Three Armies in Britain: The Irish Campaign of Richard II and the Usurpation of Henry IV, 1397-1399 (History of Warfare)

THREE ARMIES IN BRITAIN HISTORY OF WARFARE General Editor KELLY DEVRIES Loyola College Founding Editors THERESA VANN...

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THREE ARMIES IN BRITAIN

HISTORY OF WARFARE General Editor KELLY DEVRIES Loyola College

Founding Editors THERESA VANN PAUL CHEVEDDEN

VOLUME 39

Three Armies in Britain The Irish Campaign of Richard II and the Usurpation of Henry IV, 1397–1399 by

DOUGLAS BIGGS

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2006

On the cover: (miniature) King Richard II’s fleet sails from Ireland. Jean Creton (illustrator The Virgil Master), Histoire du Roy d’Angleterre Richard II, fol. 18, France 1401–1405. © The British Library, Harley 1319, BL ref. A679, record no. c5747–03. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sandoval, Timothy J. The discourse of wealth and poverty in the book of Proverbs / by Timothy J. Sandoval. p. cm. — (Biblical interpretation series, ISSN 0928-0731 ; v. 77) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-14492-7 (alk. paper) 1. Bible. O.T. Proverbs — Criticism, interpretation, etc. 2. Wealth — Biblical teaching. 3. Poverty — Biblical teaching. I. Title. II. Series. BS1465.6.W35S36 2005 223’.706—dc22 2005050799

ISSN 1385-7827 ISBN-10: 90 04 15215 6 ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15215 1 © Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

Only the other day I met an old friend of mine, a professor of history in a provincial university, and he confessed that he never read a novel because he found so much in history to entertain him. He is a very wise man. —J. D. Griffith Davies King Henry IV (1935) p. x

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ...................................................................... Abbreviations .............................................................................. List of Illustrations ...................................................................... List of Maps ................................................................................ Chapter One:

ix xi xiii xv

Historiographical Problems, and Perspectives, and the English Experience of War in the Late Fourteenth Century ................................

1

Chapter Two: Richard II and the “Irish Question,” 1390–99 ..........................................................

31

Chapter Three: Henry of Lancaster and his Invasion of England, April–August 1399 ..........................

81

Chapter Four: Edmund of Langley and the Defense of the Realm, June–July 1399 .................................. 109 Chapter Five:

Henry of Lancaster, the North, and his March to Berkeley, 28 June–27 July 1399 ... 163

Chapter Six:

The Choices of King Richard, June–August 1399 .................................................................. 195

Chapter Seven: Henry of Lancaster: From Rebel to King, August–September, 1399 ................................ 235 Chapter Eight: Conclusions: The Effect of the Lancastrian Revolution on the English Political Lancscape ........................................................ 261 Select Bibliography .................................................................... 277 Index ............................................................................................ 289

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a time worn cliché that no work of this kind is ever the product of one person alone. Cliché or not, that has been the case with this work. Many people have aided me in working through the arguments in the pages which follow because much of what makes up the book you now hold in your hands has been presented to audiences in the form of papers at international conferences at Kalamazoo, Leeds, and Auckland. Although many have endured my questions and arguments about the Ricardian deposition over the years, the following deserve special mention for their patience, good humor, aid, and friendship all of which I greatly appreciate: Michael Bennett, Andy King, K. G. Madison, Philip Morgan, Tony Pollard, Joel Rosenthal, Nigel Saul, George Stow, and the late Simon Walker. Thanks also need to go to my friends and colleagues at Waldorf College, especially Matt Plowman, who, although an historian of modern Britain, has endured my endless explanations of what I was writing about. Special thanks must go to Mark Arvanigian, Chris Given-Wilson, Cynthia Neville and Mark Ormrod; all of whom read draft chapters and saved me from many miscalculations. Not all of these friends and historians concur with my interpretations of the Revolution of 1399 and I look forward to their rebuttals in the future. Any errors of both fact and omission, along with any issues you as a reader will find with my interpretations contained herein are solely my responsibility. Special thanks also must go to Mark Ormord and Richard Dobson, along with Gwilym, Kate, and Oliver Dodd. These colleagues, friends, and family members spent tireless hours driving all over the West Midlands and the three Ridings of Yorkshire hunting down castles, abbeys, and churches in order that I could actually see the places I was writing about and take pictures. Gwilym graciously allowed me to use several of his photos of castles in North Wales as I have noted in the pages that follow. Malcolm Mercer and Sean Cunningham at The National Archives/Public Record Office aided me in my searches for obscure document references, shared lunches, and helped me run down a well-preserved seal of Edmund of Langley, Duke of York, I had been wanting to put in my office.

x

acknowledgements

Special thanks are also due to the editor of the series in which this volume appears—Kelly DeVries. Without Kelly’s friendship, enthusiasm for the project, and kind offer to put it in his History of Warfare series, this monograph would still be only an idea. Kelly read the entire manuscript, argued points of strategy and maneuver, and wondered if I was really being very revisionist in my thinking after all. His comments and criticisms were most helpful. John Haldon graciously allowed me to see the page-proofs of his book, General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics. The ideas contained therein gave me much food for thought as I considered the problems of raising significant bodies of men on short notice, feeding and supplying them as they marched. My editors at Brill, Julian Deahl and Marcella Mulder have, as always, proven to be the best people to do a book for. There was never an occasion that a question I asked via e-mail on a snowy Iowa afternoon was not responded to by the following morning. Special thanks are also due to my friend and colleague Dan Hanson, Dean of Faculty at Waldorf College. Not only did Dan allow me time off from class to present papers at conferences, he also supported me with faculty development funds, and a sabbatical leave to write the vast bulk of the text. Last and most of all, thanks go to my wife and fellow medievalist, Gloria Betcher. In addition to working through her own publications, she found time to read the entire manuscript and saved me from many foolish errors: and our border-collie, Sheba, whose persistent barking, a playful snout at my mouse arm, and longing looks at her leash when I went to the fridge for a drink, reminded me that there are, indeed, more important things in life than Edmund of Langley, Henry of Lancaster and Richard of Bordeaux. Ames, Iowa

17 December 2005

ABBREVIATIONS

Annales

Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt Bennett, Richard II BIHR BJRL BL CCR CFR Chrons. Rev. CIM CIQPM CPR Creton

DKR EHR Eulogium Foedera

RH&KA Goodman, John of Gaunt HoC

“Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti,” in Johannis de Trokelowe . . . chronica et annales, ed. H. T. Riley (London, 1866) S. Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt (New York, 1964 reprint) M. Bennett, Richard II and the Revolution of 1399 (Stroud, 1999) Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research Bulletin of the John Rylands Library British Library, London Calendar of Close Rolls Calendar of Fine Rolls Chronicles of the Revolution, 1397–1400, ed. and trans. C. Given-Wilson (Manchester, 1993) Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem Calendar of Patent Rolls Jean Creton, “A French Metrical Chronicle of the Deposition of Richard II,” ed. and trans. J. Webb, Archaeologia 20 (1825), 1–423 Deputy Keepers Reports English Historical Review Eulogium Histoiarum, ed. F. S. Haydon, 3 vols. (London, 1858–63) Foedera, conventions, literae, et cujuscunque generic acta publica, ed. T. Rymer 2nd ed., 20 vols. London, 1727–35. C. Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King’s Affinity, 1360–1413 (New Haven, 1986) A. Goodman, John of Gaunt (New York, 1992) House of Commons, 1386–1421, ed. J. S. Roskell, L. Clark and C. Rawcliffe, 4 vols. (Stroud, 1992)

xii Colvin, King’s Works Kirby, Henry IV Knighton LK&LK PRO Reg., I

Reg., II

RP Rot. Scot.

Saul, Richard II Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster Tout, Chapters Traison et Mort Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility TRHS Usk, Chronicle

abbreviations H. M. Colvin, The History of the King’s Works, 3 vols. (London, 1963) John Lavan Kirby, Henry IV of England (London, 1970) Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337–1396, ed. and trans. G. H. Martin (Oxford, 1995) K. B. McFarlane, Lancastrian Kings and Lollard Knights (Oxford, 1972) The National Archives/The Public Record Office, London John of Gaunt’s Register, 1371–75, ed. S. ArmitageSmith, 2 vols. Camden Society, 3rd Series, 20–21 (1911) John of Gaunt’s Register, 1379–81, ed. E. C. Lodge and R. Somerville, 2 vols. Camden Society, 3rd Series, 51–52 (1937) Rotuli Parliamentorum, 7 vols. (London, 1834–37) Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londonensi et in Domo Capitulari Wesmonasteriensi Asservait, ed. D. Macpherson et al., 2 vols. (London, 1814–19) N. Saul, Richard II (New Haven, 1997) R. Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1265–1603 (London, 1953) T. F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England, 6 vols. (Manchester, 1920–33) Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richart II, ed. B. Williams (London, 1846) J. A. Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility (London: 1973)

Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Chronicle of Adam Usk, 1377–1421, ed. and trans. C. Given-Wilson (Oxford, 1997) Walker, Lancastrian S. K. Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity, 1361–1399 Affinity (Oxford, 1991)

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1) Spurn Head .......................................................................... 159 2) Bridlington Bay looking south from Flamborough Head .................................................................................... 159 3) Bridlington Priory ................................................................ 160 4) The Motte at Pickering Castle .......................................... 160 5) The Keep at Knaresborough ............................................ 161 6) The Motte at Pontefract .................................................... 161 7) The Minister Church of St. Mary, Berkeley .................... 162 8) Beaumaris Castle ................................................................ 162 9) Conway Castle .................................................................... 163 10) Flint Castle .......................................................................... 163 11) The Effigy of Ralph Neville, Earl of Westmoreland ...... 164 12) The Altar Tomb of Edmund of Langley, Duke of York ...................................................................................... 164

