Towards an antomy of impoliteness

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Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 349-367

Towards an anatomy of impoliteness Jonathan Culpeper Department of Linguistics and Modern English Language, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YT, UK Received August 1994; revised version January 1995

Abstract Politeness theories have focussed on how communicative strategies are employed to promote or maintain social harmony in interaction. On the other hand, little work has been done on communicative strategies with the opposite orientation, that of attacking one's interlocutor and causing disharmony. In this paper, I consider the notions of inherent and mock impoliteness, and discuss contextual factors associated with impoliteness. In particular, I attempt to build an impoliteness framework which is parallel but opposite to Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness. Finally, I demonstrate that in some contexts - specifically that of army training and literary drama - impoliteness behaviour is not a marginal activity, and that we need an appropriate descriptive frlmaework in order to account for it.

1. Introduction Over the last twenty years politeness theories have concentrated on how we employ communicative strategies to maintain or promote social harmony: [The role of the Politeness Principle is] "to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place." (Leech, 1983: 82) "... politeness, like formal diplomatic protocol (for which it must surely be the model), presupposes that potential for aggression as it seeks to disarm it, and makes possible communication between potentially aggressive parties." (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 1)

o An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Poetics and Linguistics Association conference held at Sheffield Hallam University (April 1994). I would like to thank participants for their comments. In addition, I especially thank my sister Helen Culpeper for furnishing me with the army camp data. and Elena Semino and Mick Short for reading and commenting on drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to the comments of two anonymous reviewers. Needless to say, responsibility for the final version lies with me. 0378-2166/96/$15.00 © 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved SSDI 0 3 7 8 - 2 1 6 6 ( 9 5 ) 0 0 0 1 4 - 3

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"Politeness can be defined as a means of minimizing confrontation in discourse - both the possibility of confrontation occurring at all, and the possibility that a confrontation will be perceived as threatening." (Lakoff, 1989: 102) In this paper I shall investigate impoliteness, the use of strategies that are designed to have the opposite effect - that of social disruption. These strategies are oriented towards attacking face, an emotionally sensitive concept of the self (Goffman, 1967; Brown and Levinson, 1987). The idea that the scope of a politeness theory might be extended to include antagonistic or confrontational communication is not new. Craig et al. (1986) and Tracy (1990) argue that an adequate account of the dynamics of interpersonal communication should consider hostile as well as cooperative communication. In analysing American courtroom discourse, both Lakoff (1989) and Penman (1990) extended their models of politeness to include features of confrontational discourse. Lui (1986), investigating politeness in a Chinese novel, discussed impoliteness as an extension of Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness (1987). j However, none of these studies focus comprehensively on impoliteness in an attempt to improve our understanding of its operation and its theoretical basis. In this paper I shall start by considering inherent impoliteness and mock impoliteness; I will then move on to discuss the contextual factors that are associated with impoliteness and to propose a list of impoliteness strategies. I shall conclude my discussion by focussing on the discourse of an army training camp and the discourse of drama. Here, as I will demonstrate, Leech's claim that conflictive communication tends to be "rather marginal to human linguistic behaviour in normal circumstances" (1983: 105) does not apply.

2. Inherent impoliteness Leech (1983) makes a distinction between 'Relative Politeness' and 'Absolute Politeness'. Relative politeness refers to the politeness of an act relative to a particular context, whereas absolute politeness refers to the politeness associated with acts independent of context. Within absolute politeness, Leech argues, "some illocutions (e.g. orders) are inherently impolite, and others (e.g. offers) are inherently polite" (Leech, 1983: 83). Similarly, Brown and Levinson (1987), working within a faceoriented model of politeness, write that "it is intuitively the case that certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face" (1987: 65); in other words, they argue that certain acts (e.g. orders, threats, criticisms) run counter to one's positive face, the want to be approved of, and/or one's negative face, the want to be unimpeded. If one considers acts in the abstract, one might broadly concur with the idea that some acts are inherently polite, whilst others are inherently impolite. However, one

For earlier and more general research on conflict in interaction, see Brown and Levinson (1987: 26-27).

