World Infopaedia: Iraq (Volume 14 of World Infopaedia)

WORLD infopaedia: IRAQ

Pragun Publication

WORLD infopaedia

IRAQ

Pragun Publication (D.K. Publishers Distributors Enterprise) 4224/1, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002 Ph: 91-11-41562573-77 Fax: 91-11-41562578 E-mail: [email protected] www.dkpd.com

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ISBN : 978-81-89645-73-1

First Published 2007 ISBN 81-89645-46-3 (Set) 81-89645-73-0

© Publishers

Published in India and Printed at: liP Printers, New Delhi-110015 Mobile: 9810271526

Publi sher Parmil Mittal

Edito rial Coord inato r M.H. Syed

Edito rs AK. Saxena AM. Bagulia AZ. Bukhari Arif Ali Khan Ashok Pachauri B.o. Usmani B.M. Lal Gian Chand Jagmo han Negi Kamlesh Gupta Kapil Dev MA Khan M.M. Sury Madhurendra Kumar Manohar Puri Muhammad I1yas Naseem Ahmed P.K. Joshi S.K. Chaturvedi S.K. Sharm a Seema Sharm a Sumit Sethi Sandee p Sury Usha Chaturvedi Usha Puri Vishal Sethi

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Contents Preface

ix

Iraq at a Glance

xi

1. Introduction

1

History • People • Physical Features • Economy

2. Salient Features

5

Nuclear Capabilities • Country's Response

3. History

25

Early History • Victory of Islam • Umayyad Caliphate • Abbasid Caliphate • Mongol Invasion • Ottoman Period • World War I and British Mandate • Independent Monarchy • The Republic • Coups and Coup Attempts • Emergence of Saddam Hussein • Iran-Iraq Conflict • Anfal Campaign against Kurds • Road to Democracy • Strategy for Progress • Politi~ of Alliance • Political Opposition • Transition Period • Later Events

4. Geography

113

Settlement Patterns • Physical Features • Climate

5. Society Social System • The People • Rural Society • Urban Society • Agrarian Reforms • Lifestyle • Housing • Dressing • Eating Habits • Food and Drinks • Kurds

125

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• Other Minorities • Social Forces • Tribal Structure • Demography • Population • Healthcare • Human Development • Advancement of Women

6. Religion Sunni Muslims • Shia Muslims • Yazidis • Christians • Jews • Spiritual Centre

181

7. Heritage and Culture Cradle of Civilization • Cultural Heritage and Monuments • Customs and Rituals • Wedding Traditions

203

8. Art and Architecture Preservation of Art and Culture • Forgotten Era and Modern Art • Massacre of Mesopotamian Archaeology • Contemporary Architecture

225

9. Education Child Education • Higher Education • Administration and Finance • Educational Development and Planning • Destruction of Educational System • UNESCO's Role

243

10. Language and Literature History of the Arabic Language • Arabic, the Divine Language • Iraqi Arabic • Jewish Language • PreIslamic Literature • Arabic Literature • Modern Literature • Iraqi Literature • Arabic Writing • Folk Literature • Turkish Literature • Dictator as Novelist

265

11. Economy Economic Growth and Structure • Reconstructing the Economy • Socio-economic Development • PostWorld War II Period • Role of Government • Oil Sector • Industrialisation • Banking and Finance • Foreign Trade • Transportation • Agriculture

299

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12. Polity

349

Political System • Political Parties • The Constitution • Local Government • The Judiciary • Foreign Policy • Military Ties

13. Science and Technology

389

International Initiative • Scene in New Iraq • New Programmes • Acquisition of Technology • Situation Prior to Gulf War

14. Sports

399

Football • Wrestling

15. Tourism

405

Timeless Beauty • Journey to Iraq • Iraqi Museum • Baghdad • Babylone • Mosul • Najaf Bibliography

421

Index

431

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Preface The world which we all live in came into existence some eighteen thousand million years ago. As for the birth of this universe, there are various theories. Of them, theory of the Big Bang is regarded to be the most authentic one. According to it, a big single explosion took place, which produced condensed material, and that has been expanding continuously. This material is called galaxy/galaxies. Precisely, these galaxies are the huge congregation of stars, which are held together by the gravitational force. Of these stars, our Sun is one and our Earth is one of its nine planets. For the purpose of ease, the earth has been divided into several parts-either dry or wet. The dry ones are known as continents. These are seven in number. All but one (Antarctica) are inhabited and have charming flora and fauna. A continent consists of different countries. For instance, India lies in Asia, Egypt in Africa, France in Europe and US in North America. Total number of countries, in the world, today is nearly 200. Similarly, the waters have been divided into five oceans. The 20th century world witnessed a score of events; and some major events in the last century were determining factors for a number of people to let themselves off the fetters of slavery of centuries long colonialism and enable themselves to declare their status as free nations of the world. Colonial forces were shown doors by their inferior subjects in the third world. In the running up process of imperialist expansion and exploitation, the nations such as Germany, Italy and Japan were left bereft of what they actually deserved and demanded. These disgruntled nations steered the world to the two world wars, which took toll of crores of lives and properties worth billions. Hiroshima and Nagasaki tasted the wrath of atom bombs ever dropped in the world history. After the wars, a new world order emerged. Britain's importance in this new world order almost ceased to exist. The cold war between US and USSR reigned over the world, till the beginning of 1990s, when the Soviet Union finally got disintegrated.

(x)

The collapse of Soviet Union as a nation resulted in the world coming under a unipolar world, with US ruling the roost. Earlier. wars were fought in South Asia, South East Asia and Middle Eastern Asia. United States proved to be a failure in its Vietnam ambitions. India and China are on the path to add up to other superpowers of the world. Most of the African countries remain to be in pathetic condition in respect of economic, political and social status. However, some Pacific and some Latin American countries are emerging as new economic powers. Today, the world has evolved a new economic and cultural order. The whole world has turned into a global village. Hence, ,every nation and every country has attained its own significance and importance. Each country has its own laws of governa!,ce and enjoys full autonomy. But, they have varying capacities in terms of economy, defence, education, etc. That's why conflicts over diverse issues keep surfacing day in and day out. Taking into consideration all these crucial points, some initiatives were taken in order to control any unjust and untoward situation on the basis of mutual cooperation. With this backdrop, a dire need for a comprehensive, authentic, research-based and informative work, covering the whole world, was seriously felt. This endeavour is meant to filnhis vacuum only. In this Encyclopaedia of a unique nature, all the important nations of the world are described about. The main themes characterising this Encyclopaedia are; general information and factual data. This Encyclopaedic work reflects the history, politics, and cultural affairs of all nations. All information is given in an interesting and intelligent manner. Every volume is devoted to one nation. This volume, an independent book, in itself, is on : Iraq. These introductory titbits apart, this vast World Infopaedia is a priceless gem in the series of its ilk. Comprehensively and exclusively tailored, this modest work would certainly prove to be a win-win venture. Certainly, this novel work can be made use of by scholars, students, teachers, journalists and general readers, barring all national boundaries. All genuine suggestions and enlightening remarks will be highly appreciated by the undersigned, who would solicit your sincere response and wise comments. -Editors

Iraq at a Glance Introduction • Background: Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I; in 1920, it \Alas declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration. In stages over the next dozen years, Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A republic was proclaimed in 1958, but in actuality a series of military strongmen ruled the country, the latest was Saddam Hussein. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by US-led, UN coalition forces through the Gulf War of January-February 1991. Following Kuwait's liberation, the UN Security Council (UNSq required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and tq allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. ted a message to the governor of Egypt commanding that they must be punished. In response, the rebels besieged. Uthman in his home in Medina, eventually slaying

History

35

him. The Muslim world was shaken. AIi, who had not taken part in the siege, was chosen Caliph. Two opponents of Ali enlisted Aishah, a widow of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), to join them in accusing Ali and demanding retribution for Uthman's death. When the three went to Iraq to seek support for their cause, Ali's forces engaged theirs near Basra. Aishah's two companions were killed, and Ali was clearly victorious. Muawiyah, a kinsman of Uthman and the governor of Syria, then refused to recognise Ali, and he demanded the right to avenge his relative's death. In what was perhaps the most important battle fought between Muslims, Ali's forces met Muawiyah's at the Plain of Siffin near the largest b.end of the Euphrates River. Muawiyah's forces, seeing that they were losing, proposed arbitration. Accordingly, two arbitrators were chosen to decide whether Uthman's death had been deserved. Such a decision would give his slayer status as an executioner rather than as a murderer and would remove the claims of Uthman's relatives. When the arbitrators decided against Ali, he protested that the verdict was not in accordance with Shariah (Islamic law) and declared his intention to resume the battle. Ali's decision, however, came too late for the more extreme of his followers. Citing the Quranic injunction to fight rebels until they obey, these followers insisted that Ali was morally wrong to submit to arbitration. In doing so, they claimed, he bowed to the judgement of men-as opposed to the judgement of God that would have been revealed by the outcome of the battle. These dissenters, known as Kharajites (from the verb kharaja-to go out), withdrew from battle, an action that had far-reaching political effects on the Islamic community in the centuries ahead. Before resuming his dispute with Muawiyah, Ali appealed to the Kharajites; when they rejected the appeal, he massacred many of them. Furious at his treatment of pious Muslims, most of Ali's forces deserted him. He was forced to return to Al-Kufah-about 150 kilometres south of Baghdad-and to await developments within the Islamic community. A number of Islamic leaders met at Adruh in present-day Jordan, and the same two arbitrators from Siffin devised a solution to the succession problem. At last it was announced that neither Ali nor Muawiyah should be Caliph; Abd Allah, a son of Umar, was proposed. The meeting terminated in confusion, however, and no final decision

36

Iraq

was reached., Both AIi and Muawiyah bided their time in their separate governorships: Muawiyah, who had been declared Caliph by some of his supporters, in newly conquered Egypt, and Ali, in Iraq. Muawiyah fomented discontent among those only partially committed to AIL While praying in a mosque at AI-Kufah, AIi was murdered by a Kharajite in 661 AD. The ambitious Muawiyah induced AIi's eldest son, Hasan, to renounce his claim to the Caliphate. Hasan died shorHy thereafter, probably of consumption, but the Shias later claimed that he had been poisoned and dubbed him "Lord of All Martyrs." Ali's unnatural death ensured the future of the Shia movement-Ali's followers returned to his cause-and quickened its momentum. With the single exception of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), no man has had a greater impact on Islamic history. The Shia declaration of faith is: "There is no God but God; Muhammad (Pbuh) is his Prophet and Ali is the Saint of God."

Umayyad Caliphate Muawiyah was declared Caliph. Thus began the Umayyad Dynasty, which had its capital at Damascus. Yazid I, Muawiyah's son and his successor in 680 AD, was unable to contain the opposition that his strong father had vigorously quelled. Hussein, Ali's second son, refused to pay homage and fled to Mecca, where he was asked tl) lead the Shias-mostIy Iraqis-in a revolt against Yazid I. Ubaidullah, governor of AI-Kufah, discovered the plot and sent detachments to dissuade him. At Karbala, in Iraq, Hussein's band of 200 men and women refused to surrender and finally were cut down by a force of perhaps 4,000 Umayyad troops. Yazid I received Hussein's head, and Hussein's death on the tenth of Muharram (October 10, 680 AD) continues to be observed as a day of mourning for all Shias. Ali's burial place at AI-Najaf, about 130 kilometres south of Baghdad, and Hussein's at Karbala, about 80 kilometres south-west of Baghdad, are holy places of pilgrimage for Shias, many of whom feel that a pilgrimage to both sites is equal to a pilgrimage to Mecca. The importance of these events in the history of Islam cannot be overemphasised. They created the greatest of the Islamic schisms, between the party of Ali (the Shiat Ali, known in the West as Shias or Shias) and the upholders of Muawiyah (the Ahl-us-Sunna, the People of the Sunna-those who follow Muhammad's (Pbuh) custom and example) or the Sunnis. The Sunnis believe they are the followers

History

37

of orthodoxy. The ascendancy of the Umayyads and the events at Karbala, in contrast, led to a Shia Islam which, although similar to Sunni Islam in its basic tenets, maintains important doctrinal differences that have had pervasive effects on the Shia world view. Most notably, Shias have viewed themselves as the opposition in Islam, the opponents of privilege and power. They believe that after the death of Ali and the ascension of the "usurper" Umayyads to the Caliphate, Islam took the wrong path; therefore, obedience to existing temporal authority is not obligatory. Furthermore, in sacrificing his own life for a just cause, Hussein became the archetypal role model who inspired generations of Shias to fight for social equality and for economic justice. During his Caliphate, Ali had made Al-Kufah his capital. The transfer of power to Syria and to its capital at Damascus aroused envy among Iraqis. The desire to regain pre-eminence prompted numerous rebellions in Iraq against Umayyad rule. Consequently, only men of unusual ability were sent to be governors of Al-Basrah and Al-Kufah. One of the most able was Ziyad ibn Abi Abihi, who was initially governor of Al-Basrah and later also of Al-Kufah. Ziyad divided the residents of Al-Kufah into four groups (not based on tribal affiliation) and appointed a leader for each one. He also sent 50,000 beduins to Khorasan (in north-eastern Iran), the easternmost province of the empire, which was within the jurisdiction of Al-Basrah and Al-Kufah. The Iraqis once again became restive when rival claimants for the Umayyad Caliphate waged civil war between 687 AD, and 692 AD Ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi al-Hajjaj was sent as provincial governor to restore order in Iraq in 694 AD. He pacified Iraq and encouraged both agriculture and education.

Abbasid Caliphate Many unsuccessful Iraqi and Iranian insurrectionists had fled to Khorasan, in addition to the 50,000 beduins who had been sent there by Ziyad. There, at the city of Merv a faction that supported Abd al-Abbas (a descendant of the Prophet's (Pbuh) uncle), was able to organise the rebels under the battle cry, "the House of Hashim." Hashim, the Prophet Muhammad's (Pbuh) grandfather, was an ancestor of both the Shia line and the Abbas line, and the Shias, therefore, actively supported the Hashimite leader, Abu Muslim.

38

Iraq

In 747 AD, Abu Muslim's army attacked the Umayyads and occupied Iraq. In 750 AD, Abd al-Abbas (not a Shia) was established in Baghdad as the first Caliph of the Abbasid Dynasty. The Abbasids, whosl1line was called "the blessed dynasty" by it supporters, presented themselves to the people as divine-right rulers who would initiate a new era of justice and prosperity. Their political poliCies were, however, remarkably similar to those of the Umayyads. During the reign of its first seven caliphs, Baghdad became a centre of power where Arab and Iranian cultures mingled to produce a blaze of philosophical, scientific, and literary glory. This era is remembered throughout the Arab world, and by Iraqis in particular, as the pinnacle of the Islamic past. It was the second Abbasid Caliph, Al-Mansur (754-75 AD), who decided to build a new capital, surrounded by round walls, near the site of the Sassanid village of city of Baghdad. Within fifty years, the population outgrew the city walls as people thronged to the capital to become part of the Abbasids' enormous bureaucracy or to engage in trade. Baghdad became a vast emporium of trade linking Asia and the Mediterranean. By the reign of Mansur's grandson, Harun ar Rasheed (786-806 AD), Baghdad was second in size only to Constantinople. Baghdad was able to feed its enormous population and to export large quantities of grain because the political administration had realised the importance of controlling the flows of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. The Abbasids reconstructed the city's canals, dikes, and reservoirs, and drained the swamps around Baghdad, freeing the city of malaria. Harun-ar-Rasheed, the Caliph of the Arabian Nights, actively supported intellectual pursuits, but the great flowering of Arabic culture that is credited to the Abbasids reached its apogee during the reign of his son, Al-Mamun (813-33 AD). After the death of Harun ar Rasheed, his sons, Amin and Al-Mamun, quarrelled over the succeSsion to the Caliphate. Their dispute soon erupted into civil war. Amin was backed by the Iraqis, while Al-Mamun had the support of the Iranians. Al-Mamun also had the support of the garrison at Khorasan and thus was able to take Baghdad in 813 AD. Although Sunni Muslims, the Abbasids had hoped that by astute and stern rule they would be able to contain Shia resentment at yet another Sunni dynasty. The Iranians, many of whom were Shias, had hoped that

History

39

AI-Mamun would make his capital in their own country, possibly at Merv. AI-Mamun, however, eventually realised that the Iraqi Shias would never countenance the loss of prestige and economic power if they no longer had the capital. He decided to enter his rule in Baghdad. Disappointed, the Iranians began to break away from Abbasid control. A series of local dynasties appeared: the Tahirids (821873 AD), the Suffarids (867-1495), and the Samanids (819-1005). The same process was repeated in the West: Spain broke away in 756 AD, Morocco in 788 AD, Tunisia in 800 AD, and Egypt in 868 AD. In Iraq, there was trouble in the south. In 869, Ali ibn Muhammad (Ali the Abominable) founded a state of black slaves known as Zanj. The Zanj brought a large part of southern Iraq and south-western Iran under their control and in the process enslaved many of their former masters. The Zanj Rebellion was finally put down in 883 AD, but not before it had caused great suffering. The Sunni-Shia split had weakened the effectiveness of Islam as a single unifying force and as a sanction for a single political authority. Although the intermingling of various linguistic and cultural groups contributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic civilization, it also was a source of great tension and contributed to the decay of Abbasid power. In addition to the cleavages between Arabs and Iranians and between Sunnis and Shias, the growing prominence of Turks in military and in political affairs gave cause for discontent and rivalry at court. Nomadic, Turkic-speaking warriors had been moving out of Central Asia into Transoxiana (i.e., across the Oxus River) for more than a millennium. The Abbasid Caliphs began importing Turks as slave-warriors (Mamluks) early in the ninth century. The imperial palace guards of the Abbasids were Mamluks who were originally commanded by free Iraqi officers. By 833 AD, however, Mamluks themselves were officers and gradually, because of their greater military proficiency and dedication, they began to occupy high positions at court. The mother of Caliph Mutasim (who came to power in 833 AD) had been a Turkish slave, and her influence was substantial. By the tenth century, the Turkish commanders, no longer checked . by their Iranian and Arab rivals at court, were able to appoint and depose Caliphs. For the first time, the political power of the Caliphate

40

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was fully separat ed from its religious function. The Mamluks continued to permit Caliphs to come to power because of the importance of the office as a symbol for legitimising claims to authority. In 945 AD, after subjugating western Iran, a military family known as the Buwayhids occupied Baghdad. Shias from the Iranian province of Daylam south of the Caspian Sea, the Buwayhids continued to permit Sunni Abbasid Caliphs to ascend to the throne. The humiliation of the Caliphate at being manipulated by Shias, and by Iranian ones at that, was immense. The Buwayhids were ousted in 1055 by anothe r group of Turkic speakers, the Seljuks. The Seljuks were the ruling clan of the Kinik group of the Oghuz (or Ghuzz) Turks, who lived north of the Oxus River. Their leader, Tughril Beg, turned his warriors first against the local ruler in Khorasan. He moved south and then west, conquering but not destroying the cities in his path. In 1055, the Caliph in Baghd ad gave Tughril Beg robes, gifts, and the title, "King of the East." Because the Seljuks were Sunnis, their rule was welcomed in Baghdad. They treated the Caliphs with respect, but the latter continued to be only figureheads. There were several lines of Seljuks. The main line, ruling from Baghdad, controlled the area from the Bosporus to Chinese Turkestan until approximately 1155. The Seljuks continued to expand their territories, but they were content to let Iraqis and Iranians simply pay tribute while administering and ruling their own lands. One Seljuk, Malek Shah, extended Turkish rule to the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor, and to parts of Arabia. During his rule, Iraq and Iran enjoyed a cultural and scientific renaissance. This success is largely attributed to Malek Shah's brilliant Iranian vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, one of the most skilful administrators in history. An astronomical observatory was established in which Umar (Omar) Khayyam did much of his experimentation for a new calendar, and religious schools were built in all the major towns. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, one of the greatest Islamic theologians, and other eminen t scholars were brought to the Seljuk capital at Baghda d and were encour aged and suppor ted in their work. After the death of Malek Shah in 1092, Seljuk power disintegrated. Petty dynasties appear ed throughout Iraq and Iran, and rival claimants to Seljuk rule dispatched each other. Between 1118 and 1194, nine

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41

Seljuk sultans ruled Baghdad; only one died a natural death. The atabegs, who initially had been majordomos for the Seljuks, began to assert themselves. Several founded local dynasties. An atabeg originated the Zangid Dynasty (1127-1222), with its seat at Mosul. The Zangids were instrumental in encouraging Muslims to oppose the invasions of the Christian Crusaders. Tughril (1177-1194), the last Seljuk sultan of Iraq, was killed by the leader of a Turkish dynasty, the Khwarizm shahs, who lived south of the Aral Sea. Before his successor could establish Khwarizm rule in Iraq, however, Baghdad was overrun by the Mongol horde.

Mongol Invasion In the early years of the thirteenth century, a powerful Mongol leader named Temujin brought together a majority of the Mongol tribes and led them on a devastating sweep tl-lrough China. At about this time, he changed his name to Chenghis (Genghis)man,meaning "World Conqueror." In 1219, he turned his force of 700,000 west and quickly devastated Bokhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Merv and Neyshabur (in present-day Iran), where he slaughtered every living thing. Before his death in 1227, Chenghis Khan, pillaging and burning cities along the way, had reached western Azarbaijan in Iran. After Chenghis's death, the area enjoyed a brief respite that ended with the arrival of Hulagu Khan (1217-1265), Chenghis's grandson. In 1258, he seized Baghdad and killed the last Abbasid Caliph. While in Baghdad, Hulagu made a pyramid of the skulls of Baghdad's scholars, religious leaders, and poets, and he deliberately destroyed what remained of Iraq's canal headworks. The material and artistic production of centuries was swept away. Iraq became a neglected frontier province ruled from the Mongol capital of Tabriz in Iran. After the death in 1335 of the last great Mongol khan, Abu Said (also known as Bahadur the Brave), a period of political confusion ensued in Iraq until a local petty dynasty, the Jalayirids, seized power. The Jalayirids ruled until the beginning of the fifteenth century. Jalayirid rule was abruptly checked by the rising power of a Mongol, Tamerlane (or Timur the Lame, 1336-1405), who had been atabeg of the reigning prince of Samarkand. In 1401, he sacked Baghdad and massacred many of its inhabitants. Tamerlane kille-9 thousands of Iraqis and devastated hundreds of towns. Like Hulagu, Tamerlane had a penchant for building pyramids of skulls. Despite his showy

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display of Sunni piety, Tamerlane's rule virtually extinguished Islamic scholarship and Islamic arts everywhere except in his capital, Samarkand. In Iraq, political chaos, severe economic depression, and social disintegration followed in the wake of the Mongol invasions. Baghdad, long a centre of trade, rapidly lost its commercial importance. Basra, which had been a key transit point for sea borne commerce, was circumvented after the Portuguese discovered a shorter route around the Cape of Good Hope. In agriculture, Iraq's once-extensive irrigation system fell into disrepair, creating swamps and marshes at the edge of the delta and dry, uncultivated steppes farther out. The rapid deterioration of settled agriculture led to the growth of tribally based pastoral nomqdism. By the end of the Mongol period, the focus of Iraqi history had shifted from the urban-based Abbasid culture to the tribes of the river valleys, where it would remain until well into the twentieth century.

Ottoman Period From the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, the course of Iraqi history was affected by the continuing conflicts between the Safavid Empire in Iran and the Ottoman Turks. The Safavids, who were the first to declare Shia Islam the official religion of Iran, sought to control Iraq both because of the Shia holy places at An Najaf and Karbala and because Baghdad, the seat of the old Abbasid Empire, had great symbolic value. The Ottomans, fearing that Shia Islam would spread to Anatolia (Asia Minor), sought to maintain Iraq as a Sunni-controlled buffer state. In 1509, the Safavids led by Ismail Shah (1502-1524), conquered Iraq, thereby initiating a series of protracted battles with the Ottomans. In 1514, Sultan Selim the Grim attacked Ismail's forces and in 1535, the Ottomans led by Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), conquered Baghdad from the Safavids. The Safavids re-conquered Baghdad in 1623 under the leadership of Shah Abbas (1587-1629), but they were expelled in 1638 after a series of brilliant military manoeuvres by the dynamic Ottoman sultan, Murad IV The major impact of the Safavid-Ottom~m conflict on Iraqi history was the deepening of the Shia-Sunni rift. Both the Ottomans and the Safavids used Sunni and Shia Islam respectively to mobilise domestic support. Thus, Iraq's Sunni population suffered

History

43

immeasurably (1623-1638). while during the br,'ef Safavid reign (1623-1638), ..... Iraq's Shias were excluded from power altogether dUring the longer perbd of Ottoman supremaLy (1638-1916). During the Ottoman period, the Sunnis gained th{;- administrative experience that would allow them to monopolise political power in the twentieth century. The Sunnis were able to ta1{e advantage of new.economic and {'dllcntiolll't I>olific~t {'dllcntiolll'1 opportunilles opportunllles whde the Shl.lS, Shl.lS. frozen Oll! of the I>olific~1 proce!'ts. remained politically Impotent and economicdlly depresseu. The Shia-Sunni rift continued as an Imprrtant element of Iraqi social In the till the cnd {,f Saddam Husseln. structure in By the seventeenth century, the frequent comlicts with the Safavlds had sapped the-strength of the Ottoman Empire and had weakened Its control over Its provincel. In Iraq, tribal' authority once again dominated, nh leteenth-century Iraq is a chronicle of dominated. the history of nil tdbal migrations and of con'lict. The nomadic population swelled with the influx of bedulns from Najd, In the Arabian Peninsula. Beduln Becluln raids on settled areas became impossible to curb. In the interior, interior. the large and powerf~l MlIntafiq tribal confederation took shape under the leadership of the Sunni Saadun family of Mecca. In 1he desert south-west. south-west, the Shammar-one of the biggest tribal cor,federations of the Arabian Penlnsula-entered the Syrian desert and c\asr.ed clasr.ed with the Anayzah confederation. conf!ilderatlon. On the lower Tigrls Tlgris near Al.Am~h, AI·Amarah, a new tribal confeder~tion. confederation, the Banl Lam. took root. In the norm, the Kurdlsh Baban Dynasty emerged and organised Kurdish resistance. The resistance made It Impossible for the 'Ottomaru to maintain even nominal suzerainty bv{;!r Iraqi Kurdlstan (land of the Kurds).- Between 1625 and 1668, 1668. and from 1694 to 1701, Incal sheikhs ruled AI·Basrah fine the shllikhs mershlands. mershlands, home of the Mac,an (Marsh Arabs). Th.e powerful shlllkhs basically Ignored the Ottoman governor of ~aghdad. . The cycle of tribal warfare- and of deteriorating urban life t.~at benan in the thirteenth century with the Mongol Invasions invasions waS temporarily reversed with the re-emergel1ce _of the Mamluks., In the early eighteenth century. century, the Mamluks began asserting authority mle fimt fin;t over Basra, the apart: from the Ottomans. Extending their ru-le Mamluks eventually control1(!d the Tigris Tlgris and Euphrat~s EuphratE;!s river vaUeys valleys , from the Pe~ian Gulf to the foothills of Kurdistan. For the most part, thE' Mamluks were able administrators, and their rule was'markea

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by pOlitical stability and by economic revival. The greatest of the Mamlu k leader s, Suleym an the 11 (1780- 1802), made great strides in imposing the rule of law. The last Mamluk leader, Daud Initiated import ant moder nisation progra mmes that (1816- 31), initiate Industries, training a 20,000 canal~, establishing industr . Included eleanlng canals, . man army, and starting a printing press. .MarTJJuk period ended in 1831, when a severe flood and ThE! Th~ .MatTJJu bild Baghdad, enabling the Ottoman sultan, Muhmud Il, plague devastatlild to re.assert Ottom an sovereisnty over Iraq. Ottoman rule was unstable; ten governors between 1831 Baghdad, for exampie, had more than ~en and 1869. In 1869, however, the Ottomans regained authority when Mldhat Pasha was appointed Slovernor of Baghdad. the refoml-minded Midhat 0) 1 the Western model. 011t to modernise Iraq 0) Immediately set Ollt Mldhat immed Midhat at, .' prlm~ry objectivc-s of Midhat's reforms called the tanzim The primpr . rcial were to reorganise th.a army, to create codes of criminal and comme law, to secularise the school system, and to Improve provincial administration. He created provincial representative assemblies to assist the governor, and he set up elected municipal councils In the major ~Ities. Staffed largely by Iraqi notables with no strong ties to . the masses, the neW OffiC'lS nonetheless helped a group of Iraqis gain adrrilnlstratlve experience. By establishing government agencies In the cities and by attempting tribes, Mldhat altered the tribal-urban balance of power, to settle the tribEW, In favour of the which since the thirteenth century had been. largely in . wnlch n ~bes, 1~he most important element of Midhat's plan to extend Ottoma TfJlU land law (named ., into the countryside was the 1858 Tfro authori~~l authori it), The new land issu'ng office ment govern the of Ini'lats after the Ini'ials tax farms with and ldings ldirlgs iandho of system reform replaced the feudal to induce both ed des:gn wa.o;: It rights. ty legally sanctioned proper political existing the n stake a them give sheikhss to settle and to tribal sheikh . order. trihal sheikhs to become In practice, the TAPU laws enabled. the tribal new law was an attempt the that fearing en, large landowners; tribesm to collect taxes more effectively or to impose conscription, registered community-owned tribal lands in their sheikhs' ~~mes or sold them outright to urban speculators: As a result, tribal' sheikhs gradually were transformed into profit-seeking landlords while their tribesmen were relegated to the role of impoverished sharecroppers.

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Midhat also attempted to replace Iraq's clerically run Islamic school system with a more secular educational system. The new secular schools provided a channel of upward social mobility to children of all classes, and they led slowly to the growth of an Iraqi intelligentsia. They also introduced students for the first time to Western languages and disciplines. The introduction of Western disciplines in the schools accompanied a greater Western political and economic presence in Iraq. The British had established a consulate af Baghdad in 1802, and a French consulate followed shortly thereafter. European interest in modernising Iraq to facilitate Western commercial interests coincided with the Ottoman reforms. Steamboats appeared on the rivers in 1836, the telegraph was introduced in 1861, and the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, providing Iraq with greater access to European markets. The landowning tribal sheikhs began to export cash crops to the capitalist markets of the West. In 1908, a new ruling clique, the Young Turks, took power in Istanbul. The Young Turks aimed at making the Ottoman Empire a unified nation-state based on Western models. They stressed secular politics and patriotism over the pan-Islamic ideology preached by Sultan Abd al-Hamid. They reintroduced the 1876 constitution (this Ottoman constitution set forth the rights of the ruler and the ruled, but it derived from the ruler and has been called as at best an "attenuated autocracy,"), held elections throughout the empire, and reopened parliament. Although the Iraqi delegates represented only the well-established families of Baghdad, their parliamentary experience in Istanbul proved to be an important introduction to selfgovernment. Most important to the history of Iraq, the Young Turks aggressively pursued a "Turkification" policy that alienated the nascent Iraqi intelligentsia and set in motion a fledgling Arab nationalist movement. Encouraged by the Young Turks' Revolution of 1908, nationalists in Iraq stepped up their political activity. Iraqi nationalists met in Cairo with the Ottoman Decentralisation Party, and some Iraqis joined the Young Arab Society, which moved to Beirut in 1913. Because of its greater exposure to Westerners who encouraged the nationalists, Basra became the centre from which Iraqi nationalists began to demand a measure of autonomy. After nearly 400 years under

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Ottoman rule, Iraq was ill prepared to form a nation-state. The Ottomans had failed to control Iraq's rebellious tribal domains, and even in the cities their authority was tenuous. The Ottomans' inability to provide security led to the growth of autonomous, self-contained communities. As a result, Iraq entered the twentieth century beset by a complex web of social conflicts that seriously impeded the process of building a modern state. The oldest and most deeply ingrained conflict was the competition between the tribes and the cities for control over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. The centralisation policies of the Sublime Porte (Ottoman government), especially in the nineteenth century, constituted a direct threat to the nomadic structure and the fierce fighting spirit of the tribes. In addition to tribalurban conflicts, the tribes fought among themselves, and there was a fairly rigid hierarchy between the most powerful tribes, the so-called "people of the camel," and the weaker tribes that included the "people of the sheep," marsh-dwellers, and peasants. The cities also were sharply divided, both according to occupation and along religious lines. The various guilds resided in distinct, autonomous areas, and Shia and Sunni Muslims rarely intermingled. The territory that eventually became the state of Iraq was beset, furthermore, by regional differences in orientation; Mosul in the north had historically looked to Syria and to Turkey, whereas Baghdad and the Shia holy cities had maintained close ties with Iran and with the people of the western and south-we~tern deserts. Although Ottoman weakness had allowed Iraq's self-contained communities to grow stronger, the modernisation initiated by the Sublime Porte tended to break down traditional autonomous groupings and to create a new social order. Beginning with the tanzimat reforms in 1869, Iraq's for the most part subsistence economy slowly was transformed into a market economy based on money and tied to the world capitalist market. Social status traditionally had been determined by noble lineage, by fighting prowess, and by knowledge of religion. With the advent of capitalism, social status increasingly was determrned by property ownership and by the accumulation of wealth. Most disruptive in this regard was the TAPU land refor~ of 1858. Concomitantly, Western social and economic penetration increased; for example, mass-produced British machine-made textiles gradually

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displaced Iraq's traditional crafts and craftsmen. The final Ottoman legacy in [raq is related to the policies of the Young Turks and to the creation of a small but vocal Iraqi intelligentsia. Faced with the rapidly encroaching West, the Young Turks attempted to centralise the empire by imposing upon it the Turkish language and culture and by clamping down on newly won political freedoms. These Turkification policies alienated many of the Ottomantrained intelligentsia who had originally aligned themselves with the Young Turks in the hope of obtaining greater Arab autonomy. Despite its relatively small size, the nascent Iraqi intelligentsia formed several secret nationalist societies. The most important of these societies was Al-Ahd (the Covenant), whose membership was drawn almost entirely from Iraqi officers in the Ottoman army. Membership in AI-Ahd spread rapidly in Baghdad and in Mosul, growing to 4,000 by the outbreak of World War I. Despite the existence of AI-Ahd and of other, smaller, nationalist societies, Iraqi nationalism was still mainly the concern of educated Arabs from the upper and the middle dasses.

World War I and British Mandate By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman territories had become the focus of European power politics. During the previous century, enfeebled Ottoman rule had invited intense competition among European powers for commercial benefits and for spheres of influence. British interest in Iraq significantly increased when the Ottomans granted concessions to Germany to construct railroad lines from Konya in south-west Turkey to Baghdad in 1899 and from Baghdad to Basra in 1902. The British feared that a hostile German presence in the Fertile Crescent would threaten vital lines of communication to India via Iran and Afghanistan, menacing British oil interests in Iran and perhaps even India itself. In 1914, when the British discovered that Turkey was entering the war on the side of the Germans, British forces from India landed at Al-Faw on the Shatt ai-Arab and moved rapidly toward Basra. By the fall of 1915, when British forces were already well established in towns in the south, General Charles Townshend unsuccessfully attempted to take Baghdad. In retaliation, the Turks besieged the British garrison at AI-Kut for 140 days; in April 1916, the garrison was forced to surrender unconditionally. The British quickly re-grouped their forces, however, and resumed their advance under General

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Stanley Maude in December 1916. By March 1917, the British had captured Baghdad. Advancing northward in the spring of 1918, the British finally took Mosul in early November. As a result of the victory at Mosul, British authority was extended to all the Iraqi wilayat (sing, wilayah-province) with the exception of the Kurdish highlands bordering Turkey and Iran, the land alongside the Euphrates from Baghdad south to An Nasiriyah, and the Shia cities of Karbala and An Najaf. On capturing Baghdad, General Maude proclaimed that Britain intended to return to Iraq some control of its own affairs. He stressed that this step would pave the way for ending the alien rule that the Iraqis had experienced since the latter days of the Abbasid Caliphate. The proclamation was in accordance with the encouragement the British had given to Arab nationalists, such as Jafar al-Askari; his brother-in-law, Nuri as Said; and Jamil al-Midfai, who sought emancipation from Ottoman rule. The nationalists had supported the Allied powers in expectation of both the Ottoman defeat and the freedom many nationalists assumed would come with an Allied victory. During the war, events in Iraq were greatly influenced by the Hashimite family of Hussein ibn Aii, sharif of Mecca, who claimed descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh). Aspiring to become king of an independent Arab kingdom, Hussein had broken with the Ottomans, to whom he had been vassal, and had thrown in his lot with the British. Anxious for his support, the British gave Hussein reason to believe that he would have their endorsement when the war ended. Accordingly, Hussein and his sons led the June 1916, Arab Revolt, rr::lrching northward in conjunction with the British into Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. Anticipating the fulfilment of Allied pledges, Hussein's son, Prince Faisal (who was later to become modern Iraq's first king), arrived in Paris in 1919, as the chief spokesman for the Arab cause. Much to his disappOintment, Faisal found that the Allied powers were less than enthusiastic about Arab independence. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class a mandate entrusted to Britain. This award was completed on April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Palestine also was placed

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under British mandate, and Syria was placed under French mandate. The French ejected Faisal, who had been proclaimed king of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, in July of the .same year. The high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, and his deputy, Colonel Arnold Talbot Wilson, headed the civil government of post-war Iraq originally. The British were confronted with Iraq's age-old problems, compounded by some new ones. Villagers demanded that the tribes be restrained, and tribes demanded that their titles to tribal territories be extended and confirmed. Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts, and laws to protect their activities and interests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid in addition to the establishment of public health and education facilities. Landlords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and livestock. The holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala and their satellite tribes were in a state of near anarchy. British reprisals after the murder of a British officer in An Najaf failed to restore order. The Anayzah, the Shammar, and the Jubur tribes of the western desert were beset by violent infighting. British administration had yet to be established in the mountains of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, from the Hakkari Mountains beyond Iraq's northern frontier and from the plains of Urmia in Iran, thousands of Assyrians began to pour into Iraqi territory seeking refuge from Turkish savagery. The most striking problem facing the British was the growing anger of the nationalists, who felt betrayed at being accorded mandate status. The nationalists soon came to view the mandate as a flimsy disguise for colonialism. The experienced Cox delegated governance of the country to Wilson while he served in Persia between April 1918 and October 1920. The younger man governed Iraq with the kind of paternalism that had characterised British rule in India. Impatient to establish an efficient administration, Wilson used experienced Indians to staff subordinate positions within his administration. The exclusion of Iraqis from administrative posts added humiliation to Iraqi discontent. Three important anti-colonial secret societies had been formed in Iraq during 1918, and 1919. At An Najaf, Jamiyat an Nahda alIslamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organised; its

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numerous and varied members included Ulema (religious leaders), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. Members of the Jamiyat assassinated a British officer in the hope that the killing would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's other holy city, Karbala. ,Al-Jamiya al-Wataniya al-Islamiya (The Muslim National League) was formed with the object of organising and mobilising the population for major resistance. In February 1919, in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers formed the Haras al-Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). The Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, An Najaf, AI-Kut, and AI-HiIlah. Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only mandate status. Upon the death of an important Shia mUjtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia Ulema temporarily put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of several leaders. When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organise the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Hiza acted as liaison among insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued a fatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British. By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray, They did not cooperate in an organised effort against the British, however, which

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limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anarchy for three months; the British restored order only with great difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and from Iran. Ath Thawra al-Iraqiyya al-Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolution (as the 1920 rebellion is called), was a watershed event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis and Shias, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common effort. In the opinion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work on Iraq, the building of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two major factors, the integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new body politic and the successful resolution of the age-old conflicts between the tribes and the riverain cities and among the tribes themselves over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The 1920 rebellion brought these groups together, if only briefly; this constituted an important first step in the long and arduous process of forging a nation-state out of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure. The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both manpower and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the military regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for eventual self-government. The large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria aided the provisional government. Like earlier Iraqi governments, however, the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were under represented. At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution; they chose Faisal as Iraq's first King; they established an indigenous Iraqi army; and they proposed a new treaty. To confirm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was carefully arranged that had a return of 96 per cent in his favour. The British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist and Islamic credentials

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to have broad appeal, but who also was vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), and his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century. The British believed that these credentials would satisfy traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy; moreover, the British thought that Faisal would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his role in the 1916 revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities. As a counterforce to the nationalistic inclinations of the monarchy and as a means of insuring the king's dependence, the British cultivated the tribal sheikhs, whose power had been waning since the end of the nineteenth century. While the new king sought to create a national consciousness, to strengthen the institutions of the emerging state, and especially to create a national military, the tribal sheikhs supported a fragmented community and sought to weaken the coercive power of the state. A major goal of the British policy was to keep the monarchy stronger than anyone tribe but weaker than a coalition of tribes so that British power would ultimately be decisive in arbitrating disputes between the two. Ultimately, the British-created monarchy suffered from a chronic legitimacy crisis: the concept of a monarchy was alien to Iraq. Despite his Islamic and pan-Arab credentials, Faisal was not an Iraqi, and, no matter how effectively he ruled, Iraqis saw the monarchy as a British creation. The continuing inability of the government to gain the confidence of the people fuelled political instability well into the 1970s. The British decision at the Cairo Conference to establish an indigenous Iraqi army was significant. In Iraq, as in most of the developing world, the military establishment has been the bestorganised institution in an otherwise weak political system. Thus, 'vhile Iraq's body politic crumbled under immense political and economic pressure throughout the monarchic period, the military gained increasing power and influence; moreover, because the officers in the new army were by necessity Sunnis who had served under the Ottomans, while the lower ranks were predominantly filled by Shia tribal elements, Sunni dominance in the military was preserved.

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The final major decision taken at the Cairo Conference related to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Faisal was under pressure from the nationalists and the anti-British mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala to limit both British influence in Iraq and the duration of the treaty. Recognising that the monarchy depended on British support-and wishing to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria-Faisal maintained a moderate approach in dealing with Britain. The twenty-year treaty, which was ratified in October 1922, stated that the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq was in debt to Britain, and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent financial agreement, which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically dependent on Britain. While unable to prevent the treaty, Faisal clearly felt that the British had gone back on their promises to him. After the treaty had been signed, Iraq readied itself for the country-wide elections that had been provided for in the May 1922 Electoral Law. There were important changes in the government at this time. Cox resigned his position as high commissioner and was replaced by Sir Henry Dobbs; Iraq's aging Prime Minister, Abd ar Rahman al-Gailani, stepped down and was replaced by Abd alMuhsin as Saadun. In April 1923, Saadun signed a protocol that shortened the treaty period to four years. As a result of the elections, however, Jafar al-Askari, a veteran of the Arab Revolt and an early supporter of Faisal replaced Saadun. The elected Constituent Assembly met for the first time in March 1924, and it formally ratified the treaty despite strong (and sometimes physical) opposition on the part of many in the assembly. The assembly also accepted the Organic Law that declared Iraq to be a sovereign state with a representative system of government and a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The newly ratified constitutionwhich, along with the treaty, had been hotly debated-legislated an

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important British role in Iraqi affairs. The major issue at stake in the constitutional debate revolved around the powers of the monarchy. In the final draft, British interests prevailed, and the monarchy was granted wide-ranging powers that included the right to confirm all laws, to call for a general election, to prorogue parliament, and to issue ordinances for the fulfilment of treaty obligations without parliamentary sanctions. Like the treaty, the constitution provided the British with a means of indirect control in Iraq. After the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was ratified, the most pressing issue confronting the newly established constitutional monarchy was the question of boundaries, especially in the former Ottoman wilayah of Mosul, now known as Mosul Province. The status of Mosul Province was complicated by two factors, the British desire to gain oil concessions and the existence of a majority Kurdish population that was seeking independence apart from either Iraq or Turkey. According to the Treaty of Sevres, concluded in 1920 with the Ottoman Sultan, Mosul was to be part of an autonomous Kurdish state. The treaty was scrapped, however, when nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal (18811938-also known as Ataturk) came to power in Turkey and established control over the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey. In 1923, after two failed British attempts to establish an autonomous Kurdish province, London decided to include the Kurds in the new Iraqi state with the proviso that Kurds would hold government positions in Kut'dish areas and that the Kurdish language would be preserved. The British decision to include Mosul in Iraq was based largely on their belief that the area contained large oil deposits. Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) had held concessionary rights to the Mosul wilayah. Under the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement-an agreement in 1916 between Britain and France that delineated future control of the Middle East-the area would have fallen under French influence. In 1919, however, the French relinquished their claims to Mosul under the terms of the Long-Berenger Agreement. The 1919 agreement granted the French a 25 per cent share in the TPC as compensation. Beginning in 1923, British and Iraqi negotiators held acrimonious discussions over the new oil concession. The major obstacle was Iraq's insistence on a 20 per cent equity participation in the company;

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this figure had been included in the original TPC concession to the Turks and had been agreed upon at San Remo for the Iraqis. In the end, despite strong nationalist sentiments against the concession agreement, the Iraqi negotiators acquiesced to it. The League of Nations was soon to vote on the disposition of Mosul, and the Iraqis feared that, without British support, Iraq would lose the area to Turkey. In March 1925, an agreement was concluded that contained none of the Iraqi demands. The TPC, now renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPq, was granted a concession for a period of seventyfive years. In 1925, the League of Nations decided that Mosul Province would be considered a part of Iraq, but it also suggested that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be extended from four to twenty-five years as a protection for the Kurdish minority, who intensely distrusted the Iraqi government. The Iraqis also were to give due regard to Kurdish sensibilities in matters of culture and of language. Although reluctant to do so, the Iraqi assembly ratified the treaty in January 1926. Turkey was eventually reconciled to the loss by being promised onetenth of any oil revenues that might accrue in the area, and a tripartite Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty was signed in July 1926. This settlement was to have important repercussions, both positive and negative, for the future of Iraq. Vast oil revenues would accrue from the Mosul Province, but the inclusion of a large number of well-armed and restless Kurds in Iraqi territory would continue to plague Iraqi governments. With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the settling of the Mosul question, Iraqi politiCS took on a new dynamic. The emerging class of Sunni and Shia landowning tribal sheikhs vied for positions of power with wealthy and prestigious urban-based Sunni families and with Ottoman-trained army officers and bureaucrats. Because Iraq's newly established political institutions were the creation of a foreign power, and because the concept of democratic government had no precedent in Iraqi history, the politicians in Baghdad lacked legitimacy and never developed deeply rooted constituencies. Thus, despite a constitution and an elected assembly, Iraqi politics was more a shifting alliance of important personalities and cliques than a democracy in the Western sense. The absence of broadly based political institutions inhibited the early nationalist movement's ability to make deep inroads into Iraq's diverse social structure. Thus,

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despite the widely felt resentment at Iraq's mandate status, the burgeoning nationalist movement was largely ineffective. Nonetheless, through the late 1920s, the nationalists persisted in opposing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and in demanding independence. A treaty more favourable to the Iraqis was presented in December 1927. It remained unratified, however, because of nationalist demands for an unconditional promise of independence. This promise eventually was made by the new high commissioner, Sir Gilbert Clayton, in 1929, but the confusion occasioned by the sudden death of Clayton and by the suicide of Abdul Muhsin-as-Saadun, the most powerful Iraqi advocate of the treaty, delayed the writing of a new treaty. In June 1929, the nationalists received their first positive response from London when a newly elected Labour Party government announced its intention to support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932 and to negotiate a new treaty recognising Iraq's independence. Faisal's closest adviser (and soon-to-be Iraqi strongman), Nuri as Said, carried out the treaty negotiations. Despite widespread opposition, Nuri as Said was able to force the treaty through parliament. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930. It provided for a "close alliance," for "full and frank consultations between the two countries in all matters of foreign policy," and for mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted the British the use of air bases near Basra and at AI-Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country. The treaty, of twenty-five years' duration, was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. The terms of the treaty gained Nuri as Said favour in British eyes but discredited him in the eyes of the Iraqi nationalists, who vehemently opposed its lengthy duration and the leasing of air bases. The Kurds and the Assyrians also opposed the treaty because it offered no guarantees for their status in the new country.

Independent Monarchy On October 13, 1932, Iraq became a sovereign state, and it was admitted to the League of Nations. A complex web of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts, all of which retarded the process of state formation, still beset Iraq. The declaration of statehood and the imposition of fixed boundaries triggered an intense competition for power in the new entity. Sunnis and Shias, cities and tribes, sheikhs and tribesmen, Assyrians and Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi

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nationalists-all fought vigorously for places in the emerging state structure. Ultimately, lacking legitimacy and unable to establish deep roots, the British-imposed political system was overwhelmed by these conflicting demands. The Sunni-Shia conflict, a problem since the beginning of domination by the Umayyad Caliphate in 661, continued to frustrate attempts to mould Iraq into a political community. The Shia tribes of the southern Euphrates, along with urban Shias, feared complete Sunni domination in the government. Their concern was well-founded; a disproportionate number of Sunnis occupied administrative positions. Favoured by the Ottomans, the Sunnis historically had gained much more administrative experience. The Shias' depressed economic situation further widened the Sunni-Shia split, and it intensified Shia efforts to obtain a greater share of the new state's budget. The arbitrary borders that divided Iraq and the other Arab lands of the old Ottoman Empire caused severe economic dislocations, frequent border disputes, and a debilitating ideological conflict. The cities of Mosul in the north and Basra in the south, separated from their traditional trading partners in Syria and in Iran, suffered severe commercial dislocations that led to economic depression. In the south, the British-created border (drawn through the desert on the understanding that the region was largely uninhabited) impeded migration patterns and led to great tribal unrest. Also in the south, uncertainty surrounding Iraq's new borders with Kuwait, with Saudi Arabia, and especially with Iran led to frequent border skirmishes. The new boundaries also contributed to the growth of competing nationalisms; Iraqi versus pan-Arab loyalties would severely strain Iraqi politics during the 1950s and the 1960s, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser held emotional sway over the Iraqi masses. Ethnic groups such as the Kurds and the Assyrians, who had hoped for their own autonomous states, rebelled against inclusion within the Iraqi state. The Kurds, the majority of whom lived in the area around Mosul, had long been noted for their fierce spirit of independence and separatism. During the 1922 to 1924 period, the Kurds had engaged in a series of revolts in response to British encroachment in areas of traditional Kurdish autonomy; moreover, the Kurds preferred Turkish to Arab rule. When the League of Nations awarded Mosul to Iraq in 1925, Kurdish hostility thus increased. The

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Iraqi government maintained an uneasy peace with the Kurds in the first year of independence, but Kurdish hostility would remain an intractable problem for future governments. From the start, the relationship of the Iraqi government with the Assyrians was openly hostile. Britain had resettled 20,000 Assyrians in northern Iraq around Zakhu and Dahuk after Turkey violently quelled a British-inspired Assyrian rebellion in 1918. As a result, approximately three-fourths of the Assyrians who had sided with the British during World War I now found themselves citizens of Iraq. The Assyrians found this situation both objectionable and dangerous. Thousands of Assyrians had been incorporated into the Iraqi Levies, a British-paid and British-officered force separate from the regular Iraqi army. They had been encouraged by the British to consider themselves superior to the majority of Arab Iraqis by virtue of their profeSSion of Christianity. The British also had used them for retaliatory operations against the Kurds, in whose lands most of the Assyrians had settled. Pro-British, they had been apprehensive of Iraqi independence. The Assyrians had hoped to form a nation-state in a region of their own. When no unoccupied area sufficiently large could be found, the Assyrians continued to insist that, at the very least, their patriarch, the Mar Shamun, be given some temporal authority. Both the British and the Iraqis flatly refused this demand. In response, the Assyrians, who had been permitted by the British to retain their weapons after the dissolution of the Iraq Levies, flaunted their strength and refused to recognise the government. In retaliation, the Iraqi authorities held the Mar Shamun under virtual house arrest in mid-1933, making his release contingent on his signing a document renouncing forever any claims to temporal authority. During July, about 800 armed Assyrians headed for the Syrian border. For reasons that have never been explained, the Syrians repelled them. During this time, King Faisal was outside the country for reasons of health. According to scholarly sources, Minister of Interior Hikmat Sulayman had adopted a policy aimed at the elimination of the Assyrians. This policy apparently was implemented by a Kurd, General Bakr Sidqi, who, after engaging in several clashes with the Assyrians, permitted his men to kill about 300 Assyrians, including women and children, at the Assyrian village of Simel (Sumayyil).