LIST OF MAPS

1. Richard II’s campaign in Ireland 1399 ..............................

81

2. Henry of Lancaster’s march from Bridlington to Berkeley (c. 28 June–27 July) .............................................. 110 3. Edmund of Langley’s march from London to Berkeley, July 7–27 ................................................................................ 157 4. Richard II and Henry in Wales .......................................... 236

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PROBLEMS, AND PERSPECTIVES, AND THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE OF WAR IN THE LATE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

The summer of 1399 was one of momentous events in Europe. In Germany, the alcoholic Wenceslas, King of the Romans, worked to hold the disparate and fragile elements of the Empire together, while Rhenish electors and German princes openly sought ways of removing him from the throne. In France, the continued instability of Charles VI deepened the rift between his uncles, the Dukes of Orleans and Burgundy, as they sought to govern the kingdom of their mentally incompetent nephew. In Scotland, the Dukes of Rothesay and Albany vied for control of the kingdom in the presence of the infirm and ineffectual Robert III. Manuel II Palaeologus, the Byzantine Emperor, traveled like a mendicant friar from one western European capital to another seeking money and military aid against the Turks in the wake of the disaster at Nicopolis. Pope Benedict XIII in Avignon, and Pope Boniface IX in Rome, continued to perpetuate the Great Schism which more than ever threatened to tear the fabric of the Western Church asunder. In the Spanish peninsula, the kings of Castile and Leon continued their crusades against the infidel Muslims in Granada; and as the spring rains gave way to summer in Italy, tens of thousands of white-clad Bianchi took to city streets and highways, marching for peace and an end to the internecine warfare that had plagued the Italian peninsula for over a century. The issue of war was on the mind of the English king as well that summer. The Irish policy that Richard II had pursued since the early 1390s had begun to fray at the edges. In June the king embarked on what he intended to be a year-long military, diplomatic and political campaign to restore the peace that he had achieved in 1395. Yet, within weeks of his landing in Ireland, his cousin, Henry of Bolingbroke, disenfranchised Duke of Lancaster, landed near his estates in North Yorkshire, and within four weeks was master of England. In September, less than four months after leaving

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for Ireland, Richard of Bordeaux resigned his crown and was replaced by Henry. Interpreting this series of events has been one of the most difficult conundrums for historians of later medieval England and Ireland. For Irish historians such as J. Otway-Ruthven,1 Edmund Curtis,2 J. F. Lydon,3 Dorothy Johnson,4 and Robin Frame,5 Richard II’s campaign in Ireland was the key to his downfall. As Edmund Curtis suggested, bluntly if succinctly, Art MacMurrough was the real cause for Richard’s deposition. Curtis wrote that “by delaying Richard in the wilds of Leinster, [Mac Murrough] let in the usurping Bolingbroke and wrecked the unity of England for a hundred years.”6 English historians such as William Stubbs, T. F. Tout,7 Anthony Steel,8 May McKisack,9 and J. J. N. Palmer,10 also focus some of their attentions on Richard II’s preparations for his Irish expedition in 1399. All these historians considered the expedition hastily planned and arranged by the king, which neatly dovetailed into their conception of a king who increasingly suffered from mental instability.11 Only a king whose sanity was in question would leave England in

1

J. Otway-Ruthven, A History of Medieval Ireland, (London: 1968). Edmund Curtis, Richard II in Ireland, 1394–5 (Oxford, 1927). 3 J. F. Lydon, “Richard II’s Expeditions to Ireland,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, 93 (1963), pp. 135–49. 4 Dorothy Johnson, “The Interim Years: Richard II and Ireland, 1395–9” in England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1981), pp. 188–90; Dorothy Johnson, “Chief Governors and Treasurers of Ireland in the Reign of Richard II,” in Colony and Frontier in Medieval Ireland, ed. T. Barry, R. Frame, K. Simms (London, 1995), pp. 96–115. 5 Robin Frame, English Lordship in Ireland (Oxford, 1982). 6 Edmund Curtis, A History of Medieval Ireland, (London, 1923), p. 277. 7 T. F. Tout thought Richard’s entire 1399 expedition was an act of meaningless megalomania on the part of “a fatuous king,” Chapters, IV: 53. 8 Anthony Steel thought that the plans for Richard II’s Irish expedition were “hurriedly completed,” Richard II (Cambridge, 1941), p. 261. 9 May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307–1399 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 490–91. 10 J. J. N. Palmer, England, France and Christendom, 1377–99 (Chapel Hill, 1972), pp. 270–71. 11 The historiography on this is well known. Steel argued that from 1394 the king became “progressively more unbalanced, reckless and impatient,” Richard II, pp. 41–42. He contended that by 1399 Richard was a “mumbling neurotic, sinking rapidly into a state of melancholia, in which he could offer only the feeblest resistance from the first, while before long it would be totally impossible to rouse him,” p. 279. May McKisack, perhaps ironically, supported this view. She found that by 1399, “Richard had become dangerous, perhaps even dangerously mad,” Fourteenth Century England, p. 497. 2

historiographical problems, and perspectives

3

the hands of so pathetic a guardian as Edmund, Duke of York, while still at liberty in France resided the disenfranchised Henry of Lancaster, a tactful courtier, renowned jouster, noble crusader, veteran military commander, and experienced politician who knew well the Byzantine world of Ricardian politics. K. B. McFarlane thought these combined qualities made Henry a “perfect knight,” and one who acted with resolve and purpose when the opportunity to gain his inheritance and remove Richard from the throne presented itself.12 For James Sherborne, Henry of Lancaster was a noble schemer who was not above perjuring himself before the political community that summer to achieve his goal of replacing Richard of Bordeaux.13 For T. B. Pugh, Henry’s role as a noble plotter went so far as to involve him with his father John of Gaunt in a plan to wait for the appropriate moment to remove Richard from the throne.14 Chris Given-Wilson in his work on the chronicles and chroniclers of the revolution of 1399, not surprisingly, relied heavily on contemporary authors to argue that Richard acted tyrannically toward his subjects beginning in 1397. Richard’s arbitrary behavior, combined with denying Henry of Lancaster his rightful inheritance turned the landed elite against him in the summer of 1399 and was largely responsible for his downfall.15 Nigel Saul, in his seminal political biography of the king, argued that Richard II had worked throughout the 1390s to establish a new political consensus within the kingdom. But, in this attempt the king found himself caught in the political no-man’s-land between a “war state,” where political unity was created on campaign, to a “peace state,”16 where political unity was created at court. Richard, Saul continued, had no good solution to this problem and his final method was to “place novel emphasis on the prerogative.”17 The king’s greatest failure, Saul concluded, was in his not understanding that he needed

12

LK&LK, p. 49. J. W. Sherborne, “Perjury and the Lancastrian Revolution,” in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1990), pp. 131–54. 14 T. B. Pugh, “The Magnates, Knights and Gentry,” in Fifteenth Century England, ed. S. B. Chrimes, C. D. Ross and R. A. Griffiths (Manchester, 1972), pp. 107–08. 15 Chrons. Rev., pp. 31–32; RH&KA, pp. 245–51. 16 For commentary on the “war state” and the “peace state,” see Richard Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1992), esp. pp. 11–133. 17 Saul, Richard II, p. 439. 13

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his people’s affection in addition to their loyalty. Michael Bennett in his study of the revolution of 1399 also found Richard’s behavior the key to his downfall.18 Relying heavily on chronicle evidence, Bennett argued with great eloquence that the king had surrounded himself with flatterers and ne’re-do-wells and had taken poor advice, and in the end no one in the political community could trust him.19 Both Saul and Bennett, portrayed Henry of Lancaster as a strong, self-confident, nobleman who presented himself to the political community as a man wronged by the king through his vindictive policies towards him. In 1399, they argued, Henry bestrode the English body politic like a colossus and emerged as the “all conquering hero.”20 Running parallel to this more traditional strand of historiography is a second, if not as well developed, revisionist strand. Historians in this camp have seen more than enough reason to question the veracity of many of the narrative sources and official records that have served as the basis for the more traditional studies. The fifteenthcentury Scottish chronicler Walter Bower noted that Henry demanded that documents and chronicles brought to London following his usurpation and ordered documents, letters and portions of chronicles that he found objectionable be destroyed.21 Although early modern and eighteenth-century historians faithfully recounted the Lancastrian version of the deposition that they found in the chronicle sources, by the end of the Victorian period with the new focus on documentary evidence, more historians began to find themselves in agreement with Bower’s claims. Cracks in the Lancastrian edifice of the official version of events surrounding the Ricardian deposition have appeared frequently in the twentieth century. In 1925 Gronwy Edwards demonstrated that the portion of the parliament roll of 1398 that appeared in the eighteenth century published rolls, which historians had used as an example of Richard II’s tyranny was, in

18

Bennett, Richard II, pp. 147–69. Bennett, Richard II, pp. 197–99. 20 Michael Bennett, “Henry of Bolingbroke and the Revolution of 1399,” in Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, 1399–1406, ed. G. Dodd and D. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 25. 21 Walter Bower, Scotichronicon, ed. D. E. R. Watt, 9 vols. (Aberdeen, 1989–98), 8:20–22. 19


