Insight Turkey

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LOCAL ADVICE WITH GLOBAL EXPERTISE

GSIMERIDIAN I ~~:ONRS~~~SRS Si.iIeyman Seba Caddesi BJK Plaza No:48, B stok. 34357 Be~ikta~ • istanbul T: +90 212 381 8000 (pbx) I F: +90 212 381 8048

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Insight ..;,:P;::: : ;ll,.···· JI.,••••• lit,...... Turkey Vol. 13 No.1 2011

Guest Editors' Note / III

Commentaries Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Board

ihsan Dagl,Middle East Technical University Assistant Editors Saban Kardos, TOBB Economy & Technology University Kivanc Ulusoy, istanbul University Kadir Ustim, SETA DC Book Review Editor

Talip Kucuscan. SETA Managing Editor Hakan Copur, SETA Production Manager Mustafa Kaya, SETA Subscription Manager Ornare Yazar, SETA Publisher SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research Graphic Design & Publishing Ferhat Babacan Printing House Pelin Oftet Ltd. Stt., Ankara ISSN 1302-177X / SETVAKFI iktisadi !.jletmesi, 2008. All Rights Reserved

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Meliha Altumsik, Middle East Technical University Billent Aras, istanbul Technical University Steven Cook, Council on Foreign Relations Gokhan Cetjnsaya, istanbul Sehir University Beril Dedeoglu, Galatasaray University Metin Heper, Bjlkent University ibrahim Kahn, Georgetown University Ali Karaosmanoglu, Bilkent University Fuat Keyman, KO<j= University Suat Kuuklioglu, Member of Turkish Parliament Kemal Kirilj'Ti, Bogezici University Stephen Larrabee, RAND Corporation Ian Lesser, The German Marshall Fund Ziya Onilj, K0'Y University Mesut Ozcan, iTO University Soli Chell Kadir Has University Taha Ozhan, SETA Walter Posch, SWP Berlin Philip Robins, Oxford University Orner 'Iaspmar, National Defense University Dmitri Trenin, The Carnegie Moscow Center ilter Turan, istanbul Bilgi University Jenny White, Boston University

Insi8ht Turkey

The 'New Turkey and American-Turkish Relations /1 F. Stephen Larrabee The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right /11 Orner Taspmar U.S.-Turkey Relations: Model Partnership as an 'Empty Signifier' / 19 Nuh Ytlmaz The Congressional Elections 2010 and Turkish Interests in the Congress / 27 David L. Wiltse Turkey's Response to the Global Economic Crisis / 37 Ibrahim Turhan and Ziibeyir Kilmc

Articles Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique / 47 ZiyaOni§ Economy as the 'Practical Hand' of 'New Turkish Foreign Policy': A Political Economy Explanation / 67 Mustafa Kutlay Turkeys Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence? 1 89 Kadri Kaan Renda Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkeys Foreign Economic Policy 1109 AltayAth Whither an Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkeys Foreign Trade /129 Mehmet Babacan Turkey-GCC Relations: Is There a Future? 1159 BiroI Baskan Global Transformations and the :MENA: A Comparative Political Economy Analysis /175 Sadik Unay

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Book Reviews Honored by the Glory ofIslam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe / 199 By Marc David Baer Ursula Wokoeck The Shiites ofLebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1788/201 By Stefan WInter Faruk Yashcimen From Hellenism to Islam, Cultural and Linguistic Change in the Roman Near East I 204 Edited by Hannah M. Cotton, Robert G. Hoyland, Jonathan J. Price and David L. Wasserstein Averil Cameron Economic Liberalization and Turkey I 206 By Subidey Togan

Erdal Tanas Karagol

TheBroken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and the Questfor Peace in Cyprus I 209 By Harry Anastasiou Kamer Kasun Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership I 211 By Burak Akcapar

Fatemeh Shayan The Unmaking oj the Middle East, A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands / 213 By Jeremy Salt Charles Dunbar Egypt, The Moment ofChange / 215 Edited by Rabab al- Mahdi and Philip Marfleet

HilaryFalb Lebanon, Liberation, 'Conflict and Crisis / 217 Edited by Barry Rubin Jeremy Salt Spies in Arabia, The Great War and the Cultural Foundations ofBritain's Covert Empire in the Middle East / 220 By Priya Satia Roberto Mazza Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in 20 th Century Egypt / 222 By Yoav Di-Capua Konrad Hirschler Speaking ofJews: Rabbis, Intellectuals, and the Creation ofan American Public Identity / 225 By LUi Corwin Berman Ephraim Tabory Archaeology ofReligions, Cultures and Their Beliefs in Worldwide Context / 226 By Sharon R. Steadman

Ralpb W Hood. Jr. Turks in Europe, Culture, Identity, Integration / 228 Edited by Talip Kucukcan and Veyis GUngor Netice Yrldrz

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SADIK UNAY and ERDAL TANAS KARAGOL

Turkey's rejuvenated foreign policy activism firmly constructed on novel conceptual parameters, such as "strategic depth;' "zero problems with neighbours;' "maximum cooperation" and "balance between security and freedom'; attracted ever-increasing academic and popular attention over the course of the last decade. By now, a substantial reservoir of literature has emerged, assessing the profound transformation ofTurkish foreign policy from different angles under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Depending on their respective ideational/ideological standing, various experts dubbed the proactive, multidimensional and order-creating tendencies of the new foreign policy attitude as a sign of "Turkey's rising star" as a regional and even global power; or an indication of carefully camouflaged "neo-Ottomanism" associated with an "axis shift" towards the Muslim world. Likewise, Turkey's singular experiment, since the 1980s, with the first and second-generation models of neoliberalism has shaped the country's transition from an inward-looking import-substitution-cum-planning regime to an export-oriented open economy. This experience has also triggered the accumulation of a comprehensive collection of writings evaluating various aspects of ongoing structural transformation. Academics and experts with a more liberal economic orientation and the IMF-led Bretton Woods circles praised Turkey's early performance as "a textbook example of successful liberalization;' while relatively left-leaning authors warned against the fragile institutional foundations, weak regulatory-monitoring mechanisms, and insufficient social safeguards embedded in the Turkish model. However, Turkey's post-2001 economic performance characterized by a series of regulatory reforms that strengthened oversight-on public finance and the financial sector, robust growth dynamics, and resilience to external shocks attracted the attention of international investors to this "emerging market" and drew widespread praise from the majority of economic observers. Partly as a result of the resilience ofrigid disciplinary boundaries between political science and international relations, and economics and development studies, and partly due to the tendencies of independent observers to use supportive material.-from their specific area of interest, a clear vacuum in the literature appeared concerning critical interfaces and linkages between Turkish foreign policy and macroeconomic developments. This special issue

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of Insight Turkey aims to kick-start interdisciplinary studies that could contribute to the filling of that vacuum. By mainly adopting an international political economy (IPE) perspective, this special issue on the " Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy" brings together a provocative collection of articles written by political scientists, international relations experts, and economists exploring the economic underpinnings and repercussions of the "new Turkish foreign policy:'

T he 'New Turkey' and American-Turkish Relations!

To this end, articles in this issue cover the profound developments witnessed in the global political economy and particularly Turkey's regional environment in the last decade; identify the foremost economic consequences

of Turkey'smultidimensional foreign policy; probe into tbe objective validity

F. STEPHEN LARRABEE>

of the "axis shift" arguments in terms of international trade patterns by analyzing Turkey's trade over time with her neighbours, the ED countries and the Islamic world; and assess the particular role of main economic actors, conglomerates and business associations in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy. In doing that, this issue of Insight Turkey aims to provide an arguably more «objective" reading of ongoing transformations in Turkey's foreign policy orientation and global positioning in the light of concrete figures and performance outcomes, rather than political/ ideological discourses.

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ficulties and strains. The U.S. invasion of Iraq contributed to a sharp deterioration of

US.-Turkish relations and a visible rise in anti-American sentiment in Turkey. 2 More recently, differences over Turkey's ties to Iran and the problems in Turkish-Israeli relations have created tensions in relations with the Obama Administration and raised concerns

As far as the overall conclusions which could be drawn from the articles presented in this special issue of Insight Turkey are concerned, perhaps the first and foremost is a categorical rejection of reductionist and crude categorizations compressed under the rubric of the «axis shift" debate. Widespread evidence from international trade and foreign economic relations confirm that there is absolutely no concrete basis to justify the proposition that Turkey is moving away from its traditional Western-orientation and realizing a systematic policy of integration with her eastern/Islamic neighbours. On the contrary, there is strong evidence confirming Turkey's enthusiasm to increase her economic interdependence with the neighbouring countries in respective of their cultural/religious affiliation, and realize new openings in relatively unexplored markets in Africa, Latin America, and East Asia to strengthen her newly adopted role as a regional power and global broker.

in Washington and other Western capitals that Turkey is drifting away from tbe West in favor of strengthening ties with the Muslim world. Strains in U.S.-Turkish relations are noth-

ing new. The us. withdrawal of Jupiter missiles in tbe aftermatb of the Cuban missile crisis precipitated a serious crisis regarding the

The second conclusion concerns the systemic shift in the "eplcentre of the global political economy" from the Euro-Atlantic axis to the East and South

credibility of the US:s commitment to defend Turkey against outside attack. US.-Turkish re-

Asian heartland led by China, India, and Russia closely followed by a group

lations also suffered a sharp downturn as a result of the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis. The crisis

of emerging markets, which incidentally include Turkey. The profound transformation in the priorities of Turkey's foreign policy and macroeconomic strategy should be read in view of tectonic shifts in the world system and dynamic responses given to them, rather than ideological precepts and unwarranted assumptions about the true intensions ofleading political actors.

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n recent years, us. -Turkish relations have been plagued by significant dif-

prompted Ankara to broaden its security ties * Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, [email protected] mSl£ht Turkey Vol 13/ No. 1/2011 ,

pp 1-9

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The 'New Turkey' and American-Turkish Relations

F. STEPHEN LARRABEE

Turkey's recent foreign policy activism is aimed at overcoming the anomalies of the Cold War. It represents an attempt to broaden and diversify Turkey's foreign policy not change its basic orientation

and reduce its dependence on Washington. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 precipitated an even more severe crisis. In response to the invasion, the US. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, which resulted in a sharp deterioration of U.S.- Turkish relations.

While these crises put severe strains on the US.-Turkish partnership and prompted Turkey to begin to reduce its dependence on the United States for its security, their impact was mitigated by the constraints imposed by the Cold War. In the face of an overriding Soviet threat, both sides felt the need to maintain strong security ties and not allow these disagreements to fundamentally weaken the security partnership.

Turkey's Changing Security Environment

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The current strains are quite different. They are primarily the result of structuralchanges in Turkey's security environment, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of the Soviet threat removed the main rationale behind the US.-Turkish security partnership and reduced Ankara's dependence on Washington. At the same time, it opened up new opportunities ~d vistas in areas that had previously been neglected or were off-limits to Turkish policy, particularly in the Middle East and the Caucasus/Central Asia. Ankara sought to exploit this new diplomatic flexibility and room for maneuver by establishing new relationships in these areas.

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In addition, with the end ofthe Cold War, the locus ofthreats and challenges to Turkish security shifted. During the Cold War, the main threat to Turkish security came from the north-from the Soviet Union. Today, Turkey faces a much more diverse set of security threats and challenges: rising Kurdish nationalism and separatism; sectarian violence in Iraq, which could spill over and draw in outside powers; the possible emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran on Turkey's doorstep; and a weak, fragmented Lebanon dominated by radical groups with close ties to Iran and Syria. Most of these threats and challenges are on or close to Turkey's southern border. As a result, Turkish strategic attention is today focused much more on the Middle East than it had been in the past because this is where the key threats and challenges to Turkish security are located. In addition, Turkey's economic interests have shifted towards the east and south.

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This does not mean that Turkey is turning its back on the West or that its policy is being "Islamisized," as some critics charge. Rather Turkey's recent foreign policy activism is aimed at overcoming the anomalies of the Cold War. It represents an attempt to broaden and diversify Turkey's foreign policy, not change its basic orientation.

Part of Turkey's recent foreign policy activism has had its roots in the growing frustration and disenchantment with Europe and the problems encountered in its ED membership bid

This is not to argue that the current ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) Islamic roots have had no influence on Turkish policy, but they have not been the main drivingforce behind Turkish policy. Ankara's foreign policy primarily represents an attempt to adapt to Turkey'snew strategic environment and exploit the new flexibility and freedom of maneuver afforded by the end of the Cold War.

Turkey's new foreign policy outrea."ch has not been limited to the Middie East; it has also included an effort to improve ties to the newly independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus.' Turkey's opening to Central Asia and the Caucasus began well before the AKP came to power in November 2002. In the first few years after the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, Turkey, under the dynamic leadership ofPresident Turgut Ozal, launched a concerted campaign to expand relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia. Ankara opened up cultural centers in the Central Asian republics, established extensive scholarship programs to allow students from these countries to study in Turkey, and expanded its television broadcasts in an effort to extend its cultural influence in the region. The AKP has. built on Ozal's early efforts and given them new impetus. The main driving force behind the AKP's policy in Central Asia, however, has been energy not Islam. Under the AKP, Turkey has focused largely on intensifying ties with the energy-rich countries of the Caspian basin, especially Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, which have few energy resources, have received far less attention. Similarly, the significant improvement in Turkey's relations with Russia in the last decade has little to do with religion or the AKP's Islamic roots. As in Central Asia, the rapprochement with Moscow has been driven primarily by economics' particularly energy concerns. Russia is Turkey's largest trading partner and its largest supplier of natural gas. Moscow supplies nearly 65 percent of Turkey's natural gas imports and 25 percent of its crude oil imports. These close economic and energy ties have given Ankara a strong vested take in maintaining cordial po-

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ESTEPHENLARRABEE

litical relations with Russia At the same time, the loss of momentum in Turkey's EU membership bid has reinforced Ankara's desire to expand its ties to other areas. Part of Turkey's recent foreign policy activism has had its roots in the growing frustration and disenchantment with Europe and the problems encountered in its EU membership bid. As Turkey's problems with Europe have increased, Turkey has sought to broaden its ties elsewhere, especially with those areas and countries where it has long-standing historical and cultural ties.

American policymakers are dealing with a "New Turkey" -one which is politically more self-confident and more willing to assert its own national interests

Domestic factors have also had an impact on Turkey's foreign policy. The democratization of Turkish politics in the last several decades has changed the dynamics of Turkish foreign policymaking by reducing the influence of the military in Turkish politics. The military remains an influential force in Turkish politics, but it does not have the political clout it used to enjoy a decade ago and is subject to much stronger civilian control. Today, there is a vibrant and diffuse foreign policy debate, with a diversity of actors striving to influence it. This has made foreign policy much more difficult for the traditional Kemalist elite to control, and has also made U.S.-Turkish relations more difficult to manage. In short, the United States has to deal with a very different Turkey today than the Turkey during the Cold War. The disappearance of the Soviet threat has reduced Turkey's dependence on the United States for its security and deprived the U.S.-Turkish security partnership of a clear unifying purpose. At the same time, Turkey's geographic role and interests have expanded. Turkey now has interests and stakes in various regions it did not have two decades ago. It is thus less willing to automatically follow the U.S:slead on many issues, especially when U.S. policy conflicts with Turkey'sown interests.

This does not mean that Turkey is turning its back on the West or the United States. Turkey still wants-and needs-strong ties with the United States. But the terms of engagement have changed. Ankara is a rising regional power and is no longer content to play the role ofjunior partner; American policymakers are dealing with a "New Turkey" -one which is politically more self-confident and more willing to assert its own national interests. '!

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Turkey has the 17'" largest economy in the world and the sixth largest in Europe and has seen an average annual growth rate ofnearly 7 percent in the last five

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years. While Turkey's high growth rates may not be sustainable over the long haul, as Ian Lesser has noted, a more assertive and independent Turkish policy line is likely to persist and Western governments, including the United States, will need to learn how to live with it."

The Danger of Strategic Drift

The real danger is "strategic drift" and an increasing decoupling of US. and Turkish security interests. Both the US:s and Turkey's policies have lost their agreed sense of common strategic purpose

The problem is not that Turkey's policy has become "Islamisized" The real danger is "strategic drift" and an increasing decoupling of U.S. and Turkish security interests. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the U.S:s and Turkey's policies have lost their agreed sense of common strategic purpose. The result has been an increasing decoupling of U.S. and Turkish strategic interests. The AKP's Islamic roots have reinforced this trend but they have not caused it. The problem has been aggravated by a sense of disappointment on the U.S. side. President Obama has invested a lot in the relationship with Turkey, which he argues is "more important than ever'" The administration has stepped up military cooperation and assistance to Turkey in its struggle against the PKK-Turkey's number one security problem and a source of tension with the Bush Administration. It has also strongly backed Turkey's bid for EU membership, the rapprochement with Armenia, and the Erdogan government's "Kurdish Opening" -three other important Turkish policy priorities. But many U.S. officials feel Obama has received little in return for his efforts. While cooperation with Turkey has been effective in many areas such as Iraq and the Balkans, on critical security issues of great concern to the United States, such as the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran, Turkey has opposed the U.S.position. This has led many U.S. officials and congressmen to question whether the United States can really rely on Turkey in a crunch.

These strains have been given new impetus by the publication by WikiLeaks of classified cables from the U.S. embassy in Ankara which portray Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu in an unflattering light. However, while embarrassing, the leaked cables represent a diplomatic tempest in a teapot and not a serious crisis in bilateral relations. The most controversial cables were written by mid-level diplomats during the Bush Administration at a time when strains in U.S.-Turkish relations were more pronounced than they are today. Davutoglu has gone out of his way to downplay the Significance of the leaks, stressing the close

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F. STEPHEN LARRABEE


fective and will only serve to reinforce Iranian intransigence. Turkish officials argue that Turkey's close ties to Tehran enable it to influence the Iranian leadership behind the scenes.

The deterioration in TurkishIsraeli relations adds a new element of instability to the already highly volatile situation in the Middle East and could have a spill-over effect on u.s.Turkish relations

However, Turkey's emphasis on diplomatic engagement with Tehran has produced few visible concrete results so far. Iran has agreed to reopen negotiations led by Lady Ashton nnder the P5 plus 1 formula. But the severity ofthe sanctions has been main factor that has induced Iran to return to the negotiating table, not sweet talk from Ankara.

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Turkey still wants-and needs-strong ties with the United States. But the terms of engagement have changed.

and cordial ties that exist at the highest level with U.S. officials in the Obama Administration, and both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama have publically reiterated the importance that the United States attaches to good relations with Turkey Prospects for the Future

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At some point down the line, Turkey could play an important role in facilitating a resolution of the nuclear issue with Iran. It thus makes sense for Ankara to keep diplomatic channels open to Tehran. However, such a mediating role is likely to have a serious chance of success only when Tehran concludes that its current policy of evasion and obfuscation has failed and become a serious obstacle to its economic and political stability and development. Prudently applied, the sanctions can help to hasten that day. Realism and a little "tough love" on Ankara's part would help as well. In addition, Ankara needs to take steps to repair relations with Washington. Turkey's opposition to the imposition ofUN sanctions against Iran has weakened support for Turkey in the U.S. Congress and raised questions in the minds of many congressmen about Turkey's reliability as an ally.Ifthese differences persist, they could complicate Turkey's ability to obtain congressional support for important weapons procurement requests in the future.

The attempt by both sides to downplay the impact ofthe Wikileaks cables does not mean that U.S.-Turkish relations are likely to be trouble-free in the future. Several issues are likely to pose important policy challenges. The most important challenge is posed by differences over Iran's nuclear program. U.S. and Turkish strategic interests regarding Iran basically coincide: Neither side wants to see the emergence of a nuclear Iran. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran could spark a destabilizing nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It could also provoke a divisive internal debate in Turkey about whether Ankara should seek to acquire its own nuclear arsenal.

The sharp downturn in Turkey's relations with Israel poses a second important area of discord with Washington. The deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations adds a new element of instability to the already highly volatile situation in the Middle East and could have a spill-over effect on U.S.-Turkish relations. While Turkish-Israeli relations are unlikely to regain the warmth or strategic importance they enjoyed in the late 1990s, a reduction in current tensions with Tel Aviv would not only enhance security in the Middle East but would also remove an important irritant in U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations.

The differences between Ankara and Washington over Iran are primarily over tactics. The Erdogan government believes sanctions against Iran will not be ef-

The Armenian Genocide Resolution (H. R. 252) poses a third potential irritant. The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the resolution by a one-vote

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F. STEPHEN LARRABEE

margin in early March 2010, prompting Ankara to recall its ambassador. While the Obama Administration subsequently persuaded the House leadership not to bring the resolution to a floor vote. the issue is far from dead and could re-emerge after the new Congress returns to work in January 2011. As a result of changes precipitated by the mid-term elections last November the Republicans will control the House in the new Congress.. This normally would work to Turkey's advantage. The Republicans have traditionally given strategic considerations priority in the debate over the resolution. However, many Republicans such as Ileana Ros -Lehtinen, the new chairman ofthe House Foreign Affairs Committee, are staunch supporters of Israel and have been angered by Erdogan's strident attacks on Israel and Turkey'svote in the UN against imposing sanctions on Iran. Thus Turkey cannot automatically count on strong Republican support to the same degree it could in the past. Lehtinen's voting record on the Genocide resolution, for instance, is mixed: she voted against it 2007 and 2009 but voted for it from 2000-2005.

In addition, Turkey could take several actions of its own which could weaken congressional support for the resolution. The first would be to show greater political support for Western sanctions toward Iran, especially those US. sanctions that go beyond the sanctions called for in the UN. resolution. As noted earlier, Turkey's opposition to the imposition of sanctions in the UN. has angered many congressmen, including many Republicans, and weakened support for Turkey in Congress. If Turkey were to support some of the unilateral US. sanctions beyond those mandated by the U.N., this could enhance Turkey's image in Congress and help Ankara regain some of that support.

The 'New Thrkey' and American-Turkish Relations

new conditions regarding deployment, this could provoke new strains in relations with Washington as well as with many of Turkey's European allies.

Finally; the U.S:s use of Turkish bases, particularly the Incirlik air base, is likely to remain a sensitive issue in bilateral relations. Turkey has allowed the United States to use Incirlik to transport men and materiel to Iraq and Afghanistan. However, given its expanded interests in the Middle East, Turkey is likely to be very cautious about allowing the United States to use it bases to conduct combat operations in the Middle East unless these operations are clearly perceived by Turkish leaders to be in Turkey's national interest. As a result, the United States cannot automatically assume it will have access to Turkish facilities in future Middle East contingencies. Endnotes 1) This article is a revised and expanded version of a presentation by the author at the Insight Turkey Conference, "Debating 'New Turkey"; Washington DC, December 3, 2010. 2) For a comprehensive discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, Troubled Partnership. U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era ofGlobal Geopolitical Change (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, MG-899PAP, 2010). 3) For a comprehensive discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey's Eurasian Agenda," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No.1 (Winter, 2011), pp.l03-l20. 4) Ian. O. Lesser, "US-Turkish Relations and the Risks of Strategic Drift;' Turkish Policy Center 2010, p. 2. 5) Tolga Tanis, "Relationship with Turkey 'more important than ever; US president says," Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, December 19, 2010.

The second action that could help would be for Ankara to restart the dialogue on normalization of relations with Armenia broken off in April 2010. This would enhance Turkey's image in Congress and help defuse support for the genocide resolution. Such a move, however, would need to be carefully coordinated with Azerbaijan in order to avoid stimulating new fears in Baku that Turkey was putting its interest in detente with Armenia above its friendship with Azerbaijan Turkey's approach to missile defense will also have an important impact on bilateral relations. Missile defense is one ofthe Obama Administration's top priorities and has strong Republican backing. Turkey's support for missile defense at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November has brought US. and Turkish policy into closer alignment. But many details still remain to be worked out regarding the deployment of the missile defense system. If Turkey gets cold feet or raises

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CALL FOR PAPERS

MEHAT CONFERENCE 2011: "Mutual Perceptions" University of Exeter, 27-29 June 2011 The British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) organizes its annual conference 2011 at the University of Exeter in association with the European Association for Middle Eastern Studies (EURAMES) and the Association of Far Eastern Middle Eastey be proposed. As in previous BRISMES conferences, panels on topics not covered by the overall theme or the research networks may also be proposed. Individual papers, however, will not be accepted unless they are relevant to the overall theme, relevant to the research network sessions, or integral to a panel proposed on a different topic.

T he Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right

Those wishing to participate should send a 250-word abstract at:

OMER TA~P1NAR*

[email protected] We will consider both individual papers and pre-arranged themed panels; the latter is especially encouraged. More information about the conference and the application process can be viewed at our website: http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/mehat/conference

JOURNAL OF ARAB & MUSLIM MEDIA RESEARCH (JAMMR) http://www.intellectbooks.co.uk!journals/view-journal.id=148

Call for Papers: Special Issue NEW MEDIA, PUBLIC OPION & DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB & MUSLIM WORLD The aim of this special issue of the Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research is to develop and publish a timely collection of papers representing current research in this area. Of particular interest are papers that present empirical findings of fieldwork, Manuscripts to be considered for publication should be submitted via e-mail Each manuscript should be no more than 8500 words in main text and 150 words in abstract. All submissions will be blind-refereed.