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The Assyrian affair marked the military's entrance into Iraqi politics, setting a precedent that would be followed throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. It also paved the way for the passage of a conscription law that strengthened the army and, as increasing numbers of tribesmen were brought into military service, sapped strength from the tribal sheikhs. The Assyrian affair also set the stage for the increased prominence of Bakr Sidqi. At the time of independence, tribal Iraq was experiencing a de-stabilising realignment characterised by the waning role of the sheikhs in tribal society. The privatisation of property rights, begun with the tanzimat reforms in the late 1860s, intensified when the Britbll supported Lazmah land reform of 1932 dispossessed even greater numbers of tribesmen. While the British were augmenting the economic power of the sheikhs, however, the tribal-urban balance was rapidly shifting in favour of the cities. The accelerated pace of modernisation and the growth of a highly nationalistic intelligentsia, of a bureaucracy, and of a powerful military, all favoured the cities. Thus, while the economic position of the sheikhs had improved significantly, their role in tribal society and their status in relation to the rapidly emerging urban elite had seriously eroded. These contradictory trends in tribal structure and authority pushed tribal Iraq into a major social revolution that would last for the next thirty years. The ascendancy of the cities and the waning power of the tribes were most evident in the ease with which the military, led by Bakr Sidqi, put down tribal unrest. The tribal revolts themselves were set off by the government's decision in 1934 to allocate money for the new conscription plan rather than for a new dam, which would have improved agricultural productivity in the south. The monarchy's ability to deal with tribal unrest suffer.!d a major setback in September 1933, when King Faisal died while undergoing medical treatment in Switzerland. Faisal's death meant the loss of the main stabilising personality in Iraqi politics. He was the one figure with sufficient prestige to draw the politicians together around a concept of national interest. Faisal was succeeded by his twenty-oneyear-old son, Ghazi (1933-1939), an ardent but inexperienced Arab nationalist. Unlike his father, Ghazi was a product of Western education and had little experience with the complexities of Iraqi tribal life.

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Ghazi also was unable to balance nationalist and British pressures within the framework of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance; increasingly, the nationalist movem ent saw the monarchy as a British puppet . Iraqi politics during Ghazi's reign degene rated into a meanin gless competition among narrowly based tribal sheikhs and urban notables that further eroded the legitimacy of the state and its constitutional structures. In 1936, Iraq experienced its first military coup d'etat- the first coup d'etat in the modern Arab world. The agents of the coup, General Bakr Sidqi and two politicians (Hikmat Sulayman and Abu Timman, who were Turkoman and Shia respectively), represented a minority response to the pan-Arab Sunni govern ment of Yasin alHashimi. The eighteen-month Hashimi government was the most successful and the longest lived of the eight governments that came and went during the reign of King Ghazi. Hashimi's govern ment was nation alistic and pan-A rab, but many Iraqis resent ed its authoritarianism and its suppression of honest dissent. Sulayman, a reformer, sought to engineer an al1!ance of other reformers and minori ty elemen ts within the army. The reform ers includ ed communists, orthodox and unorthodox socialists, and persons with more modera te positions. Most of the more modera te reformers were associated with the leftist-leaning Al-Ahali newspaper, from which their group took its name. The Sidqi coup marked a major turning point in Iraqi history; it made a crucial breach in the constitution, and it opened the door to further military involvement in politics. It also temporarily displaced the elite that had ruled since the state was founded; the new govern ment contained few Arab Sunnis and not a single advocate of a pan-Arab cause. This configuration resulted in a foreign policy oriented toward Turkey and Iran instead of toward the Arab countries. The new government promptly signed an agreem ent with Iran, temporarily settling the question of bounda ry betwee n Iraq and Iran in the Shatt ai-Arab. Iran maintained that it had agreed under British pressure to the international bounda ry's being set at the low water mark on the Iranian side rather than the usual international practice of the midpoint or thalweg. After Bakr Sidqi moved against Baghdad, Sulayman formed an Ahali cabine t. Hashim i and Rashee d Ali were banish ed, and

\

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Nuri as Said fled to Egypt. In the ·course of the assault on Baghdad, Nuri as·Said's brother-in-law, Minister of Defence'Jafar Askari, was killed. . . Ghazi. sanctioned SUlayman's government even th.ough it had achieved power unconstitutionally; neverthele.;s, the coalition of forces that gained power in 1936 was beset by major contradictions. The Ahali group was Interested In scei,,1 reform V:·h~reas Sldqi and his supporters In the mHitar~l\lIere inte~ted In expar,lSion. Sidql, momover, alienated important sectors of the population; the natlohalis~ in the army resented him because of his l' advanc ed. Rashld All end his gove.mrnent fled to Egypt. An armistice was signed on May 30. Abdullah reh.,mad as regent, and Rash~d AIi and the four generals were tried in absentia and were sentenc ed to death: The generals returned to Iraq and were subsequently exe( uted, but Rashid AI! remained in exile. The most Important C1Spect of n e Rashid AIi coup of 1941 was Britain's use of Transjordan's Arab Legion against the Iraqis and their reimposition by force of arms of Abdullah as regent. Nothing !=ontrlbute('\ more to nationalist sen ,iment in Iraq, especially in the military, than the British Invasion d 1941 and the reimposilion of the mon.archy. From then on, the m(lOarchy was completely di-lOrced from the powerful nationalist trend. Widely viewed as an Clnachl'Onism that lacked popula r legitimacy, the monarchy was perccivec', 10 be aligned with social forc'e'i that were retardi ng the cOlllllry's developm~nt.

111 Januar y 1943, under the terms of the 1930 treaty with Britain, Iraq declared war on the Axis powers. Iraq cooper ated completely with the British under the succesSive governments of Nuri as Said achi (1944-1946). Iraq bL!ci:l!ne a (1941·1944) and Hamdi aI-Pach .,

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base for the rnilita~ occupation of Iran and of the Levant. In March 1945, Iraq became a founding member of th(~ British-supported League of Arab States (Arab League), which included Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Although the Arab League was ostensibly deSigned to foster Arab unity, many Arab natiol1allsts viewed it as a British-dominated alignment of pn)Western Arab states. In December 1945, Iraq joined the United Nations (UN). World War II exacerbated Iraq's social and economic problems, The spiralling prices and shortages brought on by the war increaseci the opportunitl; for exploitation and significantly widened the gap between rich and poor; thus, while wealthy landowners were enrichinf! themselves through corruption, the salaried midde class, includinn teachers, civil selVants, and army officers, saw their incomes depreciak daily. Even worse off were the peasants, who lived under the heGl~1 burden of the 1932 land reform that permitted their landlords (sheikhs) to make huge profits selling cash crops to the British occupying force. The worsening economic situation of the mass of haqis duri'ng th.l 1950s and the 1960s enabled the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) to establish ueep roots during this period. In addition to its festering socio-econorni~ problems. posl-World War 11 Iraq was beset by a leadership crisis. After the 1941 Rashid All coup, the pro-British Nurl as Said had dominated Iraqi politia-. The latter's British orientation and autocratic marmer increasingl; were at vftriance with the liberal, reformist philosophy of Iraq's new, nationalists. Even before the end of the war, nationalists hnci dmn( mde, I the restoration of politfcal activity, which hod been banncd durin:] the war ill th~ interest of national security. Not until the government of Tawflq Suwaidi (Febnlflry-Mflrch 1946), however, wem poiitiril! parties allowed to orgallise. Within a short period, six rmtics wme formed. The parties !;oon became so out»poken in their ctiticislll of the govcrn:nent that thp government closed or clIrtclileci the clci)viti('s of the more t,X'treme leftist parties, Accumulated grievances against Nur! as Said and the regellt climaxed h the 1948 Wath~ah (uprising). The Wathbah WilS (\ prote~t against the Portsmouth Treaty of January 1~48 and its provision th'lt Cl board of Iraqis and British be established to dec.ide on dC!fen. 'e matters of mutual interest. The treaty enragecllraqi natiol1C1lists, wf 10

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were still bitter over the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 and,the continued influence of the British in Iraqi affairs. The uprising also was fuelled by widespread popula r discontent over rising prices, by an acute bread shortagl>, and by, the regime's fallure to liberalise the political , system. The Wathbah had three important effec~ on Iraqi politics. First; and most directly, it led Nuri as Said and the regent to repudiate the Portsmouth Treaty.. Second, the succass of the uprising led the OPPOSItion tt'! Intensify Its ~paign to' discredit the regime. This activity not only weakened the monarchy b'.Jt also seriously eroded the legitimaCy of the political process. Finally, the uprising created a schism bP.tween Nuri as Said and Abdullah. The former wanted, tighten political control and to deal harshly with the opposition; response, the the regent edvoca ted a more tempered approach. and more more relied British Increasingly mistrusted the regent and ~uri' as Se.ld. ' Iraq bitterly objected to the 1947 UN decision to partition Palestine and scnt S 3veral hundred recruits to the Palestine front when hostilities broke out on May 15, 1948. Iraq sent an additional 8,000 to 10,000 troops of the regular army during the course of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War; theSe troops were withdrawn in, April 1949. The Iraqis had arrived at the Palestine front poorly equ! pped and undertrained because of the drastic reduction In'defence (!xpenditures imposed by NUr! as Said following the 1941 Rashld All coup. As a result, they even more f~red verY poorly In ,the fighting and returned to Iraq Impact on e negativ a had also war The alienated from the regime. available of cent per 40 d allocate ment govern the Iraqi economy. The s paid royaltie Oil s. refugee iian Palesth for funds for the army and 1948. In off cut was Halfa to e pipelin the to J.raq were halved when er, moreov led, sman busines Jewish a of g The war and the hangin nity; commu Jewish ous prosper Iraq's of most of to the departure about 120,00 0 Iraqi Jews immigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1952. In 1952, the depTes~ed economic si uation, which had been exacerbated, by a bad harvest and by the gcvernment's refusal to hold direct elections, triggered large-scale anti regime protests;' the protests , turned especially violent in Baghdad. In I esponse, the government declared martial law. banned (}\I political po rties, suspended a numbe r

to

on

In

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of newspapers, and imposed a curfew. The immense size of the protests showed how widespread dissatisfaction with the regime had become. The middle class, whom had grown considerably as a result of the monarchy's expanded education system, had become increasingly alienated from the regime, in large part because they were unable to earn an income commensurate with their status. Nuri as Said's autocratic manner, his intolerance of dissent, and his heavyhanded treatment of the political opposition had further alienated the middle class, especially the army. Forced underground, the opposition had become more revolutionary. By the early 1950s, government revenues began to improve with the growth of the oil industry. New pipelines were built to Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1949 and to Baniyas, Syria, in 1952. A new oil agreement, concluded in 1952, netted the government 50 per cent of oil company profits before taxes. As a result, government oil revenues increased almost fourfold, from US $ 32 million in 1951 to US $ 112 million in 1952. The increased oil payments, however, did little for the masses. Corruption among high government officials increased; oil companies employed relatively few Iraqis; and the oil boom also had a severe inflationary effect on the economy. Inflation hurt in particular a growing number of urban poor and the salaried middle class. The increased economic power of the state further isolated Nuri as Said and the regent from Iraqi society and obscured from their view the tenuous nature of the monarchy's hold on power. In the mid-1950s, the monarchy was embroiled in a series of foreign policy blunders that ultimately contributed to its overthrow. Following a 1949 military coup in Syria that brought to power Adib Shishakli, a military strongman who opposed union with Iraq, a split developed between Abdullah, who had called for a Syrian-Iraqi union, and Nuri as Said, who opposed the union plan. Although Shishakli was overthrown with Iraqi help in 1954, the union plan never came to fruition. Instead, the schism between Nuri as Said and the regent widened. Sensing the regime's weakness, the opposition intensified its anti regime activity. The monarchy's major foreign policy mistake occurred in 1955, when Nuri as Said announced that Iraq was joining a British-supported mutual defence pact with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Baghdad Pact constituted a direct challenge to Egyptian President

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Gamal Abdul Nasser. In response, Nasser launched a vituperative media campaign that challenged the legitimacy of the Iraqi monarchy and called on the officer corps to overthrow it. The 1956 British-French-Israeli attack on Sinai further alienated Nuri as Said's regime from the growing ranks of the opposition. In 1958, King Hussain of Jordan and Abdullah proposed a union of Hashimite monarchies to counter the recently formed Egyptian-Syrian union. At this point, the monarchy found itself completely isolated. Nuri as Said was able to contain the rising discontent only by resorting to even greater oppression and to tighter control over the political process.

The Republic The Hashimite monarchy was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift, predawn coup executed by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd as Salaam Arif. The coup was triggered when King Hussain, fearing that an anti-Western revolt in Lebanon might spread to Jordan, requested Iraqi assistance. Instead of moving toward Jordan, however, Colonel Arif led a battalion into Baghdad and immediately proclaimed a new republic and the end of the old regime. The July 14 Revolution met virtually no opposition and proclamations of the revolution brought crowds of people into the streets of Baghdad cheering for the deaths of Iraq's two "strong men," Nuri as Said and Abdullah. King Faisal 11 and Abdullah were executed, as were many others in the royal family. Nuri as Said also was killed after attempting to escape disguised as a veiled woman. In the ensuing mob demonstrations against the old order, angry crowds severely damaged the British embassy. Put in its histo~cal context, the July 14 Revolution was the culmination of a series of uprisings and coup attempts that began with the 1936 Bakr Sidqi coup and included the 1941 Rashid Ali military movement, the 1948 Wathbah UpriSing, and the 1952 and 1956 protests. The revolution radically altered Iraq's social structure, destroying the power of the landed sheikhs and the absentee landlords while enhancing the position of the urban workers, the peasants, and the middle class. In altering the old power structure, however, the revolution revived long-suppressed sectarian, tribal, and ethnic conflicts.

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The strongest of these conflicts were those between Kurds and Arabs and between Sunnis and Shias. Despite a shared military background, the group of Free Officers that carried out the July 14 Revolution was plagued by intern~J dissension. Its members lacked both a coherent ideology and an effective organisational structure. Many of the more senior officers resented having to take orders from Arif; they're junior in rank. A power struggle developed between Qasim and Arif over joining the Egyptian-Syrian union. The Baath Party supported Arif's pro-Nasserite sympathies, while Qasim found support for his anti-union position in the ranks of the communists. Qasim, the more experienced and higher ranking of the two, eventually emerged victorious. Arif was first dismissed, then brought to trial for treason and condemned to death in January 1959; he was subsequently pardoned in December 1962. Whereas he implemented many reforms that favoured the poor, Qasim was primarily a centrist in outlook, proposing to improve the lot of the poor while not dispossessing the wealthy. In part, his ambiguous policies were a product of his lack of a solid base of support, especially in the military. Unlike the bulk of military officers, Qasim did not come from the Arab Sunni north-western towns nor did he share their enthusiasm for pan-Arabism: he was of mixed Sunni-Shia parentage from south-eastern Iraq. Qasim's ability to remain in power depended, therefore, on a skilful balancing of the communists and the pan-Arabists. For most of his tenure, Qasim sought to counterbalance the growing pan-Arab trend in the military by supporting the communists who controlled the streets. He authorised the formation of a communist-controlled militia, the People's Resistance Force, and he freed all communist prisoners. Qasim's economic policies reflected his poor origins and his ties with the communists. He permitted trade unions, improved workers' conditions, and implemented land reform aimed at dismantling the old feudal structure of the countryside. Qasim also challenged the existing profit-sharing arrangements with the oil companies. On December 11, 1961, he passed Public Law 80, which dispossessed the IPe of 99.5 per cent of its concession area, leaving it to operate only in those areas currently in production. The new arrangement significantly increased oil revenues accruing to the government. Qasim

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also announced the establishment of an Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) to exploit the new territory. In March 1959, a group of disgruntled Free Officers, who came from conservative, well known, Arab Sunni families and who opposed Qasim's increasing links with the communists, attempted a coup. Aware of the planned coup, Qasim had his communist allies mobilise 250,000 of their supporters in Mosul. The ill-planned coup attempt never really materialised and, in its aftermath, the communists massacred nationalists and some well-to-do Mosul families, leaving deep scars that proved to be very slow to heal. Throughout 1959, the ranks of the ICP swelled as the party increased its presence in both the military and the government. In 1959, Qasim re-established diplomatic relations between Iraq and Moscow, an extensive Iraqi-Soviet economic agreement was signed, and arms deliveries began. With communist fortunes riding high, another large-scale show of force was planned in Kirkuk, where a significant number of Kurds (many of them either members of, or sympathetic to, the ICP) lived in neighbourhoods contiguous to a Turkoman upper class. In Kirkuk, however, communist rallies got out of hand. A bloody battle ensued, and the Kurds looted and killed many Turkomans. The communist-initiated violence at Kirkuk led Qasim to crack down on the organisation, by arresting some of the more unruly rank-and-file members and by temporarily suspending the People's Resistance Force. FollOWing the events at Mosul and at Kirkuk, the Baath and its leader, Fuad Rikabi, decided that the only way to dislodge the Qasim regime would be to kill Qasim. The future President, Saddam Hussein, carried out the attempted assassination, which injured Qasim but failed to kill him. Qasim reacted by softening his stance on the communists and by suppressing the activities of the Baath and other nationalist parties. The renewed communist-Qasim relationship did not last long, however. Throughout 1960 and 1961, sensing that the communists had become too strong, Qasim again moved against the party by eliminating members from sensitive government positions, by cracking down on trade unions and on peasant associations, and by shutting down the communist press. Qasim's divorce from the communists, his alienation from the nationalists, his aloof manner, and his monopoly of power-he was

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frequently referred to as the "sole leader" -isolated him from a domestic power base. In 1961, his tenuous hold on power was further weakened when the Kurds again took up arms against the central government. The Kurds had ardently supported the 1958 revolution. Indeed, the new constitution put forth by Qasim and Anf had stipulated that the Kurds and the Arabs would be equal partners in the new state. Exiled Kurdish leaders, including Mullah Mustafa Barzani, were allowed to return. Mutual suspicions, however, soon soured the BarzaniQasim relationship; in September 1961, full-scale fighting broke out between Kurdish guerrillas and the Iraqi army. The army did not fare well against the seasoned Kurdish guerrillas, many of whom had deserted from the army. By the spring of 1962, Qasim's inability to contain the Kurdish insurrection had further eroded his base of power. The growing opposition was now in a position to plot his overthrow. Qasim's domestic problems were compounded by a number of foreign policy crises, the foremost of which was an escalating conflict with the shah of Iran. Although he had reined in the communists, Qasim's leftist sympathies aroused fears in the West and in neighbouring Gulf states of an imminent communist takeover ofIraq. In April 1959, Allen Dulles, the director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, described the situation in Iraq "as the most dangerous in the world." The pro-Western shah found Qasim's communist sympathies and his claims on Iranian Khuzestan (an area that stretched from Dezful to Ahvaz in Iran and that contained a majority of Iranians of Arab descent) to be anathema. In December 1959, Iraqi-Iranian relations rapidly deteriorated when Qasim, reacting to Iran's reopening of the Shatt ai-Arab dispute, nullified the 1937 agreement and claimed sovereignty over the anchorage area near Abadan. In July 1961, Qasim further alienated the West and proWestern regional states by laying claim to the newly independent state of Kuwait. When the Arab League unanimously accepted Kuwait's membership, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with its Arab neighbours. Qasim was completely isolated. In February 1963, hemmed in by regional enemies and facing Kurdish insurrection in the north and a growing nationalist movement at home, Qasim was overthrown. Despite the long list of enemies

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who opposed him in his final days, Qasim was a hero to millions of urban poor and impoverished peasants, many of who rushed to his defence. The inability of the masses to stave off the nationalist onslaught attested to the near total divorce of the Iraqi people from the political process. From the days of the monarchy, the legitimacy of the political process had suffered repeated blows. The government's British legacy, Nuri as Said's authoritarianism, and the rapid encroachment of the miHtary (who paid only scant homage to the institutions of state) had eroded the people's faith in the government; furthermore, Qasim's inability to stem the increasing ethnic, sectarian, and claSS-inspired violence reflected an even deeper malaise. The unravelling of Iraq's traditional social structure upset a precarious balance of social forces. Centuries-old religious and sectarian hatreds now combined with more recent class antagonisms in a volatile mix.

Coups and Coup Attempts Two Syrian students, Michel Aflaq and Salah-ud-Din al-Bitar founded the Baath Party that orchestrated the overthrow of Qasim in the early 1940s. Its ideological goals of socialism, freedom, and unity reflected the deeply felt sentiments of many Iraqis who, during the monarchy, had suffered from the economic dislocation that followed the break-up of the old Ottoman domain, from an extremely skewed income distribution, and from the suppression of political freedoms. Beginning in 1952, under the leadership of Fuad Rikabi, the party grew rapidly, especially among the Iraqi intelligentsia. By 1958, the Baath had made some inroads into the military. The party went through a difficult period in 1959, however, after the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents, the failed attempt on Qasim's life, and disillusionment with Nasser. The Baath's major competitor throughout the Qasim period was the ICP; when Qasim was finally overthrown, strongly pitched battles between the two ensued. The Baath was able to consolidate it., bid for power only with the emergence of AIi Salih as Saadi as leader. Upon assuming power, the Baath established the National Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC) as the highest policy-making body and appOinted Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, one of the Free Officers, as Prime Minister and Arif as President. The party leader, Saadi, however, held the real power. Despite the dominance of the newly

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established NCRC, the Baath's hold on power was extremely tenuous. The organisation was small, with an active membership of fewer than 1.000, and it was not well represented in the officer corps or in the army at large. Its leadership was inexperienced, and its ideology was too vague to have any immediate relevance to the deep-seated problems besetting Iraq in the early 1960s. Its ambiguity of purpose had served the party well during the Qasim era, enabling it to attract a diverse membership sharing only a common aversion for "the sole leader." In the post-Qasim period, that ambiguity was tearing the party asunder. The party's lack of cohesion and lack of a coherent programme had two major effects on Baath policy. First, it led party strongman Saadi to establish a one-party state that showed little tolerance for opposing views. Second, in the absence of strong ideological ties, cliques from the same village, town, or tribe increasingly pervaded the Baath. This tendency became even more pronounced during the 1970s. Troubled by internal dissension and unable to suppress a new wave of Kurdish unrest in the north. the Baath held power for less than a year. Most damaging was the foundering of unity talks with Nasser and the new Baathist regime in Syria. When the unity plan collapsed, Nasser launched a vituperative campaign challenging the legitimacy of the Baath in Iraq and in Syria. Nasser's attacks seriously eroded the legitimacy of a regime that had continually espoused pan-Arabism. Another factor contributing to the party's demise was Saadi's reliance on the National Guard-a paramilitary force composed primarily of Baath sympathisers-to counter the Baath's lack of support in the regular army. By bolstering the guard, Saadi alienated the regular army. Finally, the Baath was sharply divided between doctrinaire hard-liners, such as Saadi, and a more pragmatic moderate wing. With its party ranks weakened, the Baath was overthrown by Arif and a coterie of military officers in a bloodless coup in November 1963. Upon assuming power, Arif immediately announced that the armed forces would manage the country. The governing core consisted of Arif; his brother, Abd ar Rahman Arif; and his trusted colleague, Colonel Said Slaibi. Arif was chairman of the NCRC, commander in chief of the armed forces, and President of the republic; his brother

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was acting chief of staff, and the colonel was commander of the Baghdad garrison. The Arif brothers, Slaibi, and the majority of Arif's Twentieth Brigade were united by a strong tribal bond as members of the Jumailah tribe. Other groups who participated in the 1963 coup included Nasserites-an informal group of military officers and civilians who looked to Nasser for leadership and who desired some kind of unity with Egypt-and Baathists in the military. By the spring of 1964, Arif had adroitly outmanoeuvred the military Baathists and had filled the top leadership posts with civilian Nasserites. Arif and the Nasserite officers took steps to integrate the military, economic, and political policies of Iraq with those of Egypt; this was expected to lead to the union of the two countries by 1966. (The United Arab Republic [UAR] , which Iraq expected to join, existed from 1958 to 1961 and consisted of Egypt and Syria. Arif proposed that Iraq joined partly as an anti-communist measure but this union never occurred.) In May 1964, the Joint Presidency Council was formed, and in December the Unified Political Command was established to expedite the ultimate constitutional union of the two countries. In July 1964, Arif announced that henceforth all political parties would coalesce to form the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. Most important for the future, Arif adopted Nasser's socialist programme, calling for the nationalisation of insurance companies, banks, and such essential industries as steel, cement, and construction-along with the tobacco industry, tanneries, and flour mills. Arif's nationalisation programme proved to be one of the few legacies of the proposed Egyptian-Iraqi union. By 1965, Arif had lost his enthusiasm for the proposed union, which had received only lukewarm support from Nasser. Arif began ousting Nasserite officers from the government. As a result, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Brigadier Arif Abd ur Razzaq, who was also a leading Nasserite, made an unsuccessful coup attempt on September 12, 1965. In response, President Arif curtailed Nasserite activities and appointed fellow tribal members to positions of power. Colonel Abd ur Razzaq an Nayif, a fellow Jumailah, became head of military intelligence. Arif also attempted to bring more civilians into the government. He appointed the first civilian Prime Minister since the days of the monarchy, Abd ur Rahman Bazzaz. Bazzaz strongly advocated the rule of law and was determined to end the erratic,

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military-dominated politics that had characterised Iraq since 1958. He also tried to implement the First Five-Year Economic Plan (1965-70) to streamline the bureaucracy and to encourage private and foreign investment. In April 1966, Arif was killed in a helicopter crash and his brother, Major General Abd ur Rahman Arif, was installed in office with the approval of the National Defence Council and the cabinet. Abd ur Rahman Arif lacked the forcefulness and the political acumen of his brother; moreover, he was dominated by the ambitious military officers who were responsible for his appointment. The government's weak hold on the country, thus became more apparent. The most pressing issue facing the new government was a renewed Kurdish rebellion. The 1964 cease-fire signed by Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani and Abd as Salaam Arif was short-lived; by April 1965, the two sides were again engaged in hostilities. This time military support provided by the shah of Iran helped the Kurds win important victories over the Iraqi army. Kurdish inroads in the north and escalating Iraqi-Iranian tensions prompted Iraq's Prime Minister Bazzaz to propose a more far-reaching settlement to the Kurdish problem. Some of the more salient points of Bazzaz's proposal included amnesty, use of the Kurdish language in Kurdish areas, Kurdish administration of their educational, health, and municipal institutions, and the promise of early elections by which the Kurds would gain proportional representation in national as well as in provincial assemblies. When Barzani indicated that he approved of these proposals, the Kurdish conflict appeared to have ended. The army, however, which had opposed having Bazzaz as a civilian head of the cabinet, feared that he would reduce their pay and privileges; consequently, it strongly denounced reconciliation with the Kurds. President Arif yielded to pressure and asked for Bazzaz's resignation. This ended the rapprochement with the Kurds and led to a collapse of civilian rule. The new Prime Minister was General Naji Talib, a pro-Nasserite who had been instrumental in the 1958 Revolution and who strongly opposed the Kurdish peace plan. Arif also sought to further the improved relations-- with Iran initiated by Bazzaz. This rapprochement was significant because it denied the Kurds access to their traditional place of asylum, which

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allowed recovery from Iraqi attacks. Arif visited Tehran in the spring of 1967; at the conclusion of his visit, it was announced that the countries would hold more meetings aimed at joint oil exploration in the Naft-e Shah and Naft Khaneh border regions. They also agreed to continue negotiations on toll collection and navigation rights on the Shatt ai-Arab and on the demarcation of the Persian Gulf's continental shelf. During the winter of 1966-67, Arif faced a crisis emanating from a new source, Syria. The IPC transported oil from its northern fields to Mediterranean ports via pipelines in Syria. In 1966, Damascus claimed that the IPC had been underpaying Syria, based on their 1955 agreement. Syria demanded back payments and immediately increased the transit fee it charged the IPC. When the IPC did not accede to Syrian demands, Syria cut off the flow of Iraqi oil to its Mediterranean ports. The loss of revenue threatened to cause a severe financial crisis. It also fuelled anti-Talib forces and increased public clamour for his resignation. In response, Talib resigned, and Arif briefly headed an extremely unsteady group of military officers. In the opinion of Phebe Marr, a leading authority on Iraq, on the eve of the June 1967 War between Israel and various Arab states, the Arif government had become little more than a collection of army officers balancing the special interests of various economic, political, ethnic, and sectarian groups. The non-intervention of Iraqi troops while Israel was overtaking the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies and was conquering large tracts of Arab territory discredited the Arif regime in the eyes of the masses. To stave off rising discontent, Arif reappointed strongman Tahir Yahya as Prime Minister (he had first been appointed by Arif in November 1963). Yahya's only accomplishment was to lessen Iraq's economic dependence on the Western-owned IPC: on August 6, his government turned overall exploitation rights in the oil-rich North Rumailah field to the statecontrolled INOC. The Arif government, however, had lost its base of power. Lacking a coherent political platform and facing increasing charges of corruption, the government was only hanging on. Ultimately two disaffected Arif supporters-Colonel Abd ur Razzaq an Nayif and Ibrahim ad Daud-were able to stage a successful coup against Arif, and the Baath quickly capitalised on the situation. Nayif and Daud had been part of a small group of young officers, called

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the Arab Revolutionary Movement, which previously had been a major source of support for Arif. By July 1968, however, reP9rts of corruption and Arif's increased reliance on the Nasserites (whom both Nayif and Daud opposed) had alienated the two officers. Nayif and Daud acted independently from the Baath in carrying out the coup, but lacked the organisational backing or the grass-roots support necessary to remain in power. In only a few weeks, the Baath had outmanoeuvred Nayif and Daud, and, for the second time in five years, had taken over control of the government.

Emergence of Saddam Hussein The Baath of 1968 was more tightly organised and more determined to stay in power than the Baath of 1963. The demise of Nasserism following the June 1967 War and the emergence of a more parochially oriented Baath in Syria freed the Iraqi Baath from the debilitating aspects of pan-Arabism. In 1963, Nasser had been able to manipulate domestic Iraqi politics; by 1968, his ideological pull had waned, enabling the Iraqi Baath to focus on pressing domestic issues. The party also was aided by a 1967 reorganisation that created a militia and an intelligence apparatus and set up local branches that gave the Baath broader support. In addition, by 1968, close family and tribal ties bound the Baath's ruling clique. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis-Sunni Arabs from the north-west town of Tikrit-related to Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Three of the five members of the Baath's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were Tikritis; two, Bakr and Hammad Shihab, were related to each other. The cabinet posts of President, Prime Minister, and defence minister went to Tikritis. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, also was a Tikriti and a relative of Bakr. Another distinguishing characteristic of the Baath in 1968 was that the top leadership consisted almost entirely of military men. Finally, Bakr was a much more seasoned politician in 1968 than he had been in 1963. Less than two months after the formation of the Bakr government, a coalition of pro-Nasser elements, Arif supporters, and conservatives from the military attempted another coup. This event provided the rationale for numerous purges directed by Bakr and Saddam Hussein. Between 1968 and 1973, through a series of sham trials, executions, assassinations, and intimidations, the party ruthlessly eliminated any group or person suspected of challenging Baath rule. The Baath also

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institutionalised its rule by formally issuing a Provisional Constitution in JUly 1970. This document was a modification of an earlier constitution that had been issued in September 1968. The Provisional Constitution, which with some modifications is still in effect, granted the party-dominated RCC extensive powers and declared that new RCC members must belong to the party's Regional Command-the top policy-making and executive body of the Baathist organisation. Two men, Saddam Hussein and Bakr, increasingly dominated the party. Bakr, who had been associated with Arab nationalist causes for more than a decade, brought the party popular legitimacy. Even more important, he brought support from the army both between Baathist and non-Baathist officers, with whom he had cultivated ties for years. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was a consummate party politician whose formative experiences were in organising clandestine opposition activity. He was adept at outmanoeuvringand at times ruthlessly eliminating-political opponents. Although Bakr was the older and more prestigious of the two, by 1969, Saddam Hussein clearly had become the moving force behind the party. He personally directed Baathist attempts to settle the Kurdish question and he organised the party's institutional structure. In July 1973, after an unsuccessful coup attempt by a civilian faction within the Baath led by Nazim Kazzar, the party set out to re-consolidate its hold on power. First, the RCC amended the Provisional Constitution to give the President greater power. Second, in early 1974, the Regional Command was officially designated as the body responsible for making policy. By September 1977, alI Regional Command leaders had been appOinted to the RCC. Third, the party created a more pervasive presence in Iraqi society by establishing a complex network of grass roots and intelligence-gathering organisations. FinalIy, the party established its own militia, which in 1978 was reported to number close to 50,000 men. Despite Baath attempts to institutionalise its rule, real power remained in the hands of a narrowly based elite, united by close family and tribal ties. By 1977, the most powerful men in the Baath, thus, were alI somehow related to the triumvirate of Saddam Hussein, Bakr, and General Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah, Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law who became minister of defence in 1978. All were members of the party, the RCC, and the cabinet, and all were

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members of the Talfah family of Tikrit, headed by Khayr Allah Talfah. Khayr Allah Talfah was Saddam Hussein's uncle and guardian, Adnan Khayr Allah's father, and Bakr's cousin. Saddam Hussein was married to Adnan Khayr Allah's sister and Adnan Khayr Allah was married to Bakr's daughter. Increasingly, the most sensitive military posts were going to the Tikritis. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Bakr was beset by illness and by a series of family tragedies. He increasingly turned over power to Saddam Hussein. By 1977, the party bureaus, the intelligence mechanisms, and even ministers who, according to the Provisional Constitution, should have reported to Bakr, reported to Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, was less inclined to share power, and he viewed the cabinet and the RCC as rubber stamps. On July 16, 1979, President Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein officially replaced him as President of the republic, secretary general of the Baath Party Regional Command, chairman of the RCC, and comma nder in chief of the armed forces. In foreign affairs, the Baath's pan-Arab and socialist leanings alienated both the pro-Western Arab Gulf states and the shah of Iran. The enmity between Iraq and Iran sharpened with the 1969 British announ cemen t of a planned withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. In February 1969, Iran announced that Iraq had not fulfilled its obligations under the 1937 treaty and deman ded that the border in the Shatt ai-Arab waterway be set at the thalweg. Iraq's refusal to honour the Iranian deman d led the shah to abrogate the 1937 treaty and to send Iranian ships through the Shatt ai-Arab without paying dues to Iraq. In response, Iraq aided anti-shah dissidents, while the shah renewed suppor t for Kurdish rebels. Relations between the two countries soon deteriorated further. In November 1971, the shah occupied the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which previously had been under the sovereignty of Ras al-Khaymah and Sharjah, both membe r states of the United Arab Emirates. The Iraqi Baath also was involved in a confrontation with the conservative sheikhdoms of the Gulf over Iraq's suppor t for the leftist People's De~ratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the PopUlar Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf. The major contention between Iraq and the conservative Gulf states, however, concerned the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah that

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domina te the estuary leading to the souther n Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. Beginning in the early 1970s, Iraq's desire to develop a deep-w ater port on the Gulf led to deman ds that the two islands be transferred or leased to Iraq. Kuwait refused, and in March 1973, Iraqi troops occupi ed As Samita h, a border post in the north-e ast corner of r Kuwait. Saudi Arabia immediately came to Kuwait's aid and, togethe with the Arab League , obtaine d Iraq's withdrawal. The most serious threat facing the Baath was a resurgence of a Kurdish unrest in the north. In March 1970, the RCC and Mustaf Barzani announ ced agreem ent to a fifteen-article peace plan. This plan was almost identical to the previous Bazzaz-Kurdish settlem ent that had never been implemented. The Kurds were immediately ed pacified by the settlement, particularly becaus e Barzani was permitt e becam then troops i's Barzan to retain his 15,000 Kurdish troops. "Those g meanin rga, an official Iraqi frontier force called the Peshme Who Face Death." The plan, however, was not completely satisfactory becaus e the legal status of the Kurdish territory remain ed unresolved. At the time y of the signing of the peace plan, Barzani's forces controlled territor already and ast from Zakhu in the north to Halabja h in the south-e had established de jacto Kurdish administration in most of the towns , of the area. Barzani's group, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP) was granted official recognition as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people. The 1970 agreem ent unravelled through out the early 1970s. After the March 1974, Baath attemp t to assassinate Barzani and his son Idris, full-scale fighting broke out. In early 1974, it appear ed that the Baath had finally succee ded in isolating Barzani and the KDP by co-opting the ICP and by signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, both traditionally strong suppor ters of the KOP. Barzani, however, compe nsated for the loss of Soviet and ICP suppor t by obtaini ng military aid from the Shah of Iran and from the United States, both of which were alarme d by increasing Soviet influence in Iraq. When Iraqi forces reached Rawanduz, threatening to block the major Kurdish artery to Iran, the Shah increased the flow of military supplies to the Kurdish rebels. Using antitan k missiles and artillery obtaine d from Iran as well as military aid from Syria and Israel, the KOP inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi forces. To avoid a costly stalema te like that

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which had weakened his predecessors, Saddam Hussein sought an agreement with the shah. In Algiers on March 6, 1975, Saddam Hussein signed an agreement with the Shah that recognised the thalweg as the boundary in the Shatt ai-Arab, legalised the shah's abrogation of the 1937 treaty in 1969, and dropped all Iraqi cl;:;lims to Iranian Khuzestan and to the islands at the foot of the Gulf. In return, the Shah agreed to prevent subversive elements from crossing the border. This agreement meant an end to Iranian assistance to the Kurds, Almost immediately after the signing of the Algiers Agreement, Iraqi forces went on the offensive and defeated the Peshrrierga, which was unable to hold out without Iranian support. Under an amnesty plan, about 70 per cent of the Peshmerga surrendered to the Iraqis. Some remained in the hills of Kurdistan to continue the fight, and about 30,000 crossed the border to Iran to join the civilian refugees, then estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000. Even before the fighting broke out in March 1974, Saddam Hussein had offered the Kurds the most comprehensive autonomy plan ever proposed. The major provisions of the plan stated that Kurdistan would be an autonomous area governed by an elected legislative and an executive council, the President of which would be appointed by the Iraqi head of state. The Kurdish council would have control over local affairs except in the areas of defence and foreign relations, which would be controlled by the central government. The autonomous region did not include the oil-rich district of Kirkuk. To facilitate the autonomy plan, Saddam Hussein's administration helped form three pro-government Kurdish parties, allocated a special budget for development in Kurdish areas, and repatriated many Kurdish refugees then living in Iran. In addition to the conciliatory measures offered to the Kurds, Saddam Hussein attempted to weaken Kurdish resistance by forcibly relocating many Kurds from the Kurdish heartland in the north, by introducing increasing numbers of Arabs into mixed Kurdish provinces, and by razing all Kurdish villages along a 1,300 kilometre stretch of the border with Iran. Saddam Hussein's combination of conciliation and severity failed to appease the Kurds, and renewed guerrilla attacks occurred as early as March 1976. At the same time, the failure of the KDP to obtain significant concessions from the Iraqi government

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caused a serious split within the Kurdish resistance. In June 1975, Jalal Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK was urban-based and more leftist than the tribally based KO? Following Barzani's death in 1975, Barzani's sons, Idris and Masud, took control of the KO? In October 1979, Masud officially was elected KOP chairman. He issued a new platform calling for continued armed struggle against the Baath through guerrilla warfare. The effectiveness of the KOp, however, was blunted by its violent intra-Kurdish struggle with the PUK throughout 1978 and 1979. Beginning in 1976, with the Baath firmly in power and after the Kurdish rebellion had been successfully quelled, Saddam Hussein set out to consolidate his position at home by strengthening the economy. He pursued a state-sponsored industrial modernisation programme that tied an increasing number of Iraqis to the Baath-controlled government. Saddam Hussein's economic policies were largely successful; they led to a wider distribution of wealth, to greater social mobility, to increased access to education and health care, and to the redistribution of land. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the subsequent oil price rises brought on by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran greatly enhanced the success of Saddam Hussein's programme. The more equitable distribution of income tied to the ruling party many Iraqis who had previously opposed the central government. For the first time in modern Iraqi history, a government-albeit at times a ruthless one, had, thus, achieved some success in forging a national community out of the country's disparate social elements. Success on the economic front spurred Saddam Hussein to pursue an ambitious foreign policy aimed at pushing Iraq to the forefront of the Arab world. Between 1975, and 1979, a major plank of Saddam Hussein's bid for power in the region rested on improved relations with Iran, with Saudi Arabia, and with the smaller Gulf sheikhdoms. In 1975, Iraq established diplomatic relations with Sultan Qaboos of Oman and extended several loans to him. In 1978, Iraq sharply reversed its support for the Marxist regime in South Yemen. The. biggest boost to Saddam Hussein's quest for regional power, however, resulted from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's signing the Camp David Accords in November 1978. Saddam Hussein viewed Egypt's isolation within the Arab world as an opportunity for Iraq to play a leading role in Arab affairs. He

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was instrumental in convening an Arab summit in Baghdad that denounced'Sadat's reconciliation with Israel and imposed sanctions on Egypt. He also attempted to end his long-standing feud with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, and, in June 1979, Saddam Hussein became the first Iraqi head of state in twenty years to visit Jordan. In Amman, Saddam Hussein concluded a number of agreements with King Hussein, including one for the expansion of the port of Aqabah, regarded by Iraq as a potential replacement for ports in Lebanon and Syria.

Iran-Iraq Conflict In February 1979, Saddam Hussein's ambitious plans and the course of Iraqi history were drastically altered by the overthrow of the shah of Iran. Hussein viewed the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran as both a threat and an opportunity. The downfall of the Shah and the confusion prevailing in post-revolutionary Iran suited Saddam Hussein's regional ambitions. A weakened Iran seemed to offer an opportunity to project Iraqi power over the Gulf, to regain control over the Shatt ai-Arab waterway, and to augment Iraqi claims to leadership of the Arab world. More ominously, the activist Shia Islam preached by the leader of the revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, threatened to upset the delicate SunniShia balance in Iraq, and a hostile Iran would threaten Iraqi security in the Gulf. Furthermore, deep-seated personal animosities separated the two leaders. The two men held widely divergent ideologies, and in 1978 Hussein had expelled Khomeini from Iraq-reportedly at the request of the shah-after he had lived thirteen years in exile in An Najaf. For much of Iraqi history, the Shias have been both politically impotent .and economically depressed. Beginning in the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Sunnis favoured their Iraqi co-religionists in the matter of educational and employment opportunities, the Shias consistently have been denied political power. Thus, although the Shias constituted more then 50 per cent of the population, they occupied a relatively insignificant number of government posts. On the economic level, aside from a small number of wealthy landowners and merchants, the Shias historically were exploited as sharecropping peasants or menially employed slum dwellers. Even the prosperity brought by the oil boom of the 1970s, only trickled down slowly to

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the Shias; however, beginning in the latter half of the 1970s, Saddam' s populist economic policies had a favourable impact on them, enabling many to join the ranks of a new Shia middle class. Widespread Shia demonstrations took place in Iraq in February 1977, when the government, suspecting a bomb, closed Karbala to pilgrimage at the height of a religious ceremony. Violent clashes between police and Shia pilgrims spread from Karbala to An Najaf and lasted for several days before army troops were called in to quell the unrest. It was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, however, that transformed Shia dissatisfaction with the Baath into an organised religiously based opposition. The Baath leadership feared that the success of Iran's Islamic Revolution would serve as an inspiration to Iraqi Shias. These fears escalated in July 1979, when riots broke out in An Najaf and in Karbala after the government had refused Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir as Sadr's request to lead a procession to Iran to congratulate Khomeini. Even more worrisome to the Baath was the discovery of a clandestine Shia group headed by religiOUS leaders having ties to Iran. Baqir as Sadr was the inspirational leader of the group, named Ad Dawah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah. He espoused a programme similar to Khomeini's, which called for a return to Islamic precepts of government and for social justice. Despite the Iraqi government's concern, the eruption ofthe 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran did not immediately destroy the IraqiIranian rapprochement that had prevailed since the 1975 Algiers Agreement. As a sign of Iraq's desire to maintain good relations with the new government in Tehran, President Bakr sent a personal message to Khomeini offering "his best wishes for the friendly Iranian people on the occasion of the establishment of the Islamic Republic." In addition, as late as the end of August 1979, Iraqi authorities extended an invitation to Mehdi Bazargan, the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to visit Iraq with the aim of improving bilateral relations. The fall of the moderate Bazargan government in late 1979, however, and the rise of Islamic militants preaching an expansionist foreign policy soured Iraqi-Iranian relations. The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in relations occurred during the spring of 1980. In April, the Iranian-

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supported Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after the failed grenade attack on Tariq Aziz, Ad Dawah was suspected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi leader, Minister of Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim. In response, the Iraqis immediately rounded up members and supporters of Ad Dawah and deported to Iran thousands of Shias of Iranian origin. In the summer of 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the executions of presumed Ad Dawah leader Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqr as Sadr and his sister. In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sector near Qasr-e Shirin, with an exchange of artillery fire by both sides. A few weeks later, Saddam Hussein officially abrogated the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran and announced that the Shatt alArab was returning to Iraqi sovereignty. Iran rejected this action and hostilities escalated as the two sides exchanged bombing raids deep into each other's territory. Finally, on September 23, Iraqi troops marched into Iranian territory, beginning what was to be.a protracted and extremely costly war. The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to severe economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, just another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict that had been fuelled by twentieth-century border disputes. Many observers, however, believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based on ambition and a sense of vulnerability. Saddam Hussein, despite having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi nation-state, feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geo-strategic vulnerabilities-Iraq's minimal access to the Persian Gulf, for example. In this respect, Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran has historical precedent; the ancient rulers of Mesopotamia, fearing internal strife and foreign conquest, also engaged in frequent battles with the peoples of the highlands.

Anfa) Campaign against Kurds This is a narrative account of a campaign of extermination against the Kurds of northern Iraq. It is the product of over a year and a half of research, during which a team of Middle East Watch

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researchers ~ve analysed several tons of captured Iraqi government documents and carried out field interviews with more than 350 witnesses, most of them survivors of the 1988 campaign known as Anfal. It concludes that in that year the Iraqi regime committed the crime of genocide. Anfal-"the Spoils"-is the name of the eighth sura of the Koran. It is also the name given by the Iraqis to a series of military actions, which lasted from February 23 until September 6, 1988. While it is impossible to understand the Anfal campaign without reference to the final phase of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal was not merely a function of that war. Rather, the winding-up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the immediate historical circumstance that gave Baghdad the opportunity to bring to a climax its long-standing efforts to bring the Kurds to heel. For, the Iraqi regime's anti-Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or more, well before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. Anfal was also the most vivid expression of the "special powers" granted to Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin of President Saddam Hussein and secretary general of the Northern Bureau of Iraq's Baath Arab Socialist Party. From March 29, 1987 until April 23, 1989, al-Majid was granted power that was equivalent, in Northern Iraq, tc? that of the President himself, with authority over all agencies of the state. Al-Majid, who is known to this day to Kurds as ''Ali Anfal" or ''Ali Chemical," was the overlord of the Kurdish genocide. Under his command, the central actors in Anfal were the Arst and Fifth Corps of the regular Iraqi Army, the General Security Directorate (Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Ameh) and Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat). The pro-government Kurdish militia known as the National Defence Battalions, or jahsh, assisted in important auxiliary tasks. But the integrated resources of the entire military, security and civilian apparatus of the Iraqi state were deployed, in al-Majid's words, "to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs." The campaigns of 1987-1989 were characterised by the following gross violations of human rights: • mass summary executions and mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of non-combatants, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire population of villages;

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• the widespread use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, against the town of Halabja as well as dozens of Kurdish villages, killing many thousands of people, mainly women and children; • the wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, which are described in government documents as having been "burned," "destroyed," "demolished" and "purified," as well as at least a dozen larger towns and administrative centres (nahyas and qadhas);

• the wholesale destruction of civilian objects by Army engineers, including all schools, mosques, wells and other non-residential structures in the targeted villages, and a number of electricity substations; • looting of civilian property and farm animals on a vast scale by army troops and pro-government militia; • arbitrary arrest of all villagers captured in designated "prohibited areas" (manateq al-mahdoureh), despite the fact that these were their own homes and lands; • arbitrary jailing and warehousing for months, in conditions of extreme deprivation, of tens of thousands of women, children and elderly people, without judicial order or any cause other than their presumed sympathies for the Kurdish opposition. Many hundreds of them were allowed to die of malnutrition and disease; • forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers upon the demolition of their homes, their release from jail or return from exile; these civilians were trucked into areas of Kurdistan far from their homes and dumped there by the army with only minimal governmental compensation or none at all for their destroyed property, or any provision for relief, housing, clothing or food, and forbidden to return to their villages of origin on pain of death. In these conditions, many died within a year of their forced displacement; • destruction of the rural Kurdish economy and infrastructure. Like Nazi Germany, the Iraqi regime concealed its actions in euphemisms. Where Nazi officials spoke of "executive measures," "special actions" and "resettlement in the east," Baathist bureaucrats

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spoke of "collective measures," "return to the national ranks" and "resettlement in the south." But beneath the euphemisms, Iraq's crimes against the Kurds amount to genocide, the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. The campaigns of 1987-1989 are rooted deep in the history of the Iraqi Kurds. Since the earliest days of Iraqi independence, the country's Kurds-who today number more than four million-have fought either for independence or for meaningful autonomy. But they have never achieved the results they desired. In 1970, the Baath Party, anxious to secure its precarious hold on power, did offer the Kurds a considerable measure of self-rule, far greater than that allowed in neighbouring Syria, Iran or Turkey. But the regime defined the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in such a way as deliberately to exclude the vast oil wealth that lies beneath the fringes of the Kurdish lands. The Autonomous Region, rejected by the Kurds and imposed unilaterally by Baghdad in 1974, comprised the three northern govern orates of Erbil, Suleimaniyeh and Dohuk. Covering some 14,000 square miles-roughly the combined area of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island-this was only half the territory that the Kurds considered rightfully theirs. Even so, the Autonomous Region had real economic significance, since it accounted for fully half the agricultural output of a largely desert country that is sorely deficient in domestic food production. In the wake of the autonomy decree, the Baath Party embarked on the ''Arabisation'' of the oil-producing areas of Kirkuk and Khanaqin and other parts of the north, evicting Kurdish farmers and replacing them with poor Arab tribesmen from the south. Northern Iraq did not remain at peace for long. In 1974, the long-simmering Kurdish revolt flared up once more under the leadership of the legendary fighter Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who was supported this time by the governments of Iran, Israel, and the United States. But the revolt collapsed precipitately in 1975, when Iraq and Iran concluded a border agreement and the Shah withdrew his support from Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KOP). After the KOP fled into Iran, tens of thousands of villagers from the Barzani tribe were forcibly removed from their homes and relocated to barren sites in the desert south of Iraq. Here, without any form of assistance, they had to rebuild their lives from scratch.

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In the mid and late 1970s, the regime again moved against the Kurds, forcibly evacuating at least a quarter of a million people from Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey, destroying their villages to create a cordon sanitaire along these sensitive frontiers. Most of the displaced Kurds were relocated into mujammaat, crude new settlements located on the main highways in army-controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The word literally means "amalgamations" or "collectivities." In their propaganda, the Iraqis commonly refer to them as "modern villages"; in this report, they are generally described as "complexes." Until 1987, villagers relocated to the complexes were generally paid some nominal cash compensation, but were forbidden to move back to their homes. After 1980, and the beginning of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, many Iraqi garrisons in Kurdistan were abandoned or reduced in size, and their troops transferred to the front. In the vacuum that was left, the Kurdish peshmerga-"those who face death" -once more began to thrive. The KOp, now led by one of Barzani's sons, Masud, had revived its alliance with Teheran, and in 1983 KOP units aided Iranian troops in their capture of the border town of Haj Omran. Retribution was swift: in a lightning operation against the complexes that housed the relocated Barzanis, Iraqi troops abducted between five and eight thousand males aged twelve or over. None of them have ever been seen again, and it is believed that after being held prisoner for several months, they were all killed. In many respects, the 1983 Barzani operation foreshadowed the techniques that would be used on a much larger scale during the Anfal campaign. And the absence of any international outcry over this act of mass murder, despite Kurdish efforts to press the matter with the United Nations and Western governments, must have emboldened Baghdad to believe that it could get away with an even larger operation without any adverse reaction. In these calculations, the Baath Party was correct. Even more worrisome to Baghdad was the growing closeness between the Iranians and the KOP's major Kurdish rival, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Baath regime had conducted more than a year of negotiations with the PUK between 1983-1985, but in the end these talks failed to bear fruit, and full-scale fighting resumed. In late 1986, Talabani's party concluded a formal political and military agreement with Teheran.