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must bear in mind that any assessment of politeness outside the theorist's vacuum will take context into account. Fraser and Nolan (1981) make this point: "... no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. We often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determines the judgment of politeness." (1981: 96) It is not difficult to think of examples where a supposedly impolite act will be judged as polite in a particular context (or as falling somewhere between the two extremes on a continuum ranging from politeness to impoliteness). An order could be conceived as polite in a context where it is thought to be of benefit to the target (for example, " G o on, eat up" as an order for a dinner guest to tuck in to some delicacy). However, in some instances the conjunction of act and context does give rise to impoliteness that may be said to be inherent, since it cannot be completely mitigated by any surface realisation of politeness. For instance, recently I was one of three passengers in a car driven by a somewhat nervous driver who had left the windscreen wipers on even though it was not raining. I wished to tell the driver to turn them off, but any form of request would have the unfortunate effect of drawing attention to the fact that the wipers had rather foolishly been left on, and thus damage the positive face of the driver. I was faced with a clash of goals: I wished to be polite, but no amount of politeness work could eradicate the impoliteness of the act I wished to perform. I reached an impasse and said nothing. A fellow passenger tried "Is it raining?". This did achieve its goal of getting the driver to turn off the wipers, but for all its superficially polite indirectness, it still embarrassed the driver in pointing out an apparent deficit in driving ability. The notion of inherent impoliteness irrespective of contexts only holds for a minority of acts. For example, acts which draw attention to the fact that the target is engaged in some anti-social activity (e.g. picking nose or ears, farting) seem to be inherently impolite. It is difficult to think of politeness work or a change of context that can easily remove the impoliteness from an utterance such as " D o you think you could possibly not pick your nose'?-2 The reason why these acts may be described as inherently impolite is as follows. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 1), politeness comes about through one's orientation towards what Goffman called the 'virtual offense' (Goffman, 1971" 138ff.). In other words, by demonstrating concern for the face-threatening potential of an act, one shows that one has the other's interests at heart. An inherently impolite act does not involve virtual or potential offence; it is in its very performance offensive and thus not amenable to politeness work. In the example, " D o you think you could possibly not pick your nose?", the facethreatening potential in the request to desist from a particular line of activity can be mitigated by politeness work, but the face damage incurred in drawing attention to an anti-social habit cannot. This explanation for inherently impolite acts also applies

2 If the 'anti-social' act is established as an acceptable norm (as in the case of burping in certain cultures) then, of course, the act would not be impolite. In the cultures I am aware of, nose picking is not acceptable.

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to the inherent impoliteness arising from the conjunction of act and context, as in the windscreen wipers example. In both cases the fiction of the potential face threat is not available for politeness work. Instead, by drawing attention to an undesirable aspect of the addressee, the utterance inflicts unavoidable damage to his or her positive face.

3. Mock impoliteness Mock impoliteness, or banter, is impoliteness that remains on the surface, since it is understood that it is not intended to cause offence. For example, I once turned up late for a party, and upon explaining to the host that I had mistaken 17.00 hours for 7 o'clock, I was greeted with a smile and the words "You silly bugger". I knew that the impoliteness was superficial, it was not really meant, and that I had been accepted into the party. Leech (1983) attempts to capture this kind of phenomenon within his Banter Principle: "In order to show solidarity with h, say something which is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to h" [and this will give rise to an interpretation such that] "what s says is impolite to h and is clearly untrue. Therefore what s really means is polite to h and true." (1983: 144) Leech argues that banter reflects and fosters social intimacy (i.e. relative equality in terms of authority and closeness in terms of social distance): the more intimate a relationship, the less necessary and important politeness is. In other words, lack of politeness is associated with intimacy, and so being superficially impolite can promote intimacy. Clearly, this only works in contexts in which the impoliteness is understood to be untrue. Leech, however, neglects to specify what these contexts might be. If lack of politeness is associated with intimacy (an idea which is reflected in Brown and Levinson's model), surface impoliteness is, paradoxically, even more likely to be interpreted as banter in non-intimate contexts, where it is more clearly at odds with expectations. This can be illustrated with the advertising slogan, "Eat beef You bastards",3 used by an Australian meat retailer. One may suppose that the prototypical customer is both socially distant from the retailer and more powerful than the retailer (in so far as the customer has the power to determine the success or otherwise of the retailer's goals). Clearly, the retailer is not in a position to employ a derogatory term of address, and has nothing to gain from doing so: it is obviously banter. Some support for this argument can be found in Slugoski and Tumbull's (1988) investigation of the interpretation of ironic compliments and insults. Though the power variable was not included in their model, they did examine the effect of social distance. Subjects tended to interpret an insult as polite (i.e. as banter) in conditions of high social distance. More importantly, their study revealed the even stronger influence of affect (liking or disliking) operating as an independent variable. -

