of the Luso-AfroBrazilian research network on Muslims in Lusophone Areas (MEL-net). She holds a PhD in Comparative Religion and has researched on Muslims in Europe since 1990. She is author of Muslime in Europa: Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Muslims in Europe: Religion and Identity Politics in New Societal Settings) (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006), and editor of “Islam in PortugueseSpeaking Areas”, Lusotopie, vol. 14, no. 1 (special issue, 2007). 2 This number is arrived at by cross-referencing of data from the Aliens and Borders Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, SEF) and estimates from within the community. Pakistanis use to live in the centre of and near Lisbon (Odivelas), as well as in Porto. No significant research has so far been carried out about/among this population. 3 This number is arrived at by cross-referencing data from the SEF (3,000 individuals), and data provided by the Consulate of Bangladesh in Lisbon (4,500). The number 4,000 corresponds with the estimates made by researchers with ethnographic field experience. Bangladeshis mostly live in the centre of Lisbon, but also in and around Porto. See Mapril, José, “ ‘Bangla masdjid’: Islão e bengalidade entre bangladeshianos em Lisboa” (Bangla mosque: Islam and Bengali identity among Bangladeshis in Lisbon), Análise Social, vol. 39, no. 173 (Winter 2005), pp. 851–873.

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neighbourhoods, such as in Laranjeiro and Odivelas (both having wellestablished representative mosques), Damaia and Sintra (Cacém). ‘Official’ figures provided by the Aliens and Borders Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, SEF) and the census4 do not reflect realities, being usually lower than the estimates of researchers and the communities themselves. For example, according to the 2001 census, Portugal’s total population was 10,356,117, of whom 12,014 were declared to be Muslims.5 The reasons for these low numbers are, first, that religious affiliation is not an obligatory question in the census and, second, that Portuguese citizenship is quite widespread and so is an unsatisfactory starting point, so estimates based on nationality are unsatisfactory. In addition, in many cases the proportion of Muslims in the population of the country of origin cannot simply be transferred to the equivalent population in Portugal, especially not in the case of those from Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau. 2

Islam and the State

The Constitution, which recognises freedom of religion and conscience and prohibits all discrimination in this respect, provides for a system of equality and separation between the state and religious denominations, although the Roman Catholic Church traditionally enjoyed privileges not granted to other religious groups.6 A decisive change came with the Religious Freedom Act of 22 June 2001, with important improvements for religious minorities implemented from 2006. Before the implementation of the new law, the Islamic Community of Lisbon (Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa, CIL), smaller Islamic communities and other religious minorities, could only be officially recognised as “associations in private law”. With the change in the law in 2006, the CIL became a registered religious community, giving it a status substantially equal to that of the Catholic Church, including agreements with the state with regard to marriages (see below) and the optional benefit of the voluntary assignment by individual tax payers of 0.5% of income tax to their religious

4

National Institute of Statistics, http://www.ine.pt. Leitão, J., “The new Islamic presence in Portugal: Towards a progressive intregration”, in B.-P.R. Aluffi and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 180. 6 Ibid., p. 291. 5

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community organisation, but no general public funding. Several inequities remain, as privileges depend on the number of adherents of religious groups and on the period of their establishment in the country, with a minimum of 30 years required (the CIL was founded 40 years ago). In practice, the CIL can benefit from tax advantages—for example, on buildings expenditure. Whenever the main Islamic communities (Sunni and Isma’ili) celebrate an anniversary or special occasion, the Portuguese state often sends high-level representatives. The present and former presidents of the republic have all been made of Honorary Members of CIL, and the current CIL president has been one of the advisers to the president of the republic during his visits to India, Turkey and other countries. During the Dalai Lama’s visit to Portugal in 2007, the CIL organised and hosted a huge interreligious meeting in the Central Mosque, with the Dalai Lama as guest of honour—an important event, taking into account that the Portuguese government had been facing the same problems as other governments regarding the impact of the visit on official relations with China. 3


The role of a small group of Muslims from Mozambique (a Portuguese colony until 1975), who were studying at the faculties of law, medicine and economics in the then metropolitan Portugal was decisive in laying the foundations of Muslim organisations. Most of these community founders, as well as other Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin, had already been Portuguese citizens under colonial rule and so did not regard themselves as ‘immigrants’. Many African Muslims gather around their Sufi leaders, and Muslims from Bangladesh have founded a mosque (Mesquita Martim Moniz) closer to their work place. However, the vast majority of at least c. 30,000 Sunnis and their local communities are linked to and occasionally take part in the life of the central Islamic Community of Lisbon (Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa, CIL), founded in 1968, which acts as a formal and informal umbrella organisation for Sunni Muslims. The founding of an official umbrella organisation of/for Islamic communities in Portugal, starting with a first national congress, is planned for 2010. The Mesquita Central de Lisboa (Rua da Mesquita in Bairro Azul [à Praça de Espanha], 1070–283 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 21 387 41 42/21 387 91 84; fax: (+351) 21 387 22 30, http://www.comunidadeislamica.pt)

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has as its Imam Sheikh David Munir and is the home of the CIL. As well as housing a bookstore, social space and the CIL website administration, the 30-year-old Central Mosque in the heart of Lisbon is also used by the Women’s Association, several groups of Guinean Muslims, and the Youth Association of the Islamic Community (Commissão de Jovens da Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa, CILJovem) which is organised and attended mainly by young people of South Asian origin, including some Isma’ilis. The other main Muslim organisations are: – Comunidade Islâmica de Palmela (Av. Vila Amélia, lote 171, 172, Cabanas, 2950–805 Palmela, tel: 21 211 05 30, fax: 21 211 05 39). – Centro Cultural Ismaili (Rua Abranches Ferrao, 1600–001 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 217 229 000, fax: (+351) 217 229 045). – Comunidade Shi’ta de Portugal (Ithna Ashari) (Avenida das Forças Armadas, 11 D, Almada; tel: (+351) 218106030). 4


In 2002–3 the Islamic Community of Lisbon received a one-off grant to cover one third of the construction costs of the Central Mosque. The state’s Commission for the Coordination of the Lisbon and South Targus Region (Commissão de Coordenação da Região Lisboa e Sul de Tejo, CCR) then provided further funding, bringing the state contribution to 40% of the total costs. Later, in 2004, the CIL received a small grant from the City Hall of Lisbon (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa) towards the daily costs of the Central Mosque. Various donors had funded the first phase of construction of the Central Mosque, which was concluded in 1985 (the year of its inauguration, see below, section 16), the City Hall had provided the land (as it also did later for the cemetery in Lumiar, see section 7), and various Islamic majority countries had given donation, as did the community members themselves.7

7

For details, N.C. Tiesler, N.C., “No bad news from the European margin: The new Islamic presence in Portugal”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 12, no. 1 (2001), pp. 71–91 (79).

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Besides the Central Mosque, there are two other large public mosques near Lisbon (in Odivelas and Laranjeiro) and another in Coimbra, and there are a total of 33 cultural centres and prayer halls across the country (close to Porto and mainly near Lisbon), and around 12 madrasas,8 as well as the Jamatkhana of the Shi’a Imami Isma’ili Muslim Community. 5


There is a recognised, private secondary Islamic school in Palmela (near Lisbon). It has around 150 pupils, nearly 10% of whom are non-Muslims. Apart from any input by their parents, most young Muslims receive their Islamic education in one of the madrasas and/ or by private tutors who visit them at home. The Law of Religious Freedom allows Islamic instruction in public schools, provided there are at least ten pupils whose parents request it. In practice, there are currently no public schools in Portugal with enough Muslim pupils of more or less the same age to take this option. Parents do not complain about the lack of provision, as their children receive instruction in the madrasas. 6


The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) governs the role of the imam in detail, equating imams with Roman Catholic priests in terms of legal status, and providing for the possibility of setting up specific training institutions.9 As a higher institution for the training of imams has not yet been founded, imam training is partly provided at the Islamic school in Palmela, where 10–15 women have been educated as alimas. Some imams have received their education abroad (mostly in the UK, but also in Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia).

8 Madrasa in the Portuguese context does not refer to a physical place, such as a school building or class room, but rather to religious instruction classes held in the main mosques and prayer halls. 9 Leitão, “New Islamic presence”, p. 300.

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There is no exclusively Islamic cemetery in Portugal, but several municipal cemeteries, reserve areas for Muslims and their communities (Odivelas, Feijó). Such an area has also existed formally since 2005 (and informally since 1998) in the cemetery at Lumiar (a district of Lisbon). It was donated by the Municipality of Lisbon and is available to Muslims from all over Portugal and more than 500 gravestones bear Muslim names. It has become the most important cemetery for both Sunnis and Shi’a, including Isma’ili and Ithna-Ashari families, who all call it ‘our cemetery’. Because these facilities exist and also probably because most Muslims in Portugal are either Portuguese citizens or are in other ways deeply attached to the country, it is very rare for families to send the body of a deceased relative to be buried abroad.10 8


The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) grants members of the Islamic and other communities the right to practise their religion in special situations (such as during military service, or when in hospitals or in prison). No imams work exclusively or regularly in such institutions due to the lack of demand. If the need arises in hospitals, the Commission of Social Affairs (Comissão de Assuntos Sociais) of the CIL provides special care and support for the individuals and their families, including the visits of an imam. With regard to prisons, imams made informal visits until an official protocol was registered in the Diário de República I/185 (23.09. 2009), and only came into effect on 13 November 2009. 9

Religious Festivals

The state does not officially recognise Islamic festivals or holidays, but permits absence from work and school for the main festivals on request. On these occasions, the CIL distributes information to the public, the Ministry of Justice, schools and employers and provides

10 This does not apply to Muslims from Bangladesh, Pakistan and sometimes Guinea Bissau.

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the relevant forms for applying to the authorities for time off. Workers and employees are expected to be flexible and make up for the time lost. Students may take examinations on alternative dates. 10 Halal Food According to a CIL spokesman, ritual slaughter according to Islamic tradition has been permitted since 1975, although most ritual slaughter for Muslims was performed by the Rabbi of the Lisbon Synagogue until the first halal butcher’s shops were established in 1982. Today there are at least six halal butcher’s shops in Lisbon (three in Odivelas, one in Martim Moniz Square in the city centre, one in Laranjeiro, and another downtown in Alvalade, which is owned by a non-Muslim), and one in Porto. Halal chicken is available in the major shopping centres and supermarket chains (Continente and Jumbo). At least twelve halal restaurants exist in the main cities, nine of them in Lisbon. 11

Dress Codes

The use of the headscarf or other distinctive clothing at school and workplaces has not caused any conflict or controversies. Islamic dress is rarely worn by women in public places. 12


Like other religious groups, Muslims take part in two television programmes on the public channel RTP2, in which the presentation time is divided according to the numerical strength of the communities. This means that, in practice, the time is mostly taken up by the Roman Catholic Church, followed by Protestant and Pentecostal churches. A programme on the public radio station (Antena 1), which follows the same pattern, started on 1 November 2009. The CIL runs a website (http://www.comunidadeislamica.pt ) and some younger community members have set up a chatroom (http://www.aliasoft .com/forumislam), which also accepts questions to be answered by the imams. This chatroom is also used by Muslims from other Portuguesespeaking countries (mainly Brazil, but also Mozambique) as well as by Portuguese Muslims living abroad.

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There is currently only one printed periodical, Al-Furqan, which is also available online (http://www.alfurqan.pt). It has a long tradition, is a private initiative and is not related to CIL. The CIL publishes newsletters and occasional pamphlets. 13

Family Law

Since 2006, religious communities that are registered have the right to perform religious marriages, which will be accepted by civil law if the appropriate documents are submitted. According to a CIL spokesman, the organisation is currently making the necessary legal preparations for this process, while the Jewish and Evangelical communities have already solemnised a few such marriages in 2008. 14


Portuguese Muslims look back on a long tradition of interreligious relations, the latter having already been informally established between leading figures of variousdifferent religious minorities under Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique. The closest ‘cooperation’ partner during the early years in Portugal was the Jewish community (see section 10). This relationship was maintained during the negotiations regarding legislation on religious freedom which took place in the early 1990s and gained official standing in 2007 with the founding of the Abrahamic Forum (Forum Abraâmico de Portugal), which includes Muslim, Jewish and Catholic representatives. It is linked to the Three Faiths Forum (http://www.threefaithsforum.org.uk) and connected with groups worldwide. The Abrahamic Forum organises cultural events (including lectures and debates) and assistance to needy people of any religion or none. Such assistance is mainly organised through a task force made up of young people from the three religions working with a selected Portuguese NGO. In 2008, the CIL joined the Municipal Board for Interculturality and Citizenship (Conselho Municipal para Interculturalidade e Cidadania), which includes 37 religious groups and immigrant associations and is hosted at the City Hall of Lisbon. CIL is also involved in the International Movement of Charter for Compassion (http://charterforcompassion.org/). Again, it was CIL, together with the Abrahamic Forum, which took the initiative and

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provided the space where 150 people met on Sunday, 15 November 2009, for a ‘Day of Compassion’ to reflect upon concepts of compassion (and follow up action), with speakers from 17 different religious and non-religious groups. 15


The historically recent ‘new’ Muslim presence (in distinction to the historical presence on the Iberian Peninsular before the fifteenth century) did not attract much attention before 9/11, which gave rise to curiosity and questions about Islam and Muslims. The rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ is dealt with by Portuguese Muslims and their spokesmen in their normal, patient and calm way. Researchers and Muslims know about harassment, but public Islam in Portugal always stresses that Muslims in Portugal do not suffer discrimination and are well integrated citizens and members of society. The media mainly cover special occasions (anniversaries and famous visitors to the communities) and festivals (first and foremost being the beginning and end of Ramadan), or mention the Portuguese Muslim community when reporting on Muslims in other European countries or at the international level. The most recent of the rather rare occasions when the Portuguese Islamic community has become part of a polemical public debate occurred in January 2010. In a TV talk show aired nationally on 13 January, the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon, José Policarpo, had addressed Portuguese women and girls, advising them that “they would put themselves in a whole lot of trouble if they married a Muslim man”. There were international echoes, when USA Today, the International Herald Tribune and the Daily Mail (London), among others, reported this. The leading Portuguese newspapers responded critically and invited Muslim responses (both representative and others), which were not polemical or aggressive, and found much support in online readers’ comments. In fact, the online version of the main article, published by the important daily O Público (14 January 2010), which quotes Policarpo at length, had only 3,123 readers and 645 overwhelmingly critical readers comments, while the follow up interview with the President of CIL, Abdool Magid Vakil (O Público 14 January 2010), had 10,993 readers and 542 comments.

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nina clara tiesler 16


The Day of Compassion (see section 14) on March 15 was the major cultural event in 2009. Preparations are taking place for the celebration in March 2010 of the 25th anniversary of the Central Mosque, the first mosque to be built in Portugal since the fifteenth century, when Muslims and Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula.

ROMANIA Irina Vainovski-Mihai1 1

Muslim Populations

The first Muslim communities in Romania were formed (mainly in northern Dobrudja and along the lower Danube) in the fourteenth century when Ottoman rule was established in the region. Dobrudja remained part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. After the Russian-Romanian-Ottoman War (1877), Romania gained its independence and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) acknowledged Dobrudja as a Romanian territory. As a result of the deteriorating economic conditions in the early twentieth century, Turks and Tatars migrated massively from Dobrudja to Turkey.2 Since its establishment as an independent state, the constitutions of Romania and special laws have guaranteed the rights of certain religious groups, in addition to Orthodox Christians who represent the majority of the population. The law on religious denominations issued in 1923 lists the Muslim faith among the recognised ‘historical faiths’.3 The establishment of the Communist regime (1948) introduced many formal changes with regard to the recognition of religious denominations, but put them under strict state control. Between 1948 and 1989, the Communist state acted systematically to impose atheism and limit the impact of religious creeds. After 1959, education in the Tatar and Turkish languages was gradually eliminated and in 1967 the Muslim Theological Seminary was closed. Today, the majority of Muslim communities live in Dobrudja and are mainly made up of the historical ethnic groups.

1 Irina Vainovski-Mihai is Lecturer in Arabic Literature at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest. She holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and has published studies in Arab literature, comparative literature and intercultural stereotyping. 2 Bara, Maria, “Relaţii interetnice dintre creştinii ortodocşi şi musulmani în Dobrogea. Studiu de caz: Medgidia şi Cobadin (Muslim-Orthodox Christian interethnic relations in Dobrudja. A case study: Medgidia and Cobadin)”, Philologica Jassyensia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 93–104 (94). 3 Gillet, Oliver, Religie şi naţionalism (Religion and Nationalism) (Bucharest: Compania, 2001), p. 6.

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The most recent official census (2002) recorded 67,257 Muslims (0.3% of the total population of Romania), of whom 31,118 were ethnic Turks, 23,641 Tatars, and 3,310 Romanians.4 As regards levels of education, out of the total Muslim population over the age of ten (i.e., 57,687 individuals), 2,637 have a university degree.5 The main Muslim ethnic groups, the Turks and the Tatars, follow Sunni Islam. In the official census, a relatively small number of Turks and Tatars declared themselves to belong to religions other than Islam, to be atheists or to have no religion (980 Turks out of 32,098, and 294 Tatars out of 23,641).6 The total number of Muslim families is 16,807, out of which there are 12,584 families in which both spouses are Muslims.7 By 2009, the number of Muslims in Romania should have increased slightly due to immigration from Middle Eastern countries, and conversion (mainly consequent on marriage). Updated estimates for 2008 vary: 70,000 according to the muftiate in Romania, with 87% living in the south-eastern county of Constanza, approximately 67,300 according to the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs (Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte),8 and up to 213,440 in other estimates.9 After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, new Muslims groups appeared in major cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Timisoara. These groups are made up of Middle Eastern businessmen, former students who studied in Romania before 1989, and refugees. They are mostly Palestinians, Kurds (from northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey), Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians. These new communities have not joined the old Muslim communities in Romania, and the two groups

4 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 5 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t13.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 6 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 7 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t30.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 8 Figures from the Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs available at http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml .aspx?id=1745, accessed 23 November 2009. 9 “Muslim population statistics”, appendix in John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin (eds), The 500 Most Influential Muslims in the World (Washington DC: Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2009), pp. 174–181 (179).

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live almost parallel lives,10 so discussion does not centre run around the question of who is a Muslim, but rather what kind of Muslim someone is and to which extent.11 As of June 2009, most Middle Eastern immigrants were of Turkish origin (17% of the total number of legal immigrants and 25% of expelled immigrants).12 2

Islam and the State

Romania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority (86.8% according to the 2002 census).13 The Islamic faith, as one of the 18 religious denominations recognised by law (Law 489/2006), is considered a public-utility legal entity. Expenses are covered primarily from the Muslim communities’ own income. Through their officially recognised national leadership and representative body (the muftiate), Muslims can receive material support from the state for the maintenance of mosques, monuments and other communal buildings. According to the law, the muftiate is the only religious institution that represents the followers of the Islamic faith in Romania and has the right to organise pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Any other individual or legal entity that wishes to organise pilgrimages must have the muftiate’s approval.14 The Synodal Council (Romanian: Consiliu Sinodal, Turkish: Şura-i Islam), headed by the mufti, takes decisions regarding the functioning and organisation of the Muslim community. The Synodal Council is made up of the mufti, four members nominated by the Democratic Union of the Turkish-Muslim Tatars in Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor Turco-Musulmani din România, UDTTMR), four members nominated by the Turkish Democratic Union of Romania (Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România, UDTR), the principal of the Kemal Ataturk Muslim Theological and Pedagogical High School (Liceul Teologic Musulman

10

Grigore, George, “Muslims in Romania”, ISIM Newsletter, 3 July 1999, p. 34. Kozák, Gyula, “Romániai muzulmán intézmények diskurzusa az identitásról és integrációról (The discourse of Muslim institutions from Romania on identity and integration)”, Korunk, no. 5 (May 2009), pp. 54–61 (54). 12 Romanian Office for Immigration figures available at http://ori.mai.gov.ro/api/ media/userfiles/InfoStat_Octombrie_2009_text.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 13 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 14 Cf. Chapter III, Art. 3.e and Art. 4(1) of the “Goverment Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination”, officially published on 25 June 2008. 11

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şi Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk) and 15 clerics. The UDTTMR and the UDTR are two of the 19 political parties and cultural associations representing ethnic minorities in the Romanian parliament. The mufti must be a Romanian citizen, born in Romania and with no other previous citizenship, and a graduate of an Islamic theological institute in Romania (or abroad, provided his qualification is recognised by the Romanian state). Because the position of the head of a religious denomination is regarded as equivalent to a high-ranking public position, after being elected by the Synodal Council, the mufti is confirmed by a decree of the president of the republic. Although the muftiate has a longer history in the region of Dobrudja, it has functioned as the only institution representing the Muslims in Romania since 1943. The present mufti, Murat Yusuf (b. 1977 in Medgidia, Constantza), was elected to this position in 2005.15 He studied in Romania and Turkey, holds an MA in Comparative Religion from the Faculty of Orthodox Christian Theology (University of Târgovişte)16 and is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Orthodox Christian Theology (University of Constantza).17 3


The traditional Muslim denomination (Sunni) engages in public activities mainly through the muftiate (http://www.muftiyat.ro) together with the UDTTMR (Constantza 900613 , Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel.: (+40241) 61 66 43; (+40241) 52 01 86, http://www.tatar.ro) and the UDTR (Constantza 900613, Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel./fax: (+40241) 55 09 03, http://www.udtr.ro). However, newly established associations and foundations dominated by immigrants from various ethnic backgrounds are also actively engaged in public activities, charities, translating and publishing religious literature, and teaching Arabic. The main such organisations are:

15 http://www.muftiyat.ro/muftiyatul/organizare/muftiu (The Muftiate of Romania), accessed 12 March 2010. 16 http://ftl.teologie.info/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 (Faculty of Theology, University of Târgovişte), accessed 31 March 2009. 17 http://www.univ-ovidius.ro/teologie/ (Faculty of Theology, University of Constantza), accessed 23 November 2009.

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– Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre Foundation (Fundaţia Centrul Cultural Islamic Semiluna, Bucharest, sector 6, Str. Munţii Gurghiului nr. 50–52, http://www.scoala-araba.ro) – Taiba Foundation (Fundaţia Taiba, Bucharest, sector 2, Şos. Colentina, nr. 373; Constantza, Str. Maior Şofran, nr. 11, http://www .islamulazi.ro) – Association of Muslims of Romania (Asociaţia Musulmanilor din România, at the same address as the Taiba Foundation in Constantza, www.associatiamusulmanilor.ro) – Muslim Sisters Association (Asociaţia Surori Musulmane) (at the same address as Taiba Foundation in Bucharest, http://www .surorimusulmane.ro/) – Tuna Foundation (Fundaţia Tuna, Bucharest, Bd. Regina Maria, nr. 34, http://www.tuna.ro) – Islamic and Cultural League in Romania (Liga Culturală şi Islamică din România, Bucharest, sector 2, Str. Fabrica de Gheaţă, nr. 14, http://www.islam.ro). The most active of them appears to be the Taiba Foundation, which has several websites—one recently launched, The Little Muslim, is dedicated to children (Micul musulman, http://www.miculmusulman .com)—as well as blogs and Internet discussion groups in Romanian, handbooks on Islam in Romanian, stands in book fairs, charitable activities, and Internet broadcasting (see Section 12 below). Most of the other organizations are offshoots of the Taiba Foundation, apart from the Tuna Foundation, which is linked to the Gülen Movement. There are also a number of foundations established very recently,18 such as the Association of Romanian Converts to Islam (Asociaţia Românilor Convertiţi la Islam, Bucharest, sector 1, Str. Lugoj, nr. 20, http://www.arci.ro/). Under the Law of Denominations (489/2006) and particularly the Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination (officially published on 25 June 2008), all Islamic NGOs, associations and foundations need to be endorsed by the mufti. However, the mufti considers that many of these associations are harmful to traditional Hanafi Islam in Romania because

18 See the National Registry of NGOs, the Ministry of Justice, available at http:// www.just.ro/Portals/0/WWWW/files/registrul_ong/Asociatii07072009.pdf, accessed 23 July 2009.

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of their persistent propaganda and conservative views, which come from Arab schools of Islam, and also that they have taken advantage of legal ambiguities and the need for religious education after the collapse of Communism.19 The Taiba Foundation rejects this opinion and has accused the mufti and the Synodal Council of libel.20 The case is pending. 4


There are 73 purpose-built mosques in the region of Dobrudja and one in Bucharest (built in 1960).21 Ten of them are historical monuments and still in use. The oldest, Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Mangalia, was built in 1590. Although the muftiate can receive financial aid from the Romanian state, the costs of new buildings and maintenance of historical monuments are mainly provided by the Turkish state (the Diyanet) and/or foreign Muslim citizens with businesses in Romania. For example, the cost of restoring the sixteenth-century Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Medgidia, amounting to €1,000,000 was covered by the muftiate, the Consulate of Turkey in Constantza and a Turkish businessman. At the beginning of 2009, at the suggestion of the UDTTMR representative Amet Aledin, parliament allocated 50,000 Lei (approx. €12,000) for the building of a new mosque in Castelu village, Constantza county. Funding is pending, as the local community has not yet submitted the technical documentation requested by the Ministry of Culture and Religious Denominations.22 In addition to the main mosque, it is estimated that there are 15 other mosques in Bucharest

19 “Daca musulmanii ar respecta ceea ce scrie in Coran ar exista unitate (There would be unity if Muslims respected what is written in the Qur’an)”, interview with the mufti, Ziua de Constanta, 29 March 2007, available at http://www.ziuaconstanta .ro/rubrici/interviu/%22daca-musulmanii-ar-respecta-ceea-ce-scrie-in-coran-ar-exista-unitate%22.html, accessed 14 March 2010. 20 See http://www.islamul.ro/stire.php?id=11, accessed 23 November 2009. 21 See Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml.aspx?id=1745, accessed 10 October 2009. 22 See the situation of financial support for religious denominations as of 10 December 2009, part 2, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, available at http://www.culte .ro/DocumenteDownload.aspx?ID=2770, accessed 12 March 2010.

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funded by foreign residents,23 but these are in fact prayer halls adjacent to the buildings of associations and foundations established in the capital city and principal towns.24 5


The Law of Education adopted in 1995 introduced religion as a compulsory subject in public schools. A national curriculum is set for the legally recognised denominations, including Islam. National curricula for religion are set by each denomination and submitted first to the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs and then to the Ministry of Education for approval. Pupils can express their wish to take courses in a particular religion, those under 16 being spoken for by their parents or guardians. Pupils are exempted from attending religious education classes if they declare themselves to be non-religious or if the school cannot provide instruction in the religion requested. The basics of Islam are also introduced in classes on the history and traditions of the Turkish-Tatar Minority, which are part of the national curriculum for the Turkish and Tatar minorities. According to the Law of Education (Law 4/1995, Ch.XII, Art. 120.4), each legally recognised ethnic minority can draw up a curriculum for special subject teaching on their history and the traditions. The curriculum and textbooks are approved by the Ministry of Education. Islam is also taught in mosques and by religious and cultural associations on an extra-curricular and private basis, mainly in weekend schools, or within an Arabic language programme. In November 2009, the Association of Muslims of Romania launched an on-line version of such weekend schools.25 In 1996, an Islamic secondary school (Liceul Teologic Musulman şi Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk) was opened in Medgidia, a city with a sizable Turkish and Tatar population, which is now functioning with 23

Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2007), p. 155, available at http://www.fnst-freiheit.org/uploads/974/Islam_in_Europe.pdf, accessed 23 November 2009. 24 For a list, see http://www.islamulazi.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=597, accessed 1 August 2009. 25 http://www.asociatiamusulmanilor.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=ca tegory&layout=blog&id=69&Itemid=74, accessed 4 May 2010.

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the support of the Turkish government.26 A similar institution existed before the Communist period and was closed in 1967. 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at several universities and consist of a general overview within courses on Arabic language, history of Arab culture and civilisation and history of Arab literature. All holders of academic degrees in Islamic theology have studied abroad, as no such higher education qualifications are offered in Romania. Diplomas issued abroad are subject to the recognition of the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the mufti. In 2007, disputes emerged after the mufti refused to endorse diplomas obtained from Islamic theological institutes in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Sudan. The mufti officially requested the Ministry of Education not to recognise diplomas obtained by seven Tatars on the ground that they had studied a radical form of Islam,27 and recognition of their diplomas was denied. 7


The muftiate owns 108 cemeteries. In some cities, e.g. Bucharest, there is an acute need for a cemetery, while in others, e.g. Constantza, there is need for additional provision. The creation of a Muslim cemetery in Bucharest was put on the Municipality’s agenda some ten years ago. At present, Muslims who die there are usually taken to Constantza (250km away) for burial. The matter seemed to have been settled recently after the Muslim community was allotted land for this purpose on the outskirts of Bucharest. In July 2009, in Medgidia, Con26 Cf. a protocol signed by the Romanian and Turkish ministries of foreign affairs on 22 December 1999, valid until 2010 (see the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mae.ro/index.php?id=5746&unde=doc, accessed 23 November 2009). 27 “Teologi musulmani in ‘razboi’ cu muftiul (Muslim theologians at ‘war’ with the mufti)”, Evenimentul zilei, 24 April 2007, available at http://www.evz.ro/articole/ detalii-articol/439826/Teologi-musulmani-in-quotrazboiquot-cu-muftiul/, accessed 23 November 2009, and “Plangere catre Sura-i Islam (Complaint to the Sura-i Islam)”, Clubul român-arab de presă şi cultură (Romanian-Arab Club for Press and Culture), 19 April 2007, available at http://www.ana-news.info/index.php?option=com_content &task=view&id=440&Itemid=171, accessed 23 November 2009.

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stantza county, the representatives of the local administration and the Muslim community laid the foundation stone for a new cemetery after a decision taken by the Municipal Council in 2002 and the assignment of the land in 2008.28 8


There are no imams in the armed forces. The muftiate can assign an imam to visit a prison inmate at the inmate’s request and at the muftiate’s expense. The same applies to patients in hospitals. Most prisons and state hospitals have Orthodox Christian chapels. In hospitals in the towns of Dobrudja, where there are a significant number of Muslims, quotations from the Qur’an are often displayed on the walls of the wards. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations take place in the main cities (with popular music concerts, etc.) and in villages with a significant Muslim population. They are open to the public. In Ramadan, iftar dinners offered by Turkish and Arab restaurants are open to the public. Non-Muslims participate in events organised in public places (including sharing food), while in the regions without a historical tradition of Muslim-Christian coexistence (as in Dobrudja), they attend iftar meals in restaurants only if accompanied by a Muslim, being wary of behaving inappropriately. Large-scale iftars are also organised in cities with a quite small Muslim population. According to the report posted on the website of the Romanian-Arab Club for Press and Culture (Clubul român-arab de presă şi cultură), the Tuna Foundation prepared an iftar for a thousand people in Bucharest on 9 September 2009.29

28 “Medgidia—Piatră de temelie la noul cimitir musulman (Medgidia—the ground stone for a new Muslim cemetery)”, Telegraf, 21 July 2009, available at http://www .telegrafonline.ro/1248123600/articol/91618/medgidia__piatra_de_temelie_la_noul_ cimitir_musulman.html, accessed 30 July 2009. 29 “Iftaru al-alfi shakhs (The iftar of one thousand persons)”, Ana-News, 9 September 2009, available at http://www.ana-news.ro/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=475&Itemid=1, accessed 1 October 2009.

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irina vainovski-mihai 10 Halal Food

In the main cities, there are several halal food shops with both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, as well as numerous ethnic restaurants (which offer halal food and Arabic and Turkish television programmes, and do not serve alcohol). The meat for the shops and restaurants is supplied by halal slaughter houses functioning in Romania. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools, but it is mostly in villages with a large Muslim population that women wear head scarves. No women have been observed wearing niqab. 12


The main printed media are the monthly periodicals Hakses (The Authentic Voice, published by UDTR (Constantza 8700, Bd-ul Tomis nr. 99, bl. SO, ap. 3, tel./fax: (+40241) 55 09 03), Karadeniz (The Black Sea, Constantza 8700, Str. Stefan cel Mare nr. 66, tel./fax: (+40241) 61 66 43) and Cas (The Youngster, same address as Karadeniz), both of the latter published by the UDTTMR. The website http://www.tatar.ro, although it focuses on information about the Tatar community, also offers extended articles on the Muslims in Romania in general. In March 2009, UDTR, UDTTMR and the muftiate opened a broadcasting station, Radio T, in Constantza with programmes in Romanian, Turkish and Tatar, which adds to the already long-running similar programmes aired by the local station of the state-owned Romanian Broadcasting Society (Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune, SRR). DDTV (a television channel broadcasting from Bucharest nationally, although with a small audience) hosted a weekly programme, Islamul azi (Islam Today) presented in Romanian by the Taiba Foundation. The programme was cancelled after DDTV started broadcasting movies only. Webcasting is used increasingly: video clips (in Romanian or with Romanian subtitles) on dailymotion (http://www.dailymotion .com/AsociatiaSuroriMusulmane), YouTube (http://www.youtube .com/islamulazi, http://www.youtube.com/muhlisun) and Ikhwan Tube

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(http://www.ikhwantube.org/), and audio streaming on sites such as Radio Islam (http://www.radioislam.ro/radio.html ). 13

Family Law

According to the Family Code, marriages are only recognised if they are performed and registered by a state (secular) authority. Marriages in mosques (as in the places of worship of other religions) have a rather ceremonial function. The Romanian legal system is secular. In litigation, a non-denominational premarital contract may be taken into account. The Family Code prohibits polygamy, but marriages are recognised if they were legal in the jurisdictions where they were contracted. There are circumstances (almost exclusively among Arab expatriates) when marriages contracted in countries with legal systems different from the Romanian are officially recorded as such in the Romanian civil status register. Painful litigation (mainly over custody of children) emerges in cases of separation when the spouses bring to court the laws of their respective countries. Generally, such cases are not resolved because they end with two separate court decisions pronounced under different legal systems. 14


Muslim festivals and special events are regularly attended by nonMuslim representatives of local authorities (see Sections 7 and 9). On 4 September 2009, the president of Romania, Traian Băsescu (an Orthodox Christian), attended an iftar dinner in Bucharest at the invitation of the mufti.30 Government agencies, such as the Department for Interethnic Relations (Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice, http:// www.dri.gov.ro/) and non-governmental institutions, such as the Intercultural Institute Timisoara (Institutul Intercultural Timişoara, http://www.intercultural.ro/rom/index.html) are promoting dialogue through symposia, publications and websites, such as Intercultural Calendar (Calendar Intercultural, http://www.calendarintercultural .ro/index.php), comprising both ethnic and religious festivals. Probably

30 See the speech of the Romanian president on the occasion, http://www .presidency.ro/pdf/date/11390_ro.pdf, accessed 1 October 2009.

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as a result of the long tradition of coexistence with Muslims, those who are long-established in Romania are regarded as familiar Others, while outsiders (i.e., Muslims from other countries, including the Balkan countries) are regarded with suspicion (even if contact is indirect, through media coverage, etc.). 15


Media coverage concerning Muslims in Romania at the national level focuses almost exclusively on significant events (cultural exhibitions, ethnic festivals and public performances) (see also Section 16). The regional media (in Dobrudja) covers in detail the life of the community, as it addresses a broad audience and presents both religious and ethnic points of view. Internal debates within the community and tensions between the version of Islam professed by the historical Muslim community and that professed by new-comers are irrelevant to the non-Muslim population and not understood by them. Media focus on Islam tends mostly to be related to international events and presentations and debates about international Islam-related subjects are usually presented by non-Muslim commentators, Middle East experts and ad-hoc analysts. 16


Nawruz, the annual spring holiday, is observed with public festivities organised by the Turkish and Tatar minorities, as well as Kurdish immigrants. There are several other festivals and contests with a mainly ethnic dimension, such as Küreş (traditional Tatar wrestling) and Hîdîrlez (the Turkic spring festival ).

RUSSIA Elmira Akhmetova1 1

Muslim Populations

There is no official record of the number of Muslims in the Russian Federation as the 2002 census did not include a question about religious beliefs. However, according to that census, the total number of members of Muslim ethnic groups indigenous to Russia is about 15 million, and there are significant numbers of labour migrants from newly independent Central Asian republics, mainly Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan among the approximately eight million officially registered labour migrants in Russia. In addition, the Federal Migration Service estimates that there are around five million illegal immigrants.2 According to Ravil Gainutdin, head of the Russian Council of Muftis (RCM) and the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia, 80% of labour immigrants in Russia are ethnic Muslims.3 Accordingly, the RCM estimates that there are over 20 million Muslims in Russia, which is about 14%–15% of the total population (about 142 million in January 2009). In 2003, Russia’s then-president Vladimir Putin, addressing the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, also said the Muslims of Russia numbered about 20 million. In 2000, the Muslims of Russia celebrated 14 centuries of Islam on Russian soil. Islam first entered the territory of the modern Russian 1 Elmira Akhmetova is an assistant research fellow at the International Institute for Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), Malaysia, and a PhD student in history and civilisation at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM). She has published her MA thesis, Ideas of Muslim Unity at the Age of Nationalism: A Comparative Study of the Concept of the Ummah in the Writings of Musa Jarullah and Said Nursi (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009) and her latest book, Islam in Russia: Historical Facts and Modern Developments, is due to be published in Malaysia by the IAIS in 2010. 2 This number may be even higher as some unofficial agencies estimate there are 10 to 15 million unregistered foreigners in the country: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/eo20060921a1.html, accessed 5 April 2010. 3 http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/03/11/2323_type63378type63381_214089. shtml, accessed 23 March 2010.

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Federation through Dagestan from the mid-seventh century and from there started to spread to the entire Northern Caucasus. In 641 CE, the Muslim army under the leadership of ‘Abd Rahman ibn Rabi’a al-Bakhili reached the Southern Caucasus. In 685–6 CE, the Arabs took the town of Derbend, which subsequently became the focus for the Islamisation of the north-eastern Caucasus, referred to as bab aljihad (the gateway of jihad).4 In the other part of modern Russia, the upper Volga basin, Islam gradually took root through trade and other economic relations with the Muslim world. The first Muslim state in modern Russian territory was the Bulghar Kingdom,5 which voluntarily recognised Islam as an official state religion in 922 CE in the presence of a delegation sent by the Abbasid Caliph Ja’far al-Muqtadir Billah (r. 908–932).6 From there, Islam spread to other parts of modern Russia. The second wave of the spread of Islam in Russia took place during the period of the Golden Horde (Altyn Urda), a western province of the vast Chenghizid Empire, which was established in 1242 as a result of the Mongol invasion of the Bulghar Kingdom and other neighbouring territories. Under the rule of Uzbek Khan (r. 1312–42), Islam became the official religion of the state and, from the mid-fourteenth century until the demise of the Golden Horde in 1437, the Volga Bulghar elite dominated the cultural and Islamic discourse of the empire.7 At the beginning of the fifteenth century a number of independent Islamic khanates (or states), including the Kazan, Crimean, Siberian, Noghay, and Astrakhan khanates, emerged from the gigantic Golden Horde. From the sixteenth century, these Muslim states were con-

4 Galina Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia: An historical perspective,” in Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yemelianova (eds), Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 28. 5 The Bulghar Kingdom existed in the Middle Volga region, a territory of the modern republic of Tatarstan, from the eighth century until the Mongol invasion in 1236 CE (see http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=12037579169 53&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 12 August 2009). 6 Marjani, Shihabetdin, Mustafadu al-Akhbar fi Ahwali Qazan wa Bulghar (Useful information about the conditions of Kazan and the Bulgars) (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nashriyaty, 1989), pp. 124–130; Wimbush, Enders, “Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, in John Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 271–272; Yemelianova, Galina M., Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 7. 7 Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia”, p. 21.

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quered one after another and incorporated into a newly centralised Muscovite state of proto-Russians: Kazan in 1552, Astrakhan in 1556, and Western Siberia in 1598.8 By the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian advance had reached the Northern Caucasus too. In 1859, the Muslims of Dagestan (Chechnya and Ingushetia were also part of Dagestan) lost their country to the Russian Empire after 34 years of resistance under Imam Shamil (1797–1871).9 Today the majority of Muslims live in their historical territories of the Volga-Urals basin, western Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. Other parts of Russia, including large cities such as Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg also have significant Muslim populations. The Muslim population of Moscow alone is estimated to be more than 2 million (about 20% of the total), and St Petersburg’s Muslim community is about half a million10 (out of a population of about 4.6 million, according to the 2002 census). Russia’s Muslims belong to more than 40 ethnic groups,11 such as the Volga Tatars, the Siberian Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Bashqorts, Dargins, Balkars, Avars, Karachays, Circassians, Kabardins and many others. In the Dagestan region alone, there are tens of indigenous Muslim ethnicities. The majority of Russia’s Muslims follow two Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence—the Hanafi and Shafi’i madhhabs. Muslims of the Volga-Urals region and the Nogais, Karachays and Balkars in the Northern Caucasus follow the Hanafi madhhab, while Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia are Shafi’is. Shi’ites are a small minority to be found almost exclusively in the Caucasus, among Azeri Turks and the Azeri diaspora and part of Dagestan’s small Muslim ethnic group, the Lezgins.

8 On Russian expansion into Muslim territory, see Wimbush, “Islam in Central Asia”, p. 272. 9 Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 304–318; Blanch, Lesley, The Sabres of Paradise: Conquest and Vengeance in the Caucasus (London: Tauris Parke, 1960). 10 Hahn, Gordon M., Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 19–20. 11 If we include the tiny ethnic groups of the Caucasus region, this number may be even higher. For example, President Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, noted that 57 of Russia’s 182 ethnic groups identify themselves as Muslim.

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Ethnic Muslims are predominant in seven out of the 21 republics of the Russian Federation: Bashkortostan and Tatarstan in the VolgaUrals region, and Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia in the Northern Caucasus.12 2

Islam and the State

The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that Russia is a secular state and that “no religion can be established as the official or compulsory [religion]” (Article 14). It guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance with them (Article 28), and prohibits “all forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds” (Article 19). The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, a supplemental law on religion, does not recognise a state religion. But its preamble identifies Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism as traditional religions and recognises the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture. Islam is repeatedly affirmed to be the part of Russian society by the Russian authorities and political leaders. From 29 June 2005, the Russian Federation obtained observer status at the OIC. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, stressed the importance of Islam in the country’s internal affairs and declared: “We are a nation of many ethnicities and faiths, and the Muslims of our nation have due respect and influence in our country. Muslim religious organizations make important contributions to supporting civil order, to providing spiritual and moral guidance to an enormous number of people, and to fighting extremism and xenophobia.”13

12 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1229319098125& pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 31 August 2009. 13 Medvedev, Dmitry, “Opening remarks at meeting with Muslim spiritual leaders of Russia”, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/07/15/1219_type84779_219684 .shtml, accessed 31 August 2009.

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The central and provincial muftiates are on good terms with the Kremlin and the regional leadership. On 2 November 2009, the grand mufti Ravil Gainutdin was decorated by the government with the fourth degree Order “For Services to the Fatherland” in recognition of his contribution to propagating spirituality and strengthening harmony between the nations of the Russian Federation. The Russian government assists Muslim institutions by financing some educational and cultural developments. In December 2006, a Fund for Supporting Islamic Culture, Sciences and Education was founded by the Russian president, with an annual budget of about 200 million Russian Roubles (about €5 million) to support scholarships, Islamic events, conferences, seminars and festivals and the Muslim press. It should be stated that the Islamic factor played a minor role in the declaration of war by the Russian government against Chechnya in 1994 and 1999. Many experts agreed that the Caspian Sea’s oilfields and the strategic significance of oil pipelines passing through the Caucasus were major incentives for Moscow to use force against the separatist movement in Chechnya during the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000. This small mountainous region of the Northern Caucasus sits astride a critical pipeline that links the oil-rich republics of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, both bordering the landlocked Caspian Sea, to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. In addition, Grozny, the capital Chechnya, was the second-largest oil-refining city after Baku (the capital of Azerbaijan) during the Soviet period.14 The horrible consequences of these wars, together with the 9/11 attacks in the United States, played a fundamental role in creating a negative image of Islam and Muslims in Russia (see section 15 below). Furthermore, in the wake of the Russian Extremist Law of 2002, adopted by the Russian government after the declaration of the US-led global ‘war on terror’, cases of discriminations and violation of Muslims’ rights under the pretext of ‘fighting against religious extremism’ or ‘Islamic terrorism’ have significantly increased in Russia. Dozens of mainstream Islamic books such as the Risale-i Nur by the Turkish intellectual Said Nursi (1877–1960), Muhammad Ali Hashimi’s Lichnost’

14 Lieven, Chechnya, pp. 84–86; Cohen, Ariel, “The new ‘great game’: Oil politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1996/01/ BG1065nbsp-The-New-Great-Game, accessed 1 April 2010.

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Musul’manina (The Personality of Muslims), some books under general titles as Jizn’ Proroka Muhammada (The Life of the Prophet Muhammad), Osnovy Islama (Foundations of Islam) and Islam Segodnya (Islam Today) have been indiscrimately banned in several district courts in Russia, for allegedly inciting interreligious and interracial hatred, and promoting exclusivity and superiority on the basis of religion. A number of Muslim organisations, movements and societies such as Hizb al-Tahrir, Jama’a al-Tabligh, Nurdzhular ( followers of Said Nursi), the so-called ‘Ahl as-Sunna’, Islamic Jamaat, Salafism, Wahhabism and others have been banned in Russia as being ‘extremist’ and “contradictory to the traditional Hanafi madhhab”. These bans have inevitably led to the arrest of dozens if not hundreds of Muslims in Russia on allegations of belonging to “extremist groups”.15 In fact, only the Hanafi madhhab is considered acceptable and traditional in Russia, while other schools of thought and fiqh, apart from the Shafi’i madhhab (which can be tolerated as indigenous Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, such as the Chechens and Ingush, are Shafi’is), are ‘non-traditional’ and unwelcome.16 The monopoly of the Spiritual Directorate and regional authorities over the lives of Muslims arouses feelings of suspicion about everyone who does not follow the ‘traditional’ Hanafi madhhab.

15 On the banning of Islamic books and organisations, see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: The battle with ‘religious extremism’—a return to past methods?”, http://forum18. org/Archive.php?article_id=1288, accessed 25 September 2009; idem, “Russia: Religious freedom survey, October 2008”, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_ id=1196, accessed 14 September 2009; Akhmetova, Elmira, “Time to burn Islamic books: Russia 2008”, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1 203758662613&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 14 September 2009; “Fabrication of ‘Islamic extremism’ criminal cases in Russia: Campaign continues”, http://www.memo.ru/2008/09/04/0409082.htm, accessed 25 September 2009; and Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Raids continue as doubts grow over Nursi ban”, http://religionandpolicy.org/cms/index2.php?option=com_content&do_ pdf=1&id=4178, accessed 25 September 2009. 16 The Oslo-based Forum 18 News Service also reports on the existing Hanafi monopoly in Russia (see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Any school of Islam, as long as it’s Hanafi”, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1324, accessed 29 September 2009.

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The voice of the Russia’s Muslim population is mainly represented by two competing Islamic structures. The most influential among them is the Russian Council of Muftis (Soviet Muftiyev Rossii, RCM, 7, Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel/fax: 0074956–814904, http://www .muslim.ru), founded in July 1996 by the decision of the first Assembly of the heads (muftis) of Regional Spiritual Boards of Russia, which elected Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia (Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Evropeiskoi Chasti Rossii), as its first chairman.17 The RCM is an umbrella organisation that unites religious Muslim associations in the Russian Federation on a voluntary basis. Among the its main tasks are: consolidation of Muslim religious organisations of the Russian Federation with the aim of finding solutions to problems affecting the whole Muslim community in Russia; coordination and mutual assistance with respect to activities organised by individual religious boards; clarification of the Council’s official position with regard to various issues in relations with public authorities on federal and local level, organisations representing other confessions, international and foreign organisations; organisation of Hajj, conferences, public relations campaigns concerning the Muslim population, the government, and the non-Muslim population. The second but oldest Muslim religious organisation is the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and European countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tsentral’noe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Rossii i Evropeiskix Stran SNG, CSBM, 50, Tukaeva str., Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, tel: 0073472–508086/ 25080 79). It was established in post-Soviet Russia in 1992 and is located in Ufa, Bashkortostan; its head is Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin. The CSBM began in 1788, when the Empress Catherine II ordered the establishment of the Ufa Spiritual Gathering for Mohametan Law (Ufimskoe Duxovnoe Magometanskogo Zakona Sobranie), which was renamed the Central Muslim Religious Board of Inner Russia and Siberia (Tsentral’noe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Vnutrennoi Rossii i Sibiri) in 1917

17 Hunter, Shireen, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), p. 56.

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and the Muslim Religious Board of European part of USSR and Siberia (Musul’manskoe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Evropeiskoi Chasti SSSR and Sibiri) in 1948. Regional Muslim religious boards are registered with either the RCM or the CSBM and every local Muslim community must be affiliated to the regional Muslim religious boards in order to be officially recognised as a legal organisation. These two organisations enjoy equal rights and status in the government structure and are recognised by the state as umbrella Muslim organisations of Russia. In 2009, the CSBM suggested they might unite, together with the Muslim Coordination Centre in the Northern Caucasus, under one centralised organisation and discussions are on-going. There are no Muslim political parties in Russia, but Muslims are integrated into Russian political life. At present, two ministerial positions are occupied by ethnic Muslims: Rashid Nurgaleev is the Minister of Internal Affairs, and Elvira Nabiullina is the head of the Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation. In republics with a Muslim majority, especially in the Northern Caucasus, major posts in the government structure and industry are largely occupied by ethnic Muslims. The Polish weekly news magazine Wprost reported that the ethnic Muslim Suleiman Karimov was the richest man of Russia in 2008.18 4


Mosques or prayer houses are to be found in almost every Russian city and town that has a Muslim community. Experts estimate that at least 11,000 officially registered mosques and around 12,000 Muslim prayer houses are functioning in Russia, and their number continues to increase.19 New mosques have been opened in ancient Russian cities such as Tver, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Ryazan, Nizhniy Novgorod and many others. In regions with a Muslim majority, there is a boom in opening mosques. In the small Republic of Dagestan alone, with a population of about 2,577,000, more than 1,700 mosques are registered. The first mosques that opened after the collapse of the Soviet

18 http://www.islam.ru/rus/2008–10–22/?single=23392?print_page, accessed 5 April 2010. 19 Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, p. 13; Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 137–138.

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Union have often been reconstructed on the historical sites of old mosques, which were confiscated and in some cases destroyed by the government in the 1930s. The mosques are purpose-built and their size depends on the size of the community. Village mosques are usually designed for several dozen Muslims, while city mosques can accommodate from several hundred up to several thousand believers. On 24 June 2005, one of the largest mosques in Europe, the Qul-Sharif Mosque, was opened inside the Kazan Kremlin, Tatarstan. In addition to a prayer hall, this mosque also includes an Islamic museum, library and publishing house, and has become an important marker in the Kazan architectural landscape. Its prayer hall is designed to hold 1,500 people, while the open space outside the mosque can accommodate around 9,000 more for prayer. The construction cost around 375 million rubles (€9,430,000), most of which was donated by the Tatar people. On 16 October 2008, another large mosque, Ahmad Kadyrov Grozny Central Dome Mosque, was officially opened in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. It is believed to be the biggest mosque in Europe (excluding Turkey), with space for 10,000 people to pray. Prayer houses (molel’niyi komnaty) are commonly single rooms opened in universities, schools, workplaces, hospitals, prisons and in small towns with a Muslim minority. In 2002, a Muslim prayer room with an area of 35 square metres was opened at Domodedovo International Airport, Moscow; it is the only Russian airport prayer room. More mosques and prayer houses are needed by practising Muslims in many regions of Russia, especially in Moscow. There are currently five mosques in Moscow, which together can only accommodate about 10,000 believers. According to security service records, about 50,000 Muslims gathered around the Moscow Cathedral Mosque building alone on 20 September 2009 to perform the ‘Id al-Fitr prayer. Since the mosque can only accommodate several hundred, worshippers had no choice but to pray wherever they could find a space—neighbouring streets, garage roofs and adjacent Macdonald’s and church precincts—several blocks away from the mosque itself. The same happened in Saratov, where around 50,000–60,000 Muslims came to pray at a mosque when only 5,000–6,000 were expected. Construction of new mosques is therefore a burning issue for Russia’s Muslims. Work recently began on the restoration of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque (7, Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, Russia, tel: 0074956–814904), which was originally built in 1904 by local Muslims and remained open even during Soviet times.

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There are no restrictions in Russia, including Moscow and St Petersburg, on the adhan being called outside the mosque. 5


The 1997 law on religious freedom establishes the secular nature of public school education in Russia. However, in November 2002, the Ministry of Education announced that a course in ‘Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture’ (FOC) would be taught in public schools. Optional classes in Orthodox culture began appearing across the country in the late 1990s, but from 1 September 2006, FOC became part of the required curriculum in all schools in Belgorod Oblast, and in some schools in Bryansk, Kaluga and Smolensk Oblasts. All students, including Muslims, Jews, Protestants and Buddhists have to study this subject for two hours a week for 11 years. Representatives of other religions—Muslims, Protestants, Old Believers and others—have protested against FOC being compulsory and the Muslim republics of Russia rejected it. From September 2007, for instance, in several schools in Tatarstan, pupils study ‘history of religions’, which outlines the general ideas of Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism. In July 2009, in order to solve the problem, President Medvedev proclaimed the first national plan to teach the basics of major religions and secular ethics in Russian schools. Under this scheme, pupils will be offered the choice of studying Russia’s four federally recognised religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism—as well as a course in comparative religion. This scheme will be expanded to all schools in the country by 2012. Russia’s Muslim children can learn about Islam in maktabs (mektebe in Russian) or Sunday schools and Islamic schools, which are expected to follow the state school curriculum. The first such school, the Islamic Usmaniyya school, was opened in Kazan in 1995. In addition to all the compulsory secular subjects, the pupils also study Arabic, Qur’an recitation, tafsir, basics of fiqh and theology. There are currently around 100 pupils studying at primary and secondary levels. A private Islamic primary school, named Ansar, has recently opened in St Petersburg (www.ansar-school.com). Muslim children who do not have the option of attending an Islamic school may get basic knowledge about Islam at maktabs or Sunday schools in mosques in the cities and some villages. Some madrasas (see

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section 6 below) also have their own maktabs. For example, the Mahinur madrasa operates a number of maktabs and 15 summer schools, where children, in addition to enjoying themselves, study Arabic, Qur’an, basics of fiqh, and stories of the prophets and rightly guided caliphs. 6


Professional Islamic education in Russia is carried out primarily in madrasas.20 There are currently over 20 licensed madrasas in the European part of Russia, excluding the Northern Caucasus region.21 Eight are in Tatarstan, seven are branches of the Russian Islamic University set up by CSBM in various regions, and three are run by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan. In addition, the Spiritual Boards of Muslims of the European part of Russia, Saratov and Nizhniy Novgorod each have one madrasa.22 Branches of the Russian Islamic University established by the CSBM in Ufa are: Khadji Tarhan in Astrakhan, Bilyar in Ulyanovsk, Nur in Samara, Husainiya in Orenburg, Nurul-Islam in Oktyabrsk, and Gulistan in the village of Shigirdani in Chuvashiya. The three madrasas established by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan, the RCM, are as follows: Imeni M. Sultanova madrasa (3, Sotsialisticheskaya str., Ufa, tel: 0073472–723858) and Galiya (3, Mustay Karim str., Ufa, tel: 0073472–721987), and Nur al-Iman in Sterlitamak (73, Bogdan Hmelnitskiy str., 453100, Sterlitamak; tel: 0073473–252223). The Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia runs the Moscow Spiritual Islamic College (7, Vipolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel: 0074952–844704), Sheikh Said madrasa in Saratov, and

20 The term madrasa in the modern Russian context usually refers to a higher Islamic educational institution, equivalent to a higher technical college or specialist high school. 21 The exact number of madrasas in the Northern Caucasus is unknown, but is in the hundreds. 22 Muhetdinov, Damir, “Sovremennoe medrese dlya Sovremennoi Ummy (Modern madrasa for a modern nation)”, in D. Muhetdinov (ed.), Problema Stanovleniya i Razvitiya Musulmanskogo Obrazovaniya v Postsovetskom Prostranstve (The Question of the Establishment and Development of Islamic Education in Post-Soviet Space) (Nizhny Novgorod: Knijniy Dom Medina, 2009), p. 11.

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Mahinur in Nizhniy Novgorod (6, Kazanskaya Naberezhnaya str., Nizhniy Novgorod). There are no madrasas for women only in Russia, but the Muhammadiya madrasa in Kazan, the Fanis in Yutazi and the Nur al-Iman madrasa in Sterlitamak accept both men and women as full-time students, using separate class rooms, and all madrasas accept women as part-time students. Male madrasa graduates can receive diplomas as ‘imam-khatib’, ‘Islamic sciences teacher’, ‘Arabic language translator’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics’. Female graduates can qualify as ‘teacher-advisor’, ‘teacher and translator of Arabic language’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics’. Study programmes last from two to five years and these diplomas are recognised by the state. The majority of madrasa graduates enrol at Islamic universities in Russia to obtain higher religious education. Higher Islamic education in Russia is provided by eight Islamic universities: Moscow Islamic University (Moskovskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 12, proyezd Kirova, Moscow, tel: 007495–3513067, http://www.miu .su), Russian Islamic University, Kazan (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, RIU, 19, Gazovaya str., Kazan, Tatarstan, tel: 0078432–775536, http://www.e-riu.ru), Russian Islamic University, Ufa (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 5, Chernyshevskogo str., 450076, Ufa, Bashkortostan; tel: 0073472–519787), the North-Caucasian Islamic University named after Abu Hanifa in Nalchik, and, in Dagestan, the Institute of Theology and Religion in Makhachkala, the Islamic University named after Imam Shafi’i, the Islamic University named after Imam Ash’ari and the Dagestan Islamic University named after M. Arif. The biggest and best established Islamic university in Russia is the RIU. Currently about 400 students from 20 regions of Russia are studying at this university. It also has a centre for memorisation of the Holy Qur’an and its own mosque, called Anilar (Mothers). In addition, the Russian Centre of Islamic Economics and Finance (RCIEF) was launched in 2008 at the RIU in response to the increasing interest in Islamic finance and banking (http://eng.rcief.com). Practically all madrasas and universities have their own buildings and student hostels and there are currently about 3,000 Muslims studying at Islamic tertiary educational institutions. Tuition at all educational institutions is free. In addition, hostel accommodation is free, and full-time students are given three meals a day free of charge. About US$10–12 million a year from the federal budget is spent to support Islamic education.

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Muslim cemeteries exist in all parts of the predominantly Muslim republics and also in Muslim populated villages in other regions, such as Orenburg, Saratov, Yekaterinburg, Penza and Chelyabinsk. Special sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in most Russian cities, including Moscow (e.g. Perepechenskoe Cemetery) and St Petersburg (Novovolkovskoe Cemetery, established in 1820). When no special areas are available locally, relatives bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries in neighbouring regions. Most of the ethnic Muslims take the observance of burial customs seriously. In contrast to other parts of the Muslim world, Russia’s Muslims widely practise the custom of the Qur’an Ashy (literally ‘Banquet of the Qur’an’) on the third, seventh, fortieth and fifty-first days and the first anniversary after the funeral. On those days, the family of the deceased invite relatives and everyone who took part in the funeral to a meal, and verses from the Qur’an are recited by the local imam or, in the case of female gathering, by the most knowledgeable woman (abystai). Prayer (du’a) is said for the dead and his/her family, and gifts of money sadaqa (usually a very small amount) are distributed among the guests and those who took part in the funeral ceremony. Men and women usually gather separately. Recitation of the whole Qur’an and the slaughter of an animal as a sacrifice (qurban) in the name of the dead person is also widely practised. 8


There have been officially appointed Muslim chaplains in some parts of the Russian army in the Northern Caucasus and abroad since 1 February 2010, and this will expand to other regions during the year. In some places imams pay occasional visits to the armed forces, and Muslim religious representatives are often invited to new soldiers’ swearing-in ceremonies. Some private hospitals in Moscow, Kazan and cities of the Northern Caucasus have prayer rooms for Muslim patients and staff. There is a Muslim prayer room in the military hospital in Orenburg regularly attended by a representative from the local Karavan-Saray mosque. There are no officially appointed Muslim chaplains in prisons, although some prisons in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Mordovia, Penza and other regions have mosques and prayer houses with regular imams, usually

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appointed from among the detainees. In the prisons in Tatarstan alone, there are currently seven mosques and eight prayer houses with libraries and basic Islamic training facilities. 9

Religious Festivals

The Muslim religious festivals ‘Id al-Adha (Qurban Bayram) and ‘Id al-Fitr (Uraza Bayram) are public holidays in almost all the predominantly Muslim republics. Muslims living in other regions can usually take a day off work, provided they make up for their absence later. The Russian president officially congratulates Muslim citizens at their religious festivals every year. On festival days and during the month of Ramadan, Muslim communities organise fundraising for local orphanages, prisons, hospitals, old people’s homes and homes for the disabled. In Moscow, the RCM organises the so-called Shater Ramadana (the Ramadan Tent), a cultural-charity project, where diplomats from Muslim countries, as well as local Muslim and non-Muslim political leaders, activists, scholars, public figures, the media, representatives of other religions and soldiers, as well as ordinary citizens, are invited to attend cultural programmes and share iftar with Muslim religious leaders. Public cultural events, such as lectures, competitions, sports and performances, are often organised at these times. On festival days, Muslims also often visit cemeteries and pray for deceased family members, and during Qurban Bayram Muslim charities, such as the Solidarity Foundation (Solidarnost, 18, Polbina str., Moscow, tel/fax: 0074953–546601, http://www.solidarnost.su) organise the slaughtering of sacrificed animals and distribute meat to orphans, elderly people, the disabled and others in need. The Muslim New Year, the ‘Blessed Night’ and especially the Prohpet’s birthday (Maulid Bayram) on 12 Rabi‘ al-Awwal are also widely celebrated. During the Maulid Bayram (and through the whole month) Muslims gather together for talks and Friday sermons on the life and importance of the Prophet Muhammad, and to read from the Qur’an and perform qasidas (Arabic poems about the Prophet Muhammad, particularly the Burda), prayers and munajats (nashids). Charitable donations, gifts and sweets are distributed and congratulation are exchanged with relatives and neighbours.

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10 Halal Food Halal restaurants and shops are widespread in predominantly Muslim Republics. In Kazan alone, meat with a halal logo is sold by a number of supermarket chains such as Bahetle, Metro, Edel’veis, Perekrestok, Real and Patterson. Also, almost every mosque has its own shop, where visitors can buy halal food, Islamic garments and literature. Halal meals are provided in 12 Tatar schools and 16 kindergartens in Kazan. In cities with a minority Muslim population, halal food, mostly meat and processed meat products, is usually available at local mosques. Imported halal goods may be found in major supermarkets. In Moscow, there is a halal supermarket called “Apelsin” (apt.1, house 3, Gospitalniy val, M. Semenovskaya, Moscow). The largest Russian retail company, X5 Retail Group, recently signed an agreement with the halal meat manufacturer Safa of the Moscow region (http://www .safahalal.ru) to supply halal meat products to major Russian supermarket chains such as Karusel’, Pyaterochka and Patterson in Moscow, Voronedz, St Petersburg, Kazan, Ufa, Novosibirsk and other cities. A number of confectionary and bakery companies in Tatarstan produce halal cakes, sweets, chocolate products and pastries and, in 2009, the Mustella Talir Group in Kazan began producing cosmetics with a halal logo.23 Halal certification is carried out by Muslim religious authorities, who issue halal certificates to food manufacturers and suppliers. Halal standards have been recognised by the governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Most regional Muslim religious boards have established halal committees for the development and promotion of halal standards. They issue the halal logo, control its usage, and notify the authorities of the illegal use of the halal sign on manufactured products. According to Mr Azizbaev, head of the halal standards department of the RMC, as of March 2009 there were 17 major halal meat manufacturers in Russia.

