United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2004 (United Nations Disarmament Yearbook)

Department for Disarmament Affairs New York, 2005 The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK Volume 29: 2004 NOTE The...

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Department for Disarmament Affairs New York, 2005

The United Nations

DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK

Volume 29: 2004

NOTE The United Nations Disarmanzent Yearbook is designed to be a concise reference tool. As a good amount of background information is condensed, it may be helpful to consult previous editions. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices. Web sites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations,research institutes and non-governmental organizations appear as footnotes. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. For the first time since the inception of The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook in 1976, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has produced an electronic version of the publication. The inaugural edition consists of three volumes (27, 28 and 29) covering the years 2002,2003 and 2004, respectively. This initiative responds to the 2003 DDA survey on The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, in which a number of delegations and subscribers expressed a strong interest in making the publication internet accessible, as well as the subsequent request of the General Assembly in resolution 591103 for the 2002 and 2003 books. The Department for DisarmamentAffairs draws your attention to its web site at htp://disamament.un.orgwhere up-to-date information on disarmament issues may be obtained throughout the year. Among the many electronic resources, you will find the departmental database on the status of disarmament and arms regulation agreements, which contains the texts of the treaties and States parties covered in Appendix I of The Yearbook, as well as electronic versions of all the resolutions and decisions covered in TheYearbook.

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.05.IX.1

ISBN 92-1-14225 1-5

Copyright O United Nations, 2005 All rights reserved Printed in United Nations, New York

On 15 October 2004, the UN Postal Administration issued a "Disarmament" stamp in the denomination of 37 cents, designed by the French graphic artist, Michel Granger. During conflict, small arms and light weapons devastate children. The vast majority of casualties are directly attributable to these firearms. In addition to being victims, children have been recruited as child soldiers and taught to handle these lethal weapons, allowing them to be used as instruments of war. The high prevalence of small arms in post-conflict society perpetuates a culture of violence. Some former combatants view the gun as their means to economic survival. In other cases, civilians arm themselves for protection, exposing children to the dangers of weapons at home, resulting in a vicious cycle of crime and violence. Disarmament at the United Nations contributes to the security of the child through UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the United Nations Mine Action Service. The Department for Disarmament Affairs works for advocacy, information and education for balanced military spending, the end of nuclear dangers, a curb on illegal gun trading and the elimination of landmines.

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CONTENTS

The texts of all disarmament resolutions and decisions are contained in Appendix V1. Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

CHAPTER I Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Developments and trends. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues related to NPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues related to the CTBT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Second Joint Ministerial Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conference on Disarmament 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices Negative security assurances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bilateral agreement and other issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Six-Party Talks on DPRK nuclear issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Draft Convention on Nuclear Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IAEA Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Strengthened Safeguards System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Safeguards Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

Other SafeguardsImplements tion Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Nuclear safety and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Application of international safety standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Convention on Nuclear Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

Joint Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Safe transport of nuclear and radioactive material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Nuclear security and prevention of nuclear terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

Physical protection of nuclear material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

Radioactive sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

Low Activity Radioactive Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Radiologicalweapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Missile-related issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in all its Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

Nuclear Suppliers Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Political declarations and other initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Annex I: Resolution 1540 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

CHAPTER I1 Biological and chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Developments and trends 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second Meeting of Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73 73 74 76 76

Second Meeting of States Parties to the B WC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

......................................

78 81

Ninth Session of the Conferenceof States Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . UNMOVIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82 84

Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

Chemical Weapons

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Australia Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

Conventional weapons issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

CHAPTER 111

Developments and Trends. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Small arms and light weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent. Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SAL W in All Its Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures . . . . 104 Assistance to States in curbing the illicit trafficin small arms . . . . . . . . 104

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures 104 The UN Register of Conventional Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Annual report on the Register for the calendar year 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Objective information on military matters. including transparency of military expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

The Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Meetings of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts . . . . . . . . . 108 Anti-personnel mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Nairobi Summit.. First Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 iii

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The Sixth Annual Conferenceof the States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to theCCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Wassenaar Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Annex I: Composite table of replies of Governments for the UN Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 CHAPTER IV

Regional disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Developments and trends. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Conventional Disarmament at Regional Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 AsiaandthePacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 League of Arab States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 General Assembly, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

CHAPTER V

Related issues and approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Recommendations by the High-level Panel on issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Recommendations by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters as its contribution tothe workoftheHigh-levelpanel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Terrorism and disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 Outerspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Conference on Disarmament. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Human rights. human security and disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 Fifty-sixth session of Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Disarmament and Human Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Relationship between disarmament and development . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Gender and disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Multilateralism and disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Arms limitation and disarmament agreements. including verification of compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Annex 1:Recommendations made by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters as its contribution to the work of the High Level Panel . . . . . . . 190 Annex 11:Decision 2004/123 by the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Annex 111:Recommendations by the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development (Part V. SecretaryGeneral ' S Report: A/59/119) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

CHAPTER V1

Institutional aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Developments and trends. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Conference on Disarmament. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Disarmament Commission. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 Disarmament fellowship. training and advisory services. 2004 . . . . 214

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Department for Disarmament Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Regional Centres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

.

General Assembly 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Annex I: Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. 2004 226 Annex II: Agenda items of the General Assembly as allocated to the First Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

CHAPTER V11 Studies. education and information . . . . . . . . . . 231 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 Disarmament studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 Studies completed in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 Studies in progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Studies mandated in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 DDA Implementation of the recommendations of the 2002 UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (DNP) . . . . . . . . . 234

Implementation of the recommendations by the United Nations and other international organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 Implementation of the recommendations by non-governmental organizations 239 United Nations Disarmament Information Programme . . . . . . . . . . . 240 E-andprintpublications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 DDA panels. NGO symposia. exhibits and special events . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Activities of the Secretary-General'sMessenger of Peace . . . . . . . . . . . 245 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) . . . . 245 General Assembly. 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 Annex I: Composition of the Group of GovernmentalExperts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Annex 11: Composition of the Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in All its Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 Annex III: Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and telecommunications in the context of

international security (first session)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Annex

Publications and other materials of the Department for Disarmament Affairs or produced in collaboration with the Department and its regional centres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

Annex V: UNIDIR Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Annex Vk List of symposia and panels sponsored by DDA . . . . . . . . . . 254

APPENDIX I Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 APPENDIX I1 Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316

APPENDIX I11 An Appeal of the States Parties to Amended Protocol I1 to the CCW on the Occasion of the Sixth Annual Conference 326

APPENDIX IV Report of Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

APPENDIX V Towards a Mine-Free World: The 2004 Nairobi Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 APPENDIX V1 Texts of disarmament resolutions and decisions 336 APPENDIX V11 Voting patterns of resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 2004 . . . . . 420 APPENDIX V111 Table of Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 1 APPENDIX IX Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463 APPENDIX X List of reports and notes of the Secretary-General 469

APPENDIX XI Abbreviations and acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 vii


As is customary, this latest edition of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook objectively charts and records not only arms control successes, but also failures and disappointments. For a number of years the latter category has been much in evidence. Indeed, despite continuing efforts, 2004 revealed no signs of a breakthrough in the continuing impasse that has prevented any chance of substantive progress in important United Nations fora - most notably, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. By virtue of its very detailed nature, however, the Yearbook also bears eloquent testimony to the impressive level of effort and energy that the international community devotes to the task of disarmament and arms control. The commitment by Member States to that task does not waver and it is perhaps in the small, daily incremental steps that we need to see the true effectiveness of the global efforts in disarmament. The perhaps fragile seeds of future progress are therefore surely contained within these pages. It is our duty to identify and nurture them. The year began in a mood of unexpected but very real optimism generated by Libya's decision, in December 2003, to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. It immediately became the task of the OPCW and the IAEA to provide the long-term monitoring and assistance capability. By its example, Libya demonstrated that it is possible to undertake a transparent and cooperative process thereby restoring international trust and confidence with all the political and economic benefits that can then ensue. During 2004, the threat of WMD proliferation was addressed with increasing attention and urgency, particularly in relation to the possibility of WMD and related materials falling into the hands of terrorists. These efforts received their most significant boost when, on 28 April, the Security Council adopted resolution 1540, an instruction to Member States that they must legislate nationally to introduce effective controls on nuclear, biological and chemical weapon's proliferation-sensitive items and their means of delivery. The resolution was adopted under Chapter V11 of the United Nations Charter, leaving open the potential use of enforcement measures by the Council against States failing to comply with this instruction. The year also closed on a high note with the publication of the report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change and its detailed prescriptions for enhancing international security. Nevertheless, the long-standing argument among States regarding the balance between disarmament and non-proliferation continued to

characterize - and hinder - progress in other areas. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, States parties reaffirmed that the NPT remained the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. However, the persistence of divergent views prevented the Committee from reaching agreement on substantive recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference - developments which obviously cast a shadow on prospects for a successful outcome. The second Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the CTBT appealed to all States to maximize their efforts towards the early entry into force of the Treaty. While work continued on establishing the Treaty's verification system, little progress was registered in securing the ratifications by the 11 States still needed for its entry into force. International pressure was maintained for the adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a global standard of nuclear verification and met with a largely positive response. In addition, the pace and scope of the Agency's nuclear security-related activities, aimed at helping States prevent, detect and respond to terrorist or other malicious acts, continued to accelerate and expand. The issue of WMD proliferation, in particular in the nuclear area, continued to figure prominently, with special concern expressed about the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the clandestine nuclear technology and information network of A.Q. Khan. Various initiatives by the international community sought to address these concerns, in particular the renewed interest in proposals for limiting civil uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing capabilities on a worldwide basis. Elsewhere, the introduction of a new resolution on the Hague Code of Conduct manifested the increased concerns of the international community at the threat posed by the proliferation of missiles. For its part, the Australia Group stepped up its efforts in preventing chemical and biological weapons proliferation, including to non-State actors. In 2004, multilateral efforts towards the total elimination of biological and chemical weapons were also maintained. There was a successful second Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and further progress was also achieved in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, particularly chemical weapons disarmament. With the focus on the WMD threat, it can easily be forgotten that matters relating to the regulation and reduction of conventional arms and armed

forces have been on the Organization's disarmament agenda since its inception. Despite the fact that much progress has been made by the international community to address the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) following the adoption, in 200 1, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in A11 Its Aspects (PoA), the proliferation of small arms continues to pose a serious threat to peace and security in too many regions of the world. The year saw the start of multilateral negotiations on tracing illicit SALW as well as the beginning of consultations on curbing illicit brokering. Through the adoption of several resolutions, the General Assembly continued to recognize the indispensable role of regional and subregional initiatives in promoting confidence-building as well as disarmament measures to enhance regional security. The First Review Conference of the Mine-Ban Convention took place in Nairobi. The meeting reviewed progress on implementation and adopted a detailed Action Plan addressing the challenges for the coming years. The pursuit of universal adherence remains a priority for the international community as part of its unwavering commitment to achieving a world free from anti-personnel mines in which such weapons will claim no new victims. There were some very notable successes in 2004 which may have a lasting and beneficial impact. The 'Libyan model' of disarmament offers proof that proliferation can be effectively and quickly reversed once a critical political decision has been made. The creation of the 1540 Committee within the United Nations presents an opportunity for the Organization to play a key part in implementing innovative measures to combat the possible terrorist use of WMD. The challenge we presently face has never been greater, more varied or in many respects more dangerous. It will demand a shared level of commitment, innovative thinking and practical action on the part of all Member States if we are to prove ourselves equal to that challenge.

NOBUYASUABE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS


The Yearbook was produced under the general direction of the UnderSecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Nobuyasu Abe, as well as the Director of the Department, Hannelore Hoppe. Thanks go to the following writers and contributors: Kerstin Bihlmaier, Michael Cassandra, Daiana Cipollone, Francesc Claret, Amanda Cowl, Merav Datan, Annette Ekberg, Antonio Evora, Ivor Fung, Pericles Gasparini Alves, Tonya Hennessy, Tsutomu Ishiguri, Nazir Kamal, Soo-Hyun Kim, Peter Kolarov, Patrick Lamb, Robert Leeder, Tamara Malinova, Valere Mantels, Pamela Maponga, Agnks Marcaillou, Thomas Markrarn, Tak Mashiko, Silvia Mercogliano, Bantan Nugroho, Myrna PeAa, Curtis Raynold, Richard Lennane, Nikolai Rogosaroff, Enrique Roman-Morey, Henning Soegaard, Asa Theander, Carolin Thielking, Rafael Loza, Predrag Vasic, Chen Wang and Jerzy Zaleski. Special thanks go to the core team: Joanna Panepinto for written contributions, research assistance and language editing and Elizabeth Scaffidi for desktop publishing and web conversion. The electronic version of the Disarmament Yearbook was produced by the Department for Disarmament Affairs, New York with the assistance of Lynne Price, President, Text Structure Consulting, Inc.

Xiaoyu Wang

EditorKoordinator New York, August 2005

xiii


CHAPTER I

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation "Since the horrors of nuclear weapons were revealed, their elimination has been a high priority of the international community. And from the time of its inception, the United Nations has worked untiringly for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The goal of a nuclear weapons free world is still a long way off While there has been progress in disarmament, especially since the end of the cold war, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in arsenals around the world, and there have been worrying indications that efforts are under way to develop new types of nuclear weapons. The continued existence of nuclear stockpiles leaves the shadow of nuclear war hanging over our world - particularly given the existence of clandestine networks dealing in nuclear materials and the prospect of terrorists with extreme ambitions gaining access to these materials. "

'

KOFI ANNAN, UNITEDNATIONS SECRETARY -GENERAL

Introduction NUCLEARDISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION HAVE BEEN PRIORITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE and security agenda for a long time. Discussions and negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation both within and outside the United Nations have led to the conclusion of a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements. Unilateral initiatives as well have been taken to cut down nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Efforts have even led to the prohibition of nuclear weapons from certain environments and regions called nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) . Finally, international norms have been established to prevent the proliferation and the testing of nuclear weapons. At the bilateral level, the Russian Federation and the United States have signed a number of agreements concerning their nuclear arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed on 31 July 1991, provided for a reduction of their strategic arsenals to no more than 6,000 Message at the Peace Memorial Ceremony, Hiroshima. 6 August 2004, available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm944l .doc.htm.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004

nuclear warheads each, over seven years. By December 2001, the parties had completed reductions to the level required under START I. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 11), signed on 3 January 1993, would have further reduced the parties' strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 each. Further progress in the START process was linked to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), which, for decades, had been regarded and reaffirmed as the cornerstone of international stability and security. The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002. Subsequently, the Russian Federation declared that it was no longer bound by its obligation under the Treaty. A new strategic relationship established between the parties in 2002 superseded START I1 and led to the conclusion of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), or the Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 2003. The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), was extended indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. It is considered the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, NPT States parties adopted by consensus a Final Document containing numerous agreements and undertakings. Those measures aim to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty's provisions and achieve its universality as well as improving the effectiveness of its strengthened review process. The Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference held its first session in 2002, its second in 2003 and its third in 2004. Throughout the review process, States parties reaffirmed that the NPT rested on three pillars - non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The safeguards system provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an essential part of the non-proliferation regime and was bolstered by the 1997 Additional Protocol, which granted the Agency wider scope in inspecting nuclear facilities. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, after more than 40 years of efforts by the international community to ban nuclear test explosions in all environments. Under its provisions, the Treaty will enter into force when the 44 States that possess nuclear ower or research reactors listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have ratified it.' In 1999, 2001 and 2003 respectively, Conferences to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT were convened by the SecretaryAt the end of 2004, l1 of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty had not yet ratified it.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues

General of the United Nations in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty. The Conferences adopted Final Declarations which called upon the States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, especially those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force. Pending entry into force, States parties were called upon to maintain their moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Conference on Disarmament (the Conference) has been unable to commence its substantive work since 1998 due to persistent divergences of positions with regard to priorities for disarmament negotiations. Despite the proposals and initiatives made by its Member States and the numerous consultations undertaken by its presidents to break the stalemate, the Conference again failed to reach agreement on a substantive programme of work. This chapter deals with a wide range of issues relating to developments within the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that occurred during 2004.

Developments and trends, 2004 The issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation continued to be a major concern of the international community. The Conference on Disarmament was again unable to commence substantive work despite continuous efforts on the part of its Member States. The CTBT continued to lack the ratifications required for its entry into force. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference concern was expressed by a number of States parties over the slow progress in nuclear disarmament as well as the possible development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, while the issue of compliance with non-proliferation obligations was regarded as the priority by other States parties. The importance of universality of the Treaty was also emphasized. The announcement in 2003 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from the NPT remained a concern of the international community, with views diverging on its status in relation to the Treaty. The issue of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran also continued to be a concern of the international community. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held extensive discussions with Iran on safeguards issues and carried out a range of verification activities in the context of its NPT safeguards agreement. As a result, by late 2004 the Agency had gained a broad understanding of Iran's past undeclared activities, but was not yet in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.


Following the announcement by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in December 2003 of its decision to eliminate materials, equipment and programmes that might be used to produce internationally banned weapons, and its intention to fulfil all obligations under weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation regimes, Libya ratified the CTBT in January and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol in March 2004. Throughout the year, the IAEA carried out verification activities which confirmed that Libya had pursued a clandestine programme of uranium conversion and enrichment. Further investigations were ongoing at the end of 2004 in order to verify the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1546 (2004) which reaffirmed its intention to revisit the IAEA mandate in Iraq. The Agency maintained a core team with the necessary competence to fulfil this mandate. In February, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of Pakistan's nuclear programme, admitted to having shared nuclear technology and information through a clandestine international network. The discovery of the Khan network highlighted growing international concerns about the risks of WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, including the risks of terrorist access to those weapons. In response to such concerns, in April the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 (2004) calling on all States to adopt and implement effective measures, including export controls, to prevent non-State access to WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at interdicting transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials and launched by the United States with eleven participating States in 2003, had more than 60 participating States at its first anniversary. PSI training exercises were conducted throughout 2004. In February, the United States proposed seven new steps to help combat the development and spread of WMD. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters deliberated on the issue of terrorism, WMD and their delivery systems, and made several recommendations in its report to the Secretary-General.3 The Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, appointed by him in 2003, presented its report entitled A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, on 2 ~ e c e m b e rThe . ~ report stressed the interrelated nature of threats and proposed over 100 recommendations to help the world face the new and evolving threats identified and to strengthen the United Nations. Several of those recommendations were related to disarmament and non-proliferation. See chapter VI, section on the Advisory Board. AI591565, available from http://www.un.org/secureworld.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferationissues

Issues related to NPT

Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference The Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) convened its third session in New York from 26 April to 7 May. At the session the Committee elected Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia) as chairman of the third session. Participants included 123 States parties, five specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations. Representatives of 69 non-governmental organizations attended the third session of the Preparatory Committee as observers. The Third Session was tasked to produce recommendations and finalise arrangements for the 2005 Conference, such as the rules of procedure, background documentation and agenda. However, the issue of whether the review and discussions in 2005 should be framed in terms of the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference dominated deliberations. As a result there was no agreement on any substantive recommendations as well as no agreement on the agenda or background documentation. The final report adopted on 7 May therefore contained only minimal agreements on procedural matters to enable the 2005 Review Conference to take place. Substantive work The Committee held 30 meetings devoted to the substantive discussion of item 6 of its agenda5 namely, preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. The Preparatory Committee held a general exchange of views on issues related to all aspects of its work during which 55 statements were made.

NPT/CONF.2005/1, para.18. This and all subsequent documents of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference are available from http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html. NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/SR. 1-3 and 5, available from the web site of the Official Document System of the United Nations, http:l/ods.un.org.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook:2004 During the substantive discussions, the Committee considered the following three clusters and three specific blocs of issues. States parties put forward documents and proposals in which they reviewed developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and outlined measures for further action. Clusters

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security States parties reaffirmed that the NPT was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They reaffirmed the best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was through universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all States parties with its provisions. States parties also reaffirmed that effective implementation of the Treaty was vital for maintaining its validity and integrity. A number of States parties noted with grave concern the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to international peace and security. Some States parties also warned that the failure to address and resolve instances of non-compliance would directly undermine the credibility of the Treaty. The United States submitted a document on "the contemporary crisis of compliance," in which it stated that the agreement on non-proliferation principles in the NPT incorporated an understanding that the States should be entitled to cooperate to obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and research, but they may do so only if they complied with the provisions of the Treaty on preventing the misuse of such technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. France submitted a working paper on 'strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regimew8in which it proposed the strengthening and universalizing of the rules for sensitive equipment, that new guarantees be given to States in good standing and that action be taken to prevent new breaches of confidence. Germany submitted a workin paper on 'Strengthening the NPT against withdrawal and non-compliance"' as a follow-up to its suggestion made at the second session on the subject. In the working paper, Germany proposed that the Review Conference look for an agreement on the rules and procedures to be observed in case a State party intended to withdraw from the

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues Treaty. France, in its working paper, expressed its views that a State that withdrew from the NPT remained responsible for violations committed while still a party to the Treaty; a withdrawing State should no longer make use of all nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies acquired in a third country before its withdrawal; and inter-Governmental agreements setting the framework for sensitive or major nuclear transfers should include a clause forbidding the use of the transferred nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies in case of a withdrawal.'' The United States noted the proposal made by its President in February 2004 on creating a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus intensively on safeguards and verification which would strengthen the IAEA's capability to enforce compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

Concern was expressed over the continued retention of a nuclear weapons option by the States that remained outside the NPT. A number of non nuclear weapon States (NNWS) cautioned against research and development of new types of nuclear weapons. The possibility of terrorists or non-State actors acquiring nuclear weapons and materials was mentioned as a threat that would undermine the NPT regime. Some States parties stressed the importance of the Security Council as an international body with enforcement powers and expressed support for Security Council resolution 1540 on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The Global Partnership Initiative of the Group of 8 (G8), the PSI and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) were discussed as measures taken voluntarily in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts outside the NPT. While some States parties expressed their support for those initiatives, others noted the need for a cautious approach to them.

Security assurances NAM expressed support for a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances by the nuclear weapon States (NWS) to the NNWS as a matter of priority and called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on the issue at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. It also underlined that the third session of the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the issue of security assurances, given that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference mandated the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on the issue to the 2005 Review Conference. Switzerland l0

See footnote 14.


noted that the security assurances provided outside the NPT were not satisfactory and stressed that NNWS parties to the NPT had a legitimate right to legally-binding security assurances from the NWS. NAC called upon the NWS to respect fully their existing commitments on security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally-binding security assurances for all NNW States parties, which could either be in the form of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT, or as a protocol to the Treaty. China submitted a working paper on security assurances1 which contained proposals for the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference on this subject. They included no first use of nuclear weapons or no threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS; a diminished role for nuclear weapons in national security strategies; support of the NWS for nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ); and the reestablishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament. The Republic of Korea stressed that only the NNW States parties complying fully with their obligations under the NPT had a legitimate right to credible and reliable negative security assurances from the NWS. (b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-freezones

General support was expressed for the concept of NWFZs established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security was recognized. A number of States parties welcomed the progress made so far in concluding an agreement to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan submitted a' working paper proposing elements on the subject to be included in the report of the Preparatory committee.12 The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Member States submitted a working paper on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, l in which the Association reported that it had been holding direct consultations with the NWS on their terms of accession to the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Mexico stated that it would continue to promote cooperation and exchange of information among the Member States of the existing NWFZs with the eventual holding of a conference of States parties and signatories of the NWFZ treaties.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues The NWS were urged to conclude protocols to respective NWFZ treaties. In that regard, NAM stressed that the NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of NWFZs.

Safeguards States parties stressed the need for the universalization of strengthened IAEA safeguards. In that connection, they urged the 44 States that had not yet concluded any safeguards agreements with the IAEA to do so without delay. Australia stated that the revelations of previously undeclared nuclear programmes in Libya and Iran clearly showed that comprehensive IAEA safeguards were not sufficient to prevent proliferating States covertly acquiring sensitive nuclear materials and technology, and that there should be no question of the urgency of universal application of the strengthened IAEA safeguards system. The United States recalled the steps outlined by its President to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which included universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and making signature of the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply by the end of 2005. The announcement by the EU that the Additional Protocols of all its Member States were entering into force was welcomed. The NWS were urged to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. NAM reaffirmed its view that the IAEA was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article 111, paragraph 1 of the NPT. Further, they believed that States parties that had concerns regarding non-compliance by other States parties with their safeguards agreements should direct such concerns to the IAEA for action in accordance with its mandate. States parties welcomed the completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards by the IAEA. Some States parties recognized that the strengthened safeguards system, comprised of safeguards arrangements as contained in INFCIRCl153 (comprehensive safeguards agreements) and the Additional Protocol, should be a condition for new nuclear supply arrangements to NNWS and verification standards. Canada urged the Preparatory Committee to recommend that the 2005 NPT Review Conference take a decision that the Additional Protocol be mandatory under Article I11 of the Treaty.


Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol in December 2003 and its announcement that the State would act as if it had ratified the Protocol pending its actual ratification were welcomed. The announcement by Libya of its decision to sign the Additional Protocol was also welcomed.

Export controls The role of export controls in preventing proliferation was discussed. The United States underlined that in order to fulfil Article I obligations, the NWS must have in place comprehensive and effective export controls and must protect sensitive nuclear weapons information, facilities and material. Germany submitted a working paper on export controls1* and stressed the need for defining a minimum standard of export controls which addressed the question of "dual-use" items as well and proposed an active role for the IAEA in enhancing nuclear export controls as required by Article 111.

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformitywith Articles I and II States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right of the States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well as Article IV of the NPT which provided a framework for cooperation in that area. At the same time, some States parties reiterated that such a right must be in conformity with obligations under Articles I, I1 and I11 of the Treaty. Some also expressed support for strengthening control over the export and transfer of nuclear material and technology in view of the revelation of illicit trade and trafficking of such material, technology and equipment. Switzerland, in that connection, noted that a fair balance had to be struck between rules to avoid misuse of nuclear energy and technology and the risk of unjustified discrimination against NNWS that had demonstrated excellent nonproliferation credentials. The United Kingdom recalled its proposal of February 2004 that States parties that had failed to comply with their safeguards obligations should forfeit the right to access to some of the benefits of peaceful uses. Brazil expressed concern over the risk that new restrictions on nuclear research and development would be decided and enforced by small groups of like-minded nations or even unilaterally and stressed the importance of differentiating between States in good standing in


the matter and would-be proliferators and respecting the legitimate scientific andlor commercial interests of developing nations. Some States parties underscored the role of nuclear technology and science in sustainable development, health and human security. States parties commended the work of the IAEA in implementing its Technical Cooperation Programme. They stressed the importance of ensuring that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund received sufficient financing. The IAEA gave the Preparatory Committee an overview of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. China submitted a working paper on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,' which put forward possible recommendations from the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference on the subject. Specific blocs

(a) Implementation of Article V .of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament ", as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfthpreambular paragraphs ", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A number of NNWS continued to express their disappointment over the slow progress made in implementing the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article V1 of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament", as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. These practical steps were considered a strong basis for progress in the field of nuclear disarmament by many. NAM, Austria and Switzerland called on the NWS to reaffirm and fully implement the unequivocal undertaking through accelerated, progressive and full implementation of all the practical steps. Some States parties recognized the nuclear disarmament measures taken so far. The EU encouraged further progress towards systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament. NAM underscored that indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply the indefinite possession by the NWS of their nuclear weapons arsenals and that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. NAC stressed the need for the NWS to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and formalize their unilateral


declarations into legal instruments including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility. l6 The NWS reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament and noted the progress that had been made in nuclear disarmament. They respectively presented the measures taken in reducing their nuclear weapons arsenals. China presented its basic positions and policies on nuclear disarmament. France reported on its efforts in reducing its nuclear arsenal and delivery vehicles as well as dismantling its nuclear testing sites. Russia presented the nuclear disarmament measures it had taken both unilaterally and through bilateral agreements. The United States presented a record of its compliance with Article VI. The United Kingdom submitted the second interim report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components. l 7 While many States parties and the EU welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, they called upon the United States and Russia to make the Treaty reductions irreversible and verifiable. A number of States parties stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT and called upon all States that had not yet signed and ratified the Treaty, particularly the 12 States whose ratification was required for its entry into force, to do so without delay and unconditionally. At the same time, they urged all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which were contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The United States was urged to change its position on the Treaty. States parties called for the immediate commencement of a negotiation on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material (FMCT) for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Until a cut-off treaty entered into force, all relevant States were urged to uphold or declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material destined for nuclear weapons. NAC called for an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament. NAM stressed the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specific time frame, and thus the importance of establishing a subsidiary body in the Conference with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament as the highest priority. A number of States parties, including Canada and the EU members, underlined the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to


nuclear disarmament. NAC called for irreversible destruction (rather than storage) of non-deployed nuclear warheads, as well as closing and dismantling of nuclear test sites. It was stressed that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures.18 The NWS were urged to take further measures to de-alert and de-activate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of those weapons. Many NNWS expressed concern over strategic and military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons, on the possibility of pre-emptive use of such weapons and on the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons which would lower the nuclear threshold and undermine disarmament commitments. Reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons were considered by Austria, Sweden, Ukraine, NAC and the EU to be an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process which should be given priority. Canada and the EU encouraged all States concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest reductions in these weapons. NAC called for achievement of further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons.lg While the progress made in the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the United States and Russia in 1991 and 1992 was welcomed, the NAC called upon the two States to preserve, reaffirm and formalize the Initiatives into a legallybinding agreement, ensuring the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verification. The United States and Russia pointed to the progress that had been made in reducing their non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals. Russia reported that it had practically completed all its initiatives concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons reductions, except for elimination of its army's nuclear munitions. Austria, Sweden and Ukraine submitted a working paper on "reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".20 The paper proposed specific recommendations to be made on this subject by the PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The issue of regular reporting on the implementation of Article V1 as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference was also discussed by a number of States parties. NNWS underscored the importance of regular reporting in enhancing transparency and accountability in the l8 NPTlCONF.20051 PC.IIIl11. l9 Ibid., p. 4. 20

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP. 13.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Treaty's implementation as well as in confidence-building. Many considered reporting as an obligation and that reports should be submitted to each Preparatory Commission and Review Conference. As for the contents of the reports, many concurred that they should address policies and provide comprehensive and specific information on measures taken in nuclear disarmament. The responsibility of the NWS to submit reports was underlined and the information already made available by the NWS was welcomed. Canada, however, noted that it would be desirable to receive information from the NWS on their nuclear arsenals (both strategic and non-strategic), operational status, and policy and doctrine, preferably in the form of a formal report." In its working paper, Canada provided ideas to improve the reporting with a view to taking a decision at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East ", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference "

The Arab Group stated that the 2005 NPT Review Conference must stress the importance of Israel's ratification of the NPT as a first step towards the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. In that regard, Canada appealed to all States in the region to further contribute to regional stability and security and demonstrate greater openness and transparency by concluding Additional Protocols to their respective safeguards agreements. Australia urged the States in the Middle East that had not signed or ratified the NPT, the CTBT, the BWC and the CWC to do so without delay. The United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to moving the Middle East peace process forward and stated that the roadmap still described the best route to peace. In its working paper,22the Arab Group recalled that the resolution on the Middle East constituted an inseparable part of the NPT review process and thus it must be accorded due attention and sufficient time for discussion and the submission of recommendations regarding it from the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 Review Conference. Some States parties welcomed the signature by Iran of the IAEA Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and called for its early ratification.


Some other States parties expressed concern over the remaining issues regarding IAEA verification of Iran's nuclear programme and called upon the latter to fully cooperate with the Agency. Iran stated that it had been vigilant regarding compliance with its obligations under Article I1 and non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Iran also noted that it had embarked on a programme of cooperation with the IAEA on the basis of full transparency and that it was provisionally implementing the Additional Protocol, undergoing intensive rounds of inspections and complementary access to different sites inside the country. States parties welcomed the decision by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its WMD programme and ratify the CTBT and the CWC. States parties called on the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and reverse its announced withdrawal from the NPT. They expressed support for the Six Party Talks as the best prospect for establishing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. States parties called on India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as NNWS and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and conclude Additional Protocols. They welcomed the continuing moratoria of India and Pakistan on nuclear testing and called on them to sign and ratify the CTBT and to continue their mutual confidence-building measures.

(c) Safety and security ofpeaceful nuclear programmes The increased risk of nuclear weapons, technology and material falling into the hands of terrorists and the possibility of terrorists attacking nuclear facilities were underscored. The importance of enhancing physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, as well as national measures to protect sensitive technology and material, including export controls, was stressed. States parties underscored the importance of ensuring that peaceful nuclear activities were carried out in accordance with the highest international safety and security standards. States parties commended the contribution of the IAEA in the area of nuclear security and safety. Germany, in its working paper,23noting the continuing risk of non-State actors acquiring nuclear material, expressed its view that it was necessary for the States parties to adopt a set of mutually reinforcing measures to enhance the security of existing stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. To that end, it suggested that the 2005 Review Conference should give an impetus to the elaboration and establishment of such measures like a data


exchange of existing stocks and a legally-binding universal standard for physical protection of nuclear material. The Conference should also urge the elimination of all (surplus) stocks and recommend the cessation of the production of weapons usable material. The EU reaffirmed the importance of the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes and recognized the work done for the disposition of weapons origin material in the United States and the Russian Federation, including the verification of the disposition by the IAEA. Switzerland, on behalf of several countries, submitted a working paper on "Plutonium Management Group: Activities since the 2000 NPT Review ~ o n f e r e n c e . "In~ ~the paper, the States parties participating in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRCl549) reviewed their activities since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and suggested that the 2005 NPT Review Conference should encourage all other States who separate, hold, process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those adopted by the participants in the Guidelines. States parties called on the States that had not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). They also urged all IAEA Member States to accelerate final negotiations on an amendment to strengthen the CPPNM and support a diplomatic conference by the end of 2004. States parties welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations on the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its adoption by the IAEA General Conference. They also welcomed the progress made in the improvement of IAEA safety standards and their application. NAM stressed the importance of GA resolution 58/60 on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes and called upon States to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States. NAM also called for effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means to enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories. States parties also called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as part of the non-proliferation regime, in light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, States 24 NPT/CONF.2005/PC.IIINVPP 10. Working paper submitted by Switzerland, on behalf of Belgium, China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

Nuclear disarmament a n d non-proliferation issues

parties expressed support for the IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism. Russia announced that the first phase of its initiative put forward at the Millennium Summit to develop proliferation resistant nuclear technologies had been successfully implemented within the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) under the IAEA auspices, and called upon all the States parties to join the project in full scale. The IAEA made a presentation on the enhanced physical protection measures and the Agency's Plan of Action for Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. Procedural issues On the issue of the status of the DPRK, the Chairman made a statementz5 informing the meeting that as a result of his consultations on the issue, he would retain the nameplate of DPRK temporarily in his custody. The Committee took note of the statement. The Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the Conference and agreed to recommend them to the Conference. At the session, the Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference. The Committee agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, i.e., the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee (Indonesia); Main Committee I1 should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, i.e., the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (Hungary) ; and that Main Committee 111 should

25 "I would like to refer to some aspects of my consultations prior to this session, which I carried out in accordance with the mandate given to the Chairpersons of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My consultations revealed, inter alia,the continuation of divergent views on the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the NPT. The consultations also revealed that States Parties were ready to uphold, in this regard, the procedure applied by my predecessor, Ambassador Laszlo Molnar. Accordingly, it is the intention of the Chair, under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of the said country temporarily in his custody. The Chair has therefore asked the Secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference room for the duration of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. This is in no way meant to prejudice the outcome of ongoing consultations on this issue."

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 be chaired by a representative of the Western Group, i.e., the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Sweden). The Committee also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States. The Committee authorized its Bureau and the President-Elect to handle technical and other organizational matters, as well as to carry out consultations with States parties in the period before the Conference. It also decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Conference. The Committee agreed to the schedule for the division of costs. The schedule for the division of costs is contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure as reflected in annex 111 to the final report of the Preparatory Committee. The Committee decided to defer the consideration of final document (S) of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to the Review Conference. Despite the efforts of the States parties, the Preparatory Committee was unable to reach agreement on the provisional agenda of the Review Conference, background documentation and substantive recommendations for the Conference. The Preparatory Committee adopted its final report at its last meeting, on 7 May 2004.

Issues related to the CTBT Second Joint Ministerial Statement On 23 September, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands launched the second Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the United Nations. Ministers from 66 countries associated themselves with the Joint statementz6 In the Statement, the Ministers reaffirmed their support for the Treaty, which they maintained would rid the world of nuclear weapon test explosions and contribute to the systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Statement emphasized the essential role the Treaty could play in strengthening global peace and security as well as its contribution towards preventing the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that could be used for nuclear weapons. 26 A/59/550. This and all subsequent General Assembly documents are available from http://www.un.org/documents.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues The Statement further welcomed the fact that a total of 172 States had signed the Treaty and that 115 States had ratified it. The Ministers called upon the States that had not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force. They also called upon all States to continue a moratorium on nuclearweapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions; welcomed the progress that had been made in establishing the verification system and underlined their continued support for its completion and operation in the most efficient and cost-effective way as well as the promotion of technical cooperation to enhance verification capabilities under the Treaty. The Ministers appealed to all States to maximize their efforts to achieve a major step towards the Treaty's early entry-into-force.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty (CTBTO) On 21 October, in his statement to the General Assembly under the agenda item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Wolfgang Hoffman, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, reported on its activities. He concluded that eight years after its opening for signature, the CTBT was enjoying growing support and recognition by the international community as an important instrument in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He noted that since its adoption in 1996, the CTBT had been signed by 173 States and ratified by 119, including 33 of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty whose ratification was required for its entry into force. He reported steady progress in the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the worldwide network comprising 32 1 seismic, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories. Since over 55 per cent of the stations were operational, he was confident that the IMS could be completed within the next three to four years. He added that the current phase of testing and evaluation of the monitoring system showed promising results and that the system had already provided global coverage. He underlined that IMS stations were already transmitting raw data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna through the satellite-based Global Communications Infrastructure which connects the IDC to the 82 already established National Data Centres (NDCs) of States, and that the development of the draft On-site Inspection Manual continued to be a key task of the Preparatory Commission. "

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 He presented an overview of the activities of the Provisional Secretariat of the Prep Com in 2004, including training courses for IMS station operators and the organization of international cooperation workshops as measures to enhance support for, and further participation in, the work of the Preparatory Commission. The Executive Secretary, taking into account the role assigned to the CTBT in the disarmament-related chapter of the Millennium Declaration, indicated that ratifying States of the CTBT might use the opportunity to hold the forthcoming CTBT Article XIV Conference in 2005 at the same time as the General Assembly deliberations on the Millennium Declaration. On 22 October, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization." 27 For the discussion and the voting, see the General Assembly section of this chapter. Conference on Disarmament 2004

Nuclear disarmament In 2004, the Conference on Disarmament once again could not adopt a programme of work. Consequently, it did not establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The issue of nuclear disarmament was therefore addressed in its plenary meetings. With a view to the upcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, several references were made to the outcomes of previous NPT Review Conferences and, in particular, to the " 13 practical steps" for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Concerns related to the proliferation of WMD, in particular nuclear weapons and related technologies, both to States and non-state actors remained high on the Conference's agenda. The importance of the Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) was underscored on several occasions. The proposal on the programme of work by five former Presidents of the Conference (the so-called A5 Proposal) was considered, as was the case last year, by many delegations as the preferred basis for a programme of While the Non-Aligned Movement continued to give the highest priority to nuclear disarmament?' the Western Group underscored the importance of

27

A/RES/59/6.

CDl1693, 23 January 2003. This and all subsequent documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are available from http://disarmament. un.org/cd. 29 CDlPV.941 (20 January 2004). 28

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferationissues negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). China continued to emphasize the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).~' In the same context, Pakistan noted that the A5 proposal contained four items which had to be addressed (FMCT, -nuclear disarmament, PAROS and negative security assurances) .3 A view was expressed that issues such as WMD proliferation including the double standard in the perception of such weapons, the traffic in fissile material, obstacles concerning the establishment of NWFZs as well as the growing menace of terrorism and WMD required the immediate attention of the Conference on is armament.^' Libya's decision to ratify the CTBT was widely welcomed, as was Iran's signature, on 18 December 2003, of the IAEA Additional Protocol to its Safeguards ~ g r e e m e n.33 t Iran considered nuclear disarmament to be a priority of the Conference on Disarmament and noted that no progress had been made in that field, particularly the implementation of the thirteen steps adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Moreover, it questioned the value of current unilateral and bilateral initiatives to reduce nuclear weapons as they lacked international verification measures and could be reversed at any time. Furthermore, it defended its own right of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. 34 Several Arab countries recalled the pledges made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to make progress towards the complete dismantlement of their nuclear arsenals. Those pledges have yet to be implemented and the results of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the seventh NPT Review Conference were hardly e n c ~ u r a g i n gThe . ~ ~ Arab Group attached great importance to disarmament issues, particularly nuclear disarmament, out of a sincere desire to create security, stability and peace at the international and regional levels.36 The Group underscored that over the past three decades, t h e Arab States had adopted clear policies on disarmament, ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and launched several initiatives to rid the Middle East region of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, including the setting up of a committee CDlPV.946 (12 February 2004) CDlPV.962 (29 July 2004). CDlPV.944 (29 January 2004). CDlPV.941, op. cit., p. 3. CDlPV.944, op. cit., pp. 2-5. CDlPV.958 (3 June 2004). Ibid., p. 6.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 of government experts in the League of Arab States to prepare a draft treaty to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The Group believed that, in the light of the situation in the Middle East, it was now more important than ever for the international community to consider adopting effective and practical alternatives to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass d e s t r ~ c t i o nIn . ~that ~ regard, Syria recalled that on behalf of the Arab Group it had presented an initiative to the Security Council in April 2003 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle ~ a s t . ~ ~ The United States suggested that States should enact and enforce effective domestic laws and controls that supported non-proliferation. It noted that the NPT sought to strike a balance between preventing proliferation and permitting maximum scope for States to pursue peaceful nuclear programmes. It maintained that resolving the problem of proliferation would not be quick or easy as terrorists and outlaw regimes would not be dissuaded by high-minded speeches or written agreements. It stated that the first step could be fostering an environment in which outlaw behavior would be met with universal condemnation and with real consequences that would make the cost of proliferation unsustainable. 39 The United Kingdom declared that the greatest contribution that nonnuclear-weapon States could make to nuclear disarmament was to continue to renounce nuclear weapons and to assure that their partners did the same. It added that the existing nuclear-weapon States could greatly contribute by refraining from testing and manufacturing fissile material and by continuing to reduce their arsenals to the minimum level.40 It declared that while the existing nuclear-weapon States had reduced their arsenals and were continuing to do so; proliferation still continued4' It considered that the inevitability of gradualism would continue to operate for obvious reasons and that once the perception of threat was eliminated, the salience of nuclear weapons in security policies would lessen. 42 Both the United States and United Kingdom spoke extensively on the issue of counter-proliferation. The latter read out a recent statement by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, while Ambassador Sanders of the

37 Ibid.

38 CDlPV.943 (10 August 2004). 39 40 41

CDIPV.948 (26 February 2004). CDlPV.968 (7 September 2004). Ibid., p.4.

42 Ibid.


United States cited the practical steps identified by President Bush, in his l I February 2004 address to discourage proliferation.43 Nigeria felt that the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament had generated certain impressions around the world that questioned the bona fide non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament commitments of the nuclear powers. The continuing technological sophistication of those weapons in violation of the commitment under Article V1 of the NPT reinforced those impressions. It believed that the five major nuclear powers, as permanent members of the Security Council (P5), should recommit themselves to genuine nuclear disarmament, because any presumption of their indefinitive possession of nuclear weapons would not be compatible with sustaining global non-proliferation. As a first, tangible step in that direction, the P5 should take the lead to ensure the early entry into force of the CTBT, as a demonstration of good faith in that regard.44 Nigeria stressed the need for the Conference on Disarmament to take into account the interrelationship between disarmament, global security and common development in order to see their way through in the ~onference?' Bangladesh strongly supported regional approaches to nuclear disarmament, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, in the Middle East and in other parts of the worldP6 Japan underscored its efforts to promote nuclear disarmament by aiming to achieve a peaceful and secure world, free of nuclear weapons. Its resolution to the UN General Assembly on nuclear disarmament entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons", garnered 164 affirmative votes last December, the largest since its first adoption in 2 0 0 0 . ~ ~ Ireland considered that preserving the integrity of the NPT meant respecting all its provisions and the commitments freely undertaken at the previous NPT Review Conferences. Together with the other New Agenda Coalition partners, it worked to implement Article V1 of the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. 48 The Netherlands and Canada explored "innovative" approaches to expanding the legal framework of the non-proliferation regime, including the elements referred to by IAEA Director General El Baradei and President

CDIPV.948 (26 February 2004). CDlPV.950 (1 1 March 2004). 45 Ibid., p. 10. 46 CDlPV.951 (16 March 2004). 47 CDlPV.950 ( l l March 2004). 48 CDIPV.951. op. cit., p. 10. 43

44

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Bush, namely a rigid system of export controls, international control of the nuclear fuel cycle and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, presented a comprehensive approach on key emerging threats, namely: terrorism, WMD proliferation, organized crime, State failure and regional conflicts.49 To address those threats, the EU based its approach on multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, non-proliferation mainstreaming in other policies, support of the multilateral institutions charged with verification of compliance with relevant instruments, enhanced consequence management capabilities and coordination, and national as well as international export controls. Furthermore, the EU placed emphasis on regional solutions for regional problems as well as on an international order based on the rule of law and effective multilateralism. That approach was translated into active policies, which, inter alia, included fostering the role of the Security Council with regard to implementing resolutions 1373 and 1540.

Fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices In 2004, as in previous years, difficulties over reaching an agreement on a comprehensive programme of work which would take into account the negotiating priorities of all Member States, prevented the Conference on Disarmament from re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee which worked shortly in 1998. The issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes was addressed during plenary meetings, as well as an informal plenary meeting devoted to considering issues under item 1 of the agenda of the Conference - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". During the first half of the session, delegations reiterated their wellestablished views on the subject. In addition, the Republic of Korea was of the view that nuclear -weapon States might voluntarily declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons even before the conclusion of negotiations. It also advocated the broadest participation in the negotiations, including non-parties to the NPT. Poland, recalling that in its 1998 report the Conference recommended the reestablishment at the beginning of its 1999 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material, was of the opinion that the re-establishment of this committee was a key element in rebuilding the credibility of the Conference. The Netherlands recalled its contributions to an informal process over the last few years to keep the FMCT alive in Geneva. The NAM States, and particularly Bangladesh and Syria emphasized that any treaty on the CDiPV.963 (5 August 2004) 24


prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons must include the existing stockpiles of such material. Algeria was of the view that a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for military purposes, with verification and controls over existing stockpiles, should be an element of a global approach to nuclear disarmament. It added that a convention should also include an instrument to assure the NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and a treaty to eliminate them. In such an approach, the fissile material ban would be restored to the framework of nuclear disarmament, achievements in limiting and reducing nuclear stockpiles would be incorporated in a multilateral process and the legitimate fears of the NNWS would be taken up in a legally-binding regime that would build confidence among nations. The issue of the prohibition of a production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was discussed in a more detailed way at the informal plenary meeting devoted to the item "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Later, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, drew attention to a proposal on the establishment of an expert group to address technical issues related to the prohibition of the production of fissile materials. Recalling similar expert groups dealing with the verification of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the President believed that such a mechanism would facilitate better understanding of the complexities involved in a ban on fissile material. Norway noted that during the informal plenary meeting several delegations regarding negotiations on an FMCT as their priority also expressed their willingness to address other issues in the Conference as well. On the other hand, those who advocated the prominence of nuclear disarmament or PAROS did not reject the importance of an FMCT. Norway considered it to be an encouraging development. At the beginning of the third part of the session, the United States announced its new position on an FMCT. Reaffirming its commitment to the negotiations in the Conference of a legally-binding treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, it announced that its policy review had raised serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMCT was not achievable. The United States also emphasized also that an FMCT was ripe for negotiations and achievable, but it must have a clean mandate that was not linked to any other unrelated proposals for the Conference's ad hoc committees. Many delegations welcomed the statement by the United States and offered some preliminary comments. The United Kingdom, reiterating its

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 support for negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and recalling its view that an FMCT should be effectively verifiable, stated that it would approach the United States proposal with an open mind in the hope that it would permit early agreement to start work in the Conference. It also confirmed the maintenance of the moratorium on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom believed that an FMCT should be approached separately on its own merit and not as a part of a comprehensive package. France, reiterating its support for negotiations on an FMCT, emphasized its openness to proposals which could help re-launch them. Accordingly France was ready to consider the United States proposal. The Netherlands welcomed the finalization of the review of an FMCT by the United States and was looking forward to having a substantive debate on the verifiability concerns of such a treaty. In this connection, the Netherlands hoped that discussions on verifiability could be conducted without any premature conclusions. Japan, welcoming the United States statement, believed that it opened a new window of opportunity for the Conference to start negotiations on a legally-binding FMCT. Japan maintained that the treaty should be effectively verifiable, since an effective verification mechanism was essential for the transparency and accountability of fissile material production, thus ensuring the credibility of the treaty. Similarly, Australia believed that an FMCT should include appropriate verification arrangements. Australia recalled its so-called "focused approach" for effective and cost-efficient FMCT verification. Under this approach, verification measures would apply to fissile material produced after the treaty's entry into force, and to the enrichment and reprocessing plants. Australia was ready to work with the United States and others to ensure effective FMCT verification and emphasized that the first objective was to secure a start to FMCT negotiations so that verification and other issues could be taken forward. China attached importance to the United States proposal on an FMCT, and hoped for further clarification of issues, particularly those related to the mandate of the ad hoc committee on an FMCT, verification and the content of the treaty framework. Argentina was convinced that the United States support for FMCT negotiations combined with the broadly expressed support from members of the Conference offered hopes for speedy approval of the Conference's programme of work. Germany noted that it would thoroughly examine the results of the United States review of an FMCT. Germany also emphasized that a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was the next logical step in the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It felt that the negotiations should be based on the Shannon mandate, which was also contained in the revised A-5 proposal and which called for a non-

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable

FMCT. Negative security assurances Many non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their active interest in the issue of negative security assurances (NSA). Syria affirmed the need for a binding instrument on effective international arrangements and measures to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 50 Nigeria stated that the lack of seriousness in nuclear disarmament had unfortunately generated certain impressions around the world, questioning the bona fide commitment of the nuclear Powers to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the refusal to conclude a legally-binding multilateral agreement to extend negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to NNWS only reinforced those impressions.5 1 For its part, the DPRK also asserted that nuclear non-proliferation could only be meaningfully sustained if the NNWS were assured, under legallybinding commitments, that their independence, territorial integrity and sovereign5$ would be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Norway stated that NWS should deal with NSA issues seriously.53 The Netherlands maintained that legally-binding negative security guarantees by the NWS would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by taking away one rationale for some countries to seek nuclear weapons.54 Bangladesh affirmed that NNWS parties to the NPT had a legitimate right to receive an unconditional assurance from the NWS that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. It was therefore critically important that renewed and vigorous efforts were taken on a priority basis to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument to provide security assurances to NNWS?

"

CDlPV.943, op. cit., p.3. 51 CDfPV.950, op. cit.. p.9. CDIPV.951, op. cit. p.22. CDlPV.962 (29 July 2004) 54 CDlPV.952 (17 March 2004) 55 CDIPV.951 , op. fit., p. 14. 53


Bilateral agreement and other issues On 1 June 2003, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) - or Moscow Treaty - between the Russian Federation and the United States entered into force. According to the U.S. Department of State's 2004 annual report to Congress on SORT implementation, the Bilateral Implementation Commission, a body established under the treaty, met for the first time from 8-9 April in Geneva. In addition, senior officials from the United States and Russia met several times in the course of 2004 to discuss SORT implementation. As to the question of extending the Moscow Treaty beyond its 31 December 2012 expiration date, the two governments announced that they would continue to consider the matter within the context of START implementation over the next years. During its fifty-ninth session, the General Assembly welcomed the Moscow Treaty's contributions to nuclear disarmament and adopted resolution 59/94 entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework" on 3 ~ e c e m b e r ? For the discussion and the voting of the resolution, see the General Assembly section of this chapter.

Six-Party Talks on DPRK nuclear issue The DPRK's nuclear programme remained a concern of the international community during 2004. Aimed at resolving the issue, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the United States had met with the DPRK in the framework of the six-party talks in Beijing for the first time on 27-29 August 2003. The parties resolved to seek a peaceful settlement of the crisis, to address the DPRK's security concerns, to avoid actions that would escalate the situation and to continue the six-party talks. The second round of the six-party talks took place in Beijing on 25-28 February 2004. All parties again expressed commitment to a nuclearweapon-free Korean peninsula, to resolving the issue peacefully (through dialogue), and to maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Further, the parties agreed to continue the process and to establish a working group in preparation for the third round of talks. The third round of talks was held in Beijing on 23-26 June 2004. In preparation, two working group meetings were held from 12-15 May and from 21-22 June 2004. The parties reaffirmed their commitment and emphasised the need to take first steps towards the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. The parties stressed the need for a step-by-step approach, "word for word" and 'actions for actions". The DPRK did not accept the US proposal to freeze its nuclear program within three months. In return for a full


disclosure of the DPRK's nuclear activities, submission to inspections, and beginning eliminating its nuclear programs after a preparatory period of three months, the US had offered fuel aid and security guarantees. A fourth round of talks was scheduled for September 2004 but the DPRK declined. No Six-party talks had been held since June during 2004.

Draft Convention on Nuclear Terrorism The Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 5 11210 of 17 December 1996 met in June and July to continue its work on a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, which represents one aspect of the efforts to develop a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism. Due to the persistent differences concerning the convention's scope, the Ad Hoc Committee was unable to conclude its work. During the Assembly's fiftyninth session, further work was conducted within the framework of the Sixth Committee. Despite a comprehensive exchange of views on the main outstanding issues related to the convention's scope of application, no further progress was made in 2004. General Assembly resolution 59/46 of 16 December decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues related to the draft convention on nuclear terrorism.

IAEA Verification Strengthened Safeguards System Comprehensive safeguardsagreements and additional protocols During 2004, the Agency continued to secure broader acceptance of its strengthened safeguards system.57 The number of States for which the Agency was implementing strengthened safeguards increased from 41 in 2003 to 64, including 19 additional States with significant nuclear activities. This substantial increase was due to the entry into force in April 2004 of the additional protocols for the-then 15 States of the European Union. However, about 100 States still had not concluded additional protocols to safeguards agreements - including 15 States with significant nuclear activities. Five more States parties to the NPT concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in 2004. The application of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols remains crucial for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards See: http://www.iaea.orglOurWork/SV/Safeguardsv.html.


and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole. In this connection, the Agency's Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional ~ r o t o c o l continued s~~ to focus on the Secretariat's efforts to promote and facilitate wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system. In line with that plan, in 2004 the Agency held seven national, regional and international training events for State systems of accounting and control of nuclear material (SSAC). In addition, the Agency held regional seminars for the western and southern African regions as well as for Pacific Island States.

Integrated Safeguards By the end of 2004, integrated safeguards were being implemented in six States, including Japan (September 2004) - the first State with an advanced nuclear fuel cycle to have integrated safeguards applied. Two independent evaluations of the Agency's safeguards activities in 2004 commended the overall effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards application and stressed the importance of giving continued priority to the implementation of integrated safeguards in States with extensive nuclear fuel cycle programmes.

Safeguards Implementation The verification activities of the Agency remained under challenge in a number of ways - the discovery of undeclared nuclear programmes and activities; the emergence of covert nuclear supply networks; and the acquisition of sensitive nuclear know-how and technologies by additional countries. During the year, the IAEA responded to those challenges by investigating and analyzing the activities of covert nuclear supply networks and conducting verification activities. By the end of 2004, a total of 923 facilities and locations outside facilities ( ~ 0 ~ swere ) ~ under ' Agency safeguards, along with nearly 164,000 tonnes of nuclear material, including 15 tonnes of fresh high-enriched uranium, 89 tonnes of separated plutonium, and 450 tonnes of heavy water! 58 See http:llwww.iaea.orglOurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg~actionplan2005. 59 Integrated safeguards describe the optimum combination of all

safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. A prerequisite for the implementation of integrated safeguards is a broader safeguards conclusion drawn by the Agency for the respective State. Once implemented, the combination of measures enables maximum effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards measures. 60 See h t t p : l / w w w . i a e a . o r g / P u b l i c a t i o n s / R e p o ~ 2 3 .


During 2004, the Agency performed 2,302 safeguards inspections in 598 facilities and LOFs. The regular budget for safeguards was increased by 12.4 per cent to $104.9 million. In addition, US $16.3 million was spent from voluntary contributions on safeguards equipment and services.

Expert Group on nuclear fuel cycle In June 2004, the Director General appointed an international expert group to consider possible approaches to the front- and back-ends of the nuclear fuel cycle - uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and storage and final disposition of spent nuclear The Group, consisting of 26 experts drawn from nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT States, participating in their personal capacity, was to hold four one-week meetings and to present its report to the Director General by March 2005 in time for the 7th Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

Democratic People 'S Republic of Korea (DPRK) Since December 2002, the DPRK has not permitted the Agency to perform any verification activities on its territory, therefore the Agency could not draw any conclusions regarding that State's nuclear materials or a c t i ~ i t i e s . ~ ~ The situation in the DPRK continued to pose a serious challenge to the NPT regime. The Agency continued to maintain its capability to resume verification in the DPRK at short notice.

Islamic Republic of Iran In 2004, the Agency further enhanced its understanding of Iran's current and past nuclear programme and continued to carry out verification activities with the cooperation of Iran in order to clarify outstanding issues. Reports by the Director General were made to the March, June, September and November meetings of the Board of Governors, which adopted four resolutions on the implementation of safeguards in 1ran." The March report noted, inter alia,that all declared nuclear material in Iran had been presented to the Agency for verification, that Iran had been actively cooperating with the Agency in providing access to locations and that corrective actions were being taken. The report also noted the continuing need for clarification regarding the nature and scope of Iran's activities. The Board, inter alia,

61

Ibid., table A22.

62 See http:/lwww.iaea.orglNewsCenterlNews/2005lfuelcycle.htmI.

63 See http:llwww.iaea.orglNewsCentedFocus/IaeaDpr~index.shtml. 64

See http:llwww.iaea.orglNewsCenter/FocuslIaeaIranlindex.shtml.


welcomed Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol, noted with concern that omissions had come to light regarding Iran's nuclear activities, and that questions remained to be resolved. The Director General's June 2004 report welcomed Iran's submission of its initial declaration pursuant to its Additional Protocol as well as the progress achieved on agreed actions. However, the report noted, inter alia, that two issues were outstanding: understanding Iran's P-2 centrifuge programme and the origin of contamination of high- and low-enriched uranium. The Board expressed concern that Iran's cooperation had not been as full, timely or proactive as it should have been and called on it to undertake further confidence-building measures. The September 2004 report again noted that resolution of the questions of contamination and the P-2 centrifuge programme were still outstanding. The report also noted that the Agency continued to make steady progress in understanding Iran's nuclear programme and added that the Agency had been able to verify Iran's enrichment-related activities at specific facilities and sites. The November 2004 report recapitulated the Agency's findings on Iran's nuclear programme since September 2002. It noted that the Agency had concluded that all declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for, and that such material was not diverted to prohibited activities. However, the Agency was not yet in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in that State. The process of drawing such a conclusion, based on the implementation of all safeguards measures including those contained in the Additional Protocol, is normally a time consuming process. Drawing such a conclusion in the case of Iran could be expected to take longer than in normal circumstances given its past activities. The Board welcomed Iran's decision to continue and extend the scope of its voluntary suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. At the Board's request, the Agency continued monitoring Iran's voluntary suspension of all of its uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya The Director General provided reports on the implementation of safeguards in Libya in March, June and September 2 0 0 4 . ~The ~ March report noted that, over an extended period of time, Libya was in breach of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its comprehensive safeguards agreement. The report also noted that Libya's undeclared nuclear programme had focused on 65

See http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/index.shtml.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues developing nuclear weapons. The Board welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate materials, equipment and programmes leading to the production of nuclear weapons as well as its decision to sign the Additional Protocol and to act as if it were in force. The Board adopted a resolution in March in which it stated that under Article XI1.C of the Statute, Libya's past failures to meet the requirements of its NPT safeguards agreement constituted non-compliance and, in accordance with that Article, requested the Director General to report the matter to the Security Council for information purposes only.66 The Director General reported to the Security Council on 11 March 2004. In its Presidential Statement of 22 April 2004, the Council stated that it welcomed the decision by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the positive steps that it had taken to fulfil its commitments and obligations, including its active cooperation with IAEA. The June and September 2004 reports noted that Libya had submitted its initial declaration under its additional protocol and that it had provided good cooperation with the Agency. At the end of 2004, the Agency assessed that Libya's declaration regarding its uranium conversion programme, enrichment programme and other past nuclear-related activities appeared consistent with the information available to the Agency and verified by it. It also noted that Libya had taken corrective actions, but underlined that verification of the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations remained ongoing.

Other Safeguards Implementation Issues

Republic of Korea In August 2004, following the submission of its initial declaration under the Additional Protocol, the Republic of Korea (ROK) informed the Agency that on a number of occasions and without the Government's knowledge, laboratory-scale experiments that involved the production of small quantities of enriched uranium at a nuclear site in ROK in 2000 had not been reported to the ~ ~ e n c ~ . ~ ~ The Director General submitted a report to the Board in November containing the preliminary findings of the Agency's investigation of the information received which indicated that the quantities of nuclear material " The full report is available from http:Nwww.iaea.orglPublications/

Documents/Board/2004/gov2004- 18.pdf. 67 See http://www. iaea. orgi News Centerl PressReleases/2004/prn200408, also available from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south~korea.


involved in those undeclared activities were not significant. Nonetheless, the nature of the undeclared activities - uranium enrichment and plutonium separation - and the failure of the ROK to report those activities to the Agency was a matter of serious concern. The ROK however had taken corrective action and actively cooperated with the Agency's investigation, providing information and access. Based on information provided by the ROK and verified by the Agency, there was no indication that the undeclared experiments were continuing. By the end of 2004, the Agency was still in the process of verifying whether ROK's declarations were correct and complete.

Egypt In 2004, the Agency identified several open source documents published by the Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency that indicated the possibility of unreported nuclear material, activities and facilities in that State. The Agency sought clarification of those matters through the State authorities. The Government of Egypt cooperated with the Agency providing information and access. At the end of 2004, the Agency was still in the process of verifying whether Egypt's declarations were correct and complete.

lraq Since mid-March 2003, the Agency has been unable to implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolution^^^ which remained valid. Security Council resolution l546 adopted in 2004, however reaffirmed the Council's intention to revisit the Agency's mandate in Iraq. Throughout 2004, the Agency continued to consolidate, restructure and further analyze information collected about Iraq since 1991.69 The Agency remained concerned about the widespread and apparently systematic dismantlement of sites previously relevant to Iraq's nuclear programme that had been subject to ongoing monitoring and verification by the Agency. In June 2004, the United States Government informed the Agency that, with the consent of the interim Iraqi Government, it had removed most of the nuclear material from Iraq under Agency safeguards stored at the Tuwaitha complex, along with approximately one thousand high-intensity radioactive sources. In August, pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement, the Agency carried out an annual physical inventory verification of the remaining nuclear material in Iraq (located at Location C, Tuwaitha) consisting of natural and See http:llwww.iaea.orglOurWorWSV/Involindex.html. 69 See http:llwww.iaea.org~ewsCenferlFo~~~lIaeaIraqlindex.shtml.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferationissues low enriched uranium. It also verified the records detailing the transfer from Iraq of the nuclear material referred to above. In October, the Agency received information from the interim Iraqi Government about the disappearance of 342 tonnes of the high explosives HMX, RDX and PETN~' kept under Agency seal. The Agency promptly informed the Security Council of this development. The Agency remained ready to resume its verification activities in Iraq pursuant to its mandates under Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions, once the security situation in Iraq had improved and it was allowed access.

Nuclear safety and secwit? The IAEA organized an International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety: Continuous Improvement of Nuclear Safety in a Changing World, in Beijing from 18 to 22 October 2004. Its objective was to foster an exchange of information on topical issues in nuclear safety and to develop an international consensus on the basic approaches for dealing with those issues. Throughout the year, other conferences were held to further global efforts to improve security and safety at sites housing nuclear and radioactive material^.^' Application of international safety standards In 2004, progress continued on revision of IAEA safety standards especially filling in the remaining gaps in coverage. They are being revised in order to take account of current trends and challenges facing the nuclear industry such 70 See glossary, Appendix XI1 of this volume.

While nuclear safety and security is considered a national responsibility first and foremost, the IAEA is promoting a Global Nuclear Safety Regime and a Global Nuclear Security Framework. These include international standards and guidelines; binding international conventions and non-binding codes of conduct; international peer reviews to evaluate national operations, capabilities and infrastructures; and an international system of emergency preparedness and response. In the safety area, IAEA activities cover nuclear installations, radioactive sources, radioactive materials during transport and radioactive waste. A core element is setting and promoting the application of international safety standards for the management and regulation of activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials. Concerning nuclear security, IAEA activities cover nuclear and radioactive materials as well as nuclear installations. The focus is on helping States prevent, detect and respond to terrorist or other malicious acts and to protect nuclear installations and transport against sabotage. 72 http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/Announcements.


as deregulation, competitiveness, plant ageing and potential loss of experience. During 2004, amended transport safety requirements and ten safety guides were published.73 In March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the International Action Plan for the Development and Application of IAEA Safety Standards. 74 The primary purpose of the Plan was to put into effect a strategy for enhancing the IAEA safety standards as a global reference for protecting people and the environment. In August 2004, the Director General submitted reports to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the development and application of IAEA safety standards, including progress in implementing the Action In September 2004, the IAEA General Conference welcomed the Board's approval of the Action Plan and the progress since then in its implementation.76 The Action Plan pays special attention to the application of standards and the collection of information on their use. Convention on Nuclear Safety The Convention on Nuclear entered into force on 24 October 1996. By the end of 2004, it had 55 Contracting Parties. The Organizational Meeting for the third Review Meeting was held from 28 to 30 September 2004 at which it was decided to establish six Country Groups for the third Review Meeting scheduled to be held from l l to 22 April 2005.