Deadline for submission of full papers: 15th March 2011 Please send your completed papers to: Editor: Dr Noureddine Miladi ([email protected]) School of SOcial Sciences, University of Northampton, Park Campus, Northampton NN2 7AL, UK

010 proved to be a difficult year in Turkish-American relations. The Gaza flotilla .incident and Turkey's "no" vote to a new round of sanctions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council, once again, triggered a heated debate about the "Islamization" of Ankara's Middle East policy. The cliche question of "who lost Turkey?" maintained its relevance for most of the year. In the meantime, the looming threat of an Armenian genocide resolution continued to sporadically dominate the bilateral agenda.

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Overall, American official circles thatfollow Turkey closely tend to display a sense of doom and gloom. The perception of an Islamist "axis shift" is real. Popular columnists, such as Tom Friedman from the New York Times, have now joined the cohort of those who share such pessimism. Yet,interestingly such pessimism tends to dissipate in the higher echelons ofAmerican foreign policy. There seems to be a less alarmist approach to Turkey at the level of the National

* The Brookings Institution, and The National War College, [email protected]

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crMER TA1;lPINAR

Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and certainly the President ofthe United States. Part of this interesting phenomenon is related to the simple fact that everything is relative. American officials who focus on Turkey are often experts on Western Europe, NATO, Russia, the EU, and the Mediterranean. With high expectations and habits established during the Cold War, they tend to look at Turkey exclusively as a member of the transatlantic alliance and a Western state. Their level of disappointment is, therefore, much stronger when Turkey acts in defiance oftransatlantic and western norms. Similarly, there is a tendency to see any deviation from transatlantic norms as Islamization.

In the post-Soviet regional and global order, Turkey and the United States no longer share an existential threat perception

In the eyes of strategist and high level policy makers with global outlook and portfolios, however, Turkey is doing rather well. Turkey is a success story compared to the rest of the Islamic world. It has a growing economy, a functioning democracy, and a strong government that can provide relatively good governance. It is a Muslim country, with a secular, democratic, and capitalist system. And despite its recent popularity in the Islamic world, it is still firmly anchored in the transatlantic alliance represented by NATO. In short, compared to all the major problems and multiple crises facing U.S. foreign policy, Turkey is a country that doesn't pose serious problems for Washington. Yet, one still needs to explain why Turkish and American national interests no longer always converge in order to understand the pessimism among US officials who closely monitor Turkey. Diverging Agendas and Diverging Perceptions There are two fundamental problems that have exacerbated. relations since the demise of the Soviet Union. First and foremost is the absence of a common enemy. In the post-Soviet regional and global order, Turkey and the United States no longer share an existential threat perception. Despite the identification of rterrorism" as a common threat, terrorism is too generic of a concept. Anti-terrorism doesn't provide a sense of urgency, direction and discipline for a genuinely "strategic partnership" anchored around the need to contain, deter, and defeat a common enemy that threatened both Washington and Ankara with nuclear weapons during the Cold War.

Second, as a byproduct of the post-Soviet order, the center of gravity of the Turkish-American bilateral relationship shifted from Eurasia to the Middie East. Turkey's relevance for America has increasingly become its connections with the

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The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right

Middle East and larger Islamic world. At the same time, Americas new threat perception became "rogue states" such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which all happened to share borders with Turkey. Yet, as Ambassador Mark Parris has previously argued there is a structu,ralproblem in the way American bureaucracy thinks of Turkey. "For reasons of self-definition and Cold War logic, Turkey is considered a European nation. It is therefore assigned, for purposes of policy development and implementation, -to the subdivisions responsible for Europe: the European Bureau (EUR) at the State Department; the European Command (EUCOM) at the Pentagon; the Directorate for Europe at the NSC, etc. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and progressively since the 1990-91 Gulf War and 9/11, the most serious issues in U.S.-Turkish relations - and virtually all ofthe controversial ones - have arisen in areas outside "Europe:' The majority, in fact, stem from developments in areas which in Washington are the responsibility of offices dealing with the Middle East: the Bureau for Near East Affairs (NEA) at State; Central Command (CENTCOM) at the Pentagon; the Near East and South Asia Directorate at NSC."l

During the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Turkish-American partnership survived the test in great part thanks to Turgut Ozal. Yet, even then, the Turkish military proved very reluctant to fully back the American war effort. The clash between Ozal and then-Chief of General Staff Gen. Necip Torumtay ended up with the resignation of the latter. In 2003,12 years after the first potential crisis in TurkishAmerican relations was averted thanks to Ozal's leadership, the second Gulf War proved much more consequential for the future of Turkish-American relations. The big picture was clear: America was increasingly involved in fighting wars in Turkey's immediate neighborhood. Turkey did not share America's threat perception. In the first Gulf War, it was Turgut Ozal that averted the crisis. In the second Gulf War of 2003 Turkey simply decided to stay out. Similar dynamics are in play today, as Washington is asking for Turkey's support against Iran. Turkey doesn't want to destabilize Iran because it doesn't share America's threat perception. To be sure, Iran is a rival of Turkey, and Ankara doesn't want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. But there is no shared sense of urgency with Washington or Tel Aviv. In fact, Turkey believes the only way to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear military capacity is to engage it more effectively on the economic and diplomatic fronts. Washington, on the other hand, wants to isolate Iran. This is exactly what happens when two countries no longer share the same threat perception. In the eyes of Turkish decision makers and public opinion, neither Iraq under Saddam Hussein, nor Iran under the Islamic regime and certainly not the close ally of today, Syria, posed an existential threat necessitating a war effort.

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Making things worse is the fact that Turkey developed a much different threat perception since the end of the Cold War: Kurdish separatism. At a time when Washington wanted to prioritize Iraq, Iran' and Syria as regional th~eats, Turkey remained a status quo power reluctant to destabilize the region. In fact, Turkey needed the support, stability and partnership of its Middle Eastern neighbors more than ever. Ankara wanted to contain, deter and defeat its new existential threat, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). To do so required a regional security partnership with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. All of these neighbors have significant Kurdish minorities and are as determined as Turkey to block Kurdish nationalist aspirations for independence.

If current trends continue, Washington might witness the emergence in Turkey of not necessarily an Islarnist foreign policy but a much more nationalist, independent, self-confident and defiant strategic orientation

After 1991, the US appeared to be on the wrong side of this regional equation. The no-fly zone enforced in northern Iraq by the US Air Force created conspiracy theories about American support for Kurdish separatism and independent statehood. In the eyes of Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran and Damascus, Washington had become the protector patron of the Kurds. This perception went from bad to worse as Kurds became America's best friend in post-Saddam Iraq and began to pursue a maximalist territorial agenda with claims over Kirkuk. All this proved too much to digest for a Turkish public opinion that had always maintained a heavy dose of fear of disintegration - the Sevres Syndrome - due to Western support for Kurdish and Armenian nationalism. Of course, it did not help that Turkey's own repressive anti-Kurdish military policies in the early 1980s had triggered a regional Kurdish backlash. By the mid-1990s a major part of the Turkish army was fighting a Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Anatolia. Therefore, in this post-Cold War context, Ankara and Washington not only failed to share a common threat perception; in the eyes of most Turks, America itself had become the main supporter of the local and regional enemy, Kurdish separatism. It was hardly surprising that a radical paradigmatic shift was taking place in Turkish-American relation as far as the Turkish public opinion's growing distrust of the United States was concerned. Perhaps most troubling is the state ofTurkish public opinion vis-a-vis the United States. During the Cold War, resentment against the United States was mainly a leftwing phenomenon. Today, however, anti-Americanism has become the com-

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mon denominator of the vast majority A Gaul1ist Turkey may in the of Turks. Bashing the United States and long run decide to no longer blaming Washington for every domestic pursue an elusive EU issue - from the Kurdish conflict to the membership. It may even rise ofthe Justice and Development Party question its military alliance (AKP) - has become a national hobby. Most secularist and Kemalist believe that with the United States there is an American agenda to promote "moderate Islam" in Turkey and a "Turkish model" for the Islamic world. In addition to President Bush praising Turkey as a model of for the Islamic world, in 2004, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell's reference to Turkey as an "Islamic Republic" strengthened the secularist paranoia and provoked widespread conspiracy theories and criticism in Turkey.Many within the secularist establishment thought that America was pushing Turkey to play the role of the "good Muslims" against the bad ones in the Arab world, a role that would situate Turkey firmly in the Islamic Middle East rather than secular Europe. Then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer reacted to such alleged American plans by stating that "Turkey is neither an Islamic republic, nor an example ofmoderate Islam." The fact that Fetullah Gulen resides in the United States and the perception ofAKP as America's favorite political party in Turkey are important factors. As previously mentioned, similar negative dynamics are in play on the Kurdish front. The majority of Turks also believe. that there is an American agenda supporting Kurdish independence. When you have a domestic public opinion that is so .resentful of American foreign policy and a prime minister who really cares about what the "Turkish street" thinks, there emerges a combustible mix. In that sense.what we are witnessing in Turkey is not the emergence of an Islamist foreign policy but rather the rise of a populist and quite nationalistic government.

The Rise of Turkish Gaullism Another reason why US officials who closely monitor Turkey differ. in their analysis of the country from those with global portfolios is because of the exaggerated importance attached to Islam. The current analysis on Turkey in most American circles constantly refers to the tension between «secularism and Islam" or "Eastern versus Western" proclivities. Such focus often comes at the expense of the most powerful force driving Turkish foreign policy: nationalism and selfinterest. Such nationalism is driven by a perception that Turkey'sself-interests are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the West. One should not underestimate the emergence of nationalist and self-confident Turkey that transcends the

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One should not forget that Turkey's newfound sense of confidence and grandeuris taking place in a context where most Turks feel they are not getting the respect they deserve from the West


over-emphasized Islamic-secular divide. After all, both the Turkish military's Kemalismand the AKP neo-Ottomanism - the ideal of regional influence - share a similar vision of Turkish independence and nationalism.

If current trends continue, Washington might witness the emergence in Turkey of not necessarily an Islamist foreign policy but a much more nationalist. independent, self-confident and defiant strategic orientation - in short, a Turkish variant of"Ganllism:' Turkish Gaullism is primarily about rising Turkish self-confidence and independence vis-a-vis the West. A Gaullist Turkey may in the long run decide to no longer pursue an elusive ED membership. It may even question its military alliance with the United States. Burdened by a sense that it never gets the respect it deserves, Turkey may increasingly act on its own in search of "full independence, full sovereignty" strategic leverage and, most importantly, "Turkish glory and grandeur:' As France did under Charles de Ganlle in the 1960s, Turkey may opt for its own "force de frappe" - a nuclear deterrent - and its own "Realpolitik" with countries such as China, India, and Russia. It could even contemplate leaving, as France under de Ganlle did, the military structure of NATO, while maintaining its political membership in the organization.

To understand Turkish Gaullism one needs to look at Turkey'simpressive economic performance. Today's Turkey offers a considerably different picture than Turkey in the 1990s. During the "lost decade" of the 1990s, the Turkish economy was plagued by recessions, an average inflation rate of 70 percent, structural budget deficits, chronic financial crisis and constant political instability. In addition to such dismal economic performance, the fight against the PKK, had caused 30,000 deaths during that decade alone. Turkey managed to surprise most, analysts with its remarkable economic recovery and political stability in the last 10 years. Shortly after the lost decade culminated with the worse financial crisis in Turkish history in early 2001, Turkey began structural economic reforms and cleaned up its financial and banking system under the stewardship of Finance Minister Kemal Dervis. Economic and political reforms continued after the AKP came to power in 2002. In the last 8 years, the Turkish economy managed to grow by an average of 6.5 percent. Turkey is now the sixteenth largest economy in the world, and in the last decade, Turkish per capita income has nearly doubled from $ 5500 to $10,500. C

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Such economic performance. couThe rise of Turkish Gaullism pled with political stability fuels an unneed not come fully at the precedented sense of self-confidence expense of America and and pride in Turkey. The AKp, under the Europe. But Turks are already charismatic and mercurial leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan personifies this looking for economic and sense ofTurkish "hubris:' Much has been strategic opportunities in Russia, said about the Islamist character of the India, China and, of course, the AKP and the "Islamic shift" in Turkish Middle East and Africa foreign policy. Yet, one should not forget that Turkey's newfound sense of confidence and grandeur is taking place in a context where most Turks feel they are not getting the respect they deserve from the West, particularly from Europe and the United States.

Should the West pay attention to Turkish Gaullism? The answer is yes. The recent referendum results on Turkish constitutional reforms clearly show that the AKP is doing well Barring aside a sudden change in the AKP's policies or a new pro-Western sentiment within the CHP under its newly elected leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkish Gaullism will increasingly define Ankara's foreign policy. In the past, Americans and Europeans would often ask whether Turkey had any realistic geopolitical alternatives and complacently reassure themselves that it did not. But today such alternatives are starting to look more realistic to many Turks.. The rise of Turkish Ganllism need not come fully at the expense of America and Europe. But Turks are already looking for economic and strategic opportunities in Russia, India, China and, of course, the Middle East and Africa. If the strategic relationship between Ankara and Washington continues to erode and prospects for joining the EU continue to recede, Turkey will certainly go its own way. Americans and Europeans who do not take the risk of such a development seriously underestimate the degree of resentment of the West that has been buIlding up in the country. It is high time for analysts to pay more attention to what unites the secularist and Islamists camps in Turkey: Turkish nationalism. Gaullism may be the real future for Turkey in the 21st century. Endnotes 1. Mark Parris, "Toward a Successful Turkey Policy: Suggestions for the Next Administration," Unpublished paper, 2008.

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U.S.-Turkey Relations: Model Partnership as an 'Empty Signifier' NUHYILMAZ*

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uring his first bilateral intercontinental trip after his election, . President Barack Obama visited Turkey in April 2010. During his visit he used the expression "model partnership" to define US-Turkey relations.

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Ever since Obarna's visit, Turkish and American analysts of Turkish-American relations have been debating what "model partnership" really means. Both sides have emphasized the importance of Turkish-American relations and suggested that a redefinition of relations after the Bush presidency was necessary. However, it seems that there is no agreement on what "model partnership" is or will be. Some-analysts and even politicians have argued that the Flotilla Crisis and Turkey's "No" vote at the UN Security Council put an early end to "model partnership;' which is now only a bygone hope. In this commentary, I aim to take issue

with such arguments and make a conceptual

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contribution to the «model partnership" debate. I argue that "model partnership" has not ended; on the contrary, it has not even started. "Model partnership" is not a well-defined and all encompassing type of relationship. This concept is premised on the recognition that TurkishAmerican relations are very valuable and that the old framework, which threatens the bilateral relationship itself, needs to change. In other words, it is not a "model" describing how Turkish-American relations are today. On the contrary, "model partnership" is the "will to redefine" bilateral relations. AB such, I will treat it as an "empty signifier:' i.c. «a signifier without a signified.'"

The current problem derives from the gradual transformation in the nature of TurkishAmerican relations from a hierarchical relationship into a complementary one

What Went Wrong? U.S.-Turkey relations have experienced difficult times. This is nothing new to the relationship, as the two partners have had serious disagreements in the past even during the Cold War when the two sides worked closely under NATO. However, this time the difficulty behind recent tensions is qualitatively different than the previous disagreements.

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The current problem derives from the gradual transformation in the nature of Turkish-American relations from a hierarchical relationship into a complementary one, i.e. from a "strategicpartnership" to a "model partnership:' In other words, the cause of the ongoing tension that marked the year 2010 does not merely emanate from disagreements over policy problems. It is, in fact, the other way around: policy disagreements are the consequences ofthis transformation in the very core of the partnership. Therefore, any attempt to resolve problems between the two countries, without serious consideration of this structural change, is doomed to fail. What needs to be done is not to offer a policy solution as a «quick fix," but rather to recognize and address the question in a conceptual manner. A conceptual rethinking ofrelations does not mean to supply content for what seem to be otherwise empty concepts. In other words, it should not mean to find a "signified" to the "signifier:' A more radical conceptual thinking is needed to reconstruct the relations on a healthy basis. A possible step in this direction would be to ask, "What does 'model partnership' really mean?" Many analysts have tried to answer this question. Some argue that there is no such thing as a "model partnership:' Some argue that it was a good way to start

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0.5.-Turkey Relations: Model Partnership as an 'Empty Signifier'

the relations allover again but now it is a lost opportunity. Some simply start talking about "model partnership" as if it is a well-known fact over which there is an agreement. Some merely transfer the content of the «strategic partnership" concept to "model partnership'; and naturally conclude that it is a failed project. Some argue that it is a good project upon which we still place some hopes. And finally, some argue that it is the new framework of Turkish-American relations. The common theme that brings together all of these responses is the desire to answer the question right away without conceptual reflection. None of them pause for a second to try and make sense of the basic reason why we are still discussing the "model partnership:' Let us assume anyone of those answers actually reflects the truth about the issue; then, what does one need to do? If the model partnership has failed, why have there been so many discussions on the issue? If the model partnership is simply another name for "strategic partnership:' why then does it not satisfy the parties and force them to find another label for the bilateral relations between Turkey and the USA? If the model partnership can be saved through some policy solutions, why have there been so many problems especially at the policy level? My answer to these questions and answers is rather simple. The option for a model partnership is still on the table; however, it requires a serious, engaged, and conceptual discussion as the two sides adjust to and negotiate the new form of the relationship. To put it in a different way, I argue that since the conceptual construction and re- negotiation of the partnership as a "model partnership" is still the main issue in defining Turkish-American relations, it is neither a failed nor a complete project.

We can identify the "model partnership" debate as the symptom ofthe lack ofa genuine conceptual engagement and discussion of the fundamental changes takingplace in Turkish-American relations. In short, even though the questions cited above might seem justifiable, none of the answers are satisfactory, or justifiable for that matter, because the question does not require an answer in the first place. The question deserves attention, discussion, engagement, and thoughtful analysis rather than a simple answer. If that discussion can be undertaken, I believe that the two sides can build a healthy and long-term relationship. It remains a serious challenge that these somewhat misplaced questions and responses foreclose the discursive area for a quality discussion that needs to take place. Quality of the Debate on Turkish-American Relations An engaged discussion, which aims to question the current state of the relations, requires a pause before answering what a "model partnership" signifies. The

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U.S.-Turkey Relations: Model Partnership as an 'Empty Signifier'

NUHYILMAZ

"Model partnership" is not the name of the new phase of Turkish-American relations; it is an imaginary space where both parties agree that the old relations are not sustainable

answers described above have not helped ease the tensions in the bilateral relations but kept them alive. One would expect tensions to be relieved when politicians express good will and offer "simple answers" so to speak. But these are not enough, as they do not address the fundamental issue.

The fact that simple explanations do not suffice becomes even more obvious when we consider that the level of cooperation between the two countries is exceptional on many of their foreign policy issues. Why is it that we define the Turkish-American relationship with reference to problem areas only? How do we fail to remember that the u.s. and Turkey work very closely on two top-priority American foreign policy issues, namely the wars in Iraq and Afghanistani? The two countries share similar policies on many other issues such as Syria, Bosnia, Serbia, Caucasus, NATO etc. There are only two significant areas where the two parties diverge on a tactical level: the Iranian nuclear issue and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were to make a list of agreement and disagreement areas, we would find convergence rather than divergence in most of them. Then, what is the reason for the problems haunting the Turkey-US relationship? Why it is the case that "model partnership" neither solves these problems, nor allows them to disappear from the discussion? The "model partnership" is yet to be constructed through adjustment to a newly defined relationship between the two actors. We need to treat "model partnership" as an empty signifier of this new yet-to-bedefined relationship between the US and Turkey. Since policy agreements or disagreements do not help solve the «structural re:adjustment problem;' then it would be better to leave the policy issues on the side for a more conceptual discussion that might open up a space for in-depth discussion. "Model partnership," used by both parties, would allow us to diagnose the problem. Let's look at how it has been used. Neither explained nor materialized. by either party, "model partnership" does not present concrete solutions or offer a framework. It mainly functions as a word that carne to be used by either party to show that the other partner "violated" the spirit of the "model partnership:' Both parties define "model partnership" differently while they agree on policy issues; but it does not produce any tangible results. Since there is no genuine content to "model partnership;' I argue that "model partnership" is an "empty signifier."Argentinean political theorist Ernesto Laclau

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works on the concept in a political con"Model partnership" as an text. Laclau argnes that an empty signifier empty signifier indicates that is a «Signifierwithout a stgnified'" Laclau strategic partnership is dead; questions the very idea of empty signifia new type of relationship is ers, and asks how it would be possible to have empty signifiers in a system ofsignirequired, but nobody knows fication. His answer to this question is as how new relations will look like impressive as his question: «there can be empty signifiers within the field of signification because any system of signification is structured around an empty place resulting from the impossibility of producing an object which, none the less, is required by the systematicity of the system." This discussion of empty stgnlfiers, therefore, would be a good start to diagnose the problem in Turkish-American relations, or problems in defining what "model partnership" really signifies. Following Laclau's discussion, I see "model partnership" not as a policy issue or a new framework of relations. Rather, model partnership is an "empty signifier:' In other words, model partnership as an empty signifier, does not provide a positive content to the relations nor does it offer a «road map:' Because of this very reason, it lacks the ability to contribute to the discussion in a positive way.

"Model partnership" as an empty signifier, instead, carves out an empty space for Turkish-American relations where it is impossible, under the present conditions, to define or found the bilateral relationship. Therefore, "model partnership" does not show us how to resolve problems; in contrast, it shows that it is impossible to construct a new type of relationship given the current circumstances. «Model partnership;' because ofthis very reason, is not the name ofthe new phase of Turkish-American relations; it is an imaginary space where both parties agree that the old relations are not sustainable. Relations have to be reconstructed. "Model partnership" will be the name ofthat empty space that will be filled with a positive content when the two parties agree on political terms to fill that gap. However, even though there is no positive content to the discussion, model partnership shows that both parties agree on the importance and continuation of the relationship. "Model partnership" indicates that there is an agreement between the parties on the necessity and urgency of a new framework that would allow them to rethink and rebuild a new model. Only through such rethinking would it be possible to prepare the ground for a sustainable and long-term relationship between the two sides. In other words, the concept of "model partnership" signifies "the need for a redefinition of relations;' nothing more.

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U.S.-TurkeyRelations: Model Partnership as an 'Empty Signifier'

NUHYlLMAZ

Since the model partnership' represents this "hegemonic" race to give a positive content to the relations, all «political" actors attempt to fill the content of this empty signifier. "Modelpartnership" as an empty signifier indicates that strategic partnership is dead; a new type of relationship is required, but nobody knows how new relations will look like. This might answer the question why we still discuss "model partnership" and why all parties attempt to give their meaning to the concept. Moreover, this also answers the question why the parties did not give up on the conceptaltogether even though there have been some serious tensions and disagreements.

Now, the Turkish side is pushing for a more egalitarian relationship with the U.S by trying to act as an agent on its own

Since the model partnership discussion is not a policy discussion, it is impossible to put an end to this discussion on a policy level. Policy recommendations would work only if there were an agreed framework on the nature of the relationship, which is currently missing in the Turkish-American relationship. The broader structural question I am concerned with here has to be answered at the conceptual ievel informed by a reconstructed political reality through a re-negotiation of political terms of the game. «Policy recommendations" as .such win-not be sufficient.

Conclusion In the end, "model partnership" as an "empty signifier" shows US. an empty space in the «political discussion" in Turkish-American relations. The American side, which was the "privileged" party in the "strategic partnership:' is attempting to turn this discussion into a policy discussion in order to keep its privileged «subject" position in the relationship. The Turkish side, however, was the "submissive" party lacking the "subject" status enjoyed by the US. Now, the Turkish side is pushing for a more egalitarian relationship with the U.S. by trying to act as an agent on its own. Therefore, Turkey has been focusing on political issues rather than policy issues to be recognized as a "political subject." Turkey is on course to have a real sayin the destiny of affairs it is asked to have a stake in. In the past, it has simply assumed its role in scenarios designed by the US. in a bipolar world. However, just as that anomalous reality no longer exists, the very definition of the relationship is to be redefined through thoughtful conceptual consideration. If a "model partnership" is to be truly realized between the US. and Turkey, the first and foremost condition will not be reaching an agreement on a "policy issue:' The most crucial qualitative difference will be whether the US. can revise

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its general attitude towards and position vis-a-vis Turkey and accept its partner as a true "subject." Once this recognition is realized, it would only then be possible to talk about the content of the "model partnership" and whether it can provide a genuine meaning and framework for the Turkish-American relationship. Until then, Turkish-American relations are destined to experience many tensions and "model partnership" will likely remain an ''empty signifier."

Endnotes 1. I borrow the term from Laclau. See Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s), (London; Verso, 2007). I argue that "model partnership" as an empty signifier does not represent either the ideal or the fully accomplished state of Turkish-American relations.