23

http://www.talir.ru/catalog.php?parent=1, accessed 5 May 2010.

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Dress Codes

There are no restrictions on the wearing of Muslim dress in public. Muslim women wearing head scarves are no longer an unusual sight. In 2002, Muslim women won a court case that allowed them to be photographed with the head scarf for identification documents. There are also some cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab, particularly in the republic of Dagestan. However, wearing black, particularly black hijab, is taboo among Muslim Tatar women, as black is traditionally the colour of mourning. 12


Within a short period of the collapse of the USSR, Russia witnessed a boom in the field of Islamic literature and periodicals, as well as a proliferation of Islamic books and audio and video materials produced in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Great Britain. Within two decades, a number of publishing houses, such as Iman in Kazan (27, Qayum Nasiyri str., Kazan, tel/fax: 0078432–934292) and Ummah in Moscow (http://ummah.ru) have become Russia’s leading specialist Islamic publishing houses and Islamic books are appearing in increasing numbers and improved quality. Annual Islamic book fairs have become customary. Among other influential Muslim publishers is the Medina Publishing House in Nizhniy Novgorod (http://www.idmedina.ru), which produces four academic journals and a newspaper; it also aims to produce a 12-volume encyclopaedia, Islam v Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Islam in the Russian Federation) by the year 2012. In 2009, four volumes appeared (in Russian): Islam in Saint Petersburg, Islam in Central Russia, Islam in the Volga Region, and Islam in the Urals. In addition, it has produced important books on fiqh and also organises international and local symposiums, conferences and seminars. In Tatarstan alone there are about 25 Muslim publishing houses producing newspapers and magazines amounting to 66,000 copies per year in both the Russian and Tatar languages. The major ones are: Islam info, Iman, Vera and Umma. The Spiritual Board of Tatarstan issues the Islam Nury (Light of Islam) newspaper and a magazine called Deen ve adap (Religion and Morality). In 2003, the Muslim Journalists’ Union was set up under the auspices of the RCM and with the support of the Russian Journalists Union (http://muslim-press.ru).

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There are no Islamic radio or TV stations in Russia that broadcast on air but, in 1997, the RCM together with private individuals established the TV Company Islamskiy Mir (Islamic World, http://www .islamtv.ru), which in 2007 launched the first Islamic internet channel in Russian, Islam TV. The channel currently broadcasts daily for 14 hours online. Its programmes include Islamic lectures, documentaries, news, children’s programme, sermons, etc. Islamskiy Mir also produces audio, video and printed Islamic materials. In August 2009, during his meeting with political and religious leaders of the Caucasus region, President Medvedev stressed the necessity of creating an Islamic satellite channel under Russian state television, but this has not yet come to fruition. Since 2002, Russian state television has been broadcasting a weekly programme called Musul’mane (Muslims) which is devoted to the traditions, customs and culture of Russia’s Muslims, and state radio stations have similar programmes. Muslim leaders often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. The most popular Islamic websites are http://www.islam.ru, http:// islamnews.ru and http://islamrf.ru. 13

Family Law

Russian law does not recognise Muslim marriage contracts conducted in mosques or marriage or divorce certificates issued by local imams. Russia’s Muslim couples usually first perform nikah rituals, and then, on the same day or later, have a civil marriage ceremony at state offices, which is the only form of marriage recognised by Russian law. Both ceremonies are widely celebrated by the Muslim community. Regarding inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular state law. 14


Interreligious relations in the Russian context mean interactions between the followers of the minority creeds such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and the dominant Russian Orthodox Christianity, which has one universally recognised centre, Moscow Patriarchate. All these religions have coexisted in the territory of the Russian Federation over a thousand years. Over time there have been periods of peaceful

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relations, competition and even ruthless confrontations, especially between the victorious Orthodox Christians and their Muslim subjects. This deep-seated historical antagonism as well as recent developments such as war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the emergence of anti-Russian moods in the Muslim-majority republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000, and, the most importantly, the events of 11 September 2001 have played an important role in creating the stereotype image of Islam as an aggressive, militant religion, associated with separatism, terrorism and drugtrafficking. This stereotype was adopted by the great part of Orthodox believers and the Russian Orthodox Church authorities.24 Another problem of the relations between Muslims and Orthodox Christians is related to a recently evolved wave of competition for “human souls” between their official institutions. In the last few years, the most active priests have begun to propagate Christianity among traditionally Muslim peoples of Russia.25 Muslim leaders, on their parts, have started to involve new converts to Islam from Christianity in the management structures of official Muslim organisations. As a result, mutual mistrust and the opposition between Islam and Christianity have been significantly increased. It should be also noted that this hostile attitude is not shared by all leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate and Muslim officials. In recent years, the movement for peace, dialogue and co-operation between Muslims and Christians has become quite popular among Russian educated circles. On 23 December 1998, the Interreligious Council of Russia (Mezhreligiozniy Sovet Rossii) was founded at the initiative of the country’s religious leaders. This council unites all the country’s traditional religious associations and has undertaken an important role in coordinating social projects with religious organisations. A contribution to interreligious dialogue is being made by multilateral and bilateral meetings and conferences. For instance, on 3–5 July

24 See, Alexander Sotnichenko, “Islam-Russian Orthodox Church Relations and the State in the Post-Communist Russia,” http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/ images/pdf_files/srpski/godina3_broj2/Analiza%203.pdf, assessed 24 May 2010. 25 For instance, one of the most aggressive missionary priests Daniil Sisoev turned up at the Tatar national festival Sabantuy to convert visitors to Christianity. This resulted in a scandal which was covered by the media from many positions, and relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and Islam became more difficult than before; see http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/images/pdf_files/srpski/ godina3_broj2/Analiza%203.pdf, assessed 24 May 2010.

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2006 the World Summit of Religious Leaders was held in Moscow on the threshold of the G8 Summit, and discussed the most pressing problems of the international community. More than 200 religious leaders from 40 countries took part. On 13–16 September 2007, the International Conference “Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue for Sustainable Development” was held at the Russian Academy for Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation in Moscow, with the support of UNESCO, with the aim of developing a dialogue between representatives of different confessions and cultures. The issues of inter-religious dialogue were discussed with the active participation of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, the RCM, the Consultative Council of Protestant Churches of Russia, the Congress of Jewish Communities of Russia, the Federation of Jewish Organisations of Russia, the Buddhist Sangha of Russia and others.26 Russia’s Muslims and their umbrella organisations are engaged in various local and international interfaith activities. The RCM is one of the founders of the Interreligious Council of Russia and has also initiated a number of international conferences on interreligious dialogue, including “The Civilisational Aspects of the Unity of Today’s Islamic Society” (November 2003), “Islam and Christianity: On the Road of Dialogue” (November 2005), “Islam and Judaism: The Prospects of Dialogue and Cooperation” (June 2006), and the public forum “The New Bridges of Inter-civilisational Interaction” (May 2007). In fact, organising round tables, seminars, conferences and public lectures on interreligious dialogue, greeting followers of other faiths at their religious festivals and inviting them to iftars and other Islamic festivals has become a tradition in modern Russia. Joint sports, cultural and religious events between followers of different faiths also occasionally take place. In 2008, for example, a summer camp “Caucasus is Our Common House” was organised for Muslim and Christian youth in the Stavropol region under the patronage of the Fund for Supporting Islamic Culture, Sciences and Education, where young people were engaged in discussions, seminars and sports competitions. However, the relations between Islam and Orthodoxy remain difficult in Russia.

26 Egorov, V.K. (ed.), Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue for Sustainable Development: Proceedings of the International Conference, Moscow, 13–16 September 2007 (Moscow: Publishing House of the RAPA, 2008).

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Therefore, by acknowledging the importance of maintaining social harmony and mutual respect for the well-being of the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Russia, the government should pay greater attention to the establishment of healthy interreligious relations among different religious groups and support various interreligious dialogue initiatives. 15


As in many other countries, the September 11 attacks were the catalyst for Russia’s decision to get serious about ‘Islamic extremism’. Earlier attacks within Russian territory, such as the September 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow, were in most cases seen as an overspill from the localised conflict in Chechnya and the product of separatism rather than any religious ideology. A new phenomenon called “Islamophobia” has emerged very rapidly in Russia. Along with the beginning of the US-led ‘war on terrorism’, the Russian Federation adopted a new law “On Fighting Extremist Activity” in June 2002. The Beslan tragedy in September 2004 was a turning point in the emergence of the politics of hatred towards all things Islamic in Russia.27 The Russian media and cinema industry also adopted a hostile stance towards Islam and Muslims and played a vital role in creating a negative image.28 As a result, several negative developments took place, such as cases of public and official objections by the Orthodox Church and non-Muslim populations to the construction of new mosques and the refusal to give jobs to head scarved women and bearded men, which have had an overwhelming impact on the security, rights and well-being of Russia’s Muslims. In fact, the most integrated traditional Russia’s Muslims such as Tatars and Bashqorts, whose religious adherence is not noticeable, do not face serious adverse public opinion on the part of the nonMuslims. Muslims of the North Caucasus region and Central Asian immigrants, however, are unwelcomed in Russian cities. This intolerant nature of ethnic Russian population toward Muslims is evident 27 Hunter, Islam in Russia, p. 6; Dow, Leah, “Religious discrimination in Russia remains important issue: Muslims, Jews, non-Orthodox Christian groups targeted”, http://www.america.gov/st/democracyhr-english/2008/September/20080919173838cl wod9.507388e-02.html, accessed 24 September 2009. 28 For instance, in most of the recent Russian movies good guys fight against bad guys with expressed Muslim identity.

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in the opinion polls conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in May 2010. 29% of respondents acknowledged their antipathy towards Caucasian nations due to fear from terrorism.29 Moreover, in recent years ethnic Russian nationalism has increased. The reported skinhead attacks have been mainly directed against immigrants from Central Asia and are largely confined to a few cities within the Russian Federation such as Moscow, St Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod. Leaders of Muslim organisations and scholars are involved in public debate on various social issues, such as the issue of immigrant workers, crime, religious and racial tolerance. As the majority of Russians fear ‘Islamic terrorists’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, Muslim officials and activists publicly express their rejection of all forms of terrorism and call on the media and their compatriots not to link the phenomenon of terrorism with Islam. Public statements in this vein were made after the double suicide bombing of the Moscow subway on 29 March 2010. On 5 April 2010, the RCM organised a roundtable on the topic “Islam: Tolerance, Peace and Refusing Violence”, which ended with the issuing of a joint declaration. Diplomats from Muslim countries and Russian officials, as well as local Muslim activists, were invited to the event. 16


The diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds of Russia’s Muslim population give rise to numerous cultural events throughout the year. They range across sporting, arts and religious events, and attract local as well as international participants. The major arts event is the International Festival of the Muslim Cinema Altyn Minbar (The Golden Minbar), which takes place annually in Kazan (http://www.mfmk.ru). This event is mainly sponsored by the government of Tatarstan, and has become internationally recognised. Another annual event, which brings together diverse Russian Muslim communities, is the celebration of the acceptance of Islam by the Volga Bulghar Kingdom, organised by the CSBM in June since the 1990s. Several thousand Muslims from

29 http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13515.html, accessed 25 May 2010.

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all parts of Russia30 gather at the ruins of the ancient city of Bulghar (present-day Spasskiy district, Tatarstan) to perform prayers and make special supplications for their forefathers. In June, the Russian Islamic Book Fair, where major Muslim publishers exhibit their new issues, takes place in Kazan. Qur’an recitation competitions for men, women and children are organised by Muslim communities every year in various parts of Russia. The main event is the Moscow International Qur’an Reciting Competition, which attracts representatives of Muslim countries and Muslim communities in nonMuslim countries.

30 According to unofficial sources, about 20,000 in 2009: http://bulgar-portal. ru/1120let, accessed 30 March 2010.

SERBIA Ahmet Alibašić1 1

Muslim Populations

Muslims are one of the traditional religious communities that have been present in Serbia for centuries. Serbian Muslims are almost all Sunnis following the Hanafi school of Islamic law. Islam started to spread in the territories of Serbia with the Ottoman conquest of the late fourteenth century and parts of Serbia remained under the Ottomans for three to five centuries. After the incorporation of the medieval Serbian state into the Ottoman Empire, Islam over time became the majority religion in some regions mainly due to the voluntary conversion of the local population, as well as to migration. The Ottomans withdrew from the territories of today’s Serbia slowly over centuries, starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699. The withdrawal process was completed after the Balkan wars in 1912–13, when Serbia doubled its territory by taking over the Ottoman regions of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia. At that time there were about 500,000 Muslims in Serbia. In the territories left by the Ottomans prior to 1912, Muslims were in various ways very quickly reduced to insignificant numbers. Soon after the first phase of Ottoman withdrawal in 1834, only 12,000 Muslims remained in the then Serbia (much smaller than today’s Serbia), and by 1866 there were only 5,000 Muslims, mostly Roma. Many of the expelled Serbian Muslims settled in Bosnia and Sandžak, which were then still under the Ottomans. Some migrated all the way to Anatolia, where there is today a significant Bosniak community. The migrations continued after World War I but on a smaller scale, so that most Muslims in the territories acquired by Serbia after 1912 and 1913 stayed where they were.2 1 Ahmet Alibašić holds an MA in Islamic Civilization from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in south-east Europe and interreligious relations. 2 Zirojević, Olga, Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459–1804 (Serbia under Turkish Rule 1459–1804) (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2007); Bandžović, Safet, Iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva iz Srbije i Crne Gore tokom XIX stoljeća (Migration of the Muslim

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According to the latest census of 2002, there are 239,658 Muslims among a total Serbian population of 7.4 million. As 3.2% of the population, they constitute the third largest religious group in Serbia after Orthodox (6,371,584) and Catholics (410,976).3 As a result of historical developments, the Muslim population today is concentrated mostly in south-western Serbia, known as Sandžak (where according to the 2002 census there are 142,685 Muslims, or 60.67% of the local population) and in south-eastern Serbia, Preševo Valley (municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, where there are 58,903, or 66.2% of the local population). In addition to these two regions, significant Muslim communities are present in Belgrade (20,366 or 1.3%), central Serbia (10,000 or 0.3%) and Vojvodina (8,000 or 0.4%). Sandžak is home to 60% and Preševo Valley to 25% of Serbia’s Muslims. They are a majority in the municipalities of Tutin (97%), Sjenica (83%), Novi Pazar (80%), and Prijepolje (51%) in Sandžak, and Preševo (89%) and Bujanovac (55%) in south-eastern Serbia. If Belgrade Muslims are added to those of Sandžak and Preševo, it appears that around oneninth of Serbian territory hosts over 90% of its Muslim population. Ethnically speaking, Bosniaks make up 56% (136,087), Albanians 25% (61,647), Roma 8%, and other ethnic groups 7%, of the total Muslim population, which amounts to about 96% of all Muslims in Serbia. Most of the few thousand Arabs living in Serbia, mostly in Belgrade, are also followers of Islam. Conversions to Islam today are rare but do happen. Some Muslim representatives question the accuracy of the 2002 census data and refer to much higher number of Muslims, up to 700,000. There are no surveys on levels of practice but, generally speaking, the Muslims of Sandžak and Preševo Valley are much more religious than those in other parts of the country. Of all ethnic groups, Roma practise the religion least.

Population from Serbia and Montenegro during the Nineteenth Century) (Sarajevo: no publ, 1998); Avdić, Hakija, Položaj Muslimana u Sandžaku (The Status of Muslims in Sandžak) (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Ključanin, 1991); Karčić, Fikret, Muslimani Balkana ‘Istočno pitanje’ u XX vijeku (Muslims of the Balkans: The ‘Eastern Question’ in the Twentieth Century) (Tuzla: Behram-begova medresa, 2001). 3 See the details at http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd//en/popis.htm, accessed 22 April 2009.

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Islam and the State

The Constitution of Serbia states that religious communities are equal and separate from the state. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (2006)4 has regulated the issue of state-church relations. The law distinguishes between seven traditional religious communities, including the Islamic community, and all other communities. These seven enjoy the privilege of having inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Serbia, which the Republic of Serbia automatically recognised. This does not prevent the Serbian government from being an actor in the current dispute within the Muslim community (see below). Furthermore, the law particularly mentions the historical role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the development of the national identity of the Serb people. In practice, the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status and plays an important social and political role in the country. On the occasion of the death of Serbian patriarch Pavle on 15 November 2009, the Government decreed three days of mourning. 3


The most important Islamic organisation in Serbia is the Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska zajednica u Srbiji, ICiS, Ul. 1. maja 70/b, 36300 Novi Pazar, tel: 020/331-620, fax: 020/331 622, www .islamskazajednica.org) with its headquarters in Novi Pazar, headed by the chief mufti Muamer Zukorlić. The competing Islamic Community of Serbia (Islamska zajednica Srbije, ICoS, www.rijaset.rs, www .mesihatsandzaka.rs) was established in 2007 (see below). Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1991–92, the united Islamic Community in Yugoslavia

4 http://www.mv.gov.rs/cir/images/stories/pravna_akta/zakon_o_crkvama_i_vz .pdf, accessed 22 April 2009. For the history of church-state relations in Serbia, see Bremer, Thomas, “Relations between the church and the state: The case of the Serbian Orthodox Church”, in Devetak, Silvo et al. (eds), Religion and Democracy in Moldova (Maribor-Chisinau: ISCOMET and ASER, 2005), p. 88; Bašić, Goran, “Status of churches and religious communities in Serbia”, in Silvo Devetak et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 143–157.

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dissolved too. A separate Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mešihat islamske zajednice Sandžaka) was established on 30 October 1993, while the Muslim community in the rest of the country remained organised only at regional and local level. Since the Law on Churches and Religious Communities of 2006 envisages the registration of only one organisation, with the words ‘in Serbia’ in its name, for each of the seven traditional religious communities, the unification assembly of the ICiS was held on 27 March 2007 and the ICiS was registered by the state in the registry of religious organisations on 30 July 2007.5 The ICiS is organised into four muftiates, which are currently headed by three muftis: the Sandžak muftiate with Mufti Muamer Zukorlić as the chief mufti, Preševo muftiate with Mufti Mumin Tahiri, and Belgrade and Novi Sad muftiate with Rešad Plojović as its mufti. Its executive body is called the Mešihat, headed by the chief mufti. Its main institutions are the Faculty of Islamic Studies and Gazi Isa Bey madrasa in Novi Pazar, a monthly newspaper Glas Islama (Voice of Islam), El-Kelime publishing house, the International Humanitarian Organization (IHO), a media centre, an agency for halal quality certification, a library, and two kindergartens. It also has three associations: for women, Islamic scholars (ulama) and youth. All contact details can be found on the main website of the ICiS given above. However, this officially recognised community was opposed by the then long-time mufti of Belgrade, Hamdija Jusufspahić and his two sons, both imams. In October 2007, the family was joined by personal opponents of the chief mufti Zukorlić from within the ICiS and, supported by his political opponents, gathered around the Bosniak political leader from Sandžak, Sulejman Ugljanin, a Bosniak nationalist who was once in alliance with Serb nationalists and radicals. The state joined in the dispute by supporting the Jusufspahić family, widely seen as compromised by the positions it took under the Milošević regime. Despite the fact that the Law on Churches and Religious Communities stipulates the registration of only one organisation for each religious community, the state also recognises the ICoS, under the formal leadership of Adem Zilkić. The real mover of events is assumed to be Muhamed Jusufspahić. The website of the Serbian Ministry of Religions

5 Bećirbegović, Edah, “Organizacija Islamske zajednice u Srbiji” (Organization of the Islamic Community in Serbia), in Karčić, Fikret et al., Organizacija islamskih zajednica u regionu (Organising Islamic Communities in the Region) (Sarajevo: Udruženje ilmijje IZ u BiH, 2008), p. 39.

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has web links to both communities on its homepage (www.mv.sr.gov .yu/cir/). Only the ICiS enjoys the support of the Islamic communities in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia.6 The two communities have been disputing each other’s legality and legitimacy since 2007. The dispute has on several occasions erupted into violent conflict on the ground. The ICiS controls most of the mosques and other Islamic institutions in the country, and is by far the better organised and more active.7 At the core of the dispute seems to be the relationship with Sarajevo, and the ambition of some local Muslim politicians and the Serbian government to control the community. The ICiS would like the Islamic Community in Sandžak to stay formally connected to the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and in the case of Preševo with the Islamic Community in Kosovo),8 while the ICoS wants complete independence. During 2009, prospects of possible unification seem less clear after a long year of struggle. Attempts by the Turkish minister of foreign affairs to mediate between the two communities have so far failed to achieve any success.9 4


According to the meticulous research conducted by Divna ĐurićZamolo before the Great Vienna War (1683–99), Belgrade had at least 73 mosques and other sources give higher figures.10 However, after the withdrawal of the Ottomans, they were all destroyed, apart from the Bajrakli Mosque, which was torched in March 2004 in revenge

6

Jusić, Muhamed, “The split within the Islamic community in Serbia”, paper presented at the conference “Administration of Islamic Affairs in Secular States: SE European Experience”, Sarajevo, 17–19 April 2009. 7 For a summary of ICiS activities in 2009, see “Izvještaj o radu Rijaseta IZ u BiH za 1428/9 HG / 2008” (Report on Activities of the Presidency of the Islamic Community in B&H for 1428/9 AH / 2008”), Glasnik Rijaseta IZ u BiH, vol. 71, no. 7–8 (July-August 2009), pp. 714–719. 8 Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia. 9 Novosel, S., “Prostorije povod za sukobe” (Conflict over premises) Danas [Belgrade newspaper], 23 April 2009. 10 Đurić-Zamolo, Divna, Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima 1521–1867: Arhitektonsko-urbanistička studija (Belgrade as an oriental town under Turks 1521– 1867: an arcitectural and town-planning study) (Belgrade: Muzej grada beograda, 1977), p. 62. See also: Djurdjev, B., art. “Belgrade”, in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 1, pp. 1163–1165.

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for the burning of the Kosovo churches. Today, there are some 190 mosques in Serbia: about 120 in Sandžak, 60 in southern Serbia, and one in each of Belgrade, Niš, Mali Zvornik and Subotica. A number of mosques are under construction. In the last few years the initiative to build a new mosque and eventually an Islamic centre in Belgrade has been widely discussed in the Serbian media, with fierce opposition from Serbian nationalists. During the October 2009 visit to Belgrade by Turkish President Abdullah Gül, the initiative got support from both Serbian President Boris Tadić and President Gül, who promised financial support for the building of an Islamic centre and mosque in Belgrade once legal procedures were completed.11 In some cities, including Novi Sad, Muslims gather in unmarked premises, presumably out of fear of attack. 5


Religious education in public schools was introduced in 2002 following joint lobbying by the Orthodox Church and other churches and communities, including the Islamic community. The law guarantees the right to religious education in elementary and secondary public and private schools (Art. 40). In public schools, Islamic religious education is an ‘optional-compulsory’ subject, which means that pupils may choose the subject but may then not later withdraw. It is taught by Muslims trained and licensed by the Islamic community and paid by the state. The subject is offered once a week in all the grades if there are seven or more interested pupils.12 With the beginning of 2009/2010 school year in Serbia, the Ministry of Religion started preferring the ICoS teachers in some towns, which caused fierce reaction from the ICiS.13 Islamic religious instruction for Muslim children is

11 Bojić, B. “Srbija će imati velike koristi od posjete predsjednika Turske (Serbia will benefit a lot from Turkish’s President visit)”, Press, 28 October 2009. 12 Savić, Svenka, “Some notes on Islamic education in Serbia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe, Wiener Islamisch-religionspädagogische Studien, 1 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), pp. 449–456. See also Kuburić, Zorica and Milan Vukomanović, “Religious education: The case of Serbia”, in Zorica Kuburić and Christian Moe (eds), Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), pp. 107–138. 13 Center for Protection of Human Rights and Tolerance—Polimlje, “Izvještaj o stanju vjerskih sloboda u Sandžaku za 2009. godinu s posebnim osvrtom na Prijepolje (Report on Religious Freedom in Sandžak 2009 with special reference to Prijepolje)”, Prijepolje, 23 December 2009.

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also organised within the Islamic community’s mosques and maktabs and the ICiS also runs two kindergartens. 6


The ICiS is the founder of the Gazi Isa Bey madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies. The madrasa (http://medresa.net/) is an Islamic high school whose male section was established in 1990 while the section for girls was established in 1996. Another girls’ section in Rožaje (Montenegro) was opened in 2001. The Faculty (www.fis.edu.rs) was established in 2001 as a two-year Islamic Educational Academy. Today, it provides four-year training for imams and Islamic religious education training for school teachers. Programmes are offered at undergraduate, MA and PhD levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. Many of the teaching staff are visiting lecturers from Bosnia and Macedonia. In addition to these two institutions, the ICiS runs the International University of Novi Pazar (www.uninp.edu.rs), which is formally registered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in four other towns in Serbia, which are attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim students. 7


As the status, history, problems, and ethnic and social composition of the Muslim community differ from one region to another, so does the situation with cemeteries. In Sandžak, Preševo Valley and some other parts of the country, Muslims have no difficulty in carrying out burial according to Islamic tradition. In some towns where there are no Muslim cemeteries, Muslims choose to be buried in the nearest city where there is one. Belgrade Muslims have been complaining for a long time about the need for a new cemetery, but to no avail. During the socialist period, most cemeteries were taken from the Islamic community and are now managed by the municipal authorities. 8


There are no chaplains in state institutions in Serbia. There have recently been statements suggesting that this may be introduced and legally regulated.

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Religious Festivals

The two ‘Ids/Bayrams are the two main Muslim festivals in the country. On the occasion of both holidays the chief mufti holds an official reception. The manner in which the bayrams are celebrated varies significantly between Muslim majority and Muslim minority areas. In addition, Muslims in Serbia celebrate the Islamic New Year, the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, and the five sacred nights. 10 Halal Food Halal slaughter is permitted. In cooperation with the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ICiS has started its own Halal Quality Certification Agency which operates on a commercial basis. Halal products can be found in some supermarkets. In addition, Muslims often slaughter animals privately following the halal practice. 11

Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on wearing hijab, but few women would do so outside the Muslim majority regions of Sandžak and Preševo Valley. Hijab is now allowed in photographs for personal documents. 12


Most of the Muslim media in Serbia are religious. Glas islama (Voice of Islam, www.glas-islam.info) is a biweekly newspaper published by the ICiS since 1996. The Faculty of Islamic Studies issues an annual collection of articles called Islamska misao (Islamic Thought) while students at the Gazi Isa Bey madrasa publish their own magazine called Softa. A private Sandžačke novine (Sandžak Newspaper) has been issued with various degrees of regularity, depending on the financial resources of the owners. It is difficult to brand any of the electronic media as strictly Bosniak or Muslim. Apart from the private Bosniak television station in Novi Pazar there are three other television stations: the regional radio and television station of Novi Pazar owned by the municipality, the private television station Jedinstvo, and a television station, Universa (www

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.universa.tv) started in 2008 by the International University in Novi Pazar. There are several other private radio stations in Novi Pazar. In Preševo Valley, the municipal radio and television station Preševo and two private radio and television stations (Spektri and Aldi) broadcast in Albanian. There are no printed publications in Albanian in this region. In autumn 2009, Glas islama was denied regular financial support from Ministry of Religion. The ICiS criticised this decision as another proof of discrimination against Muslims in Sandžak and as “an attack on freedom of expression”.14 13

Family Law

Only marriages conducted by a public registrar are legally valid. The Islamic community encourages ‘Shari’a weddings’ administered by an imam. Such weddings have no legal standing and are usually performed after the civil ceremony. Divorce is usually formalised only by the civil authorities. This is also true of inheritance; families may agree privately to divide an inheritance according to the norms of Islamic law but they must still go to the civil authorities to have it authorised. There have been cases of polygamy, including some involving officials of the ICiS. No formal ‘Shari’a divorce’ procedure has been adopted. 14


There is no permanent interreligious council to bring representatives of religious communities together. Most of the interreligious events in which the ICiS has participated have been organised by Belgrade Open School (Beogradska otvorena škola, Masarikova 5/16, 11000 Beograd, Srbija, tel: + 381 11 30 65 800, www.bos.rs) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation office in Belgrade. Besides that, a meeting of students from the Islamic, Catholic and Orthodox theological studies faculties in Serbia is organised in Novi Pazar, Belgrade and Subotica three times a year.

14 “Uskraćena sredstva ‘Glasu islama’ (Funds withheld from Glas islama)”, Preporod, vol. 22, no. 912 (15 November 2009), p. 35.

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The dispute between the ICiS and the ICoS, and related violence and verbal attacks, has dominated public discourse on Islam and Muslims in Serbia during the last three years. On 18–20 May 2009, the Grand Mufti of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina Dr Mustafa Cerić, recognised by the ICiS as its ultimate religious authority, visited Sandžak, holding several meetings and giving speeches during which he accused the Serbian state of interfering in the affairs of the Islamic community and thus infringing the rights of Muslims. The Ministry for Religions reacted by saying that he was not welcome in Serbia.15 In addition, the issue of Muslim extremism has been on and off the public agenda. Two groups of so called Wahhabis have been prosecuted in separate trials before the Special Court in Belgrade for illegal possession of arms and planning terrorist attacks. In November 2008, a Belgrade publishing house, Beobuk, published a Serbian translation of The Jewel of Medina (Dragulj Medine) by Sherry Jones, which the Islamic authorities in Serbia considered insulting to the Prophet Muhammed. The book was briefly withdrawn from circulation at the request of Chief Mufti Zukorlić, but is now on sale again and featured at the Sarajevo book exhibition in neighbouring Bosnia in 2008, where it also provoked sporadic protests, although this did not stop retailers selling it at the exhibition. In 2009, the sequel to Dragulj Medine was published under the title Sword of Medina (Mač Medine) by the same publisher, with almost no reaction from any representatives of the Islamic community or any other Muslim intellectuals. 16


Most Muslim cultural events take place in Sandžak, which is the centre of both religious and cultural life. The most common of these are concerts of religious songs (ilahije), literary evenings, the traditional days celebrating Bosniak culture, various exhibitions, and book promotions.

15 “Potreban srpsko-bošnjački dijalog (There is a need for Serb-Bosniak Dialogue)”, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/63357/Potreban+srpsko-bo% C5%A1nja%C4%8Dki+dijalog.html, accessed 21 January 2010.

SLOVAKIA Štěpán Macháček1 1

Muslim Populations

The last census in Slovakia in 2001 did not offer the respondents the option of stating they were Muslims because the Islamic community has not yet been registered as a religious community and so Islam has not been recognised by the state as a Slovakian religion. Those respondents who indicated Islam were classified in the official results of the census as belonging to ‘other churches and religious societies’ and those Muslims who did not indicate any religion were classified as of ‘unknown’ religion.2 Figures for the number of Muslims in Slovakia are therefore only estimates. It is generally accepted that they number about 5,000, including foreigners living temporarily in the country. Muslim community sources say there are about 4,000–5,000 Muslims, with only about 10% of them actively practising the faith.3 According to these estimates, Muslims constitute about 0.09% of the population of Slovakia. Despite the fact that some Muslims came to present-day Slovakia as early as the tenth century and today’s southern Slovakia was controlled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly 150 years, there is not (and most likely has never been) an ‘indigenous’ Slovak Muslim population and the overwhelming majority of today’s Slovak Muslims are people of foreign origin. Similarly to the Czech Republic, there are Muslims from mostly Arab countries who came to the former Czechoslovakia to study and stayed, and often also married. In the 1990s, they

1 Štěpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 Figures provided by the Department for Statistics of the Slovak Republic (Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky), available at http://portal.statistics.sk/files/Sekcie/sek_600/ Demografia/SODB/Tabulky/tab13.pdf, accessed 27 May 2009. 3 Moravčík, Roman, “Posledná krajina bez mešity” (The last country with no mosque), Hospodárske noviny, 11 May 2007, http://hnonline.sk/c6–10157090– 21127090–kL0000_detail-posledna-krajina-bez-mesity, accessed 27 May 2009.

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were joined by Muslim refugees from the Balkans (mostly Bosnians, but also Kosovan and Macedonian Albanians) and the former Soviet Union. Afghan refugees also form a significant component of the Slovak Muslim community. The number of Slovak converts is estimated at about 400 persons, of whom about 60% are Slovak women, mostly married to Muslims of foreign origin.4 Most Muslims and Muslim activities are concentrated in the capital Bratislava, with small numbers living in the cities of Košice and Martin and the spa town of Piešťany. 2

Islam and the State

Slovakia has no state religion and the Constitution provides for religious freedom. The prevalent faith is Roman Catholicism, professed by an estimated 70% of the Slovak population. Registration of churches and religious communities is not obligatory. However, religious communities that do not register are not granted the right to public funding, or allowed to build places of worship for public religious services. The last restriction also applies in prisons and hospitals. The Muslim community has never been registered in Slovakia as a religious community and would probably not be able to meet the strict requirements for registration. The 2007 amendment to the 1991 law on churches and religious communities registration requires that communities wishing to register must have a minimum of 20,000 members permanently resident in Slovakia, and information must be provided about members’ personal details and their knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith. These regulations make it impossible for Slovak Muslims to become a recognised religious community in the foreseeable future. 3


The Islamic Foundation in Slovakia (Islamská nadácia na Slovensku, PO Box 247 Bratislava 814 99, www.islamweb.sk) is generally regarded 4

In comparision with previous estimates, this recent one doubles the number of Slovak converts (cf. “Moslimovia pod Tatrami (The Muslims Under the Tatra Mountains)”, SME, 12 December 2009, http://www.sme.sk/c/5150676/moslimovia-pod-tatrami.html, accessed 25 April 2010.

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as an official institution of the Muslim community. It was established in 1999 by Mohamad Safwan Hasna (who is Syrian by origin). Its activities are limited to organising religious and cultural events and worship, providing information on Islam, giving interviews in the media and helping Muslim asylum seekers with their problems. The General Union of Muslim Students in Slovakia (Všeobecný zväz moslimských študentov na Slovensku), sometimes also General Union of Muslims in Slovakia (Všeobecný zväz moslimov na Slovensku) was founded in 1993 as a civil association. Its declared aim is to help Muslims living in Slovakia and to provide ‘objective’ information on Islam and its culture. Its activists overlap with those of the Association of Friends of Islamic Literature (Združenie priateľov islamskej literatúry, Žabotova ulica č.2, 811 04, Bratislava), whose goal is to inform the Slovak public about Islamic culture and traditions. A leading person in both organisations is Abdulwahab Al-Sbenaty, a Slovak-Syrian, and the translator of the only Slovak version of the Qur’an. 4


Bratislava is probably the only European capital without a proper mosque, and Slovakia the only European country without an Islamic shrine. All efforts to establish an Islamic centre in Slovakia, including a mosque, have so far been unsuccessful. In Bratislava, the Muslim community uses a hired space as a prayer room (Staré grunty 64, Karlova Ves, Bratislava). However, in 2009 the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia represented by Mr Hasna succeeded in opening an Islamic cultural centre, called the Cordoba Centre for the Intercultural Dialogue (Cordóba centrum pre medzikultúrny dialóg; Obchodná 31, Bratislava) in central Bratislava. The centre has a prayer room and library and its goal is to launch language courses and educational programmes for children, and also to help Muslim immigrants in Slovakia.5 The Cordoba Centre is regarded as the first step to the planned larger Islamic centre with a mosque, which is not easily accepted by Slovak public.

5 See http://www.islamweb.sk/stranky/spravodajstvo/domov/10.07.09.htm, accessed 4 May 2010.

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Primary and secondary schools in Slovakia provide lessons in religious education, which are organised by officially registered churches and religious communities. Islam is not registered, so no Islamic religious education can be given. For those who do not wish to attend classes on an officially recognised (mostly Catholic) religion, classes in ‘ethics’ are provide, which include some coverage of history of religions. This is the option chosen by Muslim children. 6


There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in Slovakia. At the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University, in Bratislava, Arabic philology can be studied in the Department of Classical and Semitic Philology. Apart from Arabic language and literature, lectures on Islam and Islamic history are also part of the programme. 7


The only burial place assigned to Muslims is part of the large municipal cemetery, Slávičie údolie, in Bratislava. Islamic burials have taken place there for several decades. There are about 200 burial places and the Muslim community now faces the problem of the lack of space—a general problem in the capital, which is not specific to the Muslim community. Members of the Islamic Foundation perform burial rituals. 8


Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they cannot perform any of these activities in government institutions and services. 9 No data available.

Religious Festivals

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10 Halal Food Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they do not have access to slaughterhouses, or to issue halal certificates. However, Vienna is only about 50 kilometres away and this means that Muslims in Bratislava and elsewhere in Slovakia have easy access to halal food. In Bratislava and a few other Slovak cities, there are fast food stalls serving imported halal meat. 11

Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting or restricting the wearing of typical Islamic clothing by women, including hijab and niqab. No dress code incident has so far been reported. 12


The only printed Islamic periodical publication is Al-Islam magazine, published irregularly, (usually several times a year) by the Islamic Foundation. It was originally, from 1994, published by the General Union of Muslim Students. The Islamic Foundation has its own website (www.islamweb.sk), which is regarded as an official medium of the Slovak Muslim community. The Association of Friends of Islamic Literature and the General Union of Muslims in Slovakia have a joint website (www.islam-sk.sk); the above mentioned Slovak translation of the Qur’an is available here, as well as on the website www.koran.sk, managed by Mr Al-Sbenaty. 13

Family Law

Islamic marriages are not officially recognised by the state because Muslims are not registered as a religious community. Muslims can (and do) perform Islamic marriage ceremonies, but must also have a civil marriage in order for the marriage to be registered. However, some Muslim countries recognise marriages conducted by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia.

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No data available. 15


There is some Slovak media interest in the local Muslim community. A major article published in 2009 was positive in its tone; it presented information about the Muslim lifestyle and interviewed Mr Al-Sbenaty and a Slovak convert, a university professor. The discussion on establishing the Islamic centre proposed by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia disappeared from the public space in 2009. Following the 2007 amendment to the 1991 law on churches and religious communities, Slovak Muslims gave up their chances to register and accepted that they could only be active as civil associations. 16 No data available.


SLOVENIA Christian Moe1 1

Muslim Populations

According to the last census, 47,488 Muslims made up 2.4% of Slovenia’s population (2002). Though markedly higher than in the 1991 census, the figure may be low, as the 23% of the population whose religion is not known probably includes some Muslims. Census data on (ethnic) nationality, however, do not suggest that there are many more people of Muslim cultural background. The figure does not include guest-workers. The Islamic Community does not provide membership figures, as it has not yet centralised its records and no data are available on active participation in religious practice. For centuries, Slovenes encountered Muslims primarily as Ottoman armies, though in World War I Bosnian Muslims fought for the Habsburg Empire on Slovenian soil. Significant numbers of Muslims first arrived from the 1950s onwards as internal migrants from other parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to meet the need for low-skilled workers in the growing economy of the most-developed Yugoslav republic. Consequently, nearly all Slovenian Muslims are urban dwellers, concentrated in industrial towns. In the 1990s, after Slovenian independence, they were joined by thousands of refugees from Bosnia. The Islamic Community began to organise itself in the early 1960s, and the first local Islamic community council was founded in Ljubljana in 1967.2 Census data on the ethnic makeup of Slovenia’s Muslims are open to interpretation, as some categories are contested, fluid or overlapping. Of those who declared themselves Muslims by confession,

1 Christian Moe (PhD candidate, History of Religion, University of Oslo) is a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 2 Pašić, Ahmed, Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji (Islam and Muslims in Slovenia) (Sarajevo: Emanet, 2002), pp. 103–106.

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some 74% declare themselves Bosniaks, Bosnians, or Muslimani (the Yugoslav-era category of ‘Muslims in the national sense’);3 they originate mainly from northern Bosnia or the Sandžak region. They are followed by Albanians (11%), mainly from Kosovo and Macedonia; Slovenes (6%); people of unknown nationality (ca. 4%); Roma (ca. 2%); and Montenegrins, Macedonians, and others (ca. 1% each).4 2

Islam and the State

Slovenia is a secular state. The 1991 Constitution provides inter alia for freedom of conscience and for the separation of the state and religious communities. The new Religious Freedom Act (2007) replaced a Communist-era law on religious communities with a more accommodating model providing inter alia for state-funded spiritual care in public institutions. Religious communities (including two Islamic ones) are registered by a state Office for Religious Communities. In 2007, the Islamic Community concluded a separate agreement with the state detailing its legal status and rights, becoming the fifth Slovenian religious community to do so.5 The election of a centre-left government in late 2008, and the appointment in 2009 of a critic of the 2007 law as head of the Office for Religious Communities may herald certain changes in state-religion relations, but not necessarily in the situation of the Islamic Community. The state contributes part of the mandatory social security payments for religious employees, including imams on the payroll of the Islamic Community. Under the new law, the state will also directly or indirectly employ some religious personnel as providers of spiritual care in institutions (but see section 8 below). The Islamic Community has so

3

On these overlapping identities, see Kalčič, Špela, “Changing contexts and redefinitions of identity among Bosniaks in Slovenia”, Balkanologie, vol. 9, no. 1–2 (December 2005), pp. 149–171. 4 Komac, Miran (ed.), Priseljenci: Študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo (Immigrants: Studies on Immigration and Inclusion into Slovenian Society) (Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2007), p. 536 (Table 10). 5 See documentation in Čepar, Drago (ed.), State and Religion in Slovenia (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008), http://www.uvs.gov.si/fileadmin/uvs.gov.si/pageuploads/razni_dokumenti/DRZAVA_ IN_VERA_V_SLOVENIJI_THE_STATE_AND_RELIGION_IN_SLOVENIA .pdf, accessed 31 December 2009.

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far not managed to benefit from the opportunities for religious communities to apply for state funding for social programmes (probably because of limited capacity) or for maintaining cultural heritage (as they have little material heritage to maintain). The Islamic Community has stated that it expects state financial support for the mosque project. 3


The Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia (Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji, IC, Grablovičeva 14, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386(1)2313625, fax: +386(1)2313626, www.islamska-skupnost.si), headed by Mufti Dr Nedžad Grabus, is the main religious organisation that represents Islam, employs imams and organises the religious life of nearly all Slovenia’s Muslims through 15 local chapters and two smaller congregations. It is a branch of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stands for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school (see Bosnia-Herzegovina for details). Its membership is multi-ethnic, but the large majority are Bosniaks.6 Noteworthy cultural initiatives in the IC’s orbit are the Zemzem women’s group (address: same as the IC) and the Averroes Institute (Proletarska cesta 4/III, p.p. 2725, 1001 Ljubljana, tel: 01 5211 341, fax: 01 5211 342, www.averroes.si). A very small Muslim Community of Slovenia (Slovenska muslimanska skupnost, MCS, Ledina Center room 33, Kotnikova 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386 1 430 4866, fax: +386 1 430 4866, www.smskupnost. si) was registered in 2006 by Osman Đogić, the former mufti of the IC, who broke away after internal conflict blocked his re-appointment—in 2009, he lost a lawsuit against the IC for wrongful dismissal. The MCS is independent of Bosnia, but similar to the IC in ethnic make-up and doctrinal orientation.

6 IC secretary Nevzet Porič has helpfully provided updates on various IC-related questions in this chapter (personal communication, 29 November 2009), but bears no responsibility for any mistakes.

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Slovenia has no purpose-built mosque with a minaret. Muslims have sought to build a mosque in Ljubljana since 1968 and have stepped up their efforts in the last decade. At the end of 2008, a location was approved for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque, and the IC bought most of the land from the city, taking on substantial debt. After an anti-mosque referendum initiative was quashed by the Administrative Court in June 2009, the obstacles to the mosque project are now financial rather than political. Local congregations have prayer-houses; standards vary. The IC has a house on the outskirts of Ljubljana, used for meetings, prayers and a halal restaurant. The SMC has acquired a space in the city centre. 5


There is no religious instruction or other confessional activity in public schools. An optional non-confessional course in religions and ethics exists, but is not widely taught. There are no separate Muslim schools. Religious communities may establish private schools (eligible for 85% state funding if they teach the public curriculum), but due to limited capacity this is not on the agenda of the IC. Some Slovenian youths attend Islamic boarding school (medresa) in Croatia (Zagreb) or Bosnia. Islam is taught to children in mekteb classes organised in about a dozen towns by local congregations of the IC. Classes take place outside school hours and sometimes in inadequate facilities. The IC is developing Slovenian learning materials to replace the Bosnian ones currently in use; by late 2009 the first textbook was ready for printing. Some adult religious instruction is also offered.7 6


Slovenian imams typically receive their higher Islamic education at institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see that section). The IC holds 7 Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008); Porič, personal communication.

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some internal training courses. In 2009, one imam spent a threemonth scholarship at Al-Azhar, arranged by the Egyptian embassy. Slovenian universities have only recently begun to offer Religious Studies, let alone Islamic Studies, though some relevant courses are found in departments of sociology, anthropology and theology. Teacher training for the optional school subject on religion is offered jointly by the Faculty of Arts and the (Catholic) Theological Faculty in Ljubljana. 7


Imams may officiate at burials. The lack of Muslim cemeteries is a concern in many places. Cemeteries are publicly owned and, while a few towns have allotted separate cemetery sections for Muslims (Jesenice, Maribor, Krško, Tržič) or are reportedly close to doing so (Celje, Koper, Postojna), most, including the capital, have not. An important heritage site to Slovenian Muslims is a cemetery for Muslim troops from Bosnia who fought for Austria-Hungary in World War I. It was marked with Muslim tombstones in 2007. 8


The 2007 Religious Freedom Act guarantees the right to pastoral or spiritual care for hospital and nursing home patients, detained persons, police and the army. When there is sufficient demand, the relevant authorities should provide religious personnel. The right to provide such care is also stated in the IC’s agreement with the state. However, Muslim spiritual care in state institutions has not yet been implemented. During 2009, the IC raised the issue with the authorities on several occasions. 9

Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are public holidays. Celebration of the two Bayram holidays is publicly recognised by official greetings and a nationally televised short address by the mufti. For lack of a mosque or other suitable facilities, communal Bayram prayers have to be held in rented sports halls. Some qurban sacrifice is carried out in private (see section

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10). Mevluds (mawlids) and other events are also held to mark other important dates in the Muslim calendar (e.g., Muslim New Year, holy nights). 10 Halal Food A new initiative to institutionalise the certification of halal meat was taken by the IC in 2007, and the first butcher’s shop so certified opened in Ljubljana in 2008. Previously, demand had mainly been met through informal arrangements, if at all. Several food companies have long held halal certificates, chiefly for export. The law requires the animal to be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but veterinary authorities may grant exceptions for ritual slaughter. The IC met with veterinary authorities in 2009 to discuss the matter, but says some slaughterhouses still lack information. Private slaughter, common on farms and formerly the occasion of a folk holiday, is allowed (regulated in 2004) for the personal consumption of one’s own animals, but as there are hardly any rural Muslims, the legality (and social acceptance) of private Muslim ritual slaughter is unclear. 11

Dress Codes

While some older women may wear traditional headscarves, and new Islamic dress (often colourful) with hijab was adopted by some young women in the 1990s, most Muslim women do not cover their heads. A Muslim women’s fashion show was held in Ljubljana in May 2009. The law does not regulate religious attire, and hijab in schools has not been an issue, but questions are now being raised as to how long this will continue, given developments in other European countries. A major contribution to the ethnography of Islam in Slovenia was a monograph on Muslim dress and identity published in 2007.8

8 Kalčič, Špela, Nisem jaz Barbika: Oblačilne prakse, islam in identitetni procesi med Bošnjaki v Sloveniji (I Am Not a Barbie Doll: Dress Practices, Islam and Identity Processes among Bosniaks in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo, 2007).

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The IC operates a website (www.islamska-skupnost.si), has started an internal bulletin, and distributes the (Bosnian) Preporod bi-weekly. A small independent group has produced a magazine, Iqre, oriented towards globalised, Arab-centred and revivalist discourses rather than local tradition. Other Slovenian media that are not specifically religious reach a Muslim audience and include Islamic contents, as they report on everything of interest to the Bosniak community. They include the biweekly student radio broadcast Podalpski selam (Salaam under the Alps), the website www.bosnjak.si, and the monthly Bošnjak magazine. 13

Family Law

Family law is secular, and a valid marriage can only be performed by a public registrar in a secular ceremony. Couples may choose to have a religious ceremony in addition to this. The IC encourages Islamic marriages (‘Shari’a weddings’) performed by imams, and has recently begun to register them. Unofficial Islamic marriages exist,9 though the IC discourages the practice. 14 Interreligious Relations Interreligious dialogue and cooperation takes place on an ad hoc basis. There is no permanent interreligious institutional framework, except that the state Office for Religious Communities regularly convenes consultations with religious community representatives. Mufti Grabus is a frequent participant in dialogue events at home and abroad, and sits, inter alia, on a task force on intercultural dialogue in the Western Balkans supported by the Slovenian government.

9

Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika, pp. 64–66.

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Media attention on Islam has continued to focus on plans for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Ljubljana, but this question is now largely settled and is no longer prominent in public debate. Muslims are not very evident in the media, but their visibility has increased and the quality of reporting has improved over the last decade. 16


The “Islamic Culture Days” in Maribor (20–29 May 2009), initiated by the Faculty of Philosophy, had a rich and varied programme, including performances by visiting groups of Bosnian dervishes and Iranian zurkhaneh practitioners. Other noteworthy events included a mawlid concert and an open-air Bosnian Food Festival featuring the world’s largest Bosnian coffee-pot, both in Ljubljana’s most central locations. The Averroes Institute also began organising lectures, concerts and exhibitions.

SPAIN Jordi Moreras1 1

Muslim Populations

The 1978 Spanish Constitution (article 16.2) prevents the development of a statistical census of religious groups in Spain. The number of Muslims in Spain is the subject of estimates that are not always based on objective criteria. Some Muslim voices speak of two million Muslims, while others reduce this figure to 800,0000. The Observatory Andalusi,2 an entity created by the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain in 2003 (sect. 3), produces an annual report on the Muslim population in Spain. Despite methodological corrections that need to be borne in mind, it constitutes a solid basis for estimating the number of Muslims in Spain. Given the degree of settlement of Muslim communities in Spain, it is no longer sufficient to use statistical data on foreign residents alone. It is necessary to take into account the people of Muslim origin who have been naturalised over the past 40 years (representing between 1960 and 2008, a total of 110,773 new Spaniards),3 the Spanish populations of Muslim origin in Ceuta and Melilla (a total of 62,194, according to the estimate by the latest report of the Observatory Andalusi),4 and the 1 Jordi Moreras is Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), and member of th eResearch Group on Social and Organizational Analysis (ASO-URV). He is the author of Musulmans a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2008) and Actors i representacions. L’associacionisme d’origen marroquí a Catalunya (Barcelona: Secretaria per la Immigració—Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009). 2 http://observatorioandalusi.blogspot.com/, accessed 8 September 2009. 3 Foreigners may apply for Spanish nationality after living in Spain for ten years (except for those from Latin America, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Andorra, who only need two years’ residence). Access to citizenship is also available by marriage and by birth in Spanish territory, after a year’s residence. 4 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31 de diciembre de 2008 (Demographic study of the Muslim population. Statistical analysis of the Census of Muslim citizens in Spain conducted 31 December 2008) (Madrid: Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 2009). According to the Observatory,

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estimated 16,836 new Muslims). The sum of these data, together with the foreign residents of Muslim origin (958,713 people in September 2009) would represent a total of 1,148,516 Muslims,5 a lower estimate than that proposed by the Observatory (1,310,148). Taken together, these data represent between 2.5% and 2.6% of the total Spanish population. 2

Islam and the State

The 1978 Constitution defines the Spanish state as following a principle of non-confessionalism (aconfesionalidad), which guarantees religious freedom and establishes cooperative relationships with representatives of religious denominations. There is no state religion, but the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths. This framework of religious freedom was developed in law in 1980. The government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is preparing a reform of this law of religious freedom, which will reflect a new context of increasing pluralism. This reform seeks to introduce a ‘positive’ concept of ‘laicity’ (laicidad positiva), which has drawn serious criticism from the Catholic Church. In recent years Zapatero’s government has been heavily criticised by the Catholic Church on issues such as gay marriage, abortion, and the presence of religious symbols in public space. With regard to Islam, the Spanish government continues to promote cultural activities in Muslim communities through the annual grants programme of the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia),6 which in 2008 amounted to

the Muslim populations of Ceuta and Melilla represent, respectively, 41% and 50% of the populations of these territories in North Africa. This data contains a symbolic significance for this cities, which have officially claimed their ‘Spanishness’ as synonymous with their Catholic roots. 5 Data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. Children born after naturalisation of the parents are included in this data, unlike the children of illegal immigrants, since it is not possible to estimate the numbers of those of Muslim origin. 6 “Pluralism and Coexistence Foundation is a foundation of the public sector, created by agreement of the Council of Ministers of 15 October 2004, at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice. Its purpose is to contribute to the implementation of programs and projects of cultural, educational and social integration of minority faiths that have concluded cooperation agreements with the State or set roots in Spain, as well as promoting the full exercise of religious freedom” http://www.pluralismoyconvivencia .es/.

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€701,285, representing 40% of the total awarded to minority religious communities. In July 2009, the Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat of Catalonia) passed a law on places of worship, by which it wants to regulate the opening of places of worship, and to prevent conflicts that have led in recent years to the establishment of rival committees of Islamic prayer in Catalonia. The law provides that municipalities must reserve public land for religious facilities, as far as they are able. In May 2009, the Spanish press picked up the complaints of various leaders of the Jama’at Tabligh ad-Da’wa in Spain when the Spanish government was refusing to grant citizenship to members of this group on the basis of reports from the National Intelligence Centre. The habits of clothing and displays of religiosity of these applicants were cited as arguments “against the social integration that the individual must prove to obtain Spanish nationality”. In early 2009 in Grenada, the Renaissance and Union Party of Spain (Partido Renacimiento y Unión de España, PRUNE), the first Muslim political party outside Ceuta and Melilla was established. On July 23, it was registered with the Ministry of the Interior, and intends to stand in municipal elections in 2011. It has opened regional offices in Granada and Asturias, and seeks to open new offices in Madrid, Catalonia and other regions of Spain. Its main leader and promoter is Mustafa Bakkach, a leading journalist from Tangier, with 18 years in Spain, who is considered close to the Moroccan government. The party proclaims its ‘Spanishness’, and advocates the social and moral regeneration of society based on the principles of Islam as a way to attract the votes of the Muslim population. 3


In 1992, on the occasion of signing the Cooperation Agreement with the Spanish State, the Islamic Commission of Spain was created, with the de facto union of the two major Muslim federations: the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, La Unión 47, Málaga 29006, tel: +34.629559273)7 and the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE, Anastasio Herrero 5, Madrid 28020, tel: +34.915714040, fax: +34.915708889, http://es.ucide.org). The FEERI

7

FEERI’s original website (http://www.feeri.es) was closed in 2006.

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was created in 1989, and until 2006 was managed by members of the Junta Islámica,8 an organisation made up of Spanish converts, with Mansur Escudero as president. The UCIDE was created in 1991 by Riay Tatary Bakri, of Syrian origin, who in 1971 had created Muslim Association of Spain (Asocición Islámica de España), which manages the Abu Bakr mosque in Madrid. Since then, Riay Tatary continues to chair the federation that brings together the majority of Muslim communities in Spain. Tatary is considered to be ideologically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Currently, the FEERI is controlled by associations of Moroccan origin, related to the Moroccan government’s official policy. Its president, Mohamed Ahmed Ali, leader of the Union of Muslims of Ceuta, is close to Moroccan interests and, in 2006, said that Ceuta and Melilla should be returned to Morocco. In October 2009, during a regular meeting of the federation, a group of Moroccan associations linked with the movement ‘Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) attempted to wrest control of the federation from Mr Ali. Both parties filed complaints in civil courts, which have not yet been heard. In November 2009, there were 707 Islamic religious institutions in the Register of the Ministry of Justice: 407 belong to UCIDE, 54 to FEERI, and 246 are not federated. In the absence of development of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement, and the lack of operational capability of the Islamic Commission of Spain, various Islamic organisations have called for the modification of the representation model of Islam in Spain. In the early months of 2010, the Spanish government wants to begin a process of electing Muslim representatives at the regional level, who then must choose the board that should lead a renewed Islamic Commission of Spain. This proposal has sparked an intense debate within Muslim communities, generating new organisational initiatives and new strategies for cooperation between associations.

8

Junta Islámica is an Islamic religious association established in 1989. It maintains Webislam (http://www.webislam.com), the main portal on Islam in Spain, and the Instituto Halal, dedicated to the certification of halal products.

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The 2008 report of the Observatory Andalusí estimates that there are some 598 Muslim worship places in Spain, of which 14 are major Muslim centres. There is no official record of the number of Islamic places of worship, which further contributes to their social invisibility. The spatial integration of Islam in Spanish society manifests a strong contrast between the great Islamic cultural centres, with their clearly identifiable architectural forms and minarets, and prayer rooms in garages that have been opened on the initiative of small immigrant communities, without any symbols that might identify them as religious centres in the public space. The paradox is that while these wellknown centres are part of the urban landscape of the cities where they are located, it is the prayer rooms that, despite their invisibility, receive social opposition to their location. Analysis of conflicts over the mosques in Spain should consider two dynamics of the creation of these religious centres: the first, induced and operated externally, through the intervention of Muslim countries to finance the construction of these centres, and second, through a process of self-organisation of religion by Muslim communities of immigrant origin. These dynamics cannot be presented as unconnected, but they incorporate different logics and interests. When in the early 1980, the Saudi Prince Salman Ben Abdulaziz Al Saud promoted the building of the mosque in Marbella (Malaga) as the first mosque to be opened in Spain in modern times,9 he probably was not thinking as much about meeting the worship needs of Muslims in Spain, as about the needs of his own entourage that accompanied him during his summer break in the lands of the former Al-Andalus. Located in the exclusive neighbourhood of Las Lomas de Marbella, its 25-metre minaret meters and its 400-person capacity, do not disturb local residents. Between the 1980s and early 1990s four new Islamic centres were opened in Spain, sponsored by several Muslim countries. In 1983, the Abu Bakr mosque, was built in the Estrecho neighbourhood of Madrid.

9 During the Protectorate of Northern Morocco (1912–1956), the Spanish colonial administration built mosques, prayer halls and other Islamic religious buildings. The two main mosques of Ceuta and Melilla, the mosque Sidi M’barik and the mosque on Garcia Cabrelles St, respectively, are good examples of this.

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It is the home of the UCIDE and covers a total area of 3,500 m2, distributed over four floors and a minaret. It was financed by donations from various Arab countries. The opening generated little interest in the Madrid press, which considered it a centre for the Muslim-Arab diplomatic corps posted to the Spanish capital. The Spanish press were more attentive to the opening in September 1992 (five months after the approval of the Cooperation Agreement with the Islamic Commission) of the Omar ibn al-Jattab Mosque, or Islamic Cultural Centre of Madrid (popularly known as the M-30 mosque, after a highway that circles Madrid). The 16,000 m2 area where the mosque is located was ceded by the Madrid city council, and King Fahd Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud undertook to finance it. The prayer hall of this mosque occupies 550 m2 with capacity for 700 men and 130 women. Until the inauguration in 1997 of the mosque in Rome, the mosque in Madrid was the largest in Europe. Outside Madrid, other centres were opened in the same period: in June 1992, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Valencia was inaugurated, financed by Kuwaiti capital and under the authority of the Organisation of Arab Cities. In 1994, the mosque of Fuengirola, headquarters of the Suhail Islamic Community, was opened, financed by Saudi Arabia and linked to the Muslim World League. During the rest of the 1990s no Islamic centres were opened. However, small prayer houses proliferate throughout the Spanish landscape, which are indicative of the first settlement of Muslim communities of immigrant origin in Spanish territory. In the early 2000s, two new Islamic centres in Andalusia were launched. First, in July 2001 the Cultural Association Azzagra built a mosque and the Centre of Andalusian Studies in La Puebla de Don Fadrique (Granada). Located on a 120-acre farm, this centre has the financial support of Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasim, Emir of Sharjah. Second, and after two decades of polemics concerning its placement in the Albaicin neighbourhood, in July 2003, the Great Mosque of Granada was officially inaugurated. Various Islamic countries (Libya, Morocco, the Arab Emirates, Malaysia) eventually contributed to its construction. The centre is managed by members of the Murabitun (a Sufi movement inspired by the Darqawi’s brotherhood, founded by the Scottish Muslim convert, Ian Dallas, in 1970s). Finally, the last major Islamic centre was opened in Malaga in August 2007, which occupies over 4,000 m2. Its construction has cost about €22 million, provided by Saudi Arabia. The Suhail Foundation owns this new mosque, which

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can accommodate over 1,000 worshipers, and has a nursery, auditorium, rooms for men and women, and a translation service. 5


The only Islamic school in Spain is the Umm al-Qura school, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex. It provides pre-school, primary and secondary education. The school was recognised by the Spanish state in April 1998 and has 400 students. With regard to public schools, in 1996 the Spanish state and the Islamic Commission of Spain signed an agreement to include Islamic religious education in the national educational system.10 Despite the fact that the agreement established that this teaching should have begun in the 1996–97 school year, its application was in fact delayed until the 2003–4 school year, when it began in some Autonomous Communities (regional authorities) to which the transfer of responsibility for education had not yet taken place (Ceuta, Melilla, Aragon, Valencia, and Madrid). According to the Observatory Andalusí, in 2008/2009 there were 149,366 Muslim students in the Spanish educational system, and 46 teachers of Islamic religious education. According to UCIDE the full implementation of this agreement would require 360 teachers.11 Parallel to the development of this more formal Islamic religious education, the communities themselves have put forward various religious socialisation initiatives, focused on children, young people and women, and based on a traditional model of religious transmission (kuttab, or Qur’anic schools). Many of these initiatives are considered by parents to be complementary to the education their children receive in school, even though they are outside the structured, formalised school environment. In 2006 the UCIDE, with funding from the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence, published a textbook on Islam, Conocer el islam

10 See Roson, Javier, Sol Tarrés and Jordi Moreras, “Islamic religious education in Spain”, in A. Alvarez Veinguer et al. (eds), Islam in Education in European Countries: Pedagogical Concepts and Empirical Findings (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2009). 11 Observatory Andalusi (2008). No official data are available on the number of students who have received Islamic religious instruction. One of the problems for the development of this education is the refusal by various regions to implement these programmes. This is the case in Catalonia, which has a Muslim student body of over 34,000 but no teachers of Islamic religious education.

