Towards an Evolutionary Pragmatics of Science Author(s): Asher Idan and Aharon Kantorovich Source: Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1985), pp. 47-66 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25170700 . Accessed: 09/02/2011 12:28 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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an Evolutionary
Towards
IDAN - AHARON
ASHER
of Science
Pragmatics
KANTOROVICH
Zusammenfassung Fundamentismus setzte Positionen rie. Zwischen neuere
Arbeiten
Fundamentismus Ansatze.
den Evolutionismus. ihnen gibt es einen dritten Standpunkt, von Putnam (1979). Im Gegensatz (1978) und Stegmiiller der Evolutionismus auch dynamische beriicksichtigt
Stegmiiller
folgend
entlehnen
Gesichtspunkte, losophie pragmatische zu ersetzen. Wir Fundamentismus, wie Problemen Erkenntniswachstum, und Entdeckung nicht-fundamentistischer Vorschlag
wissenschaftliche Theorie
und Skeptizismus-Anarchismus sind zwei entgegenge und in der modernen Erkenntnistheorie Wissenschaftstheo
("Foundationism") in der traditionellen
sind zwei Beispiele zum logisch-statischen und naturalistische
aus der wir in der vorliegenden Untersuchung Sprachphi um die die Werkzeuge des logische Syntax und Semantik, von die Kraft der Pragmatik bei der Behandlung zeigen TheorienBegriffswechsel, beim Problem besonders der
ist ein heuristisches
Modell,
und Bedeutungsdynamik, Unser Inkommensurabilitat.
das auf der modernen
genetischen
basiert.
0. INTRODUCTION:
FROM FOUNDATIONISM TO EVOLUTIONISM
was the dominant view in modern since the Foundationism Epistemology of the foundationists and empiricists) were 17th century. Most (rationalists and theories as static entities. Hume's logicists and treated scientific method was directed towards foundationism. Feyerabend's scepticism epistemological foundationism towards modern and anarchism was directed (falsificationist verificationist). of science such as Quine, Kuhn, On the other hand, modern philosophers and Stegmiiller, have argued from their various points of Toulmin, McMullin view
that
the
staticist
which
approach,
analyzes
as
science
a static
of
corpus
should be replaced by a dynamical one, and that the logicist knowledge else. be should Furthermore, Feyerabend replaced by something approach (1976) and others showed that logicism and staticism have (1975), McMullin The reason is that foundationists the same root: foundationism. try to find a secure ("hard rock") basis for evaluating our knowledge (both in the empirical the scientific and in the mathematical sciences sciences), by "freezing" into static units, i. e. statements, and validating or falsifying them by products means of logic. let us draw a diagram inwhich we can locate the For the sake of orientation, are encountered which various basic approaches through the history of the two in epistemology and The basic of science. oppositions philosophy methodology,
formalism,
foundationism
can be described
vs.
non-foundationism
by drawing
two axes
and
formalism
to construct
oppositions: Zeitschrift fiir allgemeineWissenschaftstheorie XVI/1 (1985) ? Franz SteinerVerlagWiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart
vs.
non
a square of
Idan
48 Asher
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
Formalism A
B
C
Verificationism Falsificationism
Explicationism
Foundationism Intuitionist
Non-Foundationism
Scepticism Anarchism
Methodology
A
D V
Non-Formalism
in the philosophy of science was The first modern the development and non-formalistic transition from intuitionistic methods (Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Mill) at A, to formalist-logicist approach (both inductive and deduc tive) at B. Then, in the last decades, a new approach emerged which consists of a descriptive, is not non-normative of scientific method which explication to be founded on a secure basis, at C. Point D represents both intended Hume's anarchism, or in general, epistemological scepticism and Feyerabend's relativism.
between C and The new naturalized may be located midway epistemology since it might employ formal scientific tools, but not as an end in itself. are fully Putnam and Stegmuller We think that unlike their predecessors, aware of the following two requirements: as the root of staticism 1. the need for a total abandonment of foundationism
D,
and logicism. 2. the need for an integration the of the dynamical approach with as a basic naturalistic approach into evolutionism approach for understanding science.
