Varieties of Belief (Muirhead Library of Philosophy)

THE VARIETIES OF BELIEF •

Copyrighted materiaj

Copyrighted material

Copyrighted

materi~1

I

Muirhead Library of Philosophy

THE VARIETIES OF BELIEF

MUIRHEAD

,.

I

I Muirhead Library of Philosophy

PH ILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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In 7 Volumes

III

The Penon God is On ~Ifhood and Godhood PhilOlOphy and Rcl iiion

VII

The Varie1in ofBe- lief The Theological FrontiQ" ofElhic. Pa~holoaY of the ke1iaioul Life God and PcQOiWity

II

'v V v,

8,,,occ/ ClJ~1I

Hiigtntrlim

Hd. M~,-" SlnUIOII

W...

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THE VARIETIES OF BELIEF

PAUL HELM

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First published in 1973 Reprinted in 2002 by Routledge II New Fetter u.~, London EC4p4EE Routltdg~

i.I an imprint oftlt~ Taylo~ d Francu Grotip

Printed and Bound in Great Britain C 1973 George Allen & Unwin Ltd All rights testt.ed. No part of lIlis book may be reprint~ or reproducul 01' utilized in any form or by any eie.;tronic, IIl(>Chanical, 01' other means. now known Of hereafteT inV<mted. including

photocopying and rocordi~ or in any infonnatioo iIIoTllgc or retrieval system. without pmruuion in writing from the publi.t...:n. Tl>e publishers bave made ewry effort to contact authors/copyright

holders of the works rcprinlCd in the M~i,lread Lim/')' of PlllloJaplly. This has ~ible in every case, however, and...., would ....,1CM>"~'" ed. J""n Hiel ; Oxford Uniwraity Pr-. New York, for Lo1lp"I'. P"M>1IS.11d &1U1 by o.nu M. H igh; Allen It Unwin and Stanford Univenity Prca fO1l by John Calvin, Vol. XX, 'The Library of Chrlitian CJaIlig edited by John T . McNeill and lran$laled by Ford LeWd &11Iea. Copyricht (C) MCMLX by W. 1.. Jenkin&.

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CONTENTS

IxW 15 Acknowkdganents I I ntroduction p Air

I6 19

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2 Intanal and Exlemal Qur1iom

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Iklief and KoowlMge

PAIT II

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Probability

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Sr:](.Ambentication

7 RTd:uion

85 101 liS

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14()

AcqllainWl«:

.AaT III

9

Belief, Meaning and UndtQtanding

I ndex

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167 187

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Copyrighted materi I

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INTRODUCTION

Work in the phiIoeophy of rdigion in the wI thirty years baa foculled inaeaojngly on the language of religion. Appeab have been made to what the rdigious bel~e.- "')"0, or would &;Ir, in certain IliIUWoIII, and attention baa been called to the allegedly logical l"!'CuliaritiQ of 'rdigious langu3i"'. The argument of this book is that such approaches involve an important error in philolOphical method, for lhey rot on the mistaktJl aaumption that the 'religious bclicve:r' has an unm;.t.hble identiry, and that 'rdigious language' is a distinct, homogeneous fann of language. Too oflen it IICam thai unlas one happens to dw-e the particular migious outlook of the writer, religious or tho!!> logica1 p«mi3cs are being made to yield philOlOpbica1 concluDonI. 'I1u:te is an obviouJ need lor a Ics quotion-bcgging p,ouxIure, one thac aeparata the philatophy from the religion. One way of making this separation is to distinguhll religion Of theology from meta-religion or mcta-lhcology. Two linrs of argummt are dcvdopai in this book for this di3tinctioo. In the first cltaptr;r it is ~ that the " I'riori objections that haw: been made against it are DOt rogent, and in the .')eCOIld chapter that the distinction ill ~ if certain eonfusioIll are 10 be avoided. Later it is argued that the difJermt a.ecoo nt:J 01 rdigious belid that are offered provide a funller reuoD for nwguizing the distinction in the phUo.ophy of religion. ~

are a nwnw of I"U$OIUI for
defend accepted de- ! , iDe apina phioophical alta'*' or milunckntaodinp due to pbiIoeopbic:al l acton. For 1'- rtUOllI it appean that O . E . H ughes'. quest ions about tIw: eompatibility or othe:rwi!e of any given mda-theology with any given theology an: misplaced. It II • misrake to think

'lubltana' -

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10

of ontological. questions, for aample, or quations about the ju.uirl(.lUon of rdigM>us clilims, III cnernal quettions, and ., as alien to the teal busincs of n:ligicn and to the phi'-'phcr'. i n _ in religion. DiffCZ'I:JICS in ontology CUI be rdigioUi dilfo:r.......... Rd~ qUCllions an: not simply about rub for oertain liDgWItic pratt....... they MIl conccm onlologjcal quettionl. So lhal Ikrlckr'- dictum d fn'opos pereeption, to 'think wilb the k:amed and tpePk with the vulgar' will not hold for religion. Vu1gar rdigioua tall:: often raisa Ic:amcd qu~ and rdigioul talk _often kamed. Someone mi«ht objcd that thinking learnedly about God ;. an alien intrusion into religion. But this, to be ...",ained, would have 10 be argued, and an appea.lIO the 'grammar of religion II not by i~ going 10 be a /JtroI!3 enough argument, as wiD be

demonII:rated later. There II an intcrcJting similArity between poeitivists such as Rudolf eamap and thoee who, like D . Z . Phillipi, appeal to the grammar of religion to validate n:ligioul language. Calnap thought llat when Jama Cornman calli Eo qu:n ions, quatiool the ...,,1,:1'1 to whkh lie outside the juri1dictjoo of rub govnning. particulu opa "jon, and whieh would not murJ a changl: in Of" an addition to rea goouuing the opoation,.. ate ~ qn j innI beta . . of hill aoco:ptanoc of the vai6catioo principle. Phillipi'. readion is timilar: becaUit the 'form of life' (e.g. re-

ligion) exicta, the reality that it cmbndiet in iu Iangu. exi'u In bit view it invohu. oonf",;m of inta"na1 and exUln.al quationa to ~ qu~"'" about, IlaY, the onlOlogieal JtatUII of whilt illalktd about by referring to cxfH' ·)jli in the religious form of life in other than rdigious !mnI. For him the o nl y permiaible cxternal qt....ioo;. 'h the language.game coherently playcdr, .. (h i m' D. os>- cit., p. 167.