2. Turkey has been helping the u.s. establish stability and security on both issues by engaging with alienated political actors, which cannot be really be done by any other actor. 3. Laclau, Emancipation(s), p. 36. 4. French anthropologist Claude-levi-Strauss, deriving from French anthropologist Marcel Mauss and Russian linguist Roman lakobson, defined empty signifier as a "pure symbol" that does not have a positive semantic value. See Claude Levi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, Trans. Felicity Baker (London: Routledge, 1987). An empty signifier, similar to lakobsons 'zero phoneme' or Mauss' 'mana: has a "zero symbolic value" that "can take on a value required:' In discussing German phenomenologist philosopher Edmund Husserl's idea of "circle square:" Jacques Derrida argues that an empty signifier is a Signifier that is emptied out all of its empirical content, see Jacques Derrlda, Speech and Phenomena, (Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). . 5. Laclau, Emancipation(s), p. 40.

T he Congressional Elections Preemption, Prevention, and Prolifera Memoirs of Turkey Old and New

The Threat and Use of Weapons in History

Halide Edib With an introduction by Sibel Erol

George H. Quester

When stereotypes of women in the Muslim world abound, Halide Bdib' s memoirs remind us of the courage and dedication of "foremothers" who struggled for emancipation at both personal and national levels. These memoirs open a window on the search for personal expression of a woman caught up in the oppressive dynamics of her polygamous households, and the travails of national liberation and nation-building in Turkey, in which she played an active role. ISBN: 978-1-4128~1002-9(paper) 2009 442pp. $34.95/£31.50/$C41.95 ISBN: 978~1-4128-1540-6(eBook) 2010 442 pp. $34.95/£31.50/$C41.95

"This lively book cuts through conceptual confusions aboutpreventive war and coercive threats, mines relevant historical knowledge overlooked by most commentators, and generates thoughtful lessons for statesmen facing dangerous choices." -c-Richard K. Betts, director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University ISBN: 978-1-4128-1041-8 (cloth) 2009 221 pp. $39.95/£35.95I$C47.95 ISBN: 978-1~4128-1567-3(eBook) 2010 221 pp. $39.95f£35.951$C4?95

Islamic Culture iu Crisis

Crime of Numbers

A Reflection on Civilizations in History

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Hichem DjaIt Contrasting the achievements of other civilizations, both past and present, Hichem Djart demonstrates eloquently that Arabs and Muslims win not be able to connect with the modern world unless they are able to be inspired by a supreme ambition to further the causes of high culture-s-In knowledge, science, art, literature, and other spheres. ISBN, 978-1-4128-1140-8 (cloth) 2010 257 pp. $39.95/£35.95/$C47.95

Post-Orientalism Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror

Hamid Dabashi This book is a record of Hamid Dabashi's reflections over many years on the question of authority and the power to represent. Who gets to represent whom and by what authority? Dabashi updates Edward Said's classic, Orientalism, and maps it out to the events that led to the post-9fll syndrome. ISBN: 978-1-4128-0872-9 (cloth) 2008 302 pp. $49.95/£44.95/$C59.95 ISBN, 978-1-4128·1209-2 (eBook) 2009 302 pp. $49.95/£44.95/$C59.95

•

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Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897·1918 Isaiah Friedman, Using unpublished official German and Zionist records and contemporary diaries, memoirs and other private sources, Friedman proves conclusively that, in spite of the opposition of her Turkish ally, the German government emerged as the foremost protector of the Zionist cause during World War I. ISBN: 978-0-7658-0407~5(paper) 1997 461 pp. $29.95/£26.951$(,35.95

A':'I,ir&Ji}

2010 and Turkish Interests in the Congress DAVID L. WILTSE'

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he 2010-election was by any measure a stinging loss for the Democratic Party in the United States Congress, and perhaps a blowto President Barack Obama. The electorate swept aside the Democratic majority with Republicans gaining 63 seats in the US House of Representatives bringing the new partisan balance to 242 to 193 in the Republicans' favor, and reduced the Democrats' , majority in the United States Senate by seven seats to a Democratic advantage of 53 to 47. The heavy swing of seats in the House and lighter swings in the Senate tend to obfuscate the, actual percentage of each parties' vote share due to the single member district plurality system. The Republicans polled at 51.6 percent and the Democrats 44.8 percent in House races, and in the Senate races the Republicans' vote share was 49.3 'percent to the Democrats' 45.L' Put simply, the Republicans had a very good night indeed and President Obama's relationship with Congress will get much more complicated and contentious.

.. Briar Cliff University, david. wiltse@briarcliffedu

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Deciphering the Message of the Electorate The idea ofan electoral mandate is seemingly ingrained in the American understanding of democratic governance. Though the presidency is most often the focus of scholarly work concerning electoral mandates (and presidents elect are generally quickest to claim them), there is no doubt that congressional delegates search for and act upon perceived mandates as well; with winners pursuing aggressive agendas and the losers generally moving in that ideological direction." The attractiveness of the electoral mandate theory is clear: it allows policymakers and commentators to make easy sense out of the complexities of public opinion. Rather than trying to parse through the layers of nuance and vagaries in the public will, an elected official can simply default to their own ideological agenda, which they presume was the vehicle by which they were elected. However, the murkiness of public opinion and the marginal importance of policy preferences in the voting calculus, have led scholars to reject the claim of policy mandates with near unanimity.' Couple these factors with the weak American party system, the lack ofa cohesive party platform, and the fact that candidates are almost entirely responsible for their own elections," claiming any kind of policy mandate is a patently ridiculous proposition.

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The aftermath of the 2010 election has proven to fall into this historical pattern. The newly empowered and emboldened Republican leadership of the House has predictably made this dubious claim. Hours after the Republican victory was secured, incoming Speaker of the House John Boehner of Ohio claimed the American people delivered a clear message to repeal the "monstrosity" of Obamas health Care reform. This is despite the fact that election-day polling showed voters were evenly divided on the issue. Even the minority leader of the Senate, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, claimed a part of this mandate despite his failure to deliver a Republican majority in his chamber. What is most remarkable about this claim ofa policy mandate is the fact that many conservatives readily acknowledge that Republicans failed to run on a cohesive policy agenda during the election and merely defaulted to criticisms of President Obama appealingto latent anger and frustration in the electorate." Perhaps the best clues for divining the meaning of American congressional elections are the models that forecast their results. These models do a rather nice job of describing the underlying dynamics that drive American voting behavior. They typically include several structural factors that influence the vote, and a variety of indicators ofthe general political mood ofthe electorate.'

Structurally speaking, it is an axiom that the presidential party almost always loses seats during midterm elections. In 2010, it was never a question of ifthe Dem281

The Congressional Elections 2010 and Turkish Interests in the Congress

ocrats would lose seats, but of how many The American voter is seats they would lose. While the presiimpatient and expects to see dential party typically gains congressiotangible results from their nal seats when their president is elected elected officials quickly, or reelected, an inevitable combination of a decline in presidential popularity from sometimes unfairly so the "honeymoon" following his election, an inability to forward all promised points of the legislative agenda, and perceived shortcomingsoflegislation passed conspire against the president's party. Additionally, the very fact that Republicans had done so poorly in the 2006 midterm and 2008 general elections put them in a position where substantial congressional gains were likely, as the Democrats simply had more seats at risk than did the Republicans. All told, these structural factors put the Democrats in a rather precarious position regardless of how other political factors would eventually play out.' What proved to be the tipping point for the Republicans in this election was the general mood of the electorate-principally comprised of attitudes towards President Obama and the economy. Despite the impressive number of legislative victories for President Obama during his first two years," the electorate was in a very sour mood. Obamas public approval ratings started off rather high, but as he engaged a rather hostile Congress in securing his policy victories," the public began to turn against him. Presidents often face the conundrum ofthe public's demand for pursuing a policy agenda, but have rather strong distaste for the messy policy process that comes with the negotiating and partisan conflict that is endemic in Washington. Obama, bloodied from these protracted legislative fights, simply lost a great deal of standing with the public who perceived him during the election as someone who could rise above the partisanship of Washington and fulfill his agenda without the messiness of partisan bickering and pettiness. During the 2008 election, Obama cast himself as a "post-partisan' candidate and helped fuel these paradoxical expectations. In many regards, he was a victim of his own electoral rhetoric. Republican opposition in the US Senate during Obamas first two years was also noteworthy. Typically the majority party is able to negotiate with enough members of the minority to reach the 60 percent threshold necessary to pass legislation through the Senate. Not so in this Congress. From the beginning of the session in January 2009, the Republican leadership mounted a very effective, disciplined, and simple tactic of opposing Virtually all of the presidents legislative agenda with near unanimity. Additionally, the Democrats had trouble with a few of the more moderate members who were hesitant to venture too far from center. 129


fovember 201U, Americans erred Republicans to emocrats by 50.7 to 41.3 in what pollsters call "generic Congressional ballot"

The health care package was perhaps the most visible in this regard.

The second, and most important factor in souring the mood of the electorate was the electorate's assessment on the health of the economy. Though the financial crisis that triggered the «great recession" predated the Obama administration, the felt effects of the recession bore down on the American public with a vengeance shortly after he assumed office. The unemployment rate at the time of the 2008 election was about 6.5 percent. This figure was higher than normal, and was an ominous sign that things would get far worse. Unfortunately for President Obama and millions of Americans, the unemployment rate would swell to 10 percent by November 2009, and stood at about 9.6 percent at the time of the election. Though the economy had been growing for nearly a year, corporate profits had returned to strong levels, and the stock. markets were on the rebound. The most tangible indication of the economic health ofthe nation from the electorates perspective, unemployment, remained at unacceptable and truly painful levels.

When these painful reallties were coupled with the flowery rhetoric and lofiy expectations that brought Obama to the White House in the first place, it is small wonder that the electorate would turn on him to the degree that they did. Displeasure with Congress was also rather high. Typically, Americans hold Congress with the lowest regard when compared to the presidency, Supreme Court, and military, but in 2010 that confidence in the Congress fell to record low levels. Democrats also faced the grim reality that the electorate was turning on them specifically. By November 2010, Americans preferred Republicans to Democrats by 50.7 to 41.3 percent in what pollsters call the "generic Congressional ballot." For proper perspective though we must keep in mind the scope of the President's 2008 victory and the Republican showing in 2010. In 2008, Obama netted 52.9 percent of the popular vote, House Democrats brought in 44.8 percent of the vote in 2010. These are moderate shifts. But even small shifts in presidential popularity and the generic congressional ballot can spell victory or doom in midterm elections." Also, the forces driving the vote are rather vague and in no way represent specific policy preferences. Though policy certainly matters in the voting calculus of a few voters, it is not driving the vote for most. Paradoxically, the public is largely in support of most of the legislation that the president and previous Congress passed when they are asked in public opinion polls, but impres30

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Should the people's economic confidence begin to recover by 2012, President Obama will be well positioned for reelection; should it not, Republicans may well be competitive.

sions of Congress, the president and the way in which they conduct business are more important than the actual policies passed. In sum, we can best characterize this election as the electorate seriously questioning the first two years of the president's term, with disappointment and frustration that tangible improvements in the economy were slow in coming. In no way can it be seen as a full rebuke of the Congress and the President as many may try to infer, and it is certainly not a policy mandate against their legislative agenda.

The Tea Party Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the 2010 election cycle was the emergence of a new political force known collectively as the Tea Party "Party" is something of a misnomer as the movement itself does not fall under the strict definition of a political party, but is an historical reference to the Boston Tea Party of 1773; an act of civil disobedience where colonists protested the levy of tea taxes upon the colonies by the British parliament. With an unprecedented vigor, the tea partiers truly became a force to be reckoned with and are without doubt the most significant mass movement since the 1960s.

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Trying to define the nature, scope, and impact of the Tea party is nearly an impossible task since the movement is about as diffuse of a mass movement as seen in the modern era. It is impossible to even get a proper estimate as to how many individuals are involved with the movement since we are dealing with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individual groups with membership ranging from a dozen in size to thousands. The only constant between all these groups are the labels of "Tea Party" and that they express a conservative political agenda that has a distinct libertarian bent on economic issues accompanied with a strict interpretation of the federalism of the Constitution (read: weak national government). They are especially wary of public spending, deficits, and high taxes. They also uniformly resent President Obama, consider his health care reform law as socialist (if not a fascistic) intrusion into the private sector, and harbor a great deal ofanger over the GM and Chrysler bailouts and the financial bailout (signed into law by President Bush). The latter three give rise to their populist claims of goverumeut coming to the aid of the business interests of Wall Street at common citizens' expense.

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Throughout the nation Tea Party organizations have sprouted up, often facilitated by social networking websites. They first received mass atteution during the health care debate during the summer of2009. Tea party activists would regularly attend town hall meetings to verbally assail members of Congress with vociferous accusations (often patently false)" regarding the contents of the proposed law. There can be no doubt that the tea party was partly responsible for the precipitous decline in the popularity ofthe health care reform package and they certainly hurt several members of Congress, who were publicly haraugued during its passage.

The power and influence of the Tea Party lies both with its identifiers and the politicians that have associated themselves with the movement. The Tea Party proved to be especiaily powerful in Republican primary elections. As the movement gathered momentum in 2009, they systematically began to chailenge the Republican establishment. From a tea partier's perspective, "establishment" Republicans had largely betrayed the conservative priuciples that defined their party in the post-Goldwater era; after ail, it was under a Republican presideut and congress that spending and debt came to record levels. Several incumbents and established Republicans were defeated in their primary fights, most uotably Mike Castle of Delaware, Linda Murkowski of Alaska, and Bob Bennett of Utah. With the aggregatiou of Republican primaries, the tea party had exercised a great deal of power, which made them a powerful new voice within the party. Come the general election, Tea Partiers throughout the nation began pouring money into several House and Senate campaigns. Their effects were most potent

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in the Senate elections, though not in the The grass roots Turkish lobby way that Republicans had hoped. It can be in America is relatively new. said with near certitude that the tea party Though its influence is growing erased hopes of the Republicans taking on a yearly basis, it is still control of the United States Senate. U Several of the Tea Party favorites proved dwarfed by other groups to be too inexperienced, too ideologisuch as the plethora of cally extreme.P or just too weird 14 for the Armenian-American interest electorate. Yet, Tea Party activists would groups gladly sacrifice short-term political gains in exchange for having a more enduring effect on the party by tugging it in a more libertariau and rightward direction. Given the mixed results they had in 2010, their legacy may be in doubt. Turkish Interests in Congress Like most congressional elections, especially in economic hard times, foreign policy plays little to no role in shaping the American voting calculus. Additionally, since the most critical foreign policy decisions are under the purview of the Presidency; there will be far more continuity in Turkish-American relations than there is changes. However, Turkish interests will probably be affected in a few ways, some symbolic and some substantive.

What has dominated the headlines in the Turkish press is the non-binding House resolution requesting that the President refer to the plight of Armenians during World War One as genocide, which has repeatedly failed to reach the floor of the House over the past couple decades. Though it carries no force of law and has no substantive effect on public policy, it has attracted a great deal of attention from all interested parties due to its symbolic importance. Though the partisan divide on the issue is far from absolute, Republicans tend to be less inclined to support it. Most people believe the issue won't be tabled for the next two years and there will be no vote by the Foreign Affairs committee or on the House floor. Needless to say; there are far more important Turkish interests at stake in the US Congress, particularly in regards to military cooperation, aid, and commerce between the two natious. Though it is impossible to examine all these points, suffice it to say that hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake on a yearly basis in the budgetary process. To make a precise assessment of whether the interests of the Turkish government and people are best served by a Democratic or Republican controlled House would be difficult, again because these issues are never 133


DAVID 1. WILTSE

decided upon by strict party-line votes. However, we can get a sense of which party is more hospitable to Turkish interests by following the money of Turkish American interest groups and the organizational resources these groups have within Congress. The grass roots Turkish lobby in America is relatively new. Though its influence is growing on a yearly basis," it is still dwarfed by other groups such as the plethora of Armenian-American interest groups and the spending of the Turkish government in direct lobbying. 16 That said, the activities of the Turkish lobby are worth observing as a good proxy for where Turkish-Americans see their interests best served. The preeminent Turkish lobbying organization is the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), established in 2007. Despite its recent formation, it has quickiy organized a political action committee (Turkish Coalition USA) that strategically dispenses campaign contributions to Congressional candidates under the strict limitations and reporting requirements of federal campaign finance law. In the two most recent election cycles, TC- USA donated approximately $278,000 to various House candidates. The partisan division of this money is skewed towards Republicans, but not terribly so, with a ratio favoring Republicans three to two. The giving also goes well beyond the Armenian genocide resolution, with only a handful of recipients (19 of the 82) sitting on the Foreign Mairs committee. Though the opposition to the resolution is important, it would seem to be a secondary issue. Those receiving the higher contributions are clearly targeted for their inlIuence on some ofthe most policy-relevant and powerful committees in the House. Several were from the Financial Services (of importance to Turkish business interests), Transportation (a powerful appropriator), Rules (procedurally critical to the operation of the House), Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, and the Defense Appropriation subcommittee. Though mouey does not buy policy, it certaiuly makes key policy makers accessible to donating interest groups. Conclnsion All told, the results in the midterm election of 2010 were hardiy surprising given the current political and economic climate ofthe United States. Any incumbent party presiding over a 10 percent unemployment rate can expect to lose a significant number of seats, particularly if they are of the presidential party. Though Republicans may have gained a few more seats in the House than many expected, this is hardly an unprecedented loss. It will uuquestiouably make it rather difficult for President Obama to pursue as aggressive of a legislative agenda as he did in

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his first two years of office, but the elections haven't rendered him powerless Visa-vis the Congress. The month of December may offer a rather nice preview of what we might expect to see in the next two years. In a rare "lame duck" session of Congress," the President had an impressive string of political victories including a major tax law, ending the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the military, and the ratification ofthe New Start nuclear arms treaty with Russia. If this is how President Obama responds in the wake of an electoral defeat with a rather hostile Congress, we can certainly expect a degree of cooperation and productivity simi1ar to President Clinton. Moreover, no one should assume that this loss is a signal of a sure Republican victory in 2012. Following the midterm elections of 2006 and the general elections of2008 many Democrats in their own moments of hubris spoke of partisan realignments with Democratic majorities lasting decades. Just as those prognosticators were proven wrong in 2010, anyone assuming that President Obama or the Congressional Democrats are doomed in 2012 could be simllarly disappointed. If there is any word that aptly describes the American electorate at the moment it is "volatility;' something Turkish readers are no strangers to. The American voter is impatient and expects to see tangible results from their elected officials quickly, sometimes unfairly so. Typically, the party that controls the Presidency bears the brunt of that anger. Should the people's economic confidence begin to recover by 2012, President Obama will be well positioned for reelection; should it not; Republicans may well be competitive. But as many a failed presidential candida" can tell you> two years is an eternity. Endnotes 1. Again, the S:MD system coupled with the staggering of elections in the Senate allowed the Democrats to maintain their power in the Senate despite losing the overall share of the vote. This was largely due to several Republican incumbents winning rather lopsided elections while most Democratic incumbents won narrower races, and that only one third of the seats were at stake.

2. Lawrence J. Grossback, David A. M. Peterson and James A. Stimson, "Comparing Competing Theories on the Causes of Mandate Perceptions;' American lournal afPolitical Science, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2005), pp. 406-419. 3. Robert Dahl, "Myth of the Presidential Mandate," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No.3 (1990), pp. 355-72-

4. David Broder, a well respected "elder statesman" of the press and political columnist for the Washington Post, once noted that Washington is run by 536 political entrepreneurs: the president, 100 senators, and 435 house members. Each gets there essentially on their own: choosing the office to run for, raising their own money, funding their own campaigns, and staffing their campaigns with their own staff and volunteers. They are also willing to do anything retain office, up to and including running against their own political party and president if it ful:fi1ls their electoral ambitions (Broder 1989).

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DAVID L. WliTSE

5, RossDouthat, "The Unready Republicans;' The New York Times, November 10, 2010, retrieved fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/20l0/l1l08/0pinion/08douthat.html?_r=1&scp=8&sq=boehner%20 mandate%20nov%203&st=cse. . 6. For a survey of several models, refer to the symposium on the 2010 election in the summer ISSue of PS: PoliticalScienceand Politics, Vol. 43, Issue 4.

7.Alan 1. Abramowitz, "How Large a Wave? Using the Generic Ballot to Forecast the 2010 Mid~ term Elections;' PS:PoliticalScienceand Politics, Vol. 43, No.4 (2010), pp. 631-32. 8. Again, consider the myth of the electoral mandate. President Obama had an enormously suc-

cessful two years in Congress with impressive wins in health care, the economic stimulus package, funding renewable energy, financial regulations, GM and Chrysler bailouts, and public infrastructure. Nearly all of these were promises made in the campaign, yet upon delivery of these promises the electorate delivered a blow to his presidency by handing the house to Republicans. . 9. None of these victories were easily won. In the US Congress, party discipline in roll call votes ISfar lower than parliamentary systems simply because the power of nomination is not in the hands of the party, but in the electorate at large through the primary process. Couple this with the 60% margin necessary to close debate in the US Senate, a degree of bipartisan support is generally necessary. In practical terms, this meant President Obama had to secure every Democratic senator's vote or peal away a few Republican senators for each roll call. 10. Abramowitz, "How Large a Wave? Using the Generic Ballot to Forecast the 2010 Midterm Elections:' pp. 631-32. 11. Sarah Palin popularized the notion of "death panels" where bureaucrats would decide if patients would receive treatment. 12. In Florida, Kentucky, and Utah, Tea Party favorites won Senate seats. Though these were seats previously held by Republicans and they were a net wash for the balance in the Senate, it shOWed that some tea party candidates were viable in certain states. 13. Tea Party favorite Sharron Angle was the Republican nominee for Senate in Nevada taking on the majority leader Harry Reid. Angle made some rather strong statements with clear subtext that Violence directed at politicians was justified should the elections not go their way, in what she dubbed "Second Amendment solutions:' Had virtually any other Republican run for this seat, Reid would have most likely been defeated. 14. Another Tea Party candidate Christine O'Donnell, running for the Senate in Delaware, had appeared on television in the 1990s claiming to have "dabbled in witchcraft:' Eventually she had to run political ads explaining that she wasn't a witch, not an especially effective campaign tactic. I~ the primary she defeated a Republican that would have surely won the general election. On the mght ofher primary victory, manypohtical observers made note that her victory made a Republican talceover of the Senate very unlikely. 15. In June of20IO I appeared on a panel with Lincoln McCurdy, president of the TeA, and he generally agreed with this characterization I made of the current state of the Turkish lobby in America. 16. The spending of the Turkish government can be tracked through the reports filed in compliance"With the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1983 (FARA). According to FARA disclosures, the 1'u~kish government spent $10,371,628.99 in direct lobbying through US firms from 2007 to 2009. ~s total does not include any additional cost encumbered by the diplomatic efforts of Turkish officials themselves, which is presumably quite high. 17. A lame duck session is a continuation of the previous Congress that takes place between the ele~tion and the formal creation of the new Congress in early January. Representatives and Senators typ1ca lly resent being called in the interim, making presidential deal-making that much harder.

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Turkey's Response to the Global Economic Crisis M. iBRAHiM TURHAN* and ZUBEYiRKILIN While trying to develop the instruments in dealing with existing multilateralism, the interdependence paradigm puts a special importance into three channels, which are highly relevant in Turkey's recent foreign policy activism: multiple channels ofcommunications, an absence ofhierarchy among the issues (the rejection of high politics vs.low politics dichotomy), and the diminished role for military power. In recent foreign policy initiatives, Turkey seems to be following the functionalist framework so as to exploit economic opportunities and interdependence in further institutionalizing its relations with neighboring countries by downgrading military power in favor ofeconomic interactions. From the political economy per- . spective of this paper, the transformation of Turkish industrial and financial capital in the post-200l period enables the functionalist and interdependence theories to become relevant in the recent context. The next part of the paper investigates the transformation of industrial and financial capital and aims to determine the political economy fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy.

Transformation ofIndustrial and Financial Capital after the 2001 Crisis The establishment of the economic fundamentals of the new Turkish foreign policy goes back to the 2001 economic crisis.'? The 2001 crisis was the severest economic disaster in Turkish history, in terms of many indicators. Yet, from another perspective, it created a 'window of opportunity' for the transformation of the political economy structure and state-business relations in Turkey. In fact, the destructive consequences of the crisis influenced almost all classes of society. The intensity of the shock helped in the creation of a broad and strong consensus among different parts of society: People understood very well that the problem regarding the economy was not a simple liquidity shortage or an improper crisis-

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l:"m'~nage.rnent strategy; instead, there were very deep-seated structural problems in

financial and real pillars of the economy" This clear and broad understandin turn, paved the way for radical reforms in the post-crisis episode. In these SUitable circumstances, reformist <policyentrepreneurs' found large room for maneuver and they were backed by influential business associations like TUSiAD and MDsiAD as well as by other associations named siAns. The progressive/ dynamic fractions of Turkish finance capital also supported a new model of capital accumulation strategy in Turkish economy. The government's determination to implement the economic restructuring reforms was underpinned by its proEuropean stance in the political and foreign policy arena. The pro-EU reforms in this period, and the improved relations with the EU, enabled the government to create a broad-based interclass alliance. Hence, the macroeconomic environment and institutional framework in the country was further consolidated with the help of the Europeanization process. As a result: For the first time in many years, Turkeyfound itself in the midst ofa virtuous cycle With economic and political reforms as well as key foreign policy initiatives feeding into one another. helping to produce a favorable environment for economic growth. 19

During this period, Turkish finance capital and the state's role in the economy Were subjected to Significant changes at least in terms of two qualifications. First, the restructuring of domestic business actors and the emergence of a new competitive capitalist class underpinned the economic arm ofTurldsh foreign policy. SeCond, the rise ofthe Anatolian tigers' as new game-setters in Turkey's economic POliCies and foreign relations has changed the political economy structure.