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(Understanding Islam) for primary education. In 2009, they edited the material for secondary education. 6


As a result of the history of Al-Andalus, there is a long tradition of Arab and Islamic studies in Spain, including in many departments in Spanish universities and research centres (such as the universities of Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Seville and Alicante). A recent shift to the study of contemporary Islam has generated new initiatives in training and interdisciplinary research in other academic fields.12 The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslim communities to open training colleges. The only example was the International University Ibn Rushd of Cordoba, founded in 1992, which closed as a result of the loss of institutional and financial support after the death of its director, Ali Kettani, in 2001. This university offered Arabic language and Islamic sciences taught by Muslim teachers. With regard to the training of imams, the first formal initiative began in the 1980s at the initiative of various associations and Islamic centres in Spain. After the Cooperation Agreement of 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain began an internal consultation to propose a training programme for imams. No projects were completed because of internal disagreements. The Spanish university system has undertaken two initiatives to train imams and Muslim leaders. The private University Camilo José Cela has organised, with Junta Islámica, an online course on Islamic culture and religion offered to general public. This course was previously (from 2006) organised by the National University of Distance Learning (UNED, http://www.uned.es), and in 2010 it produced its fifth version.13 Secondly, in January 2009, the UNED, sponsored by the Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia (Foundation Pluralism and Coex-

12 For a review of the advanced training in Islamic Studies, see Larramendi, Miguel H. de and Bárbara Azaola, “Studies of the contemporary Arab world and the Mediterranean in Spain”, in Richard Gillespie and Iván Martin (eds), Researching the Mediterranean, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: British Council-CIDOB Foundation-Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2009), pp. 85–144. 13 “Experto Profesional en cultura y religión islámicas (Professional expert in Islamic culture and religion)”, http://www.catedraelearning.es/Islam/, accessed 10 November 2009.

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istence), initiated a training programme for Islamic religious leaders, under the title “Islam and democratic principles”. The second version, to be developed in 2010, will be held in Madrid, Valencia and Terrassa (Barcelona).14 The Muslim communities have organised two training courses for imams. In Catalonia, the Islamic and Cultural Council of Catalonia has run a training programme specifically for imams since 2006, coordinated by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, with support from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Similarly, the Muslim Federation of Murcia has, since 2007, organised several training sessions with teachers and imams from Belgium, France, Spain, Morocco and Egypt. The Spanish Deputy Director of Relations between State and Religions (Ministry of Justice) and Professor of Law Juan Ferreiro, was commissioned in July 2008 by the Council of the European Union, to prepare a report on a training centre for imams in Europe. This report, titled Islam and State in the EU: Imams Training Centres, will be published in March 2010. 7


The need to provide space in municipal cemeteries for use by the Muslim population has arisen recently, with the increasing settlement of Muslims in Spain. Until now, the existing cemeteries were either those in Ceuta and Melilla (whose Muslim cemeteries were managed by the various communities in both cities), or historical cemeteries (such as those in Seville and Granada, opened in 1936 by the Franco regime to bury Moroccan troops who fought in the Civil War), or cemeteries that belonged to the governments of Muslim countries and were used for their employees or citizens (such as the cemetery of Griñón in Madrid, which has now reached capacity). In Andalusia, various groups of Spanish Muslims have always called for spaces, which were ultimately acquired and maintained by personal initiatives; they did not always provide appropriate conditions and are filling rapidly. Since 1992, the Cooperation Agreement has recognised the right of Muslims to make use of sites in public cemeteries. There are reserved spaces 14 http://www.fundacion.uned.es/cursos/derecho/diploma-actualizacionprofesional/islam_principios_democraticos/index.html, accessed 10 November 2009.

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in Ceuta and Melilla, Seville, Granada, Barcelona, Madrid, Murcia, Bilbao, Valencia, Benalmádena, Zaragoza, Palma de Mallorca, Manresa and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. However, there are not enough spaces and this leads to a significant number of families returning the bodies of their deceased to their home country. Recognition of the right to an Islamic burial is conditional on there being no contravention of other legal principles, which require the use of a coffin, and burial at least 48 hours of death. In April 2007, Barcelona City Council opened a room in one of the local funeral homes to perform mortuary practices required by Islam. The Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia released in May 2008 a “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs at funerals” (Guida para el respeto a la diversidad de creencias en el ámbito funerario), addressed to the municipalities. 8


Articles 8 and 9 of the Cooperation Agreement of 2002 regulate Islamic pastoral care in public hospitals, prisons and the army. In 2006, the Spanish government developed the regulations that facilitate this care. However, unlike that provided by the Catholic Church, Muslim pastoral care is still inadequate and is offered on a voluntary basis. In the case of hospitals, there are difficulties in the spiritual care of Muslim patients, especially in the treatment of the bodies of the deceased. In December 2005, the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia published the Guia para el respeto a la diversidad de creencias en el ámbito hospitalario (Guide to respect for diversity of beliefs in hospitals). In Spain there are about 7,000 Muslim prisoners (2008). An agreement was reached in October 2007, which states that Muslims chaplains will be paid by the state, provided they serve a group of ten or more prisoners. Fear of the influence of radical imams who may visit detainees has led to efforts to control pastoral care in prisons. The imams in charge of this service must be accredited by the Islamic Commission of Spain. In addition, prison authorities bear in mind reports by the Spanish National Intelligence Centre on assessing the adequacy of these imams. The Military Honours Regulation still states the obligation of Spanish soldiers to participate in Catholic religious events. In July 2009,

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the Defence Ministry introduced a new draft of the regulation, more consistent with the principle of non-confessionalism, and with the growing presence of non-Catholic soldiers (particularly Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla). The new regulation will make attendance at religious military ceremonies voluntary. 9

Religious Festivals

Article 12 of the Cooperation Agreement recognises the right to take time off to celebrate the major Muslim festivals by prior agreement between Muslim workers and their employers. Prisons organise cultural and religious activities during the month of Ramadan. The celebration of the major prayers for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha is becoming increasingly visible in neighbourhoods and towns with a substantial Muslim presence. City councils tend to assign public facilities or the use of public streets for these celebrations. In 2010, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha will be official holidays in Ceuta and Melilla by agreement of both governments with the local Muslim communities. 10 Halal Food The 1992 Cooperation Agreement recognises the right of Muslims to request food produced in accordance with Islamic requirements at public facilities such as schools, prisons and the army. So far there have been no major problems regarding this law, partly because these areas of public office have developed alternative menus without pork products. The emergence of initiatives for producing and marketing halal products is beginning to take shape in Spain. In the neighbourhoods of the large cities, where populations of Muslim immigrant origin are concentrated, a good number of halal butchers and grocery shops can be found as well as other types of establishment offering products and services that specifically target the Muslim community. All these commercial initiatives are in response to an incipient demand for these products, which then generates an infrastructure of production and distribution. In view of the potential of this new market, and as a way of guaranteeing the proper use of the term ‘halal’ to describe these products (as Article 14 of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement states), the Junta Islámica promoted the creation of the Halal Institute (Instituto

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Halal, c./ Arco, Nº13 Almodovar del Río, 14720 Córdoba, tel: +34 02431937, http://www.institutohalal.com), which, since 1999, has for the first time in Spain certified and regulated the use of the halal label.15 For some time now, Muslim communities have been asking the political authorities for the facilities necessary for slaughter on ‘Id alAdha. Various political institutions have developed recommendations to comply with current health regulations, but variations exist across the country. While some regions provide sites for sacrifice (Ceuta, Melilla and Aragon), others threaten severe economic sanctions to those who slaughter animals outside the slaughterhouses. Meanwhile, Muslim families continue to carry out the ritual sacrifice discreetly in private. 11

Dress Codes

There is no legal prohibition of wearing Muslim dress in public places such as schools and workplaces. Since 2002 there has been some controversy regarding the wearing of hijab in schools, as well as some complaints about the police’s refusal to photograph Muslim women with hijab when preparing identity cards. However, since November 2009, a regulation of the Ministry of Interior has allowed Muslim women to wear hijab in these photographs. Since the xenophobic party Platform for Catalonia (Plataforma per Catalunya) put forward in 2007 a motion to ban the wearing of the burqa in Vic (Barcelona), representatives of other political parties have referred to the desirability of restricting types of clothing that are regarded as synonymous with radicalization. Two events in the National Court intensified this debate in September 2009. Judge Javier Gomez Bermudez banned a Muslim woman wearing niqab from testifying, agreeing to take her statement only if she uncovered her face. A month later, the same judge dismissed a Muslim lawyer from the courtroom for wearing hijab in a court case against a network of Islamist terrorists. The lawyer, of Moroccan origin, lodged a complaint in the Supreme Judicial Council, the governing body of judges in Spain. 15 The Halal Institute is an facility for companies to certify their products as halal, but it does not organise the halal trade.

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Since the appearance of the first Islamic religious associations in Spain in the 1970s, there have been numerous initiatives to edit and publish journals. Some have had a very short life span, and others have been irregular. Various Muslim communities have published translations of the Qur’an, doctrinal treatises and essays on contemporary Islam through publishing houses seuch as Junta Islamica, Editorial Kutubia Mayurqa and Madrasa Editorial. It is interesting to note that, in recent years, some Muslim converts (such as Yaratullah Monturiol, Abdennur Prado, Abdelimumin Aya or Jalil Bárcena), have begun to publish with non-Muslim publishers. Muslim community leaders appear in the media only occasionally, in the context of conflicts involving Islam and Muslim communities. Since 1985, Spanish state television has broadcast “Islam Today”, produced by Mohamed Chakor, a Spanish journalist of Moroccan origin. More recently, Catalan public television broadcast live the final prayer of Ramadan in 2006 and the ‘Id al-Adha prayers in 2007. Both programmes were discontinued in 2008. Muslim communities cannot be involved in setting the agendas for Catalan public television, but are sometimes consulted on topics such as Muslim women and the hijab, or Islamism. The Internet has been adopted by the Spanish Muslim community as an alternative way of expressing their views. There is a significant Muslim blogosphere, and the main internet portal is Webislam (http:// www.webislam.com), created in 1997 by Junta Islámica. UCIDE also has its own website (http://es.ucide.org) and a blog (http://www .islamhispania.blogspot.com). 13

Family Law

The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the validity of marriages celebrated in accordance with the form established by Islamic law, but a marriage must be registered in the Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths in order to be fully valid.16 Polygamy is not

16 Motilla, Agustín, El matrimonio islámico y su eficacia en el Derecho español (Islamic Marriage and its Effectiveness in Spanish Law) (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba, 2003).

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recognised in Spanish family law, although some instances of polygamy have occurred, especially among groups of Gambian and Senegalese origin. The main problems in relation to family law have to do with divorce by repudiation (talaq), a practice that is not recognised in Spanish law, which poses serious difficulties for divorced women. 14


Since the 1970s, numerous activities related to Muslim-Christian dialogue have been held. Many of them have had the implicit support of the Spanish Catholic Church, following the principles of the Second Vatican Council. The evolution of the Church’s participation in these activities has to do with the development of the Muslim community in Spain (especially accelerated since the immigration of the 1990s), and with the change in the Vatican’s doctrinal approach in relation to Islam.17 The 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were a real blow to the public awareness. In the weeks after the attacks, there were innumerable and continual meetings, demonstrations and religious ceremonies, in which representatives of the Muslim community openly expressed their rejection of these actions. The media gathered the statements of the main Muslim bodies, which unanimously rejected terrorism in the name of Islam. The initiatives in favour of dialogue and mutual understanding that should have been carried out long before the attacks have multiplied throughout Spain. The most influential are inter-religious dialogue activities, which, in addition to the doctrinal content, make the presence of representatives of these groups actively visible in Spanish society. Their intervention as mediators in resolving local conflicts about the location of Muslim prayer sites has at times been very positive, adding to the viability and credibility of these initiatives.

17

For a synthesis of these activities, see Sánchez Nogales, Jose Luis, El islam en la España actual (Islam in Modern Spain) (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2008).

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Spanish society appears to be having difficulty in coming to terms with the cultural contributions of certain groups, particularly Muslims. The perception of ‘otherness’ that is a combination of the accumulation of old stereotypes and the introduction of new images and demands, hinders debate on the Muslim presence in Spain and the place Muslims are to occupy in Spanish society. One crucial factor that makes the full recognition of Islam difficult may be the insistence of many Spaniards on seeing the Muslim presence in Spain as the result of certain migratory cycles, rather than as the result of a process by which a religious minority has been created. Islam is still seen as an import, an alien reality, in clear contradiction to the understanding of Islam as a permanent presence, which was one of the motivating reasons for adopting the Cooperation Agreement. There is a feeling that mutual mistrust has become the currency in relations of proximity between Muslims and non-Muslims. Both groups eventually express their inner fears, so that communication is interrupted and encounters are avoided. After the recent impact of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks, the old stereotypes were replaced by a sense of diffuse and unpredictable threat that is nevertheless implicitly related to concrete faces and a concrete presence. Terrorism, which continued to be one of Spaniards’ main worries thanks to the Basque political conflict, has, since the 11 March events, become a stronger source of fear than ever before. The Observatorio Andalusí has reported and condemned increasing Islamophobia among the Spanish public.18 According this report, controversies during 2008 have included a clearly xenophobic discourse in relation to Muslims. New conflicts have arisen against the background of mosques being opened. Statements by politicians about certain Islamic practices, such as the wearing of hijab, have further revealed a latent bias against the Muslim presence. Police actions against suspected Islamist activists have also contributed to a widespread perception of mistrust and threat in relation to the presence of Muslims in

18 Observatory Andalusi, Informe especial 2008. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Annual Report 2008. Institute for the observation and monitoring of Islamophobia in Spain) (Madrid: UCIDE, 2009).

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Spain. From the Muslim point of view, according to a survey of 2,000 Muslims prepared by the Ministry of Interior in December 2008, 31% of respondents said that Islam was rejected in Spain. 16


Cultural events related to Islamic tradition tend to be linked to multicultural rather than specifically Islamic initiatives. Since 2006, Casa Árabe (Arab House)19 in Madrid has organised an annual extensive programme of cultural and artistic activities, including debates on contemporary Islam. The city council of Barcelona has also joined this initiative with the cultural festival, “Nights of Ramadan”, in 2008 and 2009. In 2009, the Arab House published Muslims in Spain. Reference guide, commissioned by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This guide is intended to help the media improve their understanding of the realities of Muslim communities in Spain.

19 Casa Árabe (http://www.casaarabe-ieam.es) is a public institution established in 2006 as a centre for the study the Arab world and a point of support for Spanish diplomacy in relation to Arab countries. It is a consortium established through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, the Government of Andalusia, the Community of Madrid and the municipalities of Madrid and Cordoba.

SWEDEN Göran Larsson1 1

Muslim Populations

The last official census to include information about religious affiliation was collected in 1930 and 15 individuals were recorded as Muslims in that year.2 However, larger numbers of Muslims started to arrive in the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure for today varies between 350,000 and 400,000 out of a total Swedish population of 9,000,000. This estimate is not supported by hard evidence as it is against the law to collect personal data on religious belief in order to protect individual freedom, and official bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include potentially sensitive personal information. The figures are therefore necessarily problematic, but they suggest that Muslims constitute 1.8%–3.5% of the population.3 According to the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST), the number of practising Muslims (i.e. practising on a daily or at least regular basis) is estimated at 100,000. This estimate is probably on the low side, and 150,000 is probably a more realistic figure.4 The Muslim community in Sweden is heterogeneous and encompasses a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, as well as a wide range of different languages. Muslims have come to

1 Göran Larsson is Associate Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). 2 Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund, “Från invandrarreligion till blågul islam? 50 år av organiserad muslimsk närvaro (From immigrant religion to blue-yellow Islam? 50 years of organised Muslim presence)”, in I. Svanberg, and D. Westerlund (eds), Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige (Blue-yellow Islam? Muslims in Sweden) (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1999), p. 13. 3 Roald, A.S., “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden”, in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 101–120 (102). 4 Larsson, G. and Å. Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmentation? A Contextual Study (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008).

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Sweden as both economic migrants and asylum seekers, and their educational background is varied. Up until the mid-1980s, the Turkish group was numerically the largest, but today it is not possible to say that one ethnic group dominates the Swedish Muslim scene and it is incorrect to analyse, present or view the Muslim community in Sweden as a homogenous phenomenon or a static group. It consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, Bosnians and a growing proportion of Swedish converts. Roald estimates the total number of converts to Islam in Sweden at between 1,000 and 3,000, though as there are no reliable data, this figure too must be considered problematic.5 The great majority of Muslims have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, the three largest cities in Sweden and approximately 50% of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm.6 However, Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are also generally problematic and uncertain.7 2

Islam and the State

Since 1951, freedom of religion has been guaranteed in the Constitution, and the Muslim community is able to organise various welfare, religious and cultural activities under the laws of association. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST, www.sst.a.se) is the authority, under the Ministry of Culture, that provides religious minorities with state funding and it describes its grants as being divided into three categories: – organisational grants enabling ‘parishes’ to hold religious services, offer pastoral care and provide education;

5

Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’ ”, p. 102. Stenberg, L., Muslim i Sverige: Lära och liv (Muslims in Sweden: Teachings and Life) (Stockholm: Bilda, 1999), p. 67. 7 Larsson, G., Muslims in the EU. Cities Report (Sweden): Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), http://www .eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims/country/sweden, accessed 4 November 2009. 6

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– working grants to support specific areas that the state wishes to subsidise, e.g. the Hospital Church, and theological training at certain seminaries; – project grants, aimed at stimulating new forms of activity and cooperation. In 2008, the five Muslim organisations recognised by the SST received SEK5,009,000 in organisational grants and ISS (Islamiska Shia-Samfunden i Sverige—Islamic Shi’a Community of Sweden) received SEK93,900 in establishing grants.8 The SST also supports spiritual care within the medical/hospital sector, and in 2008 granted SEK5,288,000 to be distributed among the religious communities they have recognised. Out of this sum, the five Muslim organisations received only a small sum (around SEK260,000).9 Economic support from the state is based on the principle that religious associations form important popular movements that contribute to society. However, it is the government that decides which religious communities are to be entitled to state grants. In order to receive this support, religious groups must guarantee and observe the principles of democracy and equality and ‘Swedish values’. Registration also makes it possible to use the taxation system to collect levies from members, but if this provision is adopted, the state automatically reduces the economic support that the organisation can receive from the SST. In 1963, the Swedish government decided to give anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years the opportunity to apply for citizenship10 and in 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s, the question of dual nationality was debated, and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual nationality.11 On the basis of existing data, it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish nationality, but it is likely that many Muslims are

8

Figures available at http://www.sst.a.se/bidrag/utbetaldastatsbidrag2008.4.7e1f30 b611fbb31ed2a800010793.html, accessed 4 November 2009. 9 SST, Årsbok 2009 (Stockholm: Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund), p. 16. 10 See, for example, Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’”. 11 Ibid., pp. 103–104; Lappalainen, P., Analytical Report on Legislation: Raxen National Focal Point Sweden (Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), p. 5.

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full citizens of Sweden. It is the mother’s nationality that determines the nationality of the child, but if the father is a Swedish national, the child can apply for Swedish citizenship, even if the mother is not Swedish. 3


Even though Muslim communities in Sweden are split along political, economic and religious lines, a number of initiatives towards the formation of Islamic and Muslim umbrella organisations have been taken since the early 1970s. Today there are five umbrella organisations that operate nationally, and it is claimed that they serve approximately 75% of all Muslims in Sweden. However, this estimate is difficult to substantiate with hard facts, and the calculation is based on the statements of these five organisations. The first national Muslim organisation, the Union of Islamic Congregations in Sweden (Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige, FIFS, Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, http://www.fifs.se), was set up in 1974. It later split because of internal tensions and criticisms, and in 1982 a new national organisation emerged under the title Swedish Muslim Union (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund, SMF, Kyrkbacken 14, bv SE-169 62 Solna). Despite further tensions and conflicts over money and influence, the two organisations have been able to co-operate under an umbrella organisation called the Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd, SMR, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). It is difficult to associate the three organisations with specific Islamic opinions, but it is clear that the ideology or ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement have influenced the SMR. The establishment of Muslim organisations in Sweden is also linked to international developments. For example, the beginning of the 1980s saw the establishment of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen, IKUS, Box 61, SE-191 21 Sollentuna), an organisation heavily influenced by the Süleymançi movement and its counterpart in Germany. The Swedish Islamic Assemblies (Svenska Islamiska Församlingar, SIF, Moränvägen 13, SE-136 51 Haningen) was founded in 2002. The Islamic Shi’a Communities in Sweden (Islamisk Shiasamfund, ISS, Box 690, SE-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund .se/sida1.html) is the first umbrella organisation for Shi’a Muslims in Sweden.

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In addition, it is also possible to identify a large number of ethnic and religious organisations, both local and national. For example, Bosnian (Bosniakiska Islamiska Samfundet, Barnarpsgatan 39 G, Se-553 33 Jönköping, http://www.izb.se), Shi’a, Ahmadi (Nasir Moské, Tolvskillingsgatan 1, SE-414 82 Göteborg, http://www.ahmadiyya .se) and Sufi organisations have been established in various locations and a number of youth organisations have also been set up with the aim of representing all Muslims in Sweden (especially those born and raised in Sweden). The most significant of these is Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Unga Muslimer, SUM), but it is also important to mention the Eritrean Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Eritreanska Unga Muslimer, SEUM, http://www.seum.nu) and the Muslim Youth Organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bosnien-Hercegovinas Muslimska Ungdomsförbund, BEMUF, http://www.bemuf.org). “Islamic Peace Agents”, a project run by the educational associations Sensus and Ibn Rushd, should also be highlighted. Ibn Rushd (Brännkykagatan 111B, SE-117 26 Stockholm, http://www.ibnrushd.se) is the first recognised independent educational association with a Muslim profile. Among many other things, Ibn Rushd organises courses in the field of religion, culture and language. One of its aims is to strengthen the identity of the Muslim community and inform non-Muslim Swedes about Islam and Muslim cultures. 4


There are six purpose-built mosques in Sweden (four Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, and two in Stockholm), one Shi’a mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, being started in 1975/1976). In Gävle and Västerås, Muslims have adapted old churches and converted them into mosques. This demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between so-called purpose-built mosques and ‘basement’ mosques. There are plans to build mosques in Eskilstuna, Jönköping, Växjö, Umeå, Göteborg and Örebro, and a mosque is already under construction in Skövde. When a Muslim organisation applies for permission to build a mosque, it is the relevant town council that issues the building permit. In the three largest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), the number of basement mosques is estimated at approximately 20 in Stockholm, 15–20 in Göteborg and 10–15 in Malmö.

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As in other European countries, the building of mosques in Sweden has given rise to public debates and strong anti-Muslim reactions.12 For example, on ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the building site of a new mosque in Göteborg was desecrated with pigs’ heads. This specific building was attacked because it was supported and funded by Saudi Arabia (see, for example, the anti-Muslim website http://www.ramberget.com). The Swedish right-wing populist party, Sverigedemokraterna, has also publicly targeted Islam, Muslims and the building of mosques.13 5


Religion is a compulsory subject in the Swedish school system, but is required to be taught in a balanced and neutral way, and pupils should not be indoctrinated into any specific religious system. Consequently, Islam should be presented as just one religion among many. Nevertheless, some textbooks have been criticised for being anti-Muslim and negative about Islam.14 All teachers (no matter what their own personal beliefs) must follow the curriculum and teach pupils about religion without any attempts at indoctrination. In addition to traditional Islamic communal education, which takes place in the mosques (e.g. the Friday sermon, the teaching of the Qur’an and other types of study circle), the setting up of so-called independent, private or ‘free’ schools is the most distinctive characteristic of Islamic religious education in Sweden today. Since the school reform of 1992, it has become much easier to receive support and economic subsidies from the Swedish state to establish independent schools. These schools are obliged to follow the national curriculum, but they can be influenced by particular pedagogical or religious and cultural profiles, although they should “not have a content which deviates from the value premises of Swedish society”.15 In addition to the national syllabus, the independent Islamic schools also teach Islam in 12 See Allievi, S., Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy ITsues and trends (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009). 13 Åkesson, J., “Muslimerna är vårt största hot (The Muslims are our biggest threat)”, Aftonbladet, 19 October 2009. 14 Otterbeck, J., “What is reasonable to demand? Islam in Swedish text-books”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (2005), pp. 795–812. 15 Daun, H. et al., “Educational strategies among some Muslim groups in Sweden”, in H. Daun and G. Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 191.

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a normative manner. However, this freedom does not allow them to present their religion in an “unbalanced or indoctrinating way”, and pupils must follow the national curriculum for religious education. This means that they have to learn about other religions, world views and ethical outlooks, and that religious education cannot be restricted to Islam or Muslim doctrines or rituals. Generally, education on Islam is confined to a few extra hours per week.16 Permission to start an independent school must be granted by the Swedish National Agency for Education. By 2009, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 66, of which nine were Islamic, Muslim and/ or Arab.17 The first Muslim independent school was started in Malmö in 1993. When an independent religious school is recognised by the state, it receives 85% of the support given to public schools. However, it is important to stress that the great majority of pupils with a Muslim cultural background still go to municipal schools. 6


A large number of universities and university colleges offer courses in history of religions, Islam and Middle East studies, and there are a substantial number of researchers engaged in critical, academic study of Islam and Muslims.18 In 2009, the Ministry of Education finalised an inquiry about the possibility of starting a training programme for Muslim clerics or imams in Sweden. The inquiry came to the conclusion that there was no need for a specific training programme for Muslim leaders. It was argued that the existing educational system could facilitate the

16

On the content of religious education in Muslim independent schools in Sweden, see Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Religious Education at Three Muslim Schools in Sweden (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009). See also Larsson, G., “Islamic religious education in Sweden”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–421. 17 See http://www3.skolverket.se/friskola03/l_sok_i_be_p.aspx?skolkategori=GR&i nriktning=B1&bidrag_enl=+&profil=&lan=&kommun=&tamed=G&omgang=&B1=S kick, accessed 4 November 2009. 18 See, for example, Larsson, G., “Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and academic research, with a bibliography of English and French literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden”, European University Institute Papers (RSCAS No. 2006/36), 2006.

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current need and the state should not take part in confessional training programmes.19 7

Burials and Cemeteries

Muslims living in or close to larger Swedish cities have no difficulty in finding a burial site that follows prescribed Islamic norms. The practical organisation of burial sites, regardless of religious affiliation, is still in the hands of the dioceses belonging to the Church of Sweden through the Cemetery Administration (Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen). According to the latest available statistics from 2000, approximately 111 municipalities in Sweden provide burial grounds for Muslims.20 There is no prohibition on Muslims being buried in a shroud rather than a coffin (as many Muslims require), and certain local offices of the Cemetery Administration, as in Malmö, specifically permit Muslims to be buried in this way. 8


No Muslim religious leaders or theologians are employed by the state in the health service, prisons or armed forces. However, through grants from the SST and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, imams and religious leaders receive small grants to perform these kinds of social services. Since 2006, the SST is also funding a hospital imam at the Skaraborg hospital in Skövde (50%) and since 2008 the SST has paid for three 25% positions as coordinators for Muslim healthcare.21 It is nevertheless clear that most of the work in hospitals, prisons and other social institutions is done on a voluntary basis, and that there is a great imbalance between non-Christian denominations and the Church of Sweden and other Christian denominations, which have a long history and an established platform for such work.

19 SOU 2009:52 Staten och imamerna. Religion, integration, autonomi (The State and the Imams: Religion, Integration, Autonomy) (Stockholm: Fritzes, 2009). 20 Larsson and Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden, p. 336. 21 SST, Årsbok 2009, p. 16.

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Religious Festivals

Even though the major religious festivals are highlighted by the media in a positive and neutral way, they are not recognised by the state. Muslims have to apply for leave to celebrate the ‘Id/bayram religious festivals, and the employer has discretion as to whether an employee should be given time off. For the second year running, the end of Ramadan was celebrated in 2009 by the Museum of World Culture in Göteborg, which organised a reception, lectures and a concert for the ‘Id (see http://www.eidfirande.se). The reception was covered by the media, and part of the concert was broadcast by Swedish national television. The Muslim community in Gothenburg appreciated this initiative, and the Ramadan celebration was attended by a large number of Muslims and non-Muslims. There were games for children, lectures and dialogue meetings were arranged, and the cafeteria served traditional Muslim food from various countries. In addition to the Muslim initiatives, an academic book on the celebration of Ramadan in Sweden was also published in 2009.22 10 Halal Food Halal slaughter without stunning has been prohibited by law since 1937. Methods of slaughtering animals are not regarded as a religious issue, but one of animal rights. There have been some attempts to organise halal methods of slaughter that comply with Swedish law (e.g., giving the animal an anaesthetic before it is killed), but this method is not accepted by all Muslims. There is, however, no difficulty in finding halal food in Sweden, and there is easy access to imported meat. There are no data on the availability of halal food in schools, public institutions or hospitals, but it is clear that most institutions have become aware of the fact that Muslims have certain requirements, and so-called ‘Muslim alternatives’ are generally available.

22 Berglund, J. and S. Sorgenfrei (eds), Ramadan: En svensk tradition (Ramadan: A Swedish Tradition) (Lund: Arcus, 2009).

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Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting Muslim dress, but there have been some debates about women wearing hijab in the health-care sector, in schools, in the police, etc. In 2006, the National School Authority intervened to protect a student who had been banned from a school in Umeå because she wore hijab. The niqab has also been discussed in the media in 2009 and some politicians have argued that it should be banned, but no law has been passed.23 The debate has often been focused on health issues, integration and practicalities rather than on religion, but it is clear that many Muslims perceive the discussion about the hijab and sometimes the niqab as being coloured by Islamophobia and xenophobia. Figures published by the Board of Integration in 2005 suggest that women who wear hijab have greater difficulty in finding jobs, and that it is often associated with negative opinions about Muslims. 12


Reports from the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that Islam, Muslims and the Middle East are generally associated with negative opinions and stereotypical media reporting. There is no current research on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in the media, but it is generally believed, at least among Muslims, that the Swedish media have a negative bias towards them. Most Muslim media are confined to the Internet (websites, blogs, discussion lists, etc.), and there are probably over 50 Swedish Islamic websites, such as http://www.islamguiden.com. The journal Minaret: Tidskrift för Svensk muslimsk kultur is published by a group of Muslim intellectuals, while the al-Ghazali institute (http://al-ghazali.org/sidan/) has recently translated a number of Arabic and English books into Swedish (including Martin Ling’s book on the Prophet Muhammad and a collection of hadith-texts). In addition to journals and books published by Sunni Muslims, the Ahmadi community has published a large number of Swedish translations of Ahmadi books (for example, a book on dhikr in the Ahmadi community).

23 Danielsson, S. and L. Pettersson, “Fel dölja ansiktet i öppet samhälle (It is wrong to cover the face in an open society)”, SvD, 16 October 2009.

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In 2008, three young Muslim women were given the opportunity to record a television series and broadcast it on national television. The series is called Halal-TV and addressed questions of equality, gender, Muslim identities and generational differences within the Muslim community. The series has received both critical and positive reviews from both Muslims and non-Muslims and, according to the critics, has contributed to presenting the Muslim community in a stereotypical way. One of the programme’s leaders was also severely criticised for her opinions about Shari’a penalties and for not taking a stand against those that conflict with Swedish law, such as the stoning of women. The Swedish Muslim poet Mohamed Omar (b. 1976) received a lot of media attention in 2009 because of his support for Islamism and his strong critique of the state of Israel, and for associating with international Holocaust deniers.24 13

Family Law

No exceptions are made to the laws of Sweden, which Muslims must follow. Consequently, Islam has no distinct legal status. Muslim leaders (imams) can apply for a permit to conduct marriages. If the imam is approved by the state and has the correct papers, the marriage is accepted as legally binding in Sweden. Sweden does not apply a socalled double marriage rule (i.e., that one must go both to the mayor or city hall and to one’s own religious or ideological organisation). Some Muslim communities have tried to develop specific Islamic marriage contracts and forms for divorce, inheritance, etc. that comply with both Islamic and Swedish law, but hardly any information about these documents is available. In 2006, the chairperson of SMF, Mahmoud Aldebe, sparked a row in the Swedish media, when he proposed that the Muslim community should be exempted from Swedish law and be governed by specific rules and regulations. This suggestion was primarily an attempt to start an advisory board for a so-called Shari’a council to protect Muslim interests, but Muslims and non-Muslims alike generally dismissed it.25 24

On Mohamed Omar, see http://www.mohamedomar.org/. See, for example, Kihlström, S., “Muslimskt förbund kräver egna lagar (Muslim association demands its own teachers)”, Dagens-Nyheter, 27 April 2006. 25

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In the city of Gothenburg, a network for peace and dialogue including people of various religions (Jews, Christians and Muslims) organised lectures and a football match for peace on 11 September 2009. Similar activities were also organised in other Swedish cities. Currently, the Church of Sweden is funding a priest in Gothenburg who is working explicitly in interfaith relations and in Stockholm they have set up a centre for religious dialogue (Centrum för religionsdialog, Västra trädgårdsgatan 2, Box 16345, SE-103 26 Stockholm). 15


Several studies indicate that many Swedes have negative views and preconceptions about Islam and Muslims, and Muslim leaders report instances of Islamophobia. Although it is very difficult to measure Islamophobic attitudes and incidents, mainly because of the lack of a clear definition, it is certain that many Muslims perceive themselves to be viewed as a problem, and that Islam is seen as something negative or even un-Swedish by many ethnic Swedes. Muslims have also been attacked by Sverigedemokraterna and, according to a open letter published in Aftonbladet (19 October 2009), the leader of the party, Jimmy Åkesson, argues that Islam and Muslims are the biggest threat to society. Since 2006, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) has included Islamophobia as a specific category in its report on hate crimes. For the year 2008, 272 incidents (45% of the approximately 600 reported anti-religious hate crimes) were included in this category.26 During 2009, Muslims have tried to make space for themselves in public debate and Mahmoud Aldebe is, for example, trying to win 26 Hatbrott 2008. Polisanmälningar där det i motivbilden ingår etnisk bakgrund, religiös tro, sexuell läggning eller könsöverskridande identitet eller uttryck (Hate crimes 2008. Reports where the motivation for crime includes ethnic background, religious faith, sexual orientation or transgender identity) (Stockholm: BRÅ, 2009), pp. 50–56. For an English summary of this report, see ”Reports where the motivation for crime includes ethnic background, religious faith, sexual orientation or transgender identity”, http:// www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Hatecrime_2008_summary.pdf&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/090916/072681d84616ef1e0cda07047c76ab6 2/Hatecrime%255f2008%255fsummary.pdf, accessed 4 November 2009.

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votes for Centerpartiet. Mehmet Kaplan, who is a former member of SUM, was also nominated as responsible for matters concerning integration for the Green Party (Miljöpartiet). 16


In 2009, the celebrations of both Ramadan and ‘Id al-Fitr were highlighted by the Swedish media, and some of the festivities were broadcast on national television. This celebration was organised by WAMA, a Muslim cultural and event company.

SWITZERLAND Stéphane Lathion1 1

Muslim Populations

Prior to 1960, the presence of Muslims within the Swiss population was rare. That changed with three waves of immigration: one economicbased, one family-based, and one politically-based. The first wave, in the late 1960s, was mainly caused by economic factors and consisted chiefly of men coming to work in Switzerland with no particular intention to stay permanently in the country. These immigrants were mostly from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The second wave came in the late 1970s, after Switzerland changed its legislation concerning foreigners to allow family regrouping. This decision had direct implications: from this point on, Islam was no longer only an ephemeral, male social factor in Switzerland but, with the presence of families, had become a lasting reality. The last, political, wave consisted of foreigners seeking asylum from oppressive dictatorships, various civil wars, famines and other situations. More accurately, this is not so much a wave as an ongoing movement, since it started in the 1960s (mainly from the Middle East) and continues today with the exodus of people from the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, North Africa and other African countries. According to the 2000 census, the total Swiss population numbers 7,288,010. For the first time, a question related to religious belief was included in the census, and the census reported 310,807 Muslims, or 4.3% of the total population, although Muslims of Swiss nationality made up only 0.6%. The fact that statistics reveal the presence of 169,726 Muslim men compared with 141,081 Muslim women demonstrates that the Muslim presence has evolved and is no longer merely

1 Dr Stéphane Lathion heads GRIS (Research Group on Islam in Switzerland) and is a researcher associated with l’Observatoire des Religions en Suisse, University of Lausanne.

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due to labour migration. Some estimates suggest that the number of Muslims today is much closer to 400,000 than the number indicated in the last census. It is a young community with about half under the age of 25. The great majority live in the urban cantons of Basel, Bern, Zürich, St Gallen, Vaud and Geneva. Automatic Swiss nationality is by descent and not by birth on Swiss territory and foreigners must generally have lived for a total of 12 years in Switzerland before they can apply for Swiss nationality, even if they were born in Switzerland. A federal referendum in 2004 eased access to Swiss citizenship for the descendants of immigrants. The majority of Muslims in Switzerland (58%) are from the former Yugoslav republics, followed by Turks (21%), Swiss (11%), North Africans (4%), Subsaharan Africans (4%) and Middle Eastern immigrants (2%). For more details, see http://www.gris.info. Muslim communities in Switzerland are 75% Sunnis, 7% Shi’is, 10%-15% Turkish Alevis, and some members of Sufi orders. 2

Islam and the State

Switzerland is a secular state but, under the Constitution, the Swiss state recognises both Catholicism and Protestantism as official religions and relations with religious communities are based on the fundamental rights to freedom of religion and philosophy and to equality before the law. However, since Switzerland is a federation of states, all matters of religion fall under the competence of the cantons, within the limits of federal (constitutional) law. This means that a canton is permitted to support a recognised religion. The only two cantons that have clearly separated the state and religion are Geneva and Neuchâtel.2 Muslims in Switzerland must abide by all Swiss laws and regulations. In general, no Swiss laws exist that directly interfere with any Islamic obligation. For example, no Swiss laws forbid Muslims from exercising their religious beliefs or practices, such as the five pillars.

2 Mahnig, Hans, “L’intégration institutionnelle des Musulmans de Suisse: L’exemple de Bâle-Ville, Berne, Genève, Neuchâtel et Zurich (The institutional integration of Muslims in Switzerland: The example of Bâle-Ville, Berne, Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich)”, Tangram: Bulletin de la Commission Fédérale contre le Racisme, vol. 8 (2000), pp. 102–111.

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The issue of official recognition of non-Christian religions is a matter of continual debate and was the subject of a referendum in the canton of Zürich in 2003. All the main political parties developed a strategic paper on the place of Islam in Switzerland during 2007–2008. 3


At present, there are over 80 Muslim associations in Switzerland and the figure is constantly changing. It should be noted that most of the established Muslim associations have subsidiary youth sections, and women are also often organised within the framework of the main association.3 The range of activities varies; some associations focus on religious activities, while other are much more culturally orientated. Muslim associations are generally locally organised, but they are also starting to create representative bodies at canton level. In most cantons, the associations are grouping into federations (for example, the Union of Muslim Associations of the canton of Fribourg), which gives them more weight in discussion on important issues, such as cemeteries, swimming pools, construction of mosques, etc. At the national level, there are three main bodies: Muslim Men and Women of Switzerland (Musulmans et Musulmanes de Suisse, MMS, www.islam.ch), the League of Swiss Muslims (Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse, LMS, www.rabita.ch); and the Federation of Swiss Islamic Organisations (Fédération des Organisations Islamiques de SuisseI, FOIS, Kappelenring 44c, 3032 Hinterkappelen), but there is no official representation as in France. The LMS and the MMS were both founded in 1994 with the aim of helping Swiss Muslims to find ways of integrating and participating constructively in Swiss society. Their wish to develop some form of Swiss federation of Muslim organisations has not so far met with success. However, since 2002, in most cantons, united bodies have started to emerge, including the Union des organisations musulmanes de Genève (UOMG) in Geneva, Union vaudoise des associations musulmanes (UVAM) in Vaud, Union des associations musulmanes de Fribourg (UAMF) in Fribourg, Vereinigung der Islamischen

3

Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory, Etre musulman en Suisse romande, une enquête qualitative sur le role du référent religieux dans la construction identitaire (Suisse Romande, a qualitative enquiry into the religious dimension of the construction of identity), PhD thesis, University of Fribourg, 2006.

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Organisationen in Zürich (VIOZ) in Zurich, and the Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Luzern (VIOL) in Lucerne. 4


Switzerland has registered more than 100 mosques and/or prayer halls, although statistics in this field are unreliable. Only five have the features of Islamic architecture, in particular a minaret: in Geneva (financed by Saudi Arabia), Zurich (Ahmadiyya), and more recently in Winthertour (Albanians), Wangen (Turks) and Langenthal. The rest are mainly prayer halls without any outward indication of their Islamic function. Some have facilities such as a library and/or cafeteria, but these are few and almost invisible from the outside. On 29 November 2009, the Swiss population voted in a referendum to prohibit the building of minarets in Switzerland (see section 15 below). 5


The question of religious education is the responsibility of the cantons. Each canton’s department for public education decides autonomously what to do about religious education or whether to offer it at all (provision is usually no more than one hour per week). In order to provide religious education for their children, Muslims must therefore organise it themselves. Religious socialisation takes place through families and Muslim organisations, which offer various classes, such as introductions to Islam, the Qur’an and Arabic. Until now, Muslim pupils (like pupils from other religious communities) are not given any time off school to attend such classes, which often take place on Saturdays or in the early evening. At the Swiss primary school level, religious education often takes the form of catechism. However, this type of education is evolving and is slowly being replaced with non-religious and inter-religious classes. In secondary school, only an introduction to the history of religions is offered and is usually taught in a non-dogmatic or non-confessional fashion. Enbiro (Enseignement Biblique Romand) has developed a new pedagogy for teaching religion in school. This new programme gives an introduction to the world’s most influential religions and has been generally welcomed in French-speaking Switzerland, although not in the canton of Wallis, where a controversy erupted in November 2003.

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Some conservative Christian parents removed their children from the religious education class when they learned that Muhammad was presented as a prophet who received messages from God and that the Qur’an is a holy book. These parents were concerned that presenting Islamic teachings conflicted with the religious education they wanted to provide for their children. All the objections to this new kind of religious education were related to Islam, and not to the other religions taught. With regard to Islamic religious instruction, there is so far one exception. In the canton of Lucerne, two communes decided in the autumn of 2002 to introduce Islamic religious classes for their Muslim pupils. These classes are given in German to all nationalities together and is optional. After a difficult start, this decision has now been accepted. 6


In Switzerland, there are a small number of university chairs in Islamic studies (Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Basel, for example), but they do not present a contemporary view of the Islamic world, concentrating more on the historical, civilisational and sometimes political aspects. Only occasional courses at Lucerne University (about Islam in Bosnia, for example) and at Fribourg University (Islam and Modernity, Islam in Europe) present a more contemporary picture. On 7 May 2003, in Wallis, a Catholic canton, an imam from Macedonia was denied a work permit to work as an imam, largely due to the fact that he had studied in Medina (Saudi Arabia) and the canton authorities considered him to be a potential threat to religious harmony. As a result, the issue of imam training became a political issue and a study group was established which reported its findings in May 2009. The report, “Formation en Suisse des imams et des enseignants-es en religion islamique (Training in Switzerland for imams and teachers of Islamic religious education)”, confirms that the Muslim majority expect training courses for teachers based on the German model (educational studies, Arabic, Islam). The situation in the French part of Switzerland is quite different and seems more orientated towards an historical and ecumenical approach proposed by the NGO Enseignement Biblique et Interreligieux Romand (ENBIRO, http://www.enbiro .ch/default_b.html). Two models for training Muslim religious teachers are discussed. One is to establish an academic unit in a university.

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An intermediate solution is to provide adult continuing education to supplement the theological training that functioning imams already have, and also to make it available to leaders in Muslim associations in such a way as might assist foreign imams. 7


The situation with regard to cemeteries for Muslims in Switzerland varies. As a federation of states, Switzerland has left this issue to the cantons, which usually allow the individual communes to find the solution that best suits their population. A number of Muslim cemeteries have been established in recent years. The oldest was started in Petit-Saconnex in Geneva in 1978, followed by Basel and Bern (2000), Lugano (2002), and Zurich (2004), but it was not till January 2008 that a law to make confessional cemeteries legal was proposed. In Neuchâtel and Fribourg, requests for Muslim sections to be allocated in existing cemeteries, or for a Muslim cemetery to be established, have recently been made but no official response has so far been given. With regard to funeral rites, Muslim organisations usually provide personnel to prepare the body for the funeral. When there are no local regulations governing the details of funeral rites, local parishes or civil authorities usually try to do their best to find a solution acceptable to the family. 8


No chaplaincy arrangements are formally organised for Muslims, and what services there are depend exclusively on the good will of institutions and individuals. 9

Religious Festivals

No specific arrangements exist in Switzerland concerning Muslim religious holidays. However, Muslims are sometimes allowed to take days off work for Islamic festivals unless this would cause serious economic difficulties for the employer. There is no legal right to a reduction of working hours during the Ramadan fast, but arrangements can be made with the employer on an individual basis. One unofficial

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regulation that exists concerns gymnastics at school during Ramadan. Students fasting during Ramadan are exempted from gym class because of the risk of fainting or dehydration. 10 Halal Food Halal slaughter is not permitted, although exceptions are made for special events. This is not a serious problem, and there is no demand, perhaps because halal food imported from France, Italy, Germany, and Austria is readily available. 11

Dress Codes

There has been fierce debate on the subject of religious dress all over Switzerland, but emotions have been higher in the French part because of the impact of events in France and a similar perception of laïcité. Hijab is permitted in school for students and pupils but prohibited for teachers. Two cantons have had to deal with legal cases concerning hijab. As the result of a case in Geneva that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was established that the principle of laïcité, which applies in Geneva, entitles the canton to rule that public officials may not wear ostentatious religious symbols, such as hijab. In theory this ruling could become a precedent for the whole of Switzerland, but the decision remains with individual cantons. In July 2009, as in France, the burqa became a subject of public debate in Switzerland, but the polemic was mostly theoretical and hypothetical, coming about mainly because of French influences. 12


Muslims do not have their own programmes on either television or radio. However, there are a certain number of religious programmes in which Islam is discussed in an inter-religious context. Themes such as creation, death, health and fundamentalism are examples of subjects covered. Similar topics are raised on the Internet, where Muslims are particularly active. Some of the Muslim websites that show how well organised the associations are becoming are: Islam en Suisse

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(http://www.islam.ch/); Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (http://www .rabita.ch/); Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève (http://www .mosque.ch/); Association Culturelle des Femmes Musulmanes de Suisse (http://www.femme-musulmane.ch/); Centre Islamique de Genève (http://www.cige.org/); Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zürich (http://www.islam-zh.ch/); Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeindschaft (http://www.islamtoplumu.ch/). Er-Rahma—Die Barmherzigkeit: unahängige Zeitschrift von Muslimen in der Schweiz (Er-Rahma—Mercy: Independent journal of Muslims in Switzerland, http://barmherzigkeit.ch/typo3/) is a quarterly journal. Bulletins du Centre Islamique de Genève (http://www.cige.org/ cige/publications/bulletins_du_cig/) is a report produced three times a year. 13

Family Law

In Switzerland, as in other European countries, polygamy is illegal. Conflicts may arise in inheritance law or in cases where women are called to testify in Swiss courts.4 Marriages can only be formalised according to civil law. 14


In 2007 the Swiss Council of Religions (SCR) was established with the goal of contributing to the maintenance and promotion of religious harmony and freedom in Switzerland. It consists of representatives of the three national churches (Roman Catholic, Christian Catholic, Evangelical Reformed), the Swiss Federation of Israelite Communities, the Liberal Jewish Forum of Switzerland, the Coordinated Islamic Organisations of Switzerland and the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Switzerland. Since 2008, Bern has been home to a Maison des Religions (House of Religions, Schwarztorstrasse 102, 3002 Berne) whose ambition is to promote intercultural dialogue and integration. Each religion (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Bahaism) has it own

4 Pahud de Mortanges, René and Erwin Tanner (eds), Muslime und Schweizerische Rechtsordnung (Muslims and Swiss law) (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2002).

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reception area and meeting space. At the cantonal level there are a number of interreligious fora that conduct meetings, public debates, and joint prayers in connection with the main religious festivals. 15


The major public debate of 2009 was linked to the referendum, held on 9 November, in which the Swiss electorate were asked to vote on whether to ban the construction of minarets. Having collected the required 100,000 signatures required for a referendum, the organisers handed over the proposal to the federal authorities and, after an intense debate, the government took the risk and approved the initiative. For the initiators, the purpose of proposing a ban on minarets was to send a clear signal to the Muslim communities that not everything is permitted, and that their first priority should be to integrate. The approach chosen was clearly provocative and polemical, since there are only four minarets in Switzerland and, despite the marked growth in the Muslim population, there has not been a proportional growth in requests for permission to build mosques with minarets. There has, for example, not been a single request for a minaret in the Frenchspeaking part of Switzerland. It was an issue more about the Muslim presence than about minarets. The debate was very emotional because of the widespread ignorance about Islam among both the population and politicians, an international climate which, as elsewhere in Europe, rejects a considered and nuanced approach to Islamic matters, and, finally, a national context infected by the Libyan government’s imprisonment of two Swiss citizens since 2008. The result of the vote, 57% in favour of the ban, came as a surprise to all and spilled over into the international arena. By way of explanation, some analysts pointed to a disconnect between the political and media elites and the general population. Others pointed to the Libyan crisis, and yet others referred to a certain degree of Swiss xenophobia, which has a tendency to surface at intervals. It is most likely that a combination of these factors came into play. The refusal of the elites to recognise people’s fears concerning an Islam which is generally not well known and is felt to be threatening, and the suggestion that people were stupid to hold such views, can only have reinforced the opposition.

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On Saturday 9 November 2009, the main Muslim associations opened their premises and mosques to non-Muslims visitors. Some associations had already been doing this at the end of Ramadan for some years, but given the public debate in connection with the 9 November referendum on the building of minarets, more associations than ever before decided to make this gesture on the day of the vote.

TURKEY Ahmet Yildiz1 1

Muslim Populations

The census conducted by the Turkish Statistics Institution (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, TÜİK) on 31 December 2008 recorded the population of Turkey as 71,517,100.2 Following the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1924, the nation-building process envisaged a thoroughly homogeneous population in religious and ethnic terms. The extreme sensitivity of the state elites has led to the ethnic and religious affiliations of the population being excluded from the official census since 1965, so we do not have official data for these factors, but there have been some significant surveys, the most important of which was conducted in 2006 by the Milliyet-KONDA company.3 This survey found that there were 55,484,000 self-identified Turks (76.03% of the population), 11,445,000 Kurds (15.68%) and 6,460,000 people from other ethnic groups (8.3%). The same survey also indicates the religious demography of the Turkish population and found that around 99% of the Turkish population identify themselves as Muslim. In terms of denominational affiliations, Sunni Hanafi Turks comprise 82.14% of the total population, Sunni Shafi’is 9.06% (of whom 72% live in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, 76% are Kurds, 13% Turks, and 10% Arabs). Alevis comprise 5.73% of the population (4,500,000 people), and are 43% Turks, 42% Kurds and 7% Arabs, with the remaining 8%

1

Ahmet Yıldız is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Centre of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. He has specialised in Kemalist and Kurdish nationalisms and the role of Islam as a socio-political factor in Turkish democracy. He contributed the article “Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Justice and Development’ ” in Ümit Cizre (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 2 TÜİK figures available at http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul, accessed 2 March 2009. 3 Milliyet-KONDA, Biz Kimiz? Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması 2006 (Who Are We? Survey of Social Structure 2006), http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf, accessed 6 May 2010.

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of various other ethnicities. About a third of all Alevis live in Istanbul with other major concentrations in central Anatolia and the Mediterranean region. The Ja’faris are the country’s principal Shi’a community and number between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul).4 Overall, Hanafis and Shafi’is regard their Sunnism as a powerful common denominator, while Alevis consider themselves a distinct group. In a survey carried out in 2006 by two prominent political scientists from the University of the Bosphorus, respondents were asked to reply, on a scale of 1 to 10, to the question: Where do you locate yourself in the continuum from ‘Islamist’ to ‘secular’? In reply, 20.3% of respondents identified themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% as somewhere in between. One should not forget, however, that the meanings ascribed to the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘secular’ are vague, so these results are open to interpretation.5 2

Islam and the State

Under its 1982 Constitution, Turkey is a secular state providing for freedom of belief and worship, and freedom to privately disseminate religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. Turkish laiklik (laïcité) not only prescribes a separation between religion and the state but also requires that religion be kept under state control. Accordingly, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, symbolised in the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf. Article 219 of the penal code prohibits imams, priests, rabbis and other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. As a corollary of the principle of laïcité, there is legislation against insulting any religion, interfering with a religion’s services or damaging its property.

4 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008, http://2001– 2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/index.htm, accessed 2 March 2009. 5 Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey) (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006), pp. 29–31, 38–39.

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The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, administers Sunni Muslim religious facilities and teaching courses. The Diyanet is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants, and also covers the cost of utilities at registered mosques. Some groups, particularly some Alevis, claim that Diyanet policies reflect mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs and accuse the Diyanet of bias since it does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership and does not cover the cost of utilities at ‘Alevi cem houses’ because they are not formally recognised as places of worship. 3


The oldest Islamic groupings in Republican Turkey are the Nurcu movement founded by Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, and the Suleymancis originally led by Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, the establishment of both dating back to the 1930s. Sufi and other mystical, religious-social orders, brotherhoods (tariqas) and lodges (cemaats) are banned under the “Law on the Closure of Religious Shrines and Dervish Convents and Prohibition of Some Titles” of 30 November 1925, but tariqas and cemaats have nevertheless remained active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with them and other Islamic communities. Calls for the lifting of this ban are part of the on-going agenda in Turkish politics, but Kemalists and neoKemalists are resolutely against the growing power of brotherhoods in the political and social life of the country. Apart from miscellaneous non-official Islamic groupings, the most important organisation is the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Eskişehir Yolu 9. km. Çankaya-Ankara, tel.: +90 312 295 70 00; http://www.Diyanet.gov.tr), an official institution established by Law 429 on 3 March 1924, the same day as the abolition of the caliphate. It represents the highest Islamic religious authority in the country. According to Article 136 of the Constitution: “The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” It is empowered to regulate issues concerning Islamic belief, rituals and morality and to provide society with religious guidance.

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Other notable Islamic organisations are as follows: – The Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak no. 89, 06640 Kocatepe, Ankara, tel.: +90 312 417 12 35, fax: +90 312 418 19 00, www.Diyanetvakfi .org.tr) was established on 13 March 1975. It is a tax-exempt foundation, has the right to collect donations without prior permission, and is the biggest foundation in Turkey in terms of its financial resources. Its purposes are to support the activities of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, to enlighten and guide the population in religious matters, to build mosques and to work towards strengthening social solidarity. The prestigious Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Islam), the first of its kind in the Muslim World, is a product of the Islamic Studies Centre (Islami Araştırmalar Merkezi, ISAM, İcadiye Bağlarbaşı Cad. 40, Bağlarbaşı 34662, Üsküdar-Istanbul, tel.: +90 216 474 08 50, fax: +90 216 474 08 74, http://www.isam.org.tr/) established by the Foundation. – The Foundation for Turkish Volunteer Associations (Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküller Vakfı, TGTV, Otakçılar Mh. Savaklar Cd. no. 134050, Edirnekapı/Eyüp/İstanbul, tel.: +90 212 534 04 07, fax: +90 212 534 04 08, http://www.tgtv.org) was established on 22 January 1994 and is based in Istanbul. It is an umbrella organisation made up of 700 foundations, associations and unions that have Islamic and Turkish nationalist leanings. – There is a network of organisations linked to the Gülen Community, the controversial Fethullahçi or neo-Nurcu movement, founded and led by a retired preacher, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi, now living in the USA, including the Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı, Cumhuriyet Cad. no. 129/5, 34230 Harbiye-Istanbul, tel.: +90 (212) 232 17 10, fax: +90 (212) 232 15 88, http://www.gyv.org.tr), established on 29 June 1994. The Foundation has three important organisational components through which it conducts its global outreach: The Dialogue Eurasia Platform, the Abant Meetings and the Intercultural Dialog Platform. – The Anatolia Youth Association (Anadolu Gençlik Derneği, Hükümet Cad., Hilal Sokak no. 10, Kat:1, Ulus-Ankara, tel.: 0312 309 59 27, fax: 0312 311 56 71, http://www.agd.org.tr) is the successor of the National Outlook Foundation (Milli Görüş Vakfı), the most important social organisation of the National Outlook Movement. It was founded in Ankara in 2002 and has 700 branches throughout the

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country. It follows the ideology and programme devised by the founder of the National Outlook, Necmettin Erbakan. There are numerous socially and financially powerful Islamically oriented charitable associations that have become widely known and acquired popular support. Areas of their activities include: social aid, food aid, care of orphans, housing and clothing aid, vocational training, and support for educational and health facilities. The prominent charitable associations are: International Humanitarian Help (IHH, http://www.ihh.org.tr), Solidarity and Aid Association (Kimse Yok Mu, http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr), Deniz Feneri (http://www .denizfeneri.org.tr), Cansuyu (http://www.cansuyu.org.tr) and Yardımeli (http://www.yardimeli.org.tr). 4


In 2008, there were 80,053 mosques in Turkey.6 The most famous are those built in Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultans, called Selatin mosques, while the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara is the most important to have been built in the Republican period. 5


The 1982 Constitution established compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools within the framework of the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, developed by the military government in response to leftist movements. In January 2007, the religious education curriculum was changed so as to include a very basic introduction to Alevism. Only the Diyanet is authorised to provide courses in religion (Kuran Kursları) outside school, although clandestine and unofficial private courses do exist. Students who complete the first five years of primary school may enrol in Diyanet Qur’an classes at weekends and during summer vacations. Only children aged 12 and older may legally register for official Qur’an courses,

6 http://www.Diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/strateji/strateji.asp, accessed 18 November 2009.

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which include 32-week courses, summer Qur’an classes and classes for memorising the whole Qur’an. Since 1997, it has been compulsory for children to attend eight years of secular education, after which those who wish to receive Islamic religious education may continue their studies at İmam-Hatip high schools (lycees), which cover both the standard curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. There are currently 444 İmam-Hatip schools in Turkey. Although they date back to 1924, İmam-Hatip schools were only named İmam-Hatip high schools in 1973, when they were authorised to provide education for both vocational and undergraduate study under Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Education of 1973. During the process of military intervention, the so-called “28 February 1997 post-modern coup”, the secondary school sections of İmam-Hatip schools were closed down and the high school sections became four-year lycees providing only vocational education. As a result of this change, graduates of these schools were effectively barred from entrance to universities, apart from faculties of theology, and the number of students attending them fell from 500,000 to 60,000 in the space of five years. In July 2009, the regulation that discriminated against students from vocational schools, including Imam-Hatip high schools, was changed by the Higher Education Council so as to provide them with equal opportunities in university entrance examinations without restricting the university programmes they could apply for outside their vocational specialisation.7 Many religiously devout citizens consider the religious instruction provided in state schools to be inadequate and most families who enrol their children (especially girls) in İmam-Hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams. Apart from state-provided religious education and instruction, there are hundreds of private schools affiliated to Islamic communities. These schools are not designed as Islamic religious schools, but provide a more conducive environment for Islamic socialisation. Many of these schools are very popular and most are affiliated to the Gülen community.

7 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=872057&title=meslek-liselilerinkatsayi-magduriyeti-sona-erdi, accessed 18 November 2009.

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Boys and girls are usually taught together in the education system, in both public and private schools. Students are strictly forbidden to wear the headscarf in both primary and secondary schools. 6


There are 25 theology faculties offering undergraduate programmes.8 No new ones have been opened since the 28 February 1997 military coup and student numbers have fallen drastically. The Higher Education Board decided to equalise the quota used in the calculation of points in university entrance examinations and made all university programmes accessible to all applicants, including graduates of İmamHatip schools. This is bringing about a slow change, but suits brought before the Council of the State to annul these decisions are on-going. 7


The TÜİK does not produce statistics on the number of Muslim cemeteries in Turkey. Municipalities deal with all issues related to Muslim funerals in accordance with Islamic practice and relevant legislation,9 including burial and cemeteries. Muslims in Turkey face no problems in observing Islamic burial practice or in creating and maintaining their cemeteries. 8


Religious services in prisons date back to 1974, but were not well enough organised and established to be called ‘chaplaincy’. However, under a protocol signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate of Religious Affairs on 15 May 2001, Diyanet officials provide religious services in prisons on a weekly or monthly basis.10 Since then,

8 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/linkler/linklerkatagori.asp?kategori=5, accessed 17 May 2009. 9 For the relevant national legislation regarding funeral services and cemeteries, see, for example, Belediye Kanunu (2005), http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393 .html, accessed 16 March 2009. 10 See Kaya, Talha, “Cezaevi Vaizliği (Prison chaplaincy)”, in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu

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10,000 copies of Qur’an have been distributed in prisons. As of 2009, there are 42 ‘chaplains’ in prisons and 417 preachers have been commissioned in prisons following requests by public prosecutors.11 No religious services or moral guidance are provided in hospitals, and most hospitals do not have proper places of worship for patients. In 1995, religious services began to be provided by volunteers in some state hospitals, but this was stopped by the Council of State at the request of the Ankara Chamber of Doctors on the grounds that it violated the principle of secularism.12 There is a core army chaplaincy structure, but this is reserved for times of war and no army chaplains have been appointed since the 1974 war in Cyprus.13 9

Religious Festivals

Turkey observes Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) and Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fıtr) as national holidays (the first lasting 3.5 days, and second 4.5).14 In addition, there are other holidays known as kandils that are religiously important and celebrated, but not officially recognised. Apart from kandils, the Day of Ashura is observed by both Sunni and Alevi Muslims and all prepare a traditional dessert known as ashura to share with their neighbours. Since the 1980s, the week that includes 20 April is celebrated as the Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet

(Religious Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 2 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 158–159. See also http://www.haber7.com/ haber/20090312/Diyanetten-cezaevlerinde-irsad-hizmeti.php, accessed 12 March 2009. 11 http://www.risalehaber.com/news_detail.php?id=64648, accessed 5 November 2009. 12 See Başar, Serpil, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Yürüttüğü Cami Dışı Din Hizmetleri Kapsamında Hastanelerde Din Hizmeti İhtiyacı(The Need for the Hospital Chaplaincy within the Context of the non-Mosque-based Religious Services),” in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religious Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 1 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 621–623; also see, İlhan, Ayşegül, “Dünya Hastanelerinde Din Hizmetleri (Hospital Chaplaincy in the World),” http://www.onder .org.tr/projeleroku.asp?ID=7, accesssed 10 March 2009. 13 See Acar, Erkan, “Din İşleri Subayı Ataması Yapılmıyor (Why are No Military Officers Appointed as the Army Chaplains?),” Zaman, 11 May 2005. 14 For the relevant legislation regarding religious holidays, see “Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun. Kanun no. 2429 (Law on National and Public Holidays. Law no. 2429)”, Official Gazette, no. 17284, 19 March 1981, http://www .alomaliye.com/ulusal_bayram_ve_genel_tatiller_.htm, accessed 6 May 2010.