,

IIfl the way in whicla we anJWtt th~ qUQlion "What objects ar~ the cJementl of given, direct experienc~?" And this is DO( a matter of language, bot a matler of fact.'''

Further, proponmts of the cobuence throry of truth were lac:ai with a problun about arbitrariness. If it is poeble to have formal ~emI that are inoompau"ble with each other, who is to decide buween the rivaJ merits of each? 'For any fairy talc there may be constructed a aystun of protocol statancnts by which it would be IlIfficiently fUpportcd; bot we call the fairy tale fal5c and the .statunents of empirical science true, though both comply with that formal criterion. It. cn~d by ~ is acecpt
INT ERNAL AND

EXT E R NAL QUESTIONS

41

the field 01 divoune into which it mtml', " then it is clear that within such a language the question of reductionism. cannot be

rai"".

It is Ul'IIIltisfactory simply to say that thc langu~ame of religion defines the reality of God, for this prevents qUesUollI about, for example, rdigioltll bclid, about possible diffet'l:llt grounds that believers have fo r lheir beliefs, and about bow what is bdieved is to be understood. The temptation is to say 'The.art of reality ddioca the _ t 01 belief; hence rdigious belief is of litis kind oc it is IlIpentitious or impollible to undentand'. A philootopm who lUes this view of religioltll language as being strictty autOIlOIDOtIS precludes hinuclf from investigating different notiollI of belief occwring in religion bceau.t for him the objKt of belief is noa-oontingentIy conl'ltttro with the belief, and with the affective and otbc:r attitudes that go with it , such all praix and thanbgiving, fear and hope. Thae criticisms, wit h particular reference to rdigious bclid, are developed in theno:t chapter. Brown'. distinction bd:wecn theology as grammar and metagrammatical isles b1un the issues that reductionism rai$es in religion and theology bceauae the reduaionist, (in at least one 01 the ..,1llICS of 'reductionism' to be discussed below), and the non-reductioniat may both adhae in good faith to the same articka of faith ; that ~ in Brown'. !emU, their religioltll grammat5 might be the same, ~I their ootologia difI~Dt. It is just poIIible that, by regarding anicles of faith as opclling out the grammar 01 rdigion, Brown means that, illlOmeone gives the tams in the an kles of faith a diff~nt ICIIK, this entails a difference in grammar. In this CMe particular definitions would he crucial to the grammalicalnars of an apt. ion, and a proposal to redefine God, in lite manner of J. A. T. Robin.Jn, would be a grammatical prr-veaL This may be what Brown 1ll"aJU. On the other !wid the implT$ion that he gives in molt of his di5c .... sian is tIlat the only i.sue bclwccn R obin-'llrl and tr.Idition.al theism is flUlI the now !.hat ..,Iip:>u. diIcoune h.. clI .."".. riotialprV.<noiblo to him he doe. "'" UDd ...1U qll<Sb an: not JM"'{'nrily to be understood q caU$lllly dliracjo'Js in the way that the right min i" causaJJy efficacious in a laundercur:.. For prayers are "quests, or at least lOme of them are, and n:queslll an: k>gic;illy differmt from mecha.nistic caU3e!I, 00 matter to wham the requCWI are malk. But because x ill not mechanistically dIicacious it doa not follow that x is not C3uAl and that x may not be dficacioUil under certain conditioll.'l. prayers arc not mechanistic caW1!'3 it does not follow that lhey are DOt n..... ry oonditions for the production of cutalo effects under ca1ain conditions, if, for example, what is requested is in acox-dance with God', will. P~ably if Phillip did come 10 understand pdilionary pnyus, tru.n h. idea of what was meaningful in rcligion would be extended. That is, he must allow that be could rome to underltand Ihc.e praycno othe!-wix h~ would be wrong 10 identify them il5 prayers, and not as 'prayers' in the first place. ~eause

Further, be claimll that as

II.

result of philosophical invcstiga-

tim into rdigioo, which he likens 10 the cure of an illne., a petlIOn can p is an undcr31anding that he did not have before. N a raul! of this growth in insight he might rome to I t t that the religion of certain believen was shallow, 01' evm that it WlliI not a religion at all." So there are at least ilire poaribilitits-that a prayer ill: intelligible and religiously adequate, or thac ic is intelligible but i"f!ligiowIy shallow, or that it ;. unintelligible but still a prayer. On the one hand Phillips, following IIOrlle ranarks of Witlgemtein, says that the alteria of religion are internal to religion and ~ jeets the philalopher's role u bdng that of tidying up religion.' On the other hand be wants to say that certain prim .. t..ci# religious activitia such lliI prayers an: not intelligible as prayen, on the ha.!;is of the fact that they are unintelligible when measured against critala thaI an: derived from religion alone. What this suggats is that Phillips is working with a substiUltive 'ibid.., pp. IG-I\. • ibid.., p. 11.

