Turkey and the European community

Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts

Ahmet Evin/Geoffrey Denton (Editors) Turkey and the European Community

Ahmet Evin Geoffrey Denton (Editors)

Leske + Budrich, Opladen 1900

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung

Preface

The history of relations between the Europan Community and Turkey has been a sad story, on both sides. Unrealism has been the keynote throughout. What was long overdue by the end of 1987 was to sweep away the past contradictions and tergiversations, and try to make a new start on a more realistic basis. Turkey has now applied formally to resume as a full member of the Community. However, as several chapters of this Report show, there are oni_both si4j^r^tj-eAe.rY3lions a¬ bout membership, unless this were intended to take place only many years ahead. Politically, the ^ r ^ t i œ ^ ^ bg£w6fi11.th€ Commiioj.^-^ ^- -^tl^J?™^dani^^Jby..tiieX^prMS and ^Aegean pr^km^^weenJTurkey and Greece; It beganjo break down already in 1964, and the preach was widened by the events of 1974 in Cyprus, by Greece's subsequent rapid ac- cessJpatpjM and bydie militarytake oyer in Turkey in 1980.. Since 1980 there has been a sW^rocess^of restoration of relations, marked by new elections in November 1983, and a ^ r l ( i ^ . ^ h j B & i ^ o n . p J T ^ k e ^ s ^position in the Council of Europe by 1986, as Turkey ItroveVre-establish its credentials âs a democratic state.-. Economically there were serious complaints on both sides about the working of die Association Agreement. In the Community it was felt that the economic policy of Turkish go- _ vernments prior to 1979 was in contradiction with the purposes of the Agreement. The Turlysh authorities complained that agreements made by th^ Community with other coun¬ tries riuUifiedme a d v ^ TUrkey was supposed tq Je.nve from the Agreement, and the Community countries put obstacles in the way of Turkish exports. An Additional Protocol of 1970, referring to the possibility of full membership by Turkey by 1995, reflected euphoria for a larger Community rather than progress towards political and economic rapprochement. During the 1970s the political situation in Turkey was confused, and there was no serious effort to formulate a policy leading towards membership. This allowed the Community countries to avoid having to contemplate seriously the full political implications of Turkish membership in foreseeable future. Global economic developmejttSr^witlu-RcessiQn and growing protectionism following the OPEC-iriauced oil price shopks of 1973 and 1979 served to intensity the difficulties m economic relations between the E C and Turkey. 1

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081485 CIP-Titelaufhahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Turkey and the European Community/Ahmet Evin; Geoffrey Denton. ~ Opladen: Leske u. Budrich, 1990 Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts) ISBN: 3-8100-0646-7 NE: Evin, Ahmet [Hrsg.] © 1990 by Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, Opiaden Druck und Verarbeitung: Druckpartner Rübeimann, Hemsbach Printed in Germany N

What then of the future of relations between Turkey. and,the.Commum^Ti^yé thejrobi- " guities of the last 25 years to be repeated over the next 25 years? Or should it be accepted^! thâfTûikey will inevitably grow apart from WëstéHBurope,.abandon its European identity, an3 seek its culturai,.poïitiçal arid economic development elsewhere? Not necessarily. There are still opportunities for realistic co-operation and close and friendly relations between the Community and Turkey if the truly common interests are

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sensibly pursued on both sides in an atmosphere of mutual respect and abnegation of unrealiSicTdemands. Politically, and strategically, the common interests of nations that are all members of NATO (except for Ireland) remain as powerful as they have, ever been. The whole European Com­ munity, but above all Greece, has a vim interest in a stable and democratic Turkey remain­ ing attached to the Western Alliance, as a pÙÎàf against the threats of Soviet expansion out ofthe Black Sea, and of Arab and Iranian turmoil in the Middle East. For.TUrkey, the Western European connection remains the ultimate guarantee of freedom toVursuê the democratic way to peace and prosperity. Economically, the logic of the customs union envisaged as long ago as 1963, and specifi­ cally targeted in 1970, remains as strong as ever, on both sides. And here there is at last real hope of progress. The economic strategy pursued by Turkish governments since January 1980 is consistent with the objective of external economic liberalisation; finally, domestic policy is in line with the stated external policy. While 1995 may be too near for the full cus­ toms union to be completed by the original target^datejrcertamly progress could now be made on a new timetable. Assuming that the European Community achieves its current objectives of controlling agricultural spending, re-structuring the budget, reforming the institutions-and completion of theinternal common market, the way would be open on that side for p new dialogue with Turkey^ i f meanwhile the Ôzaj_goyernment has succeeded in c o i i ^ n r u ^ ^ bow fîtes, wîulè" maintaimngthe stability created since 1980, the way will also be opengn the Turkish .side:-An easingôffhTwôrïd* economic crisis could also create more favourable conditions for removing economic irritants.

Regardless of the Turkish application for full membership, the Council of Association, in reviewing Turkey's relations with the Community, could have as its immediate objective the restoration of economic co-operation on a realistic basis covering the customs union, conditions for migrant workers, capital flows and aid to Turkey. If the Community's politi­ cal co-operation machinery could at the same time be brought to bear not only on distant matters such as the Middle East, Afghanistan of Central America, but on other problems closer to home in the Aegean and Cyprus, political as well as economic relations could be put on a new footing. Progress on all these issues, over a period of some years, would create a sound basis for success in negotiations on full membership. This Report was written before Turkey applied for full membership. The intention was to explore the history of Turkey-EC relations, including the Association Agreement. If the E C should respond negatively to the application, the work will not have been wasted. For whether Turkey joins the E C or not, it will not go away, and relations with Turkey, in or out of the Community, will remain important for the member states. This exploration of the va¬ , rious ftspecjts of relations between, Turkey and theJBÇ may therefore be regarded either, as a ctanncltiôn of the issues to be résolve^ m%e^tia'»ng Yugoslavia, a country that had been isolated since the Cominform conflict of 1948 - 49, under the protection of the whole of NATO by means of a military pact with two NATO partners, thus changing the status quo in the Balkans in favour of the West. However, owing to the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and due to newly arising tensions between Greece and Turkey because of Cyprus, the Balkan Pact soon lost its original significance. Reappearance of Antagonism (1955 - 1958) At the end of May 1954 Greek Premier A . Papagos was still praising the stability of the Greek-Turkish friendship: "We believe that the Greek-Turkish friendship cannot be threatened or disturbed by the Cyprus issue." It was only a year later that this unity was shattered. The dispute on the future of Cyprus that was carried on with increasing bitterness had within only a matter of months poisoned the climate between the two allied countries. Cyprus, which during the Berlin Congress in 1878 had been leased to the British Crown by the Ottoman Empire, had been annexed by Great Britain in 1914. Two years later,.after the annexation had been recognised in the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Cyprus was formally made a British Crown Colony in 1925, but had been in a state of continuous ferment since the 1930s. Inspired by nationalism, the Greek Cypriots who made up 78 per cent of the island's population, strove for unification with Greece. However, their battle cry of "Enosis" met with suspicion on the part of and, later on, with resistance by the TurkishCypriot minority who made up 18 per cent of the total population. Though the Greek government had acted with reserve on the occasion of the first great revolt of the Greek-Cypriots against the British Colonial power in 1931, the position of the government in Athens changed after the victory in the civil war in 1949, when the newly elected Archbishop and Ethnarch Makarios became spiritual and political leader of the Greek-Cypriots, and started a new campaign for the right of self-determination for Cyprus. At the beginning of February 1951, Greek Premier S. Venizelos, son of former Premier E . Venizelos, stated before parliament: "I am glad of the opportunity to advise from this official platform the House and the whole Greek nation of the request for a unification of Cyprus with its Greek mother. It is the most fervent wish of both nations, of the Cypriot and the Greek people". With tenacious perseverance the Greek government attempted to bring the Cyprus issue before the United Nations despite Great Britain's resistance. The growing Turkish displeasure with Greece's Cyprus policy became quite obvious during the deliberations of the First Political Committee of the U N on 14 December, 1954. The Turkish delegate pointed out that for historic, ethnic, economic and geographical reasons Cyprus should be considered part of the Anatolian region. When seen from this angle, the Greek-speaking population constituted a minority when compared with the overall population of the Anatolian peninsula. The British delegate indirectly seconded the Turkish desire to be heard as a concerned party by explaining that the present status of Cyprus under the Law of Nations had been laid down with Turkey in the Lausanne Treaty and that it would be quite unthinkable for the Treaty of Lausanne to be changed without Turkish agreement. 23

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The commencement of guerilla warfare by the Greek-Cypriot organisation E O K A under the leadership of the Greek general N . Grivas against the colonial power at the beginning of April 1955, and the failure of a British-Greek-Turkish foreign ministers' conference called by Great Britain in August of the same year, increased the Greek-Turkish antagonism. A bomb attack on the Turkish Consulate,™ Salonika on 5 September, 1955, in the course of which the house where Ataturjt-wts^iorn was damaged, increased the gravity of the situation. The next day saw anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir during the course of which some 600 persons were injured. Thereupon the government in Athens withdrew the Greek personnel from NATO Headquarters in Izmir, thus creating a precedent of suspending obligations to the alliance, a method that was to be frequently used in the coming decades as a means of political pressure. In the highly emotional atmosphere of those September days, there was imminent danger of war between Greece and Turkey for the first time since the great conflict of 1919 - 1922. The situation eased slightly only when, on 10 September, 1955, Turkish Minister of the Interior, N . Gedik, resigned, and two days later an official apology from the Turkish government arrived in Athens. 2 6

On Cyprus, however, the underground fighting against the colonial power continued, increasingly involving the Turkish Cypriot minority as well. At the beginning of 1957, the Turkish Cypriot underground organisation T M T was established. Their retaliatory acts towards those Cypriot Turks who supposedly or actually collaborated with the colonial power were no less cruel or brutal than those of the Greek-Cypriot underground fighters. A r med conflicts in Limassol, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on 14 June, 1958 reached civil war proportions and illustrated clearly that the original dispute between Greece and Great Britain had long since escalated into a new Greek-Turkish conflict. In the summer of 1958 an early solution seemed hopeless: Turkey countered the Greek demand for "Enosis" with the uncompromising formula of division, "Taksim". 27

Rapproachement and Willingness to Reach a Compromise (1959 - 1962) It is due to the intensive efforts at reconciliation on the part of the controlling power of the Western Alliance that within only a matter of months after the crisis came to a head, British-Greek-Turkish negotiations could again be taken up on the occasion of the annual NATO Council of Ministers meeting. The results of these negotiations foreshadowed the subsequent compromise reached at the end of 1958: Greece would abandon the Enosis idea, and Turkey, the division of the island. Great Britain was to give the colony independence but would have the right to operate two military bases on the island, in order to keep its strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. On Cyprus itself, the rights of the minority were to be protected by means of a well-contrived proportion^ representation system. Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, as guarantor powers, were to safeguard^ the status quo thus outlined. After further intensive preliminary talks, joined later by Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives, a skeleton agreement, which became known as the "London Agreement", was reached on 19 February, 1959. However, another year and a half were to pass before all controversial items were to be settled, and, finally, on 16 August, 1960, the independence of Cyprus was formally proclaimed. . 28

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At this time a further step was taken almost simultaneously by both Greece and Turkey toward closer connections with Europe when only a few months previously a rapproachement between them could hardly have been envisaged. On 8 June, 1959 the Greek govern106

ment applied for association with the European Economic Community (EEC). On 27 July, 1959 the foreign ministers of the E E C unanimously accepted this application. Six days later the Turkish government also made an application for association. There is no doubt that it was the Greek application which to a large extent prompted the Turkish government to take this step, in order to make sure that entry into the European Community would not be missed and Turkey not fall behind Greece. In view of the overriding political aspects, the Turkish application was also accepted although with reservations. If the Association Agreement with Greece already materialised after two years of negotiations on 9 July, 1961, , negotiations with Turkey had to be continued for considerably longer, owing to the difficulties caused by economic as well as internal political conditions in Turkey with the violent overthrow of the Menderes government at the end of May 1960. The Association Agreement was only signed on 12 September, 1963. The Association Agreements gave both countries the option of full membership after a flexible transitional period without legally binding promises to admit them as members. Even this open option was exceptional, one which was not contained in later similar agreements of the E C with other Mediterranean countries. In the summer of 1962 it actually seemed as if Greek-Turkish relations had settled down to what they had been between the wars or during the first post-war years, influenced by fears of external threat. The visit by the Greek Foreign Minister E . Averoff to Turkey at the beginning of August 1962 was considered a gesture of reconciliation between the two states. Averoff and his Turkish counterpart, F C . Erkin, agreed on all international and bilateral issues. The final communique of 5 August, 1962 referred to a "great cordiality in the exchange of views" and stated the desire on both sides to increase cultural, artistic and scientific co-operation. However, in less than a year the reconciliation that took so much effort to achieve was shattered, ruining the chance for hopeful and constructive attempts towards the solution of the Cyprus issue. 30

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Relapse into Enmity (1963 - 1976) The difficulty of maintaining the formula for Cyprus became apparent in the course of a new crisis in 1963 - 64. The carefully devised proportional representation system of the 1960 constitution which included extensive rights of veto for the Turkish-Cypriot minority, could only function as long as both ethnic groups were willing to co-operate and reciprocal mistrust was reduced. On the contrary, problems were compounded. By 1962 all administrative and governmental activity was increasingly burdened by numerous disagreements, particularly about tax and finance legislation, but also about separate local government. The Turkish-Cypriot minority kept insisting on fully using the rights conceded to them in the constitution. When finally, on 30 November, 1963, President Makarios submitted to his Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President F. Küçük constitutional changes that considerably restricted the vested rights of the minority, these were rejected by the Turkish-Cypriots as well as the Turkish government, thus leading to an explosive state of tension. Transgressions that clearly originated from the Greek side escalated into civil war, into which the Greek and Turkish contingents stationed on Cyprus according to the provisions of the London Agreement were threatened to be drawn. With the aid of Great Britain, one of the gua34

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rantor powers,^ precarious cease-fire was reached on 30 December, 1963, but a BritishGreek-Turkish conciliation conference held in London in mid-January 1964, to which representatives of the ethnic groups were also invited, failed to bring the parties any nearer to an agreement. The arrival of a U N peace force in March 1964 had only a negligible effect in diffusing tension on the island. When in the early spring of 1964 fighting between the ethnic groups flared up again, the Turkish government threatened to invade Cyprus. The realisation of this threk would probably have triggered a war between Greece and Turkey, particularly since thrGreek government had repeatedly assured President Makarios of assistance in the ever/of a Turkish attack. It was due solely to massive diplomatic intervention on the part of the United States that the Turkish government was dissuaded from carrying out its plan and that the scenario to be enacted a decade later was prevented. 36

The development towards a division of the island, however, could not be reversed. Provoked by an effective economic blockade on the part of the Greek-Cypriots, the TurkishCypriot minority was isolated into enclaves. The precarious cease-fire, kept up over the subsequent years with difficulty by the UN-peace force, was used to advantage by both sides to arm with the aid of the respective "mother countries" so as to be prepared for the next round. / Only a few weeks after a pitiful attempt at clearing up the Greek-Turkish differences at a summit meeting in mid-November 1967, direct armed conflict between the two NATOpartners became imminent. On 15 November, 1967 a unit of the Greek National Guard under the command of General Grivas attacked two Turkish Cypriot villages with armoured cars, mortars and field artillery, completely destroying them. Thereupon, the Ankara government mobilized the Turkish fleet and prepared for the invasion of the island. The West considered the situation so explosive that, independent from one another, three intermediaries initiated efforts to resolve the conflict: J. Rolz-Bennet as personal representative of U N General Secretary U Thant, NATO Secretary General M . Brosio and, as personal representative of the President of the United States, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, C. Vance. It was particularly owing to Vance's skill in negotiating that finally an agreement between Greece and Turkey could be reached, the most important results of which were: the Greek National Guard contingent, which over the past years had increased to more than 6,000 men, was to be reduced to 950, the figure set down in the London Agreement of 1959; General Grivas was to resign his command and leave the island; and all Turkish Cypriots who had been affected by Greek attacks were to be fully compensated. This crisis unmistakably resulted in a Greek setback. 37

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As a result of this setback, the military junta in Athens, which had been in power since 21 April, 1967, was in no way dissuaded from pursuing "Enosis" with all available means. Since President Makarios was increasingly opposed to this adventurous policy and sought Cyprus' well-being in strict neutrality, he came to be an annoying obstacle for the Greek military junta. The Turkish Foreign-Minister's warning of 19 March, 1970, that in the event of a coup on Cyprus Turkish intervention would be forthcoming, was prophetic. Obviously, the Greek side did not take it seriously. The simmering conflict between Athens and Nicosia finally culminated in the putsch against Makarios on 15 July, 1974. ' Once again the NATO partners in the Eastern Mediterranean came to the brink of war. After the landing of the Turkish invasion forces on 20 July, 1974 on Cyprus, fighting between the armed forces of both states was already under

way. If the Turkish invasion and the conquest of the bridgehead on Cyprus might still be argued to be the wish of a guarantor power to re-establish the status quo, the pointedly provocative breaking-off of British-Greek-Turkish negotiations in Geneva, the renewed advance starting on 16 August, 1974 and the occupation of 38 percent of the island by Turkey, pointed to a coolly calculated strategy with the aim of taking advantage of the opportunity and to carry out the division of Cyprus, which had been a goal for four decades. The circumstances that were created in the summer of 1974 have remained valid to date. The effect of the 1974 Cyprus crisis on Greek-Turkish relations can only be called catastrophic, certainly as far as the Greek side is concerned. It resulted in a national crisis of consciousness due to the misery of the 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees from the Turkishoccupied north, whose impotence was considered to be humiliation, caused by the irresponsible policies of the military dictatorship which was in the meantime overthrown. Amongst a large proportion of the Greek population, feelings of hate towards the USA, accused of not having prevented the Turkish invasion, were mixed with revived fears of the Turks who were superior in number. The danger from the East became, once again, the main threat for the whole nation. The events on Cyprus inevitably aggravated the bilateral controversies that already strained the Greek-Turkish relations, particularly the issues of control over the Aegean air space, the delimitation of territorial waters and the controversy on the exploitation of the continental shelf. The increasing gravity of the disputes concerning the prospecting licence for the Aegean sea-bed was already apparent at the end of May 1974, when a Turkish research vessel, accompanied by 32 Turkish warships, undertook exploratory drilling in the area around Lesbos, an area laid claim to by Greece. Tensions reached a dramatic high when in the summer of 1976, exploratory work was once again taken up by the Turks in the northern Aegean Sea, extending to the continental shelf claimed by Greece. There is much to be said for the foresight of Greek Prime Minister K . Karamanlis, acclaimed saviour of the nation after his return from exile in Paris in 1974, in preventing the dispute from further escalating. Karamanlis, who pursued moderate policies both domestically and internationally, agreed to taking up negotiations with Turkish government representatives after recourse to the U N Security Council, as well as the International Court of Justice in The Hague after both of these attempts proved to be unproductive. The expert talks in Bern ended on 11 January, 1976 with the result that negotiations were to take place "in a candid, profound manner and led by goodwill" on an agreement regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries with the promise "to refrain from all initiatives or actions in the mutual relations that might discredit the other party". The so-called Bern Protocol was a sign of hope that henceforth the phase of rigid confrontation could be overcome in favour of a series of flexibly conducted negotiations on ail controversial issues regarding Greece and Turkey. 42

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Negative Stability (1976 -1987)

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This subtitle points to the fact that, since 1976, neither a great crisis has occurred between Greece and Turkey, nor has a break-through been reached as far as bilateral relations or the Cyprus issue are concerned. However, beyond the Bern Protocol of 11 November, 1976, 109

there was at least progress towards the normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations which had reached a low point in 1974. It is worth mentioning the resumption on 22 November, 1976 of telephone communications between the high commands of the Greek and Turkish A i r Force, which had ceased in 1974; the agreement on 23 February, 1980 concerning the clearance of airspace over the Aegean for civil a c t i o n which had been closed by Greece in 1974; the resumption of direct air links betweenGreece and Turkey as well as the re-opening on 14 July, 1980 of the ferry service between Rhodes and Marmaris; and finally, the return on 20 October, 1980 of Greece into the NATO military command structure, after an absence of six years. 46

The crucial change in the domestic Turkish situation during this period, namely a military coup in 12 September, 1980, had initially, no negative effect on Greek-Turkish relations. On 12 March, 1981 it was still possible for Greek Foreign Minister K . Mitsotakis to state in a press conference that the atmosphere between the two countries had improved considerably. However, the change of government in Greece shortly afterwards, with the election victory on 18 October, 1981 of the PASOK under the leadership of A . Papandreou was to become an obstacle to the emerging rapprochement. The first external repercussions of the new socialist government were felt during the meeting of the NATO Council of M i n isters in Brussels at the beginning of December 1981. Papandreou demanded from NATO a formal guarantee for his country against possible attacks by Greece's ally, Turkey.. This demand, with which the allies did not comply, was bound to poison relations between Greece and Turkey. Papandreou's propagandistically much-exploited .visit to Cyprus at the end of February 1982, the first visit by a Greek Prime Minister in office ever since the founding of the Republic, also seemed to be a provocation, particularly since Papandreou\ in his speeches on the island, maintained an insultingly radical tone. In March 1982, the old disputes flared up again over the apparent violation of airspace and delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean. During press conferences, Papandreou and Turkish Prime M i n ister B. Ulusu launched heavy attacks on each other. At the end of March 1982, the Turkish Prime Minister responded to Papandreou's visit by going to the Turkish-occupied northern part of the island, an event condemned in Athens as a major provocation. 47

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It has been said that Papandreou was a practical politician and, indeed, his signing of the Standstill Agreement with Turkey on 23 July, 1982 points to the fact that this assessment is correct. However, there still remains the question of whether it might not be irresponsible to provoke and rekindle deeply rooted hostilities that may take a long time to be overcome. The Standstill Agreement did not last long. On 6 November, 1982, the Greek Government cancelled the extensive NATO manoeuvre 'Apex Express 82" because of Turkish objections to include the island of Lemnos, 60 km north of the Dardanelles, which had been demilitarised in 1923 according to the provisions of the Lausanne Conference. Only a little later Athens postponed indefinitely the agreed Greek-Turkish negotiations on pending bilateral issues. 51

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During a press conference on 21 January 1983 Turkish Prime Minister Ulusu found that his country's relations with Greece remained at a low. incidentally, Turkey was prepared to negotiate without pre-conditions. At the same time however, he cautioned the Greek government not to change the balance in the Aegean Sea. Thus it was, in August 1983, that a slight easing of tensions was again felt, after Creek and Turkish government representatives had agreed to negotiate on disputed issues in 1984. The European Community's 54

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hope that this progress was a step towards overcoming the deadlock in relations between the two states turned to disappointment after the proclamation of the Republic of Northern Cyprus and the decision on the part of the Greek government to freeze talks with the Turkish government on all levels. The Ozal government did indeed try to ease the strained relations with Greece even if controversial issues remained outstanding. The unilateral suspension of visa requirements for Greek nationals can be regarded as a gesture of good will. At the beginning of August 1984, Prime Minister Ozal surprised the public by a proposal that Turkey could deliver electricity to the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean at concessionary rates. The Turkish offer of increasing economic co-operation was indignantly rejected by Greece. At a private meeting on the occasion of an international business leaders' meeting in Davos on 1 February, 1986, the two Prime Ministers, Ozal and Papandreou, failed to come any closer to resolving their differences. Papandreou again adhered to his point of view in a letter addressed to the governments of the eleven E C members, before the beginning of the E C Summit Meeting at the end of June 1986, that the Community should not be allowed to activate its relations with Ankara while Turkey maintained a "policy of menace and increasing aggresion" towards Greece, keeping one part of Cyprus occupied, and maintaining an internal regime that was to be regarded as oppressive. 56

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Regardless of the negative stability with some variations in Greek-Turkish relations between 1976 - 1987, there has been a change in the status quo, the effects of which are significant to Greek-Turkish relations: namely, the full membership of Greece in the European Community since 1 January, 1981. During the years of military dictatatorship (1967 1974) relations between the Community and Greece were to a great extent frozen, while the association with Turkey was stressed, and despite considerable doubts about economic matters, an Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement was signed on 23 November, 1970*. Greece's return to democracy in 1974 led to a revival of relations between Greece and the European Community. On 12 June, 1975, keenly supported by France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Greek government applied for full membership of the EC. The fact that this move was partially based on security considerations becomes apparent in a statement by the Greek Ambassador in Brussels, S. Stathatos, who in 1978 clearly expressed his expectation that the E C would intervene in the event of a Greek-Turkish conflict. 61

