Triumph of self-determination: operation stabilise and United Nations peacemaking in East Timor

Triumph ofSelf-Determination

Praeger Security International Advisory Board

Board C01hairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul W ilkinson, Professor ofinternational Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study ofTerrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.)

M�mbers Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) 'Iherese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affilirs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation N ationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Mic had Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Pau l M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O'N eill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) S hibley Telhami, Anwar S adat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Govern­ ment and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Triumph of Self-Determination Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in EastTimor

John R. Ballard

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ballard, John R., 1957Triumph of self-determination : operation stabilise and United Nations peacemaking in East Timer I John R. Ballard. P· cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 973-0-3 13-34841-9 {alk. paper) 1. East Timer-History-Autonomy and independence movements. 2. East Timer-Politics and government-20 02-. 3. United Nations-East Timer. I . Title. DS649.6.B35 2008 959.8704-dc22 2007035285 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2008 by John R. Ballard All rights reserved. No portion ofthis book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the pub lisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007035285 ISBN-13: 978-0-313-34841-9 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 0 6 8 8 1 A n imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www. praeger.com Printed in the United States of America �:·-·�··

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The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organiz.ation {Z39.48-1984). 10

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In honor of Private Leonard Manning, New Zealand Army, and the other service-members who died bringing freedom to East Timor.

Miiita1y service is the ultimateform cfpatriotism

Contents

Preface Acknowledgments

IX XIII

1

1.

Background for Timorese Independence

2.

Changing Global Power Structures during the 1990s

15

3.

Developing Consensus: Regional Affairs and the UN

27

4.

UNAMET and the Vote for Independence

43

5.

Anticipating Intervention: Planning and Deployment

56

6.

Initial Military Operations

69

7.

Stabilizing East Timor

84

8.

Building a New Nation

105

9.

Lessons for a New Century

125

Appendix A: A greement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through a Direct Ballot

143

Appendix B: Code of Conduct for Participants in East Timor Popular Consultation

147

viii

Contents

Appendix C: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264

151

Appendix D: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272

155

Appendix E: Extracts from the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

159

Notes

179

Glossary

203

Selected Bibliography

207

Index

215 A photo essay follows page 68.

Preface

On September 20, 1999, Major General Peter Cosgrove of Australia embarked the national commanders of his newly created international force in a small commercial plane and flew from Darwin, Australia, to Dili, the capital of the breakaway Indonesian province of East Timor. When the nine officers disembarked in the Dili airport, they were met by armed Indonesian army troops and escorted in an old school bus past scenes of horrific devastation in the city. Looting and burning were still in progress. The Indonesians had agreed to the arrival of a United Nations-sponsored international force to bring peace to the area, but the situation in East Timor remained extremely volatile. General Cosgrove had elected not to conduct a forcible military assault into East Timor, as was originally called for in the plan his staff had devel­ oped. Only the previous day, he had successfully negotiated the permissive entry of his forces into the island province with Indonesian general Kiki Syahnakrie, the local military commander. By entering into East Timor without the force of arms, General Cosgrove was accepting extreme risk, arriving with only the sponsorship of the U nited Nations and the endorse­ ment of its regional partners as protection, yet he did so because he had an acute sense of what the military and political necessities in East Timor were at the time. Indonesian forces would still greatly outnumber his coalition troops for several days, and the lawlessness of a region subject to the whims of rampaging militias would pose threats for weeks to come, yet General Cosgrove's acceptance of these risks both set an unusual tone for military action and significantly helped ensure the success of his unique mission in East Timor-known as Operation Stabilise.

x

Preface

In many ways the fruition of a decade of multinational peace opera­ tions, General Cosgrove's mission was precedence-sening in its use of regional power to effect a United Nations' mandate designed to assist in the self-determination of a new nation. Operation Stabilise confirmed the value of regional coalition response in Southeast Asia and demonstrated the special influence that the modern United Nations can exert in specific circumstances. It also cast a new role for superpower involvement in the world's crises by showing that the United States could accept and execute a subordinate coali­ tion role just like other concerned nations. The intervention in East Timor was not the first of Indonesia's internal problems to reach the world stage, yet it set a standard for the potential resolution of so many other problems plaguing that diverse and complex nation. By the spring of 2000, the upheaval in East Timor had been resolved through one of the most effective military interventions of the past century. Yet Stabilise was only one of several United Nations operations that helped bring freedom to the Timorese people. Two significant changes in the international defense realm during the 1990s-the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise in importance of the U nited Nations-completely recast the glo bal interplay among nations. The fall of the Soviet Union not only freed the United States from a preoccupation with Soviet threats, but it also enabled America's acceptance and support of other regional power structures. The new importance of the United Nations among global powers resulted in increased UN involvement in the world's issues, particularly in the case of abuses of human rights, and finally brought the organization to a position of true influence on the world scene. These changes set the stage for a wholly new and more successful type of UN intervention. General Cosgrove's Operation Stabilise was successful not only because likely combat was avoided and security restored but also, and more important, because it built upon the previous efforts of Ian Martin's United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor and bridged to subsequent actions under Sergio Vieira de Mello's U nited Nations Transitional Admin­ istration in East Timor. All of these UN efforts helped to develop governance and new national institutions while essential democratic processes matured in Timor. Thus, a series of UN actions over time enabled the relatively rapid establishment of a new nation, where once there had been only u nrest and unacceptable violations of human rights. This is the story of the men and women of military units and international aid organizations from around the world who made operations in Timor truly humanitarian and admirably effective in only a few short years. They had the support of committed nations, and they had exceptional leadership, but it was the professional and personal efforts of many hundreds of individuals that really made UN support for the Timorese people successful.

Preface

xi

This is also a story of the significant efforts of the Timorese themselves, as they worked to establish their new nation. Perhaps more than any other event of its decade, the birth of East Timor was fraught with complex prob­ lems. The Timorese had to persevere for over twenty-five years to gain an opportunity to decide their future. But when given the chance, they acted in huge numbers, against real opposition, to determine their own future. The path chosen by East Timor's leaders and the great effort expended by the people there reveal much about what is important to a new nation and much more about the value people place on independence and personal freedom. The lessons of the UN operations in Timor should stand as guideposts down the new path of military operations in the twenty-first century. Multi­ national engagement clearly will remain a primary context for military intervention in the forthcoming decades. Even given global preoccupation with a campaign against terrorism, success in twenty-first-century military operations will also require a greater level of understanding and coordination among the host of national and international organizations that engage in the world's affairs. New national roles and new relationships with nonstate actors will certainly need to be developed in a more connected world. Cultural sensitivity and diplomacy will be required in new ways and in greater depth-particularly on the part of military commanders. At the same time, the historic fundamentals for success in a more uncertain and more complex age will remain as they have been for centuries, firmly rooted in leadership, professional skill, and discipline. All of these lessons are evident in the actions that the UN took to help the Timorese people reach independence. General Cosgrove and his immediate subordinates were shocked at the devastation they saw upon their arrival in Dili. Over the course of a few short months the eyes of the world were opened to the issue of Timorese ind ep end ence, and in a true refl.ectio n oft he lo fry goals oft he United Nations Charter, people from all over the world pitched in to help. Operation Stabilise was the last of the twentieth century's multinational interventions and the first of a different kind of global action for the new century. It facilitated the creation of a new nation where before there had been little interest and little of value. The UN focus on the development of good governance and the establishment of fundamental institutions of justice and culture, while also working to establish a real functioning economy for the Timorese, gave the new nation viability, vitalty i , and vision. For those who seek to make the world a b etter place, the lessons of the intervention in East Timor can improve the nature of peacemaking and nation building in the century.