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By this time the Iraqi regime's authority over the North had dwindled to control of the cities, towns, complexes and main highways. Elsewhere, the peshmerga forces could rely on a deep-rooted base of local support. Seeking refuge from the army, thousands of Kurdish draft-dodgers and deserters found new homes in the countryside. Villagers learned to live with a harsh economic blockade and stringent food rationing, punctuated by artillery shelling, aerial bombardment and punitive forays by the Army and the paramilitary jahsh. In response, the rural Kurds built air-raid shelters in front of their homes and spent much of their time in hiding in the caves and ravines that honeycomb the northern Iraqi countryside. For all the grimness of this existence, by 1987 the mountainous interior of Iraqi Kurdistan was effectively liberated territory. This the Baath Party regarded as an intolerable situation. In the first three months after assuming his post as secretary general of the Baath Party's Northern Bureau, Ali Hasan al-Majid began the process of definition of the group that would be targeted by Anfal, and vastly expanded the range of repressive activities against all rural Kurds. He decreed that "saboteurs" would lose their property rights, suspended the legal rights of all the residents of prohibited villages, and began ordering the execution of first-degree relatives of "saboteurs" and of wounded civilians whose hostility to the regime had been determined by the intelligence services. In June 1987, al-Majid issued two successive sets of standing orders that were to govern the conduct of the security forces through the Anfal campaign and beyond. These orders were based on the simple axiom on which the regime now operated: in the "prohibited" rural areas, all resident Kurds were co-terminous with the peshmerga insurgents, and they would be dealt with accordingly. The first of al-Majid's directives bans all human existence in the prohibited areas, to be applied through a shoot-to-kill policy. The second, numbered SF/4008, dated June 20, 1987, modifies and expands upon these orders. It constitutes a bald incitement to mass murder, spelled out in the most chilling detail. In clause 4, army commanders are ordered "to carry out random bombardments, using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all times of the day or night, in order to kill the largest number of persons present in these prohibited zones." In clause 5, al-Majid orders that, ''All persons captured in

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those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified." Even as this legal and bureaucratic structure was being set in place, the Iraqi regime became the first in history to attack its own civilian population with chemical weapons. On April 15, 1987, Iraqi aircraft dropped poison gas on the KDP headquarters at Zewa Shkan, close to the Turkish border in Dohuk governorate, and the PUK headquarters in the twin villages of Sergalou and Bergalou, in the governorate of Suleimaniyeh. The following afternoon, they dropped chemicals on the undefended civilian villages of Sheikh Wasan and Balisan, killing well over a hundred people, most of them women and children. Scores of other victims of the attack were abducted from their hospital beds in the city of Erbil, where they had been taken for treatment of their burns and blindness. They have never , been seen again. These incidents were the first of at least forty documented chemical attacks on Kurdish targets over the succeeding eighteen months. They were also the first sign of the regime's new readiness to kill large numbers of Kurdish women and children indiscriminately. Within a week of the mid-April chemical weapons attacks, Al-Majid's forces were ready to embark upon what he described as a three-stage programme of village clearances or collectivisation. The first ran from April 21 to May 20; the second from May 21 to June 20. More than 700 villages were burned and bulldozed, most of them along the main highways in government-controlled areas. The third phase of the operation, however, was suspended; with Iraqi forces still committed to the war front, the resources required for such a huge operation were not available. But the goals of the third stage would eventually be accomplished by Anfal. In terms of defining the target group for destruction, no single administrative step was more important to the Iraqi regime than the national census of October 17, 1987. Now that the springtime village clearances had created a virtual buffer strip between the government and the peshmerga-controlled zones, the Baath Party offered the inhabitants of the prohibited areas an ultimatum: either they could "return to the national ranks" -in other words, abandon their homes

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and livelihoods and accept compulsory relocation in a squalid camp under the eye of the security forces; or they could lose their Iraqi citizenship and be regarded as military deserters. The second option was tantamount to a death sentence, since the census legislation made those who refused to be counted subject to an August 1987 decree of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, imposing the death penalty on deserters. In the period leading up to the census, al-Majid refined the target group further. He ordered his intel1igence officials to prepare detailed case-by-case dossiers of "saboteurs'" families who were still living in the government-control1ed areas. When these dossiers were complete, countless women, children and elderly people were forcibly transferred to the rural areas to share the fate of their peshmerga relatives. This case-by-case, family-byfamily sifting of the population was to become a characteristic feature of the decisions made during the Anfal period about who should live and who should die. Last, but not without significance, the census gave those who registered only two alternatives when it came to declaring their nationality. One could either be Arab or Kurdish-a stipUlation that was to have the direst consequences for other minority groups, such as the Yezidis, Assyrians and Chaldean Christians who continued to live in the Kurdish areas. The Anfal campaign began four months after the census, with a massive military assault on the PUK headquarters at Sergalou-Bergalou on the night of February 23, 1988. Anfal·would have eight stages in al1, seven of them directed at areas under the control of the PUK. The KDP-control1ed areas in the north-west of Iraqi Kurdistan, which the regime regarded as a lesser threat, were the target of the Final Anfal operation in late August and early September, 1988. The Iraqi authorities did nothing to hide the campaign from public view. On the contrary, as each phase of the operation triumphed, its successes were trumpeted with the same propaganda fanfare that attended the victorious battles in the Iran-Iraq War. Even today, Anfal is celebrated in the official Iraqi media. The fifth anniversary in 1993 of the fall of Sergalou and Bergalou on March 19, 1988 was the subject of banner headlines. Iraqi troops tore through rural Kurdistan with the motion of a gigantic windshield wiper, sweeping first clockwise, then counter-clockwise, through one after another of the "prohibited

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areas." The First Anfal, centred on the siege of the PUK headquarters, took more than three weeks. Subseq uent phases of the campai gn were generally shorter, with a brief pause between each as army units moved on to the next target. The Second Anfal, in the Qara Dagh region, lasted from March 22 to April 1, 1988; the Third, covering the hilly plain known as Germian, took from April 7 to April 20; the Fourth, in the valley of the Lesser Zab river, was the shortest of all, lasting only from May 3 to May 8. Only in the Fifth Anfal, which began on May 15 in the mountainous region northeast of Erbil, did the troops have any real difficulty in meeting their objectives. Encountering fierce resistance in difficult terrain from the last of the PUK peshmerga, the regime called a temporary halt to the offensive on June 7. On orders from the Office of the Presidency (indicating the person al supervisory role that Saddam Hussein himself played in Anfal), the operation was renewed twice in July and August, with these actions denom inated Anfal VI and Anfal VII. Eventually, on August 26, the last PUK-controlled area was declared, "Cleansed of saboteurs." By this time, Iran had accepted Iraq's terms for a cease-fire to end the war, freeing up large numbers of Iraqi troops to carry the Anfal operati on into the Badina n area of northern Iraqi Kurdistan. The Final Anfal began at first light on August 25, and was over in a matter of days. On Septem ber 6, 1988, the Iraqi regime made its de facto declaration of victory by announ cing a general amnest y for all Kurds. Each stage of Anfal followed roughly the same pattern. It characteristically began with chemical attacks from the air on both civilian and peshmerga targets, accompanied by a military blitz against PUK or KDP military bases and fortified positions. The deadly cocktail of mustard and nerve gases was much more lethal against civilians than against the peshmerga, some of whom had acquired gas masks and other rudimentary defences. In the village of Sayw Senan (Second Anfal), more than eighty civilians died; in Goktap a (Fourth Anfal), the death toll was more than 150; in Wara (Fifth Anfal) it was thirty seven. In the largest chemical attack of all, the March 16 bombin g of the Kurdish town of Halabja, between 3,200 and 5,000 residents died. As a city, Halabja was not technically part of Anfal- the raid was carried out in reprisal for its capture by peshme rga suppor ted by Iranian Revolutionary Guard s-but it was very much part of the Kurdish genocide.

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After the initial assault, ground troops and jahsh envelo ped the target area from all sides, destroying all human habitation in their path, looting househ old possessions and farm animals and setting fire to homes, before calling in demolition crews to finish the job. As the destru ction procee ded, so did Hilber g's phase of the "concentration" or "seizure" of the target group. Convoys of army trucks stood by to transport the vi11agers to nearby holding centres and transit camps, while the jahsh combe d the hi11sides to track down anyone who had escape d (Some members of the militia, an asset of dubious reliability to the regime, also saved thousan ds of lives by spiriting people away to safety or helping them across army lines.). Secret police combe d the towns, cities and complexes to hunt down Anfal fugitives, and in several cases lured them out of hiding with false offers of amnesty and a "return to the national ranks" -a promise that now concea led a more sinister meaning. To this point, Anfal had many of the characteristics of a counterinsurgency campaign, albeit an unusually savage one. And capture d Iraqi docum ents suggest that during the initial comba t phase, counterinsurgency goals were upperm ost in the minds of the troops and their comma nding officers. To be sure, Iraq-li ke any other soverei gn nation -had legitimate interests in comba ting insurgency. But the fact that Anfal was, by the narrowest definition, a counterinsurgency, does nothing to diminish the fact that it was also an act of genocide. There is nothing mutual\y exclusive about counterinsurgency and genocide. Indeed, one may be the instrument used to consum mate the other. Article I of the Genocide Convention affirms, "genocide, whethe r committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law." Summarily, executing non-co mbatan t or captured members of an ethnical-national group as such is not a legitimate wartime or counterinsurgency measure, regardless of the nature of the conflict. In addition to this argume nt of principle, many features of Anfal far transcend the realm of counterinsurgency. These include, first of all, the simple facts of what happen ed after the military goals of the operati on had been accomplished: • the mass murder and disappe arance of many tens of thousa nds of non-combatants-50,OOO by the most conservative estimate, and possibly twice that number;

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• the use of chemical weapon s against non-combatants in dozens of locations, killing thousands and terrifying many more into abando ning their homes; • the near-total destruction of family and community assets and infrastructure, including the entire agricultural mainstay of the rural Kurdish economy; • the literal abando nment, in punishing conditions, of thousan ds of women, children an'd elderly people, resulting in the deaths of many hundreds. Those who survived did so largely due to the clandestine help of nearby Kurdish townspeople. Second , there is the matter of how Anfal was organised as a bureaucratic enterprise. Viewed as a counterinsurgency, each episode of Anfal had a distinct beginning and an end, and its conduc t was in the hands of the regular army and the jahsh militia. But these agencies were qUickly phased out of the picture, and the capture d civilians were transferred to an entirely separat e bureau cracy for processing and final disposal. Separa te institutions were involv edsuch as Amn, /stikhbarat, the Popular Army (a type of home guard) and the Baath Party itself. And the infrastructure of prison camps and death convoys was physically remote from the comba t theatre, lying well outside the Kurdistan Autonomous Region. Tellingly, the killings were not in any sense concurrent with the counterinsurgency: the detainees were murder ed several days or even weeks after the armed forces had secured their goals. Finally, there is the question of intent, which goes to the heart of the notion of genocide. Docum entary materials capture d from the Iraqi intelligence agencies demon strate with great clarity that the mass killings, disappe arances and forced re-locations associated with Anfal and the other anti-Kurdish campaigns of 1987-1 989 were planne d in coherent fashion. While power over these campaigns was highly centralised, their success depend ed on the orchestration of the efforts of a large numbe r of agencies and institutions at the local, regional and national level, from the Office of the Presidency of the Republic on down to the lowliest jahsh unit. The official at the centre of this great bureaucratic web, of course, was AIi Hasan al-Majid, and in him the question of intent is appare nt on a second , extremely important level. A numbe r of audio-t apes were made of meetings between al-Majid and his aides from 1987 to 1989. Four indepe ndent experts, to establish their authenticity and

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to confirm that the principal speake r was al-Majid, examin ed these tapes. Al-Majid was known to have a distinctive, high-pitched voice and the regional accent of his Tikrit district origins; those Iraqis consulted by Middle East Watch recognised both these features without hesitation. As a public figure who frequently appear s on radio and television in Iraq, his voice is well known to many Iraqis. One Iraqi consulted on this subject pointed out that the principal speake r on the many hours of recordings in Middle East Watch's possession spoke with authority and used obscene language. In contrast, he said: "Others in those meetings were courteous and respectful with fearful tones, especially when they addressed al-Majid himself." Al-Majid, two experts noted, was often referred to by his familiar nickname, ''l\bu Hasan. " The tapes contain evidence of a bitter racial animus against the Kurds on the part of the man who, above any other, plotted their destruction. "Why should I let them live there like donkeys who don't know anything?" Al-Majid asks in one meeting. "What did we ever get from them?" On anothe r occasion, speaking in the same vein: "I said probab ly we will find some good ones among [the Kurdsl ... but we didn't, never." And elsewhere, "I will smash their heads. These kind of dogs, we will crush their heads." And again, "Take good care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers." Loyalty to the regime offered no protection from al-Majid's campai gns. Nor did membe rship in the pro-go vernme nt jahsh. Al-Majid even boasted of threatening militia leaders with chemical weapon s if they refused to evacua te their villages. Ethnicity and physical location were all that mattered, and these factors becam e co-terminous when the mass killings took place in 1988. The 1987 village clearances were wholly directed at governmentcontrol led areas, and thus had nothing whatev er to do with counterinsurgency. If the former residents of these areas refused to accept government-assigned housing in a mujammaa, and took refuge instead in a peshmerga-controlled area-a s many did-th ey too were liable to be killed during Anfal. The same applied to other smaller minorities. In the October 1987 census, many Assyrian and Chalde an Christ ians-an Aramaic-speaking people of ancient origin- refused the govern ment's deman ds that they designate themselves either as Arabs or Kurds. Those who declined to be Arabs were automatically

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treated as Kurds. And, during the Final Anfal in Dohuk governorate, where r1lQst Christians were concentrated, they were in fact dealt with by the regime even more severely than their Kurdish neighbours. Those few Turkomans, a Turkic-speaking minority, who fought with the Kurdish peshmerga were not spared, because they too were deemed to have become Kurds. Almost continuously for the previous two decades, the Baathled government had engaged in a campaign of Arabisation of Kurdish regions. The armed resistance this inspired was Kurdish in character and composition. In 1988, the rebels and all those deemed to be sympathisers were therefore treated as Kurds who had to be wiped out, once and for all. Whether they were combatants or not were immaterial; as far as the government was concerned they were all "bad Kurds" , who had not come over to the side of the government. To pursue Hilberg's paradigm a little further, once the concentration and seizure was complete, the annihilation could begin. The target group had already been defined with care. Now came the definition of the second, concentric circle within the group: those who were actually to be killed. At one level, this was a straightforward matter. Under the terms of Al-Majid's June 1987 directives, death was the automatic penalty for any male of an age to bear arms who was found in an Anfal area. At the same time, no one was supposed to go before an Anfal firing squad without first having his or her case individually examined. There is a great deal of documentary evidence to support this view, beginning with a presidential order of October 15, 1987-two days before the census-that "the names of persons who are to be subjected to a general!blanket judgment must not be listed collectively. Rather, refer to them or treat them in your correspondence on an individual basis." The effects of this order are reflected in the lists that the Army and Amn compiled of Kurds arrested during Anfal, which note each person's name, sex, age, place of residence and place of capture. The processing of the detainees took place in a network of camps and prisons. The first temporary holding centres were in operation, under the control of military intelligence as early as March 15, 1988; by about the end of that month, the mass disappearances had begun in earnest, peaking in mid-April and early May. Most of the detainees went to a place called Topzawa, a Popular Army camp on the

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outskirts of Kirkuk-the city where Ali Hasan al-Majid had his headquarters. Some went to the Popular Army barracks in Tikrit. Women and children were trucked on from Topzawa to a separate camp in the town of Dibs; between 6,000 and 8,000 elderly detainees were taken to the abandoned prison of Nugra Salman in the southern desert, where hundreds of them died of neglect, starvation and disease. Badinan prisoners from the Final Anfal went through a separate but parallel system, with most being detained in the huge army fort at Dohuk and the women and children being transferred later to a prison camp in Salamiyeh on the Tigris River close to Mosul. The majority of the women, children and elderly people were released from the camps after the September 6 amnesty. But none of the Anfal men were released. Middle East Watch's presumption, based on the testimony of a number of survivors from the Third and bloodiest Anfal, is that they went in large groups before firing squads and were interred secretly outside the Kurdish areas. During the Final Anfal in Badinan, in at least two cases military officers carrying out instructions from their commanders executed groups of men on the spot after capture. The locations of at least three mass gravesites have been pinpointed through the testimony of survivors. One is near the north bank of the Euphrates River, close to the town of Ramadi and adjacent to a complex housing Iranian Kurds forcibly displaced in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War. Another is in the vicinity of the archaeological site of Al-Hadhar (Hatra), south of Mosul. A third is in the desert outside the town of Samawah. At least two other mass graves are believed to exist on Hamrin Mountain, one between Kirkuk and Tikrit and the other west of Tuz Khurmatu. While the camp system is evocative of one dimension of the Nazi genocide, the range of execution methods described by Kurdish survivors is uncannily reminiscent of another-the activities of the Einsatzkommandos, or mobile killing units, in the Nazi-occupied lands of Eastern Europe. Each of the standard operating techniques used by the Einsatzkommandos is documented in the Kurdish case. Some groups oi prisoners were lined up, shot from the front and dragged into pre-dug mass graves; others were shoved roughly into trenches and machinegunned where they stood; others were made to lie down in pairs, sardine-style, next to mounds of fresh corpses, before being killed; others were tied together, made to stand on the

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lip of the pit, and shot in the back so that they would fall forward into it-~method that was presumably more efficient from the point of view of the killers. Bulldozers then pushed earth or sand loosely over the heaps of corpses. Some of the gravesites contained dozens of separate pits, and obviously contained the bodies of thousands of victims. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the executioners were uniformed members of the Baath Party, or perhaps of Iraq's General Security Directorate (Amn). By the most conservative estimates, 50,000 rural Kurds died during Anfal. While males from approximately fourteen to fifty were routinely killed en masse, a number of questions surround the selection criteria that were used to order the murder of younger children and entire families. Many thousands of women and children perished, but subject to extreme regional variations, with most being residents of two distinct "clusters" that were affected by the Third and Fourth Anfals. Abuses by zealous local field commanders may explain why women and children were rounded up, rather than being allowed to slip away. But they cannot adequately explain the later patterns of disappearance, since the detainees were promptly transferred alive out of army custody, segregated from their husbands and fathers in processing centres elsewhere, and then killed in cold blood after a period in detention. The place of surrender, more than place of residence, seems to have been one consideration in deciding who lived and who died. Amn documents indicate that another factor may have been whether the troops encountered armed resistance in a given area-which indeed was the case in most, but not all, of the areas marked by the killing of women and children. A third criterion may have been the perceived "political stance" of detainees, although it is hard to see how this could have been applied to children. Whatever the precise reasons, it is clear from captured Iraqi documents that the intelligence agencies scrutinised at least some cases individually, and even appealed to the highest authority if they were in doubt about the fate of a particular individual. This suggests that the annihilation process was governed, at least in principle, by rigid bureaucratic norms. But all the evidence suggests that the purpose of these norms was not to rule on a particular person's guilt or innocence of specific charges, but merely to establish whether an individual belonged to the target group that was to be ''Anfalised,''

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i. e., Kurds in areas outside government control. At the same time, survivor testimony repeatedly indicates that the rulebook was only adhered to casually in practice. The physical segregation of detainees from Anfal areas by age and sex, as well as the selection of those to be exterminated, was a crude affair, conducted without any meaningful prior process of interrogation or evaluation.

Although Anfal as a military campaign ended with the general amnesty of September 6, 1988, its logic did not. Those who were released from prisons such as Nugra Salman, Dibs and Salamiyeh, as well as those who returned from exile under the amnesty, were relocated to complexes with no compensation and no means of support. Civilians who tried to help them were hunted down by Amn. The mujammaat that awaited the survivors of the Final Anfal in Badinan were places of residence in name alone; the Anfalakan were merely dumped on the barren earth of the Erbil plain with no infrastructure other than a perimeter fence and military guard towers. Here, hundreds perished from disease, exposure, hunger or malnutrition, and the after-effects of exposure to chemical weapons. Several hundreds more-non-Muslim Yezidis, Assyrians and Chaldeans, including many women and children-were abducted from the camps and disappeared, collateral victims of the Kurdish genocide. Their particular crime was to have remained in the prohibited majority Kurdish areas after community leaders declined to accept the regime's classification of them as Arabs in the 1987 census. The regime had no intention of allowing the amnestied Kurds to exercise their full civil rights as Iraqi citizens. They were to be deprived of political rights and employment opportunities until Amn certified their loyalty to the regime. They were to sign written pledges that they would remain in the mujammaat to which they had been assigned-on pain of death. They were to understand that the prohibited areas remained off limits and were often sown with landmines to discourt:'ge resettlement; directive SF/4008, and in particular clause 5, with its order to kill all adult males, would remain in force and would be carried out to the latter. Arrests and executions continued, some of the latter even involving prisoners who were alive, in detention, at the time of the amnesty. Middle East Watch has documented three cases of mass executions in late 1988; in one of them, 180 people were put to death. Documents from one local

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branch of Amn list another eighty-seven executions in the first eight months of 1989, one of them a man accused of "teaching the Kurdish language in Latin script." The few hundred Kurdish villages that had come through Anfal unscathed as a result of their pro-government sympathies had no guarantees of lasting survival, and dozens more were burned and bulldozed in late 1988 and 1989. Army engineers even destroyed the large Kurdish town of Qala Dizeh (population 70,000) and declared its environs a "prohibited area," removing the last significant population centre close to the Iranian border. Killing, torture and scorched-earth policies continued, in other words, to be a matter of daily routine in Iraqi Kurdistan, as they always had been under the rule of the Baath Arab Socialist Party. But the Kurdish problem, in Al-Majid's words, had been solved; the "saboteurs" had been slaughtered. Since 1975, some 4,000 Kurdish villages had been destroyed; at least 50,000 rural Kurds had died in Anfal alone, and very possibly twice that number; half of Iraq's productive farmland had been laid waste. All told, the total number of Kurds killed over the decade since the Barzani men were taken from their homes is well into six figures. By April 23, 1989, the Baath Party felt that it had accomplished its goals, for on that date it revoked the special powers that had been granted to AIi Hasan al-Majid two years earlier. At a ceremony to greet his successor, the supreme commander of Anfal made it clear that "the exceptional situation is over." To use the language of the Genocide Convention, the regime's aim had been to destroy the group (Iraqi Kurds) in part, and it had done so. Intent and act had been combined, resulting in the consummated crime of genocide. And with this, AIi Hasan al-Majid was free to move on to other tasks demanding his special talentsfirst as governor of occupied Kuwait and, then, in 1993, as Iraq's Minister of Defence.

Road to Democracy The Iraqi people have voted. Despite very real danger and threats, millions demonstrated their deep interest in deciding their own destiny and their fervent hope in Iraq's future. Despite inexperience and an ongoing violent insurgency, these were, without a doubt, the most free and transparent elections in Iraq's long history.

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Multinational Forces in Iraq and the US Embassy in Baghdad energetically supported the Iraqis, as did much of the international community, and we are proud of these efforts. Although American diplomats and soldiers worked together with Iraqis to assist in making this electoral process a success, this is ultimately and uniquely a triumph of the Iraqi people-of Iraqi policemen and soldiers, of election workers, of political activists and journalists, of the interim government, and of the millions of voters voting for the first time in an election where their opinions and cherished dreams counted for something. This was an Iraqi victory, after many decades of bitter suffering, in, which the entire world should rejoice and whose outcome all should respect. This election is not the end of the Iraqi democratic process but the beginning. Iraq's new leaders, chosen by the people, will now commence the nuts and bolts work of daily political life anywhere in the world: compromise, trade-offs, coalition-building, heated arguments, and long-winded debate. Iraqi political leaders will reach out to political opponents as they wrestle to fashion a new constitution, which must be supple enough to incorporate modern democratic values and also respect the hallowed and humane cultural and religious traditions of the Iraqi people. It must be a constitutional process, which has the whole-hearted participation and consultation of all of Iraq's communities. For the United States, the path in Iraq is equally clear: support the continuing development of Iraqi institutions-armed forces, police, civil society, courts, businesses. Help the Iraqi people come to their own decisions about their own future and to find Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems. Watch as this people of the Land Between the Two Rivers reclaim their greatness and take their rightful place as a respected member of the world community. Strategy for Progress

The war in Iraq is far from a mission accomplished. Today, Iraq faces a crisis with grave implications for its national security and the future of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration's mismanagement of post-war Iraq has left the United States unprepared for the instability that continues to grow. America is standing virtually alone in confronting a counter-insurgency struggle with no clear end in sight. The United States can still succeed in Iraq and fulfil its commitments

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to the Iraqi people, but it will require a plan-one that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transition. The record is all too clear. The Bush Administration's intolerance of dissent has left America without enough allies to share the burden of funds and forces. The White House and the Pentagon wilfully ignored the recent history of post-conflict experience and the specific warnings of the State Department. The Administration invested authority in a group of exiles and gave American companies a monopoly on contracts to rebuild Iraq. And it has insisted on absolute control, leaving the United States unaided by the wisdom, insights and engagement of the Iraqi people and the international community. By fOCUSing almost exclusively on military force as the primary means of social transformation and on Baghdad as the geographical engine of political change, the United States failed to wage a parallel campaign to win the consent of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration also failed to use America's economic and diplomatic resources to generate widespread popular support for and engagement in the process of moving Iraq from its autocratic past and towards a democratic future. The net result is that America is unable to guarantee security for the Iraqi people. Coalition forces have little control of major urban centres such as Fallujah and Najaf. Insurgents, terrorists and criminals have significantly slowed major elements of the reconstruction effort. Three years after the invasion, too many IraqiS have yet to see a material improvement in their lives. Getting out of the mess created by the Bush Administration will certainly prove more difficult than getting into it. We have four options. The first option is to maintain the current course, and essentially keep going it alone without a real strategy, continuing to ignore the facts on the ground. This inevitably means dispatching more American troops and further burdening American taxpayers-without an exit strategy. Absent either political credibility or a plan, the United States would be forced to rely increasingly on the military, alienating the now fractured "Coalition of the Willing." This is the option preferred by President Bush, who continues to see the current difficulties in Iraq as a speed bump on the road to democracy. The second option is to withdraw US troops following the June 30 hand over to a

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yet-to-be-named Iraqi institution. This course of action would ease the burden on the budget and our overstretched military. But it would likely bring about one of three unpalatable scenarios: the ascendance of a hard-line government hostile to the United States; the rise of sub-regional warlordism within Iraq; or the opening of Iraqi borders to the free movement of terrorists and criminals. It would also devastate America's reputation around the world as a nation that makes good on its commitments. A third option-and one that is gaining increasing currency in Washington-is to "internationalise" the Iraq operation by bringing in the United Nations, NATO and more troop-contributing nations. Clearly, it would be desirable to reduce the burden on the United States while at the same time showing an international face to an Iraqi populace grown wary of the American occupation. But there are several daunting obstacles. Current trends are running against internationalisation Spain, Honduras and the Dominican Republic have pulled out of the coalition and others have indicated they may depart shortly. The Administration having dismissed the concerns of other nations and excluded non-coalition members from the reconstruction effort has already drained its capital with the international community. The horrific pictures of abuse and humiliation at the Abu Ghraib prison have only made things worse. This leads to a fourth option, one that contains several items unfamiliar to or rejected by the current White House. This plan relies on a strategic vision, the strength to concede mistakes and make mid-course corrections, and an ability to recognise stark reality. This Strategy for Progress is based on providing the assurances us allies need about security and the overall management of Iraq's transition in order to overcome their reluctance to participate. At this stage of the game, it was not possible to layout a strategy that would guarantee a stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq, or even won and sustained the peace. The Bush Administration's gross mismanagement of post-war Iraq leaves it without the option of chOOSing good policies over bad, or safe options over calculated risks. The first choice is between handing over responsibility for security o:!Xclusively and entirely to the Iraqis or, alternatively, striking an arrangement that allows the international community to compensate for the fragility of Iraq's nascent security forces. We believe the latter

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is the only and best option, not only to protect the Iraqi people but also to advance reconstruction. The second choice focuses on sovereignty. It was at best inaccurate and at worst disingenuous for the Bush Administration to suggest that Iraqis would control their destinies after June 30. The massive US and international troop presence in Iraq would continue to wield far greater power and authority than any interim caretaker government. There was no such thing as "partial sovereignty," however, and the most realistic option was to consider the period from July to elections next January as a transition from occupation to sovereignty-a concept already validated by UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. While some elements in Iraq might perceive this as an attempt by international powers to meddle in their internal affairs, the Bush Administration's failure to develop a responsible alternative to spiralling political chaos left no other realistic choice. Third and last, the United States must make a fundamental choice between maintaining exclusive control over Iraq's future and bearing the entire resource, troop and political burden or opening up the challenge to the advice and support of the international community. We believe the only viable option is to cede America's exclusive monopoly on Iraq in exchange for the engagement of our allies, Iraq's neighbours, the United Nations, and NATO. Given the current context, there are few ideal policy options. With so much at stake, we have no option but to think creatively, understanding that at the end of the day what is possible is primarily a function of political will.

Politics of Alliance In 1988, Iraq was no nearer to the goal of democracy than it had been when the Baath came to power in 1968. The establishment of "popular democracy" as a national objective remained essentially unfulfilled. Political activities were restricted to those defined by the Baath regime. The party, however, recognised that not all citizens would become party members, and it sought to provide a controlled forum for non-Baathist political participation. It created the Progressive National Front (PNF) in 1974 to ally the Baath with other political parties that were considered to be progressive. As a basis for this cooperation, President Bakr had proclaimed the National Action Charter in 1971. In presenting the charter for public discussion, the

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Baath had invited "all national and progressive forces and elements" to work for the objective of a "democratic, revolutionary, and unitary" Iraq by participating in the "broadest coalition among all the national, patriotic, and progressive forces." The Iraqi Communist Party OCP) was one of the important political groups that the Baathists wanted involved in the PNE Discussions between the Baath and the ICP took place periodically over three years before the latter was induced to join the PNF in 1974. For Baath leaders, the PNF was a means of containing potential opposition to their policies on the part of the ICP. Although the ICP was too small to pose a serious armed challenge to the Baath, it was regarded as a major ideological rival. The ICP's roots were as deep as those of the Baath, because Iraqi Marxists had formed the former party in the 1930s. Like the Baath, the ICP was an elitist party that advocated socialist programmes to benefit the masses and that appealed primarily to intellectuals. Despite these similarities, there had been a long history of antagonism between the two parties. Baathists tended to suspect the Communists of ultimate loyalty to a foreign power, the Soviet Union, rather than to the Arab nation, even though the Baathists themselves regarded the Soviet Union as a friendly and progressive state after 1968. In return for participation in the PNF, the ICP was permitted to nominate its own members for some minor cabinet posts and to carry on political and propaganda activities openly. The ICP had to agree, however, not to recruit among the armed forces and to accept Baath domination of the RCC. The ICP also recognised the Baath Party's "privileged" or leading role in the PNF: of the sixteen-member High Council that was formed to direct the PNF, eight positions were reserved for the Baath, five for other progressive parties, and only three for the Communists. The ICP also agreed not to undertake any activities that would contravene the letter or spirit of the National Action Charter. The ICP might have hoped that the PNF would gradually evolve into a genuine power-sharing arrangement. If so, these expectations were not realised. The Baath members of the High Council dominated the PNF, while the party retained a firm grip over government decision-making. By 1975, friction had developed between the ICP and the Baath. During the next two years, at least twenty individual

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ICP members were arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison for allegedly attempting to organise Communist cells within the army in contravention of the specific ban on such activities. The April 1978 Marxist coup d'etat in Afghanistan seemed to serve as a catalyst for a wholesale assault on the ICP. Convicted communists were retried, and twenty-one of them were executed; there were virulent attacks on the ICP in the Baathist press; and scores of party members and sympathisers were arrested. The ICP complained, to no apparent avail, that Communists were being purged from government jobs, arrested, and tortured in prisons. By April 1979, those principal ICP leaders who had not been arrested had either fled the country or had gone underground. In 1980, the ICP formally withdrew from the PNF and announced the formation of a new political front to oppose the Baath government. Then onwards, however, ICP activities against the Baathists were largely limited to a propaganda campaign. The various Kurdish political parties were the other main focus of Baath attention for PNF membership. Three seats on the PNF were reserved for the Kurds, and initially the Baath intended that nominees fill these from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP), the oldest and largest Kurdish party. By the time the PNF was established in 1974, however, the KOP was already involved in hostilities against the government. The KOp, which originally had been formed in 1946 in Iran where Mullah Mustafa Barzani and other party co-founders had fled following the collapse of a 1945 revolt, was suspicious of the Baath's ultimate intentions with respect to self-rule for the Kurdish region. Even though Barzani himself had negotiated the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with Saddam Hussein, he rejected Baghdad's March 1974 terms for implementing autonomy. Subsequently, full-scale warfare erupted between central government forces and KOP-organised fighters, the latter receiving military supplies covertly from Iran and from the United States. The Kurdish rebellion collapsed in March 1975, after Iran reached a rapprochement with the Baath regime and withdrew all support from the Kurds. The KDP leaders and several thousand fighters sought and obtained refuge in Iran. Barzani eventually resettled in the United States, wh~re he died in 1979. Following Barzani's death, his son Masud became leader of the KOP; from his base in Iran he directed a campaign of guerrilla

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activities against Iraqi civilian and military personnel in the Kurdish region. After Iraq became involved in war with Iran, Masud Barzani generally cooperated with the Iranians in military offensives in Iraqi Kurdistan. Barzani's decision to fight Baghdad was not supported by all Kurdish leaders, and it led to a split within the KOP. Some of these Kurds, including Barzani's eldest son, Ubaydallah, believed that the Autonomy Agreement did provide a framework for achieving practical results, and he preferred to cooperate with the Baath. Other leaders were disturbed by Barzani's acceptance of aid from Iran. Israel, and the United States, and they refused to be associated with this policy. Consequently, during 1974, rival KDP factions, and even new parties such as the Kurdish Revolutionary Party and the Kurdish Progressive Group, emerged. Although none of these parties seemed to have as extensive a base of popular support as did the KOp, their participation in the PNF permitted the Baath to claim that its policies in the Autonomous Region had the backing of progressive Kurdish forces. The unanticipated and swift termination of KDP-central government hostilities in March 1975 resulted in more factional splits from the party. One breakaway group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, was committed to continuing the armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy. Until 1985, however, most of the PUK's skirmishes were with fellow Kurdish fighters of the KOp, and Talabani himself held intermittent negotiations with Baathist representatives about joining the PNF. Other KOP splinter groups agreed to cooperate with the central government. In order to accommodate them, and in recognition of the fact that no single political party represented the Kurds, two additional seats, bringing the total to eighteen, were created in the PNF. Thus, the number of Kurdish representatives increased from three to five. The composition of the PNF changed again in 1980, following the withdrawal of the three ICP members; the number of Kurds remained constant. In 1975, the Baath invited two independent progressive groups to nominate one representative each for the unreserved seats on the PNF. These seats went to the leaders of the Independent Democrats and the Progressive Nationalists. Neither of these groups was a

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formally organised political party, but rather each was an informal association 'of non-Baathist politicians who had been active before 1968. These groups had demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Baath Party that their membe rs had renoun ced the former "reactionary" ideas of the various pre-revolutionary parties to which they had belonged. In 1988, the Baath Party continued to hold the position that the PNF was indispensable as long as the Arab revolutionary movem ent faced dangers in Iraq and in other parts of the Arab homeland. The Baath insisted that its policy of combining its "leading role" within the front and a cooperative relationship based on "mutua l respect and confidence" among itself and the front's members was correct and that, in fact, this was a major accomplishment of its rule. Nevertheless, the PNF was not an indepe ndent political institution. Although it served as a forum in which policy could be discussed, the Baath actually controlled the PNF by monopolising executive positions by holding half of the total seats, and by requiring that all PNF decisions must be by unanimous vote.

Politic al Oppos ition Although the Baath in 1988 permitted the existence of several non-Baathist political parties, it did not tolerate political opposition to its policies. An effective security police appara tus had forced underg round those groups oppose d to the Baath. Other opposition groups operate d in exile in Europe, Iran, and Syria. These included the ICp, the KDP, the PUK, a Baath splinter that suppor ted the Damas cus-bas ed National Comm and, and several Islamic parties. Although various opposition parties periodically succee ded in carrying out acts of violence against regime targets, especially in Kurdistan, for the most part their activities within Iraq did not seriously challenge the Baath regime. The opposition to the Baath historically was fragmented, and efforts to form allianc es-suc h as the ICP's November 1980 initiative to create a Democratic and Patriotic Front of Kurdish and Arab secular parties -found ered over ideological divisions. Personality clashes and feuds also prevented the various Kurdish and Arab secular parties from cooperating. In addition, many of the opposition parties seemed to have a weak internal base of popula r suppor t becaus e of the prevailing perception that they had ~ollaborated with

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enemies of Iraq at a time when the country was engaged in war with Iran. The religious opposition to the Baath was primarily concentrated among the devout Shia population. The most important opposition party was Ad Dawah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), popularly known as Ad Dawah, which originally had been established by Shia clergy in the early 1960s. After the Baath came to power in 1968, Ad Dawah opposed the regime's secular policies, and consequently many prominent clergy associated with the party, as well as some who had no connections to Ad Dawah, were persecuted. In 1979, apparently to contain any radicalisation of the Iraqi Shia clergy like that which had occurred in Iran, the regime arrested and subsequently executed Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir as Sadr, the country's most respected Shia leader. Sadr's precise relationship to Ad Dawah was not established, but his death precipitated widespread, violent demonstrations and acts of sabotage. Ad Dawah was banned in 1980, and membership in the organisation was made a capital offence. After the war with Iran had begun, Ad Dawah and other Shia political groups reorganised in exile in Europe and in Iran. In late 1982, the Iranian authorities encouraged the Iraqi Shia parties to unite under one umbrella group known as the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). Headquartered in Tehran, SAIRI was under the chairmanship of Muhammad Saqir al-Hakim, a prominent clergyman whose father had been the leading Ayatollah of Iraq in the 1960s. SAlRI's aim was to promote the cause of Islamic revolution in Iraq by overthrowing the Baathist regime. To further that objective, in 1983, SAlRI established a government-inexile. SAIRl's activities brought harsh reprisals against members of the extended Hakim family still living in Iraq but were generally ineffective in undermining the political controls of the Baath. Another opposition element included in SAlRI was the Organisation of Islamic Action, headed by Iraqi-born Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrissi.

Trans ition Period Iraq's transitional Administrative Law, was hailed by the US occupation regime as a major accomplishment. In truth, the law is a recipe for prompt and protracted wrangling, which ,~ould lead to civil strife, fragmentation of the country and disaster. First, dissent and haggling have been ensured by the fact that the

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document does-not lay down clear steps for the creation of a body to assume "sovereignty" on June 30, when both the Coalition ProviSional Authority and the Governing Council am due to be dissolved. The section in the original text on the creation of an interim government has been excised and replaced by a vague formulation. Article 2, section Bl, says an "interim government" will be "constituted in accordance with a process of ex!ensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conduded by the Governing Council and the [occupation regime] and possibly in consultation with the United Nations". (The "possibly" demonstrates clearly that the US is not keen on UN participation in this process, denying it the legitimacy that the UN could bring to it.) Second, the lawfully titled the "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period" is subject to amendment in coming months, opening the door to a flood of complaints from members of the 25 strong Governing Councils, fractured by communal contestation, influential personalities and the public. Iraq's most powerful figure, senior Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, reacted to the law by issuing a fatwa. or jUridical opinion. which was posted on his website. He stated that any law covering the transitional period "will not gain legitimacy" until it is "'endorsed by an elected national assembly". He also said: 'This law places obstacles in the path of reaching a permanent constitution for the country which maintains its unity and the rights of all ethnicities and sects." Sistani's comments were echoed by Abdel Aziz Hakim, head of the Tehran-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SClRI). He stated: "Our main problem lies with the imposition of restrictions set by an unelected body [the US-appointed Governing Council] on an elected body [the proposed transitional National Assembly which win draw up Iraq's new constitutionl.The law, consisting of a preamble, nine chapters and 62 articles, lays down the US view on what sort of state Iraq should l,?ecome. Article 4 defines Iraq's polity as "republican, federal, democratic. and pluralistic". This provision excludes a return to the monarchy, favoured by a minority of Iraqis, and imposes a federation, opposed by a majority. A second influential religiOUS figure, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Al-Mudarrissi, who is based in Karbala, warned that: federalism

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could lead to civil war. Well before invading and occupying Iraq, the Bush administration had promised the Kurds that the "autonomy" or quasi-independence they had enjoyed since 1991 would be preserved. In addition to laying down that Iraq's polity would be federal, the law gives the "Kurdlstan Region" (consisting of the provinces of Sulelmanlya, Dohuk and Erbil plus some areas in Kirkuk, Dyala aIld Ninevah) the right to amend federal legislation applied in this re~on (ArtIcle 54, section B). Article 60, section C gives twothirds of the voters In three provinces (presumably those in the Kurdistan Region) the right to veto the permanent constitution even If approved by a majority In the other 15 provinces. This could enable the Kurds to blackmail the qrafters of the permanent constitution on other issues. The Kurds (and the ethnic Turks or Turkofnen) secured ethnic recognition In ArtIcle 7, which declared Iraq to be a country of "many nationalities". Anally, Kurdish was recognised alongside Arabic as an official language. The two latter provisions were not new: Baathist constitutions recognised the Kurds as one of the two nationalities (along with Arabs) living in Iraq and decreed .that Kurdish would be an official language. The Kurds were not granted all their demands. They were not allowed to annex K1rkuk, a city of 800,000 divided equally between Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen. The Kurds did not secure the revenues from the Klrkuk 011 fields. The document says that earnings from oil should be controlled by the federal government and shared by ail Iraqis, with special allocations being made for underdeveloped areas. The Kurds also Insisted that their peshmerga militia be incorporated into a provincial national guard, but the law prohibits communal militias unless provision has been made for them in federal legislation. If this permits the transformation of the peshmerga into a provincial force, a "national guard", the Kurdish militia could survive; otherwise, it will have to disband-as will the militias of SCIRI and the Iraqi Natlopaf COn~.· Federalism .Is. not the only point of contention. A second major Issue could be found in Article 59, which says that during the transitional period, Iraq's armed forces will be a "principal partner In the multinational force operating in Iraq under [the] unified command [of the US)". This situation will end only after the permanent

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constitutio.{l is ratified and an elected government is formed. This provision essentially denies Iraq the most basic attribute of sovereignty: control over its own territory. To make things quite clear, the Iraqi Interim Government, about to take office, was suggested to be empowered to conclude binding agreements regarding the presence and role of foreign forces in Iraq. This means that a temporary unelected body, rather than the elected government, will sign defence pacts with the US and its associates. While Sistani strongly objects to unelected bodies making any long-standing commitments on behalf of Iraq, the country's rulers will be under massive pressure to grant Washington whatever it wants on the military front. After a month of acrimonious debate, the Pentagon, rather than the State Department, was put in charge of reconstruction. This means that the military, rather than the civilian agencies of the US government, will be calling the shots when it comes to spending the $18 billion allocated by Congress for rebuilding and developing Iraq. A third issue, which has already prompted hot contestation, is the role of Islam. Article 7 states that "Islam is the official religion of the state" and "a source of legislation". It also says, "no law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited" in the law "may be enacted during the transitional period". Freedom of religious belief and practice is assured. This is simply a stopgap formulation, which was certain to be opposed by clerics and other conservatives both on the Governing Council and in Iraq's Shia and Sunni religious establishments. While Sistani, a moderate who rejected direct clerical rule, was expected to be prepared to accept the formulation, radicals like the firebrand Muqtada Al-Sadr and some members of the Shia Islamist Dawa party md SCIRI call for Iraq to become an Islamic state, ruled by clerics, Nith Sharia, Islamic canon law, being the law of the land. These forces were all set to press their case in order to pre-empt he drafting of the permanent constitution. If they had managed to mpose their will on Iraq, the pledges made by the Bush administration hat Iraqis would be a "free people governed by the rule of law" and hat Iraqi citizens would be accorded equal treatment, regardless of render, sect, nationality or religion, would have become no more

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than hollow promises. The conservative clerics likely to grab power were not expected to uphold these principles-as the case of Iran has most amply shown .. The law established a new timeframe and work plan for the "transition period".

Later Events Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August1990, Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by US-led, UN coalition forces through the Gulf War of January-February 1991: Following Kuwait's liberation, the UN Security CouncU (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range mlssUes and to allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the US-led Invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. Coalition forces remain in Iraq, helping to restore degraded infrastructure and facilitating the establishment of a freely elected government, while simultaneously dealing with a robust insurgency. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which temporarily administered Iraq after the invasion, transferred full governmental authority on 28 June 2004, to the Iraqi Interim Government (IG), which governed under the Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq (TAL). Under the TAL, elections for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) were held in Iraq on 30 January 2005. Following these elections, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) assumed office. The TNA was charged with drafting Iraq's permanent constitution, which was approved in a 15 October 2005 constitutional referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of Representatives (CoR) was held on . 15 December 2005. After an 'offlclal certified ballot count is released, an Iraqi Government Is expected to be formed by late spring or early summer 2006. (()pdated till June-2006)

\

4 Geography The border with Iran has been a continuing source of conflict and was partially responsible for the outbreak in 1980' s war. The terms of a treaty negotiated in 1937 under British auspices provided that in one area of the Shatt ai-Arab the boundary would be at the low water mark on the Iranian side. Iran subsequently insisted that "British imperialist pressures imposed the 1937 treaty on it" and that the proper boundary throughout the Shatt was the thalweg. The matter came to a head in 1969 when Iraq, in effect, told the Iranian government that the Shatt was an integral part of Iraqi territory and that the waterway might be closed to Iranian shipping. Through Algerian mediation, Iran and Iraq agreed in March 1975 to normalise their relations, and three months later they signed a treaty known as the Algiers Accord. The document defined the common border all along the Shatt estuary as the thalweg. To compensate Iraq for the loss of what formerly had been regarded as its territory, pockets of territory along the mountain border in the central sector of its common boundary with Iran were assigned to it. Nonetheless, in September 1980, Iraq went to war with Iran, citing among other complaints the fact that Iran had not turned over to it the land specified in the Algiers Accord. This problem has subsequently proved to be a stumbling block to a negotiated settlement of the ongoing conflict. In 1988, the boundary with Kuwait was another outstanding problem. It was fixed in a 1913 treaty between the Ottoman Empire

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and British officials acting on behalf of Kuwait's ruling family, which in 1899 had ceded control over foreign affairs to Britain. The boundary was accepted by Iraq when it became independent in 1932, but in the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government advanced a claim to parts of Kuwait. Kuwait made several representations to the Iraqis during the war to fix the border once and for all but Baghdad has repeatedly demurred, claiming that the issue is a potentially divisive one that could inflame nationalist sentiment inside Iraq. Hence in 1988 it was likely that a solution would have to wait until the war ended. In 1922, British officials concluded the Treaty of Mohammara with Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman al-Saud, who in 1932 formed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The treaty provided the basic agreement for the boundary between the eventually independent nations. Also in 1922, the two parties agreed to the creation of the diamondshaped Neutral Zone of approximately 7,500 square kilometres adjacent to the western tip of Kuwait in which neither Iraq nor Saudi Arabia would build permanent dwellings or installations. Beduins from either country could utilise the limited water and seasonal grazing resources of the zone. In April 1975, an agreement signed in Baghdad fixed the borders of the countries. Despite a rumoured agreement proViding for the formal division of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, as of early 1988, such a document had not been published. Instead, Saudi Arabia was continuing to control oil wells in the offshore Neutral Zone and had been allocating proceeds from Neutral Zone oil sales to Iraq as a war payment. Most geographers, including those of the Iraqi government, discuss the country's geography in terms of four main zones or regions: the desert in the west and south-west; the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in Arabic the Dijlis and Furat, respectively); the highlands in the north and north-east; and the alluvial plain through which the Tigris and Euphrates flow. Iraq's official statistical reports give the total land area as 438,446 square kilometres, whereas a United States Department of State publication gives the area as 434,934 square kilometres. The desert zone, an area lying west and south-west of the Euphrates River, is a part of the Syrian Desert, which covers sections of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The region, sparsely inhabited

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by pastoral nomads, consists of a wide, stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches. A widely ramified pattern of wadis-watercourses that are dry most of the year-runs from the border to the Euphrates. Some Wadis are over 400 kilometres long and carry brief but torrential floods during the winter rains. The uplands region, between the Tigris north of Samara and the Euphrates north of Hit, is known as Al-Jazirah (the island) and is part of a larger area that extends westward into Syria between the two rivers and into Turkey. Water in the area flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is much more difficult than it is in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified as desert. The north-eastern highlands begin just south of a line drawn from Mosul to Kirkuk and extend to the borders with Turkey and Iran. High ground, separated by broad, undulating steppes, gives way to mountains ranging from 1,000 to nearly 4,000 metres near the Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few valleys, the mountain area proper is suitable only for grazing in the foothills and steppes; adequate soil and rainfall, however, make cultivation possible. Here, too, are the great oil fields near Mosul and Kirkuk. The north-east is the homeland of most Iraqi Kurds. The alluvial plain begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Here the Tigris and Euphrates rivers lie above the level of the plain in many places, and the whole area is a delta interlaced by the channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. Intermittent lakes, fed by the rivers in flood, also characterise south-eastern Iraq. A fairly large area (15,000 square kilometres) just above the confluence of the two rivers at Al-Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is marshland, known as Hawr al-Hammar, the result of centuries of flooding and inadequate drainage. Much of it is permanent marsh, but some parts dry out in early winter, and other parts become marshland only in years of great flood. Because the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates above their confluence are heavily silt laden, irrigation and fairly frequent flooding deposit large quantities of silty loam in much of the delta area. Windborne silt contributes to the total deposit of sediments. It has been estimated that the delta plains are built up at the rate of nearly twenty centimetres in a century. In some areas, major floods lead to the deposit in temporary lakes of as much as thirty centimetres of

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mud. The Tigris and Euphrates also carry large quantities of salts. These, too, are spread on the land by sometimes excessive irrigation and flooding. A high water table and poor surface and subsurface drainage tend to concentrate the salts near the surface of the soil. In general, the salinity of the soil increases from Baghdad south to the Persian Gulf and severely limits productivity in the region south of AI-Amarah. The salinity is reflected in the large lake in central Iraq, south-west of Baghdad, known as Bahr al-Milh (Sea of Salt). There are two other major lakes in the country to the north of Bahr al-Milh: Buhayrat al-Tharthar and Buhayrat al-Habbaniyah. The Euphrates, originates in Turkey, is augmented by the Nahr (river) al-Khabur in Syria, and enters Iraq in the north-west. Here only the wadis of the western desert feed it during the winter rains. It then winds through a gorge, which varies from two to sixteen kilometres in width, until it flows out on the plain at Ar Ramadi. Beyond there the Euphrates continues to the Hindiyah Barrage, which was constructed in 1914 to divert the river into the Hindiyah Channel; the present-day Shatt al-Hillah had been the main channel of the Euphrates before 1914. Below AI-KW, the river follows two channels to As Samawah, where it reappears as a single channel to join the Tigris at AI-Qurnah. The Tigris also rises in Turkey but is significantly augmented by several rivers in Iraq, the most important of which are the Khabur, the Great Zab, the Uttle Zab, and the Uzaym, all of which join the Tigris above Baghdad, and the Diyala, which joins it about thirty-six kilometres below the city. At the Kut Barrage much of the water is diverted into the Shatt al-Gharraf, which was once the main channel of the Tigris. Water from the Tigris thus enters the Euphrates through the Shatt al-Gharraf well above the confluence of the two main channels at Al-Qurnah. Both the Tigris and the Euphrates break into a number of channels in the marshland area, and the flow of the rivers is substantially reduced by the time they come together at AI-Qurnah. Moreover, the swamps act as silt traps, and the Shatt ai-Arab is relatively silt free as it flows south. Below Basra, however, the Karun River enters the Shatt ai-Arab from Iran, carrying large quantities of silt that present a continuous dredging problem in maintaining a channel for oceangoing vessels to reach the port at Basra. This problem had been

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superseded by a greater obstacle to river traffic, however, namely the presence of several sunken hulks that had been rusting in the Shatt ai-Arab since early in the war. The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life of the country, but they may also threaten it. The rivers are at their lowest level in September and October and at flood in March, April, and May when they may carry forty times as much water as at low mark. Moreover, one season's flood may be ten or more times as great as that in another year. In 1954, for example, Baghdad was seriously threatened, and dikes protecting it were nearly topped by the flooding Tigris. Since Syria built a dam on the Euphrates, the flow of water has been considerably diminished and flooding was no longer a problem in the mid-1980s. In 1988, Turkey was also constructing a dam on the Euphrates that would further restrict the water flow. Until the mid-twentieth century, most efforts to control the waters were primarily concerned with irrigation. Some attention was given to problems of flood control and drainage before the revolution of July 14, 1958, but development plans in the 1960s and 1970s were increasingly devoted to these matters, as well as to irrigation projects on the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates and the tributaries of the Tigris in the north-east. During the war, government officials stressed to foreign visitors that, with the conclusion of a peace settlement, problems of irrigation and flooding would receive top priority from the government.