3 Thisexample is taken from Simpson (1994).

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The more people like each other, the more concern they are likely to have for each other's face. Thus insults are more fikely to be interpreted as banter when directed at targets liked by the speaker. Banter, of course, also exists in a more ritualised form as a kind of language game. In America this is known variously as 'sounding', 'playing the dozens' or 'signifying', and takes place particularly amongst black adolescents. Labov's (1972) work has been influential in revealing the complexity of the insults used and the wellorganised nature of this speech event. Typically, these insults are sexual, directed at a third person related to the target, and couched in rhyming couplets. For example: Iron is iron, and steel don't rust, But your momma got a pussy like a Greyhound Bus. (Labov, 1972: 302) The key to 'sounding' is that the insult is understood to be untrue, an interpretation that comes about on the basis of shared knowledge within the group. The effect is to reinforce in-group solidarity. There is a competitive element to 'sounding'; the winner is the one who has the widest range of ritual insults to hand and can use them most appropriately. Real time improvisation in the creation of ritual insults tends not to occur. A result of the formulaic nature of the insults is that it is easier to recognise that one is engaged in 'sounding' rather than personal insult. Labov also points out that 'weak' insults, ones that are not outrageously bizarre and so obviously untrue, are more dangerous in that they are., more likely to be interpreted as personal insults. 4 Ritualised banter has been studied most extensively in America, but occurs in other cultures as well. Thompson (1935) found 'organised' swearing amongst the aborigines of Northern Queensland, and Montagu (1973) observed that a similar form of swearing is found amongst the Eskimos. Hughes (1991) points out that 'sounding' is similar to 'flyting'. This was a kind of competitive ritual insult that was common in Old Norse. With the Scandinavian settlement of England it made its way into English literature, but gradually died out. Vestiges of 'flyting' can be found in Shakespeare's plays (e.g. Romeo and Juliet II.iv, The Taming of the Shrew II.i). In all these cases ritualized banter seems to act as a societal safety-valve. It is a place where we can be impolite with impunity, since "in ritual we are freed from personal responsibility for the acts we are engaged in" (Labov, 1972: 352-353).

4. W h e n are w e impolite?

In order to begin to answer the question when are we genuinely impolite, it is useful to consider the assumptions behind the presence of polite behaviour. Brown and Levinson (1987) put it thus: 4 Labov illustrates this thus: "Among young adults, to say I fucked your mother is not to say something obviously untrue. But it is obviously untrue that 'I fucked your mother from tree to tree' / Your father said, 'Now fuck me!' " (1972: 340).

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"'In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others" faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' face ..." (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61) There are circumstances when the vulnerability of face is unequal and so motivation to cooperate is reduced. A powerful participant has more freedom to be impolite, because he or she can (a) reduce the ability of the less powerful participant to retaliate with impoliteness (e.g. through the denial of speaking rights), and (b) threaten more severe retaliation should the less powerful participant be impolite. The fact that impoliteness is more likely to occur in situations where there is an imbalance of power is reflected in its relatively frequent appearance in courtroom discourse (Lakoff, 1989; Penman, 1990). As Penman points out, the witness has "limited capacity to negotiate positive and negative face wants", whereas the barrister has "almost unlimited capacity to threaten and aggravate the witness's face" (1990: 34). In some circumstances it is not in a participant's interests to maintain the other's face. Participants may have a conflict of interests. For example, in zero-sum games, such as legal cases or sports contests, only one participant can win and in doing so causes the other participant to lose. Sometimes, it may be the case that a long-term goal can be best achieved by a short-term impoliteness strategy. For example, one might shame somebody into doing something that will be of long-term benefit to him or her. It may also be that a participant has some particular interest in attacking the other's face. For example, an assumption behind the American adversarial legal system is that direct confrontation will elicit the truth (Lakoff, 1989). In particular, Lakoff (1989) found systematic impoliteness in the case of defendants who have been found guilty of first-degree murder in a Californian court. Here the jury, having decided on the defendant's guilt, has the additional job of recommending the death sentence or life imprisonment without parole. The prosecution needs to demonstrate to the jury that the defendant is inhuman and loathsome. As a result, the prosecution uses impoliteness in the hope that the defendant will be provoked and lose control. The factors influencing the occurrence of impoliteness in equal relationships are complex. If lack of politeness correlates with intimacy, can we assume that genuine impoliteness, as opposed to mock impoliteness, will be more likely to occur in an extremely intimate relationship? There is some evidence for this. Birchler et al. (1975) discovered that even in happy marriages spouses were typically more hostile towards each other than strangers. In a familiar relationship one has more scope for impoliteness: one may know which aspects of face are particularly sensitive to attack, and one may be able to better predict and/or cope with retaliation that may ensue. However, it seems absurd to argue that the more intimate one becomes with someone the more impoliteness one employs. Part of the problem is that intimacy is a vague notion that covers a number of independent variables; it is not just familiarity. If one follows Brown and Gilman (1960) and takes intimacy to mean that intimate participants have more in common,

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then impoliteness may well be self-defeating. Close friends in this sense are more likely to have close identity of face wants (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 64). Thus the scope for impoliteness is reduced, since in normal circumstances one presumably wishes to avoid self face damage. Sometimes intimacy is also taken to mean affect (e.g. Baxter, 1984). It seems highly plausible that impoliteness correlates with negative affect. Slugoski and Turnbull's study (1988) provides evidence to the effect that people expect less concern for face when the relationship is one of dislike. It is worth noting that a particular characteristic of impoliteness behaviour in equal relationships is its tendency to escalate. Equal relationships - by definition - lack a default mechanism by which one participant achieves the upper hand. An insult can easily lead to a counter-insult and so on. Moreover, Harris et al.'s study (1986) of verbal aggression revealed that it :is commonly assumed that the best way to save face in the light of verbal attack is to counter-attack. In fact, subjects assumed that the only way to terminate verbal aggression between male friends was through outside intervention. Not surprisingly, verbal aggression sometimes escalates into physical violence. 5 Of course, these are not the only circumstances in which impoliteness may occur. Infante and Wigley (1986), for example, conceptualise verbal aggression as a personality trait. In other words, some people are predisposed towards confrontation.