73 http://www-ns.iaea.orgistandards/documentpages/transport-ofradioactive-material.htm. 74 See http://www.iaea.org. 75 GOV/INF/2004110-GC(48)/INFl7, available from http://www.iaea.org/ About/ Policy/GC/GC48/Documents. 76 GC(48)RES/lO.A, available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/ GC/GC48/Resolutions. 77 The objective of the Convention is to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international cooperation, including, where appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation. The Convention obliges Parties to submit national reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the Parties (Review Meetings). This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention. The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure fulfiment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction, but is based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties.


Joint Convention The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention) entered into force on 18 June 2001. By the end of 2004, the Convention had 34 Contracting Parties. The Joint Convention is the first legally-binding international treaty on safety in these areas and its aim is to achieve and maintain a consistently high level of safety in the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The Convention is an incentive instrument that requires Contracting Parties to submit national reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at Review Meetings of the Parties the first meeting was held in 2003. In September, the IAEA General Conference appealed to all Member States which had not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Joint Convention to do so.78 Safe transport of nuclear and radioactive material In recent years, the transport of radioactive material has become a matter of particular interest to Member States. The IAEA contribution to the worldwide efforts to ensure that radioactive material is transported safely includes safety standards and review services. The IAEA Board of Governors has periodically adopted Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, in consultation and collaboration with competent authorities of Member States and relevant international organizations. The Transport Regulations, generally recognized as the international authoritative standards for both the national and the international transport of radioactive materials, were amended in 2003 and published in 2004. In April, the IAEA Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) conducted a comprehensive mission to France which paid particular attention to maritime and air transport. Japan also asked the IAEA to carry out a TranSAS mission. In September, the IAEA General Conference welcomed the approval of the Action Plan on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004. The Action Plan was based on the results of the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials held in July 2003 and the request of the 2003 General Conference for the IAEA to develop this Action

78

GC(48)RESIlO.A, op.cit., p.5, para. 28. 5.

79 Ibid., p.3, para.


Nuclear security and prevention of nuclear terrorism The events of l l September 2001 gave rise to a thorough review of IAEA programmes related to the prevention of acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and resulted in the adoption of a three-year Plan of Activities for Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism in 2002. The Plan covers three lines of defence - prevention, detection, and response, supplemented with activities in support of information management and coordination. It includes advisory, evaluation and training services as well as legislative and technical support. With the end of the three-year period approaching, a new Plan was being developed in 2004 that will be presented to the Board of Governors for approval in 2005. The pace and scope of the IAEA's nuclear security-related activities continued to accelerate and expand to provide form and focus to the needs identified through its advisory services. The IAEA, in cooperation with individual States, has been developing Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans. These Plans will provide a structured, predictable set of activities with clear objectives and a framework for identifying and implementing activities necessary to ensure sustainability. As of August, the IAEA had prepared seven such Plans for discussion with the concerned Member States. During 2004, the membership of the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) continued to increase. Work also continued on the implementation of the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) "Improvement of Technical Measures to Detect and Respond to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials." Twenty-seven research contracts and agreements were concluded with 18 Member States and provisional functional S ecifications to be used for detection instruments were established.8g The results of the CRP are expected to strengthen the capability of Member States to prevent, detect and respond to events of illicit trafficking by supporting them with the selection, provision and installation of equipment and related support. The nuclear security training programme for 2004 included approximately 34 courses covering nuclear security awareness, combating illicit trafficking, detection equipment training, physical protection, and nuclear forensics as well as SSACs and inventory management systems for radioactive sources. Since September 2001, more than 50 security-related assessment missions and over 60 training events have been carried out involving IAEA Member States from every region. The IAEA has also strengthened its cooperation on nuclear security issues with other regional 80 GOV/2004/50-GC(48)/6), available from http://www.iaea.org/About/ Policy/GC/GC48/Documents.


and international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies - Interpol, Europol, the Universal Postal Union, the World Customs Organization and the European Commission. From 18 to 19 September, the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, with the support of the IAEA, convened a Global Threat Reduction Initiative Partners Conference in Vienna, to address the collection and security of proliferation-attractive materials and to provide an overview of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) announced by the United States Secretary for Energy in May 2004. The Conference recommended that IAEA Member States work with the Agency to coordinate a mechanism to address opportunities for implementing GTRI-related projects and programmes consistent with the activities relevant to the GTRI and as approved by IAEA Member ~ t a t e s . ~ ' In cooperation with the Greek Atomic Energy Commission and the Olympic Games security organizations, the IAEA also helped the Greek authorities to develop and implement a high level nuclear security plan for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games.

Physical protection of nuclear material The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM),82 which entered into force on 8 February 1987 had 109 Parties by the end of 2004. In 2004 the process of strengthening the CPPNM continued. In July, at the request of the Government of Austria and 24 CO-sponsoringStates, the Director General circulated proposed amendments to the CPPNM to all States parties which would extend the scope of the present Convention to also cover the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, in domestic use, storage and transport, and the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes against sabotage. Under the terms of the CPPNM, the Director General will convene a diplomatic conference to consider the proposed amendments when requested to do so by a majority of the States parties to the CPPNM. In For more information, see http://www.pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings /announcements. 82 The Convention requires Contracting Parties to ensure the protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes on their territories, ships or aircraft at the levels specified in the Convention during international nuclear transport. The CPPNM is the only international legally-binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material aimed at averting potential dangers of the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material.


September, in a statement to the 48th session of the IAEA General Conference, the Director General expressed the hope that a diplomatic conference could be convened in early 2005. Radioactive sources The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code) has been strengthened to take account of international concerns following the events o f 1 l September 2001. The IAEA published the revised Code in January 2 0 0 4 after ~ ~ it had been approved by the Agency's Board of Governors and endorsed by its General Conference in 2003. At 31 December 2004, 70 countries had signalled their intent to follow its provisions. In 2004, the Secretariat convened an open-ended group of technical and legal experts to develop guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources in order to facilitate the implementation of the Code. The text of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive sourcesg4 was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in September 2004. The IAEA General Conference welcomed the Board's approval and endorsed the text although it was not legally-binding.85 Low Activity Radioactive wasteg6 The International Symposium on Disposal of Low Activity Radioactive Waste took place in Cordoba from 13 to 17 December 2004. It was organized by the IAEA with the co-sponsorship of the French Agence nationale pour la gestion des dechets radioactifs (ANDRA) and in cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation for Development's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). It was hosted by the Government of Spain through the Empresa Nacional de Residuos Radiactivos, S.A. and the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear. The Symposium dealt with policy and strategy, very low level waste, waste decommissioning, long-lived low activity waste and unique low activity waste streams.

83 IAEA publication IAEA/CODEOC/2004, January 2004, available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications. 84 GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13, available from http://www.iaea.org/About/ Policy/GC/GC48/Documents. GC(48)IResllO.D p. 11, para. 8, 24 September 2004, see web site for IAEA resolutions in footnote 76. 86 Low activity radioactive waste is not an internationally agreed waste category but the term is increasingly used to describe a range of waste types, warranting consideration from economic and safety perspectives.


Radiological weapons Conference on Disarmament Like the previous year, only a limited number of references were made to the issue of radiological weapons in the meetings of the Conference on Disarmament and many were indirect references in the context of the international efforts against terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, Colombia emphasized the importance of holding a plenary session to address effective cooperation to prevent terrorists from obtaining such weapons. Germany, a long-time promoter of the issue, again underscored the increased importance and urgency of addressing it, reflecting heightened security concerns following the events of 11 September. The United States delegation drew attention to the appeal made by President Bush on 11 February 2004 to address what he considered the "greatest threat before humanity today" - the possibility of a "secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological weapons". It also reported on the "Global Threat Reduction Initiative" to which it would devote US $450 million. The initiative was designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear and radiological material that could be used to build a nuclear and radiological weapon. Missile-related issues Testing and development of ballistic missiles continued in many regions in 2004 ensuring that missile-related issues, particularly the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and the efforts by the United States to build a missile defense system, remained an area of concern. On 12 April, Libya announced that it would start converting its arsenal of Soviet-made Scud B missiles to give them a shorter range. The missiles originally had a range of 185 miles and were capable of delivering a 2,200 pound warhead. Libya declared that the range would be reduced to below 185 miles and the maximum payload to less than 1,100 pounds. Libya also agreed to allow monitors from the United States and the United Kingdom to observe the conversions to ensure that they were irreversible. In the same statement, Libya pledged to end all military transactions with the DPRK. On 12 November, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced that the first phase of the national defense system had been completed with installation of the initial round of ballistic missile interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska. On 15 December, the first test undertaken in two years in the development of its national missile defense system failed. Nevertheless, U.S. officials reaffirmed their commitment to move forward on the system. On 17 December, the United States and Japan signed a memorandum of


understanding on increasing missile defense cooperation. The agreement will allow the two countries to share information on missile defense systems and cooperate on joint projects. On 7 July, Australia joined cooperation with the United States in developing, testing and deploying missile defense systems. On 2 December, Russia decided to expand its role in a joint project with India to build a sophisticated cruise missile and assured that country of steady supplies of military spare parts. On 27-28 December, India and Pakistan held a joint meeting in Islamabad, but failed to complete an agreement for mutual pre-launch notification before testing ballistic missiles. In a joint statement they indicated that they had narrowed their differences and agreed to work toward early finalization of that agreement.

UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in all its Aspects Following the study on the issue of missiles in all its aspects carried out by the Group of Governmental Experts established in 2001, the General Assembly, in 2003, requested the Secretary-General to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established in 2004, and to submit a report for consideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session. The panel held three sessions during 2004 - from 23-27 February, 17-21 May and 1923 July. It held comprehensive, constructive and in-depth discussions on all aspects of the issue, but no consensus was reached on the preparation of a final substantive report. Discussions included assessing multilateral initiatives since 2002; the right to peaceful uses of missile-related technologies; missile-relevant confidence-building measures (CBMs); national, regional or multilateral voluntary measures; and a possible role for the United Nations in addressing the issue. (See also Chapter 7 of this volume).

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Hcoc)~ The Subscribing States held their Second Intersessional Meeting in Vienna from 17 to 18 June. Among the issues discussed was the implementation of

" Germany, Israel. Italy. Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain

and United Kingdom also cooperated with the United States in the area of

missile defense systems. See http://www.bmaa.gv.at.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues confidence-building measures, such as Annual Declarations and Pre-Launch Notifications. The Third Regular Meeting of Subscribing States took place in New York from 17 to 18 November at which the Philippines took over the chairmanship of the HCOC for the period of 2004-2005. The meeting discussed, inter alia, the continuation and improved implementation of confidence-building measures, future outreach activities and methods of communication. On the issue of Annual Declarations, it was agreed that these were to cover the period from 1 January to 31 December with 31 March of the following year as the new deadline for submission. The Fourth Regular Meeting of Subscribing States will take place in Vienna from 2 to 3 June 2005. The main topics will be confidence-building measures and universalization of the Code. As of December 2004, the HCOC had 117 subscribing States. The issue of missiles was also addressed by the General Assembly which adopted a resolution entitled '~issiles"" on 3 December 2004. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Governmental Experts in 2007 to explore further ways and means to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects. A resolution entitled 'Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferationn was also adopted. For a discussion of these resolutions, see the General Assembly section of this chapter.

Export Controls

Nuclear Suppliers G m u p The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSGPO held its fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Goteborg, Sweden From 27 to 28 May. Estonia, Lithuania, Malta and the AlRESl59167. The NSG aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through export controls of nuclear and nuclear related equipment, software and technology, without hindering international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As at 31 December 2004, its members were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan. Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway. Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa. Spain. Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The participation of China. Estonia, Lithuania and Malta came into effect on 10 June 2004 by an exchange of notes.


People's Republic of China were approved by the Plenary as Participating Governments of the Group. The Plenary took stock of developments in the nuclear field since its previous meeting in Busan, Republic of Korea, in May 2003, and decided to adopt a number of measures to further strengthen the national export controls of Participating Governments. These measures included a "catch-all" mechanism in the NSG Guidelines that would provide a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear-related items that were not on the control list when such items were or might be intended for use in connection with a nuclear-weapons programme. The Plenary also decided to strengthen the annual information exchange; to reinforce the NSG's contacts with nonpartners through seminar and other joint activities with States outside of the NSG; and to strengthen the relationship between the NSG and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the 'provision of briefings to the IAEA. The Plenary further considered conditions for the supply of nuclear and dual-use items on the NSG's control lists as well as the suspension of the supply of nuclear items following decisions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors as to a State's non-compliance with the NPT or Safeguards obligations with the IAEA. Participating Governments also recalled that the NSG Guidelines contained special provisions for control of sensitive nuclear items which could directly contribute to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. They also recalled the principles of non-proliferation and consultation that could be used to address concerns over the misuse of sensitive nuclear items by recipient states. In that connection, the Group confirmed its readiness to continue its work to further enhance measures to prevent transfer of sensitive materials or technology to recipients which might use them for manufacturing nuclear explosives. The Group recognized that such work must be considered in the context of the NPT as well as international initiatives such as that of the IAEA Director General to convene an ad hoc expert group to review options and possibilities for new fuel cycle activities. The MissUe Technology Control Regime (MTCR) The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 19th Plenary Meeting in Seoul from 6 to 8 October in order to review its activities and further strengthen efforts to prevent missile proliferation. Discussion included issues of preventing intangible transfers of missile-related technologies, such as electronic transmissions of missile designs; transit. trans-shipment and brokering controls; and the need to curtail illicit


proliferation-related activities by intermediaries and front companies. In a statement released by the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry of the Republic of Korea, MTCR members expressed "serious concern" over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. The Statement welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and recognized the necessity of enhancing export controls, strictly implementing them and keeping them updated to technological advancements. Further, it called upon members outside the regime to follow the MTCR guidelines and its annex. Spain offered to host the next Plenary Meeting of the MTCR in the autumn of 2005 and serve as its chair for the subsequent year.

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) On 28 April, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540'' which affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery constituted a threat to international peace and security. Acting under Chapter V11 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council decided that States shall refrain from providing any support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The Security Council also decided that States shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The Council further decided that States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery. By resolution 1540, the Security Council established, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee consisting of all members of the Council, which would, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. To this end, the resolution called upon States to report to the Committee on steps they had taken or intended to take to implement it. In August, the Committee adopted guidelines for the conduct of its work as well as for the preparation of national reports. In September, the Committee adopted the guidelines for hiring experts who would help in the consideration of nationh reports submitted by Member States. In December, the Committee approved the recruitment of four experts and decided to invite further nominations of SIRES11540 is available from http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htrn.

45


experts, particularly from Asia and Africa. By the end of the year, 97 States had submitted national reports, and a report was also submitted by the European Union.

Political declarations and other initiatives The XIV Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was held in Durban, South Africa, on 17-19 August 2004. In the Final Document of the ~onference,'~the Ministers reaffirmed and reiterated the longstanding principled NAM positions on disarmament and international security. They expressed their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions. In this context, they strongly underlined and affirmed that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, provided the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security. The Ministers remained deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines that set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, and, in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review undertaken by the United States, they expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons were being considered. They reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS contravened the security assurances provided by the NWS. They also reiterated deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament which remained their highest priority, and again called for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. On 9 June, during its 30th Summit on Sea Island, Georgia, (8-10 June), the ~ 8 announced ' ~ an Action Plan on Non-Proliferation. The Group reaffirmed their commitment to fulfil1 their arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation commitments, called on all States that had not already done s o to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and expressed strong support for Security Council resolution 1540. The Group also called on all States to implement that resolution promptly and fully, adding that they were prepared to assist them in so doing. The Action Plan on Non-Proliferation included new actions to reduce the risk

92 Available from

93 The

http://www.nam.gov.za/rnedia.

G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,

United Kingdom, and United States. In addition, the European Union participates and is represented by the president of the European Council and the President of the European Commission.


of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists, such as efforts to amend the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and outreach efforts toward the goal of universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol. The G8 also stated that it would work to establish a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification. The Action Plan further stated that the G8 would continue efforts to build effective PSI partnerships, would cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and would coordinate enforcement efforts where appropriate. The G8 recommitted themselves to the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction announced in 2002. In addition, the G8 expressed serious concerns over the DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, stated that they strongly supported the Six-Party Process and urged the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programmes. The G8 remained united in their determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's nuclear programme resolved and welcomed Libya's decision to rid itself of WMD and longer-range missiles. On 26 June 2004, the United States and the European Union issued a declarationg4 at the US-EU Summit in Shannon, Ireland, in which they reiterated their belief that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a major threat to international peace and security. The parties were disturbed by Iran's recent announcement of its intention to resume manufacturing and assembly of centrifuges and urged Iran to rethink its decision. It also called for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of DPRK's nuclear programme. The statement listed joint actions aimed at preventing, containing and reversing proliferation, including urging all States to fully implement Security Council resolution 1540, establishing new measures in accordance with the G8 Action Plan for NonProliferation, working together to strengthen and universalize disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes that ban WMD and related delivery systems, preserving the integrity of the NPT, enhancing the coordination of efforts to promote radioactive source security, and amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to cover domestic transport, storage and use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes. The declaration also praised Libya's abandonment of its WMD programme and pledged assistance to Libya in implementing its non-proliferation commitments.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Istanbul, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance issued two official documents on 28 June. Firstly, a declaration on "Our security in a new era",95 renewing NATO's commitment to collective defence and welcoming seven new members. The Declaration stated that NATO was transforming its military capabilities in order to adapt to the changing strategic environment and that the new command structure, the NATO Response Force, and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defence battalion were progressing. The second document was the Istanbul Summit ~ o m r n u n i ~ u96e ,which noted, that NATO members had agreed on an enhanced set of measures to prevent WMD from being acquired by terrorists. The Communique further stressed the importance of all States abiding by, and fully implementing, their arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation commitments, and of strengthening existing international arms control and disarmament accords and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes. The Alliance also expressed strong support for Security Council resolution 1540. On 11 February 2004, the United States President announced a set of new measures to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction." They included: (1) expanding the focus and law enforcement cooperation of PSI participants and other willing States: (2) passage of a Security Council resolution on non-proliferation of W M D ; ' ~ (3) expanding cooperation and support for non-proliferation efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar legislation and the G8 Global Partnership: (4) a proposal that members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology to any State that did not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants: (5) a proposal that only States that had signed the IAEA Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programmes; (6) creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board which would focus intensively on safeguards and verification; and (7) a proposal that no State under investigation for proliferation violations be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was announced by United States Secretary of Energy on 26 May at a meeting with IAEA senior officials in Vienna. The initiative aims to minimize as quickly as possible the http://dublin.usemba~~y.gov/ireland/declarationglobal. html. 96 Available from l~ttp:l/www.nato.int/docu/press.htm. 97 Available from http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/.

For discussion of SC resolution 1540, see relevant section above.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. It also seeks to put into place mechanisms to ensure that nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment, wherever they may be in the world, are not used for malicious purposes. Under the GTRI initiative, the United States would work with the IAEA and other partners to: repatriate all Russian-origin fresh high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and all its spent fuel; repatriate all US.-origin research reactor spent fuel under its existing programme from locations around the world; work to convert the cores of civilian research reactors that use HEU to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel throughout the world; work to identify other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment that are not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts; and rapidly address the most vulnerable facilities first. On 14 June 2004, the United States President submitted to Congress the text of an amendment to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes of 3 July 1958. At its Thirty-Fourth Regular Session in Quito, Ecuador, from 6-8 June 2004, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States adopted a resolution on "Inter-American Support for the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban re at^," and a resolution on "Consolidation of the Regime Established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) ". loo An independent commission on W M D ~ ~was ' launched by the Government of Sweden in Stockholm, on 16 December 2003, with Hans Blix, the former head of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, as Chairman and 14 Commissioners representing a broad and relevant geographical and political base.lo2 The WMD Commission was tasked with developing realistic proposals for the greatest possible reduction of the dangers of those weapons,

'' AGIRES.

2008 (XXXIV-O/O4), 8 June 2004, available from

http://www.oas.org/XXXIVGA/english. looAGIRES. 2009 (XXXIV-O/04), 8 June 2004. available from http://www .oas .org/XXXIVGA/english. 'OIFor The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, see http://www.wmd commission.org. lo2The Commissioners are Hans Blix, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Alexei G Arbatov, Marcos de Azambuja, Alyson Bailes, Therkse Delpech, Jayantha Dhanapala, Gareth Evans, Patricia Lewis, Masashi Nishihara, William J. Perry, Vasantha Raghavan, Cheikh Sylla, Prince El Hassan bin Talal, and Pan, Zhenqiang.


including both short-term and long-term approaches and both nonproliferation and disarmament aspects. The Commission's mandate includes the proliferation and possession of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and their means of delivery as well as terrorism-related issues and ways of preventing the acquisition and use of those weapons. The Commission received a wide range of expert studies, lo3 and it held three international meetings in 2004. Its final report will be presented to the United Nations Secretary-General and the international community in early 2006. General Assembly, 2004 The General Assembly took action on 14 draft resolutions and one decision dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter. Nuclear disarmament and non -prolifera tion 59/64. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 443 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (109-0-61) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (118-0-63). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 345 and 421. The resolution appealed to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally-binding character. It recommended that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective. First Committee. In its statement after the vote, the Republic of Korea said that it abstained because it firmly believed that any NNWS that was party to the' NPT and in full compliance with its Treaty obligations was entitled to full-fledged negative security assurances by the NWS. However, it did not believe that such negative security assurances should be provided to those parties to the NPT, if they had not fulfilled their Treaty obligations. In its view, the draft resolution continued to ignore that concern. lo3 See footnote

50

113.


59/75. Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments. The draft resolution was introduced by Sweden, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, (see page 445 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 28 October as a whole: (135-5-25) and operative paragraph 2: (153-4-5) and by the General Assembly on 3 December as a whole: (15 1-6-24) and operative paragraph 2: (169-4-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 361 and 426. Among other things, the resolution called upon States to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation commitments and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race; and to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in operative paragraph 2. It called upon all States parties to the NPT to accelerate implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; and called upon the NWS to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, China and Spain explained their positions. China would vote affirmatively for both the draft resolution as a whole and operative paragraph 2, despite its reservations about some parts of the text. It underscored the text's failure to reflect the following points: that no first use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space would help to promote the nuclear disarmament process; that nuclear transparency was related to an international climate of peace, stability and trust and should be considered in the nuclear disarmament negotiation process; and that the concept and definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons was not clear. Spain,, which voted for operative paragraph 2, but abstained on the draft resolution as a whole, noted that this year's language was more balanced, feasible and likely to garner global consensus, but still needed improvement. After the vote, France, speaking also on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom explained that the draft resolution did not sufficiently reflect the progress that had been achieved in nuclear disarmament. The three countries voted against the draft resolution as a whole because they could not accept certain of its elements: mainly, that its contents did not take sufficient account of their full range of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. Particularly, it did not mention the Moscow Treaty which committed the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 nuclear arsenals by several thousand warheads over the next decade. The Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole and voted in favor of operative paragraph 2. It pointed out that this year's shorter text omitted the close link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, the importance of prohibiting the deployment of outer space weapons, and progress in nuclear disarmament in light of its own efforts to reduce and destroy nuclear weapons under the Moscow Treaty. India voted against operative paragraph 2 and abstained on the draft resolution as a whole. For its part, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world had to be grounded in the SSOD I Programme of Action - an approach that was not fully reflected in the draft. In that connection, India would have preferred references to the non-first use of nuclear weapons and to the reduction of nuclear dangers, including de-alert measures. Ultimately, India believed that efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free world would be constrained by the intrinsic inequality and discriminatory framework of NPT obligations as expressed in the draft resolution. Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution because it supported the draft's call for meaningful disarmament measures and its emphasis on the Conference on Disarmament's role in that context. It abstained on operative paragraph 2 for its known stance regarding universal adherence to the NPT. Five States - Colombia, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea and Switzerland - which voted for both the draft resolution as a whole and for operative paragraph 2 explained their votes. Germany emphasized its serious concern about the threat posed by WMD and their delivery systems which NATO had to take into account when maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region on the basis of its strategic concept. Japan and Switzerland expressed the hope that the draft resolution would create fivourable conditions for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. With that in mind, Japan supported the draft resolution's overall objectives, although it did not agree with all its tenets. Switzerland continued to support a realistic and pragmatic approach to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and stressed that its position on the draft resolution did not reflect a change in its principles on that matter. The Republic of Korea found this year's text to be balanced and more realistic as it highlighted the nuclear disarmament issues to which it attached importance - universal adherence to the NPT, early entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Referring to the CTBT in operative paragraph 2, Colombia reiterated its known position that obligations undertaken in treaties signed by its country were binding from the time of ratification only and that it would continue to propose approaches to overcome such constitutional impediments.


59/76. A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution was introduced by Japan, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 445 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 28 October (15 1-2-16) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (165-3- 16). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 363 and 426. The resolution called upon States not parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions. It invited the nuclear-weapon States to keep the Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament; and called upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to nuclear and WMD proliferation in order to prevent those materials from falling into terrorists' hands.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, China said that it would abstain because the draft resolution failed to mention some fundamental nuclear disarmament principles and that a few proposed measures were premature for implementation in the current international situation. Iran would also abstain due to the introduction of a significant number of substantive suggestions in the draft resolution which it felt had broad implications for the current nuclear disarmament agenda. It also noted that the stress placed on developing the CTBT verification regime in operative paragraph 8 was incomprehensible since that Treaty was not presently in force. Two States which cast negative votes explained their positions after the vote. The United States said that it could not vote for the draft because it did not support the CTBT nor would it be a party to it. Turning to the FMCT, while it supported the negotiations, it concluded that such a treaty could not be made effectively verifiable. While India agreed with the draft resolution's objective of eliminating nuclear weapons, nonetheless, it cast a negative vote because the draft contained several NPT elements which India considered to be flawed; moreover, the call on India to join the Treaty as a non-nuclearweapon State in operative paragraph 1 was unrealistic and unacceptable in its view. Sweden, speaking on behalf of the NAC, and Pakistan gave their reasons for abstaining in the vote. Pakistan did not agree with several of the draft resolution's provisions. In its view, the inordinate emphasis on nonproliferation instead of nuclear disarmament represented a regression in that area; also, the draft did not represent a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons which it purported to do. Moreover, as several paragraphs of the draft resolution were rooted in NPT elements, Pakistan could not support it. Sweden, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that it would


abstain because the draft did not reflect the commitments made by the States parties at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences in their entirety. Germany, Syria and Colombia voted affirmatively. Germany fully shared the draft resolution's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. However, it was concerned that the draft resolution did not reflect the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament in their entirety and this would allow for misinterpretation of the commitment to fully implement them. Although Syria supported the draft resolution, it detected some flaws in the text such as its failure to mention the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and noted that the basic nuclear disarmament principles and the importance of achieving the universality of the NPT were not fully asserted. While Colombia voted in favour of the draft resolution, it drew attention to the paragraphs that mentioned the CTBT and upheld its own familiar situation regarding ratification of the Treaty.

59/77. Nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 445 for the sponsors) on 19 October. The revised text was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November (93-42-18) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (11743-21). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 367 and 428. The resolution urged the nuclear-weapon States to immediately stop the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; it also urged them, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems; called upon them, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an international and legallybinding joint instrument not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and called upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally-binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; urged the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament; urged them to carry out further reductions of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; urged the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which included the immediate commencement of negotiations on an effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years; and reiterated its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2005 and to commence negotiations on a phased

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons. First Committee.Two States that voted affirmatively for the draft resolution spoke before the vote. China said that it supported the main thrust of the draft resolution, but that some essential points were not reflected: all nuclear disarmament measures, including interim steps, must follow the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all countries; the unconditional commitment by all NWS not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon States or States in nuclear-weapon-free zones; further substantial, verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons of the countries possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals; and the prevention of the weaponization and arms race in outer space. Cuba believed that the draft resolution appropriately reflected the priority given to nuclear disarmament and also fully supported its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in 2005 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme leading to nuclear disarmament. After the vote, two States explained their abstentions. India stressed its strong support for the established NAM and G-21 positions on nuclear disarmament, but had to abstain mainly because the draft resolution incorporated NPT elements. Japan firmly believed that steps towards nuclear disarmament should be realistic and progressive with the involvement of the NWS. It, therefore, would have preferred to see a different approach towards the shared goal of nuclear disarmament from that proposed in the draft resolution. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea voted in favor of the draft resolution because it supported its tenets. In its view, the primary task before the international community was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and that task required Member States to pay due attention to any attempt by certain countries to control legitimate activities under the pretext of so-called proliferation.

59/79. Reducing nuclear danger. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 446 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (106-46-16) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (116-46-18). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 373 and 430. The resolution requested the five nuclear-weapon States to take measures towards the implementation of a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 accidental use of nuclear weapons; and called upon Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. It also requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, lo4 and also to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold an international conference as proposed in the United Nations Millennium ~ e c l a r a t i o nto , ~identify ~~ ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session.

59/81. The Conference on Disarmament decision (CDl1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CDl1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The draft resolution was introduced by Canada, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 447 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 4 November (147-1-2) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (179-2-2). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 375 and 430. The resolution urged the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that included the immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. First Committee. Speaking before the vote, Egypt said that it supported the draft resolution because it believed that a cut-off treaty with a scope that included fissile material stockpiles for nuclear weapons' production would be an effective instrument towards nuclear disarmament. After the vote, several States explained their votes. The United States explained that it continued to support negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, but had to oppose the draft resolution because of its call for a verification mechanism which it felt was not achievable and

lo5

See Al561400, para. 3. See resolution 5512.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues attempts to negotiate a verification regime would delay the conclusion of such a treaty. Two States abstained from the vote. The United Kingdom believed that the wording in the draft resolution divided the international community whereas consensus to quickly move forward should have been the prime objective. Israel stated that in the global context, non-compliance with international obligations and the misuse and unchecked dissemination of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities were among the most pressing challenges in the nuclear non-proliferation field. It believed that an FMCT would not address and would further complicate those challenges, but that priority should be assigned to an effective non-proliferation arrangement pertaining to the nuclear fuel cycle. Two States that voted in favour of the draft resolution expressed concern that the traditional consensus text had to be put to the vote. The Russian Federation confirmed its readiness to begin discussions on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament based on a broad mandate. For its part, France said that it supported FMCT negotiations in the Conference, but the objectives of such a treaty required careful consideration. It also expressed regret that the draft resolution did not note recent developments in that field.

59/83. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 449 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 28 October as a whole: (118-28-2 1) and operative paragraph 1: (156-3-5) and by the General Assembly on 3 December as a whole: (13229-24) and operative paragraph 1: (170-5-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 378 and 432. The resolution called once again upon all States to immediately fulfil1 the obligation under the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination (operative paragraph 1). It also requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament.

First Committee.Explaining their affirmative votes for operative paragraph 1 and negative votes for the draft resolution as a whole, the Netherlands, speaking also on behalf of Belgium, Luxembourg, as well as Germany and Norway which associated themselves with its explanation of


vote, said that it opposed the draft resolution because it referred to only one element of the International Court's advisory opinion which it felt was indivisible and had to be considered in its entirety. Furthermore, affirming its conviction that nuclear disarmament could only be achieved through a gradual process, the five countries urged the international community to focus on implementing the 13 practical steps to nuclear disarmament of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Japan abstained on the draft resolution as a whole because it believed that incremental progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be made before embarking upon the multilzteral negotiations that the draft resolution called upon all States to commence.

59/94. Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework. The draft resolution was introduced by the Russian Federation, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 456 for the sponsors) on 20 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 3 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 393. Among other things, the resolution acknowledged the contribution that the United States of America and the Russian Federation had made to nuclear disarmament by reducing their deployed strategic warheads by about half since the end of the cold war. It also invited those two States to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of their nuclear reduction activities. First Committee. Cuba reiterated that the bilateral negotiations and commitments set out by the two States in the Moscow Treaty should not replace multilateral disarmament negotiations among nuclear-weapon States, and it reaffirmed that agreements to reduce or eliminate such weapons should always be transparent, verifiable and irreversible. Turning to NPT compliance issues, Cuba believed that negotiations on a multilateral convention on nuclear disarmament that included the elements of disarmament, non-proliferation in all its aspects, verification, cooperation and assistance should begin in the Conference on Disarmament. Other States that spoke after the vote maintained that reductions in the deployments and operational status mentioned in the draft resolution could not substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Sweden, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda ~ o a l i t i o n , " ~ remarked that it was difficult for the Assembly to confirm or verify the exact numbers and figures of those reductions as stated in the draft resolution lo6 See footnote 9.

58


adding that the NAC looked forward to a more thorough review of the implementation of NPT obligations and commitments, including the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Indonesia said that the reductions mentioned in the draft resolution did not meet the unequivocal undertaking by the two States under Article V1 of the NPT, since new nuclear weapons and possibly renewed nuclear testing were on the horizon and the timeframe for the dismantlement and destruction of the remaining nuclear weapons was still unclear.

591102. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors. (see page 459 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (111-46-12) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (125-48- 12). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 406 and 437. The resolution reiterated the General Assembly's request for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances; and requested the Conference to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations. 591106. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, (see page 460 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October as a whole: (157-4-8) and preambular paragraph 6: (154-3-4) and by the General Assembly on 3 December as a whole: (170-5-9) and preambular paragraph 6: (169-6-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 410 and 438. The resolution reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the NPT and called upon that State to accede to the Treaty without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the resolution.

First Committee.Prior to the vote, Israel, which cast negative votes for both the draft resolution as a whole and preambular paragraph 6, called the draft resolution one-sided, contentious and divisive and said it undermined confidence between the States of the region. It asserted that its text ignored

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 evidence that States in the Middle East were not compliant with their international treaty obligations, obtained nuclear technology for military purposes under false pretexts, showed profound hostility towards Israel and refused to maintain any form of peaceful reconciliation and coexistence with it. In its view, adopting a resolution that did not reflect this reality and singled out Israel was counterproductive to confidence-building and peace in the region and did not give the First Committee any credibility. Israel concluded that resolutions regarding the complex arms control problems in the Middle East should focus on objective ways to address them as they existed which the draft resolution did not do. After the vote, two States explained their abstentions. India said that it abstained from the two votes because it believed that the focus of the draft was not limited to the region that it intended to address. It also underscored that the draft resolution's call for universalization of the NPT was at variance with the principle that States should adhere to treaties considered to be in consonance with their national interests based on their freely exercised sovereign choice. Voting in favor of preambular paragraph 6, but abstaining from the draft as a whole, Australia, explained that it had some substantial difficulties, notably the draft resolution's emphasis on the State of Israel with no reference to other Middle East States of nuclear proliferation concern.

591514. United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament. The draft decision was introduced by Mexico, on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (119-6-41) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (138-5-38). For the text of the decision and the voting see pages 4 18 and 440. By the terms of the draft decision, the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament". First Committee. Before the vote, Germany indicated that it would abstain because it did not consider appropriate a United Nations conference at this juncture as called for in the draft decision. In that regard, it highlighted other priorities such as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to implement article V1 of the NPT and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Issues related to the CTBT 591109. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty. The draft resolution was introduced by New Zealand, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 461 for the sponsors) on 19 October. The revised draft resolution was adopted by the


First Committee on l November (147-1-4) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (177-2-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 416 and 439. The resolution called upon all States to maintain their moratoria on nuclear-weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty; it also called upon all States that had not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible; and further called upon all States that had signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes at the earliest. It then requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, to prepare a report on the efforts of States that had ratified the Treaty towards its universalization and possibilities for providing assistance on ratification procedures to States that so requested it, and to submit such a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session.

First Committee. Before the vote, two States explained their affirmative votes. The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and a group of countries107 that aligned themselves with its explanation of vote, reiterated the importance of the Treaty's early entry into force and urged all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions that were contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Israel said that it attached importance to the CTBT's objectives, but had reservations regarding the wording in operative paragraph 1. It underscored that progress was still pending on important issues such as: the verification regime, the resolution of political issues related to the Middle East and South Asian regions and reversal of the negative dynamics evolving in the ME where certain States signatories were not fully cooperative with efforts to complete and test the international monitoring element of the verification regime. Several States explained their votes after the vote. The United States, which voted against the draft resolution, reiterated its established stance of not supporting the CTBT, nor becoming a party to it. However, it said that it would maintain its 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing and urged all States to maintain their existing nuclear testing moratoria. lo7 The Netherlands spoke on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries of Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries Iceland and Norway members of the European Economic Area.


The Syrian Arab Republic abstained from the voting because it felt that the Treaty ignored the legitimate concerns of NNWS, provided them with no security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and prevented them from acquiring advanced technology. It also rejected the inclusion of Israel in the Middle East and South Asian group because that country unilaterally possessed nuclear and weapons of mass destruction which Syria felt impeded the efforts underway to establish a Middle East NWFZ. Despite its commitment to the CTBT, Colombia had to abstain in the voting due to its constitutional difficulties in ratifying the Treaty. Pakistan said that it voted in favour of the draft resolution because it supported the CTBT's objectives. It held that the draft resolution's call for promoting signatures and ratifications leading to the Treaty's entry into force would be facilitated when major former supporters of the CTBT decided to restore their support for it and when the Treaty's obligations were accepted at the regional level in South Asia. Missile-rela ted issues

59/67. Missiles. The draft resolution was introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 443 for the sponsors) on 26 October. The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (98-2-60) and by the General Assembly on 3 November (119-460). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 350 and 423. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the support of qualified consultants and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as appropriate, taking into account the views expressed by Member States, to contribute to the United Nations endeavour to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects, by identifying areas where consensus could be reached, and to submit the report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session. It also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to be established in 2007 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to explore further ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus could be reached, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session. First Committee. After the vote, the Netherlands, Japan, Argentina and Republic of Korea explained their abstentions. The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and a number of other countries lo8 that aligned themselves with its explanation of vote underlined that the EUs abstention was not due to a lack of commitment on the issue, but on the establishment of a new panel of experts. It was also not sure that the unchanged mandate of the third panel which would be established by the

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues draft resolution would lead to a positive outcome in the form of agreed conclusions. Japan affirmed its commitment to the goal of ensuring the nonproliferation of missiles as delivery vehicles for WMD, but abstained from the voting because the draft resolution contained no explicit reference to concerns about the proliferation of such missiles or any acknowledgment of ongoing non-proliferation efforts, such as the process leading towards the universalization of the Hague Code of Conduct. For its part, Argentina believed that although the panel did not adopt a report, its final draft provided a good basis for the new panel's work. Republic of Korea believed that it was premature to establish another panel of governmental experts owing to the fundamental differences in perceptions and views among States concerning certain elements of missile-related issues which it felt would not be resolved immediately. The Russian Federation and Cuba voted for the draft resolution. The Russian Federation noted that the second panel of experts had made progress, despite its failure to produce a final report. It therefore saw a need to continue to study missile-related problems within the United Nations framework. Cuba supported the idea of establishing a group of governmental experts in 2007 and held that greater involvement by third world countries in that group would make a positive contribution to the process. It also underscored that the group's work should not only emphasize measures to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD, but also deal with the issue of high-precision cruise missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads.

59/91. Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The draft resolution was introduced by Chile, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 453 for the sponsors) on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 26 October (137-2-16) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (16 1-2- 15). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 390 and 435. The resolution invited all States that had not yet subscribed to the Code to do so; and encouraged the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively with the problem of proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. lo8 The Netherlands also spoke on behalf of the candidate countries of Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, and the European Free Trade Association countries of Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 First Committee. Before voting, six States explained that they would abstain from voting based on their beliefs that the Code was not the product of genuine multilateral negotiations. India said that arms control and disarmament measures should be transparent, equitable and nondiscriminatory and that all Member States of the United Nations should be part of that process. Moreover, an inclusive approach would allow the subject to be dealt with in a comprehensive manner and would validate and reinforce the commitment of the larger number of States participating in that process. Pakistan emphasized that this complex issue had to be addressed in a multilateral forum so that the views and concerns of all countries could be taken into account. It also stated that the Code did not adequately address its own security concerns and that the sponsors seemed more intent on getting the draft resolution adopted than on promoting the Code. Cuba felt that the Code did not adequately reflect the main interests of a significant number of countries. In particular, the Code did not address the peaceful use of missile technology and the need for cooperation in that area; its focus was limited to horizontal proliferation while it ignored vertical proliferation; it lacked a disarmament approach, particularly nuclear disarmament; and it dealt with the missile proliferation issue selectively. Mexico was of the view that the Code did not effectively resolve the ballistic missile proliferation problem since it only dealt with part of the issue, did not include the benefits from technology transfer and international cooperation and lacked a disarmament approach. Brazil expressed disappointment with the downgrading of the Code's cooperative aspects especially the development of technology for the peaceful use of outer space and satellite launching vehicle programmes. Indonesia felt that ballistic missile proliferation would affect positions of principle related to its national security interests and therefore preferred that the issue be dealt with comprehensively under UN auspices and within its framework. Oman said that while it supported the draft resolution, it would not participate in the voting because of the manner in which the sponsors of the draft resolution handled procedural matters. Two States explained their negative votes. Iran argued that the sponsors' objections to modifying the draft resolution were unprecedented and contrary to the United Naticns spirit. It also objected because the Code was concluded outside the United Nations framework. For its part, Egypt held that the Code did not address the missile issue in a balanced manner and could not do so without structural adjustments to its text. It pointed to lacunae in the Code such as peaceful uses, cooperation and assistance and its limited scope which did not address the development of cruise missiles or the continued presence and development of nuclear weapons.


The Syrian Arab Republic and Algeria explained their abstentions. Syria believed that the Code was discriminatory, selective and failed to address the causes of proliferation. It also argued that agreements concluded outside the UN were detrimental to and contrary to non-proliferation and undermined that concept and disarmament. Algeria stated that the draft resolution did not take into account the proposed amendments that would include vertical ballistic missile proliferation concepts such as design, development, testing and deployment as well as the United Nations role. Furthermore, Algeria felt that the treatment of the missile issue should be comprehensive, balanced and non-selective and that the United Nations remained the natural framework for negotiation and adoption of disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. The Russian Federation and Sudan cast affirmative votes. The Russian Federation considered the Code's adoption to be the first real step towards countering the proliferation of ballistic missiles and suggested that further practical steps included the Code's universalization, gradual expansion of its sphere and future agreements by all parties involved. Sudan, as party to the Code, said that it voted affirmatively because a majority of the 117 subscribing countries believed the draft resolution would strengthen it. China voted for the draft resolution because it agreed with the Code's nonproliferation objective~.As a non-subscriber State, it expressed its intention to continue to exchange views with all sides, including the HCOC subscriber States, in a joint effort to prevent ballistic missile proliferation. China also advocated a United Nations role in the missile proliferation process.

Export Controls

59/66. National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology. The draft resolution was introduced by the Netherlands, on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see pages 349 and 423. The resolution invited Member States that were in a position to do so, without prejudice to the provisions contained in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, while ensuring that such legislation, regulations and procedures were consistent with the obligations of States parties under international treaties. It also encouraged Member States to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to the Secretary-General on the measures described above, as well as changes therein, and requested the Secretary-General to make this information accessible to Member States.


First Committee.After the vote, Cuba affirmed that the most effective export and import control regime was one negotiated and implemented in a multilateral framework supplemented by measures adopted at the national level. It added that only broad and non-discriminatory participation in those controls could guarantee the effective achievement of the pursued goals. Conclusion In 2004, the threat of WMD proliferation, including nuclear proliferation, was addressed with increased attention and urgency, particularly in relation to the possibility of WMD and related materials falling into the hands of terrorists. Concerns were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States over the slow progress in nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. The long-standing divergent views among States regarding the balance between disarmament and non-proliferation characterized the debate at various disarmament fora. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, States parties reaffirmed that the NPT remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Despite their renewed commitment to promoting and implementing the Treaty, the persistence of divergent views prevented the Committee from reaching agreement on any substantive recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference. Those developments cast a shadow on prospects for reaching an agreement on substantive issues at the 2005 Review Conference. The second Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the CTBT appealed to all States to maximize their efforts towards the early entry into force of the Treaty. In the meantime progress continued on establishing the verification system for the Treaty, but little progress was registered in securing the ratifications by the 11 States whose ratifications were still needed for its entry into force. Despite efforts aimed at breaking the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and reaching an agreement on a substantive programme of work, the Conference remained stalled and unable to fulfil its mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. Progress continued on the revision and application of IAEA safety standards. In addition, the pace and scope of the Agency's nuclear securityrelated activities, aimed at helping States prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist or other malicious acts, continued to accelerate and expand. The Security Council reaffirmed its intention to revisit the Agency's mandate in Iraq through resolution 1546 (2004).


The issue of WMD proliferation, in particular in the nuclear area, continued to figure prominently on the agenda of international peace and security, with special concern about the nuclear programmes of Iran and the DPRK, as well as the clandestine nuclear technology and information network of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Various initiatives by the international community sought to address these proliferation concerns. The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 reflected the international community's grave concern at the threat of terrorism and the risk posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. The resolution requires far reaching measures to strengthen domestic controls, legislation, and enforcement and focuses attention on preventing non-State actors that attempt, in particular for terrorist purposes, to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery systems. The General Assembly resolution on Missiles (59/67) and the introduction of a new resolution on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (59/91) manifested the continued concern of the international community over the threat posed by the proliferation of missiles.

Resolution 1540 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004 The Security Council, Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,10g constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil

log Means of delivery include missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.


their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction, Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability, Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability, Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation, Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation, Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security, Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security, Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those


recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party, Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation, Acting under Chapter V11 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; 2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them; 3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall: Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to (a) account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical (6) protection measures; Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls (c) and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations; 4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution; 5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists; 7 . Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience andor resources for fulfilling the above provisions; 8. Calls upon all States: To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, (a) and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(d)


To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties; To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral (c) cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes; To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform (d) industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws; 9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery; 10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials; 11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end; 12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

(b)


C H A P T E R I1

Biological and chemical weapons Introduction THETHREAT TO

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY posed by chemical and biological weapons has been a preoccupation of the international community for a long time. Persistent endeavours resulted in the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) - the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) - the first such treaty to be negotiated entirely within a multilateral disarmament forum, the Conference on Disarmament (the Conference). Ever since the two Conventions were opened for signature in 1972 and 1993 respectively, the United Nations has sought to promote their universality, as well as compliance with their provisions. In addition, States have continued to reaffirm the necessity of upholding the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The CWC contains provisions to prohibit chemical weapons and to provide for their destruction as well as a comprehensive verification mechanism of unprecedented scope. Since the Convention's entry into force on 29 April 1997, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with its headquarters in The Hague, has been actively implementing the Convention's provisions.2 The BWC does not contain a specific verification mechanism. Between 1986 and 1991, in an effort to strengthen its regime, the States parties agreed upon confidence-building measures involving information and data exchanges in order to prevent and reduce the occurrence of ambiguities,

'

The texts and status of the BWC, CWC and the Geneva Protocol are available on the web site of the Department for Disarmament Affairs http://disarrnament.un.org.

For further information, see the OPCW web site www.opcw.org.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 doubts and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in peaceful biotechnological activities. At the Special Conference of States parties in September 1994, the parties agreed to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally-binding instrument." The negotiations on a protocol on compliance started in 1995 in the Ad Hoc Group and came to a halt in 2001 due to rejection by the United States of the composite text proposed by the Chairman. In the same year, the Fifth Review Conference of the States parties to the BWC suspended its work due to divergent views and positions among States parties on several key issues, particularly the work of the Ad Hoc Group. The Conference resumed its session in 2002, at which time it adopted a Final Report that included a decision to hold annual meetings of States parties and expert meetings in the subsequent three years leading up to the Review Conference in 2006. This chapter covers developments with respect to the implementation of the BWC and CWC, including efforts by the international community to strengthen and universalize the two instruments. It also gives a brief account of the work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Iraq, (UNMOVIC), which was established in December 1999 as the successor to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)~as well as that of the Australia Group.

Developments and trends 2004 The threat of biological and chemical weapons and related materials and technology falling into the hands of terrorists continued to concern the international community. Calls for further strengthening the BWC and the CWC continued, as did efforts by States parties to implement national measures that would respond to those calls. In April, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) calling on all States to adopt and implement effective measures, including export controls, to prevent nonState access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery.4 In line with the decision taken at the Fifth Review Conference of the States parties to the BWC on a new process to strengthen the implementation and effectiveness of the Convention leading up to the Sixth Review Conference i n 2006, the second Meeting of Experts from States parties to the See Security Council resolution l284 (1999). For more information on resolution 1540, see chapter I of this volume.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

BWC and the second Meeting of the States parties to the BWC were held in Geneva in July and December, respectively. In the absence of an international organization to monitor and implement the BWC, the World Health Organization (WHO) offered assistance and advice on possible situations involving the deliberate use of biological agents that affect health. Through resolution WHA55.16 of 18 May 2002,~WHO Member States requested the Organization's Director-General to strengthen activities on global public health preparedness and response to deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radionuclear material that affect health. The WHO Inter-cluster working group on preparedness and response to natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radionuclear materials that affect health was established to improve coordination among all relevant activities related to resolution WHA55.16 both at WHO headquarters and regional offices. In 2004, WHO also revised and published "The public health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance." This second edition of WHOs 1970 publication "Health aspects of biological and chemical weapons" includes information designed to guide preparedness for and response to the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents that affect health. Progress continued in the implementation of the CWC. By late 2004, approximately 10,048 metric tonnes of chemical-warfare agents, more than 14.3 per cent of the total declared stockpiles of six known chemical weapons possessor States parties had been destroyed under OPCW verification. Nine additional States ratified or acceded to the Convention bringing its total to 167 States parties covering approximately 90 per cent of the world's chemical industry. The Ninth Session of the Conference of States Parties to the CWC further reaffirmed the objectives of the 2003 Action Plans on national implementation and universality of the Convention. UNMOVIC continued to conduct off-site assessment of the status of sites subject to monitoring that were damaged during the war in Iraq and continued its work on producing a compendium of Iraq's proscribed weapons and programmes with an emphasis on lessons learned. The Commission continued to operate under the assumption that the possibility of future

World Health Assembly resolution WHA55.16 "Global public health response to natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radionuclear material that affect health", 18 May 2002.Available from http:/www.who/int/gb. See also United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vo1.27:2002, chapter 11, 77 (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E. O3.IX.1).


redeployment to Iraq and other ongoing work necessitated a sustained level of readiness to resume its operations there. The Australia Group stepped up its efforts to strengthen national export control over dual-use biological and chemical agents and equipment. Five new members also joined the Group.

Biological Weapons "States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. " REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL-PANEL ON ~ R E A T S , CHALLENGESAND CHANGE

In accordance with the decision taken by the Fifth BWC Review Conference in 2002, three annual meetings of the States parties of one week duration were to be held each year from 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held in 2006, in order to discuss and promote common understanding and effective action on a number of issues related to the implementation of the convention6 Each meeting of the States parties will be prepared by a twoweek meeting of experts.

Second Meeting of Experts To prepare for the Second Annual Meeting of States parties, a two-week Meeting of Experts was held in Geneva from 19-30 July 2004 under the Chairmanship of Peter Goosen of South Africa. Eighty-seven States parties participated in the meeting? Four states8 that had signed but not ratified the

The issues were i) the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; ii) national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins; iii) enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; iv) strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants; and v) the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of States parties are as follows: items i and ii will be considered in 2003; items iii and iv in 2004; and item v in 2005.


Convention participated in the Meeting of Experts without taking part in the decision-making. Two ~ t a t e sneither ,~ Party nor Signatory to the Convention, participated as observers. Several UN and other international bodies attended the meeting. In accordance with its programme of work," on 19 July the Meeting of Experts heard general statements from 18 States parties during the first working session and presentations from WHO,FAO, and OIE during the second working session. The period from 20 to 23 July was devoted to consideration of strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants, and the period from 26 to 29 July was devoted to consideration of enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. The Meeting heard 15 statements, presentations and interventions from States parties on general surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating infectious diseases and 84 statements, presentations and interventions on surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants. It also heard a number of statements, presentations and interventions from States parties on outbreak response idfor humans, animals and plants, as well as on investigations. In the course of this work, the Meeting of Experts was able to draw on a number of resources including background papers prepared by the secretariat,'' Working Papers submitted by States parties! statements and presentations circulated in the Meeting, as well as a paper prepared by the Chairman, under his own responsibility and initiative, listing considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn

'

See Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWCNSP/2004/MX/3, 11 August 2004). For this and all documents of the Meeting of Experts see

http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/bwc/annualmeetings/1istofdocs-2OO4.html. Egypt, Madagascar, Myanmar and United Arab Emirates. Israel and Kazakhstan. l0 The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) attended the meeting. In addition, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) attended as observers. BWC/MSP/2004/MX/Z/Rev. 1.


from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions made by delegations on the topics under discussion at the Meeting.14 On 30 July 2004 the Meeting adopted its ~ e ~ 0 r t . l ~

Second Meeting of States Parties to the BWC The second Annual Meeting of States parties was held in Geneva from 6 to10 December 2004. Eighty-nine States parties to the Convention participated in the Meeting1' Five states17 that had signed but not yet ratified the Convention participated without taking part in the decision-making. Two States, l8 neither Party nor Signatory to the Convention, participated as observers. Several UN and other international bodies attended the meeting. l g In accordance with its programme of work,20 on 6 December, the Meeting held a general debate during which statements were made by 28 States parties. On 7 December, one meeting was devoted to consideration of strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants (agenda item 5). On 8 December, one meeting was devoted to consideration l 2 These included: i) Mechanisms being implemented for Disease Surveillance by Intergovernmental Organizations (WHO, FAO and OIE) and Significant Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by NonGovernmental Organizations, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF. 1; ii) Mechanisms being Implemented for Response to Outbreaks of Disease by Intergovernmental Organizations (WHO, FAO and OIE): Background paper prepared by the Secretariat, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.2; and iii) Mechanisms Available to States Parties to Investigate the Alleged Use of Biological or Toxin Weapons and to Provide Assistance in such cases: Background paper prepared by the Secretariat, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.3. l 3 See http: //disarmament2.un.org /wmd lbwc /annualmeetings /listofdocs2004. l 4 See Annex I1 of the Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWC/MSP/2004/MX/3). l5 Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWC/MSP/2004/MX/3). l6 ~ e ~ o of r tthe Meeting of States parties, BWCIMSP/2004/3; List of Participants, BWC/MSP/2004/INF.3 and Add. l . For this and all documents of the Meeting of States parties see http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/bwc/ annualmeetings/listofdocs-2004. html. l 7 Egypt, Madagascar, Myanmar, Syrian Arab Republic and United Republic of Tanzania. l8 Israel and Kazakhstan. l9 See footnote no. 10.

Biological and Chemical Weapons of enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease (agenda item 6). During their discussions on ways and means to promote common understanding and effective action on item 5, the States parties recognized that: (a) infectious disease outbreaks could be contained and suppressed through early-detection, immediate response and cooperation and support at the national and international level; (b) strengthening and broadening national and international surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious disease may support the object and purpose of the Convention; (c) the primary responsibility for surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases rested with States parties, while WHO, FAO and OIE had global responsibilities within their mandates in this regard. The respective structures, planning and activities of States parties and WHO, FAO and OIE should be coordinated with and complement one another; (4 scientific and technological developments had the potential to significantly improve disease surveillance and response. The States parties consequently agreed on the value of: (a) supporting the existing networks of relevant international organizations for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases and acting to strengthen WHO, FAO and OIE programmes, within their mandates, for the continued development and strengthening of, and research into, rapid, effective and reliable activities for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases, including in cases of emergencies of international concern; (b) improving, wherever possible, national and regional disease surveillance capabilities, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States parties to do the same; (c) working to improve communication on disease surveillance, including working with WHO, FAO and OIE and among States parties. On ways and means to promote common understanding and effective action on item 6, the States parties recognized that:


(a) capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease promoted the object and purpose of the Convention; (b) States parties' national preparedness and arrangements substantially contributed to international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; (c) the Secretary-General's investigation mechanism, set out in AI441561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 45/57, represented an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. The States parties consequently agreed on the value of: (a) continuing to develop their own national capacities for response, investigation and mitigation, in cooperation with the relevant international and regional organizations, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States parties to do the same; (b) the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, the further development of current procedures for the provision of assistance, by those in a position to do so, to States parties in cases of alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In order to facilitate the Sixth Review Conference, States parties were encouraged to inform the Conference of any actions, measures or other steps that they might take on the basis of the discussions at the 2004 Meeting of Experts and of the outcome of the 2004 Meeting of States parties. The Meeting approved the nomination by the Western Group of John Freeman of the United Kingdom as Chairman of the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States parties in 2005. The Meeting decided that the Meeting of Experts would be held in Geneva from 13 to 24 June 2005, and that the Meeting of States parties would be held in Geneva from 5 to 9 December 2005.~


Chemical Weapons "Sevenyears after the Convention entered into force, efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons continue to occupy a central place on the

global agenda. It is a source of encouragement that steady progress has been made in the destruction of declared chemical arsenals. Nevertheless, a great deal more remains to be done. I urge the concerned States to meet their obligations under the Convention, and call upon the international community to continue to support these efforts." 22

Throughout 2004, efforts towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons continued. By the end of the year, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had inspected more than 750 facilities of various types in 66 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) over the past seven years. More than 71,000 tonnes of chemical agents and nearly 8.7 million munitions and containers were declared by six States by October 2004. With the accession of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and its declaration of chemical weapons possession, the total number of declared possessor States increased to six. By late 2004, four of the six declared chemical-weaponspossessor States parties had destroyed approximately 10,048 tonnes of chemical-warfare agents under OPCW verification, a figure representing more than 14.3 per cent of the total stockpiles declared. In the United States, more than 30 per cent of its chemical weapons arsenal was destroyed. India was approaching destruction of 80 per cent of its stockpile. The Russian Federation, which possesses the largest arsenal of chemical weapons, moved ahead after some initial delays and with the support of the international community, including through initiatives such as the Global Partnership. Albania declared a small quantity of chemical weapons inherited from the cold war days and started working with the OPCW on their destruction. Progress continued on the 2003 Action Plans on national implementation of the CWC and on its universality. CWC States parties set a deadline for themselves of November 2005 for taking stock of how much progress they had made in developing and enacting the national legislation mandated by the Convention and in establishing the required internal mechanisms. Regarding universality, nine States ratified or acceded to the Convention which brought 22 Message to the Ninth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, SG/SM/9622, 29 November 2004.


the total number of States parties to 167 by the end of 2004 and covered approximately 90 per cent of the world's chemical industry.

Ninth Session of the Conference of States Parties The Ninth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the C W C ' ~ convened in The Hague from 29 November to 2 December 2004. Over 600 delegates from 108 Member States participated in the Ninth Session. Other attendees included four Si natory one non-State party?5 five international organizationsF6 as well as thirteen non-governmental organizations. The Conference approved the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's request to convert chemical weapons production facilities into a pharmaceuticals plant to produce low-cost vaccines to be distributed to the African market for the treatment of AIDSJHIV, malaria and tuberculosis. The Conference also granted Albania and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya extensions of the intermediate deadlines for the destruction of their Category 1 chemical weapons. The final deadline for the complete destruction of their Category 1 chemical weapons is 29 April 2007. The programme and budget for 2005 were approved by the Conference. The budget totaled Euro 75,695,000, of which 50 per cent was allocated to the implementation of the CWC's verification regime.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons The OPCW implements the CWC globally and is mandated to verify the elimination of all declared chemical weapons, prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, assist and protect Member States in the event of a threatened or actual attack with chemical weapons, as well as to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. Throughout the year, the Executive Council of the OPCW, the policy-making organ of the organization, continued to meet and discuss a range of issues.27 In addition, the OPCW organized regional and subregional meetings and workshops, as well as a variety of training courses. 23 The Conference of the States parties is the highest policy-making organ of the OPCW comprising all States parties. 24 Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo. Honduras and Israel. 25 Iraq. 26 The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Biological and Chemical Weapons Throughout 2004, the OPCW continued its verification activities. In his opening address to the Ninth Session of the Conference of States Parties, the Director-General of the OPCW noted that out of 64 chemical weapons production facilities worldwide, 35 had been certified as destroyed and 13 as converted. Seven others are to be destroyed before 29 April 2007. In addition, five of the nine chemical weapons production facilities to be converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention were in the final stages of conversion.28 On 7 October, the Director-General of the OPCW informed the First Committee of the progress in chemical disarmament by declared possessor States and in the Action Plans on national implementation and universality. He noted that the OPCW "was moving decisively from being a new organisation still in the early stages of fulfilling its mandate, to being a mature one with a solid and widely recognized record of achievement and the increasing support of the international community." 29 He stated that with the accession of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Middle East as a whole had become safer. He added that Iraq had indicated its political commitment to the CWC and pointed to the decision of the interim Iraqi Government to prepare the ground for accession once the newly elected government took office in 2005. The Director-General also cited progress in Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean, but said that 'j'ustified concerns remained about the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East, where large and long-standing conflicts persist" adding that "adherence to the Convention would constitute, in any area in the world fraught with tension, a significant confidencebuilding gesture. No one could expect that any sympathy or understanding should be shown to those who decided to keep the use of chemical weapons as an option. Chemical weapons were a heinous means of terror and destruction, aimed at and useful only against unprotected civilians." In 2004, the OPCW continued to contribute to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee established under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). It had also expressed readiness to provide any technical assistance and advice that were required by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1540 on the prevention of access to non-state actors of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

27 The thirty-sixth session of the Executive Council was held from 23-26 March; the thirty-seventh from 29 June-2 July; the thirty-eighth from 12-15 October; and the thirty-ninth from 14- 17 December. 28 C-9lDG.8, 29 November 2004. 29 AIC. 1159lPV.7, October 2004.


States and regional groups again expressed their support in the First Committee for the CWC and the OPCW. A resolution entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" was adopted without a vote on 27 October by the First Committee and by the General Assembly on 3 December 2004.~' For the resolution and voting pattern, see the General Assembly section of this chapter.

UNMOVIC On 8 June, the Security Council adopted resolution l546 (2OO4), which again reaffirmed its intention to revisit the mandates of UNMOVIC and the IAEA with regard to verifications of the disarmament of weapons of mass ~ to operate under the assertion, destruction in Iraq. U N M O V I C ~continued that, as the Security Council had not rescinded its mandate, the possibility of future redeployment to Iraq and other ongoing work necessitated a sustained level of readiness to resume its operations there.

Briefings The Executive Chairman is required to report to the Security Council every three months on the implementation of resolution l284 (1999). Accordingly, the Acting Executive Chairman submitted written reports and continued to brief the Security Council orally on a quarterly basis after consulting the College of Commissioners. The College of Commissioners held two regular sessions in New York and one regular session in Vienna. 32

30 A/59/72.

At the end of 2004, UNMOVIC staff totaled 51 weapons experts and other personnel drawn from 25 nationalities, 9 of whom were women. UNMOVIC retained a core staff of nine local nationals in Baghdad who maintained the existing offices, laboratories and other equipment at the Canal Hotel. The Cyprus Field Office continued to store and maintain UNMOVIC inspection and monitoring equipment recovered from Iraq. A complete inventory of all UNMOVIC property outside Iraq was completed on 24 June 2004. The premises of the UNMOVIC Field Office in Bahrain were handed over by UNMOVIC to the Civil Aviation Affairs of the Ministry of Transport of Bahrain on 3 December 2003. For more information, see S/2004/160. 32 The College of Commissioners held regular sessions on 24 February 2004 in New York; on 25 May 2004 in Vienna; and on 17-18 November in New York. 31


Activities On 5 March, the Acting Executive Chairman briefed the Security Council on the first quarterly report of 2004, covering the period from 1 December 2003 to 29 February 2 0 0 4 . ~It~was noted that there was no official information made available to UNMOVIC on either the results or the work of the investigations of the US-led Iraq Survey Group. The Survey Group did not request any information from UNMOVIC. During the period under review, the Commission continued to compare material in the public domain on the issues pertaining to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction against UNMOVIC's own material. The Commission continued its work on draft modifications to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan for Iraq and its annexes,34 e.g., incorporating experiences and practices and updating items and materials contained in the monitoring plan. Other continuing activities dealt with the compilation of a compendium on the nature and extent of Iraq's past proscribed weapons and programmes. On 9 June, the Acting Executive Chairman reported to the Security Council on the Commission's activities from 1 March to 31 May 2 0 0 4 . ~At~ its sixteenth regular session in Vienna on 25 May, the College of Commissioners underlined that UNMOVIC's priority was to maintain its readiness to resume operations in Iraq until the Council revisits the mandate. On 8 September, the Acting Executive Chairman informed the Security Council of UNMOVIC's continuing investigation into the discovery of items relevant to its mandate that had been exported from Iraq as scrap metal. 36 The Commission continued to conduct off-site assessment of the status of sites subject to monitoring that were damaged during the war and more recently in some cases completely razed. In the light of changes and experiences on the ground in Iraq, the Commission continued to work on possible changes to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan,37 e.g., examining the degree of access that would enable UNMOVIC to fulfil1 its mandate. Furthermore, a short summary of the Commission's findings on the issue of Iraq's remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicle programmes was attached to the report. At the 7 December briefing, the Acting Executive Chairman informed the Security Council about the activities of UNMOVIC from 1 September to 33 S120041160. This and other Security Council resolutions and documents are available at http:/www.un.org/Docs/SC. 34 Security Council resolution 7 15 (199 1). 35 S/2004/435. 36 S/2004/693. 37 As approved by Security Council resolution 7 15 (l99 1).


30 ~ o v e m b e r UNMOVIC .~~ was studying the comprehensive report of the Special Advisor to the United States Director of Central Intelligence for Iraq's Weapons of Mass ~ e s t r u c t i o n ? ~ and was comparing its own knowledge and findings with those of the Survey Group. Further, the Commission's experts continued to use commercial satellite imagery to assess the status of sites subject to monitoring. It continued work dealing with the destruction of SA-2 missile engines and other items. As noted in the report (S/2004/693), various items that had been under monitoring in Iraq had been located at scrap yards in Jordan in June 2004. With support from the Government of Jordan, these engines and three more found later by the Jordanian authorities, together with four other missile and chemical related dual-use items, were destroyed in Jordan during August and October 2004, in the presence of an UNMOVIC inspector. The Commission continued its work on producing a compendium of Iraq's proscribed weapons and programmes with an emphasis on lessons learned. The first draft is expected to be ready by March 2005. Pursuant to Security Council resolution l284 (1999), UNMOVIC continued to hold training courses and exercises throughout the year to maintain the technical skills and expertise of its staff. To maintain the availability of the network of analytical laboratories established in accordance with its organizational plan, UNMOVIC extended existing arrangements for an additional year until early 2006. This will allow a total of 11 analytical laboratories to be available to support the work of the Commission, when so requested. The list of laboratories was set out in Appendix I1 of document S/2004/160.