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been written without the support of several orga­ nizations: the Joint History Office of the United States Pacific Command; the libraries at the United States Joint Forces Staff College, the United States Naval War College, and the National Defense University; the Australian and New Zealand armies; New Zealand's Massey University; and the faculty and staff of both the Naval War College and the National War College (who endured my long preoccupation with a small island conflict for far too many months). They were all important to this effort, and my thanks and deep appreciation go to each member of these fine, professional organizations. Beyond anyone else, this book has been supported by the diligence and encouragement of my beloved wife, Rosaline. She has been my best friend and my wise sounding board throughout this journey; her uniquely valuable insight and her genuine love and devotion have made every part of this book and everything in my life better. It is also for our beloved Renee and Lauren. Although it has benefited from a great deal of government information, this book does not reflect the views or opinions of the United States Department of Defense or the governments of New Zealand,Australia, or the United States; nor does it reflect their policies or those of any of the institutions listed above. The views expressed in this book are mine alone, as are any errors or OmiSSIOnS. John R. Ballard Alexandria, Virginia

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Chapterl Background forTimorese Independence

But somewhere in that tiny, distant half island, a spark was flickering, and a small segment of humanity was not only struggling to assert its rights, but more importantly was calling upon the United Nations to act in fulfillment of its Charter.l

Neglect and indifference dominate the unfortunate history of East Timor. Half an island four hundred miles northwest of Australia, just a bit smaller than the state of New Jersey, and with a population of only 800,000, it was never the focus of much attention. Dry in summer, rainy in winter, normally bleak, mountainous and malaria-plagued, East Timor has never been and will never be a tourist spot. No strategic minerals are found there and it controls no important waterways or facilities.2 Yet, small East Timor has seen more than its share of conflict and devastation.3 Many other nations have endured centuries of strife to gain their independence, but few have suffered more for less reason in order to finally manage their own affairs. No story of the campaign to bring East Timor freedom can be contextually complete without some insight into the history of the Timorese people. Sandalwood brought the Chinese to Timor as early as the thirteenth century, but the island remained free from colonization until the early 1500s. Following the famous voyage of Vasco de Gama to India in 1498, the Portuguese expanded their influence throughout Southeast Asia, focused principally on the rich spice trade, which at that time was dominated by Muslim and Venetian traders. A great naval victory in 1509 resulted in the defeat of the sultan of Egypt's opposing armada and ensured Portuguese hegemony over India and Southeast Asia.4 Soon thereafter, King Jo3.o Ill of Portugal dispatched an expedition, which eventually visited Timor. Coincident with the search for nutmeg and cloves, the Pope also charged the Portuguese with convening the area to Christianity. A Timorese settlement founded by

2

Triumph of S elf-Determination

the Portuguese in 1 561 included Dominican friars to do the Pope's work, but it was the export of horses and slaves that really piqued interest and brought Europeans to Timor. The first lasting Portuguese settlement in East Timor occurred in 1 633. Over time European influence grew to spawn a new community in the island-the mestizos, or topsasses-a mixed race. The Dominicans continued to make converts while becoming rich from sandalwood trading. The Portuguese were opposed in the region by Indonesian Muslims throughout the last half of the sixteenth century and later in the same period by another European competitor: the Netherlands. After independence from Spain in 1 5 8 1 , the Dutch expanded their influence throughout modern-day Indonesia in the early seventeenth century. They eventually took control of Kup ang and the western part of the island in 1 63 7. This faet was eo nfirmed by treaty in 1661, rhus establishing a dissatisfying Dutch-Portuguese cohab­ itation of the island. Like the Portuguese before them, the Dutch showed little interest in the possession, but they did mount a series of military pacification campaigns and largely secured themselves at peace in the west of the island by the mid-1700s.5 The Portuguese retained authority over the island's eastern section but did not take direct control of its affairs until 1701, when they appointed a wealthy trader, Ant6nio Coelho Guerreiro, governor in East Timor. Yet, even he made little difference locally. He tried unsuccessfully to set up a relationship with the local rulers, but "Timor lingered on, amidst the usual quarrels. " 6 The governor was so far d istant from the main Portuguese interests in the area-in fact, six thousand miles from the Viceroy of Go a, his direct administrator, and he had so few resources and such difficulty com­ municating within the mountainous island, that he remained largely inef­ fectual and isolated in his capitol city of Lifao, in what is known today as the Ambeno or Oecussi enclave. Realistically, control was exercised by the Dominicans and the mestizos-descendants of the Portuguese soldiers and traders and the local women. What control the Portuguese were able to accomplis h in Timor was largely due to their ability to rake advantage of rivalries among the local tribal leaders -they did not strongly garrison their half of the island.l But even under such benign rule rhe population of Timor was nor totally accepting of foreign administration. The Timorese rebelled against the Portuguese several times during the eighteenth century. In 17 42, a Dominican friar led the mutiny.8 There was sufficient unrest rhar rhe capital was moved to the port of Dili in 1769 after rebels took control of Lifao and forced the governor to fl e e.9 Another revolt led to the secession of the kingdom of Mambara in 1790 . 1 0 Unstable and really quire poor, East Timor was deemed not worth much effort at the time; "The Dutch in Indonesia harassed the Portuguese occupation but, on the whole, Portugal's share was so small that the Dutch saw no p arricu lar interest in getting rid of their neighb ors." 1 1

Background for Timorese Independence

3

After a short spell under British control during the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch returned to West Timor in the early nineteenth century to begin a series of negotiations to purchase East Timor. The Portuguese were uncoop­ erative, and a series of border disputes began, largely centered on the ques­ tion of the enclaves held by both nations within the boundaries of the other state's half of the island. The debate continued for over fifty years without sufficient concern to bring a resolution. The Dutch and the Portuguese finally came to agree on their division of rights within Timor in 1 893, and then a convention was signed at The Hague in 1904 to confirm the adminis­ tration internationally, but the distress o f the Timorese only grew during the same period . Indifference toward East Timor was not limited to administrative efforts. The Portuguese built little there and contributed only minimally to education and internal improvements. The region remained a backwater through the mid-nineteenth century, staying "little more than a trading post." 12 Coffee growing was instituted to replace the sandalwood trade in the 1850s, but few other changes were made and the productivity of the province contin­ ued to stagnate in the last half of the nineteenth century. In order to generate some improvement and profit after so many years without a worthwhile return, the Portuguese eventually instituted a forced-labor program in 188 4 designed t o increase efficiency on the backs of the Timorese. Portuguese control became more focused in 1896, when the colony's administration became independent of supervision b y the colonial governor in Macau, and beginning in 1908 the administration instituted a head tax on all males between the ages of eighteen and sixty. 1 3 These unpopular actions resulted in intermittent conflict with the Timorese for over a decade, which came to a head in two instructive revolts in 1910 and 1 9 12 . THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY REVOlTS AND THE END OF PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

These revolts originated from a multitude of causes more deeply rooted in shocks to Timorese culture than simply due to the harshness of colonial administration. As in many other colonies, East Timor was managed by two linked local governmental systems: one Portuguese and one Timorese. Where Portuguese management left off, local tribal leaders formed a buffer and bridge to the activities of the people. As long as the tribal leaders supported and were supported by the Portuguese, the Timorese people were relatively complacent. With a disruption in this interrelated system of governance came rebellion. One of the major problems in the Portuguese administration of East Timor was the general incompetence of the lower-level administrators in the province. Although several of the governors were adequately attuned to their tasks, frequently their immediate supporting staffs were populated by

4

Triumph of S elf-Determination

" military miscreants" cast off into oblivion from other regions of the Portu­ guese empire, due to corruption or ineffe ctive performance.14 The low calib e r of these people meant that the most common interface between the local leaders in Timor and the local Portuguese government was normally ineffi­ cient and sometimes even confrontational. During the decades preceding the revolts, the administration of Timor was also rocked by a rapid series of short-tenured military governors whose major emphasis turned the area fro m a lack!uster trading post to something of a military camp . 15 These two factors created an ever-widening gap of professionalism and consistency between the Portuguese and Timorese leadership. The arrival of ambitious Governor Jose Celestino da Silva in 1894 finally brought with it much greater continuity of policy (he governed for fourteen years), and also a significant effort to reduce the authority of the Timorese leaders within the power structures of the colony. Da Silva waged a campaign of domination in Timor, which brought him much greater autonomy from Lisbon but also reduced the power of the local chiefs and devastated several areas of Timor for years to come. 1 6 The people of Timor never fully adjusted to the autocratic approaches of these men, and when the inevitably unpopular head tax came into effect in 1908 , it was viewed as yet another attack on the power of the local chiefs by an ever more inconsistent and omnipresent Portuguese administration. 1 7 Da Silva continued his assaults o n the Timorese b y starting a land redistri­ bution scheme and even efforts to reorganize so me of the local tribes. 1 8 He audaciously demanded that all schooling be conducted in Portuguese and required the children of the chiefs to attend such schools. By the time Da Silva instituted taxes on salt, alcohol, and hunting, a revolt was not far dist ant . 1 9 To compound this discontent, three different governors followed Da Silva in the two years after his departure. This instability would have pave d the way for an uprising in Timor under most conditions, but when the republic was declared in Portugal in 1910, the lack of coherent policy for the colony opened the door for the Timorese to force a change of administration. The revolt began with the murder of a local Portuguese administrator, after he insulted a local chief. The indifference of the Portuguese, combined with fervent local unrest, resulted in an uprising that took the Portuguese nearly eighteen months to suppress. A local chief, Dom Bonaventura, brought together several other tribal groups and actually marched on the Portuguese capital in Dili. Residents of the city wer e kill e d, buildings were destroyed, and government house was even looted. The Portuguese brought in African troops from Mozambique to suppress the revolt, "reportedly resulting in 3,424 East Timorese killed, and 12,567 wounded, and 289 Portuguese killed and 600 wounded . "20 The spirit of the revolt also caused an intervention in West Timor in 1912-191 3,21 which led to the first international recognition of the Timorese situation in the twentieth century when The Hague Court