The Turkish government on its part felt uneasy. It saw the balance of both countries, in relation to the EC, shifting in favour of Greece and, moreover, feared that the countries in the European Community might give up their hitherto neutral status with regard to the Greek-Turkish disputes, and, from a feeling of solidarity for the new full member, might lean more toward Greece. The Turkish government was also dissatisfied that the Turkish status, as associate member, was increasingly being devalued by numerous co-operation agreements of the E C with other non-member countries, especially with those bordering on the Mediterranean. The southern Enlargement of the E C has become an item of constant worry to the Turkish side. Although the way to full membership for Greece considerably strained relations between the E C and Turkey, the Turkish government has held on to the option of full membership despite their occasionally diminished enthusiasm. In this context can be mentioned the resolution of the Association Council E C - Turkey, of 1 July, 1980, which called for revitalisa¬ tion and development of relations at the insistence of Turkey. 62

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However, the close co-operation called for had to wait, since relations between the E C and Turkey were largely frozen after 12 September, 1980. The reserved rapprochement between the Community and Turkey on economic and political issuefe^fias already been treated elsewhere in this book. It remains to be seen how the relationship between Turkey and the E C will develop under the new government of T. Ozal, which became increasingly self-conscious after the EC-Commission rejected the freedom of movement to Turkish workers in the Community which was supposed to come into force on 1 December, 1986. . This means that the Association Agreement of 1963, including the Additional Protocol of 1970 have not been honoured. The consequences of renewed aggravation of the situation on Cyprus owing to the proclamation of independence of the northern Turkishoccupied part of the island on 15 November, 1983 must under no circumstances be underestimated. It cannot be ruled out that Greece might try to force a^uniform E C policy towards Cyprus in the wake of Turkey's application for full membership in the European Community, made at the beginning of 1987. The E C will have to be prepared for this possibility. Certain aspects, however, actually point to the fact that this important issue has not yet been worked into a uniform strategy in Brussels. 65

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The EC's Position Regarding the Graeco — Turkish Conflict (1974 -1987)

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Until the introduction of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1973 — which was an attempt to co-ordinate better the foreign policy programme practised by the E C member countries — a Community Foreign Policy Programme, as it were, did not exist. With regard to Greece and Turkey, however, the member countries have always pursued a mutually agreed policy of well-balanced, benevolent neutrality (with the exception of a few, insignificant nuances), but a policy which could not permanently satisfy either of the feuding NATO partners. A first attempt to establish the EC's increased political significance so as to present it as a mediating body, took place during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. This attempt was a complete failure. The decisive lines of communication passed through NATO channels but, above all, through the U S A during the crucial days. The incumbent President of the E C Council of Ministers, V. Giscard d'Estaing, was unable to conceal the deep disappointment over the failure of his mediation efforts. 68

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From then on the E C limited itself to voicing general encouragement in settling bilateral disputes through negotiation. The Cyprus issue was to be settled through the continuation of discussions between ethnic groups as well. The European Community therefore maintained its role as neutral observer. The accusation, "Europe does not lift a finger", cannot be totally contradicted. In any case it would hardly be possible, to continue a policy of well meant neutrality — a policy which was made more difficult by Greece's accession to the Community on 1 January, 1981 — now that Turkey has submitted an application for full membership of the Community. It is not the purpose of this essay to reflect, in detail, upon whether or not Turkey — as an Islamic, developing country — actually does "belong to Europe". This has been stated repeatedly since the well-known speech by the Commission President, W. Hallstein, on the occasion of the signing of the Association Agreement with Turkey on 12 September, 1963, but it has been stated with considerably\Iess emphasis in the past years. At this point, the question may arise as to whether it seems bizarre that the European Political 71

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Union now being pursued — a corresponding resolution by the European Parliament of 15 September, 1983 reaffirms this expressly — is supposed to extend to the Elbe in Europe but reach all the way to Ararat in Asia? There is something to be said particularly from a long-term political perspective, for granting Turkey a privileged status, including working within the range of the E C instead of full membership. Such an option may be more likely to serve Turkey's long-term interests. No matter how the E C decides on a Turkish membership application, the Graeco-Turkish conflict would, in any case, remain a challenge for the Community. A positive response to an application by Turkey would very likely increase the necessity for a rapid solution of this issue. The prospect of having two disputing E C members block the European integration process in all of the Community's institutions — a process which is, in itself, burdened by numerous difficulties — would become very concrete. On the other hand, one can hardly agree to accept Turkey as a full member only on the condition that it suggest some type of solution to the conflict, since Greece was accepted into the Community on no conditions. In view of the dangers which can arise for European integration as a whole from the Graeco-Turkish conflict, the E C will, nevertheless, have to awaken from its conflict-shy passivity. It must use its influence more decisively than ever before so as to tactfully, yet persistently, reinforce any reciprocating will to compromise through discreet channels, pointing out the fact that there are superordinated, mutual interests. The full member, Greece, which is generally much better off economically and politically than Turkey — even considering Turkey's increased stability — should be advised to reduce its "mare nostrum" claim in the Aegean Sea, and to the Cyprus issue there should be increased recognition of reality although this is bound to be painful. Reinforcement of the status quo through the proclamation of the Republic of "Northern Cyprus" demonstrates, once again, that time is working against Greek Cypriots. Senseless insistence on justified legal status does not provide for long-lasting peace. On the other hand the rapid withdrawal of all Turkish troups from northern Cyprus — polemically called "Turkish Afghanistan" by Papalekas — appears to be indispensible. Such a gesture from the Turkish side would be a decisive initial step for an eventual solution by negotiation. It must be conceded, however, that the extraordinarily high level of psychological burden from the past, and the boundless mistrust in both countries as well as amongst ethnic groups on Cyprus, make a speedy understanding seem nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the E C will have to put forth more effort than before to contribute to the overcoming of the Graeco-Turkish "traditional enmity" on behalf of the Community's own, well understood, self-interest. Should a reconciliation be brought about, this would not only mean that a dangerous trouble spot in the eastern Mediterranean were defused but would, furthermore, be the required evidence — beneficial to European integration — of the EC's ability to act on foreign policy issues. In any case it would be distressing should future historians be forced to speak of a European failure to provide assistance towards a solution of this problem. 74

75

76

77

78

79

Notes 1

PASOK — Paneliiniko Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement).

2 3 4

Le Monde, 24 March ¡983. Neue Züricher Zeitung, I April 1983, below referred to as: NZZ. Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 September 1983.

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5 6 7

Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 August 1984. Ta Nea, 25 Apriİ 1986 Basic formulations of the problems on this subject: H . Gsänger, Türkei-Europäische Gemeinschaft; Nationale Entwicklungspolitik und Annäherungsprozeß (Berini: Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklung­ spolitik, 1978); W. Gumpe!, ed., Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die EG. Möglichkeiten und Probleme einer Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. (Munich, .j&enna, 1979); Th. Kampffmeyer, Entwicklungsperspektiven der türkischen Außenwirtschafts-beziefnmgen — Konsequen­ zenftirdie westlichen Partnerländer (Berlin, Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklyfigspolätik, 1982); Th.D. Zotschew; "Die Türkei und die Europäische Gemeinschaft", in K.D. Grothusen, ed., Die Türkei in Europa (Göttingen, 1979), pp. 199 - 227. 8 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 September 1983, below referred to as SZ. 9 NZZ, 12 May 1984. 10 The Guardian, 16 September 1986. 11 League of Nations. Treaty Series 28.1924, Doc. 701-708, below referred to as: LoNTS. 12 LoNTS. 32.1925. Doc. 807. 13 LoNTS. 125.1931 - 1932. Doc. 2841. 14 LoNTS. 156.1934 - 1935. Doc. 3600. 15 LoNTS. 158.1934. Doc. 3514. 16 For a graphic map regarding the Soviet demands to Turkey seeB.R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War İn the Near East (Princeton, 1980), p.189. 17 J,C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II (New York, 1972), pp. 273 - 275. 18 C M . Woodhouse, "The Problem of Cyprus", in Iñdiana Social Studies Quarterly 32 (1979), pp. 111-112. 19 K.D. Grothusen, "Außenpolitik", in K,D. Grodthusen, ed., Südosteuropa-Handbuch: Vol IV: Türkei (Göttingen, 1984). 20 Protocol on the Entry of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty, dated 15 February 1952, in the United Nations Treaty Series. 126.1952. Doc. 541, (below referred to as UNTS). 21 Resmî Gazete, 23 May Í953: UNTS 167.1953. Doc. 2199. 22 Resmî Gazete, 23 February 1955; UNTS.211.1955. Doc. 2855. 23 To Vima, 30 May 1954. 24 L . Dischler, Die Zypernfrage, Doc. 33. (Frankfurt a . M . , Berlin, 1960), p. 28. 25 L . Dischler, pp. 30 - 31. 26 E O K A = Ethniki Organismos Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). 27 T M T = Türk Müdafaa Teşkilâtı (Turkish Defence Organisation). 28 N . M . Ertekün, In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement (Nicosia, 1981), pp. 129 - 149. 29 For the text of the complete system of the contract constituting the Republic of Cyprus refer to: UNTS. 382.1960. Doc. 5475,5476; UNTS. 397.1961. Doc. 5712. 30 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1963), p. 294, below referred to as: Abl. 31 Abl, 1964. p. 3687. 32 R. Morawitz, "Die Auswirkungen der Süderweiterung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf das Mittel­ meerbecken", in Europe-Archives 35 (1980), p, 188. 33 NZZ, 6.8.1962. 34' The text was printed in Ertekün, p. 175. ^ 35 N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London, 1978), p. 366. 36 The decisive letter by American President L . B . Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister I. inönü of 5 June 1964 and Inönü's reply to Johnson of 14 June 1964, expressing deep regret was printed in F.A. Valí, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, 1972), pp. 309 - 324. 37 P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, I960 -1980 (London, 1980), p. 8. 38 Crawshaw, p. 372. 39 L . Stern, The Wrong Horse (New York, Toronto, 1977), pp. 53 - 54. 40 Crawshaw, p. 382. >, 41 On this subject a recent research contribution is H. Nowacki, Der Zypernkrieg 1974; Eine Analyse sei-

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ner Ursachen. (Phil. Diss., Hamburg, 1982). 42 With regard to the dispute on the Aegean Sea, cf. A . Wilson, The Aegean Dispute (London: The Inter­ national institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), Adelphi Papers 155; also, from the Marxist point of view cf..P. Terz, "Zu völkerrechtlichen Hauptproblemen des Ägäis-Konfükts zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei", in Deutsche Außenpolitik 23 (1978), pp. 113 - 118; specifically regarding the air space issue see Ch.Z. Sanzanidis, "The Greco-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Airspace", in Hellenic Review of International Relations 1 (no. 1, 1980), pp. 87 - 122. 43 Those regions öf the Aegean continental shelf claimed by Turkey for the allocation of licences for re­ search and exploitation are set out in Resmî Gazete, 1 November 1973, 18 July 1974. 44 For a similar assessment by the Karamanlis Government refer to N . Kohlhasse, "Der griechisch­ türkische Konflikt in der Sicht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft", in Europe Archives 36 (1986), p. 161. 45 The official text of the Bern Protocol is printed in Turkish Foreign Policy Report, No. 18. (Ankara, 1977), pp. 46 - 47. 46 On the course of the lengthy and difficult negotiations between the NATO and Greece regarding Greece's military re-integration into the Western Alliance, refer to R. Meinardus, "Griechenlands ge­ störtes Verhältnis zur NATO", in Europe Archives 37 (1982), pp. 105 - 114. 47 Le Monde, 14 March 1981. 48 Cf. Papandreou's speech before the Cypriot Chamber of Deputies on 28 February 1982, published in Public Inforamtion Office: House of Representatives. Press Release No. 41 (Nicosia, 28.2.1982). 49 NZZ, 16 March 1982; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 March 1982, (below referred to as: FAZ). 50 FAZ, 21 May 1982. 51 D. Schlegel, "Papandreou — ein Mehr an Berechenbarkeit", in Außenpolitik 33 (1982), pp. 406,, 422. 52 NZZ, 25/26 July 1982. 53 FAZ, 25 November 1982. 54 NZZ, 22 January 1983. 55 FAZ, 8 August 1983. 56 SZ, 18 November 1983. 57 Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 August 1984. 58 NZZ, 2 February 1986. 59 NZZ, 21 June 1986. 60 Abi L . 293, 29 December 1972. 61 Le Monde Diplomatique, October, 1978. 62 H . Kramer, Die Türkei: Gefährdeter Partner der westlichen Allianz: Ansatzpunkte ßr Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und sicherheitspolitischen Stabilisierung (Ebenhausen, 1981), pp. 115, 125ff.; also cf. W. Gumpel, "Türkei und Europäische Gemeinschaft". 63 Cf. with Turkish Foreign Minister LS ÇağlayangiPs argument in: "Die Türkei und die Europäische Gemeinschaft: Probleme und Anliegen im Hinblick auf die Süderweiterung", Europe Archives 32 (1977), pp. 753 - 759. 64 Kramer, p. 125. 65 FAZ, 11 December 1986. 66 Cf. interview with the Turkish Prime Minister T. Özal in Der Spiegel 12 (1987), pp. 165 - 169. Özal unreservedly pointed to increasing the Greek-Turkish tensions in the event that Turkey's accession to the E C is delayed. 67 W. Gumpel, "Die Türkei vor den Toren der Gemeinschaft", FAZ, 19 March 1986. 68 Eg. B. Beutler, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft: Rechtsordnung und Politik (Baden-Baden, 1979), pp. 416 - 417. 69 P. Tsakaioyannis, "The European Community and the Greek-Turkish Dispute", in Journal of Common Market Studies 19 (no. 1, 1980), 36 - 39. 70 Le Monde, 28 August 1974. 71 H . Rumpf, "Zypern als internationaler Modell-Konflikt", in Außenpolitik 32 (1981), p. 182. 72 K. Liebe, "Das Zypernproblem —- eine europäische Frage", in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 20 (no. I, 1980), p. 43. 73 E.E.C. Information, Memo no. 8667/X/63-E, (Ankara, 12 September 1963).

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74 75 76 77

JVZZ, 16 September 1983. Die Umrisse eines denkbaren Sonderstatus, cf. Kampffmeyer, pp. 19-22. NZZ, 3 October 1986. W. Höpker, "Die gefährdete Südostflanke: Griechenland und die Türkei im Widerstreit", in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 3 -4 (1982), p. 98. . 78 J.Chr. Papalekas, "Geteiltes Zypern: Eine Herausforderung für den Westen", in SudoefeuropaMitteilungen 3 - 4 (1982), p. 121. T . 79 Cf. the interesting contribution by E . Turczynski, "Der Zypernkonflikt als Problem der r^ltionalismusforschung", in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 23 (1983), pp. 30 - 37.

Chapter 7 Uaurizio Cremasco

The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the European Community*

Introduction An analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community presents special methodological and substantive difficulties. The European Community as an institution has no duty or responsibility to confront and deal with defense and security problems. The organization through which the European countries handle defense-related issues — strategy and tactics, doctrine and operational use of force, technical and logistical integration and standardization of armaments — is the Atlantic Alliance, of which Turkey has been a member since 1952. Not all the European countries which are members of the Atlantic Alliance are members of the European Community. Nor is the United States, which nevertheless plays a decisive role in Turkey's security. Notwithstanding the initiatives, the proposals and the indications that certain member countries are more aware of and willing to tackle the problem — the Colombo-Genscher document is a prime example — as things stand today the prospect of extending the Community's sphere of competence to include foreign policy and defense issues appears rather unrealistic and hardly realizable in the near or medium term. It is therefore difficult, and many might say incorrect, to link Europe's security problems to the political and economic issues connected with an enlargement of the Community. But the case of Turkey is emblematic of how it is just as difficult to draw a sharp line between the two series of problems because of the complexity of the interrelations and interactions which exist between political, economic and security factors. The Turkish case is emblematic for a number of other reasons too: the country's geographical position; its importance for the defense of NATO's southeastern flank and the Mediterranean theater in general; its intractable political, social and economic situation; and the important place held by Europe in the context of Turkey's foreign policy. Over the past twenty years the often dramatic evolution of Turkey's socio-political situation, the 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises, the international events in the Middle East and southeast Asia have prompted Turkey to gradually review and redefine the basic parameters of its foreign policy. The revival of Islamism, which has deep roots in the country, and Turkey's heavy dependence on external sources of energy have lent new significance and new impulse to relations with the Arab world. A measure of disillusionment in its relations with *

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This analysis, presented to the study Group, was published earlier in International Spectator 18 (nos. 1-2, 1983), pp. 47-61.

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the United States has given rise to a more articulate and diversified policy toward the Eastern bloc, though one still conditioned by the awareness, sharpened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, that the Soviet Union remains the highest potential risk factor in the Turkish security picture. Turkey's difficult relations with the Arab world (combined with the conscious rediscovery of the country's oriental roots) have raised questions as $p whether it is opportune to continue to pursue the traditional path of westernization and as to the feasibility Of a more "nationalistic" policy with a mainly regional projection and ob'i jectives. In many respects, the issue of the Community's Enlargement, especially after the accession of Greece, has become for Turkey a crucial test of the validity of its ties with the West, a touchstone of the effective willingness of the European countries to consider and accept Turkey, without reservations, as a truly "European" country. It is in this context that the security and defense issues enter into play: in the context of Turkey's perceptions of the importance of its political and economic ties with Europe in relation to its national security, and the Europeans' reciprocal perceptions. Hence, as a factor that will ultimately influence, directly or indirectly, choices whose content is basically political and economic. This analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community is therefore addressed to answering two closely interrelated questions. If, how and to what extent the problem of Turkey's accession to the E C might affect relations between Ankara and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. If, how, and to what extent the E C membership issue, as long as it is not resolved in terms acceptable to the Turkish government and public opinion, might prompt Turkey's government and public opinion to redefine, loosen or break its NATO ties, thus opening a dangerous gap in the fabric of European security and consequently in its defense capabilities. Obviously, the problem is not exclusively military. It is not only a matter of assessing the strategic and tactical advantages of having Turkey as a member of NATO in the event of an East-West conflict, as opposed to the disadvantages of a neutral or pro-Soviet Turkey (if the latter is a sustainable hypothesis). Nor is it simply a question of evaluating the military role Turkey might play in extra-NATO crises in which vital European interests are threatened. The political dimension of security is just as important in international situations in which, although a military confrontation between the two superpowers may seem improbable, the preservation of the stability of the regional balances has become essential for the maintenance of peace. It is therefore clear that an estrangement of Turkey from the European context, even if Ankara maintained those ties with the United States or NATO thatfit considered indispensable, would inevitably, even if only in the long run, have negative repercussions on European security. It is from this dual perspective, military and political, that I will attempt to respond to the questions posed above. European Perceptions Geographically, Turkey is only partly a European country. Its political and military positions as a "European" country are however, decisive for West European security. 118

Europe and Asia are sutured on its territory, making Turkey a concrete link between the two continents. The country is also at the center of the intersection between the East-West and the North-South arteries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas. Finally, Turkey serves as a barrier which hinders Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a characteristic which is enhanced by the fact that Turkey controls the Straits which are the only outlet to the Mediterranean for the Soviet Union's Black Sea naval forces. Over the past fifteen years a number of political and military developments have increased the importance of Turkey's functions as a "barrier" and a "bridge". 1. The increased activism of Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East. The tendency became evident in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the Soviet Union's direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its defense of Egyptian territory, which included the deployment of Soviet military forces to the area. In 1970, Soviet military personnel in Egypt numbered about 20,000; the 4,000 military advisers already present on Egyptian soil were in fact joined by over 200 MiG-21 pilots, ground personnel for the maintenance of aircraft, and 12,000 - 15,000 technicians and specialists assigned to the radar centers and the SA-3 surface-to-air missile bases that were installed in increasing numbers to the west of the Suez Canal. Successively, after President Sadat's dramatic political turnabout, the expulsion of all Soviet military personnel in August 1972, and the abrogation of both the 1971 friendship and cooperation treaty and the agreement by which Soviet vessels operating in the Mediterranean were allowed to use the infrastructure of Egyptian ports (March 1976), the Soviets directed their efforts to the consolidation of relations with Syria. Military aid was intensified immediately after the Yom Kippur war, with the replacement of the arms and equipment lost; between the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978, after the visits to Moscow of Syrian President Assad and the Minister of Defense Tlass; and also at the begining of the 1980s. The political ties were strengthened with the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty in October 1980 whose prime objective, apart from implicitly guaranteeing Syrian security, seemed to be to reiterate the Soviet Union's unflagging interest in the Middle East situation and its determination to become once again a central figure in the region's difficult and complex political and diplomatic game. Military cooperation between the two countries was deepened, culminating in July 1981 with joint naval manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean and Soviet-Syrian amphibious landing operations on the Syrian coast. 1

2. The quantitative build-up and the qualitative enhancement of the Soviet fleet operating in the Mediterranean. With regard to quantity, the fleet grew from 1,800 ship-days in 1964 with an average daily presence of 5 units to about 17,000 ship-days in 1981 with an average presence of 46 units. In terms of quality, Moskva-class helicopter carriers have been added to the Mediterranean fleet and, starting in 1976, the typical composition of the Soviet fleet has occasionally been reinforced by the presence of a Kiev-class aircraft carrier. In addition, Backfire bombers assigned to the Naval Aviation and armed with air-tosurface missiles have been deployed at the Soviet air bases in the Crimean and southeastern Russia. 3. The "special" relationship the Soviet Union has established with Libya, to which it has supplied and continues to supply a mass of armaments that is superior in quantity and sophistication to the country's real defense needs, and to the Libyan armed forces' effec2