Australia Group The Australia Group is an informal arrangement among a number of countries,40 which aims at preventing chemical and biological weapon proliferation through coordinated efforts to strengthen national export controls systems. The Group meets annually to discuss ways in which the 38 S/2004/924. 39 On 8 October, the US-led Iraq Survey Group presented the report to UNMOVIC. 40 The members of the Australia Group are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

Biological and Chemical Weapons national level export licensing measures of its members can collectively be made more effective. The Australia Group met for its annual plenary in Paris from 7- 10 June to further strengthen participating countries' export control measures. The Group also welcomed five new members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. Participants noted growing acceptance of the Australia Group's measures as the international benchmark in relation to export controls in the chemical and biological fields, owing in large part to the Group's ongoing outreach activities. Accordingly, participants agreed on strategies for better targeted training and assistance, particularly at the regional level, to assist supplier and transshipping countries and other interested countries outside the Group to enhance their export controls. In response to increasingly sophisticated transnational procurement activities, the participating countries agreed to consider the issue of brokering controls, which could play a key role in curtailing the activities of intermediaries and front companies. As part of the Group's ongoing efforts to keep its common control lists4' up to date and scientifically relevant, participants agreed to add five plant pathogens to the control lists - the first such addition since 1993 - and to expand medical exemptions for one of the controlled toxins. Participants also considered further additions to the control lists, including airborne spraying and fogging systems capable of dispersing biological agents in aerosol form.

General Assembly, 2004 The General Assembly took action on three draft resolutions related to issues discussed in this chapter. 59/70. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (165-0-3) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (179-0-5). For the text of the resolution and the voting, see pages 354 and 425. The resolution called upon those States that had continued to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them; and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

41 See web site http:/www.australiagroup.net/en/agcomcon.htm.


59/72. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The draft resolution was introduced by Poland, on 19 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 356. The resolution called upon all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. It also urged all States parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities.

591110. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The draft resolution was introduced by Hungary, on 19 October. The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 3 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 4 17. The resolution reaffirmed the call upon all signatory States that had not yet ratified the Convention to do so, without delay, and called upon those States that had not signed the Convention to become parties at an early date. It also requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, including all necessary assistance to the annual meetings of the States parties and the meetings of experts. Conclusion In 2004, multilateral efforts towards the total elimination of biological and chemical weapons continued. Addressing the threat of WMD terrorism continued to occupy a top place on the international disarmament agenda. The outcome of the second Meeting of States Parties to the BWC formed an integral part of the process leading up to the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC in 2006. Further progress was achieved in both the implementation of the CWC, particularly chemical weapons disarmament, and its universalization. By the end of 2004, 167 States parties had ratified the Convention. The OPCW continued to make progress in implementations of the CWC, in particular, in the destruction of declared chemical arsenals.


UNMOVIC continued to operate under the assumption that the possibility of future redeployment to Iraq and other ongoing work necessitated a sustained level of readiness to resume its operations there. The Australia Group stepped up its efforts in preventing chemical and biological weapons proliferation, including to non-State actors, through measures such as expanding control lists and dealing with brokering issues aimed at tightening the export control systems of its members States' in those two fields.


C H A P T E R I11

Conventional weapons issues "Since the adoption of the Programme of Action, States have nationally and collectively demonstrated their steadfast commitment to working together, within a multilateral framework, to address the accumulation and proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. I am delighted to note the progress so far. But we must not relax our efforts to combat the scourge of illicit small arms and light weapons, which continue to kill, maim and displace scores of thousands of innocent people every year. "

'

KOFI ANNAN,UNITED NATIONSSECRETARY -GENERAL

Introduction ISSUESRELATED

TO THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL

arms and armed forces have been on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations since its creation.' In the 1950s, the General Assembly dealt with disarmament in the context of ways and means to achieve the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and to achieve general and complete disarmament. In 1999, the Disarmament Commission adopted guidelines on conventional arms control with an emphasis on practical disarmament measures. 3 In the 1980s, the need to address conventional disarmament in a systematic way led to negotiations that resulted in the conclusion, in 1981, of the first global agreement on conventional weapons, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have l

Secretary-General Kofi Annan's message to the United Nations Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), available from http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2005/pressreleases.html See The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970. chap. 11. (United Nations publications, Sales No. 7O.IX. l), in particular, resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946. A/54/42, annex 111.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).4 The CCW, motivated by both disarmament and humanitarian causes, was concluded as an "umbrella" treaty5 to which additional specific agreements could be attached in the form of protocols. Three such protocols were concluded at its ~ u t s e t .The ~ First Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, held in 1995-1996, adopted the amended Protocol I I ~and a new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol I V ) . ~By the end of 2004, there were 95 States Parties to the Convention. The 2001 Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW decided to commission follow-up work on the decisions arising from the Conference. Pursuant to that decision, an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts was established to address the issue of explosive remnants of war (ERW) as well as mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM). After two years of intensive negotiations, the GGE concluded a Protocol on ERW which was annexed to the CCW as Protocol V. Following the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, the international community was confronted with the eruption of intra-State conflicts in many parts of the world in which small arms and light weapons (SALW) were the weapons of choice. This led Member States and the United Nations system to initiate efforts to curb the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and the uncontrolled transfers of these weapons. In the late 1990s, the General Assembly mandated three expert studies on the matter.g In 1998, on the recommendation of one of those studies, the General Assembly decided to convene an international conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. In July 2001, the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, http://disarmament/un.org/TreatyStatus.nfs. See document CCWICONF.lIGEI5 for a summary of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Convention. Protocol I on non-detectable fragments; Protocol I1 and a technical Annex on mines and booby traps; and Protocol I11 on incendiary weapons. Amended Protocol I1 entered into force on 3 December 1998. The First and Second Annual Conferences of its States parties took place in Geneva in December 1999 and December 2000, respectively. For the declarations, see . The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.OO.IX.l), vol. 24: 1999, pp. 110-111, and vol. 25:2000, pp. 135-136 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.OO.IX.1). Protocol IV entered into force on 30 July 1998. The text of Protocol IV is reproduced in Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), 5th edition, 1996. Also available from http://disarmament.un.org. See documents A1521298 (1997). A1541258 (1999) and AI541155 (1999).

Conventional weapons issues

adopted by consensus the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its ~ s ~ e c t (PoA). s ' ~ The PoA recommended actions to be undertaken at the national, regional and global levels, as well as a follow-up process to the July 200 1 conference. In 1998, the Secretary-General designated the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA or the Department) as the Organization's focal point for small arms. Subsequently, the Department established the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism, a consultative body with wide membership from within the UN system,' aimed at ensuring that the UN system as a whole addressed the challenges posed by small arms and light weapons in a comprehensive, coordinated and coherent fashion. Parallel to global efforts, a number of important initiatives were taken at regional and subregional levels to combat the illicit circulation and excessive accumulation of SALW. Civil society, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), also contributed significantly to the global efforts to address the small arms scourge. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), a network comprising over 500 participating groups from nearly 100 countries, has played a key role in raising awareness, coordinating NGO activities and campaigning in this field. In addressing the question of transparency in military matters, the General Assembly established two confidence-building mechanisms in 1980

'

'

'O See document A/CONF.192/15, pp. 7-17 for full text of the Programme of Action. The following departments and agencies are current members of CASA: the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the Department for Political Affairs (DPA), the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) , the Department of Public Information (DPI) , the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSGICAAC), the New York Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the New York Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Geneva-based United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Vienna-based Centre for International Crime Prevention of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCPICICP), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) . l 2 See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.IX. l),vo1.26: 2001, p. 73.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 a n d 1992 respectively: t h e United Nations standardized instrument for

reporting military expenditures13 and the United Nations Register of Conventional ~ r m s . 'The ~ Register, because of its high and consistent participation rate, continued to be the most important instrument in the field of conventional weapons at the global level. To address the dramatically high number of civilian casualties caused by anti-personnel mines (APMs), in the early 1990s, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian civil society organizations, including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) l5 alerted the international community to this unfolding crisis. As a result, in 1996, Protocol I1 of the CCW was amended to extend its scope and application to cover both international and internal armed conflicts and to prohibit or restrict the use of non-detectable APMs and their transfer as well as the use of non-self-destructing and non-self-deactivating mines outside marked areas. As the humanitarian impact of landmines grew more apparent, a number of governments, international agencies and the ICBL made collective efforts towards a total ban of APMs, which led to the conclusion in December 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention). l6 The Convention entered into force on 1 March, 1999. This chapter deals with the issue of conventional arms at the global level and covers small arms and light weapons, prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons, anti-personnel mines, transparency measures, and export controls.

l3 The instrument covers three categories of expenditure (operating costs, procurement and construction, and research and development) relating to strategic, land, naval, air and other combat forces, central support administration and command, paramilitary forces, and military assistance. l 4 The Register covers transfers in seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. l5 The ICBL, created in 1991, is a coalition of over 1,000 NGOs in over 60 countries working to ban landmines. On October 10 1997, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of the its crucial role in this field. l6 The text of the Mine-Ban Convention is reproduced in The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.IX.1). vo1.22:1997, appendix 11, pp. 227-241. Also available from the Department's web site http://disarmament.un.org.


Developments and Trends, 2004 The international efforts to address the SALW problem continued to register progress in the global implementation of the PoA. The open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (OEWG) began its negotiations on an international instrument and progress was made. Four broad-based consultations on further steps to enhance international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit brokering in SALW l8 were organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA or the Department) in New York and in Geneva with the participation of Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations as well as civil society organizations. A Security Council Presidential statementlg was issued after the Council held an open debate on the SALW issue, by which the Council, among other things, encouraged arms exporting countries to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in SALW transactions. A number of positive developments in the fight against SALW proliferation were also registered in other fora outside the United Nations. In April, States in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa adopted the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) decided to transform its Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa (ECOWAS ~ o r a t o r i u m into ) ~ ~ a new legallybinding instrument. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials entered into force on 8 November. This year, the General Assembly adopted an unprecedented resolutionz1 aimed at preventing the illicit transfer of, unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). The MANPADS issue was also addressed in other fora. In order to further enhance public security by reducing the threat of MANPADS, on 9 June the G8 summit (Sea Island, United States), agreed, among other things, on a set of actions to implement and expand the scope of the 2003 Evian MANPADS plan.22 These actions included accelerating efforts to destroy excess andlor obsolete MANPADS Established by resolution 581241 of 23 December 2003. Mandated by General Assembly resolution 591242. l 9 S/PRST/2004/1. 20 The Moratorium was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS countries in Abuja on 3lOctober 1998. 21 A/RES/59/90. l7

l*


and providing assistance to do so where needed; working towards adoption of the updated 2003 Wassenaar "Elements for Export Controls on MANPADS" as an international standard; further strengthening controls on transfers of MANPADS production technology to deter marketing of those systems by countries that do not maintain strong export controls standards; establishing a best practices document to serve as an international standard on optimal methods for securely storing MANPADS; developing a methodology to be used by G8 countries for assessing airport vulnerability to the MANPADS threat, as well as effective countermeasures, taking into account the study conducted by International Civil Aviation Organization; and improving methods for enhancing MANPADS identification techniques as well as countermeasures against smuggling.2 3 Progress towards the conclusion of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),24 first proposed in October 1995 by a group of Nobel Peace Laureates led by Oscar Arias gained momentum and drew the support of more than thirty countries. The United Kingdom became one of its major proponents. By SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) estimatesyz5the volume of global trade in major conventional weapons increased in 2003, estimated at $18.7 billion calculated in constant 1990 prices. This is the highest figure in the past five years. In view of the voluntary nature of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, participation in the instrument remained at a high level with 115 States reporting for the calendar year 2003. As a result of the technical adjustments made to the Register's scope on the recommendation of the Group of Governmental Experts in 2003, some States reported their transfers and holdings of SALW as well as MANPADS. Military expenditures continued to rise both globally and in many regions of the world. According to figures published by SIPRI?~world 22 Enhance Transport Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS): A G8 Action Plan. Available from http://www.g8. fr/evian/english/2003. 23 http://www.g8.utoronto.ca~summit/2004seaisland/travel.html. 24 The ATT seeks to establish a binding international agreement to control the arms trade according to established principles of human rights, humanitarian law, sustainable development and peaceful international relations. It would ban the transfer of arms that could be used to seriously violate international human rights standards and international humanitarian law and would require exporting states to avoid the sale of weapons that could have an adverse impact on sustainable development or regional peace and security. 25 See SIPRI web site: www.sipri.org.


military expenditure in 2004 was estimated to have been $975billion at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates of $1035billion in current dollars. This is just sixper cent lower in real terms than at the 1987-88 peak of cold war world military spending. As a global average, 2004 world military expenditure corresponds to $162per capita and 2.6per cent of world GDP. The major determinant of the world trend in military expenditure was the change in US defense spending, which makes up 47per cent of the world total. United States military expenditure increased rapidly during the period 2002-2004 as a result of massive budgetary allocations for what it described as the global war on terrorism, primarily for military operations in Afghanistan and ~ r a ~ . ' ~ Following the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) in November 2003, the GGE turned its attention to the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAMP), which had raised serious humanitarian concerns due to the significant risk they posed to civil populations both during conflict and long after the cessation of hostilities. In accordance with the GGE mandate, further "exploration" of the ERW issue would continue. 28 The First Review Conference of the Mine-Ban Convention, referred to as the "Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World", was held in that city from 29November to 3 December. The Conference reviewed progress made in implementing the Convention since its entry into force in 1999 and identified pending challenges. The Conference adopted a 70-point "Nairobi Action Plan" aimed at overcoming continuing challenges. There were 144 States parties to the Convention at the time of the Review Conference, pending adherence by several major military powers. The pursuit of universal adherence to the Convention remains an important priority for the international community.

Small arms and light weapons The number of initiatives undertaken at the national, regional and subregional levels increased significantly during the year. Such initiatives included the establishment of national coordinating bodies in many countries, the adoption and strengthening of relevant national laws, regulations and controls, the implementation of weapons collection and destruction 26 Ibid. 27 http://www.sipri.orgl

contents/milap/milex/rne~~trends.html. By the end of 2004, three States had notified the depositary of their consent to be bound by Protocol V: Lithuania, Sierra Leone and Sweden. See CCW/MSP/2004/2, Annex VIII.

'*


programmes and the establishment of arrangements for cooperation, networking and exchange of information at the regional and subregional levels. Awareness of the problem was further raised, due in part to an increasing involvement of civil society in efforts to implement the PoA. Significant progress was also registered at the global level in the areas of marking and tracing as well as illicit brokering. The OEWG moved ahead with the its work, despite divergence of views on issues such as whether the instrument should be legally or politically binding. With respect to the issue of illicit brokering, DDA organized a number of consultations in Geneva and New York as well as in the margins of several meetings.29 The General Assembly, by resolution 59/86, requested the Secretary-General to establish, after the 2006 Review Conference and no later than 2007, a Grou of Governmental Experts to further examine the issue of illicit brokering. The Security Council continued to address the issue of the illicit trade in SALW. On 19 January, in an open debate on the issue, the Council discussed the Secretary-General's report of 31 December 2003,~' which outlined initiatives undertaken to implement the recommendations made in his previous report on SALW on ways and means in which the Council could contribute to dealing with the question of illicit trade in SALW in situations under its purview. At the conclusion of the debate, the Council adopted a Presidential statement3' by which, among other things, it welcomed resolution 581241 and encouraged arms-exporting countries to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in SALW transactions. It also encouraged international and regional cooperation in the consideration of the origin and transfers of SALW in order to prevent their diversion to terrorist groups, in particular to A1 Qaida. Also in 2004, the Security Council addressed the issue of small arms during its consideration of related issues such as peacekeeping and eacebuilding missions; the protection of civilians in armed conflict;' and women, peace and security.34 On 25 March, the Council considered the Secretary-General's report on ways to combat subregional and crass-border problems in West ~ f r i c a At . ~ the ~ conclusion of that debate, the Council

5

29 30 31 32 33 34 35

A/59/181. A/RES/59/86. S/2003/1217 and Corr. l S/PRST/2004/1. S/PRST/2004/46. S/PRST/2004/40. S/2004/200.


adopted a Presidential Statement S/PRST/2004/7, by which, among other things, it noted the Secretary-General's recommendations to address crossborder issues, in particular the plight of child soldiers and the use and proliferation of mercenaries and small arms; urged ECOWAS Member States to fully implement their 1998 moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of SALW; and invited them to take all necessary steps to better combat illegal trafficking in SALW in the region, such as the establishment of a regional register of those weapons. In an effort to improve compliance with the Security Council arms embargoes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo @RC) and Liberia, the Council established a four-member group of experts on the arms embargo ~ ~ a five-member panel of experts on Liberia. 37 against D R C and

Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SAL W in All Its Aspects The United Nations continued to play a pivotal role in the implementation of the PoA at the national, regional and global levels. In 2004, two major initiatives were started at the global level namely, the Open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons, and the broad-based consultations on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in

SALW (OEWG). Open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable States to identifyand trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (OEWG) The OEWG, established pursuant to resolution 58/241, held an organizational session in New York on 3 and 4 February. It elected Anton Thalrnann (Switzerland) as chairman3* and decided on the dates and venue for the three substantive sessions: 14-25 June 2004, 24 January-4 February 2005 and 6-17 June 2005, (New York). The first substantive session3' was devoted mainly to a general debate. Thematic discussions were held on the main elements of tracing, i.e., marking, record keeping and international cooperation. Divergent views were 36 S/2004/3 17. 37 S/2004/40. 38 Representatives from Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Germany, India. Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Ukraine were elected as Vice-Chairpersons.


expressed on several issues, including the scope and nature of the instrument; marking SALW at the time of import; the right to initiate a request for tracing; and the role of the United Nations, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and Interpol in supporting the operation of the future instrument. The report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit SALW~'and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementin the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 47 were used as reference documents for the discussions. At the session's conclusion, it was agreed that the Chairman would produce the first draft of the international instrument and circulate it to all Member States before the convening of the second session. In preparation for such a draft instrument, on 20 October, the Chairman held informal consultations to hear the views of States on a written questionnaire which he had previously circulated on elements of the draft instrument.

Consultations on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons By resolution 581241, the General Assembly requested the SecretaryGeneral, while seeking the views of Member States on the matter, to hold broad-based consultations with all Member States, interested regional and subregional organizations, international agencies and experts in the field, on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in SALW. Pursuant to that request, DDA organized such informal consultations on 2 1 April and 24 May in Geneva and on 11 June and 15 July in New York. In order to facilitate deliberations, DDA prepared a background paper42 providing an overview of the issue of illicit brokering, outlining regional and international initiatives to combat illicit brokering, and providing a summary of identified areas of concern. To ensure the widest possible participation in these consultations, DDA included the illicit brokering issue in various regional meetings it organized. These included: the Regional Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 39 Participation in the first substantive of the OEWG included 106 Member States. In addition, 62 accredited NGOs participated in the Group's open meetings. 40 A/58/138. 41 Al551383lAdd.2. 42 http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-brokering.html.


Central Asia, (Almaty, 16-18 ÿ arch) ;43 DDNUNDP (United Nations Development Programme) workshop on the implementation of the PoA for the members of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, (Nairobi, 20-2 1 ~ a,44 ad ~ hoc) working group on SALW and landmines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Brussels, 30 April); an informal exchange of views on the occasion of a DDNUNDP subregional workshop on national reporting on the PoA for the States of the Maghreb with the participation of the League of Arab States, (Tunisia, 14-15 June) ; and a meeting of senior representatives of DDA and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) , (New York, 18 May). Other initiatives undertaken outside the United Nations system included a conference on combating illicit small arms brokering and trafficking in West Africa organized by ECOWAS in collaboration with the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, (Abuja, 22to24March), as well as a workshop hosted by the Institute for Security Studies on understanding and regulating arms brokering in southern Africa, (Johannesburg, 15 to 17 March). The outcome of the above consultations was reflected in the SecretaryGeneral's Report on Assistance to States for curbing illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,45which indicated that there was a need for a more in-depth study of the issue. By resolution 59/86 of 3 December 2004, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to hold such consultations, on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in SALW, with a view to establishing, after the 2006 review conference and no later than 2007, and after the conclusion of the work of the Open-ended Working Group on marking and tracing, a group of governmental experts, to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in SALW.

Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism CASA members, collectively and individually, continued to support the implementation of the PoA and to provide assistance to Member States in that regard. Its activities were reflected in a report by the Secretary43

Al591181.

44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 ~ e n e r a lCASA . ~ ~ meetings were also regularly convened in New York. With a view to facilitating collation and distribution of information among its Members as well as to Member States and the public at large, CASA undertook to develop an Internet database (CASA Database) which is expected to be officially launched in 2005. It will feature databases on small arms-related projects and activities, contact information for CASA Members and Member States and an electronic library. A number of joint activities and projects were implemented by CASA members. DDA, UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) and UNDP, supported by the Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based NGO, undertook the second phase of the PoA National Reporting Project. The project aims to help countries affected by small arms to develop their long-term capacity to report on their implementation of the PoA, and by participating in information-sharing and confidence-building measures. More than 80 Member States received such assistance. As part of a collaborative effort between DDA and DPI (Department of Public Information), a compilation of United Nations documents related to SALW was published and distributed to Member States and civil society institutions. WHO (World Health Organization) and UNDP continued to implement a joint project on an Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP). The research programme aims to reduce armed violence and the demand for small arms in selected settings and generates best practices in violence prevention. The United Nations organized or CO-sponsoredseveral training seminars and workshops on SALW in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the ~ a r i b b e a n . ~ ~

46 Ibid.

47 These included a training for Members of the Togolese National Commission to fight SALW proliferation; a training the trainers investigative techniques course in Peru on commercial trade and illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and ammunition; a workshop in Brazil on the firearms industry and regional brokers; a law enforcement training in Brazil; a workshop on PoA implementation and reporting in Tunisia; a workshop in Fiji on SALW issues in the Pacific region; an experts workshop in Mali on transparency and small arms control in Africa; a seminar in Peru on the PoA; a seminar in Peru on Peruvian firearms law; and capacity-building sessions in Peru and Brazil for parliamentary advisors, PoA focal points, and NGOs. Several weapons destruction and stockpile management programmes were designed and implemented by DDA,through its Regional Centre in Lima.


UNDP UNDP made a significant contribution to the fight against the impact of illicit SALW from the perspective of human, social and economic development. The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and UNDP Country Offices undertook over 30 SALW programmes worldwide at global, regional and country levels in 2004. The regional and country specific projects were extended to five regions and approximately 20 countries in the areas related to, inter alia, the management and destruction of weapons, DDR (disarmament, deomobilization and rehabilitation), security sector reform and the enhancement of public awareness on the issue of SALW.

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) The report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council prepared by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for CAAC took into consideration the illicit trade in SALW and stressed the correlation between the easy availability of such weapons and the phenomenon of child soldiers, with special attention given to the regional context.

UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) As part of a collaborative effort among UNIDIR, UNDP, DDA and the Small Arms Survey, in October UNIDIR published a book entitled "Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW: Analysis of the Reports Submitted by States in 2003". Under the auspices of the Geneva Forum, the Institute also played a substantial role in organizing the seminar "The Role of Regional Organizations in Stemming the Illicit Trade in SALW: Sharing Experience and Drawing Lessons" which brought together senior representatives of twelve regional organizations working to address the problem of illicit SALW trade.

OCHA (Officefor the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) OCHA addressed the devastating impact on civilians of the illicit flow of small arms. To that end, in his Report to the Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral urged the Council to establish monitoring mechanisms for arms embargoes on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2004/43 1, May2004). The Office continued to organize a series of regional workshops on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with a view to creating a dialogue on the issue among Member States and between Member States and the humanitarian community.


Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures During the year, the Group of Interested States on Practical Disarmament Measures ( G I S ) held ~ ~ three meetings devoted to assessing current and new project proposals and reviewing recent requests for assistance by Governments. Among the concrete projects, it supported the United NationsJLeague of Arab States SALW Conference in Cairo and follow-up of its final report; a workshop on the development of a small arms reporting system for Arab States; and setting up a Small Arms Unit in ECOWAS developing an interregional convention on SALW and an Action Plan for involvement of civil society. The GIS also considered other projects to assist Member States in their fight against SALW proliferation and reviewed requests to DDA for assistance from the Governments of Burundi, Nigeria and Tajikistan. Assistance to States in curbing the illicit tramc in small arms DDA and DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) undertook a joint technical mission to Sri Lanka from 17 to 20 October. The objective was to restart the Project to Support the Establishment of a National Commission Against the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms in Sri Lanka, which had been paralyzed because of political developments in the country. The mission found that it would be viable to restart the project as all the relevant actors - the Government, the UN system, donors and civil society organizations - were supportive and eager to begin implementation without delay. Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

The UN Register of Conventional Arms DDA continued its efforts to raise extra-budgetary funds to organize workshops in cooperation with interested States to enhance familiarity with and promote participation in the two United Nations reporting instruments: the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures. As a result, subregional workshops to discuss the Register were held in Nairobi, (May) and in Nadi, Fiji, (August). A presentation on the Register was also made at a plenary meeting of the Hemispheric Committee of the Organization of American States, (Washington D.C., March). In addition, DDA published its "Information Booklet 2 0 0 4 " , ~which ~ contains frequently asked questions regarding the standardized reporting forms as well as documents related to the Register. 48 49

See http:lldisarmarnent.un.orglcab. See DDA's web site http://disarmament.un.org.


The United Nations continued to gather official data from Member States through its standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures. In 2004, 79 States reported to the instrument, registering a slight increase over the previous year. Although the progress made so far falls far short of the goal of universal participation, the replies submitted by Member States have increased significantly over the past four years when compared to earlier years, indicating a positive trend towards greater transparency of military expenditures.

Annual report on the Register for the calendar year 2003 The twelfth consolidated report issued by the Secretary-General for the calendar year 2003 contained data and information provided by 115 governments on imports and exports in the seven categories of conventional arms covered by the Register. A composite table for 2003 listing all the replies received by the Secretary-General and indicating whether each one contained data on imports and exports or both, and whether relevant explanations and background information were included, is annexed to this chapter (see page 124). Regional participation is reflected in the following table: Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 1998-2003 (excluding Cook Island and Niue submissions)

African States (53 members)

Asian States (54 members)

Eastern European States (22 members)

Latin American and Caribbean States (33members)

Western European and Other States (29 members)

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 In addition, on the basis of paragraph 7 of resolution 58/54, the Secretary-General received views from Sweden and the European Union.

Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures The Secretary-General's report on "Objective information on military matters, including trans arency of military expenditures" contained replies from 79 Governments. By its biennial resolution 58/28 of 8 December 2003, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to promote international and regional symposia and training seminars to explain the purposes of the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and to give relevant technical instructions. Pursuant to this request, DDA continued to cooperate with interested Governments in holding workshops on transparency in armaments, including the UN standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures (For details, see the aforementioned section on the Register).

58

The Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW The Meeting of the States parties to the CCW was held in Geneva on 18and 19 November under the chairmanship of Gordan Markoti (Croatia) . Its main task was to consider the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States parties to the Convention, including the recommendations contained therein on the mandates of the two working groups for further work in 2005, as well as the recommendations to consider the issue on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols and to consider matters pertaining to the preparation of the Third Review Conference. Sixty-nine States parties5'to the Convention participated in the Meeting along with six Signatory and one State, which had deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval of or accession, but for which the Convention has not yet entered into force.53 Seventeen States not parties to the Convention attended as observers.54 Representatives of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and 50 A/59/192 and Add. 1.

"See Report of the Meeting of States Parties to CCW (CCW/MSP/2004/2). This and all documents on the CCW are available from http://disarmament.un.org/cab. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.


the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as a number of other international and non-govenrmental organizations also attended the Meeting. In his message to the Meeting, the Secretary-General underscored the importance of full implementation of and universal adherence to the CCW. He expressed particular concern over MOTAPM and remained hopeful that the Group would soon be able to recommend to States parties the strongest possible commitment on this particular issue. He also appealed to the States parties to consider further steps that could be taken to prevent weapons from becoming explosive remnants of war and to minimize their devastating humanitarian impact. He praised the three States parties that had ratified Protocol V on ERW and hoped that more ratifications would follow for the Protocol's early entry into force. During the consideration of the report of the Group's work and general exchange of views, 25 delegations made ~ t a t e r n e n t sA. ~representative ~ of the ICRC also participated in the discussion. Many participants pointed to the considerable humanitarian hazard caused by the irresponsible use of MOTAPM and underlined that after years of consideration the issue was ripe for codification. Although they recognized the existence of different approaches on how best to address the various aspects of the MOTAPM problem, the majority of States parties expressed strong support for commencing negotiations on prohibitions and restrictions on their use. Several countries, however, thought that the issue still needed further study and reiterated their readiness to consider it within the present mandate. Support was also expressed for a continuation of the ERW discussion. Moreover, in discussions on the issue of the third review conference, several delegations56 gave their support to a timely commencement of the preparations for the conference. With a view to future work, the Meeting adopted new mandates for the two working groups to continue their work in 2 0 0 5 . ~Regarding ~ ERW, the Group would continue to consider, including through participation of legal experts, the implementation of existing principles of international humanitarian law. It would also further study, on an-open-ended basis, with particular emphasis on meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including submunitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. 55 56 57

Ibid. Japan. Netherlands (on behalf of the European Union) and South Africa. CCW/MSP/2004/2.


Information exchanges, assistance and cooperation would be part of this work. On the issue of MOTAPM, the Group would continue to consider all proposals put forward since the establishment of the GGE with the aim of elaborating appropriate recommendations for submission to the next Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention. Meetings of military experts would also be convened to provide advice on these activities. The Meeting further decided that the Chairperson-designate of the Meeting of the States Parties in 2005 should undertake consultations during the intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols, as well as on the preparation of the Third Review Conference and should report to the next Meeting of the States Parties on both matters. The States parties decided to redesignate Gordan Markoti (Croatia) as Chairperson of the Meeting of the States Parties in 2005, and reappointed Jayant Prasad (India) as Coordinator on Explosive Remnants of War and Markku Reimaa (Finland) as Coordinator on Mines Other Than AntiPersonnel Mines. The Group would hold its tenth, eleventh and twelfth sessions from 7 to 11 March, 2 to 12 August and 14 to 22 November 2005, respectively.

Meetings of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts

The seventh session The seventh session of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was held in Geneva from 8 to 12 March. The Group conducted its work in two Working Groups that addressed the issues of ERW and MOTAPM. The Workin Group on ERW considered a working paper presented by the Coordinator! which, inter alia, contained ideas on how to move forward on the discussion regarding the implementation of existing principles of international humanitarian law - informally coined by delegates as his " three-step approachM. 59 It also received four working papers60 and heard a presentation by Human Rights Watch entitled "Off Target: The Conduct of 58 CCWIGGEIVIIIWG.11WP.1. 59 The Coordinator's "three-step approach'' essentially recommended that

the GGE should deliberate on (i) which principles of international humanitarian law are relevant to ERW; (ii) what is the status of their implementation by the various States Parties; and (iii) the adequacy of the national implementation mechanisms as required by international humanitarian law, and whether any further measures are required. 60 CCWIGGEIVIINVG. INVP. 1 to CCWIGGEIVIINVG. lNVP.4.


the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq". The working group also held one meeting of military experts under the chairmanship of Lt. Col. Bernard Jeanty (Switzerland), in which the question of possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions was discussed. The discussion was based on a non-paper by the chair containing a matrix on the preventive measures of munitions. It was decided that the matrix would be further updated based on comments during the Group's next sessions. The Working Group on MOTAPM had before it six working papers. It also heard presentations by the United States on "Detectability", "US Mine Systems Self-Destruct (SD) Assurance", "SD/SDA Mechanisms", "Lithium Batteries" and on the new US policy on landmines; and by Australia on "Landmine Detection Technology". UNMAS made a presentation entitled "Current and Future Technology for MOTAPM Detection and Clearance". One meeting of military experts was held under the chairmanship of Col. Juhani Kaariainen (Finland) and discussed a working paper presented by the Coordinator entitled "Military Experts Meeting: Tentative list of areas for d i s c u ~ s i o n "which ~~ focused on issues such as marking, fencing and monitoring; fuse standards, sensitive fuses and batteries; detectability and future production; lifetime, storage, transfers, training and cooperation; nonstate actors; self-destruction and self-deactivating devices. The GGE also devoted one meeting to the consideration of options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols under the chairmanship of Gordan Markoti.

The eighth session The eighth session of the GGE was held in Geneva from 5 to 16 July 2004. At its opening meeting there was an exchange of views on the status of Protocol V. The Group also welcomed Sweden's submission of the instrument of ratification as well as the Lithuanian Parliament's ratification of the Protocol. During its meetings, the Working Group on ERW considered a working paper by its c~ordinator.'~Two meetings of military experts discussed a paper by its chairman.64 The Group continued to consider the implementation of existing principles of international humanitarian law and continued to further study possible preventive measures. It heard CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/WP. 1 to CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/WP.6. CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/WP. 1. " CCWIGGEIVIIIIWG. 1lWP.1. 23 July 2004. 64 CCW/GGElVIIIlWG. 111, 8 July 2004. 'l

62

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 presentations on "ERW Matrix on Submunitions" (France), "The ERW Situation in Lithuania" (Lithuania), "ERW Threat Matrix Showing Relative Hazard" (United Kingdom), "Life Cycle Reliability Testing for Submunitions" and "Legacy US Submunition Weapon Reliability Efforts" (US), "Technical Options to Reduce ERW" (Switzerland), and "Cluster Munitions: A Global Overview" (Human Rights Watch). The Working Group on MOTAPM held nine meetings, focusing on the Coordinator's paper,65which essentially considered the aspects of preventive technical measures (detectability; limitation of the active lifespan of MOTAPM; sensitive fuses; anti-handling devices), other operational alternatives (MOTAPM laid outside marked and fenced areas), and other related issues (warning to civilians; use of MOTAPM by non-state actors and other issues related to the irresponsible use of MOTAPM; transfers; transparency and other confidence building measures; international cooperation and assistance). The Working Group received seven papers.66 It also held two meetings of military experts under the chairmanship of Brig. Gen. Juha Kilpf (Finland) and discussed his working paper.67The Working Group heard presentations on "Perimeter Marked Area" (Finland), "Technical presentation on MOTAPM" (India), and "Detectability" (United States). On the issue of options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols, under the Chairmanship of Gordan Markoti (Croatia), the Group considered a discussion paper prepared by the chairpersod8and a paper by South ~ f r i c a . ~Furthermore, ' the Group heard a presentation entitled "The Functioning of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission" .70

CCWIGGENIIIIWG.2Il. l l June 2004, entitled Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group o f Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to provide a basis for further work. 66 CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/1, CCW/GGE/VIII/WG. 212 and CCWIGGEI VIIINVG.2IWP. 1 to CCW1GGEIVIII1WG.21WP.5 . 67 CCWIGGEIVIIIMIG.2I2, 8 July 2004. " CCWIGGEIVIIII2, 1 July 2004, entitled Discussion paper on Compliance. " CCWIGGENIIIIWP. 1, 5 August 2004, entitled CC W Framework Convention: Additional Articles on Consultations and Compliance. This paper is a revised version of a document previously submitted by South Africa and issued under the symbol CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.7, on 20 December 2001. 70 Presented by Prof. Dr. Michael Bothe of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission.


The ninth session The ninth session of the GCE was held in Geneva from 8 to 16 November 2004. The Working Group on ERW continued to discuss the implementation of existing international humanitarian law as well as the possible preventive measures for improving the design of certain S ecific types of munitions, including submunitions. It received three papers7Pand heard presentations on "Safety, Reliability and Performance of Conventional Munitions and Submunitions" and ''International Law and the Use of Munitions", both by Germany. One meeting of military experts was convened under its chairman. The Working Group on MOTAPM discussed a paper by its Coordinator presenting ideas for further work.72 The paper focused on the following issues: detectability of MOTAPM; restrictions on the use of MOTAPM; sensitive fuses and sensors; anti-handling devices; protection of civilians; warning and mine risk education; transfers; transparency and other confidence-building measures; issues related to the irresponsible use of MOTAPM; and international coo eration and assistance. The Working Group also received three papers, 7y and heard presentations on "Detection Augmentation Tag for Landmines", "What is Detectability" and "Minefield Marking Methodologies, A Start Point for Discussion" (Australia); "Mine Area: Fencing and Marking" (Finland) ; "Impact of MOTAPM Detectability on their Combat Effectiveness", "Advanced Technologies of Detection of Explosive Ordnance" and "Methods of Recording, Fencing and Marking of Mines and Explosive Obstacles in the Russian Federation" (Russian Federation) ; and "MOTAPM Detection Signal Equivalence" (United States). The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD) also made a presentation of a study it carried out on the "Humanitarian Impact from Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines". It also held one meeting of military experts under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. Ahti Vartiainen (Finland) and discussed his paper.74 The GGE held one meeting to consider options to promote compliance with the Convention, under the chairmanship of Gordan Markoti, and 71 CCWIGGEIIXIWG. 111, CCWIGGEIIXIWG. 11WP.1 and CCWIGGEI IXIWG. 11WP.2. 72 CCWIGGElIXMIG.2I1, 15 October 2004, entitled Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group o f Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to provide a basis for further work. 73 CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/1, CCW/GGElIX/WG.2/2, CCWIGGEIIXIWG.2 /WP. 1 and CCWIGGEIIXIWG.2NVP.2. 74 CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/2, 29 October 2004, entitled Provisional Agenda for the Meeting o f the Military Experts on MOTAPM.


which contained ideas considered a paper presented by the European and suggestions by the EU amending their proposal for the establishment of an appropriate and adequate compliance mechanism under the CCW. At the GGE's second plenary meeting on 16 November, both Coordinators presented the recommendations of their respective Working ~ r o u which ~ s ~ basically ~ repeated the current mandates and were endorsed by the Group. The Group also recommended that the Chairman-designate should undertake consultations during the intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols, taking into account proposals put forward, and should submit a report, adopted by consensus, to the States parties. The Group further recommended that follow up work arising from the Meeting of the States parties (18-19 November 2004) should be held under the oversight of the Chairman-designate of the Meeting proposed to be held in Geneva in 2005 in conjunction with the Seventh Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol 11.

75 CCWIGGEIIXIWP. 1, 29 November 2004, entitled Ideas and Suggestions regarding a Possible Compliance Mechanism under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 76 The Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War recommended to the States Parties that it would continue its work in the year 2005 with the following mandate: "To continue to consider, including through participation of legal experts, the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open-ended basis, with particular emphasis on meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including submunitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of information, assistance and cooperation would be part of this work. The Group will report on the work done to the next Meeting of the States parties." The Working Group on Mines Other Than- Anti-Personnel Mines recommended to the States Parties that it would continue its work in the year 2005 with the following mandate: "(1) To consider all proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts with the aim of elaborating appropriate recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines for submission to the next Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention; (2) Meetings of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these activities."


Anti-personnel mines

Nairobi Summit--FirstReview Conference of States Parties to the MineBan Convention

In accordance with the decision taken at the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties, it was agreed to hold the Mine-Ban Convention's First Review Conference at the United Nations facilities in Nairobi from 29 November to 3 December 2004. The States parties agreed to designate Wolfgang Petritsch (Austria) as President of the First Review Conference; to request that Kenya designate a Secretary-General of the Review Conference; and to proceed with a preparatory process in a manner consistent with the elements contained in the report77 of the President of the Fourth Meeting of the States Parties, Jean Lint (Belgium). To prepare for the First Review Conference, two sessions of the Preparatory Meeting were held on 13 February and 28-29 June 2004, respectively. At the Second Preparatory Meeting, it was recommended that, in keeping with the practice of the annual meetings, the co-chairs of the four Standing Committees should serve as vice-presidents of the First Review Conference namely, Australia, Cambodia, Croatia, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Mexico and the Netherlands. In addition, given that the Review Conference was to take place in Africa and that the 2003-2004 complement of co-chairs did not include an African State party, it was recommended that one additional vice-president be nominated from an African State party at the Review Conference. On 2-3 December 2003, preparatory work for the Nairobi Summit was launched at a ceremony in Cyprus at which the host government commenced its programme of destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines. The following eight regional conferences were held leading up to the First Review Conference for the purpose of advancing the Convention's aims: Burkina Faso for West Africa, Romania for South-Eastern Europe, Kenya for the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, Tajikistan for Central Asia, Jordan for the Middle East, Lithuania for Northern and Eastern Europe, Ecuador for the Americas, and Thailand for South East Asia. In addition, other States parties hosted conferences of a thematic nature, including France and Switzerland. The African Union held the Second Continental Meeting of Experts on Landmines and adopted the Common African Position on Landmines. Donor states, the United Nations, ICBL, ICRC and GICHD played an instrumental role in financing, otherwise supporting and participating in these regional events or both. 77

APLC/MSP.5/2003/5, Annex 11.


The Conference The First Review Conference was opened on 29 November by Sorajak Kasemsuvan, (Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thailand). Wolfgang Petritsch (Austria) was elected President. Participants included 109 States parties, 26 States as observers, and a number of international organizations and NGOS.78 The Secretary-General addressed the Conference via satellite-link up on 3 December. He spoke highly of the progress made by States parties to the Convention in implementing the Instrument. He expressed strong support for the vision set forth in the Nairobi Declaration and promised that the United Nations would continue to help in every way possible in achieving the goal of a mine-free world.79 The Conference held ten plenary meetings from 29 November to 3December. It reviewed the general status and operation of the Convention, the matter of future meetings of the States parties and related matters, and a draft plan of action to overcome remaining challenges, and the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. The final four plenary meetings featured a high-level segment at which 103 representatives of States parties, observer States and observer organizations addressed the Conference. The Conference concluded that, since it was adopted in Oslo on 18September 1997, the Convention's unique spirit of cooperation had been sustained, ensuring the Convention's rapid entry into force and its more than five successful years of implementation. The Conference took stock of accomplishments to date and the essential work that lies before the States parties in ensuring that the Convention lives up to its promise. 80 The Conference adopted a document containing the Review of the operation and status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction: 1999-2004, emphasizing that while great progress had been made in ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines, much more needed to be done.81 It also adopted a document entitled Ending the suffering See Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 2005, available from http://www.reviewconference.org/pdf/ documents/final-report. 79 In his address to the Summit on a Mine-Free World, the SecretaryGeneral pledged support in implementing the strategy for the next five years, (SGlSMl9634). Available from http://disarmament.un.org. As recorded in documents APLC/CONF/2004/L.3/Rev. 1, APLC/CONF/ 2004/L.3/Rev. l/Corr. 1 and APLC/CONF/2004/L.3/Rev. l / Amend. 1 APLC/CONF/2004/5 78

9 February

Conventional weapons issues and caused by anti-personnel mines: Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009,~~ urged all States parties and all others who shared their aims to undertake all necessary actions at the national, regional and international levels to implement the action plan. It also adopted a document entitled Towards a emphasizing that this mine-free world: the 2004 Nairobi ~eclaration?~ declaration contained the States parties' renewed commitment to achieving the goal of a world free of anti-personnel mines, in which there were no more new victims. As for the Programme of meetings and related matters to facilitate implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009, the Conference took the decision to hold annually, until the Second Review Conference, a Meeting of the States parties to take place in the second half of the year, in Geneva or, when possible or appropriate, in a mine-affected country. In addition, until 2009, annual informal intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees would be held in Geneva in the first half of the year, for a duration of up to five days. Finally, it was decided that the Second Review Conference would take place in the second half of 2009. The next Meeting of the States Parties would be held in Croatia from 28November to 2 December 2005. Meetings of the Standing Committees would take place during the week of 13-17 June 2005 with the length of individual meetings and their sequencing, and duration of the entire period meetings to be established by the Coordinating Committee.

The Sixth Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Protocol 11to the CC W Pursuant to the decisions of the previous Annual Conference, the Sixth a ~ elected ~ Annual Conference was convened on 17 November in ~ e n e v and Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos (Brazil) as President. In a message to the Conference, the United Nations Secretary-General called on the international community to do its utmost to eliminate antipersonnel mines worldwide. He appealed to those countries that had not yet ratified Amended Protocol 11, particularly those which had acceded to the original Protocol 11, to do so as soon as possible, as anti-personnel mines aggravated the disastrous economic consequences of armed conflicts and threatened future generations.

Ibid. Ibid. For the list of participants, see the Final Document of the Sixth Annual Conference, CCW/AP.II/CONF.6/3, 17 November 2004. 82

83 84

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The Conference conducted its work in plenary meetings and reviewed the operation and status of Amended Protocol 11. Nineteen States took part in the general exchange of views.85 As at the previous annual conference, the issue of the universality of the Protocol remained the underlying theme of the debate, while many states parties also expressed support for enhancing compliance, including the submission of national annual reports. The Conference received national annual reports from 50 States parties.86 These reports contained information on (a) dissemination of information on the Protocol to armed forces and civilian populations; (b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes; (c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the Protocol and any other relevant information pertaining thereto; (d) legislation related to the Protocol; (e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance; (f) other relevant matters; and (g) information to the UN-database on mine clearance. The Conference concluded its work by adopting its final docurnentP7 as well as an to all States that had not yet done so to take all measures to accede to Amended Protocol I1 as soon as possible. In its report, the Conference recommended that the Secretary-General, as depositary, and the President-designate of the Seventh Annual Conference, exercise their authority to achieve the goal of its universality, and called upon the States parties to promote wider adherence in their respective regions. The Conference decided to designate a representative of Switzerland as president of the Seventh Annual Conference to be convened in 2005 and representatives of China, the Czech Republic and Jordan as Vice-Presidentsdesignate.89

Wassenaar Arrangement The tenth plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA)" was held in Vienna from 8-9 December. Participating States worked diligently to See CCW/AP.II/CONF.6/SR. 1. Ibid. 87 CCW/AP.II/CONF.6/3. 88 Ibid., Annex 11. 89 The Conference decided that the Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW, in November 2004, would address the dates and duration of the Seventh Annual Conference in 2005. On 19 November 2004, the Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW agreed to convene the Seventh Annual Conference on 23 November 2005 in Geneva. 85

86

Conventional weapons issues implement and expand upon the progress achieved during the 2003 Assessment Year by further developing and undertaking, as a matter of high priority, measures to implement initiatives such as the work conducted against terrorism. The Plenary welcomed Slovenia as a new Participating State. The plenary welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Participating States expressed their willingness to provide assistance in the development of effective export controls to those States that requested it. The plenary also reiterated its intention to broaden the WA outreach to countries not yet participating in the Arrangement, other export control regimes and international and regional organizations. Participating States reaffirmed their intention to intensify efforts to prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organizations, while at the same time viewing them as an integral part of the global fight against terrorism. In this context, they also exchanged information on national measures taken in accordance with their 2003 decision to tighten controls on the export of ManPortable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and called again on other countries to apply similar controls. For the first time in the history of the WA, a major initiative was undertaken in the form of an Outreach Seminar, which took place in Vienna on 19 October. The seminar raised awareness of the positive contribution that the WA made to responsible transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, the importance of increasing its transparency and the need for greater engagement by the WA participating States with industry representatives. 91

General Assembly, 2004 The General Assembly considered eight draft resolutions dealing with conventional weapons issues. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in July 1996. Its meetings are normally held in Vienna where the Arrangement is based. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. is available on WA's web site: 'lMore information

http://www.wassenaar.org.


Small arms and light weapons

59/74. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. The revised draft resolution was introduced by Mali, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 426 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page

359. The resolution encouraged the international community to support the implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium; and also called upon the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil organizations to take action to combat the illicit trade in small arms. It invited the Secretary-General and those States and organizations that were in a position to do so to provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them; and requested him to continue to consider the matter and to report to the Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

59/86. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The draft resolution was introduced by Colombia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 451 for the sponsors) on 22 October. A revised text was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November, and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 384. The resolution requested the Secretary-General, while seeking the views of States, to continue to hold broad-based consultations with all Member States and interested regional and subregional organizations, on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in SALW, with a view to establishing, after the 2006 review conference and no later than 2007, and after the conclusion of the (OEWG), a group of governmental experts, appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in SALW, and report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the outcome of his consultations. It also requested him to report on the implementation of the resolution, including any outcome of the openended working group on tracing illicit SALW. First Committee. Speaking before the vote, Egypt, said that it would join the consensus, but had concerns about the request in operative paragraph 5 for an expert group in 2006/2007 to consider brokering in SALW. It believed that the proposed group on brokering should be postponed until the Open-ended Working Group on tracing had dealt with the matter effectively.

Conventional weapons issues Two States which joined the consensus spoke after the vote. Cuba supported the consultations on new measures to enhance international cooperation in illicit brokering in SALW, but clarified that those consultations should be transparent and non-discriminatory and that the subject must be examined carefully, comprehensively and on the basis of strict respect for the principles regarding respect for sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of States. It reiterated that preventing, combating and eliminating brokering in SALW should not be seen in isolation but as part of the full implementation of the PoA at the national, regional and international levels. For its part, Iran noted that the request in operative paragraph 5 for a panel of governmental experts on brokering had not yet been agreed upon.

Practical disarmament measures 59/82. Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures. The draft resolution was introduced by Germany, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 447 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November, and by the General Assembly on 3December. For the text of the resolution see page 376. The resolution encouraged Member States, including the Group of Interested States, to lend their support to the Secretary-General, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and non-governmental organizations in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations. It then requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly's sixty-first session a report on the implementation of practical disarmament measures, taking into consideration of the activities of the Group of Interested States in that regard.

Conventional arms transfers, transparency and ammunition 59/90. Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems. The draft resolution was introduced by Australia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 452 for the sponsors) on 22 October. The revised text was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 3 November and by the General Assembly on 3December. For the text of the resolution see page 389. The new resolution encouraged Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulation, procedures and stockpile management practices to exercise effective control over access to and transfer of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 access to and use of such weapons. Member States were also encouraged to ban the transfer of those weapons to non-State end-users and ensure their export only to Governments or agents authorized by a Government. The resolution also encouraged initiatives to exchange information and to mobilize resources and technical expertise to assist States, at their request, in enhancing national controls and stockpile management practices to prevent unauthorized access to and use and transfer of MANPADS and to destroy excess or obsolete stockpiles of such weapons, as appropriate.

First Committee.Speaking after the vote, Cuba stated that it was inopportune for the Committee to introduce and adopt resolutions on specific SALW issues such as MANPADS when it was moving towards adopting an international instrument to prevent the illicit trade in those weapons. It also pointed out that the introduction of specific draft resolutions as this one ran counter to the Committee's efforts to streamline its work. Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures 59/92. Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. The draft resolution was introduced by Argentina, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 454 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 391. The new resolution encouraged Member States to continue to adopt confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms and to provide information in that regard; it also encouraged them to engage in a dialogue on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. It then requested the Secretary-General to establish, with the financial support of States in a position to do so, an electronic database containing information from Member States on confidence-building measures and assist them in organizing seminars, courses and workshops to enhance their knowledge of new developments in this field. 591515. Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. The draft decision was introduced by Bulgaria, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 462 for the sponsors) on 220ctober. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 270ctober and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the decision see page 4 19. The decision stipulated that this item be included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly's sixtieth session.


Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CC W) 591107. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The draft resolution was introduced by Sweden, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 460 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 4 12. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Meeting of the States Parties, as well as for any possible continuation of work after the Meeting, should the States parties deem it appropriate. It also requested him, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and its Protocols, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically, by electronic means, of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention and its Protocols.

First Committee. In its explanation of vote, the United States remarked that while it joined the consensus, it had concerns about the language in operative paragraph 3 calling for ratification of Protocol V on ERW. It elaborated that while it was still in the initial stages of ratifying the Protocol, it was precluded from agreeing to language that would appear to prejudge, circumvent or undermine the constitutional processes that were fundamental to its system. Anti-personnel mines 59/84. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The draft resolution was introduced by Thailand, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 450 for the sponsors) on 22 October. The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November (140- 1- 18) and by the General Assembly on 3December (157-0-22). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 380 and 432. The resolution invited all States that did not sign the Convention to accede to it without delay and urged those that had signed but not ratified the Convention to do so. It also invited and encouraged all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the ICRC and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the First Review Conference at the highest possible level and, pending a decision to be taken at that Conference, to maintain the high level of participation in the subsequent Meetings of the States parties,


including their programme of intersessional work. It also requested the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the next Meeting of States Parties.

First Committee. Before the vote, the Republic of Korea, said that while it supported the Convention's humanitarian objectives, it would abstain because the draft's provisions were inconsistent with its own legitimate security concerns. Several States that were not Parties to the Ottawa Convention - the Russian Federation, China, India, Cuba, Libya and Myanmar - explained their abstentions. While committed to the humanitarian aspect of the landmine issue, many believed that the issue had to address both the humanitarian concerns and the legitimate self-defence of sovereign States. They were therefore unable to support the invitation to accede to the Treaty as called for in the draft resolution. The Russian Federation could not support the draft, but was prepared to accede to the Treaty when the necessary conditions were met for the actual implementation of its provisions through a stage-by-stage process. China was not in a position to accede to the Convention because of its self-defence needs, but would continue to contribute to international demining efforts, step up exchanges and cooperation with all interested countries and international organizations and participate as an observer in the First Review Conference of States Parties. India remained committed to a non-discriminatory global ban on antipersonnel landmines (APLs) through a phased process that addressed the legitimate defence requirements of States. It held that the complete elimination of APLs would be facilitated by addressing their legitimate defensive role through appropriate militarily effective and non-lethal alternative technologies that could perform that role cost-effectively. Cuba would continue to lend its full support to all efforts that would maintain the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security concerns. Libya abstained due to the Convention's failure to address its security interests, the issue of responsibility for previously placed for mines and compensation for its mine victims. Myanmar stated that a total ban on APLs was not a practical or effective solution. It added that the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum for dealing with the problem of illicit trafficking and indiscriminate use of those mines. Three States that were not Parties to the Convention explained their positive votes. Singapore announced its efforts against the indiscriminate use of APLs: the expansion of its 1998 moratorium to include the export of all kinds of anti-personnel mines, indefinite extension of that moratorium and support for international efforts to resolve humanitarian concerns over APLs. Nepal stated that its positive vote reiterated its unwavering commitment to

Conventional weapons issues the elimination of APLs, however it was not currently in a position to sign the Convention owing to the issue of legitimate security concerns. Morocco stated that by its positive vote it had reaffirmed its support for and attachment to the objectives and humanitarian principles of the Ottawa Convention and its commitment to support the review process.

Conclusion The year 2004 witnessed an increased number of initiatives at the national, subregional and regional levels to further implement the PoA. There was also a growing awareness of the problem of illicit trade in SALW due in part to a more active involvement of civil society in the efforts to address the problem. At the global level, significant progress was registered in the areas of marking and tracing of SALW with the OEWG undertaking substantive work to conclude an international instrument on the subject. As requested by the General Assembly, the Department organized several broad-based consultations on further steps to enhance international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit brokering of SALW, which drew the participation of Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations as well as civil society organizations. Despite the progress made by the international community in this area, the proliferation and misuse of SALW continued to pose a serious threat to peace and security in many regions of the world, especially in conflict situations. For the first time, the General Assembly adopted a resolution aimed at preventing the illicit transfer of, unauthorized access to and use of MANPADS. Debate on the conclusion of ATT also gained some momentum. The two UN instruments - the Register of Conventional Arms and the standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures - continued to contribute to building transparency in military matters. Although both instruments witnessed a major increase in the number of reporting States over the past four years, differences among Member States continued, especially regarding the Register's scope. Despite these differences, the general trend continued to be in the direction of greater transparency in the interest of increased confidence-building among States on military matters. The continuing rise in global military spending is an issue of great concern. According to SIPRI, the global military expenditure broke the onetrillion USD barrier in 2004. Experts predicted that the trend of increase in military expenditures will continue in the coming years. The CCW process aimed at addressing the threat posed by certain types of inhuman weapons continued. The Group of Governmental Experts turned its attention to the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines due to the significant risk they posed to civilian populations both during the conflict and

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 long after the end of the hostilities. The Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World adopted the 2004 Nairobi Declaration entitled Towards a mine-free world and the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 manifesting States parties renewed commitment to achieving the goal of a world free of anti-personnel mines.

Composite table of replies of Governments for the UN Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2 0 0 3 ~ ~

124

Government

Data on exports

Data on imports

Andorra

nil

nil

Antigua and Barbuda

nil

nil

Argentina

nil

Yes

Armenia

nil

nil

Australia

nil

Yes

Austria

Yes

Yes

Azerbaijan

nil

nil

Bahamas

nil

nil

Bangladesh

nil

Yes

Barbados

nil

nil

Belarus

Yes

nil

Belgium

nil

nil

Belize

nil

nil

Benin

nil

nil

Bhutan

nil

nil

Bolivia

nil

nil

Explanation submitted in note verbale

Background Information


Government

Data on exports

Data on imports

Brazil

nil

Yes

Brunei Darussalam

nil

nil

Bulgaria

Yes

nil

Burkina Faso

nil

nil

Cambodia

nil

nil

Canada

Yes

Yes

Chile

nil

Yes

Cook Islands

nil

nil

Costa Rica

nil

nil

Croatia

nil

Yes

Cuba

nil

nil

Cyprus

nil

Yes

Czech Republic

Yes

Yes

Denmark

Yes

Yes

Djibouti

nil

nil

Ecuador

nil

nil

El Salvador

nil

nil

Estonia

nil

Yes

Fiji

nil

nil

Finland

Yes

Yes

92



Cook Island, the Holy See and Niue submitted "nil" reports.


Government

Data on exports

Data on imports

France

Yes

nil

Georgia

nil

nil

Germany

Yes

nil

Greece

Yes

Yes

Guatemala

nil

nil

Guyana

nil

nil

Holy See

nil

nil

Honduras

nil

nil

Hungary

nil

nil

Iceland

nil

nil

India

nil

Yes

Indonesia

nil

Yes

Ireland

nil

nil

Israel

Yes

nil

Italy

Yes

Yes

Jamaica

no

no

Japan

nil

nil

Jordan

nil

Yes

Kazakhstan

nil

nil

Kiribati

nil

nil

Kyrgyzstan

nil

nil

Latvia

nil

Yes




Government

Data on exports

Data on imports

Lebanon

nil

nil

Liechtenstein

nil

nil

Lithuania

nil

Yes

Luxembourg

nil

nil

Malawi

nil

nil

Malaysia

nil

Yes

Maldives

nil

nil

Malta

nil

nil

Marshal1 Islands

nil

nil

Mauritius

nil

nil

Mexico

nil

Yes

Micronesia (Federated States of)

nil

nil

Monaco

nil

nil

Namibia

nil

nil

Nauru

nil

nil

Nepal

nil

nil

Netherlands

Yes

nil

New Zealand

nil

Yes

Niue

nil

nil

Norway

Yes

Yes

Pakistan

nil

Yes




Data on exports

Data on imports

Palau

nil

nil

Paraguay

nil

nil

Peru

nil

nil

Philippines

nil

Yes

Poland

yes

Yes

Portugal

nil

Yes

Republic of Korea

nil

Yes

Republic of Moldova

nil

nil

Romania

Yes

Yes

Russian Federation

Yes

nil

Samoa

nil

nil

San Marino

nil

nil

Senegal

nil

nil

Serbia and Montenegro

nil

nil

Singapore

nil

Yes

Slovakia

Yes

Yes

Slovenia

Yes

Yes

Solomon Islands

nil

nil

South Africa

Yes

Yes

Government




Government

Data on exports

Data on imports

Spain

nil

Yes

Suriname

nil

nil

Sweden

Yes

nil

Switzerland

Yes

Yes

Tajikistan

nil

nil

Thailand

nil

Yes

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

nil

nil

Tonga

nil

nil

Trinidad and Tobago

nil

nil

Turkey

nil

Yes

Tuvalu

nil

nil

Ukraine

Yes

Yes

United Kingdom

Yes

Yes

United Republic of Tanzania

nil

nil

United States

Yes

nil

Uzbekistan

nil

nil

Viet Nam

nil

nil




C H A P T E R IV

Regional disarmament "Today, the United Nations is cooperating with regional organizations in stabilization processes in many countries around the world. While our cooperation is being enhanced, we have to consider more thoroughlythe comparative strengths of differentorganizations, be they global, regional or subregional, and move towards the creation of strategic partnerships that meet today's and tomorrow's challenges. "

'

Introduction THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ENVISAGED A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE FOR regional organizations in promoting international peace and security, although it was not until the end of the cold war that they assumed a more active role. In l98 1, a Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General concluded that there was a vast and, to a large extent, unexplored potential for progress in disarmament if the global approach was supplemented with determined and systematic efforts at the level of the different regions.2 The Group of Experts found that progress in regional disarmament, the equitable solution of problems and the just settlement of disputes at the regional level, along with regional confidencebuilding measures, could create conditions that would promote disarmament and relax tension at the global level? Over the years, the United Nations has sought to enhance the role of regional approaches to disarmament and security, including as a complement to global efforts. By adapting regional initiatives to the specific needs of the participating States, it was possible to reach agreement on measures more far-reaching than those that could be adopted at the global level. Concluding its consideration of the question in Statement at Security Council meeting on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the processes of stabilization on , 20 July 2004.At http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs2004/sgsm9424.doc.htm See: Study on All Aspects of Regional Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81 .IX.2.) Ibid.


1993, the UN Disarmament Commission (the Commission) adopted guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament. The Commission found that regional and global approaches to disarmament and arms limitation complemented each other and should be pursued simultaneously, in order to promote regional and international peace and security.4 The changing political climate of the post-cold war period prompted further analysis of the United Nations role in advancing regional approaches to disarmament. Given the surge in conflict-related demands on the Organization after the end of the cold war and the increasing central role for the Security Council in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, the Organization's wider mission demanded the participation not only of individual States and the United Nations system, but also of regional and subregional actors. Initially, regional proposals sought to limit conventional weapons and armed forces at the end of the Second World War, but by the mid-1950s, the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe had become a predominant concern. Several proposals were made to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs) in different parts of the continent or to freeze the level of nuclear forces pending actual reductions. Indeed, in the decades that followed, the establishment of such zones in the world assumed particular importance in light of the nuclear threat. The regional approach was first applied to the nuclear field in the late 1950s with the prohibition of nuclear weapons in ~ n t a r c t i c a It . ~was subsequently expanded with the creation of NWFZs in populated parts of the world, thus promoting nuclear non-proliferation Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967); the South Pacific (Treaty of Raratonga, 1985); Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty, 1995); and Africa (Pelindaba Treaty, 1995). (For the status of these Treaties, see Appendix I). In 1999, the Disarmament Commission adopted guidelines and recommendations for the establishment of future nuclear-weapon-free zones, advancing the notion that regional and global approaches to disarmament and arms limitation complemented each other and should be pursued Disarmament Commission "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security (A/48/42), Annex 11. See also "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned" (A/54/42), Annex I. See the most recent report of the Secretary-General on Antarctica (A157/346), available from http://ods.un.org.

Regional disarmament s i m u l t a n e ~ u s l ~The . ~ document noted that NWFZs had ceased to be exceptional in the global strategic environment with more than 100 States signatories or parties to such treaties covering more than 50 per cent of the Earth's land mass. It underscored that such zones were an important disarmament tool, which contributed to the primary objective of strengthening regional peace and security and, by extension, international peace and security. Major regional disarmament arrangements on conventional arms have also been established. They include the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAT)) and the Warsaw Pact and the related document on confidence- and security-building measures,7 through which significant reductions in conventional arms and armed forces, as well as confidence-building and confidence- and security-building measures (CBMsICSBMs) were undertaken. The CFE, including its verification procedures, survived the end of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and, in 1999, the verification procedures were amended to take account of national forces rather than bloc strength. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted two instruments: the 1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Traffickini in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; and the 1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons ~ c ~ u i s i t i o n sSeveral .~ CBMs have been undertaken in Asia through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), and through bilateral and multilateral agreements. In June 200 1, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) l' was Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/54/42). For the texts of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Documents on CSBMs. which were updated at the Istanbul Summit in 1999, see documents CFE.DOCUMENT/2/99/ and FSC.DOCUMENT/1/99. A/53/78, Annex. The text is reproduced in The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 22, 1997, Appendix 111. (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.IX. 1). AGlRES.1607 (XXXIX-0199). For text, see The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 24, 1999, Appendix I1 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.OO.IX.l). Also available from http://www.oas/legal/intro.htm (Treaties and Agreements). l0 Non-mandatory CBMs discussed and implemented within the ARF include: exchange of information on observation and prior notification of military exercises, exchange of visits to military establishments and naval vessels, holding seminars and workshops with defence and military officials, visits to defence facilities and dialogue on defence policy and conversion.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 established to promote mutual confidence and trust and consolidate multilateral cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region. The growing number of conflicts in Africa in the 1990s prompted the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to focus their attention on resolving them and preventing future ones. Efforts intensified to curb proliferation of conventional arms, especially the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). Under the umbrella of regional and subregional organizations, important initiatives were undertaken in many regions of the world.12 Indeed, increased global concern over the proliferation of and illicit trade in SALW and its devastating consequences led to the convening of the United Nations Conference on the issue in 2001. l3 This chapter deals with issues concerning developments in specific regions related to NWFZs, confidence-building, and conventional disarmament.

Developments and trends, 2004 On 20 July 2004, the Security Council met to consider the item "Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Stabilization Processes". A number of regional organizations participated in the meeting - the African Union, League of Arab States, Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Participants stressed their interest in enhancing cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. They also considered that regular dialogue on specific issues between the Council and regional organizations would bring significant added value in this respect. It was stressed that common and coordinated efforts undertaken by the United Nations and regional organizations in stabilization processes should be based on complementarity and their comparative advantages, making full use of their experience, in

l1

Member States of SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. l 2 See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 27, 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.IX. l ) , chapter 111. l 3 See The Yearbook, vol. 26, 2001 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.Ol.IX.1).

