Varieties of Cognitive Appraisal Alvin I. Goldman Noûs, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Mar., 1979), pp. 23-38. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28197903%2913%3A1%3C23%3AVOCA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N Noûs is currently published by Blackwell Publishing.
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Varieties of Cognitive Appraisal UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
The aim of this paper is to advance a certain non-traditional approach to epistemology. My method of introducing this approach is to compare and contrast it with more familiar epistemological orientations. Thus, the format of the paper is a survey-admittedly not exhaustive--of a variety of tasks and perspectives that epistemologists have undertaken and might undertake. J. L. Austin complained about a weakness of philosophers for "constant obsessive repetition of the same small range of jejune 'examples' " ([3]: 3). The case in point was the problem of perception, which in Austin's opinion was dominated by excessive attachment to a few words and phrases. A similar complaint can be lodged, I believe, against the theoretical proclivities of 20th century epistemologists. Epistemology has been dominated in the last half-century by a narrow class of problems and approaches, and the result has been stagnation. It behooves us to break loose from this small set of orientations and take a broader look at what epistemology might do. It is generally acknowledged that epistemology is an evaluative, normative, or critical discipline. At a minimum, it seeks to appraise doxastic attitudes o r doxastic-attitudeforming processes, on such dimensions as rationality o r warrantability. I propose that we pursue epistemology in a broader framework, as appraising the full range of cognitive events, processes, operations, or mechanisms. In particular, epistemology should join hands with current developments in psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, psychobiology, and neuroscience. T h e contributions of these disciplines to cognitive theory cannot be neglected in any forward-looking epistemology. Assorted perspectives on cognitive appraisal emerge if,we consider possible answers to four questions: (1) What are the NOUS 13 (1979) O1979 by Indiana University
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objects of appraisal? (2) What are the purposes of appraisal? (3) What are the descriptive bases of appraisal? (4) What are the terms and standards of appraisal? T H E OBJECTS OF A P P U I S A L
Many of our ordinary expressions of cognitive appraisal are directed at intellectual acts, achievements, or feats, such as answering a question correctly or solving a problem. Other everyday expressions of cognitive appraisal are directed at cognitive traits, such as intelligence, wittiness, subtlety, forgetfulness, imaginativeness, and thoughtlessness. Such traits may be construed either as patterns of (verbal o r mental) acts, or as underlying dispositions that give rise to these patterns. As contrasted with acts and traits, we may also appraise cognitive processes. Intellectual achievements and failures are the result of cognitive processes or operations, and individual differences in traits are presumably traceable to individual differences in processes, at some level of specificfiy. I believe that such processes and operations should be the primary objects of epistemological attention. Epistemologists have acknowledged this to the extent that they have focused on procedures of inference. But although inference procedures are an important subclass of mental operations, they (probably) don't exhaust the set. Epistemology should be prepared to assess a wide range of cognitive processes. Within the general class of cognitive processes, several distinctions may be drawn. First, there are conscious versus non-conscious processes. Second, there are macro- versus microprocesses. Third, there are voluntary versus automatic processes. Let us trace these distinctions in turn. Classical epistemology tended to concentrate on conscious mental events. T h e "ideas" and "impressions" of the Empiricists, for example, were clearly conceived of as conscious objects or contents. There would be little controversy among contemporary psychologists, however, that a large proportion if not preponderance of mental operations are non-conscious. Much of the domain of "long-term memory," for example, is in the non-conscious category. Cognitaive psychologists generally believe that facts and episodes are stored in LTM in some sort of complex "network" (see, for example, [18] and [2]), but this network, and operations that underlie it,