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fact, a later interpolation.22 By 1930 Maude Clarke and V. H. Galbraith forcefully argued that the official version of Richard’s deposition was little more than a Lancastrian fantasy and that the parliament rolls had been deliberately forged to reflect Henry’s version of events.23 More recently revisionist historians have argued that the chronicles from the period from roughly 1395 to 1399 are so clearly slanted against Richard as to call their usefulness into question. Both Caroline Barron and John Palmer argued the English chronicles that cover this period needed careful sifting to separate fact from Lancastrian fiction because of the heavy Lancastrian bias reflected in them. These historians called for a complete reassessment of the deposition in light of these successive layers of dynastic propaganda.24 Further evidence of the questionable nature of the chronicle sources and the traditional historiography that they have spawned has been offered by George Stow. Not only has he argued that the traditional perception of Richard II’s mental instability is, in fact, the product of modern historians,25 but also that one of the most notorious episodes in the Eulogium Historarium, so often used to demonstrate Richard’s mental instability, is nothing more than a post deposition interpolation.26 Although this revisionist strand of historiography has illuminated the difficulties with certain aspects of the traditional historical view of Henry’s usurpation, to this point it has not produced a complete re-evaluation of the Ricardian deposition. This study will be an attempt at such a re-evaluation. This study seeks to bring the disparate strands of revisionist and traditional scholarship together by focusing on the deposition within the context of the military aspects of the campaign of 1399, as well as reconsidering the political narrative of events, and re-examining

22 J. G. Edwards, “The Parliamentary Committee of 1398,” EHR 40 (1925), pp. 321–33. 23 M. V. Clarke and V. H. Galbraith, “The Deposition of Richard II,” ed. L. S. Sutherland and M. McKisack (Oxford, 1937), pp. 88–89. 24 Caroline Barron, “The Deposition of Richard II,” in Politics and Crisis in Fourteenth Century England, ed. John Taylor and Wendy Childs (Stroud, 1990), pp. 133–35; John Taylor, “The Authorship, Date and Historical Value of the French Chronicles of the Lancastrian Revolution,” BJRL 41 (1978/79), pp. 143–81, 398–421. 25 G. B. Stow, “Stubbs, Steel, and Richard II as Insane: The Origin and Evolution of an English Historiographical Myth,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143 (1999), pp. 601–38. 26 G. B. Stow, “The Continuation of the Eulogium Historiarum: Some Revisionist Perspectives,” EHR 119 (2004), pp. 667–81.

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the motivations of the major protagonists. The interpretation contained in this volume is a radical departure from traditional historiography. For too long we as historians of Richard II’s deposition have been deceived by a Lancastrian version of events that is too deceptively neat and too decisively narrow. This work will argue that the desires and emotions that drove the Ricardian deposition were embodied in a complex mixture of men from disparate segments of the political community who came together in the summer of 1399 around the convenient excuse of Henry of Lancaster. This “coalition of the disaffected” was composed not only of Lancastrians and Lancastrian allies, such as lords Roos, Willoughby, and Greystoke, and earls such as Ralph Neville. The coalition also encompassed many family members of the great noble houses that Richard had wronged in 1397, specifically Gloucester, Warwick and Arundel, in addition to collateral noble families and affinities connected to these three, such as Stafford and Courtenay. This coalition formed not so much to do right for the wronged Henry, as to further their political ambitions at the expense of the Crown and settle old scores. By far the most historically over-rated contributors to this coalition in 1399 were the Percies. Rather than the “king makers” of 1399, the house of Percy was most likely an unwanted participant in Henry’s coalition and joined him for their own reasons. This study will also perceive the king differently from historical tradition. Instead of arguing that Richard II was beset by insanity or personality disorders, it will argue that the king possessed full control of his mental faculties throughout the events in question. Far from fearing Henry, the king had little respect for Henry of Lancaster and little regard for his political abilities. Throughout the first three decades of Henry’s life he had taken little interest in politics or war. Henry had never held an important political office or military command and had spent much of his time either at tournaments or on extended trips abroad. Even though Richard II’s political and military situation steadily worsened as July became August, the king still had many cards to play. Richard chose not to force any issues with Henry and his coalition on the field of battle, where the chaos of combat and the heat of the moment could destroy him, instead the king, as he had before in political crises, became passive and waited on events. Richard had been in difficult political situations before in the twenty-two years of his reign and had always survived. There was nothing to suggest to him before he agreed to leave Conway


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and meet with Henry at Flint that he would not triumph again in 1399. Richard of Bordeaux’s greatest mistake in 1399 was his belief that the political community would not allow his removal as king. In the post-modern era no historian would contend that broad social, political, environmental and even geographical factors failed to impact historical events. But, history is ultimately about people, and the perception of the great protagonists of 1399, along with their motivation, needs to be carefully considered. Although this study will reconsider the rationale for the actions of many noblemen, clergy, and gentry in the summer of 1399, the most important protagonists, Henry of Lancaster, Richard of Bordeaux, and Thomas Fitzalan, Archbishop of Canterbury, merit special attention. Determining the character and motivation of Henry of Lancaster, the catalyst for the events that led to Richard’s deposition, remains a most difficult task. The reason for this impenetrability turns on the fact that, so much of Henry’s life and what happened in 1399 are obscured by successive layers of Lancastrian propaganda; official, narrative and popular. K. B. McFarlane noted in the opening to one of his last lectures on the subject, Henry of Bolingbroke’s life falls sharply into two halves: his life before 1399, and his life after.27 McFarlane was not the first or the last to make this distinction, but he did caution both his students and colleagues to remember that the early period of Henry’s life has been seen through the reflective lens of his seizure of the throne and the subsequent events of his reign. Nevertheless, he perceived Henry’s life before his usurpation of the throne in a rather idyllic way. Henry was a tactful courtier, a renowned jouster, and a noble crusader, a veteran military commander and experienced politician who knew the Byzantine world of Ricardian politics: a group of skills, which as we have seen, K. B. McFarlane summed up as the makings of a “perfect knight.” This perception, of course, has heavily influenced all succeeding work on Henry of Bolingbroke, and whether one thinks Henry an “all conquering hero,”28 as Michael Bennett suggests, or a weak fumbling usurper as John Kirby and Alfred Brown, all agree that Henry in his preusurpation years was an individual of titanic ability, experience, and international renown.

27 28

LK&LK, pp. 42–58. Michael Bennett, “Henry of Bolingbroke,” p. 25.

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But, was this indeed the case? Was Henry of Bolingbroke the “perfect knight” that McFarlane thought him? Was he the noble schemer of James Sherborne29 and T. B. Pugh,30 who worked with his father to wait for an appropriate moment to remove Richard II from the throne? If, as McFarlane noted, “we are driven to seek the truth about [Henry’s] personality through his actions,”31 then a reexamination of Henry’s early life with an eye towards the proLancastrian propaganda inherent in the chronicle sources will provide a much different interpretation of this phase of his life and of his character. From the actions that we historians are able to trace, there is little doubt that Henry’s reputation as an accomplished jouster and noble knight is well deserved. Henry was clearly a devotee of the sport, and his household accounts show that through purchase of tournament-helms, breastplates, and the other accoutrements he spent lavishly on jousting. As Juliet Barker suggests, Richard II appropriated tournaments and used them as venues of royal propaganda and royal patronage,32 and thus the tournaments and their participants are relatively well documented and Henry’s presence and participation may be tracked with some certainty. Throughout the first thirtyplus years of his life, Henry was a regular participant in various hastiludes. His household accounts demonstrate that, at the relatively young age of 16, he took part in two tournaments: one in London at the time of Anne of Bohemia’s coronation and a second on May Day at Hertford.33 He also attended the Smithfield tournament of 1386, and in 1390 he was part of an English contingent that included Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy to the great tournament at St. Ingevert. Henry even took his tourneying equipment to Prussia in 1390, although it is not known if he actually used it. His presence on crusade there in the later months of 1390, of course, prevented him from being at the great Smithfield tournament of 1390, but he did participate in a smaller Smithfield tournament in 1395,34 and prepared for what

29

Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy (Miami, 1971), pp. 154–55. T. B. Pugh, “Magnates, Knights and Gentry,” pp. 107–08. 31 LK&LK, p. 10. 32 J. R. V. Barker, The Tournament in England, 1100–1400 (Woodbridge, 1986), p. 69. 33 PRO DL 28/1/1, fos. 4, 6. 34 Barker, Tournament in England, p. 80. 30


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would have been the greatest joust of his life at Coventry in 1398. On the whole, then Henry’s reputation of being a noble jouster and a man of chivalry can be said to stand the test of scrutiny. Although Henry was a great jouster in the military world of England before 1399, from the actions we can trace it is difficult to describe his position as being of and real significance. His forays into war in the early 1380s were confined to the one occasion when he followed his father on a meaningless raid into Scotland in 1384 that lasted all of three weeks.35 Henry was conspicuously absent from the list of great men of the realm who accompanied Richard II to Scotland the following year, and he did not take the opportunity to help any of the king’s lieutenants in Ireland throughout the 1390s. Henry also made no effort to accompany his father to the Aquitaine in the early 1390s, and failed to attend the king on his triumphal Irish expedition in 1394/95. Although a number of modern historians credit Henry with laying the plans that eventually led to the royalist defeat at Radcot Bridge in December 1387,36 it is more than probable, as J. N. L. Myers suggests, that Henry played a lesser role in the events.37 Henry may indeed have been an accomplished jouster by 1387, but neither his military nor political experience rivaled that of the three senior Appellants. In terms of military planning and strategy, Henry received the easiest task of any of the Appellant generals in the campaign against Robert, Duke of Ireland: to act as nothing more than a blocking force and to break the bridges over the Thames at Radcot and Newbridge along with guarding the fords on the south bank of the river. This duty did not require the Lancastrian force to operate in the open country where de Vere might have outmaneuvered them. Henry himself quite possibly did little and most of the details

35 Knighton claimed that Gaunt and his troops did much harm to woods in the border region, cutting down trees and burning them in vast numbers. So devastating was the damage that when winter came on many Scots suffered from a lack of fire wood, Henry Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, ed. and trans. by G. H. Martin (Oxford, 1995), pp. 333–36. 36 Kirby, Henry IV, p. 26; Bennett, Richard II, p. 30; Saul, Richard II, p. 172; R. H. Jones, The Royal Policy of Richard II (New York, 1968), pp. 44–5; Steel, Richard II, p. 139. 37 An older, though more convincing, version of the military campaign of Radcot Bridge may be found in J. N. L. Myers, “The Campaign of Radcot Bridge in December 1387,” EHR 42 (1927), pp. 20–33.