are To sum up, logicism and staticism, which are implied by foundationism as evolutionism naturalism and shown by respectively, dynamicism replaced in in the following table:
Basic Philosophy
Method
and Tool
FOUNDATIONISM
LOGICISM
EVOLUTIONISM
NATURALISM
The Approach
to Change
STATICISM DYNAMICISM
Towards
an
Evolutionary
Pragmatics
of Science
49
is a doctrine of the kind suggested by Quine in "Epistemology Naturalism as a natural science, and Naturalized" (1968) for treating epistemology by a science of science. Tondle (1973), Sneed (1976) and others for developing is a doctrine of the kind which has emerged from Lakatos' Dynamicism Lakatos carried some aspects of Kuhn's ideas into the Popperian methodology. and Poppers's static theory (i. e. theory scheme and replaced Kuhn's paradigm as a set of statements) by a new methodological unit, the scientific research program. This entity is characterized by two main elements, the hard core and heuristic. McMullin the positive (1976) takes one step further towards a his suggestion to treat a research program in an holistic dynamical approach by manner as a unified and continuously rather developing body of knowledge, is falsified in its turn. Yet, than as a series of successive theories, each of which or dynamical view are mixed with the developmental aspects of McMullin's since criticizes Lakatos' he falsificationism from a traditional ones, logicist view when he asks whether the of positive heuristic can be logicist's point from the hard core. We will show (in Section 3) that there is no deduced in contrast between falsificationism and evolutionism, necessary contradiction can even be with McMullin falsificationism (1976), and that dynamical McMullin into evolutionism. suggests using the term "theory" integrated the non-statement instead of "research program," view of having in mind seems to us more theories. We will which suggest another terminology, illuminative. to two different between levels (or categories) Let us make a distinction theories and research programs belong. Lakatos makes this distinction which in other places he does not and thus in some places, while (at least implicitly) Lakatos' theory is an ambiguous one. The two levels are the level of ideas and schemes about the object of scientific research and the level of conceptual is seen from scientific activity as a human activity. The first level is that which constructs theories about his who the viewpoint of the scientist object of the is and traditional clarified and which research, explicated by analyzed, or logician. This is the level of scientific products which the methodologist of science assesses. scientist produces and the traditional philosopher e. g., the theorist is seen by the meta-scientist The second level is that which or studies the activity of the psychologist, who of science, the sociologist, scientists
who
conduct
research,
their
cognition,
language,
action
and
presup
as theories, hard cores and their peripheries, and positions. Thus, entities such to and Lakatosian first level. the statements, belong Whereas, negative positive heuristic, instructions, plans of action, procedures (see Dascal and Idan, 1982) and institutions belong to the second level. Like all human beings, scientists are on their actions. Thus, a research dual creatures. They act and contemplate the world about information program generates (the first level), and at the to do in order to same time it is a plan and a frame about how and what to information. that and improve produce to apply the science of science to the second level. An It is natural this level is the pragmatics of science, which can appropriate tool for describing
50 Asher
be regarded Stegmiiller's
Idan
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
as an extension of the pragmatics for the pragmatization suggestion
of language. By of methodology:
turn out to be a starting perhaps which has been overdue for a long pragmatics an of 'concepts pragmatic kind' unquestionable situations and human institutions, to knowledge to historical time interval, tion test procedures, "it may
this, we
follow
for a systematic point time. We shall speak of if they refer to persons and beliefs, to confirma etc."
(1979:29)
it with other ideas We will enrich Stegmiiller's by integrating suggestion of language such as the importance of use (Wittgenstein from the philosophy between and constitutive rules (Searle 1953), and the distinction regulative 1971). The content of the two levels of science is shown in the following table:
Tools of Analysis
Discipline
Level
1
Logic of Science
Level
2
Science Science
Syntax and Semantics of
Pragmatics
Object of Study Theory hard Action
Lakatos' Terminology and Theories cores Positive
&
negative I Heuristics j
1. Logic
as One
1.1. The Poverty
of Several Regulative
Systems
of Methodological
Rules
of Logicism
was dominant in the first half of the twentieth century, has Logicism, which of mathematics of the foundations its origin in the domain (mainly Frege and in the program (1968) argues that the logicist-reductionist Russell). Quine was a as standard for mathematics used of foundations epistemo comparative for the philosophy of science. logy in general and specifically two insurmountable in the logicist inherent difficulties found Quine one and the other and in science: in mathematics program concerning meaning to clarify how about The truth. is, meaning question concerning conceptual some means in will be defined that of such definitions, concepts concepts by terms of other concepts. The doctrinal question about truth is how to establish rules by proving them, such that some will be proven from others. From the to logic in the set theory in addition point of view, employing conceptual set theory does not was disappointing because reduction of mathematics to clarification. As to the doctrinal question, Quine contribute says:
Towards
an Evolutionary
Pragmatics
of Science
51
that no consistent from Godel's work axioms can cover we renounce when self evidence. remains Reduction not it does but do what the fascinating, philosophically epistemologist
"We know mathematics
should like of it." (1968:70)
to the above-mentioned standard from the founda comparative According in (1912) and Carnap in (1928), tried to reduce Russell tions of mathematics, sense to From the experience. conceptual point of view empirical knowledge this meant to define physical bodies in terms of sense data. From the doctrinal our about empirical truths in knowledge point of view, this meant to justify terms
of
sense
data.