Background for Timorese Independence

5

intervened to clearly establish the border between East and West Timor. In response to the revolt, the Portuguese introduced a true civil government in Dili and after 1913 £naily reestablished effective control o ver the province. Some authors, and many in East Timor, conclude from studying the colonial period that the Timorese adopted an attitude of ongoing struggle ((unu in Tetum) toward their governors.22 This attitude would grow in power and legend through the twentieth century. Still, the European population of Timor remained small. No real incentive existed to bring in colonists. For a time the territory even served as a penal colony, and after 1930 the Portuguese tried to bring settlers for the develop­ ment of a plantation economy, but that, too, failed.23 Although some sem­ blance of normality had been constructed by the time Europe entered World War Two, " incredibly Dili had no electricity, no water supply, no paved roads, and no telephones."24

WORLD WAR TWO I N T IMOR

More unfortunately, 1942 brought a new and even less beneficial admin­ istration to East Timor. First, the Netherlands and Australia landed troops in Timor, without Portuguese permission, in order to defend against the Japanese. Then in February of that year, twenty thousand Japanese troops invaded the island and occupied the Portuguese colony. Japan pushed into the region because its 1937 war with China required greater and greater resources, particularly oil, and 25 percent of its oil was supplied by the then Dutch East lndies (now Indonesia) surrounding the tiny Portuguese colony. The Japanese clearly saw Timor as an outpost supporting the expanding Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere they were building in the region. After the attack on Pearl Harbor just two months earlier, the J apanese were seeking advanced bases from which to protect the riches of Southeast Asia from the expected Allied riposte. Timor's position northwest of Australia facilitated Japanese defense of the region, so they invaded not for gains in Timor but to support objectives elsewhere. After the fall of Singapore, the defeat of the combined British, Dutch, Australian, and United States fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea gave the J apanese clear superiority in the region. On March 9, 1942, the Dutch surrendered their Timorese possessions to the aggressor without resistance. The Portuguese did nothing to protect East Timor either. But the Australians did not leave the Timorese to the mercy of the conquering Japanese; they retained a group of several hundred soldiers in order to oppose the Japanese control of Timor and stave off a potential invasion of their own country. The result of the Australian commitment was both a long and devastating guerilla war and some significantly greater interest b y the Australians in the province to their northwest.

6

Triumph of S elf-Determination

The three hundred men of the Australian 22nd and 24th Independent Companies fought along with many local militias to harass and kill Japanese soldiers until being forced to withdraw in January 1943. Casualty estimates include only forty Australians and nearly fifteen hundred Japanese-no tally of Timorese injuries is recorded, but it is estimated that J apanese reprisals following the departure of the Australians reduced the population of East Timor by possi b I y seventy thousand !25 MODERN TIMO R AND ITS EARLY INDEPENDENCE EFFORTS

The end of the war in 1 945 brought both the return of the Portuguese and renewed sentiment for East Timorese independence. It also brought some in newly formed Indonesia to call for Timor's incorporation into their "country" as they began their own struggle with nationhood . Theoretically, the Portuguese goal was to assimilate the Timorese into their own way of life.26 But this was never effectively accomplished and some would argue was never really pursued in Timor as it was in other Portuguese colonies. In 1950 less than 2 percent of Timorese were considered to have been assimi­ lated or deemed "culturally modern" by the Portuguese.27 As Portugal struggled to retain control in East Timor, coaptation of the indigenous elite became an ever-growing part of its strategy. The cultivation of a class of assimilados was seen as a method to better control the province through a Timorese buffer administration. Though technically all inhabitants of the colony had been granted citizenship, in practice only those meeting certain property and taxation requirements were permitted to vote-all of these were found among the assimilados.28 T h e educational work of the Catholic Church was key to the success of this effort, largely because literacy in Timor was tragically low and the church bore the greatest burden for education outside the urban areas. Only in 1964 was primary schooling made compulsory for young Timorese children.29 An important by-product of this educational role of the church was an important increase in membership among the local population. Although the number of conversions had been small through the war years, by 1 952 the church had accomplished significant growth and was a major contribu­ tor to pro-Portuguese sentiment. Church membership again increased mark­ ed!y, from perhaps sixty thousand in 19 52 to almost two hundred thousand by 1973.30 At the same time, the percentage of Timorese among the episcopate also grew sharply. Portugal did execute a series of colonial reforms in the 1 950s and 1960s. Lisbon fully incorporated Timor into the state in 1951 and improved the administrative structure of the colony to include a Legislative Council in 1963. During this period Portugal also significantly increased its financial support in a series of five-year development plans. Even so, over the entire

Background for Timorese Independence

7

period, the record shows very little real improvement in the lot of the average Timorese. A 1962 report made to the United Nations General Assembly noted, "In the post-war period there has been no significant progress in the economic development of Timor." 31 This effort coincided with the general European trend toward decoloni­ zation that followed the end of the world war. Portugal's African colonies rose up seeking independence beginning with Angola in 1961. The revolt in Guinea-Bisseau started in 1963, and the insurgency in Mozambique followed the next year. Portugal poured thousands of soldiers into Africa and began a long and unsuccessful campaign to halt these movements. All three nations were independent by 197 5. Similar movements were well publicized all around the world. Radio and newspapers, even the government's A Voz de Timor and the Catholic Seara, made these facts known in East Timor, and the movement for Timorese independence grew in strength, even in the isolated hamlets of the countryside, with each success by another former Portuguese colon y In 1959 a small revolt in the eastern pan of East Timor had been brutally put down by the Portuguese, resulting in the deaths of hundredsY The Por­ tuguese began a troop buildup in 1962 to stand against the growing opposi­ tion in Timor. The following year the new governor was a colonel appointed from the army staff, and the portion of the Portuguese defense budget directed to operations in Timor was increased to a level equivalent to half the pro vine e's revenues for that year. 33 These efforts appeared to eo main the rebellious activities, but in fact, from that point on, discontent continued to grow in the colon y. Still, East Timor's fust real chance for independence did not come until well after it had been accomplished by other Portuguese colonies, and only then with the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon in 1974. By then, the Timorese had developed a true opposition movement. In late April of that year the government in Lisbon fell to a coup d'etat lead by leftist military leaders who sought democracy and decolonization following the painful conflicts in Africa. Within weeks of the changeover in Portugal, East Timor was home to three separate political movements, each with a different plan for the region's future. The fust and most popular, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), was based within the pro-Ponuguese elite in Dili. lt sought continued association wit h Portugal at fust but turned in time to favor independence. The Association of Timorese Social Demo­ crats, or ASDT, favored a period of decolonization lasting eight to ten years, sufficient time for the necessary political and economic structures to develop in East Timor. Finally, the third and smallest of the most influential groups, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association, or APODETI (originally the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia), pushed for East Timor's incorporation into neighboring Indonesia. Many believe that the APODETI was a product of the Indonesian Intelligence Service (BAKIN), which certainly funneled funds to the organization. .

8

Triumph of S elf-Determination

Had there been more unity among the widely spread and easily isolated communities of East Timor, a truly national movement might have brought freedom easily from the distracted administration in Lisbon. Such a dominant movement might also have deterred Indonesian concerns about instability in its eastern border area. But a divisive civil war soon broke out in East Timor-a conflict with clear potential for socialist venues-and the fleeting opportunity for independence in 1974 turned sour. The Portuguese wanted to establish mechanisms to permit gradual decol­ onization but found ever-growing opposition to the idea. Faced with popular pressure from within and slow progress toward consensus by other groups, in September 1974 ASDT changed its program to demand immediate inde­ pendence and its name to the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN).34 Even though it enjoyed the bulk of popular support and had made a coalition with the UDT, FRETILIN had also become very threatening to Portuguese efforts aimed at gradual decolonization and to stability in the region overall. In early 1975, although the Portuguese had established a transitional government to precede the election of a Popular Assembly, APODETI refused to participate with FRETILIN initiatives, thus paralyzing development of consensus among the Timorese factions. By the summer of 1975 conditions had worsened to the point that the UDT launched a counter-FRETILIN coup in Dili. On August 1 1 , the airport and the communications center in the capital fell, and arrests of FRETIUN leaders began under the guise of freeing the territory from "communist influence."35 The Portuguese called for talks among the factions, but soon the condt i i ons of civil war existing within East Timor made mediation appear fruitless. The local Portuguese forces disintegrated and the Portuguese administrators fled to Atauro Island. During the following weeks FRETILIN established its own administration in East Timor. With growing problems in Lisbon com­ plicating rhe already complex problem, the Portuguese soon lost most of the ir real influence within East Timor, and by late November FRETILIN unilaterally declared East Timorese independence. The UDT and APODETI rejected FRETILIN's declaration, as did the Portuguese. More important, the chaotic events in East Timor had also become very threatening to Indonesia. Since early 1975, the Indonesian government, through BAKIN, had acted where possible against efforts for East Timorese independence. With FRETILIN's declaration, Indonesia's concern grew substantial, and o n December 7 approximately ten thousand Indonesian troops invaded the province. The conventional-force invasion followed an operation codenamed Komodo that was designed by senior Indonesian military officers to add chaos to the situation and set conditions for the invasion. The real motivations behind the Indonesian invasion remain murky. Many analysts claim that Indonesia acted simply to expand its territory and to stop the advance of communism within the region. There also have been many claims of U.S. support for and even U.S. impetus behind rhe Indonesian

Background for Timorese Independence

9

action, because, in the p eriod of the ongoing Cold War, the interests of the United States seemed always to be directed at stopping the advance of com­ munism, and many at the time believed that FRETILIN was a Communist Party organization. Certainly there was a high-level meeting between U.S. President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and President Suhano immediately prior to the invasion, wherein President Ford indicated he would not oppose Indonesian action.36 Suhano seemed to have indicated that he had little choice in the matter given the circumstances of the u nrest in Timor.37 The other regional partners, Australia and New Zealand , also seem to have anticipated the invasion and done nothing to prevent it. The issue remains important not because of the motivations for the invasion, but for the treatment of the Timorese people afterward and the struggle for independence that arose and remained active over the two decades that followed . As Jamsheed Marker noted, however, "While the general international response to [the Indonesian invasion of] East Timor was a grimace and a sad, helpless shrug of the shoulders, there were notable exceptions. "3 8 Significant among those exceptions, from 1975 onward, was the United Nations.