•

ItELIGIOUS LANGUAOE

view of rdigion which provida the rules of the 'grammar' of religion. This mua be borne in mind when he appeals 10 wha.! th!:

believtf' says: it is IeMi to what Ihe bdlever says than 10 whal he say.: CIthin.- at !l.e kiDd ;. ...... unain: if 'hI' 'ftre not _taitl, then "" propooiitiorJ ""'kh ;mpli.. the .,.lllLe,," 01 anythins .. lOrna) to the ml..d ol!l.. ""' ..... , ..1>0 mal.. it i. evtr fu t..... For n' t · .. wb.o wilbes to ....u.t.oin thlo .....Iyoio, or _thiq lilt. the Gettler paradoo; win b... 10 be NnIIOIInttd by ;"';lcIi", ,n oth.,. c:onditiono, ...m ., tbooe ","",toe! by Roderick Chilholm. Of tout.. the Genie.- objection doc, DOt otancI it knowled .. i .....Iyoed d;ff.....,Iy. It 'OIva the having of certain cIispositiom, usually f;o.YOurabk ones, to what is believed in," LeI: us tum to oonsida the difference between '!>did·in' and trust. 'J ona believa in GQd' entails tlUl[ 'Jones believes that God cxi5ts', but it certainly does not entail tbat God «iolS. What of 'trust'? Docs 'Jones truI(S A' entail the existence of A? The answer to this is that it depends in what ra.pttl J ana lnJSU A. If he truAs a plank actOIIS a stn:am then the object of the verb ill non-inlensionai in character. To trust the plank is not primarily to have certain bdid, about the charactemtics of the plank, but 10 act with n:spu:t to the plank in certain ways, believing or hoping that the plank will be aafe.. n.., existential import 01 'tnLsl' oftcn depends on whether what follOW! the verb is or ill nol a referring exprrsion. The 'tru!t' ill 'He tnIStI in a plank' o rten does not carry existwtial import because 'plw' doe. not neco:marily refer 10 a particuJar plank. Jo'or a sim ilar reuon the:: agnostic prcfas to talk of olba people's belief in II God ralher than bclid in God. Trust requins beliefs, though it is not DCO uily a form of belief, but a disposition to ~ in O"rtain wa}'l. (This applies to 'trust in' and not 'trust that'. 'T~ thai' secma 10 be a nonIUict I,lY 01 'trust'.) So 10 trust in !he plank iI 10 act in anain ways with respect 10 !he plank, believing lhal such and such. To 11WII in God is to act wilh respect 10 God in certain ways believing that such and .such. Bm 10 tnut in God does not entail that Cod exi!u, for il is p:!SSibJc 10 trust in God umler !he mi,..ken imp. c:ssi!m, op. oi •. , p . Ul7.

7.

THE VAUKTn.a or IELllr

v

All the ca .... of knowkdge ., far discl.lS5ed have been cu:s or knowledge by ut Smith, it would not fo1low that R.oblnIon was aequainted with Smith, simply bec:ause he haa never been familiar with him.

It _ Mated rather summarily at the beginning of !hi. wptel' that belief is a prop:citional attitude. What this llICiIIlI depends on wbat 'plOpoeition' u taken to mean . n,e P"fPOII" of this note ;. to draw atttentioo to two of the things it eould mean that are relevant to thedi5cUMioo of religious belid. (_) It eould mean simply that what u believed are SUltanenlll or ap lOOns. Thai is, to believe p is sim pl y to take p for true . • H;"tilla, op. cil .

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82

TH! VAU&Tl&a or 1I1l-lItr

Geach has pointed out the ambiguity betwoen ltatemcnt as a won! that refers to what a truth-value can be assigned to, and as the apeecb.act of •• ting." In lhis "'rut" 01 propolitiooa.l heW, tben, what are believed arc: what arc: a t iled as being true. II could mean that what is believed arc propositional functions, 10I'1I'II of words in which tbirp are propounded for comidmuioo. TItis is now Geach explaine what he means by 'proposition', but it is not VI:fy ~ beca~ 'propounded for (':OI1IIideralion' could i~ be a speech-act, and Gcach wants WvpIy to distinguish dlis III';Il8e of proposition from 1inguistic adS of any.tOrt. But his point can be put differently; while 'pr0position' in rn. «me has a truth-value the fact that it has a truthvalue ,Joe, DOC mtail thai it is being ar :ded, or ptopoundal. as true. II may be, for aampJe, a component pan of a disjunction, or a qllCllion, or a mounancl, and the« ve not aPL , tiona. 'Believe' is not a very good word to characterize a general attitude to propolitiorul in this lIe(X)lld IUI!Ie, becaUk to bclio:vc is to take for true, and OlIllIIlands, qumOons clc. are DOt what are taken for true. It makcl no _ to talk of bclicving mmmands or questions. A wonIlike 'AMelI,' which Caition it must be pdt:mify it as such logically independently of anyone'l bclieving il to be IUch. The: bcl.id thai it il: revealed il: ~ o n the criteria of identification.

mete

'For matta' of failh being only divine ~Ia()on and nothing ~,failll, as we use the word (e.l1ed commonly, dilll',,# fail ll) has to do with no propositiom but tbole- which arc IUppoied to be divinely reveakd. So that I do DOt .!I!:C how thole who make revdation alone the lOIe object of f,ulll can aay that it il: a mailer o[ failll, and not of f t 4JOII, to bcliew: that sucll or such a proposition, to be found in Iuch or IIIIch a book, ~ of divine ' CbapCtrJ 18 and 19 . • Lode cIo< • • 'JIIO _ with Slillinrfteet.

thin. ];k. th.it in

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"""'.. of h;, loft, """"0""' .,.

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PROBABILITY

iMpintion, unl_ it be revealed that that proposition, thai book, was axnmunkaW'd by divirK: impin.tion."