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aren't conscious affairs. Still, the network clearly has a crucial impact on intellectual achievements, e.g., in language comprehension and problem-solving. Short-term memory is also important to intellectual output. One of the abilities assessed in I Q tests is the ability to recall a random string of digits in order. In general, children and retardates have smaller digit spans than adults, and there seems to be a high correlation between immediate recall of digit strings and immediate recall of other types of material. Some studies suggest, moreover, that mnemonic techniques such as "rehearsal," "grouping," and "chunking" are strongly associated with immediate recall powers. Individual differences in the employment of these operations may account for individual differences in achievements o r traits.' Now immediate recall power may not be the most important cognitive trait, but it is one of the traits we should be interested in appraising. Furthermore, the propriety of that interest is not affected by fact that many of the elements bearing on this power are non-conscious elements. (Rehersal and chunking are presumably conscious elements, but other aspects and determinants of short-term retention are non-conscious.) The distinction between macro- and micro-processes has some relationship to, but is not identical with, the conscious/ non-conscious distinction. In general, even when an event is conscious, its micro-parts are not. At any rate, we cannot identify these micro-parts by introspective analysis. For example, cognitive psychologists have studied the phenomenon of selective attention with dichotic listening experiments, in which ear-phoned subjects try to attend to a given message received through one ear while a conflicting message is piped into the second ear. (For a survey of these studies, see [21].) T h e focusing o r directing of attention to the primary message is (in some sense) a conscious affair, yet one cannot directly isolate its underlying elements. How does the selection of material take place? Are there "parallel" processes, or only "serial" ones? The nature of our attentional resources is presumably scientifically discoverable, but it isn't open to introspective dissection. Similarly, the exact micro-processes that untrained (or even trained) people use in trying to assess the validity of a syllogism isn't an easy matter to determine (see [9] and [17]). T h e activity is conscious, yet its parts aren't introspectively identifiable. In both cases, though, the micro-
processes are of interest for cognitive appraisal. If there are individual differences in the operations employed, these may significantly affect intellectual outputs. It may be argued that the processes to which I am alluding are not proper subjects of epistemological attention because they are automatic rather than voluntary. The idea would be that epistemology should only concern itself with processes under the cognizer's voluntary control, since epistemology should only be concerned with the voluntary improvement of one's own cognitive performance. This suggestion represents an old tradition in epistemology. Descartes was primarily interested in the improvement of one's own intellectual performance, and this inclined him to focus on processes or states which he regarded as subject to the will. (He thought that belief and suspension of belief are directly subject to the will, though I find that very dubious. See [13] and [14].) This Cartesian approach to epistemology, however, is only one of many possible approaches. As we shall see when we turn to the purposes of cognitive appraisal, improvement or melioration is not the only conceivable purpose. Furthermore, even if improvement is the principal aim of epistemology, it needn't be self-improvement exclusively. If there are ways of our improving someone else's intellectual performance, by influencing micro-operations which he cannot directly control, then that still falls within the general purview of intellectual improvement. Epistemology can be concerned with hetero- as well auto-regulation. This would bring epistemology into closer contact with the psychology of education. Let us turn to a different set of distinctions among cognitive processes. Epistemologists and philosophers of science often talk about an intellectual procedure or state without attention to how it might be psychologically (or physically) realized. Since they are not concerned with details of realization, they ignore the question of realizability. In short, they are simply concerned with logzcally possible cognitive processes. A different orientation for epistemology is to focus exclusively on physically realizable processes. But for certain purposes, even physical realizability may be too inclusive a notion. If one is concerned with appraising cognitive operations of a human cognizer, one may wish to compare these not with allphysically possible, but only humanly possible, operations. A certain se-