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of the Lancastrian participation in this campaign remained in the hands of John of Gaunt’s experienced retainers; and almost certainly the plans for the campaign and the political drama that followed it came from the minds of Gloucester, Arundel and Warwick.38 It is often argued by historians that Henry gained much military experience in Prussia in the early 1390s, but it seems that such was not the case. Although when English chroniclers speak of Henry’s military prowess they tell a tale of English chivalry worthy of being immortalized by Chaucer, Prussian and Austrian chronicle sources paint a much different picture of Henry’s time on the Lithuanian border than their English counterparts.39 We may, as F. R. H. DuBoulay did, simply ignore the German chroniclers and their complaints about English behavior on crusade as being merely antiEnglish, but to simply ignore two independent sources for this period in Henry’s life seems a bit unreasonable.40 The Germanic narrative sources tell that the English were an unruly crowd. They fought incessantly with French and Scottish crusaders, and proved unable to put aside their issues with their fellow crusaders even for the great good of Christ.41 The leaders of the English contingent proved powerless to rein in the violent tendencies of the men under their command, and even went so far as to demand of the Grandmaster of the Teutonic order that they be allowed to carry their banner of St. George in the van of the army as they campaigned against the pagans. In fact, by late autumn the relationship between Grandmaster Rabe and the English portion of his army had become so strained that he had to ask them to leave, and Henry did not participate in the Grandmaster’s winter campaign against the pagans in that year.42 38 Anthony Goodman argues that it was probably Warwick who made up the Appellants’ military plans that December since of all the three senior Appellants he had the most experience in the field that dated from his first expedition to France in 1355, Loyal Conspiracy, pp. 128–30. 39 The monk of Westminster claimed that he returned “in excellent health and spirits,” Westminster, pp. 458–59. Henry Knighton mentioned that Henry returned “with the greatest triumph and honor, his pre-eminent success bringing joy to all Christians,” Knighton, pp. 536–37. 40 F. R. H. DuBoulay, “Henry of Derby’s Expeditions to Prussia, 1390–1 and 1392,” in The Reign of Richard II, ed. F. R. H. DuBoulay and Caroline Barron (London, 1971), pp. 168, 170–71. 41 Wigand von Marburg’s chronicle claimed that “Interim fit dissencio ex parte Anglicorum et Schotorum,” Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum (Frankfurt, 1965), II: 664. 42 William Urban, “When was Chaucer’s Knight in ‘Ruce?’” The Chaucer Review 18 (1984), pp. 351, 353 n. 17. For the problems of Crusading in Prussia in the


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Henry’s return to Prussia in 1392 found no crusade for him or his men, but his inability to control troops under his command continued to be a problem. One of his men found himself in an altercation with a local Prussian that resulted in the German’s death. Grandmaster Rabe’s payment to Henry of the substantial sum of £ 500 following this incident was, therefore, probably not so much a payment to salve the honor of a beloved fellow crusader, as Lucy Toulman-Smith thought, as it was a payment to get rid of Henry and the unruly English that he led. Thus, it seems that Henry did not gain much in the way of military experience in Prussia nor could he be considered a great military leader. From his actions Henry of Bolingbroke also seems to have been overly impulsive before 1399 and tended to be a nobleman who did not always think things through. Perhaps the most outstanding examples of this are in his crusade to Prussia and his pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Talk of crusade could be heard the air at the tournament of St. Inglevert and this clearly excited the imagination of Henry of Bolingbroke. He returned to England early from the St. Inglevert tournament after staying only four of the thirty days the tourney was to last, on 6 May 1390 and immediately began to make preparations for leading a crusade: not to one destination North Africa but two to Lithuania as well—one right after the other. Within days Henry had appointed a treasurer for war, and ordered provisions, horses, and wagons purchased; sent letters to raise men, and took ship from Dover to Calais which he reached on 9 May. For the remainder of May 1390, Henry waited at Calais for his forces to gather. Although the names of all the knights and esquires who joined Henry in May are not known, most of the ones who did were not men of great standing within the Lancastrian affinity and strongly suggests as Anthony Goodman notes that the recruitment efforts were ill-conceived and haphazard. At the end of May preparations for Henry’s expedition to the Barbary Coast were suddenly and completely suspended. The exact reasons for the abandonment of Henry’s Barbary crusade are unclear, but it seems the real reason behind Henry’s sudden reversal of action

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see William Urban, The Prussian Crusade (Lanham, MD, 1980); William Urban, The Baltic Crusade (DeKalb, 1975); William Urban, Tannenberg and After (Chicago, 1999).

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rested with his father, John of Gaunt. Preparations were now set in motion for only one destination and these preparations demonstrate a thorough, careful planning that reflects the hand and mind of John of Gaunt. Not only were sufficient funds and vessels provided for the journey, but Henry’s associates for this expedition were much unlike the men he had gathered around him in May. Although Henry’s retinue still contained friends near his age, such as Peter Bukton, John Norbury and Thomas Rempston, it also now included some of the most important members of the Lancastrian affinity. Hugh Waterton, the treasurer Henry’s household, had not only served Gaunt in war as early as 1373, but had been high in Gaunt’s councils since being retained by the duke in 1377.43 Sir Thomas Erpingham, one of the most trusted of Gaunt’s servants, who had seen military service with him at Radcot Bridge,44 as well as John Loudenham and Thomas Swynford, rounded out the “adult” portion of Henry’s force.45 These older Lancastrians possessed much military experience and were more than likely included by Gaunt to look after the practical aspects of the journey and also to keep Henry out of trouble. A similar impetuousness and lack of proper preparation may be seen in Henry’s decision to go on pilgrimage to the Holy Land the following year. Henry left England to go on crusade again in July 1392, but when he arrived at Danzig in August there was no crusade for him join. Undaunted, Henry decided on his own that he would go to the Holy Land instead and headed east in mid-September. John of Gaunt’s reaction to his son’s change of plans is not recorded, but perhaps his exasperation with his son may be guessed by the

43

Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 284. Erpingham had been in Gaunt’s service since at least 1380 and had gone to war with Gaunt in both 1385 and 1386, but his presence in England at Christmas 1387 suggests he had been sent home—possibly to look after Henry as well as Gaunt’s interests, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 264. For a discussion of Erpingham’s important life and career in Lancastrian service, see Anne Curry, “Sir Thomas Erpingham: A Life in Arms,” in Agincourt, 1415, ed. Anne Curry (Stroud, 2000), pp. 53–77. For a discussion of Erpingham and his effect on Norfolk gentry society following the usurpation, see T. John, “Sir Thomas Erpingham, East Anglian Society and the Dynastic Revolution of 1399,” Norfolk Archaeology 35 (1973), pp. 96–109. 45 Loudenham had been on part of the same military expedition with Waterton in 1373 and formally retained by Gaunt since at least 1382. Although Swynford had not accompanied the duke to war, he too had been retained by Gaunt since at least 1382, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 273, 282. 44


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fact that in late September the redoubtable Sir Thomas Erpingham was sent out from England to join Henry as he had in 1390, probably to look after the duke of Lancaster’s heir on this new adventure. Henry’s actions suggest that he was impetuous and impulsive in his personal life, but in the world of politics prior to 1398 Henry of Bolingbroke counted for precious little. His first appearance on the political stage was as one of the junior Appellants of 1387/89, and his influence with the three senior Appellants may be gauged by the fact that in spite of Henry himself seeking to save the life of Sir Simon Burley; Gloucester, Arundel and Warwick ignored him. Although Henry attended parliaments, served on diplomatic missions, and even witnessed charters in the 1390s, he almost always appears in the venues with his father, which suggests that Henry’s presence at court and weight as a politician were largely due to John of Gaunt’s efforts rather than his own. Possibly Henry found domestic politics in the period from late 1392 to 1398 unsavory and sought to avoid them. Certainly, for the house of Lancaster at least, they were not the best of times. His father, John of Gaunt, quarreled openly with Richard, Earl of Arundel, in 1394,46 while Henry himself fought with his youngest uncle, Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, over the division of their wives’ inheritance after the death of Mary Bohun in July 1394,47 and argued with his another of his old Appellant allies Thomas Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, over lands in Northamptonshire.48 It seems, however, that Henry had little time for domestic political concerns and his thoughts often turned to foreign fields. In late 1394 and early 1395 negotiations were well underway between the dukes of Burgundy, Orleans, and Lancaster on the one hand and King Sigismund of Hungary on the other for a crusade against the Turks in the Danube valley.49 Although Gaunt could not personally take the Cross because of his age, Henry sought permission from his father to attend the crusade against the Turks led by John the Fearless, Count of Nevers, which ended in the disastrous battle of Nicopolis, but his father refused to let him leave the kingdom.50 Undaunted, Henry again sought his father’s permission in 1396 to