THE ORIGINS OF INDONESIAN RULE

Portugal acted quickly to bring the situation before the United Nations, and on December 22 the Security Council voted to deplore the Indonesian intervention.39 The same resolution confirmed the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and called for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal. Four months later a second Security Council Resolution, numbered 3 89, reiterated the call for Indonesian forces to leave East Timor. Unfortunately, the Indonesians took no heed of the then largely impotent Security Council40 and went on to establish a provisional government in Dili; by May 1976 the Indonesian government claimed East Timorese sup p on for integration and two months later formally declared East Timor to be its twenty-seventh province. Soon, the new territory was closed to outside observers. The full impact of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor is difficult to judge. Significant variations in economic and census data make even deter­ mining the population of East Timor in 1975 d ifficult. But it is certain that the Indonesian invasion preceded a massive crackdown on the proindepen­ dence movement. One official British assessment n ares : The Indonesians themselves acknowledge that about 80,000 East Timorese died in the late 1970s, out of a population of some 650,000. Some Non­ Governmental Organizations (NGOs) suggest as many as 200,000, or about one third of the territory's pop ulation, died. Immediately after the invasion, East Timer' s misery was cornpo unded by a famine, exacerbated by the po !icy of establishing strategic hamlets and the consequent dismption of normal

10

Triumph of S elf-Determination farming. Comparison of the last Portuguese and first Indonesian censuses, taking into account up to 40,000 East Timorese who fled abroad, suggests a minimum figure of o ver 100,000 deaths.41

This wo u Id mean one-sixth oft he East Timorese popu latio n was destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the Indonesian invasion. Constancio Pinto provided a vivid p icture of life under the Indonesian invasion in his book East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the East Timorese Resistance. He confirms that thousands fled and alleges indiscriminate Indonesian bombing, murder, and even rape during the first days following the invasion; soon his family was also in flight.42 Although the military wing of FRETILIN, known as FALINTIL/� and its supporters fought back, they were no match for the sophisticated weaponry of the American-supplied Indonesian Army.44 In response, the Timorese resistance turned to guerrilla warfare tactics to continue the struggle, and the short campaign to p acify the province turned into a prolonged conflict. Pino describes over eighteen months of fighting, during which the Timorese suffered under mortar and rocket fire as well as naval gunfire and aerial bombardment directed by American OV-1 0 obser­ vation aircraft.45 FRETILIN wisely included an information campaign as a part of its efforts to resist the Indonesians, and in time its strength grew despite casualties from the fighting. Pino joined the movement in 1976 at age thirteen.4 6 FALINTIL brought the fight to the Indonesian military (ABRI),47 using small bands of guerillas focused directly on countering Indonesian military activity in three different zones. In addition, FALINTIL developed and employed a special, mobile force, the Brigada Choque, which could rapidly move to reinforce the guerrilla bands when they needed help.48 Every bullet counted for the impoverished FALINTIL, so it depended upon a defensive strategy, lying in wait for Indonesian mistakes. Unfortunately the Indonesian forces had overwhelming numbers and a significant technology ad vantage. With a major landing operation in Dili on December 7, FALINTIL had to resort to the strategic defensive and simply endure the Indonesian occupation. Michael Smith has described FALINTIL's campaign against the Indone­ sian military as having three phases. The first phase, from 1975 to 1978, was led by Nicolau Lobato, the group's first commander.49 Initially, FRETI­ LIN/FALINTIL activities held the Indonesians to the main population centers and kept most of the countryside free of Indonesian control. 5° But eventually the Indonesian forces developed a concerted plan to wipe out the resistance movement, and they began to fight several large-scale battles, incrementally clearing the territory from west to east and along the way reducing FALINTIL from some twenty-seven thousand fighters to fewer than five thousand. Meanwhile, the often heavy-handed approach used by

Background forTimorese Independence

11

the Indonesians gave rise to numerous human rights violations, including the massacre of five Australian journalists in Balibo in October 19 75, most I y illustrated by attacks against unarmed Timorese. Such attacks began to grow more violent and more flagrant as the FALINTIL maintained pressure and as time passed. Behind these operational tactics was an ever-developing political organ that focused the Timorese on how to continue the struggle, but during the early years it remained relatively weak. 51 After 1977, though, increasing pressure from the Suharto regime and internal problems within FRETILIN caused a turn for the worse in East Timor.52 In 1977 the Indonesians adopted a new strategy designed to encir­ cle and destroy the FALINTIL. Using significant reinforcements, additional airpower, and even napalm, the ABRI methodically strangled the Timorese opposition in the countrysideY In a climactic battle on Mount Matabean on December 3 1 , 1978, Lobato was killed and the main FALINTIL base was destroyed. By 1979 the ABRI had effectively marginalized the FALINTIL and pushed most Timorese resistance underground. Thus the first phase of nearly conventional combat operations was clearly won by the larger and more technologically superior Indonesian military. In the second phase, from 1 979 until about 19 87, the FALINTIL turned to more traditional guerrilla tactics. This period saw the rise of Xanana Gusmao, who rose to command FALINTIL in 1981, following a period of disarray in the aftermath of the death of Lobato. It was during this period of the fight that the Timorese resistance movement really developed its power and the relationship it needed with the Timorese people in order to mount an effective campaign. In the 19 80s, FALINTIL ea me to be "supported secretly with money and provisions by a large number of the East Timorese population, known as the Rede Clandestina," clandestine network or front.54 It was this support mechanism that gave FALINTIL its real power, as it was generally so weak militarily that it had to depend upon infiltrating Indonesian units and conducting high-risk attacks against numerically supe­ rior Indonesian forces just to obtain sufficie nt arms and ammunition to carry on the fight. During this period the ABRI even forcibly mobilized the Timorese population to hunt down the remaining FALINTIL guerrillas.55 This new campaign wreaked havoc on the local population and caused significant death and devastation.56 FRETILIN attempted a major move back into Dili in 1982, but it, too, was defeated, the defeat leading eventually to a cease-fire in 1983 negotiated by Gusmao. Meanwhile the external sup­ port mechanisms for FALINTIL (primarilythose of Jose Ramos-Horta, who served as the Permanent Representative of FRETILIN to the U N for ten years), began to attract international attention toward the plight of the Timorese people. With the hobbling of FALINTIL the Indonesians changed their approach to governance in East Timor. To its credit, the Suharto government actually

12

Triumph of S elf-Determination

provided more aid to the Timorese than they had ever seen under Portuguese rule. As British assessments r e ve aled : After 1982, Indonesia adopted a " hearts and minds" strategy, attempting to win over the population with large-scale economic and social development. . . . The evidence suggests that conditions, including human rights, generally improved for a time after about 1983, and the level of armed conflict gradually diminished. The International Committee of the Red Cross {lCRC) was allowed to operate and have access to d etainees. 57This is not to say that conditions in East Timer improved to the point that armed resistance ceased, however; over twenty thousand ABRI troops remained in Timer to maintain pressure against the approximately five hundred FAUNTIL guerrillas. That situation changed very little over the intervening years, with ongoing friction between the Indone­ sian military forces assigned to stabilize the province and the proindependence groups becoming a normal backdrop to life in East Timer.