and Carnap's argues that both Russell's program project do not the Humean criticism on the possibility of such a reduction (the Humean the above-mentioned suggests abandoning scepticism). Thus, Quine sense or of construction from of bodies data, program logical physical original from any other "hard rock" basis, and asks: Quine overcome
"Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle . . .That was disallowed in earlier time as circular for psychology? (1968:76)
reasoning."
to Quine, this circularity arises when one tries to justify empirical According sciences by empirical psychological research. This circularity will disappear if one stop dreaming of deducing science from observation. two mistakes were committed here by founda Thus, according to Quine, tionists : 1. the project of logical construction of the physical bodies from some kind of "hard rock" basis (sense data for example); 2. the "dream" of deducing He suggests, therefore, science from observation. that the logicist approach in should be replaced by a naturalistic which we simply try to approach understand
the
link
between
observation
and
science
and
not
to
justify
science.
ismade by the logicist There is an additional methodological mistake which who copies from natural science the method of treating isolated or "ideal" systems (as first approximations), ignoring their dynamics and the interactions with other (external) systems or phenomena for the sake of formalization. However when logicists develop their theories of science, they treat them not as first approximations but as the concrete reality of science. Thus, Feyerabend says about this approach: "The domain is separated from the rest of history and given a logic of its own. A a logic then conditions those working thorough training in such itmakes their actions more uniform and it freezes in the domain: large parts of the historical process as well." (1975:19) links logicism with staticism ("freeze") in methodology. Feyerabend are mainly mistakes the logical above three misconceptions concerning a the There is fourth of of science. mistake concerning capacities philosophers of scientists. that of argues (1974) philosophers logical capacities Suppes
Here
The
52 Asher
Idan
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
scientists science charitably assume that practicing write logically. But, as Moulines and Sneed explain
usually Suppes'
work, ideas:
infer and
"it is not always clear how different theories are related to each other and to their applications - the features of the world they tell us about. Even as in the physical science of rigor regarded usually paradigm inways that practicing scientists rarely express themselves professionally clear answers to questions like this . . . such ambiguity and provide in the literature of ongoing fuzziness may be quite harmless empirical sciences." (1979:61) remarks refer to drawbacks of logicism and lead us to suggest, to that it would better be stop treating logic as the dominant following Quine, of the rules which system (thus forming a activity define methodological - see next we one treat constitutive Instead, may system Section). logic as of of rules the several complementary which systems regulate methodological a regulative system). Other activity (thus forming regulative systems of science are metaphysics for 1975), Technology (see, example, Agassi, (Agassi, 1975, use of and the 1976), language (Kuhn, 1962). Stegmuller, We call this plurality of regulative the separation of powers in systems, in the with well-known revolutionary suggestion methodology, analogy by the 18th century political-philosopher, (1755): Montesquieu The
above
"there are three sorts of on the things depend matters that depend on power be not separated
power: the legislative: the executive law of nations: and the executive the civil war . . . there is no liberty if from the legislative and executive."
in respect to in regard to the judiciary (p. 151?152)
It is just natural that after throwing away the king of methodology, i.e. logic, come instead. Pluralism should replace any kind of else would someting monism: of the church, the authority of the tyrant, of experience (in of reason (in rationalism), and of a crowned method empiricism or positivism), (in logicism). 1.2. Pluralism,
Anarchism,
and the Authority
of Method
Searle (1971) argues that scepticism and anarchism (of Wittgenstein's kind) in the philosophy of language stem from a failure to distinguish between remarks: different sorts of rules, in a way which he explains in the following "Some
form of behavior: for (rules) regulate antecedently existing the rules of but example, etiquete regulate interpersonal relationships, these relationships exist independently of the rules of etiquete. Some rules, on the other hand, do not merely regulate but create or define new for example, do not merely forms of behavior. The rules of football, as it were creates the possibility the of but of or football, game regulate rules." defines that activity ... I call the latter kind of rules constitutive
(1971: 41)
Towards
an
Evolutionary
Pragmatics
of Science
53
from the domain of philosophy Let us carry Searle's distinction of language over to the domain of the philosophy of science. Searle, himself, borrowed his in the philosophy from Rawls' distinction distinction of law. Scientific activity one of the various kinds of institutional and individual activities of man. is just rules is appropriate between for The distinction regulative and constitutive of the interaction between the speaker and the explaining important aspects linguistic institution and between the citizen and the political institution. Thus, will that this distinction also be appropriate it is not unreasonable for some of essential the interaction between the scientist and aspects explaining etc. scientific institutions such as empirical evidence, metaphysics, technology, were states Before Montesquieu the authorities, many suggested separating one authority served as the source etc.) which (king, aristocracy, governed by or state. of for of a constitutive the The three authorities rules, laws, system serve as three regulative systems of rules for the suggested by Montesquieu state. These three regulative systems are connected with each other in a circular In politics, it is widely and circularity is way. accpeted now that plurality since in such a system there is room for criticism, control better than monism that Quine and improvement