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Muhammad (Kutlu Doğum Haftası). The first day of this week is named as the day of the rose, which symbolises the Prophet. 10 Halal Food Food in Turkey is usually prepared according to halal regulations, but in recent years there have been suspicions that some meat products are mixed with pork without being so labelled, a matter of serious concern for the great majority of the population. The Turkish Institute of Standards is working towards a system whereby food products can be certified halal upon request.15 There is no restriction on the slaughter of animals in accordance with Muslim religious and hygiene regulations, provided that the place should be allocated for slaughter by the local (usually municipal) authorities in accordance with the Law on the Protection of Animals.16 11

Dress Codes

A ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities and by civil servants in public buildings has been in force for a long time. The debate on this question revolves around whether the headscarf is religious attire or a political symbol, and whether it should be banned to protect the secular foundations of the state or permitted on the basis of individual freedom of religion as a corollary of secularism. The ban is the result of the various decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, although there is no law explicitly banning the wearing of headscarf in universities. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkish universities had the right to ban the headscarf, while in February 2008, Parliament passed constitutional amendments designed to lift the ban on wearing headscarves on university campuses. However, on 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments violated the secular nature of the state and were therefore unconstitutional.17

15 Malatyalı, Kenan, “Helal gıda nedir, ne değildir (Halal food: What it is, and is not)”, TSE Standart Dergisi, Eylül 2007, pp. 6–8. 16 For the Law on the Protection of Animals, see http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/ html/1386.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 17 Şentop, Mustafa, “Headscarf ban:A quest for the solution”, SETA Policy Brief 8, March 2008, available at http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_8_

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Apart from the hijab issue, there is also a ban on the wearing of religious attire by men of religion outside their places of worship. Only the leaders of non-Muslim communities and the President of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs are entitled to wear their religious attire in public.18 12


There is an important representation of religious concerns, interests and claims in the media. Currently, the most widely sold daily newspaper is Zaman, which is known to be affiliated to the Gülen community. Apart from Zaman, dailies such as Yeni Şafak, Milli Gazete, Anadolu’da Vakit, Yeni Asya and Türkiye Gazetesi are known to be affiliated to religious groups. There are also ‘Islamist’ columnists who write in some mainstream, non-religious newspapers such as Bugün, Star and Radikal. Aksiyon news magazine is among the most widely read Islamic weeklies. Among the national television channels sensitive to religious concerns, Samanyolu is among the top five most watched national television channels. Kanal 7, Ülke TV, Kanal A, TV NET, Ses TV, TV 5, Hilal TV, Dost TV are known to be affiliated to Muslim religious groups. There are, of course, various representations of Islamic topics on other television channels too. Two news agencies with religious roots, Cihan Haber Ajansı (CHA) and İhlas Haber Ajansı (İHA) are among the most important news agencies in the country. Burç FM, Radyo 15, Akra FM, Moral FM, TGRT FM may be counted as national radio stations with an Islamic orientation. 13

Family Law

The Turkish Civil Code prescribes equality between men and women in all respects, including role sharing within marriage, although the Mustafa_Sentop.pdf, accessed 6 May 2010. For the relevant legislation, see Article 17 of the Law on Higher Education, No. 2547, issued in the Official Gazette, 6 November 1981, No. 17506. For the relevant legislation regarding the wearing of the headscarf in state institutions, see the Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation on the Dress of Public Employees, issued in the Official Gazette, 25 October 1982, No. 17849. 18 For the relevant legislation, see the Law Banning the Wearing of Some Attires (Law No. 2596), issued in the Official Gazette, 13 December 1934, No. 2879.

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husband is considered to be the de facto head of the family. In practice, however, polygamous relationships and, more frequently, purely religious (i.e. officially unregistered) marriage ceremonies, still take place. The Civil Code does not recognise religious marriage contracts and no religious rituals are permitted during the official, secular wedding ceremony, but a religious marriage ceremony commonly takes place parallel to the official procedures. Muslims in Turkey are not permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, nor are men of religion (imams) entitled to register marriage contracts. ‘Honour killings’ and early marriages still occur. Adultery is not considered a crime, but is seen as a factor to be considered in divorce suits. According to the civil code men and women are equal in terms of their entitlement to inheritance. The legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in litigation. In practice, however, in more traditional areas females are often prevented from receiving their share of an inheritance, or receive a smaller portion than male members of the family. 14


The most important interreligious occasion is the attendance of the President of Religious Affairs and the religious leaders of non-Muslim minorities, i.e., Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews, at iftar dinners during the months of Ramadan. In terms of public opinion, there is strong support for interreligious dialogue on the part of both the Presidency of Religious Affairs and some Muslim communities, particularly the followers of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. Some neo-Kemalist and nationalist religious groups vehemently oppose the interreligious dialogue discourse on suspicion of underlying missionary activities, imperialism and alleged syncretism. Overall, there are few serious problems between communities of different religions. The locus of problems in terms of interreligious relations is not between communities but between the state and communities. 15


During 2009, the case for closing down the conservative Islamic government party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma

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Partisi, AKP) was concluded by the Constitutional Court and the party was sentenced to lose half of its annual right to state financial aid. In an opinion poll conducted by the polling company ANAR, 92.6% of respondents stated that religion had an important place in their life. The poll also indicated a correlation between lower levels of religiosity and higher levels of education.19 The government initiated a so-called “Alevi Opening” in order to articulate, determine and find solutions for the problems of the Alevi community for the first time in the Republic’s history. Seven workshops were held in which representatives of the Alevi Community and the Presidency of Religious Affairs, academicians, journalists, writers, artists and others participated. This initiative has been generally welcomed by representatives of the Alevi Community.20 During 2009, the Turkish Armed Forces announced that three teachers of theology would be employed to fill posts left vacant by staff going into retirement so as to meet the need for lecturers for compulsory religion and morality courses delivered in military high schools. Although the suspicion that the armed forces might be recruiting chaplains caused some controversy, a public declaration by the Chief of Staff made it clear that this decision had nothing to do with the practice of military chaplaincy.21 16


The Islamic practice of circumcision takes place in Turkish tradition at the age of 6–8. It has become the occasion for major family celebrations with attached ceremonial activities in which the boy is dressed in colourful, often military-style, clothes. The month of Ramadan preceding ‘Id al-Fitr creates a special atmosphere throughout the country, and book fairs organised by the Diyanet have become a complementary part of this. The Hajj, occurring at the same time as ‘Id al-Adha, also creates a very particular countrywide awareness. The Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet celebrated 19 http://www.zinde.info/zarastirmalar.php?subaction=showfull&id=1227699060& archive=&start_from=&ucat=8,10&, accessed 18 November 2009. 20 For the first workshop see, for example, http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090603/ Alevi-Calistayi-Baskentte-basladi.php, accessed 8 November 2009. 21 “TSK’dan İlahiyatçı Subay Açıklaması (A public notice about theology officers by the General Chief of Staff )”, Hürriyet, 25 July 2009.

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in the third week of April under the auspices of the Diyanet, the Hacı Bektaş Festival in August celebrated by the Turkish Alevi community, and Ashura, complemented by the Muharram fast, particularly marked by Shi’ites, may also be cited as important cultural events. The Commemorative Ceremony for Mevlana, the great Sufi saint (1207–1273), held every year in Konya, the ancient Seljuk capital, in the month of December, is one of the world’s greatest spectacles. More than a million people visit the city for this festival of the ‘Whirling Dervishes’ (Sema).

UKRAINE Elmira Muratova1 1

Muslim Populations

The number of Muslims in Ukraine is the subject of a certain amount of speculation. Muslim leaders and other interested parties insist that there are 1.5–2 million Muslims in the country, although the 2001 national census recorded only 436,000 Muslims by birth (0.9% of the population).2 There are 40 ethnic groups that traditionally practise Islam, the biggest being Crimean Tatars (248,000), Volga-Ural Tatars (73,000) and Azerbaijanis (45,000). The Crimean Tatars constitute about 57% of the all Ukrainian Muslims. They are the only indigenous Muslim people of Ukraine, having settled in the territory of the modern Crimean Autonomous Republic in the early fifteenth century. Today the Crimean Tatars live mostly in the Crimea, Kherson and Zaporozhe regions. The Ukrainian communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars appeared during the industrialisation of the Donbas area in the late nineteenth and early twetieth centuries. Today they predominately live in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions. The majority of the Azerbaijanis settled in the eastern regions of the country—Donetsk, Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk.3 The history of Islam in Ukraine is related to the history of the expansion and development of the religion in the Crimean peninsula. Islam came to Crimea with Muslim traders and Sufi missionaries from Asia Minor in the ninth to eleventh centuries. During the Crimean Khanate (1443–1783) Islam became the state religion. For several centuries Crimea was the centre of Muslim culture in the region, and a

1 Elmira Muratova is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University, Simferopol, Ukraine. 2 CD “Natsional’nyi sklad naselennya Ukrainy ta yogo movni oznaki za danymi Vseukrains’kogo perepisu naselennya 2001 roku” (CD “National make-up of the Ukrainian population and its language features based on the 2001 All-Ukrainian census”) (Kiev: Derjkomstat, 2003). 3 Bogomolov, A. et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini (Islamic Identity in Ukraine) (Kiev: AMES Publishers, 2005), pp. 16– 23.

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huge number of mosques, madrasas, mektebes (elementary schools), and mausoleums were set up. By the end of the eighteenth century there were about 1,600 mosques, 25 madrasas and a lot of mektebes in Crimea.4 The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century was a considerable blow to the independent and consistent development of Islam. The mass emigration of the Crimean Tatars resulted in many villages being abandoned and mosques, madrasas and mektebes closed down. By 1914, there were only 729 mosques left in Crimea and the number of Muslim clergy fell to 942.5 Soviet power delivered the final blow to the development of Islam in Crimea. By 1940, there were no active mosques in the peninsula; many were closed on the pretext that they were in a poor condition and turned into clubs, grocery stores, schools, etc. In May 1944, the remaining Muslim population of Crimea (about 200,000 people) were deported from their homeland to the Central Asian republics. The return of Crimean Tatars and collapse of the USSR contributed to the current Islamic revival in Crimea. 2

Islam and the State

Ukraine is a secular state where religion is separated from the state and the education system. According to the relatively liberal law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” (Pro svobodu sovisti ta religiini organizatsii) passed in 1991, a religious community may be registered if it has a minimum membership of ten adults over the age of 18. On the basis of this law, 521 Muslim communities were registered in Ukraine by early 2009.6 The legislation on religion also includes two acts which were issued to help religious organisations to repossess property taken from them under the Soviet regime. They are the Presidential Edict “On measures to return religious

4 Aleksandrov, I., O musul’manskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul’man v Krymu posle ego prisoyedineniya k Rossii (On Muslim clergy and Muslims affairs’ spiritual administration in Crimea after its annexation to Russia) (Simferopol: Tipografiya Tavricheskogo gubernskogo zemstva, 1914), p. 8. 5 Krichinsky, A., Ocherki russkoi politiki na okrainakh: k istorii religioznykh pritesnenii krymskikh tatar (Essays on Russian policy at the margins: towards a history of the religious oppression of the Crimean Tatars) (Baku: Izdanie soyuza musul’manskoi trudovoi intelligentsii, 1919), chapter 1, p. 43. 6 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine at 1st January 2009, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua).

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property to religious organisations” (Про заходи щодо повернення релігійним організаціям культового майна) issued in 1992 and the second Presidential Edict “On urgent measures on the final settlement of the negative consequences of the totalitarian policy of the former USSR toward religion and restoration of violated rights of churches and religious organisations” (Про невідкладні заходи щодо остаточного подолання негативних наслідків тоталітарної політики колишнього Союзу РСР стосовно релігії та відновлення порушених прав церков і релігійних організації) issued in 2002. Under this legislation, Ukrainian Muslims have regained part of their religious property. The national religious policy is viewed positively by Muslims, but there is dissatisfaction with the policies of local authorities. For example, Crimean Tatar leaders complain that the Crimean authorities have discriminated against Muslim communities, accusing them, among other things, of sabotaging the above mentioned Presidential Edicts, treating representatives of Orthodox Christianity and Islam unequally with respect to involvement in state and regional events, delaying the allocation of land for the central mosque in Simferopol, and not giving official recognition to the Muslim festivals of Oraza-bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (‘Id al-Adha).7 3


The main Ukrainian Muslim organisations fall into three categories: spiritual boards, charitable organisations and political organisations. There are five Muslim spiritual boards in Ukraine: – The Ukraine: Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Kryma, DUMK, 4, Kurchatova St, Simferopol, Crimea, tel./fax: (3800652) 274353, http://www.qirimmuftiyat.org.ua) was established in 1992 in Simferopol. It is one of the biggest Muslim spiritual centres in Ukraine. By January 2009, it included 346 officially registered Muslim communities (66% of the total number in Ukraine) and is often called the “Crimean Tatar Muftiate”.

7 Muratova, Elmira, Islam v sovremennom Krymu: indikatory i problemy protsessa vozrozhdeniya (Islam in Present-day Crimea: Indicators and Problems of the Process of Revival ) (Simferopol’: Elinio, 2008), pp. 174–175.

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– The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy, DUMU, 46, Luk’yanovskaya St, Kiev, 04071, tel.: (38044) 4651877, http://www.islamyat.org) was registered in 1992 in Kiev. It includes 70 Muslim communities of various ethnic backgrounds registered in different regions of Ukraine. Since its inception, it has had only one leader—native Lebanese and now Ukrainian citizen sheikh Akhmed Tamim. – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Centre (Dukhovny Tsentr Musul’man Ukrainy, DTMU, 1, Prospekt Marshala Zhukova, Donetsk, 83071, tel./fax: (380622) 521815) was created in 1995 in Donetsk. It coordinates the activities of 18 Muslim communities established mostly by Volga-Ural Tatars who live mostly in the Donbas area. – The Religious Board of Independent Muslim Communities of Ukraine “Kiev Muftiate” (Religioznoye Upravleniye Nezavisimykh Musul’manskikh Obshin Ukrainy “Kievskiy Muftiat”, RUNMOU, 10–A, Nevskaya St, Tatarskiy Dom, Kiev 03062, tel./fax: (38044) 5013778, http://kievmuftiyat.wordpress.com) was registered in 2007 in Kiev. It unites Muslim communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars who did not want to join any of the existing spiritual boards and has strong connections with Russian Muslim leaders. – The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma” (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy “Umma”, DUMU, 25–A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev, 04119, tel: (38044) 4909900, http://www.umma .in.ua) was established in 2008 in Kiev. It now includes 18 Muslim communities of multi-ethnic origin (many of them native Ukrainian or Russian converts to Islam). Of charitable organisations, one of the most active is the All-Ukrainian Association of Public Organisations “Alraid” (25–A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev 04119, tel: 044 490 99 00, http://www.arraid.org). It was established in 1997 and has 14 branches in various regions of Ukraine. Ideologically, it gravitates towards the European Council for Fatwas and Research (ECFR). The organisation contributes to the development of Islamic education and mosque construction, and initiates charitable projects to help the poor, orphans and widows. An active political organisation is the Hizb ut-Tahrir (http://qirimvilayeti.com). Although it is not officially registered, its followers (mostly Crimean Tatars) organise conferences (there have been four such conferences during the last two years) and control some Crimean mosques. It represents the so called ‘Islamic opposition’ to the national

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Crimean Tatar Medzhlis and DUMK. In September 2009, the Ukrainian authorities proposed a law to ban the organisation. 4


As at early 2009, there were 89 new mosques in Ukraine (81 of them in Crimea) and 14 mosques construction. Sixty-six old mosques have been rebuilt, renovated and returned to use (54 of them in Crimea). There are another 240 buildings throughout Ukraine in use as Muslim prayer spaces.8 Among the biggest problems facing mosques in Ukraine is bureaucracy, so most of them function without the necessary permits and many were built without planning permission or the appropriate land documentation. For example, only 13 new mosques in Crimea have the necessary documentation, and only five or six Muslim communities have formally registered the land on which their mosque is built. Thus the majority of mosques in Crimea de jure do not exist and can be treated as derelict buildings.9 The Crimean authorities have taken a decision to impose a penalty of 50% of the construction costs on religious organisations that use buildings without appropriate documentation. 5


The school system in Ukraine is separated from the church so religious subjects used not to be taught in schools. However, several years ago the Orthodox Church introduced a course on “The basics of Orthodox culture” to be taught on an optional basis in Ukrainian schools. This initiative met with opposition from Crimean Muslims, who did not want their children to take this course at school and the Crimean Tatar organisations designed a course on “The basics of Muslim culture”,

8 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine at 1st January 2009, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). 9 “Islam—real’nyi faktor obshestvennoi jizni—interv’yu s zamestitelem predsedatelya Respublikanskogo komiteta Avtonomnoi respubliki Krym po delam religii A. Bulatovym (Islam is a real factor of public life (interview with the deputy head of the Republican committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on religion affairs A. Bulatov)”, Golos Kryma, 12 October 2009.

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which is now taught in 14 schools where the language of instruction is Crimean Tatar. There are 124 Qur’an or Sunday schools in Ukraine where basic Arabic and the fundamentals of Islam are offered to anyone wishing to attend.10 6


There are eight Muslim educational institutions in Ukraine which provide imam and hafiz training.11 The biggest madrasa in Crimea, “Kalai”, founded in the village of Azovskoye by the private foundation Aziz Makhmud Hyudai, has been functioning since 1998. It runs a three-year course that is free for students, and has separate departments for men and women. Subjects taught include the Qur’an, the fundamentals of worship, Islamic ethics, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic law, Sufism, Turkish and Arabic. On graduation, students normally receive a diploma that qualifies them as imams.12 There are also two hafiz schools in Crimea which concentrate on teaching students to memorise the whole Qur’an. One has functioned since 2002 with the support of Alraid and the other since 2008 with the help of Aziz Makhmud Hyudai. There were two other institutions in Crimea that previously functioned as madrasas (“Seit-Settar” and the Higher Islamic madrasa) but were later downgraded to ‘Sunday schools’. The madrasa in Kiev was established by the RUNMOU “Kiev muftiate” with the support of Russian Muslims. There is one Islamic university in Ukraine, founded in Kiev in 1993 by DUMU. It has a Department of Shari’a and the Basics of Religion and a Department of Education and Eastern Linguistics. The programme is based on materials provided by the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (http://www.aicp.org).13

10 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine by 1st January 2009, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). 11 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine at 1st January 2009, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). 12 Muratova, Elmira, “ ‘He who pays the piper calls the tune’: Muslim sponsors of Islamic revival in Crimea”, Religion, State and Society, vol. 37, no. 3 (2009), p. 268. 13 Bogomolov et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini, pp. 80–81.

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Muslims in Ukraine face certain problems regarding cemeteries. There are no major difficulties where there are significant Muslim populations, as in the Crimea, but in other places the situation is quite sensitive. In the major cities, such as Kiev or Kharkov, it is quite difficult for commercial reasons to acquire land for use as a cemetery, so Muslims often have to bury their dead in public cemeteries. In 2008, there were several acts of vandalism at Muslim cemeteries in Crimea. 8


There are no imams or priests in state institutions—hospitals, prisons or armed forces. 9

Religious Festivals

Oraza-bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (‘Id al-Adha) are celebrated communally at Islamic centres, and privately. They do not have official status like some Orthodox festivals. This irritates Muslims, who insist that the state should adopt a neutral position towards the major religions in Ukraine. In 1993, the Council of Ministries of Crimea took a decision to declare the first day of Muslim festivals a holiday for Muslims. This gave Muslims the right to a day off work or school, while the rest of the Crimean population has to follow their regular schedule. This does not satisfy the Crimean Tatars who believe that these days should be holidays for all Crimean citizens. Ukrainian Muslims also celebrate Mawlid—the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. Celebrations are organised by the DUMK in Crimea with the support of Turkish organisations and by the DUMU in its communities across the country. 10

Access to Halal Food

The halal industry is well developed in areas with significant Muslim populations—in Crimea, Kiev, Kharkov, Donetsk. There are places in the markets, special shops and cafés where Muslims can buy halal products. For example, there are about ten fashionable cafés and

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restaurants in Crimea that serve Crimean Tatar cuisine compliant with Islamic norms. The situation is different in Western Ukraine, where the number of Muslims is rather small. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public, including in educational establishments. It is quite common to see women wearing hijab in the streets of Crimea, especially younger generation Crimean Tatars. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has issued an instruction that hijab may not be worn for photographs used for passports. This was strongly opposed by Crimean Muslims and, at the end of 2009, they started to collect signatures on a petition to challenge the instruction through the courts. 12


Four of the spiritual boards in Ukraine have their own periodicals. The DUMK publishes a newspaper, Hidaet (Straight path), the DUMU the newspaper Minaret, RUNMOU “Kievskiy Muftiyat” issues a journal Ukraina i Islamskiy mir (Ukraine and Islamic World), and the DUMU “Umma” publishes the newspaper Umma (http://ummainua .wordpress.com/2009/05/28/gazeta1, accessed 6 May 2010). The Alraid Association issues the newspaper Alraid (http://gazeta.arraid.org) and runs a website. Hizb ut-Tahrir publishes the newspaper Vozrodzdenie (Revival, http://vozrojdenie.crimea.ua) and has a website. Every Friday, representatives of the DUMK participate in a television programme Azan sedasy (The voice of azan) in which they talk about the basic tenets of Islam and current issues in Crimean society. The DUMK have published several books, the most recent being a book for children written in Crimean Tatar, Ballalarga dinniy bilgiler (Religious knowledge for children). The DUMU publishing house “Al-Irshad” has published several dozen books on various topics, many of them devoted to the prevention of extremism. 13

Family Law

As well as civil marriage, Ukrainian Muslims contract Islamic marriages, nikah, which may be conducted in a mosque or in the home by

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an imam, who after the ceremony issues a certificate. These certificates are not recognised by the state. 14


The leaders of Muslim spiritual centres are members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations created in 1996 in Kiev. This is a representative interfaith consultative body which initiates meetings with high-ranking officials to discuss various issues of religious life in Ukraine. For example, a current issue is the question of improving the existing Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations. In 1992, an interfaith council called “Peace is a gift of God” (Mir—dar Bodzii) was created in Crimea. The DUMK was a member of this council until 2000, when conflict arose between the Muslim and Orthodox (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) communities over the massive project for erecting crosses in Crimea. After this conflict, Mufti Emir-Ali Ablaev withdrew from the council and has not returned. 15


Coverage of Islam in the non-Muslim media is mostly within the context of extremism and terrorism associated with Muslims. It often happens during election campaigns in Crimea when politicians use the ‘Islamic card’ in order to mobilise the pro-Russian electorate by appealing to anti-Tatar or anti-Islamic feelings. In October 2009, Islam was again the object of media attention because of the arrest of several members of the organisation Takfir wa-Hijra who, according to the police, were planning to murder of the leaders of Medzhlis and DUMK. Several press conferences, politicians’ statements and publications draw attention to this event, not only in the Crimean but throughout the country. 16


There are annual competitions in Qur’an recitation organised by Alraid and also a competition of scholarly works dedicated to Islam organised by the All-Ukrainian Association of Islamic Scientists with the support of Alraid.

UNITED KINGDOM Seán McLoughlin and Tahir Abbas1 1

Muslim Populations

Islam is the second largest religious grouping in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The census of April 2001, which included a question on religion for the first time since 1851, identified a total of 1,591,000 Muslims living in the UK. There were approximately 1,540,000 Muslims in England and Wales, forming around 3% of the total population, as well as 42,557 in Scotland and 1,943 in Northern Ireland, both these latter figures representing less than 1% of the population in each case. If the most conservative (and realistic) estimates of Muslim numbers for 1991 are adopted, these 2001 figures suggest that the Muslim population of Britain grew by 50%–60% within a decade, due mainly to a very youthful population profile. More recently, the Office for National Statistics, drawing on figures from the Labour Force Survey, has estimated that in 2009 there were 2.4 million Muslims in Britain, with the population said to have grown ten times more quickly than any other population segment between 2004 and 2008 (The Times, 30 January 2009). The first significant numbers of Muslims to arrive in the UK were mainly Kashmiri and Bengali ‘lascars’ (merchant navy sailors) who jumped ship or were stranded in London and other ports having been employed by the British East India Company from the late eighteenth century.2 The Indians were later followed by Yemeni sailors, employed after 1869 in Aden; initially they settled in places such as Liverpool, South Shields and Swansea, with some eventually migrating to major industrial cities such as Birmingham and Sheffield.3 The end of World

1 Dr Seán McLoughlin is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Leeds. Until recently, Dr Tahir Abbas was Reader in the Department of Sociology at the University of Birmingham. Information on Northern Ireland was supplied by Victoria Montgomery (see Ireland). 2 Ansari, Humayan, The Infidel Within: The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004). 3 Halliday, Fred, The Yemeni Community in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992).

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War II saw significant migration to the UK from its former colonies, including those regions of the newly partitioned subcontinent from which chain migration had been established by the lascars, as well as Indian soldiers who had fought in World War I. As a result, thousands of Muslim men of mainly peasant farming background took up unskilled work in British factories and mills from the 1950s. Today, Muslims remain concentrated in urban areas; around 40% are settled in London, forming around 8.5% of the city’s population, with the highest concentrations in the boroughs of Tower Hamlets (36.40%), Newham (24.31%) and Waltham Forest (15.07%). Outside of London, Birmingham (14.3%) has the highest total numbers of Muslims, but it is northern towns such as Blackburn (19.4%) and Bradford (16.1%) that have the most significant concentrations.4 Most Muslims in the UK are the British-born descendants of immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Pakistanis, at 43% of the Muslim total based on the 2001 census, form the dominant ethnonational sub-population, with the majority hailing from the disputed territory of Kashmir. Other smaller ethnicised minorities come from West and East Africa (the latter usually stemming from late nineteenthcentury Gujarati migrants to present-day Kenya and Uganda), Cyprus and across the Middle East. Many Muslim communities, especially those of Bangladeshi and Kashmiri origin, suffer from low incomes, poor health and housing conditions, limited educational success and relatively high unemployment for men and low participation in the labour market for women.5 On the other hand, the East African Asians tend to be better off, and London is also host to a high number of often very wealthy Arabs from the Middle East. More recent arrivals have been refugees, especially from Somalia and Iraq. 2

Islam and the State

There is no common legal or constitutional regime governing the status of religion in the UK: each constituent country has its own

4 www.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/equalities/muslims-in-london.pdf, p. 19, accessed 31 January 2010. 5 Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 2001 census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (2006), pp. 629–655.

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arrangements.6 Although there is no written constitution, the accumulated legal tradition, and most recently the Human Rights Act (1998), guarantee freedom of religion and religious practice within the limits of public order. There is no established religion in Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland although in the case of the latter the monarch has a privileged status in relation to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Scotland. In England, the monarch is the head of the Church of England (Anglican) and, through the Prime Minister’s Office, appoints its bishops, some of whom are ex officio members of the House of Lords, the upper chamber of Parliament. Each of the other main traditional churches of England, both various Protestant denominations and Roman Catholics, as well as Jews, have a particular status established by legislation. Other smaller and more recently arrived religious communities, including Muslims, tend to register as private associations, or ‘companies’ under the Companies Act or ‘charities’ with the Charities Commission. Most Muslims in Britain have arrived with the nationality of countries within the Commonwealth of Britain’s former colonies. Having entered the UK, Commonwealth citizens had full political rights and could thus vote and stand as candidates in local and national elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority were able to acquire UK citizenship (Britain allows multiple citizenship), and children born in the UK acquired citizenship by birth. Currently, the vast majority of Muslims in Britain are UK citizens. The exceptions are those who have arrived as refugees from outside the Commonwealth since the 1980s. Until the last decade or so, the official UK response to migrant communities had not been formulated in terms of religion.7 The Race Relations Act (1976) was designed to combat discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnic origin but the courts did not interpret this to cover religion (although Jews and Sikhs are protected as ‘ethnic’ groups). During the 1980s, policy-making under the rubric of multiculturalism eventually offered greater, if ad hoc, local recognition for Muslims in arenas such as education, especially in areas where there was a large community. In 1992, under a Conservative administration, the

6 Weller, Paul, Time for a Change: Reconfiguring Religion, State and Society (London: T & T Clark, 2005). 7 Modood, Tariq, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005).

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Department of Environment, in collaboration with the Church of England and the Interfaith Network for the UK, formed the Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC).8 With a view to tapping into religious communities’ resources—people, networks, organizations, buildings—as a part of urban regeneration, the ICRC provided the first government forum for multi-faith representation and consultation on a national level, although it did not command significant resources. Since 1997, when New Labour came to power, government has engaged ‘faith’ much more publicly and controversially, so much so that it is possible to speak of a ‘faith relations industry’.9 Today this is the responsibility of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), which is also home to the ICRC’s successor, the Faith Communities Consultative Council. However, since the events of ‘7/7’, state relations with Muslims have been conducted almost entirely through the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda, although new Secretary for State, John Denham MP, has recently begun to acknowledge the limits of this approach.10 In this context, and as something of a sop to Muslims, an Act of 2006 also finally made it an offence to ‘incite to religious hatred’ after two previously unsuccessful attempts to pass the legislation. 3


In 1970, the Union of Muslim Organisations of the UK and Eire (UMO) was established but it was “essentially irrelevant because all the major aspects of government which affected Muslims were based at local level until well into the 1980s”.11 However, the Rushdie Affair of 1988–89 began to change this. While the newly formed UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) failed to make much imme-

8 McLoughlin, Seán “The state, new Muslim leaderships and Islam as a resource for engagement in Britain”, in Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State (Abingdon UK: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 55–69. 9 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships.” 10 See www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/corporate/nationalpreventconf, accessed 31 January 2010, and The Guardian, 10 August 2009. Cf. also Lewis, Philip, Young, British and Muslim (London: Continuum, 2007) which discusses the response of various Muslim organisations to the issues raised by ‘7/7’. 11 Nielsen, Jorgen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 40.

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diate impact with government, its peaceful lobbying for protection from religious discrimination marked it out from the more confrontational pronouncements of the so-called Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. However, in 1994, Conservative Home Secretary, Michael Howard, advised Muslims to speak with one voice should they wish to exercise greater public influence. Inaugurated in 1997, the year that New Labour came to power with a new interest in faith as social capital, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, PO Box 57330, London E1 2WJ, tel.: 00 44 (0)845 26 26 786, http://www.mcb.org.uk) evolved out of the UKACIA, and quickly established itself as the first Muslim port of call for government.12 Partly as a result of MCB lobbying, the government agreed to include religion as an identity category in the 2001 census. However, the MCB fell out of favour when it failed to back the so-called ‘war on terror’ and since then relations have deteriorated significantly with the media and think-tanks of the left and right exposing the Islamist heritage of some MCB activists. In 2009, the government suspended formal relations with the organisation after an MCB senior officer publicly endorsed attacks on any foreign (including British) troops intercepting arms destined for Gaza (The Observer, 8 March 2009). However, with over 500 affiliates, the MCB continues to urge Muslims to participate in the political process. Indeed, towards the end of the year, there were strong indications that, with Denham newly installed at the DCLG, official linkages to the state would be restored.13 The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB, 124 Harrowdene Road, Wembley, Middlesex HA0 2JR, tel.: 00 44 (0)208 908 9109, www .mabonline.net) was also founded in 1997, largely by Muslims of Arab heritage with historic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the MAB’s key objectives is to campaign for changes in British policy towards the Muslim world, with Gaza being an overwhelming concern during 2009. In 2002, it became an important member of the Stop the War Coalition, formed to campaign against UK involvement in the war in Iraq. It also had a central role in the RESPECT coalition, a Muslim-Leftist alliance.

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McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/john-denham-interview-lets-talk-muslim-council-not-yet, accessed 31 January 2010. 13

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The British Muslim Forum (BMF, Eaton Hall, Retford, Nottinghamshire, DN22 0PR, tel.: 00 44 (0)1777 706441, www.BritishMuslimForum .org.uk) claims to embody the largest number of Sunni (especially Pakistani Barelwi) related networks, with 600 member mosques/ organisations and strongholds in the North and Midlands. Formally launched in 2005, the BMF represents a somewhat belated attempt to respond to numerically less significant but hitherto better-organised and higher profile Jama’at-i Islami and Deobandi related rivals working on a national level through the MCB. Historically, Barelwi networks have been oriented to South Asia rather than Britain and highly fragmented in terms of allegiances to various Sufi shaykhs and ‘ulama (religious scholars). The BMF is in receipt of PVE funds to build up its capacity and organise events. A related organisation is the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC, 2a Wanlip Road, Plaistow London E13 8Q, tel.: 00 44 (0)207 055 5355, http:// sufimuslim.homestead.com), established in 2006, which also presents itself as representative of the silent majority of moderate Muslims who follow classical Islam rather than its more political manifestations. It has appeared happy to endorse the government view that other Muslim organisations have not yet done enough to counter radicalisation in their communities, seeing this above all as a problem of Muslims’ access to the right theological resources and guidance. The SMC website includes warnings against what it sees as the deviant extremism of Saudi funded Wahhabism and variants of Salafism. However, by the end of 2009, questions were being asked about the organisation’s use of PVE funds and it was reported that the government would be unlikely to fund it in the future. The state-backed Muslim counter-attack on Islamism in its apparently ‘moderate’ as well as more ‘radical’ guises is perhaps most clearly manifest in the emergence of the Quilliam Foundation (QF, PO Box 60380, London. WC1A 9AZ, tel.: 00 44 (0)207 182 7280, www.quilliamfoundation.org), which launched in 2008. Established by former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the organisation’s leadership has now channelled its skills and energies into “the world’s first counter-extremism think tank”, as it calls itself, taking its name from William Abdullah Quilliam (d. 1932) as a symbol of English Islam. Early in 2009, it was revealed that the foundation was in receipt of £1 million of government funding (The Times, 20 January 2009), probably more than any other Muslim organisation. It employs 18 members of staff and has published a number of high profile reports critical of BritishMuslim organisations, institutions and movements.

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A major Twelver Shi’ite group with roots in Iraq, the Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London, NW6 6TN, tel.: 00 44 (0)20 7372 4049, http://al-khoei.org) is a global network organisation representing Shi’a Muslims in Britain and overseas. It manages two educational establishments in the UK. In 2007, Scottish Muslims announced the establishment of an umbrella body to represent their interests, the Muslim Council of Scotland (MCS, PO Box 7595, Glasgow, G42 2EZ, tel.: 00 44 (0)799 933 3850, www.mcscotland.org), bringing together many of Scotland’s mosques and Islamic organisations. There is also a Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff CF24 1PU, tel.: 00 44 (0)2920 487667, http://www.muslimcouncilwales.org), while the main organisation serving Muslims in Northern Ireland is the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC, 38 Wellington Park, Belfast, BT9 6DN, tel.: 00 44 (0)2890 664465, www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk), established in 1978. 4


As post-war immigration began to impact in the early 1960s, there were only a dozen or so mosques listed with the Registrar General, most being conversions of existing buildings including terraced housing. More recently, most mosques have been purpose-built. Indeed, today there are estimated to be around 2,000 mosques and Islamic centres in Britain, although as many as 600 still may not have full planning permission, a contentious issue over the years.14 While formal religiosity has increased amongst Muslims in diaspora, the growth of mosques in the 1970s and 1980s accompanied the reuniting of families, which in turn raised issues concerning the transmission of Islam to a new generation, as well as unemployment and global religious revival.15 As settlements grew so too did communal fission with Islamic institutions, like residential patterns, beginning to reflect ethno-national and theological divisions in the homeland. In 2009, the Charity Commission published its first detailed survey of mosques (255 mosques) as did the Quilliam Foundation (500 14 Gale, Richard, “Representing the city: Mosques and the planning process in Birmingham, UK”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1161–1179. 15 McLoughlin, Sean, “Mosques and the public space: Conflict and co-operation in Bradford”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1045– 1066.

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mosques), but neither returned any especially notable headline findings.16 Having been first proposed in 2006 following the proposals of the PVE working groups in 2005, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB, 20–22 Creffield Road, Ealing, London, W5 3RP, tel.: 00 44 (0)20 8993 7141, www.minab.org.uk) was also finally launched after much delay on 10 May 2009. As a self-regulatory collaboration between organisations representing many key Muslim constituencies (MCB, MAB, BMF and al-Khoei), it claims to be an “independent community led body to promote good governance and improve service standards in mosques”. However, in relying upon PVE funding to develop itself, accusations of DCLG interference are not easily dismissed. 5


Until 1870, the churches dominated educational provision in the UK. Despite the clear secularisation of schooling, the place of religion has continued to be recognised in key Education Acts (for example, 1944, 1988, 1996).17 Religious education (RE) is compulsory, as is an act of collective worship, but individual students can be withdrawn by their parents. Since the 1970s, RE syllabi, which have a locally agreed element, have had more of a multi-faith emphasis and have included content on Islam. In 1988, however, there was a restatement of the expectation that RE and collective worship should reflect the nation’s Christian character. Teachers of the subject are professionally trained (and at secondary level subject specialists); they do not require the approval of religious authorities, nor do they need to belong to any particular religion. Especially at the primary school level, around one-quarter of publicly funded schools are managed by the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church (ca. 4,700 and ca. 2,100 schools respectively) with much smaller numbers of Jewish, Methodist and other schools. Since 1998, six Muslim primary and five Muslim secondary schools have been admitted to this ‘maintained’ sector in England. There are

16

See www.charity-commission.gov.uk/news/fscumosque.asp and www.quilliamfoundation.org/index.php/component/content/article/411, accessed 31 January 2010. 17 Halstead, Mark, British Muslims and Education (Budapest and New York: Open Society Institute, 2005).

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also a much larger number of privately funded and managed Islamic schools, which are government-inspected, nevertheless, and they must meet the minimum expectations of the national curriculum. Like all Muslim organisations, the environment created by the events of 9/11 and especially 7/7 has been difficult for such schools. For example, Tory leader, David Cameron MP, wrongly claimed that two private Muslim schools in receipt of PVE money were actually a front for Hizb ut-Tahrir (Muslim News, 25 December 2009). Over the years, most state schools, which still account for the vast majority of Muslim pupils, have accumulated experiences to make the necessary arrangements for the special needs of a variety of ethnic and religious groups. This applies to such matters as school uniform, where individual schools and local authorities have mostly adopted flexible approaches. More contentious, but usually resolved, are issues around appropriate dress for physical education and swimming, music (where some conservative Muslim groups have opposed such teaching), halal meat and religious holidays. From 2011, there will be mandatory sex education lessons for young people before the age of consent (i.e. 16 years old), which the MCB considered a challenge to a parent’s right to raise their children within a particular tradition (The Times, 6 November 2009). Outside the state and independent sectors, Muslim children also receive Islamic education during the late afternoon in community based supplementary schools, usually at local mosques or associated ‘madrasas’. Learning to read (if not comprehend) the Qur’an in Arabic, and instruction in the basic beliefs and practices of the faith, have both been a feature of the institutionalisation of Islam in Britain for many decades. However, Muslims and non-Muslims alike have questioned the impact of such further studies on learning at school, as well as traditional methods and discipline. Some Muslim parents have sought alternative arrangements while many mosques have begun to employ teachers keen to develop new approaches. Reforming the cultures of such institutions has also increasingly become a concern of local authorities required to address child welfare and protection issues, while government has also been keen to encourage Muslim efforts to address issues of cohesion, citizenship and radicalisation in the supplementary school curriculum. Two of the latter under development include Nasiha (www.nasiha.co.uk) and the Islam and Citizenship Education project (www.theiceproject.com).

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The Higher Education Funding Council for England designated Islamic Studies a strategically important subject in June 2007 following a review of all aspects of ‘Islam at Universities in England’.18 The subject is offered at a number of universities, usually in the context of departments of Arabic and Middle East Studies or Religious Studies, with the former sometimes funded by wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and beyond. In 2009–10, for example, Professor Tariq Ramadan took up a Qatar-funded position as Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford. As well as traditional Western and Islamic scholarship, some universities now also offer Islamic studies components in conjunction with the professional training of teachers (Birmingham) and youth workers (Chester). There is no imam training as such at publicly-funded universities, but several private Islamic colleges offer both part-time and residential courses leading to the status of imam, while some prospective imams also complete a degree at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Most of these private colleges are established on the model of the dar al-‘ulum of the Deobandi networks of the Indian subcontinent.19 Other courses are offered by the Muslim College in London (established by the late Zaki Badawi) and most recently, in 2009, the Cambridge Muslim College (with Timothy Winter / Abdul Hakim Murad as Dean). The Islamic Foundation (http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk), a research and training organisation with an historic association to Jama’at-i Islami in Pakistan was established near Leicester in 1973.20 In 2000, it founded the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (http://www.mihe.org.uk), which offers postgraduate degrees in Islamic Studies, Muslim Community Studies and Islamic Banking and Finance Management, all awarded by the University of Gloucestershire, as well as short courses on Islam for various professional groups including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

18 See www.hefce.ac.uk/AboutUs/sis/islamic/ for details, including a link to Dr A. Siddiqui’s report, accessed 31 January 2010. 19 See Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994/2002) and GilliatRay, Sophie, “Educating the ‘ulama: Centres of Islamic religious training in Britain”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006), pp. 55–76. 20 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”.

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Many local authorities are able to provide for Muslim burial needs, which require that the deceased be ritually washed by members of the family or community (many mosques now have such facilities) and laid in the ground facing Mecca. A particular problem has been a widespread expectation that the deceased be buried within 24 hours of death, but negotiations with local authorities have usually led to a resolution. Most British cities and towns have cemeteries with areas reserved for Muslim burials, although these are rapidly filling up. Since 2001 a representative of the MCB has sat on the Ministry of Justice’s Burial and Cemeteries advisory group, while The Muslim News (29 May 2009) reports that coroners will now implement more faith sensitive post-mortems, where possible, using Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanning instead of invasive autopsies. 8


Prison Services UK now employ 197 full-time and part-time imams in English and Welsh prisons. In November 2005, Imam Asim Hafiz was appointed as Muslim chaplain to the British Armed Forces, such work being further facilitated in 2009 by the founding of the Armed Forces Muslim Association. A growing number of hospitals and regional National Health Service (NHS) trusts also employ part- or full-time imams, as do some universities. There is also an Association of Muslim Chaplains in Education (http://www.amced.org.uk/) and a Muslim Chaplains Association (http://www.mca-hmps.co.uk/). 9

Religious Festivals

Annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are held throughout the UK, usually organised by local mosques and Islamic centres. Large halls or gymnasiums are sometimes rented to accommodate the significant number of people attending. In recent years, the office of the Mayor of London and Muslim organisations have together organised a celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr in Trafalgar Square. Amongst Barelwi and Sufi communities especially, ‘Id Mawlid al-Nabi is also celebrated with public processions, speeches, recitations of the Qur’an, poetry (na’at) and song (nashid) in praise of the Prophet Muhammad on the

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anniversary of his birth. Shi’ite Muslims in particular commemorate the death of the Prophet’s grandson, Hussain, on the day of Ashura (10 Muharram) although some of the more physical aspects of matam (ritualised mourning) have come under close public scrutiny. It is common practice for employers and institutions in both the public and private sectors to allow Muslims to take the religious festivals as part of their statutory holiday entitlement. However, given divergent sources of religious authority overseas, there has long been a tendency for different denominations to hold celebrations on different days. Some cities have attempted to co-ordinate religious holidays because of their impact on schools and workers in general. 10 Halal Food Halal food is widely available across the UK, representing an estimated £400 million market and 11% of all meat sales (The Guardian, 18 September 2009). Since the 1970s, animal rights groups have campaigned against exemption from animal slaughter regulations on religious grounds, but failed in the face of opposition from Jewish, Muslim and other lobbies. In 1994, the Halal Food Authority (109, Fulham Palace Road, London, W6 8JA), which has roots in the now largely defunct Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, was established to scrutinise and certify the Islamic slaughter of meat in the UK. Similar initiatives had been taken before but failed due to the extra cost that certification imposed. The HFA allows for animals to be stunned before slaughter, a process which can be carried out mechanically. However, this is disputed by the Leicester-based Halal Monitoring Committee (established 2003), which maintains that for meat to be halal animals should be fully conscious at the time of slaughter, with no machinery involved. Concerns about compliance with Islamic law have also seen halal meat removed temporarily from the menu at a Bradford school (Bradford Telegraph & Argus, 14 October 2009). Elsewhere, various high street chains such as Domino’s Pizza and Kentucky Fried Chicken have opened halal only branches in Birmingham and London respectively (The Independent, 12 February 2009; Daily Mail, 6 May 2009).

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Dress Codes

Across the UK, it has long been common to see Muslim women wearing the dupatta (South Asian style scarf / head covering) and hijab (headscarf), while the niqab (face veil), jilbab (long and loose garments, coat) and other forms of modest dress have become a more familiar sight in the last decade. There is no legislation limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in UK public institutions, although questions of uniform in schools are a matter for individual school managers (see section 5 above). Schools, local authorities and employers have been successfully sued for imposing dress codes that directly or indirectly discriminate in terms of race and ethnicity. However, a 2006 decision by the House of Lords against Shabina Begum, a schoolgirl in Luton who wished to wear a jilbab although it was not part of the agreed uniform, illustrates that such cases have their limits. Both the armed forces and the police have an approved version of hijab for Muslim women. In the context of the banning of the so-called ‘burkini’ (modest swim-wear) in a Paris swimming pool, it was reported that some municipal pools in Britain offer dedicated sessions for Muslim women, in some cases effectively imposing an Islamic dress code on all bathers (The Telegraph, 15 August 2009). 12


There are a number of Muslim newspapers and magazines in circulation. The two longest running are The Muslim News (established, 1989; PO Box 380, Harrow, Middlesex HA2 6LL, http://www.muslimnews .co.uk) and Q-News (established, 1992 and ceased publication in 2006 but still accessible at http://www.q-news.com). A more recent addition is EMEL Magazine (established 2003; Canfield Place, London, NW6 3BT, http://www.emelmagazine.com), which has its roots in the Islamic Society of Britain and focuses on Islamically inspired culture and lifestyle for Muslim professionals. The Islam Channel (established 2004) broadcasts on Sky satellite television, while Aaqil Ahmed is the first Muslim to become jointly head of Religion at the BBC (The Times, 12 May 2009). A number of local community radio stations, authorised by the Radio Authority, serve a Muslim audience, particularly during Ramadan.

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Family Law

Marriage in England is a civil status but the right to conduct a marriage can be delegated to an appropriately registered religious official by the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (priests of the Church of England have the ex officio right to formalise marriages). An increasing number of mosques now have such an official, or else register the building for the conduct of marriage, so that a civil official can be in attendance to formalise a wedding conducted according to Islamic practice. With local variations, the situation is similar in the other parts of the UK. Thus the imam of BIC is registered as an officiant under the provision of Article 10 of the Marriage in Northern Ireland Order 2003. The persistence of Muslim religious and cultural marriage practices in a non-Muslim state, most especially in respect of polygamy, divorce and disputes involving children, creates a number of conflicts with the English legal system.21 One response to this situation has been the establishment of licensed Muslim arbitration tribunals, which seek to provide Islamic solutions that both parties consent to within the requirements of English law. In 2008, the Ministry of Justice finally confirmed that the previous year a number of these ‘Shari’a councils’ had been established under the 1996 Arbitration Act. A year after his remarks that the public recognition of some aspects of Shari’a was unavoidable in Britain, the Archbishop of Canterbury reflected that many senior people now concurred with his opinion (The Telegraph, 15 February 2009). However, a report by the conservative think-tank, Civitas, which suggested that there were now 85 Shari’a courts in the UK, also argued that they should have their status as tribunals revoked. It claimed that, because two-thirds of Muslim marriages are not registered under the Marriages Act, some courts inevitably operate beyond the Act’s remit, giving illegal advice in a context where there is no guarantee that women are treated fairly (The Guardian, 29 June 2009). Officials insist that any ‘Islamic’ agreements must be approved by a judge. 21 See, for example, Poulter, Sebastian Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Menski, Werner, “Muslim law in Britain”, in M. Koga, M. Naito and T. Hamaguchi (eds), From Migrant to Citizen: South Asian Communities Overseas (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2000), pp. 294–318.

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The main focus for inter-religious activity in Britain is the Interfaith Network of the UK (IFNUK, http://www.interfaith.org.uk). Founded in 1987, it now has links to faith fora in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the English regions and localities. In collaboration with the DCLG, the UK’s first ever Interfaith Week was held 15–21 November 2009 with an emphasis on grassroots activities. Muslim individuals are involved at all levels of inter-religious activity, but member organisations of the national body of the IFNUK include the BMF, MCB and MINAB, as well as the Islamic Cultural Centre, Jamiat-e-Ulama Britain, World Islamic Mission and the Islamic Foundation. The last named of these established an Interfaith Unit in 1977, both to pursue faith-based dialogue in a secular society but also to monitor post-colonial Christian missionary activity worldwide. Today it also works in partnership with the Citizen Organising Foundation, which emphasises broad-based alliances, not least amongst faith-based organisations in London. Muslims also participate in more theologically focused inter-religious dialogue, especially across the Abrahamic traditions, for example, through the Christian Muslim Forum (http://www.christianmuslimforum.org), Three Faiths Forum (http://www.threefaithsforum.org.uk) and Alif Aleph UK (http://www.aauk.org). 15


Muslim opinion is frequently sought in matters of schooling, identity, political allegiance and voting, and surveys are administered by large polling companies such as NOP, MORI and YouGov on a regular basis. Based upon interviews with 500 Muslims and 1000 nonMuslims, a 2009 Gallup poll for the Coexist Foundation (http://www .coexistfoundation.net) produced headlines along the following lines: ‘patriotic, respectful and homophobic’ (The Independent, 8 May 2009) and ‘pious, loyal and unhappy’ (The Economist, 7 May 2009). Muslims identified with the UK more strongly than their non-Muslim counterparts (77% versus 50%) while only 3% of Muslims, compared with 26% of non-Muslims, believed that people belonging to other religions threatened their way of life. However, British Muslims were revealed as more conservative than their co-religionists in France or Germany:

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the number who found homosexuality morally acceptable was 0% compared with 58% of the non-Muslim UK population. In 2009, Ipsos Mori also included a ‘boost sample’ of 1,200 Muslim residents in the UK Citizenship Survey for the first time. 16


Islamic Awareness Week takes place in England and Wales during late November every year and is organised by the Islamic Society of Britain. It began in 1994, to “raise awareness and remove misconceptions surrounding Britain’s second largest faith group”.22 Many locally organised events, positive media and inter-faith/cultural activities take place across the country. Islam Expo, organised by the MAB and first held in 2006, is now also an annual event, held at Olympia in Earls Court, London, and attended by upwards of 30,000 Muslims and nonMuslims. A range of social, cultural and educational events and functions take place over a four-day period. Beyond the Muslim community, key national institutions for the arts, such as the Barbican in London, periodically organise events with an Islamic theme such as ‘Ramadan Nights’, a concert of music from across the Muslim world.

22

www.iaw.org.uk/this-years-theme/inter-faith-week, accessed 31 January 2010.

PART II

ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Christian Moe

ALEVI COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE: IDENTITY AND RELIGIOUS STRATEGIES Elise Massicard1 1

Introduction

Aleviness2 has become a Western European phenomenon. Today, Alevi organisations exist in Austria, Belgium,3 Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland—not to mention Australia, Canada and the United States. Although most Alevis settled in Western European countries in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, Aleviness has only recently appeared in the public spheres of settlement countries, indicating that this trend is due not so much to the migration process itself, as to the growing public awareness of questions regarding Islam. Another important factor has been a general Alevi resurgence, observed both in Turkey and in the settlement countries since the late 1980s.4 This development leads me to distinguish between the terms Aleviness, to refer to the social fact, and Alevism, to refer to activism in the name of Aleviness, ‘Alevi’ and ‘Alevist’ being used to refer to the adherents of ‘Aleviness’ and ‘Alevism’ respectively. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the Alevi phenomenon in Western Europe. Since most Alevis in Europe live in Germany, and since most studies on Alevis in Europe deal with the situation there, Germany will inevitably dominate the article. The first part analyses the settlement of Alevis in Western European countries and the main trends and dynamics of the revival since the late 1980s.

1 Tenured research fellow in sociology, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France. 2 For an overview of Aleviness see Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina, Die Kızılbaş/Aleviten: Untersuchungen über eine esoterische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Anatolien (Berlin, Klaus Schwarz, 1995). 3 On Alevis in Belgium see Lebrecht, Michaël, Alévis en Belgique: Approche générale et étude de cas, Sybidi Papers 21 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 1997). 4 On this movement see Massicard, Elise, L’autre Turquie: Le mouvement aléviste et ses territoires (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2005).

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The second part studies the ways in which Alevist organisations’ strategies for institutionalisation and recognition differ in the various places where they have settled, these strategies being strongly linked to the opportunities available. As a result, divergent identities are claimed in different places. The last part deals with the difficulties of transnationalising identity and recognition strategies on various scales, including the European scale. 2

The Settlement of Alevis in Western Europe: From Invisibility to Revival 2.1

Settlement in Western Europe

When and how have Alevis settled in Western Europe? The key periods of migration from Turkey are about the same for all European countries; three main phases can be distinguished. First, Alevi men began migrating in large numbers to West European countries— overwhelmingly to West Germany—in the 1960s, in the context of the demand for migrant labour from Turkey, among other countries. A second phase began with the official ending of labour migration in the early 1970s. Paradoxically, this resulted in an increase in the numbers of migrants from Turkey, especially of women and children coming for family reunion. The third phase was in the years immediately before and after the 1980 military coup in Turkey and saw the greatest influx of Turks into Europe since the end of labour migration, many of them coming as asylum seekers. This politically-motivated emigration mainly involved leftists, among whom Alevis were probably overrepresented. Since no country—neither Turkey nor any of the settlement countries—has official statistics that use ‘Alevi’ as a category of belonging, it is hard to know how many Alevis have migrated to Europe. Some qualitative data suggest that Alevis have had a stronger tendency than their Sunni counterparts to engage in international migration because of the repression to which they have been subjected,5 because of their

5 Mandel, Ruth, “The Alevi-Bektashi identity in a foreign context: the example of Berlin”, in A. Popovic and G. Veinstein (eds), “L’ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach”, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, vol. 60, no. 1, 1992, pp. 419–426 (423); Mandel, Ruth, “Shifting centres and emergent identities: Turkey and Germany in the lives of Turkish Gastarbeiter”, in D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori

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economic and social marginalisation, and because they may have been better able to forge community-wide migration networks.6 However, no statistical source has ever confirmed this hypothesis. A study on a sub-province near the Black Sea in fact indicates a slower growth rate of the population of Alevi villages compared with that of Sunni villages, indicating a higher outmigration rate for Alevis. Unfortunately, it does not distinguish internal from international migration.7 Another study conducted on a sub-province in Central Anatolia tends to show that migration from Alevi villages is not greater than from Sunni villages, but again this study does differentiate between migrants who settle in Turkish cities and those who go abroad.8 It is therefore difficult to draw general conclusions. Today, observers estimate the number of Alevis living in Germany at between 400,000 and 600,000.9 More precise studies show that they do not withdraw into ghettos, but that they live scattered in different places.10 2.2

An invisible group

An important characteristic of Alevis settling in Western European countries is that they initially remained invisible. Alevis did not establish a formalised religious life in the settlement countries, unlike Sunnis, who re-created their own religious institutions quite quickly. In Turkey, Alevis had a formalised religious life, even if it was invisible to the public because of its illegality. Why, then, was it not ‘exported’ to the settlement countries? The first reason is that at the time of emigration, Alevi religious practice was declining in Turkey itself. This was partly due to the growing politicisation of Alevis on the left since the 1960s. In many villages, religious leaders, the dedes, were rejected

(eds), Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 153–171 (165). 6 Faist, Thomas, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 135. 7 Shankland, David, The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 45f. 8 Fliche, Benoit, Odyssées turques: Les migrations d’un village anatolien (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2007), pp. 46, 56–57. 9 Sökefeld, Martin, “Einleitung: Aleviten in Deutschland—von takiye zur Alevitischen Bewegung”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2008), pp. 7–36 (32). 10 Shankland, David and Atila Çetin, “Aleviten in Deutschland”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2008), pp. 219–239 (224).

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by the younger generation as exploiters of the people, and ceremonies could no longer be held.11 Those who emigrated as refugees because of their leftist activism would definitely not try to foster religious practice in their settlement countries. Another factor behind the decline of religious practice was migration itself. The areas where settlement took place—be they Turkish or European cities—were cut off from the village community contexts that traditionally provided the framework for Alevi religious practice. The performance of a religious ceremony was linked not so much to precise dates as to the presence of the religious leader and of the community, which was made difficult by migration. Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to argue that Alevi religious life disappeared completely in settlement countries. Many witnesses report that in the 1970s and 1980s, especially among migrant workers, private gatherings of relatives, fellow villagers and friends were organised, where Alevi songs were sung. Some dedes also visited their followers (talips) in Europe, and sometimes religious ceremonies were performed within restricted groups, but this was a limited phenomenon. A second reason for the invisibility of Alevi migrants in their settlement countries is that many of them continued to practise ‘dissimulation’ (takiye), i.e. to hide or deny their identity in public, as they had previously done in Turkey. Dissimulation is a strategy legitimised in Shi’a Islam as a defensive response to persecution. Some parents even hid their Alevi identity from their children in order to prevent them from suffering prejudice or exclusion by Sunni children.12 Alevi immigrants were known to be Alevis only within limited circles, through their village of origin13 or because they had mostly come to Europe via chain migration. Since nobody declared himself publicly to be Alevi, Sunni Islam was the only visible religion of migrants from Turkey. In the host societies, Turkish migrants were therefore considered to be

11 For this point see Massicard, Elise, “Alevism in the 1960s: social change and mobilisation” in H. Markussen (ed.), Alevis and Alevism: Transformed Identities (Istanbul: Isis, 2005), pp. 109–135 (113f). 12 Henrich, Beatrice, “Alevitische Geschichte erinnern—in Deutschland”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2008), pp. 37–64 (55). 13 Naess, Ragnar, “Being an Alevi Muslim in South-Western Anatolia and in Norway: the impact of migration on a heterodox Turkish community”, in T. Gerholm and Y.G. Lithman (eds), The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe (London: Mansell, 1988), pp. 174–195 (187ff.).


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religiously homogeneous, which was congruent with Turkey’s official identity and discourse. Finally, Alevis in Europe did not at first organise explicitly as Alevis. They did not initially claim any distinctiveness, since they basically came either to work or for political reasons, and thought they were in Europe only temporarily. As in Turkey, most Alevis who took up commitments beyond their daily life engaged in leftist political groups or labour unions. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in Turkey as in the Turkish diaspora, large numbers of Alevis were involved in many leftist organizations, but Aleviness played no explicit role since these individuals were Marxists and atheists. Alevi organisations increasingly became autonomous from the left during the 1970s. The first Alevi organisation was created in Southern Germany in the 1970s.14 Its full name—Türkiye Aleviler Birliği, Union of Alevis of Turkey—was never used in public and its acronym, TALEB, only implicitly recalled the Alevi term talip. As a consequence, only insiders were aware that this was in fact an Alevi organisation. When it was officially registered, later in the 1970s, the organisation was renamed to the more neutral Türkiye Amele Birliği (Workers Union of Turkey), so that it was outwardly a workers’ organisation, although it functioned in close collaboration with the Alevi leftist party in Turkey, the Union Party of Turkey (Türkiye Birlik Partisi, TBP) founded in 1966.15 It gathered together more than 30 local organizations, which were strongly related to leftist groups. A further step towards autonomy was linked to escalating political violence in Turkey. In the late 1970s, the nationalist and religious rightwing organised several attacks on leftists and Alevis in Central Anatolian cities, of which the bloodiest one took place in Kahramanmaraş in December 1978, when a leftist party strongly supported by Alevis, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s Party), was in government. Alevi members of the CHP in exile wanted to protest against the government, but the party headquarters rejected their demands. As a consequence, many Alevi supporters left the party and, together with activists from the TBP in exile, founded the Union of Patriots (Yurtseverler Birliği, YSB) in 1979. A few months later, it 14

Later than in Turkey, where a few Alevi organisations had been created in the 1960s. 15 Şener, Cemal and Miyase İlknur, Alevilik ve Şeriat (Istanbul: Ant, 1995), pp. 115–116.

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became a federation. Again, this name gave no hint of Aleviness, and the YSB began as a political organisation. However, it also engaged in religious and cultural activities and organised the first public Alevi religious ceremonies in Germany. After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, its membership rapidly decreased because many supporters feared that they or their families in Turkey would be persecuted. The federation was dissolved in 1983, but some of its biggest associations continued functioning.16 The first explicitly Alevi organisations in Western Europe were created in the 1980s, when a general Alevi revival was taking place. In Germany, the first associations with names that indicated their Aleviness (named, for example, after the Alevi saint Hacı Bektaş Veli) appeared in the late 1980s. Seven of them joined forces in 1991 and formed the Federation of Alevi Communities. The first Swiss Alevi association was founded in 1992 in Basel, and the Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi of England (İnglitere Alevi Kültür Merkezi ve Cemevi) was created in 1993 in London. 3

The Alevi Resurgence in Europe

The Alevi revival was linked to global developments, to developments taking place in Turkey, but also in the conditions of Alevis living in Western European countries. Among general factors, the overall decline of the left, to which many Alevis were committed, was crucial. This decline was reinforced in Turkey by the 1980 military coup, which made revolutionary aims unattainable. At the same time, new ideologies, especially of identity and ethnicity, gained prominence. This was also the case in Turkey, especially in relation to the Kurdish issue, with the guerrilla war started by the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers’ Party) at the beginning of the 1980s. The Kurdish question affected Alevis because many of them were also Kurds, and because it questioned Turkish national identity and brought the struggle for other specific identities to the fore. Another factor was that, after the 1980 military coup, the junta re-oriented Turkish national ideology by stressing Sunni Islam as a means to overcome the political

16 Sökefeld, Martin, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space (New York/London: Berghahn, 2008), pp. 48ff.


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polarisation experienced in the 1970s and to enforce national unity. Consequently, Sunni religious instruction was made compulsory in Turkish schools and many Alevis perceived these developments as attempts at assimilation. Furthermore, political Islam was gaining momentum in Turkey, which many Alevis considered a threat and, finally, two events accelerated the Alevi revival. In July 1993, an Alevi leftist association organised a cultural festival in the conservative Central Anatolian city of Sivas, in which many prominent leftist intellectuals and artists participated. A large group of violent right-wing (both Islamist and nationalist) demonstrators targeted the festival and set fire to the hotel hosting the participants. Thirty-seven of them died, while the security forces remained indifferent. The second event occurred in March 1995: following an attack on an Alevi café in the Gazi neighborhood in Istanbul, clashes between demonstrators and the police ended in the death of fifteen demonstrators. Both events were broadly interpreted as attacks against Alevis and accelerated the revival: many Alevis in both Turkey and Western Europe started to assert their Aleviness, and many Alevi organisations were founded. In addition, there were other relevant factors specific to the settlement contexts. First, many Alevi migrants in Europe had identified themselves as Turkish but, after these violent events, Turkishness no longer provided a refuge for them and many of them shifted their identification towards Aleviness.17 Second, the arrival of women and children led to increased social pressures. In the late 1980s, in some French towns, although Turkish migrants had previously socialised together across religious orientations, divisions between Sunnis and Alevis became more prominent.18 In various places, Alevis began to create their own organisations (such as village associations), independent of general Turkish associations.19 Third, many migrants came to realise that their presence in Western Europe was not going to be short-lived, and they re-oriented their commitments to the place they lived in. In this context, some policies in settlement countries both fostered and gave direction to an Alevi revival.

17 Kaya, Ayhan, “Multicultural clientelism and Alevi resurgence in the Turkish diaspora: Berlin Alevis”, New Perspectives on Turkey, vol. 18 (Spring 1998), pp. 23–49 (38–39). 18 Fliche, Odyssées turques, pp. 120–121. 19 Naess, “Being an Alevi Muslim”, pp. 187ff.