0mcthing that the ixlieva can get to mow for hirnxlf, by perception, for uample. This distinction between faith and oornprebensioon is:a familiar ICbolastic onc; the diffaena: bctwen Aquina:! :and Calvin on thi!: point is merely tenninological. Calvin c:aIh knowledge and faith what Thomas ealls faith, but both distinguish this concept from knowledge in the _ of ~JUeo upe,;,entp!'dII deuly what God is lik" as 10 acc::ommooale the knowledge of him 10 our slight capacity."

'cn'

' n " touch .. on the thon>y q .... tion '" ,I,e .. to whkh CaMD .... . ""1'1"'"'" • natural ,hea""," ;n tM d_lopins .,.._nt cl 'he I~"i'.t... W.rfidd (op. dlJ mamlti;n. thaI he does • 1.• . 1., loS.9.

•'ibid., I"fil,"." 1.1'.1.

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104

THE

VAJlIBTIES 01" BELIE.

"

The dole connection betwem faith and ltSIimony has akeady been noted. The object of rdigio:lUli belid for ProtMantll $U~h as Calvin is the Bible rqprnkd as a '$elf_authenticating' divine revelation. The rt:a8OIl!I {Of believing the mc:ssage of t~ Bible ill"e Wntminu ... Dnc:tri- 01 l10ly Script..,..,', iB Ti. W ..... """",61,.u iF< W.,.t (193 1).

co.-..

i."..,

S EL V-A UT II E NTI C A T 10 N

105

white and black lhings do of their colour, or swttt and biller things do oflbcir wte..,. Further, this ootion of lelf-auwcol"'a ' ion is

DO' ,he .ame as

that employed in many modern rdigioWl discussions, in which it is laid to be a aittrion of 'met;ung' or 'encountering' God thac the. expc:rience is ael1_authenlicating, that 'it &hiJv:s by ita own light independently of tho: abltnct rdlWK>n!I of phiiollophy·. This modern notion .IUffiI to be open !Q levual objections, notably that such a claim a.'I 'I CDcountcted God in Christ' ill not a lepol l of an inuntdlatt experience, but of an interpreted exptrima:, and that such an cxpcric:ncc cannot have exi.\ttntial import without being cotrigible. which rq:arding it ail 'selfaulhmlicaung' aecms 10 rule OUI. The view t hat we have attributed to Calvin and Owen 5ttIt\.I: to differ from this modern view in at lcast one imporw1t respect. What is said to be Icl.f-autbenticating is identifiable indepmdtntiy of the. u:pcric:ooc of sclf-autbtnticatioo. 'Sdf-autbmtic' is a propaty DOl of an experience oot of a proJ>OIition Or let of propositions. Hence it is tbtorctically posaibk: to overthrow the claim that such a proJlOl!ition is sdl-autbentkating, and 0verthrow would actually take place if the claims made: by the proposition - for butance, tbe claim to meet certain needs - were

unfulfilled. of the truth of a given claim is that it would hold good for anyone accepting it. If J ohnny's uncle says 'If you're a good boy I'll take you on the. Big Dipper', this promise is shown to be true (or, if I00I10 object to the idea of a promise being tOM:, the f'li" ...i" .he RJ.,.u d vir.. from S. T . CoIorid!J;~' .. ~ no:...nn Alim. Tu R •• _~In.I" Foil. (l968). kao btt:tI 01 COG' .id;temaJ' grounds already mentioned belong in thi!! cat~. If the intuition is COl reet, then the internal cyiden~, the pl lic' or 'God annat ~ what is being JUggJalilil chaTacta, the fact thai it has a certain.:>l"l of influence over a pus:m's eonduct, particularly his mora] conduct. However, !his dor:s not mean that any belief could be regulative. Only belief in a purdy-moral God, wbolle ,xu'cncc is n«""hated by the nqu ir<metlb of morality, wilt serve. Rdigiom belief has nothing to do, in a positive !laIR, with knowl~. Kant dc:nks knowledge, in order to make room for faith. Kant has become the head of a tradition; though the positive part of his th~ h3.'l been continually amended and refined by Protestant continwtal theologians from Schlcicrmacher to Bull_ mann, they all ac«pt the negative claim of the critical philOllOphy that it is impoasibk to ru.ve knowledge of God. And though in this chapter the focUl of our attention will be on Kant, it is on him as rept .... ntative of a type. Two inter-connected quemons will occupy us: (a) What does Kant mean by calling belief in God 'nguLativc' ~ (b) In what IleIl!C can Kant be Aid 10 bold that God exista~ After attempting to aDaWt his dfon. God'. existence cannot be doubted and prople sliD pUTlUe their duly with unremitting vigilanc:e. This $eatUI to make the idea of the SIImmllm bOllu"" and of God ll!I the provider of it, a psychological r.wcsily. Coming 10 believe in God, on this view, would be coming to believe dIal moral effort is nOl in vain but will be rewarded. But if lhis is Kant', view, il is hard 10 tee how it m.a.ka God's existence certain or 'inevitable'. On the otbeT hand Kant may be offering a Ihesis about the meaning of 'moral'. '101lQ (XltllItantly endeavoon 10 do his duty' mtlJllS '100Ci bdieva in God: Yet if Kant means this, it is Jard to tee how he can ra;., the pos Rdi,;.... CJ.i"" MM. S.... , (1969), W. 1.'16-7. • Q""tod by 1J.rown, op. c it., p. 1~7.

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REOULATION

127

divine Penon (Locke'. "''''''11«) ill translated into talk of pr;rtooaI. relationship' (Berkeley's pndtn). If Robimon reguda his transition an,logoudy to the shift between l ocke and Bcrkclcy, what be has a~donc:d is deiIm, not du,;e,1 ChriWan thrism in which God DOt only uphnkb; the phenomena but aJso hitnsill activdy intervene. in redmlptioo and judgrnenL Robiu.m's tran,;tion is, as Alel-ir MacIntyre bas pointed oul, a ~ of the twenticth-century rejecting post-Enlightounent viewJ of God."