Settlement Patterns In the rural areas of the alluvial plain and in the lower Diyala region, settlement almost invariably clusters near the rivers, streams, and irrigation canals. Robert McCormick Adams, director of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, has summarised the bases of the relationship between watercourse and settlement. He notes that the levees lay down by streams and canals provide advantages for both settlement and agriculture. Surface water drains more easily on the levees' backslope, and the coarse soils of the levees are easier to cultivate and permit better subsurface drainage. The height of the levees gives some protection against floods and the frosts that often affect low-lying areas and may kill winter crops.

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AboveaIl, those living or cultivating on the crest of a levee have easy access to water for irrigation and household use in a dry, hot country. Although there are some isolated homesteads, most rural communities are nucleated settlements rather than dispersed farmsteads; that are, the farmer leaves his village to cultivate the fields outside it. The pattern holds for farming communities in the Kurdish highlands of the north-east as well as for those in the alluvial plain. The size of the settlement varies, generally with the volume of water available for household use and with the amount of land accessible to village dwellers. Sometimes, particularly in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys, soil salinity restricts the area of arable land and limits the size of the community dependent on it, and it also usually results in large unsettled and uncultivated stretches between the villages. Fragmentary information suggests that most farmers in the alluvial plain tend to live in villages of over 100 persons. For example, in the mid-1970s a substantial number of the residents of Baqubah, the administrative centre and major city of Diyala Governorate, were employed in agriculture. The Marsh Arabs (the Madan) of the south usually live in small clusters of two or three houses kept above water by rushes that are constantly being replenished. Such clusters often are close together, but access from one to another is possible only by small boat. Here and there a few natural islands permit slightly larger clusters. Some of these people are primarily water buffalo herders and lead a seminomadic life. In the winter, when the waters are at a low point, they build fairly large temporary villages. In the summer they move their herds out of the marshes to the riverbanks. The war has had its effect on the lives of these denizens of the marshes. With much of the fighting concentrated in their areas, they have either migrated to settled communities away from the marshes or have been forced by government decree to relocate within the marshes. Also, in early 1988, the marshes had become the refuge of deserters from the Iraqi army who attempted to maintain life in the fastness of the overgrown, desolate areas while hiding out from tl~e authorities. These deserters in many instances have formed into large gangs that raid the marsh communities; this also has induced many of the marsh dwellers to abandon their villages.

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The war has also affected settlement patterns in the northern Kurdish areas. There, the persistence of a stubborn rebellion by Kurdish guerrillas has goaded the government into applying steadily escalating violence against the local communities. Starting in 1984, the government launched a scorched-earth campaign to drive a wedge between the villagers and the guerrillas in the remote areas of two provinces of Kurdistan in which Kurdish guerrillas were active. In the process, whole villages were tortured and subsequently bulldozed, which resulted in the Kurds flocking into the regional centres of Arbil and As Sulaymaniyah. Also as a military precaution, the government has cleared a broad strip of territory in the Kurdish region along the Iranian border of all its inhabitants, hoping in this way to interdict the movement of Kurdish guerrillas back and forth between Iran and Iraq. The majority of Kurdish villages, however, remained intact in early 1988. In the arid areas of Iraq to the west and south, cities and large towns are almost invariably situated on watercourses, usually on the major rivers or their larger tributaries. In the south this dependence has had its disadvantages. Until the recent development of flood control, Baghdad and other cities were subject to the threat of inundation. Moreover, the dikes needed for protection have effectively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some directions. Dikes on its eastern edge, for example, restricted the growth of Baghdad. The diversion of water to the Milhat al-Tharthar and the construction of a canal transferring water from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Diyala River have permitted the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and the expansion of settlement.

Physical Features Location: Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran and Kuwait. Map References: Middle East Area: Total: 437,072 sq. kms; Water: 4,910 sq. kms; Land: 432,162 sq. kms Area Comparative: Slightly more than twice the size of Idaho Land Boundaries: Total: 3,650 km Border Countries: Iran 1,458 km, Jordan 181 km, Kuwait 240 km, Saudi Arabia 814 km, Syria 605 km, Turkey 352 km

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Coastline: 58 km Maritime Claims: Continental shelf: not specified, Territorial sea: 12 NM Climate: Mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq. Terrain: Mostly broad plains; reedy marshes along Iranian border in south with large flooded areas; mountains along borders with Iran and Turkey. Elevation Extremes: Lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m, highest point: Haji Ibrahim 3,600 m Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, sulphur Land Use: Arable Land: 11.89 per cent, Permanent Crops: 0.78 per cent, Other: 87.33 per cent (1998 est.) Irrigated Land: 35,250 sq. kms (1998 est.) Natural Hazards: Dust storms, sand storms, floods Environment Current Issues: Government water control projects have drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of An Nasiriyah by drying up or diverting the feeder streams and rivers; a once sizable population of Marsh Arabs, who inhabited these areas for thousands of years, has been displaced; furthermore, the destruction of the natural habitat poses serious threats to the area's wildlife population; inadequate supplies of potable water; development of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers system contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey; air and water pollution; soil degradation (salination) and erosion; desertification. Environment-international Agreements: Party to: Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification. Geography-note: Strategic location on Shatt ai-Arab waterway and at the head of the Persian Gulf.

Climate Roughly 90 per cent of the annual rainfall occurs between November and April, most of it in the winter months from December

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through March. The remaining six months, particularly the hottest ones of June, July, and August, are dry. Except in the north and north east, mean annual rainfall ranges between ten and seventeen centimetres. Data available from stations in the foothills and steppes south and south west of the mountains suggest mean annual rainfall between thirty-two and fifty-seven centimetres for that area. Rainfall in the mountains is more abundant and may reach 100 centimetres a year in some places, but the terrain precludes extensive cultivation. Cultivation on non-irrigated land is limited essentially to the mountain valleys, foothills, and steppes, which have thirty or more centimetres of rainfall annually. Even in this zone, however, only one crop a year can be grown, and shortages of rain have often led to crop failures. Mean minimum temperatures in the winter range from near freezing Uust before dawn) in the northern and north-eastern foothills and the western desert to 2°_3°C and 4°-SoC in the alluvial plains of southern Iraq. They rise to a mean maximum of about lS.SoC in the western desert and the north east, and 16.6°C in the south. In the summer mean minimum temperatures range from about 22.2°C to about 29°C and rise to maximums between roughly 37. 7°C and 43.3°C. Temperatures sometimes fall below freezing and have fallen as low as -14.4°C at Ar Rutbah in the western desert. They are more likely, however, to go over 46°C in the summer months, and several stations have records of over 48°C. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena. The southern and south-easterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts of eighty kilometres an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. It may last for a day at the beginning and end of the season but for several days at other times. This wind is often accompanied by violent dust storms that may rise to heights of several thousand metres and close airports for brief periods. From mid-June to midSeptember the prevailing wind, called the shamal, is blown from the north and north-west. It is a steady wind, absent only occasionally during this period. The very dry air brought by this shamal permits intensive sun heating of the land surface, but the breeze has some cooling effect. The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evaporation,

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soil and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from the rain, and vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigation. Some areas, however, although arid, do have natural vegetation in contrast to the desert. For example, in the Zagros Mountains in north-eastern Iraq there is permanent vegetation, such as oak trees, and date palms are found in the south.

Geography as Impediments to Peace and Stability: Insurgents in Iraq have become a major headache for the Bush administration, and an impediment to the peace and democracy so dear to many Iraqis. Nonetheless, the true question is not what to do with insurgents but what to do with Iraq itself-with the demography and geography that have been Iraq's defects since its birth as a country. Geographically, its neighbouring countries including Syria, Iran and Turkey surround Iraq. Tyranny under the Baath party has ruled Syria for almost half a century, and the Syrian government has been notorious for sponsoring terrorists against Lebanon, Israel and now Iraq. For decades, the Syrian and Iraqi governments have not been friends but rather rivals. Muslim Shia fundamentalists have ruled Iran, for its part, since the ousting of the former Shah of Iran. Iran, like Syria, has been behind the Hezbollah in Lebanon and other extreme Muslim groups such as Jihad, and has been known for state-sponsored terrorism for decades. Like Syrians, Iranians are free only to cherish their leaders and glorify their rule. Turkey, on the other hand, is a weird and a shaky democracy with its government dominated by those who claim to be of a sectarian Muslim religious group, but the recent rise in anti-Semitic sentiments among Turks, and their refusal to aid coalition forces in the war against Saddam has proven otherwise. Furthermore, Turkish authorities have been practising barbaric ruling against the Kurds, who make up one-third of their population, for years, depriving them of the most basic human rights including speaking in their mother tongue. Notably, the human rights violations of all three of these neighbours of Iraq have been documented by respectable human rights organisation such as Amnesty International for having some of the dirtiest records for many years. The problem doesn't end with negative influence alone. Iran and Iraq have been quarrelling over their territorial integrity since the end of British colonialism in Iraq. During the 1980's, Iraq and Iran fought

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one of the bloodiest wars in the history of the Middle East, and thus millions oftives were claimed on both sides. Since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Turks have been looking to intrude into Iraq to satisfy their false and unrealistic territorial claims on northern Iraqi provinces near their border. Also, Turks oppose the fair share representation of Iraqi Kurds in the Iraqi government fearing that their counterparts in Turkey will demand the same. Common sense dictates that tyrants are interested in seeing their counterparts around as opposed to something different. These regimes realise their illegitimacy as they have been maintaining their power through force and torture rather than a democratic process where the people are responsible for electing their political officials. As one can imagine, a democratic Iraq will not be in the best interests of these regimes, and they well know that a democratic Iraq will entice their people to demand the same, shake off the yoke of their repression, and end their illegitimate power. Since in a sense a democratic Iraq with peace and prosperity will mark the end of these shaky governments, they are therefore maximising their efforts to entice more chaos and fuel instability in Iraq as they fear for their own fate more than the fate of the Iraqi people. Demographically, the threads that make up the fabric of the Iraqi population are a very powerful force working against unity in Iraq, making Iraq's territorial integrity questionable and unjustifiable. Iraq's population is made up mainly of Arabs and Kurds, two different nationalities each with their own distinct and unique national attributes. Iraq has been ruled by Arabs since its formation as a republic. Kurds as a distinct nation have fought their subjugation to the Arabs, and rightly demanded their statehood since the inception of Iraq. Kurds have been tortured and genocide has been committed against them by Iraqi Arabs, resulting in the Kurds' resentment of any forced union as a nation with the Arabs. Arabs themselves are divided; the majority in Iraq are Shias and they feel closer to their fellow Shias in Iran than the Sunni Arabs in Iraq. They too have suffered under Saddam and never had their fair share of political power. The Sunni Arabs have been dominant in Iraq, and now, as their last man, Saddam, has been ousted they are not willing to share power with the rest of the Iraqis. Therefore, they are behind the insurgencies and thus the progress of peace and stability in Iraq is

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not only barred by the differences of its people groups alone, but also by the outright actions of some of its own people to sabotage it. Iraq's own geography and demography are its fatal enemies. Geographically, the only way to deal with this paramount dilemma is to encourage regime changes in Iraq's neighbours from hostile anarchy to democratic regimes. However, given our gloomy success in winning peace in Iraq this endeavour could be suicidal and regrettable. As far as Iraq's demography is concerned, imposing a merger nation on Iraq's different ethnic and religious groups will blow up in the face of its organisers, prolonging the Iraqi people's suffering and bringing civil war closer with every minute that passes. So far, neither of these two problems has been dealt with effectively, therefore causing the Iraqi people to prepare themselves for more suffering, and America to consider staying even longer in Iraq, incurring greater war expenditures and casualties.

5 Society Iraqi society is composed of sizable and distinct social groups whose differences and divisions have been only slowly and fitfully challenged by the emergence of a strong, centralised political regime and state apparatus. Moreover, there are regional and environmental differences between the scattered mountain villages whose economic base is rain-fed grain crops and the more densely populated riverain communities to the south that are dependent on intricate irrigation and drainage systems for their livelihood. There are also linguistic and ethnic differences. The most important exception to the Arab character of Iraq is the large Kurdish minority, estimated at 15-20 per cent of the population. According to official government statistics, Turkomans and other Turkic-speaking peoples account for only 2 to 3 per cent of the population. There was previously a large Iranian population settled around the Shia holy cities of Karbala and An Najaf, and the southern port city of Basra; this element was largely expelled by government decree in 1971-72 and 1979-80. Divisions along religious lines are deep rooted. Although upward of 95 per cent of Iraq's population is Muslim, the community is split between Sunnis and Shias; the latter group, a minority in the Arab world as a whole, constitutes a majority in Iraq. Numerous observers believe that the Shias make up between 60 and 65 per cent of the inhabitants, although the data to support this figure are not firm. Of the non-Muslim communities, fragmented Christian sects cannot be

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more than 1 or 2 per cent, concentrated mainly in the governorates of Nineveh and Dahuk. A formerly extensive Jewish community is to all practical purposes defunct. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948-49 rendered the situation of Iraqi Jews untenable and led to a mass exodus, both to Israel and to Iran in 1950. Just before the Iran-Iraq War, the sharp cleavage between the rural and urban communities that formerly characterised Iraqi society had begun to break down as a result of policies instituted by the government. The war has accelerated this process. Continuous fighting has devastated large areas of the rural south, which in turn has triggered a massive rural migration to the capita\. In the late 1980s, Iraqi and foreign observers agreed that for the nation's economic health this flight from the countryside would have to be reversed, and they anticipated that the government would undertake measures to accomplish this reversal once the war ended. Kinship groups are the fundamental social units, regulating many activities that in Westernised societies are the functions of political, economic, religious, or neighbourhood groups. Rights and obligations centre on the extended family and the lineage. The family remains the primary focus of loyalty; and it is in this context, rather than the broader one of corporate loyalties defined by sectarian, ethnic, or economic considerations, that the majority of Iraqis find the common denominators of their everyday lives. A mutually protective attitude among relatives is taken as a matter of course. Relatives tend to be preferred as business partners since they are believed to be more reliable than persons over whom one does not have the hold of kinship ties. On higher levels, deeply ingrained family loyalty manifests itself in business and public life. The characteristic form of family organisation involves a large group of kinsmen related to one another through descent and marriage, that is, an extended family usually consisting of three generations. Such an extended family may all live together, which is the more traditional pattern, or may reside separately like a nuclear family, but still share the values and functions of an extended family, such as depending upon one another and deferring to the older generation. As Iraqi society has become increasingly urbanised, however, the tendency towards nuclear family social organisation, as opposed

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merely to residence, has become more prevalent. The status of an individual is traditionally determined by the position of his or her family in society and the individual's position within that group. The family transmits values and standards of behaviour of the society to its members and holds them responsible for each other's conduct. It traditionally determines occupations and selects marriage partners. Kinsmen also cooperate in economic endeavours, such as farming or trade, and ownership in land and other assets frequently is vested in the group as a whole. The sharpest degree of divergence from these patterns occurs among educated urban Iraqis, an ever-increasing proportion of the society. Until 1959, family life was subject to regulation only according to religious law and tradition. All Muslims were brought under a single body of family law for the first time in 1959, with the enactment of a secular law on personal status, based on Shariah, statutes from other Islamic countries, and legal precedents established in Iraqi courts; a brief amendment was enacted in 1963. The law spells out provisions governing the right to contract marriage, the nature of the contract, economic rights of the partners, divorce and child custody, as well as bequests and inheritance. The basic structural unit of the family consists of a senior couple, their sons, the sons' wives and children, and unmarried daughters. Other dependent relatives may also be attached to the group. The senior male is the head of the family; he manages its properties and has the final voice in decisions. Kinsmen are organised into still larger groups. The next level of organisation is the lineage, composed of all persons, male and female, who trace their descent from a common ancestor. The number of generations by which this ancestor is removed from the oldest living one varies; a depth of four to six generations is usual. Individuals or whole families of other descent sometimes attach themselves to a particular lineage in an arrangement of mutual advantage, becoming recognised after several generations as full members of the lineage on equal terms with those born into it. In small villages everyone is likely to belong to the same lineage; in larger ones there may be two or more lineages in common but tempered by economic cooperation, intermarriage, and the authority of the village leadership or elders. Also among non-tribal Iraqis,

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kinship organisation and traditions of common descent do not go beyond the lineage. Awareness of distant ties is keen among recent migrants to the cities and among the rural population. In rural areas, new households are not usually set up until many years after the initial recognition of a marriage. In general, the wife moves in with her husband's parents, where the young couple remain for some time. Often this arrangement is maintained until the death of the father. Even when the father dies, the brothers sometimes stay together, forming joint family households that include themselves, their wives, and their children. The actual number of persons who make up the household is determined by the family's economic circumstances, pattern of living, and mode of habitation. In an agricultural setting, as long as ownership of land and other possessions is vested in the family as a whole, the possibilities for a young man to set up an independent household are limited. In urban centres, on the other hand, young men can avail themselves of wage-earning employment. Authority within the family is determined by seniority and sex. The father, in theory, has absolute authority over the activities of the members of the household, both within the confines of the house and outside. He decides what education his children will receive, what occupations his sons will enter, and, usually in consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. These authority patterns also have been greatly weakened in the urban environment and by the shift of more and more responsibilities from the family to larger social institutions, such as the schools. An even greater change in the traditional pattern of male dominance has been brought about by the war. Because Iraq is numerically a much smaller nation than Iran, it has experienced considerable difficulty maintaining an adequate defence on the battlefront. To field a sufficient force, it has had to draw down the available labour pool on the home front, and to compensate, has mobilised women. In the mid-1980s, observers reported that in many ministries the overwhelming proportion of employees were women. Foreign contractors have encuuntered women supervisors on huge construction projects, women doctors in the hospitals, and even women performing law enforcement roles. This emancipationextraordinary for an Arab country-was sanctioned by the government,

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which expended a significant amount of propaganda publicising the role of women in helping to win the war. The government further maintained that after the war women would be encouraged to retain their new-found work roles; this was doubtful, however, because in the same breath the government declared its determination to increase the birth rate. The Muslim majority has traditionally regarded marriage as primarily a civil contract between two families, arranged by parents after negotiations, which may be prolonged and conducted by an intermediary. The arrangement of a marriage is a family matter in which the needs and position of the corporate kin group are primary considerations. Prospective partners are often known to each other, and they frequently come from the same village and the same kin group. Among educated urban dwellers, the traditional pattern of contracting marriage is giving way to a pattern in which the young persons make their own choices, but parents must still approve. With regard to marriage and divorce, the 1959 Law of Personal Status, amended in 1963, liberalised various provisions that affected the status of women; in practice, however, the Iraqi judiciary up to the Revolution tended to be conservative in applying the provisions of the law. Specifically, Iraqi law required that divorce proceedings be initiated in a court of law, but the husband still had the controlling role in dissolving the marriage. Moreover, a man who wanted to marry a second wife was required first to get approval from the court. Provision was also made for the custody of children to be based on consideration of the welfare of the child. Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the high value placed on large families. The greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater the prestige of the father, and through him that of the family as a whole. Boys are especially welcome because they are the carriers of the family tradition, and because they're economic contribution in an agricultural society are greater than that of girls. Between the ages of three and six, children are given freedom to learn by imitating older siblings. Strong emphasis is then placed on conformity with elders' patterns and on loyalty and obedience. Family solidarity is stressed. The passage from adolescence to maturity

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is swift. Upon reaching puberty, there traditionally is a separation of sexes, and girls are excluded from male society except that of their close kin. Great emphasis is placed on premarital chastity, and this is one reason for early marriages. Boys have greater freedom during adol~scence than girls and begin to be drawn into the company of their fathers and the world of men.

Social System The impact of Western penetration on the indigenous social and demographic structure in the nineteenth century was profound. Western influence took the initial form of transportation and trading links and the switch from tribal-based subsistence agriculture to cash crop production-mostly dates-for export. As this process accelerated, the nomadic population decreased both relatively and in absolute numbers and the rural sedentary population increased substantially, particularly in the southern region. This was accompanied by a pronounced transformation of tenurial relations: the tribal, communal character of subsistence production was transformed on a large scale into a landlord-tenant relationship; tribal sheikhs, urban merchants, cnd government officials took title under the open-ended terms of the newly promulgated Ottoman land codes. incentives and pressures on this emerging landlord class to increase production (and, thus, exports and earnings) resulted in expanded cultivation, which brought more and more land under cultivation and simultaneously absorbed the "surplus" labour represented by the tribal, pastoral, and nomadic character of much of Iraqi society. This prolonged process of sedentarisation was disrupted by the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War i, but it resumed with renewed intensity in the British Mandate period, when the politic;;>.! structure of independent Iraq was formed. This threefold transformation of rural society-pastoral to agricultural, subsistence to commercial, tribal-communal to landlordpeasant-was accompanied by important shifts in urban society as well. There was a general increase in the number and size of marketing towns and their population; but the destruction of handicraft industries, especially in Baghdad, by the import of cheap manufactured goods from the West, led to an absolute decline in the population of urban centres. It also indelibly stamped the subsequent urban growth with

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a mercantile and bureaucratic-administrative character that is still a strong feature of Iraqi society. Thus, the general outline and history of Iraqi population dynamics in the modern era can be divided into a period extending from the middle of the nineteenth century to World War H, characterised chiefly by urbanisation, with a steady and growing movement of people from the rural (especially southern) region to the urban (especially central) region. Furthermore, the basic trends of the 1980s are rooted in the particularly exploitive character of agricultural practices regarding both the land itself and the people who work on it. Declining productivity of the land, stemming from the failure to develop drainage along the irrigation facilities and the wretched condition of the producers, has resulted in a potentially harmful . demographic trajectory-the depopulation of the countryside-that in the late 1980s continued to bedevil government efforts to reverse the decades-long pattern of declining productivity in the agricultural sector. The accelerated urbanisation process since World War H is starkly illustrated in the shrinking proportion of the population living in rural areas: 61 per cent in 1947, followed by 56 per cent in 1965, then 36 per cent in 1977, and an estimated 32 per cent in 1987; concurrently between 1977 and 1987 the urban population rose from 7,646,054 to an estimated 11,078,000. The rural exodus has been most severe in Al-Basrah and Al-Qadisiyah governorates. The proportion of rural to urban population was lowest in the governorates of Al-Basrah (37 percent in 1965, and 1 percent in 1987) and Baghdad (48 per cent in 1965 and 19 per cent in 1987). It was highest in Dhi Qar Governorate where it averaged 50 per cent in 1987, followed closely by Al-Muthanna and Diyala governorates with rural population of 48 per cent. Between 1957 and 1967, the population of Baghdad and Al-Basrah governorates grew by 73 per cent and 41 per cent respectively. During the same years the city of Baghdad grew by 87 per cent and the city of Basra by 64 per cent. Because of the war, the growth of Al-Basrah Governorate has been reversed while that of Baghdad Governorate has accelerated alarmingly, with the 1987 census figure for urban Baghdad being 3,845,000. Iranian forces have mounted an offensive each year of the war since 1980, except for early 1988, seeking to capture Basra

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and the adjoining area and subjecting the city to regular bombardment. As a result, large numbers of the population fled northward from Basra and other southern areas, with many entering Baghdad, which was already experiencing overcrowding. The government has attempted to deal with this situation by moving war refugees out of the capital and resettling them in other smaller cities in the south, out of the range of the fighting.

The People Although the data are not absolutely reliable, the government estimates that 76 per cent of the people are Arab, 19 per cent are Kurds, while Turkomans, Assyrians, Armenians, and other relatively small groups make up the rest. All but a small percentage adhere to Islam. The Islamic component is split into two main sects, Sunni and Shia, with the Shias by far the majority. Officially, the government sets the number of Shias at 55 per cent. In the 1980s, knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding it as low. Because the government does not encourage birth control and the Shias, the least affluent in society, have traditionally had the highest birth rate, a more reasonable estimate of their numbers would seem to be between 60 and 65 per cent. All but a few of the estimated 3,088,000 Kurds are Sunni, and thus the Sunni Arabs-who historically have been the dominant religious and ethnic group-constitute a decided minority vis-a-vis the Shia majority. Almost all Iraqis speak at least some Arabic, the mother tongue for the Arab majority. Arabic, one of the more widely spoken languages in the world, is the mother tongue claimed in 1988 by over 177 million people from Morocco to the Arabian Sea. One of the Semitic languages, it is related to Aramaic, Phoenician, Syriac, Hebrew, various Ethiopic languages, and the Akkadian of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. Throughout the Arab world the language exists in three forms: the Classical Arabic of the Quran, the literary language developed from the classical and referred to as Modern Standard Arabic, which has virtually the same structure wherever used, and the spoken language, which in Iraq is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be bilingual-in Modern Standard Arabic and in their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers, who in Iraq are about 60 per cent of the population, can comprehend the meaning

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of something said in Modern Standard Arabic, although they are unable to speak it. Classical Arabic, apart from Quranic texts, is known chiefly to scholarly specialists. Most of the words of Arabic's rich and extensive vocabulary are variations of triconsonantal roots, each of which has a basic meaning. The sounds of Arabic are also rich and varied and include some made in the throat and back of the larynx which do not occur in the major Indo-European languages. Structurally there are important differences between Modern Standard Arabic and spoken Arabic, such as the behaviour of the verb: the voice and tense of the verb are indicated by different internal changes in the two forms. In general, the grammar of spoken Arabic is simpler than that of the Modern Standard Arabic, having dropped many noun declensions and different forms of the relative pronoun for the different genders. Some dialects of spoken Arabic do not use special feminine forms of plural verbs. Dialects of spoken Arabic vary greatly throughout the Arab world. Most Iraqis speak one common dialect to Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan and-as is true of people speaking other dialectsthey proudly regard theirs as the best. Although they converse in Iraqi Arabic, there is general agreement that Modern Standard Arabic, the written language, is superior to the spoken form. Arabs generally believe that the speech of the bedouins resembles the pure classical form most closely and that the dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions.

Rural Society Rural Iraq contains aspects of the largely tribal mode of social organisation that prevailed over the centuries and still survived in modern age-particularly in the more isolated rural areas, such as the rugged tableland of the north-west and the marshes in the south. The tribal mode probably originated in the unstable social conditions that resulted from the protracted decline of the Abbasid Caliphate and the subsequent cycles of invasion and devastation. In the absence of a strong central authority and the urban society of a great civilization, society developed into smaller units under conditions that placed increasing stress on prowess, decisiveness, and mobility. Under these conditions, the tribal sheikhs emerged as a

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warrior class, and this process facilitated the ascendancy of the fighter-nomad over the cultivator. The gradual sedentarisation that began in the mid-nineteenth century brought with it an erosion of sheikhly power and a disintegration of the tribal system. Under the British Mandate, and the monarchy that was its creation, a reversal took place. Despite the continued decline of the tribe as a viable and organic social entity, the enfeebled power of the sheikhs was restored and enhanced by the British. This was done to develop a local ruling class that could maintain security in the countryside and otherwise head off political challenges to British access to Iraq's mineral and agricultural resources and Britain's paramount role in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. Through the specific implementation ofland registration, the traditional pattern of communal cultivation and pasturage-with mutual rights and duties between sheikhs and tribesmen-was superseded in some tribal areas by the institution of private property and the expropriation by the sheikhs of tribal lands as private estates. The status of the tribesmen was in many instances drastically reduced to that of sharecroppers and labourers. Tl;1e additional ascription of judicial and police powers to the sheikh and his retinue left the tribesmen-cum-peasants as virtual serfs, continuously in debt and in servitude to the sheikh turned landlord and master. The social basis for sheikhly power had been transformed from military valour and moral rectitude to an effective possession of wealth as embodied in vast landholdings and a claim to the greater share of the peasants' production. This was the social dimension of the transformation from subsistence, pastoral economy to an agricultural economy linked to the world market. It was, of course, an immensely complicated process, and conditions varied in different parts of the country. The main impact was in the southern half-the riverain economy-more than in the sparsely populated, rain-fed northern area. A more elaborate analysis of this process would have to look specifically at the differences between Kurdish and Arab sheikhs, between political and religious leadership functions, between Sunni and Shia sheikhs, and between nomadic and riverain sheikhs, all within their ecological settings. In general, the biggest estates developed in areas restored to rultivation through dam construction and pump irrigation after

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World War I. The most autocratic examples of sheikhly power were in the rice-growing region near Al-Amarah, where the need for organised and supervised labour and the rigorous requirements of rice cultivation generated the most oppressive conditions. The role of the tribe as the chief politico-military unit was already well eroded by the time the monarchy was overthrown in July 1958. The role of some tribal sheikhs had been abolished by the central government. The tribal system survived longest in the mid-Euphrates area, where many tribesmen had managed to register small plots in their names and had not become mere tenants of the sheikh. In such settings an interesting amalgam occurred of traditional tribal customs and the newer influences represented by the civil servants sent to rural regions by the central government, together with the expanded government educational system. For example, the government engineer responsible for the water distribution system, although technically not a major administrator, in practice became the leading figure in rural areas. He would set forth requirements for the cleaning and maintenance of the canals, and the tribal sheikh would see to it that the necessary manpower was provided. This service in the minds of tribesmen replaced the old customary obligation of military service that they owed the sheikh and was not unduly onerous. It could readily be combined with work on their own grazing or producing lands and benefited the tribe as a whole. The government administrators usually avoided becoming involved in legal disputes that might result from water rights, leaving the disputes to be settled by the sheikh in accordance with traditional tribal practices. Thus, despite occasional tensions in such relationships, the power of the central government gradually expanded into regions where Baghdad's influence had previously been slight or absent. Despite the erosion of the historic purposes of tribal organisation, the prolonged absence of alternative social links has helped to preserve the tribal character of individual and group relations. The complexity of these relations is impressive. Even in the southern, irrigated part of the country there are notable differences between the tribes along the Tigris, subject to Iranian influences, and those of the Euphrates, whose historic links are with the Arab bedouin tribes of the desert. The tribe represents a concentric social system linked to the classical nomadic structure but modified by the sedentary environment

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and limited territory characteristic of the modem era. The primary unit within the tribe is the named agnatic lineage several generations deep to which each member belongs. This kinship unit shares responsibilities in feuds and war, restricts and controls marriage within itself, and jointly occupies a specified share of tribal land. The requirements of mutual assistance preclude any significant economic differentiation, and authority is shared among the older men. The primary family unit rests within the clan, composed of two or more lineage groups related by descent or adoption. Nevertheless, a clan can switch its allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, ascendant tribe. The clans are units of solidarity in disputes with other clans in the tribe, although there may be intense feuding among the lineage groups within the clan. The clan also represents a shared territorial interest, as the land belonging to the component lineage groups customarily is adjacent. Several clans united under a single sheikh form a tribe (ashira). This traditionally has been the dominant politico-military unit although, because of unsettled conditions, tribes frequently band together in confederations under a paramount sheikh. The degree of hierarchy and centralisation operative in a given tribe seems to correlate with the length of time it has been sedentary: the Bani Isad, for example, which has been settled for several centuries, is much more centralised than the Ash Shabana, which has been sedentary only since the end of the nineteenth century. In the south, only solely tribesmen inhabit the small hamlets scattered throughout the cultivated area. The most widely spread social unit is the village, and most villages have resident tradesmen (ahl as suq-people of the market) and government employees. The lines between these village dwellers and the tribes-people, at least until just before the war, were quite distinct, although the degree varies from place to place. As the provision of education, health, and other social services to the generally impoverished rural areas increases, the number and the social influence of these non-tribal people increase. Representatives of the central government takeover roles previously filled by the' sheikh or his representatives. A government school competes with the religious school. The role of the merchants as middlemenbuyers of the peasants' produce and providers of seeds and implements

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as well as of food and clothing-has not yet been superseded in most areas by the government-sponsored cooperatives and extension agencies. Increasingly in the 1980s, government employees were of local or at least rural origin, whereas in the 1950s they usually were Baghdadis who had no kinship ties in the region, wore Western clothing, and took their assignments as exile and punishment. In part, the administrators provoked the mutual antagonism that flourished between them and the peasants, particularly as Sunni officials were often assigned to Shia villages. The merchants, however, were from the region-if not from the same village-and were usually the sons of merchants. Despite some commercial developments in rural areas, in the late 1980s the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser but increasing extent, animal husbandry. Failure to resolve the technical problem of irrigation drainage contributed to declining rural productivity, however, and accentuated the economic as well as the political role of the central government. The growth of villages into towns and whatever signs of recent prosperity there were should be viewed, therefore, more as the result of greater government presence than as locally developed economic viability. The increased number of government representatives and employees added to the market for local produce and, more important, promoted the diffusion of state revenues into impoverished rural areas through infrastructure and service projects. Much remained to be done to supply utilities to rural inhabitants; just before the war, the government announced a campaign to provide such essentials as electricity and clean water to the villages, most of which still lacked these. The government has followed through on several of these projects-particularly in the south-despite the hardships caused by the war. The regime apparently felt the need to reward the southerners, who had suffered inordinately in the struggle.

Urban Society Iraq's society just before the outbreak of the war was undergoing profound and rapid social change that had a definite urban focus. The city has historically played an important economic and political role in the life of Middle Eastern societies, and this was certainly true \

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in the territory that is present-day Iraq. Trade and commerce, handicrafts and small manufactures, and administrative and cultural activities have traditionally been central to the economy and the society, notwithstanding, the overwhelming rural character of most of the population. In the modern era, as the country witnessed a growing involvement with the world market and particularly the commercial and administrative sectors, the growth of a few urban centres, notably Baghdad and Basra, has been astounding. The war, however, has altered this pattern of growth remarkably-in the case of Baghdad accelerating it; in the case of Basra shrinking it considerably. Demographic estimates based on the 1987 census reflected an increase in the urban population from 5,452,000 in 1970 to 7,646,054 in 1977, and to 11,078,000 in 1987 or 68 per cent ofthe population. Census data show the remarkable growth of Baghdad in particular, from just over 500,000 in 1947 to 1,745,000 in 1965; and from 3,226,000 in 1977 to 3,845,000 in 1987. The port of Basra presents a more complex picture: accelerated growth up to the time the war erupted, then a sharp deceleration once the war started when the effects of the fighting around the city began to be felt. Between 1957 and 1965, Basra actually had a higher growth rate than Baghdad-90 per cent in Basra as compared with Baghdad's 65 per cent. But once the Iranians managed to sink several tankers in the Shatt ai-Arab, this effectively blocked the waterway and the economy of the port city began to deteriorate. By 1988, repeated attempts by Iran to capture Basra had further eroded the strength of the city's commercial sector, and the heavy bombardment had rendered some quarters of Basra virtually uninhabitable. Because of the war reliable statistics were unavailable, but the city's population in early 1988 was probably less than half that in 1977. In the extreme north, the picture was somewhat different. There, a number of middle-sized towns have experienced very rapid growthtriggered by the unsettled conditions in the region. Early in the war the government determined to fight Kurdish-guerrilla activity by targeting the communities that allegedly sustained the rebels. It, therefore, cleared whole tracts of the mountainous region of local inhabitants. The residents of the cleared areas fled to regional urban centres like Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk; by and large,

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they did not transfer to the major urban centres such as Mosul and Kirkuk. Statistical details of the impact of these population shifts on the physical and spatial character of the cities were generally lacking in the 1980s. According to accounts by on-the-spot observers, in Baghdad-and presumably in the other cities as well-there appeared to have been no systematic planning to cope with the growth of slum areas. Expansion in the capital until the mid-1970s had been quite haphazard. As a result, there were many open spaces between buildings and quarters. Thus, the squatter settlements that mushroomed in those years were not confined to the city's fringes. By the late 1950s, the sari/ahs (reed and mud huts) in Baghdad were estimated to number 44,000, or almost 45 per cent of the total number of houses in the capital. These slums became a special target of Qasim's government. Efforts were directed at improving the housing and living conditions of the sari/ah dwellers. Between 1961 and 1963, many of these settlements were eliminated and their inhabitants moved to two large housing projects on the edge of the city-Madinat ath Thawra and An Nur. Schools and markets were also built, and sanitary services were provided. In time, however, Ath Thawra and An Nur, too, became dilapidated, and just before the war Saddam Hussein ordered Ath Thawra re-built as Saddam City. This new area of low houses and wide streets has radically improved the lifestyles of the residents, the overwhelming majority of whom were Shias who had migrated from the south. Another striking feature of the initial waves of migration to Baghdad and other urban centres is that the migrants have tended to stay, bringing with them whole families. The majority of migrants were peasant cultivators, but shopkeepers, petty traders, and small craftsmen came as well. Contact with the point of rural origin was not totally severed, and return visits were fairly common, but reverse migration was extremely rare. At least initially, there was a pronounced tendency for migrants from the same village to relocate in clusters to ease the difficulties of transition and maintain traditional patterns of mutual assistance. Whether this pattern has continued into the war years was not known, but it seems likely. A number of observers have reported

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neighbourhoods in the capital formed on the basis of rural or even tribal origin. The urban social structure has evolved gradually over the years. In pre-revolutionary Iraq a well-defined ruling class, concentrated in Baghdad, dominated it. This was an internally cohesive group, distinguished from the rest of the population by its considerable wealth and political power. The economic base of this class was landed wealth, but during the decades of the British Mandate and the monarchy, as landlords acquired commercial interests and merchants and government officials acquired real estate, a considerable intertwining of families and interests occurred. The result was that the Iraqi ruling class could not be easily separated into constituent parts: the largest commercial trading houses were controlled by families owning vast estates; the landowners were mostly tribal sheikhs but included many urban notables, government ministers, and civil servants. Moreover, the landowning class controlled the parliament, which tended to function in the most narrowly conceived interest of these landlords. There was a small but growing middle class in the 1950s and 1960s that included a traditional core of merchants, shopkeepers, craftsmen, professionals, and government officials, their numbers augmented increasingly by graduates from the school system. The Ministry of Education had been the one area during the monarchy that was relatively independent of British advisers, and, thus, it was expanded as a conspicuous manifestation of government response to popular demand. It was completely oriented towards white-collar, middle-class occupations. Within this middle class, and closely connected to the commercial sector, was a small industrial bourgeoisie whose interests were not completely identical with those of the more traditional sector. Iraq's class structure at mid-century WCI~ characterised by great instabilit)..·. In addition to the profound changes occurring in the countryside, there was the economic and social disruption of shortages and spiralling inflation brought on by World War H. Fortunes were made by a few, but for most there was deprivation and, as a consequence, great social unrest. Longtime Western observers compared the situation of the urban masses unfavourably with conditions in the last years of Ottoman rule. An instance of the abrupt

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population shifts was the Iraqi Jews. The establishment of the state of Israel led to the mass exodus of this community in 1950, to be replaced by Shia merchants and traders, many of whom were descendants of Iranian immigrants from the heavily Shia populated areas of the south. The trend of urban growth, which had commenced in the days immediately preceding the revolution, took off in the mid-1970s, when the effects of the sharp increases in the world price of oil began to be felt. Oil revenues poured into the cities where they were invested in construction and real estate speculation. The dissatisfied peasantry then found even more cause to move to the cities because jobsmainly in construction-were available, and even part-time, unskilled labour was an improvement over conditions in the countryside. As for the elite, the oil boom of the 1970s brought greater diversification of wealth, with some going to those attached to the land, and some to those involved in the regime, commerce, and, increasingly, manufacturing. The working class grew but was largely fragmented. A relatively small number were employed in businesses of ten or more workers, whereas a much larger number were classified as wage-workers, including those in the service sector. Between the elite and the working masses was the lower middle class of petty bourgeoisie. This traditional component consisted of the thousands of small handicraft shops, which made up a huge part of the so-called manufacturing sector, and the even more numerous one-man stores. The newer and more rapidly expanding part of this class consisted of professionals and semi-professionals employed in services and the public sector, including the officer corps, and the thousands of students looking for jobs. This class became particularly significant in the 1980s because former members of it have become the nation's elite. Perhaps the most important aspect of the growth of the public sector was the expansion of educational facilities, with consequent pressures to find white-collar jobs for graduates in the non-commodity sectors.

Agrarian Reforms One of the most significant achievements of the fundamentally urban-based revolutionary regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-63) was the proclamation and partial implementation of a radical agrarian reform programme. The scope of the programme and the drastic shortage of an administrative cadre to implement it, coupled with

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political struggles within the Qasim regime and its successors, limited the immediate impact of the programme to the expropriation stage. The largest estates were easily confiscated, but distribution lagged owing to administrative problems and the wasted, saline character of much of the land expropriated. Moreover, landlords could choose the best of the lands to keep for themselves. Outsiders, such as officials of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), can only surmise the impact of the reforms on the lives of the rural masses on the basis of uncertain official statistics and rare observations and reports. The development of cooperatives, especially in their capacity as marketing agents, was one of the most obvious failures of the programme, although isolated instances of success did emerge. In some of these instances, traditional elders were mobilised to serve as cooperative directors, and former sirkals, clan leaders who functioned as foremen for the sheikhs, could bring a working knowledge of local irrigation needs and practices to the cooperative. The continued impoverishment of the rural masses was evident, however, in the tremendous migration that continued through the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s from rural to urban areas. According to the Ministry of Planning, the average rate of internal migration from the countryside increased from 19,600 a year in the mid-1950s to 40,000 a year in the 1958 to 1962 period. A study of 110 villages in the Nineveh and Babylon governorates concluded that depressed rural conditions and other variables-rather than job opportunities in the modern sector-accounted for most of the migration. There was little doubt that this massive migration and the land reform reduced the number of landless peasants. The most recent comprehensive tenurial statistics available before the war broke outthe Agricultural Census of 1971-put the total farmland (probably meaning cultivable land, rather than land under cultivation) at over 5.7 million hectares, of which "civil persons" held more than 98.2 per cent. About 30 per cent of this had been distributed under the agrarian reform. The average size of the holdings was about 9.7 hectares; but 60 per cent of the holdings were smaller than 7.5 hectares, accounting for less than 14 per cent of the total area. At the other end of the scale, 0.2 per cent of the holdings were 250 hectares or larger, amounting to more than 14 per~cent of the

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total. Fifty-two per cent of the total was owner-operated, 41 per cent was farmed under rental agreements, squatters worked 4.8 per cent, and only 0.6 per cent was sharecropped. The status of the remaining 1.6 per cent was uncertain. On the basis of limited statistics released by the government in 1985, the amount of land distributed since the inception of the reform programme totalled 2,271,250 hectares. Political instability throughout the 1960s, hindered the implementation of the agrarian reform programme, but after seizing power in 1968, the Baath regime made a considerable effort to reactivate it. Law 117 (1970) further limited the maximum size of holdings, eliminated compensation to the landowner, and abolished payments by beneficiaries, thus acknowledging the extremity of peasant indebtedness and poverty. The reform created a large number of smallholdings. Given the experience of similar efforts in other countries, foreign observers surmised that a new stratification has emerged in the countryside, characterised by the rise of middle-level peasants who, directly or through their leadership in the cooperatives, control much of the agricultural machinery and its use. Membership in the ruling Baath Party is an additional means of securing access to and control over such resources. Prior to the war, the party seemed to have few roots in the countryside, but after the ascent of Saddam Hussein to the presidency in 1979, a determined effort was made to build bridges between the party cadre in the capital and the provinces. It is noteworthy that practically all party officials promoted to the second echelon of leadership at the 1982 party congress had distinguished themselves by mobilising party support in the provinces. Even before the war, migration posed a serious threat of labour shortages. In the 1980s, with the war driving whole communities to seek refuge in the capital, this shortage has been exacerbated and was particularly serious in areas intensively employing mechanised agricultural methods. The government has attempted to compensate for this shortage by importing turnkey projects with foreign professionals. But in the Kurdish areas of the north-and to a degree in the southern region infested by deserters-the safety of foreign personnel was difficult to guarantee; therefore, many projects have had to be temporarily abandoned. Another government strategy for coping with the labour shortage caused by the war has been to import

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Egyptian workers. It has been estimated that as many as 1.5 million Egyptians have found employment in Iraq since the war began.

Lifestyle The family is the most important unit of social organisation in contemporary Iraqi society. It also is a relatively cohesive institution at the centre of economic activities. The family provides protection, food, shelter, income, reputation, and honour. The present-day Iraqi family is not extended in the strict sense. It is rare for three or more generations to live together in the same household. However, relatives generally remain closely tied in a web of intimate relationships. They continue to live in the same neighbourhood, to intermarry, and to group together on a kinship basis. Although the family is losing ground where social change is occurring most rapidly (such as in cities), family loyalty still dominates all aspects of Iraqi life. Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the high value Iraqis place on large families. Family members may be held responsible for the acts of every other member. Iraqi families are patriarchal and hierarchical (with respect to sex and age). The father possesses complete authority and responsibility. He expects respect and unquestioning compliance, and shows little tolerance of dissent. Fathers generally remain aloof from the task of raising children in their early years. The Iraqi Arab family is the society in miniature: the same patriarchal and hierarchical relations and values also prevail at work and in religious, political, and social associations. Iraqi society traditionally assigns women a subordinate status. The majority of women continue to occupy the private domain of the household. Wives are expected to obey and serve their husbands and to defer to them, especially in public. Supported by religious ideology and teachings, the prevailing standards of morality stress values and norms associated with traditional ideas of femininity, motherhood, and sexuality. At the heart of the role of women is the belief that a family's honour is tied to a woman's modesty and faithfulness. Men are privileged in Iraqi Arab society, wielding almost all authority. Important masculine values and virtues, dating from the

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nomadic past, include personal bravery, a willingness to bear hardships and to come to the aid of family and friends no matter what the circumstances, and fathering children (preferably sons). Traditionally, Iraqi Arab marriage has been seen as a family and communal affair more than an individual one. It has been a mechanism for the reinforcement of family ties and interests. Iraqi Arabs still practice arranged marriage and endogamy (marriage within the same lineage, village, or community). Most common is the parallel cousin marriage: marrying the child of one's father's brother. Traditionally, girls have married at a substantially earlier age than boys. Great emphasis is placed on premarital chastity. Polygamy in Iraq is conditional upon approval of a judge. It is relatively simple for a husband to divorce his wife, but very difficult for a wife to divorce her husband against his will. The traditional codes governing marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance differ in Iraq according to ethnicity and religious sect. Marriages are important events to Kurdish families. Traditionally, they are arranged. Kurds also practice endogamy. Ideally, a man will marry his father's brother's daughter, to whom he has "first rights." Marriage celebrations can range from one day to one week. Gifts are exchanged between the wedding families. The bride brings with her a dowry equal to the ceremonial bride-price and the agreed-upon alimony to be collected if the marriage ends in divorce. On the seventh day of the marriage, the couple visits close relatives, receiving more presents for their new lives. If the groom does not pay the agreed-upon bride-wealth or does not support and clothe his wife according to the standards of her own family, the bride has grounds for divorce. The only other way she may obtain divorce is by repayment in full of the bride-wealth, unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage settlement. A man may divorce his wife by renouncing her three times. The hierarchical structure of the Arab family requires children to obey their elders and meet their expectations. Sons are especially welcome in Arab families because they are the carriers of the family tradition, and because their economic contribution is greater than that of daughters. Sons are usually taught to be protectors of their sisters and to help the father with his duties inside and outside the house, while daughters are taught to defer to their brothers, and to

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help the mother to take care of household chores. Arab families also teach their children to attach tremendous importance to blood ties and bonds of loyalty. During adolescence, there, traditionally, is a separation of sexes.

Housing The availability of housing is one of the aspects of social security. Owning a house has implications on the social status of the individual and family, and is an investment for the future. It is an indication of the success and the ability to spend on the family and to guarantee its future. In Iraq, houses have taken various forms. It is either a detached dwelling unit, an apartment, or a small traditional unit similar to those in other countries in the Middle East. Dwelling units may also be annexes to larger houses. There are also dwellings such as tents and huts. Most Iraqis live in permanent dwellings in the form of houses, annexes, or flats. Some houses suffer from destruction due to war or age. The majority of families in Iraq own their dwelling units, and renting is only in the urban areas. The distribution of dwelling unit types is similar throughout Iraq. • Ten per cent of families in Iraq suffer from overcrowding, 8 per cent in the urban areas, and 16 per cent in the rural areas. • 95 per cent of units were constructed of permanent building material. • 28 per cent of families in it was Governorate, and 28 per cent of those in Misan live in non-permanent dwelling units. 14 per cent of families in Nineveh Governorate live in huts. 20 per cent of families nationwide live in simple non-traditional dwelling units, which indicates inadequate housing conditions. Ownership of property is a common form of social security in Iraq, which is more common to the Centre and South. However, in Baghdad and the North, tr...l rate of rented houses increases. The number of houses occupied without rent payment also increases in the North, especially in the Kurdistan Region, as a result of the special situation of this region in the recent past, particularly due to ownership restrictions and internal immigration. Overall it is found that: • 76 per cent of dwelling units are owned by the families living in them;

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• 15 per cent of the dwelling units are rented; • 7 per cent of dwellings have been squatted upon; • 2 per cent are occupied without paying rent. As a result to the numerous wars that took place inside Iraq, and others that took place with neighbouring countries dUring the last 25 years, many dwelling units were subject to destruction. Although the survey did not measure the costs of the destruction, the following was found: • 5 per cent of houses in the urban areas, and 3 per cent of those in the rural areas suffer from destruction; • 6 per cent of families in urban and rural areas live in dwelling units suffering from destruction; • 25 per cent of the family dwellings in the rural areas in the North have been destructed as a result of war.

Dressing The majority of Iraqi women dress conservatively. Some women dress in clothes that do not cover their faces or hair, while others cover them. For example, a very conservative woman might wear a long black garment called "abayah" that covers her body from the shoulders down to her feet. Under this cover she could be wearing a traditional Arabian dress in full body length with long sleeves or she could be wearing the latest style from an internationally known designer. In addition to the abayah, a very conservative woman would also wear a face and head cover while some others would not. The majority of men wear a long sleeved one-piece dress that covers the whole body, called a "dishdashah" or "thoub". During summer, the dishdashah is usually made of white cotton to reflect sunlight. In winter, the dishdashah is made from heavier fabric such as wool and comes in darker colours. With the dishdashah men also wear a 3-piece head cover. The bottom piece of this head covering is a white cap that is sometimes filled with holes. This cap, called "thagiyah", is used to hold the hair in place. On top of the thagiyah is a scarf-like head cover that comes in two types: a light, white head cover called "gutrah" which is worn in summer, and a heavy red and white checked head cover called "shumag" which is worn during winter.