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quence of operations may be feasible and useful for a computer but unattainable for a human cognizer, with his fundamentally different hardware. Thus, processes that are systemically possible-i.e., possible relative to the constitutional endowments of a given system-may merit special epistemological attention. The delineation of this class of processes will typically belong to the sciences that study the system in question. Thus, epistemology would have to be linked more closely with such sciences (see [13]). Until now the processes under discussion have been cognitive processes, i.e., processes that are in some sense mental (though not necessarily conscious). However, for some purposes that may well be deemed epistemological, we may be interested in processes that generate cognitive systems with this or that set of constitutional endowments. A prime example here is natural selection, which helps determine which biological systems survive and reproduce. The conceptions of evolutionary epistemology advanced by Karl Popper ([22] and [23]), Donald Campbell ([7]), and W. V. Quine ([26]), are examples of orientations that would make such processes of epistemological concern. (See also [l 11.) Another set of non-mental processes of epistemologica~ interest are the semiotic and institutional processes by which mental contents are communicated (or mis-communicated) among individuals. For purposes of social epistemology, the means and networks of communication need careful appraisal. Also, the processes that generate, sustain, or destroy means and networks of communication are of importance to social epistemology, just as evolution is important to individual epistemology. Given the space-limitations of this paper, however, we had best confine our attention to individual, rather than social, epistemology (with an exception here o r there). T H E PURPOSES OF APPRAISAL
It is time to turn to our second question: "What are the purposes of cognitive appraisal?" At least three possible answers come to mind. First, there is a purely theoretical aim. We may wish to assess the adequacy of processes or mechanisms relative to certain ends o r norms. How well do our perceptual mechanisms operate in detecting ecologically
significant patterns? How well has evolution worked in producing viable innate standards of similarity and unity (cf. [26] and [16])? Theoretical appraisal is not aimed at doing anything about the objects of appraisal; it merely seeks to assess performances o r operations much as a spectator might assess a work of art o r an athletic feat. A second kind of motivation is a design motivation. The computer scientist does notjust study computer systems in the abstract; the proximate or ultimate aim of his study is, typically, the design and construction of systems. He studies possible cognitive procedures as preliminary to the realization of the best of these in some actual system. A third possible aim, noted earlier, is that of melioration. We can study and evaluate cognitive operations with an eye to improving o u r own intellectual habits. Here there is no intention to create new systems, but simply to introduce new techniques o r principles by which to guide our elementary cognitive processes, or to correct for defects in these processes. These disparate aims have a bearing on the kinds of objects it is most suitable to study. In making appraisals of any sort, we typically compare the object under evaluation with other objects, actual or possible. The three different aims naturally give rise to different comparison classes. A purely theoretical motivation would lead one to compare actual cognitive procedures with purely "ideal" ones, i.e., mere logical possibilities. Someone concerned with design, by contrast, would only be concerned with physically possible processes. Finally, if melioration is the aim, the set of processes on which to focus are systemically possible (i.e., humanly possible) processes. This last point needs a slight qualification. Since one way of improving our own cognitive output is to use well-designed computers as "prosthetic" devices, the meliorative aim can indirectly engender an interest in any physically possible, not just humanly possible, pera at ion.^ Epistemologists have usually adopted either the theoretical or the meliorative aim, though they often leave their aims inadequately specified. T h e Cartesian tradition was avowedly meliorative. I do not quarrel with this as a primary aim of epistemology (see [13]). But, as indicated earlier, melioration need not be confined to the ego-orientedness of Cartesianism.
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Secondly, practitioners of the meliorative programme haven't sufficiently stressed how such a programme should heed the constraints of innate information-processing e q ~ i p m e n t . ~ Perhaps this is because detailed scientific attention to such equipment is a relatively recent development. In any case, there is no longer good reason for meliorists to ignore the interface of their programme with the cognitive sciences. T H E DESCRIPTIVE BASES FOR APPRAISAL