119

tive capacity to use them or maintain them technically and logistica&y without external assistance. Another special feature of the Soviet-Libyan relationship is that, notwithstanding Libya's close military ties with the communist countries — the foreign military advisers, trainers and troops in the country come not only from the Soviet Union but supposedly also from East Germany and North Korea — and notwithstanding Qadhafi's outspoken and violent anti-Americanism, Libya cannot be considered an unequivocally pro-Soviet country. Just as Qadhafi's anti-Americanism has not prevented him from continuing to utilize U.S. oil technicians, his pro-Soviet attitude has not yet induced him to let Moscow establish military bases on Libyan territory. Nonetheless, the quantity and quality of Soviet weapons systems in the Libyan arsenal and the political constraints this could generate (though mitigated somewhat by the policy of diversification of the sources of military supplies which Tripoli began to implement some years ago), coupled with the substantially anti-western and "revolutionary" (and hence potentially highly destabilizing) policy that Qadhafi seems determined to pursue in the Mediterranean area and Africa, have induced many observers to consider the Libyan-Soviet links a potential threat to.European security. 4. The Soviet Union's increasingly evident tendency to intervene in the regional crises of the African continent, supplying considerable military aid, sending advisers and instructors, and deploying the "Cuban legion" (Angola 1975, Horn of Africa 1977). 5. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The operation was significant not only as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's military capabilities but also because it raised disturbing questions as to the expansionist intentions of Moscow's foreign policy and because, by polarizing in an East-West sense the volatile situation in southwest Asia, it inserted new elements of instability into the Mediterranean strategic equation — which is now more than ever closely linked to that of the Persian Gulf, being the obligatory rear front of any confrontation between the two superpowers in the region. The "barrier" function of Turkey's geographical position with respect to the eventual lines of Soviet political and military expansion toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East can be better appreciated if considered in the light of two particular circumstances: as a direct air route from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and African countries, and as the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In the past, the Soviet Union has flown transport aircraft through Turkish airspace. This occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict when the Soviet Union organized an airlift of arms and spare parts to Egypt and Syria, and again in 1975 during the Angolan crisis with the airlifting of military equipment to the M P L A forces. ^ What interests us, however, is not so much the consequences of Turkey's allowing Soviet aircraft to fly over its territory, but rather the consequences in operational terms for the Soviet Union if Turkey refuses to grant overflight rights and if Moscow deems it inopportune to try and impose its will. In the two cases cited it would have been politically impossible for Turkey to deny overflight permission to the Soviet Union, among other things, because the airlift was effected using Aeroflot rather than military cargo planes. But the Soviet Union has no automatic rights or particular privileges. And there might^be cases in which Turkey, for evident reasons of security could decide to deny or delay the authorizations or could impose certain 120

restrictions regarding the number of flights, the type of aircraft, the norms for applying for permission or the flight procedures in such a way as to reduce the operational flexibility of Soviet transport operations. Moscow would then be confronted with the alternative of accepting the situation, and the attendant political and military constraints, or running the risks involved in attempting to force Turkey to cater to its wishes. True, it is difficult to imagine a Turkish-Soviet confrontation over the USSR's right to transit through Turkish airspace if not in defense of interests which Ankara considers vital. And it is just as true that such a threat is imaginable only if the Soviet Union were to attempt to supply arms and military equipment to a country in conflict with Turkey. Nonetheless, Turkish airspace is not unrestrictedly open to Soviet cargo planes. This fact alone, without considering further restrictions — even if hypothetical — which could be imposed, reduces the Soviet Union's strategic transport freedom in the event of an international crisis and consequently enhances, even if indirectly, the European countries' security. This advantage is available, however, only if Turkey remains strongly tied to the West. The filtering function of Turkish airspace would be extremely important to operations in the Mediterranean theater in the event of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the most dangerous threat, above all to naval operations in the Mediterranean and especially in its eastern basin, comes from the Backfire bombers of the Soviet Naval Aviation. The Backfire, a medium bomber with advanced operational characteristics — radius of action from 2,000 to 6,000 km depending on the flight profile; capable of reaching supersonic speeds at low altitudes; equipped with sophisticated navigation and firing systems and with electronic countermeasure systems; armed with AS-4 and AS-6 air-tosurface missiles; capable of attacking in any kind of weather — can cover the entire Mediterranean sea and the territory of the countries of NATO's southern flank. Turkey's air defense system could perform two important missions. The first is an early warning mission: radar detection and control, with "cross-tell" tracking of approaching aircraft in coordination with the radar centers of the allied countries' N A D G E systems and naval forces operating in the Mediterranean. In particular, the cross-tell could be effected in tandem with the NATO AWACS planes and with the E-2C Hawkeye surveillance planes of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The importance of early warning that supplies the essential data of an imminent attack — magnitude and nature of the threat, flight course and speed of the planes — is obvious. The second is an interception mission, aimed at harassing or neutralizing Soviet aircraft flying over Turkey toward the Mediterranean. If these missions are to be carried out effectively, Turkish air defenses will of course have to be improved. Radar coverage will have to be extended to cover low altitudes and overlapping will have to be increased so that the destruction of just one radar base will not open serious gaps in coverage; the command, control and communication system will have to be highly efficient and adequately protected and hardened; the fighter interceptors used by the Turkish A i r Force will have to have enhanced operational characteristics, all-weather interception capability and modern air-to-air missiles. A similar but strategically more significant filtering function is played by the Turkish Straits, the Dardenelles and the Bosphorus, with respect to maritime traffic. As already mentioned, the Turkish Straits are the only passageway available to Soviet naval forces and merchant ships travelling from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Transit 121

through the Straits is under Turkish control and is regulated by the Montreux Convention of 1936. In the 1940s the Soviets explicitly applied pressure to have the Straits regime modi­ fied. In June 1945, Moscow proposed that Turkey alldw it to establish military bases along__ the Straits. At the Potsdam and Yalta conferences, §klin tried to convince the Allies that a revision of the Montreaux Convention was necessary. Throughout 1946 the Soviet Union repeatedly asked Turkey to conclude an agreement for joint control and defense of the Straits. The Montreux Convention provides for the transit of warships through the Straits in peacetime, but sets precise conditions regarding the prior notification of passage, the num­ ber of transits allowed over a given period of time, the type of ships and the transit proce­ dure (for example, submarines are allowed to transit one at a time, emerged and during the day; and only if, having been built in foreign shipyards, they are directed to their bases in the Black Sea or are travelling toward shipyards outside the Black Sea for repairs or over­ hauls). Turkey thus evidently has the capacity to control navigation through the Straits and just as evidently has the legal right to impose respect of the provisions of the Montreaux Con­ vention, including Articles 20 and 21, which stipulate that in the event of imminent danger of war the transit of military naval units is left to the complete discretion of the Turkish government. There therefore exist precise constraints at the "technical" level which to a certain extent penalize the transit of Soviet warships through the Straits. The Soviet Union is fully aware of this, just as it is conscious of what it would mean in strategic terms if the Straits were totally closed, or even if the more restrictive limitations were imposed in such a way as to adversely affect the operability of its Mediterranean naval forces. These constraints are particularly binding because all the units of the Fifth Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean (except for the submarines from the North Sea Fleet) come from the Black Sea Fleet and depend mainly on the Black Sea bases for technical and logis­ tic support. In addition to these constraints, in peacetime, Turkey, and hence NATO, can control the flow of warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and thus remain continuously informed (by adding this information to that supplied by the Gibraltar NATO Command on the entry and exit of Soviet vessels) on the number and type of Soviet Fleet ships operat­ ing in the Mediterranean. In wartime, the closure of the Straits would isolate the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean from its Black Sea bases, depriving it of all support — unless the Soviets were allowed to use the ports of North African littoral countries — thus reducing it to what is sometimes defined as a "one-shot navy". The Soviet Union has nonetheless demonstrated that, in the ev?nt of extra-NATO-Warsaw Pact crises, it is capable of rapidly increasing its fleet in the Mediterranean without violat­ ing the norms and procedures set down in the Montreux Convention. During the 1973 ArabIsraeli conflict, Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean increased from about 47 ships at the beginning of October to 80 units, including 26 warships and 16 submarines, by Octo­ ber 24, and to 96 units, including 34 warships and 23 submarines, by October 31. Moreover, there exist clear political constraints which condition Turkey's response to the Soviet Union's requests, in 1976, the Turkish government accepted the Soviet definition of the Kiev aircraft carrier built in the Black Sea shipyards as an antisubmarine cruiser and allowed it to pass through the Straits even though aircraft carriers are not included among 3

4

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the capital ships listed in Annexe 11 of the Montreux Convention. D. B. Sezer correctly pointed out that this is an evident example of the "interplay of the Soviet Union's global strategy with Turkish rights and security." He also underlined how it clearly illustrated "the Soviet Union's dependence on the Straits and the limits of Turkey's ability to influence the strategic environment and events despite the Montreaux Convention." Turkey's control over the Straits represents an even more fundamental factor than its con­ trol over airspace for European security in peacetime and in wartime. Even if this control must be exercised, taking into account the importance the Soviet Union attributes to free access to the Mediterranean and hence the limits to a rigid application of its rights in those crises that do not directly involve Turkey's vital interests. Another element that contributes to the global security of Europe is the possibility, again deriving from Turkey's geographical position, of gathering information on Soviet military activities. The information is of course of prime interest to Turkey in that it covers activities conduc­ ted in those military districts near to or bordering on Turkish territory; but i f the informa­ tion refers to the testing of new arms or serves for the verification of the SALT accords, then it is of interest to all the members of the Alliance. A U.S. Congressional Research Service report, prepared in 1977 by the Europe and Middle East subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations, mentioned five intelligence collection sites operating in Turkey with American military personnel: at Si­ nop and Samsun on the Turkish Black Sea coast for the collection of data on Soviet naval and air activities in the area around that sea; at Karamürsel on the southeastern coast of the Marmara Sea to control Soviet maritime traffic around and through the Straits; at D i ­ yarbakır in east-central Turkey for monitoring the Soviet missile tests conducted at the test­ ing sites of southern Russia; and at Belbaşı near Ankara for seismographic monitoring of Soviet underground nuclear explosions. Command responsibilities, the carrying out of activities, relations between U.S. and Tur­ kish military personnel and other points are regulated by a bilateral defense agreement, the Joint U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, which came into force for the first time in July 1969 and was successively renegotiated in March 1976 and, in its present form, in March 1980. Most of the intelligence material gathered is of special interest to Turkey and the United States. However, part of it is eventually recycled into the Alliance's intelligence system, be­ coming the common heritage of all NATO members and contributing to a more informed and accurate evaluation of the Soviet military "threat" to NATO's southern theater, particu­ larly with regard to the naval aspects. Finally, at the military level, the fact that Turkey is contiguous to Russia and is a member of the Atlantic Alliance obliges the Soviet Union to keep more forces in its southwestern military districts than would be necessary if Turkey were to adopt a neutral policy or estab­ lish closer ties with the Soviet bloc. According to the most recent estimates, 29 divisions are deployed in the three military districts which would presumably be engaged in NATO's southern theater in the event of conflict. Specifically: 6 motor rifle divisions, 1 airborne division and 1 artillery division are stationed in the Odessa Military District; 6 motor rifle divisions, 1 armored division and 1 artillery division in the North Caucasus M D ; and 11 motor rifle divisions, 1 airborne division and 1 artillery division in the Trans-Caucasus M D . 6

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If Turkey were not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, thesefdivisions, or at least some of them, could be redeployed to the central and northern fronts^iaking the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in those areas even more evident. But we must consider not only the positive contributions to European security provided by a "European" Turkey which is firmly anchored to the western military Alliance. The strategic importance of Turkey for the security of Europe can be appreciated still better, as Sir Bernard Burrows accurately observed, if we evaluate it in negative terms; that is, if we consider the strategic advantages the Soviet Union would enjoy if Turkey were a member of the Warsaw Pact. Among the most evident advantages cited by Sir Bernard Burrows are: "free and uncontrolled passage of Soviet ships between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; open air and land passage to the Arab world over Turkey's frontiers with Syria and Iraq, an important additional threat to Greece over the Turkish-Greek frontier; and denial of Western monitoring facilities in Turkey." To which we might add the installation of Soviet radar stations and intelligence collection sites in Turkey to control NATO air and naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean. But even if Turkey's detachment from the Alliance did not culminate in a switch to the "other side", a hypothetical and highly improbable occurrence, but simply in the decision to assume a neutral or nonaligned position, this would have repercussions on European security just the same. It is difficult to predict the impact of such decisions, to estimate to what extent eventual Turkish neutrality might alter the strategic balance between East and West in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, or anticipate how it might influence Soviet policy toward these regions, reawakening and sharpening old and dormant, but never dead, expansionist drives. In any case, in elaborating its foreign policy, Turkey cannot afford to ignore the fact that it shares borders with the "big neighbour to the North", not even if its relations with NATO were less problematic than they are now. There are a number of objective contraints which condition Soviet-Turkish relations and make political caution a must. And many of the political cautions which might be necessary if Turkey opted for neutrality would probably not be much different from those present today in Turkey's foreign policy toward Moscow. Nevertheless, in considering the realm of the "possible" Turkish political options and attitudes, if Turkey knew that it could count on concrete western support, it would probably make choices that contribute to European security; choices that might not be adopted i f the ties with the Alliance were severed or drastically reduced. A n analysis of the European countries' perceptions of the strategic importance of Turkey, and of the links between this importance and the need to establish and maintain firm and stable relations with Ankara, reveals a number of contradictory aspects. In the capitals of the major members of the European Community, the approach to the problem of the linkage between Turkey's association to the Community and its strategic importance for European security is influenced by political and social biases and prejudices which are hard to change, by remote and recent historical events, by the international ties with other Mediterranean countries which traditionally have been privileged with respect to Turkey, by economic and financial interests, and so on. Naturally, the foreign and defense ministers of the European countries evaluate and tackle the problem from different perspectives. The political parties tended to attribute greater importance to the issue of democratic compatibility (especially after the military seized power in 1980) and to economic and social 9

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factors, while public opinion (apart from the special case of the Federal Republic of Germany) appears more or less insensitive to the strategic implications of the Turkish issue. Generally speaking, governments, state administrations and the leaders of the major political parties explicitly refuse to link what Turkey could represent for European security in peacetime and even more in the event of an East-West crisis, with Turkey's place in the Community order and the political and economic questions of a further enlargement. The strategic importance of Turkey is usually recognized, though without attributing to it an absolute value and with a series of distinctions. In those countries in which the Soviet Union is perceived as the greatest threat — and not only in terms of possible Soviet military intervention in areas of vital western interest — the security of Turkey is seen, as an integral part of European security. For these countries, the strengthening of Turkish defenses is considered a factor which reinforces overall European defenses and is hence a necessity to which the Europeans must contribute politically and financially. In those countries where the Soviet "threat" is considered less probable, the role played by Turkey in European security is perceived in vaguer terms. It is true that, in recent years, the Soviet Union's increased international activism, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan, and the relentless buildup of its military power have turned the Europeans' attention to Soviet intentions and have made them more conscious of the dangers of ignoring the factors which contribute to their security. But if détente is eventually revived with the conclusion of verifiable arms control agreements, the stabilization of the present crises in Europe, the Middle East and the Persian'Gulf, and a solution to the Afghan problem, the European countries' concern and attention will probably be focussed once again primarily on economic problems which have never really lost their priority position. In any case, in all the European countries there is a clear tendency to consider NATO as the institutional body responsible for European defense planning and the handling of the Alliance's military problems. It is in fact significant that the solution to the Greek-Turkish dispute over the 1974 crisis and Greece's re-entry into NATO, which involved not only special military issues but also political aspects of primary importance, was managed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, General Rogers. There is an equally evident tendency to attribute little credibility to the hypotheses of a direct political link between the Community's decisions on Turkey's entry and a more or less explicit and far-reaching shift in the country's foreign policy. That is, to the hypotheses that a European failure to meet Turkey's requests and requirements would accentuate Turkey's sense of estrangement from Europe and its lack of faith in the validity of the Kemalist policy which Ankara has traditionally pursued, engendering a progressive detachment from the European context which is bound to have negative repercussions on European security. It is difficult to say how these tendencies and the attendant European political attitudes might change if the international situation were transformed by a further deterioration in East-West relations or by a crisis involving the Gulf or the Mediterranean region or TurkishSoviet relations. However, even if changes do occur — which is not at all certain — there is reason to believe that they would have little impact on Community politics. If Turkish security were directly threatened, the West would respond through the political-military mechanisms of NATO and not with a greater European willingness to attribute more weight to the security factor provided by Turkey when making Community decisions. 125

t Under such circumstances, the stance taken by the United States, the weight of U.S. military power and the state of relations between Washington and Ankara would play the more important role in Turkish security considerations, just as they do now. In other words, it is unlikely that the strategic importance of relations between Turkey and the European countries will be an elernent which prevails over the other considerations (mainly economic and political) in arriving at a decision on whether to enlarge the Community to include Turkey. It is probable that in the Community debate on Turkey's entry, strategic considerations will not be lacking, just as it is probable that the arguments of a more strictly military nature advanced in the NATO context will be echoed. But this will not be enough to modify the parameters of a process to which security issues appear extraneous, being outside the Community's statutory area of competence. The block of economic, political and ideological factors will almost certainly outweigh strategic considerations in determining the Community's final decision on Turkey's membership. Nonetheless, security considerations do seem to have played a role in the European countries decisions to help Turkey both economically and militarily outside the Community framework. Turkish Perceptions Generally speaking, Turkey's situation and the problems that derive from it are linked to four main parameters. First, the geographic position and the orographic characteristics of Turkish territory. Second, the external "threats" as they are perceived, evaluated and ranked by the Turkish government (with a scale of priorities that may differ from that of NATO or the United States). Third, the internal problems, both those of an exclusively military nature in terms, of the efficiency of the armed forces and their effective capacity to defend the country, and those of a political nature which derive from the political, economic and social situation in the country. Fourth, the eventual repercussions, foreseen or unforeseen, of extra-regional events on the Turkish strategic equation. 1. The geostrategic factors Turkey's geographic position, which is at the root of its strategic importance for European security, is also at the root of the complexity and difficulties of Turkey's national security problems. Turkey is the only NATO country which borders directly on the Soviet Union for 610 km along its eastern frontier and indirectly for 1,500 km along the Black Sea coast. In addition, Turkey shares a 269 km border with Bulgaria, one of Moscow's most loyal Warsaw Pact allies. Finally, to the east and south it shares borders with Info, Iraq (331 km) and Syria (877 km). The latter two have signed bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union which provide for consultations and reciprocal support in the event of military threats. A geostrategic analysis reveals a number of negative elements in terms of security. In the event of East-West conflict the Turkish armed forces would find themselves engaged on three separate fronts: the Turkish Thrace, the Straits and the Black Sea coast, and the eastern Turkish-Soviet border. These fronts ar^e distant from one another and particularly extensive, characteristics which complicate the problems of defense, deployment and 126

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movement of troops, especially since Turkey has an inadequate road and rail communications system and insufficient tactical airlift capacity. Moreover, it is not to be exluded — though the hypothesis seems improbable — that Turkey may also be engaged in combat on the southern front i f Damascus decides to take advantage of the situation to revive its claims on the Turkish province of Hatay (Alexandretta). There are, however, few beaches on the Turkish Black Sea coast that are suitable for massive amphibious operations, and advances toward the interior are made difficult by the Pontus mountain range. The terrain adjacent to Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union is largely inaccessible, with few practicable passes, among which the only relatively easy one leads to Erzurum. The terrain bordering on Syria is also particularly rough and mountainous, especially near Iskenderun. The weakest and most vulnerable area is the Thrace, along the border with Bulgaria, where there are easy lines of attack through the Vardar valley, the Struma pass and the plains that lead directly to the Aegean Sea and the Straits, only a few dozen kilometers away. The terrain is particularly suited to the use of armored and mechanized divisions, while the shallow depth prevents the adoption of tactical defense manoeuvres and makes advanced defense a necessity. The Straits can easily be closed to maritime traffic, while the Aegean Sea, from the Dardanelles to the island of Crete, is dotted with more than 3,000 islands which makes it easy to block traffic. No ship, alone or escorted, could pass without having to engage in battle. The geographic "barrier" function we referred to at length in the preceding chapter, control of the Straits, proximity to the Soviet Union and to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, have obliged Turkey to direct special attention to the possible external "threats", both as elements of the traditional East-West conflict scenarios and as elements in scenarios of exclusively national conflict. 2. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria Historical reasons, physical proximity, and Russia's enormous superiority in military capabilities have obliged Turkey throughout history and now to concentrate primarily on the USSR's foreign policy intentions when evaluating its security requirements, especially on those expansionist tendencies toward the Mediterranean which have been a constant of Russian policy from the Czarist period to the Brezhnev era. The decision to join NATO was in fact dictated mainly by an acute sense of vulnerability with respect to the possible political and military initiatives of the "big neighbor to the North" and by the need to find a balancing factor, by formally tying itself to the U.S. superpower through its adhesion to the AÜantic Alliance. On the military level, the disparity in power and the potential Soviet threat appear particularly significant. As pointed out, 29 divisions (23 of which are motor rifle) are stationed in the three military districts of Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. Most of these divisions are category 3, that is at a low level of combat readiness, and would therefore have to be reinforced before being brought into action. There are, however, airborne divisions that could play a decisive role in military operations aimed at occupying the Straits. Morever, the Soviet army is being equipped with an ever growing number of M i 24 "Hind" combat and transport helicopters which increases the possibilities of effecting eni0

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circling operations, thus partly eliminating the advantages which Turkey's inaccessible terrain offered for defending the territory. The air threat consists of more than 650 combat aircraft. The Black Sea Fleet has 26 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 cruisers, 22 destroyers, 41 frigates, 25 amphibious vessels, 240 minor surface units, 541 auxiliary and support ships, and 380 planes. The ground and air forces mentioned represent of course only that part of the Soviet defense system deployed in the three military districts which it is assumed would be assigned to combat against the forces of NATO's southern flank in the event of an East-West conflict. These forces could be strengthened, if need be, by other units from the military districts of Kiev, Moscow, the Volga or from the southern Turkestan Military District." The Bulgarian army has 8 motor rifle divisions, 5 armored brigades, 3 missile brigades equipped with Scud surface-to-surface missiles, 4 artillery regiments, 3 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 1 battalion of Alpine troops and 2 reconaissance battalions. The air force consists of some 248 combat aircraft deployed in 6 fighter-bomber squadrons, 8 fighterinterceptor squadrons and 2 fighter-reconaissgnce squadrons equipped with Soviet-made MiG-17s, MiG-21s and MiG-23s (about 20 of the latter). Starting in 1974, these forces have been built up noticeably. New equipment has been assigned to the Army including armored vehicles, T-72 tanks and Mi-24 ,Hind-D' attack helicopters. The ASW Mi-4 "Haze" helicopter was introduced into the Navy's helicopter component. And in the Air Force there was a partial substitution of the MiG-17 with the "Flogger H " MiG-23 and of the MiG-21 with the "Flogger B " MiG-23. The MiG-23 was assigned to Bulgaria before the central European countries of the Warsaw Pact received it, breaking the practice of placing the southern countries of the Pact at the bottom of the list of priorities in modernization programs, often even behind certain Third-World countries. This would seem to indicate greater Soviet attention to the potential Greek-Turkish Thrace front, a trend made more evident by reports, not yet confirmed, that the Soviets have been setting up stores of military material in Bulgaria. In fact, the acquisition of Mi-14 "Haze" ASW helicopters makes operational sense only if they are to be deployed in the Aegean Sea; that is, only if they are to be used for an eventual Warsaw Pact attempt to conquer the Thrace and the Straits.