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These head covers protect the head from direct sunlight and can be used to cover the mouth and the nose dUring sand storms or cold weather. On top of the thagiyah and the gutrah is the "ogal", which is a black band surrounding the top of the head to hold everything else in place. When male children reach puberty they are taught to wear the head covering as a sign for entering manhood.

Eating Habits The Iraqis like to spread their bread with olive oil, or with soft white cheese, or to dip it in the delicious oily purees which they make from chick peas, broiled eggplant or parsley flavoured with pungent sesame seed oil. Because the cooking habits of Iraqis were so strongly influenced by neighbouring Turkey and Iran, Iraq joins Israel as one of the only Middle-Eastern nations to lack a unique cuisine. Like the Turks, Iraqis love to stuff vegetables and eat a great deal of rice, lamb and yogurt. Like Iranians, they enjoy cooking fruits together with beef and poultry. While there may not be a distinct style to Iraqi cookery, there are several dishes that have their roots there, and all have become well beloved parts of Israeli dining: Masgooj is an outdoor barbecue of skewered whole river fish; Pacha is a slowly cooked combination of sheep's head, stomach, feet and a variety of other meats in broth; and turshi, a mixture of pickled vegetables, is a popular side dish. Historian Reay Tannehill reports that in the 18th. century, the most famous chefs of Baghdad were Jews who had travelled in Europe. Upon their return, they introduced French and Italian influences to the diet of upper-class Iraqi families. Even today, one of the most popular dishes in Baghdad is lahma hi ajeen. Composed of circles of yeast bread topped with ground lamb that has been cooked in herbed tomato sauce, the dish was devised by a Jewish chef after he had visited Italy. Many young Iraqis prefer to call the dish by its popular name-"pizza." . Iraqi food is rich and diverse, incorporating spices typical of Arabic cooking, such as saffron and mint. Extra food is usually cooked in case of surprise visitors, while expected guests are treated to many elaborate dishes. People eat their evening meal around 8:00 p.m. Most cooking is done on gas or paraffin-oil stoves, though

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in the cities, people often own microwave ovens to help shorten cooking time. The preferred meats in Iraq are lamb, beef, goat, mutton and poultry. Muslims do not eat pork or pork products. As in other Middle Eastern countries, Iraqi meat dishes often combine vegetables and rice. Iraqi cooking uses two varieties of rice: amber rice in the north, and neggaza in the south. Popular main courses include kebabs, which are skewered chunks of grilled meat; quzi, roasted and stuffed lamb; and kubba, which is minced meat with nuts, raisins and spices. Masgouf is a special dish made from fish that live in the Tigres River. Another popular dish is tripe, a dish made of cow's stomach; there are a number of tripe restaurants in the cities. Most meals are accompanied by flat rounds of bread (samoons). For dessert, people enjoy some of Iraq's local fruits, rice pudding, Turkish Delight, sesame cookies, or baklava, a pastry made with honey and pistachios layered between filo sheets. The most widely consumed drinks in Iraq are coffee and tea. Arabic coffee is famous for its strong flavour. In Iraq, people brew their coffee thick and bitter, and serve it black. Tea is usually served in small glasses and drunk sweetened, without milk. Fruit juices and soft drinks are also popular. Muslims are officially forbidden to consume alcohol. Unfortunately, economic sanctions have altered Iraqi eating habits, as food has been rationed since 1991. In the south and central Iraq, the government issues five food items: wheat flour, rice, sugar, tea and cooking oil. Those with children under one year old can also get milk powder, when available. Many foods are now too expensive for most people to buy, and in many places, people are receiving only about one-third of their daily caloric requirement. Various international programmes have been working in Iraq to distribute food.

Food and Drinks The Kurds are not heavy meat-eaters, but rely more on vegetables and grains. Uke other Muslims, they eat lamb and mutton, and sometimes beef, but mostly in conjunction with rice and vegetables, in pilafs and in dishes parallel to our stews. Staple grains are rice and bulghur (a kind of wheat kernel somewhat akin to Cream of

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Wheat) and a flat bread baked on the sides of a tandoor or circular oven. Tandoor-style Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan restaurants have cropped up in recent years in bigger cities in the United States, and bread like the Kurds make is often available there. Vegetables include summer squash, cucumbers, tomatoes, and parsley-like greens. Fruit is appreciated, with watermelon (eaten with knife and fork) a favourite. Salt, pepper, cumin, and garlic are common spices; hot peppers are used sparingly, and cooking oil is used with enthusiasm. Plain yogurt is another staple, along with cheese. Kurdish families are likely to want to make their own yogurt, a simple process that depends on a live yogurt culture, which is added to milk and causes it to ferment. Our whole milk is generally unacceptable for yogurtit is too rich in fat-but 1 per cent or 2 per cent milk is fine. Kurds drink tea-lots of it, heavily sweetened, occasionally by means of a sugar cube held under the tongue. In the Middle East, tea is drunk in small glasses (with a small spoon placed in the glass to keep it from breaking when hot tea is poured into it), which can sometimes be found in Middle Eastern grocery stores in the United States. It will be a great help to your Kurdish friends if you show them where they can buy rice and bulghur in bulk. Middle Eastern grocery stores are likely to carry varieties of both that are familiar to the Kurds. A source for yogurt or the wherewithal to make their own will be appreciated. Finding a substitute for the flat bread should not be a challenge: Afghan flat bread or pita is acceptable. Gl"€ens vary widely between here and the Middle East. Kurdish women might have to try a number of kinds before finding one they like. When the time comes, and if the Kurds can find a source of seeds, you might assist them in planting a herb garden. Other necessary staples include tomato paste, which is diluted and cooked with vegetables, and whatever cooking oil a particular cook prefers. Olive oil is the standard oil throughout the Middle East, but many Kurds have not been able to afford it and might have gotten used to using butter or other kinds of oil. Kurds

Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, accounting for about 19 per cent of the population, or around 4 million. They are the overwhelming majority in As Sulaymaniyah,

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Irbil, and Dahuk governorates. Although, the government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost certainly also a majority in the region around Kirkuk, Iraq's richest oil-producing area. Kurds are settled as far south as Khanaqin. Ranging across northern Iraq, the Kurds are part of the larger Kurdish population (probably numbering close to 16 million) that inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the north-western part of Syria through Azarbaijan and Iraq to the north-west of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although, the largest numbers live in Turkey (variously estimated at between 3 and 10 million), it is in Iraq that they are most active politically. The Kurds inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys and have traditionally been organised on a tribal basis. In the past it was correct to distinguish the various communities of Kurds according to their tribal affiliation, and to a large extent this was still true in the 1980s; tribes like the Herkki, the Sorchi, and Zibari have maintained a powerful cohesion. But increasingly groups of Kurds organised along political lines have grown up alongside the tribal units. Hence, the most northern and extreme north-eastern areas of Iraq are heavily infiltrated by elements of the so-called Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The area around Kirkuk and south to Khanaqin is the preserve of the Faili Kurds, who, unlike the majority of Kurds, are Shias. Many of the Faili Kurds belong to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The far north-western region of Iraq around Sinjar is spotted with enclaves claimed by the Iraqi Communist Party, the bulk of whose cadres are composed of Kurds. Once mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic, Kurdish society was characterised by a combination of urban centres, villages, and pastoral tribes since, at least, the Ottoman period. Historical sources indicate that from the eighteenth century onward Kurds in Iraq were mainly peasants engaged in agriculture and arboriculture. By the nineteenth century, about 20 per cent of Iraqi Kurds lived in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, As Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil. The migration to the cities, particularly of the young intelligentsia, helped develop Kurdish nationalism. Since the early 1960s, the urban Kurdish areas have grown rapidly. Kurdish migration-in addition to being part of the general trend of urban migration-was prompted by the escalating armed conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad, the destruction of

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villages and land by widespread bombing, and such natural disasters as a severe drought in the 1958-61 period. In addition to destroying traditional resources, the severe fighting has hindered the development of education, health, and other services. The historic enmity between the Kurds and the central Arab government has contributed to the tenacious survival of Kurdish culture. The Kurds' most distinguishing characteristic and the one that binds them to one another is their language. There are several Kurdish dialects, of which Kirmanji tends to be the standard written form. Kurdish is not a mere dialect of Farsi or Persian, as many Iranian nationalists maintain. And it is certainly not a variant of the Semitic or Turkic tongues. It is a separate language, part of the IndoEuropean family. The Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent struggle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the founding of the Iraqi republic in 1958. It appeared in the early 1970s that the dissident Kurds-under the generalship of the legendary leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani-might actually carve out an independent Kurdish area in northern Iraq. In 1975, however, the shah of Iran-the Kurds' principal patron-withdrew his support of the Kurds as part of the Algiers Accord between Tehran and Baghdad, leading to a sharp decline in the Kurdish movement. The signing of the Algiers Accord caused a breakaway faction to emerge from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP), led by Masud Barzani, the son of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The faction that left the KDP in opposition to the accord formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani. The PUK continued to engage in low-level guerrilla activity against the central government in the period from 1975 to 1980. The war between Iraq and Iran that broke out in 1980 afforded the PUK and other Iraqi Kurdish groups the opportunity to intensify their opposition to the government.

Other Minorities The Yazidis are of Kurdish stock but are distinguished by their unique religious fusion of elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. They live in small and isolated groups, mostly in the Sinjar Mountains west of Mosul. They are impoverished cultivators and herdsmen who have a strictly graded religio-political

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Soc ial For ces McGeough's essay provides some dee per understanding of the complex make-up and structure of Iraq, in particular the relationship between the sheikhs, tribes and the governing powers in Iraq. The essay ope ns with a recounting of sheikh Malik's untimely dea th at the han ds of US forces. In the months preceding the invasion, Malik had mad e his vast resources availab le to the US military sources, providing information and assistan ce in preparation for the then imminent invasion. Malik undertook his activities at great personal risk. Yet in the early days of the inva sion US forces laun che d five missiles in to Malik's sprawling prop erty, where his extended family had gathered in what they thought was a safe area. Twenty-two

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and children. The reason for the civilians were killed, mostly women US forces by tribal enemies of bombing? Misinformation fed to the Malik. g tradition in Iraqi society to McGeough outlines the long-standin the family. Pride and sha me, seek revenge for sha me suffered by t importance to the tribes. With McGeough explains, are issues of grea on Iraqi society in the 199 0's, the UN imposed sanctions biting hard the sanctuary of the tribes, where a good num ber of Iraqis returned to dispensing justice and largesse, tribal sheikhs take responsibility for The sheikhs were, according to overseeing issues large and small. the early days of the occupation, McGeough, willing to assist the US in bee n entirely marginalised. for a price. They have, however, l leaders, and in the course While paying no hee d to the triba es have man age d to 'sha me and of the occupation, the occupying forc powerful sheikhs included, that dishonour' a good man y people, ght into Iraqi society, have bee n would, for the want of a little insi erstwhile allies. er of the sheikhs, and in McGeough makes a case for the pow that would be favourable to the particular their ability to play a role ds advised in the preparatory occupying forces. Wiser military hea tory relationship should be struck days of the invasion that a concilia tary powers ignored the advice. with the powerful sheikhs. US mili e the occupiers given to building Only after the Fallujah uprising hav in any serious way. McGeough relationships with some of the sheikhs certainly have the pow er to wind makes it clear that while the sheikhs ness to do so no longer exists. back the insurgency, the prepared a bedrock feudalist society In all, McGeough paints a picture of dam 's lengthy and brutal rule, that despite or perh aps because of Sad ds significant power in everyday the sheikhs pow er remains, and yiel life in Iraq. d deal of insight into the McGeough's essay provides a goo ety and exposes muc h of the underpinning structure of Iraqi soci inistration reflected in the daily arrogant brutality of the US adm y portents that there is a more operations of its arm ed forces. His essa goals in Iraq could be met with efficient way to occupy Iraq, that US que reveals, between the lines, an inclusive outlook. McGeough's criti alternative ruling caste in Iraq, that there is already in existence an control of religious extremists. and one that may well be bey ond the

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Quarterly Essay makes no claim to being a socialist publication, and to be sure, McGeough provides only a journalists analysis, reporting on the structure of Iraq while passing no comment on the misogynist and brutal future that awaits Iraqi society generally, if an Islamic republic is founded.

Tribal Structure At least three-quarters of the Iraqi people are members of one of the country's 150 tribes. Iraq's society is very feudalistic, with most of the population identifying him/herself with one or the other tribe. Tribes have become an increasingly important part of Iraqi society. Even those Iraqi citizens without a tribal background often turn to neighbourhood sheikhs for representation or assistance with the government. During the Ottoman period, nomadic tribes formed the bulk of Iraq's population. Throughout most of Iraq, direct Ottoman control was weak. Loose tribal confederations prevailed, with each tribe acting as a sort of mobile mini-state. In the absence of a strong central authority, the tribal framework fulfilled the primary functions of conflict and resource management. The most important tribal confederations in Iraq included: the Muntafiq, Anaza, Dulaim, Sham mar, Zubayd, Ubayd, Bani Lam and AI-bu Muhammad. Tribal origins varied, religious divisions were not always clear-cut, and there was often a fusion between the different groups. Despite the shared religion of Islam and a general feeling of Arabness, Iraqi tribes did not have a sense of common identity. During the Ottoman period, the Iraqi tribes earned their livelihood from herding animals, trade, raiding, and collecting tribute. A hierarchical system based on the mode of subsistence developed, with the camel-breeding tribes at the top, followed by the sheepbreeders, peasants, and the marsh-dwellers. Where sedentary agriculture prevailed, another hierarchy placed rice-growers on top, followed by vegetable growers, and manual workers. Tribesmen regularly visited towns, both to trade and to visit the holy shrines. Beginning the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire increased its control over Iraqi tribes through settlement policies and land reform measures. The result was an erosion of the sheikhs' traditional source of power and a disintegration of the traditional tribal system. Following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British decided to unite the three Ottoman provinces of

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Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra into one nation-state called Iraq (a name borrowed from the medieval past of the region) despite the significant religious, lingUistic, ethnic, and tribal divisions running through Iraqi society. British policies restored power to the tribal sheikhs, thereby helping to preserve and reinforce Iraq's tribal structure. At the same time, the British colonial state gradually appropriated former tribal functions like control of land, water distribution, and law enforcement. Nomadic tribes continued to settle in village communities based on extended families or sub-clans. These communities often retained their tribal names, but they were linked to the agricultural market, rather than the subsistence economy. Iraqi tribes continued to lose power under both the modernising monarchy and the republican regime. The republican regime enacted and began to implement agrarian reform. At the same time, a new wave of emigration from countryside to city weakened the remaining tribal units and ties. Following the 1968 -Baathist coup, close family, clan, and tribal ties bound Iraq's ruling Sunni elite. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis Sunni Arabs from the town of Tikrit northwest of Baghdad related to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, was a Tikriti and a relative of al-Bakr. Since the mid-1970s, the Baathist regime's efforts to overcome Iraqi divisions and bring the various ethnic and religious communities under effective central control have included military campaigns against the Shia and Kurds, social and economic incentives, and the attempted creation of a unifying national ideology. Sunni-Shia tensions peaked following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). During this period, the regime also increased its control by relying on tribal loyalties among both Sunni and Shia Arabs. Sunni tribes that closely supported the regime included: the Dulaym, Jubbur, Ukaydat, Mulla, Saidat, and Shammar. A Shia tribe, al-Ahbab, from the Tikrit region also supports the regime. The regime's rationale for increasingly relying on the tribes during this period was twofold. First, tribal' Arabs, although they had become settled, were still considered Bedouin, and thus the most genuinely Arab, and the most trustworthy in a war against the Persians. Second, they were believed to have retained

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tribal values such as communal spirit, honour, and valour. For the impoverisheCl tribes, military and government service was a respectable and profitable livelihood as well as a vehicle for upward mobility. Saddam Hussein also rewarded the villages of loyal tribesmen by providing roads, electricity, and water systems. Cooperating tribal leaders could rely on the government to provide jobs and perks to their members. In contrast, punishment for uncooperative sheikhs ranged from the denial of jobs and perks to death. In the Kurdish regions, a policy of replacing uncooperative chiefs and splitting tribes was the key to the government's interaction with the rural Kurds during the 1980s. Tribal chiefs appointed by the regime mediated between the government and their communities, and fought against Kurdish nationalists represented by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Because of a weakened economy and the severely reduced ability of the state to provide social services, many Iraqis increasingly turned to their tribes for support. The renewed alliance between state and tribe created a new symbiosis: the state advanced the favoured tribes and the favoured tribes protected the state. In the late 1980s, this state-tribe alliance became official. The regime has continued to portray tribes as a symbol of patriotism, broadcasting popular forms of tribal war poetry and stressing tribal values. It has facilitated the re-establishment of tribal councils to supervise economic activities, resolve conflicts, and police the region. It also has armed the more loyal tribes throughout the country. The success of the regime's tribal policy was demonstrated when several Shia tribes remained on the sidelines or supported the regime during the 1991 uprising. Anyone who is a Tikriti was easily understood to be affiliated with the Baath regime and the state. Anyone who had a problem with a Tikriti would not have received proper protection from the state as he would have in any other country. Individuals in disagreement with a Tikriti in Iraq would certainly have faced severe re-tributions, and even death. Alternatively, if one is having a problem with the Barzani family in Northern Iraq or the Halabchei family heading the Islamic Movement, one will be persecuted, regardless of one's identity or political perspective. The Iraq government was a family enterprise. It's run by family members, tribal members, second cousins, their sons, their nephews.

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It is a tribal system that runs the country and family relations is the most sure to loyalty, in the system and a guarantor of having no coups, no assassinations from with.

Emphasising the tribal structures as a ruling aspect was quite important as the Iraqi security system was under the umbrella of the National Security Council. The Council was headed by the President and convened in the presidential palace. When Saddam Hussein was not there, his son-in-law AIi Hasan Majid took over this function. Later on the ruling family leaders, i.e., Saddam Hussein and his brothers and half-brothers, met and decided that his son Qusay should replace him in all meetings or ceremonies where he is not present due to illness or other reasons. This provision is another indication that the tribal life was firmly incorporated in the daily decision-making process in Iraq. The same applies to the KDP where it had already been decided who was going to replace Masud Barzani, should anything happen to him. They were working on this individual to promote him like a prince. In a passport one will usually find three names: the name of the person, the name of their father, the name of the grandfather. However, the actual surname, which is the indication of the tribe or region one belongs to, was not written in the passport. The Iraqi government came up with this deliberate policy in order to not identify the area or tribe a person comes from for security reasons. This practice was partly a protection for the individual. If somebody is, e.g. called a Tikriti, it is easy to know that they are part of the ruling family which may expose them to particular security risks. The tribal society brings along some other consequences: individuals are protected, yet at the same time limited by the tribe. This fact is very visible for women and children. Women belong to the family and do not have much right to choose about their own future. Deciding whether to work or not, choosing a profession, choosing their spouses is not in their hands. What is decisive is the family's approval. If one defects from the existing social structure, it means that one is immoral. Since immorality would ruin the honour of the family, the respective family member should be punished. In Sulaymaniyah, one woman's nose was cut in order to set an example. She was accused of having an immoral relationship which, however, was not proven.

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After 1990, there were quite a high number of honour crimes in Iraq, which according to Iraqi law were not punishable. If a woman transgressed a social norm, e.g., by being with a man without marriage or eloping from her husband without permission of the family, the tribal law prescribes capital punishment for this behaviour. This punishment is tolerable according to the Iraqi criminal code. It should give the families the right to instruct their children ethically with the methods they choose, be it punishment at home, be it not letting their children attend a specific school. The result is a circle of social relations at home, with the brothers having superiority to the sisters and the father having superiority to the rest of the family. This pattern is reflected at district as well as government level. After the Baath Party came to power in 1968, they were opposed to this tribal society and wanted not only to abolish the tribal names, reflecting the Ottoman style of naming people, but also to do away with these tribal structures altogether. However, the developments in the Middle East did not allow them to reach their aim. According to Judith Yaphe, "Baghdad through the 1990s encouraged the reconstruction of clans and tribal extended families where they existed. In other areas, the government allowed the manufacture of new "tribal" groups based on economic ties or greed. Where the initiative was weak, Baghdad apparently encouraged prominent citizens to take the initiative or permitted non-leading families to manufacture an entity in order to gain power and wealth .... This has cre-ated a new symbiosis: the state advances the favoured tribes and the favoured tribes protected the state. The state benefited from its absorption of the tribes and the tribes used the state to enrich themselves. In Northern Iraq, the tribal society helped the parties to maintain their power by assigning their own people to specific positions in the government and by using the benefits of this mechanism for themselves or their families. When the KDP took over the rule of Arbil, first they just kept everything in the same order in which they had received it. In time, however, they started to promote Bahdinani people (from the northern regions of Kurdistan) to be assigned to positions in Amil City, the supposed capital of Kurdistan. This caused some reaction from Arbili people, still they support the KDP position in the

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government and in Arbil City for reasons of security and further settlement in the administration and society. This phenomenon does not only occur with the KOP. The PUK is also including some tribes, assigning tribe members to specific apparatuses. The situation in the south is not different. The head of the Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is the umbrella organisation for Shia opposition groups, is Muhammad Bakr alHakim. He comes from the al-Hakim families who for centuries have been scholars. His predecessor Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, his name deriving from his tribe, was a well-known scholar of Shia Islam, too. He was assassinated in Najaf in February 1999. These people are known because of the reputation of their tribe. The rise of an individual is quite rare in this kind of society. The routine chain of feudalistic relations continues to exist, making it difficult to ensure life, bread and security under these conditions Clans and Tribes: As a result at the Turks spaced and large settlement, the important and great existence of the Turks appeared in Iraq. The Turk's not achieving living in a settled order yet, served in Abbasi army as a Turkish colonv in the period of Abbasiler. These Turks coming to Iraq first are belonged to various clans and tribes. It can be identified easily from their names and nicknames that to which tribe they belong. For example, it's possible to understand that Ybni Kayyddyg is from Kayyoly; Kybcakhi, is from Kypcak; Khallukhi is from Karluk; Ybni Azgyp is from Azoypoolu and Ybni Yemak is from Yemakoolu. It's understood easily on condition that they are studied carefully that some of these are from Oohuz and the others are from Beni Tulun (Tolunooullary) as an example. Because many Turkish names, likely to be read in various styles according to Arabian spelling in old writing caused the thought of The Turks beings Iran or coming from another origins. Like this, the existence of many Turkish commanders, Afpyn, Sacaooullary, Karabuora and Buyuk Buora. It is seen that some Turkish tribes were represented in large r:~mbers in the army at Abbasi Caliphs service. The main tribes of these are AI-Ivaiye, that is Yyva tribe of Oghuz and the Khazor and Halac. The settlement of the Turks in a settled way to the area is actually about 11 century. North Iraw of today including Baodat started to become Turkish on a large scale especially from 1055; the date Tuorul Bey got into Baodat. The Turkish

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emigrations occurring continuously in later times reinforced the population settling in the ar'=!a before. Turkish clans and tribes emigrating until the Murad IV. Period formed Turkish group maintaining its existence today. The Turkish group maintained its culture, language, customs, and traditions in Iraq today because they lived in a settled way, tribes and clans were mixed generally each other and they became agitated. However, it is not possible to select because they have used the c!an and tribes names forming Turkish population so far. As a result of this agitation, such as tribe life style, sometimes surnames changed in the centres of developed city life like Musul, Erbil and Kerkuk. Compared to this, we can see that the names of clan and tribe have existed in a vivid way up to now in the centres of rural life. We are going to study in this section the clan, tribe and family names living in Turkish settlement areas and villages as a general apart from the clans and tribes leading role in forming Iraqi Turks of today, and the tribes living and maintaining their existence today in the course of history. Iraqi Tribes, Key Source of Loyalty, Rebellion: For a glimpse of one of Saddam Hussein's oldest weapons, look at a sign along the desolate highway that leads to this city: Territory of the Al-Dulaimi Tribe-Sword in the Hands of the Leader. Or look in a nearby suburb at a ranch house with an SUV out front, or across the border in Damascus, Syria, where plots are hatching against Saddam Hussein. These are all modern manifestations of the tribes of Iraq. When loyal, they refer to themselves as the leader's sword and provide a guide to how Saddam Hussein clings to power. When rebellious, the tribes suggest that his grip is slipping. They also are one possible lever that Western officials have largely ignored in their long campaign to unseat the Iraqi dictator.

Demography Iraq is a country of over 30 million. Baghdad is the commercial and political capital of Iraq with over 5 million in population. Basra and Mosul are the second and third largest in population. Most of Iraq's population lives along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and few Iraqis live in Iraq's West Desert region.

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Iraq is prosperous from its oil and other mineral wealth such as sulphur, phosphates, fertilisers, natural gas, and fertile land. Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world. For the time being, Iraq will solely depend on oil to breed export revenues. Other potential exports consist of urea, fertilisers, sulphur, phosphates and dates. In 1979, immediately upon coming to power, Saddam Hussein silenced all political opposition in Iraq and converted his one-party state into a cult of personality. Over the years since then, his regime has systematically executed, tortured, imprisoned, raped, terrorised and repressed Iraqi people. Iraq is a nation rich in culture with a long history of intellectual and scientific achievement. Yet Saddam Hussein has silenced its scholars and doctors, as well as its women and children. Iraqi dissidents were tortured, killed, or disappeared in order to deter other Iraqi citizens from speaking out against the government or demanding change. A system of collective punishment tortured entire families or ethnic groups for the acts of one dissident. Women were raped and often video-taped during rape to blackmail their families. Citizens were publicly beheaded, and their families were required to display the heads of the deceased as a warning to others who might question the politics of this regime. Saddam Hussein was also the first leader to use chemical weapons against his own population, silencing more than 60 villages and 30,000 citizens with poisonous gas. Saddam Hussein has tried to silence ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq as well. During the Anfal Campaign of 1987-88, Saddam Hussein's regime killed and tortured the Kurdish population. It eliminated many Kurdish villages, and forced surviving Kurds into zones where he could control them. His regime has suppressed the Shia religious community through killings and arrests and bans their Friday prayers and books in certain regions. He has also targeted the citizens of other nations in his region, killing and torturing Kuwaiti and Iranian citizens, among others. The Iraqi people are not allowed to vote to remove the government. Freedom of expression, association and movement did not exist in Iraq. The media was tightly controlledSaddam Hussein's son owned the daily Iraqi newspaper. Iraqi citizens could not assemble except in support of the government. Iraqi citizens

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could not freely leave Iraq. The international community, including the UN and internationally based non-governmental organisations, has documented and repeatedly condemned this regime's horrific record of abuse. Saddam Hussein simply ignores the will of the rest of the world. Saddam Hussein has given the Iraqi people a terrible choiceto remain silentor or face the consequences. But despite his regime's attempts to silence the Iraqi people, their voices were still being heard. Providing money, building materials and even schematic drawings, Kurdish political parties have repatriated thousands of Kurds into this tense northern oil city and its surrounding villages, operating outside the framework of Iraq's newly ratified constitution and sparking sporadic violence between Kurdish settlers and the Arabs who are a minority here, according to US military officials and Iraqi political leaders. The rapidly expanding settlements, composed of two-bedroom concrete houses whose dimensions are prescribed by the Kurdish parties, are effectively re-engineering the demography of northern Iraq, enabling the Kurds to add what ultimately may be hundreds of thousands of voters ahead of a planned 2007 referendum on the status of Kirkuk. The Kurds hope to make the city and its vast oil reserves part of an autonomous Kurdistan. Kurdish political leaders said the re-patriations are designed to correct the policies of ousted President Saddam Hussein, who replaced thousands of Kurds in the region with Arabs from the south. The Kurdish parties have seized control of the process, they said, because the Iraqi government has failed to implement an agreement to return Kurdish residents to their homes. But US military officials, Western diplomats and Arab political leaders have warned the parties that the campaign could work to undermine the nascent constitutional process and raise tensions as displaced Kurds settle onto private lands now held by Arabs. "If you have everyone participating, it'll be a clean affair and you can accomplish your goals," said Lt. Col. Anthony Wickham, the US military's liaison to the Kirkuk provincial government for the past year. "But don't go

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Iraq behind people's backs, which they have a bad habit of doing," he said, referring to the Kurds. "Does that bring greater stability to Kirkuk? No. It brings pandemonium."

In late August, Arabs shot and killed a Kurdish official who was chalking out settlements in Qoshqayah, a disputed village 24 miles north of Kirkuk. An Iraqi soldier was also killed and six Arabs were wounded in skirmishes with Kurds before US and Iraqi troops restored order, arresting two dozen Arabs and cordoning off the village. Arab residents said it was the latest of several violent incidents between security forces in the area over the past two years. "Our patience is about to end," said Hussain Ali Hamdani, a 64 year old Sunni Arab tribal leader. "There are 137 houses in this village now and in each there are at least five" Kurds. "We will protect our land and not abandon it. It's our honour." "The Arabs will not give up Kirkuk," said Muhammad Khalil, the leader of an Arab bloc within the Kurdishdominated Kirkuk provincial council. "If America really wants to help Iraq, it will try to stop the Kurds from gaining control over Kirkuk, which would start a civil war." US military officials said they had sought unsuccessfully to persuade Kurdish political leaders to avoid repatriating Kurds onto private lands, a practice they said had inflamed tensions across the region. Kirkuk, a city of almost 1 million, is home to a combustible mix of multiple ethnicities, a contentious past and enormous potential wealth. Kirkuk's precise demographic make-up is a source of dispute, but Kurds are believed to represent 35 to 40 per cent of the population. The remainder is composed primarily of Arabs, ethnic Turkmens and a small percentage of Assyrian Christians. The Kurds, saying they have a historical claim, hope to anchor Kirkuk to Kurdistan, their semi-autonomous region. Kirkuk holds strategic as well as symbolic value: The ocean of oil beneath its surface could be used to drive the economy of an independent Kurdistan, the ultimate goal for many Kurds. "Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan as Washington D.C. is part of the. United States," said

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Rizgar Ali, President of the Kirkuk provincial council and a top official in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two main Kurdish political parties. With the Kurds firmly in control of the provincial government, Kirkuk already shows signs of a remarkable transition. The names of many streets, buildings, schools and villages have been changed from Arabic to Kurdish. Thousands of Kurds who flooded into Kirkuk after Hussein's fall are still living in a soccer stadium, a city jail and vacant lots. The landscape is replete with ubiquitous gray concrete blocks of the new Kurdish settlements. The city's fate has been one of the thorniest issues of Iraq's constitutional process. Under Article 136 of the document ratified by Iraqis on Oct. 15, a referendum on the status of Kirkuk will be held in the province no later than Dec. 31, 2007, but only after the Iraqi government takes measures to repatriate former Kurdish residents and resettle Arabs or compensate them. The constitution extended a March 2004 transitional law that assigned responsibility for the re-patriations to the federal government. But throughout Kirkuk and across hundreds of remote farming villages, the Kurdish political parties are doing the job themselves. In Alu Mahmud, 20 miles north of Kirkuk, dozens of concrete houses are under construction in three subdivisions plotted by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan engineers. Rashaad Sultan, the village leader supervising the project, said the party provides $ 5,000 to each repatriated family. To ensure that the houses are completed, the money is distributed in instalments: $ 500 to lay the foundation; $ 2,000 when the walls are erected; $ 2,500 upon completion. The self-imposed Kurdish leaders have been very successful in recording one failure after another since 1991 both in internal Kurdish politics and in negotiating with outsiders about their rights and freedoms. The Kurdish role in the new Iraq was no exception to this repetitive phenomenon, this as well marked yet another failure for those who have given themselves the right to speak on behalf of these people in south Kurdistan. The appointed Iraqi government not only dose not give the role of an equal partner to the Kurds in Iraq, it is a setback from what they were offered three decades ago under a chauvinistic Arab dictatorship. Further more, the old Baathie's who are still blowing up coalition forces in Iraq, received more respect and power in the

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new Iraqi gQvernment than the Kurds who harried to the front lines and suffered casualties to help US invade Iraq without bothering to ask US for a written contract about their role in the future Iraq. Instead of a definitive plan about their rights and their role in Iraq, the Kurdish leaders might occasionally mumble that what has been done is not what they asked for, but they are living with it for the sake of pleasing others, just like what Barzani and Talabani have done in their last letter to George W. Bush. In my opinion, even if the demand of the Kurdish leaders were respected and one of the two posts of presidency or Prime Minister's was granted to a Kurd, it would not have translated into much for south Kurdistan in terms of power because of the population demography in Iraq and because of the psychology of the majority of none Kurds in Iraq. Since Kurds have less then 30 per cent of Iraq's population, but a large portion of Iraq's resources, any form of government that is based on a strong centralised power or a simple majority rule will not be in their favour. Even if ignoring the economic disadvantages, the political issue is not only disadvantage for the Kurds, but it is a great danger to Kurdish security, since Arabs in Iraq have a tendency to be very violent and indifference to democracy and the rule of law. The biggest problem the Kurdish society now faces in the south is the fact that it lacks a national plan. The fate of the area is negotiated upon arbitrarily by a couple of none elected leaders who might be good for the political parties that they represent, but they might not necessarily have the best strategies when it comes to the fate of the whole nation in south Kurdistan. The fact that legally, historically, ethnically, south Kurdistan is not part of Iraq have not been accepted yet by the Kurdish leadership; they see these people as a little brother in a dysfunctional family called Iraq, and they have to do their best to make the family behave a little better and not abuse the little brother so much. As long as this notion is in the psyche of the Kurdish leadership the role of Kurd in Iraq will remain as a sidekick, and they will never have a show of their own. At this stage of history it is seen several economical, political, and cultural advantages to be partners with the rest of Iraq in a symbolic union, but this will not be possible unless the rest of

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Iraq will accept that south Kurdistan as separate and distinct from the rest of Iraq and it is part of the fundamental right of Kurdish people in this region to form their government without any relations whatsoever, with the rest of Iraq; then if the Arabs of Iraq see that they have mutual interest to have a union with south Kurdistan, they should negotiate on the mechanism and the details of that union, until then any talks or participation in an Iraqi government is counterproductive to their cause as a nation. This should have been the policy of Kurdish leadership from the start. As far as the union with Iraq concerned we have in previous, articles outlined that south Kurdistan militarily, economically, and politically must be independent and equal to the rest of Iraq. A federal government through an elected small parliament who would have equal number of members from each government should coordinate areas of interest such as defence, economics, and foreign affairs for both governments. This will benefits both nations and puts an end to the circle of violence that they have been trapped in for eighty years. Turkic people were already in Iraq under the Sasanians. In the early Islamic era, the Turks arrival in Iraq started with the settlement of about 4000 Bukharan Turks under the Umayyad governor of Basra Ubeydullah Ibn Ziyad in 673-674. For most of the time when the Abbasids ruled from Baghdad (744-1258) the Turkish soldiers were figureheads of the army under Turkish commanders. In the Samanid (819-999) army the Turkish militia was an important element. In the Buyid (932-1062) army, the Turkmen element was the main military force. With the Seljuks the Turkmen became the real sovereigns in Iraq.

The Turkmen, who were the second largest nationality in Iraq under the Buyids, had further increased in number during the Seljuk period. During the Atabeg era, a large gathering of Turkmen took place in Iraq. Other waves of Turkmen entered Iraq in the winter of 1231, when the Mongols defeated the Khawarazm Shah Jalal ai-Din, they spread in Al-Jazeerah cities: Sinjar, Khabur and Harran. The arrival of the Turkmen in Iraq reached its climax under the Mongols. Turkmen continued to arrive in Iraq at the time of the Qara Qoyunlu, the Aq Qoyunlu and the Ottomans. While the Shabaks--(Qizilbash or Alawi) were the Turkmen soldiers of Shah Ismail who came to Iraq under the Safavids.

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The Turkmen of Iraq live mainly in a region, which stretches from Talafar in the Northwest to Badra and al-Aziziyya in the al-Kut province in mid eastern Iraq. They are found in the following provinces: Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil, Salah ai-Din, Diyala, Kut and Baghdad. The largest Turkmen population concentration is found in the city of Kirkuk whose linguistics, cultural and ethnic identity is distinctly coloured by their presence. Tavuk, Taza Khurmatu sub-districts and tens of villages in the Kirkuk province are Turkmen. The number of Turkmen in Erbil city is estimated to be no less than 250,000. Aitun Kopri which was detached from Kirkuk in 1976 and annexed to Erbil is a large Turkmen sub-district. The Turkmen of Mosul are living in the large Talafar district (Population is 227,000), sub-districts of Iyadhiyya (11,000) plus 10 villages and Muhallabiyya (8,500) plus 7 villages, the large villages of Qara Qoyunlu (11,000), Rashidiyya (25,000), Shirikhan, Sallamiyya and in the Sinjar (about 20,000) city. There are a large number of Turkmen in Mosul city (about 30,000), the city's largest area 'Prophet Jonah' is a Turkmen neighbourhood. Heavily inhabited Turkmen Bayat and Duz Khurmatu districts were annexed to Salah ai-Din Province in 1976. Bestamli, Amirli and Sulayman Pak are from the large sub-districts of the latter province. The biggest and heavily Kurdified and Arabified Turkmen cities are found in Diyala province: Kifri District, which was detached from Kirkuk province in 1976, Kara Tepe, Kizil Rabat, Shahraban, Mandali and Khanakin 11,12,13. The Turkmen speakers still constitute a considerable part of the population of Badra in al-Kut province. Those who forgot their mother language are still proud of their Turkmen origin as in al-Aziziyya. According to the Turkmen writers the Turkmen of Baghdad are estimated to be 50,000 families or 300,000 people. Distortion of the Demography: Arabification: The Arabification policies of Kirkuk City began as early as in the 1930s, when the cabinet of Yasin AI-Hashimi made 2 racist decisions: Termination of study in Turkmen language in 1932 and the huge al-Hawije project to cultivate the vast plain at the west of Kirkuk City to settle the Arab tribes of AI-Ubeyd and AI-Jubur. With the establishment of the Republic, appointment of Turkmen dropped off and the Turkmen were discharged from the important positions in

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the governmental offices. In the dictatorial Baath period, the assimilation and forced deportation of Turkmen from Kirkuk City started. The Turkmen were not allowed to buy immovable proprieties. After 1970s, Arabs have enjoyed special incentives and rights, which encouraged thousands of families to obey the order of the Baath Party and settle in the historically Turkmen area Kirkuk. In the 1970s, the names of tens of villages and districts in Kirkuk province were officially given Arabic names. Large numbers of Turkmen families were given deportation notification from Kerkuk at the end of November 1993 Kurdification. Arbil city was almost completely Turkmen at the turn of the 19th century. It is mainly Kurdified and now made the Capital of so-called Kurdistan. The main Turkmen city Kirkuk, which was almost completely populated by Turkmen, was exposed to the Kurdish emigration in the 1930s and 1940s. While the reason of Kurdification was economical and social at the beginning, with the set up of Kurdish uprising in the beginning of 1960, it took the form of political trend. McDowall describes the Kurdish policy toward Kirkuk city as follows: "For both Arabs and Kurds the value of Kirkuk city had been greatly enhanced by the nationalisation of the oil industry. At the beginning of 1974, oil revenue was expected to be ten times higher than in 1972. A huge resource was now at stake. Kirkuk accounted for 70 per cent of the state's total oil output and Mulla Mustafa felt bound to claim both the town itself and a proportion of its oil revenue". The most acute and heavy Kurdish movement into Kirkuk city started with the support of American authorities after the occupation of Iraq. Over a period of a few months about 200,000 Kurds entered Kirkuk. Thousands of the governmental buildings, were occupied by the Kurdish families and Kurdish Peshmargas. Several Shanty houses, which include hundreds of houses, started to be built around the city.

Population Although a census occurred in late 1987, only overall population totals and some estimates were available in early 1988. The latest

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detailed census information was that from the 1977 census. The total population increased from 12,029,000 in 1977 to 16,278,000 in 1987, an increase of 35.3 per cent. The population has fluctuated considerably over the region's long history. Between the eighth a.nd the twelfth centuries AD, Iraqparticularly Baghdad-was the flourishing centre of a burgeoning Arab civilization, and at the height of the region's prosperity it may have supported a population much larger than the present society. Some estimates range as high as 15 to 29 million. Decline came swiftly in the late thirteenth century, however, when Mongol conquerors massacred the populace, destroyed the cities, and ravaged the countryside. The elaborate irrigation system that had made possible agricultural production capable of supporting a large population was left in ruins. A pattern of alternating neglect and oppression characterised the Ottoman rule that began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds of years the three vilayets of Baghdad, Al-Basrah, and Mosul-which the British joined to form Iraq in the aftermath of World War 1remained under-populated backward outposts of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-1800s, the area had fewer than 1.3 million inhabitants. Upon independence in 1932, the departing British officials estimated the population at about 3.5 million. The first census was carried out in 1947, showing a population of about 4.8 million. The 1957 census gave a population of about 6.3 million, and the 1965 census returned a count of slightly above 8 million. The October 1977 census gave the annual rate of population growth as 3.2 per cent. According to the October 1987 census, the annual population growth rate was 3.1 per cent placing Iraq among the world's high population growth rate countries (2.8 to 3.5 per year). In common with many developing countries, Iraq's population was young approximately 57 per cent of the population was under the age of twenty. The government has never sought to implement a birth control programme, a policy reinforced by the war to offset losses in the fighting and mitigate the threat from Iran, whose population is roughly three times that of Iraq. In 1977, about 64 per cent of the population was listed as living in urban areas; this was a marked change from 1965, when only 44 per cent resided in urban centres. In the 1987, government

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estimates, the urban population was given as 68 per cent, resulting in large measure from the migrations to the cities since the start of the war. The partial destruction of Basra by Iranian artillery barrages has had a particularly devastating effect; by 1988, according to some well informed accounts, almost half the residents of the city-its population formerly estimated at 800,000-had fled. At the same time, approximately 95,000 persons were identified in the 1977 census as nomadic or semi-nomadic beduins. The population remains unevenly distributed. In 1987, Baghdad Governorate had a population density of about 950 persons per square kilometre and the Babylon Governorate 202 persons per square kilometre, whereas Al-Muthanna Governorate possessed only 5.5 persons per square kilometre. In general the major cities are located on the nation's rivers, and the bulk of the rural population lives in the areas that are cultivated with water taken from the rivers. The Turkmen of Iraq are considered the third largest ethnic group in Iraq. Due to the undemocratic environment, their number has always been underestimated. It was fixed at 2 per cent of the total Iraqi population during the negotiations of the Mosul issue in the establishment of the Iraqi State after the World War I. According to McDowell the Turkmen outnumbered other nationalities in Kirkuk province as a whole in the 1950s. The population of Kirkuk province was 388,939 of 6,250,000 of the total Iraqi population. The population of Arabs and Christians did not exceed 20-30 thousand in Kirkuk province. There should have been at least 180,000 Turkmen in Kirkuk province alone making up 2.9 per cent of the total Iraqi population, not taking into account other Turkmen living in Arbil, Mosul, Diyala, etc. Despite missing Turkmen voters in Mosul (not less than half million Turkmen population), Diyala and Baghdad the number of the Turkmen in the present Iraqi National Council is 15, this makes 5.5 per cent of the total. Since the establishment of the Iraqi State in 1921, the Turkmen are living between the other ethnic groups who had developed high nationalist feelings. The Arabs possessed the power of governing and the Kurds received helps and supports (financial, moral and even weapons) from the international community, while the Turkmen remained helpless. Successive Iraqi governments violated their Human rights. Turkmen officials were reduced in the government offices.

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Study in Turkrnen language was terminated in 1932. They were exposed to displacement and deportation, deprived from cultural rights, not permitted to register themselves as Turkmen in censuses and they were enforced to change their nationality. Meanwhile the neighbouring countries and the international community were and are still unaware of/or indifferent to their lot. Unfortunately, the Turkmen tragedy, continued after the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Most probably because of the non-cooperative Turkish policy toward the occupation of Iraq, the occupation policy aims to marginalise the Turkrnen of Iraq as it happened when the Governing Council and the Temporary Government were constituted. The heavily populated Turkmen district of Talafar has been neglected for about a century: the majority of houses are still built of adobes, the schools and roads have not been renovated for several decades, it has repeatedly been deprived of electricity or water for several months. They had to use the unhealthy water of the small river for washing and drinking. At present piped water from the municipality is provided for only a few hours a week to the houses. Despite extremely sporadic attacks or insult were directed toward the occupying power in the district of Talafar, sub-district Iyadhiyya and recently the large village Rashidiyya are heavily and repeatedly exposed to the attacks of the American tanks and helicopters and of the National Guards, which are constituted mainly of Kurdish Peshmargas.

Healthcare The establishment of regular and professional healthcare is regarded by many as being the most pressing of all needs for postwar Iraq. The current healthcare system is currently in a state of ruin, suffering from a lack of equipment, depleted ranks of trained personnel-with many having fled the country-and an overall poor standard of care. The principal areas that require improvement are cardiovascular treatment capability, general hygiene products, dialysis and a lack of functional laboratories. The healthcare system supported by Saddam Hussein was riddled with corruption, healthcare quality varying according to ethnic region. Southern regions of Iraq, mainly populated by Shiite Muslims, had higher infant mortality rates than Baghdad, while health standards

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in the city of Kirkuk were manipulated. Companies wishing to sell pharmaceutical products to the Iraqi Ministry of Health were required to offer a 'service charge' of 10 per cent. There are approximately 240 hospitals operating in Iraq, with around 1,200 primary healthcare clinics also in the country. Since March 2003, 49 hospitals and clinics have been rehabilitated, with plans for a further 131 units to also be improved. Most of the equipment at the hospitals and clinics is either broken, outdated or inadequate, with the better services generally located around Baghdad and the country's northern regions. Iraq's Ministry of Health has a professional staff of around 100,000, over 80 per cent of which are female. A large percentage of Iraq's healthcare professionals are specialised in their respective fields, with a severe lack of primary healthcare workers. Additionally, there is a distinct lack of first-tier pharmaceuticals available. Following the conflict in Iraq and the overthrowing of the country's previous regime, it was only through quick action from the former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and a number of other international relief agencies that a public health crisis was averted. These parties have since been able to restore the Iraqi healthcare system to its pre-war levels. Over $ 40 million has been spent on 128 generators for healthcare sites, with over 13,000 tons of pharmaceutical supplies delivered since May 2003. Existing medical equipment has been surveyed and repaired where possible. A number of programmes have been undertaken by the Ministry of Health to foster international assistance, including the recent 'Adopt a Hospital' programme and the 'Monthly National Immunisation Day' programme, under which three million children have been vaccinated. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has been heavily involved in delivering vaccines, with 1.4 million doses of vaccinations delivered since July 2003. An additional 30 million doses have been procured with the aid of both UNICEF and USAID. Malnutrition is also a major issue in Iraq, particularly in the southern and central regions, where almost a third of children are sufferers. Many women in these regions suffer· from Anaemia. Child mortality rates are high, through a combination of low breastfeeding levels, low birth weights, diarrhoea and respiratory infections.

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The Iraqi healthcare system under the previous regime was highly centralised, tending to concentrate on curing illnesses as opposed to looking to prevent them. Decentralisation of the management system has been deemed a priority. Other targets include the establishment of a body to oversee healthcare standards and to license healthcare professionals that will adhere to those standards; the incorporation of definitive legislation, updating whatever regulations are already in place. Satisfactory training and education programmes also need to be put in place, along with the necessary infrastructure to enable healthcare management, planning and finance.

-Human Development The turbulent history of Iraq over the past 30 years has had a devastating impact on the social, political, physical and human capital of the country. Rebuilding and investing in political and social capital is a major task faced by Iraqis with the support of the international community. Nonetheless, Iraq has the human, cultural and economic potential to forge ahead and Iraqis are eager to re-build their lives, communities and institutions. The Cluster aims to improve the human development situation in Iraq and promote good governance by strengthening institutional capacity, contributing to the creation of employment opportunities, and providing policy advice especially in the areas of local government, public-private partnership, pro-poor growth strategies civil society and human rights in line with Iraqi needs, objectives and priorities. Agencies within the Cluster programmed an estimated US $ 3.3 million in core funds and US $ 40.6 million in multi-bilateral funds for governance and human development activities. Accomplishments were as follows: UNICEF provided technical support to the National Mine Action Authority (NMM) in the area of mine risk education. Information materials in the form of posters and pamphlets were developed and distributed to schools and primary health centres. 1V spots were also broadcast, to alert children and families to the dangers of unexploded remnants of war. UNICEF staged eight coordination meetings with policy makers in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) to discuss child protection issues, and developed training

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modules about social work and children in need of special protection. An assessment and plan of action workshop on juvenile justice was conducted. UNICEF also supported the creation of several public centres, including centres for disabled persons and four drop-in centres for street children. Furthermore, UNICEF transferred to the government two transitional centres for children without primary caregivers, two "child friendly spaces" centres, and one open centre for children and youth. Finally 12 social worke1'5 from MoLSA received training in Syria, and 160 MoLSA social workers were trained in Iraq. UNIFEM carried out initial capacity building consultations with various Iraqi women's representatives of government institutions and civil society organisations. The results of the UNDP-sponsored Iraq Living Conditions Survey conducted in 2004, were launched in May 2005. They represent a valuable tool for policy formulation, better targeting and monitoring of interventions and initiation of work related to Millennium Development Goals (MDG). UNDP assisted the Iraqi Government's strategic planning and policy development by hosting meetings with the Ministry of Human Rights, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, and the Ministry of Provincial Affairs. UNDP implemented activities to strengthen Iraqi civil society and media. 52 civil society organisations in Northern Iraq were provided with management training and small grants, and 30 trainers from Iraqi NGOs participated in management and good governance training. 70 Iraqi journalists were trained in basic principles of journalism and election coverage, and an Iraqi News Exchange was launched. In cooperation with. Human Rights Office/UNAMI, UNDP supported the process to establish a National Centre for Missing Persons, staging a Conference on Missing Persons in January 2005, and then follow up meetings of forensic, scientific and legal experts to determine the Centre's legislative framework, organisational structure, and training needs. With the design of suitable operating modalities, the Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Programme (IREP) proved

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to be an excellent instrument for job creation and poverty alleviation. While the majority of the activities were focused in Southern Iraq, this programme was significantly expanded to other parts of the country. An estimated 2.6 million working days were generated benefiting 43,500 unemployed people. IOM organised a ministerial workshop to identify the migration functions of various Iraqi government ministries. Furthermore, initial consultation on the Iraq border management system took place. Finally, IOM is establishing an English training programme for the Ministry of Interior. HROIUNAMI made considerable progress, in collaboration with the Iraqi Government, towards the establishment of a National Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture. A Memorandum of Understanding is under discussion between UNAMI, the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, and possibly an Iraqi Association. The aim of the Centre is to strengthen the capacity of Iraqi health and legal profeSSionals to deliver multi-disciplinary care for victims of torture and to set up a rehabilitation centre/training hub in Basrah. The UNODC project for strengthening judicial integrity will support enhanced transparency and accountability within the highest courts, the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Based on the Joint UN-Iraq Assistance Strategy, many of the current activities will continue into 2006 building upon the accomplishments made so far. Notwithstanding, the security considerations, which will continue to impact on UN work in Iraq, efforts will be sustained for closer and greater interaction with Iraqi authorities and institutions focusing on the following areas: • Support the constitutional process through building the human and institutional capacities of the Constitutional Committee and the implementation of advocacy and outreach activities to ensure participation and inclusiveness. • Support the Government's efforts to refine the National Development Strato.gy and formulate sound thematic and sectoral strategies and policy papers. • Assist in the elaboration of a framework for enhancing capacities of local authorities in the management of local affairs and

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promote the implementation of local pilot development initiatives. This will include compilation of relevant legislation and carrying out comparative research. Continue implementing interventions aimed at providing basic services. At the same time, help build the capacities of central agencies, key line ministries and local administrations to better deliver public services and respond to the needs of the communities they serve. Provide short term employment opportunities through small scale public works and improve living conditions ofTocarcorrtmunities and slum dwellers. Help public institutions address problems of corruption, money laundering and drug trade, and create a transparent public accountability system by raising awareness, and strengthening planning, coordination, budgetary and management capacity of key institutions. Promote economic initiatives, enterprise development, and modernise business support services through the chambers of commerce. Support the development of a free and independent media,; promote a culture of protection of human rights in key governmental and non-governmental institutions; facilitate judicial system reform; mainstream gender equality in national policies, and promote change within the Iraqi society in support of gender equality and women's rights; support the strengthening of Iraqi civil society. Advocate issues concerning youth and child protection needs, developing child rights-based systems and poliCies, expanding child protection mechanisms at Governorate level, implementing projects that promote Iraq's rising youth population, and providing policy advice to government and civil society.