of the activity of each authority. It is no wonder in showing how the traditional argument against circularity (1968) succeeded will disappear if one stop looking for a logical justification which is a kind of in methodology. monism to Popper (1945), an open society (of citizens, of scientists, etc.) According can develop only by plurality and circularity of authorities. Methodological a constitutive system in science are two of the main pluralism and the lack of reasons for the dynamics and flux in science. One can compare the regulative with the static-constitutive system of rules of system of rules of methodology we to in be that what order convinced call power separation games (like chess) is very important for scientific evaluation. Circular in methodology justifica can now be seen in new light. They can be tion and ad-hoc modifications a the different institu process between regarded as the product of feedback tions and between the systems of rules and the working scientists. The system rather than unchangeable. The scientist himself modifies of rules is dynamic the rules, not as amatter of caprice, but by taking account of constraints like and human relevance intellectual the influ abilities; rationality, cooperation, ence of scientific progress and cultural change is essential. In Sections 2 and 3, we attempt to trace the patterns of the evolution of the methodological rules. 2. Pragmatics 2.1. Pragmatics:
of Science
Language
as a Branch
of the Science
of Science
and Science
of the science of science such as history, branches linguistics, deal with the and mainly empirical aspects of science. sociology, psychology and system-theoretical such as the logic of science and set Branches, to science, deal mainly with the formal theoretical aspects of approaches of science should be an interdisciplinary branch which science. Pragmatics Other
54 Asher
Idan
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
on both levels: formal and empirical. It emerged in the philosophy of Austin, language and linguistics, mainly through the works of Wittgenstein, tool for linguistic investigations was Piaget and Searle. Its role as a powerful one In the section we mentioned by Bar-Hillel. previous emphasized use it in the of science: is Searle's and its concept philosophy pragmatic and regulative rules. between constitutive distinction uses of various non-intentional) (1979) mentions (probably Stegmuller works of and others. in the notions Lakatos Kuhn, Sneed, Kuhn, pragmatical notion of "paradigm" from Wittgen the well-known for example, borrowed stein's philosophy of language (1953). Stegmuller concentrates mainly on the aspects of the general use of language. Thus, it can be applied sociopragmatical to the specific use of language by scientists and to their actions (Dascal and Idan, 1982). operates
2.2 Action
and Knowledge
in Science
in his criticism Habermas of the (1979) has followed Apel Recently, to of of science and semantical program reducing philosophy syntactical of the language of science. Habermas investigations points out that there is an roots in "abstraction this its in Carnap's program reduction which has fallacy" occurs reasons someone This when for (1934). fallacy usually methodological on one aspect of a given concentrates and it from the abstracts phenomena other aspects as if they do not exist, and after a certain period, he or his one aspect as the whole followers This fallacy is regard that phenomena. in Section 1.1. similar to the "isolationist" policy of the logicist mentioned program about the logic of science which Apel mentions Carnap's ignores reasons at the initial stages of the aspects for methodological pragmatical program, and after a certain period he regards the language of science and the natural language as mainly semantical and syntactical phenomena. comes in the introduction, Thus, Stegmuller's (1979), mentioned suggestion at the right time. Stegmuller concentrates on two main issues: 1. of holding a 2. it. and the evolution of theories. using theory Against Montague's logic of science (1974) - which is a powerful extension of Carnap's program mentioned above - Stegmuller argues that it is practically unable to treat non-propositio nal aspects such as intentions, scientific acts, and other social and cognitive aspects
of
science.
on the one side, think that the difference between Carnap and Montague on the other, stems from their different and Habermas and Stegmuller to the relation of knowledge to language and action. The former approaches users of the the contexts of use of theories and and of aspects ignores dynamical of scientific language. Their attitude has its roots in the long tradition of and language. Although aspect of knowledge ignoring action as a fundamental we can find references to action in the works of Descartes and his followers, We
the importance of action has been fully recognized only by the philosophers of and Marx), and by evolutionist praxis (mainly Hegel (mainly philosophers
an Evolutionary
Towards
Pragmatics
of Science
55
who followed Piaget Bergson). Piaget, who followed Bergson, and Vygotsky, on and and Marx, base their developmental linguistics genetical epistemology the basis of theories of action. Piaget (1959) and (1979) argues that both the cognitive and the linguistic capacities emerge partly from body actions in the took place mainly in continental sensory-motor period. These developments philosophy. are rigourosly In the Anglo-American the formal approaches world, on stress recasts the and Austin's action. Austin challanged by Wittgenstein's of various problems into the broad context of the discussion discussion of human
action
and
in
behaviour
general.
on
concentrates
He
the
of:
question
to Do Things with Words" deal with the (1962), and his followers can acts. We notion of ask: what about acts?" and "scientific speech important what about speech acts in the language of science? and (1953, 1966) are deeply effected by Gestalt Psychology Polanyi's works stresses his "tacit the notion by Piaget. By knowledge", Polanyi importance of to the of his for the and relevance actions scientist praxis shaping his thought is of a that much of the scientist's work and knowledge. argues Polanyi or a a nature which needs lot of like tacit bicycle swimming, riding practical is This of kind learned knowledge mainly by non-explicit knowledge. practical and this puts a limit to any absolute formalization is (which training, "How
Montague's
ideal).