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Multiculturalism and the cultural framing of Aleviness

The Alevi revival was particularly fostered by policies of multiculturalism. In the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, multiculturalism gained momentum in countries such as Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, although this was less the case in other countries, such as France. The former countries began to treat the issue of immigration mainly in terms of cultural difference, promoting the idea of a right to difference and its ‘free expression’, and implementing policies based on discourses of identity and culture.20 Multicultural policies served as a new way of public incorporation and provided many institutional opportunities, resources and space for the formalisation of ‘cultural’ organisations. By making culture the main arena for the recognition, participation and struggle of migrants, they shaped the institutional and discursive framework for migrants’ claim-making. Multiculturalism also provided Aleviness with its first opportunity for public visibility in the German public space. After Turks and Kurds, the heightened awareness of questions concerning cultural identity was also applied to Alevis. Perceiving this opportunity, Alevists began to stress their distinctiveness from ‘Turkish culture’ as a strategy to negotiate with the majority society for subsidies or integration, and they framed Aleviness in terms of a culture in need of protection.21 Until then, Aleviness, unlike Sunnism, was not recognised as a component of the identity of Turkish migrants. It was only in the 1990s that the German authorities came to recognise this distinction, and they began conceiving of Aleviness mainly in these cultural terms. During the ‘Alevi Cultural Night’ organised by the biggest Alevi organisation in Berlin in 1996, the Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs emphasised the pluralist structure of the city, using a culturalist discourse, and declared her support for Alevis to express their cultural identity in the public space.22 This cultural opportunity thus had important consequences for the way in which Alevi organisations appeared and developed in Europe. The first Alevi organisations in Germany were quite inward-looking and were hardly in contact with German institutions and the public,

20

For the Berlin case, see Vertovec, Steven, “Berlin Multikulti: Germany, ‘foreigners’ and ‘world-openness’”, New Community, vol. 22, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 381–399. 21 Kaya, “Multicultural clientelism”, pp. 39ff. 22 Kaya, “Multicultural clientelism”, pp. 42–43.


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their main purpose being to meet the spiritual needs of their local communities. In 1989, however, another, more outward-looking initiative took place: in Hamburg, former leftists created an informal group, the ‘Alevi culture group’. It aimed to campaign for the public recognition of Aleviness, and organised the first explicitly Alevi public event, an ‘Alevi Culture Week’, supported financially by German multicultural institutions. After the success of this event, the group created an ‘Alevi Cultural Centre’, and similar centres were created in other German cities. In 1993, the Sivas events put the unification of all Alevi organisations onto the agenda, and the inward-looking associations and the ‘cultural centres’ competed for the leadership of the movement. In the end, the cultural centres gained prominence, because they were more numerous, but also because of the political experience of their members, which enabled them to organise mass demonstrations. In practice, the main Alevi federation, the AABF (Federation of Alevi Communities of Germany), has presented a mainly cultural version of Aleviness since 1993. According to its 1998 programme, its main purpose is to “preserve and contribute to the development of the cultural identity and the religious or philosophical values of Alevis living in Europe”. It also aims to “meet the cultural and social needs of Alevis” and commits itself to “the transmission of Alevi culture and teachings to Alevi schoolchildren”.23 Most Alevi organisations in Germany consider Aleviness to be a ‘culture’ based on democracy, humanitarianism and gender equality. As in contemporary Turkey, Alevi organisations have become the main loci and institutions of Aleviness in Europe. They have been trying to revive, develop and transmit Alevi practices, sometimes from scratch, thereby transforming and reinventing most of them. In particular, Alevi associations have revitalised the main Alevi ceremony, the cem. However, these new, public ceremonies—like those held by most Alevi organisations in Turkey—are quite different from traditional cems. While the traditional ceremonies were limited to a specific and closed community linked to a specific dede, the contemporary cems are in part directed outwards, and address an imagined global Alevi community. Their length and composition has also changed

23 AABF, Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu Programı (Cologne: AABF, 1998), article 2, § 6.

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considerably.24 Many Alevis criticise these new ceremonies because they perceive them as ‘performances’, void of spirituality and sacral character. Alevi organisations have also been developing and teaching Alevi practices originally linked to rituals, such as playing the saz—an Anatolian instrument used in Alevi music among others—and dancing the ritual semah. These practices have become symbols of Alevi identity, and are especially appreciated by the youth. Finally, Alevi associations have been organising cultural activities, such as festivals, commemorations and concerts. These events draw much public attention, and many more participants than religious ceremonies. 3.2

Claims and conflicts

Furthermore, Alevist organisations have, like their Turkish counterparts, been voicing demands for the recognition of Aleviness. However, in the course of the movement’s development, various groups—identifiable to some extent with organisations—have emerged with diverse, or even conflicting representations of Aleviness and claims for recognition. One of the most bitterly discussed points is the relationship between Aleviness and Islam: is Aleviness ‘true Islam’, a specific interpretation of Islam, or a religion outside Islam—is it, for example, the real religion of Turks, or of Kurds? This issue partly overlaps with the question of whether Aleviness is a religion or not. For some activists, it is a political philosophy of liberation, resistance and democracy, while for yet another group, Aleviness is mainly a culture, a way of life characterised by critical-mindedness. These conflicts are also about political questions; for example, should Aleviness be integrated into Turkish institutions or not? Each group bases its perspective on reconstructions of Alevi history: for example, those who consider Aleviness a revolutionary movement emphasise social uprisings—styled ‘Alevi rebellions’—against the Selcuk and Ottoman dynasties, and criticise any attempt to integrate Aleviness into Turkish institutions. It is not our aim here to describe this diversity of positions.25 Suffice it to say

24 On ritual changes in Western Europe, see Langer, Robert, “Alevitische Rituale”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2008), pp. 65–107. For a comparison with the transformation of rituals in Turkey, see Massicard, L’autre Turquie, pp. 151–159, 197–201. 25 On this topic, see Vorhoff, Karin, Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identität in der Türkei der Gegenwart (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1995); Massicard, Elise, L’autre Turquie, pp. 89–109.


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that the lack of consensus, regarding not only the nature of Aleviness, but also the level at which that identity should be defined (religious, social, political or cultural), is a striking feature of contemporary Alevism. Even after twenty years of activism, the debate over the definition of Alevi identity is not settled, making Alevism a very competitive and conflicted movement. This ongoing struggle over meaning reflects competing representations of Alevi claims. In Western Europe, the power balance between different organisations and interpretations is slightly different from that in Turkey. The most important Alevi federation in Germany is the AABF.26 It is made up of more than 100 local associations and has published its own journal, Alevilerin Sesi, since 1992. Since 1993, the AABF has been headed by former leftist activists who espouse a cultural representation of Aleviness, distancing themselves from, or even opposing, the Turkish state. However, as a large federation comprising local organisations whose views of Alevi positions, the AABF has never issued any formal statement on the relationship between Aleviness and Islam, or on the controversial issue of the display of Turkish flags by the organisations. Other umbrella organisations exist in Germany, but none of them is as important as the AABF. One is the Federation of Kurdistan Alevis (Federasyona Elewiên Kurdistanî), created in 1994, and renamed the Democratic Alevi Federation (Demokratik Alevi Federasyonu) in 2002. Being closely related to the PKK, it claims that Aleviness is a Kurdish phenomenon, and that Alevi and Kurdish issues are related. It includes about twenty local Kurdish Alevi associations in Germany and, since 1994, has published a journal, Zülfikâr, renamed Semah in 2002. Another organisation active at the German federal level since 1997 is the CEM (Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi) foundation, the overseas representative body of a Turkish organisation with the same name. Unlike the AABF and the Federation of Kurdistan Alevis, it is not an umbrella organization, although several local associations are closely related to it. The CEM stresses both the Islamic and the Turkish nature of Aleviness. Being quite close to the Turkish institutions, it seeks representation for Alevis within the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is responsible for the official regulation of religion in Turkey, or the establishment of a similar state body for

26 Similarly, the most important federations in other European countries are those that are in close relationship with AABF.

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Alevis. However, this foundation could never become as significant in Germany as it is in Turkey, since its aims are hardly relevant to migrant Alevis. Similarly, the Europe Ehl-i Beyt Federation (Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Federasyonu, ABAF) is linked to the Turkish Ehl-i Beyt foundation, and claims that Aleviness is a religious phenomenon close to Shi’a Islam, but it is hardly active in Germany. Finally, the Alevi Academy is an organization of a different kind; it mainly publishes booklets and organises courses for Alevi dedes. Cooperation between these organisations at the federal level is rare. The situation is different at the local level, however. Many local organisations remain independent of the federations mentioned above, and not all federations are represented in every city, although the AABF has a presence almost everywhere. Thus, in many German cities, one may find several Alevi organisations (including village, regional, or neighbourhood associations) with different orientations, depending which are the main groups that have settled through chain migration. This often results in competition or conflicts between organisations,27 but cooperation at the local level does nevertheless take place—for example, in connection with the organisation of local events and the use of community centres. Thus, observers are confronted with a complex and geographically diverse landscape of associations.28 Beyond the institutional level, what are the perceptions of Alevis living in Western Europe? The proportion of Alevis who are members of Alevi organisations is quite low,29 and many Alevis are rather sceptical about them, although only limited data are available on this. Diverse views about whether Aleviness is primarily culture or religion, and about its relationship to Islam, are represented among Alevis, even among members of one and the same association. What is certain is that the relevance of Alevi identity to Alevis themselves has increased with the revival. In Germany, many parents have not taught or transmitted Alevi religious values to their children, so, for the

27 For an account of the internal conflicts of the association in Narbonne (Southern France), see Fliche, Odyssées turques, pp. 122f. 28 Massicard, Elise, “Le poids du local dans les configurations associatives des alévis en Europe”, in A. Guillou, M. Wadbled and S. De Tapia (eds), Migrations turques dans un monde globalisé: Le poids du local (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007), pp. 57–68. 29 Observers estimate that about 25,000 Alevis in Germany (i.e. roughly 5%) are members of Alevi organisations. One should also take in account multipliers such as family. Sökefeld, “Einleitung: Aleviten in Deutschland”, p. 32.


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second generation of migrant Alevis, religious norms and values are not very important. The identity dimension seems to be more relevant to them, and it is only rarely linked to religious practice. Nevertheless, many second-generation migrants consider Aleviness a belief within Islam (and therefore it remains for them a religious identity), even if they do not practise.30 It seems that there is a strong reluctance to deny any link to Islam, even if the idea that Aleviness is the correct Islam remains a minority opinion. In Switzerland, however, it seems that the most common view expressed in public is that Aleviness is a religion for itself, independent from Islam.31 Does the Alevist movement in Western Europe have specific features distinct from the movement in Turkey? First, in Europe there is a dominant organisation, the AABF and its allied organisations, which is not the case in Turkey.32 Second, in Europe there is a more oppositional stance to the Turkish government, probably due both to weaker political restrictions as compared with Turkey, and to the influence of former leftist activists in many organisations. As a consequence, some radical trends that are underground or very marginal in Turkey seem to be stronger in Europe. One of them is Kırmanç nationalism, a movement formed in the early 1980s struggling for an independent, Alevi, Zazaki-speaking nation.33 Similarly, Kurdish nationalist Alevi groups that are prohibited in Turkey have become more formalised in Europe, and some radical leftist groups have appeared in European cities, especially after the Gazi event in 1995. The extreme left-wing Turkish organization, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation PartyFront (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephe, DHKP-C) has formed an Alevi group in Germany called Al-Genç (Al[evi] Youth), which has issued an occasional journal called Kerbela since 1996, and has tried,

30

Taşçı, Hülya, “Die zweite Generation Alevitinnen und Alevitenzwischen religiösen Auflösungstendanzen undsprachlichen Differenzierungsprozessen”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transkript, 2008), pp. 133–154 (141–144). 31 Beyeler, Sarah and Virginia Suter Reich, “Inkorporation von zugewanderten Religionsgemeinschaften in der Schweiz am Beispiel der Aleviten und der Ahmadiyya”, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religion und Kulturgeschichte, vol. 102 (2008), pp. 233–259 (243). 32 More on this point in Massicard, L’autre Turquie, pp. 286f. 33 Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina, “‘Wir sind ein Volk!’ Identitätspolitiken unter den Zaza (Türkei) in der europäischen Diaspora”, Sociologus, vol. 48, no. 1 (1998), pp. 111–135 (127).

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without much success, to gain a foothold in some Alevi organisations.34 These endeavours are quite insignificant in the context of the overall Alevi movement as a whole. More significant characteristics of the movement in Europe, however, are: first, that its claims are addressed to Europeans who have no prejudice against Alevis (as well as, less significantly, to Sunni migrants), and, second, that the opportunities for recognition are different. 4

Diverse Identity Strategies Across Europe: German Alevism’s Shift Towards Religion

In their countries of settlement, Alevist organisations campaign for Aleviness: in particular, they have made efforts to engage in intercultural projects and interreligious dialogue, and worked for the construction of community centres or cem houses, the introduction of Alevi religious instruction at schools, political representation, etc. They have done so at various institutional levels: municipalities, federal states, federal governments, and Europe. Interestingly, their recognition strategies are very diverse in the different places where they have settled, and are strongly linked to the institutional opportunities for integration or recognition. The most striking example of this phenomenon is the shift towards a more religious interpretation of Alevism in Germany.35 Over the past few years, increasing numbers of Alevist organisations –primarily those affiliated with the AABF—have come to stress the religious dimension, adopt more religious names and regard their premises as places of worship. For the first time, two Alevi places of worship have recently been built.36 This is remarkable because, until recently, most Alevist organisations in Germany, including the overwhelming majority of those affiliated to the AABF, had expressed their distinctiveness mostly in political or cultural terms, had a generally secular attitude and remained largely indifferent to religious issues. In Germany, there

34

Kaya, “Multicultural clientelism”, pp. 38–40. This is studied in more detail in Massicard, Elise, “Alevist movements at home and abroad: mobilization spaces and disjunction”, New Perspectives on Turkey, vols 28–29 (Spring-Fall 2003), pp. 163–187. 36 In Berlin, several Alevi organisations have jointly opened a place of worship in a former church; in Augsburg, an Alevi organisation has built a new cemevi. 35


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was a stronger tendency than in Turkey to situate and re-imagine Aleviness outside Islam and to understate its religious dimension. The predominant view was that Aleviness is a culture based on democracy and humanism.37 Only a few Alevist organisations in Germany had had a clearly religious orientation, and most of them were not affiliated to the AABF. Given these circumstances, how can this shift towards a more religious interpretation be explained? In Germany, state and religion cooperate and so religion is a legal category of recognition. This is particularly the case with regard to educational issues, as religion is taught in public schools. The field of religion is therefore especially significant for the recognition of migrant groups and so the main goal for religious groups looking for official recognition is to obtain one of the existing legal statuses. The highest status is ‘public law corporation’ (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), but the conditions required for this status are quite difficult to meet: stability, sustainability, a clear organisational structure, and a certain number of members. The status of ‘religious community’ is more advantageous than that of a mere association: a religious community cannot be easily disbanded and enjoys the right to provide religious teaching in public schools. However, until recently, Alevists neglected this possibility of religious recognition, since they did not know about it and did not appreciate the opportunities it offered. This was, first, because no migrant group had ever been granted any of these statuses and, second, because the context in which the Alevist movement started was influenced by multiculturalism, and the issue of immigration was treated mainly in terms of cultural difference. Only in the late 1990s, in accordance with ‘global’ trends, was attention drawn to ‘fundamentalism’ among the Muslim youth, and the religious dimension of migration came to the fore. 4.1

The legal recognition of religious difference in Berlin

What made Alevists become aware of the opportunity for religious recognition? In 2000, an administrative court granted a Sunni organisation, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB), the status of a religious community. A few weeks later, Berlin’s biggest Alevist organisation, 37

On these religious reconstructions see Massicard, L’autre Turquie, pp. 150–160.

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the Anatolian Alevis’ Cultural Centre (AAKM, Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi, which is affiliated to the AABF), suddenly seeing this opportunity, asked for the same status. Until then, the AAKM, like the AABF, had called for Aleviness to be taught in schools, but in a non-confessional manner: they preferred the inclusion of Aleviness in non-confessional, interfaith religious education classes, because they considered this model appropriate to the values of tolerance and openness emphasised by Alevis.38 However, as soon as the right to teach was given to a Sunni organisation, the AAKM applied for the establishment of a parallel course, thus moving away from a generalist and universalist stance to a particularist position. Because of the tradition of parity between the Protestant and Catholic Christian churches, the German state is bound to adopt a neutral position regarding all religions and denominations and must guarantee the equal treatment of all religious communities. The recognition of one Muslim religious community would not, therefore, imply that it was the sole representative of Islam, but on the contrary would open the way for the recognition of other Muslim groups; German institutions, unlike the Turkish state, have no difficulty in appreciating and accepting the Sunni/Alevi difference. Becoming aware of this opportunity, activists began to posit Aleviness as a religion in need of protection and the exercise of equal rights with Sunni Islam. Only a few months later, the AAKM was granted the status of a religious community, implicitly as part of Islam. Interestingly, the AAKM obtained this status much more quickly and easily than the IFB, whose first application dated back to 1980. How can the difference between the treatment of the IFB’s and AAKM’s applications by the Berlin local authorities be explained? It seems strange, because the IFB was much more active on the issue and mobilised far stronger support than did the AAKM. Moreover, the AAKM had no better claim than the IFB to having met the legal conditions for obtaining the status of religious community, and the reasons put forward for denying the status to the IFB for twenty years could easily have been used to reject the AAKM’s application. The first reason was the lack of a single interlocutor representing all Muslims and of a united Muslim position. Similarly, although the AAKM is the dominant Alevi organisation, it in no

38 The first time Aleviness was taught in Germany was when Alevi themes were included in ‘religious instruction for all’ in Hamburg public schools in 1998.


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way represents all Berlin Alevis, among whom divergent orientations and theological views coexist; indeed the AAKM is opposed by some organisations with which it could not reach an agreement to make a joint request for recognition,39 and it is very questionable that even AAKM members hold a shared world view. The second reason for delaying acceptance of the IFB’s application had been that the internal organisation of Muslim worship is not based on a church-like hierarchy, but the same is also true of Alevi worship; the role of the dedes, the traditional religious leaders, is unclear and conflicted, due both to the lack of an overall hierarchical structure among them, and to the breakdown of traditional religious institutions. The last legal criterion for obtaining the status of religious community is conformity with the constitution—a point on which Sunni Muslims are usually thought suspect. However, this is more a political issue than a purely legal one. In Germany, as in most West European countries, Islam has a very negative public image, as do Turkish migrants. Islam is often equated with reluctance to integrate, backwardness, intolerance, gender inequality, ‘issues’ such as the veil, and, since the late 1990s, even fundamentalism and violence. Therefore, the recognition of the IFB, an organisation that was, moreover, criticised for its supposed links with Turkish Islamist parties, was very controversial. From this perspective, the recognition of an Alevi association provided a kind of counterweight to a religion and an organisation that were perceived negatively. Indeed, the manner in which the AAKM presented itself to the German public is significant, and reflects the Alevis’ strategies for self-representation. By asserting their difference from other Turkish migrants, Alevis distanced themselves from a stigmatised Islam. Many Alevis actually agree with the widespread discourse on Islam as a threat and even contribute to spreading the stereotype of a ‘fundamentalist danger’. In contrast, they depict themselves as more modern and open-minded than other Turkish migrants. They point to what they see as their more democratic, tolerant, and progressive stance. While steadfast in their Aleviness, they identify with and admire many aspects of West German society that the Sunnis interpret as threatening. Modeling themselves on certain German, Western

39 For an overview of the Alevi associational landscape in Berlin, see Massicard, L’autre Turquie, pp. 269–274.

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elise massicard modes, they pride themselves on how modern they are, as opposed to the ‘backward’ Sunnis. They point to the ‘marked’ village clothing many Sunni women wear, such as the flowing şalvar pants and headscarves.40

The assertions that Alevi women do not wear headscarves, that Aleviness promotes gender equality and that it permits alcohol consumption are emphasised and presented as a significant indication that Alevis have no problems with integration in European societies. The emphasis on the Alevi/Sunni difference therefore leads to an assertion of compatibility or even similarity between Aleviness and European culture,41 so that Alevis present themselves in public as sharing the essential values of their host societies, and even as embodying what are considered ‘universal’ values, such as modernity, humanitarianism, tolerance, human rights, enlightenment, freedom and democracy, and as rejecting fanaticism, fundamentalism, racism, terrorism and proselytism.42 This is also the case in France, where the Alevis present themselves as defenders of laïcité (secularism) and thus claim to support the principles of the host society.43 Thus, the Alevis’ position relative to that of Sunnis has undergone an important improvement in European settlement societies as compared with Turkey: Migrant Alevis have in many ways successfully reversed their hierarchically subordinate position to the Sunni Turks (. . .) Thus, by adhering to practices and symbols meaningful to Germans, Alevis are then thought of and labeled by Germans as being ‘better integrated’ than Sunnis (. . .) The Alevis might be slightly less marginal (i.e., more integrated) than Sunnis with respect to mainstream German society. As a consequence of their greater acceptance of German ways and people, they become more accepted by Germans than are many Sunnis.44

40 Mandel, Ruth, “Turkish headscarves and the ‘foreigner problem’: constructing difference through emblems of identity”, New German Critique, vol. 46 (Winter 1989), pp. 27–46 (42–43). 41 Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition, pp. 183ff. 42 This seems to be congruent with the assertions that Alevis try to integrate in the host society and are satisfied with their lives in Germany, and that many Alevis have applied for German citizenship. Shankland and Çetin, “Aleviten in Deutschland”, p. 224; Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition, pp. 196–203. 43 Fliche, Benoit, “Contextes d’implantation et reconfigurations sociales à Narbonne et Ankara”, in A. Guillou, M. Wadbled and S. De Tapia (eds), Migrations turques dans un monde globalisé: Le poids du local (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007), pp. 141–154 (145). 44 Mandel, “Turkish headscarves”, pp. 42–43.


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This helps the Alevis to appear legitimate and maintain good links with the public in European countries. Interestingly, this representation has been widely adopted by German politicians, who are aware of the differences between Sunnis and Alevis. They often use the Alevis as an example of Turks who ‘integrate successfully’.45 During the Alevi cultural night organised by the AAKM in 1996, referred to above, the Social Democrat mayor of the district of Wedding characterized Aleviness as a political counterweight to Islamic radicalism. He even called upon the German people to stand with the Alevis against the challenge of “radical Islam from within” looming over Europe and Germany.46 This representation is also to be found in the press. The daily Die Tageszeitung speaks of “liberal Alevis” in contrast to the IFB, and defines them as “non-dogmatic Muslims”.47 Thus the German media and public opinion have developed a favourable perception of Aleviness, and public discourses prevalent in Western Europe provide important symbolical resources for Alevis. Beyond the issue of legal status, the differentiated treatment of denominations seems to be clearly related to the political issues related to the presence of Islam in Germany. 4.2

The religious transformation of German Aleviness

As the requirements for religious recognition in Germany are basically derived from Christian traditions, adjustment to them has resulted in important transformations and the reformatting of Aleviness on the Christian model. Among the legal preconditions for the status of religious community was a clear self-positioning of the AABF as a religious body, so in 2002 the AABF changed its internal organisation and adopted new by-laws under which the AABF changed its German name to Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland (Alevi Community of Germany)—the term Gemeinde having a clear religious connotation— instead of the previous Föderation der Alevitengemeinden (Federation of Alevi Communities)—the term ‘Federation’ being a relic of the period of big political organisations. Simultaneously, the second paragraph of the new by-laws explicitly designated the AABF as a “religious community in the sense of the basic Law of the Federal Republic

45

Mandel, “Shifting centres and emergent identities”, p. 156. Kaya, “Multicultural clientelism”, pp. 42–43. 47 “Aleviten in Berlin: liberale und undogmatische Muslime” Die Tageszeitung, 10 April 2000, p. 19 [no author]. 46

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of Germany” instead of the previous “democratic mass organisation” reminiscent of left-wing discourse. Moreover, in order to qualify as a religious community, the AABF had to prove the existence of a clearly identifiable organisational structure and to furnish proof of a binding religious authority. This was problematic, because the dedes—considered the ‘clergy’ of Aleviness—had long been marginalised in most Alevi organisations, and there was no formalised relationship between the AABF and the dedes’ council (dedeler kurulu) as no statutes specified the competences of this body. In 2003, the AABF thus formally redefined the role of the religious dignitaries, though it is still questionable whether the new dedes’ council carries the authority to issue binding doctrinal statements, since decision-making remains in the hands of the board. It is also questionable whether the associations linked to the AABF have been able to integrate the dedes in a generally accepted way, since their role, of variable importance, is still a strongly debated issue.48 Moreover, the AABF had to furnish proof of a consensus on dogma and belief, a quite difficult task where Alevis are concerned. Traditionally, the teachings were handed down orally within different religious lineages. Due to the often divergent oral traditions, it would be an exaggeration to speak of a single and coherent Alevi belief system, but that is exactly what was required. In 1999, the AABF founded a ‘Commission for Religious Instruction’, which pursues the aim of developing a ‘teachable’ religion so as to meet the legal requirements. In order to succeed in the negotiations over religious instruction, this commission initiated the drawing up of a syllabus, which has broken new ground, since it is the first organised effort to write down, systematise and unify dogmas and beliefs and formalise learning within Aleviness.49 In the syllabus, specific features differentiating Aleviness from orthodox Islam are stressed, and Aleviness is presented as a coherent system of belief on the model of Christianity. For example, although traditionally there were no specific Alevi religious buildings in which

48

On this point see Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition, pp. 104, 164ff. There have been other attempts, mostly in Turkey, but they were not successful, due to the numerous differences and the lack of opportunity to formalise such efforts. See Massicard, L’autre Turquie, pp. 164–165. 49


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ceremonies were conducted,50 the syllabus presents the cemevi (cem = house) as the Alevi place of worship, like the church or the mosque.51 Could these recent developments towards a more religious view of Aleviness be a consequence of sociological developments? The fact that the first migrant generation has now reached retirement age and may be more aware of religious needs may well be a factor. Have the pensioners marginalised the most influential generation of Alevist leaders, who are mainly secular, former leftists, often political refugees? This is unlikely. In fact, those who are leading this shift towards a more religious interpretation of Alevism are not the first generation of now elderly migrant workers, but the former leftists themselves, who have publicly tempered their former secularism, or even atheism. On the whole, this increased emphasis on religion is not so much due to a resurgence of religiosity but rather appears to be a strategic response to changed public discourses and an adjustment to prevailing institutional requirements for recognition. This new framework seems to be goal-oriented and deliberate. A significant indication for this strategic interpretation is that the AAKM is not the most religious Alevist organisation in Berlin; rather, it is the biggest and the most orientated towards German institutions and public sphere. 5

Various Levels of Action and the Difficult Transnationalisation of Identity Strategies

This development raises the interesting question of the multiplicity of levels of action. In Germany, states (Länder) are responsible for matters related to worship and education. For this reason, the recognition of religious groups is a Land matter. Each state offers different legal opportunities for religious education, and the groups granted the status of religious community differ from one state to the other. The recognition of the AAKM occurred in the Land of Berlin. Seeking to benefit from these local dynamics, the AABF tried to extend this

50

In ordinary villages, ceremonies usually took place in the largest room of a house. Specifically religious buildings existed only in places of pilgrimage and, since the 1990s, in the premises of Alevi organisations. Nowadays, some are also being constructed in Alevi villages. 51 AABF, Lehrplanentwurf für den alevitischen Religionsunterricht (Cologne: AABF, 2002), pp. 32–33.

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recognition to the national level. A few weeks after the recognition of the AAKM, the AABF made similar applications on behalf of affiliated organisations in the biggest states where Alevis are settled. These states then decided to give a joint answer to this request. They commissioned two expert reports and eventually the application was accepted.52 The issue of recognition, initially local, has been taken to the national level both by activists and by institutions. More generally however, this adaptation to local contexts challenges the unity of Alevism across Europe, because this ‘religious turn-around’ has not been on the agenda in most other European countries. In Denmark, for example, the main Alevi federation was recognised as a separate religious community (i.e. distinct from Islam) in 2007 and has thus been granted rights, e.g. to conduct official marriages, to obtain work permits for ‘clergy’ brought from abroad, and to acquire Alevi spaces in cemeteries. In contrast, in republican France, activists of the main Alevist federation, the Federation of Alevi Communities of France (Fédération des Unions des Alévis en France, FUAF)53—most of whom are secular, mainly former left-wing militants, i.e. ‘sociologically’ similar to the AABF in Germany—have not adopted this religious tone. The FUAF’s statutes and aims do not refer to Aleviness as a religion, but to Alevi philosophy and culture.54 Similarly, the second article of its by-laws defines the FUAF as a “democratic mass organisation” aimed at “protecting the philosophical and cultural values of the Alevi community in France and Europe and at developing its cultures and customs”, very similar to the statutes of the AABF before its religious turn-around. This is best explained by the fact that France adheres strictly to the principle of laïcité (secularism), which implies a clear-cut separation of religion and state, and severely restricts opportunities of the recognition of religious groups. There, a framework that stresses the high value given by the Alevis to human rights is politically and strategically more relevant.

52 The lessons began in 2002 in Berlin, in 2006 in Baden-Württemberg, in 2008 in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, and in 2009 in Hesse. In each state, a few hundred children attend these lessons. It would be interesting to analyse how the recently established courses in Aleviness in state schools in Germany have influenced Alevis’ representation of Aleviness. 53 Founded in 1998, it comprises about 35 organisations. 54 FUAF, Les objectifs de la fédération des unions des alévis en France (Paris: FUAF, 2000).


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In Switzerland, the situation is different again. Most migrants arrived in the 1980s, many of them as political exiles, either following the 1980 coup or because of the hostilities between the PKK and the Turkish army.55 Most of the fifteen Alevi associations in Switzerland define themselves as “democratic mass organisations” or “cultural, progressive and humanist-thinking” organizations, and only one defines itself explicitly as a religious community.56 However, the Swiss political system has a triple structure articulated at federal, cantonal and communal levels. This opens up locally diverse opportunities for institutional integration, which influence the Alevis’ strategies for recognition. In Basel, for example, Alevi associations seek official recognition as a separate and independent religious community, distinct from Islam. They started to articulate their demands in the religious arena at a time when Basel’s cantonal administration was working on re-defining the relationship between state and religion, because migrant religious groups—especially the numerous Muslims—had not been dealt with on equal terms with established religious communities. The aim was, therefore, to grant them almost the same rights. When the administration started to investigate the Muslims’ calls for recognition, it established contact with the main Muslim umbrella association, which it soon came to consider as representative of Islam and as a negotiating partner. Since this association was Sunni, Alevists feared they might automatically be included under its umbrella, so they started to present themselves in public as a separate religious group, independent from Islam. In order to validate their views, they stressed the fact that the Qur’an and mosques are not important to Alevis, and Alevis are now perceived by Basel public opinion as a distinct religious community, and are co-opted into processes of political consultation and considered as partners in interreligious dialogue. So far, however, neither the Sunnis nor the Alevis have been granted formal, legal recognition, because of their lack of a centralised organisational structure.57 Interestingly, in other Swiss cantons, where there is no possibility of formal recognition for migrant religious groups, Alevist organisations

55 Beyeler and Suter Reich, “Inkorporation von zugewanderten Religionsgemeinschaften”, p. 239. 56 Beyeler and Suter Reich, “Inkorporation von zugewanderten Religionsgemeinschaften”, pp. 239–241. 57 Beyeler and Suter Reich, “Inkorporation von zugewanderten Religionsgemeinschaften”, pp. 249f.

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present a much less religious orientation. For example, in Winterthur, in the canton of Zürich, where such regulations are not on the agenda, the Alevist association does not call for religious recognition, but campaigns for its members’ political rights.58 Thus, the same kind of diversity observed between recognition strategies in Germany and France can be observed in Swiss cantons. These divergent developments indicate that the discourses and recognition strategies of Alevist movements in settlement countries are shaped less by their imported traditions or the ‘nature’ of Aleviness than by the institutional and discursive contexts within which they are embedded. The crucial role played in the migrants’ claim-making process by the institutional and political framework in the country of settlement has been analysed elsewhere. Spatially bounded institutional contexts and political agendas provide access to different discursive and institutional resources and frame the discourse and strategies of Alevist claim-making. Alevism, being active in various political spaces, is confronted with a variety of political opportunities. The adaptation of Alevist organisations to their settlement context, in terms of strategies and discourses, challenges the unity of the movement across Europe and the links between these political spaces will now be addressed. 5.1

Organisations at the transnational level

This issue has become even more crucial since Alevi organisations in Europe have given greater consideration to becoming more oriented towards their settlement countries in recent years. They had initially been committed to ‘homeland politics’, i.e. their priority was to support the Alevist struggle in Turkey. This homeland orientation tended to be the rule among activists from Turkey in migration.59 In the 1990s, the main aim of the AABF and other Alevi federations was to criticise the discriminatory policies of the Turkish state towards Alevis. Since the late 1990s, however, along with the turn towards migrant politics and institutional integration strategies, the increased orienta-

58 Suter Reich, Virginia, “Anerkennungspraktiken alevitischer Gemeinschaften im Kontext der jüngsten basel-städtischen Verfassungsreform”, unpublished manuscript, 2009. 59 Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva, Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 46f.


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tion of the Alevist organisations towards their settlement countries has been on the agenda. The AABF has started various Europe-oriented projects, such as an information campaign about the new German citizenship law. It has also established numerous contacts with the German authorities at all levels. How far are Alevist organisations in Europe linked to their counterparts in Turkey? Several attempts have been made to establish a transnational umbrella organisation to encompass organisations in Turkey and Europe,60 but these attempts have been unsuccessful, due in part to the legal difficulties of creating a transnational federation in Turkey, and in part to political conflicts over strategy—most of them originating in Turkey. Nevertheless, there are close relationships between organisations across the Bosphorus. Even without their Turkish counterparts, the national federations in Europe (the AABF and its sister organisations) are closely linked to each other: although the German associations were the most numerous and played the leading part, the AABF originally also included associations from other European countries and renamed itself Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Federation of Alevi Communities in Europe) in 1994. In 1998, the name was again changed to the Federation of Alevi Communities in Germany, and the non-German associations left it to form their own national federations. Later, there were attempts to found a worldwide confederation of Alevi associations with its centre in Turkey, but the confederation could not include Turkish members because of legal difficulties. At the end of a long process, the national Alevi federations in Europe (Germany, France, Denmark, Austria, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and some associations from Sweden and Norway) formed a transnational umbrella organisation, the Confederation of Alevi Communities in Europe (Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu, AABK) in 2002, which was legally registered in 2006.

60 The first attempt at a transnational umbrella organisation embracing almost all the existing Alevist organisations in Turkey and Europe, the Alevi-Bektaşi Temsilciler Meclisi (ABTM, Council of Alevi-Bektashi Representatives), dates back to 1994. Its chairman was the chairman of the AABF. However, it soon split because of conflicts between organisations over their stance toward the Turkish state and political strategies for the 1995 legislative elections. In 1999, a second Alevi-Bektashi Representative Assembly, comprising 31 organisations in Turkey and European countries (including the national federations of Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, England, Holland and Australia) came into being, but it was also short-lived.

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This confederation, however, is not very ‘binding’. Its programme and statutes are quite broad, being an interesting mixture of former leftist discourse (stressing values such as freedom, equality, labour, secularism and democracy) and quasi-religious terms. The AABK is defined as both a democratic organisation and a “faith organisation” (inanç örgütü). It defines Aleviness as a distinct Anatolian inanç (faith), i.e. independent of Islam, and also stresses that it is, at the same time, a principle of behaviour and thought.61 The use of the term inanç is interesting, because it has a more open meaning than the word din (religion), which carries connotations of (Sunni) Islam. The AABK declares that it is working for the Alevis living in Europe to be able to live their faiths, cultures and identities. With regard to its home-oriented demands, it calls for Aleviness be legally recognised in Turkey, without defining precisely on what terms. However, it also calls for cem houses to be recognised as faith centres, that the Diyanet be disbanded, and that compulsory religious education be abolished. The non-binding character of the AABK is to be seen in the fact that the faith council of the AABF (the main member organisation of the AABK) disagrees with the AABK’s definition of Aleviness. In 1998, the AABF defined Aleviness as a faith system with a distinct interpretation of Islam, separate from the Sunni faith. Moreover, the AABF definition includes more reference to Islam, especially to Ali and Muhammad and the AABF faith council considers the AABK to be too centred on cultural aspects, and too little on religious ones. The existence of a confederation is not enough for us to conclude that there is agreement across Europe over the definition of Aleviness, or that there is a united plan of action. Beyond these institutional and discursive matters, it is more relevant to consider joint actions across national borders. Interestingly, there has been hardly any integrated Alevist action across national borders apart from the transfer of quite limited financial support from Europe to Turkey. Interestingly, the main shared activities are linked to the European Union. With the approach of the crucial 2004 European summit, which was to decide on whether to open the negotiation process with Turkey, the (not yet registered) AABK and an important 61

Interestingly, in previous statements the AABK had defended views of Aleviness as both an independent religious community and a part of Islam. This inconsistency shows the difficulty of maintaining a single definition of Aleviness across Europe, and probably reflects power balances and responses to changing situations.


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Alevist organisation in Turkey embarked on a joint campaign stressing their support for Turkey’s accession to the EU and launching a petition for the abolition of compulsory religious education and the recognition of Alevi places of worship in Turkey. Thus, it was Turkey’s European political agenda that led to the first coordinated, transEuropean campaign across bothTurkey and the various countries of settlement. This ‘joint’ nature of this campaign should be qualified, however, since the petition did not explicitly define the relationship of Aleviness to Islam—the AABK at the time defending the view that Aleviness was an interpretation of Islam, whereas the Turkish organisation rejected that position. 5.2

The EU level

Thus we see that a further policy- and claims-making level must be added to these local and national developments: the EU level, although it mostly concerns the Alevi issue in Turkey. Alevi organisations have attempted to involve EU institutions and to use Turkey’s EU accession process as a lever for change in Turkey. Like most Alevis in Europe, Alevist federations favour Turkey’s admission to the EU, hoping that it would facilitate the democratisation of Turkey and better rights for Alevis, and they have therefore been trying to add the Alevi issue to the list of matters requiring improvement as a condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU. In December 1999, at the Helsinki summit, Turkey was recognised as a candidate for membership of the EU. The conditions Turkey must fulfill in order to begin negotiations for membership are the Copenhagen criteria, including the protection of minorities. Since 2000, the Alevi issue has been mentioned in the regular reports of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. In November 2000, the first Regular Report referred to it in the following terms: The official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and school books, which would not reflect the Alevi identity, as well as the fact that financial support is only available for the building of Sunni mosques and religious foundations. These issues are highly sensitive; however, it should be possible to have an open debate on them.62

62 European Commission, 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (Brussels: European Commission, 2000), p. 18.

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This statement is reiterated in almost the same words in later reports, which are critical of the absence of improvement and the lack of formal recognition of Alevis, the fact that they are not represented by the Diyanet, the fact that compulsory religious instruction in schools still fails to acknowledge the Alevi identity, and their difficulties in opening places of worship. The European Commission has thus legitimised Alevists’ demands, but what is interesting is that the Commission implicitly recognises Aleviness as a religious phenomenon within Islam. Besides, these statements are found in the section concerning freedom of religion, itself included in the chapter on “civic and political rights”, not in the chapter on “rights and protection of minorities”, which deals mainly with gypsies and Kurds. The 2003 report refers to Alevis as a “non-Sunni Moslem community”,63 and the 2004 report as a “non-Sunni Muslim minority”.64 These definitions raised much opposition from Alevists in both Europe and Turkey. Therefore it is not clear how far the engagement of EU institutions with the Alevi issue is the result of the mobilisation of Alevist organisations in Europe. 6

Conclusion

Alevis have settled in many West European countries since the 1960s, and have become visible in European public spaces since the 1990s. Unlike ‘mainstream’ Muslims from whom they assert their difference, Alevis enjoy a relatively good image in Europe. Taking advantage from this, Alevist organisations have engaged in strategies for institutional integration and recognition in their countries of settlement. However, Aleviness remains a quite blurred and contested identity, and its religious, cultural and political dimensions are balanced differently by the various Alevist organisations, which have adapted their identity and recognition strategies to the various political contexts in which they are embedded in order to maximise their chances for recognition. Very divergent developments are observed across Europe: Aleviness has been recognised as a religious community within Islam in Germany

63 European Commission, 2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (Brussels: European Commission, 2003), p. 36. 64 European Commission, 2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), p. 44.


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and as a distinct religion in Denmark, and has been described as a humanist and democratic culture in other contexts, such as France. These divergent developments produce contradictions and conflicts on the transnational and even the trans-local levels. In fact, the location of organisations, the spaces in which they are active, and the goals they try to attain, may well be distinct. For example, when Alevist organisations in Western Europe lobby the European Commission, they do so mainly on the Alevi issue in Turkey. But the same organisations also work in European settlement countries for Alevi migrants, and may defend diverse claims in these various spaces. It is a fact that the AABF has been opportunistically presenting a more religious version of Aleviness when Germany is concerned than when Turkey is. What remains to be seen in the long run is whether the recognition categories prevalent in specific contexts will impact the representations Alevis themselves make of Aleviness, for example through the teaching of Aleviness at schools. From a marginalised and silenced phenomenon back in Anatolia, Aleviness has become a clear indicator of the lack of political unity across Europe—with or without Turkey.

ISLAM, SHOPPING, RECOGNITION: LONDON’S ISLAMIC MARKETS IN A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE Johan Fischer1 1

Introduction

When I was walking down Edgware Road in central London in August 2009, the large number of ‘Islamic’ products and services offered caught my eye. I was there in connection with a research project that explored the proliferation of halal as a global religious market with a particular focus on the role of Malaysia and Malays in this market in London.2 The Islamic market so ubiquitous in Edgware Road signifies some wider transformations that have taken place during the last decade or so, including a changing Islamic business and entrepreneurial environment in London. Most of the shops, restaurants, cafes, money transfer agencies, kiosks, barbers, banks and estate agencies here are run by Muslims. The growth of Muslim businesses in London “mirrors the wider growth of ethnic minority businesses in the UK. Many also

1 Johan Fischer is an Associate Professor in the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark. His work focuses on modern Islam and consumer/material culture in Southeast Asia and Europe. His publications include the monograph Proper Islamic Consumption: Shopping among the Malays in Modern Malaysia (NIAS Press 2008), chapters in edited volumes and journal articles. A central focus in Johan’s research is the theoretical and empirical focus on the proliferation of halal commodities on a global scale. He is working on a monograph with the provisional title On the Halal Frontier: A Global Religious Market in London. Currently, Johan is working on a research project entitled Certifying Halal: Between State-regulated Islam and Capitalism in Malaysia. 2 Starting in 2005, I have visited London on several occasions. The extended period of fieldwork in London took place from July to December 2006 with one shorter stay in the spring of 2007. The methodology for this study was ethnographic, that is, I spent an extended period of time on research in London exploring, and I committed to adapt to this environment and to develop a sensitivity to the people I was learning from. During fieldwork in London, I spent a great deal of time in halal restaurants and butcher’s shops, and in grocery stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets selling halal and other forms of Islamic products.

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see the increasing Muslim population in the UK and Europe as [an] encouragement to invest in such businesses and industries.”3 At the same time, scholarly interest in Islamic markets is growing. For example, from an interdisciplinary perspective the edited volume Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption4 argues that, in spite of the intensifying globalisation of markets and consumption, these processes have received modest scholarly attention. More specifically, this volume explores issues such as the changing spaces of consumption, branding, and the marketing of religious music as well as the consumption patterns of Muslim minority groups. The proliferation of Islamic commodities and services in Britain, Europe and on a global scale applies to what has been called the globalisation of religious markets5—for the sake of argument I shall call these ‘Islamic markets’. Rules for and understandings of the attainment of salvation “have become important commodities in an expanding religious market that transcends international boundaries”.6 Politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs use the popular mass media to manipulate popular desires.7 More specifically, Islamic commodities and services are advertised globally as religious necessities that fulfil private desires such as piety, purity and health—all intimately linked to the “market for identities”.8 Planners of a religious economy try to package “convincing soteriologies and devise practical means of delivery for their target populations in order to achieve popularity, maintain or advance a religious vision, legitimate a political hegemony, or simply gain wealth”.9 This article explores contemporary Muslim consumer cultures in Europe paying particular attention to London. It examines different types of commodities (‘paraphernalia’, clothes and halal) and ‘Islamic’ services (delivered by Islamic organisations, ‘ethnic’ consultancy com-

3

Ahmed, Allam, “Marketing of halal meat in the United Kingdom: Supermarkets versus local shops”, British Food Journal, vol. 110, no. 7 (2008), pp. 655–670. 4 Pink, Johanna (ed.), Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption: Politics, Religion and Identity between the Local and the Global (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). 5 Lee, Raymond L.M., “The globalization of religious markets: International innovations, Malaysian consumption”, Sojourn, vol. 8, no. 1 (1993), pp. 351–361. 6 Ibid., p. 36. 7 Ibid., p. 37. 8 Navaro-Yashin, Yael, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 11. 9 Lee, “Globalization of religious markets”, p. 48.

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panies and banks), arguing that emerging Islamic markets raise a number of broader questions pertaining to the relationship between Muslim identities, shopping and recognition in modern Europe. More specifically, these broader questions relate to globalised Islam post9/11; shopping as a patriotic duty in mass culture; modern Islam as a discursive tradition; ‘the secular’ as an epistemic category and ‘secularism’ as a political doctrine; as well as Charles Taylor’s idea that identities are partly given shape or denied by the recognition or nonrecognition of others. 2

Setting the Scene: Muslim Consumer Culture in Contemporary London

In 2006, the Office of National Statistics estimated that there were 1,558,890 Muslims in Britain. The two largest groups are Pakistani (43.2%) and Bangladeshi (16.55) while ‘Other Asians’ account for 5.8%.10 The Muslim population in London is one of the largest in any European city and Islam is the second largest faith in London after Christianity. According to the 2001 census, 607,000 people living in London identified themselves as Muslims, that is 8.5% of London’s population.11 London qualifies as a ‘global city’12 as it plays an important role in linking the national as well as European economy with global circuits of commodities, people and ideas, and this is also the case with the Islamic marketplace. Muslim space making or landscaping in London is the production of “the ‘social space’ of networks and identities created as individuals interact in new contexts, as well as the ‘cultural space’ that emerges in a wide variety of ways as Muslims interact with one another and with the larger community”.13 The proliferation of Islamic markets contributes to social and cultural space-making in London. Often it is 10 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=954 and http://www.statistics.gov .uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=957, accessed 12 November 2009. 11 http://www.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/equalities/muslims-in-london.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 12 Sassen, Saskia, Global Networks, Linked Cities (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 2. 13 Metcalf, Barbara D., “Introduction: Sacred words, sanctioned practice, new communities”, in B. Metcalf (ed.), Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe (Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 1–27 (2).

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certain activities—shopping and eating, for example—that contribute to the creation of ‘Muslim space’.14 Another example is the display and transmission of the Arabic word halal, written in Arabic and/or Roman characters and its involvement in the production, recognition and contestation of halal space in London. Muslim space-making in general has been explored in a growing body of literature.15 However, the spatial contexts of producing, displaying, selling and shopping for Islamic commodities have received modest attention. Shopping for Islamic commodities cannot be divorced from the context in which they are sold, that is, the spatial context of such consumption may in practice be just as significant as the qualities of the paraphernalia, food or services. Hence, Islamic markets are not merely conditioning and conditioned by aesthetics and the religious self-understanding of Muslim consumers. They also reflect much more mundane understandings and practices, such as social aspects of chatting or socialising with the butcher in a halal butcher shop or customers in a convenience store. In recent years, halal spaces such as restaurants, butcher’s shops, grocery and convenience stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets, are proliferating in London. These Muslim spaces or landscapes often materialise in the interfaces between Islamic ‘paraphernalia’ (using for instance plaques with Islamic calligraphy to evoke a form of Islamic authenticity), halal commodities (a growing number of Muslim consumers are concerned not only with traditional halal food requirements as stated in the Qur’an, but also contamination from haram sources in products such as confectionary, toiletries and medication), as well as Islamic organisations or ‘ethnic’ consultancy firms that certify commodities or advise companies about proper Islamic branding and advertisement. In many parts of London, such as Edgware Road, Finsbury Park and Whitechapel Road, halal is a distinctive presence on signs and in butcher shops and restaurants. Lately, halal certified products have been appearing in large numbers in supermarkets such as Tesco (a UK-based international grocery and merchandising retail chain— Tesco is the largest British retailer by both global sales and domestic

14

Ibid., p. 6. Gottreich, Emily, The Mellah of Marrakesh: Jewish and Muslim Space in Morocco’s Red City (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), and O’Meara, Simon, Space and Muslim Life: At the Limits of the Labyrinth of Fez (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 15


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market share) and Asda (a British supermarket chain that retails both food and merchandise). In effect, the novel ubiquity of halal in some parts of London can be seen as a form of urban space making16 and Islamic visibility.17 In itself, a city such as London can be said to be a charismatic entity.18 The authors use the term charisma ‘liberally’ and extend it to “larger, and non-human, entities such as cities, sites, objects and collectivities”.19 Charisma is today being democratised in the marketplace, for example, and this has “entailed a measure of objectification—standardization, definition and tangibility—and a commercial exchangeability of objects, attributes and skills that are assumed to produce charisma.”20 The proliferation of Islamic markets in London is a good example of a particular type of urban exchangeability that is imbricated in the mundane practices of everyday shopping to effect charisma among Muslims. 3

Islamic Paraphernalia: Of Plaques and Mobile Phones

In many of the grocery stores in Edgware Road, a wide variety of Islamic paraphernalia is also sold. These Islamic commodities are no longer an expression of esoteric forms of production, trade and consumption, but part of a huge and expanding globalised market marked by intensified flows of mass-produced commodities. The global trend in recent years has been the emergence of a thriving business in Islamic goods. Items from stickers, rugs, holiday cards and plaques with Islamic calligraphy to special types of holidays aimed at Muslim audiences, watches displaying prayer (salat) times and other features, logos and ring tones on mobile phones, clothes, etc. touch upon and ‘Islamicise’ virtually every aspect of life.21 At the same time, there has

16

Metcalf, “Introduction”. Esposito, John, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 195. 18 Hansen, Thomas and Oskar Verkaaik, “Introduction. Urban charisma: On everyday mythologies in the city”, Critique of Anthropology, vol. 29, no. 1 (2009), pp. 5–26. 19 Ibid., p. 6. 20 Ibid., p. 7. 21 D’Alisera, Joann, “I ♥ love Islam: Popular religious commodities, sites of inscription, and transnational Sierra Leonean identity”, Journal of Material Culture, vol. 6, no. 1 (2001), pp. 91–110 (97). 17

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been a marked change from craft production to mass production of religious commodities.22 All these types of products are available in the Islamic marketplace in London. D’Alisera explores in depth how and why Muslim Sierra Leoneans in Washington DC inscribe religious identity onto their cars by means of a variety of Islamic commodities, such as bumper stickers displaying Qur’anic verses in Arabic. This type of decoration “serves to reflect the ways they bridge the gap between various, sometimes competing modes of reference, and thus define their place in the community”.23 These forms of decoration, marking or tagging of commodities or space are visible not only on Edgware Road, but also in other areas of London that have sizeable Muslim populations. When imported into Muslim homes, these religious commodities are highly visible manifestations of ways in which Islam can be domesticated, that is, given material expression in the intimacy of the home. The effect of this importation of Islamic paraphernalia is to individualise the house and thus transform it from being a mere commodity into a home.24 An example of this is that a plaque with Islamic calligraphy may serve a number of purposes. First, of course, it is an Islamic symbol or emblem seen as protecting the house and its inhabitants. Second, plaques or signs can also serve the purpose of marking Muslim space in public. A large part of my fieldwork took place in halal restaurants, particularly Malaysian ones, where I ate halal food and discussed halal with guests, restaurant owners and halal traders. Several of the most popular Malaysian restaurants in London advertise themselves as ‘Malaysian (halal) cuisine’ on signs. In one of these restaurants there are several tourist posters from Malaysia, but no visible Islamic paraphernalia, such as plaques with Islamic calligraphy. Another Malaysian restaurant in North London, which is part of a food court located in Oriental City Shopping Mall, likewise advertises itself as serving ‘halal Malaysian cuisine’. Adjacent to the food court is an Asian supermarket that also sells fresh halal meat and a whole range of other halal products, as well as Islamic paraphernalia. In this restaurant in North London a plaque with Islamic

22 Starrett, Gregory, “The political economy of religious commodities in Cairo”, American Anthropologist, vol. 97, no. 1 (1995), pp. 51–68. 23 D’Alisera, “I ♥ love Islam”, p. 97. 24 Dovey, Kimberley, “Home and homelessness”, in E. Altman and C. Werner (eds), Home Environments (New York: Plenum, 1985), p. 53.


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calligraphy is visible behind the counter. In another Malaysian halal restaurant in Paddington, West London, plaques with Islamic calligraphy as well as the Malaysian national flag call attention to the focus on Malaysian Muslim halal cuisine. Another example dimension is the way in which mobile phones and their widely marketed Islamic paraphernalia can be seen to inscribe technological equipment with some sort of ‘sacred’ quality. Adding to this trend, in 2004 Ilkone Mobile, a Dubai company, launched an Islamic mobile phone.25 Besides sending an SMS (Short Message Service) at prayer times, it can point to the exact location of Mecca from anywhere on the globe. On the one hand, the mobile phone in itself is a quintessential example of a commodity that has been introduced fairly recently into the global market and also a relatively expensive commodity that some Muslims may conceptualise as a trendy and technologically advanced piece of Westernisation or globalisation. On the other hand, it is a social piece of equipment through which families can communicate in a rushed everyday life where both parents and children are often away from the home. London is a thriving market for a wide range of Islamic paraphernalia that can serve a number of purposes as discussed above. This wide and growing range of commodities signifies intensified flows of goods in the era of globalisation. During my periods of fieldwork in London, I spent a great deal of time in Muslim shops that sell Islamic paraphernalia and it was evident that these commodities are imported from all over the world, eventually reaching London, where they can contribute to the marking of commodities and private/public spaces. 4

The Proper and Improper Dressing of Muslim Bodies

The French concept of laïcité roughly translates as secularism. Bowen asks “how French public figures understand the proper relationships among religion, the state, and the individual, and how they justify their arguments and policies in terms of concepts such as laïcité, Republicanism, and equality.”26 With particular reference to the question of why the law against religious signs in public schools was passed,

25

http://www.ameinfo.com/43982.html, accessed 12 November 2009. Bowen, John R., Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 3. 26

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Bowen concludes that the veil in France symbolises rising Islamism, decaying social life and “tracked” anxieties about the fraying of the Republic, as well as political Islam.27 The heated debate about religious signs in public and Muslim women’s dress in particular, is by no means limited to France. These questions are controversial in many European countries, including Britain. During my fieldwork in London, Muslim women’s right to wear the niqab (a veil that covers the face) were criticised and questioned in the media. One headline read “This veil fixation is doing Muslim women no favours: We need an honest debate about women and Islam. But the current politically driven campaign is making that more difficult”.28 Another headline was “Tribunal dismisses case of Muslim woman ordered not to teach in veil”.29 Finally, in an article headed “White pupils less tolerant, survey shows”, the point was made that “Arguments about the Muslim veil in Britain are part of a wider debate taking place across Europe. Amid competing claims of religious freedom and official secularism, some argue that the debate is motivated by growing intolerance of Muslims.”30 Thus, the veil is essentialised as ‘Muslim culture’ and thought to establish a ‘community’ with shared values despite ethnic, national, and linguistic diversity.31 The Sunday Times asked “Is it time to take God out of the state? Faith groups are increasingly demanding new rights or complaining about being wronged. Some say the time has come for Britain to create a clear divide between state and religion. Are they right? Religion, long dormant as a force in British politics and society, is back. After 9/11 and 7/7, rows over niqabs, hijabs, Christian crosses, faith schools and dress codes have exposed deep rifts in our attitudes to the spiritual.”32 Why is the dressing of Muslim women’s bodies such as controversial question in a modern European context where bodies are constantly subjected to forms of experimentation in terms of dress, fashion and plastic surgery? Human bodily existence can be seen as both the basis and the ‘model’ of the constitution of the subject or the self. The body is essen-

27

Ibid., p. 242. The Guardian, 19 October 2006. 29 The Guardian, 20 October 2006. 30 The Guardian, 21 October 2006. 31 Bauman, Gerd, Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 23. 32 Sunday Times, 22 October 2006. 28


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tial in consumption as it is the site for often involuntary and revealing display. Bourdieu33 argued that the habitus encompasses principles of practice in interaction between social structures, systems and actors. For Bourdieu, the most significant process of embodiment is the interaction that takes place between the bodies, on the one hand, and the space structured around myth and ritual on the other.34 Dressing the body is “a means of symbolic display, a way of giving external form to narratives of self-identity”.35 The main point here is that the dressing of the outer body is where the inner worlds of individuals and groups meet and/or conflict with the surrounding society. It is the overt dressing of Muslims that tends to generate intensifying debates about what is proper/improper religious signification of public bodies. Debates over Muslim dress have been explored in an extensive body of literature and it is not within the scope of this article to discuss or review all this literature. An example of an illuminating study36 of the hijab in Britain suggests that its adoption by middle-class Muslim women is often a product of the trans-cultural encounters they experience in a cosmopolitan urban environment. The article shows that the resonance of the hijab in Britain and elsewhere in the West is constantly being reshaped both through contemporary political events and their media coverage, as well as through the actions and campaigns of hijab wearers. With reference to France and Britain, Werbner considers the ambiguities and ambivalences associated with the politics of embodiment surrounding veiling and honour killings comparatively, and the implications for ongoing debates on multiculturalism. She argues that the publicity surrounding symbolic practices of sexual intimacy in the context of modernity may come to be loaded with secondary symbolic connotations, often highly politicised, for both Muslims and Europeans, leading to “irresolvable conundrums”.37

33 Bourdieu, Pierre, An Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 72–82. 34 Ibid., p. 89. 35 Giddens, Anthony, Modernity and Self-identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 62. 36 Tarlo, Emma, “Hijab in London”, Journal of Material Culture, vol. 12, no. 2 (1995), pp. 131–156. 37 Werbner, Pnina, “Veiled interventions in pure space. Honour, shame and embodied struggles among Muslims in Britain and France”, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (2007), pp. 161–186.

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In Turkey, secularists’ fantasies about Islamists in public life have actively produced and maintained versions of Islamism.38 Consequently, Islamists’ compulsions to gender segregation and veiling are not essential features of Islam. Rather, Islamists “began to know themselves and to take action upon the world in assuming, internalizing, reversing, and upholding what secularists had demonized”.39 The politics of identity within these groups has been deeply influenced by an expanding consumer market in the context of the globalisation of the 1980s and 1990s. Consumerism developed into a mantra or “politics of culture” that “organized, expressed, and mediated” political conflicts.40 In this context, Islamists moulded an Islamic consumer ontology emerging in this new market for identities.41 These controversies around the ‘veiling-fashion’ are by no means resolved in modern Turkey and pose a latent field of tension.42 My fieldwork in London showed that some Malay Muslim women in London, but by no means all, wear the tudung (long headscarf ). Based on my previous periods of fieldwork in urban Malaysia, it was clear that comparatively more women would be wearing the tudung in the Malaysian setting. This indicates that claims concerning piety and Islamic identities through dress for women in particular are not necessarily stronger in a diasporic context. Indeed, the diasporic context can be supportive of more relaxed sentiments compared with the homeland. I suggest that contrary to the tendency in much literature to see ethnic and religious traits reinforced in a diasporic context, the opposite effect is possible; that is, migrants may feel that in London, for instance, they can escape or negotiate what are seen to be dogmatic or conformist forms of religion in the homeland. Hence, the highly politicised discourses that again and again stress that Muslim women do not have a choice when it comes to dress are not necessarily backed by empirical evidence.

38

Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State, p. 7. Ibid., p. 42. 40 Ibid., p. 79. 41 Ibid., p. 111. 42 Gökarıksel, Banu and Anna Secor, “New transnational geographies of Islamism, capitalism, and subjectivity: The veiling-fashion industry in Turkey”, in J. Pink (ed.), Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption: Politics, Religion and Identity between the Local and the Global (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp. 23–53. 39

islam, shopping, recognition 5

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Halal I: In and Between Bodies

Halal literally means ‘lawful’ or ‘permitted’. The Qur’an and the Sunna (the life, actions and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad) exhort Muslims to eat the good and lawful food God has provided for them, but a number of conditions and prohibitions are imposed. Muslims are expressly forbidden from consuming carrion, spurting blood, pork, and foods that have been consecrated to any being other than God himself, which are said to be haram.43 The lawfulness of meat depends on how it is obtained. Ritual slaughter, dhabh, requires that the animal is killed in God’s name by making a fatal incision across the throat. In this process, the blood should be drained off as fully as possible. Among Muslim groups and individuals, the question of the stunning of animals prior to slaughter is highly contested; that is, some Muslims consider only meat from unstunned animals to be halal, while others accept that stunning is part of modern and ethical food production. Sea creatures and locusts are considered halal. Because the sea is seen to be pure in essence, all marine animals even if they have died spontaneously are halal and do not have to be ritually slaughtered. In spite of the fact that they are not mentioned in the Qur’an, land creatures such as predators, dogs and, in the eyes of some jurists, donkeys are haram. In addition, the flesh of crocodiles, weasels, pelicans, otters, foxes, elephants, ravens and insects has been forbidden by the ‘ulama’, although the flesh of some of these animals is often seen as makruh, or ‘undesirable’, rather than strictly forbidden.44 Another significant Islamic prohibition relates to wine and any other intoxicating drink or substance, all of which are, according to the majority of opinions, haram whatever the quantity or substance.45 Muslim dietary rules assumed new significance in the twentieth century, as some Muslims began striving to demonstrate how such rules conform to modern reason and the findings of scientific research. Another common theme in the revival and renewal of these dietary rules seems to be the search for alternatives to what are seen to be Western values, ideologies and 43 These four prohibitions parallel those of Jewish dietary law (kashrut), which includes a number of additional prohibitions (e.g., many marine species). Compared with halal, kosher requirements have a longer history of systematic institutionalisation, certification and standardisation. 44 Denny, Frederick Mathewson, An Introduction to Islam (Upper Saddle River NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), p. 278. 45 Ibid., p. 279.

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lifestyles. These re-evaluations of requirements and prohibitions are prominent, first, in postcolonial Islamic cultures such as Malaysia and, second, among diaspora groups for whom halal can serve as a focal point for Islamic movements and identities.46 In the modern food industry around the world, a number of Muslim requirements have been taken into account, such as a recommendation to avoid substances that may be contaminated with porcine residues or alcohol, such as gelatine, glycerine, emulsifiers, enzymes, flavours and flavourings.47 Commenting on this area, an article in The Guardian,48 “Something fishy in your pasta?”, demonstrates that in some cases gelatine, among other things, is being ‘sneaked’ into a variety of foods. The problem in certifying food and other products with regard to these substances is that they are extremely difficult to detect. For some Muslims, halal sensibilities necessitate that halal products be produced by Muslims only, and that this type of production be kept strictly separate from non-halal production—not unlike the way in which the proliferation of rules and taboos concerning food in orthodox Judaism excludes others as ‘unclean’. My study of modern halal in London demonstrated that many British Muslims and organisations call upon the state to help recognise and standardise halal. Contrary to the intense debate over veiling, there is no corresponding state discourse on halal in Britain. Halal in more and more commodities and contexts is becoming important for Muslim identities and bodies. At the same time, Islamic bodies or organisations in Britain try to certify and institutionalise halal, whereas state bodies are largely uninvolved. Apparently, secularism as a political doctrine defines the secular in everyday life in terms of overt dress codes or of Muslim bodies, whereas more covert halal consumption in these bodies is seen to be uncontroversial or unimportant.49 What is more, the state plays a central role in the governance of London itself,50 but not with regard to governing Islamic markets in the city.