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In addition, in November 1978, the Soviets began a ferry service with large ships equipped to transport railroad cars from the Bulgarian port of Varna to the Soviet port of Ilichevsk near Odessa. From Varna there are 54 railroad lines connecting the port to the most important regions of Bulgaria. These ferries, among the largest in the world, eliminate the serious delays (up to four weeks) that are inevitable if the trains have to pass through Rumania to get to Bulgaria, and can easily be adapted for the transport of military equipment and supplies. In fact, each ferry can carry up to 108 railroad wagons or platform cars which means a maximum load capacity of approximately 150 T-62 tanks. T^he strategic importance of this ferry link is thus evident. It makes it possible to bypass Rumania, avoiding not only technical delays (Rumanian railways have a different gauge from that of the Soviet ones) but also the eventual political delays that would ensue if, in the event of a crisis, Rumania decided to restrict the transit of Soviet military convoys through its territory. 13

Finally, Bulgaria, like the other Warsaw Pact countries, has modernized its radar network by installing new and more advanced systems with greater coverage of low altitudes. It has strengthened its air defense with the acquisition of SA-6 and SA-9 missile systems. And it has enhanced its passive defenses by hardening its infrastructure and building more hangarettes at its airports. 128

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Turkey is conscious of the fact that in the event of East-West conflict it would not be in a position to face the threat alone given the present state of its armed forces' capabilities and efficiency. The Army (470,000 men) is made up of 16 divisions (2 mechanized, 14 infantry), 23 brigades (6 armored, 4 mechanized, 11 infantry, 1 paratrooper, 1 command) and 4 missile battalions with "Honest John" surface-to-surface missiles. The Navy has 16 submarines, 15 destroyers, 2 frigates and 13 fast attack craft armed with "Harpoon" and "Penguin" antiship missiles, plus a number of torpedo boats, large and coastal patrol boats, landing craft, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and auxiliary units (depot and supply ships). The Air Force has 407 combat aircraft deployed in 18 fighter-bomber squadrons, 3 interceptor squadrons, 1 reconnaissance squadron and 6 transport squadrons, The type of aircraft: F-4E and RF-4E, F-5A/B, F-104G and F-104S, F-100C/D/F, RF-84F, C-130E and C-160 Transall, plus a number of different types of helicopters. If only the numbers are considered, the Turkish defense system might seem stronger than it actually is. A closer look reveals that 430 thousand of the 470 thousand men in the Army are conscripts. Most of the divisions and brigades are infantry (while most of the Soviet and Bulgarian units are armored or motor rifle). Almost all the tanks are old American M-47s and M-48s, which are technically and operationally obsolete. Most of the armored vehicles for the transport of troops are the outdated M-113s. The missiles are still of the old "Honest John" class that has been replaced by the "Lance" missile in the other NATO countries. Only recently have 2500 Milan missiles been ordered for the antitank systems. The air force still flies the old F-100. Effective all-weather interception capability is lacking and the air defence system suffers from inadequate coverage, especially at low altitudes, because of the technical backwardness of the radar system and the unreliability of the C system. In the Navy, all the destroyers, mostly of the "Gearing" and "Fletcher" class, are handdowns from the U.S. Navy, passed on to Turkey under the M D A P bill. The only really modern units are the four 209-type submarines and the "Dogan" and "Kartal"-class missile FAC. The current procurement programs and those planned for the future ("Leopard" tanks, Milan antitank missiles, 209-type submarines, Meko-200-class frigates, missile FAC, Harpoon antiship missiles, Super Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, F-16 and F-18 combat planes) will only partly meet Turkey's military requirements. In 1980 the Turkish government made public a detailed estimate of what would be needed to meet its NATO commitments for the 1981-86 period. The cost of the most urgent and priority needs was 4,442.3 million dollars. The Air Force needed 1,145.7 million dollars to procure F-4 and F-104 planes, spare parts and ammunition, equipment and material for air defense, etc. The Army needed 2,191.9 million dollars for tanks, antitank missiles, armored vehicles, communication equipment, helicopters, etc. The Navy needed 1,104.7 million dollars for submarines, fast attack craft, A S W helicopters, aircraft for maritime patrols, electronic warfare systems, antiship missiles, etc. It was estimated, however, that only 2,190 million dollars would be available for the 1981-86 period (from the Turkish defense budget, U.S. credits and West German aid). The shortfall of more than 2,200 million dollars could not be remedied by increasing the Tur3

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V kish military budget, nor could the Alliance partners be expected,to help fill the gap. The situation does not seem to have changed substantially since then, notwithstanding the increase in U.S. aid and in the Turkish defense budget. Turkey therefore depends on external reinforcements for its defense, especially in the Thrace area where the Turkish forces do not appear capable of driving back or halting a massive attack of armored units which would be facilitated by the flat terrain of the area. It is highly unlikely that Italian forces could be used in Turkey (except for the NATO A C E Mobile Force contingent). And it is unlikely that the Greek forces would be able to offer support to the Turkish forces on the Thrace front, except perhaps by trying to contain attacks on Turkey from the west. The United States appears to be the only ally that could supply external reinforcements. But it is uncertain how many air and ground units based in the United States would actually be available for deployment to NATO's southern front, considering the commitments in central and northern Europe; and there is also the problem of how long it would take the available units to intervene. The air force might be able to make it on the scene in a matter of one to seven days, but the ground forces — except for the Marine TF-69 normally stationed in the Mediterranean — would take much longer, up to thirty days. Moreover, the heavy equipment and supplies shipped by sea would have to cross the eastern Mediterranean where the Soviet forces, especially the air forces, enjoy greater freedom of manoeuvre thanks to the proximity of that area to the Crimean and southern Russia bases. 16

3. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf Iraq and Syria are a part of the Turkish security situation not so much because they represent a direct threat but because they are decisive parameters in the Middle East strategic equation and factors of regional instability. There are no open controversies or unresolved territorial disputes between Turkey and Iraq. Turkish-Syrian relations currently present no elements of particular tension and Damascus has not voiced claims to the Turkish province of Alessandretta since the early '60s. Moreover, Iraq, heavily engaged in a tough and bloody conflict with Iran which has closed the Shatt-al-Arab terminals from which Iraq formerly exported much of its oil (and which, incidentally, has also generated a further deterioration in its relations with Syria), now depends heavily on the pipeline that takes its crude from the Mosul wells to the gulf of Iskenderum in the eastern Mediterranean.' In addition, Ankara's gradual foreign policy shift toward a position of substantial nonalignment in the inter-Arab controversies, its explicit support for the Arab-Palestinian cause, its open participation in the Islamic Conferences (since they began in 1969), and its withdrawal from CENTO, have rid Turkey's posture of many of its more markedly prowestern aspects and have eliminated many of the previous elements of discord and tension which made its relations with the Arab world difficult. The Iraqi and Syrian armed forces are well equipped with modern armaments. Syria, for example, has more than 3,500 tanks (including 1,800 T-62s and T-72s), over 1,600 armored vehicles, Frog and Scud surface-to-surface missiles, SA-6 and SA-8 surface-to-air missiles, Su-20, MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighters. Iraq — before the war with Iran started — had over 200 tanks including 150 T-72s and some one hundred French-made AMX-30s, about 3,000 armored vehicles, Frog and Scud surface missiles, SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, Tu-22 Blinder medium bombers, MiG-23, Su-20 and Mirage F - l fighters. 7

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Nonetheless, Syria and Iraq do not represent a real military threat to Turkey since the latter's armed forces are clearly superior in terms of doctrine and combat tactics, technical and logistic capacity, discipline and training. Ankara's security concerns derive instead from the role the two countries could play in the event of an East-West crisis, complicating Turkey's defense planning; from the fact that both are tied to the Soviet Union by friendship and cooperation treaties; from the possibility of an eventual political and military union; from the close military cooperation ties between Moscow and Damascus; from the instability of the Middle East which tends to encourage the intervention of the superpowers in support of the countries of the region with which they have established ties; from the difficult situation Turkey would find itself in if, in the event of a crisis, the United States were to ask it to give a concrete show of support for its policy, of the type furnished for the 1958 landing operation in Lebanon. Turkey is just as worried about the consequences, in terms of security, of indirect involve¬ _ even if it does not require a decision to use its own military forces or give support to an external military power — as it is about the repercussions on its security which might be generated if the strategic equation in the Middle East and southwest Asia were upset. The Islamic revolution in Iran affected Turkish security in various ways. It increased Turkey's isolation. It gave new life and vigor to those political and religious movements that favor a reversal of the country's Kemalist march toward westernization and a return to Islamic values and a theocratic state. And, because of the unstable situation in Iran, it has increased the chances of a welding of Kurdish irredentism in Iran and Turkey. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened Turkey's awareness of the implications of bordering on the "big neighbor to the North" and of Moscow's readiness to intervene with its own military forces outside the Warsaw Pact area for the first time since the end of World War II in a situation in which vital security interests did not appear to be directly threatened. The invasion threw new light on Soviet military capabilities, especially in terms of the number of men and the quantity of means deployed, and raised disturbing questions as to the future of the Gulf region. Soviet military intervention capabilities and the stability of the Persian Gulf area are two elements which are necessarily a part of the Turkish security picture, especially since any crisis in the region would inevitably lead to an East-West polarization and the risk of a direct conflict between the two superpowers, which would almost certainly involve their respective allies and friends. m

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the Aegegn (division and control of airspace, the limits of territorial waters, sovereignty overThe continental shelf and the right to exploit the seabed, militarization of the Greek islands near the Turkish coast), Turkey is obliged to consider Greece_apotential,.external threat. ' ' ~~~ "tJBviously Turkey's perception of the threat does not include the hypothesis of unilateral aggression on the part of Greece, but rather the possibility of open conflict inherent in the difficulty of resolving diplomatically the problems that set the two countries against each other; problems that are rendered all the more intractable by recollections of ancient struggles and rivalries and by the more recent divergences at the political and ideological level. 18

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We have already mentioned the importance Ankara attributes to the issue of an extension of the territorial waters of the Greek islands from six to twelve miles. Equal importance is attributed to the problem of sovereignty over the continental shelf (which carries with it the right to explore for oil and exploit the mineral resources of the seabed). Turkey is almost totally dependent on external souces for its energy needs. The discovery of oil in the Aegean would reduce this dependence and would ease the enormous strain on its balance of payments which oil imports represent.

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Negotiations over the future of Cyprus are presently deadlocked. The fact that both countries are members of NATO does not seem to have helped make finding a solution to the controversies any easier. Their disputes have not been subordinated to a common view of regional security which includes their political and military cooperation. In fact, Turkey's increased flexibility, which ,in 1980 led to the removal of its veto on Athens' reentry into the military arm of the Atlantic Alliance, had little impact and served to improve Greek-Turkish relations only temporarily. Indeed, the successive victory of the Socialist party in Greece (which increased the ideological distance between the military regime in Turkey and the government in Greece) and Papandreou's more explicity nationalistic foreign policy have radicalized the positions, reignited old polemics and revived old mechanisms of confrontation. It is difficult to forecast how flexible and what margins of manoeuvre there will be in future Greek foreign policy toward NATO — since his electoral victory, Papandreou has toned down his opposition and no longer appears as determined to withdraw Greece from NATO — and toward Turkey. The Greek request at the December 1981 meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee for a formal Alliance guarantee in the event of Turkish aggression dampened hopes that Greek-Turkish relations might improve and naturally tended to accentuate the Turkish perception that security factors play a more than marginal role in its relations with Greece. At the military level, Turkey seems to be in a superior position, especially in terms of numbers and particularly with regard to ground troops. Because there is the possibility that the political controversies might lead to a military confrontation, Ankara feels obliged to keep an "Aegean fleet" — which Greece considers a possible external threat — and approximately 20,000 men on Cyprus, with a dispersion of its forces and a dysfuntional distribution of its resources that subtracts from NATO defense requirements. If a Greek-Turkish conflict were to eventually erupt, the military costs for Turkey — and for Greece — would certainly be very high, and would adversely affect its capacity to meet its other defense requirements for an unforeseeable period of time. These threats are credible to differing degrees, have more or less effective military weight and greater or lesser chances of materializing, but they are omnidirectional, a characteristic which tends to complicate Turkish defense planning. Turkey's vulnerability, accentuated by the country's strategic position, weighs not only on Ankara's military policy choices but on its foreign policy choices as well. 19

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The Convergences and the Role of the European Countries I The convergences _. The preceding analysis reveals that there are a number of convergent interests which could serve as the basis for elaborating a more articulate pattern of international relations between the European countries and Turkey and as the framework within which to formulate a program of concrete European initiatives aimed at assisting Ankara in its efforts to adequately meet its security requirements. The basic convergence lies in the fact that Turkey's security is fundamental to European security — a point which is often obscured by political and economic considerations despite the Europeans" keen awareness of its importance. From this root coincidence of interests derive a number of collateral convergences linked to those problems which most deeply affect the complex web of Turkish security perceptions. First of all, the Community and Turkey have a reciprocal interest in finding a political solution to the intractable Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean. Not only must the Europeans seek out mediation instruments that are truly efficacious for resolving the dispute and preventing an internationalization of the controversy; they must also be careful not to let the dispute become a pretext which in one way or another influences the procedures relating to Turkey's accession to the Community. Both parties also have an interest in seeing to it that Greece's membership in the Community is not interpreted as a factor which gives it not only "special" economic status but also a special political status which biases the European countries' individual or collective assessment of and attitude toward the dispute. In other words, it is in the common interest that Greek-Turkish relations be perceived as a problem that directly affects the security of Europe as a whole (the consequences at the military level of a Greek-Turkish conflict were mentioned above). The dispute must therefore be treated as an element which directly bears on European security, without ignoring the fact that Community initiatives and instruments, however impartial and finely tuned, may not be sufficient on their own to resolve the dispute or may not be accepted by one or both of the antagonists. In particular, European efforts should be directed at preventing the controversy from spreading beyond the regional sphere with the intervention of external powers (not necessarily, but most probably, the USSR) intent on acquiring political advantages (greater influence in return for support offered, attempts to weaken or destabilize the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, utilization of an eventual crisis for political gains at home, etc.). There is also a confluence of interests in providing unambiguous European support for Ankara's foreign policy whenever necessary in the context of Turkish-Soviet relations. There is a reciprocal interest in having Moscow perceive that Turkey's lies with Europe (and not only with the United States, even if the security guarantee provided by the latter appears more credible) are firmly rooted in solid terrain and that despite the ups and downs of Euro-Turkish relations, stemming partly from Turkey's internal situation, the European countries would invariably consider a direct threat to Turkey a threat to their own security. Obviously, Moscow's perception of the solidity of these ties depends not only on the European countries' attitude toward Turkey but also on Turkey's attitude toward Europe. The political limits of a convergence based mainly on security considerations should not of course be ignored or underestimated. But it would be just as erroneous to underestimate the importance of this link.

It could be argued that this convergence of interests has already been rendered operative through Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Alliance and that the Soviets, in formulating their foreign policy toward Ankara, base their evaluations on their perceptions of the significance and solidity of Turkey's NATO ties. It could also be argued that, in terms of security, a specifically European role would add very little to the ties which already exist within the Alliance framework. This is true. Yet a Community attitude which constantly and explicitly referred to Turkey as a European country and as a future member of the Community could give to the NATO ties a political and economic dimension of an importance not to be ignored. Finally, there is a convergence of interests, though not an identity of outlooks nor a coincidence of postures, in finding a way to stabilize the situation in the Middle East and a political solution to the Persian Gulf crisis. Dependence on external sources of energy, the negative repercussions on the entire Mediterranean area of another Arab-Israeli conflict (especially one involving the two superpowers) , and the risk of an extension of the Iran-Iraq war are elements which engender deep and common concerns in which security plays an important part. There is instead a less distinct convergence with regard to the political and military role Turkey could play in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Gulf regions either as an element which decisively contributes to the formulation of the Community's foreign policy and economic development strategies or as a continental platform endowed with extremely valuable infrastructure which would give the Allies a decisive geopolitical advantage in the event of an East-West crisis. The Europeans know how irreplaceable Turkish territory is from the geostrategic point of view. But they are also aware of the constraints that limit the range of military choices open to Ankara; constraints and limits that cannot be ignored or avoided even if Turkey becomes a full member of the Community. 2. The European role The convergences pointed to could serve as a frame of reference for shaping a more specific European role aimed at assisting Turkey in its efforts to adequately respond to its security needs, and at breaking the impasse created by the Europeans' reluctance or inability to concretely express their recognition of the importance of Turkey's contribution to their collective security in the political form considered most suitable and significant (especially from Ankara's point of view); Turkey's full membership in the European Community. We have already emphasized how difficult it is in many respects to include security as a factor which weighs on the member countries' evaluation of and consequent attitude toward a further enlargement of the Community. Extension of the Community's area of competence beyond the present limits of an economic association is a long-term prospect. It is therefore understandable that the member countries should telid to concentrate on more immediate difficulties in order to avoid overburdening the Community institutions with other, more ambitious goals. On the other hand, the more powerful members might decide that greater political and military integration of the Community, parallel to or following economic enlargement, should be realized gradually and should initially be restricted to integration only among the major members. In either case, Turkey's strategic importance will tend to play a very marginal role in the Community context while retaining its relevance as an essential factor with respect to operations in NATO's southern theater. 134

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And yet, in either case, an alternative solution could be found, one which could represent the first element of that European role referred to above. Whatever the timetable and procedures of Turkey's entry into the Community, a way should be found to permit it in the meantime to participate in what is today the major nucleus of "political" aggregation of the Community members: European Political Cooperation (EPC). In other words, political participation could precede economic integration, anticipating a "responsibilization" of Turkey in the Community's political choices; a responsibilization which has been rendered all the more necessary by the new strategic developments in southwest Asia and by the increasing probability of extra-NATO crises in the Mediterranean area which would require a European response which could not be given through the structures and decision-making mechanisms of the Alliance. In my opinion, this would be an extremely important step, representing a highly significant political choice for Turkey itself and serving to remove Ankara's doubts as to the importance of its European ties in the context of its foreign policy. A second element of fundamental importance, which would increase the country's deterrent capacity and hence its feeling of security, is the European contribution to the modernization of Turkey's armed forces. We mentioned earlier the enormous financial difficulties Turkey would encounter if it had to shoulder alone the extremely high cost of procuring the weapons and equipment considered absolutely necessary to meet its security requirements. We also mentioned how certain European countries have helped Turkey in its rearmament drive (especially during the U.S. arms embargo) by granting, credits, selling arms at convenient terms, passing on operationally valid, though not ultra-modern, weapons and equipment, etc. The assistance was provided mainly under bilateral accords endorsed and encouraged by NATO but undertaken outside the framework of its structures. What was lacking was coordination of the single initiatives within a European program of military aid aimed at reducing, if not reversing, the decline of the Turkish armed forces' operational capabilities provoked by the U.S. arms embargo. Obvious and understandable political considerations prevented a greater commitment on the part of the European allies. The situation was further complicated by the military takeover, which made a coordinated European effort an even more remote prospect. On the other hand, there had always been a privileged relationship between Turkey and the United States in this sphere — since the 1950s the United States had been practically Turkey's only arms supplier — also by reason of the agreements under which the Americans were allowed to use certain Turkish bases and infrastructure. As mentioned, the Federal Republic of Germany began to play an important role only in the 70s, granting credits for a considerable sum, supplying technologically sophisticated weapons systems, and allowing the Turkish arms industry to produce German arms and equipment on license (of particular significance are the licenses for producing submarines and seaborne missile units). It might again be argued that the European countries (and still more the Community as such) can play only a very marginal role, or none at all, limiting themselves to calling for (and fostering) a deeper commitment on the part of NATO and greater coordination among the allies with respect to the problems of the efficiency and operational readiness of Turkey's defense system. The thesis adopted throughout this paper is, however, that there does exist a specific sphere in which the European countries can legitimately operate. Few would beg to differ 135

with the argument that the various military aid programs should be coordinated by the or­ ganization set up to deal with Western defense problems, the Atlantic Alliance, with the participation of the United States. And it is easy to see that the Community is still too far away from achieving that degree of political integration which would justify such initia­ tives. It might even be conceded that all this has nothing to do with the issues involved in an enlargement of the Community. But by way of objection, it can also be argued that the Community cannot in any case afford to remain indifferent to developments in the field of industrial growth, economic cooperation and rationalization of production (even if limit­ ed to the arms industry), especially if the country concerned will eventually become a member of the Community and if, by strengthening its security, European security too will be reinforced, even if indirectly. What is needed is a coordinated European effort to enhance the Turkish arms industry's technological capabilities and to raise its output so as to favor, in a long-term perspective, the undertaking of joint ventures designed to increase the level of interoperability and stan­ dardization of the Turkish and the European military structures. Such an effort constitutes the third element of a possible European role in Turkish security. The 1979 accords between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey already included a series of measures providing German assistance to the Turkish arms industry: enlarge­ ment of the Kırıkkale light-arms factory; expansion of the output of the Elmadagi plant which produces Cobra-2000 antitank missiles on license; expansion of the capacity of the Arifiye plant which manufactures components and spare parts for armored vehicles; mod­ ernization of the Gölcük and Taşklzak shipyards; construction of new infrastructure for the plant producing aircraft engines at Eskiklzak. In this field a certain role could be played by the Independent European Program Group, which is not a NATO institution and of which Turkey is a member. Compatibly with the characteristics of its industrial structure, Turkey could be included in those joint ventures which would generate valuable technological fallout and offer Turkey the opportunity to modernize its defense system. 20

If Europe were to follow the course of action outlined above, the ties between the European countries and Turkey would be strengthened and proof would be given that Turkey, despite the problems and motives that may obstruct its rapid entry into the Community, is considered a European country and as such an essential element of the European security picture. Obviously, it will not be easy to assume this role in a collectively coordinated fashion. The European countries' differing evaluations and attitudes, the need to consider the reper­ cussions on relations with Greece, and the precarious state of the European economy are all constraints which limit progress in this direction. And Turkey too will have to do its part, favoring and integrating the European initiatives by stressing the "European connec­ tion" in its foreign and domestic policies and by not dramatizing an eventual European re­ luctance to respond favorably to Turkey's application for membership in the Community. Finally, since the major goal is enhanced security, the European role, even if motivated by diverse considerations and future prospects, should be coordinated with that of the Uni­ ted States (which has so far used a bilateral approach too). Moreover, though American support will continue to be indispensable, it appears to be in Ankara's own interest to avoid having the United States as its only security option. This chapter dealing with the convergences^ European and Turkish interests and the possible elements of a new European role concludes this analysis of the strategic impor136

tance of relations between Turkey and the European Community. It is logical that the need for a deeper understanding of the respective requirements, the reciprocal interests and the common aspirations should provide the principal element of the Community's future attir tude toward Turkey. Turkey constitutes an important link in European security. We can only hope that econo­ mic and political motives will not be attributed such preeminence as to alienate Turkey from Europe, opening a dangerous gap in its security. Conclusions The issue of Turkey's entry into the Community should be faced notonly injerms_af_^ thepjisjai^ also be evaluated instrategic terms, taldng^_into accoum tfiey p r e s e t capable of. mariagingjts own foreign^and militajvjrwUdes. """"European security requirements ca^motTIrTfact, be completely and credibly satisfied without Turkey's participation and contribution, which are in many respects essential. This is valid today, when it is NATO that performs the duties of planner and guarantor of European defense, and it will remain valid in the future — assuming that ideological an­ tagonism and political and military competition will continue to be the outstanding (but not the only) features of East-West relations for many years to come — when NATO may have ceased to exist in its present form, perhaps becoming the institution that manages the mili­ tary policies of a politically integrated European Community. The importance of strategic relations between Ankara and the European Community should therefore be viewed from a perspective which contemplates future developments as well, given that the process of Turkey's entry into the Community can be expected to extend over a long period, while at the same time being opportunely focussed on shorter-term se­ curity problems, too. It is logical that Ankara should tend to consider the Community's response to its applica­ tion for membership a crucial test of the Europeans' attitude which goes beyond the strictly economic issues and assumes political significance as a legitimation of Turkey's full appur­ tenance to Europe; that is, as a confirmation that Turkey is considered "European" not only when or because it participates in and integrates the European defense system. It is in fact unlikely that membership in NATO would be sufficient for the Turkish government to jus­ tify, internally, political and military choices invariably in line with European interests. It seems that Turkey's strategic importance will also have to weigh on relations with the European Community; not directly, in the sense of constraining a decision which must nec­ essarily be taken on the basis of economic considerations, but at least indirectly, in the sense of stimulating greater awareness of and attention to Turkish perceptions and requirements, and in the sense of promoting the adoption of political initiatives capable of preventing Tur­ kish perceptions from coagulating in a feeling of alienation and estrangement from Europe. In this context, perceptions — including of course the Community members' perceptions of Turkey's internal and foreign policies — play an important role whose impact should not be understimated. It is true that relations with the United States are more important for Turkey's security than relations with Europe. However, the former bear the characteristics typical of a rela137

I

tionship between a medium power and a superpower. A more solid link with Europe could to a certain extent mitigate the negative effects, but only if it possesses a good dose of credibility. I have tried to indicate how this could be accomplished. Apart from what can be done (with greater commitment and better coordination of the various national programs) to help Turkey at the diplomatic level (mediation with Greece) and at the military level (participation in the effort to modernize the Turkish defense system), it seems essential to have Turkey participate politically in the Community in advance of its complete economic integration.

C

In other words, Turkey should be invited to take part in European Political Cooperation while the long process of accession to the Community proceeds. The formal difficulties — whose existence and weight should not be ignored — could be overcome if there were t on the part of the Community members the necessary political will to do so. It might be objected that the analysis on which these conclusions are based is overly optimistic or, worse, lacking in objectivity. It might be accused of not taking into due account the limited impact Turkey's strategic importance can have on relations with the Community; of underestimating the Community's substantial indifference to security problems whose management has been delegated to NATO; of seeking to superimpose distant and uncertain future prospects on the present situation. In effect, it is undeniably difficult to imagine a politically and militarily integrated Europe at a time when the Community offers such an alarming picture of disintegration, protectionist tendencies, and diffused crisis. Yet, the international developments of the late '70s and early '80s and the projections as to the likely course of events throughout the present decade suggest that the major problem that will have to be faced and resolved by the European countries, apart from the economic crisis, will be security. A n adequate solution can be found to the security problems only if there is a collective effort and commitment. And it is essential that Turkey, because of its strategic importance, participate in this effort. It will be willing and able to do so, however, only if it feels that it is a European country and that it shares and participates in shaping Europe's destiny without having to deny or renounce those Islamic characteristics which make it a natural bridge between eastern and western civilization.

9

Sir Bernard Burrows, "The security dimension for Western Europe", paper presented at the TEPSA/IEP Conference on Turkey and the Community, Bonn, 28 - 29 November 1980, p. 1. 10 The category 3 divisions are at a quarter of their full war strengh in terms of personnel, possibly complete with fighting vehicles (some obsolescent). Cf. The Military Balance 1982 -1983, p. 15. U The deployment of forces in these military districts is as follows: Kiev, 11 divisions (6 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 artillery); Moscow, 7 divisions (2 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 airborne); Volga, 3 motor rifle divisions; Turkestan, 6 divisions (5 motor rifle, 1 artillery). 12 13 14 15

Cf. Tlie Military Balance 1982 - 1983, p. 20. Cf. International Herald Tribune, 29 November, 1978. All data on the Turkish armed forces is from The Military Balance 1982 - 83, cit., p. 44. For the financial data and a complete list of the planned purchases, cf. Senate Delegation Report, Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 3 - 13 April 1980 (Washington: USGPO, 1980), p. 16. 16 For the fiscal year 1981, the U.S. Congress approved 250 million dollars for the Foreign Military Sales Program and 200 million for the economic aid program and about 2 million for the International Military Education and Training (IME) program. For fiscal year 1982, the United States increased its aid to 700 million dollars (300 million in economic aid and 400 in military aid). Of the 400 million in military aid, 250 were provided at low interests rates. In addition, the aid for the IMET program was to be increased form 1.6 to 3.5 million dollars. Cf. International Communication Agency, Daily Wireless File, No. 53, 18 March 1981. 17 In the course of 1982 the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was frequently sabotaged. On Iraqi oil output, cf. Financial Times 4 January 1982, p. 1; 8 January 1982, p. 14; 1 June 1982, p. 3; and 3 December 1982, p. 3. 18 On the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean, cf. Andrew Mison, The Aegean Dispute (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 155, 1980). 19 Greece's insistence and the impossibility of finding a compromise formula prevented the formulation and issue of a final communique for the first time in the Alliance's history. 20 Cf. Der Spiegel, 4 February 1980, pp. 33 - 34.