3. The Pragmatics 3.1. Incommensurability
of the Problem
of Incommensurability
as an Interdisciplinary
(1979), follows Putnam Stegmuller of incommensurability: problems
Problem
(1975), who
says
in his view
of
the
"We do not have to agree with Sir Karl Popper or with Paul Feyerabend between the existence of that there is an incompatability accepting radical paradigm change in science and accepting the idea of a growth of and Feyerabend differ on objective (of course, Popper knowledge to or of objective whether reject radical paradigm change growth can have our paradigm shift and our objective We knowledge). too." (1975:281) knowledge to deal with the problem of commensurability in (1978) Putnam continues We will show how where he calls it "the convergence they problem". one another. We will first present the two solutions and suggest complement solution can be integrated with the that the semantical aspects of Putnam's can be used to Our solution. of aspects synthesis Stegmuller's pragmatical of science, but also in traditional solve problems not only in the philosophy and in linguistics and common sense knowledge. There is no reason philosophy such as scientific research program and paradigm should not be notions why to We may talk about philosophical research programs applied philosophy. or compare the dynamics of the meanings of notions like: and paradigms,
56 Asher
"Atom",
"D. N. A."
"Truth",
"God",
3.2 Putnam
Idan
etc., with
"method"
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
the dynamics
of the meaning
of notions
like:
etc.
on the Convergence
of Scientific
Knowledge
in (1978) uses evolutionary Putnam and pragmatical "instru arguments ments" in his criticism of staticism and of logicism. While Stegmiiller's a evolutionism (1979) is mainly heuristic-methodological principle, Putnam refers to biological evolutionism: "Something Marx did teach all students of society is that social forms succeed one another somewhat as species of trees succeed one another in a for the appearance of the favorable conditions forest, one providing next." (1978:59) as a kind of social form, we can get if we look at the paradigm a not an evolutionary but more specifically, immediately merely dynamical, to view of research programs. will continue this idea in our (We develop in Putnam attacks Section 4.) logicism by his evolutionary synthesis explicitly considerations: Thus,
"Human functional organization evolved over one to two million years. no reason must that it have a description There is that would fit into one ... even or to into the Bodelian Library deduce any characteriza book, tion at all of such matters from a hypothetical of our description functional
human
organization
race will
have
may
well
long ceased
require
before
so much
"real
time"
such a deduction
that
the
is carried
out!"
He
also attacks "Some
logicism
by pragmatical
considerations
like this one:
non-scientific is presupposed by science, knowledge a term "true" is that "refers" and foundamental arguing science." (1978:73) precise
I have been in logic - a
account of the positivist's Putnam first presents Boyde's of philosophy to a must science which better of the according theory imply many sentences of the earlier theory. Boyde thinks that scientists try to observation of the earlier theory as long as possible. Then they try preserve the mechanisms to keep the old observational and incorporate the old observational predictions or the data. This procedure led to important discoveries (like that of Neptune positron). is based on two beliefs: The above-mentioned procedure 1. Terms in a mature science typically refer, and true. 2. the laws of a theory in amature science are typically approximately are a terms "truth" and in "reference" of the causal explanation Thus, of scientists. Putnam shows that their beliefs serve as successful behavior
Towards
heuristic-regulative
factors
an Evolutionary
Pragmatics
in the processes
of Science
of discovery
57
and of the growth
of
knowledge: field" in a "it is a fact that we can assign a referent to "gravitational a relativity theory (though no of from the Newtonian theory standpoint a referent to Mendel's to "ether" or "phlogiston"): "gene" from the a to Dalton's and referent of molecular present day biology: standpoint "atom" from the standpoint of quantum mechanics. These retrospective a depend on principle which has been called the references assignments of the doubt'." of the benefit (1978:22) 'principle stress on This "benefit of the doubt" is, however, implied by Popper's and by his follower, Lakatos. The principle of the criticism and falsificationism, in the growth of knowledge "benefit of the doubt" usually finds an expression and the of refutations which enable