." In the lecture already refUTed 10, W. H. Wabh has drawn auenlion to c:atain mpecta in whiclt the viewJ of Kant and WillgmIItcin on religion coincide. 11 will now be argued that whik there au obvious enough diffcrenca between the two, the aimilaritie3 we striking. BaidrJI the intrinsH; inle patal lt~ .... between Wi',....,...,;" and Kon, i. """" ......n 1IIrik ..... r.nk Stoni .... Will' ......;. ·, T,.... .... (1961), dI. 11 and D...X! Peat., Wi/. , .....;. (197 1), pp. , ~ , 45«, 11.... both d .... wa 0"..,1;"'" to tho paran.1 betWftll Kant a Dd obe T,.lohu.

_.J

&10,.

129

.J.GULATtO/'f

(c) That religious bdic& arc non-isolable. Though distinguishabk, thac ihl'M;S arc not m fact :q>arablc e~ntl in Wiugenstcin'. view. The: main differences betwc:m them, bcsida the important Olld already noted, are that Wittgcll$l.e;n hcld a different view from Kant on the connection bctwcn rdigjous bdid and morality, and on the qualion of the kBi of rcJ.igio~ bclid. Thtx diffen:nca arc important, bul nol 10 important as to take Wittgn 'SupJlOlle

~~

Thill point about the non..aclf-rontradictorinem of opprgame or langua,e-garna of religion that there ia an 'enonnous gulf betWCCD any two religious vio:wI. Othc:r runarb made by Wittgcnltcin Rlggat a different view. 'You might be SUlpiled that then hasn't bHn oppoRd to tboK who believe in Reiunwtion who ... y " WdI, JlC*ibly", 'Here believing oIwiotWy pla)'1 much more Ihit role ; suwc-: we laid that a certain piaure might play the role of constantly admoni3hing me, or 1 alwa)'1 think of it. H ere, an a .... mous people for whom the pictun': diffe. alCt: would be between is COIlIWl tly in the fooeg. ound , and the others who jLlfl didn' t UIIC it .t all. rrhoIe who said: "Wdl, JlC*ibly it may happen and pos!Iibly not" would be on an entirely different plane ...•

u.o.c

u.o.c

n-e atJUeIt the view thai what makes a bdid religiow itllot whetba it ligures in the same languagc-pme ... material obja:ts wt "II di/n,nu il mill.., and that tnc 'p_~, I'm not !IUn:',

aid 01 the idea that the aeroplane aI:xwe it German indicate indiIl'fftI'ICoe, the aI»c:ncc of thai commill1lall wJUch it cbar.Ictcriatic 01 rdigjoul bdidt. It m.y lCan that ' ....... two poMIbi1itia an cxcluaivc 01 each other; Ow Wil'I",1Itdn ,hinle. that what malta a bdid religiowo is lilli" ill being in a distinctive language-game, or the tort of difference that the belief makes to the life III the believer. However, it would appear that be thinb that thcac ~ two waYI' of laying the same thing; that part of what it me... for . bdid to be rdigious it that it has a certain effect, or role, in a penon'. life. But there iI no entailment here; there are cast:t where a bclid - ibid, p. sti ,

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'32

THI VARIBTU'

or

BELli'

getl it:! rdigious fon:e bccallK the believer 'aka what be. believes to be not simply a picture thai acfmonishcos, hut an event in the matuial-object world, either preEn! or future. Such bclicls au logically amting~t. and observable in principle, though thr;y are not empirical beliefs in the ~ that they have been discovtted by a JH'OC.9I of inductive ~cn1iution, 01" thai they au hypothao:s biued entin:ly on IUch gencralwllions. The snatch of converu.OOn that Willgenstein gives about the Rcsurrcctioo could wdl take plaor: between lOOleone who boIds that u.., LiUI Judgement is both an evan to be JQOked CQlWard 10 in the material world ('every eye IIhall !II':e him') and an event the significanct: of which could only be appreciated by laking into account other beliefs, thansdva inltJpcctative of events in the malaial world. In thae cireumstanecs IOOlconc who doubts the Last Judgement mighI fairly be said 10 be doubting the lruth of the web of doctriJxo;s of which it it a part, and to be 'on an entirely diffcrml plane' from the believer. Alternatively, tbe conversation might be taken to be one between bdicvm ablut a dod:ri...,. Then one would haV(: to dmy WiugwMein'l vet1tict that the two were poles apart . (Till FirJt utt'r 10 If" Corill/IIi/IIIl, Cha~ 15, gives Putanral devdo~ menl.'" The para.lld betwcn Kant and Winge:natein .., Car should be apparenL Both wish to make a sharp distinction between malerialobject beliefl and rdigious beliefs, lhough on different grounds; to al"'::M the peculiar certainty or unihakeabIt:neS!I thaI attaches to ~ belief; and to avoid a 'hard rcductionist' position in which rdigious propositiOrlll become 1Wllu"IIg but opt" ioN 01 moral intent. Wittgemtdn avoids thilJ by stl"C!JSing the autonomy of rdigious belief and the internalily or the truth-conditio ... of rdigion, and Kant by emphasjring the (rather peculiar and elusive) 'objt:ctivity' of God. And both wish to say that what ill chanctcri3tie of rd;p.u. belief is its n:gulative character. Wiltgen«ein speab explicitly of the ~ character of religiouf belid."

• u«.,.. . ... CQ ...4>H' .... ,. p. 57. .. ibid .• pp. .. 'Remaru', p. 5i. ..

~:1--4 .

uti.,,, ... C""U., .., ....'. p. ~.