Bifurcation and Restructuring in Finance Capital The first pillar of the transformation in Turkish finance capital was the develOPments in the financial system, mainly the banking sector, the area in which pro-active state policies played a crucial role. After the 2001 crisis, the structure of the Turkish financial system changed dramatically. Political intervention and the dominance ofthe public sector within the banking sector had increased throughOut the 1990s; this in turn triggered the increase in banking licenses. As a result, the number of banks increased, from 66 in 1990 to 81 in 1999. These banks were not 'doing banking' in any real sense because they were heavily investing in trcaSury bills and bonds instead of disbursing credit to the industrial economy. In other words, the dominant capital accumulation strategy in Turkish financial sector Was based on rennerprofits extracted from the state apparatus." As a result, the 72

credit allocation mechanisms of many The changing economic banks were Significantly politicized and structure affected power irrational. The 2001 crisis put an end to relations in the country, and the rentier strategy of capital accumulainevitably spilled-over into tion and wiped most of these banks off the scene so that the total number of foreign policy banks decreased to 59 immediately after crisis. The consolidation in the sector continued in the mid-2000s with bank numbers decreasing to 49 as of 2009. 21 The consolidation in the financial sector was the result of intra-capital restructuring of finance capital in Turkey. In fact, the exhaustion of the rentier accumulation strategy in the early 2000s required the restructuring of financial firms and their affiliated holdings. In the new context, the dynamic accumulation strategy that was based on internationalization and competition on a world scale instead of state-dependent accumulation model turned out to be the only sustainable way for Turkish finance capital to develop. The Banking Sector Restructuring Program and the financial reforms were developed with this shifting strategy in mind. However, it is crucial to underline at this point that the restructuring in question was by no means a solely state-run project or a project only dictated by the international financial institutions. On the contrary; the diverging paths within finance capital and the changing attitudes ofthe factions within the financial sector turned out to be the crucial non-state factors. For the sake of categorization, the position of finance capital can be classified into two basic groups in this period." Of the first faction, there were the conglomerates that relied on the <primitive capital accumulation' strategy, in the sense that the overwhelming share of their accumulation was realized thanks to the rentier type ofprofits extracted from the investments in treasury bonds and bills." This faction, especially in the industrial sector, was characterized by low-value added and traditional production that had not helped them gain competitive advantage in the world economy. As a result, they were dependent on the state and relied on state protection and subsidies. The holdings in this fraction could not establish a strong capital structure that was sustainable in the long-run due to their concentration in the traditional and fragmented production sectors such as textiles, construction and media. Their survival, in this context, became possible only on the rentier capital accumulation throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the high state-indebtedness provided a type of 'financial protection' for these firms to survive without facing real international competition. However, this strategy failed in the late 1990s due to the fiscal crisis of the state. Unsurprisingly, the bankrupted financial inc

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'The newly rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, thanks to geographical proximity and cultural factors, has pushed policy-makers to reformulate their policies vis-a-vis Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries

stitutions came out of the holdings that overwhelmingly relied upon the 'primltive accumulation' strategy. Accordingly, the banks belonging to Cukurova Holding (Pamukbank), Yasar Holding (Yasar Bank), Nergis Holding (Interbank), Medya lpek Holding (Etibank), Cmgilhoglu Holding (Demirbank), and others, either declared bankruptcy or fell into financial difficulties in the early 2000s.

The other faction in the financial sector were the conglomerates that used the 'dynamic accumulation' strategy in the sense that these corporations did not only rely on the treasury to sustain their financial profitability." It is true that these financial institutions also significantly benefited from crony capitalistic relationships throughout the i 990s, yet they nevertheless succeeded to survive when the fiscal crisis of state hit the economy in early 2000s. These conglomerates realized that the Turkish political economy was on an unsustainable path io the 1990s and systematically improved their capital accumulation modes by iovestiog io highvalue added sectors. In the industrial realm, they veered towards newly emerging sectors and regions by using the 'dynamic accumulation' and internationalization strategies. The most popular sectors for these conglomerates turned out to be the automotive, finance, high-technology, and durable goods sectors. They used their financial arms relatively better than the first faction and invested in their banks to improve their ioternational competitive position. Koc Holding's Kocbank, Sabanci Holding's Akbank, Dogue Holdiog's Garanti Bank and i~ Holding's lsbank became the organic supporters of these holdings io their high-value added investments during the internationalization process in the 20005. For instance, Sabanci Holding divested from the traditional textile sector and concentrated on the high-technology sector by acquiriog DuPont io 2004 for $108 million. Eczacibasi Group acquired 51 % of the ceramic division of Villeroy&Boch; trlker Group acquired the famous Belgium chocolate firm Godiva for $850 million; Anadolu Group acquired the beer firms Krasny Vostok in Russia and Lomisi in Georgia; and the Koc Group acquired the washing machioe producer Blomberg, the electronics firm Grundig, and the white goods producer Artie." In summary, instead of concentrating on the state-dependent growth and accumulation strategy, the second faction of Turkish finance capital preferred global iotegration.

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In the process, the state (with IMP support) played an active role io liquidating the financial iostitutions that were relying on primitive accumulation and helping in the internationalization of financial conglomerates by promoting the dynamic accumulation strategy. The second faction of finance capital, from the other side, encouraged the state to form a new capital accumulation strategy and encouraged state-business relations. Thereby they supported the post-crisis reforms and internationalization strategies of state actors. This point is implied in the following quotation of Rahmi Koc, the chairman of Koc Holding: The difficulties of 2001 may be likening to cleaning the decks. The strong firms that do sustainable business survived the storm and had become stronger. The firms who grew extraordinarily thanks to political influence and favor were wiped out from the scene due to the harsher market conditions and changing government policies. I see this as an important and promising development for the transformation of business culture in Turkey. The inability of making money ought to be clear for the firms that do not add value to their products and servtces't" From a political economy perspective, the restructuring operation refers to a 'who-gets-what' question io the sense that the old-traditional type of finance capital lost the game and left the scene, while the pro-integrationist fraction succeeded. The power shift in domestic finance capital, in turn, underpinned an active foreign policy engagement. The restructuring of capital had important political economy and foreign policy consequences for Turkey. As a result of the abovementioned transformation, Turkish financial firms first consolidated their position in the economy, and second acted as a change agent in transforming industrial capital in Turkey. The changing economic structure affected power relations io the country, and inevitably spilled-over into foreign policy. The third part of this section will investigate the role of this transformation for Turkish foreign policy. Beforehand, it is important to map out another aspect of the transformation of industrial capital in Turkey as a complementary to the financial transformation in the post -crisis era.

A New Actor of Turkish Industrial Capital: The 'Anatolian Tigers' The aforementioned restructuring of intra-capital in Turkey refers to one aspect of Turkish finance capital. There is another aspect that has the potential to influence the political economy dynamics: The Anatolian tigers;" Starting from the 19805, during the Ozal government, a conservative and self-sufficient group of Anatolian businessmen came to the fore and has gradually increased its influence." MDSIAD, as the main representative of Anatolian capital along with 1

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the SiADs, moved from the periphery to the center of Turkish capitalism." Anatolian cities such as Kenya, Gaziantep, Denizli, Eskisehir, and Kayseri, in which MUSiAD and other siADs are quite active, have become the new powerhouses of the Turkish manufacturing industry." For example, MUSiAD, established in 1990, has 30 nation-wide branches, 92 connection points in 43 countries and 4,700 members all around Anatolia as of 2010." The economic and political power, naturally, started to shift to economic actors that were excluded from the state mechanisms beforehand. This power shift to a certain extent has changed the domestic balances in both the political and social landscape." The shifts in domestic power have foreign policy implications for Turkey in the sense that the newly rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, thanks to geographical proximity and cultural factors, has pushed policy-makers to reformulate their policies vis-it-vis Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries." The way in which these power shifts underpinned the new foreign policy activism is to be elaborated in the following part.

The major driving force for the soft power activism of Turkish foreign policy has been the economy and trade

The Economy as the 'Practical Hand' of Turkish Foreign Policy Activism In line with the new perspective for state-society and state-capital relations, the economic elite have pressured for new policy formulations not only in domestic affairs but also in foreign policy. First of all, Turkey's integration into the global economy and the EU process forced business groups to adapt to the mentality of the new world political economy. Accordingly, the new economic rationality, which necessitated investing in high-value-added products, making long-term strategic decisions, and changing economic mentality from a clientelistic approach to a rule based understanding, turned out to be a major force of change." Once the business associations had internalized the 'hard recipe' that they had no chance but to obey the rules of the game in the new international political economy, they strongly supported the EU membership process as the most appropriate method of economic modernization in Turkey. 'The economic interest groups, mainly TUSiAD, who were quite skeptical about a possible integration with the European Economic Community in the late 1970s started to gradually change their attitudes after the mid-1990s. Most of them lobbied simultaneously on domestic and international fronts." For instance, MUSiAD, which was arguing in the mid1990s that "Turkey was in full contradiction with the 'ED member countries in

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Economy as the 'Practical Hand' of 'New Turkish Foreign Policy': A Political Economy Explanation

historical, religious and cultural terms", The interaction and mutual changed its anti-Elf rhetoric and became interdependence between a member of the European small and Turkish businessmen and their medium enterprises (SME) network of counterparts have turned into European Confederation of Associations of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises one of the 'practical hands' of "for further Europeanization of Turkish Turkish diplomacy economy';" Since Turkey was given candidate country status in Helsinki in 1999 and the negotiations kicked-off in 2005, business support for Turkey's membership bid peaked in the early 2000s. Apart from the ED membership process, business associations gave vocal support on Turkey's new foreign policy approach towards its neighbors. In this new context, Turkey in the AK Party era, especially after the 2007 elections, said it was to follow a "zero problems" policy with its neighbors. This foreign policy formulation is based on Turkey's soft-power capabilities and foresees a multidimensional approach due to "Turkey's unique space in terms of geography"? In line with the new foreign policy paradigm, Turkey devoted most of its energy in mediating between Syria and Iraq, Israel and Palestine, and facilitating the talks between Iran and the Western world. Recently, Turkey has remarkably improved its bilateral relationships with Syria, Iraq and Iran. What is important in terms of this study is that the major driving force for the soft power activism of Turkish foreign policy has been the economy and trade. Putting it another way, Turkish finance capital has turned out to be the practical hand of Turkish policy-makers in the region. The new mode of capital accumulation that has become more visible in the post-2001 period and the rise of Anatolian capital have encouraged Turkish business groups to invest in abroad. Accordingly, the Turkish business elite have started to explore the economic and financial opportunities in the neighboring countries and have backed the state in its efforts to stabilize the region for the sake of their interests, inter alia. In other words, the finance capital in Turkey has gradually increased its power in foreign policy formulation. According to the broader implications ofthe Neofunctionalist and Interdependence theories, the economy has played an important role in foreign policy formulation via three mechanisms; material interests, multiple dialogue channels, and perceptions.

Material Interests The material interests established between Turkish firms and neighboring countries constitute the first mechanism that underpins the new Turkish foreign

177

MUSTAFA KUTLAY

policy activism. The interaction and mutual interdependence between Turkish businessmen and their counterparts have turned into one of the 'practical hands' of Turkish diplomacy. The leading airline operator in Turkey, Turkish Airlines (THY), for instance, has increased its destinations from 70 to more than 124 points in 80 countries. According to THY's CEO, the demands of Turkish businessmen is one of the reasons for them to increase the number of destinations in the last couple of years." The total annual turnover of the airline industry in 2009 reached more than $8 billion, compared to $2.2 billion in 2002." Turkish constructionfirms, most of which are Anatolian tigers, have invested more than $20 billion in Russia and about $35.5 billion in the Middle East over the last decade. 40

.....

,

Apart from Middle East, Turkish firms have also increased their investment stockgradually in the Turkic republics. For instance, Turkish firms have invested more than $3.6 billion in Azerbaijan and $628 million in Kazakhstan,'! In this environment, the material links between the Turkish economy and the economies of neighboring countries have drawn the attention of the policy-makers to concentrate on the new demands of business circles. Hence, Turkish foreign policy activism has become an area of realizing material opportunities that obviously goes beyond the ideational explanations. The increasing gravity of the economy in new Turkish foreign policy, especially in Middle Eastern and Asian countries, is summarized as follows:

~~

)'~''i", ,'[ ;.,' I,~

'["f

':j

Turkey mainly relies on economic instruments in improving relations with its neighbors. The economic instruments, mainly trade and investment projects, are used as facilitators in foreign policy. In other words, the recent political openings have found their ways via bilateral economic relations. For example, Turkey's recent engagement with Syria [in 2009] resulted in the reciprocal abolishment of visa requirements ... Turkish and Syrian businessmen are preparing for jointprojects in the tourism and industrial sectors. The bilateral trade relations (which expanded to 1.1 billion dollars in 2008 with a 40 percent increase visa-vis the previous year) are expected to further increase in the coming years... The other example is Iraq. Turkey aims to expand bilateral trade relations with Iraq from 5 billion dollars to 20 billion dollars in a short time span. Moreover, Turkish construction firms have been constantly searching for ways to take an active part in the possible construction projects, which are projected to total 500 thousand residences ... The last example is Turkish-Iranian bilateral economic relations. [In 2009], the trade volume between the two neighboring countries reached10 billion dollars; this figure was about 350 million dollars just ten years ago... Turkishinvestors have investments in Tabriz,the focal point ofthe Iranian economy, and they mainly concentrate on textiles, food, chemicals, gas explora-

781


tion etc. It is estimated that Turkish investments in Iran have reached up to 1 billion dollars and many other investment plans are waiting to be signed on the negotiation table." In this context, two major economic developments came to the fore. First, neighboring countries have turned into profitable trade partners for Turkish finance capital since 200 I. Parallel to the rise in Turkey's total foreign trade (which increased from $72 billion in 2001 to $333 billion in 2008), Turkey's total trade with Middle Eastern and Asian countries increased from $18.7 billion to $131 billion and Turkey's trade with Gulf Cooperation Council members also tripled in the same period." More importantly, neighboring countries' share in Turkish foreign trade has increased at the expense ofthe EU market. As the figure 1 shows, from 2003 to 2010, the ED's share in Turkish foreign trade declined from 51.38% to almost 42%, whereas Turkey-Asia and Turkey-Near and Middle Eastern foreign trade increased to 26.5% and 12%, respectively.

Figure 1: Turkey's Changing Foreign Trade Structure (% of total)

60

53,6

50 40 30 20 10

o 2003

2010'

2007

IIIEU IlIAsia

~Midd1e

East

*First 7 months Source: TUIK

The second economic development that has improved Turkey's visibility in foreign affairs is the changing outward FDI dynamics (figure 2). Concomitant with rising FDI inflows in the post-200! period, Turkey's outward investment stock has also increased. Accordingly, between 2002 and 2009, Turkey's outward direct investment stock reached at $11.2 billion, $3.1 billion ofwhich was directed to Asian countries (includlng the Near and Middle East). 179


MUSTAFA KUTLAY

Figure 2: Turkey's Outward Investment Flows (million dollars)

lobbied the government consistently to facilitate the conditions of their economic interaction with Syrta."

3.000 2.500 2.000 1.500 1.000 500 0

Source: CBRT

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

II Total outward FDI

251

486

815

1.065

1.677

2.275

2.604

2.041

~

Europe

199

166

315

504

1.104

1.621

1.370

1.538

ill

Asia

4

240

452

504

518

485

490

395

Multiple Dialogue Channels As the Interdependence theory acknowledges, the multiplication of dialogue channels is another way of improving bilateral relations between parties. Since new actors and new priorities affect the relationship, dialogue between the parties cannot be restricted to the traditional security-biased bureaucratic and military channels and spills-over into other functional corporation areas. The economy, again, acts as a facilitator in this context. Parallel to the rise of Anatolian capital in Turkey, the dialogue channels between Gaziantep and Aleppo, for example, multiplied. As functionalist theories argue, the increasing intensity of commercial relations between Anatolian businessmen and Middle Eastern markets has created spill-over effects and facilitated the establishing of new dialogue and cooperation mechanisms. In the Syrian context, the pressure from Anatolian industrialists and exporters has encouraged the government to sign free trade and visa-free travel agreements. The case of Syria is particularly interesting; as many commentators in the Arab world have suggested recently, the alliance between Turkey, now ruled by a party with strong roots in Sunni political Islam, with the widely disliked Alawi community appears unseemly. The motives behind Bashir Al-Assad's emphatic embrace of the new Turkish-Syrian alliance notwithstanding; it is the influence of local business elites, which account for Turkeys move towards Syria.Industrialists in Gaziantep, one of Turkeys leading industrial cities and "Anatolian Tigers': have 80

I

Partially due to the demands and lobbying of industrialists and exporters, Turkey concluded 50 agreements, memoranda of understanding, and cooperation protocols with the Syrian government on September 17, 2009, most ofwhich were directly related to the economic and commercial realms. The agreements also underpinned the institutionalization of dialogue channels via establishing a High Council of Strategic Cooperation." Similarly, Turkey has abandoned its previous visa regimes and signed free trade agreements 'With Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan in addition to the establishment of more High Councils of Strategic Cooperation." The institutionalization of economic linkages has been further underpinned via "official trade liaison offices, chambers of commerce and trade associations."? In summary; the multiple channels established between businessmen increases the number of interpersonal networks and helps institutionalizing the spill-over effects, As a result, relationships are not restricted to bureaucratic state-state relations anymore. The interaction between non-state actors at different levels and on different issue areas has multiplied the ways in which parties gather information about each other. Consequently, the new logic ofpolitical economy dynamics paves the way to changing perceptions, albeit slowly vis-a-vis the other mechanisms.

Perceptions The third mechanism thorough which the economy serves as a <practical hand' ofTurkish foreign policy is by changing perceptions as a natural corollary ofmaterial interests and multiple dialogue channels. In other words, the spill-over effects of commercial interests and the institutionalization ofmultiple dialogue channels in new relationships gradually changes perceptions. Arguably, perceptions have been the most persistent problem that has hindered Turkey's relations with most of its neighbors, especially during the 1990s. As Altumsik wrote, "throughout most of the 1990s, Turkey was seen largely irrelevant to debate in the Arab world and mutual perceptions of threat and distrust characterized the relations'?" Arab perceptions of Turkey, however, started to change dramatically from the early 2000s and, in 2009, 75% of the Arab population had either very positive or positive views of 'Iurkey," Obviously there are many reasons for this abrupt change, including domestic changes in Turkey and in the Arab world, as well as power shifts in world politics. The economic aspect, within the context of this study, was also important. The increasing economic interdependence paved the way for

I 81

MUSTAFA KUTLAY

more intense interaction and human mobility that changed the historically and ideologically loaded (mis)perceptions. To sum up the argument so far, business-state relations in the Turkish political economy have changed dramatically in the post-2001 period. The new context has enabled the overhauling of the economic and financial structure and has introduced a new perspective for the international presence of Turkey, especially in its neighboring region. The improvements in the domestic structure have, in turn, provided fertile ground for financial and industrial capital to push for a more dynamic and pro-active foreign policy formulation via establishing material interests, multiple dialogue channels and positive perceptions. Yet, is this trend sustainable in the incoming years? What are the limits and constraints of the political economy dynamics in Turkish foreign policy? The next part aims to make a constructive critique of the political economy of the new Turkish foreign policy. The Political Economy of the New Foreign Policy Activism: Limits and Constraints The functionalist and interdependence political economy approaches are highly relevant in explaining the existing nature of activism in Turkish foreign policy. However, in order to take advantage ofthe economy as the 'practical hand' of foreign policy in the long run, there are certain parameters that need to be satisfied. In this part of the article, three major parameters will be defined, namely industrial capacity in terms of competitiveness, the state-business and businessbusiness synergy, and the societal coherence in terms of domestic and foreign policy priorities. Then, Turkey's position will be assessed accordingly. First of ali, Turkish industry has an important competitiveness problem (see table 1). It is true that Turkish firms have developed an outward-oriented perspective and have internationalized to a certain point. Research and development (R&D) activities, for instance, have increased in the post-2001 period, with R&D expenditures increasing from $3 billion in 2002 to $6.8 billion in 2008. During the same period, R&D expenditure per capita increased from $46 to $98. The number of full-time equivalent R&D personnel increased from 28,964 in 2002 to 67,244 in 2008, which corresponds to 132% increase. By another measure, the number of scientific publications increased from 10,314 in 2002 to 22,738 in 2008. Similarly, the number of international patent applications a year rose to 361 from 85 in the same period. 50 In the final analysis, however, the comparative figures are still far from being promising. For example, while Malaysia, South Korea, and China

82[


devote 55%, 32% and 31% of their total exports to high-technology products, the ratio in Turkey is just 2%, which in fact depicts the competitiveness problem of the Turkish export sector." The following table tabulates the relatively dismal picture for the competition ability ofTurkey in which Turkey is ranked 61"'out of 133 countries in 2009. Table 1: Turkey's Competitiveness Performance (2009-2010) Rank

Main Indicators -

GCl20092010(outof133) Gel 2008-2009 (out of 134) GCl20072008(outof13l)

61 63 53

~"

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2nd pillar: Infrastructure 3rd pillar: Macroeconomic stability 4th pillar: Health and primary education ~" ,

.

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-

5th pillar: Higher education and training 6th pillar: Goods market efficiency 7th pillar: Labor market efficiency 8th pillar: Financial market sophistication 9th pillar: Technological readiness 1Othpillar: Market size

• mot."

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.-,.'-

l Ith pillar: Business sophistication 12th pillar: Innovation Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index,

'.'

96 62 64 74

l st pillar: Institutions

:.,

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73 56 120 80 54 15 ,,~';,.-,'-

,.- i.:, ;.-:

52 69 2009~20l O.

The other aspect of the competitiveness problem of the Turkish industrial sector is the lack of productive links between froancial institutions and the industrial sector. Access to credit sources had always been one of the main problems for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey. This situation became more difficult following the surge of foreign capital into the Turkish banking system. Actually, "one of the obvious limitations of the new environment is that it cannot make a sufficient contribution to the financing of the real economy, as evidenced in the weak share of savings and fixed capital investments in GDP, whilst a considerable amount of household disposable income was transferred to the banking sector"? Foreigners' participation in the Turkish financial system makes it difficult for Turkish SMEs to access credit since they are not adequately equipped to fulfill the necessary credit and rating standards. From a foreign policy perspective, the competitiveness problem is especially serious for the Anatolian ti-

[83

Economyas the 'Practical Hand' of 'NewTurkishForeignPolicy':A PoliticalEconomyExplanation

gersinvesting in Middle Eastern and Asian countries. Obviously, without the strategic planning of investment strategies in neighboring countries, sustaining the economy as the <practical hand' offoreign policy activism has certain limits and constraints. The second problem concerns state-business and business-business synergy. According to the functionalist and interdependence approaches the institutionalization of cooperation mechanisms is required for creating sustainable spill-over effects into high politics. Similarly, as Rodnk" and Evans" argue, the effective industrial policy of the 21 st century requires an active and continuous state-private sector dialogue implemented by means of proper coordination mechanisms and institutions. The dialogue in question has two dimensions. On the one hand, state-private sector cooperation is essential. However, Turkey has not developed the proper dialogue channels between the state and private finance capital to overcome information shortages and bureaucratic bottlenecks. Also private-private sector cooperation (what Susan Strange calls "firm-firm diplomacy") is sine qua non. Business associations in Turkey "have been quite reluctant to enter into alliances and have been careful to maintain a distant, arm's length relationship both with other business associations as well as wider segments of the civil society";" Although there are signs that influential business organizations in Turkey have started to engage in dialogue, the level of cooperation is still rudimentary and fledgling. As a result, the possible expansion of Turkish financial and industrial capital in neighboring countries is hindered and the ability of Turkish finance capital to act as an economic arm of Turkish foreign policy may be further curtailed in the long run. The third constraint in Turkish foreign policy from an economic point ofview relates to the fragmented identity politics and fragile democracy. The single-party government in its first term (2002-2007) succeeded in creating relative stability. Yet, the political arena has started to become more polarized, especially after 2006. In this context, identity politics, rather than the politics of service, has started to dominate the political agenda. The escalation of political tension undermines economic stability and creates new fault-lines in the sustainability of economic growth. The formulation of a comprehensive strategy and active state coordination in guiding finance capital require common denominators that unify the society. This common denominator and the 'glue' of social cohesion was a desire for a strong democracy. Yet, this is not the case for Turkey even in the first decade of the 21 st century. As the synergy among state-business and businessbusiness relations is vitally important to create competitive advantage in foreign policy issues, the lack of coordination, maiuly due to the lack of consensus on the

841

major common issues, is likely to constraint Turkey's foreign policy potential in the medium-term. Conclusion Turkish foreign policy has been more assertive and independent in the first decade of the 21" century. Accordingly many studies have devoted herculean efforts to understand the basic dynamics and the driving logic of this new Turkish foreign policy activism. Apart from the crude "axis shift" discussions, which is rightly discarded as being simplistic and ideology-loaded, to capture the complexity of the emerging multi-polarity paradigm in question there has emerged two basic explanations. The first concentrates on the changing balance of power in world politics and tries to explain the new Turkish foreigu policy within the context of new security conceptions. The second approach sees Turkey's rising influence in the neighboring region in terms of the changing identity perceptions under the AK Party era. Since Turkish foreign policy is composed of multiple facets, the explanations presented above contribute to our understanding. However, this paper has argued that one crucial aspect, the political economy of Turkish foreign policy, has been relatively neglected in the recent literature. Accordingly, this paper has utilized the functionalist and interdependence approaches to reveal the driving logic of new Turkish foreigu policy. In this context, the cooperation in the low politics (or the trade and economy-related issues) is operationalized as the practical hand of Turkish policy makers to solve the disputes in high political issues via junctional spill-overmechanisms, which can be seen as material interests, multiple dialogue channels and perceptions. Finally, this paper has also discussed the limits and constraints of the functionalist political economy logic in Turkish foreign policy in the new era. Three main constraints, namely the industrial capacity in terms of competitiveness, the state-business and business-business synergy, and societal coherence in terms of domestic and foreign policy priorities, are the principal political economy challenges for the future. Endnotes >I- I want to express my special thanks to Prof. Ziya Onis and Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur for their invaluable comments and contributions. I also benefitted from illuminating opinions of Insight Turkey editors. 1. For a concise articulation of Turkish foreign policy in the new era by the president of the Republic of Turkey, see the speech of Abdullah Gill, Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Era (Ankara: USAK Publications, 2010). 2. For details, see Gokhan Bacik, "Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey," Insight Turkey, VoL 11, No.2 (2009), pp. 31-41; William Hale, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era," Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No.3 (2009), pp. 143-159.