46 47 48 49 50

Historia Anglicana, II: 214. Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 68 n. 4, 132. Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 68 n. 6, CPR, 1392–1396, p. 325. Calendar of State Papers: Venice, I: # 117. The Byzantine chronicler Ducas actually has Henry attending the crusade and

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leave the realm for an extended period of time to accompany his cousin, William of Hainault, in his crusade against the Lithuanians in Freisland, and again Gaunt refused. Even when political participation was demanded of him, Henry seems to have looked to avoid it. Perhaps most telling is the fact that, of all the great noblemen active in the last decade of Richard II’s reign, Henry of Lancaster is alone in failing to occupy a single government office of responsibility. In 1397 he was conspicuously absent from the list of Appellants who came forward to appeal treason against Gloucester, Arundel and Warwick, even though the Appellants of 1397 included Henry’s half-brother, John Beaufort, and Henry’s brother-in-law, John Holand. Following his exile in 1398, Henry first sought to visit his armigeious cousin the Count of Hainault, who wished to lead a new crusade against the Turks in the wake of the disaster at Nicopolis. According to Froissart, Henry was eager to accompany his cousin on this foreign venture but letters from Gaunt, delivered by one of the duke’s retainers directed Henry to go to the court of Charles VI instead. It is difficult to discern exactly what Gaunt thought of Henry and his actions. Gaunt did give Henry a number of precious goods in his will,51 but little other evidence suggests the nature of the relationship between father and son. Henry’s actions in the 1390s continually prompted Gaunt to bail his son out of financial trouble and the father may not have trusted the son to make good decisions. Certainly, Gaunt ordered his retainers all over Europe to look after his heir. Perhaps even in the late 1390s, John of Gaunt may have still harbored concerns about Henry and his abilities. At that time the aged duke undertook the unusual step of underwriting Henry’s political future by granting additional fees of retainer to some of his knights and esquires on the condition that they remain with and serve Henry after Gaunt’s death.52 Indeed, one is tempted to speculate that the great building of Gaunt’s affinity in the 1390s and his expensive attempts to bind its members to each other might not

leading 1000 English lances. Clearly the Byzantine chronicler confused Henry with his half brother John Beaufort, Earl of Somerset, who did lead a contingent of troops to Nicopolis, Ducas, Chronicles, ch. xiii. 51 Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt, p. 427. 52 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 499.


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have been an attempt on his part to ensure the Lancastrian patrimony would survive a weak and generally ineffective duke that he feared Henry would become. Whatever the case, Henry’s actions suggest that even Gaunt’s death in February 1399 and his own disenfranchisement the following month did not effect him markedly.53 In fact, the entire project to return to England in 1399 was, according to both Froissart and Henry IV’s first “biographer,” John Capgrave, who wrote in the 1440s, engineered by Archbishop Arundel, not by Henry himself. The picture of Henry of Bolingbroke that emerges from this reading of his actions prior to 1399 differs from recent interpretations of Henry–especially mine. Upon reconsideration he does not appear so much the thoughtful nobleman with experience and wisdom, who employed these qualities to remove Richard II from the throne. Rather, it seems increasingly clear that such was not the case. Henry of Bolingbroke spent most of his youth and early adulthood avoiding England and English politics as much as possible. His prowess with the lance in the lists may indeed have been great, but prior to 1399 Henry possessed little in the way of real military experience: he had never held an office or military command in Richard’s government, and had shied away from any of the “heavy lifting” of politics and government. He was impulsive, not particularly thoughtful, though well educated, and was prodigal in the extreme. In fact, the £ 4,000 of Gaunt’s money he spent on his first Prussian expedition was an enormous sum—enough to support four men of ducal dignity for a full year—and no doubt many in England would have agreed with the Prussian chroniclers in finding his opulent life style scandalous. This wastrel, or what we in the modern world might characterize as a playboy, is probably what many saw in Henry in the summer of 1399. Indeed, from Richard II’s perspective in Ireland why would he have anything to fear from Henry of Bolingbroke? Who in his right mind in the political community would follow a nobleman with nothing but a title? Thus, in the summer and autumn of 1399 Henry of Bolingbroke did not bestride the political community like a colossus, rather the “coalition of the disaffected” that he formed that summer along with

53

Bennett, Richard II, p. 151.

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his father’s established Lancastrian affinity did. Henry did not coordinate the rising of Lancastrian estates from North Yorkshire to the Vale of Glamorgan, John of Gaunt’s retainers did. These Lancastrian retainers, especially the brothers John, Hugh and Robert Waterton, who collectively had the keeping of a number of major Lancastrian fortresses, organized resistance to the king, not so much to support Henry—although they certainly did seek to do this—as much as to preserve their own standing within their communities and within the political community as a whole. John of Gaunt had worked diligently throughout the 1390s to create a powerful and cohesive affinity that reached into virtually every county in the kingdom. Although, most Lancastrian retainers of Gaunt did not marry into families of other retainers themselves, large numbers of Gaunt’s retainers did seek marriage alliances with other Lancastrians for their sons and daughters. Thus, as long as Gaunt lived and the Lancastrian patrimony remained intact, these alliances among retainers were secured for the next generation of Lancastrians to accumulate more wealth and solidify and enhance their base of local political power and range of political motion. The death of Gaunt and the break-up of the Lancastrian patrimony put all of this in jeopardy. Lancastrian retainers had already witnessed the break-up of other established comital affinities, such as Beauchamp and Arundel, and had seen many retainers from these affinities removed from office and lose their once prominent places within local society that they had worked to hard to create and maintain. In the summer of 1399 Lancastrian retainers saw much the same thing happening to them. Some of their number were placed in jail, others were taken into the king’s service, and others were quietly dropped from the rolls. These things all threatened the security of these Lancastrians and it is not surprising that they rose in virtual unity even before Henry came ashore in early June 1399. Just as this work perceives Henry of Lancaster in a different light than has historical tradition, so too will this work perceive Richard of Bordeaux differently. Much of the historical tradition surrounding the character of Richard II has developed from reports of chroniclers whom recent scholarship has proven to be heavily influenced by post-deposition Lancastrian propaganda. Because of this, historical perception of the king has been slanted against him. Anthony Steel wrote his biography of Richard II in the 1940s, and for almost two generations his work stood as the standard interpretation of the


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Richard and his reign. For Steel Richard of Bordeaux was a hopeless neurotic, who, in the last years of his life, became insane. The unstable household into which he was born, coupled with his difficult youth as king, and the loss of many of his close childhood friends in the crisis of 1387–89, drove him deeper and deeper into gloom. For Steel the only element in the king’s life that allowed him any contact with reality was his wife, Anne, and when she died in 1394, the king sank into acute melancholia from which, by 1399, it was “impossible to rouse him.”54 Nigel Saul’s seminal biography of Richard II, which appeared in 1997, also undertook a detailed examination of the king’s character. Saul did not perceive Richard to be insane as Steel argued but did perceive the king to have a personality disorder that centered on narcissism rather than on schizophrenia. Like Steel, however, Saul concluded that by 1399 there was “little doubt that Richard’s grasp on reality was becoming weaker.”55 Michael Bennett, in his work on the Revolution of 1399, refrained from any wide-ranging psychoanalysis in his study of Richard’s character, but in citing narrative sources, argued that the king acted in a faithless, cynical and arrogant manner towards those who mattered in the political community.56 As we have seen, as more evidence regarding the tainted nature of the narrative sources comes before us as historians, it becomes necessary to revise our thinking as to King Richard’s character and how he responded to events in 1399. This work will take as a guide Allison McHardy’s perception of Richard of Bordeaux’s character.57 Rather than see the king as a melancholic neurotic, who sank into the depths of insanity, or as narcissistic, or as a man possessed of some personality disorder, McHardy argues that Richard merely lacked self-confidence. As a young man he grew up in the household of an invalid father. Throughout his life Richard displayed the “classic symptoms of an inferiority complex: arrogance combined with thin-skinned touchiness,” but this does not make him insane or possessed of a personality disorder.58 Instead, this reading of Richard

54

Steel, Richard II, pp. 278–79. Saul, Richard II, pp. 459–60. 56 Bennett, Richard II, pp. 197–98. 57 A. K. McHardy, “Richard II: A Personal Portrait,” in The Reign of Richard II, ed. Gwilym Dodd (Stroud, 2000), pp. 11–32. 58 McHardy, “Richard II,” p. 32. 55

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of Bordeaux’s character helps explain why Henry and the members of his coalition acted toward the king the way that they did. Henry and his supporters in 1399 had a healthy respect for the king and his abilities and worked throughout the summer to play to his ego. Questions over the king’s sexuality have been in vogue in recent discussions of his character,59 but rumors did circulate among contemporaries that Richard Maudelyn, a king’s clerk and intimate of the king, was also his bastard son.60 This tradition demonstrates that rumors of the king’s extramarital affairs were common and that he had, at least in the popular mind, kept a mistress. Like his patronsaint and hero,61 Edward the Confessor, Richard II found childlessness a blessing rather than a curse. One of the chief stumbling blocks to removing him in the dark days of December 1387 was the question of the succession. Although Thomas of Woodstock, Richard Fitzalan, and Thomas Beauchamp, might have agreed that Richard should be removed, the king’s removal would have resulted in civil disorder. Without a clearly designated successor any future attempt to remove Richard would be faced with the same problem. Richard, like the Confessor before him, Richard had played members of his nobility off against each other and, like the Confessor, whose mythical coat of arms he impaled with his own in 1395,62 Richard used the question of the succession to his advantage.63 By naming Mortimer as his heir apparent and even allowing Henry of Lancaster to joust in the trappings of the Prince of Wales in 1397, after his marriage to Isabella of France, Richard made sure the question of succession was an ambiguous one.64 Although it is fashionable to argue that Richard disliked and feared Henry and his political ambitions, and that this hatred and fear lay