Regional disarmament accordance with the United Nations Charter and the relevant Statutes of the regional organizations. 14 During the year, several United Nations bodies, especially the Security Council, remained active in resolving a number of inter-State and intra-State conflicts, and in restoring peace, security and stability in conflict or postconflict situations, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Efforts continued to consolidate existing NWFZs and to establish new ones. In the conventional weapons field, much effort at the regional level was devoted to combating the proliferation of illicit small arms and promoting the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA).

Nuclear-weapon-freezones During the year, Member States, the United Nations and other multilateral and regional fora, continued their efforts to strengthen existing NWFZs or to establish new ones. The General Assembly of the Organization of American States, at its thirty- session (Quito, 6-8 June 2004), adopted a resolution on Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of T l a t e l o l ~ o ) The .~~ resolution urged those States of the region that had not yet done so to sign or ratify the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL); reaffirmed the importance of strengthening OPANAL as the appropriate legal and political forum for ensuring unqualified observance of the Treaty in its zone of application and for promoting cooperation with the agencies of other nuclear-weapon-free zones; called on those States that had not yet done so to negotiate and implement, as soon as possible, comprehensive agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements between States and the IAEA, for application of the Agency's safeguards to their nuclear activities, as stipulated in Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. At the thirty-fifth session of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (Apia, Samoa, 5-7 August 2004), the Heads of State and Governments in attendance issued a communique which called upon the United States, as the remaining l4 Security Council Presidential statement S/PRST/2004/27, available from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc~pres~statementsO4.html. l5

AGIRES. 2009 (XXXIV-0/04), http://www.oas.org

The UN Disarmament Ysarbook: 2004 nuclear-weapon State, t o ratify the Protocols to the Treaty a s a means of

enhancing global and regional peace and security, including global nuclear non-proliferation. 16 At the Tenth ASEAN Summit (Vientiane, 29-30 November), the leaders of ASEAN countries in the Vientiane Action Programme adopted at the Summit, expressed their determination, among other things, to work towards resolving outstanding issues to ensure signing of the Protocols to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS). During the year, the States parties to the SEANWFZ Treaty, also referred to as the Bangkok Treaty, focused their efforts on setting up an institutional framework to implement the Treaty and continued consultations on the Treaty's Protocols with the NWS with a view to securing their early accession. In that connection, China announced, in April, that it had reached agreement with the members of the SEANWFZ on the Treaty and its protocols and stood ready to sign the relevant protocols once they were opened for signature. 17 By the end of 2004, 19 countries had ratified the 1996 African NuclearWeapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty), advancing it a step closer to the required ratifications by 28 countries for its entry into force. l8 The 59th session of the General Assembly, in its resolution "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,"lg welcomed the efforts towards the completion of the ratification process of the Pelindaba Treaty, and called upon the States of the region that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it, with the aim of its early entry into force.20 The Treaty's implementing mechanism, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), as envisaged in the treaty, is to be situated in South Africa once the Treaty enters into force.2 1 Since the General Assembly first adopted a resolution on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in 1974, agreement among the States of the region to negotiate such a zone has remained elusive." During l6 Available from PIF web site: http://www.forumsec.org.fj/Home.htm. l7 See Statement by Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs at the Third Session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 26 April 2004. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/.htm. l 8 See http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreignlMultilateral/africa/treaties. l 9 A/59/85, available at http//ods.un.org 20 Ibid. 21 Treaty of Pelindaba: African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ), available from: http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/ africaltreaties.

Regional disarmament 2004, calls continued to be made for its establishment in that region. In the Final Document adopted at the XIV Ministerial Conference of the NonAligned Movement (Durban. South Africa, 17-19August) , the participating States reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone. They also welcomed the initiative by President Mubarak of Egypt on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and stressed that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone.23 The Director General of IAEA, in his report entitled 'Application o f IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East," called on the states of the region to draw on the experience of NWFZs that had been established in other parts of the world.24He also stated his intention to organize a forum on the relevance of the experience of existing NWFZs, including confidence-building and verification measures, for establishing such a zone in the region of the Middle East, and that it was expected that such a forum would be organized early in 2005.'~ The Final Document of the 2004 Ministerial Conference of the NonAligned Movement welcomed the decision by the five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (CANWFZ) as soon as possible.26 During the year, with assistance of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in particular its Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the five Central Asian States (C5), - Kazakhstan,

22 A/RES/3263

XXIX,

9

December

1974.

Available

from

http;//www.un.orgDepts/dhl/resguide/gares 1.htm 23 'Final document of the XIV Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (Midterm Review) ", (Durban, South Africa, 17- 19 August 2004), p. 19, available from h~tp:l/www.nam.gov.za. 24 "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East" Report by the Director General of the IAEA, available from http://www.iaea.org/ 25 "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, A/59/47, 5-6. 26 "Final document of the XIV Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (Midterm Review), op. cit., p. 18.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and uzbekistanZ7 continued their

efforts to establish the CANWFZ. In order to assist the C5 to reach an early agreement on a CANWFZ treaty, the Centre organized several consultations among the C5 in New York. The Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, in its Final Document, reiterated the support for Mongolia's nuclear weapon-free status, and considered that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.28 The United Nations continued to assist Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate its nuclear-weapon-free status. The Regional Centre held a series of consultations with Mongolia, the five nuclear-weapon States, and other interested States on ways and means of promoting Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) undertook two studies, on economic vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia, and on ecological vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia, respectively. The studies' findings are contained in the report of the Secretary-General on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status.29

Conventional Disarmament at Regional Levels

Africa During the year, African States, through the African Union (AU) and several subregional organizations, focused their efforts on addressing the conflict and post-conflict situations on the continent. Combating illicit SALW proliferation and misuse was an important component of those efforts. Significant activities by States, regional and subregional organizations, as well as civil society, took place in implementing the 2001 United Nations PoA on SALW. Those activities constituted important building blocks in the global efforts to tackle the scourge caused by illicit SALW. Though many challenges remain, these initiatives clearly demonstrate that progress was being made in this area. At the regional level, the Second Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly, (Sirte, Libya, 28 February), adopted the Common African Defence and Security ~ o l i c The ~ . document ~ ~ cited the illicit proliferation, 27 A/59/169 available from http://ods.un.org. 28 29

See footnote 26. A/59/364, available from http://ods.un.org.

Regional disarmament

circulation and trafficking in SALW as one of the factors that engendered insecurity on the continent, and called for coordinated efforts to address the threat. At the AU's Third Ordinary Session (Addis Ababa, 6-8 July), the Assembly approved the measures taken by the Executive Council to operationalize the Peace and Security Council; requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to take the necessary measures to operationalize all aspects of the Protocol, including, in particular, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warnin System, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee. 3F A number of events took place at the subregional level. In West Africa, ECOWAS carried out activities to assist its member States in the full implementation of its Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa (ECOWAS ~ o r a t o r i u m )and ; ~ ~to start the process of transforming the Moratorium into a Convention. Having recognized the need to transform the Moratorium into a new legally-binding instrument, ECOWAS circulated a working draft entitled Protocol Regarding the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Munitions and Other Related ~ a t e r i ato l~~ member States, donors and civil society organizations with the aim of transforming the moratorium into a regional convention by the end of 2005. In March, the ECOWAS Secretariat organized a conference on "Combating Illicit Small Arms Brokering and Trafficking" in Abuja, which was attended by SALW experts from the region. The conference identified the illicit spread of small arms as a major source of instability in the region. It recommended that ECOWAS take ownership of the processes of control of the trade and brokering activities on small arms and light weapons in the region, and intensify its coordination and harmonization role on this and related issues. The conference called for the adoption of a Convention on illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons to stem the flow of such weapons into West Africa. As proposed, the Convention would address certain loopholes in the ECOWAS Moratorium which were being exploited 30 The First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union adopted the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Durban, South Africa, 10 July 2002). Available Welcome.htm. from http://www.africa-union.org/home/ 31 Ibid. 32 The Moratorium was adopted by the heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, (Abuja, 31 October 1998). See http://www.ecowas.int. 33 The Protocol is available from http://www.fosda.org/resource /ecowas~protocol.htm.Also available from http://www.ecowas.int.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 by illicit brokers to smuggle such weapons into the region. The Conference also proposed that the Small Arms Unit in the ECOWAS Secretariat should be charged with the responsibility for the coordination of issues on small arms with relevant organizations, including the United Nations, Regional Economic Communities such as the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) and non-governmental organizations.34 Participants noted that 13 of the 15 Member States had complied with a provision in the Moratorium for the establishment of National Commissions to execute and monitor its implementation and urged the strengthening of their capacity to cope with the challenges of the Moratorium. In addition, from 25to26 October, the ECOWAS Secretariat organized a meeting for the Review and Adoption of the Successor Project Document to the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in Africa (PCASED). The meeting addressed the following issues, including examining the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP); seeking commitments from development partners for financial and other resources in support of the successor programme to PCASED; sensitizing, networking and elaborating modalities for partnership building and broad-based support for the new programme; and adopting a plan of action and schedule of activities that would allow for the transformation of the Moratorium into a Convention by December 2005. A seminar on Developing West African and International Arms Control based on International Law was held in Dakar from 19to23 July. The seminar, organized by Oxfam and supported by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, discussed several issues, including raising awareness of the latest initiatives to advance the PoA's recommendations on international export controls and international law; raising awareness and understanding of the international standards and principles underpinning the proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) ; finding how the international law principles outlined in the ATT could apply in the West African context and how they could be used to strengthen the ECOWAS Moratorium; developing strategies to promote and develop the ATT; and strengthening the ECOWAS Moratorium through its development into a Convention. At the Second Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of ~ f r i c a(Nairobi, ~~ 20-21 April), the participating countries signed The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and 34 The instrument is Multilateral/africa.

available

at:

http:llwww.dfa.gov.za/foreignl


Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol) .36 The instrument's objectives were to (a) prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of SALW in the subregion; (b) prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the subregion; (c) promote and facilitate information sharing and cooperation between the governments in the subregion as well as between governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons; (d) promote cooperation at the subregional level as well as in international fora to effectively combat the small arms and light weapons problem, in collaboration with relevant partners; and (e) encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient control and management of small arms and light weapons held by States parties and civilians. The Conference also issued a Ministerial Declaration for Improved Capacity for Action on SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,37 in which the partici ating States undertook to ratify the Nairobi Protocol by 31 December 2004.' The declaration also welcomed the Republic of Kenya's proposal to establish a Committee of Experts to draft an agreement that would serve as the legal basis for the establishment of RECSA (Regional Centre on Small Arms), an inter-governmental entity designed to ensure a coordinated implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi The Nairobi Secretariat was mandated to set up the Committee of Experts which would submit a final draft of the RECSA agreement to the third Ministerial Review Conference to be held in 2005. During the year, the Nairobi Secretariat on SALW published its Annual Report for the Year 2003. The report reviewed progress made so far in combating the spread of SALW in the Great Lakes region, identified challenges, and outlined lessons learned. It also set out the Nairobi Secretariat Strategic Plan covering the period 2004-2007P0

35 See "The Second Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, (Nairobi, 20-21 April 2004) ", page 4 (available at: http://www.nbisecsalw.org) . 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 See http://www.nbisecsalw.org/events.html. " Ibid. 40 Ibid.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 In the Southern African subregion, the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, adopted in 200 1, entered into force on 8 November, constituting a step forward in the efforts by countries in that region to address the problems arising from the influx of SALW into the region as well as cross-border trafficking of arms within the region. At a joint Ministerial meeting between SADC and the European Union (EU) (Netherlands, 20 October), Ministers from both regions agreed to strengthen bilateral collaboration covering broad areas, including peace support, training in peacekeeping operations, post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration, de-mining, and the elimination of the illicit trade in drugs and SALW.42 The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (the Standing Advisory Committee) continued to actively promote peace and security in the region. The Committee held its 2 1st Ministerial Meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea from 2 1to25 June 2004. The Committee, aimed at promoting peace and security in the Central African region through confidence-building measures, discussed among other things, the attempted coup in March 2004 in Equatorial Guinea which took place with the help of mercenaries. Reflecting on the seriousness of the matter, the Committee decided to include on the agenda of its 23rd Ministerial Meeting an item on the threat of mercenaries in the Central African region. The Committee also looked into cooperation between the United Nations and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) with a view to strengthening collaboration between the two organizations. Further, the Committee undertook a critical assessment of its own work with a view to rendering itself more responsive to the needs of the Central African region.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa During the year, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in ~ f r i c continued a~~ to receive a number of requests from Member States in the region for substantive support for peace initiatives and conflict resolution activities. The Africa Regional Centre continued to promote the implementation of global instruments relating to disarmament, including the UN PoA on SALW. The Centre's activities focused on four main areas: support for peace processes and peace initiatives in Africa; The protocol was adopted on 14 August 2001, see footnote 38. http://www.sadc.int/index.news. 43 The web site for the African Regional Centre is http://www. unrec.org.

41

42

Regional disarmament disarmament and arms control; information, research and publication; and advocacy and resource mobilization. In collaboration with regional and subregional organizations and Member States, the Centre promoted the implementation of the PoA, including through regional and subregional frameworks such as the Bamako Declaration on SALW, the SADC Protocol on Firearms, the ECOWAS Moratorium and the Nairobi Protocol on Firearms on SALW. The Centre organized, in collaboration with the African Union, the Government of Mali and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), a regional workshop on "Promoting Transparency in the Flows of Small Arms and Light Wea ons in Africa" (Bamako, 26-30July). Representatives from ten countries,"relevant United Nations institutions, including the United Nations Office for West Africa, and several NGOs participated in the workshop. One of the workshop's recommendations was that a questionnaire45 be created to guide the Member States in their data and information collection processes. The ten countries agreed to provide detailed information covered by the questionnaire. They also agreed to provide, if necessary, more specific information, including countries of origin of weapons and the nature of dealers concerned. The Centre organized several consultations within the framework of the African Disarmament Forum that aimed at providing regular information on peace, security and disarmament issues to the diplomatic corps and the research46 community in and around Lom& gaining more visibility and prominence in Africa for issues of peace, security and disarmament; improving its links with Member States of the African region, universities and research institutes, regional and subregional organizations; and facilitating the organization of round-table discussions on the question of democracy and the culture of peace for crisis prevention and conflict management in Africa. The Centre provided African States with technical assistance and expertise in the area of SALW, such as establishing and strengthening their national focal points, national commissions and relevant civil society 44 Burkina Faso. Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon. Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Togo. 45 The questionnaire focused on eight areas, namely, importation, exportation, manufacture, holdings, seizure/collection, donations, surplus, and 1icenses.See Regional Centre's web site http://www.unrec.org. 46 The Forum is a monthly gathering of the diplomatic, research and university communities to discuss peace, security and disarmament issues in Africa. Its web site is http://www.unrec.org.


organizations; implementing the Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa project ( S A T C R A ) ; ~and ~ assisting the National Commissions on SALW, including in the destruction of confiscated weapons. In that context, with the French Government's financial support, the Centre organized a capacity-building workshop on 9-10 February for the 16 members of the Togolese national commission, which helped Togo establish and launch its national coalition of civil society organizations for the fight against the proliferation of SALW. The Centre assisted the Togolese National Commissions on SALW with the elaboration of a national action plan on small arms, which was validated on 16 July. The Centre also assisted the Government of Togo in destroying more than 5,134 locally manufactured and confiscated rifles on 9 July and in the destruction of more than 309 firearms, as well as ammunition on 16 December. The Centre also undertook disarmament education activities, including through gathering information, conducting research and publishing. It published editions 29 and 30 of its quarterly African Peace Bulletin during the year, and one of those editions focused on conflict resolution efforts in Africa. The Centre's library continued to serve the research and diplomatic community and others within and outside Lome. The Centre continued to be involved in promoting the implementation of the civil-military relations programme in Africa, launched in July 2 0 0 1 . ~ ~ The Centre, in collaboration with the Commission of the AU, the French Government, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), organized a pilot training workshop for the ECOWAS States on 21-24 April which focused on the role of parliamentary defence committees in military matters. 49 The Centre continued to experience considerable financial difficulties which did not allow it to operate at an optimum level and continuously weakened its staffing and institutional base. (See also chapter VI, section of the Centre).

47 SATCRA was launched on 1 October 2003. The project has pursued two strategic objectives: 1) to improve the understanding of how weapons find their way from legal into illicit channels. In that connection, it has attempted to help governments prevent such diversions by implementing tighter arms control measures; 2) to initiate a confidence-building process by creating greater openness in the legal flows and manufacture of SALW in Africa. 48 See footnote 43. 49 Ibid.


Americas The Organization of American States (OAS) continued its involvement in a number of regional initiatives in the fields of disarmament and nonproliferation. At the Special Summit of the Americas, (Monterrey, Mexico, 12-13 January), 34 Heads of State and Government reiterated their commitment to the objectives and purposes contained in the 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas. 50 At its 34th Regular Session (Quito, 6-8 June), the OAS General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions related to disarmament and nonproliferation. They included: Consolidation of the Regime Established in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of ~latelolco) Inter-American Support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban ~ r e a t y , ~Americas ' a s a Biological- and Chemical- Weapons-Free ~ e ~ i o nLimitation , of Military The Americas a s an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Proliferation of and Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Adoption of a Comprehensive Inter-American Strategy to Combat Threats to Cyber security,57 and Disarmament and Non-Proliferation ducati ion .58 The Sixth Conference of Ministers of Defense of the ~ m e r i c a s ~(Quito, ' 16-21 November) issued a declaration reiterating the region's commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to the universal application of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In connection with Security Council resolution 1540 50 Adopted by the Special Conference on Security on 28 October 2003. For the document, see http://www.oas.org. For contents of the Declaration, see The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 28, 2003. page 185 (United Nations Sales Publication, E.04.IX. 1). 51 AGIRES. 2009 (XXXIV-0104). This and all subsequent documents of the OAS General Assembly are available from http://www.oas.org, 52 AGIRES. 2008 (XXXIV-0104). 53 AGIRES. 2000 (XXXIV-0104). 54 AGIRES. 200 1 (XXXIV-0104). 55 AGIRES. 2003 (XXXIV-0104). 56 AGIRESI 1997 (XXXIV-0104). 57 AGIRES. 2004 (XXXIV-0104). 58 AGIRES. 2007 (XXXIV-0104). 59 Sixth Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas, Declaration of Quito, available from http://www.summit-americas.org.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 (2004), the declaration supported establishing national controls for the export and import of materials, equipment, technology, and specialized know-how that could contribute to the manufacture and use of WMD and their means of delivery. At the First Conference of the States Parties to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) (Bogoti, 8-9 March), the Declaration of Bogota on the Functioning and Application of CIFTA was adopted.6 A Seminar on the Identification, Collection, Stockpile Management, and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons, organized by the OAS General Secretariat and the Inter-American Defense College and a hosted by the Nicaraguan government, was held in Managua, 12-13~

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean During the year, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLiREC) carried out a wide range of activities in close collaboration with Member States, the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations and NGOs. These included: supporting the multilateral WMD regimes; creating confidence-building measures involving transparency in the procurement of conventional arms; organizing capacity-building courses, workshops and seminars on combating illicit trafficking of firearms; assisting States in practical disarmament activities such as the destruction of firearms, ammunition and explosives, as well as improving practices related to the safety of stockpile facilities; raising awareness of the disarmamentdevelopment relationship; and developing information-sharing databases. The Centre cooperated with the PrepCom for the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in assisting States to better understand the obligations and benefits of adhering to those related legal instruments and to improve their national capacity to implement them. A series of national consultations held in the Caribbean region has increased interest in the CTBT and the CWC by those Caribbean countries that had not yet ratified those two instruments. The Centre worked with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United Nations Department for Political 60 The Convention is available from http://www.oas.org.

http://www.oas.org. 62

l46

AG/RES/ 1997, op. cit.

~


Affairs (DPA) in the development of a common standardized methodological tool for the comparison of military expenditures. This project focused on lessons learned from the confidence-building measures (CBMs) initiative by Argentina and Chile developed from 1998to2000. The Centre was also involved in an ECLAC-led study to develop a common methodology for comparing military expenditures between Chile and Peru. It also worked in close cooperation with DPA. UNDP, the United Nations Foundation (UNF), independent experts and civil society in the region to assess basic principles for developing defense white books63 The Centre intensified activities under its Regional Clearinghouse Programme on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives in 2004. One of its strategic initiatives was to support the Brazilian Ministry of Justice in the creation of a Regional Public Security Training Centre in Brasilia, a platform aimed at improving the control of the legal firearms trade and preventing its illicit trafficking through training on public security, intelligence and other related issues. It also assisted in setting up subregional training centres in Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. UN-LiREC concluded a series of training courses with the support of its partners in 2004. These included training law enforcement instructors, members of parliament and their advisors for drafting of national firearms legislation, and civil society members involved in the implementation of the P O A . In ~ ~order to provide a platform for States in the region to discuss the implementation of and reporting on the PoA, the Centre and its partners initiated a series of regional seminars to evaluate the advances made since the adoption of the PoA in 200 1. The 2006 Lima Challenge project supported by the Centre and UNDP and OASICICAD (Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission) carried out major activities related to weapons destruction and stockpile management in 2004. Assistance was provided to several countries in the destruction of some 20,000 firearms and in the initiation of new projects in Paraguay and Peru. Work was carried out to improve stockpile management practices in several weapons storage facilities, in particular, the development of an Integrated Weapons Management System (SIGA) database to manage facilities where firearms, ammunition and explosives are stockpiled.

" This initiative was part of a larger programme developed by DPA and was aimed at supporting the implementation of the Secretary General's report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (A/55/985, of 7 June 2001). 64 For details of these activities, see UN-LiREC1s web site at: http://www.unlirec.org.


The Centre's Small Arms and Light Weapons Administration (SALSA) System became fully operational during 2004. This database provides a range of information on firearms-related issues, such as documents, points of contact, statistics and reports on activities by countries and by themes. The Centre, in cooperation with UNDP, organized the first region-wide workshop on Disarmament and Development with 24 country officers in the region. This three-day workshop offered participants an opportunity to discuss the 2004 Report of the Group of Governmental ~ x ~ e ron t sthe ~ ~ subject and its implications in the region.

Asia and the Pacific Activities related to disarmament and non-proliferation in Asia and the Pacific were undertaken by States at the national level as well as through a number of subregional organizations, such as ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) . At the Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the ARF (Jakarta, 2 July), the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of ARF as the main political and security forum in the region, and reiterated the importance of further strengthening it. The Ministers also reiterated their support for ASEAN as the primary driving force of ARF and further encouraged the contribution of all its participants in moving the ARF process forward. The Ministers exchanged views on recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and encouraged the efforts of concerned parties towards the maintenance of peace and security on the Peninsula and the region by achieving a peaceful solution through dialogue to denuclearization on the Korean ~ e n i n s u l a .The ~~ Ministers reiterated the importance of addressing the issue of nonproliferation and disarmament in all its aspects. They underlined the importance of close collaboration between participants to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Ministers also stressed the need to strengthen technical cooperation in order to enhance countries' capabilities and to strengthen national legal measures to address the issue of non-proliferation in all its aspects, in accordance with international law. The Ministers adopted the ARF Statement on nonproliferation.67 Furthermore, the Ministers of the NPT States Parties agreed 65 See Recommendations by the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development, Part V. Secretary-General's Report: AI5911 19, 23 June 2004. 66 Chairman's statement of the Eleventh ASEAN Regional Forum, (Jakarta, 2 July 2004), available from http://www.aseansec.org/l6245.htm. 67 Ibid., Annex D.

Regional disarmament to make further efforts for the successful outcome of the 2005 NPT Review ~ o n f e r e n c e The . ~ ~ Ministers noted the importance of all countries in the region taking strong measures to eliminate the illicit trafficking of SALW to non-State actors.69 The Fourth Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Tashkent, 17 June)7o adopted the Tashkent Declaration. The declaration summarized the outcome of the SCO's work since its establishment, evaluated the activities of the organization and set new goals.71 The six Heads of State attending the Summit declared that the SCO was ready to actively participate in a constructive formation of a new architecture of security, capable of consolidating wide international efforts to counteract new threats to global and regional stability. To achieve these goals, SCO would cooperate with other States and international structures, in particular with the United Nations, to contribute to security and stability not only in the SCO region, but also in the world in general. They believed that answers to the new complex challenges, whether international terrorism or regional conflicts and crises, could and should be found on the basis of multilateralism and cooperation without dividing States into various categories and adhering to norms and principles of international law. The leaders expressed their readiness to formulate plans and actions within the SCO framework to combat new threats, including trafficking of illegal weapons and ammunition, explosives, asphyxiate, poisonous and radioactive substances, and the recruitment of m e r ~ e n a r i e s . ~On ~ January 15, the Official Inauguration Ceremony of the Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization took place in Beijing. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Coordinators of SCO Member States attended the ceremony.

United Nations Regional Centre fbr Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific During the year, the activities of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific were focused on nuclear-weapon-free zone issues73 and organizing several regional conferences and seminars on both nuclear and conventional arms issues.

68 See footnote 65.

Ibid. See SCO web site: http:l/www.sectsco.orglnews. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 See also section of this chapter on NWFZ. 70

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The Centre organized several meetings for the five Central Asian States

(C5) to facilitate their negotiations on a CANWFZ treaty. The Centre continued to assist Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate its nuclear-weapon-free status. The Centre held a series of consultations with Mongolia, the five nuclear-weapon States and other interested States on ways and means to promote Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status at the international level. In that regard, Mongolia is considering the conclusion of a legal instrument on its nuclear-weapon-free status with China and the Russian Federation and the promotion of its nuclear-weapon-free status through the creation of an international custom on the status. The Centre, in cooperation with the Governments of Kazakhstan and Japan, organized a subregional conference on SALW (Almaty, 16- 18 March). Approximately 40 participants, including experts from the five Central Asian States, attended the conference. The conference reviewed issues such as the role of national contact points and coordination agencies, trans-border cooperation and information sharing, national laws and legislation and administrative procedures, exportlimport licensing systems and marking, stockpile management and the role of civil society. In a final communique, the Central Asian States expressed their determination to jointly tackle the illicit trade in SALW in the region. A United Nations regional seminar on SALW for the South Pacific (Nadi, Fiji, 18-20 August) was organized by the Centre in close cooperation with the Governments of Australia and Japan. The seminar was attended by representatives from the South Pacific States, members of the diplomatic corps in Fiji and NGOs in the Pacific region. The seminar addressed issues related to the implementation of the weapons control bill adopted by the Pacific Island Forum in 2003, cooperation in strengthening SALW stockpile management, regional cooperation and capacity building, and transparency in armaments and brokering. The Centre provided technical and substantive assistance to the United Nations Association of Japan for its organization of the tenth Kanazawa Symposium on North-East Asia held from 7 to 9 June, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Kanazawa Process. The symposium addressed issues such as community building in North-East Asia and its future, conflict prevention, crisis management, nuclear black markets, nuclear fuel cycle, the rapidly changing world and the adaptation of international institutions, the role of the military today, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, and food, energy and ecological security. The Korean peninsula nuclear issue and the Six-Party Talks, security assurances and humanitarian aspects of the DPRK nuclear issue were also discussed. The symposium adopted a commemorative resolution encouraging the Kanazawa process to explore a

Regional disarmament road map for peace and prosperity in the region, institutional arrangements and broadening its financial basis. To promote awareness of disarmament issues in the region, the United Nations Conference on Mounting Challenges to Peace and Security and Disarmament Today was held in Sapporo, Japan, 19-22 August. It addressed, among other issues, the mounting challenges to nuclear non-proliferation and international response, challenges and prospects of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and regional security in Northeast Asia. It also dealt with the role of civil society, including its role in the fields of peace, security and disarmament, gender issues in armed conflict and disarmament, and nonproliferation education. More than 70 participants from Governments, academic institutes and NGOs in the Asia and Pacific region as well as representatives from the Untied Nations attended the conference. In response to an invitation from the Government of Myanmar, the Centre, in collaboration with the OPCW and the PrepCom for the CTBTO, conducted a series of lectures on disarmament issues for Myanmar's Foreign Ministry officials (Yangon, 31 August- 4 September). The lectures were aimed at familiarizing the relevant officials with a wide spectrum of disarmament issues, helping them to develop expertise in those areas. The Centre and the Republic of Korea jointly organized the third conference on disarmament and non-proliferation issues entitled Challenges to Non-Proliferationand Disarmament Norms in East Asia (Jeju Island, 6-8 December). The conference dealt with broad issues such as proliferation and disarmament challenges in East Asia, the response to threats of WMD proliferation and issues of verification. Within this framework, a number of specific issues were discussed, including prospects for the NPT, CWC compliance, export controls, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and verification of WMD and missiles.

League ofArab States Following the 2003 Conference on Implementation by the Arab States of the PoA, jointly organized by DDA and the League of Arab States, in Cairo, the cooperation between the League and DDA continued during the general meeting between the representatives of the United Nations system and the League of Arab States that took place in Cairo from 10 to 12 February. A further step in strengthening the cooperation between the Arab States and international partners was a subregional workshop on the PoA organized by DDA and UNDP and hosted by the government of Tunisia (Salamb8 1415 June). In addition to representatives of the host country, participants from the four other States of the Maghreb, (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco), as well as the Secretariat of the League of Arab States attended the


workshop. Representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and civil society organizations participated as facilitators or trainers. The workshop examined in detail the national reports submitted by countries of the subregion on their implementation of the PoA and the establishment of national focal points and national coordinating agencies, as well as the development of national plans of action. Participants noted with satisfaction the designation of a regional focal point inside the organization of the League of Arab States.

Europe In the European region, security and disarmament issues continued to be addressed within regional institutional frameworks such as the OSCE, EU, NATO, the Stability Pact, South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), 74 and Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)?5 The OSCE's core activities in the field SALW have been shaped by the continued implementation of the 2000 OSCE Document on SALW. The serious threats posed by illegal trafficking of SALW led participating States to continue their efforts to ensure effective and comprehensive export controls on SALW. The OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation ( F S C ) ~adopted ~ three decisions that were designed to enhance the control of SALW and other conventional arms exports. The first decision, adopted on 26 May, was aimed at strengthening export controls over Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). The FSC agreed on principles drawn from the Wassenaar Arrangement's Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems. Participating States also agreed to incorporate these principles into their national practices, policies and regulations, and to promote the application of the principles to non-OSCE countries. The second decision on Standard Elements for End-User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports, adopted on 17 November, relates to the content of End-User Certificates (EUC) provided prior to the approval of an export-license for SALW (including SALW manufactured under license) or the transfer of SALW-related technology. The Decision contained a list of standard elements of EUC and verification procedures for SALW exports. This would allow participating States to work out a common approach regarding the application of EUCs while taking due account of their respective national

Regional disarmament legislations. In addition, the Decision foresees commitments for participating States to implement verification measures and to further strengthen transparency in this field. The third decision, adopted on 24 November, set forth OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in SALW. The Decision was designed to stop circumvention of sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, of OSCE decisions and agreements on SALW, minimize the risk of diversion of SALW into illegal markets and reinforce the export control of SALW. This Decision contained principles that allowed participating States to take all necessary measures to control brokering activities taking place within their territory. It also allowed participating States to consider controlling those brokering activities outside their territory that were carried out by brokers of their nationality or by brokers established in their territory. As a concrete measure, the Decision foresees the adoption of appropriate national legislation if existing legislation is not in conformity with agreed principles. These export-related decisions were augmented by further activities developed by the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre. For instance, the pilot project on Combating illicit trafficking of SALW through border management assistance, initiated in 2003 on the Uzbek side of the UzbekAfghan border, was further developed to encompass border checkpoints on the Afghan side. This year also saw the OSCE embark on a new type of activity. Following the adoption of the Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) and respective decisions on SALW, the OSCE began to develop and implement projects for the destruction of excess stockpiles of SALW and ammunition and for the improvement of stockpile security. The FSC received three requests relating to the destruction of excess SALW and five relating to the destruction of conventional ammunition. These projects aimed at both the destruction of SALW and ammunition surpluses as well as those weapons collected in the course of post-conflict rehabilitation processes. Two further requests for assistance in improving SALW stockpile management and security were received from Belarus and Tajikistan. OSCE expert teams, led by the Conflict Prevention Centre, visited both countries in order to assess risks posed by the SALW and ammunition in question and to evaluate the scope of needed assistance. The EU continued its work on conventional disarmament and arms control through the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (COARM).77 During its sixth year of operation, a number of new developments contributed to further strengthening and expanding the Code's


application. The single most important development and challenge in this respect was the 1 May accession of the ten new Member States to the European Union. Another significant development that took place regarding the Code of Conduct was its review, the first since the Code became operative in 1998. Under the Irish and the Netherlands Presidencies, a number of review meetings took place in which both Member States and NGOs participated. These on-going review discussions are expected to result in a significantly updated and upgraded Code with a deepened and widened scope of application. As of 1 January, the User's Guide, the first version of which was adopted in 2 0 0 3 , ~became ~ fully applicable. It contains procedures to improve the denial notification and consultation system and to clarify responsibilities of Member States in this respect. On 22 November, the European Council adopted Council Decision 20041791lCFSP to extend and amend Decision 20021842lCFSP implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in South East Europe. On 28-29 June, NATO Heads of State and Government met in Istanbul and launched a new partnership initiative promoting cooperation, as appropriate, and where NATO could add value in the field of border security, particularly in connection with terrorism, SALW and the fight against illegal trafficking. In this context, NATO will offer border security expertise and facilitate follow-up training. The NATO Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) held its annual Seminar on the implementation of conventional arms control agreements from 6-8 October. The Seminar focussed on the practical aspects of the ongoing implementation of the CFE Treaty, considered to be a cornerstone of European security. Since the Treaty's entry into force in 1992, over 4,000 inspections have taken place under its inspection protocol. The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW (SEESAC), established as a partnership between UNDP and the Stability Pact, continued to provide operational assistance, technical assistance and management information in support of the formulation and implementation of SALW coordination, control and reduction measures in South Eastern Europe.

78 Available on the "Security Related Export Controls'' web site in the Common Foreign and Security Policy section of the Council internet site http://ue.eu.int.


A Joint Conference on Countering SALW Trafficking in the Black Sea Region was held in Moldova in March and was one of the first initiatives to tackle SALW issues within the Black Sea region. It was jointly sponsored by the governments of Moldova, the Netherlands and Switzerland, in cooperation with SEESAC, and held under the auspices of the NATO EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). It brought together Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and other countries to discuss concrete measures that could be taken to enhance SALW control in the region. The issue of illicit SALW trafficking was identified as being closely linked to improved border security and integrated border management. On 25-26 May, the second Regional Arms Law Roundtable took place in Belgrade. Representatives of 30 Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior and Defence from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro gathered to discuss the legislative developments that their countries had made in SALW issues. SEESAC continued to update the compendium of SALW related legislation within the region. The second edition was also launched at the meeting. In April, SEESAC and R A C V I A C ~held ~ a joint training course for civil society on the monitoring of SALW collection and destruction operations. Civil society so far played a limited role in South Eastern European SALW efforts, confined mainly to SALW awareness and some research work. In the future, it should also be possible for governments to draw upon the expertise of trained members of civil society that could provide their services at the request of their governments. On 1-2 June, SEESAC completed its second subregional training seminar for journalists on SALW reporting. The training was held in cooperation with Saferworld and the Institute for War and Peace ~e~ortin~.~' In 2004, RACVIAC continued to draw regional and international participation in a variety of seminars and workshops, including Arms Control in SEE Countries: An Instrument to Foster Security (Zagreb, 24-25 February); a joint RACVIAUSEESAC seminar SALW Awareness Support Pack Outreach Workshop (12-14 July); the 2nd course on the Dayton Article 79 As a project of the Stability Pact, the RACVIAC was designed to provide a forum for regional dialogue and cooperation in South Eastern Europe as well as an international forum for training personnel in all aspects of arms control implementation and verification. See footnote 75. SEESACs biennial reports: 1 January-30 June 2004, and 1 July-31 December 2004 are available from http://www.seesac.org.

*'

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 IV (27 September - 8 October); the Orientation Course on the CFE and the Adapted CFE Treaty (8-1 1 November); a seminar on Dual-Use Export Control in cooperation with SIPRI (11- l 3 October) ; and a seminar on The 2nd Year of the Implementation of the SALW Stability Pact plan8' organized in cooperation with SEESAC (Rakitje, 2-4 November).

General Assembly, 2004 The General Assembly took action on nine draft resolutions and one draft decision dealing with the issues discussed in this chapter. Nuclear-weapon-freezones

59/63. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-freezone in the region of the Middle East. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on 19 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 343. The resolution urged all concerned parties to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East and invited the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Pending the establishment of the zone, the resolution also called upon all countries of the region to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and invited them not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, taking into account the evolving situation, and to seek their views on the measures outlined in the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990.~' First Committee. Prior to the vote, Israel said that it would join the consensus despite its substantive reservations. It maintained its support for the establishment of a mutually verifiable NWFZ in the Middle East, free of chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles, provided that certain conditions in the region were also met. Owing to the region's political realities, it advocated a practical, incremental approach that embraced confidence-building measures followed by the establishment of peaceful For more information, see RACVIAC web site, http://www.racviac.org. 82 A1451435, Report of the Secretary-General on "Effective and verifiable

measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East".


relations, reconciliation and possibly complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures. It emphasized that the exportation of weapons of mass destruction-related technologies and non-compliance by sorne States with their international obligations were obstacles to achieving the goal envisioned in the draft resolution.

59/73. Mongolia's international security a n d nuclear-weapon-free status. The draft resolution was introduced by Mongolia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 444 for the sponsors), on 22 October. The revised text was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 358. The resolution invited Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its independent foreign policy, economic security, and ecological balance as well as its nuclear-weapon-free status. It also requested the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking those necessary measures.

First Committee. After the vote, India affirmed its full support for the draft resolution and expressed its willingness and commitment to respond, whenever required, to Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

59/85. Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. The draft resolution was introduced by Brazil, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 450 for the sponsors), on 19 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November as a whole: 149-3-6; operative paragraph 5 as a whole: 144-1-8; and retention of the last three words &'andSouth Asia" in operative paragraph 5 (139-2-9); and by the General Assembly on 3 December as a whole: (171-4-8) ; operative paragraph 5 as a whole: (158-47); and operative paragraph 5 the last three words (166-3-7). For the text of the resolution and the voting, see pages 382 and 433. The resolution welcomed the continued contributions of the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba treaties towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those Treaties from nuclear weapons. It also called upon concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to NWFZ treaties by all relevant States that had not yet done so; and called upon the States parties and signatories to those Treaties to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and the treaty agencies.

First Committee. After the vote, two States explained their positions. India stated that it voted against operative paragraph 5 because of its call

ERRATA

United Nations

Ref.: Sales No. E.05.IX.1 15 September 2005 New York The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook Volume 29: 2004

ERRATA Chapter IV, page 157

59/85. Nuclear-weapon-fi-ee southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. 6zsert the following text after the heading, First Committee:

After the vote, several States explained their positions. France, speaking also on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States, explained their negative vote, noting that a NWFZ in the southern hemisphere would interfere with the freedom of the h g h seas and rights of passage. They held that such a measure would be contrary to existing international law and would therefore be unacceptable to those States that were committed to respecting the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Litho in United Nations, New York 48309 - September 2005 - 3,135 ISBN 92- l - 142251-5

Errata to Sales No. E. 05.IX. 1 English

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 upon all States to consider establishing such a zone in South Asia which contradicted the well-established principle for creating NWFZs. In its view, a proposal for a NWFZ in South Asia had no more validity than a proposal for one in East Asia, Western Europe or North America. Spain abstained based on its reservations over an international conference in 2005 of States parties and signatories to the NWFZ treaties proposed in preambular paragraph 8. It held that an international conference was a new concept, qualitatively different from the consensus achieved in the matter of NWFZs. In addition, the consensus reached in the April 1999 Report of the Conference on Disarmament and in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference did not merit additional legal or political elements to justify holding such an international meeting.

591513. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The draft decision was introduced by Uzbekistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 462 for the sponsors), on 19 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 418. By its terms, the General Assembly would include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclearweapon-free zone in Central Asia. " Conventional disarmament at regional levels 59/87. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context. The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 452 for the sponsors), on 25 The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 3 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 385. The resolution urged States to comply strictly with bilateral, regional and international arms control and disarmament agreements to which they were parties; and encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidencebuilding measures to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session containing the views of Member States on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context. First Committee. After the vote, India said that it supported the resolution as the text was an improvement over last year's on the same subject. However, it clarified that joining the consensus should not be seen as

Regional disarmament its support for resolution 58/43 which, in its view, presented concepts not in keeping with generally accepted principles on confidence-building measures. 59/88. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels. The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 452 for the sponsors), on 22 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October as follows: (165-1-1) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (178-1-1). For the text of the resolution and the voting see page 387. The resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider formulating principles that could serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control and looked forward to a report from the Conference on this subject. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States and to submit a report to the sixtieth General Assembly session on the subject.

First Committee. After the vote, India gave several reasons for its negative vote. It could not support the request for further work in the CD on the subject and the call for the Conference to formulate a principle for a framework for regional instruments on conventional arms control. Furthermore, from its standpoint, a resolution that set about applying regional security approaches to narrowly defined geographical regions was restrictive.

59/89. Regional disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 452 for the sponsors), on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 388. The resolution called upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels. It also supported and encouraged efforts at promoting confidence-building measures to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures. 59/96. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The draft resolution was introduced by Equatorial Guinea, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 457 for the sponsors), on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 396.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The resolution requested the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1197 (1998), to provide States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the necessary support for the implementation and smooth functioning of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa and its early-warning mechanism. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with assistance to ensure that they were able to carry out their efforts and to submit a report to the Assembly's sixtieth session on the implementation of the resolution. 59/59. Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe. The draft resolution was introduced by the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 44 1 for the sponsors), on 22 October. The revised text was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 4 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page

336. The resolution urged all States to take effective measures against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) in all its aspects and to help programmes and projects aimed at the collection and safe destruction of surplus stocks of SALW. It also called upon States and the relevant international organizations to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the subject of the present resolution. 591108. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The draft resolution was introduced by Algeria, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 461 for the sponsors), on 25 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 4 14. The resolution called upon all States in the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region; it encouraged these States to create necessary conditions for strengthening the confidence-building measures among them by promoting genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the UN system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranedn region.


Conclusion The year 2004 saw the United Nations and regional organizations continue to work together, with increased levels of coordination and cooperation, in order to address current security and disarmament challenges. Through the adoption of several resolutions in support of the regional approach to security and disarmament, the General Assembly continued to recognize the indispensable role of regional and subregional organizations in enhancing regional security. The Assembly also noted that measures adopted in one region tended to encourage efforts in other regions. The UN Security Council was joined by a number of key regional organizations in considering "Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Stabilization Processes", which marked another significant step by the UN and regional organizations to further strengthen coordination and cooperation in their common efforts to seek peace and development in various regions and the world at large. As an ongoing effort, consolidation of the existing NWFZs and further expansion of such zones to other parts of the world will continue. Measures at the regional and subregional levels to tackle the proliferation of SALW remained an important part of international efforts in related areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict peace-building as well as fighting organized crime and drug trafficking. In light of the growing awareness of the security threat posed by the presence of illegal and excessive armaments, intensive efforts will continue to address that threat. The United Nations, through its three regional disarmament centres, accelerated assistance to States in their efforts to consolidate peace and security. The Regional Centres work involved addressing issues related to WMD disarmament and non-proliferation, conventional arms control, especially SALW and landmines, and promoting openness and transparency on military and security issues.


CHAPTER V

Related issues and approaches Introduction THIS CHAPTER COVERS

THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT ISSUES: the recommendations of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change on issues related to disarmament and nonproliferation, and the recommendations made by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters as its contribution to the work of the High-level Panel; terrorism and disarmament; prevention of an arms race in outer space; human rights, human security and disarmament; information security and the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament; the relationship between disarmament and development; gender and disarmament; multilateralism and disarmament; and arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including verification of compliance. The common thread that runs through all these issues is how the international community is tackling the relationship of those issues to weapons and the disarmament process. Individually, each represents a significant step taken by the multilateral disarmament machinery or by other multilateral bodies of the United Nations system.

Recommendations by the High-level Panel on issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation1 On 2 December 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change presented its report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" to the Secretary ~ e n e r a l The . ~ report generated new ideas about the kinds of policies and institutions required to make the United Nations effective in the 2 1st century. According to the report, the world was faced with new and evolving threats that could not have been anticipated when the United Nations was founded in 1945 - like nuclear terrorism and State collapse from the l

The High-level Panel was established by the Secretary-General in September 2003 to examine the current challenges to peace and security and to recommend collective action to address those challenges and ways and means to strengthen the United Nations. The full text is available from http://www.un.orglsecureworld.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 "witch's brew" of poverty, disease and civil war. In today's world, a threat to one was a threat to all. Globalization meant that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the industrial world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions in the developing world. Any one of 700 million international airline passengers every year could be an unwitting carrier of a deadly infectious disease. The erosion of State capacity anywhere in the world weakened the protection of every State against transnational threats such as terrorism and organized crime. Every State required international cooperation to make it secure. The Secretary-General gave strong support to the report and wholly endorsed its core arguments for a broader, more comprehensive system of collective security. He planned to submit his own report in March 2005, factoring in the panel's recommendations which would help set the agenda for the 2005 summit on implementing the United Nations Millennium Declaration. Among the Panel's 101 recommendations, 18 were directly related to disarmament and non-proliferation and are listed below: Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legallybinding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons. (Recommendation 15) All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary-General should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and the Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting. (Recommendation 16) The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament: They must honour their commitments under Article V1 of the Treaty (a) on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) (NPT) to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfillment of those commitments; They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear (6) weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. (Recommendation 2 1) The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the NPT should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. (Recommendation 22)

Related issues and approaches -

The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon State. (Recommendation 23) - Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidencebuilding measures and steps towards disarmament. (Recommendation 24) - States not party to the NPT should pledge a commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia should launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia. (Recommendation 25) - All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. (Recommendation 26) - States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972) (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. (Recommendation 27) - The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today's standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. (Recommendation 28) - Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles I11 and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable the Agency to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. (Recommendation 29) - While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the NPT to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. (Recommendation 30) - All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative. (Recommendation 3 1)

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 -

A State's notice of withdrawal from the NPT should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary, mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn. (Recommendation 32) - The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched uranium (HEU) reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from ten to five years. (Recommendation 33) - States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. (Recommendation 34) - The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of HEU for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes. (Recommendation 35) - The Directors General of IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the NPT and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (1992) (Chemical Weapons Convention). (Recommendation 36)

Recommendations by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters as its contribution to the work of the High-level Panel In response to a request by the Secretary-General to contribute to the work of the High-level Panel, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, under the chairmanship of Harald Miiller, undertook intensive deliberations in 2004 on issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons, landmines, export controls, and ways and means to strengthen the United Nations role in disarmament and non-proliferation. The discussions resulted in a comprehensive document containing an indepth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of current disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, an insightful evaluation of old and new challenges, and practical recommendations on how to meet those challenges, with a particular emphasis on the dangerous combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The Board's recommendations were presented to the High-level Panel and to the Secretary-General directly. (The

Related issues and approaches recommendations by the Advisory Board are reproduced in Annex I of this chapter.)

Terrorism and disarmament "Terrorism is not new. What is new is the range, scale and intensity of the threat... In addition, the prospect that terrorists could acquire instruments ofmassive destruction creates unprecedented dangers. '" KOFIANNAN,UNITEDNATIONSSECRETARY -GENERAL In 2004, the United Nations continued to develop and promote global action to combat terrorism through collaborative efforts with Member States, other international, regional and subregional organizations. More States became parties to the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, and the Organization continued to call upon States to become parties to them as a matter of priority. On 22 April, the Security Council held an open debate on the threat to international security posed by weapons of mass destruction and, on 28 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery to non-State actors. The 1540 Committee, established pursuant to that resolution to report on its implementation, began its work in June and the Chair of the Committee submitted a first report to the Security Council in early December on the activities undertaken and the results achieved.6 In August and September the 1540 Committee adopted guidelines for the conduct of its work, for the preparation of the national reports to be submitted pursuant to the resolution, and for hiring experts to help the Committee with its consideration of the national reports. With the recruitment of its first four experts on 1 December, the Committee was equipped to enter the substantive stage of its work, namely, the consideration of the national reports. The Committee also agreed that as it proceeded with its work, it might require technical assistance from those international organizations with expertise in the areas covered by the resolution, including the IAEA and the OPCW. The Chairman sent letters to The outcome was published in DDA Occasional Paper, No. 8 October 2004, available from http://disarmament.un.org/ddapublications/op8.htm. 4 A way forward on global security, International Herald Tribune, 3 December 2004. For a detailed discussion of the resolution, see chapter I of this volume. S120041958, availablefrom http:l/disarmament.un.org/Committee 1540.


their Directors General alerting them of the Committee's intention to make requests of them. Furthermore, letters were also sent to the Chairmen of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in response to their offers to cooperate with the Committee. Pursuant to the Committee's guidelines on transparency and outreach, the Chairman held an informal meeting with the wider United Nations membership on 15 September. In December, the Committee approved the methodology for placing the national reports from Member States on the United Nations web site specifically dedicated to the Committee's work.7 In January, the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) reported on the problems encountered b States and by the CTC in the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The report initially noted that the CTC had an increasing access to a vast amount of measures and information that was all interrelated in the fight against terrorism. Citing the connection between illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and transnational organized crime on the one hand, and terrorism on the other hand, the report stated that CTC practice had shown that anti-terrorism measures related to those fields were interrelated with - and inseparable from - anti-terrorism measures under resolution 1373 (200 1). The report considered the difficulties of States in implementing resolution 1373 with regard to issues such as links between terrorism and illegal movement of nuclear chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials. Through resolution 1566 (ZOO4), the Security Council called on relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and to intensify their interaction with the United Nations and the CTC. In addition, the Council decided to establish a working group to consider and submit recommendations on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, aimed at, inter alia, preventing supply to them of all types of arms and related material. As mentioned, the report of the High-level Panel, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", in setting out a broad framework for

Yi

See http://disarmament.un.orgiCommittee1540/report.html for reports. The CTC was established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and promotes implementation of the resolution which required all States to cooperate in a wide range of areas from suppressing the financing of terrorism to providing early warning, as well as cooperating in criminal investigations and exchanging information on possible terrorist acts, and to report on the steps they have taken to implement the resolution. S/2004/70.

Related issues and approaches collective security, addressed the issue of terrorism. It reaffirmed the right of States to defend themselves, including pre-emptively when an attack was imminent, and said that in the case of "nightmare scenarios" - for instance those combining terrorists and weapons of mass destruction - the UN Security Council might have to act earlier, more proactively and more decisively than in the past. Considering the threats posed, inter alia, by nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and by terrorism, the report presented specific recommendations l for better strategies to reduce both supply and demand, better enforcement capability, and better public health defences. The report further noted that the threat that terrorists would seek to cause mass casualties created unprecedented dangers, and that its recommendations on controlling the supply of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and building robust global public health systems were central to a strategy to prevent this threat. The report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament ~ a t t e r s l noted that the Board recommended, inter alia, that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) be rendered punishable under international law and that perpetrators, whether in State service or private, must be made personally accountable. It also recommended that State action to combat weapons of mass destruction terrorism, including preventive action, be embedded in a multilateral legal framework and within the ambit of the United Nations. Despite progress made in the elaboration of the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism l disagreements remained. Nevertheless, there was an indication that the divergent views relating to the draft convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism were not irreconcilable.' By resolution 59/46 of 16 December 2004, the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee, established by resolution 511210, to continue its efforts to elaborate the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The Committee was also requested to resolve the outstanding issues relating to the elaboration of the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism as a means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of 'O See the section on the High-level Panel's recommendations on disarmament in this chapter.

Al591361. l 2 See the section on nuclear safety and security in chapter

I of this volume.

l 3 Measures to eliminate international terrorism: Report of the Working

Group, A/C.6/59/L. 10, 8 October 2004.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 conventions dealing with international terrorism, if necessary, during its

sixtieth session, within the framework of a working group of the Sixth Committee. During the debate in the First Committee, many delegations reiterated their concerns regarding the growing risk of terrorists seeking to acquire WMD and related materials. Pursuant to resolution 58/48 of 8 December 2003, the Secretary-General submitted a report14 containing the views of Member States and information received from international organizations on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction." These concerns again led to the adoption by the General Assembly, on 16 December, of resolution 59/80 on the same subject. (For details of the resolution, see the General Assembly section of this chapter.) The IAEA continued work on its action plan for nuclear security to further enhance the capacity of Member States and the Agency to respond effectively to acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials (see chapter I, section on nuclear security). At its 48th General Conference, the Director-General submitted a report entitled "Nuclear Security - Measures to Protect Against Nuclear error ism,"'^ on Agency activities regarding the implementation, in consultation and coordination with Member States, of activities relevant to nuclear and radiological security and protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism. As of the end of 2004, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), established in 1995, contained just over 650 incidents that had been confirmed to the Agency between 1993-2004. Of these, about 30 per cent of the incidents involved nuclear materials and about 60 per cent involved other radioactive materials. About half of the confirmed incidents involved criminal activities such as theft, illegal possession, smuggling, or attempted illegal sale of the material. On 26 May, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative was announced by the United States Secretary of Energy at a meeting with IAEA senior officials in Vienna. The initiative aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons (see chapter I, section on political declarations and other initiatives). It was welcomed by the IAEA.

General Assembly, 2004

59/80. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 446 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted l4 A/59/156 & Add. 1, available from http://ods.un.org. l5 GOV/2004/50-GC (48)/6, 1 1 August 2004, available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48-6.pdf.

Related issues and approaches

without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 374. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session.

First Committee. After the vote, Pakistan said that it remained convinced that implementing the Biological Weapons Convention on equal footing with that of the Chemical Weapons Convention would fully serve the goal of international peace and security and would also address the concerns expressed in the draft resolution. It also stressed the need for the international community to address the underlying causes of terrorism - oppression, injustice and deprivation. For its part, Brazil understood that the reference to Security Council resolution 1540 in preambular paragraph 4 specifically addressed the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists and other non-State actors. Outer space "Wemust guard against the misuse of outer space, and, in particular, against the creation of an arms race in outer space. The international community recognized early on that a legal regime for outer space was needed to prevent it from becoming another arena of military confrontation. It is important to find ways to reinforce the legal regime and enhance its effectiveness. "l6

KOFIANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY -GENERAL

Conferenceon Disarmament, 2004 As the Conference on Disarmament (the Conference) did not reach an agreement on a programme of work in 2004, no subsidiary body was established to deal with the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Nevertheless, following an agreement reached by Member States to have structured discussions on various substantive agenda items at l6 'Secretary-General says benefits of space exploration should not be limited to privileged few." Message delivered on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's flight and the 20th anniversary of the launch of the first United States space shuttle, 12 April 2001. (SG/SM/7767).


the plenary meetings, one plenary meeting was dedicated to an exchange of views on the issue. At that meeting, China and the Russian Federation circulated two jointly prepared informal papers entitled 'Verification aspects of PAROS" and "Existing international legal instruments and prevention of the weaponization of outer space". In its statement, Russia reiterated that the issue of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space was a priority among the items on the Conference's agenda. It held the view that outer space should remain an area of cooperation and mutual understanding, rather than confrontation. It underlined that it had no current or short-term plans to create any space weapon systems or deploy them in outer space. As a first practical step, it proposed the introduction of a moratorium on the placement of military assets in outer space, pending the conclusion of an agreement on this issue by the international community. 17 China reiterated the urgency and necessity of preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer space in the current international situation. In its view, the priority was to further consolidate the international consensus on the prevention of the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space by means of a legal instrument. 18 China held that the Conference should reach an agreement on its programme of work as proposed by the five Ambassadors in document CD11693lRev. l , the so-called "A-5 proposal", with a view to beginning substantive work on such important agenda items including PAROS leading to the negotiation and drafting of an international legal instrument on that issue. l 9 Canada stated that it was strongly opposed to the weaponization of space and strove to protect space as a universal good. It remained committed to seeing the Conference play a major role in that regard, through reinstituting an ad hoc committee to discuss PAROS in all its aspects. Canada also believed that verification provisions must be included in any space weapons ban as a necessary element of any eventual treaty.20 France said that it continued to support the setting up of an ad hoc committee on PAROS, as it was convinced that the item should be considered independently of other issues. It reiterated three essential principles on the issue: free access to space for all for peaceful uses, preservation of the 17CD/PV.966. 26 August 2004, http://disarmament.un.org/cd/cd-meeting.htm1. l8 Ibid.

l9 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

available

from


security and integrity of orbiting satellites, and the need to take into account States' legitimate defence interests2 Sweden pointed out that outer space must be preserved for peaceful purposes. The potential threat posed by the weaponization of outer space and the risk of a subsequent arms race was of great concern.22 It supported the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with outer space. As a first step, it proposed that the Conference allocate time for informal technical meetings involving a wider range of actors in the space field, for example, from international organizations, space agencies, space law and the private sector. Sri Lanka noted that the majority of delegations had expressed strong support for the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on the issue of PAROS during its open-ended informal consultations and the informal plenaries. It recalled its 1985 proposal of a moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons receding multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit weapons in space. F3 United Kingdom stated that it was difficult to separate what happened in outer space from what happened on earth. It added that what was driving developments in outer space was the risk of intercontinental ballistic missile proliferation and nuclear-weapons technology, therefore, we had to start on the ground if we wanted to avoid an arms race. It considered that a fissile material cut-off treaty would be one such step, and the next step that the Conference could and should take. 24


59/65 Prevention of an arms race in outer space. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 443 for the sponsors) on 20 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (167-0-2) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (178-0-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 347 and 173. The resolution called upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to actively contribute to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting

21

22 23 24

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 international cooperation. It also invited the Conference on Disarmament to complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992'~and to establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible during its 2005 session.

Human rights, human security and disarmament "Thehumanitarian principles of the (Inhumane Weapons)convention are timeless ... Full implementation of the convention, and universal adherence to it, is particularly vital regarding the explosive remnants of war and mines other than anti-personnel mines. These are sleeping killers which continue to threaten men and women in fields and children at play, endanger the lives of aid workers, and hold back reconstruction and development. Progress in eradicating the threat they pose will help meet pressing humanitarian needs while advancing the security interests of states. KOFI ANNAN,UNITEDNATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL Efforts to address the issue of protecting civilians and their human rights in time of international conflict can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century. But it was not until after the Second World War that significant international legal instruments were concluded on the ~ubject.'~ In 1981, the use of certain inhumane weapons was prohibited or restricted through an international treaty.28 During the 1990s, due to the dramatic increase in the number of civilian casualties caused by landmines, the international community made

25 Mandate for an ad hoc committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament's agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", adopted at the 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992 (CD11 125). 26 Message to the Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 27 November 2003. 27 The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners in Time of War; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 1997 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol IIj.

Related issues and approaches systematic efforts to address the humanitarian associated with landmines, anti-personnel landmines in particular. In the early 1990s, in response to an increase in the number of armed conflicts around the world, especially the rise in intra-State conflicts, the United Nations and other international organizations began to address questions related to SALW, the weapons of choice in those conflicts. 30 These efforts underlined the importance the international community attached to addressing the issue of protecting victims from such weapons, especially children and women during and after armed conflicts. In recent years, growing attention has been given to the link between human rights and WMD, other weapons which have indiscriminate effects and can cause superfluous injuries and suffering, as well as conventional weapons, particularly SALW, focusing on the threat posed by these weapons to the fundamental right to life. 31

Fifty-sixthsession of Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights In 2001, the Geneva-based Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (the s u b - ~ o m m i s s i o nbegan ) ~ ~ to consider the devastating impact of WMD and SALW on human rights.33 In its 2002 and 2003 sessions, the Sub-Commission continued its examination of the issue. Furthermore, in 2003 the Sub-Commission, by its decision 20031105, requested the Secretary-General to transmit a questionnaire to Governments, national human rights institutions and NGOs to solicit information required

28 See the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), and its Additional Protocols (I-V). See also chapter 111, page 106 of this volume. 29 See Mine-Ban Convention of 1997, Amended Protocol I1 of CCW; also see Chapter I11 of this volume. 30 See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, AICONF. l92Il5. 31 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights at www.unhchr.cn/html. 32 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights established the SubCommission's predecessor, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in 1947. The Sub-Commission meets annually and is composed of 26 experts who serve in their personal capacities. 33 See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vo1.26, 2001, 172-176 (United Nations publication Sales No. E.02.IX. 1).


in connection with the study by its Special Rapporteur, Barbara Frey, on the issue of prevention of human rights violations committed with SALW. 34 The above questionnaire was circulated to Governments, national human rights institutions, and NGOs. Several responses to the questionnaire were received. It was expected that more replies would be received from those concerned and that the information provided would be analyzed and incorporated in Ms. Frey's final report, due in 2006. At its 56th session in 2004, the Sub-Commission continued to consider SALW-related human rights violations based on a progress report prepared by its Special Rapporteur, Barbara The progress report focused on the following aspects: humanitarian consequences of small arms in situations of armed conflict; international law protections regarding the availability, misuse and transfer of small arms in armed conflict; and Gender implications of small arms availability. The Special Rapportuer proposed a number of measures that could be adopted to prevent, reduce and put an end to SALW-related human rights violations, emphasizing responsibilities by States to take actions. They included training armed forces in the basic principles of international human rightslhumanitarian law, especially with regard to the use of SALW; investigating and prosecuting individuals and groups within their jurisdictions that knowingly supply SALW used to commit genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, or refer such individuals for prosecution in an international tribunal; engaging in security sector reform and encouraging economic development in conjunction with civil society; and implementing appropriate legislation. She also recommended that States adopt national laws containing export criteria prohibiting SALW transfers in circumstances where such arms are likely to be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. She further recommended that States strictly regulate gun possession. Ms. Frey also identified actions that the international community could take collectively to prevent SALW-related human rights violations. They included the design and implementation of SALW embargoes, as well as the enforcement of criminal sanctions against persons and groups violating them;

re^^^.

34 See T>?E United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 28, 2003, 233 (United Nations publication Sales No. E.IX.03.1). 35 "Progress report of Barbara Frey, Special Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons"

(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/037).

Related issues and approaches and the adoption of an arms trade treaty, with the aim of creating a common global standard that would prevent the transfer of arms likely to be used to commit such violations. She also called on the human rights community, including the Sub-Commission, to focus on international action on small arms. 36 The 56th session of the Sub-Commission considered the progress report of the Special Rapporteur. It subsequently adopted a decision, expressing its satisfaction with the report and asking Ms. Frey to submit her next report to the Sub-Commission's 57th session, taking into account the discussions at the present session.37

Disarmament and Human Security Within the people-centred concept of human security, disarmament is viewed as humanitarian action. In the 1990s, the disarmament community joined forces with humanitarian and development communities to tackle the destructive impact of landmines, resulting in the Amended Protocol I1 to the CCW in 1996, and the Mine-Ban Convention in 1997. Since then, international efforts have been intensified to address the devastating consequences of the proliferation and misuse of SALW on human lives and security, and the need to tackle its multifaceted impact have brought together actors from the disarmament, human rights, humanitarian, health and development communities. The Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development established by the Secretary-General in 2003 examined the links between disarmament, humanitarian and development activities and made a recommendation that United Nations organizations and other international organizations should make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. In this connection, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework should, for example, incorporate disarmament and security measures where appropriate. 38 In 2004, human security and disarmament continued to be one of the three main research focuses of UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for .39 The Institute's activities on human security and Disarmament ~esearch) 36 Press Release, "United Nations Press Release, Sub-Commission Discusses Report on Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, " 9 August 2004 (HR/SCl04/15). 37 Decision 20041123, "Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on its 56th session, Geneva, 26 July-13 August 2004" (E/CN.4/2005/2 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/48). 38 A15911 19, available at httpl/www.disarmament.un.orgl~abld&d.html.


disarmament included cross-cutting research on small arms collection, weapons as a public health issue, and security-building measures such as peace-building, humanitarian action and the impact of landmines. The Institute actively sought to involve civil society groups and NGOs in disarmament and security debates. Inclusive methodologies and approaches, such as participatory evaluation and monitoring techniques, were used to ensure that the voices and reflections of those most affected by violence, conflict and weapons proliferation could be heard. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security With the rapidly growing dependence of society on information and communication technologies (ZCT), concerns have been raised that these technologies could potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their security in both civil and military sectors. Since 1998, the General Assembly has been considering a new item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" and adopted a resolution on the topic annually. These r e s o l ~ t i o n called s ~ ~ upon Member States to further promote the multilateral consideration of existing and potential threats in the information security field, as well as possible measures to limit emerging threats, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information. They also invited all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions: (i) General appreciation of the issues of information security; (ii) Definition of basic notions related to information security, that would include unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; and (iii) Relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems. In response to these requests, a number of Member States submitted their views and assessments on information security issues to the SecretaryGeneral who subsequently submitted them to the ~ s s e m b l ~ . ~ ~ A/59/168, p.4. General Assembly resolutions 53/70 (4 December 1998), 54/49 (1 December 1999), 55/28 (20 November 2000), 56/19 (29 November 2001), 57/53 (22 November 2002), 58/32 (8 December 2003) and 59/61 (3 December 2004). Available from http:/fwww.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguidelgaresl .htm 39

40

Related issues and approaches In 2004, in accordance with resolution 58/32, the Secretary-General established a group of governmental experts to carry out a study on the issue. The Group held its first session in New York from 12-16 July, at which it held a general exchange of views on the subject and developed an outline of its report. (For membership and other information about the Group, see chapter V11 of this volume). The Group will hold two more sessions in 2005 to complete its work.

General Assembly, 2004 59/61. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. The draft resolution was introduced by the Russian Federation, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 442 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 340. The resolution invited all Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions: (a) general appreciation of the issues of information security; (b) definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; and (c) the content of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems. It noted with satisfaction that the group of governmental experts established by the Secretary-General held its first session from 12 to 16 July 2004, in New York and that it intended to convene two more sessions in 2005 to fulfil1 its mandate specified in resolution 58/32 of 8 December 2003. 59/62. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 442 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (101-49-17) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (106-48-2 1). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 34 1. The resolution invited Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States. It also urged Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation 41 Al541213, A1551140 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A1561164 and Add.1, A1571166 and Add.1, A1581373, and A15911 16 and Add.1.


of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, nondiscriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications.