185

t,

I MUSTAFA KUTLAY

3. For crystal clear examples of this kind of approach, see Soner Cagaptay, "Is Turkey Leaving the West?," Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2009, retrieved from http://"WWVl.foreignaffairs.com/artides/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west. 4. For detailed discussions, see Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era;' Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No.1 (2009), pp. 7-24; Btilent Aras, "The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No.3 (2009); Habibe Ozdal, D. Bahadir Dincer and Mehrnet Yegin (eds.), Miilakatlarla Turk Dlf Politikas: (Ankara: USAK Publications, 201_0), 3 volumes. 5. For the increasing impact of Middle Eastern-related developments on Turkey's security, see Tank Oguzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West? ;' TurkiSh Studies, Vol. 9, No.1 (2008), pp. 3-20. 6. Cengiz Candar; "Turkey's 'Soft Power' Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World," SETA Policy Brief, Brief No. 38 (2009), p. 10. 7. For example, see Fuat Keyman, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil;' SETA Policy Brief, Brief No. 39 (2009). 8. For example, see Tank Oguzlu and Mustafa Kfbaroglu, "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who is to Blamet ," Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No.4 (2009), pp. 577-593. 9. Hasan Selim Ozertem, "The Limits of Zero Problem Policy in the Caucasus: The Impasse in Turkish-Armenian Relations," Journal ofCentral Asian and Caucasian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 10 (2010), pp.146-156. 10. For exceptions, see Kemal Kirisci, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40 (2009), Pp- 29-57; Ziya Onis, "Multiple Faces of the 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique," Insight Turkey (this volume). 11. Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process:' International Organization, Vol. 15, No.3 (1961), p. 372.

20. Melda Yaman-Ozturk and Fuat Ercan, "1979 Krizinden 2001 Krizine Tfukiye'de Sermaye Birikim Silled ve Yasanan Donusumler," Praksis, Vol. 19 (2009), pp. 55-93; Derya Giiltekin-Karaka9' Hem Hasmuz Hem Hsstmsz: 'Iiirkiyede Finans Kapitalin DonUjumu ve Banka Reformu (istanbul: lletlsim Yaymlan, 2009). 21. CBRT, Financial Stability Report, May-20ID, Vol. 10, p. 39. 22. For details of this kind of categorization, see Derya Gultektn-Karakas, "Sermaye'nin Uluslararasrlasmasi Surecfnde Tiirkiye Banka Reformu ve Finans Kapltal-ict Yeniden Yaprlanma," Praksis, Vol. 19 (2009), pp. 95-13123. Gultekin-Karakas, "Sermaye'nin Uluslararastlaemasr Surecinde

," pp. 106-112.

24. Gultekin-Karakas, "Sermaye'nin Uluslararasilasmasr Surecinde

;' p- 113.

25. Niliifer G6ziitok, "T~kiye'nin Smrr Otest Sirketlerl," Capital, Vol. 17, No. 200917. 26. Quoted in Gultekin-Karakas, Hem Hassmiz; Hem Htstmiz... , p. 246. 27. Hakan Yavuz, "Introduction: The Role of New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation ofthe Turkish Islamic Movement;' in Yavuz, H. (ed.}, The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party (Salt Lake City: The University-of Utah Press, 2006), p. 1; Sennur Ozdemir, MUSiAD: Anadolu Sermayesinin Doni1?umu ve Turk Modemlesmesinin Derinlesmesi (Ankara: Vadi Yaymlan, 2006). 28. For a comprehensive account of Ozal period from a foreign policy perspective, see Sedat Laciner; "The Ozal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ozalism," VSAK Yearbook ofInternational Law and Politics, Vol. 2 (2009), PI'. 153-205. 29. Ergun Ozbudun and Fuat Keyman, "Cultural Globalization in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, Strategies;' in Berger, P. and Huntington, S. (eds.), Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 296-319. 30. Berrin Lorasdagr and Fuat Keyman, Kentler: Anadolu'nun Diinusiimii, Tilrkiye'nin Geiecegi (Istanbul, Dogan Kitap, 2010). 31. See lYrOstAD's official website http://wwvv.musiad.org.tr.

12. Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics ofEuropean Economic Integration (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.10.

32. Orner Demir, Mustafa Acar and Metin 'Ibprak, "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No.6 (2004), pp. 166-188.

13. Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics, Vol. 40 (1988), pp. 239-240.

33. See, for example, Landon Thomas, "Turning East, TUrkey Asserts Economic Power," The New York Times, July 5, 20ID.

14. This part is partially built upon my previous work in which Turkish-Greek relations were analyzed within the context of Interdependence theory, see Mustafa Kutlay, "A Political Economy Approach to the Expansion of Turkish-Greek Relations: Interdependence or Nett" Perceptions: Journal ofInternational Affairs, Vol. XIV; (Spring-Summer, 2009), pp. 91-119. 15. For a detailed account on interdependence theory, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye., "An Introduction," in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973). 16. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, [r., "A Conclusion...:' p. 371. 17. This part is partially based upon my unpublished Msc. Thesis. See Mustafa Kutlay, "Transformation ofthe Finance Capital in Spain and Turkey: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective;' Unpublished Msc. Thesis, METU Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2010. 18. Ziya Onis, "Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics: Towards a Political Economy of the 2000 and 2001 Financial Crises in Turkey;" in Onis, Z. and Rubin, B. (eds.), Turkish Economy in Crisis (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 1-30. 19. Ziya Onis, "The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party," in Yavuz, H. (ed.), The Emergence ofa New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 208.

86


34. Berrin Koyuncu, "Kttresellesme ve Turk Isadamlan Dernegt," Uiuslararasc ili~kiler, Vol. 3, No.9 (2006), pp. 125-149. 35. For details of TUSlAD's EU perspective, see Mehmet Ugur and Dilek Yankaya, "Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Opportunism, and EU Conditionality: The AKP and TUSiAD Experience in Turkey:' Governance; An International Journal ofPolicy, Administration, and Institutions, VoL 21, No.4, pp. 581-601; for details onM0siAD's EU perspective, see Yankaya, "The Europeanization of

MUSiAD..." 36. Yankaya, "The Europeanization ofMUSiAD...;' p. 10, 11. 37. Ahrnet Davutoglu, "Turkey's New Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," Insight Turkey, VoL 10, No.1 (2008), p. 78. 38. Nevin Donat, "Arcelik Misir'a Ortadogu'nun En Biiyiik Pabrtkasmi Kuracak'; Milliyet, June 22,2010. 39. For details, see Mehmet Babacan, "Whither Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey's Foreign Trade," SETA Policy Report, Report No.4, November 2010, p. 14. 40. Yevgeni Primakov, "Ttirkiye Ortadoguda 'Bolgesel Devlet' Oldu," Cumhuriyet, June 24, 2010.

I

Q~

MUSTAFA KUTLAY

41. For details on the issue, see www.treasury.gov.tr. 42. Mustafa Kutlay, "Is Turkey Drifting Away from the West? An Economic Interpretation (1/2)", Journal of Turkish Weekly, October 28, 2009. 43. Figures are calculated from the data provided by Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. 44. Kerem Oktem, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in the MidIle East," IslamOnllne, December 7, 2009.

45. For the full list of agreements, see "Ioint Statement of the First Meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Turkey, Damascus;' retrieved from http://london.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=1900. 46. For details, see "joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon': retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ joint-political-declaration-on-the-esthablishement-of-the-high-Ievel-cooperation-council-amongturkey_-syria_-jordan-and-Iebanon.en.mfa.

Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence]" KADRl KAAN RENDA*

47. Mehmet Babacan, "Whither Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey's Foreign Trade;' SETA Policy Report, Report No.4, 20ID, p. 14. 48. Meliha Benli Altumstk, "Turkey: Arab Perspectives;' Foreign Policy Analysis Series (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 20ID), p. 8. 49. Altumsik, "Turkey: Arab Perspectives...,"p. 11. 50. The figures are retrieved from Turkish Statisticial Institute's database, TURKSTAT. 51. Ziya Orris and ismail Emre Bayram, "Temporary Star or Emerging Tiger? Turkey's Recent Economic Performance in a Global Setting:' New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 39 (2008), pp. 47-84. 52. Caner Bakir and Ziya Onis, "The Regulatory State and Turkish Banking Reforms in the Age of Post-Washington Consensus;' Development and Change, Vol. 41, No.1 (20ID), p. 103. 53. Dani Rodrik, "Uluslararasi Uygulamalar Isrgmda Tiirkiye Icin Sanayi Stratejisi Arayislari," TUSiAD-KOl; University Economic Research Forum Conference, December 25, 2010, IstanbuL 54. Peter Evans, in Search ofthe 21st Century Developmental State," CGPE Working Paper, Working Paper No.4, 2008. 55. Ziya Onis and Umut Tiirem, "Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations;' Turkish Studies, Vol.2, No.2 (2001), pp. 94-120.

T

urki sh foreign policy is by no means immune to either the influence of the international system or the effects of its neighborhood's transformations. Given this background, after the end of the Cold War, the neglected historical and geographical reality of interconnectedness between Turkey and its environs resurfaced. Interconnectedness did not only open up new. horizons and create opportunities but also posed new problems and conflicts for Ankara. With the turn ofa new century, Turkey became more able and willing to benefit from increasing interconnectedness in its vicinity. Hence, this paper emphasizes the signiiicance of the interplay between domestic and regional dynamics and the effects of the unprecedented level of economic interdependence in contemporary Turkish foreign policy. The paper starts from the proposition that Turkish foreign policy went through two concomitant yet conflicting transformations after

,.. Department afEuropean Studies, King's College London, [email protected]

881

189

KADRi KAAN RENDA

the Cold war. The first transformation is defined in this paper as the "renationalization"? of Turkish foreign policy led by security concerns, which arose from regional turmoil and domestic conflicts. The renationalization of foreign policy refers to the revival of nationalism in the political discourse and the rise of security concerns regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity and national unity of the Turkish state in the new world order. Owing to renationalization, we witnessed the predominance of a securityfirst "assertive new activism"? in Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1990s. The second transformation, which Turkish foreign policy vaguely underwent in the 1990s, was the rise of "internationalism?" due to the concerns about Turkey's new role in international politics. Starting with the Helsinki summit in 1999 but perhaps even more profoundly after the twin economic crises of 2000 and 2001, internationalism was accompanied by economic liberalization and surpassed the renationalization process. This economic orientation already towards a liberal economy began in the late 1980s under the leadership of Turgut Ozal. Since the end of the 1990s Turkey has been pursuing liberal international policies based on commerce, cooperation, and soft power. In this paper, it is mainly argued that in the Turkey of the 2000s, an economy-oriented "new activism'" has prevailed over the security-first activism of the 1990s. This is due to the changes in domestic political structures and the increasing importance of economic growth and trade not only for Turkey but also for its neighbors. Hence, instead of finding conflict with its neighbors, recently at the top of Turkey's foreign policy agenda is a move to promote interstate cooperation.

Instead of finding conflict with its neighbors, recently at the top of Turkey's foreign policy agenda is a move to promote interstate cooperation

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t i ~

~ •

Against this historical background, this paper aims to explain mainly Turkey's relations with its neighbors through a liberal framework, which underlines the importance of interdependence and international cooperation among states. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye put forward three defining characteristics of complex interdependence: i) the absence of a hierarchy among issues, if) increasing use of multiple channels of interaction between states, and iii) declining primacy of military force. I argue that recent developments in Turkish foreign policy, particularly Turkey'srelations with its neighbors resemble the characteristic features of complex interdependence. I further argue that the new activism in Turkish foreign policy seems, at least to me, to facilitate international cooperation among regional actors and to create a complex interdependence between Turkey and its neighborhood. 90

I

Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence?

The paper proceeds as follows: The first part is devoted to the description of the main premises of the liberal model put forward by Keohane and Nye. The second part gives a brief overview of the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy and the relationships between Turkey and its neighbors directly after the sudden end of the Cold War. In the third part, I apply the analytical framework to the Turkish case and try to explain to what extent the characteristic features of complex interdependence can be observed within contemporary Turkish foreign policy. In the concluding part, I discuss the analytical deficiencies of complex interdependence and the practical handicaps in Turkish foreign policy's new activism. Complex Interdependence and International Cooperation Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in their seminal book Power and Interdependence, took interdependence seriously and brought forth a new liberal model that would help the students ofinternational relations to explore the transforming relationship among Western democracies. First and foremost, Keohane and Nye challenged the realist assumption that states are unitary and the major, or rather the only actors in the international arena. The authors pointed to the rise ofmultilateralism in interstate relations and the emergence of new interaction channels." Keohane and Nye's pluralist conviction of domestic politics attaches a paramount importance to nongovernmental actors. These new actors have gained a greater voice not only with regard to issues falling under low politics such as trade but also regarding issues at the level ofhigh politics such as decisions to send troops abroad. Second, Keohane and Nye viewed the high politics-low politics divide of the realist school incompatible with to days highly complex and diverse political agendas. The authors argued persuasively that military .security does not necessarily occupy the top of the foreign policy agenda anymore.' Looking through a liberal prism, contemporary students ofinternational relations are able to observe that the protection of citizens from fluctuations in the world economy and the promotion of the welfare of societies are nowadays regarded as the top priorities of democratic governments. In line with the second argument, Keohane and Nye also cast doubt on the realist assumption that anarchy in international relations inclines states to use military force whenever necessary. For them, power has evolved from brutal military force to "soft pow~r,"8 which implies political persuasion and cultural and social

191

Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence? KADRi KAAN RENDA

attraction. Keohane and Nye suggested two analytical concepts, namely sensitivity and vulnerability to comprehend how power politics works between mutually dependent states. The authors explained that sensitivity is the "liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation,"whereas vulnerability refers to "anactor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events after policies have been altered,"? The main conclusion drawn by the authors is that "less vulnerable states will try to use asymmetrical interdependence in particular groups of issues as a source of power'?" In this respect, power is not one dimensional and material power is useful only if it reinforces an actor's ability to swiftly adapt to the new circumstances. Furthermore, power is not considered fungible because possession ofmilitary power does not automatically give leverage in every issue since the application of force among issue areas is too complex in interdependence. Of course, this does not mean that there is no room for power politics in their model. Military force can still be useful as a "bargaining tool" and an instrument for deterrence."

,,

",-

i KI

!~"

I~ •

Keohane, in another ground-breaking book, defines international cooperation as a reciprocal process which "takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process ofpolicy coordination."" Cooperation is, thus, intrinsically reciprocal and highly political. In order for cooperation to flourish, a few conditions need to be satisfied. First, the perceptions of policymakers ought to shift from "myopic national conceptions of self-interest"!" to an enlightened and far-sighted use of national interests. The logic of a zero-sum game should be replaced by the logic of a positive sum strategy. Furthermore, uncertainty about other states' behavior should be alleviated by enhanced coordination and effective communication between states. What makes the political setting conducive to coordination and communication is each state's "reputation for reliability?" and the consistency between their words and deeds. In summary, changes in the perceptions of policymakers, reduction in uncertainty; and building a reputation or a new image in the eyes of others are prerequisites for effective international cooperation. It should be noted that the neoliberal school of international relations does neither overlook the role of state nor disregard anarchy in international relations. Nonetheless, unlike realism it puts emphasis on the possibility of long-lasting cooperation among states under anarchy and underlines the role of a myriad of actors and new kinds of interaction in international relations. Prior to the empirical analysis done in the remainder of the paper, the main characteristics of

921

Turkish foreign policy in the early post-Cold War period are outlined in the next section.

The Post-Cold War Era in Turldsh Foreign Policy The euphoria which spread among some Turkish politicians owing to the collapse ofthe Soviet Union vanished quickly when it was ascertained thattheir grandiose and political romanticism to make Turkey a regional superpower was at best yet to be accomplished, at worst an illusion. IS After the initial disappointment there came the reinstatement of the type of geopolitical thinking blended with power politics, which had overwhehningly dominated Turkish foreign policy since its foundation. To put it differently, in the 1990s increasing sensitivity of Turkey to its neighborhood forced Turkish policyrnakers to "regionalize" their policies, whereas increasing vulnerability of 'Iurkish society and particularly the Turkish state led to the "renationalization' of its foreign and security policies. Thus, the vulnerability of Turkey mounted in the early 1990s up until it reached a peak when Ankara resorted to the coercive diplomacy to deal with Greece over the KardaklImia Crisis in 1996 and Syria over its support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 1998. The main driving force behind the assertive activism of Turkey during the 1990s was the renationalization of Turkish foreign and security policies. It is argued that due to the security-first approach and distrustful attitudes of the Turkish hardliners," good neighborly relations could never be maintained even though there was . a political will to do so in some circles ofTurkish politics. As a result, some scholars defined Ankara's attitude in the 1990s as one of a «coercive regional power;'1? which was poised to confront its neighbors with unilateral and military measures. From a neoliberal institutionalist point of view, throughout the 1990s, states in the region found themselves in a situation of political market fallure. Keohane defines market failure as "situations in which [... ] agreements that would be beneficial to all parties are not made'?" The optimal outcome for Turkey as well as for other states in the region would be enhancing interstate relations and facilitating cooperation as much as possible. Because of myopic self interests, deep mistrust and a lack of effective communication, any commitment to international cooperation from Ankara waxed and waned quickly. The initiatives which had succeeded in forming institutional entities such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization eventually

proved futile throughout the 1990s. Two main reasons for the failure to achieve an optimal outcome in the region should be highlighted. First of all, there was an uncertainty across the region and

193

Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependences

mistrust between states. Uncertainty was high because each state lacked reliable information about the intentions of its neighbors. Turkish traditional republican policymakers were, thus, extremely ~us picious and cautious about their neighbors," most of which were perceived to be the usual suspects who were not only giving political support to secessionist and fundamentalist terrorist organizations in Turkey but also clandestinely supplying them arms, hosting terrorist training camps, and even providing refuge to militants. In an era of great uncertainty and recurrent hostilities, and even though the political aspirations to become a regionalleader were floating around, Turkey pursued an extremely cautious, if not paranoid, foreign policy that favored a security-oriented heavy-handed approach over a welfare-oriented cooperative approach.

replaced its longstanding security-driven objectives of foreign policy with ones stemming from an economy-oriented pragmatic mindset

Secondly, myopic self-interests shaped by a zero-sum mindset were predominant among Turkish policymakers. The repercussion of myopic self-interests was the resurgence of security concerns and the reinforcement of the high politics versus low politics divide inherited from the Cold War. In the parlance ofcomplex interdependence, because of the widely-held perception of a rigid hierarchy between military and political issues on the one hand and economic and social ones on the other TUrkey lacked linkage strategies that might incorporate several issues into one package. Had the states in the region diversified their priorities and been more prone to sealing package deals by making trade-offs, the ultimate outcome could have been the development ofa cooperation on solid and even institutionalized foundations.

•

According to Keohane, states are able to redefine their self interests so as to associate their own well-being with other states'." However, Keohane is also cognizant of the fact that "Commerce by itself does not ensure peace, but commerce on a nondiscriminatory basis within an orderly political framework promotes cooperation on the basis of enlightened national conceptions of self-interest that emphasize production over war'?' Therefore, without suitable milieu conditions trade and interdependence would not result in cooperation. The capture of the leader of a terrorist organization, the PKK, the influence of the European Union (EU) on Turkish domestic political structures since Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999, and the coming of a new ruling elite to power are the key factors that initially eased the psychological state of emergency and the feeling 94

of insecurity prevalent in Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s." This eventually rendered the Turkish state less vulnerable and paved the way for the advent of new actors, new channels of interaction, and new strategies in the making of foreign policy.

Restructuring Domestic Politics and Repositioning Turkey in Regional Politics Turkey has been undergoing two complementary transformations. One of them is democratization and the other is economic Hberalization. Both had their inception and were put in place during the Ozal era but were disrupted in the 23 1990s and apparently gained new momentum in the early 2000s. As free trade and democracy became the main pillars of Turkish politics soon after Turkey was granted candidacy status by the EU in 1999, Ankara replaced its long-standing security-driven objectives offoreign policy with ones stemming from an economyoriented pragmatic mindset. The remainder ofthe paper will analyze the effects of free trade and democratization on Turkish foreign policy and its repositioning in

the center of regional politics.