INDONESIA CONSOLIDATES ITS HOLD O V E R EASTTIMOR

Indonesia tried a variety of techniques to p acify the province during the 1980s, none of which worked well enough to remove popular support for the guerrillas. Unlike its activity in other provinces, Indonesia executed a strong de velopment policy and tolerated the local language and religious preference of the Timorese people, albeit with a continued large and active military presence. One of the by-products of this approach was a strength­ ening of the influence of the Catholic Church in East Timor, shepherded by Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo. The church became a focal point for East Timorese identity within the overwhelmingly Muslim nation of Indo nesia . East Timor was eventually opened to tourists following President Suharto's visit there in 1 9 8 8 , ostensibly to demonstrate to the world that Indonesia was de veloping the area, but internal conflicts remained intermittent. Even Suharto, fearing visible opposition, avoided real contact with the people upon his arrival in Dili in 1 98 8 . Pope John Paul ll's visit in October of the following year also gave rise to a proindependence demonstration, which embarrassed the ABRI.58 Similar demonstrations before the visiting U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, John M onj o, in 199 0 left no doubt that Indonesia had much work to do if it really sought stability in East Timor. The 1990s initially saw little change in the u nstable opposition between the Indonesians and FRETILIN in the province, but both sides made changes in an attempt to end the conflict. The ABRI focused increasingly on commu­ nity work, a sort of hearts-and-minds program; yet, its deployed numbers in East Timor remained high. Within the opposition, Xanana Gusmao reorganized FRETILIN in 1990 and created the CNRM, or National Council

Background forTimorese Independence

13

of Mau bere Resistance, in order to bring together all forms of opposition to Indonesia within East Timor.59 The efforts of Jose Ramos-Horta also began to bear fruit in the early 1990s as he pushed to retain international and United Nations focus on the ongoing crisis in his homeland.60 The most far-reaching event of the early decade was, however, the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre.

Constancio Pinto described the massacre in his book East Timor's Unfin­ ished Struggle: On November 12, a huge crowd of people went to the memorial mass for Sebastiiio Gomes, at the Motael Church. After the mass, they marched to the Santa Cruz Cemetery to put flowers on Sebastiiio's grave. As the crowd marched through Dili, many of the marchers unfurled banners and shouted pro-independence slogans. S uch a demonstration, such a large and open dis­ play of pro independence sentiment, had not taken place in East Timor since Indonesia's invasion. By the time the procession reached the cemetery, there was a crowd of thousands of men, women, and children chanting slogans and waving flags and banners . . . . As the demonstrators arrived at the cemetery, there were already Indonesian troops nearby. After the demonstrators arrived and had a brief ceremony in memory of Sebastiiio, a few army trucks came and started to unload troops . As the gathering was breaking up, soldiers began marching toward the crowd, and suddenly j ust opened fire without any warn­ ing. There was no provocation.This description matched the views of several other eyewitnesses; the result was over two hundred dead and as many inj ured, many of them young people. Among these eyewitnesses were American j o ur­ nalists Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman. Among the dead was at least one foreigner, a citizen of New Zealand.61 The incident caused outrage worldwide and a new wave of criticism of Indonesian control in East Timor. -

Xanana Gusmiio understood the impact of the tragedy and became even more involved in a campaign of diplomacy and media management that was instrumental in alerting the world to the massacre. Gusmiio was interviewed by many major media channels and obtained worldwide attention, which had the desired effect of calling even greater attention to the occupation and Indonesia's overall security effort. INDONESIA'S ACTIONS D RAW INTERNATIONAL S C RUTINY

In some ways, the Santa Cruz massacre was the beginning of the end of Indonesia's authority in East Timor. Ramos-Horta, as the FRETILIN/ CNRM permanent representative to the United Nations, pressed unsuccess­ fully for a U N peacekeeping force, bur the incident resonated in several capitals, particularly in Lisbon. Allan Nairn and others began to speak out in their home countries. Because the massacre received so much international

14

Triumph of Self-Determination

press attention, many who had never before known much about Timorese issues began to pay attention to the Indonesian activities there. Even so, the ABRI did not reduce its efforts to ensure stability in the province. In fact, even in the face of mounting press coverage, it continued to crack down on CNRM activities and to aggressively seek out the leaders of the movement. As a result of his high profile, Xanana Gusmao became a prime target of the Indonesian effort, and its campaign to smother the independence movement resulted in his capture in Dili and imprisonment in 1992. Gusmao's capture only temporarily reduced FALINTIL's activities in East Timor (he was quickly replaced as field commander by a succession of loyal subordinates), and in the end, his incarceration only provided him more influence in his efforts to bring attention to the situation in East Timor. Though in May 1993, Gusmao was publicly tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Indonesian government62 and was incarcerated in a prison in Jakarta, he was rarely out of control of the independence effort and only grew in stature as an international freedom fighter as the years passed. His sentence was commuted to twenty years by President Suharto in August 1993, but many began to call for his release or a reduction in his sentence to house arrest. Until he was released in late 1 999, Gusmao successfully led the resistance movement and served as an international symbol of the plight of the Timorese from within his prison cell. Over the following four years, the Timorese struggle found more and more support around the world. The Timorese people and their supporters finally swept the world news in 1 9 96 when two of their most influential leaders won the Nobel Peace Prize. The No bel committee chose Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, both leaders in East Timor's resistance effort for twenty years, for their "work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor." Even given the growth of support for Timorese interests, the announcement of Belo and Ramos-Horta's selection for the Peace Prize delivered a huge blow to Indonesia's ongoing effort to delegiti­ mize the Timorese agenda. Though the Indonesian foreign minister claimed to be astounded by the No bel Committee decision, there was no doubt that awarding the prize to the two Timorese "dramatically magnified world awareness of their efforts and put pressure on governments" 63 to act. With the military component of CNRM's effort still alive after Gusmao's capture and the huge informational boost of the Peace Prize selection felt around the world, the pressure on the Indonesian government to justify its campaign in East Timor began to stimulate new methods of ending the crisis. Unfortunately for Indonesia, less than a year later the Asian economic crisis ripped the financial foundation from its efforts in East Timor and forced an end to the thirty-year-old administration of President Suharto. The combina­ tion of these events in the same year eventually gave the East Timorese the opportunity to press their case for independence.

Chapter 2 Changing Global Power Structures during the 1990s

The last half of the twentieth century was dominated by the structure of global power that was established in the wake of World War Two . That Cold War system drove a separation of the major powers into two general camps and made it very difficult for nations to change alliances from one camp to another. Although the Cold War power balance was dominated by the threat of superpower nuclear war; it also had the tendency to reduce the incidents of conventional war around the globe as both democratic states; dominated by the United States; and the communist states; dominated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC); worked wherever possible to minimize conflicts that had a potential for escalation to superpower involvement. This backdrop of rigid power confrontation helped obscure smaller movements like the call for East Timorese independence. This rigidity also created some very complex international relationships; and prominent among those was the association between the United States and Indonesia. Indonesia under Presidents Suharto and Sukarno was strongly anticommunist; thus it was seen as supportive of United States interests and due to its important geostrategic position astride the Strait of Malacca; Indonesia benefited from large American aid programs. Far down among the implications of such aid was the question of United States support for Indonesia during its campaign to stabilize the situation in East Timor. THE RISE O F THE INDONESIAN STATE

Indonesia is a huge; populous country that is not well understood by many in the world; particularly Americans and Europeans . In several important ways Indonesia shares much historically with the United States; Australia; and even East Timor; but in other ways the rich history of Indonesia points

16

Triumph of S elf-Determination

to important cultural differences and unique approaches that should be rec­ ognized to objectively understand the role of Indonesia in the independence movement of the East Timorese. A far-flung, diverse country, with over three hundred distinct ethnic groups speaking some seven hundred languages, Indonesia includes over thirteen thousand islands spread across nearly two million square kilomet ers. Its 225 million people also make it one of the world's most populous nations. Indonesia sits astride one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, the Strait of Malacca, and produces a significant percentage of the globe's natural gas and petroleum products. Like Timor and much of the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia's modern history was significantly influenced by its colonization by a European power: the Netherlands. The Dutch began an interest in the spice trade on Java in the early nineteenth century, but over the following century they did little for the local people, particularly in education and welfare or to advance self­ government. In 1902 the colonial government began encouraging settlement on other islands to relieve population pressures in Java; this was the beginning of a transmigration program that Indonesia would later pursue even more aggressively. It was only in 1 9 1 8 that the People's Council (Volksraad), a largely advisory body to the Dutch governor general, met for the first time. Although it approved the colonial budget and could propose legislation, the People's Council lacked effective political power and remained a stronghold of the colonial establishment. The first great leader of Indonesia, Sukarno, began his rise to power in the 1920s.1 He established the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in 1 928; the PNI stressed mass organization and noncooperation with the colonial authorities and espoused an ultimate goal of independence. Sukarno had a talent for bringing together Javanese tradition, Islam, and his own version of Marxism to gain a huge mass following; yet he advocated the establishment of a secular rather than an Islami c st at e.2 By the late 1920s, the growing Indonesian desire for independence was obvious, but not universally popular, particularly with the Dutch administra­ tion. Sukarno was arrested in December 1929, tried, and convicted of sedition. He served two years in prison, but when the PNI was dissolved and replaced by the Indonesia Parry (Partindo) in April 1931, Sukarno soon became a member. Partindo also called for independence and was repressed by the Dutch, and it, too, was dissolved in 1934. In the meantime, Sukarno had been arrested again and exiled without triai;J he went to ground for a while but reentered politics after the Japanese occupied the country in 1942. From that point he was to play the central role in the struggle for independence. Indonesian national consciousness grew significantly under Japanese occu­ pation in the mid-1940s. As mentioned previously, the Japanese occupied Indonesia to secure its rich natural resources. After the March 1942 surrender of the Netherlands Indies administration, the people of Indonesia soon