Notes 1 2 3

In that period the Soviet Mediterranean fleet consisted of 53 units, the highest number since 1977. Cf. Maurizio Cremasco and Stefano Siivesti, IIBanco Suddella Nato (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980), p. 81 The text of the Montreux Convention is reproduced in Appendix B of the book by Jesse W. Lewis, 771« Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington: American Eitferprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).

4

The exact size of the Soviet navy when the hostilities broke out has not been officially made public. For an estimate cf. R.G. Weinland, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case Study (Washington: Washington Paper No. 61, 1979) p. 76. Cf. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch. A Memoir (New York: 1976), p. 447. Cf. Duygu B. Sezer, Turkey's Security Policies (London: HSS, Adelphi Papers No. 164, 1981), p. 15. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, 95th Congress. 27 March 1977 (Washington: USGPO, 1977). \ Cf. The Military Balance ¡982 -1983 (London: IISS, 1982), p. 15.

5 6 7

8

138

139

Chapter 8 William Hale

Turkish Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy*

Agriculture in Turkey's Economy and Foreign Trade Although Turkey's economic policies since the 1920s have put the main emphasis on industrial development, it has to be remembered that agriculture still plays a vital role in the Turkish economy, and is of some importance in the context of relations with the Community. The total area of the country is 77.9 million ha, of which 23 million ha, or 29.5 per cent, is counted as cultivated. Around 5.9 million ha, or some 25.5 per cent of the cultivated area is left fallow, but this still leaves Turkey with a very large agricultural area. Within the country, there is a wide variety of ecological conditions. As a result, Turkey is not just a major producer of Mediterranean crops (grapes, olives, tobacco, cotton and the like) but also of northern products, such as grain, orchard fruit, vegetables and meat. It is selfsufficient in most foodstuffs and normally has a substantial surplus of fruits, vegetables and industrial crops available for export. The main constraints affecting agricultural production are firstly, the harshness of the climate and terrain in many regions, and the unpredictability and paucity of rainfall; secondly, the backwardness of farming techniques; and thirdly, difficulties in transportation, marketing and packaging. However, many of these handicaps have been reduced over the last few decades. The area under irrigation has increased from around 360,000 ha in 1962 to over 3.2 million ha in 1984. Fertiliser use has risen from less than 300,000 tonnes in 1960 to just under 8.7 million tonnes in 1984, and the number of tractors from 42,000 to 556,000 during the same period. There has also been an impressive extension of the road network, and of modern marketing and packaging methods. In spite of the growth of industry, about 58 per cent of the working population in 1980 was counted as employed in agriculture: at around 10.5 million, this represented a fall of 1.2 million since 1975; unfortunately, an occupational breakdown of the 1985 census results was not available at the time of writing. This figure is exaggerated by the fact that the population census, on which it is based, counts all adult women in farming families as employed in agriculture, even though they may only spend part of their time in farm work. Allowing for this, as well as probable changes since 1980, it seems likely that agriculture still occupies about 45-50 per cent of the national workforce. Measured in constant prices, value added in agriculture increased at an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent between 1960 and 1986. However, the rapid growth of industry and services activities meant that its proportionate contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1

*

This chapter is a revised version of the author's paper, "Turkish Agriculture an the EEC", published in Orient 26 (no 3, September 1985), pp. 360-375.

141

I fell from just under 38 per cent in 1962 to 22 per cent in 1986. Assuming that the Turkish economy resumes its growth path during the 1980s (and the signs are on the whole favour­ able) then it is likely that the share of agriculture in G D P will fall further. The current five year plan, for instance, predicts an annual growth rate of 3.6 per cent for agriculture during 1985-89, as against 7.5 per cent for industry and 6.3 per cent for GDP. The pattern of Turkey's foreign trade reflects the gradual industrialisation of the Turkish economy, The value of Turkey's agricultural exports rose from an annual average of around $ 350 million during 1963-67 to just under 1,331 million in 1986. However, their share of total exports fell from nearly 80 per cent in 1963-67 to around 23 per cent in 1986. This swing is artificially exaggerated by the fact that the Turkish statisticians count a number of agricultural products as "industrial", on the grounds that they have gone through some sort of processing. Moreover, many of Turkey's industrial exports (such as textiles and pro­ cessed foodstuffs) rely on raw materials drawn from the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the general problems in Turkey's relationship with the Community are less exclusively agricultural than they were in the early days of her association\vith the E C in the 1960s. This change has been enhanced by a substantial increase in Turkey's exports of both agri­ cultural and industrial products to non-EC markets — in particular, the oil-producing coun­ tries of the Middle East. In 1986, states ranked by the Turkish statistical sources as "Islamic Countries" bought almost 38 per cent of Turkey's total exports, as compared to only 9.3 per cent in 1975. 2

3

rules provide for observance of an import price, application of the preferential tariff shall be subject to observance of the price in question" and that the "gradual elimination of the customs duties actually applied by the Community to imports from Turkey shall not preju­ dice the principles and machinery of the common agricultural policy". The effect of this would appear to be that in the case of those products where the Community applies a threshold or sluicegate price, such as meat, cereals, olive oil and sugar products, imports from Turkey would continue to pay a variable levy sufficient to raise the tax-paid price to the internal Community level (in some cases, imports from Turkey were granted specified reductions of the levy). 6

7

Trends in Turkey's Agricultural Exports In the Additional Protocol of 1970, Turkey undertook to give preferential treatment to the Community's agricultural exports to Turkey. However, these are generally slight, and the following notes therefore concentrate on Turkey's agricultural exports. These can be divi­ ded into two categories, (a) "traditional" exports, consisting of hazelnuts, dried figs, rai­ sins, tobacco and cotton, which have in the past accounted for the vast majority of the total, and (b) other "non-traditional" items, for which overseas markets have only recently been developed. As the figures in Table 1 show, the share of traditional items in both total exports and the agricultural sub-total has declined substantially since the early 1970s.

4

Table I; Shares of traditional agricultural exports in total exports

Turkey's Agreements with the EC The basis of Turkey's relations with the Community is laid down in two agreements, sign­ ed in 1963 and 1970. The first of these, the Association Agreement, outlined a three-stage process by which Turkey was expected to achieve full membership of the Community by 1995. The second agreement, referred to as the Additional Protocol, specified the steps to be taken during the transitional stage which was to run from 1973 until 1980 (at the earliest) or 1995 (at the latest). 5

The main aim of the Additional Protocol was the gradual elimination of tariffs and other barriers to free trade between Turkey and the Community. In the case of agriculture, Turkey undertook to "adjust its agricultural policy with a view to adopting at the end of [the transi­ tional] period, those measures of the common agricultural policy which must be applied in Turkey if free movement of agricultural products between it and the Community is to be achieved" (Article 32). In return, the E C granted Turkey a preferential zero tariff rate on products representing about 37 per cent of its agricultural exports to the Community in 1973, and partial preference for products accounting for a further 33 per cent of the total. 10 per cent of the total was in any case zero rated under the Common Customs Tariff, so that only about 17 per cent enjoyed no tariff preference. These preferences were further enlarged by an Association Council decision of Septem­ ber 1980 under which fixed customs duties on all imports of agricultural products from Tur­ key were to be eliminated by 1 January, 1987. In the case of products paying a duty of less than 2 per cent the elimination was to be completed by 1 January, 1981. For other products, duties would be reduced to zero in successive "stages between the beginning of 1981 and 1987. The agreement added, however, that "for products in respect of which the Community 142

1972 $m

%A

%T

Hazelnuts Dried Fruit Cotton Tobacco

116 47 192 131

19.1 7.7 31.6 21.6

13.1 5.3 21.7 14.8

Sub-total Total Agric. Exports Total Exports

486 607 885

80.1

54.9 68.6

•

1985 $m

%A

%T

255 107 195 330

20.3 8.5 15.5 26.3

3,9 1.7 3.0 5.1

887 1,256 6,459

70.6

13.7 19.4

Notes: %A = as percentage of total agricultural exports; %T = as percentage of total exports; Totals may not add exactly, due to rounding. Source- OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey,(Paris O E C D , April 1982} p. 61; Türkiye 15 Bankası, Review of Economic Conditions, 1986/11, (Istanbul, 1982), p. 32

Table 2 shows the main destinations of Turkey's agricultural exports by commodities, du­ ring 1979-81. Several points are worth noting. (1) With the (insignificant) exception of wine and the (significant) one of hazelnuts, the dollar value of ail items increased between 1979 and 1981 — in many cases, by very substan­ tial margins. (2) Except for dairy products, cotton, wine and tobacco, where the combined Middle East + EC-10 share was less than 50 per cent in 1981, the Community and Middle Eastern markets took the vast majority of all items. (The low Middle East + EC-10 share in dairy products was largely accounted for by a $9.2 million sale of butter to the USSR in 1981, which may well prove a "one-off item. In tobacco, the USA has traditionally taken the 143

/ lion's share of exports, and will probably continue to do so. The C O M E C O N countries are also an important market for Turkey's raw cotton exports). (3) In the case of 13 of the 19 products listed, the Community's share of total exports fell between 1979 and 1981. Only 2 of the 6 exceptions were significant items in Turkey's export list — dried figs and raisins, where the Community's share of the market increased slightly, and tobacco, where it remained constant. The signs are that this trend is only a recent one: calculations published by Hans Gsanger show that the Community's share for most agricultural exports was still on the increase during the mid-1970s (1973-76). Those commodities showing the fastest rates of growth are non-traditional items, for which the Middle East has become by far the most important market. The following pattern thus emerges: Turkey's main exports to the Community consist of luxury foodstuffs (figs, raisins and hazelnuts) and industrial raw materials (raw cotton and tobacco) for which markets are relatively stagnant. On the other hand, exports of basic foodstuffs (meat, vegetables, fresh fruit and cereal products) have expanded fast, especially to the Middle East. It will be noted that it is in the latter items that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) tends to apply higher rates of protection. This pattern reflects the overall situation of agricultural markets in the two regions. In the Community, granted the already high nutritional standards and low population growth, the demand for most foodstuffs has been stagnant, or rising only slowly. (In the case of "filler" foods, like bread and potatoes, consumption has actually fallen.) Rising productivity on European farms and the protection afforded by the C A P has also restricted food imports from non-member countries. In the Middle Eastern oil-producing states both population and incomes have been rising fast. Domestic food production has failed to keep pace, so food imports have boomed. Its geographical position puts Turkey in a strong position to sell more perishable crops to the Middle East. On the other hand, the total population of this group of countries is still much lower than that of the Community. The result is that the market for luxury foodstuffs in the Middle East is far smaller than in the E C . Nor do the oil states have substantial markets for Turkey's exports of industrial raw materials such as cotton and tobacco.

-tO'tqwi-;O (N \o Ct\ O — ei

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144

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145

Table 3: Turkey: "traditional" exports to EC-9, 1978-80 Commodity

080330 080431 080439/40 080593 240165 240169 550190 550210

Dried figs Raisins Shelled hazelnuts Oriental tobacco Raw cotton

Table 4: Turkey: "non-traditional" agricultural'elsgorts to EC-9

(3) (4) . (2) (1) Turkish ex(2) as % (1) Ave.annual % Total EC-9 change in (1) imports from ports to EC-9 1978 - 80 non-members, ave., 1978-80 ave., 1978-80 (000 tonnes) (000 tonnes) 24,8

21,2

85,5

-

3,0

(a)

Meat (total) Sheepmeat Vegetables Fresh fruit Citrus fruit Soft wheat Hard wheat Other cereals

Employment per T L bn. of output (1979)

Net exports, as % of output (1982)

1,803 1,468 1,063 1,044 1,011 859 699 676 653 579 480 203

10.8 . 41.1 14.5 - 22.9 16.0 -118.0 - 61.5 7.2 - 17.8 - 19.3 - 13.6 0.04

from Western Europe. The development of the industry has, however, brought something of a re-assessment. The prices of Turkish-made domestic appliances, for example, are not now wildly out of line with international levels. On the other hand, the range of choice cur­ rently offered to the Turkish consumer is generally very restricted. In other words, imports of consumer durables would almost certainly increase granted free trade with Western E u ­ rope, even if the imported goods had no particular price advantage. In these conditions, it is likely that Turkey's engineering industry could survive in competition with Europe, but only at the cost of some adaptation. In the case of motor cars, for instance, it is thought likely that, rather than produce complete vehicles, Turkish firms could concentrate on the production of certain components for export, and import finished vehicles in return. This implies close collaboration between Western and Turkish firms, and rapid transfer of tech- : nology. It will also mean rationalisation within the industry, and the elimination of duplica­ tion by state and private enterprises.

Notes

5

1 2

1 3

Conclusions and Prospects The fluctuations in the EC's share in Turkey's total foreign trade and the increase in that to the Middle Eastern countries which were noted in the first section of this chapter, have raised questions about the degree to which Turkey should still be committed to eventual Community membership. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that Turkey origi­ nally entered into the Association Agreement* for primarily political reasons, and that the political basis for this orientation still stands. For their part, the Middle Eastern countries 164

4 5 6 7 8

9

Statement at Özal's press conference of 7 January 1984. I.e., goods in Chapters 25-99 of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (B.T.N.), with the exception of cot­ ton: Turkey-EEC Relations 1963-1977 (Ankara: Office of the Commission of the European Communi­ ties, 1977) p. 46. The texts of the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol appear in Official Journal of the European Communities, Information and Notices, Vol. 16, no. C. 133 (24 December 1973). Additional Protocol, Annexes 1 and 2. B.T.N, positions 50.01 and 50.02; Additional Protocol, Annex 2, Article 2. Additional Protocol, Articles 12 and 16. Ibid.. Articles 20-26. Taking 1973 as 100, the indices for 1980 were as follows: employment 74.6; output 95.3; exports 115.9; imports 212.2. Source: Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu (Ankara, State Planning Organisation, 1983), p. 59. Quoted in. Financial Times Survey, Turkey, 17 May 1983, p. XII.

165

10 See for instance the statement by Güngör Yener, Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, quo­ ted İn Milliyet and Tercüman, 21 March, 1983. 11 Figure for 1983. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1984, (London: British Petroleum, 1984), pp. 4,7. 12 An exception is that of the metal products industry, which is labour-intensive but has fairly substantial net imports. This is probably due to the fact that this sector embraces a wide range of products, some of which are not produced in Turkey. Özel ihtisas Komisyonu Raporu, op.cit., pp. 52-53. Jbid., p. 45. Source: State Planning Organisation. See Bertil Walstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy: the Turkish Case (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, for World Bank, 1980), pp. 144-151, 330. 17 Source: World Bank

Chapter 10 Harun Gümrükçü*

The Turkish Labour Market and Migration

13 14 15 16

18 Calculated from Review of Economic Conditions, 1984/IV (Ankara: Türkiye Iş Bankası), p. 33 and NIMEXE, 1983. 19 Figures are for 1982; data supplied by State Institute of Statistics, Ankara 20 NIMEXE, 1981. 21 Hürriyet, 26 My 1983. 22 Another contributory factor was the revival of the domestic construction industry, and here of demand for cement: in fact, Turkey began to make small imports of cement in 1987. 23 Milliyet, 18 January 1984, 24 V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, 1985-1989 (Ankara: State Planning Organisation, 1984), p. 48.

4

\

166

Introduction With the establishment of the E C Common Labour Market, foreign labour was classified into two groups as far as European labour migration is concerned. Workers from member countries were accorded equal treatment to a great extent with the adoption of Regulation No. 1612/63 by the E C Council on 15 October 1968. The labour force from Turkey was put in the same category as workers from non-member countries, whose access to the E C labour market is regulated by bilateral agreements. With the recruitment stop in the Federal Republic of Germany in November 1973, access for Tur­ kish workers to their main country of immigration was closed. Similar measures were also taken by the other E C countries. Since then not only a restrictive immigration policy is being conducted, but also, by way of various measures and incentives for repatriation, an attempt is being made to reduce the number of Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. In contrast to this policy, the Association Agreement of 23 December 1963, and the Sup­ plementary Protocol of Brussels of 23 November 1976, provide a step-by-step introduction of freedom of movement for Turkish workers by 1986. This has been and still is one of Tur­ key's most significant demands from the EC, since freedom of movement is essential for achieving fast improvement of the labour market. However, the EC, particularly Germany, has declared that the freedom of movement for Turkish workers beginning in 1986, as provi­ ded for in the Association Agreement, was not feasible for social and economic policy rea­ sons. The reasons for this dilemma in labour policy will be the first item discussed in relation to internal and external migration. Next, the current regulations on freedom of movement and the positions of the negotiating partners will be put into perspective. Then, the longterm policy of employment promotion will be examined in terms of how such strategies may contribute towards securing social peace in the original E C countries on a long-term basis, and how they might also facilitate the southern Enlargement by contributing to the econo­ mic, social and political stability of the newcomers. Finally, in the light of this discussion, an assessment will be made as to how far such long-term policies are worth promoting.

* The author would like to thank the Hans Böckler Foundation of the Confederation of German Trade Uni­ ons, Düsseldorf, for supporting his dissertation on "Beschäftigung und Migration in der Türkei unter Be­ rücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Auswanderung auf die Volkswirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutsch­ land" , from which this paper has been developed.

167

Demographic Developments in Turkey

Until the mid-1960s, the population policy of the Turkish government was aimed at "protecting the people's existence" and promoting population growth, which had an annual rate of only 1.7 per cent. Thereafter, as was the case in almost all developing countries, the rate of increase jumped to between 2.4 and 2.8 per cent, owing to which more than three and a half times as many people were living in Turkey in 1985 than was the case in 1927. The low population increase until 1950 was a result of inadequate medical care and high rate of infant mortality. The growth rate peaked between 1950 and 1960, a period comparable to that of Western Europe a hundred years ago in terms of population trend." After 1960 a slight decline was observed, but according to the 1985 census results, contrary to expectations, population increase accelerated between 1980 and 1985, reaching an annual rate of 2.7 per cent. The State Institute of Statistics blamed largely an "organisational" error for this high figure, and as a result of further surveys and calculations made, it concluded that the real figure stood at 756,000 fewer people. Because both the allocation of parliamentary seats assigned to each province and revenue sharing with local governments at 10.3 per cent 1

2

3

Table 1; Population Trend: Census Results 1927 - 1985 and Estimates. Year of Census

1927 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Population (in thousands)

12,648 16,158 17,821 18,790 20,947 24,065 27,755 31,391 35,605 40,198 44,737 50,664***

Index*

100.0 118.4 130.6 137.7 153.4 176.3 203.4 230.0 260.0 295.6 329.2 372.5***

Average Annual Popuiation Increase (per thousand)

21.10 17.02 (19.52)* 10.59 21.73 27.75 28.53 24.62 25.19 25.00 20.65 24.88***

Estimates 1990 2000 2013

54,633 (56.941)**** 67,166 (73.029)**** 100,000*****

*

Index based on the author's calculations

**

In 1937 the Hatay Province was united with Turkey. Taking into account the population of the Province, the rate of growth would be 19.52 p.a. Revised 1985 Census figures. Calculation based on revised 1985 figures.

*** ****

***** Calculated on the basis of an average annual increase of 2.5 per cent. Sources: State Institute of Statistics, Census of Population by Administrative Division, Publication no. 954, (Ankara, 10 September 1981), p.15; Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey, Publication no. 1210, (Ankara: November, 1986).

168

of tax collected are based on resident population figures, the whole issue has been taken to court. Despite the outcome of the case, doubt has been cast on the ability of the State Institute of Statistics to provide reliable figures. Yet, given the lack of other sources, this study utilises the general census figures with these caveats in mind. The Turkish population trend is shown in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, Turkey is a long way from bringing the population growth rate down to the "reproduction level", and still maintains the highest rate in Europe, with the exception of Albania. (See Table 2) 5

Table 2: Population of the EC and Acceding Countries in 1970 and 1980 as well as Estimates until the Year 2000 Growth (per cent)

Population (in thousands) The Community of Ten

1970

2,000

1980

60,651 50,770 53,660 13,030 340 55,420 2,940 4,930 9,660 8,790

61,638 54,221 56,276 14,336 360* 55,830* 3,483 5,120 9,860* 9,790

1.6 6.8 4.9 10.0 5.9 0.7 18.5 3.0 2.1 11.4

61,000 59,000 58,000 15,000

Spain Portugal

33,780 9,040

37,935 10,056

12.3 11.2

42,000 11,000

Turkey

35,320 35,605**

46,312 44,137**

31.1 25.5**

73,000**

Germany France Italy Netherlands Luxembourg Great Britain Ireland Denmark Belgium Greece

—

57,000 6,000 5,000 10,000 10,000

Acceding Countries

* 1981. ** The figures in brackets are according to Turkish sources. See Table 1 of this essay. Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics: Weltbank, Weltentwicklungsbericht (Washington, D . C . , 1985), pp. 238 f.

Within a decade Turkey had a population increase of 25.5 per cent and is projected to be the second most populous country in Europe, after the Soviet Union, by the year 2000. However, its natural population growth differs from region to region. While eastern Turkey records a very high birth rate of 7.4 children per woman, the economically more developed areas of western Turkey show similar patterns to Europe, with an average of 4.3 children. Thus population growth is increasingly shifting from west to east. As a result the Anatolian highlands have greater population surplus, although this area of Turkey is particularly underdeveloped. Industry has not yet been established and the labour market is mainly characterised by agricultural jobs. The rapid population growth has also affected the age structure in Turkey. While a good 55 per cent of the population is of employable age, those under fifteen years of age make up almost 40 per cent. Thus, compared with Europe, the population pyramid shows an ex169

tremely wide base and is typical of a developing country. Turkey has the youngest population among European countries and this has hardly changed in the last three decades. As in the other developing countries, the age structure is a serious obstacle for the improvement of the per capita income, since it has a negative effect on the accumulation of savings. When compared with the Europe of the nineteenth century, Turkey shows both quantitative and qualitative differences in its process of development. The rapid population increase in Europe was due to the transition of society from a static to a dynamic phase. In Turkey, on the other hand, the population explosion is an independent factor that impedes economic growth leading to cumulative under-development. A solution would be to establish a balance between population growth and the receptiveness of the economy for a growing population. Additionally, a decrease in population growth could be achieved by accelerating economic and social development in the under-developed areas as well as by improving the educational system. Only then could family planning have a chance of success. In other words, a "demographic solution" must be preceded by an "economic solution", with the aim of removing the economic and social obstacles connected with the high birth rate. However, in the medium-term Turkey cannot be expected to achieve a stationary population trend. 6

7

8

With regard to Turkey's possible E C membership, however, it is important that the demographic development approaches European standards. With social and economic development differences may begin to diminish so that by the 1990s the demographic situation in Turkey can approximate the present one in Spain and Portugal. (Table 2). Nevertheless, over the next 15 to 20 years, there will be a massive increase in the young adult population, therefore new ways have to be found and strategies developed to address unemployment in the short and medium term. The Working Population in Turkey since the Association Agreement

9

170

- Total .population - population of working age (15 years and more) - Proportion of population of working age to total population (%) - Total labour force - Proportion of labour force to population of working age (%) - Total number of gainfully employed - Proportion of gainfully employed to total population (%) - Total labour surplus - Total labour surplus (%)

1962

1967

1972

1977

29,144.7

33,001.5

37,294.2

41,835.0

17,076.9

19,186.8

21,955.8

25,448.0

58.59

58.14

58.87

60.82

13,460.0

14,246.6

15,451.1

16,887.2

78.82

74.25

70.37

66.37

12,525.5

13,263.6

14,036.9

15,121.3

43

40

38

37

1,371.5

1,553.0

1,814.2

2,005.9

10.52

11.28

12.13

12.24

Source: H . Gümrükçü, Beschäftigung und Migration in der Türkei unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Auswanderung auf die Volkswirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Nürnberg, 1986), Table 7, p. 32.