Relationship between disarmament and development "Disarmament and development are two of the international community'S most important tools for building a world free from want and fear. "42 GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

In 2004, the question of the relationship between disarmament and development remained a controversial one. While the vast majority of Member States, mostly non-aligned, continued to call for implementation of the action programme of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, a number of States, especially Member States of the European Union and the United States, considered that there was no automatic link between the two concepts.

Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 57/65, the Secretary-General established a Group of Governmental Experts to review the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in that connection, and to report on the outcome to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly. The review had been recommended in the annual report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the relationship between disarmament and development.43 Under the Chairmanship of Jose Nicolas Rivas (Colombia), the Group of experts from 14 Member States held three sessions (Geneva, 17-21 November 2003, New York, 8-12 March and 24-28 May 2004). (For more information on the study, see chapter V11 of this volume). In order to facilitate the Group's work, DDA organized a symposium on disarmament and development in New York on 9 March 2 0 0 4 . ~ ~ This was the second review of the subject by governmental experts.45 Their report,46 adopted by consensus, contains a series of important observations, ideas and recommendations that bring the understanding of this

42

A1591119, para.4.

43 See Al571167.

Related issues and approaches crucial issue into the current international context. It reiterates the importance of exercising restraint in military expenditure, so that human and financial resources can be used for the ongoing effort to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The report also contains a number of new elements, the most prominent of which are the adverse and multifaceted impact of illicit SALW and international terrorism on development. Among other things, the Group recognized the importance of multilateral approaches to questions of disarmament and development as well as the central role of the United Nations in that area. In this regard, it recommended that the Secretary-General consider further strengthening the United Nations inter-agency high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development in order to encourage relevant departments and agencies, including at the operational level, to share best practices, seek shared understanding and increase cooperation, coordination and joint programming. The Group also recommended that United Nations organizations and other international organizations should make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. In this connection, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework should, for example, incorporate disarmament and security measures where appropriate. It further recommended that when reviewing its progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in 2005, the international community should consider making reference to the contribution that disarmament could make in meeting them, as well as the importance of the disarmament-development relationship itself.47 For more details of these recommendations, see Annex I1 of this chapter.


59/78. Relationship between disarmament and development. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, on 22 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (165-1-2) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (180-2-2). For the text of the resolution and the voting see pages 37 1 and 181. 44 Sir Richard Jolly, Lawrence R. Klein and Sara Meek made presentations at the symposium. For the complete text of their presentations, see Symposium on

the Relationship between disarmament and development, DDA Occasional Paper No. 9, available at http://disarmament2.un.org/ddapublicatiop9.htm. 45 The first review was carried out from 1978-1981. 46 See footnote 38. 47 Ibid.


The resolution welcomed the Group of Governmental Experts' report on the relationship between disarmament and development, and its reappraisal of the issue in the current international context. It requested the SecretaryGeneral to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, on the implementation of the action programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference. It urged the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and to refer to disarmament's role in meeting them when it reviewed its progress towards this purpose in 2005, and to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. It also encouraged the relevant regional and subregional organizations and institutions, non-governmental organizations and research institutes to incorporate issues relating to the relationship between disarmament and development into their agenda and, in this regard, to take into account the report of the Group of Governmental Experts.

First Committee. Two States spoke after the vote. The United States, which voted against the draft resolution, reiterated its established position that the two processes were distinct and could not be linked. It added that it had not participated in the 1987 International Conference, and that it would not be bound by the terms of the declaration contained in the Final Document of that Conference. The United Kingdom, which supported the resolution, acknowledged some of the recommendations in the Group of Governmental Experts' report, especially in the field of conventional weapons. However, it did not accept the report's suggestion that little apparent progress had been made on nuclear disarmament, or the suggestion that the integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime were in doubt. It also remarked that sufficient credit had not been given to unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions in disarmament and non-proliferation matters.

Related issues and approaches Gender and disarmament "With assistance from the United Nations, Afghan women are now working hard to replace the culture of violence with a culture of peace, in the hope that the next generation ofyoung Afghan men and women can work in partnership in a free and secure Afghanistan, where there is no longer a need for guns. AMINA OMERI, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Gender issues have become increasingly important in the disarmament debate. 49 The General Assembly endorsed, in 1996, the "Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action" produced by the 1995 Fourth World Conference on In 2000, the Security Council adopted a resolution on women and peace and security.51 These actions provided an important framework for taking account of gender concerns in the UN's work, including disarmament. An important analytical tool for bringing gender concerns into the disarmament process is that of "gender mainstreaming", 52 which can help create an understanding of how differently men and women view weaponsrelated issues and power-relationships.

48 From a presentation on "Women and Security in Afghanistan" at a DDAsponsored subregional meeting on SALW (Almaty, 16-18 March). Ms. Omeri of UNDPs Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme highlighted the effects of guns and violence on the lives of women in that country. 49 The Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI) (within the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) defines "gender" on its web site (http://www.un.org/ womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm)as follows: "Gender: refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a women or a man in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age". 50 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, (AICONF.l77/20 and Add 1, October 1995). For Fourth World Conference on Women, see A/RES/50/42 of

January 1996.

17 17


Since DDA publicly released its Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan (the Action Plan) in 2003 to facilitate the practical application of gender m a i n ~ t r e a m i n the ~ , ~ Department, ~ together with its partners, have made efforts to apply gender mainstreaming to its disarmament-related activities, including bringing views and concerns of women into the disarmament debate. DDA has encouraged more women to participate in the disarmament debate at various disarmament fora and it has made efforts to bring more women to the disarmament bodies such as the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and various UN governmental expert groups. In 2004, UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) greatly increased its activities in the area of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), published lessons learned, developed a standard operating procedure and provided expertise to inter-agency processes. Two in-depth case studies, one on Liberia and one on Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, add to the compendium of materials that form UNIFEM's publication on Gender and DDR, Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. The final product in the publication was a Standard Operating Procedure on Gender and DDR that was developed in close collaboration with the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR that is currently developing a coherent UN approach to DDR. UNIFEM organized a panel to launch the publication entitled, "Gender and Disarmament in Africa." The panel also commemorated the fourth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. In August, UNIFEM CO-organizeda workshop in Rwanda for former women combatants who are members of the Ndabaga Association, the first organization for demobilized women in the Great Lakes region. The workshop marked the first time since Ndabaga's inception in 2001 that membership from all Rwandan provinces was able to assemble. This built on work begun in October 2003 in partnership with the National Reconstruction Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on "women and peace and security" (S/RES/l 325 (2000). 52. In 1997, ECOSOC defined "mainstreaming a gender perspective" as" the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality." 53 The Action Plan is available from http://disarmament.un.org/gender.htm


and Demobilization Commission to maintain the centrality of women in the upcoming phases of national reconstruction and development. As a result of UNIFEMs efforts, a record of women ex-combatants has been established and an assessment of their social conditions and economic needs carried out. UNIFEM also provided gender expertise to several forums that reviewed the policy and implementation challenges associated with DDR. In addition to the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, UNIFEM also provided gender expertise to the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) . UNIFEM continued to be an active member of the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism that is chaired by DDA. In addition to supporting CASA's research database project, UNIFEM participated as gender experts in several conferences organized by other CASA members, for example a meeting in San Salvador, in April, geared towards training researchers in SALW. UNIFEM also briefed researchers in the region on gender perspectives of SALW and presented the findings of its 2003 Expert Group Meeting on Identifying the Research Gaps in Gender and SALW.

Multilateralism and disarmament In order to better address the challenges in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation, including the prevention of the possible acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists, the United Nations underlined once again, in various disarmament fora, the urgency and importance of reaffirming and strengthening the multilateral disarmament framework. In his 2004 report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General stated that the architects of the Charter were guided by a central idea - durable international peace could be built only on foundations of interdependence. Underpinning this idea was the rule of law and multilateralism as the only rational basis for civilized discourse among nations. Shared responsibility was at the heart of the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted in September 2000. Much has changed since the Millennium Summit, and even more since the Charter was adopted. Yet the values of interdependence and shared responsibility remain f ~ n d a m e n t a l . ~ ~ The views of the Member States on the subject were reflected in the Secretary- General's report entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation"

54 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, Supplement No. l , (A/59/l), 20 August 2004. 55 A/59/128 and Add.1.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The General Assembly, in response to the call for renewed commitment to the multilateral approach to disarmament, adopted for a third consecutive year a resolution on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.56


59/69. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the NonAligned Movement on 22 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (109-9-49) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (125-949). For the text of the resolution and the voting, see pages 352 and 186. The resolution reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session. First Committee. After the vote, two States explained their abstentions. The Netherlands, which spoke on behalf of the European Union (EU) and a number of other countries57 that aligned themselves with its explanation of vote, reaffirmed the EU's commitment to the multilateral treaty system as the best approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation. Still, the EU could not support several elements in the draft resolution that did not give sufficient credit to the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts in those fields. Canada, speaking also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, said that it could not support the language in operative paragraph 1 that multilateralism was the core principle in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation. In its view, their shared security system was the sum of many parts - multilateral, plurilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral measures - which were all effective in global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. It also argued that the draft offered a restrictive vision of multilateralism. 56 A/RES/59/69. 57 The Netherlands spoke on behalf of the European Union and the candidate countries of Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, and the European Free Trade Association countries of Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area.


Arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including verification of compliance The subject of verification has been a growing concern in global arms control and disarmament negotiations since the Second World War. In 1959, General Assembly resolution 1378 established general and complete disarmament under effective international supervision as the aim of global disarmament efforts. Since then, verification has been part of many multilateral or bilateral arms control activities. In 1988, the UN Disarmament Commission adopted the 16 principles of verification, including that adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties. Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should also be considered as a normal component of the verification process. This year, to further explore the issue, the General Assembly took a concrete step by requesting the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts on the issue and transmit the panel's report to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-first session.

General Assembly, 2004 59/60. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. The draft resolution was introduced by Canada on behalf of the sponsors (see page 442 for the sponsors) on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see pages 339. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on further views received from Member States; and also requested him, with the assistance of a panel of government experts to be established in 2006 on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, and to transmit the panel's report to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-first session. First Committee. Before the vote, Pakistan stated that it was not convinced that another panel of experts could make a significant contribution to the philosophy of verification at this stage. It also maintained that any moves to revise or negate already agreed parameters and principles in the field of verification would negatively impact existing achievements and

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 consensus on that critical issue. Iran believed that the UN Disarmament Commission was the most appropriate body to further explore this issue, including the UN role, taking into account the 16 verification principles it had already adopted and its extensive deliberations on the issue. Egypt suggested that the First Committee examine the recommendations in the report of the 1995 Group of Governmental Experts on verification before embarking on a new study on the same subject with a new panel of experts. After the vote, four States explained their positions. The United States believed that any UN study that addressed verification should also examine issues of compliance and enforcement of compliance. It noted that the mandate for the study outlined in the draft resolution omitted those two factors, without which arms control and disarmament agreements would not strengthen international security and stability. The United Kingdom and Japan cautioned that the work of the panel should not undermine or overlap the work of the IAEA or the OPCW or other multilateral bodies, nor should its work be used as a pretext for delaying ongoing efforts to enhance verification in existing regimes in the UN system. Japan also had questions on the scope and objectives of the panel of experts, the relationship between the future role of the UN in verification and existing regimes, and the necessity to establish a panel of experts in 2006. India believed that recommendations to establish a panel of governmental experts were premature in view of the Disarmament Commission's work and the 1995 report of the governmental experts.

59/68. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement on 22 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (165-1-3) and by the General Assembly on 3 December (175-2-3). For the text of the resolution and the voting see page 188. The draft resolution reaffirmed that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating disarmament and arms limitation treaties and agreements. It also called upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress in the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. Member States were also invited to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they had adopted to promote the resolution's


objectives, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing this information to the Assembly's sixtieth session. First Committee: The United States voted against the draft resolution because it saw no direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control agreements and was not convinced that the issue was relevant to the First Committee's work. It maintained that States parties should take relevant environmental concerns into account when implementing bilateral, regional or multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Moreover, the United Nations should not attempt to set standards for the content of arms control and disarmament agreements, but should let the choice rest with the parties involved.

Conclusion In response to the Secretary-General's call for new thinking to tackle the new challenges confronting the international community and the United Nations, in particular, the High-level Panel submitted wide-ranging and far-reaching policies and institutions recommendations required for the UN to be effective in the 21st century. It set out a bold, new vision of collective security for the 2 1st century. The recommendations included those on disarmament and nonproliferation, with emphasis on preventing the danger of WMD terrorism through disarmament and arms limitation. By resolution 59/80, the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. Though multilateralism was again confirmed as the core principle of disarmament and non-proliferation by a majority of Member States, the voting pattern continued to reflect the lack of consensus on the issue. Despite the growing concern about a possible arms race in outer space and some initiatives to start discussions in the Conference on Disarmament, divergent views among key Member States again prevented the Conference from commencing substantive work on PAROS. Member States and the United Nations system continued to examine disarmament's broader social impact by addressing its interaction with human rights, human security, gender issues and development. The SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Disarmament and Human Security continued to build an awareness and understanding of the disarmament-human rights connection, especially through the continued work of its Special Rapporteur on the issue. Work, especially in conceptual research aspects also continued on establishing and emphasizing the importance of the disarmament-human security linkage, with small arms and light weapons, landmines and explosive remnants of war figuring prominently in this area. The relationship between disarmament and

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 development was examined by the UN Group of Governmental Experts, resulting in a comprehensive set of new recommendations for Member States, the United Nations system and civil society. Lastly, work continued on mainstreaming a gender perspective within the security and disarmament debate, with endeavors by UNIFEM and DDA both at the policy level and in practical actions in the field. The rapid development of information and telecommunication technology and the growing concern over its potential impact on international and national security led the establishment by the Secretary-General of a UN Group of Governmental Experts in an attempt to carry out a closer examination of the security aspects of the issue.

Recommendations made by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters as its contribution to the work of the High Level Panel

Nuclear Weapons Those NPT parties that have not yet done so should conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA promptly. The NPT Review Conference should make it politically binding for all NPT members to conclude Additional Protocols with the IAEA and to bring them into force expeditiously. Complementary access as provided for in the Additional Protocol should be used regularly and effectively to create and uphold confidence in existing regimes. Without prejudice to any action that the Security Council may decide to take, withdrawal should trigger an emergency meeting of NPT States parties, with a view to taking urgent action to correct the situation. The meeting should scrutinize the reasons given by the withdrawing State on its withdrawal in the declaration required by the Treaty; determine, on the basis of IAEA reporting, if the withdrawal was premeditated in bad faith under the deceptive cover of peaceful intentions; recommend to States parties the appropriate reaction towards the withdrawing state; and convey the results of the meeting to the Security Council. A five-year moratorium on the new construction of such fuel cycle facilities should be declared, accompanied by a guarantee for fuel supply, at market prices, by present suppliers to all parties respecting the moratorium. The results of the group of experts commissioned by the IAEA Director General to assess ways to "multinationalize" the fuel cycle, which will be

Related issues and approaches available in 2005, should be carefully considered and, as appropriate, implemented by the international community. The use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in civilian uses should be considered. States using highly enriched uranium in naval fuel should consider turning to reactor technology that makes use of lower enrichment grades. The thirteen steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including, inter alia, enhanced transparency, the irreversibility of nuclear weapons reduction, bringing into force the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban-Treaty and beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off instrument should be implemented promptly. The further reduction and eventual elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons is of particular priority with regard to the non-state actor threat, as these weapons are most susceptible to theft and easily usable by unauthorized persons. The achievement of the universality of the NPT should remain one primary objective to be actively pursued and eventually realized by the international community. Pending universalisation of the NPT, non-parties should undertake to take all necessary measures as contained in the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology to other actors, and to be accountable, to the degree compatible with national security, to the international community for such measures. States parties should avoid the transfer of all nuclear-related materials, technology, equipment and scientific assistance to non-parties. Non-parties should take all necessary measures - and the international community should insist they do - to prevent the dangers associated with a nuclear arms race and implied by operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The 2005 NPT Review Conference should explicitly address the risk of non-state actor access to nuclear weapons, material and technology and declare explicitly that preventing such access is included in the undertakings of all parties to the Treaty. All states should adhere to the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Materials. The Convention should extend from material in international transport to all nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport with a view to making protection for that material comparable to that recommended in the IAEA guideline INFCIRC 225IRev. 4.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Parties should be requested to report to the IAEA on the adoption of measures undertaken to bring national regulations into conformity with this amendment. Member states should also consider making extensive use of peer review mechanisms offered by the IAEA to obtain expert checks and recommendations on their national systems to control nuclear materials. The IAEA should install a "physical security assistance pool", making available on request to member states in need of assistance its own technical, legal and personnel resources as well as resources offered by member states in a position to do so. The IAEA counterterrorism programme should continue with adequate funding. The organizations administering existing nuclear-weapon-free zones should alert their membership to the problem of physical security of fissile material. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should begin forthwith in the CD and be conducted expeditiously. Pending nuclear disarmament, States possessing unsafeguarded stocks of fissile material should undertake unilaterally to observe strict accountancy and physical security measures, and confidence-building measures and transparency should be applied. The " 10 plus 10" programme of the G-8 that offers assistance to republics of the former Soviet Union to secure fissile material both in the civilian and the military realm should be extended, on request, to other States in need of such assistance. The CD should begin negotiations on a convention for the prohibition of radiological weapondwarfare. This convention should also explicitly address the obligation by States Parties to prevent the diversion of radioactive material to non-state actors. This should include licensing, registration, reliable custody and orderly disposal of radiological sources. IAEA activities to recover orphanised radiological sources must continue with adequate funding.

Biological Weapons States parties should make a major effort to make good use of the measures identified in the draft protocol. The achievements in the new BWC process must be consolidated. Measures developed in the new BWC process should be made politically binding.

Related issues and approaches There should be an organized effort by countries in a position to do so to offer assistance in further national implementation efforts by countries in need of such assistance on a voluntary basis. Efforts should be made at global, regional and national levels. The threat of BW proliferation, including to non-state actors, should be addressed at all relevant levels. Beyond the global level, efforts should be undertaken multilaterally, regionally, nationally and locally. Strong efforts should be undertaken to raise awareness about ongoing activities and further needs outside the BWC framework. Proposals should be prepared in time on how to carry forward the process in the context of the BWC beyond 2006. All relevant organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) must be part of a sustained, integrated, multifaceted effort in a continuing process with frequent review.

Chemical Weapons Strengthening and fully utilizing the existing regime. The legal basis is solid and the legitimacy is flawless and there is no doubt that a stronger regime is the best way to prevent access to chemical *weaponsby terrorist groups and to establish, through mechanisms of international cooperation, means of defence against possible attack by terrorists with such weapons. Specifically, a) achieving universality of the CWC must be accorded priority; and b) providing means and resources to OPCW to utilize fully the instruments of monitoring and verification with regard to both existing chemical weapons (prior to their destruction) and to relevant chemical industry facilities that produce, consume or store sensitive dual use chemicals. States parties should fully comply with all their obligations under the CWC. Achieving chemical weapons disarmament is fundamental to guaranteeing non-proliferation. It is vital that chemical disarmament should be tackled with urgency. Every effort should be made by those member States possessing chemical weapons in cooperation with the OPCW to ensure compliance with the destruction deadlines for chemical weapons stockpiles as provided in the CWC, if not sooner. The full implementation of the disarmament provisions of the CWC will contribute greatly to combating chemical terrorism. The possibilities of chemical weapons being subject to theft manifest the importance of destroying all stockpiles of chemical weapons as soon as practicable.

Promoting national implementation, including export controls. The ultimate responsibility for preventing CW from falling in the hands of terrorists rests with States. States should enact national legislation to implement fully the CWC, including criminalizing any activities that violate it. States should adopt stringent regulations obliging private actors handling dual use chemical substances and technologies to prevent the diversion of those assets into unauthorized hands, as well as strict export control measures with regard to dual use chemicals, especially those provided in the schedules of the CWC, reporting duly to OPCW on those transfers stipulated by CWC. Fostering international cooperation and assistance. Practical mechanisms and measures need to be developed to promote the peaceful use of chemical activities by member States of CWC and to provide emergency assistance to member States against possible CW attacks. This would contribute greatly to promoting the universality and implementation of CWC. Training for special national police and military units to identify CW agents should be provided and on decontaminating affected areas. Technical knowledge should be shared about effective protective suits and modern gas masks preventing the intrusion of aerosolized particles into the respiratory system. Methods and experiences should be made available with respect to civil protection against chemical attacks, including an appropriately prepared national health system. Following technical developments. OPCW should give high priority to developing its capacity to monitor and assess the risk of new chemical agents that could be relevant to the CWC in view of rapid scientific and technological developments. In this regard, full use should be made of the work of the Scientific Advisory Board. State parties should fully cooperate with the OPCW in this field.

Missiles Since Security Council resolution 1540 only refers to the issue of missiles in the context of means of delivery of WMD, the SecretaryGeneral should urge the Security Council to adopt a narrower and more operative resolution addressing the issue of shoulder- fired missiles (MANPADS) and their danger to civil aviation through terrorist use. This would constitute an important step in the joint areas of proliferation, terrorism and missiles that are in need of a combination of practical measures, greater international awareness and diplomatic leadership. This is a step that should be considered in the short and immediate term. In addition, for the medium term, it would be timely for the Security Council and the Secretary-General to call for Member States of the


United Nations to adopt effective national export controls in relation to missiles, rockets, MANPADS and any other means of delivery in transfers to other States and a total ban of such transfers to non-state actors that could cause extensive loss of life and mass-disruption in the post 911 1 context. Such export controls could also foster and develop confidence between countries in a regional and global context. The present UN Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles in all their aspects should provide the Secretary-General with a more focused attempt to strengthen the emerging elements of 'greater agreement' indicated above. The Department for Disarmament Affairs could also provide the Secretary-General with an informal programme of action to strengthen and consolidate those emerging trends in the context of a longer time frame. The Chairman of the CTC should undertake consultation with the chairmen of the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Group, the IAEA, the OPCW, the WHO and other relevant organizations, to consider measures that could be taken to enhance the cooperative effort between non-proliferation and counter-terrorism tools. This could be of relevance to the area of missiles and rockets as well.

Small Arms and Light Weapons Urgent action must be taken by the international community to curb the flow of small arms and light weapons to regions of conflict or with potential for conflict and to ban the supply of such weapons to non-State actors. States should be urged to reach consensus on the issue of banning the supply of SALW to non-State actors. Legal sanctions against perpetrators should be installed. The Security Council should adopt a resolution obligating the United Nations Member States to enact national laws that implement Security Council arms embargoes and to prosecute violators. The risks that the legal supply of small arms and light weapons could contribute to enhancing violence in local and regional conflict should be addressed. A universal code of conduct should be adopted on the trade in SALW. Global and regional transparency measures should be adopted. Develop legally-binding international instruments regulating tracing, marking and controlling brokering of SALW expeditiously. The present negotiations should be pursued with expediency. The United Nations should take the lead in coordinating more closely with other international organizations and regional organizations to

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 produce synergy in the collective efforts to address the threat posed by the proliferation of SALW. The United Nations should form a coalition with concerned Member States, parliamentarians, civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in launching a global campaign aimed at preventing, reducing and eradicating the proliferation of SALW. Post-conflict small arms disarmament programmes should be community-based and human security-centred, and should include local security force reform. The United Nations should coordinate international efforts in collectively providing economic and social incentives to war-affected communities and populations. The successful model of "weapons for development" should be replicated in more communities and countries emerging from conflicts.

Landmines All State must do their utmost to promote address the humanitarian objectives of the mine issue.

Mine-Ban Convention Take concrete steps to promote the full implementation of the Convention, in particular, the prevention and suppression of prohibited acts, and ensuring compliance with the Convention. Greater efforts must be made to meet deadlines set out in the Convention, such as those on destruction of stockpiles, mine-clearance, etc. States parties to the Mine-Ban Convention should promote the universality of the Convention as a priority task. They should undertake strong efforts to include anti-vehicle mines as these have also longlasting effects on civilian life. States that believe the Mine-Ban Convention is presently incompatible with their vital security interests should revisit their position regularly. Meanwhile, they should do their utmost to contribute to the fight against the negative humanitarian consequences of landmines by adhering to the Amended Protocol I1 to the CCW as well as through technical developments. Utilize the First Review Conference of the Mine-Ban Convention, to renew the political momentum to continue to seek a comprehensive resolution to the humanitarian crises caused by APMs. The United Nations, States parties and civil society should strengthen their cooperation to ensure the participation in the First Review Conference at the highest possible level and the issuance of a strong Political Declaration by the High-Level Segment of the Conference. And all

Related issues and approaches interested actors should help raise the profile of the Review Conference to ensure public pressure is brought to bear in advance to encourage renewed commitments. Identify a concrete action plan at the First Review Conference aimed at achieving the core objectives of the Convention, namely, clearing mined areas, assisting mine victims, destroying stockpiled mines, and universalizing the Convention. Efforts should be made to maintain global attention to the Convention, the need for governments and the UN system to assist in implementation by supporting the outcomes of the Review Conference, including mobilizing sufficient resources and providing assistance to mine-affected countries, with a particular emphasis on de-mining. Further strengthen the comprehensive cooperation across the United Nations, through the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), in addressing the threat posed by APMs in the following areas: global coordination, emergency relief operations, peacekeeping operations, and reconstruction and development. Enhance United Nations' coordination and cooperation with other leading international organizations and NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian D-mining (GICHD). Anti-vehicle mines should be included.

Amended Protocol I1 on Landmines States parties should: Take concrete measures to ensure the implementation of the Protocol, including the new criteria on mine detectability, self-deactivation and self-destruction, as well as the destruction of old stockpiles inconsistent with the new criteria. Promote international cooperation aimed at assisting states parties to the Protocol in meeting the new criteria on mine detectability, selfdeactivation and self-destruction. Efforts should be made to persuade those countries not yet parties to the Mine-Ban Convention to agree to be bound by the Amended Protocol I1 to ensure no gap is left. Develop a mechanism to hold non-state actors accountable for violating the provisions of Amended Protocol I1 during intra-state armed conflicts, e.g. making such violation a punishable war crime.


Export controls It might be appropriate to set up open-ended working groups on the implementation of these export control obligations and to invite the NSG, the Australia Group and the MTCR to give input with regard to possible items to be listed and experiences and models Export control: multilateral cooperation for export control structures and licensing criteria. Other UN Members could draw on such advice on a voluntary basis. Export control systems should include agreed lists of items to be subjected to export licensing, a catch-all clause dealing with non-listed items destined for weapons programmes, measures to cover the activities of intermediaries such as brokers, measures to ascertain the end use of transferred items, the intangible transfer of technology, a standard for enforcement measures, and an understanding not to undercut negative licensing decisions taken by another state. At the same time, the members of the export control regimes should consider offers of systematic legal, technical, organizational and financial assistance for the creation of effective export control systems on which those UN Member States lacking the respective resources could draw. While the gap between members and non-members would not be completely closed, it would be narrowed considerably through such practical cooperation. Open seminars should be offered to enhance information on export control issues and help to develop the skills of both civil society and officials in understanding and implementing export control law and regulation. The role of the United Nations should be strengthened in fostering cooperation and coordination among Member States on export controls. There should be a universal information system on illegal procurement and trafficking activities going beyond the present IAEA data base and integrating the insights from the various WMD fields to permit a more comprehensive picture; such a broader exchange would not prevent States from committing to more in-depth intelligence sharing in smaller settings if they so chose. Efforts should be made to develop broad-based, universal norms and rules for export controls. PSI should continue to be implemented in a manner consistent with international law. Intercepts on the high seas where present legal authority is not sufficient should be based on specific Security Council authorization. The acting

Related issues and approaches state should be obliged to report to the Council the evidence forcing interception and the results of the search. Participants in PSI operations should have in place arrangements to cover any damages that result from intercept and search of transports that prove innocent. It is advisable to initiate negotiations on ways and means to complement the Law of the Sea in order to cover the cases where presently legal authority for intercept is lacking. All states should consider becoming supporters of PSI as to make the initiative into a universal, multilateral arrangement.

The Role of the United Nations In cases of concern about non-compliance, the instruments available within established regimes should be fully utilized. Complementary access under the Additional Protocol (or special inspections as long as the Protocol has not been adopted by all NPT Parties), challenge inspections under the CWC, and investigations under the BWC should be invoked by the respective States Parties to regimes and the organization's bodies whenever needed. For cases referred to the Security Council, timely and efficient decisionmaking should be ensured. All relevant information and aspects should be made available for consideration, including the views of states from the region concerned. If required, the Security Council should be able to obtain independent technical expertise on short notice, drawing, as appropriate, on the verification bodies of the regime concerned. If the threat is not assessed by the Security Council as requiring immediate effective action and important questions of fact remain undisclosed, the imposition of intrusive inspection and elimination activities might be a useful way to address the situation. However, it must be ensured that inspections do not become a device to postpone necessary decisions. There should be a core technical WMD verification and elimination capability with particular expertise in the BW and missile sector available at UN headquarters. This core organisation should be capable of drawing on a broad roster of experts. In order to make the most economical use of this expertise, consideration should be given to locating a small core unit, designed to enhance the resources available to the Security Council, within the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Care should be taken to ensure efficiency while avoiding unnecessary growth of bureaucracy.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 If existing WMD regimes do not yet contain necessary instruments to cope with new and urgent challenges, and the risk emerging from them appears immediate, the Security Council might decide to mandate steps to remedy the situation. Measures adopted by the Security Council in such situations should carry a sunset clause, that is, they should be reviewed by the Security Council after an appropriate period of time and be extended only if such a review proved their effectiveness and they are still deemed necessary to combat a serious risk to peace and international security. When the Security Council adopts a resolution imposing such measures, it should invite simultaneously the members of the respective regimes or, where appropriate, the General Assembly to set up a negotiating body to create a universal legal instrument for provisions that are not covered by existing treaties and agreements and are outside their scope. Security Council resolution 1540 should be utilised to encourage members of the treaties and agreements to fully implement those provisions that help prevent the transfer of related items and technologies to non-state actors, and to continue their efforts to make the treaties and agreements universal. The Committee installed to supervise the operation of resolution 1540 should assist Member States to achieve at effective implementation and should develop recommendations at the end of its two-year mandate how the provisions of resolution 1540 might be improved. When the Security Council considers universalizing measures which so far are only binding on regime members, there should be consultations with states not members to such the regimes. Their views and interests should be taken into account. When the Security Council is considering measures in response to and for the prevention of the proliferation of weapons or other means of mass destruction, the General Assembly should be fully informed about the Council's deliberations and the views of General Assembly members should be taken into account. Close consultations and open sessions of the Security Council are useful in this regard. The Secretary-General should make use of his article 99 authority whenever, in his opinion, this is necessary to face a threat to international peace and security, including those emerging from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To be kept abreast of current developments, the Secretary-General should bring together regularly the heads of the OPCW, the IAEA, the CTBTO and the World Health Organisation to be briefed about events, findings and insights relevant to peace and international security.


Decision 20041123 by the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons At the 25th meeting, on 13 August 2004, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, recalling its resolution 2002/25 of 14 August 2002, decided, without a vote, to express its satisfaction with the progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37), Barbara Frey, and to ask her to submit her next report to the Sub-Commission at its fifty-seventh session, taking into account the discussions at the present session.

Recommendationsby the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development (Part V. SecretaryGeneral's Report: A/59/119)

"V. Recommendations 77. The Group recognizes the importance of multilateral approaches to questions of disarmament and development as well as the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament-development relationship. In order to fulfil this role, the necessary political will, adequate resources, and continued and effective coordination and close cooperation between the relevant United Nations departments, agencies and sub-agencies are of the essence. 78. In this regard, the Group recommends that the Secretary-General consider further strengthening the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development in order to encourage relevant departments and agencies, including at the operational level, to share best practices, seek shared understanding and increase cooperation, coordination and joint programming.

Meeting disarmament and development comxnitments 79. The Group calls for the universalization and implementation of, as well as compliance with, internationally negotiated multilateral arms control agreements with the objectives of increasing security, freeing resources currently dedicated to military expenditure for other activities, and building confidence. 80. The Group also calls for adherence to and the implementation of internationally agreed development commitments. In this regard, the Group

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 urges each Member State to assess its progress towards the Millennium

Development Goals and undertake the action necessary to meet them by 2015.

Assessing security needs of Member States 8 1. Member States should implement with transparency their l987 commitments to assess their political and security requirements and levels of military spending, taking into account the need to keep their expenditure at the lowest possible level, as well as to carry out regular analyses of the economic and social consequences of their military spending and to inform their public and the United Nations about them. In addition to their participation in the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures and the Register of Conventional Arms, Member States should periodically publish defence white papers and defence policy reviews. 82. Upon request, the relevant departments and agencies of the United Nations should continue to develop capacity-building programmes to assist States in undertaking the assessment of their security needs and to promote more complete and regular national reporting on military spending or other relevant areas. In this regard, other relevant international institutions and bilateral donors should also support capacity-building. 83. Taking into account the climate of insecurity that terrorism creates and its devastating effects on disarmament and sustainable development, the Group calls for increased multilateral cooperation and international assistance to combat terrorism and address its root causes. In this regard, the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is a particularly worrying possibility. While Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), on weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors, is an important effort to address this threat, the Group encourages the international community to continue to tackle this issue in other multilateral forums. Mainstreaming the disarmament and development relationship 84. United Nations organizations and other international organizations should make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities. In this connection, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework should, for example, incorporate disarmament and security measures where appropriate. 85. Developing countries are encouraged to take into account disarmament and security concerns when preparing their poverty reduction strategy papers with the donor community. UNDP could assist with this at the country level.


86. When reviewing its progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in 2005, the international community should consider making reference to the contribution that disarmament could make in meeting them, as well as the importance of the disarmament-development relationship itself. 87. The donor community is invited to examine the feasibility of new concepts for providing specific assistance in relation to weapon destruction, conversion, and mine action and unexploded ordnance activities, including the idea of debt-for-disarmament swaps, with a view to increasing development opportunities. 88. Regional organizations and institutions could undertake greater coordination of activities relating to disarmament and development, which could have the dual benefits of raising confidence within regions and improving the effectiveness of these activities in this field. Greater support and assistance would facilitate these activities. 89. Non-governmental organizations are encouraged to continue to be engaged on the disarmament-development relationship. The Group also encourages support for non-governmental organizations working in this field.

Increasing awareness of the relationship between disarmament and development 90. The Group encourages the international financial and development institutions to build upon the work of disarmament to further the objective of sustainable development, peace and security. Similarly, conflict prevention, peace-building, security-building and disarmament activities should take into account development perspectives. 91. The Group concludes that more needs to be done to engage bilateral and multilateral donors to work closely with countries on the interrelationship between development, disarmament, security sector reform and military expenditure, without adding conditionalities to development assistance. 92. The United Nations should place increased emphasis on promoting public awareness of the relationship between disarmament and development through its outreach activities, while also taking into consideration the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education. The international focus on the Millennium Development Goals offers a clear opportunity to promote understanding of the disarmament-development relationship.

Facilitating research and dialogue on issues relating to the relationship between disarmament, development and security 93. The United Nations, its agencies and specialized research institutes should facilitate dialogue and continuing research on issues such as:


The potential contribution of disarmament to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals; The impact of armaments on the natural environment and thus on (b) development; Ways to facilitate and promote conversion; (c) Methodologies for calculating the costs of armaments, incorporating (4 not only development, procurement, training and maintenance costs but also the costs of destruction and disposal as part of the life cycle of weapons, as well as modalities for meeting the costs of destruction and disposal; International responses to halt the illicit funding of conflicts; (e) Lessons learned from regional security arrangements; (0 Developing common understandings of evolving concepts such as @ human security; (h) Security sector reform. 94. As specialized research bodies of the Organization, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the United Nations University could play a valuable role in this regard. The Group also encourages relevant research institutes, regional and subregional organizations and research-oriented non-governmental organizations to undertake objective studies. The Group calls upon foundations and other donors to consider providing support for such studies. (a)

Promoting security through openness, transparencyand confidence 95. The Group affirms the importance of continued progress towards achieving universal participation in the United Nations System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures and recognizes the value of providing it with more comprehensive data. 96. The Group also urges universal participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and supports efforts for the further enhancement of its relevance, thereby increasing its significance as a global confidence-building measure. 97. Member States should enhance and support arms control verification regimes through the relevant treaty bodies, as well as develop appropriate capacities at the national level, in order to strengthen mutual confidence.

Conversion and surplus weapon destruction 98. The Group supports the concept of conversion in its various forms and encourages relevant States to take the corresponding decisions and steps, as

Related issues and approaches appropriate. It also encourages the international community to assist those States in that endeavour. Regarding the destruction of armaments, their components and munitions, similar assistance should be considered, where necessary. Member States should consider making their experiences with conversion available to other countries. 99. The donor community and United Nations specialized agencies (whenever appropriate) should support and contribute to initiatives and approaches for the reorientation of scientists, researchers and engineers with specialized knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. This issue should be considered as part of a country's larger socio-economic development programme. 100. The Group encourages the destruction or appropriate disposal of surplus weapons, their components and munition stocks. These activities should be completed in accordance with legal and environmental norms and should be verifiable.

Preventing conflict and promoting peace 101. The Group also expresses concern on the lack of progress in efforts by the international community to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, which continue to pose a very real threat to peace and security in the world. 102. Given the enormous scale of destruction often associated with armed conflicts and the political, social, economic and financial difficulties of postconflict peace-building, the Group emphasizes the importance of conflict prevention and, in this context, calls for the strengthening of the rule of law within States as well as further reliance on international law in arbitration and adjudication, particularly through the International Court of Justice. Additionally, the Group calls attention to the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict. 103. The Group encourages further action by the international community and the United Nations to halt the illicit funding of conflicts through activities such as illegal fund-raising and traffic in illicit drugs. Mechanisms similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on conflict diamonds could serve as an example for more action to halt the illicit funding of conflicts 104. The United Nations should continue its efforts to create effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policies and processes in postconflict situations, taking into account the importance of local ownership, public information, coordination, financial and logistical support, the needs of dependants and support workers in addition to those of former combatants, and the inclusion of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration provisions in peace agreements. Disarmament, demobilization


and reintegration should also be considered as part of a country's broader development programme. In particular, a review of the issues and processes, resulting in the updating of guidelines by the United Nations, would be timely. 105. The Group encourages Member States to follow the recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General on small arms to support efforts aimed at developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons; to assist the United Nations Secretariat in establishing the small arms advisory service; and to establish the necessary legislative or other measures, including the possible use of authenticated end-user certificates, to ensure effective control over the export, import, brokering and transit of small arms and light weapons, as well as corresponding ammunition. 106. The Group recognizes the potential for arms transfers to have an adverse impact on conflict prevention and peace-building and to add to military expenditures, and recommends, in connection with small arms and light weapons, that this issue be considered further at the United Nations review conference in 2006 with a view to discussing arrangements for arms transfers. 107. The Group encourages Member States to lend their support to the Secretary-General in responding to requests from States wishing to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations. In this regard, the Group recognizes the importance of the work accomplished in this field by the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures and calls for the strengthening of the Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures. 108. Taking into consideration the often devastating consequences of the use of landmines for the development efforts of affected countries, the Group encourages all Member States to adhere to andlor fully implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as well as the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention, in this context in particular its Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war. Non-State actors should comply with the spirit of these instruments."

C H A P T E R V1

Institutional aspects "The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consensus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its institutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to them by Member States and their leaders. " l SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE

Introduction THEUNITEDNATIONS'CONTINUED TO UNDERTAKE ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELDS OF DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION through its main organs,

namely, the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as engaging with civil society organizations interested in disarmament. The United Nations disarmament machinery consists of the General Assembly, its two subsidiary bodies - the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission - and the Conference on Di~armament.~ In addition, disarmament issues are also dealt with within other international frameworks established on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements. The Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA or the Department) carries out its activities through its five branches and three regional centre^.^ Its branches include: in Geneva - Conference on Disarmament Secretariat and Conference Support, in New York - Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Arms (including practical disarmament measures), the Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, (Al591565, p. 14). See Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, part IV, (AIRESIS-1012). To date, the General Assembly has held three special sessions devoted to disarmament: SSOD I was the tenth special session (1978), SSOD I1 was the twelfth (1982), and SSOD I11 was the fifteenth (1988). See Secretary-General's Bulletin, Organization of the Department for Disarmament Affairs (ST/SGB/2004/12).

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Monitoring, Database and Information, and Regional Disarmament which comprises the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Developments and trends, 2004 In his report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General addressed the issues of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and small arms and light weapons (SALW). He stated that the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction cast a shadow over all the peoples of the world.4 He further stated that several issues relating to WMD remained a great concern to the international community and included the slow pace of disarmament, violations of non-proliferation commitments, evidence of a clandestine nuclear network and the threat of terrorism. On the issue of SALW, the Secretary-General noted that the United Nations continued to support efforts by a wide variety of actors to implement the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). In particular, it had provided assistance to Member States in the establishment of national coordinating bodies, the development of national capacity, the management or destruction of stockpiles, reporting on the implementation of the PoA and the enactment or revision of national legislation on the transfer and use of small arms.6 In the context of continued deliberation in the General Assembly on the rationalization of its work, discussions in the First Committee on ways and means to improve its functioning resulted in some concrete action. Its most noteworthy achievement was its efforts to improve the effectiveness of its methods of work. The Committee, chaired by Luis Alfonso De Alba (Mexico), identified 14 resolutions that it would consider biennially and two on a triennial basis. It also streamlined its consideration of agenda items from ten to seven clusters - nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction; outer space; conventional weapons; regional disarmament and security; other disarmament measures and international security; and disarmament machinery. The Committee continued to set aside some time for informal meetings to hear briefings from experts and for purposes of "question time."

Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, Supplement No. I , (Al5911). Ibid., para. 68. Ibid., pan. 72.

Institutional aspects

In this connection, it heard statements from representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), as well as from the Director of UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) and the Directors of the Department's three Regional Centres for peace and disarmament. Against this background, the Committee (and subsequently the General Assembly) adopted, without a vote, an Indonesia-led resolution on improving the effectiveness of the Committee's methods of work.7 The resolution invited Member States to take steps such as submitting draft resolutions in a more concise, focused and action-oriented manner; considering the biennialization or triennialization of agenda items; continuing to hold interactive debates; and merging resolutions that were similar in substance. The submission of the Indonesian text was the outcome of intensive consultations and incorporates elements from draft resolutions submitted earlier by Malaysia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the United States, which were subsequently withdrawn.

Conference on Disarmament, 2004 In 2004, the Conference on Disarmament (the Conference) was again unable to break the impasse on reaching an agreement on its programme of work. Consequently, it did not establish any mechanism to deal with substantive agenda items. The Conference was in session from 19 January to 26 March, 10 May to 25 June and 26 July to 8 September 2004, and concluded by adopting its report8 to the General Assembly. The presidency of the Conference was successively assumed by Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco and Myanmar. Sixty-five membersg participated in the session. In addition, 38 other States, l0 at their request, were invited to take part. The Conference adopted the same agenda as its 2003 session. l1 From the beginning of the session, France emphasized that the Conference should also address new issues that could be relevant to the current international security environment, particularly terrorism and WMD, and compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements.12 Consultations carried out by successive Presidents revealed a growing interest among Members of the Conference to address those issues without, A/RES/59/95. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session.

Supplement No. 2 7 (A/59/27).


however, including them on the agenda. Subsequently, the Conference embarked on a discussion devoted to new and "additional issues" related to its agenda, which took place in the setting of an informal plenary meeting. Member States agreed to hold a structured debate on issues on the Conference's agenda with the aim of facilitating an agreement on its programme of work, in the format of informal plenary meetings on those issues, on additional issues related to the agenda, the methodology of the programme of work, and ways and means of overcoming the impasse over the programme of work. The outcome of these meetings was summarized by the successive Presidents at the plenary meetings, l 3 and was welcomed by the members of the Conference as a useful tool for the consideration of crucial arms control and disarmament issues, including new threats and challenges to security, and for bridging the gap in positons held by delegations on the Conference's agenda as well as on its programme of work. During the first part of its session, the Conference heard statements by six Foreign Ministers (Canada, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and Sweden) and one State Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bangladesh). In addition to addressing arms control and disarmament issues, those speakers expressed concern over the continuing impasse and voiced strong political support for the Conference. Throughout the session, the successive Presidents made efforts to reach an agreement on a programme of work on the basis of the proposal of the five former Presidents ("A-5 proposal") :l4 however, consensus remained elusive with a number of delegations holding on to their traditional positions and Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. l0 Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Croatia. Cyprus; Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uruguay and Yemen.


priorities. The "A-5 proposal" was regarded by many as the most promising solution to the existing impasse. In that connection, a number of delegations advocated the comprehensive approach to the programme of work as a guarantee of addressing the security concerns of all States. There were, however, criticisms of linking issues that were inherent in that approach to the programme of work, In order to overcome the impasse and to maintain the Conference on Disarmament's relevance in the current security environment with its new challenges, views were expressed that items should be addressed only on the basis of their merit and relevance. There were also opinions in favour of breaking the linkages and making separate decisions on how to deal with individual issues on the programme of work. The Conference was able to take a decision on enhancing the engagement of civil society in its work. Although the implementation of some of its elements (e.g., the allocation of a meeting for NGOs to address the Conference) was subject to the agreement of the programme of work, the decision was noteworthy in strengthenin the Conference on Disarmament's engagement of civil society in its work. l!? In its report to the General Assembly, the Conference requested the current and incoming Presidents to conduct consultations during the intersessional period and, if possible, to make recommendations, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those submitted as documents of the Conference, views presented and discussions held, and to endeavour to keep the members of the Conference informed of their consultations.

Disarmament Commission, 2004 In 2003, the Commission was unable to agree on concrete proposals to advance either nuclear disarmament or confidence building in the field of 'l The 2004 substantive agenda items included: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (b) prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; (c) prevention of an arms race in outer space; (d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; (f) comprehensive programme of disarmament; and (g) transparency in armaments. l 2 CDfPV.94 1, pp. 17- l 8 and CDfPV.944, pp. 5-8). These and the following documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are available from

http://disarmament.un.org/cd.

l 3 CDfPV.957, pp.3-5; CD/PV.958, pp.9-10; CDlPV.964, pp. 3-6; CDfPV.968, p. 23. l 4 CD11693lRev. l . l5

A/59/27, op. cit., paras. 19 and 20.

CD/PV.961, pp.5-7;


conventional arms, departing from its usual practice of completing consideration of two items in three years with the consensus adoption of guidelines and recommendations. In 2004, the Commission was, unfortunately, unable to start a new cycle of its deliberation by failing to reach consensus on its substantive agenda. The Commission held its substantive session from 5 to 23 April under the chairmanship of Revaz Adamia (Georgia). Both formal and informal meetings were held to decide on the two substantive agenda items (one on nuclear-related issues, the other in the conventional arms sphere). Several proposals were tabled, including those by the NAM, the European Union (EU) and the United States. The United States also proposed consideration of measures for improving the effectiveness of the United Nations disarmament machinery. However, the ensuing discussions indicated that a wide gap existed in positions among delegations on the agenda items. In order to narrow the gap, the Chairman formulated his own proposal, drawing on various proposals, to serve as a basis for the discussion.16 Despite all efforts, the three-week session ended without an agreement on its substantive agenda. In its 2004 report to the General Assembly,the Commission decided to continue deliberations on the substantive agenda items for the 2005 session, requested the Chairman to continue informal consultations and to present the outcome to an organizational session of the Disarmament Commission in December 2004.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its forty-second and fortythird sessions from 4-6 February (New York), and 30 June-2 July (Geneva) under the chairmanship of Harald Miiller (Germany). (For the Advisory Board's membership, see Annex I of this chapter.) The Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly on the Advisory Board's work in 2004.17 In response to a request by the Secretary-General to contribute to the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP), the l6 The Chairman's proposal read as "Guidelines for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, including, in particular, strategies for dealing with illicit activities that undermine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; Elements for verification mechanisms and instruments of conventional arms agreements; and Measures for improving the effectiveness of the United Nations disarmament machinery, without prejudice to efforts within the framework of SSOD IV". l7

Al591361.


Board undertook intensive deliberations in 2004 on issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons, landmines, export controls, and ways and means to strengthen the United Nations role in disarmament and non-proliferation. The discussions resulted in a comprehensive document containing an in-depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of current disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, an insightful evaluation of old and new challenges, and practical recommendations on how to meet those challenges, with a particular emphasis on the dangerous combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.'* (For the Advisory Board's recommendations to the HLP, see chapter V, Annex I of this volume.) The Board also undertook deliberations on the following issues: (a) terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; (b) disarmament and reconciliation in conflict prevention; and (c) export controls. The deliberations resulted in a number of recommendations and proposals. On the issue of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the Board recommended that the proliferation of WMD be rendered punishable under international law and that perpetrators, whether in State service or private, be made personally accountable. It also recommended that State action to combat terrorism, including preventive action, be embedded in a multilateral legal framework and within the ambit of the United ~ a t i 0 n s . l ~ On the issue of disarmament and reconciliation in conflict prevention, the Board made several recommendations. Among them was that in all its future resolutions setting up peacekeeping operations, the Security Council consider widening the relevant mandate to include disarmament and reconciliation aspects of conflict resolution; that paramount consideration be given, when designing disarmament and reconciliation programmes, to improving security, in particular the human security situation; and that a community-based and people-centered approach in post-conflict disarmament and reconciliation, including design and implementation of disarmament programmes, be adopted.2 0 On the issue of export control, the Board recommended, among other things, that the role of the United Nations be strengthened in fostering l* The outcome was published in DDA Occasional Paper, N a B , October 2004, available from http://disarmament.un.org/ddapublications. l9 For more details of the Advisory Board's recommendations, see AI59136 1. 20 Ibid.


cooperation and coordination among its Member States; that the members of export control regimes should consider offers of systematic legal, technical, organizational and financial assistance for the creation of effective export control systems on which those States Members of the United Nations lacking the respective resources could draw; and that efforts should be made to develop broad-based, universal norms and rules for export controls. In the context of export controls, the Board also discussed issues related to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and made several recommendations in that regard.

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services, 2004 The Department continued to provide training for young diplomats, especially from developing countries, throu h the United Nations fellowship, training and advisory services programme. 29 In 2004, fellowships were awarded to young diplomats from 30 Member The Programme continued to be structured in three segments: a study session in Geneva; study visits to intergovernmental organizations working in the field of disarmament and to Member States, at their invitation; and a study session at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Programme began on 30 August in Geneva and ended on 3 November in NewYork. It encompassed lectures by heads of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and to the First Committee, presidents of various arms control and disarmament conferences and meetings, United Nations officials, including senior DDA officials, and the representative of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The fellows also attended meetings of the Conference on Disarmament and First Committee meetings. At United Nations Headquarters, the fellows participated in a two-day seminar on non-proliferation and disarmament issues organized by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. During the programme, the fellows wrote research papers on disarmament-related topics, including disarmament issues that were on the agenda of the General Assembly. 21 Ibid. 22 The Programme was established in 1979 as a follow-up to a decision of the General Assembly at its tenth special session in 1978 (AIRESIS-1012, para. 108). 23 Argentina, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Indonesia. Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Sierra Leone (later resigned), Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zambia.


Study visits included those to the OPCW in The Hague, the IAEA and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in Vienna. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hosted the fellows in Berlin where they were briefed by, and held a round-table discussion with, senior officials and experts of the Department of Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Foreign Office, Head of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament, and representatives of the German Council on Foreign Relations. The fellows also visited the Nammo Buck GmbH conversion plant. At the invitation of the Government of Japan, the fellows visited Tokyo, Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Tokyo, the fellows were briefed by senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Japan's arms control and disarmament policies. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fellows visited memorial museums at the atomic bomb hypocentres, met with survivors and heard lectures on the social and medical legacies of atomic bombing. Furthermore, the fellows took part in a seminar with researchers of the Hiroshima Peace Institute. At its 59th session, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory service^.'^ In his report, the Secretary-General stated, inter alia, that since 1979 the Programme had trained 645 officials from 152 States, many of whom held positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments. The Secretary-General was gratified that the Programme continued to contribute to enhancing disarmament expertise in Member States, particularly in developing countries, and to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament. The Secretary-General also expressed his appreciation to all Member States and organizations that had consistently supported the Programme throughout the years, thereby contributing to its success, particularly to the Governments of Germany and Japan for the continuation of study visits for the fellows. Following the consideration of the report, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution 59/97, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services". For the resolution, see the General Assembly section of this chapter.

Department for Disarmament Affairs The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to advise and assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and the mandates given to him by the General Assembly and


Security Council in the sphere of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation. To that end, the Department's activities fell within the following areas: In the first instance, DDA provided substantive andlor technical assistance to various disarmament bodies: the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, and the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. It served both United Nations conferences and meetings, as well as meetings of States Parties to treaties and treaty bodies, including the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference; the First Review Conference on the Mine-Ban Convention, Meetings of the States Parties to the CCW (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) ; the Sixth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol 11 to the CCW; the Open-ended Working Group on an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit SALW; and the Second Annual Meeting of States Parties to the BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) and its expert meeting. The Department followed developments concerning the four existing treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones and continued to provide substantive assistance in finalizing the text of a treaty for a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Secondly, DDA provided both substantive and technical assistance to several groups of governmental experts which included: missiles in all its aspects; relationship between disarmament and development; developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security; and explosive remnants of war and mines other than anti-personnel mines. (For details, see chapters I, 111, V and V11 of this volume.) Thirdly, on the basis of the General Assembly mandates and decisions of treaty bodies, the Department issued reports containing official information received from governments on arms transfers in seven major categories of conventional arms (UN Register of Conventional Arms) and military expenditures (the UN standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures). On its web site, the Department continued to maintain a database on transparency under the Mine-Ban Convention and a database on signatories, ratification and accession by States to multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements. On the basis of the PoA, DDA also maintained a database containing national points of contacts and national reports on the implementation of the PoA, as well as on national legislations on SALW provided by States on a voluntary basis.


The fourth area pertained to coordination of, or participation in activities among a number of United Nations (UN) and UN-related bodies. DDA continued to serve as the focal point for the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism and for the Group of Interested States on Practical Disarmament Measures. Within the framework of activity of these two bodies, DDA cooperated closely with other UN Departments, Programmes, Agencies as well as States in efforts to address, in a coordinated and comprehensive manner, the multifaceted challenge posed by the proliferation of SALW and to build sustained peace in post-conflict situations. The Department also worked closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which serves as the focal point for mine action within the United Nations, on landmine-related matters, such as consolidating the existing legal norms, mine clearance and victim assistance. DDA continued its cooperation with the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women of the Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) on issues related to gender and disarmament In that regard, the Department continued to implement its gender plan of action. It also cooperated with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict on disarmament and children, and their protection in conflict situations. The fifth area of activities involved information dissemination, raising public awareness of disarmament and non-proliferation and maintaining close liaison with UNIDIR, other research and educational institutions outside the United Nations, and with NGOs. The Department implemented the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme (see above). It organized symposia, seminars and round-table discussions in New York and in a number of Member States on a wide range of issues in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. To heighten public awareness of disarmament, and as part of its information activities, DDA disseminated to Member States and the international community objective information on disarmament and related security matters through its web site, publications and other a ~ t i v i t i e s .The ~ ~ Department also continued work on an on-line resource site for disarmament and nonproliferation (DNP) education which was based on a recommendation from the United Nations study on the same subject.26

25

For further details of the United Nations Disarmament Information

Programme, see chapter V11 of this volume. 26 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Report of the Secretary-General, (A/57/124), p. 15, para. 4 1(i). The on-line

resource site is available from http:/disarmament.un.org/education.


DDA also assisted its regional centres in various SALW weapons collection and disposal programmes. 27 It also provided training during the year for interns in various aspects of its work, such as following the General Assembly and First Committee debates and reporting thereon, assisting in preparations of other meetings and research tasks, drafting portions of publications and updating various databases. Regional Centres DDA continued to oversee and coordinate the activities of its three regional centres. Since the Centres' activities are funded from voluntary contributions, in each resolution on the centres, the General Assembly continued its appeal to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen, facilitate and implement their programmes and a~tivities.'~ Pursuant to the consideration by the General Assembly of the SecretaryGeneral's proposals for strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises, funds were allotted from the regular budget to ensure that the three regional centres were in full compliance with the minimum operating security standards. During 2004, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa operated under enormous uncertainty owing to a lack of sufficient voluntary contributions to support its activities. Within its limited financial resources, the Centre continued to implement its programme of work in the four priority areas endorsed, in 1999, by the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States - support for peace processes and peace initiatives in Africa, practical disarmament and arms control, information, research and publication, and advocacy and resource mobilization (For details of the Centre's activities, see Chapter IV of this volume). Despite intensive fund-raising efforts, financial resources for the operations of the Centre have been dwindling steadily over the years. While some limited funds were received for the execution of projects, unfortunately, contributions in support of the operational costs of the Centre were not forthcoming. These costs are related to maintenance expenses and salaries for the local staff and security.

27 See chapter

IV for details of the work of the regional centres in 2004.

28 See resolutions AIRESI59199 (Latin America and the Caribbean)

A/RES/59/100 (Asia and the Pacific) and A/RES/59/101 (Africa). For details on the substantive activities of the three centres, see chapter IV of this volume.

fnstitutional aspects

Against the backdrop of the Centre's financial crisis which became more acute during the second half of 2004, extensive fund-raising activities were carried out by the Director of the Centre. These activities consisted principally of missions, correspondence, audiences, other bilateral meetings and consultations with African government representatives as well as with non-African countries, on the margins of regional conferences. Mindful of the persistent precarious financial situation of the Centre, DDA held a series of consultations last autumn with Member States on the state of affairs of the UN regional centres for peace and disarmament and on ways to improve their effectiveness. Specifically, during the 59th session of the First Committee, at an informal meeting devoted to this issue, the Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs informed the Committee of the difficulties - financial and logistical - faced by the Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, the Centres also faced the additional challenge of increased security requirements. In that connection, mention was made that the persisting precarious financial situation was compelling the Department to consider temporarily relocating their operations. In December 2004, the Government of Togo made a special financial contribution ($202,970). The donation aimed at enabling the Centre to maintain its operation in Lome until the time when substantial financial support would be firmly committed to ensuring a multi-year sustainable operation. During the year, the Asia and Pacific Regional Centre continued to promote disarmament and security through the organization of meetings and conferences in the region. It also continued to assist the five Central Asian States in the drafting and finalization of a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, as well as to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen its international security and nuclear-weapon-free status. In addition, the Centre continued to encourage the implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations DNP Study. Consultations on relocation continued with the host country. The final version of a draft host country agreement and a draft memorandum of understanding on the operational costs to be provided by the host country were forwarded to the Government of Nepal for consideration in December 2001 and April 2002, respectively. Reminders were sent to the Nepalese authorities in December 2002 and again in February and May 2003. The Department for Disarmament Affairs also provided the Nepalese authorities with information on the issues of immunities and privileges as well as the updated estimates of operational costs in a letter dated 21 October 2004.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The Regional Centre in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC) continued to strengthen its current role as an active player in assisting States in the region to implement peace, disarmament and development initiatives. The Centre focused on the consolidation of its growing programme of activities and organizational structure and strengthening its human resource capacity. It began the development of a new fund-raising strategy with a view to ensuring longer-term contribution agreements with donors to cover possibly five or more years of activities. The Centre developed more partnerships and common projects with an increased number of countries and with subregional and regional organizations in that part of the world. This expansion in partnerships would provide opportunities for joint fund-raising for longer-term financial assistance in support of the Centre's activities.

General Assembly, 2004 At plenary meetings of the General Assembly, held between 21 and 30 septemberFg a number of Member States, many represented at the level of Head of State or Government, adddressed a wide range of disarmament and security issues. The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Luis Alfonso De Alba of Mexico, held a general debate on all its agenda items, listed in Annex I1 to this chapter, between 4 to 15 October, and a sfructured discussion (thematic discussion and introduction of draft resolutions) from 18 to 22 October, and took action on draft resolutions from 25 October to 5 ~ovember.~' The General Assembly took action on nine draft resolutions related to issues discussed in this chapter.

Conferenceon Disarmament 591104. Report of the Conference on Disarmament.The draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 460 for the sponsors), on 25 October. The revised text was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 408. The resolution requested all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to cooperate with the current and successive Presidents in their efforts to guide it to the early commencement of its substantive work in 2005; 29 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 3rd to 17th meetings. 30 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, First Committee, 2nd to 23rd meetings.


and requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure that the Conference was provided with adequate administrative, substantive and

conference support services. First Committee. Before the vote, Israel stated that it would join the consensus, but expressed disappointment that the text did not reflect the full scope of the Conference's work in 2004.

Disarmament Commission 591105 Report of the Disarmament Commission. The draft resolution was introduced by Georgia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 460 for the sponsors), on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 409. The resolution requested the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate and to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament ~ o m m i s s i o n . "It~ ~also requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the 59th session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution. First Committee.Prior to vote, two States expressed their disappointment at the Commission's failure to reach agreement on its substantive work in 2004. The Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and a number of other countries that aligned themselves with its explanation of vote, 32 reaffirmed the EUs commitment to a successful outcome of the Disarmament Commission's work and to its effort to promote topical, concrete and useful recommendations. Canada mentioned that the draft resolution lacked recommendations on substantive issues for the Commission to take up at its three-week session next year, noted the financial costs that having no substantive agenda would entail, and 31 OfficialRecords o f the General Assembly, Fifty-fifrh session. Supplement No. 42 (A/55/42), annex.

32 The Netherlands spoke on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries of Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey; the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro; and the European Free Trade Association countries of Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic area.


hoped that the Commission would devote its 2005 session to an examination and discussion of its functions. After the vote, Cuba expressed its regret that operative paragraph 5 of the text (on the 2005 substantive agenda items) did not include either the constructive proposals presented by the Non-Aligned Movement or any specific item. It stressed that the effectiveness of the Disarmament Commission depended more on the political will of certain countries to advance the multilateral approach to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, than on any changes in its working methods.

Reform of the First Committee

59195. Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee. The draft resolution was introduced by Indonesia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 456 for the sponsors), on 5 November. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 5 November and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 395. The resolution invited Member States to consider the biennialization or triennialization of the agenda items discussed in the First Committee, on a voluntary basis, and particularly when no specific action was required to be taken for the implementation of relevant resolutions; to continue to hold interactive debates based on a programme and format elaborated through informal consultations between the Bureau and Member States in advance of each First Committee session; to submit more concise, focused and actionoriented draft resolutions and, where practical, to consider the possibility of submitting draft decisions. It also recommended that the respective sponsors of draft resolutions hold informal consultations, both before and during Committee meetings, with the participation of all interested Member States for furthering discussions on draft resolutions already submitted or yet to be submitted to the First Committee; reiterated that the Secretary-General would keep all Committees, including the First Committee, informed of the detailed estimated cost of all resolutions and decisions recommended by the Committees for approval by the General Assembly; requested the First Committee to explore the forms of mutual cooperation with other Main Committees; and decided to develop further, within existing resources, the electronic support for the work of the FC, in particular through the existing web sites.

First Committee. After the vote, Cuba expressed hope that the Committee's 2005 session would focus on the substantive priority items that required the necessary political will of all Member States.

Institutional aspects SSOD IV

59/71. Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 355. The resolution decided to establish an open-ended working group, working on the basis of consensus, to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, taking note of various related documents; requested the open-ended Working Group on SSOD IV to hold an organizational session in order to set the date for its substantive sessions, and to submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the 60th General Assembly session. It also requested the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to provide the open-ended Working Group with the necessary assistance and services as may be required to discharge its tasks. Department for Disarmament Affairs and its Regional Centres

59/97. United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services. The draft resolution was introduced by Nigeria, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 457 for the sponsors), on 25 October. The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 399. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to continue to implement the Geneva-based programme annually within existing resources and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its 61st session. 59/98. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 400. The resolution appealed to Member States in each region and those that were able to do so, as well as to international governmental and nongovernmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives; and requested the Secretary-General to provide


all necessary support, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities.

59/99. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 40 1. The resolution appealed to Member States, in particular those within the Latin American and Caribbean region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make and to increase voluntary contributions to strengthen the Regional Centre, its programme of activities and the implementation thereof. It also requested the Secretary-General to provide the Regional Centre with all necessary support, within existing resources, so that it may carry out its programme of activities in accordance with its mandate, and to report to the General Assembly at its 60th session on the implementation of the resolution. 59/100. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. The draft resolution was introduced by Nepal, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 459 for the sponsors), on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 403. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to provide the Regional Centre with the necessary support, within existing resources, in carrying out its programme of activities; urged him to ensure the physical operation of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host country agreement and to enable the Centre to function effectively; and requested him to report to the General Assembly at its 60th session on the implementation of the resolution. 59/101. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The draft resolution was introduced by Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, on 22 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution, see page 405. The resolution appealed once again to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the

Institutional aspects programmes and activities of the Regional Centre and facilitate their implementation. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide the necessary support to the Regional Centre for better achievements and results; to facilitate close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the African Union, in particular in the area of peace, security and development, and to continue to assist the Director of the Regional Centre in his efforts to stabilize its financial situation. It also appealed in particular to the Regional Centre, in cooperation with the African Union, regional and subregional organizations and the African States, to take steps to promote the consistent implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

Conclusion Within the overall framework of revitalizing the work of the General Assembly, progress made during the First Committee on rationalizing its work underscored the continued interest of Member States in improving the UN disarmament machinery's functioning with a view to better meeting the traditional and emerging challenges in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. Next year, Member States are expected to implement those agreed measures in their deliberations during the First Committee. The continuous impasse in starting substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament and the failure of the Disarmament Commission to begin a new three-year work cycle again underlined the wide differences among Member States on where to give priority in this field. In 2005, further efforts will have to be made to surmount the Conference on Disarmament's impasse and to agree on the Disarmament Commission's two substantive agenda items. The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to provide substantive and technical support to various disarmament bodies and expert study groups, coordinate or participate in interdepartmental activities, cooperate with other international organizations dealing with issues related to its mandates, and carry out region-specific activities through its three regional centres. It continued to collect data and issued reports containing information received from governments on a variety of disarmament and related issues and also carried out an active disarmament information and education programme. In order to cope with the new challenges and address such crosscutting issues as the illicit trade in small arms, the Department enhanced its coordination and cooperation with other United Nations departments, programmes, funds and agencies. Efforts also intensified in emerging


priority areas, such as the link between terrorism and WMD, disarmament and human security, and gender perspectives in disarmament. DDA further assisted States through training and capacity building. The Department will step up its effort to strengthen the operational capacity of its three regional centres so that they can continue to carry out activities in fulfillment of their respective mandates as set out by the General Assembly.