59

McHardy, “Richard II,” pp. 30–31; Bennett, Richard II, p. 71; Saul, Richard II, pp. 454–57. 60 Such claims were, however, absurd: Maudelyn had already been a student at Oxford when Richard had been in his teens, Chris Given-Wilson and Alice Curties, The Royal Bastards of Medieval England (London, 1984), p. 142. 61 Bennett, Richard II, p. 71. 62 For Richard II’s sense of history, see W. M. Ormrod, “Richard II’s Sense of English History,” in The Reign of Richard II, ed. G. Dodd (Stroud, 2000), pp. 97–110. 63 For commentaries on how King Edward used the succession, see Frank Ballow, Edward the Confessor (Los Angeles, 1984), pp. 80–85, 214–39; Frank Stenton, AngloSaxon England (Oxford, 1943), pp. 568–69. 64 Bennett, Richard II, pp. 61, 216 n. 32.


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behind the king’s decision to exile Henry in 1398, as we have seen, Richard had little reason to either hate or fear Henry and did neither. Those men whom the king feared and hated, such as Thomas of Woodstock and Richard Fitzalan, he had killed or judicially murdered. Allowing Henry to spend time on the Continent in exile and paying him well to do so strongly suggest that Richard believed he had little to fear from his cousin. In fact, considering how often Henry had tried to leave England for extended periods on the Continent between 1394 and 1398 perhaps Richard thought he was doing Henry a favor by exiling him. Throughout the summer of 1399, the king acted and was treated as a man in full command of his mental faculties. Henry of Lancaster and the coalition of the disaffected that he had put together in July treated Richard II with great respect for his abilities and were also conscious of his wrath. Rebellious nobles hardly bothered with kings who had sunken into deep melancholia or had become insane. For example, in the wake of St. Albans in 1455 the duke of York treated Henry VI with honor, but following his insanity of 1453/54 the king was, with some exceptions, little more than a figure-head.65 For Henry and the members of his coalition, the key in August 1399 was to coax the king out of hiding in Wales, and they did so by playing to Richard’s ego. Richard II had been in situations no worse than the one in which he found himself in 1399, and he had always triumphed over his enemies. The vehicle Richard’s opponents chose to get him out of Conway was to form Henry’s complaint not against the king, but against his “evil councilors.” Thus, the phrase of Henry’s protest was nothing more than a Third Appeal of Treason. The ruse they employed was brilliant at many levels. It first fooled Richard’s supporters among the titled nobility, baronage, gentry and clergy, into thinking Richard would not be deposed. Thus, the king’s supporters had little real need to come to blows against Henry and the members of his coalitions in defense of their king. It also fooled the king. Henry’s promise to allow the king to return to London unharassed by any road he chose played to the king’s ego and assured Richard that he would not be deposed. From Richard’s perspective in August 1399 what he needed most was time. Jean Creton, who

65

John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 317–21.

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provides our only eyewitness account of these events, claimed the king wished time and space to use his royal talents to pry Henry’s coalition apart, and Richard had little doubt that he could do so. Before Richard reached Flint, where the folly of his decisions was made clear to him, he did not believe his deposition was a viable political option. The last, and most often overlooked, of the three great personalities who drove the events of 1399 is Thomas Fitzalan, Archbishop of Canterbury. Although Robin Storey argues that no account of Richard’s deposition “can overlook the prominence of Thomas Arundel . . . in bringing about Richard’s capture and abdication,”66 most recent historians have tended to follow on from McFarlane and have given the Archbishop a lesser role in events than is warranted.67 As a younger son of Richard, 12th Earl of Arundel, Thomas was destined for the church. His career, as Margaret Aston traces, was little short of meteoric, and he attained the episcopal chair at Ely in his early 20s. By his late 30s he received promotion to the Archbishopric of York. Thomas had served as one of the key ecclesiastics supporting the Appellants of 1387/89, which earned him Richard II’s antipathy later in the 1390s. Arundel served twice as Richard II’s chancellor and was translated to Canterbury on the death of Archbishop Courtenay in 1396. His associations with his brother, the fiery Richard Fitzalan, 13th Earl of Arundel, brought him unwelcome royal attention in the Revenge Parliament of 1397. Arundel was found guilty of treason against the king for his role in the events of 1388/89, deprived of his see and banished from the kingdom. Although Richard II sent letters to Archbishop Arundel while in exile that suggested he would soon recall the Archbishop to court, the king apparently had as much distaste for Thomas as he had for his elder brother Richard. In the spring of 1398 Richard II sent secret letters to the pope in Rome, Boniface IX, informing him of his position on Arundel. The king explained to the Holy Father in no uncertain terms that Archbishop Arundel was as much

66 R. L. Storey, “Episcopal King-Makers in the Fifteenth Century,” in The Church, Politics and Patronage in the Fifteenth Century, ed. R. B. Dobson (Stroud, 1984), p. 83. 67 McFarlane argued that even as late as mid-August “it is by no means certain that [Archbishop] Arundel sided with the proposal to depose the king,” LK&LK, p. 52.


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to blame for Richard’s domestic problems over the last decade as anyone, and that Archbishop Arundel should never be allowed to return to England. Although it appears that throughout his lifetime Thomas Fitzalan was more in control of his emotions than his elder brother Richard, in 1399 he could barely contain his anger at Richard II and figured prominently in the king’s deposition. Modern scholarship has tended to see Archbishop Arundel as someone who, after 1396 at least, had the concerns of the Church and welfare of the faithful foremost in his heart and mind, and as someone who saw politics as an unwelcome distraction.68 Robin Storey, however, has presented some compelling evidence for a different interpretation,69 and there is more evidence to support his contentions.70 Although Archbishop Arundel may indeed have expressed reluctance to take up the office of chancellor for a third time in 1407,71 his actions in 1399, along with his involvement in high politics in the first half of Henry IV’s reign, demonstrate that his aversion to politics was not so pronounced. Not only did Arundel initiate contact with his fellow exile, Henry of Lancaster in Paris in April or May 1399, both Froissart and Capgrave relate that the Archbishop and not Henry was responsible for much of Henry’s success on his return to England. Clearly, Arundel functioned as Henry’s unofficial chancellor from the landing at Bridlington in early July to 5 September, when John Scarle officially received the office in Richard’s name. Strong evidence suggests that Arundel’s lack of aversion to politics in Richard II’s case came from the particularly strong and deep seated antipathy between Archbishop Arundel and the king during the Revenge Parliament of 1397. Richard had promised Arundel in that parliament that his exile would be short in duration and that he would not be deprived of his see. Yet, it appears that even before Arundel left the kingdom in October 1397, the king sent letters to the Pope in Rome requesting that Arundel be translated out of

68 Aston, Thomas Arundel, A Study in Chruch Life in the Reign of Richard II (Oxford, 1967), pp. 2–4, 375–77; R. G. Davies, “Thomas Arundel as Archbishop of Canterbury, 1396–1414.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 14 (1973), pp. 9–21. 69 R. L. Storey, “Episcopal King-Makers,” pp. 82–98. 70 R. G. Davies, “Richard II and the Church in the Years of the Tyranny,” Journal of Medieval History 1 (1975), p. 337. 71 St. Alban’s Chronicle, 1406–20, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1927), p. 10.

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Canterbury and Roger Walden be installed in his place.72 No doubt these letters and the loss of his see to Roger Walden only increased Arundel’s hatred of Richard II and his support for Henry of Bolingbroke. The Archbishop Arundel accompanied Henry throughout his travels and gave him much advice from his wealth of experience.73 But, it seems Archbishop Arundel’s real objective in 1399 was assaulting Richard of Bordeaux. The continuator of the Eulogium, reported that when Richard first appeared before Henry at Flint, Thomas Arundel flew into a rage, denouncing the king for a catalog of misdeeds against his family: the judicial murder of Archbishop Arundel’s elder brother Richard, and his own exile and “illegal” translation to the see of St. Andrew’s, headed the list. The tirade continued as the Archbishop attacked the king for misgovernance of the realm, and a vicious life, until Henry himself had to bring his compatriot up short with a simple, “sufficit.”74 Even if, as Robin Storey suggests, this entire episode is the invention of the chronicler,75 it clearly demonstrates how contemporaries viewed the relationship between Richard and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Archbishop Arundel also wrote some of the charges of deposition contained in the “Record and Process” on the parliament roll.76 Even after the deposition, Archbishop Arundel’s need to place himself at the center of the events of 1399 was so great that chroniclers of religious houses made the Archbishop figure prominently in their versions of the Ricardian deposition. We have already seen one example of the role the continuator of the Eulogium Historarium gave to Archbishop Arundel and he was by no means alone. Both Thomas Walsingham, from St. Albans, and Adam of Usk, one of Archbishop Arundel’s companions during the events of 1399, claimed that Northumberland and the Archbishop came to Richard at Conway and convinced him to abdicate.77 72 Matthew Parker, De Antiquitate Britannicae Ecclesiae (London, 1605), pp. 271–72. The case for the antagonism between Arundel and Richard is more fully developed in, Alfred Brown, “The Latin Letters in MS. All Souls 182,” EHR 87 (1972), pp. 565–73. 73 Sherbourne, “Perjury and Revolution,” pp. 152–53. 74 Eulogium, III: 382. 75 R. L. Storey, “Episcopal King-Makers,” p. 83. 76 RP, III: 416. 77 For Walsingham’s comment on the role of the Archbishop Arundel, see Chrons. Rev., p. 129. For Usk’s comment on the role of the Archbishop Arundel, see Chrons. Rev., p. 159.