This last comment needs some qualification. One reason epistemologists have ignored psychology and the other cognitive sciences is the assumption that the appraisal and choice of cognitive procedures should antecede acceptance of scientific beliefs, and hence must not appeal to any such beliefs. Epistemologists of this stripe have given what might be called a "Minimalist" answer to our third question: "What are the descriptive bases for cognitive appraisal?" Minimalism is the view that principles of belief-formation and belief-avoidance should be based on as little antecedent belief as possible. Since prior beliefs may have been formed by defective processes, the proper course is to suspend all such belief (or as much of it as possible) before choosing belief-forming and beliefavoiding procedures. In choosing intellectual operations, no assumptions should be made about the nature of the actual world or the suitability of our innate cognitive apparatus to cope with it. This a prioristic stance characterizes not only the Cartesian tradition, but also such confirmation theorists as C a r n a p , whose measure-functions a n d confirmationfunctions are intended to be selected on purely formal o r abstract grounds (see [8]). Minimalism has tended to dominate the epistemological scene since Descartes. Whatever one's assessment of the quality of the fruit it has borne until now, it seems unlikely to bear much new fruit in the future. T h e time seems right for new perspectives, if such perspectives are viable. At the other end of the continuum, there is Maximalism, which I endorse. It invites us to employ all our antecedent beliefs whenever we wish to appraise our cognitive methods. A Maximalist argues that there is likely to be little or no basis for choice among methods unless we can employ a prior corpus of belief. And ifsome prior beliefs are allowed, why not
allow them all? Or at least the more confidently held among them, or those arrived at by methods which, until now, we regard as most reliable? Admittedly, the choice of new cognitive procedures might lead us to conclude that some of our original beliefs were false. But the prospect of doxastic revision should be expected on any reasonable methodology. Given the present state of science, we have a rich set of beliefs about the physical world. We have fairly definite notions 'of what properties are exemplified with various frequencies and what sorts of laws govern the world. Though different contingencies arise for different individuals, we have a reasonable idea of many of the contingencies that are likely or unlikely to arise. According to Maximalism, all this information can legitimately be used in commending new cognitive strategies, or appraising the ones we have. If we have innate biases toward certain similarity standards, or toward certain hypotheses about the linguistic data we encounter (as Chomsky suggests), these biases are not to be disparaged as long as they are appropriately linked to the actualities of the world. Maximalism is one feature of Quine's epistemology, and my endorsement of Maximalism is also an endorsement of certain aspects of Quine's conception of epistemology. Maximalism is present in Quine's use of Neurath's boat metaphor: to say that we should re-build our intellectual boat at sea is to say that we should employ our present beliefs in deciding what subsequent changes to make, either in our total corpus of belief or in our cognitive procedures. (Quine is not fully explicit about changes in our cognitive procedure; he focuses more on cognitive content.) However, Quine's conception of "naturalistic epistemology" places much more emphasis on explanation than evaluation or melioration. His formulations frequently characterize naturalistic epistemology as the attempt to explain how homo sapiens come to have their beliefs, especially their scientific beliefs, and why these beliefs are so successful. (See especially [25] and [27].) My emphasis on appraisal departs to this extent from Quine's main concerns. Another point of difference is the f?sychological orientation that is endorsed. Quine works with an unduly restrictive behavioristic psychology, whereas I commend the style and general substance of cognitive psychology, both in terms of its scientific plausibility and in terms of its fruitfulness for
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epistemological purposes (whether theoretical, designoriented, or meliorative). T H E TERMS A N D STANDARDS OF APPRAISAL
Let us turn now to question (4): "What are the terms and standards of appraisal?" It is here, I believe, that Austin's complaint about "constant obsessive repetition" is most germane. In the last twenty-five or thirty years, epistemological discussions have been almost wholly devoted to a handful of terms of appraisal, viz., 'rational', 'justified', and (in the philosophy of science) 'objective'. Another much-discussed term, 'know', has received so much attention partly because it is believed to contain one of these evaluative notions, viz., 'justified', as a component. As indicated earlier, however, there are many trait-terms in ordinary language which have evaluative overtones: 'intelligent', 'plodding', 'imaginative', 'thorough', etc. These suggest all sorts of standards of cognitive appraisal, not obviously equivalent to the foregoing list. Why should epistemology exclude these from its attenti~n?