5. Impoliteness strategies Following the pattern of the previous section, I shall start by examining politeness strategies, specifically those of Brown and Levinson (1987), and then build a flamework for impoliteness in relation to these. This is more than a device of expository convenience; impoliteness is very much the parasite of politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that if one wishes to perform a potentially facethreatening act, but wishes to maintain the face of those involved, one will undertake politeness work appropriate to the face threat of the act. Following from this, a speaker's first step will be to calculate the degree of face threat involved in the act to be performed. This is done by considering the main dimensions affecting face threat, namely relative power, social distance, and the rank or size of imposition of the act involved. Values on these dimensions are summed to produce the 'weightiness' of a particular face-threatening act (hereafter FTA). The less the imposition of the act, the less powerful and distant the other participant is, the less polite one will need to be. Brown and Levinson proposed five superstrategies for performing an FTA. These are systematically related to the degree of face threat. Briefly outlined below, the first superstrategy is associated with least face threat, and the last with the highest:

5 Infanteand Wigley note that "Although strangers sometimes are the parties to murders, more often the victim was involved in an interpersonalrelationship with the murderer and verbal aggression precipitated the violence" (1986: 62).

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(1) B a l d on r e c o r d - the FTA is performed "in the most direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69). (2) P o s i t i v e p o l i t e n e s s - the use of strategies designed to redress the addressee's positive face wants. (3) N e g a t i v e p o l i t e n e s s - the use of strategies designed to redress the addressee's negative face wants. (4) O f f - r e c o r d - the FTA is performed in such a way that "there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69). In other words, perform the FTA by means of an implicature (Grice, 1975). (5) W i t h h o l d the F T A . Each of these politeness superstrategies has its opposite impoliteness superstrategy. They are opposite in terms of orientation to face. Instead of enhancing or supporting face, impoliteness superstrategies are a means of attacking face. (1) B a l d on r e c o r d i m p o l i t e n e s s - the FTA is performed in a direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimised. It is important to distinguish this strategy from Brown and Levinson's Bald on record. For Brown and Levinson, Bald on record is a p o l i t e n e s s strategy in fairly specific circumstances. For example, when face concerns are suspended in an emergency, when the threat to the hearer's face is very small (e.g. " C o m e in" or " D o sit down"), or when the speaker is much more powerful than the hearer (e.g. "Stop complaining" said by a parent to a child). In all these cases little face is at stake, and, more importantly, it is not the intention of the speaker to attack the face of the hearer. (2) P o s i t i v e i m p o l i t e n e s s - the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants. (3) N e g a t i v e i m p o l i t e n e s s - the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants. (4) S a r c a s m or m o c k p o l i t e n e s s - the FFA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations. My understanding of sarcasm is close to Leech's (1983) conception of irony. He states the Irony Principle (IP) as follows:

"If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of an implicature." (1983: 82) This definition is not far removed from Brown and Levinson's notion of Off record politeness. However, Leech (1983) later expands: "Apparently, then, the IP is dys-functional: if the PP promotes a bias towards comity rather than conflict in social relations, the IP, by enabling us to bypass politeness, promotes the 'antisocial' use of language. We are ironic at someone's expense, scoring off others by politeness that is obviously insincere, as a substitute for impoliteness." ( 1983: 142)

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This is, of course, the opposite of the social harmony that is supposed to be promoted through Brown and Levinson's Off record politeness. I prefer the use of the term sarcasm to Leech's irony, since irony can be used for enjoyment and comedy. 6 Sarcasm (mock politeness for social disharmony) is clearly the opposite of banter (mock impoliteness for social harmony). (5) Withhold politeness - the absence of politeness work where it would be expected. Brown and Levinson touch on the face-damaging implications of withholding politeness work: "... politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as the absence of a polite attitude." (1987: 5)

For example, failing to thank somebody for a present may be taken as deliberate impoliteness. Brown and Levinson's formula for assessing the weightiness of an VI'A still applies for impoliteness. The greater the imposition of the act, the more powerful and distant the other is, the more face-damaging the act is likely to be. But how impoliteness superstrategies relate to the degree of face attack of an act and how they promote to the overall impoliteness of an utterance is an area for future research to investigate. Much of Brown and Levinson's work is devoted to the linguistic realisations of output strategies for positive and negative politeness. Each output strategy is a means of satisfying the strategic ends of a superstrategy. Brown and Levinson provide open-ended lists of possible output strategies. Below I suggest a provisional list of some output strategies for positive and negative impoliteness. It must be stressed that this list is not exhaustive and that the strategies depend upon an appropriate context to be impolite.