us to make process conjectures through to the refuted from the point of view references theories already retrospective this makes it of the corroborated theory: namely, principle possible to have the on which Popper's content of is based. book-keeping empirical methodology and the evolutionist We can integrate, therefore, falsificationism non-logicist can serve as a semantic of referents and meanings approach. The dynamics which will include an epistemolo component of an evolutionary methodology of kind the suggested by Lakatos, while some of Stegmiiller's gical component ideas can serve as the pragmatical component. about the elimination The connection between of Popper's conception and refutations and Putnam's conception theories by a process of conjectures of the benefit of the doubt and retrospective references is described by Putnam in this way: in molecular is the gene Mendel biology "Surely the gene discussed intended to talk about ... if one believes that the terms of Tt do have referents, then itwill be a constraint on T2, itwill narrow the class of the candidate-theories." (1978:22) A mere logical explanation of "narrowing the class of candidate-theories" kind has much less explanatory than power by a theory of a Popperian Trea multidisciplinary semantical-epistemological-pragmatical explanation. ting intentions and beliefs as pragmatic entities is essential for an understan ding of scientific work and of the dynamics of theories and referents. our for a multidisciplinary is better Furthermore, suggestion explanation terms than a "global" methodological in of and explanation given "simplicity" to show "true predictions," since by means of "global" rules it is difficult for narrowing the class of candidate theories. In this clearly the mechanisms Putnam with McMullin agrees (1976), who argues that: "it would not be point, correct to infer that 'simplicity' was (thus) the criterion governing appraisal of theories" (p. 100). Let us now take one step further towards our synthesis by presenting ideas. Stegmiiller's
58 Asher
3.3. The
Stegmiiller-Sneed
Idan
System
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
and Incommensurability
and other philosophers and Feyerabend (1976) regard Stegmuller's a "Sneedification as In (1979) Stegmuller explained that his of Kuhn". theory an extension and application of the book (1976) was first and foremost to enrichment which Sneed made (he called it "informal semantics") Suppes' of Kuhn's ideas extension of Bourbaki program to science. The reconstruction Kuhn
was
only
a
by-product.
As we
ismainly evolutionism formal and is already indicated, Stegmuller's as a two The main from biology of borrowed ingredients metaphor. are: evolutionism Stegmuller's 1. The differentiation between theories and their applications, and 2. the hierarchial of the fundamental structure, consisting laws, generals laws and more specific laws ismade much more perspicuous by theory nets and core nets than by the method of expanded core (1979:27). This is because the in amore concept of a net enables us to describe the system and its evolution exact and explicit way. The core K is described by Stegmuller as the quadruplet K= xMp, Mpp, M, C?, where Mp is a set of possible models including the is a set of all partial potential models apparatus of theoretical concepts. Mpp the theoretical obtained by eliminating components (thus, remain only the set M is the of all components). pretheoretical possible models satisfying the foundamental laws. C is a set of constraints the constraint of (for example, The core K can be an element of a set of higher rigidity in classical mechanics). order: xK, I, Sc, h? where I is the set of intended applications, Sc is a scientific and h is an historical time interval, such that Sc intends to apply K community, to I during h. This in many ways like: branching, system can develop etc. For detailed of this specialization, overlaping, description development, see (1979:62). framework, Stegmuller argues that there is no By means of this evolutionary for Kuhn's longer place claiming theory to be irrational both in the context of normal science and in the context of revolutions. Stegmuller says about points in normal science : of bifurcation this as saying that at these points 'rationality to surrender to 'subjective therefore have arbitrariness and irrationality'. For 'irrationality' not means the same as one could say Kant's 'theoretical reasoning'. Borrowing terminology, we have to change over that at the points of possible progress branching from the domain of theoretical reason to domain of practical reason."
"One must not interpret come to an end' and
(1979:35) Practical normal
becomes
as a pragmatic
reasoning science.