~ I don't mean to imply that epistemology should let everyday terms of appraisal dominate its concerns. While I have myself devoted considerable attention to the verb 'know', I don't believe that analysis of this verb is the sole task of epistemology. On the other hand, I also don't believe that analysis of 'rational' or 'warranted' is the sole task of epistemology. If, as I am here proposing, epistemology is the appraisal of cognition and cognition-related processes, one should be prepared to consider all sorts of new criteria of evaluation that the study of cognition may call to one's attention. For example, one striking thing that emerges in the study of human cognition is how the organism manages to make so many successful judgments and decisions so swiftly. Since speed and efficiency are extremely important from a biological or ecological standpoint, one is motivated to take these standards more seriously than traditional epistemology has done. Cognitive processes that are sub-optimal by certain standards of rationality (e.g., Bayesian standards) may be attractive by standards of efficiency. Given the diversity of terms of cognitive appraisal, we cannot hope to explore the criteria or standards appropriate
to them all. I shall therefore proceed by talking in abstraction from particular terms of assessment. A different question concerning cognitive appraisalespecially if we adopt the meliorative aim-is its degree of prescriptiveness or permissiveness. Should epistemology aim at specification of a single optimal pattern of cognitive processing? Should it "mandate" that pattern for all human cognizers? Even if one thought one could specify such a pattern in considerable detail, such prescriptiveness has its drawbacks. First, innate individual differences are likely to make things messy, since what is optimal for an individual with, say, greater right-hemispheric capacities may not be optimal for an individual with greater left-hemispheric potential. This might be handled by conditionalizing the mandated rules. But apart from this point, considerations of social cognition make it unwise to try to legislate complete uniformity among cognizers. For the social advance of knowledge, a more diverse pool of individual cognitive patterns is likely to be more p r o d ~ c t i v e . ~ Leaving this point, let us consider possible approaches or frameworks for cognitive appraisal. Borrowing from ethical theory, we may distinguish deontological and consequentialist approaches. Consequentialism would rate cognitive processes (process-types) in terms of some set of valued results or outcomes. Deontological approaches would eschew results or outcomes and focus instead on purely formal or intrinsic characteristics of the operations. For reasons I cannot detail here, I doubt that any purely deontological approach is likely to succeed. At best it might explicate a few narrow terms of cognitive appraisal. For most purposes, or the most generic purposes, of cognitive appraisal, we shall want to judge alternative processes by their consequences. One question that arises from consequentialism is this. Should we judge the merits of a cognitive process by the results it would have in the actual world only, o r should we judge it by the results it would have8invarious logzcally possible worlds? T h e latter approach is attractive to Minimalism, since the less information we have, o r are permitted to use, about the properties of the actual world, the more we are forced to consider how the process would fare under various logical possibilities.
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Let me give a concrete example. A great deal of recent psychological work can be interpreted as converging toward the view that people's concepts or mental constructs do not delineate complete "logical spaces," or logically exhaustive sets of alternatives. People's mental representations are skewed toward objects they actually encounter. What they form are prototypes or stereotypes of perceived entities, and their expectations and even percepts are formed in terms of these prototypes. Eleanor Rosch's work ([28]) indicates that the mental representation associated with a semantic item such as 'bird' clusters around a paradigm, central tendency, o r exemplar, such as a robin. Other writers speak of "schemas," "frames," o r "scripts," which are all "central tendency" sorts of notion^.^ T h e literature seems to point to the conclusion that experience is categorized in terms of similarity and dissimilarity relationships to paradigms o r exemplars. Now there are various logically possible worlds in which the use of such constructs would not have good consequences. If there were no tidy natural kinds, this mode of cognitive operation might have less utility than other conceivable operations. But in the actual world, which does (I presume) display significant natural kinds, this mode of operation seems to have excellent consequences. Thus, an "actuality-based" consequentialism would rate this mode highly, while a "logzcal-possibility-based" consequentialism might not. In distinguishing varieties of consequentialism, an even more important feature is the kind of outcomes that are regarded as intrinsically valuable. Two possible views may be mentioned for present purposes. First, a