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Although Arundel possibly or probably influenced ecclesiastical chroniclers to reflect events the way he would have liked them, it is important not to overlook one of the more meaningful aspects of Arundel’s adherence to Henry’s cause—Archbishop Arundel’s relations with his fellows among the English episcopacy. Previous historians have noticed the lack of any resistance to Henry on the part of the great churchmen of England apart from Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich.78 But, the reason English bishops failed to flock to the royalist banner may not be so much the fact that events moved too quickly for them in July and August 1399,79 but rather that so many of them were friends of Archbishop Arundel and many owed him a debt.80 For example, Richard Scrope, Archbishop of York, owed much of the advancement in his career to Thomas Arundel, and he began his career as a servant to Arundel when the latter was still bishop of Ely.81 Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, not only possessed familial contacts with the pro-Lancastrian earls of Stafford, but also had been supported for his nomination to the see of Exeter by Arundel in 1395 and received the Archbishop’s support again in 1396, this time to succeed him as chancellor.82 Even apparently staunch royalist bishops like the redoubtable Henry Despenser from Norwich, owed much to their friendship with Archbishop Arundel. Following Despenser’s disastrous “crusade” in Flanders in 1382, the temporalities of his see were confiscated. They were only returned and Despenser restored to his bishopric in 1385 through the efforts of Thomas Arundel, then Bishop of Ely.83 Just as this work argues for a revision of the perception of the politics involved in the Ricardian deposition along with a revision

78 Christiana Weber, “The English Bishops, 1399–1413” (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1962), pp. 75–76. 79 Weber, “English Bishops,” p. 74. 80 Certainly, this was not true of all English bishops. Some like Ralph Ergum of Bath and Wells who had been provided for in 1375 were too old and infirm to take part in events in 1399, CPR, 1391–96, p. 635. Even though, in Ergum’s case his decision as to which side to support might have been made difficult because he had served for a time as John of Gaunt’s chancellor and apparently Gaunt helped him secure his bishopric, Reg, I: 33, 343, 375. 81 Weber, “English Bishops,” pp. 16–17. 82 Weber, “English Bishops,” p. 22. 83 CPR, 1385–1389, p. 34. Margaret Aston, “The Impeachment of Bishop Despenser,” BIHR 38 (1965), pp. 127–148.

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of the principal actors involved, it also argues for a revision of the military aspects of the campaign of 1399. The English military structure in the late fourteenth century was largely the same structure that had served Edward III and his son the Black Prince so well in the middle decades of the century. The old feudal levy had, with one notable exception in 1385,84 been abandoned as both an efficient and effective way of raising a military force.85 As Philip Morgan suggests, military service in this period implied a number of interpersonal relationships, either with the Crown or with other lords in whose retinues soldiers served.86 Regular methods for raising forces in the late fourteenth century revolved around kings mustering large bodies of troops through a mixture of indentures for war and commissions of array. The “indenture” system provided a vehicle for the Crown to raise contingents of a definite size and keep them under arms for a defined period of time which could be extended if necessary.87 It also allowed the various captains to reward men in their own retinues with military service and allowed for a quality control over the men in the various contingents.88 In addition to attracting the better and more experienced soldiers, these indentured companies most likely offered the men in their ranks more regular and timely pay than their counterparts raised through commissions of array. These commissions of array were usually ordered for one county and contained several— on occasion as many as a dozen—arrayers. These commissioners often times divided their county between them and arrayed men for war in their allotted regions. Although instructions were given for the arrayers to select the best man for the task at hand, they were

84 N. B. Lewis, “The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385,” EHR 73 (1958), pp. 1–26. 85 J. J. N. Palmer, “The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in England (1385),” EHR 83 (1968), pp. 771–75. 86 Philip Morgan, War and Society in Medieval Chester, 1277–1403 (Chetham Society, 1987), p. 17. 87 Andrew Ayton, “English Armies in the Fourteenth Century,” in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 26–27. See also, N. B. Lewis, “The Recruitment of a Contract Army, May to November 1337,” BIHR 37 (1964), pp. 1–19. 88 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven, 1996), pp. 41–48. Andrew Ayton, “Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armoral Cases Before the Court of Chivalry,” in The Medieval Military Revolution, ed. Andrew Ayton and J. L. Price (London, 1995), pp. 81–104.


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not always able to achieve this goal. The contingents raised by these commissions, even though they were usually led by the men who arrayed them, were often of mixed quality.89 English armies in the last quarter of the fourteenth century also saw a dramatic increase in the proportion of archers to men-at-arms. In the middle decades of the century, English armies tended to have a parity between the men-at-arms and the archers.90 As late as 1381, when Edmund of Langley, Earl of Cambridge, prepared for his expedition to Portugal, all of his contingents raised though indentures for war had exact parity between the two troop types.91 Even though the exact equality between the two types was not achieved on this expedition, the greatest gap in any one contingent between men-atarms and archers was only eight.92 Whether or not the increased ratio of archers over men-at-arms in the late fourteenth century reflects the growing prosperity of the yeoman class is difficult to ascertain,93 but contingents in Richard II’s Scottish expeditionary force in 1385 ran at 2 or even 3 to 1 archers over men-at-arms, and his Irish expeditions in 1394/95 and again in 1399 ran at roughly 2 to 1.94 Even given these figures, it is difficult to gage with any real accuracy the actual number of archers to men-at-arms in the field, since in 1399 the king supplemented his troops raised with indentures for war with commissions of array in Cheshire that raised only archers.95 The Duke of York’s, army that was hastily summoned to defend the realm against Henry in June and July possessed, on paper at least, a somewhat lower ratio of archers to men-at-arms. The duke’s letters to the sheriffs that ordered them to raise forces sought 60

89 A. E. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” in The English Government at Work, 1327–36, ed. J. F. Willard and W. A. Morris, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass, 1940), I: 355–64. 90 Ayton, “English Armies,” pp. 31–32. 91 PRO C 47/2/49/2. 92 PRO E 101/39/17. 93 Ayton, “English Armies,” p. 33. 94 Some of the contingents in Richard II’s Irish expeditionary force in 1399 had a ratio of over 4.25 to 1 such as Edward, Duke of Albemarle, who drew £1064 in April 1399 for a contingent of 140 men-at-arms and 600 archers, PRO E403/562 m. 3. For his final contingent totals entered on to the issue roll on 13 May the ratio was even higher. Duke Edward on this date drew £1074 for 4 bannerettes, 12 knights, 124 men-at-arms and 800 archers: a ratio of 5.7 to 1, PRO E403/562 m. 10. 95 DKR, 36: 89.

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men-at-arms and 100 archers: a ratio of 1.67 to 1. For a variety of reasons which will be discussed in full later, it is impossible to determine the exact numbers and troop types under York’s command at any given moment. But from the numbers of men and types of soldiers who actually drew pay at the Exchequer, appears that even this ratio was not reached. It is possible (maybe even probable) that the ratio of men-at-arms to archers in Edmund of Langley’s army at Berkeley on 27 July was 3.5 to 1.96 If Duke Edmund’s army may be said to have been raised hastily, at least it was raised via normal means. By contrast Henry of Lancaster’s army was raised through a mixture of his father’s retinue, his own retinue, and the retinues of the members of his coalition, and finally, chronicles tell us, these men were supplemented by vast numbers of well-wishers and hangers-on. The bulk of Henry’s army, not surprisingly, came from his father’s estates. Among Henry’s most valuable supporters who helped raise troops in his name were the three Waterton brothers: Hugh, Robert and John.97 Hugh Waterton was not only steward of Monmouth, but also steward of Lancastrian lands in Hereford and Gloucester, in addition to being steward of Brecon.98 Robert was steward and master forester of Pontefract as well as Constable of Tickhill castle.99 The Watertons were not alone among Lancastrians in answering the call to aid Henry in the summer of 1399. John Curson, Gaunt’s steward of Tutbury,100 and Thomas Wednesley, Gaunt’s steward of High Peak, joined Henry as well, with substantial contingents of troops.101 The men from these

96 The paper strength numbers yield a strength of 241 lords, knights and menat-arms to 848 archers, D. Biggs, “‘To Aid the Custodian and Council:’ Edmund of Langley and the Defense of the Realm, June-July 1399,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), p. 139. 97 Sir Robert Somerville identifies the three as brothers, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 417. 98 Hugh received payment for the stewardship of Monmouth along with Lancastrian lands in Hereford and Gloucester for three-quarters of a year in 1399 to 30 September, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 635, 646, 647. 99 Robert had been steward at Pontefract from at least 3 February 1399 and master forester from at 13 February 1397, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 378, 379. He was constable of Tickhill for some undetermined time under Gaunt, p. 529. 100 At least £673 was spent on soldiers’ wages from Tutbury where Curson was steward, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 539. 101 At least £237 was spent on soldiers’ wages from High Peak where Wednesley was steward, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 550.