During the planned period of Turkish economy (1962 - 1977) the number of gainfully employed persons increased from 12.5 million to 15.1 million, representing an annual increase of 1.2 per cent. By comparison the annual population growth was much more rapid at 2.5 per cent. Thus the labour supply during this period increased from 13.5 million to 16.9 million persons, resulting in a continuous increase in labour surplus. In this period the number of inactive persons increased from 3.6 million to 8.6 million, while the proportion of labour force to working-age population dropped from 78.8 to 66.4 per cent. Since 1950 this decrease has been occurring at an annual rate of 0.9 to 1 per cent. Also during the planned period there has been a continuous decrease in the number of gainfully employed in relation to the total population, falling from 43 per cent in 1962 to 37 per cent in 1977 (Table 3). During the planned period, employment increased by approximately 167,000 new jobs per annum as compared to the 1950 - 1957 period when the increase was 214,000 jobs annually. The sectorial distribution of employment also varied between the two periods. While in the 1950 - 1957 period 112,000 new jobs were created annually in agriculture, during the planned period the annual increase in this sector dropped to 13,000 per annum." This was in large part due to capital-intensive mechanisation in agriculture. By comparison industry and civil service annually offered 180,000 jobs, 130,000 of which were in the ter10

Table 3: The development of the labour force from 1962 to 1977 (in thousands)

tiary field . This was not, for instance, preceded by a boom that would have created these jobs, on the contrary, it was an attempt to reduce unemployment by means of a "work-for all policy", a social measure which governments adopted in the 1970s. The result was overstaffing in civil service and public enterprise. 12

Current Situation of the Labour Force Since 1978 the number of newly created jobs has dropped drastically, with industry offering no more than 6,000 new jobs per annum. At the same time, a further 72,000 were employed in the tertiary sector and in public administration under the "work-for-allpolicy" . But with the introduction of the Stabilisation Programme on 24 January 1980, this employment policy was renounced and from 1 January 1981 even a recruitment stop was imposed on the public sector. As a result of the new measures unemployment soared, the situation worsening due to an average annual loss of 12,900 jobs in agriculture as well. Between 1978 and 1982, only 68,100 new jobs (0,4 per cent increase) were offered. Unemployment figures between 1978 and 1982 are given in Table 4. 13

171

Table 4: Development of excess labour* in thousands from October 1978 to October 1982 1978 A, Overall Economy - increase in labour - increase in jobs - total excess labour B. Sectional Development - increase in jobs in agriculture ~ increase in jobs in all other sectors - total increase in jobs - increase in labour in agriculture - increase in labour in all other sectors

1979

1980

Table 5: Employment developmentfrom1977 to 1982. Situation as in October of each respective year age: 15 and over (in thousands)

1981

1982

252.9 128.0 144.9

265.1 - 10.7 255.8

277.4 -7.3 284.7

438.4 114.4 324.0

460.3 116.1 309.2

-8.6

-26.1

8.9

-8.5

-30.1

136.6 128.0

15.4 - 10.7

- 16.2 -7.3

122.9 114.4

146.2 116.1

20.0

-20.0

0

0

-35.0

124.9

275.8

284.7

324.0

344.2

* Gainfully employed persons of fifteen years of age or older. Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu, 1982 (Ankara, 1982), Table 1, p. 8.

In 1983 a provisional increase of 0.9 per cent was achieved. On the other hand, the num­ ber of persons reaching working age increased by 2.5 per cent. Together with the cycleinduced unemployment and returning guest workers the total excess labour rapidly in­ creased from 2 million in 1977 to 3.2 million in 1982 and to 3.56 million in 1983 . However, since 1983 the statistical data used by the State Planning Organisation in mea­ suring unemployment have been modified so as to project diminished rates of unemploy­ ment. According to the State Planning Organisation, unemployment currently stands at 3,087,000, indicating a levelling off at 16.7 per cent. But there are no accurate calculations of the actual unemployment rate, except among registered workers. While the number of unemployed registered workers was 201,892 right after the 24 January, 1980 Stabilization Programme, it reached 1,076,309 at the end of 1986. Because the aggregate figures for nation-wide unemployed are unreliable, this study has not taken those into account. Thus, in spite of a 6 per cent migration among the labour force, unemployment in 1982 was three times as high as it was in 1950. (Table 5). 14

15

16

!7

The growth strategy adopted after World War II was accompanied by growing foreign de­ pendency of industry. Because the developing industry was targeted toward domestic con­ sumption, it inevitably resulted in a considerable deficit in the balance of payments. While the share of exports in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1970 and 1979 dropped from 4.4 to 3.9 per cent, the share of imports increased from 6.6 per cent to 12.9 per cent . More foreign exchange had to be raised for oil imports as well as imported indus­ trial goods, since the oil price rise was reflected on the price of industrial products. Meanwhile Turkey's export opportunities were constrained- In comparison with the Magreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), Turkey was at a disadvantage. The E C conceded more extensive privileges to these countries than it did to Turkey. In 1975, for example, Turkey paid $ 2,338,22^0 for imports from E C countries, while only receiving $ 615,143 for its exports, the latter being approximately 27 per cent of the im18

19

172

A) Labour Market Development I. Civil labour supply JJ. Civil labour demand DX Labour surplus in the non-agricultural sector IV. Labour surplus in agricultural sector V. Total labour surplus V i . Total labour surplus in percent Sectioral distribution of employment Agriculture (including hidden unemployment) Mining industry Manufacturing trade Power, water and petrol Building Transport Trade Financial institutions, insurance business and real estate Other services

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

16,387.2 15,121.3

16,640.1 15,249.3

16,905.2 15,238.6

17,182.6 15,231.3

17,621.0 15,345.7

18,081.2 15,461.8

1,265.9

1,390.8

1,666.6

1,951.3

2,275.3

2,619.5

740 2,005.9

720 2,110.8

700 2,366.6

700 2,651.3

700 2,975.3

665 3,284.5

12.24

12.69

14.00

15.43

16.88

18.17

9,545.8 116.7 1,591.6 93.0 547.2 494.7 637,0

9,537.2 120.2 1,609.6 96.6 562.1 500.9 645.8

9,528.6 122.8 1,571.5 99.6 577.6 492.2 637.7

9,520.0 124.2 1,547.5 98.9 580.6 480.2 628.2

9,511.5 128.2 1,585.7 104.3 582.6 491.1 642.3

9,481.4

197.8 1,641.5

204.3 1,699.6

208.5 1,727.1

211.1 1,767.4

212.9 1,814.1

—

1,866.0

— —

—

Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu, 1982, Table 1, p. 34.

ports. However, the ratio later shifted in favour of Turkey, amounting to 60 per cent in 1981, and 71 per cent in 1982 . Nevertheless, in spite of this trend, Turkey's trade deficit with the E C continued to accumulate and between 1965 - 1982 amounted to $ 13.9 billion. This accumulating debt contributed towards Turkey's serious economic crisis. In order to overcome the crisis, obligations within the framework of the "Turkey-aid" were dictated by representatives of O E C D and IMF. Private enterprise was assigned the primary role in bring­ ing about an economic upturn through a monetarist orientation. Amongst others the aim was to eliminate the chronic inflation by way of reducing the public sector deficit and removing subsidies from crude oil products. At the same time market mechanisms were to determine prices. In the face of competitive pressure, this meant not only modernisation by means of imported and expensive technology, but also a reduction in the public sector personnel. At the same time, the struggle against inflation and high interest rates caused a decrease in domestic demand. As a result, production fell well below capacity in spite of export pro­ motion. Furthermore, in order to increase hard currency receipts, an exchange rate policy was adopted, designed at undervaluing the Turkish Lira and making Turkish products com­ petitive in international markets. Moreover export obstacles were removed as well as ob20

173

stacles impeding free flow of cash into Turkey. Simultaneously import regulations were re­ laxed to a large extent and import stamp duty was cut down from 25 per cent to 1 per cent, thus causing further deficits in exchange revenues. In retrospect it can be said that the Economic Stabilization Programme missed its aim to a large extent and led to rapid impoverishment of the greater part of the Turkish population. It was not possible to activate the Turkish economic potential in order to secure an "accep­ table growth rate" . Between 1980 and 1983, the annual increase in the G N P amounted to no more than 2.6 per cent. The per capita income, however, dropped from $ 1,346 in 1979 to $ 998.30 in 1984 recovering to $ 1.116,60 in 1986Inflation was reduced from 125 per cent in 1980 to approximately 45 per cent by the end of 1983. Nevertheless, the aim to force it down to 25 per cent by 1983 failed. The infla­ tion rate stood at 45.4 per cent in 1984, 44.9 per cent in 1985 and 34.6 per cent in 1986. Some analysts expect it to exceed 40 per cent in 1987. From January 1980 until the end of 1982 consumer prices in Ankara almost doubled and reached six-fold from 1980 to June 1987. At the same time the export volume was increased, but this was accompanied by a steady rise in imports and thus, over the last three years, a deficit in the balance of payments of about $ 17.5 billion developed. This led to a steady devaluation of the Turkish currency: from T L 47.10 to T L 827.60 for $ 1 between January 1980 and June 1987. Apart from a few branches of industry such as fertilisers and automotive industry, no sec­ tor of the economy showed more than a 60 to 70 per cent capacity utilisation, foreshadowing further increase in unemployment. Since the labour supply annually increases by over 500,000, the same number of new jobs would have to be made available in order not to in­ crease unemployment further. The magnitude of Turkey's unemployment problem becomes clearer when considering what growth rate would be required in order to provide real jobs to entrants in the labour force. With a growth rate of 5 per cent, employment would only be increased by 1 per cent and with a growth rate of 4 per cent the number of jobs would only increase by 0.5 per cent. On the other hand, in order to keep the present situation, an increase in the employment quota of at least 1.7 per cent would be necessary. In the period from 1962 to 1977 the G N P increased by 6.5 per cent, creating a growth in employment of only 1.2 per cent. The average growth rate over the last few years of 3.6 per cent has led to a drastic decline in job supply, thereby causing a precipitous increase in excess labour. This negative devel­ opment has chiefly affected women, youth and older persons. Women, who represent 52 per cent of the agricultural work force with 5,431,451 employed, constitute the majority of workers even in this sector, although 92 per cent of them work with their family without any remuneration. As the total number of women employed stands at 6,257,015, 85 per cent of the women work in agriculture and only 15 per cent in industry and the tertiary sector. The employment data for younger and older population also snows a negative trend. The number of young people unemployed between the ages of 15 and 24 rose to 1.6 million from 1977 to 1981, a trend that is expected to continue throughout the 1980s. Furthermore there are 2,095,500 economically inactive persons over the age of 54. Since the Turkish Institute of Social Security has fixed the age of men at 55 and that of women at 50, these groups were exluded from Table 6. On the other hand, persons below 55, who have retired with statutory pension after 25 years of employment, have been included, as well as those who were dis­ abled early in life. 21

22

23

24

23

26

27

174

Table 6: Structure of the economically inactive population according to age and gender (in thousands) Age Structure

Economically Inactive

Women Therefrom

2,555.2* 1,530.2* 4,240.1 8,325.5

1,424.6 (approx. 60 %) 1,167.4 (approx. 76 %) 3,867.4 (approx. 91 %) 6,459.4 (approx. 78 %)

15-19 20-24 25-54 Total

* Also included in these two age groups are 1.4 million students; without them the figure would total 2.7 million. Source: Y. Hamurdan, "1981 Yılında "Türkiye'nin Nüfusu ve Emek Piyasasının Durumu", işgücü Dergisi 2 (nos. 5 - 6, 1981), p. 22. Table 7: Structure of total labour surplusfromOctober 1979 to October 1983 Situation as in October (in thousands) A. Development of excess labour a) Those looking for work and registered with DBK b) Those looking for work on private initiative 1. Total of those looking for work (sum of a) and b)) 2. Discouraged labour force I. Labour surplus outside of agriculture (sum of I and 2) IL Labour surplus in agriculture III. Total labour surplus (sum of I and H)

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

169.1

244.8

294.5

468.7

763.500 *

533.5

651.5

680.8

635.6

—

702.6

896.3

975.3

1,104.3

964.0

1,055.0

1,300.0

1,515.2

1,666.6

1,951.3

2,275.3

2,619.5

2,895 **

700

700

700

665

665

2,366.6

2,651.3

2,975.3

3,284.5

3,560

* Situation until June 1983. ** This figure is based on own calculations. Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu 1982 (Ankara, 1982), Table 2, p. 9; cflIBKBülteni (nos. 68 - 73,1982), p. 85; (nos. 74,75,76, 1983), p. 3; (nos. 77,78, 79,1983). p. 33.

The discouraged labour force, i.e. those who have ceased looking for employment, has also increased. According to Hamurdan it amounted to 1.3 million in 1982 (Table 7). Para­ llel to that the total excess labour has been increasing, as shown in Table 7. As a result of sustained high birth-rate, Turkey has been confronted with the most serious employment crisis since 1978. What is even more alarming is the fact that the rapid increase since 1950 in unemployment and underemployment has still not peaked and, according to mediumterm forecasts, a further increase is to be expected.

175

Employment and Migration

Table 8: Development of Turkey's external migrationfrom1961 to 1982 * Men

Year

Over the past three decades Turkey pursued a growth-oriented development strategy of the "unbalanced growth" type with the aim to realise, among others, full employment. However, while an annual growth rate averaging 5 to 7 per cent could be attained, employment, as already mentioned, remained below target. The increase in unemployment was in the main due to the limited capacity of urban industry to provide jobs, combined with a simultaneous shrinkage in agricultural jobs. Owing to international competitive pressure and close association with the E C countries, Turkey has been forced to introduce mostly capital-intensive production methods. As a result there developed regional disparities and antagonistic structures in urban and rural areas. This development initiated the emergence of a segmented labour market in the urban and rural areas as well as in different sectors. At the same time, as a result of promoting industry at the expense of rural development, urban industrial centres offered considerably higher paying jobs. This was a crucial factor for increased migration to cities, whose population expansion averaged 4.4 per cent per annum from 1950 to 1980. But, despite incentives such as favourable depreciation terms and tax reliefs, industry in urban areas is only capable of absorbing a part of the migrants into the labour force. The majority of the migrants enter the informal sector, and try to find casual labour. In most cases migrants cannot do anything but open their own handicraft or service businesses, thus increasing the number of under-employed workers. The share of the informal sector is 30 to 70 per cent of the urban population living in the vicinity of these towns, with the result that the saturation point has long been reached in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, where 21 per cent of Turkey's population lives. In this manner, hidden unemployment from the rural areas is being transferred to cities in the form of urban underemployment, which is a widespread phenomenon in Turkey and should be considered as serious a problem as unemployment.

'

1,47611,185 30,328 66,176 51,520 34,410 8,947 43,205 103,975 329,575 88,442 85,229 135,820 20,211 4,419 10,558 19,084 18,852 23,630 28,503 58,753 49,388 1,023,685

.

Turkish Migration and Freedom of Movement According to Article 12 of the Association Agreement of 23 December, 1963, both the E C and Turkey have committed themselves "to be guided by Articles 48,49 and 50 of the Treaty of the Foundation of the Community in order to establish step-by-step freedom of movement for workers" . Article 48 includes the abolishment of "all discriminatory treatment of workers on the grounds of nationality with regard to employment, wages and other working conditions". Furthermore, nationals of E C member states would have precedence in placement over those of non-member countries. At the same time, certain escape clauses are incorporated as per Articles 48 and 49 of the EEC-Treaty, by means of which this freedom of movement can be largely curtailed by administrative and economic measures. Employment with public authorities, for example, is reserved for nationals. Furthermore, freedom of movement may be limited to jobs actually offered. The right of freedom of movement may also be restrictively applied for reasons of public policy, security and health. Moreover, labour migration may be made dependent on a balance between labour supply and demand in any single geographic region or economic sector.

As against this background of mass unemployment since the end of the 1950s, migration of Turkish workers abroad can be considered an extension of internal migration. Migration of Turkish labour to Europe was triggered off by the demand for labour in the highly industrialised E C countries, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany. By sending qualified workers who had been selected by recruitment offices, Turkey sustained a loss in skilled labour , which adversely affected its economic development. Nevertheless the promotion of external migration became a policy measure since the pressure on the labour market could be relieved by extensive migration, until the recruitment stop in 1973. Access to the E C Labour Market could ensure relief for Turkey. As early as 1977, the Employment and Labour Bureau of Turkey (IIBK) stated that it had received 1,031,838 applications for employment abroad . The subsequent employment crisis must have further increased the number of those wishing to migrate. However, those prepared to migrate should not be considered in the same category as the unemployed. The gainfully employed persons who wish to migrate are on average more qualified than the under-employed and unemployed, 29

34

30

32

33

1

176

Total

Excluded from these figures are: a) Workers departing as tourists, who afterwards have taken on a job; b) Persons departing as members of a family of Turkish workers, who afterwards have found em-

ployment; c) Turkish re-migrants. Source: DBK, 1982 Istatistik Ydltp, Table 19, p. 26.

Turkish Migration and the EC Labour Market

31

*

46 532 2,577 4,176 11,179 9,763 3,533 11,341 20,765 20,776 14,200 18,654 27,035 1,330 402 372 535 485 342 460 403 188 •

1,430 10,653 27,751 62,000 40,341 24,647 5,414 31,863 83,210 108,799 74,242 66,575 108,785 18,881 4,017 10,186 18,549 18,367 23,288 28,043 58,350 49,200

1961 1962 • 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total:

28

Women

ill

On the other hand, E C regulations based on these articles of the E E C Treaty also stipulate that freedom of movement is one of the fundamental rights of workers and their families. Recruitment stop, legal restrictions as well as "administrative reintegration" are incompatible with these stipulations. Likewise, migration cannot be determined only by the labour requirement of the accommodating economy. For this reason, freedom of movement has been one of Turkey's main requests from the EC, and it represents an essential labour policy measure, resulting from "unbalanced growth". Freedom of movement was entered into the Association Agreement, and was made concrete in the Additional Protocol signed in Brussels on 23 November, 1970. Under Article 36 of this Protocol, freedom of movement of workers would be implemented step by step between 1 December, 1976 and 1 December, 1986. However, at the meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council on 20 December, 1976, when the regulations governing the first stage (1 December, 1976 -1 December, 1980) were determined, Turkey's non-member status was not changed regarding free circulation. Nor was it altered in the subsequent second stage. The main objective of the Agreement, namely freedom of movement, was not addressed in these resolutions. They were merely legal improvements for those Turkish workers already working in E C countries. However, equality with nationals of member states was not achieved. Though in principle Turkish workers are subject to work permits, in practice new entry visas with work permits are hardly issued. The Turkish public was exasperated with this attitude. There was talk of breach of confidence and failure to comply with contractual provisions. There were those who, for this reason amongst others, demanded to turn away from the EC. On the other hand, owing to an unemployment rate of 10 per cent and the so-called hostility towards Turks, the E C , and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, is interested in evading the issue. So far the Federal Republic of Germany is merely prepared to make institutional improvements with regard to Turkish workers already living in the country. 35

36

37

While this conflict of interests continues, it is assumed that in the 1980s labour supply in the E C and in Turkey will increase significantly. However, according to forecasts, the demand for labour will only slightly increase in these countries until 1990. Based on current economic data, these forecasts do not, for example, take into consideration drastic measures that might be taken to fight unemployment and under-empioyment. Thus, accepting a stagnating labour demand, there remains only one alternative, namely, the prevention of full freedom of movement for workers from acceeding countries and from Turkey. However, socio-economic consequences of such barriers would be serious. Unless Turkey finds a way to increase occupational opportunities by way of external migration as well as through domestic economic measures, it will have to resign itself to having an immensely high structural underemployment and unemployment, and thereby, little stability in the future. Alternatives As mentioned, the serious problem of unemployment and under-employment that Turkey has been facing is in the main due to the policy of implementing capital-intensive production techniques despite labour surplus. So far there has been no serious attempt to use surplus labour as a growth potential, that is, giving an opportunity to the constantly increa178

sing working population" to use their working capacity productively. This can only be achieved by means of an increased employment rate over and above the growth rate of the population of working age. In Turkey, however, forecasts for increased employment lag behind the planned growth rate. Also the relief on the labour market through external migration will, in view of the employment problems in the E C countries, not be all that significant. Therefore other alternatives will have to be considered in order to decrease demographic as well as structurally induced unemployment. Two such alternatives consisting of measures to reduce labour supply and to increase labour demand are briefly presented. The measures to reduce labour supply, suggested below, centre around keeping young people and senior citizens away from the labour market. Since they would involve extremely high costs, their implementation would necessitate financial support from the EC. — Extend compulsory education from 5 to 8 years and increase in enrolment quota. — Develop and expand technical and trade schools so as to relieve unemployment and to meet the demands of industry for specific skills. — Develop a social security system to achieve a decrease in the number of gainfully employed senior citizens as well as in the work-force of rural and informal sectors. Measures to increase labour demand should be based on a consistent and independent employment policy and include the following measures, even if those are incompatible with development programmes adopted to date. — Subsidy of such labour-intensive production methods as may have potential economic advantages. — Increasing employment through preferential treatment of small industries and trade. — Abandoning measures for promoting mechanisation in agriculture. The savings achieved here could be used for subsidising investments to create new jobs in rural areas. — Development and product diversification in the fishing industry. — Regional product diversification and decentralisation of industry. — Creating government-sponsored jobs for young people between 15 and 25. Distributed on a regional basis, such a programme can be implemented without high administrative overheads. — Step-by-step reduction of annual working days from 275 to 240, and a reduction in weekly working hours from 45 to 40 in industry. — Development of part-time work opportunities. — Reduction of the trade deficit by means of increased exports into E C countries. In this connection it would be necessary to drastically reduce the E C protectionist measures towards Turkish exports. In order to achieve full employment, however, in addition to long-term family planning, structural reforms in agriculture as well as industry would be necessary, keeping employment, development and growth in tandem. A n extensive agrarian reform must be complemented by a programme of rural infrastructure, which at the same time should avoid triggering a sweeping industrialisation in rural areas by utilising returns of sales. Rather, a decentralised policy should be implemented in rural regions so that each region is gradually integrated into the economy and a long-term adjustment of regional differences in development is made possible. With such a plan, industrialisation is not seen as an exclusive alter179

20 21 22 23 24 25

native to the development of agrarian production. Rather, on a long-term basis the employ­ ment problem can only be overcome by co-ordinating both sectors. If, on the other hand, isolated strategies are adopted, pitching industrialisation against agricultural development, the result would be a stark failure to address employment problems.

Notes 1 2

3 4 5 6

7 8

9

10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Statistical Yearbook of Turkey (1983), calculated from Tables 305 and 306. With a 6.5 per cent annual growth rate unemployment would probably remain stable. Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey, Pub. no. 1210 (Ankara, 1986), p. 11¬ TÜSIAD, 1987 Yılma Girerken Türk Ekonomisi (istanbul 1987), p. 69. TÜSIAD, 1986 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi (istanbul 1986), p. 36 HBK, Is ve işçi Bulma Hizmetleri, Pub. no. 148, (Ankara, 1982), p. 21. IIBK (Labour and Labour Placement Services) estimate that only a quarter of the 500,000 young people entering the job market annually will be able to find employment.

26 "Imperatives of Employment Creation", p. 4. 27 Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, 1980 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics of Popula­ tion, 1 % Sample Results, Pub no. 962 (Ankara, September, 1981), Table 10, p. 14; Table 13, p. 19.