'34

TK& VARII!:TII:8 O • • aLl'"

Thais (b) can be brought oul most effectively by mmidering two P' " 'geI in the Ucwrts IUId COIU' I1Jphera, 001 this regulative understanding of reIigjGu! belief illOl'"nething distiDCti~ held in common. At the ootset of this d,apttT it was suggated lhat Kam is at the had of. wOOl... poIl-Kantian lraditioa in Prot",,'"1 theology. influential particularly on the OOIltinenl of Europe, from Sc:hJeiumachcr to Bultmann. Though they differ markedly arnonpt tllemId~ they addl'eSll themselvcs to a programme that only makes IIe:IlSe on the ptaUppositionJ of Kantian epistemology, the programme of anaJyaing n:1igiow bclid (or Christian faith) in immanentist tenns - in terms of ethlcal valUCI (RitJchl) or exDtentiaJ decision (Buhrnimn) or illXuhlrity (Bonhodfao) . Rcligioua belief is in each of tbaIe Ca.ICS non.oognitive, and XI invulnerable to attack. lUi :po:rir.nco that not everyODe has, though Hid: IIXIl1S to luggeR in placa that an)"me could have them. In di,,"";ng Hide'. thesis it is necessary to be more critical than in the caae of the other model. djvgrrl, few the following rHIOIl. Although certain important points of thc tbaiI lIN: open 10 objection, the main difficully is not thai this view is intcmaUy incohm:nl, but thai ita lICOpe is nlllTOWer than Hick bdicves it 10 be. Thai is, if the objections that are to be made are v;did ona, they do nOl ahow il 10 be a replacement of other modds of beJkf (as Hick suggata that it is, particularly in the first cl1aptcr of Fllillt lI11d K llowkdgtl, btl! that it is a difTamt model. The grounds for saying this are, briefly, that the ne(l p ary religious and tho:oIogiW aca>mpanimmts of this view are diffumt from that, say, of religious' belief iI.I a !1t. It is not pos!iblc simply to $lot in thiB model of religious belief without disturbing anything dx. Hick's view is an entircly different account of faith from the traditional Protestant·'fbomilt account . It is bllll·d OD different presuppositiol15, and $0 00... not, strictly, rival the tradi• So:wood F.dil;'" ( 1966).

A CQUAIHT AIH)E

,,,

tiom.1 view. If this claim can be upbeld, it will be a vindication of the general thesis 01 this book, that different models of Idicf operate in rdigion, and that thoe modeb are inc:xtricabl.y intatwined with substantive rdigioua views.

, Thill o;position of Hick'. view will concentrate on ita tlut:e ~n­ tial features: (oS) lhat uligious knowledge is lW: the immedWe knowledge one pa1IOn may have of another, (6) that it invol~ an interpo-etative clement, and (~) that it is uncomu-ained. The phnua 'religious knowledge' or 'knowledge of God' are usod in prcfm:ncc to 'faith' in order to highlight the cpjstanology, and 10 leave the psychoIogica1 fealure of uliglotu faith 10 ntH: side. In 100king at Hick's view., his ItttUJl: 'Religious Faith as Experiencing_M,' ill weU as Filii! oS"d KMwkdge will be UJed, bccaux the kcture is in !IOIlle TfSpKlII clo:a.rer and more fully WQl"ked out lhan the wpler 'The natun: of Faith' in the book. Hick Itro ; Ihal rdigiow knowledge is mmething immediate, and thai it involves the apprehending of God in 1m: oe-dinary environment of life. It is 'an aWa«r1CS1 of the divine being medialed through awar-wt:al of the world, the $UpemeUtr.1 ch.ne_ cI. /oi'" a ....iII" •• ho ")'I 'II i. to ... ,J , ,,,d that we ore ..,. inq~irinl who"' ... ill.... I. """ .... h ohm! .. boowledp tot God;;" order r.,.. Ihoete 10'" aVC""_t about ohio there -..1int Hid has written : "The extent of our cognitive frHdom varies in rospect of the different aspects of our environment. It is al a minimum in !ItI1¥ perception, and for that reason passes unnot.iet:d by the man in the Itred. For in pereeiving the material world, the physic:al pole of aJgnitioo. has berome lID fully developed in aJ.l of us, as the ....... It of a loog .... ou:as of evolution, that it is stable as between mind and mind. Henc:e as animal organisnu we aU peroeive the same world - that is 10 oay, our oc. aal expuicneehistoria are capilie of being corrdaled in tenns of hypothetical univcna.l experience. At thia lewl of experiQloe we are - broadly apeaking, and with occasional lapta - compclled 10 experi= correctly.'" • ibid., p. 125.

•

15O

or

THE VAkUTIIt&

To gel dear on this it

IIELI.,.

i~

JlCX"-ary to distinguish between the physical propalia of the external world with which""," have to '!ukon', and the helids they may or may not bold about the extemal world. It is beta,,$C of the physical propmia of the world that human beings cannot wa.li through brick wa.ib, no malter what tbcy believe about brick walb, or how they ciw'acteriz.c them. What compulsory about the physical mvironmenl is the faa that if men are to 5Ul'Vivc in it, they must reckon with it in certain >Va.)", BUI 'reckon with' here is to be undcntood purdy extensionally. It is lOl11.ething that purely physical