Variation ofactors and issues A very significant dilemma for Turkey has long been how to become more influential in regional politics while putting her own house in order. The can - . didacy status given by the ED at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 helped TUrkey out by heralding a new phase oftransformation in Turkish politics. Thus, democratization during the EU accession process altered the roles of several political actors in the domestic arena. Ofthese actors, it was most of all the military that had to relinquish its power. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAP) was indeed considered by many observers to be the most influential institution in setting the pace and direction of Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War. The military's hard-line approach impinged on foreign policy and manifested itself through an increase in the military budget and an enhanced role of the National Security Council (NSC) throughout the 1990s. The primary reason behind the erosion of the military's clout is without doubt the reforms demanded by the EU regarding the civilian control of the military. The reforms inevitably curbed the military's power in the foreign policymaking process as well. This paved the way for an increasing civilian influence in the field of foreign policy.24 As a matter of fact, the Europeanization process in the post-Helsinki era has belatedly transformed the civil-military relations in accordance with the socio-political dynamics of the post-Cold War. 1

1

95

- - - - - - - - - - -_ _IIIIIIIIliliiii_-

KADRI KAAN RENDA

The change in civil-military relations, the transformation of the interaction between state and society, and the division of labor and authority among different state institutions infused a new vigor and enthusiasm into Turkish foreign policy. This opened up new windows of opportunities, which domestic actors availed themselves of in order to be better heard on the national stage. Seldom had non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a significant role in the policymaking ofThrkey. The non-state actors could only exert trivial influence on the decision-making process since the national interest was very strictly defined and solely articulated by an exclusive circle of foreign policy elites within the state. The formerly excluded actors of civil society and a new middle class willing to interact with neighboring countries much more than ever slowly but steadily have gained leverage in foreign policy; as Turkey's democratization and liberalization processes have been furthered. A new class of businessman no longer buys the overselling of threats by hardliners. Indeed, they tend to establish close economic ties and then perhaps social bonds with the neighboring countries. The highly defensive and cautious approach of the traditional foreign policy elite in the foreign ministry and the military was abandoned by the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which came to power with a landslide victory in 2002. The JDP's avowed intent is to increase economic growth and trade with the country's neighbors." In this new era of Turkish foreign policy the meaning of security, welfare, and democracy are inextricably intertwined. The ultimate dominance of high politics over low politics was challenged, with the outcome being the abandoning of hierarchy among issues and an increasing variation in foreign policy preferences, as assumed by the complex interdependence model. Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister of Turkey, also underscores the prominent role of private sector firms in driving the country's foreign policy and strategic vision." An example of this new perspective in practice is the "Industry for Peace" initiative proposed by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of TUrkey; which aimed to revitalize industry in Gaza, Palestine in order to provide jobs and livelihood for the people of Gaza. The second transformation is observed in the transformations in Turkey's economic structures and a new mentality in economic policy making. The twin economic crises in 2000 and 2001 urged Turkish statesmen to stabilize the economy and find new markets so as to expand trade volume which would yield the economic growth that Turkey desperately needed. Having been an "emerging market economy; Ankara was left with no choice but to enhance trade relations with its neighbors. Thus, Turkey has evolved into a "trading state":" and its quest

961


for new markets and new business partners has continued since then. It is noteworthy that the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU contributed to the liberalization of the Turkish economy more than anything' else. Several sectors of the Turkish economy have virtually reached the standards of the EU and have become ready and eager to find new trading partners elsewhere. Consolidation and stabilization ofthe economy encouraged good relations with Turkey's crucial environs. The trade statistics in table 1 and table 2 give strong evidence of the crucial role of trade for the Turkish economy in general and in particular of the importance of trade with the neighbors. Table 1 highlights the openness of the Turkish economy and its integration in international trade. More than one fourth of the gross domestic product of Turkey came from international trade in 2008, whereas the share of international trade was approximately 17.5 percent in the mid of the 1990s. Table I: International trade in goods and services as a percentage of GDP

Year

Share

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

17.5% 19.5% 21.8%

20.8% 19.4% 21.6%

25.4% 24.4% 23.5%

24.9% 23.6%

25.1% 24.9% 26.1%

Source: QEeD Factbook201O. Retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economtcs/oecd-factbook_18147364

Table 2 depicts the detalls of Turkey's trade volumes with its neighbors plus with Africa, the EU, Israel, the Middle East, and Russia for the years between 1999 and 2008. The data for 2009 is deliberately excluded from the table as the international trade volumes fell dramatically owing to the recent recession in the world economy. The trade volume in some cases has increased more than ten

Turkeis Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence? KADRi KAAN RENDA

times since 1999. The volumes of trade with Greece, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Syria in 2008 are respectively around Jive,ten, four, and three times higher than in 1999. In addition, Turkey as a foreign direct investor has increasingly financed various infrastructure and engineering projects in its neighborhood. According to a report published in April 2010, "As of September 2009, 500 Turkish companies had invested in Iraq, and Turkey as a country was among the top ten foreign investors,"" Table 2: Trade volumes with selected countries (US dollar at current prices bflli Year Partner

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Export

n,a

n.a

na

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

na

Import

n,

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

0.391

OAOO

0.560

1.489

Flow

Azerbaijan

Export

0.248

0.230

0.225

0.231

0.315

0.403

0.528

0.695

1.046

1.667

Import

0.440

0.956

0.780

0.646

0.122

0.135

0.272

0.340

0.329

0.928 2.151

Export

0.233

0.252

0.299

0.380

0.621

0.892

1.179

1.567

2.060

Import

0.295

00465

0.393

0508

0.689

0.955

1.190

1.661

1.949

1.840

Georgia

Export

0.114

0.131

0.144

0.103

0.155

0.199

0.271

00407

0.645

0.997

Import

0.932

0.155

0.127

0.137

0.273

0.302

0.302

0.344

0.289

0525

Greece

Export

0.406

0.437

0.476

0.590

0920

1.166

1.126

1.602

2262

2.429

Import

0.287

0.430

0.266

0.312

0.427

0592

0.726

1.044

0.950

1.150

Iran

Export

0.157

0.235

0.360

0.333

0.533

0.810

0.912

1.066

1.386

2.029

Bulgaria

Iraq

Syria

Russia

Israel

EU Africa

Middle

Import

0.635

0.815

0.839

0.920

1.860

1.961

3.469

5.626

6.613

8.199

Export

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

829

1.815

2.748

2589

2.811

3.916

Import

n.a

n.a

n,

n.a

112

00467

0.458

0.375

0.644

1.320

Export,

0.232

0.184

0.281

0.266

0.410

0.393

0.551

0.609

0.797

1.l15

Import

0.307

0.545

0.4{}3

0.506

00413

0.357

0.272

0.187

0.376

0.639

Export

0.588

0.643

0.924

1.172

1.367

1.858

2.377

3.237

4.727

6.483

Import

2374

3.886

3.435

3.891

5.451

9.027

12.869

17.806

23.506

31364

Export

0.585

0.650

0.805

0.861

l.083

1.309

10466

1.529

1.658

1.935

Import

0.298

0.505

0.529

0.544

0.459

0.714

0.803

0.782

1.081

1.447

Export

15.420

15.664

17.545

20.416

27.397

36.524

41.365

47.930

60.406

63.394

Import

22.529

28.526

19.823

25.688

35.140

48.077

52.629

59.338

68.589

74.803

Export

1.049

0.901

1.031

1.203

1.527

2.150

2.558

3.365

40429

6.558

Import

1.075

1.787

1.879

1.823

2.075

3.012

3.786

4.714

5.702

6.490

Export

2.225

2.031

2.575

2.735

4.511

6.797

8.986

9.881

13.186

23.330

Import

2299

3.543

3221

3.310

4.861

6.194

8.836

11.790

12.017

16.003

Ea"

Source: Compiled from the IMP and WTO databases by the author.

981

The democratization process coupled with liberalization and internationalization in the Turkish economy made certain that at the international level, Ankara is no longer able to pursue a heavy-handed policy with a security-first mindset. In addition, the failure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to ratify a motion that would give permission to the U.S. to use Turkish military bases during the Iraq War on March 1, 2003 can arguably be considered as a turning point where credibility of Turkey as a reliable partner increasedsigniJicantly in the eyes of its southern neighbors." These two complementary processes and the Significant historical event gave the boost to a new activism in Turkish foreign policy and provided ample room for repositioning Turkey at the center of

regional politics.

country Armenia

Multiple channels of interaction

To Turkish politicians, the only way to improve welfare and maintain security in the region seems to be the development of long-lasting stability and peace through advancing collaboration with various political actors, and the enhancement of political cooperation with neighboring states via different channels of interaction. Ankara has been trying to reduce uncertainty and alleviate the distrust that overshadows it relations with Turkey's neighbors by forming trans governmental relations between the state institutions of Turkey and their counterparts in other states. These new channels reinforce and complement interstate relations, even if they also challenge the power of the traditional foreign policy elites. In· this paper, it is not possible to give every detail of Turkey's relations with each neighbor. A few examples should suffice to illustrate the change in the conduct of foreign policy. Greek-Turkish relations entered a new phase with the lifting ofthe Greek veto over Turkey's ED bid at the Helsinki European Council in 1999. From then on, confidence-building measures between Turkey and Greece were taken, and the interstate and societal interaction between the two countries developed further. A Turkish delegation visited Greece on May 14-15, 2010. The Turkish delegation included cabinet ministers, bureaucrats, and more than 100 husmessmen." During the visit a high level cooperation council between the cabinets ofthe two countries convened for the first time and several bilateral accords were signed Similar meetings and high level strategic cooperation councils held between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Russia exemplify the variety of interaction channels and different mechanisms for conducting foreign policy. In the council meetings, cabinet ministers, and bureaucrats from different ministries gather around a table to discuss several issues ranging from trade to agriculture, tourism, energy; and

199


KADRI KAAN RENDA

J

! ::! J The driving objective for Turkey seems to be to cultivate a new image as a peace-promoting and security-providing country.

transportation. The first meeting of the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council of Ministers was held on December 22-23, 2009." Moreover, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon formed the "Quadripartite High Level Cooperation Council" (HLCC) and expressed their political will to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons." As a result of these meetings. a series of agreements and protocols on cultural exchange, education, health, security. trade, and transportation were signed between Turkey and Syria, Iraq, Greece and Russia. In addition to these transgovernmental yet bilateral mechanisms of foreign policy, Turkey organized and hosted multilateral meetings. The European UnionOrganization of Islamic Conference summit, the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Conference, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact, and the Trilateral Balkan summits are to name but a few. Of these initiatives, the Neighboring Countries of 100

I

Iraq Conference is very well-known. The Even though Turkey remains a initiative started in 2003 within a small state preoccupied with regional group of countries neighboring Iraq and turmoil in the Middle East then expanded and included the repreand the Caucasus recently, sentatives of the UN and G-S countries. it has been pursuing soft Alongside regional engagements, Turkey also aims to improve the relations power policies that are more between the East and the West. The Almultilateral, cooperative, and liance of Civilizations, co-sponsored by diplomatic than ever before Spain and Turkey, epitomizes Turkey's efforts to enhance dialogue aud cooperation between different cultures and religions. The primary aim of the Alliance is to "improve understanding and cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and religions, and to help counter the forces that fuel polarization and extremism'?" To this end, the Alliance of Civilizations facilitates interaction among different social groups from different countries through several projects on civil society; youth, migration, and media. Turkey is also intent on fostering relationships between societies. tbrahim Kahn, adviser to the Prime Minister, underlined this objective in an interview by stating that "Rather than state to state relations, it is more a question of improving people to people relationsf'" In line with this approach the visa exemption protocols signed between Turkey and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Libya, exhibit Turkey's resoluteness to facilitate transnational activities in the region. Furthermore, in order to increase the level of interaction among societies and between economies of the region new transportation projects were undertaken. For instance, the railway line built before the First World War to connect Istanbul and Baghdad was re-opened in February 2010. 35 These various bilateral and multilateral meetings and other initiatives underpin the agenda-setting power and facilitator role acquired lately by Turkey in regional politics. As a result, Turkey has become more connected to its environs and more able and willing to benefit from the peaceful interactions in its neighborhood.

Primacy ofsoft power The third characteristic feature of complex interdependence is the minor role of military force. The change in Turkish strategic thinking and its perception of regional politics rendered the use of military force inappropriate on the way to realizing the new strategy envisaged by former scholar Ahmet Davutoglu,

1101

KADRi KAAN RENDA

Foreign Minister Davutoglu, in his book called "Strategic Depth'?" draws up the blueprints of a new doctrine for Turkish foreign policy. The Davutoglu doctrine conceives Turkey as a central country, comparing it to Germany, Russia, and Japan. According to Davutoglu, Turkey had not been wielding influence on the regional politics as she should be." Starting with this assumption, he puts forth a new strategic framework, which helps Turkey's bid in playing a major role in the post-Cold War international system. The Davutoglu doctrine incorporates the principles of protecting and widening civil liberties, a zero-problems policy with neighbors, a proactive and preemptive peace diplomacy; a multidimensional foreign policy, and a rhythmic diplomacy." All together, this aims to enhance Turkey's presence and influence, and ultimately redress its image on the international stage. Even though Turkey remains a state preoccupied with regional turmoil in the Middle East and the Caucasus recently; it has been pursuing soft power policies that are more multilateral, cooperative, and diplomatic than ever before." President Gill, for instance, envisages a Turkey which is "responsible to take care of the region around us. Some problems are directly related to us. With some we don't have a direct link. We want to contribute to a resolution of them alI:'4D President Gill's statement underscores that Turkey has turned into a responsible power, which not only possesses military strength but is also able to use political, diplomatic, and cultural instruments to create a favorable environment in which cooperation can last longer.

At this point it should be noted that the secondary role for military force does not mean that security is no more one ofthe top priorities of Turkey. On the contrary, security maximization is still a dominant concern for Turkey; however, the way to maximize security is now the creation of relations of interdependence. For Davutoglu, Turkey has to find the balance between security and democracy. The use of military force in any occasion should be the last resort, should conform to the soft power of Turkey and not impair civil liberties and human rights." A strong army is, thus, not an end in itself; it is rather one of the means that helps Turkey to maintain its international image and credibility. The implications ofthis change in the use ofmilitary force are twofold, namely a decrease in the military expenditure/gross domestic product ratio and transformation of military strategy. Table 3 illustrates the steady decline in military expenditure since 1999. Whereas Turkey spent approximately four percent of its GDP on the military in 1999, the allocation ofGDP to the military was virtually halved in 2008. 1021


Table 3: Military Expenditure/Gross Domestic Product ratio for the period 1990-2008

Year

Value%

1990

3.5%

1991

3.8%

1992

3.9%

1993

3.9%

1994

4.1%

1995

3.9%

1996

4.1%

1997

4.1%

1998

3.3%

1999

4%

2000

3.7%

2001

3.7%

2002

3.9%

2003

3.4%

2004

2.8%

2005

2.5%

2006

2.5%

2007

2.2%

2008

2.2% Source: SIPRIdatabase

Retrieved December 15, 2010, from http;llmilexdata.sipri.orglresult.php4

Apart from the military budget cuts, another implication of Turkey's new understanding of power is the transformation of its military strategy. Turkey today tends to establish flexible alliances. The country's new civil and economic power needs more room to maneuver easily in regional politics. This is why the principle of collective security was reevaluated and the dominance of the concept of alliance, which originates from the Cold War, was challenged. A new understanding of the notion of collective security as cooperative rather than conflicting fully conforms to the current priorities of Turkish foreign policy because "Collective security arrangements are inclusive, since they are designed to deal with threats among members; alliances are exclusive because they deter and defend against external threats."? Ankara's willingness to playa mediator and a peace-maker role 1103

Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence? KADRi KAAN RENDA

Turkey has evolved from a coercive power into a non-aggressive and cooperative state, or rather a soft power

in the Middle East in the talks between Syria and Israel, and its contribution to the negotiations between the West and Iran over the Iranian nuclear proliferation, are the highlights of Turkey's inclination towards collective-cooperative secnrity arrangements and flexible alliances. Nevertheless, NATO and the relations with the U.S. per se will most probably remain vital to Turkey in the future, due to instrumental reasons (I.e. modernization of the military) and political reasons (i.e. Western support for Ankara's international image as a mediator and securityprovider). Thus, it remains to be seen whether Turkey can achieve complete flexibility without alienating itself from the West.

Tnrkey's new political-military strategy partly accounts for the deterioration of relations with Israel too. It is argued that Turkey no longer needs Israel as an ally against imminent threats coming from its neighbors." Besides, the Israeli government's attitude on the Palestine question fuels domestic outrage against its policies in Turkey, and the heavy-handed approach to addressing the issue of Iran's nuclear proliferation collides with Turkeys priority of promoting collective security that encompasses every state in the region. These changing dynamics of TUrkey-Israel relations notwithstanding, Israel remains a strong economic partner of Turkey and a key actor in the regional eqnation for the establishment of enduring peace and continuous economic development across the region. Overall, Turkey and its neighbors have found themselves in economic interdependencies. 1hrough this Turkey wields greater influence in different issue areas such as trade, energy policy, foreign direct investment, and transportation. All of the initiatives and new mechanisms ofstate to state relations strive for the promotion of interaction and cooperation across the region. The driving- objective for TUrkey seems to be to cultivate a new image as a peace-promoting and securityproviding country. The new preferences, or rather redefined national interests, of Turkey correspond well to the liberal school's emphasis on the importance of reputation and image in today's world politics and the vital role of credible information and enhanced interaction in reducing uncertainty and forging cooperation among states. As Wallander and Keohane put it succinctly "being able to provide credible information to others is a source of Influence'?" Turkey, to a certain extent, gives the right signals and provides credible information, which in turn increases the chances of arriving at an optimal choice through the correction of market failure across the region. All in all, with the assistance of those initiatives and new mechanisms of foreign policy, Turkey has earned credibility and a new 1041

image in the international arena, which can be turned into economic, diplomatic and political capital. Conclusion

The new activism in foreign policy has deepened interdependence between Turkey and its neighborhood

Tnrkish foreign policy has lately transposed to a liberal and cooperative standpoint owing to the transformation of domestic politics through the process of democratization and the assumption of power by a new political elite espousing neoliberal ideas and a conservative interpretation of modernization. Dialogue with, rather than deterrence of, neighbors has become the primary objective of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. Hence, Turkey has evolved from a coercive power into a non-aggressive and cooperative state, or rather a soft power. Of course, it is better not to jump to the conclusion that complex interdependence between Tnrkey and its neighbors has been achieved. Nor has Turkey become a regional hegemon. The purpose of this paper was to show that the neoliberal perspective of Keohane and Nye can shed light on the change in recent years of Turkey's relations with its neighbors. However, this economy-oriented neoliberal analysis is best seen as a snapshot of Turkish foreign policy from one angle, rather than a comprehensive analysis.

, I

As for the analytical handicaps of complex interdependence, it should be kept in mind that complex interdependence was proposed at first as a model and an ideal type that gave a liberal account of the changing relations between Western democracies. Thus, complex interdependence grows to maturity if and only if pluralist democracy is institutionalized with all its aspects. Second, the complex interdependence model is heavily economy-oriented and neglects ideological and cultural factors. However, it is generally argued that Turkey's new activism in the region has cultural-religious motivations too. The JDP's conservative democratic political ideology, supported by a new middle class whose social and economic values and beliefs are a mixture of Islamic interpretation of modernization and globalization, is considered by many to be the foremost catalyst behlnd Turkey's policies vis-a-vis its neighbors.

~

The new activism in foreign policy has deepened interdependence between Turkey and its neighborhood. However, there may be some drawbacks of and impediments to the promotion of complex interdependence in the region. Of these, the most important is the interplay between the futnre of Iraq and the prospect of a solution for the Kurdish issue in Turkey exemplifies how a domestic issue can \105

Turkey'sNeighborhoodPolicy:An EmergingComplexInterdependence?

Turkey has gained a strong foothold in regional politics through the new mechanisms .of interaction and its soft power

remain a roadblock on the road to further development of regional cooperation. Secondly, cooperation in the region depends on how much Turkey will persevere with its efforts to foster friendly engagement and peaceful change. The perseverance of Turkey is commensurate with the political will of Turkish politicians and the economic capabilities ofthe state to back activism in foreign policy. Thirdly, the policy of making friends even with erstwhile adversaries such as Armenia and Iran has the potential to deteriorate relations with closed allies such as Azerbaijan and Israel." Lastly, Turkey is still cautiously welcomed by quite a few regional actors. The neighbors remain wary ofTurkish intentions and the new activism in foreign policy might generate unintended results and a backlash against the country's dynamic policies.

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In conclusion, it seems that Turkey has gained a strong foothold in regional politics through the new mechanisms of interaction and its soft power. Nonetheless, being a soft power is a much more burdensome task and at times frustrating than is widely believed. Keohane points out that any state which aspires to be a soft power needs not only to attract "the desire of people in one country to imitate the institutions and practices prevailing in another, but also [to enhance] their ability to do SO:'46 If Turkey wants to wield a power within the region, it needs i) to assist other countries to develop their democratic institutions, and ii) to increase economic growth and promote fair distribution of welfare across the region. This could be done by eliminating "public bads" such as terrorism, fundamentalism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as providing "public goods" such as economic assistance, conflict free environment and regional institutions that can reach out to every actor in the neighborhood. Endnotes 1. Previous drafts of this paper were presented at the Graduate Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research held in Dublin, August Su-September 1, 2010 and at the Annual Conference of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies held in Bruges, September 6-8, 2010. I would like to thank anonymous referees for their useful comments.

2. On this point I draw on Jan w. Honig. Jan w. Honig, "The'Renationalizatiori' of Western European Defense;' Security Studies, Vol.2, NO.1 (Autumn, 1992), pp.122-138. 3. For instance, see Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy;"SAIS Review, Vol.19, No.1 (1999), pp.92-1l3; Sabri Sayari, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges ofMulti-Regionalism;' Journal ofInternational Affairs, Vo1.54, No.1 (Fall, 2000), p.170. 4. Internationalism is generally defined as "a set of beliefs to the effect that if there is more law, organization, exchange, and communication among states, this will reinforce peace and security." 106

Kje1l Goldmarm, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p.2. 5. For the new activism during the Justice and Development Party era, see Ziya Oni~ and Suhnaz Yilmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Acttviam in Turkey during the AKP Era;" Turkish Studies, Vo1.10, No.1 (March, 2009),pp.7-24. 6. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Glenview, 11: Scott Foresman and Co., 1989), 2nd Edition, pp.24-25. 7.1bid., pp.26-27. 8. Joseph, S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 9. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.13.

10. Ibid., p.32. I!. Ibid., p.2S. 12. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.51-52 (italics original).

13. According to Keohane, "Myopic self-interest refers to governments' perception of the relative costs and benefits to them of alternative courses of action "With regard to a particular issue, when that issue is considered in isolation from others." Ibld., p.99 (italics original). 14. Robert 0. Keohane, "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics," Robert. 0. Keohane (ed.), Power and Governance in Partially Globalized World (London, New-York: Routledge, 2002), p.12!. 15. Mustafa Aydm, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation;' The Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol.3, No.2 (Winter, 2003), p.323. 16. Sevgi Drorlan, "Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times," European Security, Vol 14, Issue 2 (June, 2005), p.262. 17. Ziya Onls, "Turkey and the Middle East after September 11: The Importance of the EU Dimension," Turkish Political Quarterly, Vol.2, No.3 (Winter, 2003), p.2. 18. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, p.82. 19. William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case ofthe AKP (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 120. 20. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, p.Ll I. 21. Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered;' Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Power and Governance in Partially Globalized World (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), pA9 22. Philip Gordon and Orner Taspmar, "Turkey on the Brink;' The Washington Quarterly, Vo1.29, No.3 (2006), p.60. 23. Kemal Kirisci, "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: 'The Rise of the Trading State," New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 40 (Spring, 2009), p.33. 24. Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times;' Chaillot Paper No.92 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September, 2006), p.49. 25. Hale and Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, p.12!. 26. AhmetDavutogIu cited in Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints, International Crisis Group Europe Report No.203 (April, 2010), p.10.

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27. Kemal Klrisci, "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State:' p.42-52. 28. Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints, p. 10. 29. Ramazan GOzen, "Causes and Consequences of Turkey's Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of2003:' The Turkish Yearbook ofInternational Relations, Vo136 (2005), p.86. 30. Helena Smith, "Turkish Prime Minister in 'revolutionary' visit to Greece:' The Guardian, May 13, 2010. 31. The joint statement of the meeting is available on the official website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye---suriye_ydsik_ C -toplantisi-ortak-bildirisC-22- za-eraltk-sam.en.mfa.

Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Economic Policy

32. The details of the High Level Cooperation Council are available on the official website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ joint-political-declaration-on-the-esthablishement_of_the_high-Ievel-cooperation-council-among_ turkey_ -syria~-jordan-and-lebanon.en.mfa.

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ii,

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33. See the official website of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Retrieved December 15,2010, from httpv/wwwunaoc.org.

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34. Nicolas Birch, ']\ Neo-Ottomanism: Interview with Ibrahim Kalin," The MajalIa, November 26,2009.

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35. Jonathan Head, "Iraq-Turkey railway links re-opens," BBe News, February 16, 2010.

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36. Ahmet Davurogln, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth) (istanbul: Kiire Yaymlan, 2001).

:'

37. Davutoglu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007:' pp.78-79. 38. Abmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy;" Foreign Policy, (May, 2010). 39. Tank Oguzlu, "Soft power in Turkish foreign policy:' Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs, Vo1.61, Issue 1, (2007), pp. 81-97. 40. Gill quoted in Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitio~s and Constraints, p. 4-5. 41. Ahmet Davutogln, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of2007:' Insight Turkey, VoI.10, No.1 (January-March, 2008), p.79. 42. Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), p.92. 43. Tank Oguzlu, "The Changing Dynamics of Turkey-Israel Relations: A Structural Realist Account," Mediterranean Politics, Vol.I5, No.2 (July, 2010), p.280. 44. Wallander and Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions:' p.95. 45. Hale and Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, p.146. 46. Robert o. Keohane, "The Globalization ofInformaI Violence, Theories ofWorld Politics, and the "Liberalism of Fear':' Robert O. Keohane (ed), Power and Governance in Partially Globalized World (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), pp.282-83.

n inescapable feature of the current era of globalization is the increasing dependence of the state on capital, which, among numerous other effects, has influenced the way we think about the patterns of interaction between the state and business.' Until the early 1990s, the state was thought to be subject to the domestic pressure of the business community since it depended on capital for the pursuit of any objective that required material resources. However, with the emergence of a greater interconnectedness brought about by globalization, international dynamics began to be highlighted as the leading factor influencing the policies of the state. It was the dawn of a new type ofeconomic space called by Manuel Castells as the "space of flows" whereby the functioual integratiou of production and trade units across boundaries through information networks enabled increased flexibility and decentralization in production and management."

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* Department of Political Sdence and International Relations, Bogazifi University, [email protected]

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These two arguments, one emphasizing the influence ofdomestic actors on the state and the other nnderlining the influence of global forces, have two features in common. First, they both argue that the economic policies of a country are shaped through the interaction ofthe state and business, and second, both assume that this interaction is seen to occur between two separate, monolithic-entities. This second point was widely refuted by scholars such as Timothy Mitchell, who argued that the distinction between the state and society has to be drawn within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained.'1his approach blurs the business-state distinction and consequently neither the state nor the business is seen as a distinct entity. Whereas the former is regarded as "a complex network of heterogeneous and overlapping concerns'< the problem with the latter is that "businessmen seldom, if ever, speak with a single voice." Business as an entity interacting with the state is by no means a homogeneous one since it brings together different interests, different goals and different attitudes. One of the most crucial components of the interaction between the state and business is the role of business associations that translate common interests into collective action. As Stephan Haggard and his colleagues have stated, business associations can "maximize the positive effects ofgovernment-business collaboration by limiting the pursuit ofparticularistic benefits" and "promote collective self-governance ofbusiness, or private interest governance, that can be equally if not more efficient and effective than direct state interventjonve Over the past two decades, the way that business associations were viewed by scholars has been influenced by the changes brought about by globalization. The traditional view, which implied that business associations were transmitting information and expressing opinions in order to influence the decisions of policy makers, changed dramatically in the face of the rapid economic and political transformation that the world has been going through. Business associations, which have hitherto been studied within the larger context of interest or pressure groups, have come to be taken as separate entities with particular characteristics and, more importantly, the emphasis has shifted to functions other than transmitting information and expressing opinion.