A . Önder, "Das türkische Strafrecht", in E . Metger and A . Schönke,eds., Das ausländische Strafrecht der Gegenwart, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1962), p. 573. Cf. A . Önder and G. Endruweit, "Neue Entwicklungen im türkischen Strafrecht", in Zeitschriftßrdie gesamte Strafwissenschaft 78 (1966), p. 326; N. Ayiter, "Nüßs ve Hukuk", in Türkiye'nin Gelişmesinde Nüßs Olgusu (Ankara: Aile Planlaması ve Ana Çocuk Sağlığı Genel Müdürlüğü, 1983), pp. 38ff. H . Gümrükçü, "Die Auswirkungen der exponentiellen Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Türkei zwi­ schen 1980 und 1985: Eine Kritische Betrachtung der Bevölkerungszählung von 1985", Forum 2 (1987). Between 1813 and 1885 the population in western Europe showed a precipitous increase. The English population increased from 9 million to 36 million, and the German from 24 million to 46.8 million. Defined as the number of births (approx. two children for each couple) at which the population of a country remains constant. Cf. E . Alkin, "Sosyo-Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Nüfus", in Türkiye'nin Gelişmesinde Nüßs Olgusu, p. 73. According to Alkin, in Turkey 8 per cent of value added is spent on demographic investments; the share of total investments compared to value added amounts to 20 per cent. The second phase of the population growth in Turkey was not due to any change in the reproduction rate but to exogenous factors such as better hygiene and medical care. In Europe the process of industrialisation started at a low level. Technical development meant replace­ ment of manual work by machines. Industrialisation in underdeveloped countries no longer simply means replacement of manual labour by highly developed and complicated machines, but rather that these machines are a precondition for certain products. Production costs respectively increase as tech­ nical know-how and specialists are required for expensive maintenance. Therefore simple parallels can­ not be drawn between the process of industrialisation of European countries and that of the underdevel­ oped countries today. See "Imperatives of Employment Creation and Economic Growth, Turkish Case, 1983 - 1988", Offi­ cial Report presented by the Council of Europe at the Second Conference of European Ministers of La­ bour on Employment (Paris, 3 - 5 May, 1983), pp. 1 - 2. Cf. Y. Hamurdan: "Türkiye' de Beşeri Kaynak Kullanımı, 1923 - 2000 ve Teknoloji Seçiminin istih­ dam Politikasındaki Yeri", in Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2. Türkiye iktisat Kongresi: III. Sosyal Ge­ lişme ve istihdam Komisyonu Tebliğleri (izmir, 2 - 7 November 1982), pp. 109 - 132. H . Gümrükçü, Beschäftigung und Migration in der Türkei unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Auswanderung auf die Volkswirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ph. D. Dissertation, Uni­ versity of Hamburg (Nürnberg, 1986), pp. 31ff. Hamurdan, pp. 116ff. f Ibid, p. 117. "Imperatives of Employment Creation", pp. 1 -3. The number of returning workers is stated to be around 70,000 - 80,000 persons annually. (1982: 87,000, 1984: 130,000). Cf. Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu, 1982 (Ankara: February, 1982), Table 1, p. 34. Milliyet, 20 September 1983. Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, Pub. no. 1040 (Ankara: December, 1983), calculated from Table 304, p. 355. s T. C. Resmi Gazete, 31 January 1976, p. 30.

28 1980 Census of Population, Table 3, p. 16. 29 External migration is effected either in two steps (from the rural areas to the urban-industrial sector and from there abroad), or as direct migration (from rural areas abroad). 30 According to the Federal Employment Office in 1971, a total of260,300 foreign workers underwent me­ dical examinations in the foreign missions of the Federal Republic of Germany. 37,900 (14.6 per cent) of the applicants were refused placement in the Federal Republic of Germany for health reasons. Bun­ desanstalt für Arbeit, Ausländische Arbeitnehmer Beschäftigung, Anwerbung, Vermittlung — Erfah­ rungsbericht 1971 (Nürnberg, 1972), pp. 46ff. 31 The percentage of Turkish workers with professional qualification placed by the offices abroad of the Federal Employment Office in 1971 was 46.3; in 1972,30.3, and in 1973, 29.7 per cent of the respective placement figures. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Ausländische Arbeitnehmer 1972/73: Beschäftigung, An­ werbung, Vermittlung, (Nürnberg, 1974), pp. 58ff, and Table 54. 32 According to statements by R. IbrahimogTu, Secretary General of the Turkish Employers' Association, Turkish economy fell short of approximately 500,000 specialists in 1981. 33 Progress Report by the General Directorate of the Turkish Labour and Labour Placement Office, regar­ ding labour placement abroad, 1961 - 1978: IIBK Genel Müdürlüğü (Ankara, 9 February 1978). 34 Official Gazette of the European Community (ABI) 217 (29 December 1964); BGBI (1964) II, p. 509. The agreement came into force on 1 December 1964. 35 BGBI (1972) II, p. 385. 36 Resolution 2/76 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement. 37 Resolution 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on the development of the Association.

• .3

180

I

181

!'

Chapter 11 Ismet Ergiin

The Problem of Freedom of Movement of Turkish Workers in the European Community Introduction

v

The relations of Turkey with the E C play a most important role in Turkish economic life. Recently, however, these relations have been weighed down by considerable problems, the solution of which is of paramount importance for Turkey's future relationship with the Community. One of the gravest problems is employment, and specifically the freedom of movement of Turkish workers in the countries of the Community. The actual coming together of millions of Turks with Europeans has by no means aided harmonious relations between Turkey and the E C ; on the contrary, it has put serious strains on the relationship. However, the employment of Turkish workers in the E C could be a way of improving economic co-operation between the two partners. What are the provisions in the founding treaties of the E C , and in the agreements establishing an association between the E C and Turkey with regard to freedom of movement? What have been the effects so far of the migration of labour in the recipient countries? 7- Is it possible to achieve freedom of movement? Shouldthat not be the case, what could Turkey demand from the EC in the form of compensation for its economic disadvantages? The present paper attempts to answer these and similar questions. The main emphasis will be on economic factors; social and cultural issues of labour migration are the subject of other papers in this volume. Approximately 75 per cent of the Turkish population living abroad is in the Federal Republic of Germany and more than 60 per cent of Turkish expatriate labour is employed there. Therefore, the question of freedom of movement of Turkish workers is literally a question of migration into the Federal Republic of Germany, which will be the focal point of the following discussion.

3

Historic Development of Worker Migration Worker migration has always been determined by economic developments, and especially by industrial development. With increasing levels of economic development and of real wages, the tendency to emigrate is considerably reduced. The employment of Italians within the E C is a good example. The industrialisation of Italy has brought about a return migration of workers and has reduced further emigration. The initial expectation of an inundation of the other five original E C countries with Italian workers did not take place. Similar developments are already observed with regard to Greeks. Employment of foreign workers in Europe, and specifically in Germany, is not a new phenomenon. Great European migratory movements occurred prior to World War I. In the eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth, Polish and Italian workers came 183

to Germany in order to work in railway and canal construction, excavation work and min­ ing, but also in agriculture. Particularly during the period of industrialisation before World War I, a considerable number of foreign workers came to the Ruhr district from the Medi­ terranean countries and from Eastern Europe. Employment of foreign labour in Germany until World War II is shown in Table 1. Table 1; Employment of foreign labour in Germany from 1880 to 1939 Year 1880 1900 1907 1910 1939

Number of foreign workers (000s) 146 505 950 691 302

Source: Economy and Statistics (1965, No. 2), page 93.

What is striking in this table is that the import of labour is chronologically related to the industrialisation of Germany. During the reconstruction period in the Federal Republic af­ ter World War II, Germany again imported much foreign labour. The Federal Republic of Germany began recruiting labour in 1952. Fast economic devel­ opment and increase in exports made labour import necessary. In the beginning the demand was covered by Italy alone but towards the end of the 1950s this no longer sufficed. At this time North African states as well as other Mediterranean countries, Greece and Turkey, also began exporting labour. E C states signed bilateral agreements with these countries. Towards the end of the 1950s, foreign labour imports had reached their first high of the post­ war period. The establishment of the European Economic Community facilitated movement of la­ bour, since free movement within the Community is a basic element of the Agreement. In the beginning of the 1960s, labour migration accelerated, until the recession of 1966 - 67 in the Federal Republic; in 1966 half a million expatriate workers left the country. In 1968 foreign labour was again being imported, and in 1973 immigration reached a record high. After 1973, owing to the world-wide energy crisis and stagnation, the Federal Republic of Germany temporarily prohibited import of labour from outside the EC. The number of for­ eigners slightly decreased from 1973 onwards. Nevertheless in 1974, 4.1 million foreigners were living in the Federal Republic of Germany, compared with only 690,000 in 1961. In the mid-1970s restrictions on the establishment of residence for members of the fam­ ily were suspended, causing a new wave of migration as family members joined workers already in the Federal Republic. * The number of foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1985 was estimated at approximately 4.4 million, about 1.6 million of whom were Turks. The percentage of aliens to the German population is 7 per cent or 1 in 15. A high concentration of foreigners is to be found in the big cities, which intensifies the problem.

184

Table 2: Percentage of foreigners in selected cities Percentage of foreigners

City

21.4 21.2 20.2 19.3 17.3 17.0

Frankurt/M Rüsselsheim Bietigheim Offenbach Stuttgart Munich

Source: G. Endruweit, "Foreign Workers between Turkish Identity and German Integration," in E Alman­ ya'da Çalışan Turk isçilerinin Toptu Dönüşleri ve Türkiye ile E Almanya'da Uyum Sağlamaları (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 1982), p. 94.

Amongst the foreign population the Turks represent the largest group, 31 per cent. Even after the end of recruitment in 1973, the number of Turks increased from 1 million to 1.5 million between 1974 and 1985, the main reasons being the migration of families from Tur­ key, the high birth rate amongst Turks, and an influx of persons asking for political asylum. Approximately 550,000 of the 1.5 million Turkish residents are employed, 250,000 are unemployed, and the remainder is made up of non-employed family members. The number of Turkish children has also reached considerable proportions: 43 per cent of all foreign children under the age of 16 are Turkish (1980). Roughly 635,000 Turkish children under the age of 18 were living in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1981.' In 1980 alone the number of Turkish children under the age of 16 increased by almost 130 per cent from about 226,000 to 520,000. Approximately 50,000 children of foreign workers join the Ger­ man labour market each year. According to estimates of the Labour Market and Professional Research Institute of the Federal Employment Office, 7 million foreigners will be living in the Federal Republic of Germany in the year 2000, even if the recruitment ban is maintained. Since the birth rate in the Federal Republic of Germany has been falling for many years, it is estimated that the German population will fall by 4 million during the same period and thus the percentage of the foreign population will continue to increase. Economic Effects of Foreign Labour

3

1. In Turkey The most significant effect is the foreign exchange remittances, which contribute towards the Turkish balance of payments. The greatest part of these transfers comes from Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. In Table 3, workers' remittances are compared to Turkey's trade deficit, which underscores the significance of these transfers. It cannot, however, be claimed that the foreign exchange received was appropriately in­ vested. Most of the remittances go to consumption, and thus have an inflationary effect. Another effect is the relief of the Turkish labour market. However, Turkish foreign labour represents only a small proportion of the unemployed in Turkey. About 1 million children reach working age every year, and an estimated 600,000 press onto the labour market; Tur­ key's export of labour into the E C has only reached comparable figures over a period of twenty years. 185

Table 3: Comparison of remittances by emigrant workers and the trade deficit in Turkey Year

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

Trade Deficit $ m.

126 108 228 162 268 264 360 494 678 769 2,245 3,338 3,168 4,043 2,310 2,802 5,000 4,230 3,097 3,507 3,623 3,385 3,648

Foreign Exchange by Emigrant Labour $m

As % of Trade Deficit

8.1 69.8 115.3 93.0 107.3 140.6 273.0 471.3 740.1 1,183.2 1,426.2 1,312.3 982.7 981.7 983.0 1,694.4 2,071.1 2,490.0 2,187.0 1,513.0 1,807.0 l',774.3 1,597.0

6.4 64.6 50.6 57.4 40.0 53.3 75.8 95.4 109.2 Î53.9 63.5 39.3 31.0 24.4 42.6 60.5 41.4 59.0 71.0 43.1 49.9 52.4 43.8

Source: Turkish Ministry of Commerce.

Third, the propensity to save on the part of the Turkish workers is relatively high. Their savings in the Federal Republic of Germany are estimated at D M 20-30 billion. Attempts to mobilise these savings for the development of the country, however, have been unsuccessful owing to a lack of confidence. A pilot project for re-integration of Turkish workers and their savings has so far not had any success. Forth, an economic self-help initiative by Turkish workers abroad is to invest their sav­ ings in ' 'foreign labour companies'', in Turkey. As can be seen in Table 4, until 1980 these "employees' companies" had approximately 234,000 members (104,000 of whom were foreign workers) and had started 180 projects, 100 of which were realised. The total number ofjobs to be created by realising all of the projects is estimated to be about 20,000, but taking into consideration secondary employment effects, this figure Wild be approximately 40,000. To what extent these companies will promote the development process in Turkey depends on their success. To date-, however, the majority of the "employees' companies" have failed due to poor management and marketing, unfavourable location, and too little in­ vestment capital.

186

2. In the Federal Republic of Germany Turkish employees noticeably relieve the German labour market and the bottlenecks ex­ isting there. Even with 2 million unemployed, the German economy cannot do without Tur­ kish labour in many sectors. Moreover, the inflow of foreign labour has promoted the relatively undisturbed growth of the German economy. In the main, Turkish labour is employed in branches of industry in which jobs are considered unattractive by German workers, but which are nevertheless indispensable for a modern economy, such as the building industry, mining, or garbage col­ lection. Table 4: The Structure of the Employee's Companies (1980) Number of companies

Registered capital (İn million TL)

Investment (in million TL)

Members a) total b) foreign labour

Total of gainfully employed

100

3,555

8,289

a) 162,129 b) 78,775

10,942

Projects m the investment Phase

63

2,000

7,728

a) 65,854 b) 25,549

8,143

Projects in the planning Phase

17

169

2,401

a) 6,463 b) 449

1,668

180

5,724

18,418

a) 234,446 b) 104,773

20,753

Realized projects (companies)

Total

Source: T . C . Çalışma Bakanlığı, Yurtdışı işçi Sorunları 1981 (Ankara, 1981), p. 33.

Third, foreign labour supply has made employment more elastic, curbing wage increases and thus maintaining competitiveness in exports. Without foreign labour, the tendency to in­ flation existing in almost all countries would most probably have spread considerably in Germany. Fourth, on the other hand, the possibility of employing unlimited numbers of foreign wor­ kers has removed the incentive to invest capital for rationalisation purposes and thereby hin­ dered the increase in productivity. Freedom of Movement in the EC Apart from tree mobility of goods and capital, full economic integration also requires freedom of movement of workers. A common market without inter-state freedom of move­ ment of persons would be inconceivable. To raise basic objections in this matter would mean to disapprove the idea of an economic community and to replace it by the narrower idea of a customs union. The legal foundations for the freedom of movement of workers within the E C are laid down in the Treaty of Rome, Articles 48-50. According to the Treaty, freedom of movement 187

of workers means "the abolition of any differentiated treatment of workers of member states based on nationality with regard to employment, remuneration and other working conditions". Freedom of movement, however, may be limited for reasons of public policy, security and health. Migration of workers from non-member countries is regulated by bilateral agreements between the individual member states of the Community and non-member countries. These agreements provide for collective migration regulated by governmental commissions. Thus individual migration is not possible. The details regarding freedom of movement are laid down in the so-called E C regulations. The particular phases of development of the freedom of movement of workers are indicated therein. 4

5

6

1) Regulation No. 15/1961

7

The regulation provides direct, established law for all member states. The jurisdiction for this no longer remains with the national states but with the institutions of the EC. The most significant articles of the regulation are: — Every worker of a member state is entitled to carry out paid employment in another member state, if, within a period of three weeks, no national applicant has been found (Art. 1). —- In the case of proper employment the applicants, after a period of one year, are entitled to the extension of their work permit for the same job, after a period of three years for another job within their scope of knowledge, and after a period of four years they are entitled to any job under the same conditions that apply for national employees (Art. 6). — Spouses as well as children under the age of 21 may join the employee i f he can prove adequate living quarters (Art. 11). 2) Regulation No. 38/1964

8

This regulation enlarges the freedom of movement for workers within the Community. According to this regulation the priority for the domestic labour market is abolished and workers from other member states have a right to a work permit. This permit is not dependent on the above-mentioned period of three weeks (Art. 1). However, the abolishment of the priority for the domestic labour market can be annulled in the event that there is an excess supply of labour in a particular profession or in a specific sector (Art. 2). The principle of equality of treatment was enlarged by granting the same rights and privileges as nationals hâve in obtaining accommodation (Art. 10). The work permit is aot regionally limited and may not, with the exception of the first year, be limited to one particular employer. 3) Regulation No. 16Î2/1968

9

With this regulation, complete freedom of movement of workers within the Community was realised before the end of the transitional period (31 December 1969): — The obligation to seek jobs through labour exchanges is lifted. Article 1 states: "Every national of a member state is entitled to carry out a job within the wage and salary condi188

tions in the territory of another member state in accordance with the legal and administrative provisions applicable to employees in the said state." The exception is the sector of public administration, as per Article 48/4 of the E E C Treaty. — For the purpose of finding a job, applicants are entitled to remain in another member state for a period of three months without a residence permit. In the event that the applicant finds employment, he will be given a residence permit for a period of five years (exceptions are only possible for reasons of public policy, security or health). — A work permit is no longer necessary. However, proof of accommodation is still necessary for the reunification of families. Also in those cases where, as a result of disturbances in the labour market, if serious danger to the standard of living and employment arises, suitable information measures must be taken in accordance with Article 20, in ^, order that nationals of the other member states do not seek employment in a particular area or profession. — The principle of equal treatment was again enlarged upon and now includes, among others, remuneration, improvements, professional training and re-training, social and tax benefits, etc. The regulation regarding freedom of movement was supplemented by further regulations, namely 1251/1970, 1407/1971 and 574/1972. Thus formal obstacles to migration on the labour markets within the Community were essentially abolished and considerable progress toward integration was achieved. But there are still unresolved problems, and in order to solve these, increased co-ordination of employment policy will be needed by the Community. Provisions of the Law on the Freedom of Movement of Turkish Workers Labour migration from Turkey into the E C has lately become the most serious problem between Ankara and Brussels. The Association Agreement of 1963 between the E C and Turkey provided that the partners "be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC-Treaty, in order to establish step-by-step freedom of movement of workers" (Article 12). The Agreement also provides for lifting the restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to perform services between Turkey and the E C (Articles 13 and 14). However, the inflow of Turkish workers into the E C which started in the 1960s, was, to a large extent, independent of the Association Agreement. Turkey's labour export was based solely on the bilateral agreements between Turkey and the individual E C states. In the negotiations concerning entry into the transition phase of the Association Agreement, the regulations on the freedom of movement of Turkish workers were of great importance. Article 36 of the Additional Protocol states that "the freedom of movement of workers between the member states of the Community and Turkey will be established step by step between the end of the 12th and the 22nd year of the coming into effect of said Agreement in accordance with the principles of Article 12 of the Association Agreement". Also, with regard to working conditions, remuneration and social security, Turkish workers were to be treated in the same manner as citizens of the member states. Article 37 of the Additional Protocol lays down that "each member state provides a regulation for workers of Turkish nationality employed in the Community that working conditions and remuneration show no discrimination of workers who are not nationals of other member states owing to nationality". 189

Admittedly, at the beginning of the 1970s the problems of foreign labour became quite obvious in the Federal Republic of Germany. These problems led to a recruitment stop of foreign labour from non-member countries at the same time as the Additional Protocol came into effect. Thus the realisation of the regulations of the Additional Protocol was jeopardised. Turkey considers this measure a violation of the spirit of the Association Agreement. Already in 1976 the Turkish government wanted to start the realisation of the freedom of movement provided in the Additional Protocol. After the meeting of the Association Council had been twice postponed, both parties reached an agreement. This agreement provided a first four-year step for the realisation of Article 36 of the Additional Protocol. However, during this period (until 20 December, 1980) the measures to be taken were limited in that only the situation of Turks already working in the Community could be improved. In further intensive negotiations between the E C and Turkey in 1979 and 1980, the problem of labour was again the central issue. The initial position on either side, however, had not changed and therefore no progress was made during the negotiations with regard to the stepby-step realisation of freedom of movement of labour. As a result, the opening of the German and the wider European labour market for Turkish labour did not materialise. 10

In the meantime the basic policy on the freedom of movement of labour was revised, particularly on the insistence of the Federal Republic of Germany, but the other member states of the E C tacitly endorsed this policy. Freedom of movement as promised in the agreements and protocols seems to be out-dated owing to the changes in the world economy. Alternatives and priorities, however, have not yet been established. Economic Development in the European Community and the Federal Republic of Germany. From the foundation of the E C until the oil crisis of 1973-74, the Community was able to record a fast growth. These times seem to belong to the past: growth of G N P has since slowed down. At present there are over 12 million unemployed in the Community; the Federal Republic of Germany has recorded the greatest increase. Companies had to reduce their capacities and some E C countries experienced record deficits in the balance of trade. The late 1970s was also a period of high inflation. Youth unemployment in the Community is one of the most significant problems. There are 4 million young people among the unemployed, approximately 40 per cent of the total. Although numerous special measures have been introduced to fight youth unemployment, young people remained the primary victims of the recession period. Youth unemployment will remain a problem until the E C succeeds with its macroeconomic measures to bring about an improvement of the general economic and employment situation." The most significant cause of all this negative development is the fact that the economies of the E C countries had difficulty in adapting to new world economic conditions. The changes in world economic conditions were caused in the main by the rise in crude oil prices (in particular by the energy import prices), by the world-wide inflation, and the international monetary fluctuations that impaired investment activity. In fact, the macroeconomic measures introduced by the E C did manage to achieve some of the targets. A slight improvement in the international economic climate in 1983-1985 could not be overlooked. Prices in most E C countries no longer rose as quickly as they did two years previously; in 1986 inflation declined further; interest rates everywhere are lower 190

Table 5: Ratios of Economic Development in Selected Industrial Countries 1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1984

1983

a) Industrial production — proportional changes in comparison with the previous period, per cent. Belgium FRG France Netherlands EC-10 USA Japan

2.4 2.0 1.6 0.9 2.5 5.7 6.2

4.3 5.5 4.7 2.8 4.9 4.4 8.4

-1.0 -0.8 -0.7 0 -0.8 -3.6 7.1

-2.9 -1.4 -2.3 -1.8 -2.2 2.7 3.2

0 -2.4 -1.5 -2.7 -1.6 -8.2 1.0

2.0 0.6 0.8 2.1 0.9 7.8 3.6

2.5 3.0 2.3 5.2 2.8 12.4 11.1

b) Rate of unemployment — as percent of civil working population. Belgium FRG France Netherlands EC-9 USA Japan

8.4 3.9 5.2 4.1 5,4 6.0 2.2

8.7 3.4 6.0 4.1 5.4 5.8 2.1

9.4 3.4 6.4 4.7 6.0 7.1 2.0

11.6 4.8 7.8 7.2 7.9 7.6 2.2

13.7 6.9 8.8 10.0 9.5 9.7 2.4

14.3 8.4 8.8 14.3 10.4 9.6 2.7

14.4 8.4 9.9 14.5 10.9 7.5 2.7

4.5 4.1 10.7 4.3 10.2 11.3 3.6

6.6 5.5 13.6 7.0 14.1 13.5 8.0

7.6 5.9 13.4 6.9 12.6 10.3 5.0

8.7 5:3 12,0 5.9 10.7 6.2 2.6

7.7 3.3 9.6 2.7 8.3 3.2 1.9

6.4 2.4 7.3 3.2 7.2 4.3 2.2

-2,064 8,939 -6,194 -2,622 •22,961 -27,146 -5,574

-4,993 3,615 -16,948 -2,981 -47,829 -26,113 -7,700

-5,418 i 1.239 -17,283 1,320 -32,034 -35,538 7,831

-3,082 21,599 -24,457 3,500 -28,344 -43,518 7,034

-2,435 18,501 -15,628 4,499 -20,422 -77,969 23,072

c) Consumer prices — annual increase, per cent. Belgium/Luxemburg FRG France Netherlands EC-10 USA Japan

4,5 2,7 9.1 4.2 7.6 7.6 3.8

d) Trade balance, in million E C U , Belgium/Luxemburg FRG France Netherlands EC-10 USA Japan

-2,890 1,5967 -4,081 -2,198 -5,782 -31,014 14,285

-4,S91 24,136 -13,130 4,740 -24,086 -15,628 42,599

Source: E C Commission, Directorate General of Economy and Finance, European Economy: Supplement A, no 3 (March, 1983); Supplement A , no 1 (January, 1986); Supplement A , no 2 (February, 1986).

than in 1981; most countries have managed to check their deficits in the budget; a number of E C countries took steps to reduce their public spending; oil has become cheaper; wages do not rise as fast as they did previously. In some of the Western countries the economy has recovered. For 1986 the following growth rates were projected: Federal Republic of Germany 3.3 per cent, England 2.3 per cent, USA 2.7 per cent and Japan 3.5 per cent. Progress can also be seen in the recapitalisation of the E C net visible and invisible exports. In 1986 the trade balance was expected to profit from the relative development of the export and import volume as well as from an improvement in the terms of trade. These improvements, however, cannot hide the dimensions the economic problems have assumed. The old, well-proven remedies do not work any longer. The exchange rates of the 12