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2004

Harald Miiller (Chairman), Director, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, Germany Mariama Bayard Gamatie, Consultant on Development and Gender Issues, Niamey, Niger Vicente Berasategui, Ambassador of Argentina to the United Kingdom, Buenos Aires, Argentina Pascal Boniface, Director, Institute of International and Strategic Relations, (IRIS), Paris, France Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland Perla Carvalho Soto, Ambassador of Mexico to Uruguay, Montevideo, Uruguay Michael Clarke, Director, International Policy Institute, King's College London, University of London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Gelson Fonseca, Jr., Ambassador of Brazil to Chile, Santiago, Chile Hasmy Agam, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Putrajaya, Malaysia Kuniko Inoguchi, Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Professor, Faculty of Law, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan Jeremy Issacharoff, Deputy Director-General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel Mahmoud Karem, Assistant Minister for Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Cairo, Egypt Ho-Jin Lee, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Hungary, Budapest, Hungary Liu Jieyi, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, China

Institutional aspects Maleeha Lodhi, High Commissioner of Pakistan to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Islamabad, Pakistan U. Joy Ogwu, Director-General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria Boris D. Pyadyshev, Ambassador, Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs, Moscow, Russian Federation Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control of the United States of America, Department of State, Washington, D.C., United States of America Jill Sinclair, Special Coordinator, Middle East Peace Process, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, Tel Aviv, Israel Kongit Sinegiorgis, Director-General for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Rakesh Sood, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., United States of America Tibor Toth, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other international organizations, Geneva, Switzerland Patricia Lewis (ex-officio member), Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland

Agenda items of the General Assembl as allocated to the First Committee3 2 1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

Reduction of military budgets (item 57). Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (item 58). Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (item 59). Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (item 60). Role of science and technology in the context of international security (item 6 1). Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (item 62).

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 7.

8. 9.

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (item 63). Prevention of an arms race in outer space (item 64). General and complete disarmament (item 65) :34 (a) Notification of nuclear tests; Further measures in the field of disarmament for the (b) prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof; (c) Disarmament and non-proliferation education; Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva (d) Protocol; Relationship between disarmament and development; (e) (0 Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status; ()g) Missiles; Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non(h) proliferation agreements; (i) Regional disarmament; 0) Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the (k) First Committee; National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment (1) and dual-use goods and technology; (m) Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context; Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament (n) and non-proliferation; Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and (0) implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control:

34 The General Assembly decided that some portions of the IAEAs annual report (Al.591295) which dealt with the subject matter of item 73 (effects of atomic radiation) would be drawn to the attention of the First Committee in connection with its consideration of item 65.


10.

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons; Reducing nuclear danger; Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas; Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda; Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction; Transparency in armaments; Nuclear disarmament; Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them; The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament; Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia; Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (item 66) : United Nations Disarmament Information Programme; (a) (b) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services; United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament (c) and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean; (c$ United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific; United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament; (0 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear (g) Weapons; Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the (h) United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (item 67) : Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters; (a) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament. (c) Report of the Disarmament Commission; (d) The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (item 68). Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (item 69). Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (item 70). Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (item 7 1). Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (item 72). (e)

C H A P T E R V11

Studies, education and information Introduction FROMTHE EARLY 1960s STUDIES ON DISARMAMENT

HAVE BEEN MANDATED

by General Assembly resolutions and carried out by the United Nations Secretary-General. To reflect a wide range of expertise and political views, most studies have been conducted with the assistance of governmental experts appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. These studies have served to provide a deeper understanding of disarmament matters and have supported the negotiating process through analyses of specific issues related to ongoing or beginning disarmament negotiations. To date, 33 studies have been conducted on disarmament-related topics. Since the publication in 2002 of the UN study on disarmament and nonproliferation education (DNP), the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA or the Department) has renewed its emphasis on DNP education and served as a focal point for that activity reallocating human and financial resources to the task where possible.1 In 2004, a biennial report on the implementation of the recommendations of the DNP study was submitted to the General Assembly which contained information from Member States, the United Nations, and other international and non-governmental organizations.' The Department continued to carry out its largest disarmament and non-proliferation training effort, the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme, which awarded fellowshios to 30 officials in 2004.~ 4 The Department maintained its information and education programme focusing on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, as well as on small arms and light weapons. Issues such as international terrorism, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, other transparency and confidence-building measures and the rise in global military expenditures received attention as well. The Department's web site, L

Disarmament and non-proliferation education, Report o f the SecretaryGeneral (A/591178), p.27. Ibid. and Addenda 1 & 2. A/59/177.

Ai591171.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 disarmament.un.org, saw a dramatic increase in visitors and its content and

form were expanded in 2004. DDA continued to produce its flagship publication, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook as well as its Occasional Paper series. Plans are under way to make the Yearbook available in electronic form on the Internet in the latest and archival editions. DDA cooperated with other United Nations offices and disarmamentrelated organizations in their information and education efforts. In particular, it worked closely with the Department of Public of Information (DPI), in the development and implementation of public information strategies for the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference and the Open-ended Working Group to negotiate an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (OEWG). The Department also cooperated with civil society in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and small arms by facilitating access to and participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at special events and exhibits. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) carried out research in global security, regional security and human security and disarmament with a view to examining arms control and disarmament issues in innovative and creative ways and to providing decision-makers with specific policy recommendations. 5

Disarmament studies

Studies completed in 2004

Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in the current international context6 Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002 on the above subject, the Group of Governmental Experts reappraised the disarmament and development relationship as well as the future role of the Organization in that connection. In so doing, it took into account all the major international changes that had taken place since the adoption of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987. The review focused on the pivotal role of security, the costs and consequences of military expenditure, the release of resources for development, the importance of multilateralism and See UNIDIR projects.htm1.

A/59/119.

web

site:

http://www.unidir.org/html/en/resear~h~

Studies, education and information the role of the United Nations as well as other international organizations and institutions. For a detailed discussion of the study see chapter V of this volume. The composition of the group of governmental experts appears in Annex I of this chapter.

Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in All its ~ s ~ e c t s ~ Pursuant to resolution 58/37 of 8 December 2003 entitled "Missiles", the Secretary-General sought the views of Member States on the report on missiles and, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts (the Panel) established in 2004, explored further the "issue of missiles in all its aspects". For a detailed discussion of the Panel's work, see chapter I of this volume. The composition of the Panel appears in Annex I1 of this chapter.

Studies in progress Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the field of information and telecommunicationsin the context of international security Pursuant to resolution 58/32 of 8 December 2003 on the above subject, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consider existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them. He was also requested to conduct a study on relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and with the help of Member States in a position to render such assistance. The outcome of the study will be submitted in a report to the General Assembly at its 60th session. For a more detailed discussion of the progress being made, see chapter V of this volume. The composition of the first session of the group of governmental experts appears in Annex I11 of this chapter.

Studies mandated in 2004 Panel of Governmental Experts on Verificationin all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification Pursuant to resolution 59/60 of 3 December 2004 on the above subject, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established in 2006 on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, was requested to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, and to transmit the

panel's report to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-first session (2006). The Group will hold three sessions: the first from 30 January - 3 February 2006 in New York: the dates for the two remaining sessions have not yet been decided. For further details of resolution 59/60, see chapter V of this volume.

Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects By resolution 59/67 of 3 December 2004 entitled "Missiles", the SecretaryGeneral, was requested to prepare a report, with the support of qualified consultants and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as appropriate, taking into account the views expresssed by Member States, to contribute to the United Nations endeavour to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects, by identifying areas where consensus could be reached, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its 61st session. With the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to be established in 2007 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, the Secretary-General was also requested to further explore further ways and means to address the subject within the United Nations, including identifying areas where consensus could be reached. The outcome of the panel's work will be submitted in a report to the General Assembly at its sixth-third session (2008). For details of the resolution, see chapter I of this volume.

Group of Governmental Experts to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preven ting, comba ting and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons By operative paragraph 5 of resolution 59/86, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish, after the 2006 review conference and no later than 2007, a group of governmental experts, appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.

DDA Implementation of the recommendations of the 2002 UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (DNP) Recommendation 31 of the study on disarmament and non-proliferation education8 encouraged Member States, the United Nations and other international and non-governmental organizations to continue to inform the

Studies, education and information Department for Disarmament Affairs on steps that they had taken to implement the study's recommendations. Recommendation 32 of that report encouraged the Secretary-General to prepare a report on a biennial basis reviewing the results of the implementation of the study's recommendations. In his report to the General ~ s s e m b l ~he? submitted the replies from seven Member States: Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Sweden and Venezuela, six United Nations and international organizations and four nongovernmental organizations. Highlights of their activities in relation to specific recommendations of the study are described in brief below.

Implementation of the recommendations by Member States - the Hungarian-language version of the UNIDIR publication, Coming to Terms with Security: a Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and ConfidenceBuilding (recommendation 3, Hungary) ; - establishment of a UNESCO chair for DNP education at an institution of higher education; and inclusion of the topic in the agenda of various international and regional fora such as the Organization of American States and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean through resolutions by the Government of Mexico (Mexico); - scholarships from the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust and distribution of funds to NGOs for projects in that field. Publication of a brochure entitled "Peace education in schools" distributed to every school and kindergarten (New Zealand, recommendation 1); - establishment of a master's degree programme in the technical problems of non-proliferation at the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute, and annual seminars on export-control issues and techniques conducted by the Centre for Export Controls in Russian higher educational institutions, including the country's major regional universities (Russian Federation) ; - allocation of financial support to NGOs for their information activities and to a large-scale project to increase knowledge about weapons of mass destruction and common international security among groups of young people from political groups and interested NGOs (Sweden); - plans for creation of mass-education programmes to disseminate the concepts of disarmament and non-proliferation and emphasize the role and relevance of the multilateral disarmament system of the United Nations, the First Committee and Disarmament Commission (Venezuela); - invitations from the Government of Japan to two American DNP experts: a) to conduct a nuclear disarmament education tour of the country, working Al591178, op. cit., parts 11-IV.


with high-school students, civic leaders, and Hibakusha (atomic bomb victims) in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo (Kathleen Sullivan, Educators for Social Responsibility, 2002); and b) to lecture on DNP, particularly concerning nuclear weapons and terrorism (Natalie Goldring, Program on Global Security and Disarmament, University of Maryland, 2004). Other government initiatives included translation into Japanese and English of Japan's Disarmament Policy (2002), and publication into Japanese and English of Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (2004), (Japan). - In addition, Hungary, Japan, Mexico and Sweden have included a DNP portal on their Government web sites.

First Committee During the general debate and thematic discussions in the First Committee of the General Assembly's 59th session statements in support of DNP were made by Canada, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand (recommendation 33).

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons Several States - Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden - referred to their initiative at the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference in which they encouraged the Review Conference to attribute a high level of importance to the UN study; to report on educational and training programmes and workshops that included information on the results of review conferences and the work of States parties to implement the Treaty; and to promote a deeper understanding of the (recommendation 1).

rea at^"

Implementation of the recommendations by the United Nations and other international organizations

Department for Disarmament Affairs The Department hosted two meetings of the inter-agency task force in 2003 and 2004 with a view to stimulating further implementation of the recommendations and coordinating the efforts of the United Nations system and of other international organizations in disarmament and non-proliferation education (recommendation 29). The meetings, which were also open to nongovernmental educational practitioners, generated interest in creating DNP l0 See NPT/ CONF.2005.PC.II/WP.18 available disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2005/PC2 listofdocs.htm1.

from

http://

Studies, education and information education programmes and encouraged the efforts of the United Nations University and the United Nations-associated University for peace.' In support of recommendation 18, DDA established an Advisory Group on DNP" in close cooperation with the Global Teaching and Learning Project of DPI. The Group held its first meeting in February 2004 concomitant with the second inter-agency task force. The group mapped out developmentally appropriate peace and disarmament themes and identified best practices at different levels of education in order to enhance the United Nations Cyberschoolbus web site with disarmament and non-proliferation content. In February, DDA completed its first full-year small arms education project dealing with education in post-conflict situations and peace-building - a project carried out in partnership with the Global Campaign for Peace Education of the Hague Appeal for Peace in Albania, Cambodia, Niger and Peru. Among the many initiatives reported to the Secretary-General, one conceived and carried out by students in primary and secondary schools in N'Guigmi, Niger in April 2004, stood apart. In imitation of the arms collection projects under way by the United Nations Development Programme, students organized a collection of knives, not guns, from their fellow students and invited teachers and community members for a celebratory Flame of peace.'

'

Department ofPublic Information With its new emphasis on educational outreach, the UN Chronicle featured numerous educational articles on the need for disarmament and nonproliferation, as well as combating terrorism (recommendations 3 and 4). The UN Works campaign created two web site features on child soldiers and landmines with links to the web sites of DDA and other partners (recommendation 23). The UN study on DNP was also covered in radio news programmes as well as in radio magazine and feature programmes for regional and worldwide dissemination on topics ranging from disarmament in crisis, to mine clearance, to small arms and light weapons in Africa (recommendation 23).

l'

Al591178, op. cit.

l 2 The Advisory Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education

is composed of educators on peace and disarmament with competence in conventional and non-conventional weapons from four regions of the world. l3 Ai591178, op.cit., Summary.


United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) The UNIDIR publication Coming to Terms with Security: a Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building, is available in Arabic, English, Hungarian, Korean and Spanish and being translated into French. The Institute is keen to see it translated into other languages, in particular in countries with little tradition of study in the field (recommendations 3 and 28). Within the reporting period covered in the biennial report, UNIDIR hosted 39 research interns and 15 research fellows from a total of 26 countries (July 2002 to June 2003) and an additional 28 from 16 countries (July 2003 to June 2004) (recommendation 24). The UNIDIR focal point for DNP education will continue to work on those issues. The Institute plans to hold a seminar to assist States in their reporting on the implementation of the recommendations made in the report. UNIDIR is also exploring the possibility of sponsoring additional disarmament and arms control exhibits and bringing exhibits by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency to Geneva (recommendation 29). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Publications by the IAEA included a quarterly journal, informative brochures, thematic reports, articles and opinion pieces written by the Director General and other Agency staff, examples of which are available on the Agency's Worldatom web site (http://www.iaea.oprg) which has been expanded and includes, in particular, the Agency's verification activities in support of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The Agency's web portal receives on average more than seven million visits per month, clearly demonstrating its utility for public education and information on the Agency's activities in the field of verification, nuclear safety and security, and other activities (recommendations 3 and 4). IAEA and United Nations University A direct result of the United Nations study was the launching of the United Nations University course on arms control and disarmament which was held in Tokyo from 12 to 15 October 2004 in collaboration with the IAEA. The module covers both non-proliferation and disarmament aspects, relevant regimes, technologies, export controls and related implementation issues.

Studies, education and information

Universityfor Peace In the last academic year, the University for Peace, a United Nationsassociated university, developed and taught a disarmament module for degree credit as part of its Master's Programme on International Peace Studies. The course consists of two major segments: (a) weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weaponry and biological and chemical weapons; and (b) small arms and light weapons. (recommendations 7, 14 and 29).

Implementation o f the recommendations by non-governmental organizations

Global Guide to Disarmament and Non-ProliferationEducation The Global Guide, now in its third edition, is the most extensive guide to disarmament and non-proliferation education efforts around the world. It covers institutes and programmes in several dozen countries and is available both on the web and in print.

Foundation for Peace Studies, New Zealand The Peace Foundation has been actively engaged in the promotion and implementation of peace and disarmament education through teacher workshops and the development and distribution of teaching resources. It plays an active role in the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control, which advises the Government on disarmament issues, including education, and disperses funds from the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust for peace and disarmament education projects. The Foundation also worked with the New Zealand Government to publish the brochure "Peace education in schools" (recommendation 1).

Examples of disarmament and non-proliferationeducation programmes Of the many existing DNP education programmes, the Department received details of two programmes - the 2004 Teaching Non-Proliferation Summer Institute of the University of North Carolina and an innovative programme in English and French designed for secondary schools by the United Nations Association of Canada. The former offered practical training on curriculum development, gave lectures and held seminars and panel discussions ranging from nuclear-weapon technology to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The latter, begun in the third quarter of 2004, consisted of a comprehensive guide for teachers, an online manual for students, featuring interactive lesson plans with case studies, designed to foster critical thinking and involvement in specific follow-up activities.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) offers a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies, awarded by the Graduate School of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (recommendation 6). In the 2003-2004 academic year, 31 Masters of Arts students and six non-degree students earned the Certificate. In March 2004, CNS organized a workshop on the 2004 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in France entitled "The roadmap to 2005: where do we want to go and how should we get there?" More than 70 participants, including many ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament and other senior representatives of States parties to the Treaty took part in the workshop. It provided an opportunity for delegations as well as the Chair of the third session of the PrepCom to consider the substantive and procedural issues that would be discussed at the third session in April (recommendation 13). The Hague Appeal for Peace carries out a Global Campaign for Peace Education (GCPE) of which disarmament and human security form an integral part. From 20 to 24 October 2004 an international conference was held in Tirana, Albania entitled "Developing democracy through peace education: educating toward a world without violence". Innovative projects are ongoing or underway for 2005. (For details of the activities of Member States, the United Nations and international and non-governmental organizations in implementing the recommendations of the study, see documents AI591178 and Adds. 1 and 2.) United Nations Disarmament Information Programme The Secretary-General's biennial report to the General Assembly on the United Nations Information Programme (the Programme) l4 provided an overview of the activities of the Programme carried out by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the priority areas of: (a) weapons of mass destruction and (b) conventional weapons, in particular small arms and light weapons. Other areas of attention were international terrorism, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and other transparency and confidence-building measures, and the rise in global military expenditures. The report also recorded the activities carried out by the Department of Public Information in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Information continued to be disseminated through the Department's print and electronic publications, its web site, exhibits, panel discussions, briefings, symposia, and activities of the Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace. In some instances, activities were carried out in collaboration with

Studies, education and information DPI, including implementation of some of the recommendations from the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. (For a detailed discussion of the study see the above section). Statistics taken by the Department on the usage of its web site, disarmament.un.org, showed a dramatic rise in the number of visitors to the site over the last two years. The Department continued to expand and improve the site so as to provide current and accurate information in a dynamic format available to its growing audience. DDA, in collaboration with DPI, continued to facilitate access of civil society organizations at disarmament-related events and meetings and to cooperate closely with NGOs, especially those coalitions that spearhead the participation of a large number of such organizations in the field of disarmament.

E- and print publications The Programme issued the 28th volume of its flagship publication, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook,and plans are under way to introduce the latest and archival editions from 2002 to 2004 online. Other publications included two occasional papers entitled Multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation regimes and the role of the United Nations: an evaluation and Symposium on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the Resolutions and Decisions booklet of the 59th UN General Assembly and two ad hoc publications: one on biological weapons in collaboration with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security; the other on small arms and light weapons published by DPI under the aegis of the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism to facilitate ongoing work on the issue. (For a list of publications, see Annex V of this chapter).

Web site DDA's web site15 entitled "Peace and Security through Disarmament" leans towards issues rather than institutional structures. As such, it includes information on weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and regional disarmament. It also contains articles on emerging issues which, among other things, cover the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, the link between disarmament and international terrorism, gender perspectives on disarmament, and children and disarmament. Its substantive pages disseminate information and documentation from major disarmament-related conferences in the official United Nations languages. Its front page provides l5 See DDA web site http://disarmarnent.un.org.


current material on press releases, statements by the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials, information on current and upcoming disarmament events and relevant background documentation. An educational resource section covers all aspects of the UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, including both a powerpoint presentation and an electronic version on peace and disarmament along with related links to research and educational institutions and organizations. The web site has launched a full-text Internet search engine16 which provides basic and advanced search services and a spell-check function. With this feature, the contents of all web-based pages, MS Word files, text-based PDF files and Lotus Notes databases are search-enabled. The DDA's web site is visited frequently and provides 24-hour service worldwide. The following table provides some statistical information regarding its visitors: Web site traffic - basic statistics for 2004

Visitors from nearly l80 countries in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North and South America were attracted to DDA's home and overview pages as well as to its links to WMD, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, conventional arms, regional disarmament, disarmament and development, terrorism, education resources and disarmament machinery such as the Conference on Disarmament, Disarmament Commission, First Committee and Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. In addition, the DDA web email box also received hundreds of messages from around the world. These statistics continue to demonstrate that disarmament is an issue of global interest and that DDA is a valuable internet resource of disarmament issues for Member States, non-governmental organizations and the academic community. The Department regularly updates its established databases which include General Assembly resolutions and decisions on disarmament items and updates (covering sponsors and voting patterns), status of disarmament and arms regulation agreements, submissions by Member States to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN standardized reporting on military expenditures, reports submitted under article 7 by States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban l6

See http:l/disarmament.~n.~rg/~ear~h.html.


Convention), the Department's online reference library and on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

DDA panels, NGO symposia, exhibits and special events DDA continued to work closely with coalition non-governmental organizations such as Reaching Critical Will and IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) to facilitate the participation of representatives of civil society organizations at calendar meetings such as the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the OEWG.. The Department also cooperated with these umbrella groups as well as the NGO Committee on Disarmament and the Department of Public Information in facilitating a number of panel discussions during the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference on issues such as nuclear weapons, missiles, verification and compliance. The Department continued to organize a series of discussions on topics of interest in the field of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to broadening understanding and facilitating a meaningful discussion of those issues among Member States, academics, civil society, United Nations officials and the press. A symposium on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development took place at United Nations Headquarters on 9 March in conjunction with the third session of the group of governmental experts on the issue. Presentations by Lawrence R. Klein, Nobel Laureate in Economics, on world peace and economic and prosperity; Sarah Meek of the Arms Management Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa on confidence-building measures as a tool for disarmament and development; and Richard Jolly, a development economist, on an overview of disarmament and development provided useful input for the Group's work. (Full texts of the presentations are found in Occasional Paper 9 on the Department's web site.) l On 24 June, DDA and the Small Arms Survey project hosted the New York launch of the English edition of the Small Arms Survey 2004, subtitled Rights at &sk at United Nations Headquarters. The Survey focused on the linkages between human rights abuse and the widespread proliferation, availability, and use of small arms. Speakers included Anton Thalmann, Chairman of the Open-Ended Working Group on Tracing Illicit Small Arms

and Light Weapons; Hannelore Hoppe, Director and Deputy to the Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Keith Krause, Programme

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Director, and Glenn McDonald, Yearbook Coordinator, of the Small Arms Survey. On 12 October, an informal discussion entitled "Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education" stemming from the Secretary-General's report on the same subject18 was held at UN Headquarters sponsored by DDA and UNIDIR. The agenda included an introduction to the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the recommendations of the UN Study on DNP; highlights from the replies of Member States on the implementation of the study; the activities of DDA, UNIDIR, DPI, IAEA, the University for Peace and civil society organizations; ways to promote and stimulate new initiatives; and ideas to facilitate an exchange of information and reporting. On 21 October, DPI organized an NGO briefing in observance of Disarmament Week (24-30 October) on Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Challenges of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Briefings were given by Wolfgang Hoffmann, Executive Secretary of the PrepCom for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization; Luis Alfonso De Alba, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the International Organizations in Geneva and Chairman of the First Committee for the 59th General Assembly session; and Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association (United States). On 6 December, Harald Miiller, Chairman of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, gave a briefing on the Advisory Board's contribution to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change contained in its report entitled Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferationregimes and the role of the United Nations: an evaluation. The briefing addressed WMDrelated issues and their delivery systems, small arms and light weapons, landmines and strengthening the UN role in those fields. The Board's report appears in Occasional Paper No. 8 available on the Department's web site. lg An exhibit sponsored by the Hidankyo, a Japan-based NGO of survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was a side event at the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The display contained artifacts from 1945 along with posters and photographs documenting the after-effects of the bombing of the two cities and video projections recounting survivors' stories.

l8

A/57/124, opcit.

l9 See footnote 17.


Activities of the Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace

Stamp On 15 October, the United Nations Postal Administration issued a definitive 37-cent stamp on the theme "Books Not Guns". Michael Douglas, in his capacity as the Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace, prepared a 60second video for the launch of the stamp at the United Nations Postal Administration's First Day of Issue Ceremony at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center (New York City). The statement highlighted the proliferation of light weapons and exploitation of children as instruments of war and the accompanying physical and emotional side-effects. Mr. Douglas urged viewers to assist in redirecting investment in weapons to investment in books and education, not war. Copies of the stamp were distributed to the First Committee and the video was shown on 15 October. A photo of the stamp appears in the front of this volume. On 5 April, Michael Douglas filmed a World Chronicle television segment for DPI in which he spoke about nuclear non-proliferation and small arms. The film was aired in May 2004.~'

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) In a note to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General transmitted the report2] of the Director of UNIDIR on the Institute's activities for the period August 2003 to July 2004. It also contained the proposed programme of work and budget for 2004-2005 for the consideration by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, acting as the Board of Trustees of the Institute at its forty-third session. During the year, UNIDIR's research programme focused on global security, regional security, and human security and disarmament. In the broader framework of global security, UNIDIR initiated a project to draw, from humanitarian action, concrete proposals for new negotiating processes in disarmament. It organized a number of seminars on issues of relevance to the CD such as outer space and security, weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors, cooperative threat reduction and nuclear non-proliferation. In the area of regional security, UNIDIR focused on specific issues related to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, North-East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. In the field of human security, the Institute conducted research on issues related to small arms in West Africa, regional and cross-regional perspectives on illicit trafficking in small arms, and the implementation of

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms. The Geneva Forum, the Institute's ongoing discussion series, held a number of seminars on small arms. UNIDIR concluded its research project on the participatory evaluation of weapons for development programmes. As the connections between security and health were increasingly of interest to the disarmament and security debate, UNIDIR cooperated with WHO and other UN institutions and NGOs on the effects of and issues pertaining to interpersonal violence and the spread of weapons. The Institute continued to be engaged in an extensive network with specialized agencies and institutions of the UN system and other organizations through electronic means, its publications and conferences, seminars and discussions. (A list of publications issued by the Institute during the period under review appears in Annex V of this chapter.)

General Assembly, 2004 59/93. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The revised draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 455 for the sponsors) on 4 November. At the same meeting, it was adopted without a vote by the First Committee and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 392. The resolution welcomed the Secretary-General's report on disarmament and non-proliferation education and requested him to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations and possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education for submission to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session. It also requested him to utilize electronic means to the fullest extent possible in the dissemination, in as many official languages as feasible, of information related to that report and any other information that the Department for Disarmament Affairs gathered on an ongoing basis in relation to the UN study. 591103. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme. The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 460 for the sponsors) on 22 October . It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee, on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 3 December. For the text of the resolution see page 460. The resolution recommended that the Programme continue to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action and support for it, including action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner. It also invited all Member States


to make contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme with a view to sustaining a strong outreach programme; and it requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session a report covering both the implementation of the activities of the Programme by the United Nations system during the previous two years and the activities it contemplated for the following two years.

Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development Brigadier (Retired) Richard F. Baly, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, Department for International Development, London (third session) Fikry Cassidy, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York (second and third sessions) Todor Churov, NATO and International Security Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia Yawhito Fukui, First Secretary, Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (first session) Andrea Garcia Guerra, Minister, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, New York Friedrich Groning, Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin Leslie Gumbi, Minister, Disarmament Section, Permanent Mission of South Africa, Geneva Prasad Kariyawasam, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka Kagyabukama E. Kiliba, Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, New York Catharina Kipp, Director, Department for Global Security, Disarmament Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm Santiago Irazabal Mourao, Counsellor, Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil Cheikh Niang, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations, New York Geraldine O'Callaghan, Senior Adviser, Arms Control, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, Department for International Development, London, (first and second sessions)


Shutaro Ohmura, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, New York, (second and third sessions) Anatoliy Scherba, Head, Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiev Iwan Wiranataatmadja, Senior Official on Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, (first session)

Composition of the Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in All its Aspects Mohsen Naziri Asl, Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran (second session) Lotfi Bouchaara, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations Chun Yung-woo, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations David Cooper, Director, Non-Proliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defence, United States of America Asif Ali Khan Durrani, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations (first and second sessions) Richard Ekwall, Director, Department for Strategic Export Control, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden Khalil Ur-Rahman Hashmi, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations (third session) Tariq Osman Hyder, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan (second session) Alaa Issa, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Jeremy Issacharoff, Deputy Director-General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Israel Wernfried Koffler, Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austria Barend J. Lombard, Deputy Director, Nuclear and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa Vitali A. Lukyantsev, Senior Counsellor, Department for Security and Disarmament Matters, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation Ma Shengkun, Deputy Division Director. Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry for Foreign Affair, China


Robert McDougall, Director, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, Foreign Affairs, Canada Santiago Irazabal Mouriio, Counsellor, Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Brazil Reza Najafi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (first and third sessions) Fran~oisRichier, Director, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, Department for Strategic Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, France Renato Carlos Sersale di Cerisano, Director of International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs, Ministly for Foreign Affairs, Argentina Anatoliy Scherba, Head of Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations (third session) Paul Stephens, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Takaya Suto, Director, Centre for the Promotion of Disarmament, Japan Institute of International Affairs D. B. Venkatesh Varma, Director, Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division, Ministry of External Affairs, India (first and second sessions) Josef Vitek, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations Andrew Wood, Assistant Director, Head, Export Control Policy, Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Section, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Zainal Mohd. Noor, Staff Officer I, Department of Artillery, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia

Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and telecommunications in the context of international security (first session) Bisher Al-Khasawneh, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations Murilo Marques Barboza, Special Advisor to the Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Brazil

Jorge Antonio Espinosa Duran, Information Security Manager, Policia

Federal Preventiva, Mexico Major-General A.C. Hurribunce, Chief of Command and Management, Information Systems Division, Department of Defence, South Africa Cheickna Keita, First Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Mali to the United Nations Andrey V. Krutskikh, Deputy Director, Department for Disarmament and Security Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation Lew Kwang-chul, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Michele Markoff, Senior Coordinator for International Critical Infrastructure Protection, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, United States Department of State, United States Sanjiv Ranjan. First Secretary. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Stephanie Schaer, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, France Thomas Schafer, First Counsellor, Head of Division, Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, Division 24 1, Germany Geoff Smith, Head Information Security Policy Team, Department of Trade and Industry, United Kingdom Valery V. Tsepkalo, Assistant to the President of the Republic of Belarus, Belarus Wu Haitao, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Mohd Azlan Zaharudin, Assistant Director, Directorate of Technical Development & Information Technology, National Security Division, Malaysia

Publications and other materials of the Department for Disarmament Affairs or produced in collaboration with the Department and its regional centres

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 28: 2004, (Sales No. E.04.IX. 1)

Occasional Paper No. B,'~ October 2004, Multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation regimes and the role of the United Nations: an evaluation November 2004, Symposium on the Relationship Occasional Paper No.


between Disarmament and Development Disarmament Resolutions and Decisions of the Fifty-ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, December 2004 Small Arms and Light Weapons, Selected United Nations Documents (DPI/2353), June 2004

Reducing the Threat of Biological Weapons,2004'~ Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) African Peace BulletidBulletin Africain de la Paix No. 30f5 July 2004, "Taking stocks of the Disarmament Debate" Final Report on the "Training Workshop of the Members of the Parliamentary Defence Committees in West Africa," April 2004 Final Report on the regional workshop on "Promoting Transparency in the Flows of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa, July 2004 First Annual Report of the project entitled "Small Arms Transparency and Control Regimes in Africa, " September 2004 Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNL~REC)'~ Regional Perspectives series: No.6 Paraguay: Towards a Culture of Peace: Destruction of Firearms and Ammunition. 24 August - 6 October 2003 No.7 Improving the Security of Stockpiles in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives: A Latin American Experience 2002-2004 No.8 Destruction of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives: A Latin American Experience 2002-2004 No.9 New Strategies to Strengthen Firearms Control in Brazil's South-eastem Region, 28-30 April 2004, Brazil 22 Available from http:Ndisarrnament2.un.org/ddapublications. (The content was based on intensive deliberations and the contribution made by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.) 23 Ibid. (The contents were based on the Panel discussion held at United Nations Headquarters on 9 March 2004.) 24 In cooperation with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, New York (panel discussions were held between 2000 and 2003). 25 http:llwww.unrec.orglenglBulletin.htm, also from http://www.unrec.org/fr/bulletin.htm 26 Available from http:llwww.unlirec.org.


No.10 Legal Norms and Instruments on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives No1 l Commercial Trade of and Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Ammunition: Training the Trainers Investigative Techniques Courses, 8-26 March 2004, Costa Rica No12 Commercial Trade of and Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Ammunition: Training the Trainers Investigative Techniques Course, 3-21 May 2004, Brazil Latin America and Caribbean Policy Brief No. 1: United Nations 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Colombia's position Folders:

Small Arms and Light Weapons Administration (SALSA) System The Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives Industry (FinDATA) VHS : Training the Trainers Course (SICA) Training the Trainers Course (MERCOSUR) Training the Trainers Course (CAN) Video Clip: "Soldiers of Peace" Video: CCP (Combined Command Post) CD-ROMs: Destruction Methods - 2004 The composition of the Panel appears in Annex I1 of this chapter.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific Publications: Pacific-AsiaDialogue Series No. 1 The Challenge of Terrorismfor International Security and Disarmament: Global and Regional Impact, Kyoto, 7-9 August 2002. United Nations: New York, 2004

UNIDIR Publications Research reports Peace in the Middle East: P2P and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,by Adel Atieh, Gilad Ben-Nun, Gasser El Shahed, Rana Taha and Steve

Studies, education and information Tulliu, 2004, 54p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.05.0.2. Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences, in cooperation with the League of Arab States, 2004, 310p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.0.30. Exchanging Weapons for Development in Cambodia: An Assessment of Different Weapon Collection Strategies Assessed by Local People, by Geofrey Mugumya, 2004, l3Zp., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.0.28. Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the Reports Submitted by States in 2003, by Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Anne Yankey-Wayne, in cooperation with UNDP, DDA and SAS, 2004, 320p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.0.27. From Exchanging Weapons for Development to Security Sector Reform in Albania: Gaps and Grey Areas in Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People, by Geofrey Mugumya, 2004, l3Op., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.0.19. Open Skies: A Cooperative Approach to Military Transparency and Confidence Building, by Pal Dunay, Marton Krasznai, Hartwig Spitzer, Rafael Wiemker and William Wynne, 2004, 340p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.0.18. Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People, by Geofrey Mugumya, 2004, 174p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.0.14. A Guide to the Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons-The Approach of the South African National Defence Force, by Sarah Meek and Noel Stott, in cooperation with SAS, 2004, 76p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.04.O. 5. Costs of Disarmament-Mortgaging the Future: The South Asian Arms Dynamic, by Susan Willett, 2004, 1H p . , United Nations publication, Sales No.GV.E.04.0.1. Disarmament Forum No. 1, 2004, Strengthening Disarmament and Security No. 2, 2004, India and Pakistan: Peace by Piece No. 3, 2004, Human Rights, Human Security and Disarmament No. 4, 2004, The 2005 NPT Review Conference


List of symposia and panels sponsored by DDA "The Relationship between Disarmament and Development", 9 March 2004, New York "United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects: Implementation Reporting", 14-15 June 2004, Salambo, Tunisia "Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education", 12 October 2004, New York "Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and the role of the United Nations: an evaluation", 6 December 2004, New York

APPENDICES


APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements The data contained in this appendix has been furnished by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements concerned, as follows:

Secretary-General of the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Canada and Hungary Treaty on Open Skies

France Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

Mexico Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Netherlands Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States o f America Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor in the Subsoil Thereof Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction

Thailand Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

United States of America Antarctic Treaty

Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported. The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2004 The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2004 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. a Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A), approval by (AA), and succession by (S). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "0","B", "M", "L", and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "0"for Ottawa, "B" for Budapest, "M" for Moscow, "L" for London, and "W" for Washington.

Status of agreements Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare SIGNEDAT GENEVA:17 June 1925 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENT: France NEW PART1ES:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES: 133

The Antarctic Treaty SIGNEDAT WASHINGTON:1 December 1959 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 23 June 1961 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENT: United States of America NEW PART1ES:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:45

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water SIGNEDBY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES~IN MOSCOW:5 A U ~ U S1963 ~ OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON,MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:8 August 1963 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 10 October 1963 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W) NEW PART1ES:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:124

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies OPENEDFOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON,MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 10 October 1967 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENTS:Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W) NEW PART1ES:None TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES:9 8

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICOCITY: 14 February 1967 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: for each Government individually DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENT: Mexico NEW pAR~1Es:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:3 9

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Amendment to article 7d NEW RATIFICATIONS: None Amendment to article 2!je NEW RATIFICATIONS:None

Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 2of NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons OPENED FOR SIGNATUREAT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:1 July 1968 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 5 March 1970 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W) NEW PART1ES:None TOTALNUMBER OFPARTIES:189

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof OPENEDFOR SIGNATUREAT LONDON,MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:11 February 1971 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 18 May 1972 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENTS:Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W) NEW PART1ES:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:92

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction OPENEDFOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON,MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:10 April 1972 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 26 March 1975 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENTS:Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W) -26 February NEW PARTIES: Azerbaijan (a) (W) Kyrgyzstan (a) (M) -15 October TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:153

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA:18 May 1977 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 5 October 1978 DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

Status of agreements NEW P A R T I E S : N O ~ ~ TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 6 9

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEWYORK: 18 December 1979 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 11 July 1984 DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations NEW PARTIES? Belgium 29 June 2004 (a) TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:1 1 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEWYORK: 10 April 1981 ENTEREDL!TO FORCE: 2 December 1983 DEPOSITARY:The Secretary-General of the United Nations NEW PARTIES:~ Turkmenistan -1 9 March Paraguay -22 September Sri Lanka -24 September (a) Sierra Leone -30 September TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:97 Amended Protocol I1 (entered into force on 3 December 1998) -2 March Belarus Turkmenistan -19 March -22 September Paraguay -24 September Malta -24 September Sri Lanka -30 September Sierra Leone TOTALNUMBEROF ACCEPTANCES: 80 Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998) -23 September Poland -24 September Malta -24 September Sri Lanka -30 September Sierra Leone 79 TOTALNUMBEROF ACCEPTANCES: Amendment to Article l of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004) PARTIES: Switzerland -19 January (A) Spain -9 February Slovakia -1 l February Belgium -12 February Argentina -25 February (a) Netherlands -19 May (A)

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Liechtenstein Finland Panama Italy Denmark Malta Sri Lanka Sierra Leone Greece NUMBEROF PARTIES:36

June (A) -22 June (A) -16 August (a) -1 September -15 September (A) -24 September (a) -24 September (a) -30 September -26 November -18

Protocol V

Sweden Lithuania Sierra Leone TOTALNUMBEROF ACCEPTANCES: 3

-2 June -29 September -30 September

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) OPENEDFOR SIGNATURE AT R AROTONGA: 6 August 1985 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 1 l December l986 DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat NEW PART1ES:None Total number of Parties: 17' Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) SIGNEDAT PARIS: 19 November 1990 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 9 November 1992 DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Netherlands NEW PART1ES:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:30 Agreement on Adaptation

ADOPTEDAND SIGNEDAT ISTANBUL:19 November 1999 NOT YET IN F O R C ~ NEW SIGNATORIES:None -14 November 2003 NEW RATIFICATIONS: Kazakhstan Russian Federation -6 December 2004 NEW pAR~1Es:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES: Sk

Treaty on Open Skies SIGNEDAT HELSINKI:24 March 1992 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 1 January 2002 DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary NEW RATIFICATIONS: Croatia 31 TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS:

-2

November

Status of agreements Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction SIGNEDAT PARIS: 13 January 1993 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 29 April 1997 DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations NEW PARTIES: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Madagascar Tuvalu C had Rwanda Marshal1 Islands St. Kitts and Nevis Solomon Islands TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:166

-6 January (a) -1 5 January -1 9 January (a) -13 February -31 March -19 May -21 May -23 September

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) SIGNEDAT BANGKOK:15 December 1995 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 27 March 1997 DEPOSITARYGOVERNMENT: Thailand NEW pA~T1Es:None TOTALNUMBER OF PARTIES:10

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-ZoneTreaty (Pelindaba Treaty) SIGNEDAT CAIRO:l l April l996 NOT YET IN FORCE' DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity NEW SIGNATORIES: None TOTALNUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 55 NEW RATIFICATIONS: None TOTALNUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 2zrn

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEWYORK:24 September 1996 NOT YET IN FORCE" DEPOSITARY:The Secretary-General of the United Nations -10 June NEW SIGNATORIES: Sudan United Republic of Tanzania -30 September -30 November Rwanda TOTALNUMBER OF SIGNATORIES:174 -6 January NEW RATIFICATIONS: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -26 March Belize -1 2 April Bahrain -13 April Seychelles -19 May Serbia and Montenegro

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Sudan

-10 June

Togo -2 July Liechtenstein -2 1 September Tunisia -23 September Democratic Republic of Congo -28 September United Republic of Tanzania -30 September -30 November Rwanda 120 TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS:

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention) OPENEDFOR SIGNATURE AT OTTAWA: 3 December 1997 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 1 March 1999 DEPOSTI'ARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations -1 2 May (a) NEW PARTIES:' Estonia Papua New Guinea -28 June (a) Ethiopia -1 7 December TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 144 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. : 14 November 1997 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 1 July 1998 DEPOSlTARY: Organization of American States NEW PARTIES:~ Trinidad and Tobago -1 3 February -25 May St. Kitts and Nevis -7 July Barbados Dominica -20 October Honduras -23 November TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 26 Inter-AmericanConvention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions OPENED FOR SIGNATUREAT GUATEMALA CITY: 7 June 1999 ENTEREDINTO FORCE: 2 1 November 2002 DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States NEW SIGNATORIES: None NEW RATIFICATIONS: Argentina -28 April 9 TOTAL NUMBER OF R ATIFICATIONS:

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Signatory or party reported

Antarctic Treaty

BWC

Celestial Bodies

CTBT

CWC

Geneva Protocol

NPT

r

S

r

S

r

r

Albania

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

Algeria

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

Afghanistan

S

S

r

Andorra

S

Angola

S

r

r

r

S

r

r

r

S

r

r

r

S

Antigua and Barbuda Argentina

S

r

S

Armenia Australia Austria

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

Azerbaq an

r

Bahamas

r

Bahrain

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

SeaBed S

r

r

r

r S

r

S

S

r

r S

r

r

r r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r r

r

S

PTBT

r

S S

Outer Space

r

r

r

r

r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Signatory or party reported

Antarctic Treaty

BWC

r

Bangladesh Barbados

S

r

Belarus

S

r

S

r

Belgium

S

r

Belize Benin

S

Bolivia

S

r

Botswana

r

r

Geneva Protocol

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

r

S

r

r

S

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

S

r S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

r

r

PTBT

SeaBed

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

r S

r

S

S

r

r S

Outer Space

r

S

r

NPT

r

r

r

r

S

S

S

S

Brunei Darussalam

CWC

r

r

S

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bulgaria

CTBT

r

Bhutan

Brazil

Celestial Bodies

S

S

r

r

S

r

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r S

r

S

r


Antarctic Treaty

BWC

Celestial Bodies

r

Burkina Faso Burundi

S

Cambodia

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

Canada

S

Cape Verde Central African Republic

S

r

China

r

Colombia

r

S

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r r

S

S

S

S

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

NPT S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

r S

S

r

r

r

r

S

S

r

r

S

S

r

S

S

r

S

S

r

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

Comoros

Outer Space

r

r

r

r

Geneva Protocol

S

S

S

r

CWC

r

Chad

C ongo

r

S

Cameroon

Chile

CTBT

r

S

r r

S

PTBT

SeaBed


Antarctic Treaty

BWC

Cook Islands S

CBte dlIvoire

S

r

r

Croatia r

Cyprus

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

S

r

S

r r r

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

r

r

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

r

r S

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

S

Djibouti Dominica

r

NPT

S

r

r

S

Geneva Protocol

r

r

Democratic Republic of the Congo

CWC

S

Czech Republic

Denmark

CTBT S

Costa Rica

Cuba

Celestial Bodies

S

r

r

r

r

S

r

S

r r

S S

S

S

r

r

Outer Space

PTBT

SeaBed

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) 1

Signatory or party reported

Antarctic Treaty

Dominican Republic r

Ecuador

BWC

Celestial Bodies

S

r

S

S

r

S

Egypt

S

El Salvador

S

Equatorial Guinea

r

CWC S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

Eritrea Estonia

CTBT

Geneva Protocol

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

Fiji

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

Gabon

S

Gambia

S

r

S

S

r

r

SeaBed S

r

S

r

r

France

r

r

S

r

PTBT

r

Ethiopia

Finland

NPT

Outer Space

r S

r

S

r

r S

r

r

S

r

r

S

r

r r

S

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

r S

r

S

r r

S


Antarctic Treaty

r

Ghana r

Greece

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

Guinea r

Guinea-Bissau

S

S

r

S

S

r

S

S

Guyana

S

S

Haiti

S

S

r

Holy See Honduras Hungary

I I

I

CWC

S

Grenada Guatemala

CTBT

r

Georgia Germany

Celestial Bodies

BWC

S

r

S

I

r b r I

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

I s r I s I

s r

I

s r

Geneva Protocol

NPT

r

Outer Space

PTBT

SeaBed

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S)


Antarctic Treaty

Iceland

signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

S

r

India

Celestial Bodies

BWC

S

CTBT

r

S

r

r

S

p p

P

-

P

CWC S

r

S

r

Geneva Protocol

r S

NPT S

r

r

Outer Space

PTBT

SeaBed

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r r

-.p

Indonesia

S

r

S

S

r

r

S

r

S

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

S

r

S

S

r

r

S

r

S

Iraq

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

Ireland

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

Israel

S

r

Italy

Jordan

S

r

r

r

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

Kazakhstan Kenya

S

r

S

Jamaica Japan

r

r

r

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

P

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

r

r

r

r


Kiribati Kuwait

I I I

Antarctic Treaty

I

1

BMC

I

I

I

S r

I I I

r

I

Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia

I I I

I

I

S

r

S

r

I S

/ I

I

Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya

4

Liechtenstein

I

l

Lithuania

I

l r l I I

Luxembourg

I

S

r

Celestial Bodies

I

CTBT

I

CWC

Geneva Protocol

NPT

Outer Space

I I PTBT

SeaBed

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Antarctic Treaty

Signatory or party reported -

Malaysia

I I I

Maldives

I

Madagascar Malawi

Mali

I

Malta

I

.

Celestial Bodies

BWC

-

Marshal1 Islands Mauritania Mauritius

I

I

S r

I

Mexico

I

I

s r

I

I I

1 4 I I

Micronesia (Federated States of) Monaco Mongolia

r

CTBT

CWC

Geneva Protocol

NPT

Outer Space

PTBT

SeaBed


Antarctic Treaty

Morocco

BWC S

r

Celestial Bodies S

r

Mozambique

CTBT S

r

CWC S

S

r

r

NPT S

Namibia

S

r

S

r

r

Nauru

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

Nepal

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

Nicaragua

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

Niger

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

Nigeria

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

S

S

r

New Zealand

r

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

SeaBed

r

S

Netherlands

PTBT

r

r

r

S

S

Outer Space

r

r

S

Myanmar

Geneva Protocol

S

S

Niue Norway

S

r

S

S

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Signatory or party I eported

Antarctic Treaty

BWC

r

Oman Pakistan

S

Palau Panama Papua New Guinea

S

r

Paraguay Peru

r

Philippines Poland

Celestial Bodies

r

Portugal Qatar

CTBT S

r

r

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

CWC S

r

S

r

Geneva Protocol

NPT

r

S

SeaBed

r

S

r

S

r

r

r S

r

r

S

r

r

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

PTBT

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

r

r

r

Outer Space

r

r S

S

r

S

S

r

S

r

r

S

r

r

S

r S

r r r

P P

Republic of Korea Republic of Moldova

r

S

r

S S

r

S

r

S

r

r

S

r r

S

r

S

r

S

r

-

P P


Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal

Antarctic Treaty

1

BWC

I

Celestial Bodies

I

CTBT

I

CWC

1

Geneva Protocol

NPT

Outer Space

PTBT

SeaBed

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction . as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Signatory or party reported

Antarctic Treaty

BWC

Celestial Bodies

CTBT

CWC

s r

s r

r

r

s r

s r

Sierra Leone

s r

s r

S

Singapore

s r

s r

s r

r

s r

s r

Slovenia

r

s r

s r

Solomon Islands

r

S

Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles

Slovakia

r

Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka

Geneva Protocol

NPT

Outer Space

PTBT

SeaBed

s r

s r

S

s r

s r r

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

s r

s r

s r

r

r

s r

r

r

r

r

r

r

r r

r s r

S

S

r S

S

s r

s r

s r

s r

r

r

s r

r

s r

r

s r

s r

s r

s r

r

r

s r

r

s r

S

s r

r

s r

s r

s r

r

r

s r

s r

r

r

Sudan

r

s r

Suriname

r

S

s r

S

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Signatary or party

l Sweden l Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic

I Tajikistan

l Thailand

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

I Timor Leste I Trinidad and Tobago

Antarctic

Celestial

Geneva

Outer Space

PTBT

I

SeaBed

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

I


l Tunisia l Turkey l Tuvalu

Antarctic Treaty

I I I

l Uganda

1

l Ukraine

I

I

United Arab

' Emirates United Kingdom of Great Britain and 1 Northern Ireland United Republic of Tanzania

L United States of America

BWC

I

Celestial Bodies

I

CTBT

1

CWC

Geneva Protocol


Uruguay

Antarctic Treaty

BWC

r

r

Celestial Bodies S

r

CTBT S

r

S

r

r

S

r

Uzbekistan

r

S

Vanuatu

r

S

r

S

r r

Venezuela

r

S

Viet Nam Yemen

S

Zambia Zimbabwe

r

CWC

Geneva Protocol S

r

NPT S

r

Outer Space

PTBT

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

SeaBed S

r

r r

r

S

r

S

S

r

r

S

S

r

r

S

S

S

S

S

S

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

S

r S

r r

S

r r

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) CFE Signatory or party reported

Treaty of Tlatelolco

Treaty of Rarotonga

1992

1999'1

Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty

Algeria

S

Angola

S

Antigua and Barbuda

S

r

Argentina

S

r r

Armenia Australia

S

r r

Azerbaij an Bahamas

S

r

Barbados

S

r r

Belarus Belgium Belize

S

S

r

r

r

s r S

r

r

Firearms Convention

Convent'l. Acquisitions

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)


Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde

Treaty of Tlateloko

I 1 Treaty of Rarotonga

CFE 1992

,999

/ I

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty

I I Firearms Convention


Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Treaty of Tlatelolco


Central African Republic

I I

S

r

Colombia

I

S

r

Comoros

I

S

r

Chad Chile China

Congo

I

Cook Islands

I

Costa Rica

I

Cbte d'Ivoire

1

Croatia

I I I

Cuba

S

r

Treaty of arotona

1

CFE 992

l999q

1 / Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty

Firearms Convention


Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) CFE Signatory or party reported


Czech Republic

Treaty of Rarotonga

1992

1999q

Open Skies

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica

S

r

Dominican Republic

S

r

Ecuador

S

r

S

r

Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty

I l Firearms Convention



I

CFE Treaty of Tlatelolco


I Fiji l Finland l France

Treaty of Rarotonga

I I

I

S

r

S

r

(P. 1-3)'

l Gabon

I

Georgia Germany

l Ghana Grenada

I S

r

l992

l999q

I

I Open Skies

/

I Bangkok Treaty

I

I

Pelindaba Treaty

I

I Firearms Convention

I




Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland Indonesia Italy Jamaica Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions) Treaty of Tlatelolco


Lao People's Democratic Republic

l Latvia

I

Lesotho

l Liberia

I

I Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

I

l l Madagascar l Malawi l Malaysia I Mali l Mauritania

I I I I

Luxembourg

I

Treaty of Parotonga

1

CFE I992

I999

/

Open Skies

Bangkok ~reaty

/

Pelindaba ireaty

I

Firearms convention

I

Convent'l. *cquisition.s



l l Treaty of Tlatelolco

I Mexico I Morocco I Mozambique

I I I

l Namibia l Nauru

I I

I I

I I

I I

S

r

CFE

Treaty of Rarotonga

S

r

1999s

I

I I I S r

Netherlands

I New Zealand l Nicaragua l Niger l Nigeria

1992

S r

Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty S

r

Firearms Convention





Niue

1 I Treaty of Rarotonga

CFE 1992

l Norway Panama

I Papua New Guinea l Paraguay l Peru Philippines

l Poland Portugal Republic of Moldova

cI Romania

Russian Federation

(APII) S r

(P.2 S &r 3)'

lsr/

19999

y e Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Iliaba Treaty

1

Firearms Convention




Treaty of Rarotonga

1992

1999q

Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Rwanda

Pelindaba Treaty

Firearms Convention

S

Saint Kitts and Nevis

S

r

S

r

Saint Lucia

S

r

S

r

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

S

r

S

Samoa

S

r

Sao Tome and Principe

S

Senegal

S

Seychelles

S

Sierra Leone

S

Singapore

S

Slovakia Solomon Islands

S S

r

r

S

r

r




Treaty of Rarotonga

1992

19999

Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

South Africa Spain

S

r

S

r

Sudan Suriname

S

r

Swaziland r

Sweden Thailand

S

Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago

S

S

r

r

Tunisia Turkey Tuvalu

S S

r

r

S

r

r

Pelindaba Treaty

1 1 1 Firearms Convention



I


I

Treaty of Rarotonga

Uganda

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

S

r

S

(A.P.1 & 11)

r

(P.1-3)S

United Republic of Tanzania

I United States of America /

S

r

I

S

(P. 1-3)'

l Uruguay l Venezuela

I

S

r

I

Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty

Firearms Convention




I

Viet Nam

l Zambia

I

I

Zimbabwe


Treaty of Xarotonga

1

CFE

I992

191Y

I 1 / 1 / Open Skies

Bangkok Treaty

Pelindaba Treaty

Firearms Convention


Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (X) consent to be bound Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

I l Afghanistan l Albania


I I l

CCW S

I I I

Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW

Algeria Andorra

l Argentina l Armenia

I I Isr I

Australia

S

r

X

Austria

S

r

X

l Angola I Antigua and Barbuda

Azerbaijan

I I

Ix I

ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (s) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (x)consent to be bound

1 g I


Bahamas Bahrain

CCW

Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

Amendment to Article 1 o f t h e CCW

X

Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana

I

Amended

P.111

Bangladesh

1 X

X

X

I

P. I1

P. IV

-

-

-

-

X

X

-

-

P.V

ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention

sr

r

s r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions); (X) consent to be bound Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons


CCW


Mine-Ban Convention

Brazil

Sr

Brunei Darussalam

S

Bulgaria

S

r

Burkina Faso

S

r

Burundi

S

r

Cambodia

Sr

Cameroon

S

r

Canada

S

r

Cape Verde

S

r

Central African Republic

r

Chad

Sr

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (X) consent to be bound

I

I

I


Amended Signatory or party reported

CCW

Chile

P. I

of the CCW

r

X

--

China

S

Colombia

r

X

r

X X

-

Comoros

-

Congo

-

Cook Islands

-

Costa Rica

r

X

p p

-

CBte dlIvoire Croatia

r

Cuba

S

Cyprus

r

Czech Republic

l

X

r

X

X X

I

Ix

ENMOD

r

Mine-Ban Convention S

r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions); (X) consent to be bound

r Signatory or party reported

CCW

Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW

Amended

P.11

P. I1

P.111


-

-

Democratic Republic of the Congo

-

-

X

X

l Denmark l Djibouti l Dominica

I Dominican Republic

l Ecuador

I El Salvador Equatorial Guinea

X

Mine-Ban Convention


I


l Eritrea 1 Estonia l Ethiopia

I Fiji

l Gabon 1 Gambia l Georgia l Ghana

I

CCW

I


1

Amended P. I

P.111

Mine-Ban Convention

r

l I

lx

I

I

l

I

I

l.

I

I

I

-

II-

r S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r

S

r


I I Signatory or party reported

Grenada Guatemala

II l

CCW

l

Protocols to the Convention c I Certain Conventional Weapons Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW

I

I

Guyana

I I I

Haiti

I

I

l l

Hungary

Isr

IX I

Iceland

IS

India

Isr

I

Indonesia

I

I

Guinea Guinea-Bissau

~ o l See y Honduras

I

I

I

Ix

I

l ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (s) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (x)consent to be bound Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons


CCW


P. I

P.111

Amended P. I1

P. IV

-

Iran (Islamic Republic of) Iraq

-

I-

P.V

1

ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention

I s sr

Ireland Israel

Ix

Italy Jarnaica

-

I

Japan

j r

X

l-

sr -

I-

sr sr

X

Jordan

X

Kazakhs tan

-

II-

sr

Kenya

sr

Kiribati

r


I


ENMOD

Kuwait Lao People's Democratic r Republic

I Latvia

Ir

l Lebanon

I

l Liberia

I

l Liechtenstein

Isr

Luxembourg

S

I Libyan Arab Jamahiriya I l Lithuania

l

r

Mine-Ban Convention

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (X) consent to be bound Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

I Signatory or party reported

I

I

CCW

1


1

/

P.1

7

I

P.11

Madagascar

-

-

Malawi

-

-

Malaysia

I

I

1-

1-

Maldives

I

I

Ix

I-

Mali

l

I

IX

IX

Malta

Ir

IX

Ix

Ix

Marshal1 Islands

I

I

I-

I-

Mauritania

I

I

1-

1-

Mauritius

l

I

Ix

Ix

Mexico

Isr

Ix

IX

IX

-

-

Micronesia (Federated States of)

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (s) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (x) consent to be bound

I ~~~~~



I Monaco I Mongolia I Morocco I Mozambique I Myanmar I Namibia I Nauru

CCW

r

I

sr

I

sr

I

I Niger

Mine-Ban Convention

sr

s r

s r

r

I Nepal

I Netherlands I New Zealand I Nicaragua

I

Amendment to Article 1 oftheCCW

I

r ~

~~

-

I-

I-

-

Is r

sr

s r

I

Ir

I

X

X

S

s r sr



CCW


Amended P.111

ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention

Nigeria

r

Niue

S

r

Norway

S

r

Panama

S

r

Papua New Guinea

r

Paraguay

S

r

Peru

S

r

Philippines

S

r

Poland

S

Oman Pakistan Palau


I Signatory or party reported

l Portugal l Qatar

I Republic of Korea I Republic of Moldova l Romania ( Russian Federation

l Rwanda I Saint Kitts and Nevis I Saint Lucia

Il

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa

CCW



I

I

1 Amended

EPMIIY

Mine-Ban onv vent ion


m I

CCW


San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal

I I l 1

Seychelles

l

Sierra Leone

Isr

I

Slovakia

I

P.111

Amended P. I1

P. IV

S

r

P.V

ENMOD

-

Serbia and Montenegro

Singapore

Amendment to Article 1 o f t h e CCW


r

Mine-Ban Convention


7

Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional ,Weapons



South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden

I

Isr I I I

I. S

I

Isr

Syrian Arab Republic

Isr I

Tajikistan

I

Switzerland

Thailand

Amended

P. I1

P. IV

I

P.V

I ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2004, as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; (X) consent to be bound Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

Signatory or p a t reported

I 1 ccw

r

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Timor Leste

I

I

Tonga

I

I

l I l

I I I

Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu

S

I

I

Uganda

l

I

Ukraine

Isr

I


Mine-Ban Convention



United Arab Emirates United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Republic of Tanzania United States of America Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam

CCW

1

Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW

Amended P. I1

ENMOD

Mine-Ban Conventior:

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2 0 4 , as reported by depositaries (continued) (S) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions) ; ( X ) consent to be bound Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons


Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

II I

I

CCW

II I

I

Amendment to Article l of the CCW

P. I

v

v

P.11

P.111

Amended P. I1

P. IV

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

P.V

I

I ENMOD

Mine-Ban Convention S

r

-

S

r

-

S

r

S

r

I

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Notes: a The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 4th edition;: 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX. 1l ) , in Status, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), and thereafter in the relevant volumes of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. The texts and status data are also posted on the web site of the Department for Disarmament Affairs: www.un.org/Depts/dda. The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. C Total includes the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols. The Treaty is fully in force for all the regional States that ratify it and waive the requirements under article 28. Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990. Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991. Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992. g Article 19, paragraph 4, states: "For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument." h Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state: "2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention." Total includes nuclear-weapon States China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3, and France and the United Kingdom, which have ratified Protocols 1-3. J Article 31, paragraph 3, states: "This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form." Statement by the State Duma concerning the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: "The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation notes that the signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty) has been an important contribution to greater stability and security on the European continent.

'

The State Duma denounces the unconstructive position of some States Parties to the CFE Treaty, above all members of NATO, which have invented pretexts to postpone the start of ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Particularly given the emergence in Europe of so-called grey areas that are not covered by the regime of the CFE Treaty, primarily including the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the possible stationing of NATO troops, armaments and military facilities in these areas, further delays to this process may call into question both the arms control process and the positive trends in Russia's relations with the alliance. Noting that the rapid entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty would serve the interests of European security, the State Duma calls upon the parliaments of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty that have not yet ratified it to complete the national ratification procedures without delay, thereby fulfilling the commitment laid down in the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the Final Act), adopted in Istanbul on 19 November 1999. The Federal Law on Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has been adopted by the State Duma on the following premises: 1. Until such time as the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty enters into force, the Russian Federation will fulfil the political commitments it has assumed during and as a result of the negotiations on adaptation of the CFE Treaty, including those concerning military restraint in certain regions, on condition that all other States Parties to the CFE Treaty fulfil the commitments set forth in the Final Act, including the commitment to move forward expeditiously to complete national ratification procedures. 2. In the event of exceptional circumstances that may constitute a threat to the supreme interests of the Russian Federation, the Federation will take political, diplomatic and other measures to eliminate such circumstances, including, where necessary, measures affecting the regime of the CFE Treaty and of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, as set forth in the Federal Law on the International Treaties of the Russian Federation. In particular, the said exceptional circumstances include: (1) withdrawal of any State Party from the CFE Treaty (as amended by the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty), as well as violation of its provisions by any State Party to the CFE Treaty or group of states that may constitute a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation; (2) refusal by any State Party to the CFE Treaty or group of states to fulfil the commitments laid down in the Statement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, done at Brussels on 8 December 1998, as well as the commitments laid down in Annexes 1-4 and 7-11 to the Final Act concerning the adjustment of territorial ceilings for the Treaty-limited armaments and equipment of certain States Parties to the CFE Treaty and the future use of provisions for raising such ceilings, as well as de facto failure to fulfil the said commitments that may constitute a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation;

(3) use of force or threat of use of force by any State Party to the CFE Treaty or group of states against any other state in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations; (4) decisions by any State Party to the CFE Treaty or group of states in the sphere of military policy and armed forces build-up that would constitute a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, including: failure to fulfil commitments under Section IV of the Founding Act of 27 May 1997 on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Russian Federation and the documents adopted in pursuance of it; simultaneous or subsequent use by any States Parties to the CFE Treaty or group of states of the right to temporary deployment of conventional armaments in a manner inconsistent with the goals of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty; deployment by any state or group of states of armaments in a manner that radically alters the balance of forces between the Russian Federation and the said state or group of states; a radical alteration in the military and political situation as compared with the situation that existed when this Statement was adopted. 3. States Parties to the CFE Treaty that have joined military and political unions since the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was signed will assume commitments to reduce their territorial ceilings of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment and to refrain from raising these ceilings in the future. 4. When conducting negotiations and signing agreements on military matters with any State Party to the CFE Treaty, the Russian Federation will, among other things, take account of that state's position regarding: the entry into force of and compliance with the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty; the presence of Russian troops, armaments and military facilities on its territory; the possibility of stationing the troops, armaments and military facilities of third states or groups of states on its territory. 5. States that have acceded to the CFE Treaty will make a substantial contribution to greater European and subregional security, in particular by assuming additional commitments concerning limitation of levels of conventional armed forces on their territories, as well as the possibilities of changing them and temporarily exceeding them. 6. Once the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty enters into force, negotiations will be held as soon as possible within the Joint Consultative Group with a view to: agreeing conditions for the accession of new states to the CFE Treaty; further reducing the potential of conventional armed forces in Europe. 7. Pending the relevant decision by the Joint Consultative Group, the Russian Federation reserves the right to independently determine the terms of payment in respect of inspections carried out at the expense of the inspecting State Party to the

CFE Treaty on the territory of the Russian Federation or at the Russian Federation's military facilities outside the territory of the Russian Federation. 8. Reservations or statements made by other States Parties to the CFE Treaty will not be applicable to the Russian Federation if they would: change the essential provisions of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty; restrict the rights of the Russian Federation under the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty; or conflict with the provisions of this Statement. The State Duma proposes to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Putin, that this Statement be attached to the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. " Article 18, paragraph 2, states: "It [this Treaty] shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification." m Total includes France, which has ratified Protocols I, I1 and 111, and China and the United Kingdom which have ratified Protocols I and 11. " Article XIV, paragraph 1, states: "This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex I1 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature." O Article 17, paragraph 2, states: "For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession." p Article XXV, states: "This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification." q Agreement on Adaptation. A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. S P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga. P. means Protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty.

'

Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear weapons * Terms of reference and organization of work 1. At its fifty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 56/24 0 of 29 November 2001, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), following appropriate consultations, to hold the first meeting of the Preparatory committee in New York from 8 to 19 April 2002. 2. Accordingly, the Committee held its first session in New York from 8 to 19 April 2002. Following the decision taken at that session, the Committee held its second session at Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2003 and its third session in New York from 26 April to 7 May 2004. Reports covering the first two sessions of the Committee were issued, respectively, as documents NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21 and Corr. l and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I1/50. 3. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference. 4. Pursuant to that understanding, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee elected Henrik Salander (Sweden) to serve as Chairman of the first session. It also decided that Laszlo Molnar (Hungary) would be Chairman of the second session. It was further decided that, when not serving as Chairman, the chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as ViceChairmen of the Committee. 5. At its third session, the Committee elected Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia) as Chairman of the third session. At the same session, the Committee was informed that the Chairman had been advised by the delegation of Sweden that Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier was to succeed Mr. Salander in the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee as Vice-Chairperson. 6 . At the third session, the Committee authorized its Bureau and the PresidentElect to handle technical and other organizational matters, as well as to carry out *

316

Annexes can be found in NPT/Conf.2005/1.