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Stephen Bell offers a typology of roles assumed by business associations: (1) Limited quasi-public roles or state service functions: collecting information and passing it on to policy makers, expressing the opinion ofthe business community, sitting on state advisory bodies, explaining public policy decisions to members, and trialing proposed new legislation; (2) Policy formulation: the association is entitled to a public status and in collaboration with public officials and politicians, it plays a formal role in the shaping of public policy; and (3) Policy implementa-

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tion: a formal quasi-public role In impleBusiness community emerged menting public policy.' The roles that are as an actor in Turkey's assumed by business associations form foreign policy at a time when different patterns ofinteraction, i.e, poligreater economic liberalism cy networks, between the state and business. According to Michael Atkinson and coexisted with strong political William Coleman, the mobilization level authoritarianism ofbusiness interests on the one hand and state capacity (measured as the concentration of authority and bureaucratic authority) on the other, are the two factors conditioning the policy networks and depending on the degrees of both the state relinquishes part of its authority to business actors."

In a similar vein, Ay~e Bugra dedicated a special chapter to business associations in her seminal work State and Business in Modern Turkey and pointed out that the nature of interest representation also takes place under certain domestic constraints, and when state officials and business leaders are aware of these constraints, they tend to act in cooperation and eventually business associations acquire a quasi-public role extending beyond the simple pursuit of material gain. "When this happens, business associations are both servants ofthe state and advocates of business interests. An important observation made by Bugra is that when business leaders feel that they do not have a sufficient say in policy matters, they, do not ask for a more limited state, rather they volunteer to take part in the policy process." This theoretical framework on state-business relations will help us formulate questions to ask in order to understand the role ofbusiness associations in formulating Turkey's foreign economic policy. The main question this article deals with is to what extent Turkish business associations are able to take part in the foreign economic policy-making process, which in turn leads to two sub questions: (1) Through what kind of mechanisms is a structured pattern of interaction established between the state and the business associations, and in this regard, to what extent do Turkish business associations fit into Bell's typology? And (2) following Atkinson and Coleman, do these mechanisms require the state to transfer a part of its authority and/or administrative functions to the private sector? Foreign Policy and Business Associations in Turkey The institutionalized participation of the business community in Turkey's foreign policy can actually be traced back to 1965 when the Economic Development Foundation (1ktisadi Kalkinma Vakf' - jKV) was founded as a joint initiative ofthe

1111

Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Thrkey's Foreign Economic Policy

Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (lstanbul Ticaret Odasi - iTO) and the Istanbul Chamber of Industry Ustanbul Sanayi Odasi - iSO). However, the purpose of this organization was limited to Turkey's relations with the European Economic Community (the predecessor to the European Union) following the Ankara Agreement of1963. It was with the liberalization wave ofthe post-1980 period when the business community increased its role in Turkish foreign policy. It is important to note that the business community emerged as an actor in Turkey's foreign policy at a time when greater economic liberalism coexisted with strong political authoritarianism. On the one hand, the 1982 Constitution imposed severe restrictions upon interest group associations, both voluntary and public professional organizations." On the other hand, the same period also witnessed a remarkable move towards economic liberalism and integration with the world economy, motivated by the pro-business attitude of the ruling Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi - ANAP) and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who enjoyed the support and loyalty of the business community. In his pursuit of integrating Turkey's economy with the world, Ozal preferred the business community as his partner than the bureaucracy. According to Sedat Laciner, Ozal, who himself was from the business world, thought that the bureaucracy was "conservative, far from being creative and slowing down the business" and the foreign policy bureaucracy was especially so. This was why he was frequently bypassing the bureaucracy by making use of the lacunae in the state apparatus."

Through changes in legislation, incentives provided for exporters, and Ozals personal initiatives, such as taking businessmen with him to official visits abroad, Turkey began to experience a remarkable increase in its participation in global economic flows, with a substantial role played by the private sector. It is important to note, however, that in this process, Ozal was "instructing" the businesses and their interest groups rather than "exchanging views" with them.'> As Ergun Kalaycioglu remarks, "the role of commercial interest groups in the economic policy-making process ofthe government was either minimal or non-existantyu During the early 1980s, despite being organized around both public professional associations such as the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (Turkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi - TOBB) and voluntary associations such as the big-business representative, the Turkish Industry and Business Association (Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi - TOSLAD), Turkey's business community possessed no institutionalized channels through which they could communicate their interests with respect to the foreign economic policies to the state. TOBB and TUSiAD did not have such a function then, and it was Turgut

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Ozal himself who saw this shortcoming in the institutional framework. In those years, foreign economic policy making was under the joint responsibility of three public institutions: the Ministry of Foreigu Affairs, the State Planning Organization, and the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Poreign Trade.'These institutions were responsible for negotiating with the relevant institutions of other countries and formulating policies; however, they could not impose policies on the private sector and could only make recommendations, which the private sector had the freedom to follow or to ignore. Since the private sector is by definition motivated by profit maximization rather than the state's concerns, this was a problem for there was usually a mismatch between the two. There was the market, but there also existed a lack of state involvement in Turkey in the Keynesian sense, an involvement seen in other countries with, for example, the US Department of Commerce in the United States, or related agencies in East Asian countries, such as the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). This was the reason why Turgut Ozal embarked upon establishing a novel institutional framework, through which the state would maintain its central position but at the same time allow the business community to playa role in Turkey's foreign economic policies. 14 DEiK: The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey The first step towards the model that Ozal had in mind was taken in a bilateral context when the Turkish-American Business Council was established in 1985, followed by the Turkish-japanese Business Council and the Turkish- French Business Council. However, in time these business councils, which were mainly operating through the personal efforts of the businessmen involved, came to be seen as a waste oftime and resources and a consensus emerged that a larger and deeper institutional setting was needed in order to provide a stronger initiative. Consequently, in November 1986 the decision was taken for the establishment of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (Dl~ Ekonomik Iliskiler Kurulu - DElK) as a business association responsible for "compiling information on opportunities of commercial and economic cooperation and presenting it to entrepreneurs; providing coordination at international level for various forms of commercial and economic cooperation; ensuring the appropriate political environment for the realization of the existing potential"!" This new organization was to be an affiliate of TOBB, and it was Ozal himself who decided this way, since he believed that TOBB's semi-official legal status and wide representative basis would enable DEiK to reach entrepreneurs allover the country and, at the same time, to gain recognition at the international level. 16

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As the government used

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DEiK started in 19S6. However, since the Law of the Turkish Union of Chamgreater volumes of trade and bers and Commodity Exchanges (the investment as an instrument TOBB Law), which was then in effect," of its foreign policy, it also did not have the appropriate provisions, needed a partner to operate DEiK's official establishment took place this instrument with, and the with the issuance of the Principles of Esnatural choice was the business tablishment, Duties and Working ofBusiness Councils that was ratified by the community TOBB Board of Directors on February 26,1988. It has to be noted, however, that since there Wasno law, this document provided only de facto legal personality to DEiK. For this reason, DEiK had for years to perform certain official transactions through TOBB. The problem was solved when a new TOBB Law" paved the way for the Regulation on the Working Procedures and Principles of the Foreign Economic RelationsBoard and Business Councils (the DEiK Regulation), which was eventually issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and entered into effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette on November 27,2005. 19 Accordingly, DEiK was defined as a legal personality subject to private law established for the purpose of "pursuing the foreign economic relations of the private sector and assisting the concrete business development activities ofthe business community." In short, it was the state that established DEiK in partnership with the business commnnity and charged it with coordinating the business community's foreign economic relations. New Actors Entering the Scene During the 1990s, DEiK retained its monopoly as the sole private sector organization actively playing a role in Turkey's foreign economic policies, and this role was shaped by both international and domestic factors then influencing the Turkish economy. At the international level, the early 1990s were marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the beginnings of an unprecedented growth in cross-border movement ofgoods, services and capital. Turkey's leaders, such as Turgut Ozal and Siileyman Demirel, were aware of the untapped potential in new markets like the newly independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and in order for Turkey to benefit from this potential, they needed the collaboration of the business community. In other words, the international environment provided the conditions for DEIK to increase its role. However, at the same time, domestic factors proved to have an opposite effect. During the 1990s the Turkish political scene was marked by serious instability with a series of coalition governments

1141

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j The new business class produced its own business associations, which were established with the purpose of exploring new market opportunities and creating business partnership networks for their own clientele.

taking office as the country struggled to cope with both armed violence and eco- . nomic turmoiL Although all coalitions govermuents formed between 1991 and 1999 shared to a large extent the same pro-business stance, instability in both the political and economic sense limited the business community's access to the foreign economic policy-making process. As a result, after the initial boom in the number and scope of activities undertaken by DEiK there has been a relative decline since 1993-94. Party ideologies have also played a role in the government's attitude to partnering with the business community in matters related to foreign economic policy. After a series of coalitions led by centre-right parties, another coalition government, this time formed by Biilent Ecevits centre-left Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti - DSP), took office in 1999. In this period, DEiK was kept relatively at a distance by the government and was often denied access to the state actors.-? It is natural to expect a left-leaning government to keep the business community at an arms length, but it should also be kept in mind that Ecevit's coldness towards businessmen had its origins in the past Back in 1979, he faced severe attacks from the business community, which considered him as an obstacle to the transition to

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a free market economy. Ecevit responded to the businessmen's campaign against him by claiming that it was the large capital holders themselves who were to be held accountable for the economic slump that Turkey was in." In other words, there was already a certain level of bad blood between Ecevit and the businessmen. In 2002, the political setting changed dramatically in Turkey. After elections

brought the center-right Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi - AKP) into government, two important developments affected the way business associations. functioned as foreign policy actors. The first development was the new foreign policy paradigm adopted by the AKP government, which invalved «constructive engagement in its neighborhood and beyond"22 and relied on the improvement of bilateral economic and commercial relations as a tool of en-

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gagement. As the government used greater volumes of trade and investment as an instrument ofits foreign policy, it also needed a partner to operate this instrument with, and the natural choice was the business community as it had been back in

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the 1980s and the early 1990s. In contrast with their immediate predecessors, both President Abdullah Giil and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopted the Ozalian model of active state-business partnership in foreign economic relations.

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For instance, President Giil alone has carried out 70 visits during his first three

years in office, and according to the data released by the office of the President's Chief Economy Advisor, these visits were attended by a total of 2,670 businessmen and created a business volume of around 20 billion dollars.> The second development was the emergence of a "conservative bourgeoisie" as a result of the simultaneous rise of political Islam and the evolution of new industrial centers in Anatolia. The new business class produced its own business associations, which were established with the purpose of exploring new market opportunities and creating business partnership networks for their own clientele. One such association was the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Indus-

trialists (Tiirkiye Isadamlarr ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu _ TUSKON) founded in 2005. In contrast with DEiK, TUSKON Is a purely private-sector initiative, and whereas its field of activities is not limited to foreign economic relations, this organization has a special emphasis on external trade and investment. TUSKON defines its purpose as "making the Turkish economy and businessmen an effective

part ofglobal economy by considering the local conditions and sensitivities while serving to these aims"> Despite similarities in their goals and activities, DEiK and TUSKON have two major differences. First, in contrast with DEiK, which was founded as an

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Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Econornjc Policy

initiative of the Turkish government to collaborate with the business community

in this area, TUSKON is a purely private-sector initiative. Second, there are also structural differences between the two organizations. DEiK operates through bilateral business councils established with counterpart organizations in respective countries, which are usually a representative body of the corresponding country's private sector. On the Turkish side, business councils are joined by member companies that are either doing business in the respective country or planning to do

so. As of September 2010, there were 84 business councils subscribed to by 700 companies, and since a company can join more than one business council, there

were 1,400 company representatives taking part in the activities of DEiK's business councils." The sectoral distribution ofDEiK's members shows that they are mostly from the foreign trade sector (35% of all members), followed by construction (22%); tourism, logistics and health (12%); foreign investment (9%); banking and finance (8%); and agriculture and food (4%)." A large majority of DEiK's member companies can be classified as small- and medium-sized enterprises

(SMEs). TUSKON, on the other hand, is the nmbrella organization of seven regional federations (corresponding to Turkey's seven geographical regions), which in turn cover a total of 151 voluntary businessmen associations and around 15,000 entrepreneurs. TUSKON's members are the regional federations, not the associations or individual companies." In this pyramid structure, any individual company or entrepreneur who joins a local business association, which is in turn linked to one of the seven regional federations, is regarded as a member of TUSKON." Information on the sectoral distribution of companies associated with TUSKON is not available; however, it is safe to state that these companies are mostly SMEs from the manufacturing, construction, transportation and financial industries.

The Mechanisms of Foreign Policy Participation Through what kind ofmechanisms is a structured pattern of interaction established between the state and the business associations? Stephen Bell's classification of policy participation roles of business associations will be useful for answer-

ing this question. As discussed earlier in this article, Bell's first item was "limited quasi-public roles or state service functions", wherein business associations collect

information and pass it on to the policy makers, express the opinion of the business community, serve on state advisory bodies, explain the public policy deci-

sions to members, and trial proposed new legislation. Both DEiK and TUSKON perform these duties, through two different mechanisms: (1) Large scale international business events; and (2) participation in state leaders' official visits to other countries.

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Large-scale international business events should be considered an instrument offoreign policy participation, on the grounds that they bring together the executives of business associations, as well as representatives from member companies, together with policy makers, both from Turkey and abroad. Every year, DEiK organizes several business events, both in Turkey and abroad. Among these events, the "Joint Annnal Meeting" is the flagship event of each business council that operates under DEiK. These meetings are organized in collaboration with DEiK's counterpart organization. Although it is stated that joint annual meetings are held at least once every year, this is not the case in practice because only a certain portion of DEiK's business councils hold their joint annual meetings during the year. For instance, in 2009, when DEiK had 84 business councils, and held a total of 505 events, only 18 joint annual meetings were organized." Another event that resembles the joint annual meetings in terms of scale is the "Business Forum", which is organized not with the counterpart organization in the respective country but with other Turkish stakeholders. On the other hand, TUSKON's principal event is the "Foreign Trade Bridge" summit held in Istanbul. Since 2006, TUSKON has organized trade summits with Eurasian, Asia-Pacific and African countries, where each summit covers a whole continent rather than one particular country. It has to be noted that both DEiK's and TUSKON's events are supported by the official foreign economic policy makers of Turkey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, in the sense that these government institutions recognize the business associations as a partner and have their senior bureaucrats participate at these events. Not only is it a common practice for the Turkish government to be represented, mostly at the ministerial level, but it is also often the case that intergovernmental agreements related to economic issues are signed during these events. For instance, during 2009, 23 intergovernmental agreements concluded by Turkey were signed during DEiK's events." TUSKON's events have recently begun to serve in this way as well,"

This high-level participation gives DEiK and TUSKON the opportnnity to report problems experienced by the Turkish business community and their policy suggestions directly to the statesmen and bureaucrats ofTurkey and the respective foreign country and enables business communities of both sides to have direct contact with these statesmen. Additionally, through these events business associations also provide the opportunity for the state officials and bureaucrats of both sides to exchange opinions and ideas with each other within a semi-formal and business-oriented setting.

ua ]

Businessmen as Diplomats: 'Ihe Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Economic Policy

The practice of groups of businessmen accompanying Turkish state leaders on official state visits began during the ANAP government when in 1984 then Prime Minister Turgut Ozal traveled to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the company of a business delegation. Since then, DEiK has been the main institution organizing the participation of business delegations on official state visits abroad, whereas TUSKON is relatively a newcomer in this field. In 2009, DEiK organized business participation in 21 such visits, including 10 presidential visits, three visits of the prime minister, and eight visits of other ministers." The numbers have significantly risen during the AKP government and recent figures can be compared to just one visit in 2001 and two visits in 2002 (until the formation of the new government on November 18). These two years coincided with a coalition government led by the DSP and the term of Ahmet Necdet Sezer as president, who was rather unsympathetic towards the participation of businessmen in official matters of the state." Business participation in state leaders' visits to other countries is an efficient instrument in foreign economic policy participation, not only because events such as the joint annual business council meetings and business forums are organized within the framework of these visits, but also because they provide for a greater acquaintance with the economy of the particular country and the chance to create more contacts with the representatives of that country's government and business community. Mehmet Erdal Eren, the chairman ofthe Turkish Constructors Association, argues that traveling with the president is "not absolutely necessary, yet extremely useful" because it provides the opportunity for businessmen to communicate directly with the state." On the negative side, there is often a problem from the state's perspective with business participation in official visits, which is related to the businessmen's occasional divergence from the common goals, and their tendency to use these visits for other purposes. Ambassador Rafet Akgunay, a career diplomat who served among other posts as the senior diplomatic adviser to the prime minister, refers to Erdogans visit to China in 2003, during which a tourism seminar was organized for Turkish and Chinese companies but "nobody discussed tourism' and most of the business representatives used the opportunity to communicate their personal problems to Erdogan. Akgiinayargues that DErK's involvement is crucial for improving the efficiency of such visits, because it is DEiK that knows both the state and the business community and thus is in a position to "bring only those who are really interested in doing business with that country."" In other words, DEiK provides the knowledge, which is required by the state in order to increase the efficiency of the visits.

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While the business community is significantly mobilized, there exists a high concentration of bureaucratic authority as well

Having businessmen in delegations on official state visits carries risks as well since the businessmen's activities during the visit, motivated by the pursuit ofselfinterest, can cause problems vis-a-vis the relations between the Turkish state and the respective country. Ambassador Ender Arat, a career diplomat who also served as the senior diplomatic adviser to the prime minister, argues that there are indeed risks, but these are clearly outweighed by benefits."

It has to be noted that business associations also make use of direct contacts with state leaders to express the opinions of the business community. Senior executives of both DEtK and TUSKON frequently visit high-level state officials in Ankara, and the Turkish state is almost always presented at the general council meetings of these organizations, mostly at the level of the president or the prime minister."

The second item in Stephen Bell's typology is "policy formulation" wherein the business association is given public status and plays a formal role in shaping policy. Due to its legal status, this area is monopolized by DEtK and the main mechanism is the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meetings, which are held on a bilateral inter-governmental basis with foreign countries. These meetings offer a platform for the two countries to negotiate a road map for the future of their economic relations and formulate their policies. As specified in the related circulars of the prime ministry, DElK is always represented at JEC meetings, which is evidence of the public status given to DEtK." DEtK has a policy formulation role at the multilateral level as well. DEtK has relations with several organizations, but these are mainly based on information sharing and cannot be evaluated as a mechanism ofpolicy implementation. However, its links with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) should be dealt with separately. BSEC was founded in June 1992 for the purpose of "achieving the integration of the Black Sea region into the world economy within the principles of market economy and democracy"> This required the mobilization of business communities since nine of the II member countries of the BSEC were post-communtst transition economies. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted DEtK one month after the foundation of BSEC to inquire about possible collaboration, and eventually the BSEC Business Council was founded under the auspices of DEiK with the purpose of improving the business environment in the BSEC region and promoting individual and collective initiatives ofthe 120

I

Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Economic Polley

private sector in the member countries." It was founded as a non-governmental, non-profit organization (such as DEtK itself), but at the same time it was provided with observer status at BSEC with the right to attend all its official meetings. Currently, the BSEC Business Council is no longer operating under the auspices of DEtK and instead DEtK represents Turkey on the board of directors of the BSEC Business Council. In sum, business associations take part in the foreign policy-making process by creating platforms of interaction with the state, such as large-scale business events, participation in state leaders' official visits and direct contacts with policy makers, as well as by directly contributing to the formulation of policy by representing the business community in intergovernmental meetings and negotiations. However, Bell's third item, "policy implementation': remains the weakest link in Turkish business associations' participation in foreign economic policy. Whereas they actively take part in the process of formulating policy, implementation is undertaken by the relevant public institutions. The quasi-public status entitled to business associations does not cover the realm of implementation, and it is the state which puts the policy into effect and enforces the policy.

Does the State Transfer its Administrative Fnnctions? The question that remains to be answered is whether the state transfers some , ofits administrative functions to these business organizations, and this question is especially relevant for DEiK, given its special legal status. As discussed earlier in the theoretical part of this article, the extent to which the state relinquishes part of its authority to the business community depends on both the level of mobilization of business interests and state capacity in terms of the concentration of bureaucratic authority. In Turkey, while the business community is significantly mobilized, there exists a high concentration of bureaucratic authority as well. Cigdem Tiiziin, former director ofDEtK, recalls that back in the 1980s, Turgut Ozal had intended to place JEC meetings under the sole responsibility of DEtK but had to give up the idea in the face of a strong negative reaction from the state bureaucracy. Instead, it was decided for JEC to be organized by the state and DEiK was to be given a seat." What Ozal wanted was to transfer part of the state's administrative functions to DEiK, but the bureaucracy resisted, and no transfer took place. As seen in this example, the bureaucracy recognizes the capacity of the business community; yet it is also determined to maintain control. As a result, instead oftransferring its functions, the state subcontracts them to business associa1121

ALTAYATLI

tions in the expectation that they would perform these duties in a more efficient manner and the state determines the conditions of the contract itself. Under this corporatist setting, the state chooses the associations to work with, and to what extent they get involved depends on to what extent the state needs them to do so. For example, the DEiK Regulation states that the organization is "to represent the private sector in international or intergovernmental negotiations if and when it is invited to do SO:'41 This "if" conjunction clearly illustrates the limits imposed on DEiKs involvement. In the case of TUSKON, although its participation in official intergovernmental negotiations is out of question, the same argument holds as well. Which business associations the state chooses to collaborate with depends on the degree of the willingness these associations have to play by the rules set by the state. DEiK is an institution specially established for coordinating foreign economic relations, but this does not necessarily mean that the state is obliged to entitle DEiK to a privileged position. Instead there has been a bargaining, which has been carried out under the terms dictated by the state. Accordingly, the state gave DEiK the task of representing business interests in terms of foreign economic policies because it was not in a position to be in direct contact with the companies itself as that would have been too costly. In return DEiK gained the privilege of taking part in the policy-making process, under the condition that it did not challenge the policies of the state, remained within the framework of the policies set by the state, and did not get involved in actions that would contradict state policies. As suggested by the empirical evidence, this bargaining worked (and is working) very well for both sides, and both sides have joined forces around the common goal of improving Turkey'sforeign economic relations.

The bargaining between the state and DEiK is apparent in several incidents. In cases where the business community's opinion contradicts with the policies of the state, DEiK reports this opinion, makes suggestions to the state, and lets the state know what the business community thinks; however, it also refrains from exerting pressure and does not risk violating the rules of the game. One concrete example in this context was the proposed free trade agreement with the United States advocated by DEiK in 2000-01. Turkey's Customs Union agreement with the EU makes it impossible for Turkey to enter into such agreements with countries that do not already have the same agreement with the ED. DEiK argued that an agreement could still be concluded with the United States, with a slightly different content and format; however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was clearly against towards DEiKs proposal and the idea was shelved." DEiK did not insist.

1221


There are also cases when, upon the Whereas business associations request of the state, DEiK stretched its have a role in Turkey's foreign own rules. One example is the establishpolicy-making process, ment of the Turkish-Pakistani Business their role is to a large extent Council in 1987. Although the prerequisites for the establishment of a business instrumental council were not in place, the council was established after a direct request from President Kenan Evren following the official visit to Turkey by the then president of Pakistan, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq."

With regard to political issues, two important remarks should be made. First, DEIK strictly refrains from getting involved in domestic issues, unlike other business associations such as TDSIAD. Second, with regard to Turkey's foreign policies in the political realm, DEIK actively supports the government's line. One good example is the position of the Turkish-American Business Council at times when claims about the Armenian genocide are discussed by the US Congress. The Turkish-American Business Council actively and effectively contacts senators and congressmen in order to explain Turkey'sposition with regard to the Armenian issue. In some cases, the council has taken even more assertive steps to that end. For instance, in October 2007, the council cancelled the Turkey in 2008 and Beyond conference to be held in New York at the last minute as a reaction against the decision ofthe US House ofRepresentatives' Foreign Relations Committee to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations." This involvement in political issues is not only accepted but also welcomed by the state. Ambassador Rafet Akgiinay states that in certain problematic issues, such as the Armenian issue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls for the support of the business community since "the businessmen's involvement can change the outcome'< There are also several other cases when DEIK supported the governments policies. For instance, on February 26, i999, the Turkish-Greek Business Council decided to indefinitely suspend its operations in protest of Greece's support for the Kurdish separatist organization the PKK. Following the meeting between the foreign minister oftwo countries in New York on June 30, 1999, and the Greek contribution to earthquake relief efforts in Turkey, the business council was reactivated. In both cases, DEiK provided a chaunei of informal diplomacy, which reinforced the efforts on the formai diplomacy side. Wby TUSKON was empowered to take part in the foreign economic policy making process when there was already an organization specifically established for the purpose, i.e. DEiK, is a story that can be explained from both pragmatic and political perspectives. Ruling out the indispensability of any single business association, Ambassador Ender Arat says that "DEIK does its job perfectly, but if

1123

ALTAYATLI

it fails to do so, someone else can do it in its stead":" Arat'swords clearly indicate the ministry's pragmatic approach, and it can be argued that from the state'sperspective, having TUSKON involved can allow for the diversification of partners and avoid overdependence on one single organization.