46

Esposito, Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, p. 376. Riaz, Mian N. and Muhammad M. Chaudry, Halal Food Production (Boca Raton FL: CRC Press, 2004), pp. 22–25. 48 The Guardian, 26 October 2006. 49 Fischer, Johan, “Feeding secularism: Consuming halal among the Malays in London”, Diaspora vol. 18, no. 1 (2005), pp. 275–297. 50 Travers, Tony, The Politics of London. Governing an Ungovernable City (Houndmills UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 13. 47


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Many Muslims in London consider the city a frontier wilderness that is in need of governance. An EU-supported project ‘Religious slaughter: improving knowledge and expertise through dialogue and debate on issues of welfare, legislation and socioeconomic aspects’ (DIALREL) explains that Religious slaughter has always been a controversial and emotive subject, caught between animal welfare considerations, cultural and human rights issues. There is considerable variation in current practices and the rules regarding religious requirements are still confusing. Similarly, consumer demands and concerns also need to be addressed. Therefore, there is a need for information relating to slaughter techniques as well as product range, consumer expectations, market share and socioeconomic issues. The DIALREL project aims to gather this information by encouraging a constructive dialogue between interested parties.51

As we saw it above with regard to urban Muslim spaces or landscapes, halal is highly visible in signs and logos in the urban landscape. There are hundreds of halal butchers in London, that is, shops that mainly sell meat. They can be classified according to ethnicity and are often run by Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi Muslims. In many cases halal meat is sold together with, for example, Mediterranean or Afro-Caribbean/Asian specialities. The huge Tesco Extra store in Slough outside London, a hypermarket, boasts of having the widest ‘Asian world foods’ ranges, including halal, in Britain. Downstairs in the Tesco Extra store in Slough there is a more traditional halal butcher, operating as a concession selling fresh meat. Anecdotal evidence from my fieldwork in this area suggests that Tesco, by using this store in Slough as an entry into the halal market, has reduced sales among halal butchers in the surrounding area. Around the same time, in the Asda supermarket in North London, I found Halal Food Authority (HFA) certified chilled chicken and mutton; in other words, this shop too is undercutting the prices of local butchers. As I shall discuss in detail below, the HFA is one of two Islamic bodies set up in 1994 to certify halal meat and other types of products. Halal is being lifted out of its traditional base in local halal butcher’s shops to become part of ‘world food’ ranges in major supermarkets.

51 http://ec.europa.eu/research/biosociety/food_quality/projects/168_en.html, accessed 23 October 2009.

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Slaughter in accordance with Islamic law has been permitted in the UK under the Slaughter of Animals Act of 193352 and Slaughterhouses Act 1974,53 which expressly permit the slaughter of animals without prior stunning.54 Animal rights groups see these laws as inhuman and controversies over the Jewish and Muslim slaughter of animals for food have surfaced periodically during the twenty-first century.55 The hostility to religious slaughter “heightened awareness of Islamic practice and a sense of self-identity among a growing number of British Muslims”.56 In this respect, the state has recognised religious needs and adapted policies to accommodate Muslim groups. However, as the understanding and practice of halal production, trade and consumption are being transformed to involve more and more types of products, not unlike what has already happened with regard to kosher products, the state is called upon to help regulate these commodities. While the state in Britain recognises traditional halal requirements, such as religious slaughter without stunning, it has virtually no authority to inspect, certify or standardise halal. In the eyes of some British Muslims, this leaves consumers unprotected against growing commercial interest in halal. Hence, the more the culture of Islamic consumption asserts itself, the more the state’s incapacity to define what is legitimately halal is felt. Contrary to the intense debate in Britain over veiling (overt and on bodies), for example, there is no corresponding state discourse on halal (covert and in bodies). Only recently has the established concept

52 Charlton, Roger and Ronald Kaye, “The politics of religious slaughter: An ethnoreligious case study”, New Community vol. 12, no. 3 (1985), pp. 490–502 (490). 53 Ibid., p. 495. 54 For a more detailed discussion of religious slaughter in a European context, see Bergeaud-Blackler, Florence, “Social definitions of halal quality: The case of Maghrebi Muslims in France”, in M. Harvey, A. McMeekin and A. Warde (eds), Qualities of Food (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004); BergeaudBlackler, Florence, “New challenges for Islamic ritual slaughter: A European perspective”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 6 (2007), pp. 965–980. 55 Charlton and Kaye, “Politics of religious slaughter”, p. 490; Kaye, Ronald, “The politics of religious slaughter of animals: Strategies for ethno-religious political action”, New Community, vol. 19, no. 2 (1993), pp. 251–261; Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain. Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims: Bradford in the 1990s (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Vertovec, Steven, “Muslims, the state, and the public sphere in Britain”, in G. Nonneman, T. Niblock and B. Szajkowski (eds), Muslim Communities in the New Europe (Reading UK: Ithaca Press, 1996), pp. 169–186. 56 Ansari, Humayun, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800 (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 355.


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of halal, which largely focuses on ritual slaughter and pork and alcohol avoidance, been re-signified and assumed new meanings in terms of what is pure, sacred, appropriate or healthy. 6

Halal II: ‘Doubled in Size for 2006’?

In November 2005, the Halal Exhibition at the major World Food Market (WFM) in London was held for the first time. In addition to the large number of booths displaying halal products, WFM also offered seminars on the business potential of halal in the rapidly expanding ‘ethnic food’ or ‘world food’ market. The quotation in this heading is taken from a claim made in a pamphlet promoting the World Food Market held in 2006 in London that, compared with 2005, this event had “doubled in size for 2006”. The exhibition may have “doubled in size”, but the statement also reflects a broader halal hype in London. A large number of companies and Islamic organisations are represented at the Halal Exhibition, each with a particular understanding of what can be considered proper halal consumption. Companies at the Halal Exhibition also present a whole range of new products, such as chocolate and toothpaste, which can be subjected to divergent forms of standardisation and certification. Supermarkets such as Tesco and Asda have introduced a halal chocolate bar.57 Among other slogans, the advertising says, “Community & chocolate close to your heart? Isn’t it time your chocolate bar did something more than just taste good?” The bar’s label also carries the wording: “10% of net profit goes to charity”. In addition to the large number of booths displaying halal products, WFM also offered seminars on the business potential of halal in the rapidly expanding ‘ethnic food’ or ‘world food’ market. The controversial question of halal certification surfaced on the first day of the WFM seminars. A former director of environmental health and consumer affairs services, Dr Yunes Teinaz, who was also an advisor to the London Central Mosque on halal questions, accused many of the companies present of promoting halal products that were not properly halal certified by an Islamic authority. For this advisor, the lack of a state body in Britain that is capable of inspecting the “totally

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www.ummahfoods.com.

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unregulated” halal market has left this market open to fraud, corruption and without any kind of standards, uniform certification or legislation. This, in turn, is distorting the commercially promoted image of halal as healthy, pure and modern food in an era of food scares. In the eyes of this advisor, as well as of many Muslims in London, the Jewish system of kosher certification is seen as a model for the institutionalisation, standardisation and certification of halal in the grey zones between religious revivalism, the state and consumer culture. Present at WFM were, first, numerous Islamic organisations, groups and individuals that understand and practise halal in divergent ways, including the HFA,58 set up in 1994 to certify halal meat. Second, a number of government institutions, such as schools and hospitals were represented in that they are experiencing an increase in halal sensibilities among Muslim groups. Third, several market research firms specialising in ‘ethnic markets’ participated to provide in-depth understanding of the transformation of halal. Finally, a large number of confused Muslim consumers were there to learn how modern understandings and practices of halal are being transformed. In Ahmed’s study of the marketing of halal meat in the UK between local shops and supermarkets, he concludes: “These issues and problems also have religious, traditional, ethical and industrial relations dimensions”.59 The emergence of halal as a global Islamic market evokes a whole range of social, moral and religious questions. Halal lends itself well as examples of types of commodities to which certification as service is important. 7

Islamic Services: Certification, Ethnic Business and Banking

We have seen above that Dr Yunes Teinaz criticised products that were being promoted for not being properly certified. In front of a large audience at a WFM seminar in 2006, he made it clear that there are extensive opportunities for fraud and corruption within the halal trade as well as in the local certifying bodies such as HFA and the

58 59

www.halalfoodauthority.co.uk. Ahmed, “Marketing of halal meat”, p. 667.


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Halal Monitoring Committee (HMC)60—both represented in the audience at the seminar. He called for the Muslim community to “wake up” and “clean up their act”, and finally declared that the state authorities might be willing to “take somebody to court” and “take enforcement action”, but these bodies “feel that the Muslim community has not decided yet what the definition of halal is in the first place”. So-called ‘expert certifiers’, e.g. imams without any real knowledge of halal, are issuing certificates “as long as the money is sent first”. In order to standardise this “totally unregulated” market, he requested the government and the Food Standards Agency61 “to give us a hand so that we can come up with something like standards against which halal food can be inspected”. These views are supported by Dr Yunes Teinaz, who has worked on illegal food and brought cases to court for ten years. As he explained to me: “You can easily buy certification if you pay for it. And they get away with it because there is no control, regulation or inspection from the state.” The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an interest group, warns that up to 90% of the meat and poultry sold as halal in the UK may be being sold illegally and not slaughtered according to Muslim requirements. Consequently, supermarkets such as Asda, Morrisons (the fourth largest supermarket chain in the UK) and Sainsbury’s (the third largest) are marketing their halal meat as 100% halal authorised by the HFA.62 As halal and the aspect of religious slaughter more and more infused Muslim identity in Britain, the need to establish a body of halal butcher shops was recognised. Consequently, in 1994 the HFA was set up with encouragement from the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, a pan-Muslim interest group, and the HFA established a network of approved abattoirs and shops to provide the community with independently certified halal meat.63 On the HFA’s website the organisation is described as a voluntary, non-profit making organisation64 set up to license

60

www.halalmc.co.uk. The Food Standards Agency (www.food.gov.uk) is an independent government department established in 2000 to protect public health and consumer interests in relation to food. 62 Ahmed, Allam, “Marketing of halal meat”, p. 656. 63 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 355. 64 www.halalfoodauthority.co.uk. 61

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johan fischer slaughterhouses, distribution centres, retailers and providers of meat and poultry for human consumption. These licenses are granted on an annual and contractual basis. The HFA inspectors are there to audit and monitor compliance of both Islamic laws and MAFF65 and EU regulations of slaughter. The HFA is also assiduously engaged in regulating, endorsing and authenticating food stuffs, pharmaceuticals, confectionary, toiletries, flavourings, emulsifiers, colourings [. . .] for Muslim usage.

In an increasingly complex food market, these seem bold ambitions for a voluntary organisation. Interestingly, the intentions and activities of the HFA take place in the interfaces between not only the secular and the religious, but apparently also between local, national and international organisations and forms of legislation on food. The HFA is “regulating, endorsing and authenticating” as well as “generating” its funds through fees paid for audit by slaughterhouses and cutting plants.66 In contrast to the Jewish certification and institutionalisation of kosher, the approach to halal among Muslims in Britain has been more fragmented and disunited and “the broad range of emerging political demands may have served to dilute organisational effectiveness”.67 Moreover, Muslim organisations in Britain claiming to represent the Muslim community are of relatively recent origin and often lack both resources and political experience.68 Although the call for halal standards is to a large extent modelled on Jewish kosher certification, Jewish groups in the UK have been more concerted in their effort to impose these requirements and have therefore been more seriously recognised by the state. What some Muslim groups call for is a national standard for halal that can mark a kind of British Muslim unity and identity. The central difference, of course, is that the secular state in Britain is reluctant to extend recognition of a relatively fragmented halal market beyond already existing regulation of food in general. When I visited the HFA, there seemed to be a discrepancy between its visions, ambitions and policies stated on the organisation’s website and the modest office facilities in London housing the organisation’s limited number of staff. My point here is that halal is a significant field

65 66 67 68

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. www.halalfoodauthority.co.uk. Kaye, “Politics of religious slaughter of animals”, p. 251. Ibid., p. 247.


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for claiming recognition in a fragmented religious market whereas practices of regulating halal are highly resource demanding. At WFM in 2005 and 2006, the HFA president Masood Khawaja was present, as was a representative from the HMC, Yunus Dudhwala. The HMC was established in 2003 in Leicester and, contrary to the HFA, is against the stunning of animals before slaughter. These two organisations can be seen as competitors with overlapping interests and claims to authority in the halal market. Many of my informants saw the proliferation of halal in the UK as an overwhelmingly commercial endeavour for which Islam is a vehicle pragmatically employed by Islamic organisations, Islamic nations and the halal industry. However, the HFA president objects to such commercialisation of halal and maintains that there is also a distinctive religious or ethical aspect to halal. This is a significant point because, in the current halal market, a large part of the production and trade is carried out by non-Muslims, so maintaining that there is a definite religious aspect to halal is also a way of linking halal to Muslim groups and their interests. A large part of the research into halal and other forms of religious and ethnic marketing in the UK is carried out by ‘secular’ market research companies such as Mintel69 and Ethnic Focus,70 which are starting to recognise the commercial aspects of halal. The HFA president Masood Khawaja criticises Mintel’s overly commercial approach to halal but, at the same time, supermarkets in London such as Tesco and Asda require products that are halal certified by locally recognised bodies such as the HFA and HMC. Islamic organisations in Britain claim authority through and compete over halal in the interfaces between expanding markets, the secular state, and the rights and demands of Muslim consumers. At the same time, these organisations push for a form of national halal standard, which could be seen as a sign of Muslim unity and identity. So far, these organisations have not been able to unite Muslim groups around a shared vision of standards. As more and more products appear in this expanding market, both Islamic organisations and commercial interests compete over standards and certification in the margins of the secular state. The emergence of this type of Islamic consumption

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www.mintel.com. www.ethnicfocus.com.

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draws attention to the state’s incapacity to regulate halal and thus to recognise a Muslim ‘community’. In Edgware Road you also find a branch of the Islamic Bank of Britain,71 which promotes itself by saying: “As the first stand-alone, Sharia compliant, retail bank in the UK to be authorised by the Financial Services Authority we aim to provide a friendly, inclusive and personal service for all our customers.” The modern ‘recuperation’ of Islamic banking is not necessarily a reflection of its scriptural or medieval contractual forms of the past.72 In all this, the question of interest (riba) is essential. Islamic banking and finance (IBF) covers a worldwide phenomenon: The broadest definition of IBF would include all those activities understood to be financial or economic that seek to avoid riba—itself a term of considerable definitional anxiety—generally through profit-and-loss sharing, leasing, or other forms of equity- or asset-based financing.73

A study of mine74 on IBF among middle-class Malay Muslims in Malaysia showed that this is often associated with a high degree of ambiguity. Moreover, none of my Muslim informants in London were using IBF. The UK is one of the leading European countries in terms of Islamic banking. Compared with IBF in Muslim countries, religious and political influences have been downplayed in the case of the UK, that is, “the emergence of Islamic banks in the United Kingdom is purely based on economic foundations”.75 Several factors have influenced London’s status as a centre for IBF: it is a global city; the attraction of oil wealth influenced the strategy of the financial authorities; the growing wealth of British Muslims represents a new source of funding that requires special facilities; it supports the aim to regulate Islamic banks to stop underground Islamic banking transactions.76

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http://www.islamic-bank.com. Maurer, Bill, Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral Reason (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 9. 73 Ibid., p. 28. 74 Fischer, Johan, Proper Islamic Consumption: Shopping among the Malays in Modern Malaysia (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2008). 75 Aldohni, Abdul Karim. “The emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A comparative study with Muslim countries”, Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2 (2008), pp. 180–198 (198). 76 Ibid., pp. 180–198. 72


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In much the same way as certification and ethnic/religious marketing/business can be seen to purify commodities and services, Islamic banking may be about controlling or purifying money: The truth of money is that it is (simply) a sign, humanly created, not ordained from on high. If it is humanly created, it can be recreated and remade into a human good.77

This point, I think, can also be applied to services such as certification and ethnic/religious marketing. In a broader perspective, the Islamic market for services lends itself well to be conceptualised as a form of millennial capitalism in which consumption presently works as “the factor, the principle, held to determine definitions of value, the construction of identities, and even the shape of the global ecumene”.78 8

Discussion: Islam, Shopping, Recognition

This final section will discuss some broader issues that arise from the previous discussions of the emergence of an Islamic market for identities in which paraphernalia, dress, halal and services play an important role. In Faisal Devji’s book Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity,79 he argues that 9/11 has transformed Islam into both an agent and a product of globalisation, making it a global phenomenon that demands an opinion about itself. Ironically, the demonisation of Islam and Muslims that followed in the wake of 9/11 was complemented by the recognition that Muslims were also consumers with certain demands that were open to commercialisation. It is in this context that the empirical material from London should also be seen, that is, modern Islamic markets are global in scope. This point also has salience in the wider European context of free markets and trade that may reinforce intensified flows of Islamic commodities and services. Shopping has become a patriotic duty in mass culture,80 especially now in times of an economic crisis that is also felt across Europe. 77

Maurer, Mutual Life, Limited, p. 166. Comaroff, Jean and John L. Comaroff, “Millennial capitalism: First thoughts on a second coming”, Public Culture, vol. 12, no. 5 (2000) p. 294. 79 Devji, Faisal, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (London: Hurst, 2005). 80 Fischer, Johan, “Boycott or buycott? Malay middle-class consumption post-9/11”, Ethnos, vol. 72, no. 1 (2007), pp. 29–50 and Zukin, Sharon, Point of Purchase: How Shopping Changed American Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 14. 78

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Therefore, a number of moral imperatives related to shopping link the shopping of individuals and groups with national sentiments and discourses. Our decisions about where to shop and what to shop for separate us from others but, at the same time, shopping exposes us to the presence and gaze of others.81 In this sense, shopping as a public activity is inescapably linked to the performance and spatial context of Islamic markets. Shopping is “the zero point where the whole economy of people, products, and money comes together”.82 Of course, the British and European Muslim population is highly diverse. One way of conceptualising Muslim diversity draws attention to the debates about what Islam is or ought to be and the divergent responses produced by these controversies. 83 The focus is “on the field of debate and discussion in which participants construct discursive linkages to texts, phrases, and ideas held to be part of the universal tradition of Islam”.84 Discourse is applied to stress its centrality with regard to “social pragmatics”, namely “speech events; the cultural importance of commentary on those events; and the heterogeneous, ‘dispersive’ quality of religious discourse”85 found in Foucault. In much the same manner, my research among Southeast Asian and British Muslims reflects the force of Islam as a discursive tradition, especially with regard to the way consumption is contested and debated in everyday life. The following example from my research among middle-class Malays in London illustrates a specific point of tension or distinction between a modern Muslim puristic and a pragmatic orientation. While the moral stress on proper Muslim consumption with regard to paraphernalia, dress, halal and services is morally given among a more puristically oriented group, pragmatic Muslims either reluctantly accept the imposition of this form of Islamic moralism or simply reject it as a material and thus shallow display of belief—as Islamic materialism or excess. An informant of mine, Nur, who was a woman in her 30s, clearly represented the more pragmatically inclined group. She explained the distinction between her personal position and “the

81

Zukin, Point of Purchase, p. 2. Ibid., p. 14. 83 Bowen, John R., Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 84 Ibid., p. 8. 85 Ibid., p. 9. 82


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other group” and emphasised that Islamic consumption in all its forms had become expressive of an unbearable moralism among those who, through proper Islamic consumption, tried to perform the role of perfectly pious Muslims. In other words, to Nur, this moralistic attitude was merely a public performance intended to display proper and balanced consumption and taste. Indicative of her more pragmatic stance, she concluded, “Islamic belief alone should be fine”. Among Muslims in London, I found this form of discursive tension to be central. Indeed, the idea of Islam as a discursive tradition is not recent, but rather an immanent feature of the history of Islam. Asad86 argues that an anthropology of Islam should be built on the central concept of Islam as a discursive tradition, involving diverse interpretations of the Islamic past and future with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present. Consumption or shopping as a point of debate in Europe can be seen to constitute such a new domain of contestation. The point here is that emerging Islamic markets may be just as contestable to some Muslims as they can be between groups of Muslims and non-Muslims, for example in the case of divergent understandings of proper/improper dress. In the end, social identity, Bourdieu maintains, is defined, asserted, and practised through difference.87 As we saw in the case of distinctions between Islamists and secularists in Turkey, the politics of identity within these groups has been deeply influenced by an expanding consumer market in the context of the globalisation of the 1980s and 1990s and this tendency, I would argue, has been accelerated in the new millennium. In William James’s seminal work Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature,88 he argues that the “æsthetic motive” is endemic to religion.89 It is central to James’s conceptualisation of religion that “the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance”.90 For Muslims, the Islamic market may simultaneously be a manifestation of the visible and mundane world of shopping on the one hand and a spiritual universe on the

86 Asad, Talal, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1986), p. 14. 87 Bourdieu, Pierre, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 172. 88 James, William, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 89 Ibid., p. 355. 90 Ibid., p. 375.

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other hand, that helps shape both a moral and an aesthetic community. With respect to British Pakistanis as an aesthetic community, for example, Werbner argues that this is intertwined with the moral community so that “ideas about purity and pollution, good and evil articulate the two and [. . .] may generate moral conflicts about the legitimacy of aesthetic forms, or, indeed, of a morality which rejects these valorised forms”.91 Theological aesthetics considers religion in relation to sensible knowledge, that is, sensation, imagination and feeling.92 Islamic markets are good examples of the interplay between aesthetics and the more mundane, in the form of shopping that is also informed by convenience, thrift and health, for example. The proliferation and transformation of modern forms of halal in Britain sheds light on the way in which halal as a theological concept is being resignified. Insightfully, Asad93 asks what the connection is between ‘the secular’ as an epistemic category and ‘secularism’ as a political doctrine. A preliminary answer is that ‘the secular’ comprises concepts, practices and sensibilities that conceptually are prior to secularism.94 Modood writes that “political secularism can no longer be taken for granted but is having to answer its critics as there is growing understanding that the incorporation of Muslims has become the most important challenge of egalitarian multiculturalism”.95 Egalitarian multiculturalism builds on the idea that identities are partly given shape or denied by the recognition or non-recognition of others: “Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.”96 More specifically, there is a demand, as in the case of halal and dress, for example, for public institutions to acknowledge “ways 91 Werbner, Pnina, “The fusion of identities: Political passion and the poetics of cultural performance among British Pakistanis”, in D. Parkin, L. Caplan and H. Fisher (eds), The Politics of Cultural Performance (Oxford and London: Berghahn Books, 1996), pp. 81–100 (92). 92 Viladesau, Richard, Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty and Art (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 11. 93 Asad, Talal, Formations of the Secular; Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 1. 94 Ibid., p. 16. 95 Modood, Tariq, “British Muslims and the politics of multiculturalism”, in T. Modood and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 37–54 (37). 96 Taylor, Charles. “The politics of recognition”, in C. Taylor and A. Gutman (eds), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–74 (26).


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of doing things”97 privately as well as publicly; that is, while powerful political discourses and bodies regulate and discipline Islamic dress and banking, halal is largely outside state control. The modern market for Islamic identities is sensitive to both excessive as well as insufficient regulation and control by states in Europe. In modern consumer societies such as Britain, the state plays a crucial role in trying to balance the forces of religion and markets. In shopping, the whole economy of people, products, and money come together, but shopping and markets also generate debates about what Islam is or ought to be and divergent responses produced by these controversies. For some Muslims, the Islamic market may simultaneously be a manifestation of the visible and mundane world of shopping on the one hand and a spiritual universe on the other, that helps shape both a moral and an aesthetic community. ‘The secular’ plays an important role in balancing regulation, control and the rights of consumers in modern societies. Modern citizens, religious or not, tend to be recognised as democratic consumers with rights in the interface between markets and the state. 9 Conclusion Britain does indeed qualify as a “consumers’ republic”.98 The consumers’ republic embodies a post-WWII strategy, emerging in order to reconstruct the nation’s economy and to reaffirm its democratic values by promoting the expansion of mass consumption. Policymakers, business, labour leaders and civic groups all try to put mass consumption at the centre of their plans for a prosperous nation. The health of the economy itself is measured according to indicators such as consumer confidence, spending and housing construction.99 In the Islamic market, identities, discourses, distinctions, the secular and recognition tend to meet and be contested. London has become a European centre for Islamic markets during the last decade or so and this has changed the Islamic business

97 Modood, Tariq, Multicultural Politics. Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, p. 134. 98 Cohen, Lizabeth, A consumers’ republic. The politics of mass consumption in postwar America (New York: Vintage Books, 2004). 99 Ibid., p. 401.

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and entrepreneurial environment in Britain. The global proliferation of Islamic commodities and services that are advertised as pure, pious and wholesome are part of a market for identities. As a global city, London links the national as well as European economy with global circuits of commodities, people and ideas, and this is also the case with the Islamic marketplace. Emerging Islamic markets reflect a particular type of urban exchangeability that is imbricated in the mundane practices of everyday shopping to effect charisma among Muslims. In the eyes of some Muslims, the Islamic market is a way to control or purify money/shopping in everyday transactions. However, these ideals or practices are part of Islam as a discursive tradition, especially with regard to the way consumption is contested and debated in everyday life. Islamic markets, like any other market, are sensitive to both excessive as well as insufficient regulation and control by the state. In modern consumer societies such as Britain, the state is trying to balance the forces of religion and markets. In the end, modern citizens, religious or not, tend to be recognised as democratic consumers with rights in the interface between markets and the state.

ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE BALKANS: A SURVEY Ahmet Alibašić1 The Muslim population of South Eastern Europe,2 excluding the European part of Turkey, numbers around nine million, almost all of them being indigenous save for small immigrant Muslim minorities in Greece and Romania (see Table I). The Balkan Muslim communities originated with the Ottoman presence in the region and for centuries their destiny was tied to the fortunes of the Ottoman state. Even nowadays the Ottoman past and legacy determine to a large extent the way Balkan Muslims are perceived by non-Muslim populations. They remained part of the Pax Ottomana and lived and developed under its umbrella until 1832 (Greece), 1878 (Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania), and 1913 (Sandžak, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia). Within the Ottoman state, Balkan Muslims were an integral part of Ottoman economic, political, social and cultural life, so the collapse of the Ottoman system represented a major cultural shock. From then onwards Balkan Muslims were on their own, having to deal with hostile Christian Orthodox nationalisms in South Eastern Europe and soon after that with equally unfriendly Communist regimes. In the turbulent decades that followed almost all features related to Islam became at various times targets of popular hatred and destructive state action. Ties between Istanbul and the Balkans were quickly severed and the network of formal Islamic educational institutions became fragmented and was often completely destroyed. Practically all Balkan Muslim communities experienced breakdowns in the system of Islamic education after the World War II. The former Yugoslavia had the biggest Muslim 1 Ahmet Alibašić is a lecturer in the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo. The author would to thank all those who helped him gather the information for this paper. In particular thanks go to Aziz Shakir, Ahmed Topkev, Xhabir Hamiti, Hasan Cilo, Olsi Yazexhi, Hajrudin Hodžić, Hasan Musić and Almir Pramenković, but the author takes responsibility for any mistakes, which are his alone. 2 The terms ‘South Eastern Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ are used interchangeably in this article and include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia.

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ahmet alibašić Table 1: Major Institutions of Islamic Higher Education in the Balkans, 2008

Institution

City / Country

Established

No. of students

No. of Graduates

Faculty of Islamic Studies Higher Islamic Institute Faculty of Islamic Studies Faculty of Islamic Education Faculty of Islamic Education Faculty of Islamic Studies Faculty of Islamic Studies Total

Sarajevo, B&H

1977

800

580

Sofia, Bulgaria

1991

100

285

Prishtina, Kosovo

1992

100

118

Zenica, B&H

1993

471

597

Bihać, B&H

1996

172

291

Skopje, Macedonia

1997

80

90

Novi Pazar, Serbia

2001

230

35

Ca 1953

Ca 1996

population and the mildest of all the dictatorships; nevertheless, only one madrasa was allowed to continue to function immediately after WWII, although Bosnia and Herzegovina alone had previously had 23 madrasas. The only institution of Islamic higher education in the region, the Higher Islamic Theological School in Sarajevo, was closed in 1946. After a rapprochement with the Muslim world, the Yugoslav regime allowed Islamic higher education to resume in Sarajevo in 1977. After the collapse of the Soviet block and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, other Islamic institutes were opened in Prishtina, Sofia, Skopje, etc. Today Muslim needs for Islamic higher education are serviced by seven faculties with a total current undergraduate student population of 1,950 students and about 2,000 graduates to date (Table 1). We now turn to these institutes. Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) Bosnian Muslims manage their Islamic affairs through a non-governmental, country-wide, independent organisation called the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH) established in 1882 and currently headed by rais al-ulama or the grand mufti Dr Mustafa

islamic higher education in the balkans

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Cerić.3 The ICBH operates six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (est. 1537) in Sarajevo; Behram-bey Madrasa (est. 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla; Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (est. 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik; Osman-ef. Redžović Madrasa (est. 1992) in Visoko; Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (est. 1993.) in Cazin; and Karađoz-Bey Madrasa (est. 1557, re-established in 1995) in Mostar. The curricula of these schools have changed significantly over the past decade, transforming them from imam and religious instructor training institutions into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Some 400 students (with roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools, and most of them go on to study at public universities in fields other than Islamic studies. The graduates of these madrasas, and especially of Ghazi Husrev Bey Madrasa, have made careers as politicians, diplomats, businessmen, academics, intellectuals, writers, etc. Probably the most famous graduate of Sarajevo madrasa is the current member of Bosnian Presidency and former foreign minister Dr Haris Silajdžić. In addition, the ICBH operates three major higher educational institutions: the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo (est. 1977, www.fin.ba); the Islamic Education Faculty in Zenica (est. 1993); and the Islamic Education Faculty in Bihać (est. 1996). For several years after the introduction of confessional religious education in Bosnian state schools in the early 1990s, the state Džemal Bijedić University in Mostar offered a two-year programme for training Islamic religious education teachers (1997–2002). The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo was established in 1977 by the ICBH and is the oldest and most prestigious institution of Islamic higher education in South Eastern Europe. However, as in the case of other Islamic educational institutions in the Balkans, the faculty builds upon a much longer tradition of Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began with the building of the first mosques, tekkes and primary schools (muallimhana) in the first half of the fifteenth century. This tradition continued with the building of madrasas, haniqas, Dar al-Qur’an and Dar al-Hadith schools in the sixteenth century.

3 For more information, see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 43–57.

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More recently the faculty also became heir to the Shari‘a School for Shari‘a judges founded by the Austro-Hungarian government in 1887 to train Muslim judges and later renamed the Higher School of Islamic Theology and Shari‘a, which was closed in 1946 after the abolition of the Shari‘a court system in Socialist Yugoslavia.4 Its neo-Moorish style building is the current home to the faculty. In September 2004, the faculty became an affiliated member of the University of Sarajevo, which means it has autonomy in developing its programmes but must abide by university rules regarding quality assurance, teacher promotion and similar issues.5 The faculty has a stable source of funding, most of which comes from the Bayt al-Mal, a special fund of the ICBH, which has been replenished by zakah and zakat al-fitr since the 1970s. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo offers undergraduate and postgraduate programmes of study and undertakes academic research in the field of Islamic studies and other closely related disciplines, such as Arabic language and literature. There are three major undergraduate programmes: Islamic Theology (usul al-din), Religious Education (altarbiyya al-diniyya, and training for imams, khatibs (preachers), and muallims (teachers). The first two programmes last for eight semesters and the third lasts for six. The Islamic theology major offers students qualified instruction in Islamic studies and introduces them to scholarly research in this field. Graduates are awarded the bachelor’s degree (BA) in Islamic Studies. The programme is planned in such a way as to offer students an insight into the most relevant human and social sciences in addition to instruction in traditional Islamic disciplines, and prepares students to take on religious and educational responsibilities in the ICBH, and various cultural, educational and social activities requiring education in humanities. Many graduates continue their education abroad (in the USA, UK, Germany, Australia or Croatia, for example), while some have become members of parliament and ministers. The Religious Education major, introduced in 1992, offers students instruction in the field of religious education and introduces them to scholarly research in this field. Graduates are awarded the BA in Religious Education. The programme offers students a combination of religious, pedagogical, linguistic and general subjects and prepares 4

Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Habsburg Times (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999). 5 Bušatlić, Ismet (ed.), Fakultet islamskih nauka u Sarajevu 2006/2007 (Sarajevo: FIN, 2006), p. 9.


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them for work in the field of religious education and religious culture in the ICBH, state schools, pre-school institutions and the media. The imam, khatib and muallim training programme, set up in 2006, caters for the Muslim community’s need for qualified imams, preachers and religious instructors in mosques. In 2006, the ICBH decided that imams should be university graduates; previously, graduates of madrasas could be employed as imams. Since 1994, the faculty has offered postgraduate programmes in Islamic Studies at both Masters and doctoral levels, in addition to undergraduate degrees. The faculty enrolls some 300 full-time students and another 500 part-time. So far about 580 male and female students have graduated, in addition to 25 Masters and 15 PhD graduates. At present, the faculty employs around 40 teaching staff (17 PhDs and 10 MA holders), all Bosnian nationals except for a visiting professor of Arabic language. For several years now the faculty has had enough qualified staff to satisfy all the relevant university criteria. They have been trained all over the world, from Kuala Lumpur, Riyadh and Cairo in the east, to Zagreb, Madrid and Chicago in the West. In some respects, the faculty is a sort of melting pot. The language of instruction is Bosnian although MA theses and PhD dissertations may be written in Arabic or English. The faculty does not yet have its own student accommodation, but construction has started and will take several years to complete. The faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic Studies, a three-month non-degree programme in Bosnian and English for laymen and women who want to know more about Islam in general and Islam and Islamic culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. It is designed to provide an introductory insight into the doctrine, law, history and culture of Islam with special focus on Islam in the Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This programme is a part of the faculty’s response to the needs of the community and contemporary challenges, which over the years has resulted in a number of changes and amendments to the curriculum and an expansion of the academic programme. In the academic year 2002/2003 a comprehensive reform of the entire undergraduate programme was implemented, bringing it more in line with the requirements of the Bologna process. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established by the ICBH in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic education academies with two-year programmes to meet the demand for teachers

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of Islamic religious education in public schools after the introduction of confessional religious education in 1991. In 2004, both schools acquired the status of university faculties. The faculty in the central Bosnian town Zenica (www.ipf.unze.ba) now offers three different undergraduate programmes leading to BA degrees in Islamic Pedagogy, Social Pedagogy (since 2005) and PreSchool Teacher Education (since 2008). Social Pedagogy is an eightsemester programme, while the other two last for six semesters. Since 2009, the faculty has offered an MA in Quality Management in Religious Education. In many respects this faculty has proved itself to be the most innovative of all the Islamic faculties in the Balkans. It has managed to cross closed religious barriers and offer training for more general vocations such as social pedagogue and pre-school teacher. The curricula for the three programmes are quite different. The Islamic Pedagogy programme consists of four groups of subjects: religious (Qur’an recitation, tafsir, hadith, fiqh, ‘aqida, and da‘wa), pedagogical, linguistic and general. So far, the faculty has produced about 600 graduates, most of them in Islamic Pedagogy (582). Around 60% of all students and graduates are women. The faculty currently has 471 enrolled students, now mostly in the Social Pedagogy department (222). These students are taught by nine PhD holders, who are full time employees of the faculty and another 14 PhDs who are part-time lecturers at the institute. In 2004, the faculty became part of the University of Zenica. The faculty is funded mostly by the local authorities (70% by the region, or canton), donations and student fees. The faculty in the western Bosnian town of Bihać (www.ipf.unbi .ba), established by the ICBH in 1995/1996, is the smallest of the three Islamic faculties in Bosnia in terms of student population but has the best facilities and dormitory of all the Balkan Islamic faculties. The building was paid for by Saudi Arabia and opened in 2002. It also started as an academy with a two-year programme and later became a university faculty with a three-year programme very similar to that of the Zenica faculty. The Bihać faculty has been part of the local university since 1997.6 So far it has produced 291 graduates, of whom some 40% are women. Currently the faculty has 172 enrolled students (30% being women) and employs four PhDs and an MA holder. The faculty

6 For more on Islamic education in Bosnia, see Alibašić and Zubčević, “Islamic education”.


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is funded by the local cantonal government but it may prove difficult to sustain with only one programme on offer. Of these three institutions of Islamic higher education, the faculty in Sarajevo has the longest tradition and is considered the most prestigious. Rais al-ulema Dr Mustafa Cerić has suggested that this faculty, together with the Ghazi Husrev-bey Library (est. 1537), could be the nucleus of a future international Islamic university.7 Even at present, the importance of these institutions crosses Bosnia’s borders since it attracts students from the neighbouring countries, mainly the former Yugoslavian republics. Kosovo The Republic of Kosovo has one Islamic high school, the Alauddin Madrasa in Prishtina, which has two branches - in Prizren and Gjilan. Both male and female students are currently admitted. The school was established in 1952 and so far more than 1,300 students have graduated. The curriculum combines religious and non-religious subjects. Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies (www.fsi-ks.org) was established in 1992 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the abrupt break from the previous centre of Islamic learning in Sarajevo. As the first institution of higher Islamic teaching in Albanian, it has also attracted Albanian speaking students from Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia and Southern Serbia (the Presheva Valley). Teachers are ethnic Albanians who completed their studies either in Kosovo or overseas. Currently, the faculty offers only a four-year undergraduate programme and enrolls some 100 students, 30% of whom are female. In 2008/2009, the faculty admitted 14 full-time and 17 part-time new students. By mid-2009, 166 male and female students had graduated. In terms of the curriculum, of all the Islamic faculties in the Balkans this faculty is the least open to non-religious courses. With the exception of Arabic language and a couple of Islamic philosophy courses, only courses in the traditional Islamic disciplines of Qur’an recitation, tafsir, hadith, ‘aqida, Islamic jurisprudence, sira, d ‘wa, etc., are offered.

7 Cerić, Mustafa, A Draft Proposal for the Gazi Husrev-bey University, ed. Willem B. Drees and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008), pp. 326–332.

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No courses in psychology, sociology, or pedagogy are included. The faculty employs seven PhDs and five MA holders. The faculty is financed by the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK), and students pay only a nominal fee. The faculty currently occupies an old building in urgent need of repair and has no student accommodation. However, plans for a long delayed new building are finally moving forward and the Zayid Charitable Foundation in the UAE has committed funds for its construction. Both the Alauddin Madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies are under the jurisdiction of the ICK. Despite the fact that the legal status of religious communities has not been finalized, graduates’ diplomas were accepted and recognised by the Ministry of the Education of Kosovo until 2008, but the faculty is currently experiencing some problems with the accreditation process. Faculty graduates are commonly employed as imams and teachers of Islamic education within the community, since no confessional religious education is allowed in public schools.8 Macedonia Skopje is home to the Isa Bey Madrasa, a religious secondary school established in 1984 and run by the Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia (IRCM). The madrasa has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country such as Tetovo and Gostivar for girls and Shtip for boys. The Skopje division admits both boys and girls. It teaches Islam as a core curriculum subject, which is not subject to approval by any state agency and so the school is not funded by the state but by the IRCM. However, in 2009 the Ministry of Education and Science decided that, from 2010, Isa Bey Madrasa would become a publicly funded school operating under the ministry’s supervision. The changes will also entail changes in the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. The main Islamic higher educational institution in Macedonia is the Skopje-based Faculty of Islamic Studies, established in 1997 by the IRCM (www.fshi.edu.mk). The faculty is situated on the outskirts of Skopje in the building of the Isa Bey Madrasa. In 2008, Parliament 8 Hamiti, Xhabir, “Islamic education in Kosovo”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 233–238.


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enacted a law governing the higher education institutions of religious communities, which provided for the Faculty of Islamic Studies to be transformed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. This entitles the Faculty to state funding in addition to donations from other sources, mainly the IRCM. In addition to studying at the faculty, Muslim religious personnel in Macedonia are trained abroad at Islamic studies faculties, mainly in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Bosnia. As in Prishtina, the only current curriculum is heavily focused on the traditional Islamic disciplines of Qur’an recitation, tafsir, hadith, ‘aqida, and Islamic law. The language of instruction is Albanian, although students may take examinations in Macedonian and, as a reflection of the pluralistic nature of the country, the curriculum includes a number of language courses: Arabic is taught in all eight semesters, Ottoman Turkish in six, English in four, and Albanian and Macedonian are offered in two semesters each. As in Prishtina, no social science courses are included. There are plans to start a religious education programme. By mid-2008, about 90 people had graduated while some 80 students are currently enrolled, 80% of them women. The faculty currently employs five PhDs and several MA holders. Constant quarreling within the IRCM has severely hampered the faculty’s development. Serbia The Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS) runs the Gazi Isa Bey Madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies, both in Novi Pazar. The madrasa (http://medresa.net/) is an Islamic high school whose male section was established in 1990, while the section for girls was opened in 1996. Another girls’ section in Rožaje (Montenegro) was opened in 2001. The Faculty of Islamic Studies (www.fis.edu.rs) was established in 2001 as an Islamic Academy of Education with two-year courses, and became a faculty with four-year courses in 2005. Today, it mainly provides training for future imams and Islamic religious education teachers in public schools. Programmes are offered at undergraduate, MA and PhD levels in six fields: Qur’an and Sunna, Shari‘a, da‘wa and media, ‘aqida and comparative religion, religious education, and Orientalism. The language of instruction is Bosnian. Many of the teaching staff are visiting lecturers from Bosnia and Macedonia. Some 230

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students are currently enrolled at undergraduate level and the faculty has so far awarded 35 BAs. Because of the flexibility of the study programmes, some students come from abroad, mainly Bosnia. The curriculum very much resembles that of the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. The main source of funding is student fees, in addition to a contribution from the ICiS. In addition to these two institutions, the ICiS runs the International University of Novi Pazar (www.uninp.edu.rs), which is formally registered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in a number of towns throughout Serbia, which are attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim students.9 The Faculty of Islamic Studies is an affiliated member of the university. Bulgaria The Islamic education system in Bulgaria consists of three secondary schools, Qur’anic courses and the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. The three Islamic secondary schools are located in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad. The graduates from these schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any study field.10 Several Qur’anic schools are sponsored by various foreign organisations, but under the control of the Chief Muftiate. At the top of this education system is the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. The Islamic Institute was established in 1991 as a semi-higher institution, and was transformed into a higher institute in 1998 (http:// islamicinstitute-bg.org/). The institute’s charter envisages both undergraduate and postgraduate studies, but currently only an undergraduate programme is offered. The main mission of the institute is to train spiritual leaders for the local Muslim community, i.e., muftis, imams, preachers, and religious education teachers. The graduates receive a BA in Islamic Theology. There is also a possibility for graduates to sit a number of additional examinations and receive the title of ‘Specialist

9 Savić, Svenka, “Some notes on Islamic education in Serbia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 449–456. 10 About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of Muslims in Bulgaria in 1,217 mosques and 240 masjids; see Merjanova, Ina, “Administering Islam in Bulgaria: Legal, political, and cultural aspects”, unpublished paper presented at the Islam in South East Europe Forum (ISEEF)’s conference “Administration of Islamic Affairs in Secular States: Southeast European Experience”, Sarajevo, 17–19 April 2009.


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in the History and Culture of Eastern Peoples’ from the New Bulgarian University in Sofia (http://genmufti.net/bg/education/43–vii.html). On average there are 100 students at the institute at any one time, most of them full time. Imams, muftiate officials and teachers of religious education can attend the Institute as part-time students provided that they are not more than 35 years old. The institute has admitted female students since 1993 and they currently constitute more than 30% of the student body. Most students are of Turkish background, while Pomaks and Roma students make up 30% and 10% respectively. After graduation they can teach Islam in state schools. During the period 1991–1998 the Semi-Higher Islamic Institute produced 123 graduates, while 162 students have graduated from the Higher Islamic Institute since it came into being in 1998. The curriculum resembles very much that in Ilahiyat faculties in Turkey and religious courses are taught by Turkish professors certified by the Diyanet and the languages of instruction are Turkish and Bulgarian. Currently there are 22 lecturers, 12 of whom have PhDs and two MAs. The institute makes special efforts to train PhDs of Islamic theology from among local Muslims. The curriculum consists of compulsory and elective courses. Tuition, accommodation and food are provided to students free of charge and in certain cases students receive extra support. The institute owns its own premises but does not own student accommodation, so students live in flats for which the institute pays rent. During the period 1991–1998, the institute was supported financially by a Turkish non-governmental organisation. However, since the end of 1990s, it has been operating under a Commission established by an official protocol signed by the Bulgarian and Turkish governments, which is composed of representatives from the Bulgarian and Turkish Muslim communities,11 and is financed through the Chief Muftiate, with most funds actually coming from Turkey. It is does not receive financial support from the Bulgarian state. The institute is currently seeking state accreditation.

11 Badran, Margot, “Finding Islam”, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 20–26 November 2001, no. 552; http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/552/feature.htm.

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ahmet alibašić Albania, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia

These countries do not have any institution of Islamic higher education. There are several madrasas in Albania run by the Muslim Community of Albania (MCA) and some Albanian and foreign Muslim NGOs. The MCA operates seven high schools, two primary schools and five other courses. However, there is no institute of Islamic higher education in Albania so Albanian Muslims are dependent on institutions abroad for training their imams and religious teachers. Since both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches have their institutes of higher learning, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised in Albania since 2005, with repeated requests being made to the government by the MCA.12 The response has been positive in principle, but the university has not yet been established for a combination of political reasons and lack of local human resources. When approached by foreign parties willing to support the project, the government has refused them all. Given the eagerness of the largely staunchly secularist Albanian elite to control the Muslim community, some observers doubt that the establishment of an independent Islamic faculty or university will be permitted in the foreseeable future. Others suspect that the Albanian state may grant permission, if only to prevent students from going to study Islam abroad. The Islamic Community in Croatia has been running the Dr Ahmed Smajlović Islamic Religious High School since 1992. In 2006, because it had only low numbers of applicants, it became a general Islamic high school with a curriculum harmonised with that of state high schools. Islamic subjects are covered, but a graduate does not receive the title of imam.13 Several years ago there were plans to establish an Islamic faculty in Zagreb, but little progress has been made and the feasibility of the project as a whole is questionable. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Greece an imam training school was foreseen by Act 1920/1991 but it has not been established. Most of the country’s imams are grad-

12 Jazexhi, Olsi, “Albania”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen et al. (eds), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 15–23 (19). 13 See also: Jerolimov, Dinka Marinović and Ankica Marinović Bobinac, “Islamische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 239–258.


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uates of the two madrasas in Thrace or from the imam hatip schools in Turkey (the madrasas in Xanthi and Ehinos are considered as backward by the Turkish Muslim minority and are attended mostly by Pomaks), and some imams may be even be self-trained. However, madrasa graduates can no longer become imams without first attending university, usually in Turkey,14 so madrasa graduates tend to continue their studies at the teacher training college in Thessaloniki and become primary school teachers. Muslims in Montenegro got their first modern madrasa on 8 October 2008, the last school of its kind having been closed by the Montenegrin authorities in 1918. Its curriculum is similar to the state curriculum, with additional religious subjects, and the school is regarded as the most important project of the Islamic Community in Montenegro (ICM). The school is recognised by the government but is still in the process of full integration into the state education system. Currently, it has only two classes for boys in the first and second years, but the ICM is working hard to create conditions for the admission of girls too. Romania too has no institution of Islamic higher education. The last Islamic high school in Romania was closed by the Communists in 1967, but reopened in 1996 in Medgidia. Today all Islamic theology graduates study for their diplomas abroad. As in many other ex-Communist countries, their qualifications are subject to recognition by the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the mufti. Disputes emerge when the mufti refuses to endorse qualifications obtained in the Arab world15 on suspicion of their holders being influenced by an extremist interpretation of Islam. It is worth noting that Turkey does not recognise most Islamic studies qualifications received abroad either. There are no institutions of Islamic higher or high school education in Slovenia. Some Slovenian youths attend madrasas in Zagreb or Bosnia. Most Slovenian imams are trained at institutions in BosniaHerzegovina.16

14 Angeliki, Ziaka, “Muslims and Muslim education in Greece”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.) (Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 141–178. 15 Tanase, Laurenţiu D., “Study Regarding the Muslim community and the Islamic education in Romania”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 367–402. 16 Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 475–492; Schreiner, Stefan, “Seat of knowledge and mediator between the cultures”, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/

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ahmet alibašić General Observations

The combined student population of the seven Islamic faculties in the Balkans is approximately 1,950, mostly male, and including a significant percentage of part-time students. The total number of graduates is around 2,000 with Sarajevo and Zenica (both in Bosnia) producing the highest and second highest number. The most common languages of instruction are Bosnian and Albanian, with Turkish used at the Sofia institute. Practically all these faculties are at early stages of development. They are locally oriented, their mission usually being to serve the needs of the local community with religious leaders. None of them has ventured beyond its regional or linguistic borders or tried to attract students from outside the region. In fact, these faculties do not satisfy even the local needs for Islamic higher education and large numbers of Muslims students from the region study in other Muslims countries. These students come back with new ideas and skills and a broader academic training and establish new connections in their places of study. Problems occasionally arise when they introduce locally unacceptable interpretations, but the local Islamic administration has usually managed to help these returning graduates to adapt to local religious traditions. It is, however, regrettable that no interest has been ignited in the local faculties to develop a truly international programme of Islamic Studies in English and Arabic, despite numerous initiatives from abroad, by both Muslim and non-Muslim agencies, although there is potential for development in this direction at the faculty in Sarajevo and it remains to be seen whether the idea of an Islamic University in Sarajevo will materialise. The main obstacle to more intensive regional cooperation has been the existing linguistic and political barriers. Most Balkan Muslims do not speak “Muslim” languages other than their own, except for Muslims in Macedonia, be they ethnic Albanians, Turks or others, and to some extent in Kosovo, where Muslims often learn one or two additional local languages such as Bosnian/Serbian, Macedonian

show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-925/i.html. Schreiner writes: “The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo is the most important institute of Islamic higher education, research and teaching in Europe. It is the living proof that Islam has its place in the modern academic world.”


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and Turkish. The older generations who grew up in Yugoslavia often know Serbian very well. In addition, various security and political problems, such as the non-recognition of Kosovo travel documents by the Bosnian authorities, have severely impaired Muslim regional cooperation. The political sensitivity of such cooperation also plays a role: some Muslim communities self-censor and keep a low profile or even abstain from more intensive cooperation with other Muslim institutions for fear of being labeled pan-Islamists, although there has recently been closer contact between Albanian and Bosnian institutions. Internal communal disputes also impair institutional development. Overall, more interest in cooperation with local Islamic faculties has come from abroad, from both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, than exists among the faculties themselves. Several memoranda of understanding have been signed, but none has led to any significant or lasting cooperative project. Practically all of these faculties were founded by local Islamic communities and are very often financed by them, which explains to a large extent why they are generally under-funded. None of the institutes has reached the size that would allow them to offer a more diverse programme. Library and other research facilities are underdeveloped and only a minority of the faculties have their own student accommodation. All are equally jealous of their independence, except for the Sofia institute, which receives significant support from Turkish Diyanet. It is a peculiarity of the Bosnian faculties that they have become (affiliated) members of state universities while still enjoying extensive autonomy in curriculum development. Governments are in principle cooperative at present, although in some cases, such as Albania and Serbia, the state remains a major obstacle in the path of the development of Islamic higher education. This is a notable departure from the previous experience of state meddling in religious affairs. For example, the Communist regime explicitly told the Islamic religious authorities not to allow the late Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegović, to teach ethics at the Islamic Theological Faculty in Sarajevo, and he never did. There were other similar cases. While a lot has been achieved in terms of meeting local needs for a university educated religious elite, quality assurance generally remains a problem. Practically none of the institutes has established itself as a centre of educational or research excellence, although the Sarajevo faculty is considered by many to be a successful model that makes

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major contribution to European Islam.17 Curricula and teaching methods generally tend to be static and traditional, with the Zenica faculty being the most innovative. Most of these institutions are still short of PhDs among their teaching staff. A lot has been achieved in the field of gender equality, with female students often constituting around half of the student population, but women are much rarer among the teaching staff. Overall, compared with the 1950s, when only a few Islamic high schools (madrasas) were left operating, the Islamic education institutions in the Balkans of today are developing fast and future prospects look promising, except in Albania. The greatest challenges ahead lie in the areas of legal status, recruiting qualified staff, sustainable funding, and textbook development.

17 Moe, Christian, “A sultan in Brussels? European hopes and fears of Bosnian Muslims”, Sudosteuropa, vol. 55, no. 4 (2007), pp. 374–394.

ISLAM AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN BULGARIA: LOCAL TRADITION VIS-À-VIS GLOBAL CHANGE Simeon Evstatiev and Plamen Makariev1 1

Introduction

In Southeast Europe,2 as in other post-communist regions, the restoration of civil and religious freedoms has often been accompanied by the rediscovery of religious roots. Within the ongoing processes of globalisation, the rapid transformations and re-negotiations of identities have brought about dynamic changes in the ‘social imaginaries’3 of the cultural understandings shared by the religious communities in many different regions of the world. Indeed, there are multiple identities within every society, each with variations and sometimes conflicting subdivisions by status, class, occupation, profession, generation and gender. However, “for many, religion is the only loyalty that transcends local and immediate bonds”.4 Not only in the Middle East, but also in Europe, many Muslims in particular are increasingly turning Islam into a significant public and political force shaping and re-shaping social space. Accelerated to an unprecedented level by the new media and the internet, these developments have opened up new horizons for the formation of transnational public spheres in which religion plays an important social role, and migration and translocality become ever more consequential.

1 Simeon Evstatiev holds a PhD in Middle Eastern and Islamic History from St Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia, Bulgaria, where he is currently Associate Professor of Arabic History and Islamic Studies in the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies, as well as Founding Director of the University Centre for the Study of Religions. Plamen Makariev holds a PhD in Philosophy from St Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia, Bulgaria, where he is currently Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, where he was Head of Department from 1999 to 2007. 2 We use the term ‘Southeastern Europe’ interchangeably with ‘the Balkans’. 3 In the sense in which the term is used in Taylor, Charles, “Modernity and the rise of the public sphere”, in Grethe B. Peterson (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993), vol. 14, pp. 205–260 (213). 4 Lewis, Bernard, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), pp. 5–7.

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Europe, Western and Eastern alike, is involved in new types of networks of transnational relations, discourses and currents in which the influence of religion is expanding and becoming ever more visible. Religious revival and the increasingly visible presence of faith-based communities and groups in public and political life in many regions of the world, including secularist Europe, has been sharply described by Gilles Kepel as “God’s revenge”.5 On a global level, the most marked revivals are those of Islam and the powerful wave of Protestant-based Evangelical Christianity. Indeed, differing views on Muslims’ presence in the West have raised questions about Muslim marginalisation and integration, their success and failure, their identity, culture, religion, and education, all of which have become issues within the last two decades.6

At the same time, traditional churches, such as the Catholic and the Orthodox, seem to face challenges unknown in their previous history. Significantly, in Southeastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia, just as in other countries on this side of the former Iron Curtain, the mass influx after 1989 of religious emissaries and evangelisers from different denominations did not lead to the realisation of expectations of the emergence of a ‘free market of religions’. The majority have instead preferred to return to traditional religious denominations.7 This trend brings to the fore, among other things, the issue of how traditions are made and maintained. Throughout the regions of Islamic influence elsewhere, education has always been a remarkable sphere of primary importance for the making of tradition. Yet, religious education and the madrasa (literally from Arabic, ‘place of study’, or Islamic ‘college’, to use the phrasing of George Maqdisi)8 in general were conceived in the pre-modern, classical Islamic period

5 Kepel, Gilles, La revanche de Dieu: Chrétiens, juifs et musulmans à la reconquête du monde (Paris: Le Seuil, [1991] 2003). 6 Niyozov, Sarfaroz and Gary Pluim, “Teachers’ perspectives on the education of Muslim students: A missing voice in Muslim education research”, Curriculum Inquiry, 9, no. 5 (2009), pp. 637–677 (638). 7 Hann, Chris. “Introduction: Faith, power, and civility after socialism”, in Chris Hann et al. (eds), The Postsocialist Religious Question: Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe (Münster: Lit, 2006), pp. 1–26. We owe this reference to our colleague Dr Ilia Iliev from Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski. 8 Maqdisi, George, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).

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as a “pillar of stability, rather than as a force for change”.9 It is therefore in historical periods of dynamic societal change that Muslim religious education might be expected to play a crucial role in public life and culture. Does traditional Islamic education continue to influence the social life of the contemporary Muslim community in Bulgaria, or has it rather a “vanishing role”, as Dale F. Eickelman describes it in his analysis of madrasas in Morocco?10 How do the increasingly rapid global changes affect local traditions of Islamic education? These issues pose many challenges, involving multi-directional undercurrents, for the social sciences. 2

Statistical Data and Demographic Factors

About 8 million Muslims live in Southeastern Europe, or roughly onethird of all Muslims in Europe. The Balkan Peninsula was conquered by the Ottomans at the end of the fourteenth century and, with variations in the different countries, remained in their Muslim empire until the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, being called Rumeli. As a result, in contrast with immigrant Muslim communities in Western Europe, Muslims in the Balkans represent part of the indigenous population. In Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims constitute a majority, while in all the other countries in the region, including Bulgaria, they are a minority. Balkan Muslims belong to four main ethno-linguistic groups: Slavic, Turkish, Albanian and Roma. Sunni Islam is the most common form of Islam practised in the Balkans, and specifically the Sunni Islam associated with the Hanafi madhhab (school of Islamic law). This branch of Islam is understood to be the most tolerant and flexible in the interpretation of Islamic religious law (shari‘a). Shi’a-Alevis as well as Sufi (mystical) orders and brotherhoods, including the Bektashis, can be found in some Balkan regions.

9 Berkey, Jonathan P., “Madrasas medieval and modern: Politics, education, and the problem of Muslim identity,” in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds), Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 40–60 (46). 10 Eickelman, Dale F., “Madrasas in Morocco: Their vanishing role”, in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds), Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 131–148.

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Bulgaria’s current Muslim population consists primarily of ethnic Turks, Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks), and Roma Muslims. According to the most recent (2001) census, about 12.2% of Bulgarians profess Islam.11 This relatively large percentage represents the largest nonChristian minority group in a country with a predominantly (82.6%) Christian population. Undoubtedly, Islam is the dominant religion among ethnic Turks (of whom only 1.3% are Christians). Although exact figures are difficult to obtain, according to the official census some 131,531 individuals (or 2%) of Bulgarians who are not Turks, Pomaks or Roma Muslims profess Islam. Muslims make up more than one fourth (27.9%) of the Roma population. According to the 2001 Census of the Bulgarian Statistical Institute, the number of people practising Islam in Bulgaria is 966,978. Muslim communities and portions of the population are found primarily in the northeast and in the Rhodopes region of southeastern Bulgaria. From the standpoint of geographic distribution, ethnic Turks make up a particularly large part of the population in several specific regions, while other groups of Muslims are more scattered. The roughly 114,217 Muslims living in the region of Kurdzhali, for example, comprise about 69.6% of the region’s entire population. The second highest Muslim concentration can be found in the region of Razgrad with 81,835 (53.7%). Relatively large Muslim communities also inhabit the regions of Shumen (72,544), Burgas (64,568), Plovdiv (62,595), Blagoevgrad (62,431), Targovishte (58,838), Smolyan (58,758) and Silistra (54,174). Although the majority of Bulgaria’s Muslims profess Sunni Islam, which was practised by the Ottoman conquerors, there are also followers of Shi’a Islam—a movement that acknowledges the leadership of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661), the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, together with his successors. Shi‘ites in Bulgaria have been primarily associated with the community of Alevis or the Sufi mystical order of the Bektashis—‘heterodox’ Muslims with a culture of their own in Bulgaria.12

11 Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, Census 2001—Final Results, http://www .nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm, accessed 15 December 2009. 12 For more about the Alevi identity and culture in Bulgaria, see Gramatikova, Nevena, “Changing fates and the issue of Alevi identities in Bulgaria?”, in Antonina Zhelyazkova and Jorgen S. Nielsen (eds), Ethnology of Sufi Orders: Theory and Practice. Proceedings of the British-Bulgarian Workshop on Sufi Orders 19–23 May 2000


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The Alevis—so called mostly in Turkey and known in Bulgaria as Alians—are frequently referred to with the vague and popular designation Qizilbash (Red-head) denoting a “wide variety of extremist sects (ghulat), which flourished in Anatolia and Kurdistan from the late 7th/13th century onwards”.13 The sect first appeared in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in opposition to Ottoman rule in Western Iran and Asia Minor, and the name Qizilbash comes from Turkish in reference to the twelve red ribbons honouring the twelve Shi’i imams that were used in the turbans of the warriors of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722), which imposed Shi’i Islam as the ruling doctrine in Persia. Today, Alevis number about 3 million people. While several communities live in northeast Bulgaria, the majority live in Turkey, with some in Iran and Afghanistan. Generally speaking, however, Bulgarian Turks, Pomaks and Roma are Sunni Muslims whose religious practices continue to reflect interpretations and rituals inherited from the Ottoman period. Sunni Islam has four main juridical schools: the Hanafi, which has included Bulgarian Muslims since Ottoman times; the Hanbali, which has enjoyed a recent rise in influence and includes, for example, Wahhabi Muslims in Saudi Arabia; and the Shafi‘i and Maliki schools, which are rarely encountered in the Balkans. Although these schools are considered equal in standing, they can exhibit significant differences in the interpretation of Islamic law. At present there are 1,360 Islamic ‘communities’ in Bulgaria, 1,110 mosques and 1,160 imams. The Muslim institutional organisation comprises the administration of the Grand Mufti and the administrations of the 16 regional muftis. There is also a High Muslim Council, which is elected by the National Muslim Conference (held every five years) and which governs the activities of the Muslim community.14

(Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), 2001), pp. 564–621. 13 Savory, R.M., “Kizil-Bāsh”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. edited by P. Bearman , Th. Bianquis , C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs, Leiden: Brill Online, 2010, accessed 15 February 2010. 14 As listed on the official website of the Grand Mufti’s Administration in Bulgaria, http://www.genmufti.net.

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The Past: Ambivalent Legacies and Undercurrents

Significant organised Muslim communities have resided in Bulgaria and throughout the Balkans since the Ottoman conquests of the early fourteenth century and Muslims from Anatolia, who tend to live in compact communities, settled in what is now Bulgaria around the end of that century. Over time, local Islamised populations have been joined by Muslim groups from Asia Minor, along with other Muslim immigrants. There is a rich academic literature on the history of the appearance and growth of the population that professes Islam in the territory that now makes up Bulgaria, and throughout the Balkans. The growth of the Muslim population occurred primarily as a result of two distinct processes: colonisation and the Islamisation of the native population. Colonisation by Turks and Islamic groups did not affect all parts of the Balkans equally, but was concentrated in particular regions. With regard to the process of adopting Islam, scholars tend to agree that it was a widespread Balkan phenomenon, although they disagree as to the possible reasons behind and methods of Islamisation, as well as the role of the Ottoman authorities in this process. Analysing Richard Bulliet thesis on ‘social conversion’,15 which is well-known in Islamic studies, the Bulgarian Ottomanist Evgeni Radushev has recently shown that it also applies to Islamisation in the Balkans. Radushev writes: the social existence of the converts changed immediately with their conversion—from Christian they became Muslim reaya.16 This transformation had an immediate positive effect on their economic status—the new Muslims stopped paying cizye with which non-Muslims were taxed. They gained other prerogatives in their relationship with the administration, avoiding the numerous everyday inconveniences that were the lot of Christian subjects.17

15 Bulliet, Richard W., Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period. An Essay in Quantitative History (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 16 In contemporary debates on the Ottoman period in the public space, in spite of the original meaning of the term denoting the tax-paying class of Ottoman subjects as opposed to the askeri, the governing elite, the word reaya is often incorrectly used to denote particularly the Bulgarian, sometimes more generally the Orthodox Christian subjects, reflecting only a short period in the term’s evolution, at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. 17 Radushev, Evgeni, “Peasant Janissaries?”, Journal of Social History, vol. 42, no. 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 447–467 (449).