In
the
context
notion of
is a key notion
revolution
the
"non
in the context statement
of
view"
the key notion:
comes from the statement "Part of the scepticism presumably as classes of sentences. For from thinking of theories
view, i. e. sentences,
Towards
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Pragmatics
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59
seem to be in different language with different vocabulary, on Within the structuralist the other hand, the incompatible. approach, internal structure of different in their core-nets theories, as expressed can be analyzed in the same informal and theory-nets, language" formulated
(1979:35). and Putnam refer to extralinguistic entities as the Thus, both Stegmiiller to Putnam refers basis for intertheoretical references and relations; intentions, and Stegmiiller refers to the acts of using and holding a theory. These entities can be analyzed means of pragmatics or "informal semantics". Thus, only by means of the reduction of Tt to T2 can only be commensurability by are the elements because irreducible. extralinguistic approximate
4. A Model 4.1. A Dual
for
the Analysis
Evolutionary-Genetic
of Incommensurability
Model
McMullin between "hard" suggests (1976) to abandon the sharp distinction and "soft" parts of the hard core of the research program, since there is a or of "hardness" is in whole "softness" McMullin spectrum degrees. By this, full agreement with Stegmiiller's for of revolutions and suggestion degrees with Quine's hierarchial epistemic field (1953) which was borrowed from the Gestalt theory. We think that this suggestion improves Lakatos' notion of hard core. Concerning in Lakatos' methodology, the second central notion the as treats to it if it the level of McMullin theories. heuristic, belongs positive the positive heuristic belongs to a different level. The potentiality of However, comes not in from model from the which isolation, only growth standing theories evolve, but also from the background the knowledge within which is embedded (Kantorovich, model includes 1979). The background knowledge the accepted theories and data, partially besides articulated beliefs which cannot be analyzed by the logicist tools, in the way a well defined set of a can. in The model stands the which basis of research program propositions the theory-versions belongs, therefore, to the tacit level of knowledge, whereas the evolution of science proceeds in two belong to the explicit level. Thus, to thinkers which and failed many scientists) parallel levels, (philosophers we a To this dual borrow describe pattern distinguish. evolutionary dichotomy from biology which at this stage will serve as ametaphor (though it can evolve into a full-fledged from amere metaphor (1974), which theory like Campbell's means that epistemic evolution and biological evolution have similar, if not the same, structure). We refer to the phenotype/genotype dichotomy. Theory can core and the hard and the positive be regarded as "methodological phenotype" heuristic can be regarded as "methodological (Kantorovich, genotype" 1983). The big discovery of modern in genetics was that most of the phenomena are not the organism which can be observed directly or by a simple microscope the causes of heredity but are only products of the genes which are the causes of of an organism is a product of two parallel dynamic heredity. The development
60 Asher
Idan
of the phenotype processes the D. N. A. components: D. N. A. and the phenotype. Fig.
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
two
and of the genotype. The genotype has and the R. N. A. which mediates between
the
1
The Biological Model
The Methodological Model D. N. A.
I
Tacit Elements of a
II I
I
R.N. A.
-n
Core
Hard ^
Research
j Genotypej
J Positive
Program
J
1 Heuristic
I Explicit
The
??
is represented
scheme
developmental
environment
Sets of Statements
Phenotype
Polypeptide
phenotype,
where
the
Theory-Versions
in the formula:
environment
operates
+
genotype on
the
genetic
In science, the of the phenotype. and the result is the development potential the empirical data theory can be regarded as the "methodological phenotype", - as the environmental input and the hard core as the "methodological D. N. A.". The existence of the hard core reflects the Duhem-Quine thesis in the theory can be protected from logical which says that any element refutation. As the presence of the D. N. A. does not ensure the continuity of so the presence of a hard core does the organism during the growth process, not ensure the continuity of the research program (the whole body of to It is the of the tacit task heuristic and positive explicit). knowledge, supply the theory and for adjusting it to and inscriptions for developing the directions the task of the R. N. A. in the growth of the empirical data, in analogy organism.
From
the information-theoretical can
subsystems
be
treated
as an
the system of science or any of its
viewpoint, information
processing
system
analogous
to an
system which adapts to nature (Laszlo, 1972, Kantorovich, 1979). organismic We can distinguish between the "software" and the "hardware" (genotype) of the information processing system. In the flow diagram of a (phenotype) into dynamic system of science (Fig. 2). We separate the theoretical component - the hard core a slowly-changing and the theory part plus positive heuristic which undergoes the components which mediate rapid changes, suppressing the theoretical component the information flow between and "nature". Fig-
2
I-1
HARD CORE + POSITIVE HEURISTIC
T
i
THEORY
I
NATURE
T
Towards
an Evolutionary
Pragmatics
of Science
61
arrow The information
to the hard core designates rare directed from the theory on flow. The environment the operates directly theory and on not to It the is unsimilar the part. indirectly slowly-changing frequent which in the organismic does not affect the genotype phenotype changes is rarely changed by mutations. which The above analogy has an implication on the problem of incommensurab to and specialization of limbs are analogous differentiation ility. Organismic or branching case In of differentation calls the the (as Stegmuller it). theory in one stage is of an organism we do not say that the organism development we in the later with the will not say stage. organism Similarly, incomparable of the research program that a theory in one stage in the development is to the theory in a later stage. This is trivially true in incommensurable two species which But in phylogenetic development ontogenetic development. evolved
from
Similarly, when not
a
common
earlier
two theories commensurable.
necessarily
are
species
evolved
not
necessarily
from a common in a radical
Furthermore,
comparable.
earlier theory, revolution
they are
when
one
species annihilates another species and takes its place in a certain area, we do not expect to find any continuity between the annihilated and the annihilator. to cover these cases, we follow Thus, when we extend the model might was Democrkus' claim which J. Monod, adopted by the molecular biologist, as a moto for this book (1971): "everything in the universe is the fruit of chance and necessity." This "everything" might be "methodological species" or a one. (Popper would classify it as creatures in world 3 and in biological 2 (1974), and Bartley will agree with him in his theory about the world of the evolution of theories and organisms" (1976). The component "topology of "necessity" of "chance" and the component caused the ambiguity referred to by McMullin the relation between in Lakatos' the theory concerning core. But unlike McMullin, we think that this the hard heuristic and positive ambiguity
is
inherent
to
the
notion
of
research
program.