Changing Global Power Structures, 1990s

17

observed alternate methods of rule. Although harsh, the Japanese occupa­ tion opened the way for a sense of Indonesian nationalism in several ways. First, it showed that there were alternatives to Dutch administration. Even more significantly, during the occupation the Japanese increased t h e level of participation by Indonesians in politics, administration, and the military.4 The Japanese relied on local elites to administer the countryside, and for the first time it became clear that indigenous leaders could manage t h eir own affairs. From these beginnings grew new local political organizations and a core of the future Indonesian military. The Dutch language was even discarded in favor of Malay and Japanese-making way for an Indonesian nat ional language. Indonesian art and culture grew stronger as well.5 When the Allies began their counteroffensives in the closing months of the war, the Japanese even promoted an Indonesian independence movement as a means of frustrating Allied reoccupation. THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION, 1945-1950

In 1942 Sukarno had agreed to cooperate with the Japanese, as his only viable option, and he b ecame increasingly valuable to them as the war pro­ gressed. As the Japanese became more and more d esperate during 1944, they announced that the entire Indonesian archipelago would become inde­ pendent. This promise seemed to justify Sukarno's collaboration, at least in pan, and was certainly a tremendous boon to the Indonesian people, effectively accelerating their move to independence in relation to the former European colonies neighboring them. The new nation's territory was to include not only the Netherlands Indies bur also Portuguese Timor, Brits i h North Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula.6 This extended Japanese construct was the heart of Sukarno's Greater Indonesia Policy and has been the source of several internal problems ever since.l The Jakarta Charter formed the basis for the Indon esian state and Sukarno was chosen as its first president. The debate over what kind of nation Indonesia should become was far­ ranging, and unfortunately quite brief. The major dilemma facing the new nation was how to coalesce the divergent views of a huge and populous "nation" of so many ethnic subgroups that shared little and differed in culture, linguistics, and religion. One issue that needed resolution was the role of Islam in the state; another was the form of representation accorded the cultural and ethnic minorities; finally, the relationship between national and individual power needed to be resolved in a manner that fit Indonesia's people. Sukarno eventually resolved these issues with his five principles, or Pancasila: "They are: b elief in one supreme God; justice and civility among peoples; the unity of Indonesia; democracy through deliberation and consensus among representations; social justice for all." 8Pancasila d idn't make everyone happy, but it did provide a common foundation for the new state.

18

Triumph of Self-Determination

Two days after the Japanese surrender, on August 17, 1 945, Sukarno formally declared Indonesia's independence and raised the red-and-white national flag. One of his first challenges was in dealing with the victorious Allies once they returned to Indonesia. "The Allies had no consistent policy concerning Indonesia's future apart from the vague hope that the republicans and Dutch could be induced to negotiate peacefully. Their immediate goal in bringing troops to the islands was to disarm and repatriate the Japanese, and liberate Europeans held in internment camps. Most Indonesians how­ ever believed that the Allied goal was the restoration of Dutch rule."9 After an uneasy period of peaceful coexistence, on October 28, 1945, major violence erupted in East Java. British troops clashed with armed Indonesian groups, and the British commander and hundreds of his troops were killed. Although the British launched a counterattack in late November costing thousands of lives, it was obvious that the Allies eventually would have to accept the new republic. Eventually, the Dutch, who wanted something short of full independence for Indonesia, accepted a "Net herlands-Indo nesian Union under the Dutch crown . . . . The archipelago was to have a loose federal arrangement, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), comprising the republic (on Java and Sumatra), southern Kalimantan, and the 'Great East' consisting of Sulawesi, Maluku, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and West New Guinea . " 1 0 A formal agreement to this effect was signed i n May 1947, but the Dutch continued trying to exert control in the region, even intervening with troops later, in July 1947. The international reaction to the Dutch position was clearly negative; the United Nations Security Council even established a Good Offices Committee to sponsor further negotiations. The Dutch were not the only problem Sukarno faced. Internal weakness was already evident in Indonesia, as a breakaway regime known as Darul Islam stirred up local unrest in West Java - a movement that wou Id continue to plague Indonesia until 1962. Also, local clashes between republican armed forces and procommunist elements broke out in Septemb er 1948. Of note, it was when this revolt was violently put down that the United States first began to view the Indonesian republicans as anticommunist and began to pressure the Netherlands to accommodate Indonesian independence efforts. The Dutch attempted to intervene militarily in Indonesia a second time, in 1 94 8 , arresting and exiling Sukarno to northern Sumatra. This action aroused significant, negative international reaction among members of the United Nations Security Council, including the U nited States, and in January 1949 the Security Council demanded the reinstatement of the republican government. Finally, the Dutch agreed to recognize the fully independent Indonesian state, withdraw all Dutch military forces, and hold elections for a constituent assembly. Sovereignty was formally transferred on December 27, 1949. The Indonesian nation was born after a lengthy labor as an unwieldy federal creation comprising sixteen entities. By May 1950, however,

Ch angi ng Global Power Structures, 1990s

19

aggressive action by the national government brou ght t ogether all these states into a unitary Republic of Indonesia with Jakarta as the capital. Unfortunately, internal unrest resident at its creation never ceased to plague the new state. Indonesian society was deeply divided by ethnic, regional, class, and religious differences. Treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society has always been pr oblematic; unrest in West Java and Ambon broke out within months of the nation's founding and has continued into the cur­ rent century. This internal divisiveness and its threat to the Indonesian state became a driving force around the government's decision making concerning East Timor. INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE: THE C RUCIAL YEARS, 1950-1965 Sukarno again became president of the newly independent nation in 1950, but his powers were much more limited than those he had held under the 1945 constitution. Not only were presidential powers weaker, but other competing power centers in the country also had matured since 194 5 . In particular, given its important service during the revolution, the Indonesian military had assumed a greater role in government affairs. The militar y was no t a unified force either ; it also reflected the significant divergent opin­ ions of Indonesian society. Even so, some senior military officers garnered sufficient power to organize demonstrations in Jakarta on October 17, 1952, in an attempt to pressure Sukarno to dissolve parliament. Sukarno refused and the army chief of staff was obliged to resign in a presidential shake-up of military commands. Jockeying for power between the president and the milt i ar y in Indonesia remained a theme of Indonesian politics for five decades. Still, efforts to reform were taking place in Indonesia. The country's first general election finally took place on September 29, 1 955, years after first promised. The following D ecember, work began on a new constitution to replace the provisional document of 1 950. Unfortunately, "no single group, or stable coalition of groups, was strong enough to provide enduring gov­ ernment management. The result was chronic instability and six cabinet changes between 1 950 and 1957. " 1 1 Nationalist, communist and Islamic factions all jockeyed for dominance. The military even attempted a coup d'etat in October 1 956, and although the coup failed, its instigators were only forced underground to continue their efforts in defiance of Jakarta. In March 1957, a second military-led revolt broke out in Ujungpandang; by that time the Darul Islam movement had spread to Aceh and southern Sulawesi. President Sukarno declared martial law. The next year Indonesia suffered through yet another military insurrection. Over the following two years the instability only worsened in Indonesia and began to effect changes in Sukarno's foreign agenda. The Indonesian Communist Party was growing in influence, and Sukarno viewed it as a

20

Triumph of Self-Determination

counterweight to balance the influence of the military, so he improved rela­ tions with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Relations with the United States, on the other hand, worsened, and Washington began to provide " clandestine aid" to rebels in Sumatra .12 With problems both within and without, the future of the new nation did not appear bright. Continued Dutch occupation of West New Guinea led to another break­ down in relations between Jakarta and the Netherlands in 1960. Conflict was only averted when a compromise was worked out u nder United States aus­ pices in which West New Guinea was first turned over to the United Nations and then to Indonesian administration. The United Nations replaced the Dutch there in October 1962, and in May 1 9 63, Indonesian authority was estab­ lished. A UN-monitored popular consultation, the Act of Free Choice, was conducted in 1 9 69 to d etermine if the primarily Papuan population wanted to join the republic. The local community leaders voted unanimously to approve incorporation in an act not unlike what would occur in East Timor in 1999. Still, criticism of the process by foreign observers and suspicions of Indonesian pressure threw the legitimacy of the referendum into question. In the wake of Malaysia's creation on September 16, 1963, a wave of anti-Malaysian and anti-British demonstrations broke out in Jakarta, result­ ing in the burning of the British embassy. Union workers seized British plan­ rations and other enterprises, which were then turned over to the government. Within weeks Sukarno decided that Indonesia had to act against the perceived Malaysian threat. Indonesian military units infiltrated into Malaysia but were intercepted before they could establish an effective base of operations. Thus b egan the Malaya Confrontation involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, as well as Indonesia and Malaysia. When the United Nations General Assembly finally chose Malaysia as a nonperma­ nent member of the Security Council in December 1964, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the world body. Sukarno ruled through a complex balancing act in which he played com­ munist, Muslim, and military interests against one another to retain control. After the failure of the Constitutional Assembly to d evelop a more effective governmental structure in July 1 959, Sukarno assumed even greater power and ushered in a period called "Guided Democracy." In reality, it was more authoritarian than democratic. 1 3 As the years passed and Sukarno aged, he found the management of his authoritarian balancing act increasingly d iffi­ cult. Economics was never his strong suit and the vitality of the state began to suffer soaring inflation and debt. THE 1965 COUP AND A NEW ORDER UNDER SUHARTO