consequentialist might advance a familiar pair of epistemically valuable ends: believing the truth and avoiding error. On this view, cognitive operations are good to the extent that they conduce to these ends. A second form of consequentialism would advance adaptiveness as the intrinsically valuable end. Cognitive operations are good, according to this view, to the extent that they contribute to the satisfaction of the organism's needs. T h e need-satisfaction theory gets impetus from the actual cognitive mechanisms of bioJogica1 systems, e.g., the mechanism of lateral inhibition. Our survival and thriving depend significantly on the ability to discriminate different bodies from one another, and this is greatly facilitated by identification of edges or borders. Lateral inhibition is a
property of the visual system (with analogues in other of the sensory systems) that enhances or exaggerates differences in brightness of adjacent regions (see [29]). Though this gives rise to inaccurate "reports" about brightness, it makes borders or edges of objects more prominent than they would otherwise be, which has the indicated adaptive advantage. In criticism of the need-satisfaction theory, it will be urged that we shouldn't reduce the value of intellectual or cognitive activity to the merely prudential or pragmatic. Doesn't intellectual activity have its own autonomous ends, quite independent of survival and happiness? This sort of consideration bolsters the true-belief-and-error-avoidance theory, or other theories of that ilk. The point might be elaborated as follows. Man has an innate and intrinsic desire to know, to acquire the truth. We are intrinsically curious creatures; our curiosity isn't motivated by ulterior ends, such as survival, health, or happiness. Doesn't it follow that a proper theory of cognitive value should place intrinsic, not merely instrumental, value on truth-acquisition? A defender of the need-satisfaction theory may reply as follows. While we may grant that people have an intrinsic desire for knowledge (or true belief), the existence of that desire doubtless has an evolutionary explanation in terms of adaptiveness. A storehouse of truths about one's environment is of immeasurable value for need-satisfaction. It is therefore a boon to an organism to have a built-in desire to acquire such a storehouse. If each creature had to learn empirically that knowledge is useful for survival, it might be too late. It is more effective to have knowledge-acquisition motivations already programmed in. Thus, the mere fact that we find ourselves with a "manifest" or "immanent" impulse for knowledge is quite compatible with the suggestion that,.at a more fundamental level, the value of knowledge is the satisfaction of needs. T h e two rival approaches may be called Immanentism and Functionalism. Immanentism identifies cognitive value by looking at the conscious desires and motivations that prompt investigatory activities. Functionalism identifies cognitive valus by looking beneath the conscious level, by tracing the biological function or significance of the relevant desires, activities, and operations.
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T h e controversy between cognitive Immanentism and Functionalism has analogues in other domains. Consider sexuality, for example. People clearly have built-in desires, tastes, and preferences for sexual objects and activities. Though these desires doubtless subserve the biological end of reproduction (or the end of pair bonding, as sociobiologists suggest), they are not merely extrinsic desires. Sexual activity is a prime instance of activity carried on "for its own sake." How should these facts affect our appraisals of sexual activity? Should evaluations be geared to the biological (or social) functions that underlie these urges? There is a body of opinion that takes this position. Sexual behavior, on one view, should be governed by its conduciveness to procreation. But the majority opinion among contemporary philosophers, I suspect, is on the side of sexual Immanentism. On the other hand, consider the analogue in the gastronomical domain. Cravings and tastes for food are completely intrinsic, yet they have the obvious function of promoting nourishment and health. When we evaluate gastronomical activity, should we do it in terms of immanent ends or biological function? In this domain, contemporary trends of opinion are more likely to side with Functionalism as opposed to Immanentism. The intrinsic attractiveness of sugary foods is disparaged on grounds of health and fitness. I am uncertain how to resolve the general dispute between Immanentism and Functionalism. Perhaps no resolution is possible; perhaps we can only say that both criteria of appraisal are tenable, that neither overrides the other. This is not very satisfactory, however, especially where moral or social policy issues arise (as they do with respect to the possibility of constraints on scientific investigation, e.g., recombinant DNA research). Obviously, though, these points cannot be pursued here. OVER-INCLUSIVENESS OF T H E CONCEPTION?