u

organisms do, wbether or

in addition to certain physical properties and capacities, they It- . 4. minds. If x has to be reckoned with by a pelIOn then it haa to be rcaoned with by anything animate. If a brick wall will .$lop a man it will alao ltop a dog. But what concepti ph)'lical organi3ms \DC in think· ing and speaking about their mvironmall (if in fact they do think and speak about it), are not compdlal or dictated in the same way as their behaviour. Whether an organism judges that there is food in front of it or not will depend 011 whether it is a languageWIer and how developed illl language is. But whether it is a language-usa or not it will have to 'reckon with' the food if it is to survive. Hick makt.'S the point that in penon.t~pemn rdattollll no OPe can be oompelled to bcJievC' anything. But unless a vcr crude bdJaviouristie account of belie! is being 1.I3ed, thi!I iI surdy a general point about belid, not a point about pt:non-to-pt:rIOIl bC'licl. No ont: can be COI'llpelkd to bdievC' anything - not in thC' VII" that an)'OllC' CUI believe what he lil.t.'S about anything but in thC' !Itn!e that a paIOn is fta; to igno~ tbC' grounds for any bdid. &eaU3C of this, C'very bit 01 evidrncc pt...,....ucd to thC' mind (as oppoeed, pr;rhal's, to evidma: prcsmted to the 1I':1lIC'S) may be said to be ambiguous, and to involYona of religion as meaningless or false, whereal the heliever regards them as meaningful and eitber pr0bably or certainly true. Finally, on the view 01 religious belief as propolitional, it is poIsible to answer the objtttion against Hid'. aCC'Q\Jnt that !ledng an event as an act of God rcquira one: to haye the notion of an act of God, i .... to have the notion 01 a 'neat', unmedi.atcd act of God, Far on the aco>Unl oJ religious .. 'llolid' and Will' ;. PAiM"'''7.' Mid..... "ampohin (19i66), Po 106.

•

'"

Till:

VAKIJ;TU.1I OF

BELIEI'

belief as propositional, to ~ an act as an act of God is just a difftnnt way of saying that one believes.:Jllle act or evenl to be an act of God, and what i1 required 10 make thU good is evidem:e.

on It wu shown artier thai Hick offen the them of Faith end Knowledge as a better a.c..:ount of rcligiolD knowledge than that offered by the view of rcligioua belief IJl consisting aimply in belief in certain propositions. BUI thue is naaon to think that the ground it COVml is less than and different from that covtted by the view of faith lIiI a propositional altilU&. His view docs 1101: in faa rival this, and requires a different account oJ religion as well. The grountb for this oondusion are that the range of exprcaAons used by Hid to charactr;riu; 'ex-ledge of God' make. it impossibk to give a single acOOUllt of them. It is poiIlIible to dil('rnl wee varietiet al least, which will be referral to u (a) evidcrllial beliefs, (b) direct expuiencr.:s Of 'mcounters', ""d (c) complementary bdid!l. By direCl experiences or 'encounters' is meant thoee experimu:s in which people take thcmxlvcs to be in direct communion wilh God. 'Mystical' might be a better word, except that it hasoollle to.man almost anything. When Hick write of faith as a PCIWO'S 'religious raponse to God's rtdemptive aetKm in the life of Jesus of Nazareth', ruch a respome has a propositional basia identifiable independently of the rcspome. What the penon responds 10 is a repert Gbout J esus of Nazareth, and it "' nea·ary for the penon who lespomb in this way 10 bdieve such propositions as 'Jesus of Nazareth existed', and many morc IJt:Sidc:s. So that on this characterization of faith it is a straightforwa.rd propcmtional belief. When, on the other ha nd, Hid writes of Qpericncing an act as an act of God," no evidence other than the awarmcsa oI the act is required for this 10 be a cue of religious faith, and such qlH:lliona as 'Why do yoo apoimee this event as an act of God and not this other event ?' tv· '_ne rekvant, and perhaps awk. ward, questions 10 answer. And when he du.. libes faith as an encounter with God, or as a cue of being eoruciou! of God or

ACQ:UAINT A NC r.

'55

awan: oI God, thill teemS to be a Wrtt. expu~nce in that il doe3 DOl supervene on another non-rdigiou, act. In direct expuicno:l no action Of event is being inttlPt ctOO, and the cxpmencc take! place independently of any particular action Of' C\fmL I I is true lhat H ick doca at one point" diffr:rrntiate lxtwttll a mntcmplat ive and mystical awareness of God and 'the prophetic type of rcligioU3 expuicncc', but not on Ihe grounds thai thcIe arc IWO differen t kinds of expt;rience: only that the former may have a \oo::Jsc:r li nk witn ethics than the latler.

'Thlll thl: di3positional raponse which is part of the awareness of God is a tupol13l: in tamil of our involvement with our neighhouri wilhin our common environment. Even the awar,,",,* of

God through nalUn: and mystical mntem plalion leacb CVCI\tuall y bad. to tnutl"Vicc of God in tne world:"

This bracketing togcthl:r of a rclit!:io"", n:splllllC to J esus and an awartncsll of God thai includa mystical expcricnccs is misleading. While the fii"lt is mediated by otparately identifiable .:wnu, knowable by dl'llCl"iption, the sccond i, 001. Hid. M}"3 of direct exJXiiencca 'the ICII3e of the pl"QCntt of God may occur without any -'pt;cific environmental oontext, when the mind is wrapt in prayer or mediation'. But in Ihi., cue wbat is it Ihal is puocived-as or experienced-as? Th" i~ an experience that is per!fOnal, interior, and not dept;ndmt on rvcnts which in tn~vCl (according to Hid) arc ambiguollll bo lt which may be taken to Ix: divine acts. But there" a mDf"C fundamental r ra.'lOn why il is misleading to oonflat.e these CUM 'Having a !IellSC of the pracnce of God', 'being aware of God', 'having an encounter with God' - thac an: exp" pions that can ooly be lIIICrl to characterize: episodes. II would.teem to hi: a necasary truth "bout mystical expericncn that they are cpUodic _ th ey arc (:On""""" expcrimcft, luing for 10 long. It maka _ to uk when they began and when they ended, and 10 forth. But this is not true of the third cla.""" of expt"Clllion$ thai Hick wa to dtaractcriu fiU.th ur rcligiou. knowledge - what W Cf"C n:ferrcd to above as oompll':l1lCntary b..ticfs e.g. 'experiencing life " ibMI ·, W·3I)- 1. " imd.,p.31.