Advancement of Women Throughout history, women in Iraq have enjoyed special care and consideration to ensure their role in society is strengthened, their honour safeguarded and their rights maintained. Ever since mankind created the first laws and legislation, Iraq has paid special attention to women's issues, and provided women with legal protection against anything, which might prejudice their rights or human dignity. This

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was demonstrated in Hammurabi's Code, in passages that confirm that a woman is considered a complete legal person. This Code included provisions to protect wives and guarantee their human and financial rights. It affirmed the rights of girl child to the estate of their parents, and a woman's right to bear financial responsibility independently of her husband. It affirmed women's right to own property, engage in trade, enter into contracts, dispose freely of their money and occupy high office. Islamic law conferred equal social rights on men and women and granted women the right of independent political participation, since God ordered his Prophet to receive the support of women independently. The Shariah also gave men and women equal rights in dissolving marriage and to education. It gave women complete independence in financial rights, property ownership in the widest sense and the disposal of their money. Women have made significant advances in modern Iraq, participating widely in all aspects of political and working life. The glorious revolution of 17-30 July paid special attention to women and affirmed the importance of their role in building an integrated society by increasing their opportunities for development and progress, guaranteeing their rights and responding to the demands of social, economic, cultural and political developments in a manner appropriate to the humanitarian values and concepts on which Iraqi society is based. Thanks to the consideration paid to women by Saddam Hussein, his belief in the importance of their role in society and his affirmation of the equal human value of men and women, women begun to occupy more important positions in all aspects-economic, social and political-of working life. The number of women in all institutions and facilities and in high offices has greatly increased. Every possible opportunity was open to women in Iraq to increase their educational, cultural and personal capacities in order to qualify for appointment to positions and guarantee them an effective role in Iraqi society. Working women were granted- one year's paid maternity leave, and it is easy for them to get leave to care for their children. There are plenty of child-care facilities and kindergartens in all residential and work areas, and health and special medical services and mother and child care are provided in even the remotest areas.

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The support of Saddam Hussein for women is embodied in his backing of the General Union of Iraqi Women as a national nongovernmental Organisation and an important source of advice on women's issues. The concern of the glorious revolution of 17-30 July with the promotion of women parallelled the outcome of international conferences on women since 1975, in which Iraqi women fully participated. Iraq has taken important international initiatives. We refer here in particular to the Conference of Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries on the Role of Women in Development, held in Baghdad from 6 to 13 May 1979, and which used as a basis the Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women held in Copenhagen in 1980 and the Baghdad Conference on the Human Rights of Women (1994). Iraq also participated in other relevant regional and international conferences. However, the numerous challenges faced by Iraq have severely affected the advancement of Iraqi women. Examples of these challenges are the eight-year Iranian aggression against Iraq (1980 to 1988) and the 3D-Power aggression of January 1991, when all sorts of weapons were used, including those internationally outlawed. In addition to the material damage and humanitarian suffering caused by military action, Iraqi women have been burdened and psychologically, physically and socially scarred by the continuation of the disastrous total embargo imposed on Iraq since 1990. This has severely circumscribed the role of women, reduced their participation in public life and destroyed their achievements and progress on educational, employment, social and economic levels. This conflicts with the specifications of resolutions adopted by international conferences on women, which have stressed the obligation of the international community to improve the situation of women and raise their educational, employment and social levels. The difficult economic circumstances that are widespread as a result of the total sanctions regime have forced many Iraqi women to abandon their education in order to be available for domestic work and attempt to alleviate the burdens of daily life which become ever more onerous, with a view to fulfilling the daily demands of the family and of children in particular.

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Furthermore, the sanctions imposed on Iraq have widespread negative effec~on women and their physical and mental well-being, as a result of the daily sufferings brought about by insufficient food and medicine, and the lack of basic humanitarian supplies for the family and for women in particular. At a press conference in Geneva in March 1996, the Assistant to the Regional Director for the Middle East of the World Health Organisation stated that the health situation in Iraq had been set back 50 years, as has been confirmed by the report of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organisations that have visited Iraq. The negative [illegible] resulting from the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq have drawn the attention of the international community to the dangers of such measures. The Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (N50/60-S/1995/1) referred to the ethical and legal aspects of applying sanctions and their conflict with the purposes of the United Nations, and urged the need for measures to limit the inhumane effects of sanctions on vulnerable groups. The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, also. called for measures to be taken in accordance with international law to alleviate such effects on women and children. The goals, procedures and mechanism for the implementation of the national strategy for the advancement of Iraqi women are based on the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution and the precepts of the merciful Islamic Shariah, the cultural heritage, the values of Arab and Islamic society and the principles of human rights. The role and status of women reflect the development of society. Support is required for the process of the advancement of women and their capacities in society, and the removal of any manifestations of discrimination against them.

6 Religion Although members of the former ruling Baath Party generally were ideologically committed to secularism, about 95 per cent of Iraqis are Muslim and Islam is the officially recognised state religion. Islam came to the region with the victory of the Muslim armies under Caliph Umar over the Sassanians in 637 AD at the battle of Al-Qadisiyah. The majority of inhabitants soon became Muslim, including the Kurds, although small communities of Christians and Jews remained intact in the area of present-day Iraq. Iraq has been the scene of many important events in the early history of Islam, including the schism over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad. While a precise statistical breakdown is impossible to ascertain because of likely inaccuracies in the latest census (conducted in 1997), according to best estimates, 97 per cent of the population of 26 million persons are Muslim. Shia Muslims-predominantly Arab, but also including Turkomen, Faili Kurds, and other groups-constitute a 60 to 65 per cent majority. Sunni Muslims make up 32 to 37 per cent of the population (approximately 18 to 20 per cent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 per cent Sunni Arabs, and the remainder Sunni Turkomen). The remaining approximately 3 per cent of the overall population consist of Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, Mandaeans, and a small number of Jews. The Sunni population of Iraq is predominately Hanafi, while the Shia population is predominantly Jafari. Kurdish Muslims are mostly

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of the Sunni branch, but mainly follow the Shafii school of Sunni Islam, which distinguishes them from the majority of the Iraqi Arab Sunni Muslim population, which is primarily of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. There is also a strong Sufi mystic following among the Kurds. Sufism contributes to a less orthodox practice of Islam among much of the Kurdish population. Shia, although predominantly located in the south, also are a majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the centre of the country and in the north. Shia and Sunni Arabs are not ethnically distinct. From the mid-16th century to 1916, the Ottoman Empire ruled three disparate provinces-Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul-that comprise modern-day Iraq. To counter the influence of the Shia Safavid Empire in Iran, the Ottomans maintained Iraq as a Sunni-controlled state and largely, had excluded from power Iraq's Shia and Kurdish population. The Ottoman Empire organised society around the concept of the millet, or autonomous religious community. The non-Muslim "People of the Book" (Christians and Jews) owed taxes to the government; in return they were permitted to govern themselves according to their own religious law in matters that did not concern Muslims. The religious communities were, thus, able to preserve a large measure of identity and autonomy. The British and the British-backed Iraqi monarchy continued the Ottoman policy of supporting the ruling Sunni Arab minority from the towns, villages, and tribes of Iraq's central region. The Sunni leadership attempted to overcome Shia dissatisfaction by promoting a pan-Arab identity for Iraqis, arguing that Arab culture and the history of the Arabs transcended religiOUS and communal ties. Shia, wary of being outnumbered by Sunnis in an Arab confederation, regarded the Iraqi monarchy's pan-Arab ideology with suspicion. The Kurds, as nonArabs with their own nationalist aspirations, rejected the monarchy's pan-Arabism. The Iraqi monarchy tried to integrate the various fragments of Iraqi society through military conscription and national education. These integrationist policies achieved some modest success during the last two decades of the monarchy, but the Sunnis remained dominant. Shia penetration into the highest echelons of government and military was almost non-existent, and the vast majority of Iraq's

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poor continued to be Shia. Kurdish representation in both the government and the military was proportionately more substantial than that of Shia. The decade of republican rule following the 1958 coup that toppled the monarchy brought mixed results for both the Shia and the Kurds. Economically, Shia fared better than they had under the monarchy. Religiously, relations between the secular ruling Sunni regimes and the Shia remained tense. The radically pan-Arab ideology of the regime excluded the Kurds. Following an initial improvement in relations, a pattern of negotiations over Kurdish autonomy followed by armed clashes developed. Shia Arabs have supported an independent Iraq alongside their Sunni brethren since the 1920 Revolt; many Shia joined the Baath Party and Shia formed the backbone' of the Iraqi Army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Although Shia Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life, be it civil, political, military, or economic. Saddam's Government for decades conducted a brutal campaign of killing, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shia Muslim popUlation and has sought to undermine the identity of minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups. Sunni-Shia tensions peaked following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Tens of thousands of Shia were arrested and deported during this period. In the Kurdish region, the pattern of negotiation followed by fighting continued. During this period, the regime also tried to enhance its legitimacy and rally support for the war effort by promoting a specifically Iraqi (rather than Arab) identity. This effort included emphasising Iraq's ancient history and Mesopotamian cultural identity. Politically, the new trend took the form of increased representation in government for both Shia and Kurds. This strategy of combining repression with cooptation, along with the war effort, accelerated the integration of Iraqi society and produced a sense of common identity (excepting, for the most part, the Kurds). During the war with Shia Iran, Iraqi Shia did not revolt and mass defections to Iran did not materialise.

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Sunni Muslims In Iraq, only 35 per cent of the population is Sunni, although over 80 per cent of the global Muslim population is of the Sunni branch. In Iraq, Sunni Islam is found among both Arabs and Kurds. Sunni Arabs are approximately 15 per cent of Iraq's population; Sunni Kurds are approximately 20 per cent. Sunni Arabs are primarily of the Hanafi school, while Sunni Kurds are primarily of the Shafii school. The other two legal schools in Islam, the Maliki and the Hanbali, lack a significant number of adherents in Iraq. There is no strict or cohesive Sunni identity in Iraq. Sunnis subscribe to a broad spectrum of ideologies and affiliations, many of which have little to do with religion. For Sunnis in Iraq, ethnic identity is a more potent force for either social unity or social discord than religious identity. Iraq's Sunni Arabs inhabit the valleys of the Euphrates above Baghdad, and of the Tigris between Baghdad and Mosul. Sunni Arabs in Iraq comprise the country's ruling elite. A broad system of socio-economic enticements, patronage, and cliental relationships ties Sunni Arabs together. Sunni Islam is closely tied to Arab culture, both of which Originated in the Arabian peninsula and spread north into contemporary Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis tend to regard themselves as descendants of and heirs to the golden age of Arab Islamic civilization, much of which took place under the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad from the 8th to 13th centuries. Following the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate, nonArabs (Turks) assumed control of subsequent Islamic empires, to the shame of the Arabs. The Sunni Ottoman Empire, which governed Iraq from the mid-16th century through World Wcrr I, maintained Iraq as a Sunni-controlled state as a bulwark against ,the spread of Persian! Shia influence. As a result, Sunni Arabs gained the governing, military, and administrative experience that would enable them to monopolise political power in the 20th century. In Iraq, the Sunni-Shia division has been, on the whole, a political and socio-economic struggle over the allocation and distribution of wealth and political power. Since its founding as a state in 1921, Iraq has been largely secular. The government in Iraq has largely controlled religious teaching and institutions, while expressing an appreciation of)slam's cultural heritage and its contribution to Iraqi national identity. Individual

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Sunnis in Iraq may follow Islamic rituals and live an Islamic lifestyle. For a decade following the 1968 Baathist coup, Islam remained the official state religion. However, overall, the ruling Sunni elite attempted to defuse Islam as a political and social force. In response to the 1979 Shia Iranian Revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq War, Sunni Islam became, an important part of the Iraqi regime's identity. Radical Islamic movements in Iraq have been harshly persecuted and marginalised. Wahhabism from neighbouring Saudi Arabia has never established a foothold within Iraq. Kurdish society is marked by receptiveness to religious pluralism. Sunni Islam arrived among the Kurds somewhat later than among the rest of the Arab population. Islam gave key leaders in the Kurdish national movement an added authority that transcended the oftendivisive boundaries of tribal loyalty. At the same time, the contemporary Iraqi government's manipulation of religious symbols and values against the Kurdish nationalist movement caused many Kurds to develop an ambiguous view of the relationship between Sunni Islam and Kurdish identity. Many Iraqi Sunni Kurds belong to mystical Sufi orders, of which the Qadiri and Naqshbandi are the largest. Both orders have followers across the Middle East, Central, and South Asia. A Qadiri Sufi shrine in Baghdad attracts annual transnational pilgrimages. While Sufi Islam has broad acceptance in Iraqi society, Sufism has frequently been viewed by orthodox Sunni Muslim theologians with some degree of suspicion because of its strong mystical components. Shia Muslims tend to be hostile towards Sufism because they believe it is heretical. Sufi orders serve to both strengthen and divide Kurdish society. Kurds of the same order feel a common bond, regardless of tribe. There is, however, tension between rival orders. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the President of the Republic, follows the Qadiri order. The Masud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP) , and the influential Barzani family are Naqshbandi Sufis.

Shia Muslims Islam, as it is practised in Iraq, is closely tied to Arab culture. Shiism in Iraq is heavily influenced by Arab identity and, thus, differs

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from the version followed in Persian Iran. Many of Iraq's tribes converted to Shiism in the 19th century, partly in response to Ottoman settlement policies that disrupted the tribal order. Shia rituals and law helped tribesmen cope with their more complex daily life. The rapid conversion of Iraq's tribes to Shiism did not permeate the former social and moral values of the tribesmen. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi Shia for the most part chose their Arab identity over their religious one. Historically, Iraq has been the heartland of the global Shia community. For the most part, Shia Arabs have made attempts to accommodate their religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state. Although Shia resent the ruling Sunni minority's repeated questioning of their loyalty and Arab bona fides, the Shia community has never unified behind a Shia cause. A variety of views about politics and religion contradicts the image of a monolithic, radical, and pro-Iranian Shia community. Although there are strong cultural and familial links between Iraqi and Iranian Shia, Arab identity and national sentiment remain powerful influences within the community. A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the shrines of Imams both in Iraq and in Iran. These include the tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son Imam Hussain in Karbala since both are considered major Shia martyrs. Before the 1980 Iran-Iraq War, tens of thousands went each year. The Iranians made it a central aim of their war effort to wrest these holy cities from the Iraqis. Other principal pilgrimage sites in Iraq are the tombs of the Seventh and Ninth Imams at Kazimayn, near Baghdad, and in Iran, the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qom. Such pilgrimages originated in part from the difficulty and expense in the early days of making the hajj to Mecca. Commemorating the martyrdom of Hussain, killed near Karbala in 680 AD during a battle with troops supporting the Ummayad Caliph, there are processions in the Shia towns and villages of southern Iraq on the tenth of Muharram (Ashura) , the anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is performed by groups of men of five to twenty each. Contributions are solicited in the community to pay transportation for a local group to go to Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after Ashura. There is a great rivalry among groups from different places for the best performance of the passion

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plays. In the villages, religious readings occur throughout Ramadan and Muhamim. The men may gather in the mudhif {tribal guesthouse}, the suq {market}, or a private house. Women meet in homes. The readings are led either by a mumin (a man trained in a religious school in An Najaf) or by a mullah who has apprenticed with an older specialist. It is considered the duty of sheikhs, elders, prosperous merchants, and the like to sponsor these readings, or qirayas. Under the monarchy these public manifestations were discouraged, as they emphasised grievances against the Sunnis. In 1722, Persian Shia clerics emigrated to southern Iraq under the protection of the Iranian government in an area of Iraq where Ottoman control was weak. The emigration shifted the centre of Shia scholarship from Iran to Iraq, increasing the importance of Iraq and its Shia Shrine cities among the larger Shia community. The Sunni Ottomans considered the Shia clerics to be a potential fifth column because of their ties with Iran. To counter this Shia influence, the Ottomans placed the Sunni Arabs in positions of government in Iraq, a practice that was continued by the British. The predominance of the Sunni in the government continued throughout the Baath period. In 1920, a tribal revolt began against the British in the south of Iraq, incited largely by the Shia clerics. Many of the Shia clerics were Persian and felt threatened by British policies that endangered their influence among the local population and resented the occupation of Iraq by Christian infidels. The revolt was put down by the British, who saw the ability of the Shia clerics to incite a far-reaching rebellion as a danger both to them and to the young Iraqi state. From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, the Shia made up the majority of the membership of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). The Shia ulema later condemned the ICP as an atheist party, which caused Shia to withdraw support~ a factor in the successful coup against President Qasim in 1963. The Iraqi Shia later became supporters of the al-Dawa and al-Mujahideen parties. The al-Dawa party was guided by the philosophy of Iraqi Shia Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a leading figure in the Shia Islamist movement until his execution by the government in 1980. Ayatollah RuhoUah Khomeini, a Persian and the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, had taught and preached in Najaf after being

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exiled from Iran by the Shah in 1964. Khomeini's presence in Iraq had an impact on the Shia political movement in Iraq, but his influence in that movement was overshadowed by that of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a native Iraqi and an Arab.

Shia Leadership A Marjah is the highest authority on religion and law in Shiism. Where a difference in opinion exist between the Marjah, Aalims (Religious Scholar) try to provide different opinions. Four senior Grand Ayatullahs [Ayat Allah] constitute the Religious Institution (al-Hawzah al-llmiyyah) in Najaf, the pre-eminent seminary centre for the training of Shiite clergymen. Taqlid means acting according to the opinion of the jurist (mujtahid) who has all the necessary qualification to be emulated. So you do what the mujtahid's expert opinion says you should do, and refrain from what his expert opinion says you should refrain from, without any research [in Islamic sources] on your part. It is as though you have placed the responsibility of your deeds squarely on his shoulders. Among the conditions which must be found in a jurist (mujtahid) who can be followed is that he must be the most learned (al-alam) jurist of his time and the most capable in deriving the religious laws from the appropriate sources. There are generally six ranks among Shia clerics. The highest, grand ayatollah means "great sign of God". In the past, there were usually no more than five grand ayatollahs in the Shia Islamic world. Today, however, it is suspected that there are at least seven and possibly more. Under grand ayatollah is ayatollah ("sign of God"). Below Ayatullah is the rank of hojat ai-Islam, whi~h is Arabic for "authority on Islam". Next is mubellegh al-risala or "carrier of the message". While mujtahid often refers to clerics in general, it is also a specific rank, which denotes one has graduated from a religious seminary. At the bottom of the ladder are religiOUS students, talib ilm. Besides the obvious factors such as graduation to be promoted to mUjtahid, promotion in the ranks is a rather subjective matter. Two important factors behind promotion are the size and quality of one's student following and authorship of scholarly works on Islam. As of late 2002, there were two generally acknowledged senior Shia clerics in Iraq. Prior to the American occupation,

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Ayatollah al-Sayed Ali al-Seestani [Ali as-Sistanil had been forbidden to lead prayers and remained under virtual house arrest in Najaf as a result of attempts on his life. Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali Seestani, the current Shia spiritual leader, was attacked in his home in Najaf in November 1996, resulting in the death of one of his employees. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim, another of Iraq's most important Shia clerics, is the uncle of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, whose brother, Abdul Aziz, serves on the Interim Governing Council. But Said is not associated with SCIRI; he is much closer to Sistani. His cousin Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim had been the spiritual leader of the Shia world between 1955 and 1970 and served as mentor to the founder of Iran's Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The two other living grand ayatollahs, who along with al-Hakim and Sistani comprised the four most powerful clerics in Iraq, are Muhammad Ishaq Fayadh and Bashir Hussain al-Najafi. Both rarely speak on political issues. All are based in the Shia seminary-the 'Hawza'-in AI-Najaf, which is the highest religious authority of Iraq's majority Shia population. Their followers regard them as sources for religious emulation and their written opinions can carry the force of law. At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, President George Bush urged Iraqis to topple the Baath regime, but the US did not back the Shia uprising that ensued in southern Iraq, and the rebels were slaughtered. When the fighters of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, poured over the border from Iran. Fears of Iranian influence over Iraqi Shiites through SCIRI was a decisive factor in the US decision not to support the uprising. Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qasim al-Khoei sent his son Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei to contact the Americans. When he reached French lines he was told Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the allied forces, would meet him, but the meeting never took place. Afterwards, AI-Khoei went into exile. For more than half a century, the school of the late Grand Ayatollah Imam Abul Qasim al-Khoee was an undepletable spring that enriched Islamic thought and knowledge. From his school graduated dozens of jurists, clergymen, and dignitaries who took it upon themselves to continue on his ideological path which was full

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of achievements and sacrifices in the service of the faith, knowledge, and society. Among those are outstanding professors of parochial schools, especially Holy Najaf and Qom. Some of them have attained the level of 'ijtihad'-competence to deduce independent legal judgment enabling them to assume the office of supreme religious authority. Others reached lofty levels qualifying them for shouldering the responsibilities of teaching and education. Most distinguished among those figures is His Eminence Grand Ayatullah as-Sayyid Ali al-Hussaini as-Seestani. He ranks among the brightest, the most qualified and knowledgeable of Imam al-Khoee's former students. In 1991, Iraqi authorities arrested 108 Shia clerics and students, including 95-year-old Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qasim al-Khoee, 10 of his family members, and 8 of his aides. Ayatollah al-Khoee subsequently was released; however, he was held under house arrest until his death in August 1992. Ayatollah Hussain Bahr al-Uloom, who was arrested in 1991, had reportedly died under questionable circumstances in June 2001. The late Grand Ayatollah Muhsin AI-Hakim was the spiritual leader for the Shia world in the period 1955-1970. Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoee received the mantle of leadership after the death of Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, in 1970. Grand Ayatollah AIi al-Sistani, who succeeded Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoee in 1992, is believed to favour, keeping the Iraqi Shiite clergy out of politics. Baath Governmental authorities were associated with a series of previous fatal accidents, apparently engineered, such as the well known case of Sayed Muhammad Taqi al-Khoee, son of the Grand Ayatollah al-Khoee, who died on 21 July, 1994 in a suspicious car accident while returning from his weekly visit to Karbala. He was accompanied by his brother-in-law, Amin Khalkhali, his six-year-old nephew and his driver, when they crashed into an unlit truck blocking the divided highway. Since January 1998, the killings of three internationally respected clerics and an attempt on the life of a fourth have been attributed widely to government agents by international human rights activists, other governments, and Shia clergy in Iran and Leban~on. Ayatollah Sheikh Murtada al-Burujerdi was shot dead in the evening of 21 April, 1998 while he WaS walking home with two

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companions after he had led cor.gregational evening prayers at the shrine of Imam~Ali. Following the 1991 Shia uprising in southern Iraq, Ayatollah ol-Burujerdi, who at that time had been arrested for three days, begar. leading the daily prayers in the sacred enclosure of Imam Ali. As well as being a leader of the congregational prayers, Ayatollah al-Burujerdi was a serious candidate for the position of Marja. It was reported that Ayatollah al-Burujerdi had been asked by the Iraqi authorities to give up his post as leader of the prayers at the shrine of Imam Ali, but he refused. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi (68 years old) was assassinated on 18 June, 1998 in his car on the route between the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. He was accompanied by his son-in-law, driver and another companion. According to information from persons claiming to have been witnesses, the car of Ayatollah al-Gharawi was stopped and all four passengers of the car were then shot dead on the spot. Ayatollah al-Gharawi was a well-respected religious scholar and was also a senior spiritual leader (or Marja) of Shia Muslims. Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al-Hussaini escaped an attempt on his life in January, 1999. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad al-Sadr [aged 66], the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, was assassinated in Najaf while driving home on the evening of 19 February, 1999 along with his two sons and chief assistants, Mustafa and Muammal, and their driver. The government had recognised al-Sadr as grand ayatollah in 1992, but in the months preceding his death he had begun distancing himself from the government in Ftiday sermons and urging people, against government wishes, to attend mass prayer gatherings. Following the murder of Ayatollah al-Sadr there were widespread reports, of at least four days of heavy clashes between protesters and security forces in heavily Shia neighbourhoods of Baghdad such as Medinat al-Thawra and in majority Shia cities such as Karbala, Nasriyya, Najaf, and Basra in which scores were killed and hundreds arrested. According to Iraq's opposition groups, the latest killings unleashed a mini-insurrection. They claim the army besieged Najaf. United Nations observers, monitoring food distribution in Iraq, passed through Najaf on the day of the supposed siege and noticed nothing unusual. In mid-April 2003, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who had lived in exile in Iran for 23 years, and Ayatollah Abdul

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Majid al-Kohei who had lived in exile in London for 12 years, both returned to the holy city of Najaf to organise their followers. The two men were leaders of the most important Shia families in Iraq. Each man's father had served as the supreme religious authority in the Shia world for more than 20 years. They had both been betrayed by America after the 1991 Gulf War. And by the end of August 2003 both had been assassinated. At the beginning of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Baqir al-Hakim instructed SeIRI elements in Basra, Najaf, Karbala and other cities not to start an uprising 'or support the US-led coalition. To supporters, Baqir al-Hakim's arrival was the Khomeini-like return from exile of a man who is due-at the very least-a place among the Iraqis who will form the country's interim leadership. To his opponents Hakim had been away too long and is too close to Tehran, where he lived while his people fought a bloody eight-year war with Iran. Al-Hakim warned repeatedly that the US would face armed resistance if its forces stayed too long after ridding Iraq of Hussein's regime. Al-Hakim was far less accommodating to coalition interests than al-Khoee and said, "We refuse to put ourselves under the thumb of the Americans or any other country, because that is not in the Iraqis' interest." On 10 April, 2003 Ayatollah Abdul Majid Al-Kohee was assassinated by a knife attack in Najaf after arriving from London. Majid was the son of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Khoee, spiritual leader of Iraq's Shias at the time of the 1991 Gulf War. Al-Kohee was a moderate and his competition with Grand Ayatollah Al-Hakim (who also headed to Najaf from his base in Iran) would have helped the American occupation. Al-Khoee had a better relationship with the United States, and his quick return to Najaf-with American assistance-was part of the Bush administration's effort to draw support away from al-Hakim. Although al-Khoee was usually accompanied by coalition forces, the officers do not enter the mosque and so were unable to rescue him. Abdul Majid was stabbed to death at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, one of the holiest shrines for Shia Muslims. The murder raised tensions among Iraq's majority Shia population. The perception of al-Khoee as a US puppet was strengthened by the subsequent admission by Washington that it had channelled $ 13 million dollars to him. On 24 August, 2003 a bomb

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exploded outside the house of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said alHakim, killing 3 guards and injuring 10 other people. Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim was slightly wounded in the neck by flying glass when a bomb went off outside his offices in Najaf, shortly after he finished his prayers. Four men in a car dropped a canister of cooking gas near the wall of the house beside the room where the 9rand ayatollah and his son were resting. Bodyguards noticed a flame coming from the top of the canister before it exploded, killing two of the guards and another household employee. Ten of his aides were wounded. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim is the uncle of Ayatollah Muhammad Bakir al-Hakim, the leader of the best-organised Shia party, the Supreme Council forthe Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI). Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim headed one of Iraq's most powerful clerical families. The family included his nephew Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who led the best-organised Iraqi Shia group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The group waged a long guerrilla campaign against deposed leader Saddam Hussein from exile in Iran until the US overthrew the Iraqi regime in April 2003 . Subsequently, SCIRI modified its traditional calls for an Islamic system in Iraq and now says it is ready to work towards that goal within a democratic framework. A representative of SCIRI is one of the 25 members of the US-appointed Governing Council in Baghdad. The bomb attack called new attention to the potentially violent political divides among Iraqi Shia organisations. While no one knows who was behind the attack, suspicion in AI-Najaf immediately fell upon political rivals of the al-Hakim family. And those enemiesthanks to the family's prominence-are numerous. On 29 August, 2003 a car bomb exploded during Friday prayers in AI-Najaf outside the Imam Ali Mosque, killing Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and many others. Over a hundred people were killed, and several times that many were reported to be injured at the mosque, which is the most holy shrine for Shia Muslims in Iraq. There had been considerable unrest among the religious factions in the holy city, 175 kilometres south-west of Baghdad. AI-Hakim was the brother of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who is a member of the Iraqi

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Governing Council. Baqir al-Hakim, who was 66 years old, returned to Iraq on 10 May after 23 years in exile in Iran. Shia-Sunni Relations Until the 1980s, the dominant view of contemporary political analysts held that Iraq was badly split along sectarian lines. The claim was that the Sunnis-although a minority-ran Iraq and subjected the majority Shias to systematic discrimination. According to the prevailing belief, the Shias would drive the Sunnis from power, if once afforded an opportunity to do so. There was some basis to this notion. For many years Iraq was ruled, by-and-Iarge, by Arab Sunnis who tended to come from a restricted area around Baghdad, Mosul, and Ar Rutbah-the so-called Golden Triangle. In the 1980s, not only was President Saddam Hussein a Sunni, but he was the vice chairman of the ruling Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection). One of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the defence minister were also Sunnis. In addition, the top posts in the security services have usually been held by Sunnis, and most of the army's corps commanders have been Sunnis. It is also true that the most depressed region of the country is the south, where the bulk of the Shias reside. Nonetheless, the theory of sectarian strife was undercut by the behaviour of Iraq's Shia community during Iran's 1982 invasion and the fighting thereafter. Although about three-quarters of the lower ranks of the army were Shias, as of early 1988, no general insurrection of Iraqi Shias had occurred. Even in periods of major setback for the Iraqi army-such as the AI-Faw debacle in 1986-the Shias have continued staunchly to defend their nation and the Baath regime. They have done so despite intense propaganda barrages mounted by the Iranians, calling on them to join the Islamic revolution. It appeared that, however important sectarian affiliation may have been in the past, in the latter 1980s nationalism was the basic determiner of loyalty. In the case of Iraq's Shias, it should be noted that they are Arabs, n0~ Persians, and that they have been the traditional enemies of the Persians for centuries. The Iraqi government has skilfully exploited this age-old enmity in its propaganda, publicising the war as part of the ancient struggle between the Arab and Persian empires. For example, Baathist publicists regularly call the war a modern day "Qadisiyah." Qadisiyah was the battle in 637 AD in which the Arabs defeated the pagan hosts of Persia, enabling Islam

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to spread to the East. The real tension in Iraq in the latter 1980s was between the majority of the population, Sunnis as well as Shias, for whom religious belief and practice were significant values, and the secular Baathists, rather than between Sunnis and Shias. Although the Shias had been under represented in government posts in the period of the monarchy, they made substantial progress in the educational, business, and legal fields. Their advancement in other areas, such as the opposition parties, was such that in the years from 1952 to 1963, before the Baath Party came to power, Shias held the majority of party leadership posts. Observers believed that in the late 1980s Shias were represented at all levels of the party roughly in proportion to government estimates of their numbers in the population. For example, of the eight top Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat with Hussein on the Revolutionary Command Council-Iraq's highest governing body-three were Arab Shias (of whom one had served as Minister of Interior), three were Arab Sunnis, one was an Arab Christian, and one a Kurd. On the Regional Command Councilthe ruling body of the party-Shias actually predominated. During the war, a number of highly competent Shia officers have been promoted to corps commanders. The general who turned back the initial Iranian invasions of Iraq in 1982 was a Shia. The Shias continued to make good progress in the economic field as well during the 1980s. Although the government does not publish statistics that give breakdowns by religious affiliations, qualified observers noted that many Shias migrated from rural areas, particularly in the south, to the cities, so that not only Basra but other cities including Baghdad acquired a Shia majority. Many of these Shias prospered in business and the professions as well as in industry and the service sector. Even those living in the poorer areas of the cities were generally better off than they had been in the countryside. In the rural areas as well, the educational level of Shias came to approximate that of their Sunni counterparts. Prior to the war with Iran, the Baath had taken steps towards integrating the Shias. The war placed inordinate demands on the regime for manpower, demands that could only be met by levying the Shia community-and this strengthened the regime's resolve to further the integration process. In early 1988, it seemed likely that when the war ends, the Shias would emerge as full citizens. This was not to be, however.

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Shla-Baath Relations The Iraq~ Baath Party was a proponent of secularism. This attitude was maintained despite the fact that the mass of Iraqis are deeply religious. At the same time, the Baathists did not hesitate to exploit religion as a mobilising agent; and from the first months of the war with Iran, prominent Baathists made a public show of attending religious observances. Iraq's President Saddam Hussein was depicted in prayer in posters displayed throughout the country. Moreover, the.-' Baath provided large sums of money to refurbish . important mo~q\fes; this has proved a useful tactic in encouraging support from the Shias. Since the 1980's, the Baath Government reportedly attempted to eliminate the senior Shia religious leadership (the Mirjaiyat) through killings, disappearances, and summary executions. Despite supposed legal protection of reiigious equality, the Baath regime repressed severely the Shia clergy and those who follow the Shia faith. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General Security (Amn al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Baath Party have killed senior Shia clerics, desecrated Shia mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shia, interfered with Shia religious education, prevented Shia adherents from performing their religious rites, and fired upon or arrested Shia who sought to take part in their religious processions. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all the major Shia mosques and shrines, and search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshippers. Reports of military operations against Shia civilians also increased notably in the summer of 1998 after the killings of Ayatollahs Ali alGharawi and Sheikh al-Borojourdi. In numerous incidents during 1998, security forces injured and summarily executed Shia civilians, burned Shia homes, confiscated land belonging to Shia, and arbitrarily arrested and detained scores of Shia. In January 1999, according to a report from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), security officials reportedly arrested Sheikh Awas, Imam of the Nasiriyah city mosque. Shortly after the arrest of Sheikh Awas, hundreds of Shia congregation members reportedly marched on the security directorate to demand that Awas be released immediately. Security forces allegedly opened

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fire on the unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and threw hand grenades. Five persons reportedly were killed, 11 wounded, and 300 arrested. The Human Rights Organisation in Iraq (HROI) reported that 1,093 Shia were arrested in June 1999 in Basrah alone. The Iraqi National Congress reported that tanks from the Hammourabi Republican Guard division attacked the towns of Rumaitha and Khudur in June 1999 after residents protested the systematic unequal distribution of food and medicine to the detriment of the Shia. Fourteen villagers were killed, over 100 persons were arrested, and 40 homes were destroyed. In June 1999, SCIRI reported that 160 homes in the Abul Khaseeb district near Basra were destroyed. Baath security forces also forced Shia inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern cities and to areas along the Iranian border. Former Special Rapporteur van Der Stoel described this practice in his February 1999 report, adding that many other persons have been transferred to detention centres and prisons in central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad. The Government reportedly also continued to move forcibly Shia population from the south to the north to replace Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians who had been expelled forcibly from major cities. The military also continued its water-diversion and other projects in the south. The Government's claim that the drainage was part of a land reclamation plan to increase the acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production was given little credence. Hundreds of square miles have been burned in military operations. The former Special Rapporteur noted the devastating impact that draining the marshes has had on the culture of the Shia marsh Arabs. SCIRI claimed to have captured government documents that detailed the destructive intent of the water diversion programme and its connection to "strategic security operations," "economic blockade", and "withdrawal of food supply agencies." The Baath Government's diversion of supplies in the south limited the Shia population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and transportation. According to the former Special Rapporteur and opposition sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were denied rations that should have been supplied under the UN oil-for-food programme. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to food allegedly is used to reward regime supporters

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and silence opponents. Shia groups reported that, due to this policy, the humanitarian condition of Shia in the south continued to suffer despite a significant expansion of the oil-for-food programme. By the end of Saddam's regime, the following government restrictions on religious rights remained in effect: restrictions on communal Friday prayer by Shia; restrictions on Shia mosque libraries loaning books; a ban on the broadcast of Shia programmes on government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of Shia books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on many funeral processions other than those organised by the Baath Government; a ban on other Shia funeral observances, such as gatherings for Quran reading; and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings commemorating Shia holy days. The Baath Government required that speeches by Shia Imams in mosques be based upon government-provided material that attacked fundamentalist trends.

Yazidis Yazidis are a syncretistic religious group (or a set of several groups). Many Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. However, the Baath Government, without any historical basis, defined the Yazidis as Arabs. Yazidis predominately reside in the north of the country. There is evidence that the Baath Government in the past compelled Yazidis to join in domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included in a 1998 Human Rights Watch report describe special all-¥azidi military detachments formed dUring the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to "pursue and attack·' Muslim Kurds. The Baath Government also targeted the Yazidis in the past. For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for.

Christians Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be distinct ethnic groups, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest Christian communities. The communities speak a distinct language (Syriac). Although they do not define themselves as Arabs, the Baath Government defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, evidently to

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encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated regime. Christians are concentrated in the north and in Baghdad. Most Assyrians live in the northern governorates, and the Baath Government often has suspected them of "collaborating" with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly executed and tortured many Assyrians. Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Baath Government occasionally targeted Assyrians as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkoman as a part of its Arabisation campaign of ethnic cleansing designed to harass and expel non-Arabs from government-controlled areas in the north. AsSyrians are a Syriac-speaking people of Christian faith and of mixed Semitic, Aramaean, Assyrian, Persian, and Kurdish descent. Contemporary Assyrians, influenced in the 19th century by Western nationalism, now identify themselves as a single ethnic group, united by the Syriac language, the Christian Church of the East, and a common cultural heritage of the ancient Assyrian civilization. There are about 200,000 Assyrians in Iraq who constitute approximately one-sixth of Iraqi Christians. Assyrians are located mostly in the large cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Basra. Rural Assyrians are located primarily in towns on the Mosul plain in northern Iraq. Assyrians share the Syriac language and much of a common history with Chaldeans. The two groups were divided over the last 500 years by the Chaldeans' re-unification with the Roman Catholic Church in 1552. Both contemporary Assyrians and Chaldeans claim to be heirs of the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, including the ancient Babylonian, Assyrian, and Chaldean empires. Contemporary Assyrians often refer to Assyrians and Chaldeans as belonging to the same ethno-national group, while Chaldeans often include AsSyrians in their ethnic group. Assyrians sometimes identify themselves interchangeably as ''Assyrian'' or "Chaldean." Assyrians resist attempts by the Iraqi government to deny them their language and culture by giving them labels such as "ancient Iraqis" and "Iraqi Christians." They also oppose government policies that attempt to force Arabic and Arab culture upon them. Likewise, Assyrians in northern Iraq resist attempts by Kurds to assimilate them into Kurdish culture, language, and political parties.

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Assyrians did not fare well under Saddam Hussein, who destroyed Assyrian churches. Saddam Hussein's emphasis on tribal identity alienated contemporary Assyrians, who are excluded from Arab tribes and tribal customs. Assyrians have been in close proximity to political power in a number of empires of which they have been a part, despite their small numbers. As leaders of the Church of the East traditionally emphasised learning, their political success was often due to their high degree of education. Although the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Iraq, was allied with Germany during World War I, the Assyrians sided with Britain and were later protected by the British during the British Mandate that ruled Iraq after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Assyrians joined the British imperial troops, known as Levies. The Levies were notoriously used as an instrument of internal security, particularly to suppress Kurdish revolts in northern Iraq. Considered haughty by other Iraqis, the Assyrians earned bitter resentment among Iraqi Kurds and Arabs during this period. In 1933, as several hundred Assyrians attempted to cross the Tigris River into the French mandate of Syria, fighting erupted with Iraqi border troops. Within a few days, thousands of unarmed Assyrians were summarily executed in their villages while the Iraqi government stood aside. The Assyrian patriarch fled to exile in Cyprus and Britain, eventually re-establishing his seat in Chicago in 1939 along with, approximately, 15,000 Assyrians. Christianity is an important facet of identity among contemporary Assyrians. Assyrians and Chaldeans both trace their religious identities to the beginning of the Christian era. Syriac is a language closely-related to the Aramaic spoken by ancient Mesopotamian peoples, including Jesus. These historical facts strengthen the Assyrian identification with the ancient Assyrian and Chaldean civilizations, and with the early Christian church. The Assyrians emerged as a distinct Christian group in 431 AD, when their religious leader, the Patriarch Nestorius of Constantinople, broke away from the Byzantine Orthodox Church during the Third Ecumenical Council when his teachings were declared heretical. The Assyrians became pejoratively known as followers of the Nestorian Church, although Assyrians traditionally referred to themselves as "Suraya," or as followers of the "Church of the East." Assyrians do

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not believe that the teachings of Nestorius are in violation of Christian teachings.

Jews Although few Jews remain in the country, government officials frequently make anti-Semitic statements. For example, in 2001 a Baath Party official stated, "lowly Jews" were "descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshippers of the infidel tyrant."

Spiritual Centre One of the most interesting places to visit are the Islamic cities of Karbala, Najaf and Qufa. These cities played a vital role in the history of early Islam, particularly during the establishment of Shiism. At Karbala, huge gold domes on two massive turquoise-coloured mosques face each other. The mosques, named after Imam Hussain and his cousin Abbas, are sacred places of pilgrimage for the Shias. Pilgrims pay respect to their leaders who sacrificed their lives by not accepting to pay allegiance to the Caliph in Damascus. On any given day and time, one finds scores of people visiting Karbala and offering prayers, meditation, feeding the poor and even having family outings. There are more Shia sites in Iraq than in Iran, so there always has been a large influx of Iranians visiting Iraq as pilgrims. Though both these sites are holy to the Shias, they are open to non-Muslims as well, and tour members were free to walk around the courtyard, take photos and meet people. The inside portion is, however, open only to Muslims, be they Shias or Sunnis. The adjoining cities of Najaf and Qufa house many more Shia sites, including a large cemetery, several mosques and madrasas (religious schools). It is also here that the main school of Shia thought exists and where the Ayatollahs undergo their training. The magnificence of modern-day Iraq lies in the capital city of Baghdad. Baghdad-the name means "garden of God"-is a large and beautiful city. It was during the early days of the Abbasid period (750-969 AD) that Baghdad became the world centre of intellectual and aesthetic growth. It was also here that the stories of Arabian Nights were conceived, where science, especially medicine, astronomy, mathematics, algebra, etc., developed and flourished. Names such as al-Khawarismi, the discoverer of algebraic equations (his name was later Latinised to Algorismus), al-Kindi, the philosopher who

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applied reason to tradition, al-Razi, a physician who compiled a medical encyclopedia and al-Ghazzali, a scholar of religious law, were names still proudly referred to by tourist guides. Baghdad maintained its beauty and majesty. From the palaces of the Abbasids to the palaces of Saddam Hussein, medieval and modem schools, museums, mausoleums and gardens, the city certainly had an atmosphere reflecting its historical past. The pride of the Iraqis, the city had construction of aesthetically designed structures going on seemingly everywhere, all from locally manufactured materials. The famous al-Rasheed Hotel, which like all other hotels in the country, had a large underground hall deSignated as a bomb shelter for use in case of an air raid. Other "five-star" hotels in the city included the Palestine and the al-Mansuriya, both of which were very much in the news during the recent bombings.

7

Heritage and Culture Cradle of Civilization In ancient times, the land area now known as modern Iraq was almost equivalent to Mesopotamia, the land between the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates (in Arabic, the Dijla and Furat, respectively), the Mesopotamian plain was called the Fertile Crescent. This region is known as the Cradle of Civilization; was the birthplace of the varied civilizations that moved us from prehistory to history. An advanced civilization flourished in this region long before that of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, for it was here in about 4,000 BC, that the Sumerian culture flourished. The civilized life that emerged at Summer was shaped by two conflicting factors: the un-predictability of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which at any time could unleash devastating floods that wiped out entire peoples, and the extreme richness of the river valleys, caused by centuries-old deposits of soil. Thus, while the river valleys of southern Mesopotamia attracted migrations of neighbouring peoples and made possible, for the first time in history, the growing of surplus food, the volatility of the rivers necessitated a form of collective management to protect the marshy, low-lying land from flooding. As surplus production increased and as collective management became more advanced, a process of urbanisation evolved and Sumerian civilization took root. The people of the Tigris and the Euphrates basin, the ancient Sumerians, using the fertile land and

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the abundant water supply of the area, developed sophisticated irrigation systems and created what was probably the first cereal agriculture as well as the earliest writing, cuneiform-a way of arranging impressions stamped on clay by the wedge-like section of choppedoff reed stylus into wet clay. Through writing, the Sumerians were able to pass on complex agricultural techniques to successive generations; this led to marked improvements in agricultural production. Writing evolved to keep track of property. Clay envelopes marked with the owner's rolled seal· were used to hold tokens for goods, the tokens within recording a specific transaction. Later on, the envelope and tokens were discarded and symbols scratched into clay-recorded transactions such as 2 bunch of wheat or 7 cows. As writing evolved, pictures gave way to lines pressed into clay with a wedge tip; this allowed a scribe to make many different types of strokes without changing his grip. By 3,000 BC, the script evolved into a full syllabic alphabet. The commerce of the times is recorded in great depth. Double entry accounting practices were found to be a part of the records. This remarkable innovation has been used to this day, as a standard for record keeping. It was the custom for all to pay for what they needed at a fair price. Royalty was not exception. The king may have had an edge on getting a "better deal", but it wasn't the law as it was in Egypt where the Pharaoh was the "living god" and as such, owned all things. It seems that everyone had the right to bargain fairly for his or her goods. Unlike their Egyptian neighbours, these people were believers in private property, and the kings were very much answerable to the citizens. In Egypt, the Pharaoh owned all things, including the people and property. Sumerians invented the wheel and the first plow in 3700 BC. Sumerians developed a math system based on the numeral 60, which is the basis of time in the modern world. Sumerian society was "Matriarchal" and women had a highly respected place in society. Banking originated in Mesopotamia (Babylonia) out of the activities of temples and palaces, which provided safe places for the storage of valuables. Initially deposits of grain were accepted and later other goods including cattle, agricultural implements, and precious metals. Another important Sumerian legacy was the recording of literature.

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Poetry and epic literature were produced. The most famous Sumerian epic and the one that has survived in the most nearly complete form is the epic of Gilgamesh. The story of Gilgamesh, who actually was king of the city-state of Uruk in approximately 2700 BC, is a moving story of the ruler's deep sorrow at the death of his friend Enkidu, and of his consequent search for immortality. Other central themes of the story are a devastating flood and the tenuous nature of man's existence, and ended by meeting a wise and ancient man who had survived a great flood by bUilding an ark. Land was cultivated for the first time, early calendars were used and the first written alphabet was invented ·here. Its bountiful land, fresh waters, and varying climate contributed to the creation of deeprooted civilization that had fostered humanity from its affluent fountain since thousands of years. Sumerian states were believed to be under the rule of a local god or goddess, and a bureaucratic system of the priesthood arose to oversee the ritualistic and complex religion. High Priests represented the gods on earth, one of their jobs being to discern the divine will. A favourite method of divination was reading sheep or goat entrails. The priests ruled from their ziggurats, high rising temples of sunbaked brick with outside staircases leading to the shrine on top. The Sumerian gods personified local elements and natural forces. The Sumerians worshipped Anu, the supreme god of heaven, Enlil, god of water, and Ea, god of magic and creator of man. The Sumerians held the belief that a sacred ritual marriage between the ruler and Inanna, goddess of love and fertility brought rich harvests. Eventually, the Sumerians would have to battle another peoples, the Akkadians, who migrated up from the Arabian Peninsula. The Akkadians were a Semitic people, that is, they spoke a language drawn from a family of languages called Semitic languages; Semitic languages include Hebrew, Arabic, Assyrian, and Babylonian, the term "Semite" is a modern designation taken from the Hebrew Scriptures; Shem was a son of Noah and the nations descended from Shem are the Semites. When the two peoples clashed, the Sumerians gradually lost control over the city-states, they had so brilliantly created and fell under the hegemony of the Akkadian kingdom, which was based in Akkad (Sumerian Agade). This great capital of the largest empire

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humans had ever seen up until that point that was later to become Babylon, which was the commercial and cultural centre of the Middle East for almost two thousand years. In 2340 BC, the great Akkadian military leader, Sargon, conquered Summer and built an Akkadian empire stretching over most of the Sumerian city-states and extending as far away as Lebanon. Sargon based his empire in the city of Akkad, which became the basis of the name of his people. But Sargon's ambitious empire lasted for only a blink of an eye in the long time spans of Mesopotamian history. In 2125 BC, the Sumerian city of Ur in southern Mesopotamia rose up in revolt, and the Akkadian empire fell before a renewal of Sumerian city-states. Mesopotamia is the suspected spot known as the "Garden of Eden." Ur of the Chaldees, and that's where Abraham came from, (that's just north of the traditional site of the Garden of Eden, about twenty-five miles north-east of Eridu, at present Mughair), was a great and famous Sumerian city, dating from this time. Predating the Babylonian by about 2,000 years was Noah, who lived in Fara, 100 miles south-east of Babylon (from Bab-ili, meaning "Gate of God"). The early Assyrians, some of the earliest people there, were known to be warriors, so the first wars were fought there, and the land has been full of wars ever since. The Assyrians were in the northern part of Mesopotamia and the Babylonians more in the middle and southern part.