A
theory
usually
from the hard core neither by logical inferences alone ("necessity") develops nor only by intuitive or accidental "jumps" ("chance"), but by a combination of logical inferences and accidental "jumps". Thus, when we compare two or methodological) we will find many kinds of relationships species (biological them of identity, of similarity and of between (partial commensurability) difference.
4.2. Commensurability
of Games,
Theories
and Grammars
uses the games of chess and checkers for a imagine someone who situations (battle area, hierarchy (simulation) of military symbolic description a From first of commandment, glance it seems as if the chess strategies, etc.). for the purpose of simulation. than checkers the is much "richer" game game to each element of the checkers game we can find an equivalent Almost in the chess game, but not vice versa. At the strating element (rule or Man) kind of men and two the checkers game has only one homogeneous stage Let us
Idan
62 Asher
-
Aharon
Kantorovich
rules. The rules in the game of chess, on the other hand, kinds of movement at the starting point many kinds of pieces and many kinds of movements. have We will call the transformation of the user from the first game, to the second the game, of differentiation. transformation In the above transformation, we have one invariant element, the board. The chess
user
can
argue
against
the
checkers
user
that
cannot
he
simulate
a "state
structures since the checkers there are hierarchical military of affair" in which user has only one kind of men. Furthermore, from a semantical point of view, of the checkers game, the term the chess player can argue that by means Because of several is arguments of this kind we can "ambiguous". "hierarchy" a not is richer "model" than the checkers game, that the chess game say only but that the checkers game is reducible to the chess game, but not vice-versa. is only partial. Even when a set (or a system) A is this reduction However, richer than B, some elements of B may remain irreducible to A. was confirmed in developmental The model of differentiation empirically in comparing where McNeill (1966) followed Chomsky psych^linguistics, that the child theories. McNeill and argues grammars changes grammar during Between these grammars there are "partial his linguistic development. in the invariant transformation from elements with inclusion" relationships, to the other. A one grammar in the similar situation was discovered of the ability of the child in games situations (Bruner, et al., development no used the that it is wonder Thus, (1953) intensively 1976). Wittgenstein a context not in an in but of language notion games only linguistic a central notion as well. "Family resemblance" context in is epistemological but he did between of the games, language relationships analysis Wittgenstein's not take into account developmental between different language relationships therefore, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm, which was games. It is no wonder, was one of the causes which aroused the heavily affected by Wittgenstein's, account takes into (1967) who Lennenberg problem of incommensurability. treatment in his of considerations and Chomsky's evolutionary developmental of genotype/ the dichotomy ideas about language and cognition, compares structure. Castaneda of deep structure/surface phenotype, with the dichotomy to uses in the from order transformation the latter dichotomy (1976) explain to of the the "language of inscriptions" (or (or norms) "language description" facts). The same can be said about the positive heuristic or "methodological of the "language of R. N. A." which is composed from the hard core (the D. N. the transformations are composed of the "language 'phenotype") which have, therefore, a clear linkage between inscriptions
it generates inscriptions": to the theories A.) (the Here we of descriptions." for action and descriptive
knowledge. 4.3. Incommensurability
from a Dynamical
Perspective
of the the dynamics like to take one step further to present We would differentiation process as a process which goes through alternating periods of e. g., (revolution and normal science). change and stability,
Towards
an
Evolutionary
Pragmatics
of Science
63
Laszlo invokes Bronowski's idea about for (1972) stratified stability as a result of to his model, the evolution of science. According describing ("nature"), the science system develops information input from its invironment a series of intermediate and grows to stable states on its way through to as a environment. with the McNeill result of (1966), equilibrium According the redundancy of information-input, the linguistic system or the cognitive a process of differentiation. The system adopts not system developes through more it becomes richer but also flexible by means of grammars, only The topological Chomskian transformations. of changes of this description kind was widely R. Thorn in described his (1972) by "catastrope theory", is applicable to biology, which linguistics and epistemology. The evolutionary-probabilistic model which is presented in (Kantorovich, some the above of mentioned ideas for explicating 1978, 1979) employs are to Let and be which taken be representa progress. P(T) P(E) probabilities tive degrees of rational belief in T - the theoretical component of the system and in E - the empirical or observational Let C(T) - be the degree component. of confirmation of T. When E is deducable from T then, according to Bayes' = we our research program is When have theorem, C(T) AC>o, P(T)/P(E). or our is fertile (McMullin's (Lakatos' progressive terminology), theory not is but also involves confirmational, terminology). Progressivness only information growth. We can distinguish three kinds of growth. Let 1(E) be the function of empirical information growth, and I(T) the function of theoretical information growth, then we define a function R, which will characterize the kind of growth:
R= AI