Positive impoliteness output strategies: Ignore, snub the other - fail to acknowledge the other's presence. Exclude the other f r o m an activity Disassociate f r o m the other - for example, deny association or common ground with

the other; avoid sitting together. Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic Use inappropriate identity markers - for example, use title and surname when a

close relationship pertains, or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains. Use obscure or secretive language - for example, mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target. Seek disagreement - select a sensitive topic.

6 Leech(1983) does acknowledgethat irony varies from comic irony to sarcasm, but in his definitions and description he does not allow for non-offensiveirony. Leech's own example of comic irony, "'Some of his words were not Sunday school words (Mark Twain)" (1983: 143), is clearly non-offensive.For 'enjoyable' ironic acts see Roy (1981).

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M a k e the o t h e r f e e l u n c o m f o r t a b l e - for example, do not avoid silence, 7 joke, or use

small talk. U s e t a b o o w o r d s - swear, or use abusive or profane language. C a l l t h e o t h e r n a m e s - use derogatory nominations. etc.

Negative impoliteness output strategies: F r i g h t e n - instill a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur. C o n d e s c e n d , s c o r n o r r i d i c u l e - emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous.

Do not treat the other seriously. Belittle the other (e.g. use diminutives). I n v a d e the o t h e r ' s s p a c e - literally (e.g. position yourself closer to the other than the

relationship permits) or metaphorically (e.g. ask for or speak about information which is too intimate given the relationship). E x p l i c i t l y a s s o c i a t e t h e o t h e r w i t h a n e g a t i v e a s p e c t - personalize, use the pronouns 'I' and 'you'. Put the other's indebtedness on record etc'.

There are other important means by which impoliteness can be transmitted. The structure of conversation itself is sensitive to violations. Brown and Levinson point out that "... turn-taking violations (interruptions, ignoring selection of other speakers, not responding to prior turn) are all FTAs in themselves, as are opening and closing procedures." (1987: 233) Moreover, we need to be aware of the fact that some areas of politeness are not well represented in Brown and Levinson's politeness model; otherwise those deficiencies could be carried over into an impoliteness framework. Their-model is primarily geared to handling matters relating to linguistic form. A result of this, as they admit (1987" 11), is that impolite implicatures can slip through thelr framework. In contrast, Leech's politeness model is primarily concerned with linguistic content, and may be used to complement Brown and Levinson's model. Thus, reversing Leech's Politeness Principle (1983:81), one general way of being impolite is to minimize the expression of polite beliefs and maximize the expression of impolite beliefs. Furthermore, Brown and Levinson have little to say about paralinguistic or non-verbal politeness. Avoiding eye-contact or shouting, for example, could be a means of conveying impoliteness. To demonstrate the power of the impoliteness framework outlined so far, I shall examine examples from the discourse of army recruit training and the discourse of drama.

7 See Leech's Phatic Maxim: a politeness maxim which states that one should "Avoid silence" (1983: 141).

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6. Impoliteness in an army training camp There are two basic reasons for the prevalence of impoliteness in army recruit training discourse. Firstly, there is, great inequality of power. The American and British armies, and indeed many other armies in the world, 8 have a rigid hierarchical power structure, and recruits are at the bottom. This power structure is rigorously maintained. The vast majority of a recruit's training is undertaken by Non-commissioned officers (NCOs). These NCOs exert control over innumerable aspects of a recruit's life including where they are, who they are with, what they do, what they say, what they wear, and even what they think. Secondly, there is the particular training philosophy. The training program is designed to cast the recruit in the mould of the ideal soldier. In essence, this means getting the recruit to conform to various physical and pychological standards. They should be physically fit, able to perform drills, fire a gun, endure hardship, and so on. Most importantly, they should obey orders without question or hesitation. A general assumption is that the best way of achieving these goals is to destroy the recruits' individuality and self-esteem, and then rebuild it in the desired mouhi. In effect, impoliteness is used to depersonalize the recruits. Politeness behaviour involves, amongst other things, a recognition that the interlocutor is a person like oneself; impoliteness behaviour denies that recognition. In the context of the army, impoliteness is not the haphazard product of, say, a heated argument, but is deployed by the sergeants in a systematic way as part of what they perceive to be their job. The source of my data is the documentary Soldier Girls (Broomfield and Churchill, 1981). This was filmed .at an American recruit training base in 1980. As a 'fly on the wall' study, the documentary follows the fortunes of a group of women recruits. My data is drawn from one particular, though not unrepresentative, interview lasting approximately six and a half minutes. The participants are the recruit Private Alves (PA) and three sergeants (S1, $2, $3), one of whom ($3) is a woman. 9 Alves has performed consistently badly in the training program and proved intractable in the face of repeated attempts by the NCOs to force her to improve. As punishment for her latest failure, she is consigned to digging a hole under the supervision of a squad leader. After digging a substantial hole, she refuses to continue and ends up screaming hysterically whilst the squad leader tries physically to force her to keep digging. The interview takes place in an office shortly after this event. From the point of view of the sergeants, she is not only guilty of failing to try hard enough in the training program, but also of the far more heinous crime of 'insubordination'.