Cultural Heritage and Monuments Between April 12 and 15, 2003, the Iraq Museum in Baghdad was looted, and many of the most important objects in the collection were stolen. Among them were the famous monumental Uruk Vase of 3300 BC, that appears in every art survey textbook and is one of the earliest narrative works of art, and the beautifully carved marble female head, perhaps representing the great Sumerian goddess Inanna, also from the sacred precinct at Uruk in southern Iraq and of the same period. Thousands of works of Mesopotamian and Islamic art and artifacts were stolen from the Iraq Museum, but that is not all: in the days before and after, the majority of other museums and libraries in the country were also looted, burnt, and destroyed. For thinking people

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all over the world, this was a great tragedy. For the people of Iraq, however, it was more than that. It was the theft and destruction of their history, a history that forms the basis of their identity as the people of this very ancient land. In pre-war news reports on Iraq we could read or hear descriptions of this country as a desert, a place poor in culture, if rich in oil reserves. But Iraq is also the land that archaeologists refer to by the Greek name of Mesopotamia: the land between two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and the home of one of the world's oldest civilizations. Paradoxically, ancient Mesopotamia is taken to be the past of mankind and even as the place of origin of Western civilization. So, if we remember that Mesopotamia is in fact the name given to the place we now call Iraq, then we should consider this: the ancient history of Iraq has traditionally been claimed as the history of the West, since according to the nineteenth-century model of the progress of civilization, the torch was passed from Mesopotamia and Egypt to Greece and Rome, and subsequently to the Western world. Sites such as Abraham's city of Ur, the Garden of Eden, Babylon, and Nineveh are, thus, the cultural heritage of the world. Many of these sites are indeed of particular interest to the Western world, since it derived certain aspects of its own culture from ancient Iraq, but all are valued and well loved by the people of Iraq, regardless of their significance for the world. The Iraqi people, who live their entire lives surroun ded by monuments and ancient sites, identify their land through these familiar landmarks. This is an aspect of Iraqi cultural patrimony fhat is not often addressed. A destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq is, thus, not simply a misfortune for global cultural heritage, but also a tragic loss for the people of Iraq. The reason that international laws on cultural heritage (such as the Hague Convention) exist is precisely becaus e people's sense of communal identity is defined in relation to a shared culture and history. In Iraq, the ancient monuments and thousa nds of archaeological sites are such a major part of the terrain that, for an Iraqi, a conception of the land without them is simply impossible. Families go for day trips and picnics to sites like the Parthian city of Hatra, a wonderful and magical place that dates to the second century BC, a city where Mesopotamian gods were worshipped

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alongside Greeco-Roman deities and where the architecture is a fabulous mixture of Assyrian and Roman forms. The pre-Islamic capitals of Ctesiphon and Babylon are also popular tourist destinations for all. Young children are taken on school trips to these ancient cities and to the local museum collections: the medieval Islamic city of Baghdad, founded in 762 AD, was consciously modelled upon these earlier, legendary capitals. Some ancient sites are simply part of daily life. The walls of cities, such as the Nineveh of biblical fame, can be seen everyday by the local people as they go about their daily lives. Rock reliefs carved by the sculptors of the Assyrian kings mark the terrain across the northern Iraqi countryside. While ancient sites in Iraq are the local cultural patrimony, there are moments of Iraq's past that were certainly events of world-historical significance. The first of these is the Uruk phenomenon of the fourth millennium BC This phenom enon can be described as the first cultural revolution, comprising the development of the first cities, the first monumental architecture, and, perhaps most important, the invention of writing. The second significant world event in the history of Iraq is the period of the Islamic rule of the Abbasid dynasty, between the eighth and tenth centuries AD. This was when Baghdad became the centre of the development of the arts and sciences, the place in which the Greek texts of classical antiquity were preserved through translations and copies. It was in the universities of Baghdad, under the patronage of the Abbasid kings, that mathematics, astronomy, physics, and medicine developed. This period of scholarly achievement was at its height in the eighth to the tenth centuries, but Baghd ad continued as the centre of scholarship, at least until it fell to the Mongol invasion of Hulagu Khan in 1258 AD. Both the Uruk and the Abbasid periods are truly remarkable because the innovations that took place in Iraq at those times influenced the state of knowledge and views of reality well beyond the narrow geographical region of the Tigris-Euphrates river valleys. In both periods, intellectual innovations in this land had long-term effects on the development of scholarship and world views throughout what we now call the Middle East, North Africa, and a large part of Europe, as well as, to a certain extent, southern Asia. These moments are, thus, comparable to turning points in world history such as the Italian

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Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, all of which had significance well beyond the local, all of which became part of world history. Yet, we should not forget that cultural heritage and monuments, despite their significance to the world, are a powerful basis of local histories and identities. Historical artifacts, works of art, and monuments are the agents of memory and even of a sense of self. Their loss is psychologically devastating well beyond the loss that is calculated at the market value of antiquities. All New Yorkers can understand this sense of loss, since many of them still mourn the missing World Trade Centre structures themselves. While their destruction was certainly an event of world significance and people everywhere saw it as a tragedy, New Yorkers felt it in a different way, not only because they lost friends and fellow citizens, but because the towers were part of the horizon of their daily lives, part of the identity of their city. It was exactly this power of monuments and their relationship to a sense of local identity that the Mesopotamians seem to have understood very well. Many works of sculpture exemplify this ancient Mesopotamian understanding of the importance of the place of memory and identity in works of art and monuments. During the second half of the third millennium BC, an unparalleled number of images of the human figure in the form of sculpture in the round were produced in southern Mesopotamia at places such as Lagash and Ur. These statues are generally images in two-dimensional narrative art, whether political or religious, and they are also unlike images of deities or super-natural beings known primarily from the glyptic arts. Above all, what sets these statues apart is not so much the medium of sculpture in the round as their function: they are images of real, historical people who lived in antiquity and were represented in an image. The fact that these are statues of individuals places them in a genre of sculpture that is categorised in art-historical terms as portraiture. But using this descriptive term "portrait" immediately brings up a number of concerns. In the standard Western division of genres, mimetic resemblance is the first criterion of portraiture. The images from Mesopotamia representing historical individuals are indeed portraits because they represent the person in an image, even if they do not mimetically imitate the features of the person.

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The Mesopotamian portrait is actually linked to the person represented in much closer ways than the later tradition of external resemblance or approximation with which we are most familiar. In terms of function, it has long been known that such statuary represented the individual as a worshipper and was to be placed in a temple. A number of these images, both male and female, have been discovered in Situ, in temples. Numerous others bear inscriptions that dedicate them to specific deities for the life of the patron, the patron's family, and sometimes also for the life of the ruler. The two statues here are fine examples of the type. A Sumerian inscription on the back of the basalt statue from the Iraq Museum tells us that it represents a man called Dudu, a high priest and scribe of Urnanshe, the ruler of Lagash about 2400 BC. The statue was placed in the Temple of Ningirsu at Girsu, Telloh, in order to represent Dudu continuously in front of the deity. Its compact, blocky style of carving seems to emphasise durability. Here is a work of art in which style and function are closely linked, since the statue represented Dudu for all time and thus needed to convey durability. Another statue (stolen from the Iraq Museum in April) is a diorite statue from Ur that represents Enmetena, the ruler of Lagash, Tell ai-Hi ba, about 2350 BC. The statue bears an inscription on the back and on the right shoulder dedicating the image of Enmetena to the god Enlil. The inscription tells us about Enmetena's lineage and how the gods favour his rule. It also tells us of his many accomplishments and pious acts, the many temples that he had build for the gods. The end of the inscription reads: "At that time, Enmetena fashioned his statue, named it 'Enmetena whom Enlilloves,' and set it up before Enlil in the temple. Enmetena who built the Eadda, may his personal god Shulutul forever pray to Enlil for the life of Enmetena." These portraits were thus substitutes of sorts. They stood in the place of the person represented and could function as a very real form of presence of that person. They were, therefore, linked to the person in ways much closer than our notion of portrait, since an essence of the person continupd to exist in the image, a fact demonstrated in numerous ancient texts through which we can see that for the Mesopotamians an image had agency and was therefore a powerful object.

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With the Akkadian period it becomes clearer that portraits, as well as large-scale monuments such as stelae, were imbued with agency. The famous copper head of an Akkadian ruler, perhaps Naramsin, who ruled the entirety of Mesopotamia in 2254-2218 BC, is a fine example of this type and fortunately has survived the looting. It is life-size and hollow-cast in the lost-wax method, a technique that would be used by the ancient Greeks almost two thousand years later. The head was part of an entire statue that was most likely made of various materials. It is sensitively modelled to portray the aquiline nose and almond-shaped eyes of the king. The long, braided hair and curling beard are depicted as decorative and orderly patterns of luxurious excess indicating his ideal beauty and virility. The eyes themselves were originally inlaid with another material, which has unfortunately been lost. The head was found in Nineveh in northern Iraq and seems to have suffered an attack. The eyes, ears, and bridge of the nose all seem to have been deliberately attacked in antiquity, most likely during some ancient battle, and done deliberately in order to annihilate the agency that was thought to inhere in the Akkadian king's image. Both the monuments and the images of kings suffered similar fates in wars throughout antiquity. This treatment of images occurred because the ancient Mesopotamians saw images and monuments as social agents, as an index linked to the real essence of the person represented. In this case it is the king, and therefore the image is linked to the land itself. Its loss would have dire consequences for all the land, just as it is recorded that the loss of cult statues during wars indicated defeat and destruction for the city from which they were taken. Many of the Mesopotamian works of art that now reside in museum collections took on a totemic power through the millennia, and their destruction or loss was considered to have terrible and negative consequences for the country. The loss of the objects from Iraqi museums and libraries today would have been understood by the ancients as a sign of destruction of local identity; in their own cultural and historical contexts, the artifacts would have been considered social agents of cultural memory. So it is perhaps not an irony, but rather a profound understanding of the relation of artifacts and memory, that so many aspects of what we in the third millennium AD, consider to be our own civilized lives

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and way~ of thinking, in fact, originated in the third millennium BC, in Mesopotamia. Although in Iraq to date UNESCO has acknowledged only one World Heritage Site (Hatra), this is perhaps because the whole country should be so designated. Iraq is often described as the cradle of civilization, and the country is thickly dotted with the remains of thousands of villages, towns and cities. In 1990, the hostilities affected a number of archaeological sites. Rocket or shellfire damaged the brickwork of the Ziggurat at Ur (constructed in 2100 BC and restored around 550 BC). American troops were probably also responsible for minor looting at the site of Ur itself. Cracks appeared in the arch at Ctesiphon (Taq Kisra, dating to the 4th century AD and until last century the largest single span vault in the world). Bombing destroyed traditional houses on the citadel at Kirkuk. In a ground confrontation the greatest danger to archaeological sites is posed by the fact that their mounds, which can be 30m high and extend over kilometres are often the only raised features on the southern alluvial plain, and therefore liable to be adopted by combatants for various purposes. With modern machinery an entire 6000-year-old village can be recycled into a defensive earthwork in a day or two, and even old-fashioned trenches, which were much used in the last hostilities, can do irreparable damage to sites of paramount interest. Since the foreign troops did not significantly penetrate the inhabited sector of the southern Iraqi plain, the only example known to us is at Tell al-Lahm south of Ur, where American bulldozers did extensive damage. Another example of what can happen is prOVided by the ancient city of Der, modern Tell Aqar, which was converted into a military emplacement by the Iraqi army during the Iraq-Iran war. The trenching cut through the 4500-year old main temple uncovering unique statues and completely destroying their architectural context. A further risk is that archaeological trenches may be mistaken from the air for military emplacements. We do not have documented instances of this happening in 1990, but again in the 1980's the excavated site of Godin Tepe in western Iran was attacked from the air causing considerable damage to the 5000-year-old excavated remains.

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However, the chief potential casualty from modern explosives is standing architecture. One of the surviving ancient churches of Mosul (10th century) was partly destroyed in 1990. There are others equally old and at risk, not to mention a number of monasteries in the district some of which date back to the 4th Century AD. The minarets of the medieval mosques of Mosul and other cities are structurally very vulnerable, but entire mosques are of course at risk. Quite apart from the architectural and historical value of such structures, in Iraq the destruction of places of worship has been viewed with particular abhorrence since at least 2400 BC, and should be avoided with the utmost care. Iraq's few surviving old bridges must be imperiled, as must the few medieval and earlier forts, being self-evidently military structures. Unlike Egypt, Iraq does not have many standing monuments in stone, the principal example being the Parthian city of Hatra, but several ancient capital cities have been excavated with their palaces and temples uncovered, in Assyria with sculptured relief's lining the walls (especially at Nineveh [KouyunjikJ and Nimrud). Last, but not least, there are the museums. In 1990, the portable contents of the Iraq Museum in Baghdad were transferred to another site, from where they have since been returned; we do not know if similar measures have been taken this time, although they have reportedly in Mosul. The destruction of the Iraq Museum would be an appalling loss to the world. The majority of all archaeological finds, made in the country since its foundation in 1920, are stored there. As well as individual items of stunning beauty and importance from successive civilizations (Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Islamic), it shelters huge archives of cuneiform documents, many still unpublished, excavated by Iraqi and foreign expeditions: these include the earliest written archives in the world from Uruk, Sumerian literary texts from the schools of ancient Mesopotamia from 2500 down to 1600 BC, and the 4th century BC temple library of Sippar. There are also museums in most.of the Governorates, stocked with representative but still extremely valuable exhibits selected from the central collections in Baghdad. In 1990-91, several of these were looted in the aftermath of the withdrawal from Kuwait. Chests of manuscripts were recovered scattered across a hillside near Kirkuk.

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Finds in the Dohuk Museum were ground underfoot, and extremely few of the 4000 lost pieces have been identified on the world's art markets. The contents of the Nasiriyyah Museum were rescued by the courageous action of its woman Director who defied looters at the front door while a lorry was loaded at the back. We cite these instances to illustrate the danger, which attends the breakdown of law and order, which can so easily result from military action. Since the spring of 2003, when front pages all over the world were filled with alarming images of the looting of the Iraq National Museum, in Baghdad, relatively little has been heard about the aftermath of that event, although a limited number of items have, in fact, been recovered, leaving some 10,000 to 14,000 objects missing. Even less has been heard about the fate of the more than 10,000 historic and archaeological sites in Iraq that remain vulnerable to the same threats of war, looting and neglect. Although conflict and political uncertainty still characterise daily life in Iraq, important measures are being taken within the country to rebuild many of the institutions that anchor a civil societyincluding those concerned with education, commerce and cultural heritage. Iraqis unquestionably, face formidable challenges on a daily basis, but some significant advances have been made in stemming further loss of their cultural heritage. Equally true, and also frustrating, is the fact that much that needs to be done cannot be done until stability is restored. In the wake of the looting of the museum, a number of countries (some through UNESCO) have helped to refurbish the building, install new security systems conservation laboratories, and train lab technicians and conservators. The challenges facing archaeological and other historic sites are even more complex, given their remote and dispersed locations. Most of these sites are not safe to visit and have no guardians. Looting, now often carried out by bands of armed professionals, has caused irreparable damage to many archaeological sites and has scattered objects not seen in centuries among smugglers and collectors around the world. The areas most at risk include the Dhi Qar, Qadisyah and al-Muthanna provinces, which are south of Baghdad, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and are part of the "fertile crescent." This region, wh:ch lay at the heart of ancient Sumerian and Babylonian

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civilizations, has suffered greatly at the hands of looters. In Nippur, for example, which was one of the most important sites in ancient Mesopotamia, many cuneiform tablets-including a copy of the Gilgamesh epic-are missing. In the province of Dhi Qar, however, a police force of 204 officers has begun patrols, and looting in the region has sharply decreased. Unfortunately, the looters are moving on to other provinces that are not as heavily patrolled but are just as significant. Another 1,500 patrol officers are currently being deployed in those areas. We continue to work to expand the police force and are even encouraging graduates of archaeology programmes to join the effort. In addition, at sites where it is possible to have guards, we plan to provide them with communication equipment when the funds can be raised, so that they can, at the least, alert the police when they see looters coming. The conflict itself, and the military installations that go along with it, are also threatening cultural-heritage sites. In Najaf and Mosul, particularly, historic buildings have been damaged in combat, as has the Mosul Museum, home to important objects from such nearby sites as the World Heritage Site of Hatra (This museum was also subjected to looting. Among the objects stolen from it are 30 bronze panels from the ninth-century BC Assyrian city of Balawat.). An ammunition depot that was constructed under Saddam Hussein's regime in the region of Hatra is now subject to controlled explosions that are damaging important buildings of the Hellenistic, Roman and Arab civilizations. One of the most important developments to have taken place since the looting of the museums has been the establishment, in spring 2003, of two significant relationships between the SBAH and international institutions, in order to develop both short-and long-term strategies for the preservation and stewardship of Iraq's cultural-heritage sites. Long-term planning efforts for the protection of historic sites are being undertaken with private-sector support from the Getty Conservation Institute in Los Angeles and the World Monuments Fund in New York, through the GCI-WMF Iraq Cultural Heritage Initiative. This partnership was established with seed funding from the J.M. Kaplan Fund and with further support from the National

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Endowment for the Humanities and UNESCO. In addition to supplying a diversity of hands-on support, the initiative attempts to stem the tide of looting by raising public awareness of it. The Iraq Cultural Heritage Initiative provides equipment, technology and methodologies for assessing and inventorying cultural 'Sites. It includes the creation of a National Cultural Heritage Information System and Database that will allow us to collect and organise information about the condition of, and threats to, the sites and monuments in Iraq. This will be essential for planning any future activity at these sites, whether for conservation, protection or research. This system was modelled after one now being used in Jordan, and it will help the SBAH to better assess the risks that Iraqi sites face, set priorities for intervention, plan for preventive conservation strategies, coordinate reconstruction efforts with other agencies, avoid further damage to the sites and organise international support for on-site restoration and preservation projects. Sixteen of our employees have just completed a month-long training programme in the use of this database organised by the GCI and WMF. It included training in the use of the software and the technical equipment proVided by UNESCO, as well as in the methodology of site documentation and assessment. The initiative has completed an on-the-ground project in Nineveh: When Sennacherib's palace was looted, and the roof stolen, protective roofing was reinstalled thanks to a grant from the initiative. We will continue our work in the museums and our efforts to strengthen our ability to protect historic sites, including our cooperation with international institutions and colleagues. While on-site work cannot take place until security improves, the assessment of the situation at Babylon is, nonetheless, a priority. Unlike many Arab countries, in a particularly similar manner to Iran (Persia), Iraq's neighbouring country, it embraces and celebrates the achievements of its past in pre-Islamic times. One of the great achievements of Ancient Mesopotamia, is, what seems like an ancient battery. Some archaeologists recently discovered a pot that could produce a couple of watts of electricity. Modem science only reached that stage recently. In the 8th century and 9th century, the Islamic Abbasid Caliphs presided over what was then the world's leading civilization, rich in science, art and literature.

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In the most recent millennium, what is now Iraq has been made up of five cultural areas: Kurdish in the north centred on Arbil; Sunni Islamic Arabs in the centre around Baghdad; Shia Islamic Arabs in the south centred on Basra; the Assyrians, who are a Christian people, living in various cities in the North; and the Marsh Arabs, a nomadic peoples, who live on the marshlands of the central river.

Customs and Rituals Gilgamesh Epic, an important Middle Eastern literary work, written in cuneiform on 12 clay tablets about 2000 BC This heroic poem is named after its hero, Gilgamesh, a Babylonian king who ruled the city of Uruk, known in the Bible as Erech (now AI-Warka', Iraq). According to the myth, the gods respond to the prayers of the oppressed citizenry of Uruk and send a wild, brutish man, Enkidu, to challenge Gilgamesh to a wrestling match. When the contest ends with neither as a clear victor, Gilgamesh and Enkidu become close friends. They journey together and share many adventures. Accounts of their heroism and bravery in slaying dangerous beasts spread to many lands. When the two travellers return to Uruk, Ish tar (guardian deity of the city) proclaims her love for the heroic Gilgamesh. When he rejects her, she sends the Bull of Heaven to destroy the city. Gilgamesh and Enkidu kill the bull, and, as punishment for his participation, the gods doom Enkidu to die. After Enkidu's death, Gilgamesh seeks out the wise man Utnapishtim to learn the secret of immortality. The sage recounts to Gilgamesh a story of a great flood (the details of which are so remarkably similar to later biblical accounts of the flood that scholars have taken great interest in this story). After much hesitation, Utnapishtim reveals to Gilgamesh that a plant bestowing eternal youth is in the sea. Gilgamesh dives into the water and finds the plant but later loses it to a serpent and, disconsolate, returns to Uruk to end his days. This saga was widely studied and translated in ancient times. /< Biblical writers appear to have modelled their account of the friendship of David and Jonathan on the relationship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu. Numerous Greek writers also incorporated elements found

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in the Gilgamesh epic into their dragon-slaying epics and into stories concerning the close bond between Achilles and Patroclus. The longest Babylonian epic poems are the Creation Epic and the Gilgamesh Epic. The former, consisting of seven tablets, deals with the struggle between cosmic order and primeval chaos. The secular Gilgamesh Epic, written about 2000 BC on 12 cuneiform tablets, concerns the hero's fruitless search for immortality. Masterfully woven together from an older series of separate Sumerian tales, this epic poem had great popular appeal in antiquity. It is of interest to modem biblical scholars because of its reference to a Noah-Iike character who survived a great flood. The Epic of Zu tells of the theft of the Tablets of Destiny from the gods by the evil bird Zu and of their recovery by the warrior god Ninurta. The search for the "plant of birth" by the shepherd Etana, who ultimately founded the first dynasty after the deluge, is related in the Epic of Etana. Among other Babylonian epics and myths are The Descent of Ishtar to the Nether World; Atrahasis, which deals with human sin and its punishment through plagues and the deluge; and Nergal and Ereshkigal, concerning the marriage of the divinities who ruled the netherworld. Other important works are The Babylonian Theodicy, a poetic dialogue about a Job-like "righteous sufferer"; a satirical dialogue, The Master and His Obliging Servant; and a recently discovered folktale, The Poor Man of Nippur, which seems to be the ancestor of one of the stories in the Arabian Nights. Among significant historical romances in poetic form are, The Cuthaean Legend, concerning the defeat of King Naram-Sin (reigned about 2255-2218 BC) of Akkad; The King of Battle, dealing with a military expedition to Anatolia led by Sargon I (reigned about 2335-2279 BC) of Akkad; and The Epic of Tukulti-Ninurta, describing the defeat of the Babylonians by the Assyrians. Each of the important deities had, in one or more of the Babylonian cities, a large temple in which he or she was worshipped as the divine civic ruler and protector. The larger cities also contained many temples and chapels dedicated to one deity or another; Babylon, for example, possessed more than 50 temples in Chaldean times (8th to 6th century BC). Temple services were generally conducted in open courts containing fountains for ablution 'lnd altars for sacrifices.

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The cella, or inner part of the temple, in which the statue of the deity stood on a pedestal in a special niche, was the holy of holies, and only the high priest and other privileged members of the clergy and court were permitted to enter it. In the temple complexes of the larger cities, a ziggurat, or staged tower, was often built, crowned by a small sanctuary, which probably was reserved for the all-important sacredmarriage ceremony celebrated in connection with the new-year festival. The upkeep of the major Babylonian temples required large revenues, which were provided primarily by gifts and endow ments from the court and the wealthy. In the course of the centuries, some of the major Babylonian temples accumulated immense wealth and came into possession of large estates and factories employing large numbers of serfs and slaves. Primarily, however, the temple was the house of the god, in which all the needs of the deity were prOVided for in accord ance with ancien t rites and impressive ceremonies carried out by a vast institutionalised clergy. The latter comprised high priests, sacrifice priests, musicians, singers, magicians, soothsayers, diviners, dream interpreters, astrologers, female devotees, and hierodules (temple slaves). Sacrifices, which were offered daily, consisted of animal and vegetable foods, libations of water, wine, and beer, and the burning of incense. Numer ous annual and monthly festivals were held, including a feast to celebrate the new moon. The most import ant festival of all was the celebration of the New Year at the spring equinox; it was known as the Akitu festival because some of its more esoteric ritual was enacted in the Akitu, Marduk's shrine outside of Babylon. The festival lasted 11 days and included such rites as purification, sacrifice, propitiation, penanc e, and absolution, but it also involved colourful processions. The culmination was probab ly the sacred-marriage ceremony previously mentioned, which took place in the sanctua ry crowning the ziggurat. Babylonian docum ents indicate that the ethical and moral beliefs of the people stressed goodness and truth, law and order, justice and freedom, wisdom and learning, and courage and loyalty. Mercy and compassion were espoused, and special protection was accord ed widows, orphan s, refugees, the poor, and the oppressed. Immoral and unethical acts were considered transgressions against the gods

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and the divine order and were believed to be punished by the gods accordingly. No one was considered to be without sin, and therefore all suffering was held to be deserved. The proper course for Babylonians unhapp y with their condition in life was not to argue and complain but to plead and wail, to lament and confess their inevitable sins and failings before their personal god, who acted as their mediator in the assembly of the great gods. The religioSity of the Babylonians has come to be proverbial, and not unjustifiably so. Nevertheless, religious skepticism existed and may have been more prevalent than sources reveal. One extant literary document known as the Babylonian Theodicy, for example, consists of a debate between a skeptic and a believer in which the latter finds it necessary to conclude with the patent and somewhat unsatisfying argument that the will of the gods is inscrutable. In anothe r Babylonian essay, taking the form of a dialogue between a master and slave, the tone is similarly skeptical and the mood cynical; the relativist view is advanc ed that all human actions can be justified and are therefore fundamentally without meaning, particularly because death makes life itself insignificant. For the Babylonians, death was indeed the consuming dread and a source of great despair. The Babylonians generally believed that at death the disembodied spirit descends to the dark nether world, and that human existence beyond the grave is at best only a dismal, wretched reflection of life on earth. Any hope of an eternal reward for the righteous and deserving was absent; everyone was impartially consigned to the world below. It is not strange that the most popular, dramatic, and creative Babylonian literary work, the Gilgamesh Epic, centres on a vain and pathetic quest for eternal life. We ask all Iraqis to study the history, mythology, religions, and all life aspects of our ancestors and forefathers, The people of the land between the two rivers, since we all, in one way or another, belong and relate to the life and history of the peoples of ancient Iraq, and to understand the stages of development of the cultural, religious, life style, literature, government, habits of our "ancestors who lived and created the most interesting historical tales and civilization, great in the standards of the day, and really mystifying

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for present scholars and ordinary people alike, as well as it is important for us to understand our roots in the land of the two great rivers and all it's great cities and accomplishments in all fields of humanity... the good and the bad and those in between! Hope you enjoy reading this 5000 years poem!

Wedding Traditions In Mosul, they make the party in the fourth day after marriage. This is usually held in the groom parent's house and the guest are from women only; the invited women should bring gifts for the new couple. Only the bride attend this party while her husband usually awaits in another room of his family house waiting for everyone to leave the house. The bride usually wears a party dress and some time more than one, or she may enter the room with her white dress and then change it after a while. The guests starts to dance and celebrate the new marriage. Most of the marriages are arranged in the traditional way (i.e., not after a love story). When a man sees a woman and he likes her form the first sight he tells his mother about her and his family starts to ask about her family and start to work like a detective and if they match with the groom family socially and economically and in other things they agree about her. His mother goes to the bride house and asks for her hand on his behalf from her mother and gives her all the information about her son and the family, so the bride family will start to do the same thing that the groom's has done but this time, in opposite direction. And if they agree they call the groom's house and ask the groom to come with his mother. Some families let the bride sit with the future groom alone and let them get introduced to each other and talk alone about themselves, if they both agree about each other they will go to the next step and if one of them did not like the other very much they will separate. Also many still prefer the marriage between relatives, like cousins especially in small towns and villages. The first thing to do after the initial agreement is called 'Mashaiya' in which the groom's family bring the older person in their family with a number of relatives and friends all just men and go to the bride's father who also brings all his relatives and friends all men and sit together to get introduced to each other and in this party the older

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person in the groom's side make a speech asking for the bride's hand from her father, the father makes another speech saying yes, then juice and deserts are serviced at once and after they finish, everybody leaves home. This party is very short and almost lasts for an hour only. Then comes the engagement party, in which the bride and the groom exchanged rings, he buys the bride a ring and she buys his ring, the engagement party is made by the bride's family, and usually is attended by close relatives only from both sides, some times if the house is too small only women attend the party beside the groom of cout:Se. There is a limit in the relation between the man and woman in their engagement period. 50 there is another step and this is (tying the knut) this is the exact translation to the Iraqis language where the couple become legally married in court but they still don't get to live together. In this contract the man usually writes her some kind of money or gold which she will take if he divorce her or he dies. This is usually done in court and some families bring the judge to the house of the bride where more traditional ceremonies can take place. For 5unnis the bride wear a white dress or Jallabyia, a tradition Arabic cloth, and in front of her they put seven cups, containing different kinds of white things like sugar, yoghurt, cream, honey, etc. Also they put the holy Quran and a mirror. These are traditions only and the people like to observe them. Usually the judge asks the bride personally if she agrees to marry this man by saying a long traditional speech and he repeats it for thre2 times and then the bride says yes. And then returns to the groom but he asks him only once! For 5hias: the bride wears a white nightgown and they also put in front of her the seven whites besides a big plate with different kind of spices decorated in a very nice way, and they bring a 5hia cleric instead of the judge and while he asks her, two women stand holding a piece of white cloth above her head and a third woman start to sprinkle white sugar above her head to that piece of cloth, her feet are put in water with some dried flowers in it. Then after tying the nut, comes the 'Nishan' which is another party held by the bride family either in their house or a hotel if the house is very small. In this party the groom's family gives the bride

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jewellery from gold or diamond depending on their wealth and the groom starts to put it on her, while every one dance and sing. Before the wedding day in one night there is also a small party held in the house of the bride and the groom as well separately, he invites his friends (like the bachelor party but with no stripper! some of the men might bring traditional dancers.) and she invites her friends. After all both parties have 'Hinna' to be put on the guests hands. After that comes the wedding party. Some, they don't have a party just Zaffa as we call it, in which the groom's family goes to the bride family bringing with them a music band and start to dance for a bit and then the new couple go to their home or hotel. Some have a big party. There are many other traditions before the wedding and after it. Of course these traditions may differ a little bit according to the social and economic levels and according to beliefs as well but this is the basic thing. Some of the families started to shrink those parties into two or three depending on the security and economic conditions.

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8 Art and Architecture Iraq is where the Mesopotamia Civilization, that went on to influence the European and Asian civilizations, grew. So as far as culture is concerned, Iraq has a rich heritage. The country is known for its poets and its painters and sculptors are among the best in the Arab world, some of them being world-class. Besides this, Iraq is also known for producing fine handicrafts, including rugs and carpets. The architecture of Iraq is best seen in the sprawling metropolis of Baghdad, where the construction is almost entirely new, with some islands of exquisite old buildings and compounds. More than 4,000 years ago, the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers began to teem with life-first the Sumerian, then the Babylonian, Assyrian, Chaldean, and Persian empires. Here, too, excavations have unearthed evidence of great skill and artistry. From Sumeria have come examples of fine works in marble, diorite, hammered gold, and lapis lazuli. Of the many portraits produced in this area, some of the best are those of Gudea, ruler of Lagash. Some of the portraits are in marble, others, and such as the one in the Louvre in Paris, are cut in gray-black diorite. Dating from about 2400 BC, they have the smooth perfection and idealised features of the classical period in Sumerian art. Sumerian art and architecture was ornate and complex. Clay was the Sumerians' most abundant material. Stone, wood, and metal had to be imported. Art was primarily used for religious purposes. Painting and sculpture was the main median used. The famous votive stone/marble sculptures from

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Tell Asmar represent tall, bearded figures with huge, staring eyes and long, pleated skirts. The tallest figure is about 30 inches in height. He represents the god of vegetation. The next tallest represents a mother goddessmother goddesses were common in many ancient cultures. They were worshipped in the hope that they would bring fertility to women and to crops. (Another connection to African culture.) The next largest figures are priests. The smallest figures are worshippers-a definite hierarchy of size. This is an example of artistic iconography. We learn to read picture symbols-bodies are cylindrical and scarcely differentiated by gender, with their uplifted heads and hands clasped. This is a pose of supplication wanting or waiting for something. Ur yielded much outstanding Sumerian work, e.g., a wooden harp with the head of a bull on top, showing mythological scenes in gold and mosaic inlay on the sound box (c.2650 BC, Univ. of Penn., Philadelphia) . Sumerian techniques and motifs were widely available because of the invention of cuneiform writing before 3,000 BC. This system of writing developed before the last centuries of the 4th millennium BC, in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valley, most likely by the Sumerians. The characters consist of arrangements of wedge-like strokes, generally on clay tablets. The history of the script is strikingly like that of the Egyptian hieroglyphic. Among other Sumerian arts forms were the clay cylinder seals used to mark documents or property. They were highly sophisticated. A detailed drawing was made from tracing a photograph of the temple vase found at Uruk/Warka, dating from approximately 3100 BC. It is over one metre (nearly 4 feet) tall. On the upper tier is a figure of a nude man that may possibly represent the sacrificial king. He approaches the robed queen Inanna. Inanna wears a horned headdress. The Queen of Heaven stands in front of two looped temple poles or "asherah," phallic posts, sacred to the goddess. A group of nude priests bring gifts of baskets of gifts, including, fruits to pay her homage on the lower tier. This vase is now at the Iraq Museum in Baghdad. "The Warka Vase, is the oldest ritual vase in carved stone discovered in ancient Summer and can be dated to round about 3000 BC, or probably 4th-3rd millennium BC. It shows men entering the presence of his

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gods, specifically a cult goddess Innin (Inanna), represented by two bundles of reeds placed side-by-side symbolising the entranc e to a temple. Male statues stand or sit with hands clasped in an attitude of prayer. They are often naked above the waist and wear a woollen skirt curiously woven in a pattern that suggests overlapping petals (commonly described by the Greek word kaunakes, meanin g "thick cloak"). A toga-like garment sometimes covers one shoulder. Men generally wear long hair and a heavy beard, both often trimmed in corrugations and painted black. The eyes and eyebrows are emphasised with coloured inlay. The female coiffure varies considerably but predominantly consists of a heavy coil arrange d vertically from ear to ear and a chignon behind. A headdress of folded linen sometimes conceals the hair. Ritual nakedness is confined to priests. It has been thought that the rarity of stone in Mesopotamia contributed to the primary stylistic distinction between Sumerian and Egyptian sculpture. The Egyptians quarried their own stone in prismatic blocks, and one can see that, even in their freestanding statues, strength of design is attained by the retention of geometric unity. By contrast, in Summer, stone must have been imported from remote sources, often in the form of miscellaneous boulders, the amorph ous character of which seems to have been retained by the statues into which they were transformed. Beyond this general characteristic of Sumerian sculpture, two successive styles have been distinguished in the middle and late subdivisions of the Early Dynastic period. One t very notable group of figures, from Tall al-Asmar, Iraq (ancien Eshnunna), dating from the first of these phases, shows a geometric simplification of forms that, to modern taste, is ingenious and aesthetically acceptable. Statues, characteristic of the second phase on the other hand, though technically more competently carved, show aspirations to naturalism that are sometimes overly ambitious. In this second style, some scholars see evidence of occasional attempts at portraiture. Yet, in spite of minor variations, all these figures adhere to the single formula of presenting the conventional characteristics of Sumerian physiognomy. Their provenance is not confined to the Sumerian cities in the south. An important group of statues is derived

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from the ancient capital of Mari, on the middle Euphrates, where the population is known to have been racially different from the Sumerians. In the Mari statues there also appears to have been no deviation from the sculptural formula; they are distinguished only by technical peculiarities in the carving. Deprived of stone, Sumerian sculptors exploited alternative materials. Fine examples of metal casting have been found, some of them suggesting knowledge of the cire perdue (lost-wax) process, and copper statues more than half life-size are known to have existed. In metalwork, however, the ingenuity of Sumerian artists is perhap s best judged from their contrivance of composite figures. The earliest and one of the finest examples of such figures -and of Sumerian sculpture as a whole- -comes from a Protoliterate level of excavation at Tall al-Warka'. It is the limestone face of a life-size statue (Iraqi Museum, Baghdad), the remainder of which must have been compo sed of other materials; the method of attachment is visible on the surviving face. Devices of this sort were brought to perfection by craftsmen of the Early Dynastic period, the finest examples of whose work are to be seen among the treasures from the royal tombs at Ur: a bull's head decorating a harp, composed of wood or bitumen covered with gold and wearing a lapis lazuli beard (British Museum); A rampan t he-goat in gold and lapis, supported by a golden tree. The composite headdresses of court ladies (British Museum, Iraqi Museum, and University Museum); or, more simply, the miniature figure of a wild ass, cast in electrum (a natural yellow alloy of gold and silver) and mounte d on a bronze rein ring (British Museum). The inlay and enrichment of wooden objects reaches its peak in this period, as may be seen in the so-called standar d or doublesided panel from Ur (British Museum), on which elaborate scenes of peace and war are depicted in a delicate inlay of shell and semi-precious stones. The refinement of craftsmanship in metal is also appare nt in the famous wig-helmet of gold (Iraqi Museum), belonging to a Sumerian prince, and in weapons, implements, and utensils. Relief carving in stone was a medium of expression popula r with the Sumerians and first appears in a rather crude form in Protoliterate times. In the final phase of the Early Dynastic period, its style becam e

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conventional. The most commo n form of relief sculpture was that of stone plaques, 1 foot (30 centimetres) or more square, pierced in the centre for attachment to the walls of a temple, with scenes depicted in several registers (horizontal rows). The subjects usually seem to be commemorative of specific events, such as feasts or building activities, but representation is highly standardised, so that almost identical plaques have been found at sites as much as 500 miles (800 kilometres) apart. Fragments of more ambitious commemorative stele have also been recovered; the Stele of Vultures (Louvre Museum) from Telloh, Iraq (ancient Lagash), is one example. Although it commemorates a military victory, it has a religiOUS content. The most important figure is that of a patron deity, emphasised by its size, rather than that of the king. The formal massing of figures suggests the beginnings of mastery in design, and a formula has been devised for multiplying identical figures, such as chariot horses. In a somew hat different category are the cylinder seals so widely utilised at this time. Used for the same purposes as the more familiar stamp seal and likewise engraved in negative (intaglio), the cylindershaped seal was rolled over wet clay on which it left an impression in relief. Delicately carved with miniature designs on a variety of stones or shell, cylinder seals rank as one of the higher forms of Sumerian art. Prominent among their subjects is the complicated imagery of Sumerian mythology and religious ritual. Still only partially understood, their skilful adapta tion to linear designs can at least be easily appreciated. Some of the finest cylinder seals date from the Protoliterate period. After a slight deterioration in the first Early Dynastic period, when brocade patterns or files of running animals were pre{erred, mythical scenes returned. Conflicts are depicted between wild beasts and protecting demigods or hybrid figures, associated by some scholars with the Sumerian epic of Gilgamesh. The monotony of animat ed motifs is occasionally relieved by the introduction of an inscription The beginnings of monumental architecture in Mesopotamia are usually considered to have been contemporary with the founding of the Sumerian cities and the invention of writing, in about 3100 BC. Conscious attempts at architectural design during this so-called Protoliterate period (c. 3400-c. 2900 BC) are recognisable in the

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construction of religious buildings. There is, however, one temple, at Abu Shahra yn (ancient Eridu) , that is no more than a final rebuilding of a shrine, the original foundation of which dates back to the beginning of the 4th millennium; the continuity of design has been thought by some to confirm the presence of the Sumerians throughout the temple's history. Already, in the Ubaid period (c. 5200-c .3500 BC), this temple anticipated most of the architectural characteristics of the typical Protoliterate Sumerian platform temple. It is built of mud brick on a raised plinth (platform base) of the same material, and its walls are orname nted on their outside surfaces with alternating buttresses (supports) and recesses. Tripartite in form, its long central sanctuary is flanked on two sides by subsidiary chambers, provided with an altar at one end and a freestanding offering table at the other. Typical temples of the Protoliterate period -both the platform type and the type built at ground level-a re, however, much more elaborate both in planning and ornament. Interior wall orname nt often consists of a patterned mosaic of Terra-cotta cones sunk into the wall, their exposed ends dipped in bright colours or sheathe d in bronze. An open hall at the Sumerian city of Uruk (biblical Erech; modern Tall al-Warka, Iraq) contains freestanding and attache d brick columns that have been brilliantly decora ted in this way. Alternatively, the internal-wall faces of a platform temple could be orname nted with mural paintings depicting mythical scenes, such as at Uqair. The two forms of temple -the platform variety and that built at ground level-p ersiste d throughout the early dynasties of Sumerian history (c. 2900-c. 2400 BC). It is known that two of the platform temples originally stood within walled enclosures, oval in shape and containing, in addition to the temple, accommodation for priests. But, the raised shrines themselves are lost, and their appear ance can be judged only from facade ornaments discovered at Tall al-Ubayd. These devices, which were intended to relieve the monoto ny of sun-dried brick or mud plaster, include a huge copper-sheathed lintel, with animal figures modelled partly in the round; woode n columns sheathe d in a patterned mosaic of coloured stone or shell; and bands of copper-sheathed bulls and lions, modelled in relief but with projecting heads. The planning of ground-level temples continued to elaborate

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on a single theme: a rectangular sanctuary, entered on the cross axis, with altar, offering table, and pedestals for votive statuary (statues used for vicarious worship or intercession). Considerably less is known about palaces or other secular buildings at this time. Circular brick columns and austerely simplified facades have been found at Kish (modem Tall al-Uhaimer, Iraq). Flat roofs, supported on palm trunks, must be assumed, although some knowledge of corbelled vaulting (a technique of spanning an opening like an arch by having successive cones of masonry project farther inward as they rise on each side off the gap )-and even of dome construction-is suggested by tombs at Ur, where a little stone was available. The Sumerian temple was a small brick house that the god was supposed to visit periodically. The earliest Sumerians in the valley ornamented it so as to recall the reed houses built. This house, however, was set on a brick platform, which became larger and taller as time progressed until the platform at Ur (built around 2100 BC) was 150 by 200 feet (45 by 60 metres) and 75 feet (23 metres) high. These Mesopotamian temple platforms are called ziggurats, a word derived from the Assyrian ziqquratu, meaning "high". They were symbols in themselves; the ziggurat at Ur was planted with trees to make it represent a mountain. There the god visited Earth, and the priests climbed to its top to worship. Most cities were simple in structure; the ziggurat was one of the world's first great architectural structures.

Preservation of Art and Culture Members of Historians of Islamic Art, an international association of scholars professionally engaged with the art, architecture and history of the Islamic world have written and expressed their outrage and profound concern about the destruction of Iraq's cultural patrimony, art and institutions following the occupation of the country by coalition forces. Much attention has been focused on the extraordinary loss of Sumerian, Akkadian and Assyrian art and antiquities. As scholars who study and research the art and culture of Islamic societies, they would also like to draw attention to the loss and reported destruction of numerous collections of unique documents relating to the cultural

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history of Iraq from the eighth to the twentieth century. In addition to those artifacts lost during the sack of the museums in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, the burning of the National Library and Archives, the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and the looting of major university libraries have led to the destruction and dispersal of unique (and often poorly documented) works of art and manuscript collections. The scale and nature of the loss may never be known for certain. While these losses are now thought to be smaller than Originally estimated, the destroyed collections included early Qurans, historical works, Ottoman archival documents, and unique collections of early printed works and popular literature. Such museum collections and libraries constituted repositories of a knowledge that was both the patrimony of the Iraqi people, and the heritage of all humankind. The eradication of Iraq's cultural infrastructure in a matter of days following the fall of the Baathist regime is a grave and tragic calamity. The events that led to the catastrophe in Iraq constitute a gross dereliction of the duties of an occupying power under the Hague Convention. Moreover, this destruction was not only preventable, it was also predicted. Meetings between American archaeologists and the State Department made it clear that Iraq's cultural patrimony would require protection in the aftermath of a military victory. The effective protection afforded the Ministries of Oil and of the Interior show what might have been achieved had the administration shown the will to act upon such advice. In the light of the universal opprobrium that these events have attracted, the conflicting reports and counter-reports surrounding them, and the recent suggestion of international criminal involvement, members of Historians of Islamic Art called on the House and Senate in the US, and the British Parliament in the UK, to launch a comprehensive investigation into the events of April 2003. In addition to apportioning blame where it is due, such an investigation should also liaise with their Iraqi colleagues with the aim of making practical suggestions as to how to ameliorate this disastrous situation. They further requested that both governments ensure the availability of financial assistance and professional expertise to Iraqi cultural institutions upon request, as they began the process of reconstructing what remained of their patrimony. I

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In the interim, they called on the coalition forces to extend full protection to the shattered remnants of Iraq's cultural institutions, and to ensure that none of the looted material (including books and manuscripts stolen from Iraqi archives and libraries) leaves the country. They called on the American and British administrations to publicly affirm that any institution or individual in Europe or the Unites States buying material shown to have been looted from Iraqi cultural institutions will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, and the material returned to Iraqi custody. While these measures cannot undo completely the damage already done to an ancient cultural heritage, they do amount to a belated assumption of the responsibilities that the US and UK administrations have repeatedly shirked, with such catastrophic consequences for the national patrimony of Iraq. These administrations must demonstrate their commitment to Iraq's restoration by making the preservation of Iraqi art and culture a top priority. The meeting that took place at the British Museum among European, American and Iraqi museum professionals was a positive step toward establishing cooperation and liaisons. The United States and Great Britain should support these important efforts, and provide funds and personnel to Iraqi museum and university colleagues to assist them in recovering and rebuilding their lives and their culture. It is simply not possible to think of the rebuilding of the country of Iraq without the restoration of its artistic and cultural heritage.

Forgotten Era and Modern Art News about the destruction of Iraq's cultural heritage often takes a back seat to reports on political and military issues and information about the wanton destruction, lack of protection, and severe neglect of Iraq's archaeological sites and museum collections. But the destruction of the modern cultural heritage that was a pioneering force in worldwide modernism is a tragedy that should not go unnoticed. Many seem to forget that the cradle of civilization is also the land of a contemporary country with a thriving culture. Since the mid-twentieth century, Iraq hosted important regional and international cultural events, which exhibited many works of art that entered the permanent collection of the Iraqi Museum of Modern Art, formally known as the Saddam Centre for the Arts. Iraqi artists

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once led tha Arab world in successfully forging a modern national style and provided a model for other artists in the region. In addition to Iraqi and other important regional works, the museum also owned works by Pablo Picasso, Joan Miro, and other modern European masters. In the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, nearly all of the museum's collection was destroyed, looted, or lost. The modern art museum was one of many buildings severely damaged during the US bombing raids over Baghdad. The collection of over seven thousand works of art was viciously looted as the Baath regime collapsed, and as the occupying power failed to provide security to protect Iraq's important cultural institutions. A number of the works were smuggled out of the country, while others are still available on the black market in Baghdad. Many have petitioned the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the US State Department for help in stopping the pillaging of the museums and the recovery of the stolen works of art, but the official position has been to insist on the voluntary return of the stolen works; thus, nothing has been done. Only recently did the new Iraqi government authorise the repossession of works by force with the aid of the recently formed Iraqi police. About 1,300 works have been recovered and are in the custody of the Ministry of Culture. Most of these are severely damaged and are in desperate need of restoration. It is not certain the extent to which the Iraqi government will actively retrieve other stolen works. Luckily, a number of successful inc:lividual efforts were undertaken by concerned Iraqi citizens and are helping to locate, acquire, and protect missing art-works. It is presumed that most of them are still in Iraq; thus, it is possible that with concerted and coordinated efforts most can be recovered. Almost immediately after the looting of museums, some works were purchased personally by Iraqi gallery owners with the publicly stated intention of preserving them until they could be returned to a new Iraqi museum. The renowned Iraqi sculptor Muhammad Ghani has organised a wider and more efficient effort. Returning to Baghdad weeks after the collapse of the former regime, Ghani found the Iraqi Museum of Modern Art in ruins, with mounds of shattered sculptures and broken or empty frames whose canvases had been hastily cut out.

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With the help- of his colleagues and students, he initiated and funded a campaign to buy back some of the stolen works in the neighbourhood near the museum. Ghani contacted the CPA, pleading for financial support and help to continue his endeavour. Failing to secure any aid, he solicited funds from friends, personal acquaintances, and other concerned individuals within the Iraqi community. His plan was simple: his eager students were to locate and purchase the stolen works through word of mouth. The individuals who donated the funds for the effort signed an agreement, retained by Ghani, establishing them as the temporary custodians of the specific works purchased until the museum is re-constituted. In return, these individuals will be publicly acknowledged as donors. He has been able to retrieve a considerable number of works in various conditions, which are currently stored in private Iraqi houses. Ghani's efforts persist, but, unfortunately, the price of stolen works continues to rise while his limited funds are being depleted, making his task slower and much harder to complete. Time is critical: most of the missing works will vanish into private collections, and the history of modern Iraqi art will be lost forever. Many have either been damaged beyond recovery or face the risk of severe damage, due to the lack of a safe, controlled environment. Iraq's infrastructure has been destroyed, and resources are in short supply. During the hot temperatures of summer, most households, businesses, and establishments only had electricity for few hours every day. Recently, Abbas Jawar was appointed the director for the planned new modern art museum. He is operating under the administration of the Institute of National Heritage, but no funds have been allocated to retrieve, restore, or document the works previously held at the museum, or those recovered so far by the government or by individuals. Furthermore, while the museum is a government institution, administered since its inception by the Ministry of Information and Culture, there is talk of converting it into a self-sufficient private institute, eliminating much-needed government funding altogether. There are controversial reasons for the government's abandonment of Iraq's modern art. Art of the last twenty years may be perceived by authorities as problematic because of concern about

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the political identity or patronage of the artist. In other words, the fear is that a policy of "de-Baathification" might determine the value and worth of a work of art.

Massacre of Mesopotamian Archaeology In the southern Iraq desert, the standing structures of ancient archaeological cities dot the horizon-majestic monuments to times long gone. Untouched for thousands of years, historic temples, palaces, tombs and entire dead cities are the sole witness of the passing of time. Properly excavated, these cities could reveal valuable knowledge on the development of the human race and resolve the big mysteries of history. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen. The Sumerian cities have been destroyed, ravaged by the incessant looting that started with the American invasion of Iraq. Once considered historical treasures, today crater-filled landscapes compete for space with hills of shredded pottery and broken bricks. Looters-mainly farmers or jobless Iraqis of all ages-have destroyed the monuments of their own ancestors, erasing their own history in their tireless search for artifacts. They leave their homes and villages seeking financial rewards. Poverty, ignorance and greed force them to change their lives and become tomb raiders and they actually live on the sites, they are robbing for months at a time. A cylinder seal, a sculpture or a cuneiform tablet can bring in desperately sought hard cash. They work all day long hoping to find an artifact that they can sell to the dealer for a mere few dollars. It is tough, dangerous work for bad pay. "A cylinder seal or a cuneiform tablet brings in under $ 50 on the site for the looter from the dealer. The dealer then sells it at ten times the price," explains the archaeologist responsible for the district of Nasiriya, Abdul Amir Hamadani. "More than 100 Sumerian cities haye been destroyed by the looters since the beginning of the war," says Hamadani, who was appointed at the war's end by the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in Iraq. "It's a disaster that all we are keeping watch on but about which we can do little. We are incapable of stopping the looting. We are five archaeologists, some hundred guards, and, occasionally, a couple of policemen and they are a million armed looters, backed by their tribes and the dealers.

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"We are in danger every time we go on a tour to an archaeological site. A couple of weeks ago, while on site, six vehicles surrounded our cars and we were shot at. After that, we were assured that the next time, we would be killed."

If the looters are just simple peasants, the dealers in stolen antiquities are far more sophisticated. Professional smugglers, they are connected to the shadowy ring that is the international antiquities mafia and black market collectors. There's never a shortage of funds since demand for Mesopotamian artifacts is constantly high-private collectors all around the world adore Sumerian artifacts because they go back to the beginning of civilization and in order to possess such items, they are ready to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars, all of which intensifies the looting. To cover their backs, local dealers buy the protection of the big clans in the nearby city of AI-Fajr who send their own people to plunder the sites. "The tribes are powerful, they are well armed and above all, they abide by their own laws," explains Donny Georges, the Director of the Iraq's museums and an Iraqi archaeologist of Assyrian origin appOinted by the Americans a few months after the looting of the museum. "No one can stop them. Although the Coalition forces are well aware of what is going on, no real effort is being made to stop the looting. The Italian Carabinieri (soldiers) are the only force that worked on this issue for a few months. Their efforts were fruitful in some parts of the Nasiriya district because the tribal leaders there are never interested in confronting the military." Every military force in Iraq has it's own programme of working in the city that they are controlling. Depending on their internal organisation some of them work on humanitarian levels, others on protection and others like the Carabinieri on archaeology. The Carabinieri unit in charge of heritage protection, known as Viper 5, used military backup on the sites to stop the looting at the beginning of this year. With the help of helicopter flyovers and foot patrol raids on the archaeological sites once or twice a week, they were able to capture and imprison many looters, but in doing so also

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terrorised the local population. The illegal digging stopped as a result, but only for a few months. The military conflict between the A1-Mahdi army, the local Shia militia loyal to firebrand cleric Moqtada A1-Sadr, and the Coalition Forces hit this protection scheme hard. "On one hand, it forced the Viper 5 team to reduce their excursions to the archaeological sites to occasional trips, and on the other, it pushed the looters to join the A1-Mahdi army," assures Hamadani. It's no longer a question of looters versus protectors; this is a war with heavy political dimensions. The turn of events caused the Carabinieri to withdraw from a protection assignment. ''At the time, it was like a pleasant dream sequence in a long nightmare," says Hamadani, "The looters did not join the A1-Mahdi army because they believe in fighting the Occupation, it's more about personal vendetta. Now they were able to intensify their activities. There were no Italian forces at the Nasiriya Museum when the library was set ablaze. The smugglers are now controlling life in this district and nothing is stopping them from looting." "These people have no respect for anything, not even their own religion," claims Georges. "They stole the treasures of the Imam A1i in Najaf. No one really knows what was there but it is widely believed that those were the treasures of the Islamic Sultans. People have been donating their most precious objects to the Mausoleum since the birth of Islam. All that is vanished today." According to sources inside and outside Iraq close to the smugglers, the local ringleaders are members of the old regime and are known to archaeologists, police, Interpol, private collectors and antiquities dealers. They work out of Baghdad and other big cities in Iraq; they secure the cash flow to the looters, and are capable of smuggling anything outside the country. There seems to be no end in sight to this horrific scenario. The coalition military forces are now causing irreparable damage themselves: they have transformed the historical city of Babylon in southern Iraq into a military base, despite promises from former US overseer of Iraq Paul Bremer in late June to dismantle the base. "They have levelled archaeological grounds in parts of the

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site to build a landing zone for helicopters," says Zainab Bahrani, professor of Ancient Near Eastern art history and archaeology at Columbia University, who recently returned to New York City from a six-month observer mission in Iraq having been appointed by the Coalition Forces Senior Advisor for Culture. "The continuous movements of helicopters have caused the destruction of a wall at the temple of Nabu, and the roof of the Temple of Ninmah. Both date back to the sixth century BC." Bahrani says. The military base at Babylon has still not been removed. According to an archaeologist working with the Americans at the World Heritage Site of Hatra, Northern Iraq, who did not want to be named, the danger is no less there than in Babylon. The US Army programme to destroy military leftovers from the old regime and the war is harming the ancient site-a Parthian city with a blend of Hellenistic, Roman and Arab styles. Twice a day, the army conducts controlled explosions of recovered munitions and mines at the nearby military base. The constant seismic activity is damaging the stone arches in the main temple and the outer wall of the city and this may cause the collapse of parts of this site, listed as a World Heritage monument.