191

key currencies fluctuate considerably and add a further element of uncertainty. Protectionist developments in world trade do not cease. Interest rates have dropped but when deducting the rate of inflation from the interest rates, there still remains an extremely high real rate of interest. When interest rates are high everywhere, it is nevertheless attractive to invest money in papers yielding high interest instead of using the money for buying capital goods for creating new jobs. Thus it is obvious that it will be difficult to reduce unemployment in the E C countries to any great extent, as long as the rate of interest remains high. Also it cannot be said with absolute certainty that the measures undertaken by the E C will suffice to make possible a lasting and self-sustaining recovery. The economy of the Federal Republic of Germany is also in the process of adapting to new conditions: payment of taxes on oil, high interest policy of the United States, more increase in wages than in productivity (cost-push inflation), weak German competitive ability, etc. Although the economy has slightly recovered and the balance of payments shows once more a surplus, there are at present 2.3 million unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Unemployment has become the number one subject. Unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is of a structural nature, reflecting the after-effects of the years with a high birth-rate (beginning of the 1960s) on mass unemployment, particularly amongst the young people. In 1985, for example, more than 180,000 young people remained without training and work. About 200,000 new workers per annum from the high birth-rate years will still be pressing into the labour force until 1990, 150,000 of them German and a further 50,000 foreign labour. The latest forecasts of the Institute of Labour Market and Professional Research refute the hope that soon there will be an improvement of the labour market situation. According to these forecasts gaps amounting to several million jobs are expected oyer the next ten years. This result, however, would be modified if different growth rates were assumed. In this connection the individual results of the findings by the Institute are of interest. Apart from demographic situation and economic growth, the most important factors that determine labour supply and demand are productivity and working hours. Taking these into consideration, the Institute of Labour Market and Professional Research has developed three scenarios based on growth rates and different policies regarding labour migration. These are as follows. Scenario 1: The number of foreign gainfully employed persons increases by 55,000 per annum, by the moving up of the second generation of foreigners as well as by further migration of foreigners. In view of the southern Enlargement of the E C , a further additional migration of foreigners to the tune of 30,000 persons per annum is expected in 1988. a) If economic growth in the coming years comes to an average of 2-2.5 per cent, then the demand for labour will steadily decrease. In this case the number of unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany will be about 4.4 million in 1990,4.5 million in 1995, and approximately 4 million in 2000. b) Should economic growth in the coming years average 3 per cent, then it is expected that the demand for labour will remain unchanged. The number of unemployed will increase at first (until 1990) and then drop, according to tendency, and will then reach today's figure again only in the year 2000 (2.5 million unemployed). Scenario 2: No migration of foreigners. The growth of gainfully employed foreigners will only be the result of those foreigners born in the Federal Republic of Germany (the second generation of foreigners reaching working age). 13

14

15

192

a) Should economic growth amount to an average of 2-2.5 per cent, then there will be about 3.9 million unemployed in 1990, 3.1 million in 1995, and in the year 2000, 3 million unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. b) If economic growth amounts to 3-3.5 per cent, then unemployment is not removed but under control. At the close of the century full employment could be achieved. c) Should the economic growth amount to 4-4.5 per cent, then the labour market problem will just about retain its present dimensions until 1990. During the 1990s full employment could be achieved. Scenario 3: The number of foreign labour remains constant (2.5 million). However, this could only be possible by repatriating a portion of second generation of foreigners reaching working age. In this case the labour market situation would be improved in all three growth variants. At a growth rate of 3-3.5 per cent full employment would be achieved towards the close of the century, at a rate of 4-4.5 per cent, already prior to 1995. In either case labour supply would even exceed labour demand at the turn of the century. Some significant results can be deduced from the calculations of the Institute for Labour Market and Professional Research. 1. There is no fool-proof remedy for the elimination of mass unemployment. Apart from low growth rate, world-wide recession, automation and rationalisation hinder the reduction in unemployment. Furthermore the increase in foreign population in the Federal Republic of Germany and the expansion of the E C aggravate the employment problem. Therefore new strategies are needed to fight mass unemployment. 2. At an economic growth rate of under 3 per cent, the target of full employment will in no case be reached in the Federal Republic of Germany in this century. What is more, in this case the difference between supply and demand will increase. 3. In the event that the growth rate over the next years reaches an average of over 4 per cent, then full employment could be achieved in the 1990s. Since the population of the Federal Republic of Germany has been decreasing since the 1970s, recruitment of foreign labour would, in such a case, be unavoidable, unless the gap would be filled by automation and rationalisation. Conclusion The discussion so far has shown that the Federal Republic of Germany in particular has reached its absorbtion capacity limit as far as foreigners are concerned. The Federal and Länder governments have even decided that the foreign population in the Federal Republic of Germany may not increase, not even in the event that the labour market situation should happen to improve again. That means that the freedom of movement of Turkish workers within the E C planned for 1986 cannot be realised in Germany under the present conditions. On the other hand, the step-by-step realisation of the freedom of movement was contractually guaranteed to Turkey. We have not investigated what compensations the E C could offer in the event of non-performance of the regulations of the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol. This will be an important item in future negotiations between Turkey and the EC. Renunciation of the freedom of movement will have to be accompanied by economic compensations. 193

The problem of foreign labour reveals itself as a complicated, difficult and serious prob­ lem not only in the host countries but also in Turkey. The present stagnation in the relations between Turkey and the E C gives pause for thought. Solutions have to be found, but there are many questions and few answers. As regards these problems, experts from both governments should work out a concept as quickly as possible, which, on the one hand, would relieve the Federal Republic of Ger­ many from the pressure of Turkish workers, and, on the other, would properly get Turkey started on finding a solution to its economic and social problems. Even the universities and research institutes of both countries should seriously look into these problems and make constructive suggestions for the solution of these problems. Until the problem of the free­ dom of movement has been cleared, the Federal Government should not take unilateral measures and should always discuss the question of Turkish workers with the Turkish go­ vernment. It is of the utmost importance that Turkish workers are not forcefully sent home and that no pressure is applied in this direction, since such a policy would gravely strain German-Turkish relations. It should also be noted that the Federal Republic of Germany be­ ars particular responsibility for those foreign workers who migrated before recruitment was halted in 1973.

Notes

1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 ' 12 13 14

15

Cf. A . Barışık, Turquie — OCDE: Systeme d'observation permanante des migrations (Ankara, 1982), p. 7ff. Avrupa Dergisi (Ankara: Eylül, 1982), p. 31. in connection with this problem cf. F . Voigt, "Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte", m Das Gastarbeiterproblem (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1975), pp. 17. Art. 48 (2) of the EEC-Treaty. Art. 48 (3) of the EEC-Treaty. Cf. H . Werner, "Freizügigkeit der Arbeitskräfte und die Wanderungsbewegungen in den Ländern der E G " , reprint from Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt' und Berufsforschung, vol. 6 (Stuttgart, 1973), p. 327. EC Gazette, no. 57 of 26 August 1961. EC Gazette, no, 62 of 17 April 1964. EC Gazette, no. L . 257 of 19 October 1968. Cf. H . Kramer, Die Türkei: Gefährdeter Partner der Allianz: Ansatzpunkte för Beiträge zur wirt­ schaftlichen, sozialen und sicherheitspolitischen Stabilisierung (Ebenhausen, 1981), p. 124. Cf. E C Commission, Directorate General of Economy and Finance, European Economy, Supplement A-No. 3 (March, 1983), p. 7. * Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Tur­ key, Economic Report 1986, p. 230, Table 112. Cf. L . Kippers, "Integrationspolitik aus Landessicht", in F. Almanya'da Çalışan Türk işçilerinin Toplu Dönüşleri Semineri (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 1982), p. 163. The findings of the Institute for Labour Market and Professional Research have been taken from E . Rossberg's "Das Thema Nummer 1", in Scala 9 (1983), p. 15ff; D. Martens, "Zukünftig keine Vollbe­ schäftigung mehr?" Der Spiegel, no. 49, 6 December 1982, p. 34. It is supposed that productivity in the coming years will be poorer than in the past and that the working hours will continue to show the same trend, wifh-an annual reduction averaging about one per cent.

194

Chapter 12 Geoffrey Denton

Economic Implications for the Community of Turkish Membership

Assessments^ implications of Turkish membjasbipj^ .shji^TXirkeyj^ ' It involves forecasting a¬ bout 15-20 years ahead the economic development of the EC, the economic development of Turkey, and the development of Community membership and policies. Some guidance can be obtained from looking at the current impact on the E C if Turkey were to become a member now, but those indications must be second-best. The forecasting problems are also exacerbated by the very uncertain state of the world economy, given the great changes in technology, in the distribution of industrial production, and in world trade flows that are occurring. This paper will therefore attempt to assess the economic impact by using a com­ bination of current assessment and forecasting of the future developments. Section 1 will outline some existing facts about the structure of the Turkish economy and its trade and other relations with the EC, with special reference to comparisons with the states involved in the second Enlargement of the EC, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Section 2 will outline a scenario for the future shape of the E E C and its policies in 2000. Section 3 will make some guesses about the development of the Turkish economy between 1983 and 2000. Sec­ tion 4 will then attempt to combine the previous three sections to outline the impact Turkish membership may have on the EC, on the assumption that Turkey may join the Community about 2000. The assessments will all cover the four major economic areas that are relevant: industry, agriculture, budgetary and financial questions, and labour movements. 1. The Structure of the Turkish Economy as it affects the EC The Turkish population of 45m (1980) makes it one of the larger European countries, ran­ king with Germany, France, Italy and the U K in the EC-Ten, and with Spain among the pre­ sent Applicants for membership. The Turkish economy is, however, much smaller than that of the major E C countries. The G D P in 1980 was $54 billion compared with $280 billion for the U K and $620 billion for Germany. The G D P per capita in 1980 was only $1,200, compared with £ 5,000 in the U K and $ 9,580 for Germany. Even allowing for the normal problems of comparability of G D P statistics, the contrasts are so enormous that they imme­ diately reveal the crucial question about Turkish membership of the EC. While the size of the Turkish economy may be reassuring from the point of view of its potential for industrial competition with the existing members, its low income per capita is alarming because of the potential burden on the financing of E C regional and social policies. 2

195

The following list provides basic economic data for Turkey, with comparisons, where possible, with the EC-Nine, Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS), and the EC-Twelve. There is no need for detailed verbal description of these statistical comparisons, but a few comments may pick out salient features. 1. Turkey has many features of an L D C at an early stage of the industrialisation process. Its GDP per capita is less than one quarter of the EC-Nine average, only two-fifths that of the poorest major country of the EC-Twelve (Spain, $ 2,900). 2. Turkey is a largely self-sufficient economy, except for dependence on oil, so far as visible trade is concerned. Its proportion of G D P traded (15 per cent) is lower than for most LDCs. These statistics are particularly unreliable, however, because oil price movements since 1973 have had a large impact on annual import values and the trade deficit and unofficial exports and imports go unrecorded but are thought to be massive. (Hale, 1981).' 3. Trade with the E C is lower as a percentage of total trade than for GPS, but is still substantial. (Imports from the EC-Nine, 29 per cent; exports to the EC-Nine, 43 per cent of total trade.) These statistics of E C trade dependence are, however, also strongly affected by the significance of oil in total imports, the increase in oil prices after 1973, and the consequential development of exports to and worker's remittances from the Middle East and North Africa. It is not certain how long this oil effect on reducing the proportion of Turkey's trade with the E C will continue, and for the longer term trade with the E C may be much more significant to Turkey than recent trends suggest. 4. Exports to the E C have a relatively simple structure. The major agricultural export, cotton, is not a competitor with existing EC-Nine, or GPS production. The second major export, hazelnuts, competes only with a very small Spanish export (in 1978). Dried grapes and figs, and oriental-type tobacco, compete with substantial exports from Greece to the EC-Nine. 5. Textiles are by far the most significant industrial product exported to the EC. Most tex¬ - tiles exports are classified as "sensitive", and they compete with exports from GPS, as well as with exports from many other countries, and with EC-Nine production. 6. The existing potential for Turkish competition in E C markets can be assessed on the basis of an index of "export similarity" as used by Donges (1982) . The index is defined as the percentage of exports of one country which is matched by another country's exports to the same market. Donges' results for the five most valuable Turkish exports to the EC-Nine were indices with respect to competition with Spain of 71.4; with Greece of 40.5, and with Portugal of only 6.6. (The overlap with Greece in exports of dried fruit and tobacco is apparent in Donges' tables. The explanation of the high index for trade with Spain is not.) 7. On the side of manufacturers, Turkey's concentration on the export of textiles, especially those classified as sensitive, indicates a high degree of export similarity with GPS, and with the EC-Nine's own production. Turkish exports of these products have been subjected to restrictions, despite the Association Agreement. 2

2. The European Community in 2000 To forecast the future of an institution like the E C thirteen years ahead is extremely difficult. This can be shown by reference to some surprising developments in the previous history of the Community, which could not have been forecast. Who would have believed in 1957, at the signing of the Treaty of Rome, that by 1966 a national veto would have been established with respect to any declared vital interest? Who, in 1960, or in 1963, would have forecast that by 1973 Britain and Denmark would have left EFTA and joined the EC? To describe the state of the EC in 2000 is to indulge, therefore, in speculation of the most airy kind. Nevertheless, it must be done if one is to provide any kind of basis for considering what kind of Community Turkey may be joining, or developing its Association with, by that year. The starting point must be a general appreciation of the political and economic situation in the world at large, since this must determine the pressures on the member states either to develop, or to run down the Community, or to allow it to stagnate. Politically, one must expect that the pressures that have in recent years caused a substantial development of political cooperation among the member states, even if outside the formal Community framework, will .continue. The power and influence of the US will continue to decline in comparative terms, while the dichotomy between the military strength and the political and economic weakness of the Soviet bloc will intensify. Political and economic instability in the Middle East, in Latin America and elsewhere must be expected to continue. The need for Western Europe to increase its co-operation in order to protect its interests in a rapidly evolving world order will be stronger than ever. Political co-operation may develop much more toward a common foreign policy, and this should lead to defence co-operation (common procurement, etc.) and to technological and industrial common policies. These in turn would require development of the Community's economic and financial structure and of its institutions. Economically, we should expect that the relative strength of the E C , together with that of the US and probably the Soviet bloc, will diminish relatively to the newly industrialising countries in East and South Asia, in Latin America, and in the Middle East. The recent easing of pressures in the markets for energy and other commodities may prove to be shortlived, and competition for both supplies of raw materials and markets for finished products, will intensify. High levels of unemployment will persist in the E C countries throughout the 1980s, but by the early 1990s we should expect that labour markets will have adjusted, with many and far-reaching social changes, so as to restore a new kind of reasonably full employment, but at lower levels of hours of work, longer holidays, earlier retirement, etc. Even if economic growth resumes at reasonably rapid rates, it will be different in kind from growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, emphasising services, using less energy and materials, and very economical in its demands on labour. The member states will find the E C institutional framework essential in co-ordinating their adaptations to the new work situation, in restoring full employment, avoiding the worst excesses of inflation, and maintaining a common external policy to secure their imports of energy and raw materials and the "orderly" marketing of their exports to third countries and imports from third countries into the EC. Thus for both political and economic reasons we must anticipate that the E C will be developing further in the direction of economic and political union during the period to 2000. There will of course be substantial resistance to this development. At various times the external pressures will lead to irrational and unhelpful "beggar-my-neighbour" poli-

196

197

cies, such as the present "recapturing of the national market" that is popular in some member states. Not only the British Labour Party may persuade itself that a chauvinistic approach would be to the national advantage. But common sense must lead Western European nations to understand that the Community is even more important during a difficult economic period than it was during the period of rapid and stable growth in the 1960s; and that similarly the political and strategic benefits are most marked when the world scene is unsettled and the protection of the US "umbrella" has been diminshed. Although the accession of Portugal and Spain will have exacerbated the difficulties of the C A P by adding new dimensions of Mediterranean-type production and of net imports by poor countries of high-priced northern produce, the agricultural problems will have been ameliorated by another thirteen years of adaptation, including further massive outflows of labour from the land, notwithstanding the labour market problems that will thereby be exacerbated. The pressure of net importing countries to reduce the surpluses by maintaining lower intervention prices will have been strengthened by Portuguese and Spanish accession, while the resistance from the agricultural lobbies will have been weakened by the further reduction in the numbers of farmers. With increasing adaptation required of industrial workers, the priority given to farmers in the Rome Treaty, and since largely maintained, must be diminished. We may therefore expect that the CAP will take a smaller proportion of the E C Budget, and that more emphasis will have been placed on national measures, in so far as some national governments wish to provide support which other governments are not prepared to finance through the common policy. Industrial, including R & D, policy will be taking a larger share, as will regional and social policy, especially labour market policy. With such marked shifts in the emphasis of Community policies and financing, there will have been an increase in the VAT rate, despite the reluctance which will have been overcome by the late 1980s, as the problems or structural adaptation overtake those of stabilisation on governments' lists of priorities. These developments and changes in the balance of E C policies will have required substantial institutional changes. The national veto will have been more closely defined, and limited to the really vital areas, leaving scope for majority decision-making on many of the details of policy. The Council of Ministers will have improved its functioning by coordinating decisions of the Agriculture and other Ministers better with those of the Finance Ministers (on the Budget) and with the Foreign Ministers (on external political) including political-economic affairs. The Council Secretariat and the Permanent Delegations will have developed into a more satisfactory permanent "Cabinet Office" for the Community. The Parliament will have extended to some extent its powers, both over many of the new areas of policy in which its deliberations will have been important in determining common policies, and over the increased size and more balanced and varied scope of the Budget. The Commission will not have developed so much its role as legislative initiator, but will increasingly operate as an executive to handle the increasing load of responsibility for implementing Community policies. Vie Development of the Turkish Economy to 1995 The Turkish population was still growing at a rate of over 2 per cent per annum in 1975-80. Assuming that growth continues at aVate not much lower than this, the population by 2000 would be around 65 million. Since population in other E C countries will be grow198

ing much slower, if at all, Turkey will probably be more populous by the last years of the century than any other EC-Twelve member state except Germany. To forecast any other developments than the demographic ones requires some assumptions,, which are at least as formidable as those needed in Section 2 to assess the future development of the E C and its policies. However, if developments in the Turkish economy are unfavourable, membership of the E C in 2000 will be out of the question. Therefore the only relevant assumptions are those that would create the conditions in which Turkey could be in a position actively to seek E C membership, and to be accepted by the EC-Twelve. The Turkish economy has in the last decades been growing much faster than that of the EC-Nine or the EC-Twelve. Real G D P rose 5 1/2 times between 1950 and 1980. Since population more than doubled, per capita growth was lower, but even so per capita G D P rose more than 2 1/2 times in the same thirty years. Rates of economic growth were higher than the German, and twice as high as the U K growth rates. These typical statistics for a developing country in the "take-off phase were matched by other indicators; literacy rates doubled from 19 to 41 per cent of the total, proportion of GDP contributed by agriculture fell from 41 to 27 per cent, while that contributed by industry grew from 13 to 28 per cent. Extrapolation of these data to 2000 is not possible. A progressive slowing down in rates of growth and structural change is a normal statistical feature of economic development. Moreover, many changes in Turkey, and in the world economy could affect its economic development. However, the best assumption, and one that matches the condition that Turkey must develop if membership of the E C is to be a live issue, is that growth rates will continue to be faster than those in the more mature EC-Twelve economies. The growth of industry and decline of agriculture as percentages of the working population and of the G D P will continue, though at a lower rate. The G D P should continue to grow at a formidable rate, to 2000. Both such developments will increase the significance of Turkey as a market for E C exports and a competitor in E C markets. The increase in GDP per capita relative to that of other E C countries will reduce the gap between Turkish and EC-Twelve social standards, while at the same time the growth of population will increase the numbers for whom that gap may have to be filled by E C policies. On the side of agricultural trade, the probability is that investment in Turkish agriculture will develop new competitive products for which the Turkish climate provides an adequate basis. These could include, for example, citrus fruits, in which Spanish membership already raises problems, and there are other important Mediterranean producers such as Israel . On the side of industrial trade, the Turkish economy will move into more efficient production, and export to the EC, of a more diversified range of products. These could include more clothing and other finished textiles, but also footwear and labour intensive goods such as electronics components and consumer durables, which are already exported to non-EC markets. On the side of Turkish imports, the demand for capital goods, machinery etc. should continue to grow with the further industrialisation of the economy. Demand for consumer goods should grow less rapidly, since the channelling of resources into development will continue to hold down personal disposable income. The effects of Turkish industrial competition in the markets of the EC-Twelve will be uneven. The strongest competition will be with the Mediterranean countries, especially Greece, Portugal and Spain. Among the existing members of the EC-Nine, it will also af199

feet most strongly those economies, such as the British, that have been slow to adapt their industrial structures to higher technology, less labour intensive production. Meanwhile, the opportunities to exploit the growing market in Turkey for capital goods will go to those economies, such as the German, which have concentrated on those kinds of production. The unevenness in the impact of Turkish competition will create problems mainly for the poorer, rather than for the richer E C countries. The Impact of Turkish membership on the EC-Twelve Since Turkey in 2000 will have a population close to that of Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS) taken together, but with a G D P per capita still much lower, it must be expected to add more to the budgetary burden on the E C than the net total of GPS. Application of C A P common prices to Turkish production of northern agricultural products, especially wheat, assuming existing policies are not made much cheaper by reforms between 1983 and 2000, will be very costly. Successful agricultural development could well make Turkey a consistent and major net exporter of cereals. Application of more generous policies than those currently in operation to Mediterranean-type agriculture, would be costly to apply to existing Turkish production, which will be expanded both by internal agricultural policies and by the stimulus of C A P support. As a still backward agricultural producer, however, Turkey would also expect a large share in the CAP'S Guidance Fund. Turkey's poverty and wide discrepancies in development between western and eastern regions will qualify it for a large share in the Regional Fund. Unemployment problems in Turkey remain more pressing even if the 1990s see a restoration of full employment in the E C , therefore calls on the Social Fund will be large. Meanwhile, on the revenue side, relatively low proportions of imports to G D P will keep down the Turkish contributions of duties, and of levies, to the Budget, while the low level of G D P per capita will mean VAT revenue contributions will be less than proportionate to Turkey's share in E C population. The impact on the E C Budget will therefore be almost entirely "negative", and raise financial problems at least as great as those provoked by the accession of GPS. The distribution of these budgetary burdens among the EC-Nine will however be the inverse of the distribution of the burden of increased Turkish competition in industrial and agricultural trade. Assuming that the poorer members of the EC-Twelve (GPS, Ireland, Italy) are able to maintain a position of net beneficiaries from the EC, and that they are not expected to contribute much if at all to carrying the budgetary burden of Turkish membership, the main budgetary impact would fall on the richer countries (Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium).

as the natural source of aid in soiving payments problems. Turkish membership of an E C monetary union which may have been created by 2000 would probably be delayed still further, but eventual membership of such a union, or association at least with exchange rate management^schemes such as the E M S , would "internalise" Turkey's financial problems witn n me EC. Labour mobility has been an important means of improving Turkey's unemployment situation, while at the same time emigrants' remittances have been making a

r ?ir° 0n

n

^ °' ° P y ' P e m s . Social problems in the richer industrialised EC-Twelve countries are likely to continue to impose some constraints on the flow of migrant workers. More seriously, in the 1980s the high levels of unemployment will mean there is little demand for migrant workers, and the flow is likely to be very small With the expected (hoped for) restoration of full employment in the 1990s, and the application of the principle of free movement of labour to Turkey after membership, some flow of workers is likely to resume. If conditions are such that this flow is recreated, it would not be a burden but a contribution to the economies of the E C member states that must have a demand for it if it is to exist. E C policy is likely to be put off full freedom of movement to the end of a long transition period, say to 2010 (assuming 2000 as the date of accession). However, the demand for migrant workers in the more industrial member states is likely to be a far more important determinant of the flow than policy, 1 0

S

U l i 0 n

f

a

m e n t s

robi

Notes

1 2

William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modem Turkey (London 1981) J.B. Dönges, et.al., The Second Enlargement of the European Community (Tübingen, 1982).

Although the budgetary impact will probably be the most transparent, as for the Second Enlargemant, the question of financial flows to Turkey will have even greater significance than for GPS. Turkey has already received substantial financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) under the first three Financial Protocols to the Association Agreement, and implementations of the Fourth Protocol will extend this financial aid. Although Turkey has also been the recipient of much financial aid from other sources, including the O E C D , IMF, and private multinational banks, it must be assumed that it will continue in the 1990s to make large demands on E C sources. This will be both because its payments problems and debt service ratio difficulties must be expected to be more prolonged than those of GPS, and because if E C membership is to become a real issue, E C financial assistance will be seen 200

201