8 The Israeli army is a notable exception. It has many more junior officers and thus a much flatter power structure. 9 There do not appear to be any obvious differences in the way the male sergeants and the female sergeant interact with Private Alves in this interview. However, this issue could benefit from specific study across a wider range of data.

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6.1. Conversational structure Alves is denied speaking rights. This is clear at the beginning of the interview: 10 S I : you're going to mess up one of my squad leaders PA: S I : [indistinct] any way you can how about it= =don't PA: =I= S l : bullshit me now Alves you want to jump you want to PA: S I : jump on somebody= =JUMP ON ME then .... PA: =no= who Sl: shut up Alves you're the one who is P A : said that sergeant S I : running your little mouth again you're the one PA: S l : intimidating and threatening my squad leaders .... PA: SI: bullshit tell that god damn lie to someone P A : I didn't sergeant S I : that believes your ass private you've already been PA: S I : proven to be a damn habitual liar PA: Alves is interrupted, told not to speak, or, when she denies that she "wants to jump on somebody", has her response ignored. All of these are impoliteness acts. In addition, her ability to tell the truth is discredited. Cumulatively, the effect is to oppress her negative face wants in that she is denied the opportunity to present a more favourable version of events. Alves manages to say only five words in the rest of the interview.

~0 This transcription is organised in 'staves', with a line for each participant, Only the speakers Sergeant 1 (S1) and Private Alves (PA) are represented. The other participants, Sergeant 2 and Sergeant 3, say nothing in this part of the interview. Overlap is shown as simultaneous speech on both lines. Pauses are shown as full stops (each full stop represents approximately half a second). An equals sign shows one utterance immediately followingon from another. Capital letters show loud speech.

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6.2. Impolite beliefs With Private Alves gagged and prevented from denial or retaliation, the way is clear for the sergeants to launch an attack on Alves's face. The notion of face is not confined to the immediate properties of the self, but can be invested in a wide range of phenomena such as one's family, job, nationality. Liu (1986) conceptualised the notion of face as consisting of concentric circles with the most face-laden closest to the ego. For example, an insult directed at my partner would prove more offensive than the same insult directed at an acquaintance or colleague. The sergeants comprehensively and systematically attack the components of Alves's positive face. This is mostly achieved through the expression of impolite beliefs. They attack her social roles: her role as an American citizen S2: you don't even deserve to live in the United States her role as a soldier S2: disgrace to the uniform that's what you are Alves a disgrace to be wearing a uniform that you're wearing private nothing but a disgrace to that uniform you don't even deserve the time to wear it to have it on your little body her potential role as a mother S1: I doubt if you could accept the responsibility of a child $3: the baby will cry itself to death before she ever was able to move across the room to give her anything to eat her role as a human being SI: you haven't functioned as a human being I doubt since you were about thirteen you stopped being a member of the human race They attack her personal value: S l : you are despicable S l : you don't deserve to be out there in society her competence S2: can't do anything right her self-sufficiency S2: what's probably going to end up happening is probably you will find some man that will have to end up supporting you for the rest of your life

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They attack her mental stability: $3: I think she is nutso $2: you're nuts you're nuttier than a fruit cake Alves $2: you're crazy They attack her psychological make-up: $2: I think I need to get you evaluated $2: let you run around there like a psycho [small laugh] psycho private $2: we're going to take you to see a psychiatrist $3: you know Alves there's something about you that makes me think that you just might be the type that would take a weapon and go up on the top of a building and start just picking people off in the street just for the heck of it because you're apathetic that sooner or later it's bound to turn to hate and it's got to get out and when it gets out it it usually manifests itself in a violent manner $3: and I would rather you were locked up on that thirteenth floor than out in civilian society because you might possibly kill one of my relatives or a member of my family They even attack her genetic make-up: 11 S I : do me a favor don't have any children ........ because unfortunately there is such a thing as heredi hereditary genes that I would hate to think that anybody would even closely come out like you

6.3. Impoliteness strategies A number of the impolite beliefs discussed in the previous section are straightforwardly asserted. The impoliteness strategy in each of the following cases is bald on record impoliteness: S I : you've already proven to be a damn habitual liar $2: disgrace to the uniform that's what you are Alves a disgrace to be wearing a uniform that you're wearing private nothing but a disgrace to that uniform S I : you haven't functioned as a human being I doubt since you were about thirteen you stopped being a member of the human race S l : you are despicable S2: can't do anything right $2: you're nuts you're nuttier than a fruit cake Alves $2: you're crazy

~ There may be a racist undercurrent here, since Private Alves is of Mexican origin.