Contemporary Architecture The regaining of tradition is as crucial in Iraq as it is in Egypt; both are important centres in the Arab world and cradles of Western civilization. The contemporary situation of architecture in Iraq is as significant as the architecture in Egypt, and many parts of the Arab world have been influenced by leading Iraqi architects such as Muhammad Saleh Makiya, Rifat Chadirji, Basil al-Bayati, and Maath al-Alousi. Iraq has been unique in its revitalisation of one of the oldest traditions in architecture into a contemporary form. In a book about his father's work, Kanan Makiya quotes T. S. Eliot on the meaning of tradition: "Tradition cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical

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sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence." For its architectural quality and its revival of tradition, the work of Muhammad Saleh Makiya stands as a prototype for Iraq and for new developments in the third world in general. Like Hasan Fathy in Egypt, Makiya analysed Iraq's past in his architectural work, in his role as an influential teacher, and in his scholarly publications. His ideas can be found in his writings: The Arab Village, sponsored by UNESCO and published in Cairo in 1951, and The Architecture of Baghdad, published in 1969 with the assistance of the Gulbenkian Foundation. In both books the fundamental insights that he established led to a reappraisal of the Iraqi architectural past. In contrast to the concepts of the international style, the style of modern Western architecture, Makiya proposed a new beginning for architecture in harmony with the spiritual and cultural identity of the Iraqi people and their unique tradition. The elements of the past are not seen as mere forms or ornaments but rather as elements and functions of space and the local climate conditions. The Kuwait State Mosque (1977-1981) is a step further in the consolidation of a building type from the past for contemporary use. At a cost of 13 million Kuwaiti dinars, 130 times the cost of the Khulafa Mosque, in Baghdad, this very large building accommodates 7000 people. Makiya designed several additional mosques for Islamabad (1970), Bahrein (1973), and Muscat (1997), but his most important work in this category is the 1983 design for the Baghdad State Mosque. The design was part of a competition that included invited architects such as Robert Venturi, Ricardo Bofill, Rasem Badran, and Maath al-Alousi. This very ambitious project was to accommodate 30,000 worshippers and included a school, a library, guest houses and residences. Makiya's proposal created a grandiose complex in a rectangular space with a monumental minaret and a dome that was supposed to be the dominant element of the neighbourhood. It was to be located in the central area of the round city of Al-Mansour. It was, for Makiya, a synthesis of earlier elements now orchestrated into a monumental ensemble. As his son Kanan Makiya interpreted the design, its "monumentality is deeply rooted in the architecture, not attached to it from the outside as a consequence of the brief, the type of client

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or througn'simple-minded bigness." He legitimately compares the unbuilt design for the Baghdad State Mosque with the great examples of the mosques of the region, specifically the mosques at Samara and Ibn Tulun in Cairo, the culmination of the old tradition. The fact that a contemporary project can stand such a comparison is unique as it demonstrates the very different and yet unrecognised status of a non-Western architecture of high quality.

As was stated before, the ability of an architect is manifested not by a few singular buildings but in the many problems that await contemporary solutions. Makiya is in line with a few modern architects who are engaged in a wide variety of difficult tasks. Besides his religious buildings, Makiya has designed a number of educational structures. In 1965, he worked out a plan for Baghdad University; in 1966, he designed the Theology College in Baghdad, in close proximity to the existing buildings of Baghdad University; and in the 1967 plan for Al-Kufa University, he envisioned a new campus for 20,000 students in a shape that harmonises with the old Iraqi tradition. In 1981, Makiya designed the complex of Rasheed University in Iraq in collaboration with the German firm of Heinle, Wischer & Partners. And in a recent project for Al-Ain University of the United Arab Emirates, Makiya further developed his scheme, replicating and adapting the old plan of the city of Arbil for contemporary academic purposes. Since 1966, Makiya's activities have expanded beyond the borders of his country, where he executed a large number of commercial and residential buildings that include bank buildings in Basra and Mosul (both 1966) and Karbala and Al-Kufa (both in 1968). In open reference to old Iraqi historic building elements, these banks apply motif!) that relate to tradition, such as window setbacks in the Rafidain branch in Al-Kufa and the blue tile exterior walls on the Rafidain branch in Karbala. The Al-Kufa building was heavily damaged in the Gulf War, and the one in Karbala was completely demolished. In expanding his work to Bahrain and Oman, Makiya was able to realise a large number of buildings; among them are the Sheikh Mubarek Building in Bahrein (1973), the Entrance Arch and the Centre for the Handicapped of Isa Town in Bahrain (1973), the International Hilton

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Hotel, a garage and houses in Dubai (1974), the Al-Andalous housing complex in Doha, Qatar (1983), and the Police Officers Club interior design in Abu Dhabi (1982-1986). Among his most important projects in recent years are the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Tunis (1983), the headquarters for the Regional Arab Organisations in Kuwait (1982-1987), and the ceremonial grounds in Tikrit (1984), all three significant for the emerging symbolism of Arab architecture in different manifestations. The headquarters building in Kuwait searched for forms in which the unity of Arab states could be visualised. In the headquarters of the Arab League, this language is further developed and successfully articulated. Originally planned for Baghdad and later for Tunis, it calls for a contemporary structure in which both official political management and the imagery of Arab identity was expressed. In the ceremonial parade grounds in Tikrit, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, a political involvement of a different kind was expected. For this questionable task, Makiya proposed a monumental open area in which the architectural details recall comparable traditional structures. Even though Kanan Makiya was intensely at odds with the political regime of Saddam Hussein, he could not help being impressed by the "breathtakingly beautiful and virtually timeless architecture, an architecture that is rooted in Mesopotamian traditions going back at least 4,000 years and yet has somehow become modern, even post-modern in feeling.

9 Education The impact of government policies on the class structure and stratification patterns can be imputed from available statistics on education and training as well as employment and wage structures. Owing to the historic emphasis on the expansion of educational facilities, the leaders of the Baath Party and, indeed, much of Iraq's urban middle class were able to move from rural or urban lower-class origins to middle and even top positions in the state apparatus, the public sector, and the society at large. This social history is confirmed in the efforts of the government to generalise opportunities for basic education throughout the country. Between 1976 and 1986, the number of primary-school students increased 30 per cent; female students increased 45 per cent, from 35 to 44 per cent of the total. The number of primary school teachers increased 40 per cent over this period. At the secondary level, the number of students increased by 46 per cent, and the number of female students increased by 55 per cent, from 29 to 36 per cent of the total. Baghdad, which had about 29 per cent of the population, had 26 per cent of the primary students, 27 per cent of the female primary students, and 32 per cent of the secondary students. The government through a centrally organised school system provided education. In the early 1980s, the system included a six-year primary (or elementary) level known as the first level. The second level, also of six years, consisted of an intermediate-secondary and an intermediate-preparatory, each of three years. Graduates of

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these schooHi could enrol in a vocational school, one of the teacher training schools or institutes, or one of the various colleges, universities, or technical institutes. The number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools was highest in the central region and lowest in the north, although the enrolment of the northern schools was only slightly lower than that of the south. Before the war, the government had made considerable gains in lessening the extreme concentration of primary and secondary educational facilities in the main cities, notably Baghdad. Vocational education, which had been notoriously inadequate in Iraq, received considerable official attention in the 1980s. The number of students in technical fields has increased threefold since 1977, to over 120,090 in 1986. The Baath regime also seemed to have made progress since the late 1960s in redUcing regional disparities, although they were far from eliminated and no doubt were more severe than statistics would suggest. Baghdad, for example, was the home of most educational facilities above the secondary level, since it was the site not only of Baghdad University, which in the academic year 1983-84 (the most recent year for which statistics were available in early 1988) had 34,555 students, but also of the Foundation of Technical Institutes with 34,277 students, Mustansiriya University with 11,686 students, and the University ofTechnologywith 7,384 students. The universities in Basra, Mosul, and Arbil, taken together, enrolled 26 per cent of all students in higher education in the academic year 1983-84. The number of students seeking to pursue higher education in the 1980s increased dramatically. Accordingly, in the mid-1980s the government made plans to expand Salah ad Din University in Arbil in the north and to establish Ar Rasheed University outside Baghdad. Both were designed ultimately to accommodate 50,000 students. In addition, at the end of December 1987, the government announced plans to create four more universities: one in Tikrit in the central area, one each at AI-Kufah and AI-Qadisiyah in the south, and one at AI-Anbar in the west. Details of these universities were not known. With the outbreak of the war, the government faced a difficult dilemma regarding education. Despite the shortage of wartime manpower, the regime was unwilling to tap the pool of available university students, arguing that these young people were Iraq's hope

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for the future. As of early 1988, therefore, the government routinely exempted students from military service until graduation, a policy it has adhered to rigorously. This policy, however, has likely caused resentment among the poorer classes and those forced to serve multiple tours at the front because of continuing manpower shortages. The education system in Iraq was highly regarded and high performing, and in 1980 had achieved nearly universal primary enrolment. In the early 1980s, public funds began to be Siphoned off for military expenditures and other priorities of the ruling regime. Combined with the politicisation of the education system, which influenced everything from curriculum, teaching, staff, and admission policies, the system went into a steady decline. The looting that followed liberation compounded thirty years of neglect. There are 15,000 school buildings in Iraq and 10,000 of them need repair. Despite the problems of the previous regime, the education system in Iraq has improved since liberation. Most schools were open very soon after liberation and the highly valued national exams were given in June (had they not been given, Iraqi students would have lost an entire academic year). Attendance in academic year 2003-2004 was as high or higher than pre-conflict days. The CPA and a multitude of civilian agencies, military units, and international agencies have coordinated work with the Ministry of Education to train more than 33,000 secondary teachers in modern classroom management and instructional delivery and rehabilitate over 2,000 schools. The Ministry has been reorganised and re-staffed and teachers have received substantial pay raises. Iraq's education system, considered one of the best in the region in the 1980s, has declined dramatically in the last 20 years. An estimated 60 per cent of Iraq's population is now illiterate, and at least 25 per cent of primary school-age children do not go to school, according to World Bank statistics. It is estimated that half of children do not go on to secondary school. In rural areas the numbers are even higher. Up to half of girls never attend school, according to the Ministry of Education (MoE). UNICEF suggests that only 55 per cent of men and only 23 per cent of women can read. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in recent months the number of children being kept at home by their parents has risen dramatically as insecurity and violence plague parts of the country. The MoE

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recently unveiled a policy of freedom of thought and expression, tolerance and national unity in schools after gathering opinions from religious and political leaders from around Iraq. But the ministry still faces pressure from religious conservatives to teach more religion and morals in schools, following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Ministry officials last year removed decades of political teaching and indoctrination required by the former Baath party regime. Officials replaced it with a moderate curriculum that focuses on basic, universally practised religious teachings. According to MoE statistics, there are 14,924 schools in Iraq and 80 per cent of them (11,939) need some sort of repair following the looting when the former regime fell. Some 40 per cent (5,970) need major rehabilitation and 9 per cent (1,343) are in need of demolition or rebuilding. However, the country's schools were never in good condition-in 2002 the UN estimated that half of all school toilet facilities did not meet basic hygienic standards. There are plans for the MoE to build 4,500 schools in the next four years. The ministry asked for US $ 3.2 billion in repair and investment costs at an international donor's conference in Madrid in November 2003. The World Bank has pledged $ 100 million to rewrite and reprint all school textbooks containing references to Saddam Hussein. In addition, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) edited all primary and secondary school maths and science textbooks and distributed 8,759,260 million textbooks in 16 governorates across the country. Some 70 per cent were printed in Iraq and 30 per cent in Jordan. Central Region: In Baghdad, about 1,560 of approximately 1,700 schools have received $ 750 grants for repairs and supplies of their choice from the Baghdad School Teacher/Parent Programme. The money was part of the $ 35 million that USAID allocated in Central Iraq between May 2003 and March 2004. Baghdad University received a multi-million dollar grant from the US-Iraqi higher education and development programme for archaeology and environmental health. It also received a grant for legal education reform. Baghdad's Technology University and al-Anbar University in western Iraq got a chunk of the money to deal with higher education initiatives.

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Southern Region: USAID invested up to $ 29 million in education-related issues, such as the accelerated learning programme, which involved students from Nasiriyah and Karbala. The US-Iraqi higher education and development programme pledged a $ 20.7 million grant to fund higher education reforms. The University of Babil, the University of Salah ad-Din and Basra University were the beneficiaries of this initiative. Basra University used part of its grant for archaeology and environmental health and for legal education reforms. Northern Region: Students in ad-Diwaniyah and Arbil were involved in the USAID accelerated learning programme. In total, the USAID allocated more than $ 8 million for education projects in the five governorates of the region during the last year. Mosul University received a grant from a US-Iraqi higher education and development programme for archaeology and environmental health. The University of Mosul Hamam al-Alil and the University of Dahuk received a grant for academic, research and extension programmes. Those two universities also received a grant, along with the Nursing Ir.stitute in Dahuk, for public health and sanitation. The University of Sulaymaniyah received money for legal education reform. In general, the USAID funded 5.5 million examinations immediately after the conflict. It awarded 627 grants worth more than $ 6 million to repair schools. More than 2,300 schools were repaired for the 2003/4 school year. In addition, USAID distributed nearly 1.5 million secondary school kits with basic school supplies like pens, pencils and paper. It bought and installed 159,005 student desks, 61,500 chalkboards and 58,100 teacher kits. It also distributed 808,000 primary student kits and 81,735 primary teacher kits. USAID also awarded 25 Fulbright scholarships to students to study in the United States.

Child Education These declarations accompany the first comprehensive study on the condition of schools in post-conflict Iraq conducted by the Ministry of Education with the help of UNICEF. The survey has confirmed that thousands of school facilities lack the basics necessary to provide children with a decent education. Roger Wright added: "Iraq used to have one of the finest school systems in the Middle East. Now we have clear evidence of how far

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the system has deteriorated. Today millions of children in Iraq are attending schools that lack even basic water or sanitation facilities, have crumbling walls, broken windows and leaking roofs. The system is overwhelmed." He commented that the decay is the result of over a decade of neglect and under-funding during the sanctions era, as well as the impact of three wars, starting with the Iran-Iraq war. The survey collected data on students, teachers, and the condition of buildings for every kindergarten, primary, secondary, Yafieen (Alternative), and vocational schools and higher education institutes in the country. In all, the survey covered over 20,000 schools and institutes. The survey reveals that, in this last year, school enrolment surged but also that the facilities available are not near to adequate. There are not enough desks, chairs, or classrooms. Many schools have had to double up, with a quarter of all primary schools in Iraq running two or three shifts per day-meaning reduced classroom time for each shift of students. It also revealed that enrolment of girls was lower than boys in every grade. Overcrowding, insecurity and the lack of water and sanitation facilities in schools are the three main causes of lower enrolment of girls. On a daily basis, teachers, children and their families in Baghdad, and other flash points of conflict and criminality, have to overcome the feai" of bombings, explosions and kidnapping.

Rehabilitation works carried out since March 2003 has only partially reduced these difficulties and, the worsening security situation has now slowed down work on improving education facilities. Wright observed that: "The problem is not just delays in improving school buildings, more importantly, poor security is also holding back improvements in the quality of teaching and learning that is going on inside the classroom." He added that despite difficulties inside Iraq, UNICEF, the Ministry of Education, and many other partners continue to work to rehabilitate schools and conduct trainings to help ensure Iraqi children get the quality education they deserve.

Higher Education While Iraq enjoyed a long and proud tradition of distinguished universities, a sequence of wars and sanctions in recent years have

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severely damaged the system. After the recent invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces, 84 per cent of the infrastructure in Iraqi higher education institutions has been burnt, looted or severely destroyed in some form; 48 academics have been assassinated and many are under daily threat. Modern universities in Iraq were established in the second half of the last century, beginning with the University of Baghdad in 1957 uniting several constituent colleges in the process. During the 1960s five more universities were established-the University of Technology and the Al-Mustansirya University in Baghdad as well as universities in Basra, Mosul and Sulaymaniah. The further development of higher education in Iraq was characterised by establishment of technical institutes reflecting the considerable demand for qualified technicians created by the flourishing oil industry. During the last 20 years the policy of establishing a university in each governorate responded to both the demands of equity and the growing demand for higher education. Thus, 14 new universities were founded. Iraq's current higher education system comprises 20 universities and 47 technical institutes under the management of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR). This includes 200 colleges, 800 departments, 28 research centres. The Commission for Computers and Informatics offers specialised course for post-graduates. There are, in, addition 10 private colleges offering programmes in computer sciences, business administration, economics and management. The UNESCO survey, 2004 found a total student enrolment of 251175, 42 per cent of whom are women. Almost 50 per cent of the students are enrolled at the 5 universities in Baghdad. Two universities have less than 2000 students while Baghdad University enrols two-thirds of all students. Thus, there is wide range in the size of universities as well as a lack of geographic equity in their distribution across the country. The major fields of study offered by the universities are: education, arts, law, social sciences, administration, economics, natural sciences, engineering and technology, medical sciences, veterinary medicine and agriculture. In the area of education there are 24 colleges preparing teachers for secondary schools, 7 colleges for primary and ki~dergarten school teachers and 7 for physical education. The University of Technology has a specialised college for technical education, training

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teachers for vocational schools and technical institutes. During the period of economic sanctions, the importation of computers was restricted and, therefore, computer related disciplines were offered in a limited number of institutions. Technical Education in Iraq comprises 37 Technical Institutes (58540) and 9 Technical Colleges (7368) with 66 000 students, 22 per cent of whom are female with 2837 teaching staff. There is, at least, one institute in each of the 18 govenorates. Iraqi higher education has a strong orientation towards technical education through the technical institutes which had significant growth after their inception in 1969. This expansion was triggered by the oil boom, which created the need for large numbers of technical workers. Technical Institutes award a Degree while Technical Colleges award a Diploma. These qualifications cover over 60 fields of specialisation in engineering, administration, medical subjects, agriculture and applied arts. The Technical Institutes resort with the Commission for Technical Education under the direction of the MHESR. Of the 19112 academic university teaching staff, 56 per cent are male and 44 per cent female; 43 per cent of the teaching force is concentrated in Baghdad. The average staff student teaching ratio is 1:13 being much more favourable than neighbouring countries such as Jordan (1:30) and Saudi Arabia (1:20). There are, however, extreme variations among Iraqi universities from 1:43 to 1:4. In Iraq, the minimum educational qualification for a teaching post in higher education is a master's degree. However, one-third of the teaching staff lack a masters degree; 28 per cent of the staff has doctorates, 39 per cent masters and 33 per cent bachelors degrees. While in pre-war days, Iraqi scientists were publishing widely in international and regional journals, very few articles were published in the last decade. The larger universities like Basra, Baghdad and Mosul have between 5 and 8 specialised research centres. In addition, there are other specialised research centres-the Polymer Research Centre, Date Palm Research and the Marine Research Centre. The Commission for Computers and Informatics (CCI) and the Commission for Medical Specialisation played an important role in training of research staff and promoting research activities. Socio-political research was conducted at the Gulf Study Centre at Basra University, International Study Centre at Mustansiriya University, Iranian Studies

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Centre in Basrah and Turkish Studies Centre in Mosul. Archeological research was undertaken in the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad. The House of Wisdom-Beit Al-Hikma and the Iraqi Academy of Sciences-Majma AI-Hmi ai-Iraqi, two famous institutions focus on the history and academic tradition of the country and region. The teaching overload of academic staff was a serious obstacle to the development of high quality research. There was also limited international cooperation in research. The Iraqi Academy of Sciences, founded in 1948 was a centre for fellows from various disciplines including modern and ancient Middle Eastern languages, history, social and physical sciences. Its main goal was to promote the Arabic language and heritage. Its digital and traditional library was partially looted during the war. Iraqi academics are of the view that the Academy can re-establish itself as one of the leading research centres of the country but urgent interventions are required to rebuild its infrastructure for which a modest $ 825000 is estimated.

Administration and Finance Education in Iraq is state-controlled and highly centralised. The responsibility for deCision-making and supervision of the Iraqi education system is controlled by three authorities: local government educational authorities, which are responsible for kindergarten and primary education; Ministry of Education, which is responsible for secondary education (general, vocational, and teacher training), including curriculum development; and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which is responsible for the administration of universities and the Foundation of Technical Institutes. Iraq is divided into 15 educational regions, each under a Director General of Education, for the administration of primary and secondary education. Each university and higher education institute has a council, and they are autonomous in a range of professional matters. However, they are financed directly by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which makes most decisions concerning facilities, admission requirements and the appointment and assignment of staff. The State fully finances all aspects of public education. There are two types of finance: funding from the Ministry of Higher Education

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and Scientific Research and funding which covers private undergraduate education, which is provided by professional and private organisations and associations. The government is responsible for supplying books, teaching aids and free student residences for all public institutions. Arabic is the primary language of instruction at all institutions, with Kurdish also taught in Kurdish areas.

Size: There are approximately 12,950 educational institutions of all levels and types in Iraq. Of this total, 10 are state universities; three private colleges, and a state Technical Institutes Commission, which is comprised of 28 institutions. The total enrolment of students at all levels of education is approximately 4,319,368. Structure: Pre-school education in Iraq is of two-year duration and is open to children 4 years old. Primary education is six years in duration and is compulsory through age 11. Secondary education is six years in duration and completed in two stages: Intermediate and Preparatory. Intermediate education lasts three years for students aged 12 to 14 years. Preparatory education also lasts for three years and is designed to prepare students for the labour market or university study. It is divided into two branches (scientific and literary) beginning with the second year of preparatory education, during which students pursue academic studies in the sciences or humanities. In addition, there is also a six or three-year (depending on the point of entry) vocational preparatory stream of education, which covers industrial, agricultural and commercial branches. Vocational preparatory education is designed to prepare students for work in the professions or for university study. Tertiary education is open to students who satisfactOrily complete secondary education. Programmes at the undergraduate level are from three to six years in duration. Additionally, there are 28 two-year post-secondary institutes, which train students for various technical professions. Programmes leading to post-graduate degrees are also available. Teacher Education: Kindergarten and primary teachers are trained in five-year post-intermediate or two-year post-preparatory courses taught at Teacher Training Institutes. The qualification obtained is the Diploma in Primary Education. Teacher training for secondary-level teachers is available at the colleges of education in various universities. The Bachelor of Arts or Science for secondary

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teachers canbe completed in four years and includes a small number of professional education units. Graduates from non-education degree programmes can complete a one-year Higher Diploma of Education at the University of Baghdad, or a six-month course offered by the Ministry of Education. Training for teachers of vocational education is provided through the University of Technology, and Colleges of Agriculture, Administration, and Commerce within special teacher preparation departments. Funding for the Transformation: The International Fund for Higher Education in Iraq was initiated by the First Lady of Qatar through a donation of $ 15 million in 2003 and has enabled UNESCO to address the most urgent needs of higher education in Iraq. To this has been added smaller donations from the Qatar National Bank, South Korea and Doha National Bank. It is vital that the international community in order for the reconstruction and rejuvenation of the Iraqi higher education system to proceed un impeded augments these funds substantially. Compelling international evidence indicates that countries cannot generate sustainable socio-economic development without investment in human development. At the heart of such development is the production of critical intellectual capabilities and well-trained graduates with a range of competencies and skills. Douglas (2000) captures this necessity succinctly and aptly: "As the global economy becomes more competitive, those states and nations that invest the most time and energy in expanding and nurturing their higher education systems, will likely be the big winners of tomorrow." Without adequate higher education and research institutions providing a critical mass of skilled and educated people, no country can ensure endogenous and sustainable development and in particular, developing countries and least developed countries cannot reduce the gap separating them from the industrially developed ones. Sharing knowledge, international cooperation and new technologies can offer new opportunities to reduce this gap (World Declaration of Higher Education for the 21st Century, 1998). This is the vision that should be the driving force of the MHESR in constructing a modern higher education system for Iraq. The view on the reconstruction of higher education expressed by the Deputy Minister of Higher Education of Iraq at the Paris Round table is

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indeed encouraging: "To ensure quality higher education marked by gender parity, the separation of state and religion, mindful of the values of democracy and human rights". It is clear from the recent UNESCO Round table, the International Community stands ready to assist in whatever way required by the Iraqi people.

Educational Development and Planning Prior to 1991, the education system in Iraq was one of the best in the region, with over 100 per cent gross enrolment rate for primary schooling and high levels of literacy, both for men and women. Iraq's higher education, particularly in scientific and technological fields, was of an international standard and staffed by high quality personnel. As Iraq finds itself once again an active member of the international community, the renewal of the education system needs to reflect the universal norms and standards which will enable its children to fully understand democratic principles and processes while at the same time retaining their rich and multifaceted cultural identity. There are approximately 19,000 schools in Iraq, with around six million school pupils in total. Unfortunately, there are only 14,000 available buildings to host thEm, a shortage of around 5,000. As a result, schools are forced to work on double and triple shift systems with high pupil density. The Ministry of Education is embarking on c. plan to build 1,000 schools per year, though with growth in enrolment amounting to 3-4 per cent per year, it is expected that it will take longer than five years to overcome the shortage. Another problem for the education sector is the provision of textbooks and other school requirements such as desks and blackboards. The ministry is still in the process of devising a suitable plan to ensure the delivery of textbooks to pupils. Short-term activities will include the pevelopment of baseline indicators to measure educational progress, procuring and distributing essential school materials and providing equipment and supplies. Teacher training is also badly needed; many teachers have not received any sort of training for over two decades. Particular emphasis will be placed on emergency teachers or those who have been newly appointed or re-appointed. The ministry has deemed this as one of its core objectives.

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Cross-cultural awareness is crucial to Iraq's business growth potential. In order to allow the cultural community to have its voice heard in the reconstruction planning process, foundations and institutions have been invited to recommend strategies for collaborating with the people of Iraq. These include the preservation of cultural heritage, protecting the environment, socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, education and diplomacy, along with multi-cultural industrial design, marketing, healthcare and safety practices.

Destruction of Educational System Iraq's educational system was the target of US-British military action, because education is the backbone of any society. Without an efficient education system, no society can function. Schools and universities were bombed and destroyed. The Al-Mustansiriyah University, one of the oldest schools in the world with a history that goes back at least 1000 years was bombed and partially destroyed. It was here in 1980 that Iranian agents tried to assassinate Prime Minister Tariq Aziz-a terrorist act that helped precipitate the Iran-Iraq War. Afterthe 1991 war, UNSCOM inspectors, led by Australian Richard Butler, burned all chemistry books of the University Library. All other universities in Iraq have their science books burned by UNSCOM. Furthermore, the sanctions and US wars forced many Iraqi professionals to leave the country in what is called, Iraqi 'brain drain' . An estimated 30-40 per cent of Iraq's best-trained educators left to other countries. Under the sanctions, Iraq's contact with the rest of the world was also restricted and contributed to the deterioration of Iraq's educational system. To complete Iraq's isolation and inflict more harm, the UScontrolled sanctions committee banned all educational materials (including pencils, which allegedly could be converted to "weapons of mass destruction" by Iraqi children, papers and textbooks) from entering Iraq. A newly released study by the UN University (UNU) International Leadership Institute in Jordan revealed that: "The devastation of the Iraqi system of higher education has been overlooked amid other cataclysmic war results but represents an important consequence of the conflicts, economic sanctions, and ongoing turmoil in Iraq caused by US militaristic policy."

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Furthermore, "some 84 per cent of Iraq's institutions of higher education have been burnt, looted, or destroyed. Some 2,000 laboratories need to be re-equipped and 30,000 computers need to be procured and installed nationwide, said Jairam Reddy, director of UNU. "The Iraqi Academy of Sciences, founded in 1948 to promote the Arabic language and heritage, saw its digital and traditional library partially looted during the war and it alone needs almost one million dollars in infrastructure repairs to re-establish itself as a leading research centre", the study revealed. There was no shortage of bombs to destroy Iraq, but "there weren't enough desks, chairs, or classrooms and most schools lacked even basic water or sanitation facilities", added the report. According to the UN children's fund, UNICEF, Iraq's primary and secondary educational systems were further ruined by the war and almost 1 in 4 children has no access to education under US Occupation. The current Iraq's school curriculum is a US-crafted curriculum to brainwash Iraqi children. The US Occupation Authority or the (CPA) removed any content considered anti-American, including the 1991 Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq war, and all references to Israel policy in Palestine, and U.S support for Israel. "Entire swaths of 20th-century history have been deleted", said Bill Evers, a US Defence Department employee, and one of three American "advisers" to the Ministry of Education. It should be noted that these US "advisers" are US-handpicked proxies who make the major decisions in the Iraqi ministries, (i.e. it is not the USappointed quislings, which occupy cabinet pOSitions which make the decisions). "We considered anything anti-American to be propaganda and we took it out, and in some cases, we had to remove entire chapters", said Fuad Hussain, an Iraqi expatriate in the Ministry of Education. In other words, Mr. Hussain made the decision to remove "propaganda" and enforce a "free" curriculum. Before the staged "handover of sovereignty" in June 2003, Paul Bremer, th~ former US Proconsul in Baghdad, issued a series of "edicts" that "take away virtually all of the powers once held by several ministries", reported The Wall Street Journal on 13 May, 2004. In addition, Bremer enacted the "Bremer's Orders", a set of colonial "laws" widely known as the "100 Orders".

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"The Bremer orders control every aspect of Iraqi life-from the use of car horns to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. For example, "Order No. 39 alone does no less than 'transition [Iraq] from a ... centrally planned economy to a market economy' virtually overnight and by US fiat", wrote Antonia Juhasz, a scholar at the International Forum on Globalisation in San Francisco. Order 37 will lower Iraq's corporate tax rate from about 40 per cent to a flat rate of 15 per cent. The accurate description of Iraq's economy is a "Capitalism dream" economy. The Virginia-based Corporation, Bearing Point Inc., received 250 million contracts to facilitate the looting. On May 22, Bush signed Executive Order 13303 granting blanket immunity to any US corporation dealing with Iraqi oil through 2007. The order "unilaterally declares Iraqi oil to be the unassailable province of US corporations .... In other words, if Exxon Mobil or Chevron Texaco touches Iraqi oil, it will be immune from legal proceedings in the United States", said Jim Vallette, research director for the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network. It makes the new "sovereignty" more like a US colonial dictatorship with no "democracy" and no national independence. That is why the January 2003 elections were a US-made trap to legitimise the US Occupation of Iraq. Nonetheless, these US-crafted "Orders" and economic therapies are illegal and in violation of the Geneva Conventions and The Hague Regulations, which stipulate that the occupiers 'must abide by the country's existing laws unless prevented'. Under international law, the occupiers are 'prohibited from selling of state-own assets' of the occupied country. Further, these "Orders" are illegal because they were enacted without tacit approval of legitimate Iraqi government, but under the threat of US military force. To make things worse for Iraq's education, Iraq's reconstruction has become the "biggest corruption scandal in history". In April 2003, USAID awarded a one-year, $ 62 million contract to Creative Associates International Inc. (CAU), and $ 1.8 billion to Bechtel Corporation to build Iraq's infrastructure, including schools and higher education institutions, without a public tender, a by-invitation-only deal awarded in a secret process. "For this initial round of contracts alone, Bechtel was also guaranteed another $ 80 million for company profits", wrote Jeffrey st. Claire, author of Grand Theft Pentagon. "While the situation continued to deteriorate

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for the US military forces in Iraq ... Last year Bechtel earned more than $ 17 billion for the first time", added St. Clair. Bechtel record of dodgy business does not bode well for the Iraqi people. Its record in Bolivia and India left poor communities without affordable drinking water. US officials often have highlighted their renovation of schools as a success story of Iraq under the occupation. However, despite the size of contracts, little has been done to rebuild or repair Iraq's schools and universities. "Schools listed as fully rebuilt are, in fact, flooded with sewage and lack desks, but are often freshly painted", wrote Christian Parenti of The Nation. Indeed, schools were only painted to remove the old regime slogans from the wall and replace them with George Bush's own lies of "democracy" and "liberation" rhetoric. A propaganda cliche designed to manipulate public opinions in the West (the US in particular), and enhance US imperial agenda of militaristic domination of the world. In a recent report Antonia Juhasz noted that; "The constant complaints from the Iraqi Ministry of Education officials and principals of schools that Bechtel has worked on, is that the work is either non-existent and shoddy, often putting students' health and safety at risk". There is "no improvement to the infrastructure, and no new equipment has been bought" , Muzhir AI-Dulaymi, spokesman for the League for the Defente of Iraqi People's Rights, told Aljazeera on 28 May, 2004. Bechtel waves off complaints with: "No matter what we do, the Iraqis will never be on the losing end", reported Corp Watch, a U.S-based anti-corruption organisation. The billion of dollars approved by Congress for the "reconstruction" of Iraq, was simply a "gift" from US taxpayers to US private corporations, not for the Iraqi people. In other word, US citizens are subSidising Bechtel, Halliburton and other US corporations. In October 2004, the CPA paid $ 12 billion to the contractors out of the Development Fund of Iraq (DFI) , instead of using the money earmarked by Congress for the "reconstruction" of Iraq. In other words, the CPA used Iraq's oil revenues to payoff the US contractors money that before the war was said (by Secretary of State Powell, among others) to be the "Iraqi people's" money. According to an independent audit conducted by KPMG for the multilateral International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq (IAMB)

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(established under UN Security Council Resolution 1483 as an audit oversight board), nearly $ 1.5 billion was extracted from the OFI to pay Halliburton. While Iraqi children are dropping out of school and dying of malnutrition, Iraqi money nourishes Halliburton executives and friends, including US Vice President Dick Cheney. The IAMB and auditors working for the United Nation's Iraq Advisory as well as the CPA's own Inspector General have since blasted the occupation authorities for sloppy handling and faulty accounting of the more than $ 9 billion in seized assets (including Iraqi oil revenues) known as the OFI. The $ 9 billion simply vanished. They discovered a wide range of irregularities, including the lack of competitive bidding for large contracts, missing contracts information, payments for contracts that had not been supervised, and, in some cases, outright theft. "The billions of dollars of oil money that has already been transferred to the US-controlled CPA has effectively disappeared into financial black hole", reported Christian Aid, a British humanitarian organisation. Protected by the presence of more than 200,000 US-British troops and mercenaries, Iraq is the biggest imperial lootocracy in the history of Western colonialism, and a "capitalism dream" economy. Iraq's education system has also fallen victim to the Occupationinstigated violence. School dropouts are very high, particularly among females as a result of violence and kidnappings. Many schools in Iraqi cities and towns have been closed, preventing hundreds of children from receiving basic education. ''Approximately 50 per cent of children are not going to school because their parents are too scared to send them, having heard these stories about children being kidnapped and held for ransom", a spokesman for Save the Children UK, Paul Hetherington, told IRIN. Moreover, malnutrition amongst Iraqi children has almost doubled from 4 per cent in 2002 to roughly 8 per cent since the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The ongoing occupation and associated violence is wreaking havoc on Iraqi children and Iraq's long-term future. Although the UNU report noted briefly that only "four dozens academics have been assassinated", the real number is much higher. In a callous and murderous policy termed "Oe-Baathification", thousands of academics, scientists and prominent Iraqi politicians have been murdered. Together with the C.I.A., and Israel's Mossad

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agents; criminal elements and militia groups including, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iranian-trained Badr Brigade, the INA of Iyad Allawi and the INC of Ahmad Chalabi, have terrorised an entire nation and murdered its entire intellectual community. Two years of continuing occupation and violence have killed thousands of innocent men, women and children. The November 2004 scientific report by the reputable British medical journal, the Lancet, shows that from March 2003 to October 2004, US forces have killed more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians. The Lancet authors acknowledge that most of the victims were innocent women and children killed by US bombing of population centres. The number of Iraqis killed is increasing daily. Instead of condemning and exposing the crimes of this illegal occupation, Western liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers close ranks with their own governments and have deliberately shifted the blame on the Iraqi Resistance with increasing sophistication. This known falsehood is intended to discredit the Iraqi Resistance and to deny the Iraqi people a'legitimate Resistance movement against an illegal foreign occupation. After all, the US and its collaborators have the most to gain from a divided Iraq embroiled in sectarian violence. How can the liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers blame the Iraqi Resistance for the violence? Who committed the Fallujah atrocity, where more than 6000 innocent men, women and children were slaughtered with napalm and chemical weapons? Where were the liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers when Iraq's cultural heritage which stands at the heart of human civilization, was destroyed and looted? Very few people in the West heard the scream of Fallujah's victims. The atrocity was sold as a 'necessary step' to enforce Western "democracy". On many occasions, the Iraqi Resistance has rejected violence against civilians, and has called on foreign journalists to stay in Iraq and report honestly. By contrast, US troops have detained and killed journalists who cover the Iraqi Resistance view of the war. Indeed US troops in Iraq have killed more than 13 journalists there. You do not need to do lots of research to find out why US troops targeting independent journalists. Today, more Iraqi cities and towns are under the same siege as Fallujah. People are not allowed to leave their homes and have no food and medicine.

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The cities of Ramadi and Qaim in western Iraq, just to mention two, had been under siege by US forces for many days. Hospitals have been destroyed to erase the number of civilians killed by US troops in hospital data banks. Schools, universities and government offices are closed. Random arrests of men, women and children, have resulted in the imprisonment of many young men, women and children. Tens of thousands of Iraqis are now imprisoned and tortured in hundreds of US-run prisons throughout Iraq. Had it not been for the Iraqi Resistance, Iraq would have been sold on the cheap to private US corporations, and Syria and Iran would have been attacked by now in pursuit of US hegemony. As a result of potent Iraqi Resistance, US Army recruitment is at its lowest level, and the war becoming very unpopular among the citizens of the imperial power(s). And the so-called "coalition of the willing" is fleeing and is losing its will. Even US Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Richard Myers acknowledged the presence of an effective Iraqi Resistance against US forces, although the US maybe using the presence of the Resistance as pretext to justify the ongoing occupation. The liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers have yet to have an impact on their own government's policy. Meanwhile, hundreds of Iraqi children are dropping out of school and experienced Iraqi professionals, who were once called the 'German of the Middle East' for their technical prowess, are unemployed. Unemployment rate in Iraq is as high as 70 per cent today. Iraqis are watching their country and their society destroyed and looted by an armed imperial power and its private corporations. They can only be praised for their courage to stay and continue the struggle against the odds. "The bravery and dedication of educators [and other profeSSionals] who remain in a shattered Iraq should inspire the swift, meaningful and practical support of the international academic community," says UN Under Secretary-General Hans van Ginkel, Rector of the Tokyo-based UNU. The most urgent actions needed in Iraq today are the end of US violence and the revitalisation of Iraq's education and health systems. "Repairing Iraq's higher education system is in many ways a prerequisite to the long term repair of the country as a whole", said Jairam Reddy of UNU.

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Worldwide academics and educators should campaign for the end of the occupation and use the recommendation provided by the authors of the Iraqi Observatory report as a benchmark to assist the Iraqi people in rebuilding their education system. It stated rightly that, ''American Universities should refrain from competing for USAID Higher Education grants until the military occupation of Iraq ends and an independent and sovereign government exists in Iraq. That said institutions should make an effort to build contacts and offer expertise to the Iraqi academic community on an informal basis in preparation for that moment". The deliberate US strategy targeting anything other than "strictly military targets", including Iraq's educational system, constitutes a major war crime. In addition, legal evidence has shown that the war on Iraq amounted to a 'crime of aggression'. Clearly, US wars against Iraq violated the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare (Article 22) and the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (Article 3). A major reason the Nuremberg Tribunal was convened was because Germany had failed to prosecute its own war criminals after World War I. The setting up of an international war crimes tribunal, like the Nuremberg Tribunal, to investigate and prosecute those who committed these crimes against the Iraqi people should be the aim of the world community.

UNESCO's Role A recent Round table was convened by UNESCO to enable Iraqi academics and representatives from the MHESR to discuss with representatives of the international community the current status of the higher education system in Iraq and to explore ways of both its immediate and long term reconstruction and transformation. In all, 120 delegates participated in the discussions over a two day period. The main issues, needs and priorities that emerged from the Round table were the following: • The widespread destruction of the infrastructure of the higher education system and now lacking a reliable source of electricity and potable water; • The unstable and dangerous environment for normal academic activity-48 academics have been assassinated since 2003 and

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many are under daily threat. This has served to demotivate academics and many have left the country; • The quality of higher education has been steadily deteriorating since the imposition of authoritarian rule in Iraq. This has been exacerbated by a sequence of wars first with Iran, the Gulf war and now the invasion of 2003 with sanctions compounding the problems; it is estimated that 30-40 per cent of the best trained professors have emigrated since 1990; its research centres have suffered from isolation by the international academic community; • Only about one-third of the academic staff hold doctoral degrees; this together with long periods of isolation make the retraining of staff to international standards an urgent priority; • There is a need to equip more than 2000 scientific laboratories and for 30000 computers; libraries are in a poor condition and are in urgent need of restocking with new books and journals in both Arabic and English; journals in electronic format are required; • The student population has been rapidly increasing both due to a high birthrate and admissions policy that allows all students who have completed secondary school to enter higher education. At the conclusion of the conference, The Director General of UNESCO, Matsura stated: "The meeting provided us with valuable information and gave us an opportunity to appreciate the determination of Iraq's academics and Ministry of Education to bring higher education back to its former level of excellence". Despite the formidable problems encountered by the Iraqi higher education system, progress and improvements have been made. The subjects of democracy, human rights and anti-terrorist have been included in the curricula. There is no dedicated budget for higher education but an ad hoc amount has been allocated. This has increased from $ 40 million in 2003 to nearly $ 70 million in 2005. This has enabled salaries for teachers to be increased from $ 1000 a month to $ 1500 a month. Teacher upgrading has been supported by UNESCO and the World Bank; 4300 new jobs have been created in the universities; 40 per cent of the reconstruction of destroyed buildings have been achieved through the existing budget. A$tudent's union has been formed in each college and a new law governs student election based on freedom and democratic principles.

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In his concluding remarks at the Round table, the director of Higher Education, Georges Haddad, UNESCO outlined the following measures in support of the Iraqi Higher Education System: • Establish a database of the Iraqi academic Diaspora; • Connect the Iraqi higher education system to international networks; • Iraqi academics partiCipated in the next international quality assurance network held in Wellington, New Zealand; • Iraqi academics attended the next meeting of the International Association of University Presidents held in Bangkok; • A workshop was held in Amman to discuss student life in Iraqi universities; • There should be capacity building for university governance and management of Iraqi universities; • UNESCO/UNITWIN Chairs should be established for Iraqi universities in a number of disciplines-engineering, medicine, teacher training, distance education; • Establish a Conference of Rectors /University Presidents.

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Language and Literature Kurdish is the language of more than twenty million Kurds living in a vast unbroken territory. Kurdish belongs to the family of IndoEuropean languages and to the Irano-Aryan group of this family. The Iranophone tribes and peoples of Central Asia and of the bordering territories began moving towards the Iranian plateau and the littorai steppes of the Black sea at the turning point of the second and first millennium BC. As these tribes and peoples invade the area, they assimilate and gave their language and their name to other IranoAryan peoples already present on the land. Some refuse total assimilation. Even today, there are fairly large pockets of nonKurdophone Kurds living in Kurdistan of Turkey, of Iran of and of Iraq. Kurdish, the language of the Kurds, which belongs to the northwestern group of Irano-Aryan languages, has never had the opportunity to become unified and its dialects are generally separated into three groups with distinct similarities between them. The biggest group, as regards the number of people who speak it, is the northern Kurdish, commonly called "Kurmanji", spoken by the Kurds living in Turkey, Syria, the USSR and by some of the Kurd's living in Iran and Iraq. 200,000 Kurdophones settled around Kabul, in Afghanistan, also speak this language. This group gave birth to a literary language. The central group includes the Kurdish spoken in the north-east of Iraq, where it's called "Sorani" and the dialects of the neighbouring areas, beyond the Zagros, in Kurdistan. of Iran. This group also gave birth to a literary language.

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There has always been an intellectual elite amongst the Kurds who, for centuries, expressed themselves in the conqueror's language. Numerous Kurdish intellectuals wrote just as easily in Arabic and in Persian as in Turkish. This is shown in the 13th century by the Kurdish historian and biographer, Ibn al-Asir, who wrote in Arabic, whilst Idris Bitlisi, a high Ottoman dignitary, of Kurdish Origin, wrote the Hesht Behesht (The Eight Paradises) in 1501, which recounts the first story of the eight first Ottoman sultans, in Persian. The Prince Sharaf Khan, sovereign of the Kurdish principality of Bitlis, also wrote his "History of the Kurdish Nation", at the end of the 16th century, a brilliant medieval source on the history of the Kurds, in Persian. It's difficult to date the origin of Kurdish literature. Nothing is known about the pre-Islamic culture of the Kurds. Moreover, only some of the texts have been published and it's not known how many disappeared in the torment of endless conflicts, which have been occurring on Kurdish territory for several centuries. The first well-known Kurdish poet is Ell Herirl, who was born in 1425 in the Hakkari region and who died around 1495. His favourite subjects are already those, which his compatriots will treat most often: love of the fatherland, its natural beauties and the charm of its girls. Kurdistan, in the 16th century was a battlefield between the Persians and the Turks. The Ottoman and Persian Empires were permanently formed and, at the beginning of the second half of the century, stabilised their borders, in other words they shared the territory of the Kurds, Kurdistan. The most famous poet from the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century is the Sheikh Ahmadi Nishani, known as Melaye Jeziri. He was born in Jezire Bohtan, and like many well read people of the time, he knew Arabic, Persian, and Turkish well. He was also influenced by Arabo-Persian literary culture. His poetic work of more than 2,000 verses has remained popular and is still republished regularly. He travelled a lot and made numerous disciples, who tried to imitate their master by adopting his language, which from then on became the literary language. Gradually the feeling of belonging to the same entity develops amongst the Kurds. This epoch will see the birth of the poet Ahmadi Khani, native of the Bayazid, who defines in his Mern-o-Zin, a long

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poem of more than 2,650 distiches, the elements of Kurdish independence. In the 19th century, following the general expansion of national liberation movements at the heart of the Ottoman Empire, and although strongly tinged with tribalism, a Kurdish national movement will slowly develop. A new literature blossoms with a certain delay due to distance and isolation. The authors who had received a classical education during their youth, given at a high level in the Madrasa, the religious schools, know Arabic and Persian well. The themes and images of their poetry is inspired, to a large extent, by the Persian tradition, but the poets display great imagination in the renewal of symbols and the musicality of verse. This poetry has, firstly, a religious tonality,-this is the epoch of the blossoming of mystic brotherhoods-but it is the patriotic and lyrical poets who have the most success. Mela Khidri Ahmadi Sh?weysi Mikhayill, better known as Nali is the first great poet to write his poetry mainly in central Kurdistan. The birth of the press accompanies the progress of the Kurdish national movement and the first review, with the significant name "Kurdistan" appears in Cairo, in Egypt, in 1898. In the 20th century, despite being the object of prosecutions, the Kurdish national movement doesn't stop developing. The outbreak of the First World War and its consequences radically change the situation of the Kurds. The Kurds had lived up until then in multi-cultural and multilingual societies. At the end of this war, the Kurds find themselves divided between four states: Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Syria, legally sovereigns but politically subordinated to the world game of superpowers. These states very quickly found themselves confronted with the problems of the diversity of languages. The literary production of the Kurds and the development of the language will from now on be dependent on the freedom they acquire in each of the states, which share their territory. Iraq, under British mandate, recognises a minimum of cultural rights to its Kurdish minority. Although the latter only comprises 18 per cent of the total Kurdish population, the centre of the Kurdish cultural life is transported to Iraq, where production develops from the second half of the 1920s. The Kurds come out of isolation and contact with the West-translation of Pushkin, Schiller, Byron and

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particularly Lamartine-completely changed the basic ideas in the poetic field. The beginning of modernity distances poetry from its traditional paths and if, in the first stage, the poems keep their classical form, innovation lies in their content, the Kurdish population lost their freedom and production dries up. They are forced to publish their works abroad or to go into exile. In Turkey, after the military success of Mustafa Kemal against Greece, a new treaty signed at Lausanne in 1923, confirmed Turkish sovereignty over a large part of the Kurdish territory and over more than 52 per cent of the total Kurdish population. This treaty guaranteed "non-Turks" the use of their language. A few months later, in the name of State unity, Mustafa Kemal violated this clause by banning the teaching of Kurdish and its public use. He deported most of the intellectuals. The Kurds became the "mountain Turks", living in "Eastern Anatolia" or in the "East". All the traditions, even the dress, all the groups, even the song and dance were abolished in 1932. After the Second World War, the Turkish regime between 1950 and 1971 gave itself a tinge of bourgeois democracy and use of the Kurdish language was authorised again. A new Kurdish intelligentsia formed. The military coup d'etat of 1971 and 1980 restored the policy of repression and massive deportations towardJ the west of Turkey. Their teaching of Kurdish and publications in this language are strictly forbidden today. In Iran, where more than a quarter of the Kurdish population live, the authorities conduct a harsh policy of assimilation of their Kurdish minority. All Kurdish publications and teaching of the language are absolutely forbidden. The great period of Kurdish literature in this area is that of the Republic of Kurdistan, which only !ast eleven months at the end of the Second World War. Despite its brevity, it provokes a remarkable development in Kurdish literature. Numerous poets emerge, such as the poets Hejar and Hemin. The repression, which follows the fall of the Republic, forces the intellectuals to go into exile, mostly in Iraq. In February 1979, a revolution of the people expels the monarchical regime but the Islamic government, which replaces it, is also unwilling to accord national rights to its Kurdish minority.

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Under- pressure from Kurdish revolutionaries gathered around the much missed Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, whose memory is engraved in the depths of every Kurdish heart, who demand incessantly the recognition of their language and their culture, the Iranian authorities are forced to tolerate the publication of various Kurdish works. If all literary creation remains forbidden, censorship authorises the publication of monuments from the Kurdish literature of the 19th century, some of which will be translated into Persian. Manuscripts depicting the history of Kurdish dynasties are finally published and dictionaries, grammar books and encyclopaedias by Kurdish personalities who marked their epoch, religious or not, appear in Kurdish and Persian. The Kurdish literary life in Iraq suffered the repercussions of the failure of the long Kurdish insurrection and the pitiless war between Iran and the Iraq. The Kurdish intellectuals choose the path of exile and take refuge in most of the Western countries and, remarkably, they will be at the. source of a real renaissance of the "Kurmariji" literature, strictly forbidden in Turkey and Syria. Supported by several hundred th