By 1965 Indonesia was in desperate 5traits, menaced by internal unrest and division and an increasingly skeptical international community. The rapid

Changing Global Power Structures, 1990s

21

growth of pro communist factions within the country was opposed by Islamic groups and the Indonesian military; the situation was anything but stable. The Indonesian military was itself divided in its support for President, with the opposition counting the army chief of staff, General Nasution, and one of his most influential senior commanders, Major General Suharto, among its number. 14 This chronic instability exploded into a coup d'etat on September 30, 1965. Six generals were murdered on the first night; the state radio station was captured, and other military units stepped in to restore order. As a result many communists were purged in bloody repressions on Java, Bali, and elsewhere. Some believe that Sukarno was responsible for mastermind­ ing the coup with the cooperation of the Indonesian Communist Party and that the purges were designed to purify both organizations. Some scenarios even alleged United States involvement in the purge based upon the sizable American military assistance programs provided to Indonesia . So me still believe these were designed to establish a pro-United States, anticommunist constituency within the Indonesian armed forces. In reality, the original coup was most likely put into effect by a small splinter element of the military, 1 S but the aftereffects of the coup abruptly changed the path of Indonesian history. In the three months following the September 30 coup, a violent anticom­ munist and anti-Chinese reaction resulted in some three hundred thousand casualties and eventually brought General Suharto to power. After extensive purging of both the left and the right and any other threatening elements of Indonesian society, Sukarno finally signed an executive order on March 1 1 , 1966, transferring authority to Suharto. Sukarno was kept under arrest until his death in 1970. The Suharto regime truly brought a new order to Indonesia; in particular, the new government realigned the country's political dynamic, effectively destroying the influence of the communist party and elevating the Indonesian military (ABRI), to a position of preeminent influence. To ensure that the communists would never again pose a challenge to his authority, Suharto created powerful new intelligence bodies in the wake of the coup: the Oper­ ational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin). Suharto's "New Order" was also clearly authoritarian, characterized by tight centralized control and long-term personal rule. Suharto made all important policy decisions and carefully balanced competing interests within the still very diverse society that was Indonesia. Within his bureaucratic state the army played a central role (with its raison d'etre defined as dwifungsi: a permanent dual political-social function within Indonesian nationhood ) . Beginning in the revolutionary period, the army had assumed a dominant role in the highest ranks of the government and civil service, and on the federal, regional, and local levels as well. "As early as 1947, the

22

Triumph of Self-Determination

military under the leadership of General Sudirman had begun setting up its own, parallel system of government so that each civilian official, from pro­ vincial governors down to district supervisors, would be matched with a corresponding figure from the military." 1 6 The Indonesian military viewed itself as father and guardian of the nation and had often been d issatisfied with the chaos of parliamentary democracy. After 1958, the military grew so influential that it was recognized as a national functional group deserving direct representation within the national assembly. 17 The army also repre­ sented a significant force within the national economy. For these reasons military actions in Indonesian took on a very different influence than in many other nations, and the role of the armed forces in East Timor, as in many other areas of Indonesian society, exerted much more authority than many understand. Suharto's regime was extraordinarily stable compared wit h its predecessor, largely due to the military's strong loyalty to the regime and wide-ranging administrative power. Another factor in his regime stability was the estab­ lishment of social, class, religious, and professional organizations to develop horizontal bonds within Indonesian society. One example of this use of federations was the creation of the Golkar "Party" in 1971. Golkar was a nominal collection of trade unions and param ilitary organizations designed simply to provide an electoral vehicle for the Suharto government in the 1971 national election (which was the first election held since the 1 950s). Golkar succeeded then in focusing support for Suharto and remains a dominant force in Indonesian politics. Indonesia was a very different nation after 1965. The internal reforms also led to changes in Indonesian foreign relations and regia nal objectives. These changes were key to the eventual movement to East Timorese independence. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SUHARTO

Suharto brought dramatic change to Indonesian foreign policy as well. After 1966 Indonesia developed a moderate approach to its international relations, although it was clearly inclined toward the West and focused most on regional issues. Indonesia maintained a foreign policy that kept it free from potential conflicts between the Soviet Union and the U nited States. Relations were restored with many Western countries; the Malayan Con­ frontation was resolved on August 1 1 , 1966; and in September, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations. Meanwhile Indonesian ties with Beijing were suspended. Then Indonesia joined Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was technically nonaligned but clearly friendly to the West. Yet, Indonesia remained heavily dependent upon Japanese, American, and Western European assistance and private investment. In 1 967 the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia met for the first time to develop

Ch angi ng Global Power Structures, 1990s

23

international economic support, and the United States and Japan provided the start-up donations. The next year the World Bank began loans to Indonesia. U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Indonesia in 1969, and Suharto visited the United States the following year. One common effort transcending the Sukarno and Suharto eras was the ambition to build a state whose territories would extend from the west coast of Sumatra to the eastern border of lrian Jaya. Although territorial claims against Malaysia were dropped in 1966, the western half of the island of New Guinea (Irian J aya) and the former Portuguese Timor were incorporated into Indonesia in pursuit of this goal. Such expansion was not well accepted in the region generally and was met with substantial international criticism, notably from Australia. West New Guinea, as Irian Jaya was then known, 1 8 had been incorpo­ rated into Indonesia on May 1 , 1 963, following a period of United Nations administration of the former Dutch colony. A plebiscite was promised, but before it could be conducted the Free Papua Movement (OPM) became active, and Indonesian forces were instructed to combat it. In reaction to international pressure, Suharto agreed to hold the plebiscite, implemented under Indonesian terms. During the voting, local councils were strongly pressured to approve incorporation into Indonesia, yet, the UN General Assembly approved the outcome of the plebiscite, and in November Irian Jaya b ecame Indonesia's twenty-sixth province. Resistance to Indonesian rule by the OPM continued, though, well after the integration of the province into Indonesia. The ongoing crisis in Irian Jaya, combined with similar resistance move­ ments in Ambon, Aceh, and East Timor, came to dominate an increasingly unstable internal security environment in Indonesia during the 1970s and early 1980s. Indonesian riots in 1974 were followed by arrests and a crack­ down on the press. As previously noted, Indonesia invaded East Timor the following year. International response to the invasion was uncertain and sporadic. Domestically, the invasion was portrayed as an internal security issue . Had the conflict been resolved quickly, any hope of Timorese self­ determination might have been snuffed out; yet the fighting continued and grew increasingly difficult to justify. The following summer, Indonesian troops were sent again into Irian J aya, and the Indonesian military began even more heavy operations in East Timor. The Indonesian operation in East Timor modulated in intensity but remained problematic for years; the resulting combat killed tens if not hundreds of thousands of Timorese and also resulted in significant Indonesian casualties. Internationally, Indonesia worked during the period to build its reputation and increase its involvement in regional issues. Indonesia disagreed with the other ASEAN nations over the response to the 1978 crisis in Cambodia, but its role in the negotiations to end the civil war there in 1988 and 1 989 rein­ forced its importance within the region both at home and abroad.