On the political side, however, there is a different story. In contrast with DEIK, TUSKON does get involved in domestic politics, albeit only through expressions of opinion, which always support rather than challenge the government's positton." While it might appear that by stepping into the political field TUSKON has moved outside the bargain with the state, the organization's pro-government stance can be thought ofas a reason why it gained the privileged status. In a recent study, Ayse Bugra and Osman Savaskan argue that TUSKON owes its close relations with the government to its large local support base, and none of the other business organizations that have emerged with the rise of the new conservative bourgeoisie in Turkey has closer relations with the AKP govemment.v' Thanks to its pyramid shaped organizational structure, TUSKON has a large membership base mainly consisting of SMEs from the conservative camp, i.e. members of the newly emerging conservative bourgeoisie, which is at the same time the main component of the government's electoral support base at the grassroots level. Despite the absence of organic links between the AKP and TUSKON, this situation appears to have created a mutually beneficial relationship between AKP partisanship and TUSKON membership. Concluding Remarks In the current era of greater economic interdependence, the business community has an increasingly important place in economic relations between nations and it is no longer possible for governments in liberal economies to formulate their foreign economic policies without the feedback and active participation of the business community. However, since the state cannot be expected to have the resources to maintain direct contact with businessmen, it cooperates with business associations, which voice the interests of business and provide a platform for business-state interaction in an effective manner, for the purpose of attaining the common good.

This article has evaluated business associations' role in foreign economic policy within the corporatist context ofTurkey, where there are several business associations and the state is an arbiter of group influence deciding which groups get favors and which groups are excluded. DEIK has been given a privileged position by the state in the foreign policy-making process. This privileged position is the qua-

1241


si-public governmental status acquired Business associations such by DEiK, which, despite being a private as DEiK and TUSKON are sector organization, can have direct acimportant actors in Turkey's cess to state leaders, allowed to have a foreign economic policy, and say in policy issues, and to participate in intergovernmental meetings. Recently they are likely to maintain this TUSKON has begun to receive some of position as long as they remain the same privilege, which, according to loyal partners to state actors some observers, has led to competition between DEIK and TUSKON. For instance, columnist Serpil Yilmaz, who has been closely following the activities of business associations in Turkey, argues that for several years DEIK had been in charge of coordinating bilateral foreigu economic relations and guiding the government in this respect; yet in recent years its ability to represent the business community has been questioned as TUSKON, despite its relatively smaller business volume, has defined its policy and action plan independently from DEIK and has begun to assume a role in international economic relations." According to Metin Heper, each pattern of business-state interaction has a "particular logic behind it, which closely fits one type ofstate, or government, and not others'':" Turkey has a strong and dominant state, which has led to a particular form of business-state relationship, where the state maintains its central position, exercises its authority, determines the rules of cooperation, and effectively uses the business associations as an instrument to advance the nations interests. Remarks made by the then Prime Minister Tansu Ciller at a meeting with business representatives in 1994 clearly illustrates this approach: "Get ready. We are transferring the power to the public sector. We will determine the rules of the game as much as we can":" In the meantime, Heper's argument also helps to explain why different governments have had different attitudes toward cooperating with the business community. In sum, whereas business associations have a role in Turkey's foreign policymaking process, their role is to a large extent instrumental. Business associations do not have an autonomous role in shaping Turkey's foreign economic policies since they remain within the policy framework set by the state and refrain from challenging the policy objectives of state actors. This, however, does not necessarily mean that their role is frivolous. By establishing a platform of interaction between the state and the business community, business associations communicate the private sector's demands, needs and positions in different issue areas to the state as a vital input for the formulation of policy. On the other hand, business1125

ALTAYATU

state interaction is also instrumental in facilitating the policies that are already in effect. Business associations' mobilization behind the policies formulated by the state serves to provide greater legitimacy for the policies in question and help to turn policies into concrete results in the form of higher trade and investment figures. Business associations such as DEiK and TUSKON are important actors in Turkey's foreign economic policy, and they are likely to maintain this position as long as they remain loyal partners to state actors.

Endnotes 1. The term "businessmen" as used in this article refers to the members of the business community in general, regardless of gender. 2. Manuel Castells, "The Informational Economy and the New International Division of Labor," Manuel Castells, Martin Carnoyand Stephen S. Cohen (eds.), The New Global Economy in the Information Age (University Park. PA: Penn State University Press, 1993), p. 20. 3. Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics;' American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No.1 (March, 1991), p. 78. 4. Evaleila Pesaran, "Business-State Contestations and Shifting Economic Policies: The Case of Iran;' 57th Political Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Bath, Aprilll~13, 2007. 5. Arthur M. Johnson, Government-Business Relations (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books Inc., 1965), p. 14. 6. Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben R. Schneider, "Theories of Business and BusinessState Relations;' Sylvia Maxfield and Ben R. Schneider (eds.), Business and State in the Developing Countries (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 49. 7. Stephen Bell, "Between the Market and the State: The Role of Australian Business Associations in Public Policy;' Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No.1 (October, 1995), p. 27. 8. Michael M. Atldnson and William D. Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No.1 (January; 1989). pp. 50-59. 9. Ay§e Bugra, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 9-11 and 229. 10. According to Article 135 of the Constitution, public professional organizations were not allowed to engage in political activities of any kind; they had to remain within their legally prescribed areas of activity and they were subject to the administrative and financial supervision of the state. Moreover, as Ergun Ozbudun argued, nine ordinances issued by the National Security Council on August 5, 1983 specified and greatly increased the tutelary powers of the relevant ministries over professional organizations, thus further restricting their autonomy. Ergun Ozbudun, "The Post-1980 Legal Framework for Interest Group Associations," Metin Heper (ed.), Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin, New York De Gruyter, 1991), p. 49. 11. Sedat Laciner, "Ozal Donemi Turk Dis Pclitikasi, Turgut Goksu, Hasan Hiiseyin Celfk, Abdillkadir Baharcicek and All Sen (eds.), 1980-2003 Ticrkiyenin Dis. Ekonomik, Sosyal ve Idari Politikalan (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003), pp. 25~48. 12. Interview with Ctgdem Tliziin, former Director ofDEiK, May 24, 2008. 13. Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Commercial Groups: Love-Hate Relationship with the State," in Heper (ed.), Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: ThePost~1980 Turkish Experience, p. 83. 126


14. For a discussion of the developments that led to the establishment of DElK, see Mehmet Altun, Dl~ Dunyanm Anahtan DEiK (Istanbul: Kurumsal Yaymlar, 2009), pp. 80-83. 15. "Dl§ Ekonomik Iliskiler Kurulu," introductory brochure, 1988. 16. Altun, Dl? Diinyanm Anahtart DElK, p. 115. 17. Law No.5590, issued on March 8,1950. 18. Law No.5174, issued on May 18, 2004. 19. This regulation was later revised through a new text, which entered into effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette on June 23, 2008. 20. A good example is from Ecevits visit to the United States in January 2002. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2001, when Turkey relied on increasing exports for recovery, DEIK contacted the Prime Minister's Office suggesting a business delegation to accompany Ecevit in this visit. The answer received was a plain refusal. Funda Ozkan, "1l,' Dunyasr Ecevit'ten Davet Bekliyor," Radikal, December 20, 2001. 21. "Ecevit: Bazr Isadamlannm Muhtrrasi ile Hiikiimet Oldurttlemez," MiIliyet, May 16, 1979. 22. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 20ID;' Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No.3 (Fall, 2009), p. 13. 23. Vahap Munyar, "Gul, 70 DIl,'Seyahate Cikn, 194 Giinliik Tur 20 Milyar Dolarhk Il,'i 'Ietikledi," Hiuriyet, August 27, 2010. 24. TUSKON web site, retrieved September 26, 2010, from http://www.tuskon.org/ hakktmtzda/Iidehistory 25. DEIK web site, retrieved September 26, 2010, from http://www.deik.org.tr:80/pages/TRI DEIK_DeikHalckinda.aspx?IKID=lO. 26. "2010 YllI Sunumu," DEiKweb site, retrieved December 9, 20ID, from http://www.deik.org. tr:80/Pages/TRlDEIKJaydaliBilgilerDetay.aspx?fbDetId=40&IKID=10 27. TUSKON web hakkimizdal?id=tuskon.

site, retrieved September 26, 2010, from http://www.tuskon.orgl

28. Information received from DEIK secretariat. 29. "2010 YIh Sunumu" DEIK web site. 30. For instance, seven intergovernmental agreements between Turkey and Indonesia were signed during the 'Iurklsh-Indonesian Trade and Investment Forum organized by TUSKON on June 30, 2010, with the participation of the Presidents from the two countries. "Endonezya ile Yedi Il,'birligi Anlasmaer lmzalandi, lhlas Haber Ajansl, June 30, 2010. 31. Information received from DEll< secretariat. 32. Some businessmen even regarded to Sezer's term as the 'lostyears: "Sezer'in 7 yih Kazakistanda Elestiri Konusu," Aksom, December 16, 2007. 33. "Cumhurbaskaru Sezere 16 Acidan Balas" Milliyet, August 27, 2007. 34. Telephone interview with Ambassador Rafet Akgiinay,May 28, 2008. 35. Written interview with Ambassador Ender Arat, May 29, 2008. 36. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Brdogan attended the most recent general council meetings of both DEIK (held on December 27, 2009) and TUSKON (held on March 6, 2010). 37. Circular of the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Personnel and Principles, September 25, 1996. This circular states that the chairman of the respective business council of DEIK is to attend the JEe meetings.

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U 38. "The Black Sea Region;' DEiK Bulletin, 1993. 39. Altun, Dtj Dunyanm Anahtari DElK, p. 328. 40. Interview with Ctgdem Tiiziin, former Director of DElll9.lllS

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Endnotes 1. Halil Inalcik, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire," The Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 29, No.1 (1969), p. 102, cited in Fernand Brandel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th_18 th Century, Val.2 The Wheels afCommerce (London: Phoenix Press, 2002), p. 558.

1541 1155

Whither an Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey's Foreign Trade MEHMETBABACAN

2. Cited in "Turkey's Export Development," Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade Report, 2009: 3. Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009 Annual Foreign Trade Report. 4. Meliha Benli Altumsik, "Turkey: Arab Perspectives;' TESEV Foreign Policy Analysis Series 11 (May, 2010), p. 9, retrieved from http://w-w>v.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/ODIYYN/ArabPerspectivesRapWeb.pd£ 5. UNCTAD and Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2010. 6. Rahimullah Yusufzai, "'A 'shift of axis' by Turkey?" The News International, Peshawar, June 22, 2010, retrieved from http://www;pkcolumns.com/2010/06/22/a-shift-of-axis-by-turkey-by-r ahimullah-yusufzai/.

25. See Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer, "Does Trade Cause Growth?" The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No.3 (1999), pp. 379-399. 26. Babacan, "Whither Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey's Foreign Trade". 27. Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik (istanbul: Kiire Publications, 2001), p.,336. 28. Ibid, p. 513. 29. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of2007," Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No.1 (2008), p. 78. 30. Ibid, pp. 83. 31. Turkish Airlines, www.turldshairlines.com. 32. Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009 Annual Foreign Trade Report and Turkish Statisti-

7. Nub Yrlmaz, "Mahalle Baskrsr Olarak Eksen Kaymasi" USA Sabah Daily, SETA Commentary, September 22, 2010, retrieved from http://www:.setav.org/publiclHaberDetay. aspx?Dil=otr&hid=48440.

cal Institute (TurkStat). 33. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Interest Groups and Trade Policy (Princeton, NJ:

8. See Nub Ydmaz, "Deger Eksenli Realist D~ Politika ve Eksen Kaymasr," Anlayis, SETA Commentary, November 2009, retrieved from http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay. aspx?Dil=tr&hid=5486.

Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 173-198. 34. See Robert C. Feenstra, Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) for a comprehensive understanding on the role of trade in defin-

9. Mensur Akgiin, "Turkey: what axis shift?" Le Monde diplomatique English edition Blog Posts, July 9,2010, retrieved from http://mondediplo.comlblogs/turkey-what-axis-shift.

ing economic change.

10. Mehmet Babacan, "Whither Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey's Foreign Trade:' SETA Policy Report, No.4, November 2010, pp. 1-36, retrieved from http://ww-w.setav.orglUps/do')'a/53018.pdf.

35. TurkStat, 2010. 36. IMP forecast for Turkey's GDP growth in 2010 is 7.8 percent (WED 2010) while the government's projection is revised from 3.5 percent up to 6.8 percent according to the recently announced Mid-Tenn Economic Program.

11. UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2010 and China Investment Promotion Agency of Ministry of Commerce (CIPA). 12. World Trade Organization (WTO), 2009, wwwwto.org. 13. UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2010 and Bloomberg. 14. IMF World Economic Outlook (WED), October 2010, http://www.imf.orglexternallpubs/ ft!weo/20 10!02!index.htm. 15. IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2010, Statistical Appendix, Table B16, p. 21. 16. IMF World Economic Outlook (WED) 2010, Statistical Appendix, Table A8, p. 191. 17. IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2010, Statistical Appendix, Table A16, p. 204. 18. Sally McNamara, Ariel Cohen and James Phillips, "Countering Turkey's Strategic Drift;' The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2442, July 26, 2010, p. 14, retrieved from http://thCmedia. s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdflbg2442.pdf. 19. McNamara et al, "Countering Turkey's Strategic Drift," p. 14. 20. For arguments of the defense of the customs union between the EU and Turkey, See Sinan Ulgen and Yiannis Zahariadis, "The Future of Turkish-EU Trade Relations: Deepening vs. Widening:' Centre for European Policy Studies and the Economics and Foreign Policy Forum, EU ~ Turkey Working Papers No.5, August 2004, p. 30. 21. Aysegul Dfnccag-Umtt Ozlale, "Export Losses in EU markets;' TEPAV Policy Note, July 2010, p. 3, http://www;tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284637561-9.Export_Losses_in_the_EU_Market. pdf. 22. Data from the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009. 23. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr. 24. "A Note on Turkey's Free Trade Agreements," Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009. 156

I

1157

Democratization EDITORS:

T urkey-GCC Relations:

Jeffrey Haynes, London Metropolitan University, UK Gordon Crawford, University of Leeds, UK

Democratization aims to promote a better understanding of democratization - defined as the way democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated both within and across national and cultural boundaries. While the focus is on democratization viewed as a process, the journal also builds on the enduring Interest In democracy itself and its analysis. The emphasis is contemporary and the approach comparative, with the publication of scholarly contributions about those areas where democratization is currently attracting considerable attention world-wide. There is special reference to democratization in the developing world and in post-communist societies, but not to the exclusion of other relevant areas such as North America, Australasia, and the European Union and its member states. The journal aims to encourage debate on the many aspects of democratization that are of interest to policy-makers, administrators and journalists , aid and development personnel, as well as to all those involved in education.

Is There a Puturei" BiROL BA~KAN*

- ci.;..";~_",,::;;:~::,""~,,",~~ --i~ ~~ed:;,;;:,---~

To sign up for tables of contents, new publications and citation alerting services visit www.informaworld.comlalerting

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ccording to different estimates, between 36 and 40 percent of the world oil reserves and between 22 and 23 percent of the world natural gas reserves are under the control of six states comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCe): Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE (Table 1). While only less than 0.6 percent of the world population, around 36 million, live in these countries in conditions above world standards, more than 20 percent of the world population, aronnd 1.6 billion, live in their immediate geographical vicinity -Jndia, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Yemenin conditions below world standards (Table 2). For example, GDP per capita levels among the GCC countries range from the lowest 14,031 $ in Oman to the highest 64,193 $ in Qatar.i in terms of purchasing power parity. However, in the latter group, GDP per capita levels range from 284 $ in Eritrea to 4,028 $ in Iran, in terms of purchasing power parity.

A

* Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service in Qatar, [email protected]

159

Turkey-GCC Relations: Is There a Future?

BiROLBA~KAN

Table 1: Oil and Natural Gas Reserves in the Gee

Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels) OGJ World Oil NR 0.125 NR 101.5 104 99.425 55 5.7 5.572 27.436 15.21 20 264.20 266.71 264.825 97.8 97.8 68.105 1238.89 1342.89 1184.208 BP

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAB World

Natural Gas Reserves (Trillion Cubic Feet) BP CGAZ OGJ World Oil 3.002 3.002 3.25 NR 63.001 63.002 63.36 66.3 24.367 24.367 30 32 904.05 904.06 891.94 903.15 253.03 257.8 258,47 254 215.06 227.323 214,4 196.3 6290.63 6342.41 6254.36 6436.02

Source: Energy Information Administration, httpJlwww.eia.doe.govlemeu/international/reserves.html Notes: BP refers to BP Statistical Review of World Energy and its numbers are from year-end 2007; OGJ to Oil and Gas Journal and its numbers are from January 1, 2009: World Oil to World Oil Journal and its numbers are from year-end 2007; CGAZ to Centre International d'Information sur Ie Gaz Naturel et tous Hydrocarbures Gazeux and its numbers from January 1, 2009.

the UAE,- also have to guard their independence in the face of a much more populous Saudi Arabia.

The GCC countries rely on domestic and international patronage, diplomacy, and more importantly, the protection of a super power in order to solve their security problem

Complicating the situation further, the Gee countries are not well endowed with necessary state capacities to combat these threats. The Gulf state institutions are often paralyzed by various factors, such as tribalism, widespread nepotism and corruption, as well as the lack ofhuman capital. Hence, they are heavily dependent on expatriates in staffing state institutions. As a result, the GCe countries rely on domestic and international patronage, diplomacy, and more importantly; the protection of a super power in order to solve their security problem.

Table 2: The Gee States and its Environment

World Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAB India Pakistan Iran In,'1 Jordan Egypt Sudan

Eritrea Djibouti Somalia Yemen

Pop. (million) 6661.9

HD!

GDP (per cap.)

Life Exp.

Health

66 69 67

669 422 321

66 64 68

468 491

57 55 62

21 8 406

75.8 60.3 8

90 257 129 23

NA

0.8

39

2.9 2.7

31 56

1.1

33 59 35

21,421 42,102 14,031 64,193 15,800 38,436

134 141

879

24.7 4.4

1164.7 173.2 72.4 29.5

1,046

88

4,028

NA

NA

96 123

2,769 1,729 1,199

Pop. Below $2

1115

4.8 0.8

150 16S 155

284 997

58 64 62 50 S6 50

8.7

NA

NA

46

8

NA

22.3

140

1,006

55

38

46.6

5.9

80.1 40.4

10 75

3.5 18.4

NA NA 41.2

Source: UN Human Development Report 2009. Notes: Population numbers are in millions and from the year 2007; lIDI refers to Human Development Index; health refers the government expenditure per capita; pop. Below $2 refers to the percentage of population earning below $2 a day.

The extreme concentration of wealth in a few hands in the middle of an area heavily populated and marked by poverty constitutes the essence of the Gulf's security problems. In such an environment the neighboring states may develop strong predatory incentives, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made it painfully clear. Furthermore, five smaller Gce states, -Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and 160

I

The literature on the issue of security in the Gulf is ever-growing. I This paper aims to contribute to this literature by addressing a question, largely neglected by both international and regional analysts. Can Turkey playa role in the Gulf's future security architecturej? I argue that Turkey can make critical contributions to security in the Gulf. As the most likely regional hegemonic power in the near future, Turkey can help build institutional mechanisms to solve potential crises, thus alleviating the security dilemma of the GCC states vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran. Under the present government, Turkey is Signaling its intention to serve such a . role. However, I argue, Turkey still lacks the necessary resources to play that role. To do so, Turkey needs to develop a numerically and technologically superior military power, form an effective international intelligence gathering system, and turn itself into a major energy transit road connecting the Gce states, Iraq and Iran with the European energy market. In the next section, I take a look at the security problem in the Gulf and discuss how Turkey can help the GCC states address it. In the final section I will present Qatar as a typical case among the GCC states to illustrate the Gulf's general security problem and the ways the GCC states tackle it. Gulf Security Architecture Security in the Gulf almost exclusively and heavily depends on the willingness of the United States to keep a strong military presence in the Gulf and wage, if necessary, costly wars against the aggressors. The problem with this situation is at least four-fold. First, the uni-polar world dominated by the US is slowly, but recognizably, giving way to a multi-polar world, which will possibly be dominated by; in addition to the US, China, Russia, India, and probably the ED. It is 161

Turkey-GCC Relations: Is There a Future?

B1ROL BA~KAN

thus more advisable for the GCC states to keep a healthy distauce from all sides in this global shift of power. Second, although heavy dependence on the US has positive aspects to it, it also carries with it negative repercussions. In return for the precious protection afforded by the US to its allies, the US gives itself the right to define who are the friends and foes of the GCC states. Third, for one reason or another, anti-Americanism is on the rise throughout the Middle East, which may cause a crisis oflegitimacy for the political regimes in the Gulf. Finally, if the situation in Iraq aud Afghauistau further deteriorates, not only will the US' credibility be questioned, but also will the US' willingness to provide security weaken. Therefore, the present security architecture in the Gulf is unsustainable in the future aud the GCC states should seriously consider all oftheir options.

Driven mostly by Turkey's need for new markets and foreign capital, the relations took a new turn with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party

But, what are the GCe's options? There are basically two. One option is the typical historical solution that is to depend on the protection of a superpower. If the US cannot, or is reluctant to provide security; then the choice is to invite another power, who cau aud is willing to do the job. Therefore, the underlying question becomes who is going to be that superpower? The future is more likely to be a multi-polar world, not a uni-polar one. In addition to the US, China, India, Russia, and the EU will possibly bid for superpower status. In such a world, dependence on one superpower only will not help, but complicate the security problem of the GCC states. The other option for the GCC states is to develop their own military capabilities, preferably within a common GCC defense system. This option is, according to this author's point of view, the ouly reliable option for the long-term security of the GCC states. A step in that direction has already been taken at the GCC summit in December 2009, when the GCC leaders decided to create a joint security force. However, important obstacles exist and similar attempts have failed in the past. It is highly likely that Saudi Arabia is going to dominate such a system, which is a matter of concern for the smaller Gulf States. More importantly; the Gee states have to contend with serious structural problems, such as a small and weak population base, whlch hinder the development of a joint. Strong military power that would serve as a deterrent. What role, if any, cau Turkey play in the future security architecture of the Gulf? Turkey had long been absent in the Gulf. In fact, after the Ottomau power was dismautled during the First World War, Turkey cut almost all ofher relations with the Gulf. For example, the first hlgh-level official visit between Turkey and a Gulf country, Saudi Arabia, occurred in 1966 when King Faysal visited Turkey. 162

I

However, Turkey remained distaut and did not try to develop auy relations with the Gulf States. For mauy years, both Turkish and Gulf dignitaries made no high level official visits to each other. It was no until 1984, when the Turkish President, Kenau Evren, aud the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah finally visited each other.' Driven mostly by Turkey's need for new markets and foreign capital, the relations took a new turn with the accession to power of the Justice aud Development Party. Since then, economic relations between Turkey and the Gulf have expauded; for example, the trade volume has increased four-fold from 2.1 billion US dollar in 2002 to 8 billion US dollar in 2009 (Table 3).' Table 3: Turkey-GCC Trade Relations (total volume in million $)

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Qatar UAE Oman Total

1996

2002

2005

2009

2.138

1.348

2.850

3.462

0.210

0.165

0.251

0.395

0.014 0.013

0.035 0.026

0.060 0.132

0.138 0.375

0.234

0.558 0.031

1.880

3.566

0.020

0.043

0.122

2.632

2.165

5.220

8.059

Source: Turkish Statistics Institute, http://www.tuikgov.tr

In May 2005, both sides Signed a Memoraudum ofUnderstanding in Manama, Bahrain, to support economic cooperation, encourage exchange of technical €,Vpertise and information, improve economic relations, and initiate negotiations to establish free trade zones.' As a symbol of the strengthening relations between Turkey aud the GCC states exchauged high-level official visits. For example, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia visited Turkey in 2006 aud 2007, aud President of Turkey, Abdullah Gill, responded with au official visit to Saudi Arabia in 2009. Truly a historical milestone in the relations, on September 2, 2008, the GCC foreign ministers declared Turkey a strategic partner.' The GCC also Signed a Memorandum of Understauding with Turkey, calling for the establishment of a comprehensive and regular consultation mechanism on political, economic, defense, security and cultural matters. In this vein both sides agree to hold a joint annual meeting of foreign ministers. In the words of the Qatari prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin [asem alThaui, by then the chairmau of the GCC Ministerial Council, "the signing ofthe memo is a step on the way to strategic relations:" The first joint ministerial meeting was held in Istanbul on July 8, 2009. As specified in the joint statement of the meeting, the sides decided to improve cooperation in

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