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Because of the significant power differential, a relatively direct and unambiguous strategy can be chosen. In addition, the sergeants employ positive impoliteness strategies. They use taboo words: "bullshit" (twice), "ass" (twice), "damn", "goddamn" and "hell" (twice). In an army context one might think that these words are only mildly taboo. However, it should be noted that the situatJLon is relatively formal (she is in the sergeant's office, not with her mates in the bar), and that the use of taboo words is unilateral. The sergeants make her feel uncomfortable. For example, the interview is punctuated by numerous silences, the longest of which lasts 12 seconds. They use the strategy Ignore, snub the other in talking about her in the third person: "I think she's nutso". They also use a range of negative impoliteness strategies. They belittle her in using the diminutive "little": "little mouth", "little act", "little ass" and "little body". They explicitly associate her with negative aspects, for example, "you're the one who is running you're little mouth again you're the one intimidating and threatening my squad leaders". $3 tries to frighten Alves by describing the effects of the drugs they give disturbed patients: $3: do you know what the thorazine does to you makes you walk like a mummy sound like Frankenstein you just kind of shuffle around all stiff and numb There are instances where the sergeants use sarcasm or mock politeness. On the surface S 1 uses positive politeness in conveying the approval of other people: "you really impress people with your little act girl". The word 'impress' usually conveys a favourable judgement. Here it is clearly false. The sergeant implicates extreme disapproval. In another of S 1's utterances, "do me a favor don't have any children", the impoliteness of the belief expresse.d is exacerbated by the mock politeness. "Do me a favor" is, ostensibly, a negative politeness strategy, whereby the speaker goes on record as incurring a debt. 6.4. Paralinguistic and non-verbal aspects of impoliteness

A number of paralinguistic and non-verbal aspects contribute to the creation of a threatening atmosphere. The sergeants' speech varies from shouting to an almost inaudible growl. Both suggest hostility. Throughout the interview Alves is made physically uncomfortable in that she is forced to stand to attention in front of the office desk. In contrast the sergeants are very relaxed in posture: S 1 leans one foot on a chair, $2 is seated and $3 sits on top of the desk. The negative impoliteness strategy, 'Invade the other's space', is most clearly evident in the positioning of S 1 and $2. The dialogue between S1 and Alves at the beginning of the interview (quoted above) takes place with S1 's mouth positioned approximately ten centimetres from Alves's ear, and later $2 gets up from his chair and positions himself similarly. Not once during the interview does Alves make eye contact with the sergeants. Interestingly, when Alves comments on the interview to a friend later in the documentary, only the 'screanfing' of the sergeants and the fact that they get 'up close' are mentioned as aspects that 'get to a person'.

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7. Impoliteness in drama dialogue: An example from Macbeth It is not surprising that the courtroom has been the basis for numerous films and television dramas. Aggression has for thousands of years been a source of entertainment. The courtroom provides a socially respectable and legitimate form of verbal aggression. Moreover, I would argue that there are good reasons why drama in general thrives on verbal conflict. Impolite behaviour, either as a result of social disharmony or as the cause of it, does much to further the development of character and plot. Hochman (1985), writing on literary characterisation, specifically associates conflict with well-developed, complex characters - or, in E.M. Forster's (1987) terminology, with 'round' characters. 'Flat' characters tend to be relatively static. They are not buffeted by conflict and thus not put in a position where they have to change in order to resolve a conflict. As far as plot is concerned, impoliteness can be related to what people working in narrative analysis have said about the development of plots in stories and novels (e.g. Bremond, 1966, 1973). In a nutshell, it has been suggested that the prototypical plot is constructed by means of a movement from a situation of equilibrium, through a situation of disequilibrium, to the re-establishment of equilibrium. In 'Little Red Riding Hood', for example, a situation of equilibrium is disrupted by the wolf, who brings disequilibrium to the peaceful lives of Red Riding Hood and her family. Action therefore needs to be taken to reestablish equilibrium, in this case by the woodcutter. As is the case with most fairy stories, perfect equilibrium triumphs at the end. Impoliteness may be seen as a symptom of a situation of disequilibrium. A number of studies have demonstrated that politeness frameworks can be used to account for aspects of dramatic dialogue and can shed light on literary critical issues, notably characterisation (e.g. Simpson, 1989; Leech, 1992). However, no study has systematically described the occurrence of impoliteness in drama or attempted to explain its importance. In the rest of this section I shall show how my impoliteness framework can be applied to drama by analysing a passage from Macbeth, where impoliteness plays an important role in the development of character and plot. Of course, the fact that this text was written in the seventeenth century raises a number of issues about the applicability of modem linguistic theories. To fully address these issues would require separate and lengthy argumentation. However, one might note that Brown and Gilman (1989) have successfully applied Brown and Levinson's (1987) model to discuss the operation of politeness phenomena in four of Shakespeare's tragedies, including Macbeth. In Macbeth one can see chains of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Disequilibrium in the social structure of the state has been created by the murder of Duncan, the former king. The fundamental objective of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth in the banquet scene is to reestablish equilibrium, to reinforce their social position by strengthening relations with the Lords. A result of this is that, at the beginning of the scene, the Macbeths go to extraordinary lengths in pursuing politeness strategies that support the Lords' faces, far beyond the requirements of the host operating in a formal situation. Disequilibrium, however, is created by the arrival of the ghost. Macbeth loses his nerve and starts blaming the Lords for the appearance of the ghost. Lady Mac-