Preparatory Committee Report for the 2005 NPT Review Conference consultations with States parties in the period before the Conference. It also decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Conference. 7. At its first session, the Committee adopted its agenda as contained in paragraph 8 of document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/2 1 and Corr. 1, as follows: 1. Opening of the session. 2. Election of the Chairman. 3. Adoption of the agenda. 4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee. 5. Statements by non-governmental organizations. 6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee: (a) Election of officers; Dates and venue for further sessions; (b) (c) Methods of work:

8. 9.

10. 11.

(0 Decision-making; (ii) Participation; (iii) Working languages; (iv) Records and documents. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee. Organization of the 2005 Review Conference: (a) Dates and venue; (b) Draft rules of procedure; Election of the President and other officers; (c) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the Review (d) Conference; (e) Provisional agenda; Financing of the Review Conference, including its (f3 Preparatory Committee; (g) Background documentation; (h) Final document ( S ) . Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference. Any other matters.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 8. Hannelore Hoppe, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the first session of the Preparatory Committee. Silvana Fonseca da Silva, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) represented the Agency at all sessions. 9. Delegations of the following 153 States parties participated in one or more sessions of the Preparatory Committee: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C8te dfIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, ~ k r i t a n i a Mauritius, , Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 10. At the second session, the Chairman made the following statement: "You will recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons mandated the Chairpersons of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee 'to carry out consultations with the States Parties to prepare the ground for the outcome of the sessions as well as their agenda'. Accordingly, I carried out those consultations, which revealed diverging views on the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the NPT. It is my conviction that a debate on the issue would only serve to the detriment of the purpose of the Preparatory Committee, namely 'to consider principles, objectives and ways in

Preparatory Committee Report for the 2005 NPT Review Conference order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality'. In the light of the above, the Chair has the intention, under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of the said country temporarily, in his custody. The Chair has therefore asked the Secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference room for the duration of the second session of the Preparatory Committee. This is in no way meant to prejudice the outcome of ongoing consultations on the issue". The Committee took note of that statement. 11. At the third session, the Chairman made the following statement: "I would like to refer to some aspects of my consultations prior to this session, which I carried out in accordance with the mandate given to the Chairpersons of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My consultations revealed, inter alia, the continuation of divergent views on the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in NPT. The consultations also revealed that States Parties were ready to uphold, in this regard, the procedure applied by my predecessor, Ambassador Laszlo Molnar. Accordingly, it is the intention of the Chair, under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of the said country temporarily, in his custody. The Chair has therefore asked the Secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference room for the duration of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. This is in no way meant to prejudice the outcome of ongoing consultations on this issue". The Committee took note of that statement. 12. At its first session, the Committee decided that: Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non(a) proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. Accordingly, representatives of Cuba attended the first session of the Committee as observers; Representatives of specialized agencies and international and (b) regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. The following international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at meetings of the Committee: Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), European Commission, International Committee of the Red Cross,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 League of Arab States, Organization of African Unity (first session), Organization of the Islamic Conference, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and Pacific Islands Forum; Representatives of non-governmental organizations should be (c) allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the public gallery, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee. Representatives of 1 11 non-governmental organizations attended one or more sessions of the Committee. 13. At its first session, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2000 Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis. 14. Also at its first session, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages. 15. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its first session, summary records were provided, at each session, for the Committee's opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings. The summary records of the first session were issued as documents NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR. 1-4,6, 18 and 19. The summary records of the second session were issued as documents NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/SR. 1-4 and 19. The summary records of the third session (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/SR.l-3 and 5) are issue'd separately as annex I to the present report. 16. At each session, the Committee set aside meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of its work in the course of which many delegations made statements. All statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings. 17. Also at each session, the Committee set aside one meeting for presentations by representatives of non-governmental organizations.

Substantive work of the Committee 18. The Committee held 30 meetings devoted to substantive discussions under agenda item 6. 19. The discussion at each session of the Preparatory Committee was structured according to indicative timetables, which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues. 20. At the third session, the Chairman made the following statement: "To resolve the pending issues that we have, particularly on the timetable of this session of the Committee, and with the objective of ensuring that any understanding that is achieved on how the issues relevant to the Treaty are addressed does not prejudice the way in which these issues are to be dealt with at the Review Conference, I intend to organize our work in the few days to come in the following way: the Chair will

Preparatory Committee Report for the 2005 NPT Review Conference provide the opportunity for States parties to specifically address the issue of security assurances under the time allocated for cluster 1, and the issue of the 1995 Middle East resolution under the time allocated for regional issues. In reaching this conclusion, the Chair has taken into account the different views that exist on the timetable of work and the limited time available for our deliberations at this particular session of the Committee. Delegations are invited to structure their deliberations on the issues that will be dealt with, within these time allocations in accordance with the proposal that I am making. I strongly hope that such an approach will secure a positive outcome for our work for the completion of the mandates of the Committee. Regarding any other issues on our agenda, the structure of the programme of work of the previous two sessions of the Committee will be applied with some necessary adjustments". The Committee took note of that statement and of the indicative timetable proposed by the Chairman. 21. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues as contained in annex V111 to the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/1): Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non(a) proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non(b) proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weaponfree zones; Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the (c) inalienable right of a11 States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles 1 and 11. 22. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues: Implementation of article V1 of the Treaty on the Non(a) proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled "Article V1 and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs" contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the (b) implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled "Regional issues: the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 resolution on the Middle East", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; Safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes. (c) 23. Guided by the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, paragraph 7 of the section entitled "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty", the Chairmen of the first and second sessions of the Committee prepared factual summaries of the consideration of the issues of the Committee, which were annexed to the respective reports of the first and second sessions. 24. The Committee had before it a number of documents submitted by delegations. The list of the documents submitted during the Committee's sessions is contained in annex I1 to the present report.

Organization of work of the Review Conference 25. In the course of its sessions, the Committee considered the following questions relating to the organization and work of the 2005 Review Conference: (a) Dates and venue; (b) Draft rules of procedure; Election of the President and other officers; (c) (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General; (e) Provisional agenda; Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory (4 Committee; (g;) Background documentation; (h) Final document (S).

Dates and venue o f the Conference 26. At its third session, the Committee reaffirmed its agreement, reached at its first session, that the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be held in New York from 2 to 27 May 2005.

Draft rules o f procedure 27. At its third session, the Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the Conference and agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex 111 to the present report. 28. Also at its third session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that, notwithstanding rule 44.3 of the draft rules of procedure recommended to the Conference, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Conference upon the decision of the Conference, on a case-by-case basis. 29. At its third session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that, in accordance with the draft rules of procedure, representatives of nongovernmental organizations be allowed to attend meetings, other than those

Preparatory Committee Report for the 2005 NPT Review Conference designated as closed, and to receive documents of the Conference; that, in accordance with past practice, non-governmental organizations be allowed to make written material available, at their own expense, to the participants of the Conference; and that non-governmental organizations be allowed to address the Conference, consistent with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Election of the President and other officers 30. At its third session, the Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference. 31. Also at the third session, the Committee agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, i.e., the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee (Indonesia); Main Committee I1 should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, i.e., the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (Hungary) ; and that Main Committee I11 should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group, i.e., the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Sweden). 32. The Committee also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States.

Appointment of the Secretary-General 33. At its first session, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a nomination to be confirmed by the Conference itself. At its third session, the Committee was informed of the decision of the Secretary-General, taken after consultations with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate Silvana Fonseca da Silva, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, to serve as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference. The Committee took note of that nomination.

Financing of the Review Conference,including its Preparatory Committee 34. At its second session, the Committee took note of the estimated costs of the Conference, including its Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I1/1). At its third session, the Committee agreed to the schedule for the division of costs. The schedule for the division of costs is contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure as reflected in annex I11 to the present report.

Final docurnent(s)

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 35. At its third session, the Committee decided to defer the consideration of this matter to the 2005 Review Conference.


A P P E N D I X I11

Appeal of the States Parties to Amended Protocol I1 to the W on the Occasion of the Sixth Annual Conference* We, the States which have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol I1 to the CCW, meeting in Geneva on 17 November 2004 for our Sixth Annual Conference: Bearing in mind the important contribution of Amended Protocol I1 to international efforts to alleviate the suffering caused by certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; Noting that Amended Protocol I1 is the only international legal instrument which covers all types of mines, booby traps and other devices; Having reviewed the operation and status of Amended Protocol 11, in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of Article 13; Having considered the national annual reports presented by States which have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol 11; Welcome the fact that, since the First Annual Conference held in December 1999, 35 more States have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol 11, thus bringing the total number of States which have adhered to this Protocol to 80; Emphasize the importance of achieving the widest possible adherence to Amended Protocol 11; Urge all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to accede to it as soon as possible.


A P P E N D I X IV

Report of Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their ~estruction* Introduction 1. The Final Document of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.V/17), in the section dealing with Decisions and Recommendations, contained the following decision: "The Conference decided, by consensus, as follows: To hold three annual meetings of the States Parties of one week (a) duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on the adoption of necessary national measures to (i) implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; national mechanisms to establish and maintain the (ii) security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; enhancing international capabilities for responding to, (iii) investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; strengthening and broadening national and international (iv) institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of (v) conduct for scientists. All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any (b) conclusions or results by consensus.

Meeting of the States Parties Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a two week meeting of experts. The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of States Parties will be as follows: items i and ii will be considered in 2003; items iii and iv in 2004; item v in 2005. The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Eastern Group, the second by a representative of the Group of NonAligned and Other States, and the third by a representative of the Western Group. The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing (d) their work. The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these (e) meetings and decide on any further action." 2. In accordance with the decision of the Fifth Review Conference, the 2003 Meeting of States Parties was convened in Geneva from 10 to 14 November 2003, and was preceded by a Meeting of Experts held in Geneva from 18 to 29 August 2003. The 2003 Meeting of States Parties approved the nomination by the Group of Non-aligned and Other States of Mr. Peter Goosen of South Africa as Chairman of the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties in 2004. The 2003 Meeting of States Parties decided that the 2004 Meeting of Experts would be held in Geneva from 19 to 30 July 2004, and that the 2004 Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva from 6 to 10 December 2004. 3. By resolution 591110, adopted without a vote on 3 December 2004, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the United Nations Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, including all necessary assistance to the annual meetings of the States Parties and the meetings of experts. 4. The 2004 Meeting of Experts convened in Geneva from 19 to 30 July 2004. At its closing meeting on 30 July 2004, the Meeting of Experts adopted by consensus its Report (BWClMSP/2004/MX/3).

(c)

Organization o f the Meeting o f States Parties 5. In accordance with the decisions of the Fifth Review Conference and the 2003 Meeting of States Parties, the 2004 Meeting of States Parties was convened at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 6 to 10 December 2004, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Peter Goosen of South Africa. 6. At its first meeting, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its agenda (BWClMSPl200411) and programme of work (BWC/MSP/200412) as proposed by the Chairman. 7. At the same meeting, following a suggestion by the Chairman, the Meeting of States Parties adopted as its rules of procedure, mutatis mutandis, the rules of + See BWC/MSP/2003/4 (Vol I)

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 procedure of the Fifth Review Conference, as contained in Annex I1 of the Final Document of the Review Conference (BWC/CONF.V/17). 8. Mr. Peter Kolarov, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, was in charge of the BWC issues in the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. Richard Lennane, Political Affairs Officer, served as Secretary of the Meeting of States Parties. Ms. Melissa Hersh and Dr. Piers Millett, Professional Assistants, served in the Secretariat.

Participation at the Meeting of States Parties 9. Eighty-nine States Parties to the Convention participated in the Meeting of States Parties as follows: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen. 10. In addition, five States that had signed the Convention but had not yet ratified it participated in the Meeting of States Parties without taking part in the making of decisions, as provided for in rule 44, paragraph 1 of the rules of procedure: Egypt, Madagascar, Myanmar, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania. 11. Two States, Israel and Kazakhstan, neither Parties nor Signatories to the Convention, participated in the Meeting of States Parties as observers, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 (a). 12. The United Nations, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), attended the Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 3. 13. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) were granted observer status to participate in the Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 4. 14. Fourteen non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the Meeting of States Parties under rule 44, paragraph 5. 15. A list of all participants in the Meeting of States Parties is contained in document BWC/MSP/2004/INF.3.

Meeting of the States Parties Work o f the Meeting o f States Parties 16. The Meeting of States Parties held two public meetings, on 6 and 10 December respectively, and six working sessions between 6 and 10 December 2004. In accordance with the programme of work (BWC/MSP/2004/2), on 6 December the Meeting of States Parties held a general debate in which 28 States Parties made statements. On 7 December, one meeting was devoted to consideration of strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants (agenda item 5), and on 8 December, one meeting was devoted to consideration of enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease (agenda item 6). 17. The Meeting of States Parties was preceded by a Meeting of Experts where measures relevant to the two agenda items were discussed in detail. States Parties noted that the Meeting of Experts was helpful in promoting common understanding and effective action on the agenda items. They stressed the need for undertaking activities at the national and international levels on these two agenda items in accordance with the decision adopted by consensus in the Final Document of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention (BWC/CONF.V/17) in the section dealing with decisions and recommendations. 18. On the mandate to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants, the States Parties recognised that: infectious disease outbreaks can be contained and suppressed (a) through early-detection, immediate response and co-operation and support at the national and international level; strengthening and broadening national and international (b) surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious disease may support the object and purpose of the Convention; the primary responsibility for surveillance, detection, diagnosis (c) and combating of infectious diseases rests with States Parties, while the WHO, FAO and OIE have global responsibilities, within their mandates, in this regard. The respective structures, planning and activities of States Parties and the WHO, FAO and OIE should be co-ordinated with and complement one another; scientific and technological developments have the potential to (d) significantly improve disease surveillance and response.

19. The States Parties consequently agreed on the value of: (a)

supporting the existing networks of relevant international organisations for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases and acting to strengthen the

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 WHO, FAO and OIE programmes, within their mandates, for the continued development and strengthening of, and research into, rapid, effective and reliable activities for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases, including in cases of emergencies of international concern; improving, wherever possible, national and regional disease (b) surveillance capabilities, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States Parties to do the same; working to improve communication on disease surveillance, (c) including with the WHO, FAO and OIE, and among States Parties. 20. On the mandate to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, the States Parties recognised that: capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the (a) effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease promote the object and purpose of the Convention; States Parties' national preparedness and arrangements (b) substantially contribute to international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; the Secretary-General's investigation mechanism, set out in (c) AI441561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution AlRes145157, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. 21. The States Parties consequently agreed on the value of: continuing to develop their own national capacities for response, (a) investigation and mitigation, in cooperation with the relevant international and regional organisations, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States Parties to do the same; the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, the further (b) development of current procedures for the provision of assistance, by those in a position to do so, to States Parties in cases of alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. 22. The States Parties further considered that in pursuing the above understandings and actions, States Parties could, according to their respective circumstances, consider the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions made by delegations on the topics under discussion at the Meeting

Meeting of the States Parties of Experts, as contained in the Annex I1 of the Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWC/MSP/2004/MX/3), as well as the synthesis of these considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals contained in BWC/MSP/2004/L.l, which are attached to this report as Annexes II and 111. These annexes were not discussed or agreed upon and consequently have no status. 23. States Parties are encouraged to inform the Sixth Review Conference of, inter alia, any actions, measures or other steps that they may have taken on the basis of the discussi~nsat the 2004 Meeting of Experts and of the outcome of the 2004 Meeting of States Parties in order to facilitate the Sixth Review Conference's consideration of the work undertaken at the meetings in 2004 and of a decision on any further action in accordance with paragraph 18 (e) of the decision adopted at the Fifth Review Conference (BWC/CONF.V/17). Documentation 24. A complete list of official documents of the Meeting of States Parties, is contained in Annex I to this Report. All documents on this list are available on the United Nations Official Document System (ODS), accessible on the internet at www.ods.unog.ch. Conclusion of the Meeting of States Parties 25. At its closing meeting on 10 December 2004, the Meeting of States Parties approved the nomination by the Western Group of Ambassador John Freeman of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Chairman of the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties in 2005. The Meeting decided that the Meeting of Experts would be held in Geneva from 13 to 24 June 2005, and that the Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva from 5 to 9 December 2005, in accordance with the decision of the Fifth Review Conference. 26. At the same meeting, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its Report by consensus, as contained in document BWC/MSP/2004/CRP. 1, as orally amended, to be issued as document BWC/MSP/2004/3.

APPENDIX V

Towards a Mine-Free World: The 2004 Nairobi ~eclaration* 1. Seven years ago today, representatives of states -joined by international organizations and civil society - gathered in Ottawa to sign the Convention banning anti-personnel mines. In its short history the Convention has become the framework to pursue a conclusive end to the suffering caused by those mines. Today, we, the high representatives of States Parties to the Convention again have gathered in the presence of the global public conscience here at the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World. We do so to mark our accomplishments, to take stock of our remaining challenges and to recommit ourselves to ending the scourge of anti-personnel mines.

We celebrate the tremendous advances made towards our common goal of forever ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines: 2. One-hundred-forty-four states have joined this endeavour and have established a powerful international norm that is recognized, in words and actions, well beyond the Convention's membership. Whereas anti-personnel mines were until recently in widespread use, their production has decreased dramatically, trade in this weapon has virtually ceased and their deployment is now rare. The number of new victims has fallen significantly and more of those who have survived are receiving assistance. Major strides have been made in clearing mined areas. And together we have destroyed more than 37 million stockpiled mines. These achievements have been fuelled by a unique spirit of cooperation between states, international organizations and civil society - a partnership that has become an example and inspiration for addressing other humanitarian, development and disarmament challenges.

While great progress has been made, we are prepared to address the remaining challenges: 3. We remain gravely troubled that anti-personnel mines continue to kill or maim, adding new victims to the hundreds of thousands of landmine survivors requiring life-long care. The presence of mines still blocks the return of displaced persons, hinders the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals that we have pledged to meet, and impedes states and peoples from building confidence between one another. Much more is required to ensure that mined areas are cleared by the Convention's deadlines, that mine victims receive the needed care, and that all other promises of this Convention are fulfilled. And we call upon those states that have not joined our efforts, and in particular those that possess vast stocks of anti-

Towards a Mine Free World personnel mines or continue to use this insidious weapon, to adhere to the Convention without delay.

We renew our unwavering commitment to achieving the goal of a world free of anti-personnel mines, in which there will be zero new victims: 4. We will strengthen our efforts to clear mined areas and destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with our time-bound obligations. We will assist mine victims and we will vigorously promote the universal acceptance of the Convention. Together as representatives of both mine-affected states and those spared this scourge, we pledge to work in partnership, fulfilling our shared responsibility to provide the required human, technical and financial resources. We will condemn any use of anti-personnel mines by any actor. And we shall persevere until this unique Convention has been universally applied and its aims fully achieved.

A P P E N D I X V1

Texts of disarmament resolutions and decisions Resolution 59/59 Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe

The General Assembly, Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, Recalling also the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Recalling further its previous resolutions on the subject, including resolution 57/52 of 22 November 2002, Welcoming with appreciation the increased cooperation among countries in the region of South-Eastern Europe on issues related to security, economy, trade, transport, cross-border cooperation, human rights and justice and home affairs, Reiterating the importance of the South-East European Cooperation Process for further enhancing regional cooperation and stability, which constitutes one of the main elements of the Stabilization and Association Process, and welcoming the positive results of the South-East European Cooperation Process summit meeting, held in Sarajevo on 21 April 2004, Welcoming the conclusions reached at the Summit of the European Council, held in Thessaloniki, Greece, on 19 and 20 June 2003, and the decisions of the European Council on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnerships with all countries of the Stabilization and Association Process, Noting the progress made by the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process in fulfilling the criteria for membership in the European Union and, in this context, the first entry into force of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, as well as Croatia's becoming a candidate country for membership in the European Union, Emphasizing the crucial importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 on Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, and stressing, inter alia, the role and responsibility of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union, and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its Kosovo Force in that regard, Reaffirming the validity of the Agreement for the delineation of the borderline between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions signed in Skopje on 23 February 2001, and encouraging the parties to cooperate in its timely implementation, Noting the importance of the Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, held in Ohrid, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on 22 and 23 May 2003, Emphasizing the crucial importance of strengthening regional efforts in SouthEastern Europe on arms control, demining, disarmament and confidence-building measures and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and concerned that, in spite of ongoing efforts, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects persists in some parts of the region, Affirming its support for all regional initiatives on combating the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, including the activities undertaken at the national level for their collection and destruction, Mindful of the importance of national, regional and international activities of all relevant organizations aimed at the creation of peace, security, stability, democracy, cooperation and economic development and the observance of human rights and good-neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe, Reaffirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, 1. Reaffirms the need for full observance of the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Calls upon all States, the relevant international organizations and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to respect the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States and the inviolability of international borders, to continue to take measures in accordance with the Charter and the commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and through further development of regional arrangements, as appropriate, to eliminate threats to international peace and security and to help to prevent conflicts in South-Eastern Europe, which can lead to the violent disintegration of States; 3. Acknowledges the positive results achieved so far by the countries of the region, urges them to invest further efforts in consolidating South-Eastern Europe as a region of peace, security, stability, democracy, the rule of law, cooperation and economic development and for the promotion of good-neighbourliness and the observance of human rights, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and enhancing the prospects for sustained development and prosperity for all peoples in the region as an integral part of Europe, and recognizes the role of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union in successfully promoting regional disarmament; 4. Calls upon all participants in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, as well as all concerned international organizations, to continue to s u p ~ o r the t efforts of the States of South-Eastern Europe towards regional stability and cooperation so as to enable them to pursue sustainable development and integration into European structures, taking also into account trans-Atlantic relations; 5. Calls upon all States and relevant international organizations to contribute to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), on Kosovo,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Serbia and Montenegro, as well as of Council resolutions 1345 (2001) of 21 March 200 1 and 1371 (2001) of 26 September 2001, and emphasizes the importance of the standards review process, of the implementation of the "Standards for Kosovo" document endorsed by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 12 December 2003 and of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan of 31 March 2004; 6. Recognizes the efforts made and activities undertaken in Kosovo by the United Nations and the Kosovo Force for the establishment of a multi-ethnic and stable Kosovo, thus contributing to a further improvement of the overall security situation in the region; 7. Rejects the use of violence in pursuit of political aims, and stresses that only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future for SouthEastern Europe; 8. Stresses the importance of good-neighbourliness and the development of friendly relations among States, and calls upon all States to resolve their disputes with other States by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter; 9. Urges the strengthening of relations among the States of South-Eastern Europe on the basis of respect for international law and agreements, in accordance with the principles of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect; 10. Recognizes the efforts of the international community, and welcomes in particular the assistance already provided by the European Union and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, as well as other contributors, in promoting the longterm process of democratic and economic development of the region; 11. Calls upon all States to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 to bring all at-large indictees to surrender to the Tribunal in line with Security Council resolutions 1503 (2003) of 28 August 2003 and 1534 (2004) of 26 March 2004; 12. Stresses the importance of enhanced regional cooperation for the development of the South-Eastern European States in the priority areas of infrastructure, transport, trade, energy and environment, as well as in other areas of common interest; 13. Also stresses that the rapprochement of the South-Eastern European States with the European Union will favourably influence the security, political and economic situation in the region, as well as good-neighbourly relations among the States; 14. Emphasizes the importance of continuous regional efforts and intensified dialogue in South-Eastern Europe aimed at arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures, as well as strengthening cooperation and undertaking appropriate measures at the national, subregional and regional levels against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent all acts of terrorism; 15. Recognizes the seriousness of the problem of anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war in some parts of South-Eastern Europe, welcomes in this

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions context the efforts of the countries in the region and of the international community in support of mine action, and encourages States to join and support these efforts; 16. Urges all States to take effective measures against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to help programmes and projects aimed at the collection and safe destruction of surplus stocks of small arms and light weapons, and stresses the importance of closer cooperation among States, inter alia, in crime prevention, combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organized crime and corruption, drug trafficking and money-laundering; 17. Calls upon all States and the relevant international organizations to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the subject of the present resolution; 18. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe".

Resolution 59/60 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification The General Assembly, Noting the critical importance of and the vital contribution that has been made by effective verification measures in non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other similar obligations, Reaffirming its support for the sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission, Recalling its resolutions 401152 0 of 16 December 1985,41186 Q of 4 December 1986, 42/42 F of 30 November 1987, 43/81 B of 7 December 1988, 45/65 of 4 December 1990,47145 of 9 December 1992,48168 of 16 December 1993,50161 of 12 December 1995, 52/31 of 9 December 1997, 54/46 of 1 December 1999 and 56115 of 29 November 2001, as well as its decision 5815 15 of 8 December 2003, Recalling also the reports of the Secretary-General of l l July 1986, 28 August 1990, 16 September 1992, 26 July 1993, 22 September 1995, 6 August 1997, 9 July 1999, 10 September 2001 and 10 July 2003, and the addenda thereto, 1. Reaffirms the critical importance of and the vital contribution that has been made by effective verification measures in non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other similar obligations; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on further views received from Member States; 3. Also requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of government experts to be established in 2006 on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, and to transmit the report of the panel of experts to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-first session;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

Resolution 59/61 Developments in the field of information and telecommunicationsin the context of international security

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 53/70 of 4 December 1998, 54/49 of 1 December 1999, 55/28 of 20 November 2000, 56/19 of 29 November 2001, 57/53 of 22 November 2002 and 58/32 of 8 December 2003, Recalling also its resolutions on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, in which, inter alia, it recognized that scientific and technological developments could have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be maintained and encouraged, Noting that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and applying the latest information technologies and means of telecommunication, Affirming that it sees in this process the broadest positive opportunities for the further development of civilization, the expansion of opportunities for cooperation for the common good of all States, the enhancement of the creative potential of humankind and additional improvements in the circulation of information in the global community, Recalling, in this connection, the approaches and principles outlined at the Information Society and Development Conference, held in Midrand, South Africa, from 13 to 15 May 1996, Bearing in mind the results of the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, held in Paris on 30 July 1996, and the recommendations that it made, Noting that the dissemination and use of information technologies and means affect the interests of the entire international community and that optimum effectiveness is enhanced by broad international cooperation, Expressing its concern that these technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their security in both civil and military fields, Considering that it is necessary to prevent the use of information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes, Noting the contribution of those Member States that have submitted their assessments on issues of information security to the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of resolutions 53/70, 54/49, 55/28, 56119, 57/53 and 58/32, Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General containing those assessments, Welcoming the initiative taken by the Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in convening an international meeting of experts in

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Geneva in August 1999 on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, as well as its results, Considering that the assessments of the Member States contained in the reports of the Secretary-General and the international meeting of experts have contributed to a better understanding of the substance of issues of international information security and related notions, 1. Calls upon Member States to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information; 2. Considers that the purpose of such measures could be served through the examination of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems: 3. Invites all Mernber States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions: General appreciation of the issues of information security; (a) Definition of basic notions related to information security, (b) including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 above; (c) 4. Notes with satisfaction that the Secretary-General is considering existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, and is conducting a study on the concepts referred to in paragraph 2 above, with the assistance of the group of governmental experts, established in 2004 pursuant to resolution 58/32, and will submit a report on the outcome of the study to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 5. Also notes with satisfaction that the group of governmental experts established by the Secretary-General held its first session from 12 to 16 July 2004 in New York and that it intends to convene two more sessions in 2005 to fulfil its mandate specified in resolution 58/32; 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security".

Resolution 59/62 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament The General Assembly, Recognizing tha.t scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged, Concerned that military applications of scientific and technological developments can contribute significantly to the improvement and upgrading of advanced weapons systems and, in particular, weapons of mass destruction,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Aware of the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on international security and disarmament, and to channel scientific and technological developments for beneficial purposes, Cognizant that international transfers of dual-use as well as high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are important for the economic and social development of States, Also cognizant of the need to regulate such transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications through multilaterally negotiated, universally applicable, non-discriminatory guidelines, Expressing its concern about the growing proliferation of ad hoc and exclusive export control regimes and arrangements for dual use goods and technologies, which tend to impede the economic and social development of developing countries, Recalling that in the Final Document of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Kuala Lumpur from 20 to 25 February 2003, and in the Final Document of the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 17 to 19 August 2004, it was again noted with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persisted, Emphasizing that internationally negotiated guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account the legitimate defence requirements of all States and the requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that access to high-technology products and services and know-how for peaceful purposes is not denied, 1. Affirms that scientific and technological progress should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security, and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes should be promoted; 2. Invites Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States; 3. Urges Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, nondiscriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications; 4. Encourages United Nations bodies to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Resolution 59/63 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of l 1 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978,34177 of 11 December 1979, 351147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983,39154 of 12 December 1984,40182 of 12 December 1985,41148 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 441108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50166 of 12 December 1995, 51/41 of 10 December 1996,52134 of 9 December 1997,53174 of 4 December 1998, 54/51 of 1 December 1999, 55/30 of 20 November 2000, 56/21 of 29 November 2001, 57/55 of 22 November 2002 and 58/34 of 8 December 2003 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, Emphasizingthe basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate, Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities, Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirtyfifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region, Recognizing the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone, Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone, Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 58/34, 1. Urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; 3. Takes note of resolution GC(48)/RES/16, adopted on 24 September 2004 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-eighth regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East; 4. Notes the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone; 5. Invites all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclearweapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,l and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council; 6. Also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; 7. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution; 8. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General; 9. Invites all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East; 10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters 111and IV of the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990 or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; 11. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution; 12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Resolution 59/64 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly, Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples, Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization, Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament, Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war, Determined to abide strictly by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force, Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of nonnuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter, Recognizing that effective measures and arrangements to assure non-nuclearweapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapms, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the report of the Conference on its 1992 session, Recalling also paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure NonNuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this question, Taking note of the proposals submitted under the item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention, Taking note also of the relevant decision of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Kuala Lumpur from 20 to 25 February 2003, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Taking note further of the unilateral declarations made by all the nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States, Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all, Taking note of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views expressed on it, Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991, 47150 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15 December 1994, 50168 of 12 December 1995,51143 of 10 December 1996,52136 of 9 December 1997,53175 of 4 December 1998, 54/52 of 1 December 1999, 55/31 of 20 November 2000,56122 of 29 November 2001, 57/56 of 22 November 2002 and 58/35 of 8 December 2003, 1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; 2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions the difficulties with regard to evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out; 3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; 4. Recommends that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be explored further in order to overcome the difficulties; 5. Also recommends that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective; 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclearweapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Resolution 59/65 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, Reaffirming also the provisions of articles I11 and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities, Reaffirming paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty, Recalling its previous resolutions on this issue, and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recognizing that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security, Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space, Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness, Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions, Noting also that there were no objections in principle in the Conference on Disarmament to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, subject to reexamination of the mandate contained in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament of 13 February 1992, Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from those efforts as soon as possible, Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space, Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community, Recalling, in this context, its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, 47/51 of 9 December 1992 and 48/74 A of 16 December 1993, in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as a means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Conscious of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field, Recognizing that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements, 1. Reaffirms the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; 2. Reaffirms its recognition, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that the regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness and that it is important to comply strictly with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral; 3. Emphasizes the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space; 4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation; 5. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; 6. Invjtes the Conference on Disarmament to complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 19924 and to establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible during its 2005 session; 7. Recognizes, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space; 8. Urges States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the matter, if any, so as to facilitate its work; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Resolution 59/66 National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dualuse goods and technology

The General Assembly, Recognizing that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling that effective national control of the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology, including those transfers that could contribute to proliferation activities, is an important tool for achieving those objectives, Recalling also that the States parties to the international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties have undertaken to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of materials, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of those treaties,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Considering that the exchange of national legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology contributes to mutual understanding and confidence among Member States, Convinced that such an exchange would be beneficial to Member States that are in the process of developing such legislation, Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Invites Member States that are in a position to do so, without prejudice to the provisions contained in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, while ensuring that such legislation, regulations and procedures are consistent with the obligations of States parties under international treaties; 2. Encourages Member States to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to the Secretary-General on their national legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology, as well as the changes therein, and requests the Secretary-General to make this information accessible to Member States; 3. Decides to remain attentive to the matter. Resolution 59/67 Missiles

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 54/54 F of lDecember 1999, 55/33 A of 20 November 2000, 56/24 B of 29 November 2001, 57/71 of 22 November 2002 and 58/37 of 8 December 2003,

Reaffirming the role of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps to strengthen that role, Realizing the need to promote regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments, Convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, as a contribution to international peace and security, Bearing in mind that the security concerns of Member States at the international and regional levels should be taken into consideration in addressing the issue of missiles, Underlining the complexities involved in considering the issue of missiles in the conventional context, Expressing its support for the international efforts against the development and proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, Considering that the Secretary-General, in response to resolution 58/37, established in 2004 a Panel of Governmental Experts, which had a comprehensive, in-depth exchange of views on the issue of missiles in all its aspects,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, in which he stated that given the complexity of the issues at hand, no consensus had been reached on the preparation of a final report by the Panel, 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies from Member States on the report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, submitted pursuant to resolution 58/37; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the support of qualified consultants and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as appropriate, taking into account the views expressed by Member States, to contribute to the United Nations endeavour to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects, by identifying areas where consensus can be reached, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session; 3. Also requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to be established in 2007 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to further explore further ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus can be reached, and to submit a report for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixty-third session; 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Missiles". Resolution 59/68 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 50170 M of 12 December 1995, 51/45 E of 10 December 1996, 52/38 E of 9 December 1997, 53/77 J of 4 December 1998, 54/54 S of 1 December 1999, 55/33 K of 20 November 2000, 56/24 F of 29 November 2001, 57/64 of 22 November 2002 and 58/45 of 8 December 2003, Emphasizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements, Recognizing that it is necessary to take duly into account the agreements adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, as well as prior relevant agreements, in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, Mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, 1. Reaffirms that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation and that all States, through their actions, should contribute fully to ensuring compliance with the aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties; 2. Calls upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development; 3. Welcomes the information provided by Member States on the implementation of the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution; 4. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report containing this information to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control".

Resolution 59/69 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation The General Assembly, Determined to foster strict respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling its resolution 56/24 T of 29 November 2001 on multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism and other relevant resolutions, as well as its resolutions 57/63 of 22 November 2002 and 58/44 of 8 December 2003 on promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, Recalling also the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, as enshrined in the Charter, Recalling further the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which states, inter alia, that the responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally and that, as the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role, Convinced that, in the globalization era and with the information revolution, arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament problems are more than ever the concern of all countries in the world, which are affected in one way or another by these problems and, therefore, should have the possibility to participate in the negotiations that arise to tackle them,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Bearing in mind the existence of a broad structure of disarmament and arms regulation agreements resulting from non-discriminatory and transparent multilateral negotiations with the participation of a large number of countries, regardless of their size and power, Aware of the need to advance further in the field of arms regulation, nonproliferation and disarmament on the basis of universal, multilateral, nondiscriminatory and transparent negotiations with the goal of reaching general and complete disarmament under strict international control, Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament, Recognizing also that the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, are among the most immediate threats to international peace and security which need to be dealt with, with the highest priority, Considering that the multilateral disarmament agreements provide the mechanism for States parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, the provisions of the agreements and that such consultations and cooperation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter, Stressing that international cooperation, the peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue and confidence-building measures would contribute essentially to the creation of multilateral and bilateral friendly relations among peoples and nations, Concerned at the continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament, and recognizing that a resort to unilateral actions by Member States in resolving their security concerns would jeopardize international peace and security and undermine confidence in the international security system as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself, Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations, 1. Reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope; 2. Also reaffirmsmultilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns; 3. Urges the participation of all interested States in multilateral negotiations on arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner; 4. Underlines the importance of preserving the existing agreements on arms regulation and disarmament, which constitute an expression of the results of international cooperation and multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges facing mankind; 5. Calls once again upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation; 6. Requests the States parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in those instruments, and to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another to resolve their concerns; 7. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies of Member States on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, submitted pursuant to resolution 58/44; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation".

Resolution 59/70 Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol The General Assembly, Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 57/62 of 22 November 2002 Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions, Emphasizing the necessity of easing international tension and strengthening trust and confidence between States, Welcoming the recent initiatives by three more States Parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 1. Takes note of the note by the Secretary-General; 2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions; 3. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

Resolution 59/71 Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 49/75 I of 15 December 1994, 50170 F of 12 December 1995, 51/45 C of 10 December 1996, 52/38 F of 9 December 1997, 53/77 AA of 4 December 1998, 54/54 U of 1 December 1999, 55/33 M of 20 November 2000, 56/24 D of 29 November 2001 and 57/61 of 22 November 2002 and its decision 581521 of 8 December 2003, Recalling also that, there being a consensus to do so in each case, three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, Bearing in mind also the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, Taking note of paragraph 98 of the Final Document of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Kuala Lumpur from 20 to 25 February 2003, and paragraph 91 of the Final Document of the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 17 to 19 August 2004, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons, Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted by the heads of State and Government during the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, held in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, in which they resolved "to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers", Reiterating its conviction that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can set the future course of action in the fields of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and related international security matters, Emphasizing the importance of multilateralism in the process of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and related international security matters, Taking note of the report of the Open-ended Working Group to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 1. Decides to establish an open-ended working group, working on the basis of consensus, to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, taking note of the paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group I1 during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission and the written proposals and views submitted by Member States as contained in the working papers presented during the three substantive sessions of the Open-ended Working Group in 2003, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General regarding the views of Member States on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; 2. Requests the Open-ended Working Group to hold an organizational session in order to set the dates for its substantive sessions in 2006, and to submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly; 3. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to provide the Open-ended Working Group with the necessary assistance and services as may be required to discharge its tasks; 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

Resolution 59/72 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly, Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject of chemical weapons, in particular resolution 58/52 of 8 December 2003, adopted without a vote, in which it noted with appreciation the ongoing work to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction, Noting with satisfaction that, since the adoption of resolution 58/52, nine additional States have ratified the Convention or acceded to it, bringing the total number of States parties to the Convention to one hundred and sixty-seven, Reaffirming the importance of the outcome of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the Political Declaration, in which the States parties reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the objective and purpose of the Convention, and the

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions final report, which addressed all aspects of the Convention and made important recommendations on its continued implementation, 1. Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction1 is fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose, and acknowledges progress made in the implementation of the action plan for the universality of the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay; Underlines that the Convention and its implementation contribute to 2. enhancing international peace and security, and emphasizes that its full, universal and effective implementation will contribute further to that purpose by excluding completely, for the sake of all humankind, the possibility of the use of chemical weapons; 3. Stresses that the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention is in itself an important contribution to the efforts of the United Nations in the global fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; 4. Also stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities, including previously declared possessor States, should be among the States parties to the Convention, and welcomes progress to that end; 5. Notes that the effective application of the verification system builds confidence in compliance with the Convention by States parties; 6 . Stresses the importance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Convention as well as in promoting the timely and efficient accomplishment of all its objectives; 7. Urges all States parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities; 8. Reaffirms the undertaking of the States parties to foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities of the States parties and the importance of that cooperation and its contribution to the promotion of the Convention as a whole; 9. Notes with appreciation the ongoing work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the full implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties, and also notes with appreciation progress made in the implementation of the plan of action regarding the implementation of article V11 obligations; 10. Welcomes the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons within the framework of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction". Resolution 59173 Mongolia's international security a n d nuclear-weapon-free status

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 53/77 D of 4 December 1998, 55/33 S of 20 November 2000 and 57/67 of 22 November 2002, Recalling also the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Bearing in mind its resolution 49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection and security of small States, Proceeding from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means of ensuring the national security of States, Convinced that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia's security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance, Taking note of the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining and regulating its nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete step towards promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation, Bearing in mind the joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States on security assurances to Mongolia in connection with its nuclear-weapon-free status as a contribution to implementing resolution 53/77 D as well as their commitment to Mongolia to cooperate in the implementation of the resolution, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, Noting that the joint statement has been transmitted to the Security Council by the five nuclear-weapon States, Mindful that at the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Kuala Lumpur, from 20 to 25 February 2003, the heads of State or Government reiterated their support for Mongolia's nuclear-weaponfree status and considered that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the region, Noting other measures taken to implement resolution 57/67 at the national and international levels, Welcoming Mongolia's active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status, 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 57/67;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts to implement resolution 57/67, in particular the completion of the two studies on the non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia's international security; 3. Endorses and supports Mongolia's good-neighbourly and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability; 4. Welcomes the efforts made by Member States to cooperate with Mongolia in implementing resolution 57/67, as well as the progress made in consolidating Mongolia's international security; 5. Invites Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its independent foreign policy, its economic security, and its ecological balance, as well as its nuclearweapon-free status; 6. Appeals to the Member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support Mongolia's efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements; 7. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph 5 above; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session on the implementation of the present resolution;

Resolution 59/74 Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 58/58 of 8 December 2003 on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, Considering that the illicit proliferation and circulation of and traffic in small arms impede development, constitute a threat to populations and to national and regional security and are a factor contributing to the destabilization of States, Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the illicit proliferation and circulation of and traffic in small arms in the States of the Sahelo Saharan subregion, Noting with satisfaction the conclusions of the United Nations advisory missions dispatched by the Secretary-General to the affected countries of the subregion to study the most appropriate way of halting the illicit circulation of small arms and collecting them, Welcoming the designation of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat as a centre for the coordination of all activities of United Nations bodies concerned with small arms, Congratulating the Secretary-General for his report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and bearing in mind the statement on small arms made by the President of the Security Council on 24 September 1999,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Welcoming the recommendations resulting from the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers, Bamako, Yamoussoukro and Niamey to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security, Wefcomingalso the decision taken by the Economic Community of West African States to renew the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, adopted by the heads of State and Government of the Economic Community at Abuja on 31 October 1998, Recalling the Algiers Declaration adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty fifth ordinary session, held at Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999, Emphasizing the need to advance efforts towards wider cooperation and better coordination in the struggle against the illicit proliferation of small arms through the common understanding reached at the meeting on small arms held at Oslo on 13 and 14 July 1998 and the Brussels Call for Action adopted by the International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development, held at Brussels on 12 and 13 October 1998, Bearing in mind the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted at Bamako on 1 December 2000, Recalling the millennium report of the Secretary-General, Welcoming the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and calling for its expeditious implementation, Recognizing the important role that the organizations of civil society play in detection, prevention and raising public awareness, in efforts to curb the illicit traffic in small arms, Welcoming the convening of the Open ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, which held its first session in New York from 14 to 25 June 2004, 1. Notes with satisfaction the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, held at Abuja on 8 and 9 May 2000, and encourages the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in the context of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1994 and the recommendations of the United Nations advisory missions, aimed at curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and collecting such arms in the affected States that so request, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the African Union; 2. Encourages the international community to support the implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa; 3. Encourages the establishment in the countries of the Sahelo Saharan subregion of national commissions to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions and invites the international community to lend its support wherever possible to ensure the smooth functioning of the commissions; 4. Also encourages the involvement of organizations and associations of civil society in the efforts of the national commissions to combat the illicit traffic in small arms and their participation in the implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa as well as in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; 5. Further encourages cooperation among State organs, international organizations and civil society in combating the illicit traffic in small arms and supporting operations to collect the said arms in the subregions; 6. Calls upon the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil organizations to take action to combat the illicit trade in small arms; 7. Takes note of the conclusions of the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Economic Community of West African States, held at Bamako on 24 and 25 March 1999, on the modalities for the implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development, and welcomes the adoption by the meeting of a plan of action; 8. Takes note also of the conclusions of the African Conference on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms: Needs and Partnerships, held at Pretoria from 18 to 2 1 March 2002; 9. Invites the Secretary-General and those States and organizations that are in a position to do so to provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them; 10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to consider the matter and to report to the General Assembly at its sixtiethsession on the implementation of the present resolution; 11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them".

Resolution 59/95 Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 58/51 of 8 December 2003, and mindful of the upcoming 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Expressing its grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used and at the lack of implementation of binding obligations and agreed steps towards nuclear disarmament, and reaffirming that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recalling the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments made under article V1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and noting that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 1. Calls upon all States to comply fully with commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race; 2. Also calls upon all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; 3. Calls upon all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 4. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies; 5. Agrees urgently to strengthen efforts towards both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the resumption in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, as well as the completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification; 6 . Calls for the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament; 7. Underlines the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification capabilities; 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session an item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Resolution 59/76 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 49/75 H of 15 December 1994, 50170 C of 12 December 1995, 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, 52/38 K of 9 December 1997, 53/77 U of 4

December 1998, 54/54 D of 1 December 1999, 55/33 R of 20 November 2000, 56/24 N of 29 November 2001, 57/78 of 22 November 2002 and 58/59 of 8 December 2003, Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other, Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including that caused by proliferation networks, Welcoming the decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, announced on 19 December 2003, to renounce all its weapons of mass destruction programmes, Welcoming also the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004 as an important step for global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war and nuclear terrorism, Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear nonproliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, Bearing in mind that challenges to the Treaty and to the nuclear non-proliferation regime have further increased the necessity of full compliance and that the Treaty can fulfil its role only if there is confidence in compliance by all States parties, Recognizing the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in the reduction of their nuclear weapons unilaterally or through their negotiations, including the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and the efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by the international community, Welcoming the ongoing efforts aimed at the reduction of nuclear-weaponsrelated materials deployed within the framework of international cooperation, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, Reaffirming the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace and security, Welcoming the continuation of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions since the last nuclear tests, in 1998, Welcoming also the successful adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and stressing the importance of implementing its conclusions,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recognizing the active discussions at the third session, held from 26 April to 7 May 2004, of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and emphasizing the importance of a successful Review Conference in 2005, the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings, Welcoming the steady increase in the number of States that have signed andlor concluded additional protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements in recent years, and sharing the hope that the Agency's safeguards system will be further strengthened through the universalization of safeguards agreements and the additional protocols, Encouraging the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States, Welcoming the Final Declaration of the third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in Vienna from 3 to 5 September 2003 in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty, and the Joint Ministerial Statement of the second meeting of Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2004, Encouraging all States to make maximum efforts to bring about the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, progress on which would contribute to a positive outcome of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Recognizing the importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or related materials, radioactive materials, equipment and technology, and underlining the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard, Stressing the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations and of efforts to tackle the current non-proliferation and disarmament problems, 1. Reaffirms the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons1 and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions; 2. Also reaffirmsthe importance for all States parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty; 3. Stresses the central importance of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article V1 of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, (a) without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

6'

(g)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty; The establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2005 session to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2005 session in the context of establishing a programme of work; The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures; An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article V1 of the Treaty; Deep reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international security; Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: Further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to (i) continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States (ii) with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article V1 of the Treaty and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmame~t;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 (iii)

The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process:

(iv)

Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

(v)

(vi)

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control; 4. Recognizes that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process of working towards achieving their elimination; 5. Invites the nuclear-weapon States to keep the Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament; 6. Encourages all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to make maximum efforts for a successful Review Conference in 2005; 7. Welcomes the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials, and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes; 8. Stresses the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regimes, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world; 9. Calls upon all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons, while ensuring that such policies are consistent with the obligations of States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (h)

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions 10. Also calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists; 11. Welcomes the adoption of resolution GC (48)/RES/14 on 24 September 2004 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which it is recommended that States members of the Agency continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22 September 2000 by the General Conference of the Agency, and in the Agency's updated plan of action of February 2004, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution; 12. Encourages all States to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session, and voluntarily to share information on efforts they have been undertaking to that end; 13. Encourages the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Resolution 59/77 Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat, and its resolutions 50170 P of 12 December 1995, 51/45 0 of 10 December 1996, 52/38 L of 9 December 1997, 53/77 X of 4 December 1998, 54/54 P of 1 December 1999, 55/33 T of 20 November 2000, 56/24 R of 29 November 2001, 57/79 of 22 November 2002 and 58/56 of 8 December 2003 on nuclear disarmament, Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world, Bearing in mind that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993 have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recognizing that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressing the need to take concrete practical steps towards achieving this goal, Bearing in mind paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time, Reaffirming the conviction of the States parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the Treaty is a cornerstone of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament and the importance of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on the extension of the Treaty5 and the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Stressing the importance of the thirteen steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as agreed to by the States parties in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community, Reiterating its call for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty, Stressing the importance of the forthcoming 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the need for a positive and substantive outcome of the Conference in a manner that will preserve the integrity of the three pillars of the Treaty regime, that is, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Noting with appreciation the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties, Noting wi'th appreciation the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") between the United States of America and the Russian Federation as a significant step towards reducing their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, while calling for further irreversible deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, Noting with appreciation also the unilateral measures taken by the nuclearweapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to take further such measures,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect, Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date, Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996, and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, Mindful of paragraph 74 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of NonAligned Countries, held at Kuala Lumpur from 20 to 25 February 2003, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, Recalling paragraph 61 of the Final Document of the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 17 to 19 August 2004, Reaffirming the specific mandate conferred by the General Assembly in its decision 52/492 of 8 September 1998 upon the Disarmament Commission to discuss the subject of nuclear disarmament as one of its main substantive agenda items, Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which heads of State and Government resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should refrain from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in settling their disputes in international relations, Seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it, l . Recognizes that, in view of recent political developn~ents,the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of these weapons; 2. Reaffirmsthat nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the two processes must go

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 hand in hand and that there is a genuine need for a systematic and progressive process of nuclear disarmament; 3. Welcomes and encourages the efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, which is an effective measure for limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons geographically and contributes to the cause of nuclear disarmament; 4. Recognizes that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total. elimination; 5. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; 6. Also urges the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-aIert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems; 7. Reiterates its call upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-bystep reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons; 8. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon States; 9. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament; 10. Underlines the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures; 11. Underscores the importance of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclearweapon States, in the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 24 April to 19 May 2000, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article V1 of the Treaty, and the reaffirmation by the States parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; 12. Calls for the full and effective implementation of the thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions 13. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to carry out further reductions of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; 14. Calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein; 15. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years; 16. Calls for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; 17. Also calls for the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; 18. Expresses its regret that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at its 2004 session, as called for in General Assembly resolution 58/56; 19. Reiterates its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2005 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons; 20. Calls for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament; 21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution; 22. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament". Resolution 59/78 Relationship between disarmament and development The General Assembly, Recalling that the Charter of the United Nations envisages the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Recalling also the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, as well as the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Recalling further its resolutions 49/75 J of 15 December 1994, 50170 G of 12 December 1995, 51/45 D of 10 December 1996, 52/38 D of 9 December 1997, 53/77 K of 4 December 1998,54154 T of 1 December 1999, 55/33 L of 20 November 2000,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 56/24 E of 29 November 2001 and 57/65 of 22 November 2002, and its decision 581520 of 8 December 2003, Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, and the Final Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cartagena, Colombia, on 8 and 9 April 2000, Mindful of the changes in international relations that have taken place since the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, including the development agenda that has emerged over the past decade, Bearing in mind the new challenges for the international community in the field of development, poverty eradication and the elimination of the diseases that afflict humanity, Stressing the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in this connection, and concerned at increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs, 1. Welcomes the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development and its reappraisal of this significant issue in the current international context; 2. Stresses the central role of the United Nations in the disarmamentdevelopment relationship, and requests the Secretary-General to strengthen further the role of the Organization in this field, in particular the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development, in order to assure continued and effective coordination and close cooperation between the relevant United Nations departments, agencies and sub-agencies; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development; 4. Urges the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever widening gap between developed and developing countries; 5. Encourages the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to make reference to the contribution that disarmament could provide in meeting them when it reviews its progress towards this purpose in 2005, as well as to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities; 6. Encourages the relevant regional and subregional organizations and institutions, non-governmental organizations and research institutes to incorporate issues related to the relationship between disarmament and development in their

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions agendas and, in this regard, to take into account the report of the Group of Governmental Experts; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

Resolution 59/79 Reducing nuclear danger

The General Assembly, Bearing in mind that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization, Reaffirming that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, Convinced also that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war, Considering that, until nuclear weapons cease to exist, it is imperative on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures that assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Considering also that the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons carries unacceptable risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, which would have catastrophic consequences for all mankind, Emphasizing the imperative need to adopt measures to avoid accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incidents arising from computer anomaly or other technical malfunctions, Conscious that limited steps relating to detargeting have been taken by the nuclear-weapon States and that further practical, realistic and mutually reinforcing steps are necessary to contribute to the improvement in the international climate for negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, Mindful that reduction of tensions brought about by a change in nuclear doctrines would positively impact on international peace and security and improve the conditions for the further reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons, Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community, Recalling that in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons it is stated that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, Recalling also the call in the United Nations Millennium Declaration to seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and the resolve to strive

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, 1. Calls for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in this context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons; 2. Requests the five nuclear-weapon States to take measures towards the implementation of paragraph 1 above; 3. Calls upon Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons; 4. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 58/47 of 8 December 2003; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, and also to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold an international conference as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 6 . Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Reducing nuclear danger".

Resolution 59/80 Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 58/48 of 8 December 2003, Recognizing the determination of the international community to combat terrorism, as evident in relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, Deeply concerned by the growing risk of linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and in particular by the fact that terrorists may seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Taking note of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adopted on 28 April 2004, Noting the support expressed in the Final Document of the Thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which was held in Kuala Lumpur from 20 to 25 February 2003, and in the Final Document of the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which was held in Durban, South Africa, from 17 to 19 August 2004, for measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, Noting also that the Group of Eight, the European Union, the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and others have taken into account in

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions their deliberations the dangers posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and the need for international cooperation in combating it, Acknowledging the consideration of issues relating to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Taking note of resolution GC(48)/RES/l l , adopted on 24 September 2004 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-eighth regular session, and the setting up of an Advisory Group on Security in the Agency to advise the Director General on the Agency's activities relating to nuclear security, Taking note also of the report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, Taking note further of the report of the Secretary-General, submitted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 58/48, Mindful of the urgent need for addressing, within the United Nations framework and through international cooperation, this threat to humanity, Emphasizing that progress is urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism, 1. Calls upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 2. Urges all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, and invites them to inform the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, of the measures taken in this regard; 3. Encourages cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in this regard; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction".

Resolution 59181 The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD11547) of l 1 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessationof the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CDl1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 48175 L of 16 December 1993, 53/77 I of 4 December 1998, 55/33 Y of 20 November 2000, 56/24 J of 29 November 2001, 57/80 of 22 November 2002 and 58157 of 8 December 2003, Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, Recalling the 1998 report of the Conference on Disarmament, in which, inter alia, the Conference recorded that, in proceeding to take a decision on this matter, that decision was without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 and that intensive consultations would be pursued to seek the views of the members of the Conference on Disarmament on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, taking into consideration all proposals and views in that respect, 1. Recalls the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 2. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty. Resolution 59/82 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 51/45 N of 10 December 1996, 52/38 G of 9 December 1997, 53177 M of 4 December 1998, 54154 H of 1 December 1999, 55/33 G of 20 November 2000, 56/24 P of 29 November 2001 and 57/81 of 22 November 2002 and its decision 581519 of 8 December 2003, entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures " , Convinced that a comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and security and thus provides a basis for effective post-conflict peace-building; such measures include: collection and responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of weapons obtained through illicit trafficking or illicit manufacture as well as of weapons and ammunition declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions confidence-building measures; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; demining; and conversion, Noting with satisfaction that the international community is more than ever aware of the importance of such practical disarmament measures, especially with regard to the growing problems arising from the excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons, which pose a threat to peace and security and reduce the prospects for economic development in many regions, particularly in post-conflict situations, Stressing that further efforts are needed in order to develop and effectively implement programmes of practical disarmament in affected areas as part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures so as to complement, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on prevention of armed conflict, which, inter alia, refers to the role which the proliferation and the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons play in the context of the build-up and sustaining of conflicts, Taking note of the statement by the President of the Security Council of 31 August 2001 underlining the importance of practical disarmament measures in the context of armed conflicts, and, with regard to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, emphasizing the importance of measures to contain the security risks stemming from the use of illicit small arms and light weapons, Also taking note of the report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and, in particular, the recommendations contained therein, as an important contribution to the consolidation of the peace process through practical disarmament measures, Welcoming the work of the Coordinating Action on Small Arms, which was established by the Secretary-General to bring about a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to this complex and multifaceted global problem and to cooperate with nongovernmental organizations in the implementation of practical disarmament measures, Welcoming also the report of the First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held in New York from 7 to l l July 2003, as well as the convening of the open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons. 1. Stresses the particular relevance of the "Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N", adopted by the Disarmament Commission by consensus at its 1999 substantive session; 2. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, submitted pursuant to resolution 51/45 N, and once again encourages Member States as well as regional arrangements

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 and agencies to lend their support to the implementation of recommendations contained therein; 3. Emphasizes the importance of including in United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions, as appropriate and with the consent of the host State, practical disarmament measures aimed at addressing the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in conjunction with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes aimed at former combatants, with a view to promoting an integrated comprehensive and effective weapons management strategy that would contribute to a sustainable peace-building process; 4. Welcomes the activities undertaken by the Group of Interested States, and invites the Group to continue to analyse lessons learned from previous disarmament and peace-building projects, as well as to promote new practical disarmament measures to consolidate peace, especially as undertaken or designed by affected States themselves, regional and subregional organizations as well as United Nations agencies; 5. Encourages Member States, including the Group of Interested States, to lend their support to the Secretary-General, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, in accordance with Chapter V111 of the Charter of the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations; 6 . Welcomes the synergies within the multi-stakeholder process, including Governments, the United Nations system, regional and subregional organizations and institutions as well as non-governmental organizations in support of practical disarmament measures and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, in particular, inter alia through the Coordinating Action on Small Arms; 7. Thanks the Secretary-General for his report on the implementation of resolution 57/81, taking into consideration the activities of the Group of Interested States in this regard; 8. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and nonproliferation education, as well as his report on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session a report on the implementation of practical disarmament measures, taking into consideration the activities of the Group of Interested States in this regard; 10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures".

Resolution 59/83 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions Recalling its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, 51/45 M of 10 December 1996, 52/38 0 of 9 December 1997, 53/77 W of 4 December 1998, 54/54 Q of l December 1999, 55/33 X of 20 November 2000, 56/24 S of 29 November 2001, 57/85 of 22 November 2002 and 58/46 of 8 December 2003, Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again, Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world, Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article V1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nucleararms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Emphasizing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Recalling the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution 50124.5 of 10 September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the increasing number of States that have signed and ratified the Treaty, Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons, Stressing the importance of strengthening all existing nuclear-related disarmament and arms control and reduction measures, Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference during its 2004 session, Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, Expressing its deep concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of the thirteen steps to implement article V1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Nuclear Weapons agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control, Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996, Taking note of the relevant portions of the report of the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of resolution 58/46, 1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control; 2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination; 3. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its sixtieth session; 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".

Resolution 59184 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 54/54 B of 1 December 1999, 55/33 V of 20 November 2000, 56/24 M of 29 November 2001, 57/74 of 22 November 2002 and 58/53 of 8 December 2003, Reaffirming its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti.-personnel mines, which kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement, Believing it necessary to do the utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to facing the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and to assure their destruction, Wishing to do the utmost in ensuring assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration, of mine victims,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Welcoming the entry into force, on 1 March 1999, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and noting with satisfaction the work undertaken to implement the Convention and the substantial progress made towards addressing the global landmine problem, Recalling the first to fifth meetings of the States parties to the Convention held in Maputo (lggg), Geneva (2000), Managua (2001), Geneva (2002) and Bangkok (2003), and the reaffirmation of a commitment to the total elimination of antipersonnel mines and to pursue, with renewed vigour, efforts to clear mined areas, assist victims, destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines and promote universal adherence to the Convention, Recalling also the preparatory process for the First Review Conference of the Convention, to be held in Nairobi from 29 November to 3 December 2004, and the two preparatory meetings held in Geneva on 13 February and on 28 and 29 June 2004 pursuant to the decisions of the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties, Welcoming the regional seminars that have been held in different parts of the world during 2003 and 2004, which contributed to the exchange of information, experiences and best practices in mine action as well as to preparations for the First Review Conference, and recalling the efforts to enhance cooperation in the regional context and promote synergies between different regions, Noting with interest the increased recognition of the need to integrate mine action into international and national development programmes and strategies, and, in this respect, welcoming the developments since the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties, including the meeting between the President of the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties and the President of the World Bank on 20 September 2004, which contributed to possible partnership between the mine action community and the World Bank, Noting with satisfaction that additional States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of States that have formally accepted the obligations of the Convention to one hundred and forty three, Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization, Noting with regret that anti-personnel mines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and impeding post conflict development, 1. Invites all States that have not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to accede to it without delay; 2. Urges all States that have signed but not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay; 3. Stresses the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 4. Urges all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information as required under article 7 of the Convention in order to promote transparency and compliance with the Convention; 5. Invites all States that have not ratified the Convention or acceded to it to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to make global mine action efforts more effective; 6. Renews its call upon all States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims, mine risk education programmes and the removal of anti-personnel mines and stockpiles throughout the world and the assurance of their destruction; 7. Invites and encourages all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the First Review Conference at the highest possible level and, pending a decision to be taken at the First Review Conference, to maintain the high level of participation in the subsequent meetings of the States parties, including their intersessional work programme; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the next meeting of the States parties, pending a decision to be taken at the First Review Conference, and to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant nongovernmental organizations to attend the meeting as observers; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". Resolution 59/85 Nuclear-weapon-freesouthern hemisphere and adjacent areas

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 51/45 B of 10 December 1996, 52/38 N of 9 December 1997, 53/77 Q of 4 December 1998, 54/54 L of 1 December 1999, 55/33 I of 20 November 2000, 56/24 G of 29 November 2001, 57/73 of 22 November 2002 and 58/49 of 8 December 2003, Recalling also the adoption by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session of a text entitled "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned", Determined to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Determined also to continue to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to the process of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions strengthening international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling the provisions on nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, Stressing the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga,Bangkok and Pelindaba establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the Antarctic Treaty, to, inter alia, achieve a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, Underlining the value of enhancing cooperation among the nuclear-weaponfreezone treaty members by means of mechanisms such as joint meetings of States parties, signatories and observers to those treaties, Welcoming the announcement of the organization of an international conference of States parties signatories to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties in Mexico, in 2005, to support the common goals envisaged in those treaties, Recalling the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1. Welcomes the continued contribution that the Antarctic Treaty7 and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok5 and Pelindaba6 are making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons 2. Also welcomes the ratification by all original parties of the Treaty of Rarotonga, and calls upon eligible States to adhere to the treaty and the protocols thereto; 3. Further welcomes the efforts towards the completion of the ratification process of the Treaty of Pelindaba, and calls upon the States of the region that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the treaty, with the aim of its early entry into force; 4. Calls upon all concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so; 5. Welcomes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia; 6. Affirms its conviction of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, and, with particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, calls upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and to work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons; 7. Calls upon the States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, in order to pursue the common goals envisaged in those treaties and to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 hemisphere and adjacent areas, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies; 8. Welcomes the vigorous efforts being made among States parties and signatories to those treaties to promote their common objectives, and encourages the competent authorities of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties to provide assistance to the States parties and signatories to those treaties so as to facilitate the accomplishment of these goals; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

Resolution 59/86 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, 57/72 of 22 November 2002 and 581241 of 23 December 2003, Emphasizing the importance of early and full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Welcoming the efforts by Member States to submit, on a voluntary basis, national reports on their implementation of the Programme of Action, Noting with satisfaction regional and subregional efforts being undertaken in support of the implementation of the Programme of Action, and commending the progress that has already been made in this regard, Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 58/24 1, Welcoming the convening of the Open ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, which held its first two week substantive session in New York from 14 to 25 June 2004, Welcoming also the broad-based consultations held by the Secretary-General with all Member States, interested regional and subregional organizations, international agencies and experts in the field on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, and noting the report of the Secretary-General in this regard, 1. Decides that the United Nations conference to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects1 shall be held in New York for a period of two weeks, from 26 June to 7 July 2006; 2. Also decides that the preparatory committee for the conference shall hold a two week session in New York from 9 to 20 January 2006, and reiterates that, if necessary, a subsequent session of up to two weeks in duration may be held;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 3. Further decides that the second biennial meeting of States, as stipulated in the Programme of Action, to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action shall be held in New York from 11 to 15 July 2005; 4. Expresses its appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the Chair of the Open ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, encourages the continued active participation of delegations in the remaining sessions of the Open-ended Working Group, and stresses the importance of making every effort to ensure that a positive outcome is achieved by the Openended Working Group; 5. Requests the Secretary-General, while seeking the views of States, to continue to hold broad based consultations, within available financial resources, with all Member States and interested regional and subregional organizations on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, with a view to establishing, after the 2006 review conference and no later than 2007, and after the conclusion of the work of the Open-ended Working Group, a group of governmental experts, appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the outcome of his consultations; 6. Reaffirms the importance of ongoing efforts at the regional and subregional levels in support of the implementation of the Programme of Action, and invites all Member States that have not yet done so to examine the possibility of developing and adopting regional and subregional measures, as appropriate, to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; 7. Continues to encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in its implementation; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis, including national reports, on the implementation by those States of the Programme of Action, and encourages Member States to submit such reports; 9. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution, including any outcome of the work of the Open-ended Working Group; 10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects". Resolution 59/87 Confidence-buildingmeasures in the regional and subregional context The General Assembly,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Guided by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 58/43 of 8 December 2003, Recalling also its resolution 571337 of 3 July 2003, entitled "Prevention of armed conflict", in which it called upon Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means, as set out in Chapter V1 of the Charter, inter alia, by any procedures adopted by the parties, Recalling further the resolutions and guidelines adopted by consensus by the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission relating to confidence-building measures and their implementation at the global, regional and subregional levels, Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the agreement of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, since such measures can contribute to regional stability, Convinced that resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries, Recognizing the need for meaningful dialogue among States concerned to avert conflict, Welcoming the peace processes already initiated by States concerned to resolve their disputes through peaceful means bilaterally or through mediation, inter alia, by third parties, regional organizations or the United Nations, Recognizing that States in some regions have already taken steps towards confidence-building measures at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels in the political and military fields, including arms control and disarmament, and noting that such confidence-building measures have improved peace and security in those regions and contributed to progress in the socio-economic conditions of their people, Concerned that the continuation of disputes among States, particularly in the absence of an effective mechanism to resolve them through peaceful means, may contribute to the arms race and endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and the efforts of the international community to promote arms control and disarmament, 1. Calls upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Reaffirms its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter V1 of the Charter, in particular Article 33, which provides for a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means chosen by the parties; 3. Reaffirms the ways and means regarding confidence- and security-building measures set out in the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1993 session; 4. Calls upon Member States to pursue those ways and means through sustained consultations and dialogue, while at the same time avoiding actions which may hinder or impair such a dialogue;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 5. Urges States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they are party; 6. Emphasizes that the objective of confidence-building measures should be to help strengthen international peace and security and be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armament; 7. Encourages the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures, with the consent and participation of the parties concerned, to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session containing the views of Member States on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context". Resolution 59/88 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 48/75 J of 16 December 1993, 49/75 0 of 15 December 1994, 50170 L of 12 December 1995, 51/45 Q of 10 December 1996, 52/38 Q of 9 December 1997, 53/77 P of 4 December 1998,54154 M of 1 December 1999.55133 P of 20 November 2000, 56/24 I of 29 November 2001, 57/77 of 22 November 2002 and 58/39 of 8 December 2003, Recognizing the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security, Convinced that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts, since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion, Aware that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control, Desirous of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces, Noting with particular interest the initiatives taken in this regard in different regions of the world, in particular the commencement of consultations among a number of Latin American countries and the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia, and recognizing, in the context of this subject, the relevance and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is a cornerstone of European security, Believing that militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Believing also that an important objective of conventional arms control in regions of tension should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression, 1. Decides to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; 2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject; 3. Requests the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels". Resolution 59/89 Regional disarmament

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 45/58 P of 4 December 1990, 46/36 I of 6 December 1991, 47/52 J of 9 December 1992, 48/75 I of 16 December 1993, 49/75 N of 15 December 1994, 50170 K of 12 December 1995, 51/45 K of 10 December 1996, 52/38 P of 9 December 1997, 53/77 0 of 4 December 1998, 54/54 N of 1 December 1999, 55/33 0 of 20 November 2000, 56/24 H of 29 November 2001, 57/76 of 22 November 2002 and 58/38 of 8 December 2003 on regional disarmament, Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits, Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations, Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, Taking note of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session, Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers, Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament at the regional and subregional levels, Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security, Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions enhance the security of all States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts, 1. Stresses that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues; 2. Affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security; 3. Calls upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels; 4. Welcomes the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels; 5. Supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional and subregional levels; 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament".