24

Triumph of Self-Determination

O ver the same period, however, Indonesia's troubles were confounded by growing economic problems. The close control of the national economy exerted by Sukarno had left Indonesia weak; over time Suharto and his close advisers improved the health of the Indonesian economy, but it remained at risk due to heavy d ep end ence on foreign markets and loans. From 1971, in response to pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Suharto placed ever more restrictive controls on the banking system, and in the following year, a rice production crisis led to riots and an economic downturn. The 1974 global oil crisis even hurt oil-exporting Indonesia due to recessions in America and Western Europe. Indonesia erupted in riots that shook the government. As a result Suharto embarked upon a gradual reformation of the Indonesian state to improve economic conditions. The Indonesian economy regained strength during the oil crisis of 1979-1980, but foreign investment in the country began to fall, due to heavy government restric­ tions and high subsidies for state-owned companies. By 1983 the economy had lost its momentum. Indonesia's geostrategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and controlling the Malacca and Sunda Straits, made it vitally important to the security of the United States and its allies. Due to its strategic position astride the most significant maritime chokepoint in the region, the U nited States provided significant military aid and equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. Indonesia has also benefited from American security relation­ ships with other regional states, including Australia and the Philippines. Suharto's authoritarian politics and his attempts to control areas such as East Timor with a heavy hand eventually came u nder criticism not only from other government officials bur, more important, from the international press and supranational bodies such as the United Nations. THE FALL O F T HE BERLIN WALL AND T H E RISE T O PROMINENCE O F SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

As with most states created following the end of World War Two, Indo­ nesia's early years were influenced significantly by the superpower confron­ tation of the Cold War. Both Sukarno and Suharto operated internationally within artificial boundaries established by the superpower orbits of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although Sukarno toyed with communist leanings for a short period following the 1 9 65 coup, Suharto was strongly pro-West and reinforced relations with the United States. He visited Washington in 1970 following President Nixon's visit to Jakarta the previous year. Still, bilateral relations have not been the only method of international cooperation between Indonesia and other states. The United Nations played an important role in the recognition of Indonesia as an independent nation

Ch angi ng Global Power Structures, 1990s

25

and was involved with many of the country's " internal" disputes, such as those p ertaining to Irian Jaya and East Timor. Another k ey to und erstanding Indonesia's approach to international affairs has been the role of ASEAN in the region. From its inception Indonesia was a proud and influential mem­ ber of ASEAN, which normally holds a strict noninterventionist approach to the resolution of issues among its member states. There is value in the view that Indonesia's international relations were most significantly affected during the last half of the twentieth century by the UN, ASEAN, and the superpowers. Although Indonesia was nonaligned formally, it still demonstrated a clear drift toward favored relations with the United States, particularly under Suharto. Except for the immediate period of the 1 965 coup, the U nited States provided military aid to Indonesia every year between 1950 and 1992, when the U .S. Congress cut funding due to Indonesian actions in East Timor. 1 9 This aid not only reinforced ties between the United States and Indonesia but also helped the Indonesian military to retain its very influen­ tial position in Indonesian society. There is even evidence to demonstrate that the United States government knew about the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor and did nothing to prevent it.2° Certainly it was the superpower politics of the time that made the individual rights of the Timorese pale in comparison to the benefits of a strong and anticommunist Indonesia. And in 1975 the United Nations was particularly ineffective; ASEAN, then only eight years old, was never vocal concerning internal disputes. Indonesia still paid no attention to the condemnation of the Security Council later rhe next year. By that time t i had developed the story that the Timorese had actually called for the Indonesian invasion to help restore order. With Indonesian help, the remnants of the pro integration movement were formed into a " Regional Popular Assembly," which quickly called for integration into Indonesia on May 31, 1 976.21 Indonesia certainly acted in part because of the radicalism of the FRETILIN government. In the global politics of the mid-1970s, such actions were not rare. The next decade wit­ nessed little change, either in Timor or within the international context. It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR in the final months of the decade that international power structures b egan to shift, making way for new approaches to the issue of East Timor. After 1989, the new world order had room for condemning Indonesian actions in Timor. The Santa Cruz massacre led to significant worldwide condemnation and, when Indonesia failed to show improvement, eventually to the end of foreign aid and then the 1992 dissolution of the Inter­ Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which had had as its goal rhe impro vement of the Indonesian economy through foreign cooperation . Still, the Suharto regime was so powerful in Jakarta that few expected any change to rake place.

26

Triumph of Self-Determination

THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND THE FALL OF SUHARTO, 1998

The 1 990s saw not only Indonesia's first strong steps as a regional power but also its greatest defeat-the economic collapse of 1997-1998. The countries worst affected by the 1 997-1 998 financial crisis were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand; given the precarious state of the Indonesian economy at the time, the effects of the crisis were devastating. When the full impact of the Asian economic crisis became evident in Indo­ nesia, the Suhano regime scrambled to intervene, but between August 1997 and January 1998, the Indonesian rupee lost 76 percent of its value, and the Indonesian stock market lost nearly 60 percent of its value.22 This downturn established both an economic and a political crisis in Jakarta, which even a $40-million bailout package could not stop, given President Suhano's inability to effect change. Suhano resigned in May 1998, bringing his vice president, B. J . Habibie, to power in a caretaker government pending new national elections. However, the change of leadership in Jakarta was far too swift and Suhano's control too strong to make the transition of power easy. Within weeks of taking office, Habibie, a much weaker yet more emotional man than Suhano, who did not fully comprehend the complex forces within Indonesian society, opened the door to change concerning East Timor when he agreed to consider some son of special autonomy. Habibie was the wrong leader for a period of crisis in Indonesia, but his desperation created a unique opportunity for the Timorese, which was soon bolstered by international support from the United Nations, Portugal, Australia, and the United Kingdom. For over a year following Habibie's statement on East Timor, a "complex web of events, choices made, and hard decisions taken by a range of players"23 produced a diplomatic and media sensation that would, in turn, eventually create conditions for United Nations intervention in East Timor and Timorese independence.

Chapter 3 Developing Consensus : Regional Affairs and the UN

The selection of two East Timorese men as Nobel laureates in 1 996 escalated the stakes of the debate over East Timor's future. The momentous global changes that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1 9 89 and ended with the resignation of Indonesian president Suharto in May 1998 completely reshaped the prospects for the Indonesian region. Throughout the 1990s interested regional powers and the United Nations cooperated to set unique conditions for change, but these efforts still fell far short of ensuring self­ determination in Timor. Still, the a ctivities of the United Nations, Australia, the United States, and, to a lesser degree, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reveal important perspectives on the response to crisis in East Timor. The United Nations interest in East Timor began in 1960, when the General Assembly added "Timor and dependencies" to the areas where Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter applied .1 At the time, Portugal d s i puted the propriety of the United Nations action, but little was done otherwise. Only after the change of the Portuguese government in 1974 did international effons for Timorese self-determination begin to advance. And when Indonesia invaded Timor in 1975 both the Security Council and the General Assembly urged respect for the "territorial integrity of East Timor" and called for an Indonesian withdrawal. In its Resolution 384 of December 22, 1975, the Security Council specifically focused on the rights of the East Timorese to self-determination and condemned the use of force in the area by Indonesia.2 Although the Security Council promised to hold Portugal accountable and to remain involved, the United Nations soon lost any focus on East Timor and demonstrated little influence over the situation in the short term. Annual reaffirmations of the UN's commitment to Timorese self­ determination continued through the end of the decade, but little progress was made on the issues until the early 19 80s, when United Nations-sponsored

28

Triumph of Self-Determination

talks involving Indonesia and Portugal began. Timorese representatives were included in these talks, but little tangible result was evident. In 1995, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, sponsored a new series of talks with more broad representation, called the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). The AIETD was conducted annually in Austria from 1995 to 1998.J For the first time, this dialogue began to produce a softening of attitudes and showed some promise o f eventually delivering an alternative to continued strife in East Timor. In another major contribution to the resolution of the Timorese issue, newly appointed UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated Pakistani Ambassador Jamsheed Marker as his personal representative for East Timor in February 1997. This act not only signaled the growing interest of the United Nations and its new chief in the issues of the province but also engaged one of the most skilled of international diplomats in the effort to resolve the ongoing conflict there. Marker would make significant contribu­ tions throughout his assignment, and Secretary-General Annan would main­ tain a focus on East Timor over the challenging years to come. MODERN EAST TIMOR UNDER INDONESIAN RULE

At the time, East Timor included thirteen districts,4 including the enclave of Oecussi, halfway down the western coast of the island in West Timor terri­ tory, and two offshore islands, Atauro and Jaco, for a total area of some fifteen thousand square kilometers (see map, East Timor and its Districts) . The capital city, Dili, was the largest town b y far, having some one hundred thousand inhabitants. The city of Baucau, some one hundred kilometers east of Dili, was the second largest town in the territory, but with only about twenty-five thousand people. The towns of Viqueque, southwest of Baucau, and Suai, southwest of Dili on the southern coast, were also important centers of nearly twenty thousand inhabitants. But the landmass of East Timor and all activities by any group within it were dominated by the area's mountainous terrain, which was made more difficult to travel through because of a poor system of roads and only three small airports. During the rainy season, the roads were often destroyed by landslides, the rivers swelled to become impassable in areas, and movement around the region became extremely perilous. Such terrain made enforcing security difficult for the Indonesians and the insurgent campaign of FAUNTIL much easier.5 Life in East Timor continued as a sporadic but deadly, intermittent, guerrilla-driven civil war between the TNI forces, who were tasked with providing security in the provinces, and the proindependence militia groups who continued to resist what they saw as an Indonesian occupation of their homeland. John Martinkus, in his book The Dirty Little War, an Eyewitness Account of East Timor's Decent into Hell, 1 997-2000, shows that 1997

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