'I'

ate

"6

TillI VARIETlltll 0 '

BilLIE'

as a continual int=tion with the \r.I.J1Scendm1 God', 'life as" sphere in which we have oontinually to do with God and he with us'. 'Regarding the whole of onc'.life as involving deallng. with God', 'living one'. life as a ~ respoll3C to God' - thae are ditpc:citional cxprcaions, and do not !Ittm 10 involve the having of pattkl,llar experiM«s which one takes to he of God. A man'. whole life can he a religious responae to God, and he can be said 10 regan:! his Life as a rdigious r~MC to God whuo his mind is occupied with aU Ittb of extraneous things, but a man cannot have a direct expoiencc of God when his mind is 110 occupied. It ought to be m· .d at this point thai our cona:m is only with qucnions of clmficalKm. Wbeth~ men do law: sueh CJ;puien«:s, or are justified in having such beliefs as we have tried to du· jfy above, is a diffuml question. It hlU 1«n omggalm that Hick has thrown together ca ; that ought to be kept ilep;u1lte. This can be supported by oonsidaing particular exampla Though Hick', model of reUgiouIJ knowledge as cognition_in_j>Icscnew of rdig;oua knowledg.:, two Iinuo bIiI ." R.Ut;"~, Clfsi ... , M d;, S.K"', p . 143. W..,h. rd. Goold, IV, pp. ~, 60.

•

182

THE

VAIlIII.TI.l.S OF

BELlEY

lach it xnst:, or that the smtUlC!: as III whole is meaningl= beaux. it is either syntactically ill-formed 01' fIouts.arne categoryrule Of' fails to ~ IIOIlle phiJoeophkal criterion of meaning. It is pcmible few someone 10 argue that rdigious propo;eitions have meaning in aU scnaeoI, and he may be able 10 &bow this by

mete

givins the proposition.

eon~ it TOOgh

panphrue. Yet in III lunber IleNe of 'mu.ning' they may IIlill be meaning!. . 10 him, in that he does not .see tl.e point or function of the proposition eo~med, iUld this may be bccaU3e he is not aware of any needs thai the propoail)oo is designed 10 fulfil. He may lite that a particular form of words';' a eoanmand from 'God' but not a (l)ffi. mand from God, say. It is clear bow son..:"ne woo took roughly this position would respond to Macintyre's point: 'Yet accptic and bdicver disagn:c in tolD in Ihcir judgements on .!Orne rdigiotu matlen:; or 10 it .setlm. So bow can they be in peE ion of the!lalllC concepb? If I am prepared to say "olhing of what you will say about God or sin or salvation, how can my concepts of God, sin and salvatim be the AIllC as yo~? And if they are not, bow can we understand each other?'"

There are two points about this. The lUst ill that there au various am:! of disagr ....."'ent thai can be envi.ragal. One can agree with another penon on the meaning of 'fairy' but dingue on whether tilae are fairies. In the same way sceptics and believers can talk about God, and disagree on whether he exialll 01' not, and they can talk about him beca.u..e both ac;a,pt a.rtain definition:!. And 10, and this is the sooond point, when MacIntyre claims, in the above quotalion, that there can be a situation in which one party in a dispute is 'Fn'1>ared to lay nolllin,' that the IMher is pn:pilJ'ed to say, this is woefuUy ambiguous. He may mean say, or he may mean MUTt. It may be true of the accptie and the believer that they are not able to MUTI the same tbings of God limply beca..w. one beli"",,,,, in him and the other does DOt. But this does not mean that they are not able to speak about 'God'. It is not that they both believe in his o::xistence but c:an agree on nothing about him, nor thAt ncither can agree even Oil a lei of "'iI UDd.,ltaI>dlDll R. ~iooo Compalibio with B"Jio";nB?', in F.i, . . ., P.w.w,..... ..I . 1. lIick. p . 115.

,k.

IILur, ""AIouo belief - belief 10d knowltdge. CIt. f. ,.", ... as a perl(lfmantt:. 391. as prlctical. 115f. and tettimony, !.lb Ll9- I 20 and ",,"1.,..,.. D., 18 M • • ninS and mcaningf..me., 24, t1. ~ Ill. 0.. !I , ......... mela-rnquiria, 231. M o)",< U, n .• H M iracleo, ~ fr1 Moon:, G. E., li!l.. 1St .• LB5 MOfal"y and the J~"''''W''' bo. . ", .

:rr.. 121

ill

,..,i. .,

Locka! pwilivilm. :M 'Iofically odd', Looo01 t..litl, ]31, Ili

m

!1§, l2.5

Propolition..ol and pcr.onal

t --

k dse, III

QuiJJ,on, A. M., 1.ll9.

Ib.,,,.. y, L T., ~!Ii Reali,y 01 God, f.l

M.cln,Y"'. A. C.. 127, W Makolm , N., MI .• 131., LB5

Rebell ion, 1M

Manin, C , 8., 211

Red..."ioniom, iQ.. ~

In. ill

189

I luo _ . lions, 54/. Unbolief, 1I10{. Undo .... ""dinc, of7/ .,

a.. 9

,=im

R..-Il, B., ~ 18 Ru!bc. Iud, 5., Itt

V.lun, IlCbI Vi" .... ~ VinlOOOlllheism, I.2!b1

Scq.t'dom, ~ 159. Sclot."'rmacl-, r ., 138/. Sd!lick, M~ 11 'Seoin, ...', !!.!& 1111. Scll·authentiaotlon, Ch . Ii: , ..,i... Sbedd, W. G. T., 32

Wakh, W. !L. 121 , 125, 121 W.r6