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At the same time, as Gradeva and Ivanova have pointed out, precisely how and why some Christians adopted a foreign faith is a matter of much conjecture, but whatever individuals’ motives were, they could hardly have been as clear-cut as is sometimes implied. Not everything came down to material interests and lower taxes.18

Unlike convivencia19 in al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) on the level of ‘high’ culture, the century-long religious co-existence in Bulgaria and the Balkans, appropriately defined by historians as a mélange,20 has been based on a specific peaceful communication on the ‘low’ cultural level of everyday life communication embodied in the specific practices of the komşuluk, which turned into a general principle of coexistence and good-neighbourly interactions between Christians and Muslims. Originally, the komşuluks were “doors in fences, which were never closed and which made the yards of houses into something like linked vessels; through them neighbours provided each other with all kinds of assistance.”21 So, while convivencia may provide richer material for the field of intellectual history, komşuluk is more a matter of the history of everyday human relations. At least one clear outcome of these briefly sketched historical processes is the existence in presentday Bulgaria of compact Muslim communities. These communities are typically divided into two groups: Turkish-speaking and Bulgarianspeaking Muslims. Both Muslim and Christian representatives have tended to entirely discount Roma Muslims, as they have Roma Christians, as members of Muslim and Christian communities in Bulgaria. The traditional Ottoman educational system consisted of a threetier structure: primary, intermediate and specialised training, each of which was related to a particular type of school. For example, primary

18 Gradeva, Rossitsa and Svetlana Ivanova, “Researching the past and present of Muslim culture in Bulgaria: The ‘popular’ and ‘high’ layers”, in Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (July 2001), pp. 317–337. 19 Although recently challenged by authors such as David Nirenberg (Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages [Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996], p. 9), the term convivencia refers to the cooperative and conflictavoiding coexistence of Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities in the medieval Iberian Peninsula. 20 Georgieva, Tsvetana, “La culture bulgare entre islam et chrétienté: Une culture de mélange”, in Jocelyne Bonnet and André Carenini (eds), Frontières visibles et invisibles: L’Europe de régions ou des aires culturelles. 2e Atelier PACT-Eurethno (Strasbourg: Conseil de l’Europe, 1991), vol. 2, pp. 215–222. 21 Hajiyski, Ivan, Bit i dushevnost na nashiya narod [Everyday Life and Mentality of Our People] (Sofia: Bulgarski pisatel, 1966), p. 97.

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education was acquired at the so called mektebs, which spread as a network in Southeastern Europe from the end of the fourteenth/beginning of the fifteenth century onwards. It seems that up to the nineteenth century the organisation of the educational process remained rather ‘informal’; not being subordinated to any specific state legislation, it depended rather on the pious endeavours of Muslims to fulfil one of their religious duties by providing the younger generation with the means to acquire the basics of their Islamic faith, thus socialising them in their local community. As Orlin Sabev has noted, in some cases the opening of mektebs was the result of specific political agendas on the part of the ruling elite, particularly related to strengthening ‘the outpost of Islam’.22 Although Bulgarian citizens of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds officially enjoy equal rights, after Orthodox Christianity was proclaimed to be the ‘dominant’ state religion following liberation from Ottoman rule in 1877–1878. During the consolidation of the modern Bulgarian state some Bulgarian administrations actively participated in acts of violence and deportation campaigns against Muslim citizens. Policies encouraging de-Ottomanisation continued to be implemented until the end of the twentieth century, with minority communities forced to change the names of their settlements or streets as a way of distancing themselves from their traditional Ottoman heritage. The rights of the Muslim minority were guaranteed by provisions in several international and national documents recognised by the Bulgarian authorities. Article 5 of the Berlin Treaty (1878) granted religious minorities the right to have their own organisations. Article 40 of the Turnovo Constitution (1879) declared the right of religious freedom, and article 42 the right of minorities to religious autonomy insofar as the latter does not contradict general legislation. On this constitutional basis, “Provisional Regulations for Religious Governance of the Christians, the Muslims and the Jews” were adopted, and

22 Sabev, Orlin, Osmanski uchilishta v bulgarskite zemi ХV–ХVІІІ vek [Ottoman Schools in Bulgarian Lands during the 15th–18th centuries] (Sofia: Lyubomudrie, 2001), p. 84. Cf. the recently finalised and very informative PhD dissertation by Margarita Dobreva, Osmanski obshtoobrazovatelni institutsii v Dunavskiya vilaet [Ottoman Institutions of General Education in the Danube Vilayet] (Sofia: Institute for Balkan Studies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 2008), pp. 45ff [unpublished]. Both studies are among the few scholarly works dealing with Ottoman educational institutions in Bulgarian territory.


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in 1895 “Provisional Statutes of Governance of the Religious Affairs of the Muslims”. During the Balkan wars in 1912–1913, a portion of the Muslim population in Bulgaria was forcibly converted to Christianity. The Pomak population along the Bulgarian-Greek border was particularly affected by this forced conversion. With this conversion to Christianity, the new Christians were also given Christian names, thereby eliminating one of the primary outward distinctions between Christians and Muslims. After that, various Bulgarian rulers seeking the support of the Pomaks, including the government of Radoslavov following the Balkan wars and the Fatherland Front after the Second World War, promised the annulment of the forced conversions.23 In the course of the final determination of relations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, two treaties were signed between them (in 1909 and in 1913). On a bilateral basis, the rights of the Muslim community were regulated in greater detail. Later, these provisions were used as guidelines in working out the “Statutes for Governance and Organisation of the Religious Institutions of the Muslims in Bulgaria” (1919). Substantial changes in the legal arrangement of the religious life of the Muslim community took place after the communist takeover in 1944. Following a short transition period, a totalitarian, Soviet-type rule was established, ideologically guided by a Marxist Leninist doctrine, which was profoundly atheistic. The Law of the Denominations (1949), for example, abolished the right of religious communities to deal autonomously with the religious education of their children. Led by the desire to make Bulgaria a unified nation, the communist regime embarked upon a series of attempts to assimilate Pomaks and ethnic Turks into mainstream Bulgarian (Christian) society. The communist state policy of forced assimilation began in the 1950s with the closing down of Muslim newspapers and schools, and continued via policies including the changing of Bulgarian Muslim names. From 1972 to 1974, a campaign was conducted to change Pomak names to suitably Bulgarian ones, while in 1984–1985 the so called ‘revival process’

23 See Eldarov, Svetlozar, “Bulgarskata pravoslavna tsurkva i bulgarite myusyulmani 1878–1944 [The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Muslim Bulgarians, 1878–1944]”, in Gradeva, Rossitsa (ed), Istoriya na myusyulmanskata kultura po bulgarskite zemi [History of Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands], Vol. 7, The Fate of Muslim Communities in the Balkans (Sofia: IMIR, 2001), pp. 592–639.

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took place, involving the mass changing of ethnic Turkish names. This ‘revival’ or ‘regeneration’ process, based on similar periodic attempts before World War II, was grounded on the presumption that all Muslims in Bulgaria are Bulgarians who adopted Islam during the Ottoman Empire and were therefore in need of an ‘awakening’ to fully realise their ‘true’ national identity. However, the name change policies of the communist regime aimed to achieve a different set of objectives from similar policies under previous Bulgarian regimes. A primary aim was to prevent the Roma and Pomaks from associating with the Turkish minority. In the case of the Pomaks, while the officially stated argument was that the change of names restored ‘historical truth’ by returning Pomaks to the cradle of Bulgarian civilisation from which they had been cut off, either forcibly or voluntarily, some centuries ago with their conversion to Islam, an unstated goal of the policy was to sever the relations between this minority community and Turkey. The Bulgarian Communist Party mistakenly hoped that the policy would encourage ethnic Turks in Bulgaria with a ‘strong Turkish consciousness to strengthen their ties to the Bulgarian nation. Ibrahim Yalamov is right to analyse the doctrine and practices of the ‘renaming’ as reflecting “a deep crisis of state socialism” beginning in the late 1960s and becoming all-embracing by the beginning of the 1980s.24 In the spring and summer of 1989, ethnic Turks initiated mass protests in northeastern and southern Bulgaria, demanding to be allowed to revert to their original names. Protests erupted that were put down with the help of the police and army, and innocent victims were killed. The resistance of ethnic Turks led the communist regime to change its strategy and open the border with neighbouring Turkey to allow them to leave the country. Between June and August 1989, about 300,000 ethnic Turkish Bulgarian citizens left Bulgaria to find refuge in Turkey. After the democratic changes in 1989 and the restoration of Muslim minority rights, the role of Islam in Bulgaria underwent significant changes. The establishment of a multiparty system and protection of religious freedoms enabled a political party of Bulgarian Turks, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), to develop into a liberal 24

Yalamov, Ibrahim, “The ‘renaming’: Consequences and how to overcome them”, in Ekaterina Popova and Marko Hajdinjak (eds), Forced Ethnic Migrations in the Balkans: Consequences and Rebuilding of Societies. Conference Proceedings 22–23 February 2005 (Sofia: IMIR and Meiji University, 2006), pp. 105–116 (105).


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political organisation which was part of ruling coalitions from 1992 to 1994 from 2001 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2009. In this climate of political pluralism and religious freedom, religious administrative bodies represented by the General Mufti Administration were established according to Southeast European tradition to oversee the activities of the mosques, along with the hojjas and imams working in them. The current state of affairs is regulated by the Constitution of 1991 and the Law of the Denominations (2002). Article 13 of the Constitution says: (1) The practice of any religion shall be free. (2) The religious institutions shall be separate from the state. Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria . . . . (4) Religious institutions and religious beliefs shall not be used to political ends.25 The Law of the Denominations guarantees the right of citizens to provide their children with instruction in their religion (Art. 6), and also the right of religious communities to open secondary religious schools (under the supervision of the Ministry of Education) and higher religious schools (with the permission of the National Assembly or the Council of Ministers (Art. 33).26 The first normative document adopted after Bulgaria restored de facto its national independence which concerned more specifically religious education was the Law on Public and Private Schools (1885). This allowed for the functioning of private Muslim schools, which were not obliged to abide by the curricula of mainstream public schools. The bilateral treaties between Bulgaria and Turkey (1909 and 1913) explicitly granted to the central and the regional muftis’ offices the right to open and control various kinds of schools. Nominally, there were two kinds: secular schools for Muslim children and Muslim religious schools (madrasas), although in fact the demarcation 25 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, officially published in Durzhaven vestnik [State Newspaper], vol. 56, 13 July 1991; available online at http://www.online.bg/law/ const/const1_b.htm. 26 Law of Denominations, officially published in Durzhaven vestnik [State Newspaper], vol. 120, 29 December 2002, changes published in Durzhaven vestnik [State Newspaper], vol. 59, 20 July 2007; available online at http://www.bcnl.org/doc .php?DID=338.

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line between them was rather blurred. The curriculum of the former included a substantial proportion of religious subjects and that of the latter included some secular disciplines, such as mathematics, history and geography, especially in the places where there happened to be no secular Muslim schools and the madrasa had to fill the gap. In the course of time, the proportions of the two kinds of subjects came to vary widely in both kinds of schools. This was due largely to the fact that the muftis’ offices did not exercise systematic control over these educational activities. Most of the several hundred Muslim primary schools were Turkish, but there were also Pomak and Tatar schools— about 50 of each in the 1920s. The first Turkish-Muslim secondary school in modern Bulgaria was opened in 1918 in Shumen, a major city in northeast Bulgaria.27 The school was a state college of education called Dar ul-mu‘allimin (from Arabic through Ottoman Turkish: ‘House of the Teachers’) established to train teachers for ethnic Turkish children. The course of study was two years comprising the eighth and the ninth grades. The language of instruction was Bulgarian with the exception of religious subjects which were taught in Turkish just as were the subjects Turkish language and literature. The college functioned until 1928 and over that time produced about 350–400 teachers. Another secondary but private Muslim school called Nuvvab was opened in 1922, also in Shumen. The major task of this school was to train Islamic theologians to serve the needs of the Muslim community in Bulgaria. Generally, the school prepared imams, preachers (wa‘izes) and teachers, but in 1930 a ‘Higher Department’ was established in the same building with the main aim of training future muftis. In the Nuvvab School, which appears to have played a groundbreaking role in the history of Islamic education in Bulgaria, the students were taught not only fiqh (Islamic law) or usul al-fiqh (methodology of Islamic law), but also Bulgarian secular law and economics. The language of instruction in religious subjects, such as Qur’an and Hadith, was Arabic. In 1933, the Nuvvab School also took on the role of a secondary school of education, preparing teachers for Turkish private schools in Bulgaria. Consequently, a number of secular disciplines 27

The authors owe the basic data about public Islamic religious schools in Bulgaria throughout the twentieth century before the changes in 1989 to an unpublished paper on Islamic education in Bulgaria by the current director of the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia, Dr IbrahimYalamov, who has provided historical and statistical data.


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were introduced, such as mathematics, physics, arts, sports, music, etc. The private Muslim schools were financed mostly by the Muslim communities. In the period 1919–1923, a special fund for the support of these schools was established from the income from community property, particularly land. In accord with the measures for the protection of minorities prescribed by the peace treaties after World War I (especially the Treaty of Neuilly), the government of the Republic of Turkey acquired the right to support Turkish minority schools in Bulgaria financially, and did so from 1923 to 1934. In 1934 a military coup took place, a rather authoritarian political regime was established and government policy with regard to minority education took a negative turn. The number of hours allocated to religious disciplines was reduced to about 25% of the curriculum in the secular schools for Muslim children and the number of these schools fell dramatically—from 1,700 to 404 primary schools in 1943–1944. The madrasas in the Pomak regions were closed. It is indicative that in this period the Smolyan based cultural association Rodina (‘motherland’), which had been established by Pomaks with a Bulgarian national consciousness and was probably very close to the central government, started a campaign not against the Islamic faith as during the Balkan wars, but against traditional Pomak clothing and the Pomak use of Arab names. The campaign was called razferedzhevane, ‘unveiling’, and was most probably encouraged by its coinciding with the anti-headscarf initiatives in neighbouring Kemalist Turkey.28 In 1939 the Ministry of Education opened in Raykovo, a town which comes under today’s major city of Smolyan in the Central Rhodopes region in southern Bulgaria, a ‘Bulgarian-Muhammadan’ religious school to train imams for the Pomak population. In fact, however, it functioned more as an ideological centre for the promotion of the Pomaks’ Bulgarian national identity. Eventually, the interest of the would-be students faded and after several years it was closed because of the decreasing number of applicants. After the communist takeover in 1944, the state of religious education deteriorated dramatically. Religious schools (madrasas) were closed at the end of the 1940s, Bulgarian and Turkish schools merged 28

Buchsensütz, Ulrich, Maltsinstvenata politika v Bulgaria: Politikata na BKP kum evrei, romi, pomatsi i turtsi (1944–1989) [Minority policy in Bulgaria: The Policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party towards Jews, Roma, Pomaks and Turks (1944–1989)] (Sofia: IMIR), 2000), p. 43.

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in 1958–1960, religious literature was virtually unavailable, and official religious institutions were placed under the strong control of the communist regime. Indeed, in the absence of formal theological training, the post of hojja was passed on from father to son or uncle to nephew. This mode of transmission resulted in an impoverishment of religious knowledge and widespread syncretism.29

First, in 1946, religion became an optional subject in the secular public schools for Muslim children, taught for two hours a week from first to seventh grade. In 1947 the Nuvvab School was converted into a state secular secondary school, and in 1948 all madrasas were either turned into secular schools or simply closed. The Law of the Denominations passed in 1949 abolished the right of the religious communities to organise the religious education of their children. In 1951 the study of religion in school was entirely prohibited by the communist regime. 4

The Present: Between the Pursuit of Stability and Fragmentation

In August 1990, even before the adoption of the new Constitution in 1991, the Nuvvab School returned to being a private religious secondary school. In the next year, two more schools of the same type and enjoying the same status were opened, in the city of Ruse in the northeast on the Danube River, and in Momchilgrad in the southeast of the country. Both had initially functioned as branches of the Shumen Nuvvab school and from 1995 they became regular private secondary religious schools. Girls were enrolled in the school in Ruse from the very beginning and in the other two schools from 2000. All three religious schools follow the same curriculum, developed in general following the curricula for mainstream Bulgarian public secondary schools with some additional elements from the curricula for the secondary schools for imams and khatibs in Turkey. The curriculum for schools of the Nuvvab type is approved by the Ministry of Education and the Grand Mufti’s Administration. Two thirds of teaching hours are designated for secular subjects and one

29 Ragaru, Nadege, “Islam in post-communist Bulgaria: An aborted ‘clash of civilizations’?”, Nationalities Papers, vol. 29, no. 2 (2001), pp. 293–324 (296).


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third for religious disciplines.30 As with the Higher Islamic Institute, however, the official Turkish Religious Foundation (Diyanet Vakfı) provides all of the schools’ funding for religious education, with most religion classes conducted in Turkish only and emphasising the need to preserve Bulgaria’s Ottoman heritage. Although receiving Islamic instruction in Turkish is not a problem for most ethnic Turks, the majority of Muslim students in these schools are now Pomaks, who cannot necessarily speak Turkish. This situation creates a resentful sense among Pomaks that, rather than receiving a good religious education, they are being ‘Turkified’ and treated as second-class citizens, and are forced to look beyond Bulgaria in search of a decent religious education. A completely new Islamic College was founded in Sofia in 1990 as a private religious educational institution related to the Grand Mufti.31 In 1999, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, it was transformed into the Higher Islamic Institute, which functions until today. The official website of the Higher Islamic Institute says that it has a total of about 60 male and female students. It trains Islamic theologians who can work as imams and muftis, and also as teachers of religion in both the religious and the secular public schools. The curriculum of the Institute is made up of basic Islamic religious sciences such as tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), fiqh (Islamic law), ‘ilm al-kalam (theology), etc., and also includes more general educational subjects, such as history of Islam, Islamic ethics and Islamic philosophy, and completely secular subjects, such as sociology of religion, psychology of religion, and design and function of religious institutions. Among the optional courses there are a number of pedagogical subjects, such as education, educational psychological, etc., which are obligatory for students who want to be state-qualified teachers. At present, the Institute has a faculty of 22 full-time and part-time lecturers. Twelve of them hold PhDs and nine are full professors or associate professors, mostly on the staff

30 The information on Islamic religious education is to a great extent based on the authors’ experience as director (Simeon Evstatiev) and methodological expert (Plamen Makariev) of the following two educational projects at the Center for Intercultural Studies and Partnership in Sofia: 1) ‘Islamic Religious Education in Bulgaria: The Challenges of Partnership’ funded by the Democracy Commission of the US, 2003– 2004; and 2) ‘Religion and Education: Enhancing Christian-Muslim Understanding in Bulgaria’ funded by the United States Institute of Peace, 2004–2007. 31 For further details about the history of the Institute, see its official website: http:// www.islamicinstitute-bg.org.

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at other universities and only teaching part time at the Higher Islamic Institute. The basic Islamic religious disciplines are taught by visiting lecturers from Turkey, sometimes in Turkish, which causes a problem for the Bulgarian-speaking students. The Bulgarian state does not permit the Institute to receive direct public finance and it is funded by the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı). Neither does the state recognise its diplomas because the Institute does not have the required minimum number of qualified teaching staff. The Higher Islamic Institute currently offers an extremely low level of education by Bulgarian standards and still suffers from a chronic lack of qualified staff, so employment opportunities for the Institute’s graduates are almost exclusively within the Mufti system, as hojjas and imams, or as teachers of Islamic religion in public schools, where Sunni Islam and Eastern Orthodox Christianity are required by law to be offered as optional subjects. As a result of this situation, many young Bulgarian Muslims believe that a ‘true’ religious education is only possible abroad and Saudi foundations have offered grants to hundreds of them from the early 1990s to the present day. In 2008, the director of the Higher Islamic Institute, Ibrahim Yalamov, has publicly reiterated his long-standing idea that this religious college should be officially accredited by the Bulgarian state as a ‘university’. At the very beginning of 2009, two MRF parliamentary deputies, Ahmed Yussein and Lutfi Mestan, initiated a lobbying campaign in favour of changing the existing regulation through changes in the Law on Religious Confessions in order to allow the Higher Islamic Institute to be upgraded from a religious ‘institute’ to a ‘university’.32 However, at this stage, this seems very difficult to achieve due to the lack of enough established faculty with PhDs or qualifications for tenure-track academic positions as ‘associate professors’ or ‘professors’. It is hard to believe that the strict state requirements for accrediting universities and colleges will change soon, and even if they do, the change of name from ‘institute’ to ‘university’ will not substantially change the current state of affairs in Islamic religious education. Alongside these formal Muslim educational institutions, the 20 years since 1989 have seen the spread of informal Islamic schools called ‘Qur’an courses’, which have been increasingly active since the beginning of the twenty-first century. These schools, which have appeared in the last decade in several Bulgarian settlements with a Muslim major32

Novinar (newspaper), 28 February 2009.


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ity, are the subject of much lively public and media debate in Bulgaria. The ‘Qur’an courses’ are either short term intensive courses, where the children study five to six days a week for a period of up to two months, or longer, weekend ones. They are organised by the regional Muftis’ administrations and the teaching is done by students from the Higher Islamic Institute or by imams. There are also one- or two-year courses for pre-service or in-service qualification of imams in the regions with larger Muslim populations. Many Bulgarian Muslims who received their education in Arab countries teach in these Qur’anic schools. The subjects taught represent only a portion of the traditional Islamic religious sciences, particularly subjects related to the ‘Qur’anic sciences’, Islamic law (fiqh), and the Prophetic Tradition (Hadith) At least some of these schools, such as the Qur’anic school in the village of Ustina near the city of Plovdiv, also receive Turkish support. Although the school curricula have been approved by the Grand Mufti’s Administration, several schools have been publicly criticised for instigating a cultural divide between their graduates and the followers of the traditional ‘popular Islam’ practised in Bulgaria. The Qur’anic schools fall outside the mainstream state educational and cultural model and are characterised by extremely low standards of education by Bulgarian standards. Graduates of these schools (whose age ranges between 15 and 30) are deprived of a secular education, cannot be appointed to work in a Bulgarian institution or enrol in Bulgarian higher education, and are only qualified to become imams or hojjas. This contributes to the marginalisation of a segment of the future local spiritual Muslim elite of Bulgaria and could frustrate efforts aimed at the better integration of the Muslim minority into Bulgarian society. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that religious and political centres in the Middle East tend to rely upon these schools as outlets for their religious propaganda in Bulgaria. In Bulgarian public (municipality and state) schools, religion was reintroduced in the school year 1997–1998 experimentally as an optional subject. However, classes in Islam, more specifically, began later, in 1999–2000.33 Since 2001, religion has been an optional subject

33 Ilchevski, Stefan, “Prepodavaneto na religiya v bulgarskite uchilishta: istoricheski osobenosti i suvremenno sustoyanie [Instruction in religion in Bulgarian schools: Historical development and contemporary state of affairs]”, Strategies of Policy in Science and Education, vol. 2 (2007), pp. 82–91.

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in the National School Curriculum for the first to the twelfth grades, being allocated one hour per week. It is taught on a confessional basis in separate classes as ‘Religion-Christianity’ (Eastern Orthodox Christianity) or ‘Religion-Islam’ (Sunni Islam) and classes take place on condition that a sufficient number of parents declare at the beginning of the school year that they wish their children to receive such education. The teachers of ‘Religion-Christianity’ come from the theological faculties of such major universities as Sofia University, Plovdiv University and Veliko Turnovo University, while those in ‘Religion-Islam’ are graduates of the Higher Islamic Institute. Their salaries are paid by the schools, not by the religious communities and their work is supervised by the public educational authorities. There are positions for experts in this subject in the 28 Regional Inspectorates of Education and one such position at the Ministry of Education and Science, but in most cases these functions are performed by experts in related subjects, such as history or philosophy. At present, ‘Religion-Islam’ is taught to about 3,500 students at about 70 schools—quite a small proportion of the 180,000 to 200,000 Muslim children in Bulgaria. With insignificant exceptions, this subject is taught only until the eighth grade. There are textbooks only for grades up to this level and they, like the syllabi, have been prepared by lecturers from the Higher Islamic Institute and experts from the Grand Mufti’s Administration. 5

Confessional versus Secular Teaching of Religion in Public Schools

The subject ‘Religion-Islam’ (like ‘Religion-Christianity’) is taught as either a ‘free option’ or a ‘statutory option’. In the former case, classes in religion are conducted after school hours and the students (or rather their parents) can freely decide whether to attend them or not. If students do not take such classes, their academic record is not affected. Religion as a ‘statutory option’, on the other hand, is available to be chosen from among other optional subjects. If religion is taken as a ‘statutory option’ it becomes part of the student’s formal assessed curriculum. The decision as to whether religion is a free or statutory option at each school is made by the regional educational administration, taking into account the opinion of the school’s head teacher.


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A necessary condition for such classes to be conducted is that there should be enough students for groups to be formed. In each grade, a minimum of 13 applicants is required for a free option and 11 for a statutory option. This curricular pattern makes the classes in religion quite unattractive for the children. If a student takes this subject as free option, s/he bears an additional workload. If the subject is being studied as a statutory option, it ‘competes’ with subjects such as foreign languages or computer training. The student may not be able to take both religion and English (for example), or computer studies, because they are taught at the same time. In addition, the school and regional administrators are not keen for options to proliferate because this increases the costs of running the schools. Consequently they are not usually very helpful when it comes to motivating parents and students to choose religion as an optional subject. The resulting scarcity of groups of students who take religion at a given school makes it impossible to keep a regular position for a teacher in this subject. That would require a 21-hours workload per week, and as religion is taught for only one hour per week, that adds up to 21 groups—a goal that is practically unattainable. Consequently, the teachers work part-time at more than one school, for a very low wage, and are never sure that they will have enough working hours to support themselves in the next school year. These difficulties, which are due to the status of the subject ‘Religion-Islam’ or ‘Religion-Christianity’ as a confessional option, have brought about intensive discussion on reform in this field.34 The radical alternative, which is supported by a wide range of social scientists, historians, philosophers, sociologists, educational scientists, experts in religion from various disciplines and some theologians, is to introduce compulsory classes on ‘religious studies’ or ‘history of religions’, taught on a non-confessional basis. The leaderships of the two main religious communities, the Eastern Orthodox and the Muslims, however, insist that religion should continue to be taught on a confessional basis, but as an obligatory subject. This position is also supported by most of the theologians who take part in the debate, and by most of the

34 Evstatiev, Simeon, “Religiyata v bulgarskoto uchilishte [Religion in Bulgarian public schools]”, Strategies for Policy in Science and Education, vol. 2 (2007), pp. 136–140.

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teachers and educational administrators who are currently involved in the teaching of this subject. In order not to contradict the Constitution, which proclaims freedom of conscience and separation of the religious institutions from the state, this model for teaching religion also envisages an option for children who do not wish to study the subject in a confessional mode (because they come from secular families, or for other reasons) to have in its place classes in a subject related to world issues, or history of religions taught in a non-confessional way. What reasons have been put forward in favour of and against these two alternatives? The proponents of compulsory non-confessional teaching of religion maintain that this is a way to overcome the organisational difficulties that ensue from the optional status of the subject, without violating the principles of freedom of conscience and separation of the church from the state. The subject should familiarise the students with the history and the moral principles of the world religions; it should present the cultural traits and achievements that characterise these religions, without trying to indoctrinate anybody in one direction or another. Providing information about religion should not be conflated with initiating people into a particular religion. The former function can be performed by the state and municipality schools, but the latter should be left to religious institutions and the children’s families, with the ‘Sunday schools’ model specifically recommended. The opponents of this ‘radical therapy’35 express their concerns about a probable nullification of the moral effect of studying religion on the formation of the children. An objective presentation of the doctrines and practices of religion would not only, they claim, be void of any positive moral appeal to the students, but it would also bring about a relativisation of religious faith as such. Can a young child of seven or eight, for example, keep its commitment to the religion of his/her ancestors if confronted with a disorienting picture of a multitude of beliefs and world views? There is little risk of this for a more or less mature person who has a more or less clear religious awareness; such a person can ‘safely navigate’ around various doctrines without compro-

35 Andonov, Bozhidar, “Za predmeta religiya v SOU [About the subject religion at the public schools]”, Strategies of Policy in Science and Education, vol. 2 (2007), pp. 98–106.


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mising his/her preference for his/her own faith. However, a student in the early grades is much more vulnerable in this respect. Besides, the opponents ask, who is supposed to teach a non-confessional religious subject? It cannot be theologians, because even if they would be trying in good faith to do their job in an unbiased way, there is a very great probability that they would, even unwittingly, give preference to their own religion. And what would then become of the graduates of the theological faculties and the Higher Islamic Institute, who have been trained to work as teachers of religion? The other option is to employ mainstream primary teachers, and in the upper grades teachers in secular subjects, such as history or philosophy. However, one could then expect that the new subject would be taught in a relatively incompetent, superficial way, as an assignment of peripheral importance for the teacher. And this is even more probable if the latter holds atheist views, which would be true of most of the available teaching staff. A third counter-argument is that there is almost no tradition in Bulgaria of religious institutions organising religious education of the Sunday school type, i.e. for the children of the general public. The experience of the madrasas is quite different and, what is more, has been largely forgotten. The Qur’anic schools which are being organised by the imams in the mosques have quite modest tasks and cannot take the place of classes that are systematically organised and taught in an educationally sound way. What about the more conservative alternative—to continue teaching religion as a confessional subject, but to improve its status by giving it a more stable place in the curriculum? The proponents of this argument claim that this would have beneficial effects on the moral formation of the students, especially as far as the struggle against drug addiction, youth violence, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, etc. is concerned. Furthermore, they point out that the engagement of the state and municipalities with the teaching of religion does not violate the Constitution, because this is a means by which society can control the content of the educational process. In fact, state officials share general serious concerns about the study of religion in public schools. It is understandable that some of them are still inspired by the atheist perceptions of religion as ‘opium for the masses’. Others are puzzled by the constitutional formula of separation of the church from the state and the law requirements for

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simeon evstatiev and plamen makariev ‘secular education’. It is not clear how to teach religion within such a legal framework.36

If the public institutions totally distance themselves from the teaching of religion and leave it entirely in the hands of the religious communities, it would leave room for possible aberrations, such as encouraging religious intolerance, religious fundamentalism, extremism, and even ideas subversive of the existing social order. Is it not much safer for this educational process to take place entirely in public schools, where it can be professionally designed and controlled in the interests of society as a whole? Apart from the critiques against this model of teaching of religion in school that refer to its organisational shortcomings, as discussed above, the arguments of its opponents focus mostly on the fact that it implies a division of the children according to their faith. The students who choose ‘Religion-Christianity’ and those who choose ‘Religion-Islam’ take their classes separately. Of course, this is the case with all optional subjects, but it is a different matter when the division takes place simply according to the students’ interests, rather than according to their religion. This is a potentially controversial issue, especially in regions where large communities of different faiths live side by side and their children study together. That is why the supporters of this model recognise the necessity of including in the syllabus and textbooks important themes such as religious tolerance, intercultural competence and the like. In addition, they recommend that, after the first four grades, the confessional nature of the subject should be gradually tempered and knowledge about other religions should be also taught—of course in an objective manner. 6

Islamic Education in Bulgaria at the Junction of Diverse Cultural, Social and Political Influences

Bulgaria’s transition from a totalitarian to a democratic political system from the end of the 1980s was accompanied by great expectations that policy in a democratic Bulgaria would finally work to reconcile

36

Kalkandjieva, Daniela, “Religious education in Bulgaria today”, in Martin Jäggle, Thomas Krobath and Robert Shelander (eds), Religiöse Dimensionen in Schulkultur und Schulentwicklung [Religious dimensions in the culture and development of schools] (Vienna: Lit, 2009), pp. 481–488 (484).


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the public interest with social justice. Although the government did generally guarantee the rights of religious denominations, Bulgaria’s democratic governments have largely ignored specific policy challenges related to religion, particularly Islam. As stated above, during 45 years of communist rule, no religious instruction was offered in mainstream Bulgarian schools, with courses on Christianity and Islam reintroduced only in 1997–1998 and 1999–2000 respectively. Nevertheless, mainstream public policy continues to be rooted in traditional secularist strategies, with religious instruction remaining conservative, ethnocentric and dogmatic. Basic moral religious values are represented as exclusive, with little or no attention to interfaith relations in either an ethical/theological or practical/social sense. Religious education tends to be strictly separated from issues of broader social and political development and, rather than supporting social integration and building bridges, perpetuates and even exacerbates divides between Christian and Muslim communities. As the influence of religious instruction increases with time, as it inevitably will, it is crucial that it not serve as an impediment to positive inter-religious relations. Increased academic and intercultural competence must be brought in to contribute to curriculum development and instruction. General ignorance among Bulgaria’s governing elite about Islamic religious and social traditions has engendered official ambivalence towards the Muslim minority. Consider, for example, the government’s recent handling of the hotly contested issue of the administration and funding of centres of Islamic religious education. Both secondary and higher Islamic schools in Bulgaria are chronically underfunded, and governing bodies for these institutions, such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs, lack any coordinated communication strategies for dealing with these Muslim institutions. The state’s position is simply to refuse support on the basis that such schools are non-secular and private—an understandable position, but one that results in the further marginalisation of Muslim communities and drives these educational institutions away from local development and international secular cooperation. Islamic religious schools in Bulgaria have turned instead for support to foreign religious foundations—for scholarships and fellowships to study and specialise abroad, for example. The lack of public access to the educational and research activities of these schools has, in turn, helped to render them suspect by many in mainstream Bulgarian society. Such mistrust is compounded by global events and media reports related to the ‘war on terror’ and political Islam.

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Ignorance about Islam among public officials, together with the poor quality of religious educational instruction and the politicisation of Islam in the media, could prove to be a dangerous mix with regard to the treatment of Bulgaria’s significant population of devout Muslims. Traditionally, foreign influence in Bulgarian Islamic affairs has deep roots in Turkey and, culturally, in the Ottoman past.37 Turkey has long been a source of financial support and religious inspiration for Muslim communities in Bulgaria, the majority of whom are ethnic Turks. The Bulgarian state has traditionally allowed secular Turkey to exert influence and even control, with the help of powerful institutions and foundations such as the abovementioned Diyanet Vakfı, over the religious affairs of Bulgarian Muslims. Although the authority of the Turkish state and Turkish-supported foundations are relatively well accepted by ethnic Turks, the Pomaks in the central Rhodopes region feel that they are being pushed towards Turkification and abandoned by the Bulgarian state. A significant difference has recently resulted from the increasingly visible interactions of Bulgarian Muslims with Islam in the Arab world. It is understandable that this relatively rarely involves Iran—the influence of Teheran is weak given the secular character of the Alevi Shi’a community in north-eastern Bulgaria, not to mention significant cultural differences, and the Turkish ethnic identity of the Qizilbash population constitutes an additional ‘obstacle’ to the success of Iranian religious influence among Bulgarian Muslims. Consequently, Pomaks have been the most likely to seek their religious education outside Bulgaria and, as a result, are most often accused of being susceptible to conservative and fundamentalist influences from Middle Eastern (primarily Arab) regimes and movements, including Saudi-inspired Wahhabism, one of the most traditionalist and ‘purist’ Islamic schools. Such movements can take advantage of the lack of legitimacy of local Turkish leadership among Pomaks in Bulgaria, assisted by charitable foundations such as Tayba or Irshad, Qur’anic schools, and popular publications (translated into Bulgarian) by conservatively-minded

37 Evstatiev, Simeon, “On the periphery of two worlds: Some Aspects of the perception of Arabic-Islamic tradition among the Muslims in the Balkans”, in Alexander Fodor, et al. (eds), Proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants. Pt 2: Islam, Popular Culture in Islam, Islamic Art and Architecture, The Arabist: Budapest Studies in Arabic 26–27 (Budapest: Eötvos Loránd University Chair for Arabic Studies, 2003), pp. 37–44 (44).


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thinkers such as Muhammad al-Ghazzali (1917–1996) or Yusuf alQaradawi (b. 1926). Within the general framework of re-Islamisation, the influence of such ideologues seeks to indirectly dethrone the dominant ‘Turkish’ (i.e. ‘post-Ottoman’) interpretation of Islam in Bulgaria, along with its traditional rituals and rites. The religious education and practices of the young people who return to the central Rhodopes Mountain from various Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia, where they have received schooling, stands in stark contrast to the local Islamic teaching passed down through centuries of written and oral tradition. Arab-educated youngsters are appointed by local Bulgarian Muslims to serve as imams—a source of tension with both local Muslims and Christians. There have been attempts in some places to replace the more open-minded Hanafi school of Islamic law, which is traditionally widespread in the Balkans, with the extremely conservative, Hanbali school of Islamic law followed today by Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. If such attempts were to succeed, it could set a precedent with unpredictable consequences for the future of Islamic education, the cultural pattern, and the social practice of co-existence in Bulgaria and elsewhere in Southeastern Europe. However, it is not only direct foreign influences that bring about a paradoxical situation in Islamic education in Bulgaria. The development of Islamic education does not follow an intrinsic logic of its own, because it is located within the spheres of various influences which pull in different directions. It is regarded (and justly so) as a one of the factors that are significant in the balance of the country’s interethnic relations in so far as almost all of the Turks—the largest ethnic minority—are Muslims. It is also a variable to be reckoned with in the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. It is a possible gateway for the penetration of ‘Arab’ interpretations of Islamic doctrine and, in turn, of alleged Middle Eastern influence in Southeastern Europe. Islamic education is also a sensitive theme in the debates around the role of the de facto Turkish ethnic party, the MRF, in the political life of the country. In addition, it is the target of the criticism from nationalist political parties, such as the recently formed Ataka, and also attracts the attention of international human rights’ organisations, especially those associated with the European Union. All these influences, whether real or alleged, ‘block’ the development of Islamic education in Bulgaria in the sense that any significant change in its status would be regarded as infringing the interests of one or another

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powerful ‘player’, and is likely to cause vigorous counteractions and unpredictable consequences. These risks motivate the people involved in the administration of the institutions of Islamic education in Bulgaria to prefer the preservation of the status quo, although it is obvious that this leads to decline. This position on the part of policy-makers is, however, unsupported by either local traditions or the modern social environment and global change. Analysing the informality characteristic of the transmission of learning in medieval Islam, and also true of the Ottoman period, in the context of modern educational trends, Muhammad Qasim Zaman has soundly argued that the scholars of different times and places, but also within the same society, would have sometimes differed significantly in their intellectual formation. But modern educational reforms have institutionalised the differences at the same time that a globalised world creates unprecedented opportunities for those embodying these differences to come into contact with one another as well as with products of other systems of education.38

The standstill observed in contemporary Muslim education in Bulgaria may therefore have been misleading with its affected ‘calmness’ and resistance to modernisation and change. 7

Conclusions

A new, more globalised generation of Muslims in Bulgaria is already transcending local traditional bonds and participating in transnational exchange, including in the area of religious education. The seemingly vanishing role of the traditional madrasa type of Islamic school, whether state-sponsored or institutionally sustained by the mufti network, could turn out to have been an additional factor encouraging globalising tendencies among Muslims in Bulgaria, with the side effect of their marginalisation vis-à-vis the mainstream non-Muslim society in the country. The development of Islamic education in Bulgaria is,

38

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, “Epilogue: Competing conceptions of religious education”, in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds), Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 242–268 (264).


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therefore, important not only for the future of the country’s education and science, but also for reasons of national unity and stability. The lack of a stable, lasting tradition and the current distortion of the previously known forms of its transmission are accompanied by the fact that local Muslims often attend Turkish-language private schools offering Turkish curricula—in many educational subjects this is true even for the mainstream religious schools of the Nuvvab type and for the Higher Islamic Institute itself. Many Pomaks, especially those in the Central Rhodopes region, for their part, attend Arab educational centres abroad and, upon their return to Bulgaria follow Middle Eastern interpretations of religion and cultural traditions considered by their co-religionists as alien to the Balkans. Incidents of intergenerational conflict appear to be on the rise among Bulgarian Muslims: while the older generations prefer ‘traditional’ local versions of Islamic doctrine, education and practice inherited from Ottoman times, younger Muslims are more often perceived as seeking to impose various ‘more classical’ interpretations of Islam. Power struggles between proponents of different interpretations of Islam have led to the fragmentation of religious authority in Southeast Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, a more active participation by the Muslim community in Bulgaria in the national public sphere, including in its institutions, would have a beneficial effect in dispersing the suspicions of the general public and freeing Islamic education from its dependence on various cultural and political factors whose influence does not favour an educational development that is adequate for the increasingly globalised context of a complex, modern society. As for policy-makers in Bulgaria and other Balkan countries, along with their European counterparts, they must refrain from direct political intervention in Muslim affairs, while strictly fulfilling their obligation to protect religious freedom. The adoption of new policies that embrace and nurture the importance of the religious freedom of all communities in Bulgaria and Southeastern Europe, including the region’s significant Muslim populations, can, on the basis of long past experience, offer positive models of peaceful and prosperous co-existence for the rest of Europe too.

APPLYING SHARI’A IN EUROPE: GREECE AS AN AMBIVALENT LEGAL PARADIGM Konstantinos Tsitselikis1 1

Introduction

For historical reasons, Greece’s Muslim communities have remained under legal protection with a strong communal profile: Muslim schools, foundations (waqfs) and religious hierarchies (muftis, imams) survived from the preceding Ottoman administration within a modern legal system. Often these institutions were governed both by mainstream legal norms and by a special minority protection framework. On the other hand, while mainstream legal norms were developed along with other institutions and law inherent in the Greek legal system, minority institutions were less exposed to evolution as community structures were less flexible when it came to change. These community structures and institutions were akin to the organisational category of millets, ethno-religious communities, on which the Ottoman state and society were based. However, some institutions, while retaining their own characteristics, did acquire a certain amount of new content and functions. In Ottoman times, the mufti was appointed by the qadi (judge) as an interpreter of Shari’a law. Under the Greek legal system, he became both judge and interpreter of Shari’a. Through this new role, the muftis became in many cases heads of the local Muslim communities with a political authority, representing the Muslim community to the Greek administration. In concrete terms, following the gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman administration after 1881 and Greece’s annexation of Thessalia and part of Epirus, the local muftis took office as judges in matters of personal status, and became heads of the Muslim community. When Greece annexed the New Territories (Epirus, Macedonia, Crete and

1

Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in international law and human rights and is co-director of the series of studies produced by the Minority Groups Research Centre (www.kemo.gr).

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the islands of the Eastern Aegean) after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the position of the muftis was again acknowledged in Greek law, with special jurisdiction being granted to them in family and inheritance matters concerning Muslim Greek citizens. In both cases, special legal regulations implemented bilateral treaties between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The end of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, the fall of the Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, engendered the population exchange between the two countries on the basis of religion: as a counter-weight to the Greek Orthodox already expelled from Asia Minor and Pontus, the Muslims of Greece had to migrate to Turkey. In total, 1.6 million Greek Orthodox and 450,000 Muslims became refugees in terms of the Lausanne Convention (January 1923). According to the treaty, the Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from the exchange, as were the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul (including Imvros and Tenedos, under the Treaty of Lausanne). The Treaty of Lausanne finalised the agreement of the participants in the conference, establishing modern Turkey. Among other issues, the Treaty attributed special minority rights to non-Muslim Turkish citizens in Turkey and to Muslim Greek citizens in Greece (residents of Thrace who had been exempt from the population exchange).2 In addition, although not explicitly mentioned in the convention, Muslims of Albanian origin were also exempt, but they were expelled en masse to Albania during the German occupation of Greece and the beginning of the civil war. In the aftermath of the annexation of the Dodecanese by the Greek State in 1947, the Mufti of Rodos remained a religious leader with no jurisdiction. Thus Muslim communities enjoyed a special status and rights regarding internal institutions, such as schools, foundations and the offices of the mufti, the muftis exerting jurisdiction in matters of personal status and these institutions have operated in Western Thrace until today without interruption. The three muftis in Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotyho apply Shari’a law in family and inheritance disputes, in an awkward relationship vis-à-vis the Greek constitutional and European legal systems. The adjudication by the mufti applying Islamic law in a nationally recognised court is unique in the current European legal

2 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402).

applying shari’a in europe

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system (disregarding the temporary case of Mayotte [France]), raising a series of legal questions to be discussed below. The core issue arising from discussion of the status of the mufti within the Greek and European system is the matter of how to accommodate non-liberal minorities in a liberal legal context, which touches the lines between integration, preservation of minority identity, and the relation between individual and collective identity, as a potential field of normative action. Thus what appear to be positive measures for the minority taken or supported by the Greek state today is a legacy of Ottoman times, a relic of the segregational millet system. This creates an impermeable barrier in relation to current European human rights legal standards, such as gender equality and the right to fair trial, while, on the other hand, adjudication by the mufti is claimed to be of central importance for the preservation of the identity of the minority in Thrace. The case of the Islamic courts in Thrace opens up the field for further discussion on the following questions: What should be the position of such religious courts within a democratic society? Is this division by religion in accordance with non-discrimination principles? Why not extend such a paradigm to other legal fields, both for Muslims and for other groups? On what terms could modern human and minority rights legislation endorse legal pluralism? In practice, how could the various interpretations of Qur’anic norms, which usually assume the superiority of men over women, accommodate perceptions of gender equality? This article cannot give exhaustive answers to these questions, but it aims to contribute to the discussion by reviewing the application of Shari’a in Greece and outlining an approach to reform, keeping a balance between freedom of religion and communitarian minority protection. 2

The Mufti-Judge as a Relic of the Ottoman Legacy

In the framework of the settlement of new borders in the Balkans after the end of the European-Russian-Ottoman disputes at the end of the nineteenth century, Greece—and the other Balkan emerging states—used the Ottoman system of division on the basis of ethnoreligious communities. The millet was a convenient legal paradigm to accommodate ethno-religious minorities within the new national

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states. In this context the qadi was replaced by the mufti, who retained special jurisdiction in matters of personal status of the members the Muslim communities. The Treaty of Constantinople (1881) adopted this paradigm, followed by the Treaty of Athens (1913), which established the special jurisdiction of the muftis over the more than half a million Muslims who became Greek citizens. A series of Greek laws implemented the provisions of the Treaty of Athens.3 The special Shari’a courts chaired by a single judge, the mufti, were organised by Act 2345/1920. Under the amendment of Act 3069/1924 (FEK A 71), the mufti’s decisions were not subject to appeal, as no Chief Mufti, who would be the adjudicating authority, has been appointed. The jurisdiction of the Mufti was also regulated by article 14 § 1 of the Treaty of Sevres (1920 and confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne 1923) concerning the protection of minorities in Greece, which provided that “Greece agrees to take all necessary measures in relation to the Muslims to enable questions of family law and personal status to be regulated in accordance with Muslim usage”. The Treaty of Lausanne (the cornerstone of minority protection up to the present, in force from 1923) refers to the matter as follows (art. 42 para. 1): “The [Greek] government undertakes, as regards [Muslim] minorities in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities”. By the adoption of the new Civil Code after the end of World War II, the jurisdiction of the muftis was kept in force. The legal content of Act 2345/19204 did not change even when Act 1920/1991 was adopted. The new Act retained the legal content of the previous regime regarding the law and procedure to be applied. According to article 7 of the new Act 1920/1991,5 the mufti must be a Greek citizen since “The Mufti office is considered to be a civil servant”. The three muftis of Thrace have jurisdiction over Muslims of Greek citizenship in their respective administrative areas of Rodopi, Xanthi and Evros. In prac-

3

Article 11 of the Act 4734/1913, article 4 of Act 147/1914. Act 2345/1920, article 10, partly amended by article 8 para.1 of the introductory Act to the Code of Civil Procedure, reiterated article 11 para.9 of the Convention of Athens on the jurisdiction of the Muftis. This provision has finally been abolished and replaced by article 9 of Act 1920/1991 on the legal status of the muftis in Greece. 5 Adopted on 4 February 1991 (FEK Α 11). 4


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tice, the religious courts have widened their jurisdiction to mixed marriages and residents outside Thrace or Greece. 3

The Role of Turkey

According to article 42 para. 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek government and the minority have the right to refer any relevant dispute to international arbitration. However, this option has never been exercised, nor has any substantial discussion been entered into, and the institutions previously established have continued to apply. In Turkey, in 1925, following political pressure, the minorities signed a declaration of non-application of article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Thus, the Turkish Civil Code was applicable to all Turkish citizens with no distinction on the basis of religion, denying the right to parallel religious jurisdictions. The Greek government did not attempt to impose the same measure, which would not have been opposed by the Turkish government in that given political context. However, and contrary to natural expectation, the maintenance of the Islamic character of the minority society created grounds for political involvement and political interference. During the Greek-Turkish meeting of 1931, after the establishment of friendship between the two rival countries, the Turkish government opened discussion towards an eventual abolition of the Shari’a courts in Thrace: Prime MinisterVenizelos replied that these courts were protected by international treaties and Greece alone could not alter their status.6 In 1959, in the framework of the negotiations that resulted in “The report of the two”, Turkey again attempted to reiterate its desire that the jurisdiction of the mufti be abolished. The Turkish representative proposed a reform of the Shari’a courts based on civil law, on the basis that Shari’a law constituted a social regression.7 The Greek delegates expressed the conviction that “the minority is satisfied by the status quo and they could not see by which legal rules the personal status of the Muslims would be replaced in case of abolition of the Shari’at” (sic).

6

Speeches of the Prime Ministers during the meetings of 5 and 6 October 1931, AEV, F. 173/61, p. 7. 7 Kuneralp, Zeki, İkili rapor/Rapport des deux [May-August 1959] (Istanbul: İSİS, 1997), p. 19.

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If Turkey was attempting to bring modernity to Thrace with the aim of establishing its political influence within the community, the Greek authorities fuelled divisions between progressives and Islamists and remained reluctant to decide on any eventual reform of the Shari’a courts. The proposal by the Turkish delegate8 to establish a right for Muslims to choose between the Greek civil code and Qur’anic regulations was placed under consideration by the Greek delegation and has apparently remained so until today: the discussion continues to be limited to a small number of scholars and a few journalists. 4

The Mufti’s Decisions as Part of the Greek Legal System

Islamic law as applied by the muftis’ courts of Thrace is not standardised or codified, but has been left to the broad interpretation of the judge. The mufti has been given competence to adjudicate family law in matters such as divorce,9 pensions, alimony (nafaqa),10 emancipation of minors and custody. Cases related to adoption, children born out of wedlock, division of property upon divorce, and communication with children are not subject to the mufti’s jurisdiction. As far as inheritance litigation is concerned, the mufti has jurisdiction solely in cases related to Islamic wills, according to which not more than one third of the overall inheritance may pass to anyone other than the relatives of the deceased. To acquire legal effect, the mufti’s decision must be acknowledged by the civil court. In accordance with Act 1920/1991 (art. 3, par. 3), the decisions of the mufti are executable after being ratified by the Court of First Instance.11 The most important matter to consider is how the Islamic legal system functions in parallel to the civil code applied by the Greek courts. The application of Islamic jurisdiction must be voluntary rather than mandatory in such a way that the judicial competence

8

Kuneralp, İkili rapor/Rapport des deux, p. 19. In Thrace, according to the case law of the Shari’a Courts, a divorced father is obliged to pay an average of €160–€230 per child per month. Ktistakis, Yannis, Ιερός νόμος του Ισλάμ και οι Έλληνες μουσουλμάνοι (The Holy Law of Islam and Muslim Greek Citizens) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), p. 69. 10 There is an obligation to feed the wife and children during the marriage; a sort of alimony for a period of three months after the dissolution of the marriage for the wife, and for sons and daughters up to the age of 7 and 9 respectively, after which children are placed under the direct protection of the father. 11 For relevant case law, see Ktistakis, Ιερός νόμος του Ισλάμ, pp. 42–46. 9


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of the mufti is optional and supplementary. Consequently, Muslims should be free to choose between the civil court and the Shari’a court.12 However, until recently, most of the Greek courts have denied Muslims the right to bring their cases before the civil court as they did not want to be thought to be infringing the minority’s institutional autonomy. This effectively gave the muftis exclusive jurisdiction. The division in the application of the law between ‘Greeks’ and ‘Muslims’ involves obvious dissimilarities in the legal treatment of similar social situations regarding ‘citizens’ and non-‘members of a millet’. The obligation to submit a case to the mufti’s jurisdiction amounts to a legally imposed distinction between Greek citizens on grounds of religion, which conflicts with the Greek Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and other relevant international instruments. The question to be examined is whether applied legal pluralism, namely the option to choose or to impose different legal systems according to religious affiliation, complies with or enriches fundamental human rights standards. A second issue regards the terms upon which Islamic law may be developed so as to converge with fundamental standards of human rights. 5

Issues of Compatibility

The mufti applies rules of fiqh derived from the Qur’an and Hadith, in practice according to his own interpretation, with no standardisation. Consequently, the implementation of Shari’a in Thrace differs from court to court. Islamic procedural and substantial law is in many cases rather different from that of the Greek civil law, and even controversial, although “a relatively mild version of Islamic law” is applied.13 The most ambiguous issues concern gender equality and children’s rights as guaranteed by the Greek Constitution and international human rights law. For instance, according to Islamic law, the husband, but not

12 Naskou-Perraki, Paroula, The Legal Framework of Religious Freedom in Greece (Athens: Sakkoulas, 2000), p. 52, and Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, “Οι δικαιοδοσίες του μουφτή ως ιεροδίκη. Με αφορμή την απόφαση 405/2000 του ΜονΠρΘηβ” (The jurisdiction of the mufti as a religious judge. On the occasion of the case No 405/2000 of the First Instance Court of Thiva), Nomiko Vima no. 49 (2001), pp. 658–693. 13 Tsaoussis, Aspasia and Eleni Zervogianni, “Multiculturalism and family law: the case of Greek Muslims”, in K.Boele-Woelki and T.Svedrup (eds), European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law (Anwerp: Intersentia, 2008), pp. 209–239 (219).

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the wife can obtain a divorce without giving any grounds; the husband can initiate a divorce without the consent of the wife, but not vice versa;14 the wife can obtain the dissolution of the marriage only on the basis of a serious fault on the part of the husband; in cases of divorce by consent at the wife’s request (khul‘ ), the wife must compensate her husband; a male heir can in most cases obtain twice the inheritance awarded to the corresponding female heir; after the dissolution of a marriage, the mother obtains custody of the children only until they reach a certain age. Moreover, comparison between the substantive legal norms of civil law and Shari’a reveals serious divergence between them, leading to contradictory legal solutions. One example is alimony: Islamic alimony (nafaqa) is granted to the divorced wife for only 90 days after the dissolution of the marriage, during which time the woman may not remarry, whereas the alimony provided by the civil law is granted for an unlimited time, until the next marriage, if any. The mufti’s decision is under the control of the First Instance Civil Court in the same administrative district only with regard to procedural issues. The Civil Court (Monomeles Protodeikeio) is empowered to adjudicate only with regard to the limits of the jurisdiction of the mufti’s decision, not with regard to the merits of the case and the mufti’s decision is subject to appeal before the Court of First Instance (Polymeles Protodikeio) only with regard to the extent of his jurisdiction. The usual juridical practice is still to accept the mufti’s decisions without thorough constitutional oversight, for reasons which seem to be political rather than legal. The vast majority of the decisions made by the mufti are ratified by the judge of the civil court as a routine exercise, although the civil courts have the duty of constitutional control. As research has shown in detail,15 the coexistence of the two

14

For relevant case law of the Shari’a Courts of Thrace see Ktistakis, Ιερός νόμος

του Ισλάμ, pp. 60–65. 15 Minaidis, Simos, Η θρησκευτική ελευθερία των μουσουλμάνων στην ελληνική έννομη τάξη (Religious freedom of the Muslims in the Greek legal order) (AthensKomotini: Sakkoulas, 1990), 63; Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, “Η θέση του Μουφτή στην ελληνική έννομη τάξη” (The Mufti’s position in the Greek legal order)”, in

D.Christopoulos (ed.), Legal Issues of Religious Alterity in Greece (Athens: Kritiki/ KEMO, 1999), pp. 271–329; Tsitselikis, Konstantinos, “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: a legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in R. Aluffi and G.Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132; Ktistakis, Ιερός νόμος του Ισλάμ; and Tsitselikis, “Οι δικαιοδοσίες του μουφτή”.


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systems in Thrace, the one applying the Islamic Law and the other the Greek Civil Code, gives ground for legal discrepancies and shortcomings in the following areas: • There are no means of monitoring the merits of the muftis’ decisions and no effective means of ensuring their constitutionality, although the right of recourse to a judge must be effectively safeguarded, according to article 20 of the Greek Constitution. There is also the question of the compatibility of the procedure before the mufti with the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR, when the equality of the litigants is not safeguarded, nor representation through a lawyer, nor the predictability and transparency of the relevant law. • There is no inherent and adequate legal guarantee of fundamental human rights values as to gender equality, when Islamic family and inheritance law provides regulations disadvantaging women and contradicting international norms, such as article 4.1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. • There are no specific legal regulations governing conflict between the civil code and Islamic law, regarding rules of procedural and substantial law in cases regarding divorce of a mixed couple (Muslims of Greek and foreign citizenship),16 or of Muslims residing outside the area of the mufti’s jurisdiction. In the latter case, conflict would concern the selection of the Mufti’s jurisdiction by only one of the litigants. • It is doubtful whether the muftis’ decisions would be recognisable by other legal systems according to the Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters. If not, the Shari’a court decisions of Thrace would be deprived of any legal effect before a foreign court as being incompatible with standards of EU law.

16 By his decision 7/2000 the Mufti of Komotini issued a divorce regarding a woman of Greek citizenship and an immigrant Muslim (from Iran). The First Instance Court of Komotini approved the decision. In contrast, the First Instance Court of Xanthi overturned a mufti’s decision as being outside his jurisdiction in a case regarding a marriage between a Christian and a Muslim, both Greek citizens. Papasiopi-Pasia, Zoi, “Προβληματισμοί γύρω από το πεδίο εφαρμογής του διαπροσωπικού δικαίου στην Ελλάδα και τη δικαιοδοτική αρμοδιότητα του Μουφτή (Reflections on the implementation field of the personal law in Greece and the jurisdiction of the Mufti)”, vol. 7, no.b, Koinodikion (2001), pp. 391–411 (402).

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• The qualification criteria for the selection of the mufti should be on a par with those required for other judges, so as to avoid the debasement of his role. On the one hand, the mufti’s appointment by the state may infringe on the moral obligation to respect the community’s will to have a religious leader of their own choosing. On the other, election of the mufti by the community, since he is a judge, would contravene the fundamental constitutional rules about the status of the judges, who must be appointed by the state and enjoy independence. The limited version of Shari’a applied within the Greek legal system is subject to the limitations set by ‘public policy’ or ‘public order’, an ambiguous legal notion, which attempts to safeguard the fundamental components of each legal system. According to the Greek High Court, public order consists of a series of fundamental norms and principles that supersede and reflect the legal, social, economic, religious, ethical and other beliefs that govern its legal relations. The abrogation of public order can be detected when these beliefs are offended and disorder in their legal relations ensues.17 Of course, this flexible definition would allow restrictive interpretations that reflect only the mainstream opinions of a majority, to the detriment of any minority rights. Public order should be understood as a group of principles connected to constitutional norms that constitute the legal framework within which the legal system operates. The pertinent international laws (the ECHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Women’s Convention [CEDAW]) regulating both areas safeguard basic standards that the implementation of the Shari’a would infringe, not only directly but also by contravening European public order.18 The mufti’s decision without any corrective control endangers not only the legal interest of citizens who come under the jurisdiction of the mufti, but also the authority and importance of this Muslim institution. The mufti court needs to be reassessed and reformed with equal regard to both the religious traditions and freedoms of Muslims, and

17 18

Areios Pagos 17/1999, Elliniki Dikaiosyni 1999, p. 1288. Ktistakis, Ιερός νόμος του Ισλά, pp. 129–146.


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the fundamental values and individual rights of the European legal order. 6

To Abolish Shari’a Courts or to Develop Shari’a Law?

The discrepancies between the Shari’a law applied by the muftis’ courts in Greece and fundamental human rights principles, as verified so far, could be corrected in two different ways: either by abolishing the mufti’s jurisdiction, or by channelling the development of Shari’a law in a direction that will not contradict public policy and the legal system required by the Greek constitution and European human rights. The Commissioner for Human Rights in the Council of Europe has made recommendations that Greece consider withdrawing the judicial competence of the muftis, given the issues of compatibility with international human rights standards; strengthening the substantial review of the mufti’s judicial decisions by domestic courts; and formalizing an open and continuous dialogue with representatives of the Muslim minority.19 After a productive and dynamic development of its application and interpretation, Shari’a law has been seen by mainstream political theology as not subject to further developments, a ‘closed door’. A new discussion has brought up the question of whether in our times the notorious closed door of ijtihad (namely the endeavour of jurists to analyse and comprehend the written sources of Shari’a with ‘justice and equity’) has been or should be re-opened.20 The issue could be discussed under the umbrella of legal pluralism, which indeed is extraordinary by European standards. What is quite surprising is that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has not subscribed to legal pluralism in relation to religion. The case of the Refah Islamic political party, which was suspended by the Turkish

19 Hammarberg, Thomas, Report on Human Rights Following his Visit to Greece on 8–10 December 2008, Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH(2009)9 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009), para 59–60, www.coe.int. 20 “After carefully digesting what these giants of Shari’a law [of the university of Cairo] wrote, I am fully convinced that the corpus-juris elaborated by the jurists of the past is not a closed book, but an open one which can be brought to life and rejuvenated in order to cope with the requirements of the modern world.” Sadek El Kosheri, Ahmet, “Islamic schools of law”, in Christian v. Bar (ed.), Islamic Law and its Reception by the Courts in the West (Cologne: Karl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1999), pp. 35–45 (43).

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courts, involves interesting issues.21 The ECtHR upheld the thesis of the Turkish courts that the party’s political programme was not in conformity with democratic values. It said that legal pluralism would introduce a distinction between people on the basis of their religion, which would allow them rights and freedoms not as individuals but according to their religion.22 According to the ECtHR, legal categorisation according to one’s religion would do away with the role of the state as the guarantor of human rights and the impartial organiser of the practice of beliefs and religions in a democratic society, as the individuals would be obliged to obey static religious rules.23 A millet-like system ensures the systemic tolerance between groups but it excludes any individual dissent within the group. In the neomillet system applied by the jurisdiction of the mufti in Greece, the dissenter who seeks recourse to the civil courts would immediately be seen as traitor towards the minority society. Moreover, although anyone can take his/her case before a Greek civil court, the latter very often impose jurisdictional cleavages by denying their own competence on the basis of millet-like divisions and sending the case to the mufti. The coexistence of two different legal systems could be seen as a case of legal pluralism, but only provided it ensures the freedom of personal choice to submit to one or the other legal system and does not lead to any direct violation of fundamental rights. If a certain juridical system were imposed on the individual on the basis of religious affiliation, it would contradict the general principles and values of the European system and democratic society, as the ECtHR has stated.24 On the other hand, the alignment of Shari’a law with European standards should not mean the total elimination of the former and its absorption into the latter. That would simply reflect the domination

21 The Refah political party was declaring in the name of respect for legal pluralism that: “The citizen must be able to choose for himself which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a framework of general principles. Moreover, that has always been the case throughout our history. [. . .] Everyone lived according to the legal rules of his own organisation, and so everyone lived in peace. Why, then, should I be obliged to live according to another’s rules?”, ECtHR, Refah partisi v. Turkey, 13.2.2003, para. 25. 22 ECtHR, Refah partisi v. Turkey, 13.2.2003, para. 70–76. 23 ECtHR, Refah partisi v Turkey, 13.2.2003, para 119. 24 CtHR, Refah partisi v Turkey, para 126–128.