Resolution 59/90 Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 58/42 and 58/54 of 8 December 2003 and 581241 of 23 December 2003,

Recognizing that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, Acknowledging the authorized trade in man-portable air defence systems between Governments and the legitimate right of Governments to possess such weapons in the interests of their national security, Recognizing the threat posed to civil aviation, peacekeeping, crisis management and security by the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems, Taking into account that man-portable air defence systems are easily carried, concealed, fired and, in certain circumstances, obtained, Recognizing that effective control over man-portable air defence systems acquires special importance in the context of the intensified international fight against global terrorism, Convinced of the importance of effective national control of transfers of manportable air defence systems and the safe and effective management of stockpiles of such weapons, Welcoming the ongoing efforts of various international and regional forums to enhance transport security and to strengthen management of man-portable air defence

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 systems stockpiles in order to prevent the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons, Noting the importance of information exchange and transparency in the trade in man-portable air defence systems to build confidence and security among States and to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to such weapons, 1. Emphasizes the importance of the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; 2. Urges Member States to support current international, regional and national efforts to combat and prevent the illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons; 3. Stresses the importance of effective and comprehensive national controls on the production, stockpiling, transfer and brokering of man-portable air defence systems to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons; 4. Encourages Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulations, procedures and stockpile management practices to exercise effective control over access to and transfer of man-portable air defence systems so as to prevent the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons; 5. Also encourages Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulations and procedures to ban the transfer of man-portable air defence systems to non-State end-users and to ensure that such weapons are exported only to Governments or agents authorized by a Government; 6. Encourages initiatives to exchange information and to mobilize resources and technical expertise to assist States, at their request, in enhancing national controls and stockpile management practices to prevent unauthorized access to and use and transfer of man-portable air defence systems and to destroy excess or obsolete stockpiles of such weapons, as appropriate; 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session an item entitled "Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of manportable air defence systems".

Resolution 59/91 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The General Assembly, Concerned about the increasing regional and global security challenges caused, inter alia, by the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its role and responsibility in the field of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Emphasizing the significance of regional and international efforts to prevent and curb comprehensively the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions delivering weapons of mass destruction, as a contribution to international peace and security, Convinced that the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation will contribute to enhancing transparency and confidence among States, Confirming its commitment to the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, as contained in the annex to its resolution 511122 of 13 December 1996, Recognizing that States should not be excluded from utilizing the benefits of space for peaceful purposes, but that in reaping such benefits and in conducting related cooperation they must not contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, Mindful of the need to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, l . Welcomes the adoption of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation on 25 November 2002 at The Hague as a practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 2. Notes with satisfaction that one hundred and seventeen States already have subscribed to the Code of Conduct; 3. Invites all States that have not yet subscribed to the Code of Conduct to do so; 4. Encourages the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively with the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session an item entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation".

Resolution 59/92 Information on confidence-buildingmeasures in the field of conventional arms

The General Assembly, Guided by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the contribution of confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms, adopted on the initiative and with the agreement of the States concerned, to the improvement of the overall international peace and security situation, Convinced that the relationship between the development of confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms and the international security environment can also be mutually reinforcing, Considering the important role that confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms can also play in creating favourable conditions for progress in the field of disarmament,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recognizing that the exchange of information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms contributes to mutual understanding and confidence among Member States, 1. Welcomes all confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms already undertaken by Member States as well as the information on such measures voluntarily provided; 2. Encourages Member States to continue to adopt confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms and to provide information in that regard; 3. Also encourages Member States to engage in a dialogue on confidencebuilding measures in the field of conventional arms; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, with the financial support of States in a position to do so, an electronic database containing information provided by Member States and to assist them, at their request, in the organization of seminars, courses and workshops aimed at enhancing the knowledge of new developments in this field; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session an item entitled "Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms". Resolution 59/93 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 55/33 E of 20 November 2000 and 57/60 of 22 November 2002,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and nonproliferation education, in which the Secretary-General reported on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Desirous of stressing the urgency of promoting concerted international efforts at disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, with a view to strengthening international security and enhancing sustainable economic and social development, Conscious of the need to combat the negative effects of cultures of violence and complacency in the face of current dangers in this field through long-term programmes of education and training, Remaining convinced that the need for disarmament and non-proliferation education has never been greater, especially on the subject of weapons of mass destruction, but also in the field of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and other challenges to international security and the process of disarmament, as well as on the relevance of implementing the recommendations contained in the United Nations study, Recognizing the importance of the role of civil society, including nongovernmental organizations, in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Member States, the United Nations and other international and regional organizations, civil society and non-governmental organizations, which, within their purview, implemented the recommendations made in the United Nations study, as discussed in the report of the Secretary-General reviewing the implementation of the recommendations; 2. Conveys once again those recommendations to Member States, the United Nations and other international and regional organizations, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and encourages them to report to the Secretary-General on steps taken to implement them; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations and possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session; 4. Also requests the Secretary-General to utilize electronic means to the fullest extent possible in the dissemination, in as many official languages as feasible, of information related to that report and any other information that the Department for Disarmament Affairs gathers on an ongoing basis in regard to the implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations study; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session an item entitled "Disarmament and non-proliferation education".

Resolution 59/94 Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 57/68 of 22 November 2002, Noting with satisfaction the new strategic relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, built on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability, as affirmed in their Joint Declaration of 24 May 2002, Noting the increasing cooperation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in addressing significant challenges to international security, as illustrated by their joint efforts regarding Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, Welcoming the determination of the two countries to work together, and with other nations and international organizations, to meet their respective obligations under article V1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, Mindful of the obligation of all parties to the Treaty to abide by all of their commitments under the Treaty, 1. Welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") on 1 June 2003, under which the United States of America and the Russian Federation are committed to reducing and limiting their

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 strategic nuclear warheads so that by 31 December 2012, the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1,700 to 2,200 for each party; 2. Supports the continued commitment of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to cooperative efforts in strategic offensive reductions, inter alia, through meetings of the Bilateral Implementation Commission for the Moscow Treaty, as well as increased strategic stability through discussions in the working groups established under the Consultative Group for Strategic Security; 3. Recognizes that the Moscow Treaty is an important result of the new bilateral strategic relationship, which will help in establishing more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability; 4. Acknowledges the contribution that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have made to nuclear disarmament by reducing their deployed strategic warheads by about half since the end of the cold war; 5. Recognizes the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), which is still in force, and of its provisions, which will lay the foundation for ensuring confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions; 6. Also recognizes that, since the end of the cold war, the United States of America has reduced the number of its START-accountable deployed strategic warheads from over 10,000 to less than 6,000, and has also eliminated 1,032 launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 350 heavy bombers and 28 ballistic missile submarines, and removed 4 additional ballistic missile submarines from strategic service; 7. Further recognizes that, in the same time period, the Russian Federation has reduced the number of its START-accountable deployed strategic warheads to less than 5,000, and has also eliminated 1,250 launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 43 ballistic missile submarines and 65 heavy bombers; 8. Recognizes the importance of the 1991 and 1992 initiatives put forward by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation, which represent a major step forward in the meeting by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their obligations under article V1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons2 9. Notes with approval that, since the end of the cold war, the United States of America and the Russian Federation have halted the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and have committed themselves to eliminating excess fissile material resulting from the dismantlement of weapons no longer needed for national security; 10. Welcomes,in this context, the implementation of the 1993 Agreement concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, signed by the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, under which more than 216 metric tons of excess Russian highly enriched uranium have been down-blended for use as power reactor fuel, and the fact

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions that, under the Agreement, 30 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons will be down-blended per year until a total of 500 metric tons has been processed; 11. Also welcomes the independent action taken by the United States of America to dispose of 174 metric tons of excess highly enriched uranium from its nuclear weapons programme, of which 50 metric tons have already been downblended for use as reactor fuel; 12. Supports continued efforts by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to implement the 1997 Agreement concerning Cooperation regarding Plutonium Production Reactors and the 2000 Agreement concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes and Related Cooperation; 13. Invites the United States of America and the Russian Federation to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of their nuclear reduction activities; 14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework".

Resolution 59/95 Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 48/87 of 16 December 1993, 49/85 of 15 December 1994, 571300 of 20 December 2002, 58/41 of 8 December 2003, 581126 of 19 December 2003 and 581316 of 1 July 2004, Affirming that its rules of procedure permit the Main Committees to undertake organizational refinements to improve the effectiveness of their methods of work, and noting with satisfaction that the First Committee already has done so, Emphasizing that improved functioning of the First Committee should be considered in an integrated and comprehensive manner through the existing three stages, namely general debate, thematic/structured debate, and consideration of and action on draft resolutions, Determining to continue its efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee, as a means to enhance the role of the General Assembly in promoting international peace and security, 1. Invites Member States to consider the biennialization or triennialization of the agenda items discussed in the First Committee, on a voluntary basis, and particularly when no specific action is required for the implementation of relevant resolutions; 2. Also invites Member States to continue to hold interactive debates based on a programme and format elaborated through informal consultations between the Bureau and Member States in advance of each First Committee session:

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 3. Further invites Member States to submit draft resolutions in a more concise, focused and action oriented manner and, where practical, to consider the possibility of submitting draft decisions; 4. Recommends that the respective sponsors of draft resolutions hold informal consultations, both before and during First Committee meetings, with the participation of all interested Member States for furthering discussions on draft resolutions already submitted or yet to be submitted to the Committee; 5. Encourages Member States to introduce draft resolutions on related or complementary issues to find commonalities in the language and purpose of those draft resolutions, and invites Member States to consider pursuing mergers of such texts through consultations with all sponsors; 6 . Also encourages Member States, in particular those that present any draft resolution, to follow up on the agreed resolution in order to contribute to the achievement of the objective of such resolution; 7. Encourages the First Committee to introduce presentations of, and focus discussions on, reports on the work of expert groups, the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters initiated by the Committee; 8. Reiterates that the Secretary-General, in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, shall keep all Committees, including the First Committee, informed of the detailed estimated cost of all resolutions and decisions that have been recommended by the Committees for approval by the Assembly; 9. Requests the First Committee, in the light of the growing interconnectedness of issues before the General Assembly, to explore the forms of mutual cooperation with other Main Committees; 10. Decides to develop further, within existing resources, the electronic support for the work of the First Committee, in particular through the existing web sites; 11. Decides also to review regularly the implementation of the present resolution. Resolution 59/96 Regional confidence-buildingmeasures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa The General Assembly, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling its resolutions 43/78 H and 43/85 of 7 December 1988, 44/21 of 15 November 1989, 45/58 M of 4 December 1990, 46/37 B of 6 December 1991, 47/53 F of 15 December 1992, 48/76 A of 16 December 1993, 49/76 C of 15 December 1994, 50171 B of 12 December 1995, 51/46 C of 10 December 1996, 52/39 B of 9 December 1997, 53/78 A of 4 December 1998,54155 A of 1 December 1999,55/34 B

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions of 20 November 2000, 56/25 A of 29 November 2001, 57/88 of 22 November 2002 and 58/65 of 8 December 2003, Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, since such measures can contribute to regional stability and to international peace and security, Convinced that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries, Recalling the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, Convinced that development can be achieved only in a climate of peace, security and mutual confidence both within and among States, Bearing in mind the establishment by the Secretary-General on 28 May 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, nonproliferation and development in the subregion, Recalling the Brazzaville Declaration on Cooperation for Peace and Security in Central Africa, the Bata Declaration for the Promotion of Lasting Democracy, Peace and Development in Central Africa and the Yaounde Declaration on Peace, Security and Stability in Central Africa, Bearing in mind resolutions 1196 (1998) and 1197 (1998). adopted by the Security Council on 16 and 18 September 1998 respectively, following its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Emphasizing the need to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, Recalling the decision of the fourth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee in favour of establishing, under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a subregional centre for human rights and democracy in Central Africa at Yaounde, 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on regional confidencebuilding measures, which deals with the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa in the period since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 58/65; 2. Reaffirms its support for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels in order to ease tensions and conflicts in Central Africa and to further peace, stability and sustainable development in the subregion; 3. Also reaffirms its support for the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee adopted at the organizational meeting of the Committee, held at Yaounde from 27 to 31 July 1992;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 4. Notes with satisfaction the progress made by the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee in implementing the programme of activities for the period 2003-2004, in particular by holding the twenty first ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee in Malabo from 21 to 25 June 2004; 5. Emphasizes the importance of providing the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the essential support they need to carry out the full programme of activities which they adopted at their ministerial meetings; 6. Welcomes the creation of a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Economic Community of Central African States, held at Yaounde on 25 February 1999, and requests the Secretary-General to give his full support to the effective realization of that important mechanism; 7. Emphasizes the need to make the early warning mechanism in Central Africa operational so that it will serve, on the one hand, as an instrument for analysing and monitoring political situations in the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with a view to preventing the outbreak of future armed conflicts and, on the other hand, as a technical body through which the member States will carry out the programme of work of the Committee, adopted at its organizational meeting held at Yaounde in 1992, and requests the Secretary-General to provide it with the assistance necessary for it to function properly; 8. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to provide their full assistance for the proper functioning of the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa; 9. Requests the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1197 (1998), to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the necessary support for the implementation and smooth functioning of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa and the early warning mechanism; 10. Also requests the Secretary-General to support the establishment of a network of parliamentarians with a view to the creation of a subregional parliament in Central Africa; 11. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue to provide increased assistance to the countries of Central Africa for coping with the problems of refugees and displaced persons in their territories; 12. Thanks the Secretary-General for having established the Trust Fund for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa; 13. Appeals to Member States and to governmental and non-governmental organizations to make additional voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the implementation of the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee; 14. Thanks the Secretary-General for sending a multidisciplinary mission from 8 to 22 June 2003 for the purpose of undertaking an assessment of the priority needs

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions of the region and challenges confronting it in the areas of peace, security, economic development, human rights, HIVIAIDS and humanitarian questions; 15. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with assistance to ensure that they are able to carry on their efforts; 16. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution; 17. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa".

Resolution 59/97 United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services The General Assembly, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General, Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, inter alia, to continue the programme, Noting that the programme continues to contribute significantly to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security, as well as to enhancing the knowledge and skills of fellows, allowing them to participate more effectively in efforts in the field of disarmament at all levels, Noting with satisfaction that the programme has trained a large number of officials from Member States throughout its twenty-six years of existence, many of whom hold positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments, Recognizing the need for Member States to take into account gender equality when nominating candidates to the programme, Recalling all the annual resolutions on the matter since the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in 1982, including resolution 50171 A of 12 December 1995, Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, in particular to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, 1. Reaffirms its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by the Assembly in its resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 2. Expresses its appreciation to all Member States and organizations that have consistently supported the programme throughout the years, thereby contributing to its success, in particular to the Governments of Germany and Japan for the continuation of extensive and highly educative study visits for the participants in the programme, and to the Government of the United States of America for organizing a presentation to the fellows in the area of disarmament; 3. Expresses its appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for having organized specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their respective areas of competence, thereby contributing to the objectives of the programme; 4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty first session; 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services".

Resolution 59/98 United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 58/63 of 8 December 2003 regarding the maintenance and revitalization of the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, Recalling also the reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Reaffirming its decision, taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, to establish the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, the purpose of which is to inform, educate and generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament, Bearing in mind its resolutions 401151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 4411 17 F of 15 December 1989 on the regional centres for peace and disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo, Recognizing that the changes that have taken place in the world have created new opportunities as well as posed new challenges for the pursuit of disarmament, and, in this regard, bearing in mind that the regional centres for peace and disarmament can contribute substantially to understanding and cooperation among States in each particular region in the areas of peace, disarmament and development,

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions Noting that in paragraph 146 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, the heads of State or Government welcomed the decision adopted by the General Assembly on maintaining and revitalizing the three regional centres for peace and disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo, 1. Reiterates the importance of the United Nations activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament; 2. Reaffirms that, in order to achieve positive results, it is useful for the three regional centres to carry out dissemination and educational programmes that promote regional peace and security and that are aimed at changing basic attitudes with respect to peace and security and disarmament so as to support the achievement of the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 3. Appeals to Member States in each region and those that are able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives; 4. Emphasizes the importance of the activities of the regional branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities; 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament". Resolution 59/99 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 K of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 H of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, with headquarters in Lima, Recalling also its resolutions 46/37 F of 9 December 1991, 48/76 E of 16 December 1993, 49/76 D of 15 December 1994, 50171 C of 12 December 1995, 521220 of 22 December 1997, 53/78 F of 4 December 1998, 54/55 F of 1 December 1999, 55/34 E of 20 November 2000, 56/25 E of 29 November 2001, 57/89 of 22 November 2002 and 58/60 of 8 December 2003, Underlining the revitalization of the Regional Centre, the efforts made by the Government of Peru and other countries to that end, as well as the important work done by the Director of the Centre,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Recognizing that the Regional Centre has continued to act as an instrument for the implementation of regional initiatives and has intensified its contribution to the coordination of United Nations efforts towards peace and security, Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General, which concludes that the Regional Centre has continued to act as a facilitator for the implementation of regional initiatives by identifying regional security needs and new areas of cooperation with States and organizations in the region, and to provide more in depth information on weapons related matters, weapons destruction and stockpile management, including the initiation of a series of training courses for the law enforcement community, members of parliament, representatives of ministries of foreign affairs and non-governmental organizations on such matters, Welcoming also the fact that the report stresses that the Regional Centre has placed more emphasis on the inclusion of a gender perspective in its planned activities and the relationship between disarmament and development, Welcoming further the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 57/65 of 22 November 2002, which is of utmost interest with regard to the role that the Regional Centre plays in promoting the issue in the region in pursuit of its mandate to promote economic and social development related to peace and disarmament, Noting that security and disarmament issues have always been recognized as significant topics in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first inhabited region in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Welcoming the support provided by the Regional Centre to strengthening the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), as well as to promoting and assisting the ratification and implementation of existing multilateral agreements related to weapons of mass destruction and to promoting peace and disarmament education projects during the period under review, Bearing in mind the important role that the Regional Centre can play in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, disarmament and development at the regional level, Bearing in mind also the importance of information, research, education and training for peace, disarmament and development in order to achieve understanding and cooperation among States, Recognizing the need to provide the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament with sufficient financial resources and cooperation for the planning and implementation of their programmes of activities, 1. Reiterates its strong support for the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the promotion of United Nations activities at the regional level to strengthen peace, stability, security and development among its member States; 2. Expresses its satisfaction and congratulates the Regional Centre for the expansion of the vast range of activities carried out in the last year in the fields of

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions peace, disarmament and development, and requests the Regional Centre to take into account the proposals to be submitted by the countries of the region in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, transparency, disarmament and development at the regional level; 3. Expresses its appreciation for the political support and financial contributions to the Regional Centre, which are essential for its continued operation; 4. Invites all States of the region to continue to take part in the activities of the Regional Centre, proposing items for inclusion in its programme and making greater and better use of the potential of the Centre to meet the current challenges facing the international community with a view to fulfilling the aims of the Charter of the United Nations in the fields of peace, disarmament and development; 5. Recognizes that the Regional Centre has an important role in the promotion and development of regional initiatives agreed upon by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the field of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as the relationship between disarmament and development; 6. Encourages the Regional Centre to further develop activities in the important area of disarmament and development; 7. Highlights the conclusion contained in the report of the Secretary-General that the vast regional cooperation undertaken by the Regional Centre during the reporting period was evidence of the important role of the Organization as a viable regional actor in assisting countries in the region to advance the cause of peace, disarmament and development in Latin America and the Caribbean; 8. Appeals to Member States, in particular those within the Latin American and Caribbean region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make and to increase voluntary contributions to strengthen the Regional Centre, its programme of activities and the implementation thereof; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Regional Centre with all necessary support, within existing resources, so that it may carry out its programme of activities in accordance with its mandate; 10. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

Resolution 591100 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 441117 F of 15 December 1989, by which it established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and renamed it the United Nations Regional Centre

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, with headquarters in Kathmandu and with the mandate of providing, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asia-Pacific region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources, Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General, in which he expresses his belief that the mandate of the Regional Centre remains valid and that the Centre has been a useful instrument for fostering a climate of cooperation for peace and disarmament in the region, Noting that trends in the post cold war era have emphasized the function of the Regional Centre in assisting Member States as they deal with new security concerns and disarmament issues emerging in the region, Cornmending the useful activities carried out by the Regional Centre in encouraging regional and subregional dialogue for the enhancement of openness, transparency and confidence-building, as well as the promotion of disarmament and security through the organization of regional meetings, which has come to be widely known within the Asia-Pacific region as "the Kathmandu process", Expressing its appreciation to the Regional Centre for its organization of meetings and conferences in the region, held in Osaka, Japan, from 19 to 22 August 2003, on Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, from 3 to 5 December 2003, in Almaty, Kazakhstan, from 16 to 18 March 2004, in Kanazawa, Japan, from 7 to 9 June 2004 and in Sapporo, Japan, from 26 to 29 July 2004, Welcoming the idea of the possible creation of an educational and training programme for peace and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific for young people with different backgrounds, to be financed from voluntary contributions, Noting the important role of the Regional Centre in assisting region-specific initiatives of Member States, including its continued assistance in finalizing a treaty related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, as well as to Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status, including the organization of an informal consultation among relevant United Nations bodies in January and June 2004 to discuss the status of implementation of the non nuclear aspects of Mongolia's status, Appreciating highly the overall support that Nepal has extended as the host nation of the headquarters of the Regional Centre, 1. Reaffirmsits strong support for the forthcoming operation and further strengthening of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific; 2. Underlines the importance of the Kathmandu process as a powerful vehicle for the development of the practice of region-wide security and disarmament dialogue; 3. Expresses its appreciation for the continuing political support and voluntary financial contributions to the Regional Centre, which are essential for its continued operation;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 4. Appeals to Member States, in particular those within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions, the only resources of the Regional Centre, to strengthen the programme of activities of the Centre and the implementation thereof; 5. Requests the Secretary-General, taking note of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 49/76 D of 15 December 1994, to provide the Regional Centre with the necessary support, within existing resources, in carrying out its programme of activities; 6. Urges the Secretary-General to ensure the physical operation of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host country agreement and to enable the Centre to function effectively; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific". Resolutian 591101 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

The General Assembly, Mindful of the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations stipulating that a function of the General Assembly is to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation, Recalling its resolutions 401151 G of 16 December 1985,41160 D of 3 December 1986, 42/39 J of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 D of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and its resolutions 46/36 F of 6 December 1991 and 47/52 G of 9 December 1992 on regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures, Recalling also its resolutions 48/76 E of 16 December 1993, 49/76 D of 15 December 1994, 50171 C of 12 December 1995, 51/46 E of 10 December 1996, 521220 of 22 December 1997, 53/78 C of 4 December 1998, 54/55 B of 1 December 1999, 55/34 D of 20 November 2000, 56/25 D of 29 November 2001, 57/91 of 22 November 2002 and 58/61 of 8 December 2003, Aware of the widespread support for the activities of the Regional Centre and the important role that the Centre can play in the present context in promoting confidence-building and arms-limitation measures at the regional level, thereby promoting progress in the area of sustainable development, Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, in which it was stated that the Regional Centre received an increasing number of requests from Member States in the African region for substantive support for several peace initiatives and conflict resolution activities in the region,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Taking note also of the fact that, as noted in the report of the Secretary-General. very limited financial contributions were made to the Regional Centre despite continued fund-raising efforts, Concerned that the continuing financial difficulties faced by the Regional Centre have impaired its ability to realize its full potential and to fulfil its mandate adequately, Bearing in mind the efforts undertaken to mobilize the necessary resources for the operational costs of the Regional Centre, Taking into accountthe need to establish close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the African Union, in conformity with the decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty fifth ordinary session, held at Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999, 1. Commends the activities that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa is continuing to carry out, in particular in support of the efforts made by the African States in the areas of peace and security; 2. Reaffirms its strong support for the Regional Centre, and emphasizes the need to provide it with the necessary resources to enable it to strengthen its activities and carry out its programmes; 3. Appeals once again to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programmes and activities of the Regional Centre and facilitate their implementation; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the necessary support to the Regional Centre for better achievements and results; 5. Also requests the Secretary-General to facilitate close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the African Union, in particular in the areas of peace, security and development, and to continue to assist the Director of the Regional Centre in his efforts to stabilize the financial situation of the Centre; 6. Appeals in particular to the Regional Centre, in cooperation with the African Union, regional and subregional organizations and the African States, to take steps to promote the consistent implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa". Resolution 591102 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons The General Assembly, Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Bearing in mind the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Convinced that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security, Conscious that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 3511 52 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981, Determined to achieve an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction, Stressingthat an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time, Noting with regretthat the Conference on Disarmament, during its 2004 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject as called for in General Assembly resolution 58/64 of 8 December 2003, 1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances; 2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

Resolution 591103 United Nations Disarmament Information Programme The General Assembly, Recalling its decision taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, by which the World Disarmament Campaign was launched, Bearing in mindits resolution 47/53 D of 9 December 1992, in which it decided, inter alia, that the World Disarmament Campaign should be known thereafter as the "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme" and the World Disarmament

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund as the "Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme", Recalling its resolutions 51/46 A of 10 December 1996, 53/78 E of 4 December 1998, 55/34 A of 20 November 2000 and 57/90 of 22 November 2002, Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, 1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme; 2. Commends the Secretary-General for his efforts to make effective use of the limited resources available to him in disseminating as widely as possible, including by electronic means, information on arms limitation and disarmament to Governments, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities and research institutes, and in carrying out a seminar and conference programme; 3. Stresses the importance of the Programme as a significant instrument in enabling all Member States to participate fully in the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament in the various United Nations bodies, in assisting them in complying with treaties, as required, and in contributing to agreed mechanisms for transparency; 4. Notes the results of the survey of users of The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook;

Resolution 591104 Report of the Conference on Disarmament The General Assembly, Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, Recognizing the need to conduct multilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on concrete issues, Recalling, in this respect, that the Conference has a number of urgent and important issues for negotiation, Taking note of active discussions held on the programme of work during the 2004 session of the Conference, as duly reflected in the report and the records of the plenary meetings, Taking note also of significant contributions made during the 2004 session to promote substantive discussions on issues on the agenda, as well as of discussions held on other issues that could also be relevant to the current international security environment, Stressing the urgent need for the Conference to commence its substantive work at the beginning of its 2005 session, Taking note of the decision reached on 12 February 2004 with regard to enhancement of the engagement of civil society in the work of the Conference and the statement by the President made thereafter,

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 1. Reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community; 2. Calls upon the Conference to intensify consultations and explore possibilities with a view to reaching an agreement on a programme of work; 3. Takes note of the strong collective interest of the Conference in commencing substantive work as soon as possible during its 2005 session; 4. Welcomes the decision of the Conference to request its current President and the incoming President to conduct consultations during the intersessional period and, if possible, to make recommendations, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those submitted as the documents of the Conference, views presented and discussions held, and to endeavour to keep the membership of the Conference informed, as appropriate, of their consultations, as expressed in paragraph 46 of its report; l 5. Requests all States members of the Conference to cooperate with the current President and successive Presidents in their efforts to guide the Conference to the early commencement of substantive work in its 2005 session; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to ensure the provision to the Conference of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services; 7. Requests the Conference to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Resolution 591105 Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly, Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission, Recalling its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, 47/54 G of 8 April 1993, 48/77 A of 16 December 1993, 49/77 A of 15 December 1994, 50172 D of 12 December 1995, 5 1/47 B of 10 December 1996, 52/40 B of 9 December 1997, 53/79 A of 4 December 1998, 54/56 A of 1 December 1999,55/35 C of 20 November 2000, 56/26 A of 29 November 2001, 57/95 of 22 November 2002 and 58/67 of 8 December 2003, Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, Bearing in mind its decision 521492 of 8 September 1998, 1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission; 2. Reaffirms the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament:

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 3. Also reaffirms the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues; 4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items on its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission"; 5. Recommends that the Disarmament Commission consider the following items at its 2005 substantive session:

(a) [To be determined] ; (b) [To be determined] ; Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding

6. three weeks during 2005, namely, from 18 July to 5 August, and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the fifty ninth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution; 8. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Disarmament Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

Resolution 591106 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East The General Assembly, Bearing in mind its relevant resolutions, Taking note of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(48)/RES/16, adopted on 24 September 2004, Cognizant that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security, Mindful of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Recalling the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty, Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on l l May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, Noting that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Concerned about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region, Stressing the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global nonproliferation regime, Emphasizing the need for all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, inviting the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, Noting that one hundred and seventy-three States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including a number of States in the region, 1. Welcomes the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 2. Reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East; 3. Calls upon that State to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Resolution 591107 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 58/69 of 8 December 2003, Recalling with satisfaction the adoption and the entry into force of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol 11) and its amended version, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol 111) and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Recalling the decision by the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects to establish an open-ended group of governmental experts with two separate coordinators on explosive remnants of war and on mines other than antipersonnel mines, Recalling also the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the elaboration of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, and welcoming the particular efforts of various international, non-governmental and other organizations in raising awareness of the humanitarian consequences of explosive remnants of war, 1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality;

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions 2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character; 3. Welcomes with satisfaction the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) at the Meeting of the States Parties held at Geneva on 27 and 28 November 2003, and calls upon the States parties to express their consent to be bound by the Protocol and to notify the depositary at an early date of their consent; 4. Notes the decision of the Meeting of the States Parties that the Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War would continue its work in 2004 with the mandate to continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of international humanitarian law and to further study, on an open-ended basis, and initially with particular emphasis on meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war; 5. Also notes the decision of the Meeting of the States Parties that the Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines would continue its work in 2004 with the mandate to consider all proposals on mines other than anti-personnel mines put forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts; 6. Further notes the decision of the Meeting of the States Parties that the Chairman-designate should continue to undertake consultations during the intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and the Protocols thereto, taking into account proposals put forward; 7. Expresses support for the work conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts, and encourages the Chairman-designate and the Group to conduct work, in accordance with the mandate for 2004, with the aim of elaborating appropriate recommendations on mines other than anti-personnel mines, for submission to the Meeting of the States Parties on 18 and 19 November 2004, and to report on the work done on compliance, as well as on the implementation of existing principles of international humanitarian law and on possible preventive technical measures in relation to explosive remnants of war; 8. Recalls the decision of the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects to convene a further conference not later than 2006, with preparatory meetings starting as early as 2005, if necessary, and requests the Meeting of the States Parties on 18 and 19 November 2004 to consider this issue; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Meeting of the States Parties on 18 and 19 November 2004, as well as for any possible continuation of work after the Meeting, should the States parties deem it appropriate;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 10. Also requests the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically, by electronic means, of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention and the Protocols thereto; 11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

Resolution 591108 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

The General Assembly, Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, including resolution 58/70 of 8 December 2003,

Reaffirming the primary role of the Mediterranean countries in strengthening and promoting peace, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, Bearing in mind all the previous declarations and commitments, as well as all the initiatives taken by the riparian countries at the recent summits, ministerial meetings and various forums concerning the question of the Mediterranean region, Recognizing the indivisible character of security in the Mediterranean and that the enhancement of cooperation among Mediterranean countries with a view to promoting the economic and social development of all peoples of the region will contribute significantly to stability, peace and security in the region, Recognizing also the efforts made so far and the determination of the Mediterranean countries to intensify the process of dialogue and consultations with a view to resolving the problems existing in the Mediterranean region and to eliminating the causes of tension and the consequent threat to peace and security, and their growing awareness of the need for further joint efforts to strengthen economic, social, cultural and environmental cooperation in the region, Recognizing further that prospects for closer Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in all spheres can be enhanced by positive developments worldwide, in particular in Europe, in the Maghreb and in the Middle East, Reaffirming the responsibility of all States to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region and their commitment to respecting the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region, Expressing its concern at the persistent tension and continuing military activities in parts of the Mediterranean that hinder efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the region, Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions 1. Reaffirms that security in the Mediterranean is closely linked to European security as well as to international peace and security; 2. Expresses its satisfaction at the continuing efforts by Mediterranean countries to contribute actively to the elimination of all causes of tension in the region and to the promotion of just and lasting solutions to the persistent problems of the region through peaceful means, thus ensuring the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries of the Mediterranean and the right of peoples to self-determination, and therefore calls for full adherence to the principles of non-interference, nonintervention, non-use of force or threat of use of force and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations; 3. Commends the Mediterranean countries for their efforts in meeting common challenges through coordinated overall responses, based on a spirit of multilateral partnership, towards the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, encourages them to strengthen such efforts through, inter alia, a lasting multilateral and action-oriented cooperative dialogue among States of the region, and recognizes the role of the United Nations in promoting regional and international peace and security; 4. Recognizes that the elimination of the economic and social disparities in levels of development and other obstacles as well as respect and greater understanding among cultures in the Mediterranean area will contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries through the existing forums; 5. Calls upon all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region; 6. Encourages all States of the region to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening the confidence-building measures among them by promoting genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; 7. Encourages the Mediterranean countries to strengthen further their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and in combating international crime and illicit arms transfers and illicit drug production, consumption and trafficking, which pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region and therefore to the improvement of the current political, economic and social situation and which jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder the development of international cooperation and result in the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic basis of pluralistic society;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region".

Resolution 591109 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty

The General Assembly, Reiterating that the cessation of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions constitutes an effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure, Recalling that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by its resolution 501245 of 10 September 1996, was opened for signature on 24 September

1996, Stressing that a universal and effectively verifiable Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Encouraged by the signing of the Treaty by one hundred and seventy-three States, including forty-one of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, and welcoming the ratification of one hundred and nineteen States, including thirty-three of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, among which there are three nuclearweapon States, Recalling its resolution 58/71 of 8 December 2003, Welcoming the Joint Ministerial Statement reaffirming support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, signed in New York on 23 September 2004, 1. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; 2. Welcomes the contributions by the States signatories to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular its efforts to ensure that the Treaty's verification regime will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty; 3. Underlines the need to maintain momentum towards completion of the verification regime; 4. Calls upon all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear-weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty; 5. Also calls upon all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible; 6. Further calls upon all States that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to their earliest successful conclusion; 7. Urges all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;

Text o f disarmament resolutions and decisions 8. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, to prepare a report on the efforts of States that have ratified the Treaty towards its universalization and possibilities for providing assistance on ratification procedures to States that so request it, and to submit such a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Resolution 59IllO Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly, Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to their destruction, Noting with satisfaction that there are one hundred and fifty two States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council, Bearing in mind its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Review Conferences, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and to provide such information and data in conformity with standardized procedure to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and no later than 15 April, Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the Convention, Recalling the decision reached at the Fifth Review Conference to hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week's duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference and to hold a two-week meeting of experts to prepare for each meeting of the States parties, 1. Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention;

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 2. Welcomes the information and data provided to date, and reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention; 3. Recalls the decision reached at the Fifth Review Conference to discuss and promote common understanding and effective action: in 2003 on the two topics of the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation, and national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro organisms and toxins; in 2004 on the two topics of enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, and strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants; and in 2005 on the topic of the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists; and calls upon the States parties to the Convention to participate in its implementation; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, including all necessary assistance to the annual meetings of the States parties and the meetings of experts; 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".

Decision 591513 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-freezone in Central Asia The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, recalling its resolutions 52/38 S of 9 December 1997, 53/77 A of 4 December 1998, 55/33 W of 20 November 2000 and 57/69 of 22 November 2002 and its decisions 541417 of 1 December 1999, 561412 of 29 November 2001 and 581518 of 8 December 2003, decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia".

Decision 591514 United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament The General Assembly decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament".

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions Decision 59/515 Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus The General Assembly decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus".

A P P E N D I X V11

Voting patterns of resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 2004 Resolutions on disarmament questions 59/59 Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe, p. 120 Adopted without a vote Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations 59/60 in the field of verification, p. 187 Adopted without a vote Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in 5916 1 the context of international security, p. 1 79 Adopted without a vote Role of science and technology in the context of international security 59/62 and disarmament, p. 179 Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 48 with 21 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Votingpatterns of disarmament resolrrtions and decisions

59/63

59/64

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark. Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Chile, Haiti, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshal1 Islands, Nauru, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Samoa, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tonga, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, p. 156 Adopted without a vote Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, p.50 Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 0 with 63 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te dtIvoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: None Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria,


59/65

Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu Prevention of an arms race in outer space, p. 173 Adopted by a recorded vote of 178 to 0 with 4 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Voting patterns of disarmament resolutions and decisions Against: None Abstaining: Haiti, Israel, Palau, United States 59/66

59/67

59/68

National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dualuse goods and technology, p. 65

Adopted without a vote Missiles, p. 62 Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 4 with 60 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte dVIvoire,Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Palau, United States Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, p. 65


59/69

Adopted by a recorded vote of 175 to 2 with 3 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe Against: Palau, United States Abstaining: France, Israel, United Kingdom Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation, p. 186 Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 9 with 49 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti,

Voting patterns of disarmament resolutions and decisions

59/70

Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Albania, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Latvia, Marshal1 Islands, Palau, Poland, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining:Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, p. 87 Adopted by a recorded vote of 179 to 0 with 5 abstention as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sr3 Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: None Abstaining: Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshal1 Islands, Palau, United States Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, p. 223

Adopted without a vote Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, p. 88

Adopted without a vote Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status,

p.119 Adopted without a vote Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, p. 118

Adopted without a vote Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, p. 51 Adopted by a recorded vote of 151 to 6 with 24 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,


59/76

Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, SaudiArabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, TimorLeste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: France, Israel, Latvia, Palau, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Albania, Australia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uzbekistan A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, p. 53 Adopted by a recorded vote of 165 to 3 with 16 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote dtIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, GuineaBissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: India, Palau, United States Abstaining: Bhutan, Brazil, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Malta, Mexico, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden

59/77

Nuclear disarmament, p. 54 Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 43 with 21 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte d1Ivoire,Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshal1 Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France,


59/78

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Haiti, India, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Relationship between disarmament and development Adopted by a recorded vote of 180 to 2 with 2 abstentions as follows: In favoul: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, GuineaBissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Against: Palau, United States 59/79

59/80

59181

Abstaining: France, Israel Reducing nuclear danger, p. 55 Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 46 with 18 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cdte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, GuineaBissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall, Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Ecuador, Georgia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, p. 170 Adopted without a vote The Conference on Disarmament decision (CDl1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item I of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to


59182

negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CDl1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, p. 56 Adopted by a recorded vote of 179 to 2 with 2 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Palau, United States Abstaining: Israel, United Kingdom Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, p. 119

Adopted without a vote 59/83

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons, p. 5 7

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to 29 with 24 abstentions as follows:

59/84

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamhs, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte dlIvoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uzbekistan Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, p. 121 Adopted by a recorded vote of 157 to 0 with 22 abstentions as follows:

In favour. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei

Votingpatterns of disarmament resolutions and decisions Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: None Abstaining: Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, Federated States of Micronesia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Marshal1 Islands, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palau, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam 59/85

Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, p. 157 Adopted by a recorded vote of 171 to 4 with 8 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te dlIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Filji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein,

59/86

59/87

59/88

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: France, Palau, United Kingdom, United States Abstain: Bhutan, Federated States of Micronesia, India, Israel, Marshal1 Islands, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, p.118 Adopted without a vote Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context, p. 158 Adopted without a vote Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, p. 159 Adopted by a recorded vote of 178 to 1 with1 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius,

Voting patterns o f disarmament resolutions and decisions

59/89 59/90

59191

Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: India Abstaining: Bhutan Regional disarmament, p. 159. Adopted without a vote Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems, p. 1 19 Adopted without a vote Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p. 6 3 Adopted by a recorded vote of 161 to 2 with 15 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te dfIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Egypt, Iran Abstaining: Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cuba, Djibouti, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms, p. l 20 Adopted without a vote United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, p.246 Adopted without a vote Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework, p. 58 Adopted without a vote Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee, p. 222 Adopted without a vote Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, p. 159 Adopted without a vote United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services, p.223 Adopted without a vote United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, p.223 Adopted without a vote United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, p.224 Adopted by a recorded vote of 162 to 4 with 10 abstentions as follows: Adopted without a vote United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Adopted without a vote

Voting patterns o f disarmament resolutions and decisions 59110 1

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, p. 224

Adopted without a vote 591102

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, p. 59 Adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to 48 with 12 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dtIvoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and

591103

Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, D. 246.

Adopted without a vote 591104

Report of the Conference on Disarmament, p. 118.

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Adopted without a vote 591105 591106

591107

Report of the Disarmament Commission, p. 22 1 Adopted without a vote The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, p. 59 Adopted by a recorded vote of 170 to 5 with 9 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d11voire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshal1 Islands, Palau, United States Abstaining: Australia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, India, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Vanuatu Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, p. 121 Adopted without a vote

Votingpatterns of disarmament resolutions and decisions 591108

591109

5911 10

5915 13

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, p. 160 Adopted without a vote Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, p. 60 Adopted by a recorded vote of 177 to 2 with 4abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te dtIvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: Palau, United States Abstaining: Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syria Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, p. 88 Adopted without a vote Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, p. l 5 8


5915 14

5915 15

Adopted without a vote United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament, p. 60 Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to 5 with 38 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te dlIvoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Against: France, Palau, Poland, United Kingdom, United States Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy. Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, p. 120 Adopted without a vote

A P P E N D I X V111

Table of Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament Issues RESOLUTIONS Res. No.

Title

Ref. Sponsors * * in Text *

59/59

Maintenance of international security - goodneighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe

160 336

Algeria, Andorra, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America (without a vote).

* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is produced *" The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.


Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * 187 Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 339 Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine (without a vote).

Res. No.

Title

59/60

Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

59/61

Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

59/62

Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

341

Establishment of a nuclearweapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

343

59/63

179 340

Kyrgyzstan , Russian Federation (without a vote).

179

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Viet Nam, Zambia( 106-48-21).

156

Egypt (without a vote).

* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is produced ** The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

Table of Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament Issues

Res. No.

Title

59/64

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

59/65

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

59/66

59/67

Ref.

Text * 50 Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, 345 Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam, Zambia (1 18-0-63). 173

34 7

National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology

65

Missiles

62

349

350 59/68

Sponsors * *

in

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

188

351

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, China, CBte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia (178-0-4).

Netherlands (adopted without a vote).

Egypt, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of) (1 19-4-60). Burkina Faso, Liberia, Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the NonAligned Movement. (175-2-3).



Res. No.

Title

59/69

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

59/70

59/7 1

59/72

5917 3

59/74

Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * 186

352

Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

87

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

223

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

88

354

355

Burkina Faso, Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement. (125-9-49).

Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the NonAligned Movement (179-0-5). Jamaica, Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, Somalia (without a vote).

Poland (without a vote).

356

Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weaponfree status

157

Mongolia, Papua New Guinea,

358

United States of America (without a vote).

Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them

1 18

359

Angola, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, C6te d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Hungary,



Res.

Title

No.

Ref.

Sponsors * *

in

Text *

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, on behalf of the ECOWAS, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zimbabwe (without a vote).

59/75

Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

51 361

Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cbte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ireland, Liberia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Samoa, South Africa, Sweden, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Countries, Ukraine ( l 5 1-6-24).

59/76

A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

53 363

Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, C6te dtIvoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia (165-3-16).

59/77

Nuclear disarmament

54 367

Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, C6te d'Ivoire,

* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is produced *" The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.


Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe (1 17-43-21).

Res. No.

Title

59/78

Relationship between disarmament and development

Burkina Faso, Liberia, Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the NonAligned Movement (180-2-2).

59179

Reducing nuclear danger

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cuba, Fiji, Haiti, India, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Papua New Guinea Sudan, Viet Nam, Zambia (11646-18).

59/80

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Afghanistan, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy,



Res.

Title

No.


Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (without a vote).

59/81

The Conference on Disarmament decision (CDl1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD11299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

59/82

Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures

56 3 75

Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Venezuela (179-2-2).

119

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia. Bosnia and

3 76



Res. No.

Title


Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav



Res. No.

59/83

Title

Ref. in Text *

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality

of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

57 388

Sponsors * * Republic of Macedonia, TimorLeste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote). Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, TimorLeste, Tonga, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia (132-2924).



Res.

Title

No. 59184

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

59/85

Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * 12 1 Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, 380 Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, C6te dlIvoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen (1570-22). 157 380

Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama,



Res. No.

Title

Ref. Text *

59/86

Sponsors * *

in

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

1 18

382

Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen (17 1-4-8). Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland. India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Peru, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia,



Res. No.

Title

Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote).

59/87

Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

158 382

Liberia, Pakistan (without a vote)

59/88

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

159 385

Bangladesh, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Spain the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine (178- l - l).

59/89


159 392

Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey (without a vote).

59/90

Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems

119 389

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain,



Res.

Title

Ref. Text *

59/91

Sponsors * *

in

No.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

63 396

Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (without a vote). Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Marshal1 Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,



Res. No.

Title

Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu Venezuela, Zambias (16 1-2-15).

59/92

Information on confidencebuilding measures in the field of conventional arms

120 391

Andorra, Angola, Argentina Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,



Res.

Title

Ref. Text *

59/93

Sponsors * *

in

No.

United Nations study on disarmament and nonproliferation education

246 400

Italy, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America,Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia (without a vote). Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Estonia, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,



Sponsors * * Ref. in Text * Thailand, Ukraine, Zambia (without a vote).

Res. No.

Title

59/94

Bilateral strategic nuclear arms 58 reductions and the new strategic 403 framework

Russian Federation, United States of America (without a vote).

59/95

222 Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First 405 Committee

Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, C6te dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands. Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland,

* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is produced ** The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type. 456


Res. No.

Title

Ref.

Sponsors * *

in Text *

Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen (without a vote).

59/96

Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

159 395

Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda (without a vote).

59/97

United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

223

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India,

406



Res. No.

59/98

Title

United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament

Ref. Sponsors * * in Text * Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote).

223 407

Burkina Faso, Malaysia, on behalf of the States Members of


Table of Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament Issues the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (without a vote). United Nations Regional Centre 224 for Peace, Disarmament and 409 Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Belize, Mexico (without a vote).

United Nations Regional Centre 2 2 4 for Peace and Disarmament in 41 0 Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam (without a vote).

United Nations Regional Centre 224 for Peace and Disarmament in 41 2 Africa

Burkina Faso,Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, Somalia (without a vote).

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Haiti, India Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Viet Nam, Zambia (125-48-12).

59 41 4

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 59/lO3

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

24 6 41 6

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Liberia, Mexico, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uruguay (without a vote).

591104

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

220 41 7

Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Myanmar (without a vote).

591105

Report of the Disarmament Commission

22 1 409

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, C6te dlIvoire,Georgia, Ireland, Israel, Kazakhstan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Uzbekistan (without a vote).

591106

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

59 41 0

Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, on behalf of the League of Arab States, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (170-5-9).

591107

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

12 1 41 2

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te dlIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New

Table of Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament Issues Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela (without a vote). 59/108

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote).

591109

Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty

Andorra, Austria, Australia, Burkina Faso, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia,

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Suriname, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay (177-2-4). Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Hungary (without a vote).

Establishment of a nuclearweapon-free zone in Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan on behalf of the C-5 states (without a vote).

United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament

Mexico (138-5-38).

Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

Bulgaria, France, Germany, Netherlands (without a vote).

A P P E N D I X IX

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter Reference in text

Chapter I


Issues related to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 59/106


Issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 591109

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Issues related to nuclear disarmament 59/64


59/75

Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

59/76

A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

59/77

Nuclear disarmament

59/79

Reducing nuclear danger

5918 1

The CD decision (CD11547) of l l August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD11299) and the mandate contained therein, a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter Reference

in text 59/83

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

57

59/94

Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework

59

591102

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

59

5915 14

United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament

60

Missile related issues 59/67

Missiles

62

59/91

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

63

59/66

National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology

65

Chapter I1


Export Controls

Chapter I11

Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

87

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

88

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

88

Conventional Weapons Issues

Small arms and light weapons

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Reference in text 59/74

Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them

1l 8

59/86

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

1l 8

Practical disarmament measures 59/82

Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures

119

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures 59/90

Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems

119

59/92

Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms

120

5915 15

Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

120

Meeting of the States parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 59/107

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Anti-personnel mines 59/84

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Chapter IV

Regional Disarmament

Nuclear-weapon-freezones 59/63

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East


59/73

Mongolia's international security and nuclearweapon-free status

157

59/85

Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

157

5915 13

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in Central Asia

l60

Conventional disarmament at regional levels Maintenance of international security - goodneighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe

l60

Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

l58

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

159


159

Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

159

591108

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

160

Chapter V

Other issues

59/59

Terrorism and disarmament 59/80

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Outer space 59/65


Information technology and security

'


Reference in text 5916 1


179

59/62

Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

179

Relationship between disarmament and development 59/78

Relationship between disarmament and development

Multilateralism and disarmament 59/69

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including verification of compliance 59/60


59/68

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Chapter V1

Institutional Aspects

Conference on Disarmament 591104


Disarmament Commission 591105


Reform of the First Committee 59/95

Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee

SSOD IV 5917 1

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

187


Department for Disarmament Affairs and its Regional Centres 59/97

United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

59/98

United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament

59/99

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

591100

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

591101

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

Chapter V11

Studies and Information

59193

United Nations study on disarmament and nonproliferation education

591103

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

APPENDIX X

List of reports and notes of the Secretary-General Agenda item 58

Maintenance of international security - gosdneighbourliness, stability and development in SouthEastern Europe Maintenance of international security - goodneighbourliness, stability and development in SouthEastern Europe

Agenda item 59


AI591453


Agenda item 60


Al591454, AI591116 and Add. 1


Agenda item 61

Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

Agenda item 62


AI591456


Agenda item 63


The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Agenda item 64


AI591458


Agenda item 65

General and complete disarmament

AI591459

General and complete disarmament

(c)

Disarmament and non-proliferation education

(4

Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament Relationship between disarmament and development Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weaponfree status Missiles Regional disarmament Conventional arms subregional levels

control at

the regional and

Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology Confidence-building measures in the regional and su bregional context Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

List of SG ' S Reports Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons " Reducing nuclear danger Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction Nuclear disarmament Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects Agenda item 66

Review and Implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly Review and Implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

United Nations Regional Disarmament in Africa

Centre for

United Nations Regional Centre for Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific United Nations disarmament

regional

Peace and Peace

and

centres for peace

and

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use o f Nuclear Weapons Regional confidence-building measures: activities o f the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa Agenda item 67

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

(c)


(4


Agenda item 68


AI5 9146 2


Agenda item 69

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Agenda item 70

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region Strengthening of security and Mediterranean region

Agenda item 71

472

cooperation


in

the

List of SG 'S Reports

A/59/465


Agenda item 72


A/5 9/4 66



A P P E N D I X XI

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABM

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

AFCONE

African Commission on Nuclear Energy (inplementing mechanism of the Pelindaba Treaty)

APEC

ASEAN Pacific Economic Cooperation

APLs

anti-personnel landmines

APMs

anti-personnel mines

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEM

Asia Europe Meeting

ASTOP

Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation

ATT

Arms Trade Treaty

AU

African Union

BCPR

Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)

BICC

Bonn International Centre for Convention

BMD

ballistic missile defence

BMS

bienniel meeting of States parties to coniser the implementation of the Programme of Action on SALW

BOMVIC

Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Centre

BWC

Biological Weapons Convention


C5

the five Central Asian States

CANWFZ

Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone

CARICOM

Caribbean Community

CASA

Coordinating Action on Small Arms

CBMs

confidence-building measures

CBW

chemical and biological weapons

ccws

Certain Conventional Weapons

CD

Conference on Disarmament

CENA

Centre d'etudes d' Afrique noire

CFE

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CHR

Commission on Human Rights

CICA

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia

CICAD

Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission

CICTE

Inter American Committee against Terrorism

CIFTA

Consultative Committee of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials

CMC

Cooperative Monitoring Center (US Sandia National Laboratories)

CNCCAI

National Commission for the Monitoring and Collection of Illicit Arms

COARM

Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (European Union)

COPAX

Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa

CPPNM

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

CSBMs

confidence- and security- building measures


CSCAP

Council for Security and Cooperation in the AsiaPacific

CTBT


CTBTO

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

CTC

Counter-Terrorism Committee

CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

DDR

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

DDA

Department for Disarmamemt Affairs

DESA

Department for Economic and Social Affairs

DEW

directed energy weaponry

DNP

disarmament and non-proliferation education

DPI

Department for Public Information

DPKO

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DPRK


DU

depleted uranium

EAPC

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EAPCCO

Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization

ECAAR

Economists Allied for Arms Reduction

ECCAS

Economic Community of Central African States

ECLAC

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

ECOMOG

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ECPS

Executive Committee on Peace and Security


ECS

Experts Communicating System

EEA

European Economic Area

EFTA

European Free Trade Association

EISAS

Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

ESDP

European Security and Defence Policy

EU

European Union

FMCT

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

FMT

Fissile Material Treaty

FOC

Friends of the Chair

FSC

Forum for Security Cooperation (OSCE)

GC1

Global Communications Infrastructure

GCS

Global Control System

GICHD

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

GRIP

Groupe de Recherche et dlInformation sur la Paix et la Securite (Belgium)

GSI

Global Security Institute

HCOC

Hague Code of Conduct (see ICOC)

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IANSA

International Action Network on Small Arms

ICBL

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

ICGEB

International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology

ICJ

International Court of Justice

478


ICOC

International code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (also HCOC)

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IDC

International Data Centre

IFRCRCS

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IFRI

Institut francais des relations internacionales

IMO

International Maritime Organization

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

IMS

International Monitoring System

IMSMA

Information Management System for Mine Action System

INSServ

International Nuclear Security Advisory Service

INPRO

International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles

IOM

International Organization for Migration

ISIS

Institute of Security and International Studies

ISU

Implementation Support Unit (of the GICHD)

JDEC

Joint Data Exchange Center

KFOR

International Security Force in Kosovo

LAS

League of Arab States

MANPADS

Man Portable Air Defence Systems

MD1

Monitoring, Database and Information Branch of DDA

MESA

Middle East and South Asian States

MIRV

multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle

MTCR

Missile Technology Control Regime


MONUC

Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Moscow Treaty

see SORT

MOTAPM

mines other than anti-personnel mines

MOU

memorandum of understanding

MTCR

Missile Technology Control Regime

NAC

New Agenda Coalition

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

NAMSA

NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs

non-governmental organizations

NMD

national missile defence

NPT

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSG

Nuclear Suppliers Group

NWFZ

Nuclear-weapon-free zone

NNWS

non-nuclear-weapon State

NWS

nuclear-weapon State

OAS

Organization of American States

OAU

Organization of African Unity

OEWG

Open-Ended Working Group on tracing illicit small arms and light weapons

OL A

Office of Legal Affairs

OPANAL

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

OPCW

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OSCC

Open Sky Consultative Commission

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

480


on-site inspection Office of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict PAROS

prevention of an arms race in outer space

PCASED

Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in Africa

PETN

Pentaerythritoltetranitrate (one of the strongest known high explosives)

PP

Partnership for Peace

PIC

Peace Implementation Council (Dayton Agreement)

PM&E

participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques

PoA

UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

PSI

Proliferation Security Initiative

PTBT

Partial Test-Ban Treaty

PTS

Provisional Technical Secretariat (CTBTO)

PWG

Policy Working Group (United Nations and terrorism)

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

RACVIAC

Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre

RCMP

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RGSA

Reference Group on Small Arms

RMA

Revolution in Military Affairs

SACSQCA

Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

SAB

Scientific Advisory Board (OPCW)

SADC

Southern African Development Community


SALSA

Small Arms and Light Weapons Administration

SALW

small arms and light weapons

SARPCCO

Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization

SAS

Small Arms Survey

SATCRA

Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa

SCA

Stockpiles of conventional ammunition

SCBMs

Security and confidence-building measures

SCE

Standing Committee of Experts

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEANWFZ

South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone

SEE

South East Europe

SEECP

South-East European Cooperation Process

SEE1

South-East Europe Initiative (NATO)

SEESAC

South Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

SFOR

Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SIGA

Integrated Weapons Management System

SIPRI

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLBM

submarine-launched ballistic missile

SORT

Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty)

SPSEE

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

SS1

Swedish Radiation Protection Authority

SSOD

special session on disarmament

SSRC

Social Science Research Council

482


START

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (I, I1 and 111)

SweFOR

Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation

TMD

theatre missile defence

UNAJ

United Nations Association of Japan

UNCED

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNDC

United Nations Disarmament Commission

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNEP

United Nations Environmental Programme

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNIFEM

United Nations Development Fund for Women

UN-LiREC

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

UNISPACE

United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMOVIC

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNODC

United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime

UNSCOM

United Nations Special Commission

VCC

Verification Coordinating Committee (NATO)

VEREX

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint

VERTIC

Verification Research, Training and Information Centres

WA

Wassenaar Arrangement

WAANSA

West African Network on Small Arms


WC0

World Customs Organization

WFSA

World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities

WHO

World Health Organization

WILPF

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

WTO

World Trade Organization

SELECTIVE INDEX

A reference to a chapter indicates the main place in The Yearbook where a subject is discussed. For information concerning the titles and sponsorship of resolutions, refer to Appendix VII. For the status of treaties, see Appendix I.

A Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2 12-2 14 membership, 226 recommendations to High-level Panel, 166 Africa, 138- 144 Regional Centre, 142-1 44 Algeria explanation of vote 59/91,65 Americas, 145-148 Latin America & Caribbean Regional Centre, 145- 148 anti-personnel mines, 113- 1 15 Nairobi summit & declaration, 97, 113-115 resolution on, 121 Argentina explanation of vote 59/67,63 arms limitation and disarmament agreements, l87 resolutions on, 187- l 8 9 ASEAN, 136 Asia and the Pacific, 148-151 Regional Centre, 149- 15 1 Australia explanation of vote 591106, 60 Australia Group, 86-87

B bilateral agreements, 28 biological weapons, 76-80 resolution on, 87 Meeting of Experts, 76-78 Meeting of States Parties, 78-80 Brazil explanation of vote 59178,171 59/91,64

C Canada on behalf of Australia & New Zealand explanation of vote 59169,186 CASA mechanism, 93, 101-103 Ceratin Conventional Weapons, 91 Amended Protocol II,94, 1 15- 116 Meeting of States Parties, 1O6- l08 Meetings of Governmental Experts , 108-1 12 resolution on, 121 chemical weapons, 8 1-84 resolution on, 88 OPCW, 82-84 China explanation of vote 59/75, 5 1 59176, 53

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 59/77, 55 59184,122 59/91,65 Colombia explanation of vote 59/75,52 59/76, 54 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 18-20 PrepCom for CTBTO, 19-20 Conference on Disarmament, 20-27, 209-2 1 1 resolution on, 220 Conventional arms transfers, 104- 105 resolutions on, 1 19- 12 1 conventional disarmament, 138- l56 Cuba explanation of vote 59/66,66 59167,63 59/77,55 59184,122 59186,119 59190,120 59191,64 59/94,58

D DDA, 2O7,Z 15-2 18 disarmament & non-proliferation education implementation of recommendations, 234-240 resolution on, 246 disarmament and development, 180-181 Governmental Experts, 180- 1 8 1 resolution on, 181 Disarmament Commission, 2 1 1-2 12 resolution on, 221 disarmament fellowship, training and advisory, 2 14-2 15 resolution on, 223

disarmament information programme, 240-246 messenger of peace, 245-246 NGOS, 243-244 resolution on, 246 stamp, 245 web site, 241-243 DPRK nuclear programme, 28

E Egypt explanation of vote 59160,188 59181,56 59186,118 59/91,64 Europe, 152-1.56 European Union, 153- 154 explanation of vote 59169, 186 Explosive Remnants of War, 97, 107 See Certain Conventional Weapons export controls, 43-45

F First Committee agenda items, 227-230 resolution on, 222 fissile material, 16, 21, 24-27 France explanation of vote 59/81, 57 on behalf o f US & UK 59/75, 5 1

6 gender (& disarmament), 183- l85 Germany explanation of vote 59/5 14, 60 59/75, 52 59/76, 54

Global Threat Reduction Initiative, 39, 48-49

Hague Code of Conduct, 42-43 High-level Panel of the SG, 163-167 human rights (& disarmament), 174-1 78 human security, 177

I IAEA DPRK, 1 5 , 3 1 Egypt, 34 Iran, 3, 14, 31-32 Iraq, 34-35 Libya, 32-33,41 nuclear safety & security, 35-40 ROK, 33-34 safeguards, 33-35 verification, 29-35 India explanation of vote 591106, 60 59160,188 59173,157 59/75,52 59/76, 53 59/77,55 59184,122 59185,157 59187,158 59188,159 59/91,64 Indonesia explanation of vote 59/91,64 59194,59 information security, 178-179 resolutions on, 179- l 8 0 Iran explanation of vote 59160,188

59/76,53 59/86,ll9 59/91,64 Israel explanation of vote 591106, 59 591109, 61 59163,156 59181, 57

J Japan explanation of vote 59160,188 59/67,63 59/75,52 59/77,55 59/83, 58

L Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Centre, 146- 148 League of Arab States, 151- 152 Libya explanation of vote 59184,122

M MANPADS, 95-96, 109,110, 111-1 12 Mexico explanation of vote 59/91,64 military expenditures, 96, 104, 106 missiles & related issues, 41-43 MTCR, 44-45 Morocco explanation of vote 59/84,123 multilateralism (& disarmament), 185 resolution on, 185 Myanmar

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2004 explanation of vote

59184.122

Negative security assurances, 27 Nepal explanation of vote 59/84,12 2 Netherlands explanation of vote on behalf of Benelux countries, Germany and Norway 59/83,57 on behalf of the EU 591109, 61 59/67,62 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT, 2,5-18 PrepCom for 2005, 5- 18 non-strategic nuclear weapons, 13 nuclear safety & security, 35-40 Nuclear Suppliers Group, 43-44 nuclear terrorism, 29 nuclear-weapon-free zones, 135- l38 resolutions on, 156- 158

Oman explanation of vote 59/91,64 Outer space, 171-1 73 PAROS, 171-173 resolution on, 173

Pakistan explanation of vote 591109, 62 59160,187 59/75,52 59/76, 53

59/80,171

59/91,64 political declarations, 46-50 Practical Disarmament Measures, 104 resolution on, 119 Proliferation Security Initiative, 4, 24, 47

radiological weapons, 4 1 Regional Centres, 2 18-220 resolutions on, 223 regional disarmament resolutions on, 158- l 6 0 Register of Conventional Arms, 104-106 composite table, 124- 129 Republic of Korea explanation of vote 59/64,50 59/67,62,63 59/75,52 59/77,55 59184,122 Resolution 1540,67, 74 Russian Federation explanation of vote 59/67,63 59/81,57 59184,122 59/91,65

Security Council resolution 154O,45 Singapore explanation of vote 59184,122 small arms and light weapons, 92,95, 97- 104 military expenditures reporting instruments, 12 3 open-ended working group, 95, 99

Programme of Action, 95, 98 resolutions on, 1 18- 1 19 Spain explanation of vote 59175,5 1 59185,158 START I & 11, 1-2 studies disarmament & development, 232-233 illicit brokering in SALW, 234 information security, 233 missiles in all its aspects, 233 non-proliferation education, 234-240 verification, 233 Sudan explanation of vote 59191,65 Sweden explanation of vote on behalf o f NAC 59/76, 5 3 59194,58 Switzerland explanation of vote 59/75,52 Syria explanation of vote 591109, 62 59176,54 59/91,65

terrorism (& disarmament) nuclear terrorism, 29 Terrorism and disarmament, 167- 170 resolution on, 170

U UNIDIR, 245-246 United Kingdom explanation of vote

59160,188 59178,182 59/81,57 United States explanation of vote 591107, 121 591109, 61 59160,188 59168,189 59176, 5 3 59/78, 182 59181,56 UNMOVIC, 74-76,84-86

W Wassenaar Arrangement, 1 16- 1 17 weapons of mass destruction, 4, 20-21, 47-49, 66-67


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