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beth pulls him to one side and, presumably out of earshot of the Lords, uses impoliteness to knock him back into line. The impoliteness is detrimental to Macbeth in the short-term, but of benefit to their long-term goal of concealing Duncan's murder and establishing their position in the state. (1) Lady Macbeth Are you a man? (2) Macbeth Ay, and a bold one that dare look on that Which might appal the Devil. (3) Lady Macbeth O proper stuff! This is the very painting of your fear; This is the air-drawn dagger which you said, Led you to Duncan. O, these flaws and starts Impostors to true fear - would well become A woman's story at a winter's fire, Authoris'd by her grandam. Shame itself! Why do you make such faces? When ali's done, You look but ,an a stool. (4) Macbeth Prithee, see there. Behold! look! 1o! how say you? Why, what care I? If thou canst nod, speak too. If charnel-houses and our graves must send Those that we bury back, our monuments Shall be the maws of kites. [Ghost disappears.] (5) Lady Macbeth What! quite unmann'd in folly? (6) Macbeth If I stand here, I saw him. (7) Lady Macbeth Fie ! for shame ! Macbeth III.iv.57-73 ~2 Lady Macbeth's strategy within this interaction is consistent across her four turns. In each turn she uses impoliteness to attack Macbeth's face. She expresses impolite beliefs in order to goad his masculine ego and thereby get him to pull himself together. Lady Macbeth's question, Are you a man? (turn 1), flouts the Maxim of Quality (Grice, 1975): it is obvious that Macbeth is a man. She implicates the impolite belief that he is so lacking in those characteristics which she perceives as male that his gender is called into question. She has a rather peculiar notion of gender: earlier in the play, she equates being a man with performing the murder of Duncan. To her being masculine means being cold and ruthless. Macbeth is apparently the converse: emotional and suffering pangs of conscience. Further on (turn 3), she attacks his masculine ego by suggesting that his fears are suitable for A woman's story at a winter's fire / Authoris'd by her grandam. Also, in her following turn (turn 5), her question quite unmann'd in folly ? flouts the Maxim of Quality, implicating the impolite belief that his foolishness casts doubts upon his masculinity.

L2 This extract is taken from the Peter Alexander text (1951).

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Her first exclamation (turn 3) employs the impoliteness superstrategy of sarcasm. 0 proper stuff? flouts the Maxim o f Quality; she implicates the opposite, that his behaviour is preposterous. She employs positive impoliteness by pouring scorn on him, Shame itself(turn 3), and Fie? For shame? (turn 7), and by ridiculing his fears, Impostors to true fear (turn 3). Lady Macbeth's impoliteness tactics appear to succeed. Macbeth regains stability and returns to the banquet table. In terms of characterisation, one might note that Lady Macbeth's impoliteness helps divorce Macbeth from the values that cause him such guilt. One way of coming to terms with the murder he has carried out is to adopt values that make it more acceptable. During the course of the play he shifts from a man o f conscience to a relatively desensitised murderer who organises the gratuitous killing o f M a c d u f f ' s wife and son.

8. Conclusion In this paper I have brought together some ideas and observations about an area of discourse that has been much neglected. As Craig et al. (1986) argue, politeness theory needs to consider confrontational strategies, if it is to preserve analytical coherence. Furthermore, it is clear that in some circumstances impoliteness plays a key role, not a marginal one. This paper goes some way towards providing a framework that can capture this impoliteness. M a n y issues have been raised which could benefit from further research. For example: What factors lead to the interpretation that s o m e b o d y is impolite? What factors influence the use o f impoliteness in equal relationships? H o w do the impoliteness superstrategies relate to the degree of face attack o f an act?

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