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and hegemony of a dominant legal system over a minority legal system. After all, “We should combat fanaticism but not the other forms of life. This should be the contemporary meaning of public order in private international law.”25 The clause concerning public order should apply as a buffer zone with regard to Islamic law, but not as an assimilatory mechanism. Otherwise, gradually, different legal norms will be equalised by the mainstream perception of legal regulations—unless society itself were to call for this, and then legal pluralism would not have any justification. To what degree could alternative legal norms of private law survive in Greece? Maybe the paradigm of the reform in Mayotte or arbitration practices in the UK could give food for thought to the rather reluctant Greek policy and law making. As Tsaoussis and Zervogianni suggest,26 an alternative resolution process could create patterns of permeability between the two legal systems in Thrace, so that mediation or arbitration would resolve family disputes, taking into consideration women’s interests from the perspectives of human rights and Islamic law. Eventually the concept of mediation would contribute to reducing social injustice and encouraging new mentalities and communication between different legal cultures that would encompass women’s and children’s rights among the minority community. With the exception of the hard core of the Qur’anic rules, which is perceived as an unchangeable domain, other matters of Islamic law could be studied and new rules could be produced to comply with the prevailing socio-economic conditions. Codification has been carried out in the Ottoman Empire and more recently in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere. The example of the discussion regarding Shari’a as an applied legal system in Bosnia27 during the war in the early 1990s and the role of Islam after independence (1995) might provide a paradigm for how Islamic law could be seen in relation to modernity. In this 25 Jayme, Erik, “Order public, droits de l’homme, diversité de religion”, in Christian v. Bar (ed.), Islamic Law and its Reception by the Courts in the West (Cologne: Karl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1999), pp. 221–229 (229). 26 Tsaoussis. Zervogianni, “Multiculturalism and family law”. The authors take into consideration the discussion on extra-judicial settlement of family disputes among Muslims in Canada. 27 Bougarel, Xavier, “Trois définitions de l’Islam en Bosnie-Herzégovine”, Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions, no. 115 (2001), pp. 183–201. For the accommodation of secularism and ‘European values’ such as rule of law and human rights by Bosnian Islam see Moe, Christian, “A Sultan in Brussels? European hopes and fears of Bosnian Muslims”, Sudost Europa, vol. 55 (2007), pp. 374–393.

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case, a series of absolute and mandatory norms are de facto or de jure abolished or softened. A reform and codification of Shari’a regarding the law applicable by the muftis in Thrace could be carried out through ijtihad, following which a reformative intervention should correspond to social interests and needs and thus embodied in the Shari’a. Thus, Shari’a could serve social modernisation, democratisation and openness towards other cultures, and then public order could play a key role in orienting Islamic law, in substance and application, towards the primary values of an open society that tolerates legal pluralism and accommodates different legal systems. Otherwise, to impose the immediate abolition of Shari’a would contradict the democratic process of social negotiation. Legal solutions without the consensus of the population concerned would impose a ‘republican fundamentalism’, which would ignite hysteria surrounding the Shari’a debate, rendering women and children even more vulnerable within a parallel hidden legal order. Equality should be enhanced from within the Muslim community, and not imposed by law. Thus, an alternative, culturally accommodated, legal mechanism could be promoted as a democratic paradigm for society overall. 7

Controversy Over the Selection of Muftis

The discussion on the jurisdiction of the mufti is closely linked to the broader legal and political status of the minority. The mode of selection of the mufti has acquired major importance for both the Muslim community and the Greek government. Under the new legal framework of 1991, the functions and qualifications of the muftis remain largely unchanged. However, provision is made for the appointment of the muftis by presidential decree following a proposal by the Minister of Education who, in turn, must consult a committee comprising the local prefect and a number of Muslim dignitaries chosen by the state. Act 2345/1920, which provided for the election of the muftis, was in effect not implemented and has since been expressly abrogated. At first sight, the interference of the government in the internal affairs of the minority regarding the selection of the muftis seems to be suspect from the point of view of human rights law on freedom of religion and article 9 of the ECHR. It is worth noting that the Declaration adopted in 1981 by the UN General Assembly on the Elimination


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of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, guarantees the freedom to “train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief ” (art. 6.g). However, there was no discussion of the will of minorities or the Islamic religious requirements in the matter. From a broader perspective, this situation also raises the question of the representation of the minority in Thrace before the state authorities: are the muftis to play the role of the representatives of the minority as a community? The question is complicated since the answer depends on two states (Greece and Turkey) and their controversial28 policies, stances and mutual perceptions aimed at winning over the minority religious elite. On the other hand the muftis as religious, and often political, leaders have had to balance their actions and statements in order to safeguard their own position, state policies and the aspirations of the domestic elite. The political dispute over the control of the Mufti Offices of Thrace makes the minority an area of antagonism, placed within the broader Greek-Turkish confrontation. For example, the minority strongly opposed the recent regulations regarding the selection of the mufti, and these regulations, moreover, challenged the minority’s right to self-administration in religious affairs: As the UN rapporteur noted in 2009, the “appointment by government of religious officials, such as muftis, infringes on the right of persons belonging to the Muslim minority to effectively participate in the decision-making process that affects their daily lives”.29 Thus, the issue of the election of two ‘parallel’ muftis, in Komotini and in Xanthi—not recognised by the government—ended up at the EctHR after long processes before the penal and administrative Greek courts. The Serif 30 and Agga cases31 cost Greece a series of rulings that articles 9 and 6 of the ECHR had

28

Akgönül, Samim, “Religious institutions of the Muslim minority of Greece”, in W. Shadid and S. van Koningsveld (eds), Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), pp. 145–157 (147). 29 McDougall, Gay, Mission to Greece (8–16 September 2008): Report of the independent expert on minority issues, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, Human Rights Council, General Assembly, UN, A/HRC/10/11/Add.3, 2009, para. 95. 30 ECtHR Serif v. Greece, Application No 38178/97, 14.12.1999. 31 ECtHR, Agga v. Greece (No 3), 17.10.2002, applications nos. 50776/99 and 52912/99, Agga v. Greece (No 3), Application no. 32186/02 and Agga v. Greece (No 4), Application no. 33331/02.

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been violated. The ECtHR recognised that it was possible for tension to be created in situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided; it considered that this was one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such circumstances was not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerated each other. In this context, the ECtHR noted that, “apart from a general reference to the creation of tension, the Government did not allude to disturbances among the Muslims in Rodopi (and Xanthi) that had actually been or could have been caused by the existence of two religious leaders”. Moreover, in a similar case concerning the Mufti of Bulgaria, the Court considered that “In democratic societies the State does not need to take measures to ensure that religious communities are brought under a unified leadership.”32 The issue of the selection of the muftis is of key importance to our discussion, as free elections would entail the loss of their jurisdiction. In view of balancing political interests in a given historical context, neither Greece or Turkey, nor the minority’s political and religious elite, have proven able to answer the following questions: which rule should be applied regarding the selection of the mufti? How would the development of Islamic theology and practice affect the position of the religious leadership of the minority? What should be the qualifications of the mufti? To what extent should the state intervene in the internal religious affairs of the minority? Which model of selection should be followed, that of the Patriarchate, that of the Orthodox Church of Greece, or that of the Mufti Offices in Turkey? After all, the practice for the past 85 years regarding the selection of Thrace’s muftis shows that law was subject to a rigid political custom that harmed the prestige and authority of the mufti and undermined any relevant discussion on the content of legal rules. 8

Conclusions

Undoubtedly, the case of the special jurisdiction of the mufti in Greek Thrace to apply Islamic family and inheritance law raises a series of questions related to the core issues of legal inter-culturalism and

32

ECtHR, Hasan and Tchaoush v Bulgaria, 26.10.2000, para 78.


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unravelling the limits of public policy. A comparison of the mainstream legal norms of the Greek/European space with those of Islamic family and inheritance law would be unfavourable to the latter where women’s and children’s rights are concerned. In view of this, a neutral multiculturalism would amount to the infringement of various rights of minority sub-groups (such as women and children) among the Muslim community. Moreover, these groups have not always been offered the rights and freedoms that the European system and the Greek constitutional order have developed over the past 60 years. If Shari’a were applicable if chosen by the litigant, the question would be reframed as follows: can one legitimately opt to curtail one’s own rights in deference to a given social framework or pressure? Nevertheless, if women are oppressed in a given context, it seems unlikely that they would seek recourse to the legal system that disadvantages them most. On the other hand, offering Shari’a as an option does not of itself amount to an infringement of our legal values and principles. What in effect matters is the content Shari’a norms would have and the procedure through which they would be applied. A second cluster of questions would then tackle the possibility of developing Shari’a with a view to its convergence with fundamental human rights principles, at which stage the position of the community would be crucial. Furthermore, the state should open a dialogue with the community in order to enhance the prospect of developing these norms. Indeed, to abolish a long-standing legal system based on communitarianism without the consent of the community would undermine the political process of the envisaged modernisation of the minority’s personal status law.

ISLAMIC FINANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE Ibrahim Zeyyad Cekici1 1

Introduction

Islamic finance has grown by 15% to 20% in about two decades with assets evaluated to be worth US$500 billion to US$700 billion in 2008. There are more than 800 Islamic financial institutions in the world. The potential for growth is still considerable, for Muslims make up about 20% of the world population, while their share of gross domestic product amounts to only 10%. Experts estimate that, on average, Muslims have invested only about US$100 dollars per head in Islamic finance.2 The process of legal reassessment of Islam that is taking place in Europe3 has led to reflections that have made it obvious that the terms dar al- islam and dar al-harb are obsolete. Dar al-Islam means literally the ‘territory of Islam’, or in contemporary terms the ‘Muslim countries’. The other term, dar al-harb, means the ‘territory of war’, signifying ‘non-Muslim countries’. There is a current of thought that wants to overcome this vision of a two-fold division, which dominated and still

1 Lecturer and co-director of the Diploma programme of the Université Finance Islamique, École de Management de Strasbourg, Université de Strasbourg, France. Translated by Connie Pedersen. 2 Wahab, A., “L’essor des banques islamiques”, La documentation française, Problèmes économiques, Religions et croissance, 14 September 2005, pp. 2f; ‘Les banques françaises converties à la finance en terre d’Islam,’ AFP Infos Économie, 11 April 2006; “La société générale se plie à la charia”, Libération, 3 July 2007, http://www.liberation .fr/actualite/instantanes/histoiredujour/264954.FR.php, accessed 17 January 2010; “La City veut devenir une tête de ponte de la banque islamique en Europe”, AFP Infos Mondial, 13 June 2005; “La Deutsche Bank lance son premier hedge fund islamique”, Le Temps, 6 June 2006; http://www.calyon.fr/banque-financement-investissement/ finance-islamique/produits#sng_2, accessed 17 April 2010; “Ford cède Aston Martin à un Britannique épaulé par des fonds islamiques”, Le Monde, 13 March 2007. 3 Frégosi, Franck, “Les horizons européens de l’islam”, in J.-P. Bastian and F. Messner (eds), Minorités religieuses dans l’espace européen. Approches sociologiques et juridiques, (Paris: PUF, 2007), pp. 177–208, especially pp. 189–198. See also Gonzalez, Gérard, “Définition du concept de minorité religieuse en droit européen”, in J.-P. Bastian and F. Messner (eds), Minorités religieuses dans l’espace européen. Approches sociologiques et juridiques, (Paris: PUF, 2007), pp. 121–131.

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dominates the understanding of international relations in direct conflicts, by presenting an analysis of the situation that is more nuanced and more realistic because it takes into account the large number of Muslims in Europe. It makes it obvious that the religions have to coexist in a context that is becoming increasingly secular. Thus Tariq Ramadan puts forward the idea of dar al-shahada4 (the territory of testimony) in Europe, where Muslims have the opportunity to practise their religion without major obstacles, in particular as regards prayer, fasting and zakat and—as we shall see in this article—economic activity according to Islamic law. Islam prohibits the taking of interest (riba) and investments in illegal sectors (e.g. alcohol, pork, pornography, gambling, conventional banking) and suggests as an alternative the sharing of losses and profits in financial operations. The stated objective of Islamic finance is to support the real economy for, in addition to the prohibitions mentioned above, risky and dangerous speculation ( gharar and maysir), such as the issuance of dubious debt obligations, is also prohibited. Such operations must relate to real assets.5 In this article we shall put into perspective the birth of Islamic finance, its establishment in Western Europe and its salient features in order to review the situation in France. 2

The Rise of Islamic Finance and its Establishment in Western Europe Historically Islamic financing was developed in countries with an Islamic tradition and even today it is concentrated in the Persian Golf and in South-East Asia. It has moved to the United States and Europe following

4 See Ramadan, Tariq, Les musulmans d’Occident et l’avenir de l’Islam (Paris: Sindbad Actes Sud, 2003), p. 328; English trans.: Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 73ff. 5 Al-Zuhayli, Wahhab, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Al-fiqh alislami wa-adillatuh), trans. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal and rev. Muhammad S. Eissa, 2 vols (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, no date); Iqbal, Zamir and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons (Asia), 2007); Thomas, Abdelkader (ed.), Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba (London: Routledge, 2006); Kettel, Brian, Introduction to Islamic Banking and Finance (Northampton UK: Printhaus, 2008); Obaidullah, Muhammed, Islamic Financial Services (Jeddah: Islamic Economics Research Centre, King Abdelaziz University, 2005); Usmani, Muhammed Taqi, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Karachi: Idaratul Ma’arif, 1998).

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the fast increase of the oil-prices in the past few years. In reality a surplus of the liquidity from the monarchies in the Golf has in part floated towards the big international financial centres and generated a growing interest in this economic system, which is based on the Qur’an and the Sunna6 (my translation).

The birth of the first Islamic bank dates back to 1956 in Malaysia and 1963 in Egypt, where Ahmed al-Naggar created Mir Ghamr Saving Bank, which offered saving accounts based on the principle of sharing profits and losses. This institution experienced great popular success and attracted a million clients in five years.7 Subsequently, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference introduced the idea of creating an intergovernmental Islamic bank, and the Islamic Development Bank was established in 1975.8 Parallel to this, other banks were established on a private basis, including the Dubai Islamic Bank, Al Baraka, Al Rajhi Bank, The Kuwait Financing House and the Bahrain Islamic Bank. Today the number of Islamic financial institutions has grown considerably, with around a 1,000 institutions of which the most recent can be found in the UK.9 It should be noted that Pakistan Islamised its banking sector following a Supreme Court decision in 1979, although the decision was only put into effect after 2000. Iran and Sudan followed this tendency from the 1980s and other Muslim states have passed laws on the subject. This is the case in Turkey, Lebanon, Malaysia and Indonesia, where dual banking systems have developed. The first Islamic fund was the Amana Income Fund, established in 1986, which was set up by members of the North American Islamic Thrust (NAIT). It is worth noting that only five to seven funds account for half of the listed Islamic capital and they are all structured by conventional financial actors.10 It was not until the second half of the 1990s that the second issue of Islamic bonds (sukuk) was undertaken, by the

6 Arthuis, Jean, Rapport d’information du Sénat fait au nom de la commission des finances, du contrôles budgétaires et des comptes économiques de la Nation sur la finance islamiques, 2 octobre 2008, no. 329, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 14 mai 2008, p. 7, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r07-329/r07-3291.pdf, accessed 22 April 2010. 7 Ruimy, Michel, La finance islamique (Paris: Arnaud Franel Éditions, 2008), p. 30. 8 www.isdb.org. 9 Wilson, Rodney, Islamic Finance in Europe, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Policy paper no. 2007/02 (Florence: European University Institute), p. 10. 10 Such as Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, UBS and BNP Paribas.

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National Commercial Bank and the Wellington Fund. Its success is explained by the participation of international banks, fund managers and even Islamic banks. A great number of conventional banks11 have opened Islamic sections and financial indexes have been created, beginning in 1996. The Dow Jones Islamic Markets Indexes, Standard & Poor’s and the FTSE provide data for measuring the performance of the Islamic banks and financial institutions. These data also take into account non-Islamic enterprises, which are not listed in the Islamic financial market.12 An Islamic NYSE Euronext has also been announced. The non-Islamic countries are also interested. Islamic financial institutions are active in the UK, Luxembourg, Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Germany, and there are initiatives in Spain and Italy. But in Europe, the UK is a pioneer in that it has been quick to adopt legal and economic measures with a view to facilitating the emergence of Islamic finance, be it by reinforcing the attraction of its financial market or by proposing services adapted to the needs of the retail clients: The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has taken clear positions, as far as the subject of Islamic Finance is concerned, and has given its consent to the operators and the products that are in accordance with the sharia (unit trusts, credit institutions, sukuk . . .). With the purpose of promoting and providing better regulation to Islamic financing, specialized departments have been created in the FSA.13

In 2004, the first Islamic retail bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain, opened its doors to all clients, regardless of religion. In July 2004, the German region (Land) of Saxony-Anhalt purchased Islamic bonds to the value of US100 million, which did not go unnoticed, followed by the British government. Sukuks are bonds representing tangible assets, whose subscribers are rewarded according to the performance of the assets. They are converging with asset backed securities or asset based securities, which depend on the degree of guarantee provided by the issuers. It is also worth noting that Ger11 Including, Citigroup, HSBC, Barclays, Lloyd’s, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Société Générale. 12 Analysis of the application of IOSCO’s objectives and principles of securities regulation for Islamic Securities Products (International Organization of Securities Commissions, September 2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD280 .pdf, p. 17. 13 Jouini, Elyès and Olivier Pastré, Enjeux et opportunités du développement de la finance islamique pour la place de Paris, November 2008 (Paris: Europlace, 2008), p. 90.


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many was the first country after the UK to license an Islamic bank, while none have yet been licensed in France. In France, the Senate report of 2 October 2008, the first on the subject, points to the “paradoxical situation in France concerning Islamic financing: there is a certain national inertia even if the development of Islamic finance would not meet any invalidating obstacle . . . .”14 M. Saint-Marc has stated: the French legal context is largely compatible with the principles of Islamic finance. Important rules of the Sharia are also found in our civil code: gaming has been prohibited since 1804 and usury is also forbidden. Indeed, there are legal and fiscal frictions, for instance in the permission of housing loans in the form of mudaraba or ijara, namely the problems of back-to-back transactions in relation to registration and notary fees, but not more so than in London. Moreover Europlace has decided to take account of these frictions and rapidly propose corrective measures to the lawmakers.15 (my translation)

3

Characteristics of Islamic Financial Institutions

If Islam claims universality, it will face a tough test in banking and financial matters. In addition, Islamic law will have to make sure that its legal mechanisms and techniques are applicable as a part of secular legislation. Tariq Ramadan remarks regarding Islamic finance that “L’approche est trop utilitariste, et sa dimension éthique reste marginale (Its approach is too utilitarian and its ethical dimension is only marginal)” and, in his view, it is the terms under which Islamic finance is conducted that are problematical. It would be more appropriate to talk about Islamic financial institutions practising Islamic ethics, “[c]ar, pour lui, c’est d’abord d’éthique qu’il s’agit (because for him it is primarily about ethics)”. And the ethical approach to investments that is currently lacking is not part of a particular religion. The sense of fairness, the redistribution of wealth (zakat in Islam) and return on productive capital invested in legitimate commerce are ethical principles rather than purely Islamic ones. “Ces valeurs élevées existent dans toutes les traditions religieuses et humanistes, et devraient insuffler une pensée renouvelée dans notre pratique de la finance (These 14

Arthuis, Rapport p. 8. Quoted in A. Fulconis-Tielens, “La finance islamique a-t-elle un avenir prometteur en France?”, Revue Banque, no. 696 (November 2007), pp. 28–34 (29). 15

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noble values exist in all religious and humanitarian traditions and should inspire a new way of rethinking in our financial practice”, he concludes.16 I agree with Ramadan on the definition and the contents of ethics, but this does not prevent Islamic finance from providing itself with tools and instruments that emphasise its Islamic nature. This may seem to be something new that may also complicate the framework established by conventional finance. 3.1

Finance in Islamic Law (Shari’a)

At the centre of Islamic financial institutions are Islamic supervisory committees called Shari’a boards, made up of Muslim lawyers with expertise in economics, banking, finance and insurance. They issue fatwas to guarantee the halal nature of the products. They are very often supported by Shari’a audit committees, which check that these products retain their Islamic nature at every stage. According to Michael Ainley, head of the wholesale banks and investment firms department of the FSA, the Islamic banks have been able to provide the FSA with proof that their Shari’a boards functioned in a consultative way in the same way as a legal consultant. It being so, it is not up to the FSA to determine who should be member of the Sharia committees—we do not have either the expertise or the necessary knowledge. We operate as regulators in a strictly secular and not religious field. But we expect that the Islamic banks will be able to handle all kinds of potential conflicts of interest in the same way as the traditional banks.17

In fact, the Islamic Financial Services Board has established principles to guide the establishment, composition and the functioning of the Shari’a boards,18 which are also implemented elsewhere in Western Europe. In France, the authorities regulating the financial markets have

16 “Tariq Ramadan dénonce l’hypocrisie de la finance islamique”, Ribh: Le Journal de la Finance Islamique, 22 May 2006, http://ribh.wordpress.com/2006/05/22/tariqramadan-denonce-l%e2%80%99hypocrisie-de-la-finance-islamique-en-marge-dusalon-financier-investissima/, accessed 23 April 2010. 17 M. Ainley, “Banques islamiques au Royaume-Uni: ‘La FSA est prête à suivre les évolutions du marché’ ”, Revue Banque, no. 696 (November 2007), pp. 34–39 (37). 18 Islamic Financial Services Board, Guiding Principles on Sharî’ah governance system, London: IFSB, December 2008.


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stressed that a committee like this can be set up by investment funds, but without replacing the fund manager, as we shall see below. 3.2

The Prohibition of Riba

Muslim lawyers explain the “relationship between the linguistic and the legal sense of the term riba” as “clear and evident”19 because both senses denote an unwanted increase. In Arabic, the term riba is linked with the word ribh which means—depending on the context—advantage, profit, usefulness, benefit or gain. As far as riba is concerned, it describes more specifically an excess, a surplus and specifically, in the financial context, interest. As far as loans with interest are concerned, the interest is a sum of money that the debtor pays to the creditor in return for the use of the loan for a given period of time.20 In fact ‘interest’, in the sense to which riba refers, applies equally in other contexts, such as loans of groceries and household goods. The implied increase in value has an impact on the subject matter of the contract, that is the agreement that binds the parties to the contract. The prohibition of riba concerns all transactions that may assume the character of usury. However, the sum of money referred to includes not only ‘usury’ as the term is used in French legislation, but it ‘interest’ defined as being equivalent to rent paid for loan capital. The French language—or more precisely French legislation—distinguishes between interest and usury, usury being an amount that is excessive over and above reasonable. The former is legally permitted, the latter is not. Riba has a wider meaning because it results from all kinds of augmentation without a real counterpart and has no equivalent in French legislation. As well as capital loans, the exchange of goods may also generate a profit, as foreseen in article 1905 of the French civil code: “It is permitted to stipulate interest on a simple loan, be it in money, goods or other movables.”21 Consequently, there is a legal difference between interest and riba and between French and Islamic legislation.

19 Al Fawzan, Saleh ibn Fawzan, La différence dans la législation islamique entre le commerce et les transactions usuraires (Jedda: Assia, 2004), pp. 20f. 20 al-Zuhayli, Financial Transactions, vol. 1, pp. 309–352; Al Fawzan, La différence…. 21 Interest on movables is less frequent than on credits for property loans.

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The Reception of Islamic law in Western Europe: Islamic Law of Contracts in Perspective

Islamic finance rests on Islamic law and essentially uses the contractual law of sale or rent to structure Islamic financial products, and this is accepted by European countries. For example, the FSA report states that the Islamic Law of Contracts plays a pivotal role within the Islamic financial system. Islamic commercial jurisprudence consists of principles and rules that must be observed for transactions to be acceptable in Islam; and the Islamic Law of Contracts is at the heart of this. One important principle is contractual certainty. Under this body of law, uncertainties or ambiguities that can lead to disputes may render a contract void under Shari’a.22

On the other hand: “in the case of a dispute, it is unlikely that a UK court will give a verdict based on Sharia law.”23 In the case of a law suit involving an Islamic bank, British judges will invoke two reasons for not taking the Islamic law into account: first, no legislation or rules permit the use of—or the option of using—a set of rules from another legal system, and second, the rules referred to are not unanimously approved by Muslim authors and Islamic authorities.24 It is worth remembering that, in Muslim law, contracts concerning Islamic finance can be classified into two categories: contacts applying the principle of profit and loss, and those that stipulate a profit margin linked to a real asset (a contract for sale or rent). It is worth noting that these contracts may be combined, depending on the need for finance. The first category includes contracts covering matters such as mudaraba and musharaka and their variants. For the Islamic banks, the purpose of these kinds of contract is to offer clients funds that are in conformity with a distribution key for profit and loss. The second category includes contracts for murabaha, salam, istisna’ and ijara. The first category supports credits for housing and movable property, and the latter covers the equivalent of lend-lease or a rental-sale arrangements.

22 Financial Services Authority, Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges (London: FSA, 2007), p. 5, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/islamic_finance .pdf, accessed 8 December 2009. 23 Ibid., p. 17. 24 Ibid.


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Murabaha is a special sales contract that always implies the purchase of an asset by the investor followed by a repurchase by the client based on a payment in stages, allowing for a profit margin. The term ‘revolving murabaha’ also exists and means that the client benefits from overdraft facilities.25 Salam is a sale where the buyer pays cash for an asset that will be delivered at a later date, whereas istisna’ is a business contract that stipulates the delivery of “goods to be constructed, fabricated or produced” at a later date. Conceptually, this is close to a sale based on the degree of completion and may also serve as a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) in major infrastructure construction projects. As far as ijara or lend-lease is concerned, the lease payment includes not only repayment of the principal capital but also a profit margin to the benefit of the lender. Investment funds may represent up to 10% of all funds in ijara-type contracts, and up to 47% in murabaha and mudaraba arrangements combining the logic of risk and return. When it comes to Islamic property credits, some Islamic banks combine the limits of musharaka and ijara,26 in which case the operation refers to the 3P principle and to the profit margin. The combination of musharaka mutanaqqissa (limited) and ijara becomes the archetype of Islamic property loans. It gives a client the possibility of financing the acquisition of a property following a repayment plan determined by his financial capacity. The bank provides 90% of the funds and the client 10%. The bank’s part decreases in line with the reimbursement by the client according to a repurchase mechanism. Thus the client reimburses the funds made available by the bank, which is remunerated by a margin fixed by the parties. This may look like a payment that conceals interest, but its originality lies in there being an asset where ownership by the lender guarantees against the risk of bankruptcy on the part of the client, so that, if the client is no longer able to reimburse, the asset will be sold taking into account the fact that the value of the asset may have increased thanks to the repurchase of the parts held by the bank. As far as the bank is concerned, it not only shares in the risk, but it also holds the property rights to the asset in parallel with the client. 25

A. Fulconis-Tielens, “Les stratégies sur le terrain”, Revue Banque, no. 696 (November 2007), pp. 36–38 (37). 26 That is the case of the Islamic Bank of Britain, see http://www.islamic-bank.com/ islamicbanklive/HomeFinance/1/Home/1/Home.jsp, accessed 8 December 2009.

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The Case of France

In France, Islamic finance has been subject to consultation after a roundtable organised in the Senate in May 2008, followed by a report.27 This report is enlightening in several ways. On the one hand, it notes that France has come to Islamic finance late in comparison with the UK, a fact which is always repeated in the reports and articles about Islamic finance in France. On the other, the report notes that the regulatory authorities especially the Comité des Établissments de Credit et des Enterprises d’Investissement (CECEI) will be very vigilant as far as the mandatory measures of internal control are concerned and it will want to know which regulations are envisaged in this field. The regulation of the risks should be secured by a control system to be put in place. In this framework, the prevention of whitewashing of capital and financing of terrorism will be the focus of special attention. (my translation)

We see here the appearance of the misleading idea of the relationship between Islamic banks and the financing of terrorism. In brief, internal control regulations require that the institution’s governing bodies should ensure that the products offered to clients respect all the rules of French law and the law on monetary and financial matters. In this respect, it is worth clarifying the relationship between the roles of the Shari’a committee and the boards and internal controls in the bank. The existence of a Shari’a committee to control the conformity of financial products with the principles of Islam is a matter for the free internal decision of the institution, just as in the case of committees that oversee ethical investment products. On the other hand, the role of Shari’a committees must be limited to examining and certifying Islamic products. It should not extend beyond that to interfere with the bank’s general governance and its internal methods of functioning. Finally, concerning the continuing capacity of the bank to respect the rules of the CECEI, the latter is expected to work in close cooperation with the Bank Commission to ensure that the legal-financial composition of Islamic financial operations is correctly recorded in the accounts and measured in terms of risk, and that there is sufficient equity to cover the risks. 27

Arthuis, Rapport.


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The Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) has already published two notes, on investments funds and on sukuks. On 17 July 2007, following agreement on the first Islamic funds, it published a memo,28 which underlines three points. First, on the preservation of the autonomy of the management company, since the oversight committee (Shari’a board), which is nominated by the management company, advises the managing director of the OPCVM (Organisme de Placement Collectif en Valeurs Mobilières) on all questions relating to the Shari’a, that the committee should not have the exclusive right to give an opinion on the conformity of the bonds selected by the management company. Second, as far as the limits on the selection of bonds are concerned, the funds must respect all the laws and rules in force. They are likewise prohibited from discriminating in the selection of bonds on grounds of the race or the religion of the chairman of the board of directors of the issuer of the bonds. Otherwise, the funds would be carrying out an activity contrary to French public order. Third, the funds may carry out a process of purifying impure revenues, which consists in distributing it to entities that are clearly distinct from their bearers or shareholders, in most cases are charity foundations, which must be recognised as having a public value. This process must be referred to in the prospectus. The AMF defines sukuk29 as: Islamic bonds connected to an underlying asset through different types of structures, of which the two main categories are: on the one hand the sukuk whose price and repayment rest principally on the underlying assets and which resemble in construction Asset Backed Securities; and on the other hand, the sukuk whose price and payment are based on underlying assets, but in this case the investment rests principally on the participation of one or more entities for all or part of the repayment according to the sukuk.30 (my translation)

In France, sukuk are currently transferable in a regulated market. In addition, the Fiscal Administration published two fiscal instructions on 25 February 2009, concerning sukuk and the operation 28 AMF, Critères extra financiers de sélections de titres: Cas des OPCVM se déclarant conforme à la loi islamique, 17 July 2007, http://www.amf-france.org/documents/ general/7876_1.pdf, accessed 8 December 2009. 29 On the fiscal treatment of sukuk see, Direction Générale des Finances Publiques, “Instruction fiscale 4 FE/09”, Bulletin Officiel des Impôts, no. 22, 25 February 2009. 30 AMF, Admission aux négociations d’obligations islamiques (sukuk) sur un marché réglementé français, note of 2 July 2008.

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murabaha. Their aim is to remove the fiscal obstacles to structuring financial products and Islamic finance and at the same time preserve fiscal neutrality and evade the dual transfer of property (cash against delivery), for Islamic finance implies a gradual transfer of property which increases the cost of the operation.31 At the beginning of November 2009, the Ministry of Economics announced the publication of fiscal instructions for ijara and istisna’. Matters seemed settled before the decision of 14 October 2009,32 which cancelled the regulations concerning the structuring of sukuks by means of fiduciary arrangements, on the basis that it does not connect, even indirectly, with the arrangements in a proposed law aimed at favouring small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to credit. However, this is a formal problem, for these regulations are considered preliminary proposals. In conclusion, France is increasingly debating the question of whether Islamic finance is compatible with the constitutional principle of a secular state. In my opinion, this principle regulates the relationship between the state and its administrations and does not concern French citizens’ freedom of religion and freedom to act as economic citizens. The current trend may be summarised as indicating that, little by little, Western Europe is opening up to the religious aspirations of its 15 million Muslims in banking and financial matters.

31 Cekici, Ibrahim Zeyyad, “Développement de la finance islamique en France: Les premiers de l’Administration fiscale”, Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires, no. 35 (February 2009), pp. 77–81 (77), http://www.forumfrancais-financeislamique.com/data/ document/analyse-fiches-administration-fiscale-par-ibrahim-cekici.pdf, accessed 23 April 2010. 32 Conseil constitutionnel, 14 octobre 2009, Décision n° 2009-589 DC; Commentaire de la décision du 14 octobre 2009, Décision n° 2009-589 DC, in Les Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel, n° 28, p. 3: “Cette jurisprudence est appliquée de manière constante. Le Conseil a encore récemment censuré trois articles de la loi de mobilisation pour le logement, dont deux ont été soulevés d’office.”

PART III

BOOK REVIEWS Edited by Christian Moe and Samim Akgönül

REVIEWS Laïcité en débat: Principes et représentations en France et en Turquie. Ed. Samim Akgönül. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2008. P. 335. Pbk. ISBN 978-2-86820-385-4. €26. Are practices of secularism in France and Turkey similar or different? “It depends” is the correct answer. In comparison with secularism in the United States and India, where religious symbols are accommodated in the public sphere, secularism in France and Turkey appear to be similarly exclusionary. In other words, if one categorises cases with mutually exclusive typologies, France and Turkey are in the same (assertive secularist) category, unlike (passive secularist) America and India. On the other hand, if one conducts in-depth analysis to evaluate cases along a continuum, France and Turkey differ in numerous ways in terms of their practice of secularism.1 Laïcité en débat successfully reveals this complex similarity-difference dynamics of secularism in France and Turkey. As an interdisciplinary work par excellence, it brings together scholars of history, law and philosophy, among other disciplines. The “Introduction” by the editor, Samim Akgönül, is a systematic comparative analysis of secularism in France and Turkey. It emphasises that in France Catholic schools survived even during the staunchly anti-clerical Third Republic, whereas in Turkey all Islamic schools were shut down during the 1930s and 1940s. To explain this difference, Akgönül points to the authoritarian regime in Turkey in those decades, as well as the institutional strength of the Catholic Church in France. He traces how secularism in both cases, starting from a radical origin, has become more moderate over the decades. Some issues, however, such as the headscarf bans, indicate that in both countries the history of secularism moves back and forth rather than in a linear process of moderation. I would like briefly to mention some noteworthy chapters. Gilbert Vincent’s essay elaborates on the philosophical roots of secularism, especially regarding morality, religion, and the state. Gérard Groc 1 See Kuru, Ahmet T., Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

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explores the recent history of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party. Pierre-Henri Prélot writes the French constitutional history from the Revolution of 1798 to the present. Jean-Maries Woehrling discusses the notion of state neutrality in terms of public policies toward religion. Paul Dumont’s essay is on Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs. The contributions of Akgönül, Elçin Macar, and Franck Frégosi focus on religious minorities in both countries. Faruk Bilici and Mehmet Aydın analyse Islamic religious instruction in Turkish schools in separate essays. My main reservation about Laïcité en débat is the lack of sufficient comparative analysis of France and Turkey, apart from Akgönül’s insightful “Introduction”. Chapters are mainly single-case studies of one of the two countries. The authors would have provided more generalisable results (at causal or conceptual levels) if they had produced more comparative analysis and engaged with the general literature on secularism beyond works on France and Turkey written in French and Turkish. The bibliography includes only five sources in English. Laïcité en débat is a timely and important work on secularism in two intriguing cases. I strongly recommend it to those who study religion and politics in France and Turkey. Ahmet T. Kuru San Diego State University Islam in Inter-War Europe. Ed. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain. London: Hurst, 2008. P. 348. Hbk. ISBN 978-1-85065-8788. £45. Not everyone will expect to be enthralled by a book that has as its rousing finale a chapter on a spat about misspelt Turkish in a provincial school examination in 1929. However, those looking for solid scholarship to map the terra incognita of Islam in Europe between the two world wars could not find a handier volume. And by the time one gets to the final chapter, it should be clear that momentous questions of identity, ideology and social transformation could revolve around as obscure an issue as whether Muslim students in Western Thrace should spell out their vowels or not. Clayer and Germain identify and set out to fill two relative voids in the literature on Islam in Europe: the time before the 1950s, and the

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space to the east. They discover their areas of study to be interconnected, as the early Muslim missions in Western Europe studied by Germain turned out to have played an important role in the Albanian modernisation processes studied by Clayer. Hence the idea of a workshop (held in Paris in 2004) and this resulting volume to deal with these developments as part of a single European space. Four themes, highlighted by the editors, give further unity to the book. First, Muslim networks—these include political networks such as those of pan-Islamists and anti-imperialists from the colonies, Sufi and neo-Sufi networks and, in particular, the early European mission work by the Lahori Ahmadiyya. Second, the early building of a “European Islam”—by Albanians seeking acceptance for their young country as part of modern Europe, by Ahmadis turning their mission network to Europe as a whole, and by the symbolism of the European Muslim Congress of Geneva in 1935, masterminded by the Lebanese exile Shakib Arslan (whose manifold views of Europe get a chapter of their own). Third, relations between Islam and politics in the “Muslim agendas” of European governments, notably Germany, where diplomats plotted to promote jihad in order to strike at the soft colonial underbellies of their enemies in both the first and second World Wars. Fourth, “strategies and debates” in European Muslim communities concerning their situation as “minorities between acculturation and identity claims”. The last theme essentially concerns the debates between secular and religious reformers, revivalists, traditionalists, and so on, though the terminology varies between chapters, and some contributors are careful to caution against simplistic distinctions. The book is correspondingly organised in four parts, one for each theme, though the grouping of chapters under each heading cannot but be a little arbitrary, since most chapters touch on more than one of the themes. In their introduction to each part, the editors make a good job of gathering together these strands as they run through the book. These introductions, taken together, do not limit themselves to the countries studied by the contributors, but give an admirable brief overview of more or less the whole subject area suggested by the book’s title. One noteworthy omission, considering the nationality of the editors and the venue of the workshop, is Muslims in France, who have no chapter to themselves, although the editors’ introductions provide basic information about the Muslim population, the building of the

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Paris Mosque, and some French parallels to phenomena discussed by the contributors. On the other hand, there is ample information about the UK, Germany, Poland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Albania, as well as insights into Greece and Macedonia. The chapters on the UK by Ansari and Lawless range from British upper-class converts to the increasingly unwelcome and discriminated-against communities of Muslim seamen in British port cities. For those interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fact-filled, reliable chapters on Shari’a courts and Islamic law reform, by Karčić, and on reformist and revivalist tendencies, by Bougarel, are alone reason enough to buy the book. Together with Clayer’s discussion of the banning of the veil hijab in a young Albania intent on a “European” and “modern” Islam, and Aruçi’s and Bonos’s explorations of Muslim education in Macedonia and Greece between Kemalism, conservatism and the Orthodox nation-state, these chapters add up to a solid Balkans section. Further to the north, the oftignored Tatar communities get a chapter covering both Poland and Germany. Those interested in transnational Muslim networks, too, will want to read Germain’s overview of Lahori Ahmadi mission networks and Sedgwick’s of Sufi and neo-Sufi movements. The Lahori Ahmadis prefigured later global Muslim da‘wa movements, with their origin in India, their centres in Woking (UK) and Berlin, their wide-ranging contacts all over Europe, and their competition with other Muslim groups—including aspiring local alternative leaderships, the Qadiyani branch of the sect, and a Singapore-based Muslim mission seeking to counter the heretical Ahmadis. Of the traditional-style Sufi orders, most attention is paid to the Alawiyya, of Algerian origin, which spread among Muslim seamen in European port towns. Then as now, however, upper-class Europeans flirted happily with Sufi-inspired forms of spirituality as long as their connection with the rest of Islam was kept suitably tenuous, and Sedgwick, an expert guide, gives a quick profile of neo-Sufi movements including those of Inayat Khan and Frithjof Schuon. Some tantalisingly drawn conclusions should spur further research. Bougarel finds a 1940 quote from a Bosnian revivalist scholar that prefigures very recent formulations of Bosniak nationalism. Schwanitz’ conclusion about a German-led “jihadisation of Islam” in the World Wars that has come back to haunt us, most recently in the form of

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Usama Bin Laden, skips too many steps, but those steps would no doubt be worth tracing. In short, any well-stocked bookshelf dedicated to Islam in Europe should have a copy. Christian Moe University of Oslo Mutual Misunderstandings? Muslims and Islam in the European Media. Europe in the Media of Muslim Majority Countries. Ed. Kerem Öktem and Reem Abou-El-Fadl. Oxford: European Studies Centre, St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford, 2009. P. 156. ISBN 978-0-9562098-0-1. Available at http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ seesox/pdf/ESC-2009-MuMi.pdf. This book is an edited collection of essays by selected participants in the workshop “Mutual Misunderstandings? Muslims and Islam in the European media. Europe in the media of Muslim majority countries”, which was convened by the European Studies Centre and the Reuters Institute for Journalism, both at the University of Oxford. There are numerous publications in several languages that deal with (mis-) representations of Islam or Muslims in Western media. There seem to be too few similar studies that look at how Europe or ‘the West’ or ‘Christians’ are represented in the media in Muslim-majority states. The question is whether we are all caught in the web of mutual misunderstandings when we are dealing with ‘the other’. This edited volume takes a different approach from most existing reports and books. It attempts to transcend the dichotomist readings of Islam vs. Europe (p. viii) by looking instead both from Europe to the Muslim world and from the Muslim world to Europe. It does so through five case studies from France, Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt and Turkey. Öktem underlines that when it came to selecting case studies from the Muslim world, it was the express intention to shift the geopolitical focus somewhat from the Arab Middle East and Iran to South East Europe (p. 1). This is indeed refreshing, as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey are often sidelined when discussions revolve around Muslim countries. Since this series is published by two British institutions, the UK example could have been a valuable addition, especially as Öktem

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suggests that the media in the UK and continental Europe differ when it comes to perceptions of a threat from Islam. At the same time, it is refreshing to see the focus on continental case studies in a book published in English. Hafez draws his findings from a systematic and thorough content analysis of German newspapers, in which he analyses foreign reporting. He concludes that German foreign reporting focuses on covering conflict, which includes Islam and the Middle East. He points out that these findings could support Edward Said’s argument about the stereotypical, negative orientalist view. Yet Hafez stops short of this claim and points out that diverse coverage of Islam and the Middle East does exist. Moreover, talking about terrorism per se does not explicitly denigrate the ‘Other’ as inferior or evil (p. 50). Deltombe traces how opinion makers in the French media have created a media discourse that mainly presents Islam and Muslims, including French Muslims, as threatening to French culture and society, since it is usually the most radical interpretation of Islam that is portrayed. He points out that this does not reflect “reality” but rather the opinion makers’ “imaginary Islam”. This goes hand in hand with how such portrayals work “as a mask for the ethnicisation of economic and social issues” (p. 26), which mainly stigmatises French Muslims. Moreover, Deltombe claims that this “imaginary Islam” is found in all the political strands of the French elites, and conveniently disguises the increase in conservatism, even among the leftist elite, over the past 20 to 30 years. The editors are aware that the categories ‘Europe’ and ‘Muslim world’ are unhelpful, especially when their relationship is mainly viewed in the context of conflict (p. 2). However, it is not always clear what kind of ‘Europe’ is taken as a point of reference by some authors, e.g. Sarajlić and Ebeid in their chapters on Bosnia and Egypt. Is it a political unit subsumed under the European Union, with all its political, economic and to some extent cultural implications, including countries with migrants from Muslim countries? Is it the Europe that was divided by the Cold War, the Europe of former colonial empires, or the Europe referred to by some conservative politicians as the ‘Christian Occident’? In the chapters by Ebeid and Sarajlić, it only becomes clear towards the end that they are mainly alluding to the European Union as a political institution and economic area, and that this is what they take as their unit of analysis.

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Looking at how Europe is viewed among Muslims, Sarajlić explains that, for people in former Yugoslavia, (Western) Europe has been regarded as something desirable, something they would like to become part of, as Europe as a social and political ideal became mythologised and associated with various benefits (p. 56). Sarajlić sees in this a “media myth of Europe” (p. 57), which is found among all communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Bosnian Muslims, who perceive themselves as European Muslims. This European-ness is underlined in comments by Bosnian Muslim journalists and religious leaders, who did not view the Danish cartoon crisis as symbolic of a European crusade against Islam, but reframed it as “Europe’s ignorance of its own values” (p. 71) and suggested that the mission of Islam would be “to awaken ‘Europe’ and help it to return to its forgotten, better Self ” (p. 72). For her analysis, Ebeid concentrates on the Al-Ahram newspaper, as it carries more information about Europe than the rest of the Egyptian media. She concludes that Europe is mainly seen in economic and political terms, very often in relation to Egyptian affairs, rather than in terms of cultural representations. This changed somewhat with the Danish cartoon crisis, when value differences between Europe and Muslim countries were highlighted, but Ebeid interprets these negative representations more as feelings of disappointment than as expressions of outright hostility towards European values (p. 104). Looking at Turkey, Finkel argues that the way Europe is represented in the Turkish media is part of how political elites play out their domestic struggle. While the ‘Islamic’ ruling AKP has taken many steps to meet the entry criteria for accession to the European Union, it is the more secular but nationalist parties that reject the idea of giving up sovereignty to a supra-national organisation such as the EU. Turkish media, moreover, mirror intra-European disagreements about Turkey’s membership ambitions, most often in light of domestic Turkish politics. From a comparative international media studies point of view, it might be a limitation that the various contributors have used different methodological approaches to analyse the media in their respective countries, which does not make the findings easily comparable. Nor, one assumes, did the editors aim at such comparability, since they assembled journalists and academics who deal with media representations in different ways. However, it would be desirable for future

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research to develop some methodological tools that could provide a comparative framework of analysis and could bring together media scholars, political scientists, sociologists, cultural anthropologists and area specialists. Overall, this volume is a highly commendable effort to expand the discussion beyond the commonly applied ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ rhetoric. This mission has been accomplished, and it is to be hoped that this collective effort will be appreciated by many and used for future research. Katharina Nötzold University of Westminster/ Free University Berlin Crime and Muslim Britain: Culture and the Politics of Criminology among British Pakistanis. By Marta Bolognani. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009. P. 288. Hbk. ISBN 978-1845118334. £54.50. Bolognani’s book is an exploration of Bradford Pakistanis and crime, specifically in relation to the dimensions of culture, gender and religion. The book is well-written. It is divided into nine chapters focussing on the following areas: a presentation of previous criminological research in relation to minorities, particularly racialised minorities; Bradford as a case study; labelling and strain theories; informal and formal social control; and gender in relation to crime. The book presents data from a research project that Bolognani undertook between 2003 and 2006, utilising an anthropological approach, which aimed to provide and engage with insiders’ views of crime in Bradford. Crime and Muslim Britain contains some interesting material and observations. The discussion about biraderi as being perceived both positively and negatively by Bradford Pakistani community members is particularly interesting, as is the chapter on gender and deviance, which discusses issues such as the pathologisation of young men, women and deviance, and women and victimisation. In this chapter, Bolognani highlights how mainstream institutions dealing with Pakistani women tend to stereotype women in a role of helplessness, as victims of a pathological family. Bolognani (p. 137) argues that, within the family, women appear to play a significant role in administering what she describes as its ‘moral economy’. Women, it seems, are the main carriers of izzat, or honour, and Bolognani argues that in Bradford Pakistani communities, izzat still plays a significant role.

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In relation to the specific question of crime, however, it seems that rather than preventing crime, izzat may lead families to concentrate on preserving an honourable facade. Although the book presents some interesting empirical data and analysis, there is insufficient theoretical or conceptual focus or clarity. Although Bolognani intends that the book should comprise insiders’ perspectives and experiences, there is insufficient exploration of the notion of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, and an insufficient explanation of the difficulties facing a researcher when attempting to develop minority perspectives in criminology. For instance, in what ways is Bolognani both an insider and outsider, and how was trust achieved, particularly in a context where Muslim minorities have been otherised through ‘new terrorism’ discourse? Presenting the voices of individuals occupying disempowered racial, social and other positions is extremely challenging in any academic discipline, particularly when the presentation of those voices may lead to a re-presentation of individuals’ experiences. Moreover, there is little discussion of how the voices of the individuals as presented in this book challenge criminological inquiry. Thus, whilst there is some extremely interesting data in chapter seven on people’s religious practices and beliefs as a means of social control, there is little discussion of the challenges that religious perspectives and experiences pose to a secular academic discipline such as criminology. Furthermore, there is insufficient exploration of religion in this book, even though religion is referred to quite often. Bolognani argues that it is often external events (such as the Rushdie affair and 9/11) that encourage researchers to focus on religion as a dimension to people’s lives. This is a gross over-simplification, and I think that Bolognani needs to engage more substantially with the body of work that explores Muslim identities in relation to intersectionalities of ethnicity, religion, gender and so forth. Crime and Muslim Britain would benefit from drawing more on work in subject disciplines other than criminology, for it is in the disciplines of politics, sociology, sociology of religion, human geography, women’s studies and other subjects, that some of the most important work in relation to multiculturalism, citizenship, community and identity can be found, which I think would enrich the analysis in Bolognani’s book.2

2 Yuval-Davis, N., “Intersectionality and feminist politics”, European Journal of Women’s Studies vol. 13 (2006), pp. 193–221; Bauman, Z., Identity: Conversations

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Bolognani’s criticisms of Quraishi’s Muslims and Crime3 ignores the wider context of the focus on Islam in Quraishi’s book, which needs to be viewed as a response to, and a critique of, secular-based research about Muslim communities. Within an academic discipline like criminology, secularism is a dominant norm, so that work that focuses on religious questions and religious aspects of people’s everyday lives tends to be questioned and criticised. Indeed, Bolognani’s criticisms tend to reproduce this secular norm. This illustrates the lack of conceptual focus in Bolognani’s book on dominant norms within academic disciplines themselves, and how these can define minority perspectives and experiences as constituting the ‘Other’, the devalued. It is also interesting to note that there is very little in Crime and Muslim Britain about Muslim communities and ‘new terrorism’. On the one hand, this might be viewed as quite an interesting departure from the voluminous research that has examined Muslim communities in a post-9/11 and 7/7 context, which often perpetuates unhelpful stereotypes of Muslim communities. Nonetheless, ‘new terrorism’ as a dominant discourse and set of rationalities has influenced counterterrorism measures, which have had a profound and negative impact upon Muslim communities, and so the lack of discussion about ‘new terrorism’, Muslim communities and citizenship constitutes a significant omission. Furthermore, Islamophobia is only briefly and fleetingly mentioned in the book, yet Muslim organisations have for many years claimed that Islamophobia is a significant feature of Muslims’ everyday lives. Again, this points to a serious lack of real engagement with insiders’ perspectives, despite offering some new insights into Bradford Pakistanis’ experiences and perceptions of crime. Basia Spalek University of Birmingham

with Benedetto Vecchi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Berger, P. (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); Brah, A., “Difference, diversity and differentiation”, in J. Donald and A. Rattansi (eds), ‘Race’, Culture and Difference (London: Sage, 2003) pp. 126–48; Castells, M., The Power of Identity, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Hopkins, P.E., “Young people, masculinities, religion and race: New social geographies”, Progress in Human Geography vol. 31, no. 2 (2007), pp. 163–177; Hopkins, P.E., “Global events, national politics, local lives: Young Muslim men in Scotland”, Environment and Planning, vol. 39, no. 5 (2007), pp. 1119–1133. 3 Quraishi, M., Muslims and Crime (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 2005).

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The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Ed. Maurice Crul and Liesbeth Heering. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008. P. 192. Pbk. ISBN 978-90-8964-061-1. €34.50. Comparison in the social sciences is an almost commonsense activity and is at the same time one of the most complex theoretical and epistemological exercises. Data need comparison almost by definition. This is what our knowledge of social phenomena rests upon. At the same time, comparing data is a tricky business because we often do not have really comparable material at our disposal. In most cases, data, whether quantitative or qualitative, come from different research settings or have been collected under very dissimilar conditions. This often makes any conclusion drawn from these juxtapositions conjectural or at least imprecise. This is especially the case with data about such politically delicate issues as those presented in the volume at hand: the societal position of young Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands. The project “Integration of the European Second Generation” (TIES) has been set up precisely to overcome these methodological shortcomings. It is a large comparative research project on the integration of descendants of migrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco in eight European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). The data cover a wide area, ranging from housing conditions and segregation, position in the labour market and school results, through social relations and family structure, to issues of culture, religion and identity. The data were collected in 2006 and 2007 and the present volume is the first report on the data from the Netherlands. The project is very explicitly meant to produce policy-relevant outcomes in the countries included. The importance of the results brought together here cannot be overstated. The design of the research project, the areas covered, and not least the thorough comparative perspective that has been applied, obviously make the outcomes valuable to policy-makers. But data such as those presented here can also serve as a means to counter all kinds of assumptions and sweeping statements about the societal position of young Turks and Moroccans and allegations about their unwillingness to take part in society. Integration is increasingly becoming a very delicate issue across Europe, and populist anti-foreigner sentiments are on the rise.

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The authors of the present volume, most of them working at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, start from the theoretical assumption that a combination of policy measures and characteristics of the groups in question accounts for the particular pace and development of integration. The first five chapters of the book, dealing with the labour market, education, housing and some additional data on migration, show that indeed one cannot just blame young Moroccans and Turks for their sometimes poor performance in these areas. Policy measures are also crucial in accounting for the achievement of better outcomes by some. On the other hand, the data suggest that there are structural characteristics of the migrant populations that also play a crucial role. The intricate conjunctions of these two clusters of factors produce very specific patterns of success and failure. This in itself provides an abundance of data for further research. However, TIES is clearly much more ambitious than this: the authors draw conclusions on the relation between socio-economic characteristics and matters of cultural and religious identity. In the second part of the book, data are presented on issues such as identity and intercultural relations, social relations and family characteristics. The authors aim to connect the relatively objective data on employment, education and housing with data that deal with cultural perspectives and worldviews, religious affiliation, intercultural relations and networks, participation in society, friendships, social and ethnic cohesion, family relations within the Netherlands and with the countries of origin, and partner choice. The assessment of such data, and the very question of whether such complex issues as these can be quantified and related to other data sets or to each other, is the subject of extensive academic debate. Unfortunately, the authors stick largely to common-sense and mainstream sociological notions about the cultural and ideological dimensions of integration; the less orientation toward the countries of origin or toward one’s own ethnic community, the more integration into the host society. One-dimensional notions of integration such as these have been thoroughly criticised and commented upon.4

4 See e.g. Baumann, G., Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); De Koning, M., Zoeken naar een zuivere Islam (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Schiffauer, W. et al., (eds), Civil Enculturation: Nation-State, School and Ethnic Difference in four European Countries (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004).

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Of course there is a relation between, for example, people’s position and experiences in the labour market and their ideational perspectives and outlooks, but this relation is complex, contingent and not at all unambiguous. Even the break-down into several domains of life that the authors apply does not solve this problem. Basically there are three problems with this kind of approach: a methodological, a conceptual, and a causal problem. Methodologically speaking, the question is how culture, religion and worldviews can be made measurable. The very assumption that culture and religious convictions and practices can be measured is very problematic because culture cannot be placed on a scale from ‘more’ to ‘less’. In chapter 8, but also elsewhere in the study, the authors adopt a series of criteria by which religious affiliation is measured, such as frequency of mosque attendance or performance of religious obligations. The implicit assumption here is that there is a consensus that e.g. the practice and frequency of mosque attendance tell us something about religious convictions. But there is no such consensus. Recent research on religiosity among young Moroccans and Turks in Europe has convincingly shown that these criteria are insufficient to capture the complexities of new forms of religiosity.5 The final problem concerns the conclusions that can be drawn from data on the cultural dimension. The basic assumption is that data on cultural perspectives and data on, say, educational performance point in the same direction. If that were the case, we might reverse the authors’ argument and assert that cultural outlooks exert influence upon educational outcomes. This is indeed often heard in public debate, but the connection is, as I said before, far from evident. The outcomes of the TIES project are impressive and worth pursuing, but it would be good to be much more careful in drawing conclusions on matters that are far more ambiguous than they seem. Only then will systematic comparison provide us with the necessary insights into the process of integration. Thijl Sunier VU University Amsterdam

5 See Mandaville, P., Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge”, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (2007), pp. 101–105.

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Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization. By Ayhan Kaya. (Migration, Minorities and Citizenship). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Pp. xiv+249. Hbk. ISBN 978-0-230-51679-3. £55. Ayhan Kaya has produced a very insightful book that deals with a complex of issues originating from, but certainly not limited to, a perspective on Muslims of Turkish origin in Europe. The book is based on extensive research, both qualitative and quantitative, carried out from 2003 to 2008. Kaya presents his findings on Muslims in the first four chapters, and goes on in the fifth and sixth chapters to discuss their implications not only for the Muslims, but also for European states, their regimes of integration and their changing mode of governance. The book goes far beyond the limits of any particular social analysis and engages with some of the most defining and difficult questions that face contemporary European states. These are—to mention the most significant—securitisation, Islamophobia, discrimination and violence, the stigmatisation of Islam, all framed by the distinct logic of governmentality as “the conduct of conduct” of the state or national government. The introductory chapter considers an array of useful perspectives on the discourses of the regimes of citizenship, migration, and integration in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. European migration statistics and demographics are presented, and the issues of immigration are addressed. From what initially looks like an ordinary presentation of migration problems, Kaya goes on to argue that migration studies has become a research field that contributes to the production of management technologies applied by the state to fight immigrants “. . . believed to be challenging national, social and cultural unity” (p. 23). On the one hand, the book claims to present the state of affairs with regard to Muslims in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands and to analyse the relevant issues. On the other hand, Kaya also wants to investigate the linkage between nation, culture, identity and citizenship. This linkage is scrutinised in order to criticique the immigration and citizenship policies and the various state-projects that are applied to Muslims in general and Turkish-European immigrants and their descendants in particular. Both approaches frame the book and neither takes priority, but Kaya manages to make them challenge one another in productive and insightful dialogue.

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Each of the four country chapters begins with an introduction to the country’s specific history of immigration, followed by a review of the legislation on nationality and citizenship. Then the presence and status of Islam and Muslims is presented, with a strong focus on Turks. The final part of each chapter is a survey of political associations and parties and a thorough discussion of their relation to Islam and integration policy. Germany is presented in the first chapter, with a clear focus on Turks. Kaya explains that the point of departure for the book was research on Turkish-origin immigrants, which expanded to include North African origin immigrants as well. This is of course very relevant because Turks are one of the largest groups—when not the largest—in these countries, but if the intention was to present an even-handed analysis of Muslims, the result is slightly off the mark. In the chapter on Germany, Kaya examines the culturalist discourse in which Muslim migrants have until recently been expected to adopt German culture, history and identity in order to become citizens. If they did not, they would remain second-rate sojourners in society. Now, however, Germany is more likely to apply liberal policies of citizenship that may allow diversity to flourish (p. 60). Kaya stresses this tendency by designating Germany as a country moving from segregation to integration. The discourse in France is different; France is undergoing the reverse process—from integration to segregation. It is stressed that in France, civilisation is the main indicator of identity, and to be naturalised French is “to assimilate to French society” (p. 70). However, according to Kaya, the leading dilemma in the French republic is the myth of the politically equal citizen, as Muslims, the unemployed and youth are relegated to positions outside the political system. With regard to Muslims, the result is a syndrome of depicting immigrants as enemies within. Kaya concludes his chapter on a pessimistic note: “. . . When all the misinterpretations add up, it is easy to see how smoothly ‘neighbours next door’ can be turned into ‘enemies within’ ” (p. 92). The next two chapters look at Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgium is divided between the French-inspired civilisation discourse in Wallonia and the culturalist discourse in Flanders, and thus many of the debates regarding immigrants and Muslims in Belgium reflect the tensions between these two. This political and cultural division seems to threaten the unity of the Belgian state, and the Flemish and Walloon

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models of integration tend to divide Muslims along these lines. However, Kaya’s analysis reveals that “the integration capacity of BelgianMuslims is primarily related to the general and social-economic status differences” (p. 114). Muslims integrate into social groups according to age, gender and class, and this constitutes an alternative to the variety of official integration initiatives. The ability of alternative integration strategies based on social affinities other than politics and culture may—broadly speaking—be what is keeping Belgium together. The Netherlands is a fourth and different story. Dutch society has historically been organised in Protestant, Catholic, Liberal and Socialist “pillars”. Islam and Muslims were thus expected to form a fifth pillar. Recently, however, Dutch society has become depillarised, which apparently challenges the long established Dutch multiculturalism. The integration of Muslims into Dutch society is made difficult by structural exclusion from the labour market, higher education and affluent neighbourhoods (p. 140). Since the killings of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, the country seems to be changing from tolerant to assimilationist. On a mildly critical note, I would maintain that Kaya never fully develops ‘governmentality’ as an analytical category. He initially defines it as the art of governing a population rather than a territory, which for his purposes is completely adequate. He applies Michel Foucault’s governmentality perspective as recast by Nikolas Rose to suggest a criticism of the welfare state in terms of prudentialism, statisticalisation and stigmatisation of Islam and Muslims. However, amid the broad array of themes and issues that Kaya touches upon, governmentality is limited to playing the role of a recurring perspective, rather than a distinct analytical tool. Kaya is content with presenting the current state of affairs and the politics of integration, and does not go into an analysis of the government and its techniques, procedures and tactics. He does not give the impression of having has internalised the understanding of the poly-centric, network-based and mediating state that is often implied in governance theory. When he points to governmentality, there is no reflection on the virtue of it: that the success of the state is based on the productivity and consent of the governed. That is to say, government can ensure that the governed now want what they did not previously realise they wanted. In short, Kaya only points to the fact of governmentality, but never explains how it works.

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But was it ever the intention to do anything other? To me as a reader, it is hard to discern whether this conceptual framework is merely the academic discourse in which Kaya situates his analyses of the four countries, or whether there is a genuine attempt at challenging the interpretation of, say, securitisation or statisticalisation as an expression of a distinct governmentality approach. Kaya does not always relate the frame to the analytical parts, but when he does so, it is with great success. What Kaya does very well indeed is the actual analysis. The qualitative analysis and the huge amount of material in the form of questionnaires and interviews provide a strong basis for the chapters on the four countries. Many of the problems addressed by Kaya have already been examined in the ever-growing research library on Islam in Europe, but when he supplies the empirical information, it is precise, carefully selected, and substantiates the claims made in the analyses. Drawing on his huge back catalogue of empirical material and relevant publications, Kaya not only analyses the data on Muslims, but also takes the opportunity in the two last chapters to comment on the series of broader questions relevant to the relationship between Islam, European states and the European population. This interplay between substantiated analysis and critical discussion is the core strength of the book. Kaya remains refreshingly disinterested in the catch-phrase rhetoric and media circus that sometimes characterise current discourses on Muslims and migrants in Europe. For example, he has no illusions as to the acclaimed secularity of the French state, and does not validate the self-referential identities of European political discourses. Furthermore, Kaya enjoys a special relationship with his subject-matter, which is also, but not only, due to his inside-outside position. Based at Istanbul Bilgi University, he easily navigates the European internal discourses and has a cutting edge understanding of the state of affairs in the European countries he discusses, while at the same time the reader senses the detached stance of an external observer maintaining the critical researcher’s prudent distance from his subject matter. As it stands, this book is thorough, well researched, sharply analytical and—in addition—both painfully necessary and highly relevant. Niels Valdemar Vinding University of Copenhagen

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