This concludes my attempt to survey some alternative epistemological perspectives, and to commend a very broad and inclusive orientation for the pursuit of epistemology. Let me finish with some remarks about an apparent difficulty for my conception. I n broadening the concept of epistemological appraisal, isn't there a danger of making anything that affects
intellectual output a question of epistemology? But is any tip for improving memory a piece of epistemological advice? If ingesting vitamin E improved thought-processes, would that make such ingestion a suitable topic of epistemological appraisal? Notice first that ingesting vitamin E is not a cognitive, i.e., psychological, operation, just an action that has an indirect bearing on intellectual output. T h e interesting question would be how such an action would affect intellectual output, i.e., what psychological changes would it effect. It must conceded, though, that I haven't confined epistemology to the appraisal of psychological processes. However, we can distinguish between fundamental and peripheral matters of cognitive appraisal. T h e most fundamental questions would be ones concerning generic psychological operations, and perhaps only a selected subclass of these operations. I am certainly not committed to the view that all events that bear on intellectual output a r e of equal epistemological interest. It does little harm, therefore, if some intuitively insignificant processes manage to squeeze their way into our epistemological net. Finally, it should be emphasized that not all psychological processes are appropriately appraised along all intellectual dimensions. Processes of encoding and retrieval from LTM, for example, are proper subjects for epistemological appraisal, on my view, but that doesn't mean that they are "rational" or "irrational," "intelligent" or "unintelligent." It remains to be determined what the best terms are for assessing such processes. Indeed, determination of proper terms is part of the task of epistemology, as I conceive it. The situation is analogous to that of social philosophy. It is proper for social philosophy to study and appraise the whole gamut of social institutions. But this doesn't mean it should assess every institution as either "just" o r "unjust." It may decide that certain institutions are neutral with respect to justness. Still, those institutions may be evaluated on other dimensions that fall within social theory, e.g., as efficient or inefficient, as culturally progressi"e o r decadent, etc. Social philosophy should include a wide range of types of appraisal and objects of appraisal (institutions),even if not all objects are proper subjects of all types of appraisal. A similar breadth and comprehensiveness are appropriate, on my view, to epistemology.'
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"The Nature of Natural Knowledge," in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.),Mind [27] , and Language (Oxford: University Press, 1975). [28] Rosch, Eleanor, "Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories;'Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 104(1975): 192-233. [29] Von Bektsy, Georg, Sensory Inhibition (Princeton: University Press, 1967). [30] Wittgenstein, Ludwig,Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953). NOTES '[I91 briefly surveys the relevant literature, though it challenges the view that rehearsal accounts for individual differences among adults. 21 am indebted to Peter Railton for this point. 3Perhaps this remark does an injustice to classical philosophers. Locke, Hume, and Kant were all heavily concerned with the powers and limits of our cognitive faculties, as were Peirce and Dewey. It is arguable that only with the advent of 20th century analytic philosophy, and its sharp distinction between philosophy and science, has epistemology turned away from detailed consideration of o u r cognitive endowments. 4I should mention that, on my view, whether a person knows a given proposition, or hasjmtfied belief, is a matter of the cognitive processes he goes through. Thus, even these traditional foci of epistemological attention are properly viewed as notions that appraise cognitive processes. See [12] and especially [15]. 5This point has been stressed by Feyerabend, in [lo], though he exaggerates it out of proper proportion. %ome of the important psychological literature on these concepts may be found in [4], [5], [I], [20], and [6]. Similar suggestions may be found in Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances" ([30]), Quine's notions of "paradigm" and "foil" ([26]), and Putnam's notion of "stereotypes" ([24]). 'For helpful comments o n an earlier draft of this paper, I am indebted to several of my colleagues, especially Peter Railton and Holly Goldman.
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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge Alvin I. Goldman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 20. (Nov. 18, 1976), pp. 771-791. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819761118%2973%3A20%3C771%3ADAPK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 13
Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition Alvin I. Goldman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 10, Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. (Oct., 1978), pp. 509-523. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28197810%2975%3A10%3C509%3AETRTOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M 16
A Sense of Unity Eli Hirsch The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 9. (Sep., 1978), pp. 470-494. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28197809%2975%3A9%3C470%3AASOU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K
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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge Alvin I. Goldman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 20. (Nov. 18, 1976), pp. 771-791. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819761118%2973%3A20%3C771%3ADAPK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
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