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Lancastrian estates ensured that a majority of the men under Henry’s banner were loyal Lancastrians. Nevertheless, these supporters were supplemented by men from the Northern Marches led by the Percy family as well as those from the midlands led by men in the earl of Warwick’s retinue and numerous hangers-on. Despite the cohesiveness of these Lancastrian backers in his host, Henry’s army apparently suffered logistical difficulties in terms of food for the men and fodder for their horses. Chronicle sources tell of his men despoiling the land as they marched—especially those estates of the king and his supporters. One of the greatest difficulties the historian faces in interpreting the events of the campaign of 1399 relates to the speed at which news, messengers, and armies traveled. This difficulty is magnified by the fact that sources do not always reveal where particular individuals or bodies of troops were at any one time, thus historians must employ a great deal of surmise and speculation. The absolute necessity to convey news quickly and accurately was well understood long before 1399, but although the English government maintained a substantial stable of royal messengers, it would not be until the last quarter of the fifteenth century that a regular postal system would be instituted in England. It is also important to note and remember that news in this period did not come in as complete a package as one would have wished, but rather trickled in to commanders over periods of time, that had to be carefully sifted to determine fact from fiction. Indeed, in some cases the news that kings and generals acted upon came to them by accident, through a merchant or traveler. Froissart’s telling of how news of Henry’s landing at Ravenspur reached towns on the coast was that it came to them through fishermen. In practical terms this meant that kings and generals often were forced to make decisions on information that was either inaccurate or untrue altogether, and then they had to live—or die—with the consequences of their actions. Nevertheless, solid evidence exists for the speed at which news traveled in 1399. For example, the Custodian of the Realm, Edmund, Duke of York, sent letters to the sheriffs in every county on 28 June 1399 to muster men in defense of the realm against the king’s enemies. This news reached Chester castle on 3 July when the sheriff there, Sir Robert Leigh, ordered the castle to be placed in a state of defense. Thus, the news traveled the 190 some miles from London to Chester in five days at the rate of about

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40 miles a day. This rate of movement will be taken throughout the work when considering the movement of single messengers carrying news. This rate of speed for the dissemination of news is also borne out by other examples in C. A. J. Armstrong’s seminal article, “Some Examples of the Distribution and Speed of News in England at the Time of the Wars of the Roses.”102 As Armstrong demonstrates, news could travel quickly even before the advent of the postal system in the late fifteenth century. In 1483 news traveled from York to London, some 200 miles away, in five days,103 and in 1455 news reached London from Newcastle, 276 miles away, informing the government that the Scots had been defeated before Berwick in only seven days.104 As Armstrong further proves the speed at which news traveled could be enhanced or delayed by the simplest and most basic of natural factors, such as the phase of the moon.105 The rate of speed at which armies moved in the late fourteenth century is somewhat easier to determine than the speed at which news traveled. The primary reason for this is because bodies of troops that constituted an army attracted the attention of narrative chroniclers who did their best to trace not only the route of march but also the speed at which it moved from town to town. These narrative sources are supplemented with government documents that these armies generated. From these two divergent sources the historian is able to gain a clearer picture emerges of how quickly large bodies of troops could move. For example, the duke of York’s army moved with some speed coming across Buckinghamshire on the northern shoulder of the Chiltern Hills on its way from Bedford to Oxford and made about 15 miles a day. By contrast, Henry of Lancaster’s army moved more slowly as he progressed up the eastern side of the Welsh March in late July and early August as he made his way from Bristol to Chester moving at about 10 miles a day. These figures are in line with those from continental armies of the same

102 C. A. J. Armstrong, “Some Examples of the Distribution and Speed of News in England at the Time of the Wars of the Roses,” in Studies in Medieval History, ed. R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin and R. W. Southern (Oxford, 1948), pp. 429–54. 103 Ibid., p. 435. 104 Ibid., p. 455. 105 Ibid., p. 444 ff. For the phases of the moon in 1399, see http://sunearth. gsfc.nasa.gov/exlipse/phase/phases.-1399–1300html.


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period,106 and will be used as the guidelines for movements of troops throughout this study. In order to provide answers the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter the book will follow a narrative format of events surrounding the campaigns of 1399. It will begin with a discussion of the English situation in Ireland in the last years of the century and offer some explanation as to not only what Richard II was trying to achieve there, but how he determined to build up a massive military presence there. It will discuss how the king went about recruiting and deploying these men long before Richard himself crossed to Ireland with the last portion of his Irish expeditionary force in June of 1399. The work will then discuss Richard’s 1399 campaign itself from his landing at Waterford and his march to Dublin where he learned of Henry’s return in mid-July. The work will then turn to a discussion of Henry of Lancaster’s predicament in Paris in the late spring of 1399, and of his meeting with Archbishop Arundel. I will argue that Henry’s return was a campaign at many levels; military, political and propagandistic. The work will then carry through the issue of those preparations for Henry’s return carried out by his own and his late-father’s retainers in the weeks before his landing at Bridlington in late-June. The book will then turn to a discussion of the third army of 1399; that of Edmund of Langley, Duke of York. As Custodian of the Realm, the aged duke had access to the legitimate machinery of government and worked with good effect to raise an army of some size in a very short period of time. I will follow York as he moved from London, to Oxford, and finally to Berkeley where he made his decision to join Henry of Lancaster. Following this, the work will return to Henry of Bolingbroke at Bridlington and trace his movements throughout his estates and how and why other members of his “coalition of the disaffected” joined him on his march to Berkeley. I will then turn to the military and political problems of Richard’s return from Ireland. Moving forward to South Wales was a sound military strategy for the king, and moving to

106 Monique Somme’, “La Chamber des Comptes de Lille, Auxiliaire Vigilante du Pouvoir Ducal au Milieu du XVe Sicle,” in Guerre, Pouvoir et Noblesse qu Moyen Age: Melanges en L’Honneur de Philippe Contamine, ed. J. Paviot and J. Verger (Paris, 2000), pp. 641–48. Nicholas Agrait, “The Reconquest During the Reign of Alfonso XI (1312–1350),” in On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O’Callaghan, ed. D. Kagay and T. Vann (Leiden, 1998), pp. 149–65.

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North Wales was sound political strategy. I will discuss the problems involved in Richard’s abandonment of his army and also discuss the issues surrounding his agreeing to meet with Henry at Flint. Following the king’s capture the work will follow the final steps of Henry of Lancaster from North Wales to London where in September decisions were made that removed Richard II and placed Henry IV on the throne. The work will conclude with a brief discussion on the political ramifications of the Revolution of 1399 on the English body politic.

CHAPTER TWO

RICHARD II AND THE “IRISH QUESTION,” 1390–99

The problems that Richard II encountered in Ireland in the 1390s were not of his own making. The history of the English lordship of Ireland in the late medieval period is one of political as well as cultural collision between the Anglo-Irish and Gaelic Irish. Unlike other locations in the British Isles, such as the Welsh March or Northern Marches where geography of the Welsh mountains or the Cheviot hills separated the English from rival ethnic groups, in Ireland no such geographical boundaries existed and the two cultures freely intermixed.1 Irish chieftains and their clans lived side by side with feudalized Anglo-Irish and English knights, lords, and peasants. This fact, perhaps more than any other, fueled the incessant antagonisms between these groups as the fourteenth century went on. Many authors have set out the general flow of events, especially in the recent past,2 but all have seen Richard II’s second Irish expedition as a completely new campaign rather than as an outgrowth of a consistent Ricardian policy toward Ireland.3 The force Richard II personally led to Ireland in June of 1399 represented only the final portion of a substantial concentration of English military force in the Emerald Isle, preparations for which began as early as 1397. Much of historical tradition has argued that the 1395 settlement between Richard and the Irish chiefs had not worked satisfactorily from its inception, and perhaps Richard viewed the 1395 settlement as only a temporary measure used to gain time to negotiate and to assemble a larger and more powerful army to achieve the task of bringing the “wild Irish” back to obedience.4 But, within the last-quarter century Dorothy Johnson has demonstrated

1

Frame, English Lordship in Ireland, pp. 1–10. Saul, Richard II, pp. 405–417; Bennett, Richard II, pp. 147–69. 3 Curtis, Richard II in Ireland, p. 53. 4 For a general survey of the Irish problem in the 1390s see, J. Otway-Ruthven, A History of Medieval Ireland; J. F. Lydon, “Richard II’s Expeditions to Ireland,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, 93 (1963), pp. 135, 146–47. 2

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that, in fact, such was not the case. Richard’s departure for home in 1395 did not result in a rapid decay of his 1394/95 diplomatic efforts. In fact, for nearly three years following the king’s first expedition, the Gaelic chieftains in Leinster lived and worked within the framework of their agreements with Richard II. Only in 1398 did some of the Irish chieftains rise in rebellion, and even then it is difficult to determine the breadth and depth of the rising.5 At the core of the difficulties facing Richard II in Ireland was a resurgence of Irish chieftains brought on by the extinction of many great Anglo-Irish families in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries followed by a growing absenteeism among the English and Anglo-Irish lords who remained. Within the eight decades that spanned the period from 1245 to 1324, virtually all of the great Anglo-Irish noble families were extinguished. The Marshalls of Leinster; the Laceys of Meath and Ulster; the Bigod Earls of Norfolk and lords of Carlow; the Claire Earls of Gloucester and Lords of Kilkenny; the Vescy lords of Kildare; Valence lords of Wexford and the Verdun lords of Westmeath all died out. The three earldoms of Kildare, Ormond and Desmond that replaced them proved insufficient to maintain a significant English presence within the lordship. Even the king combining the lordships of Liex and Trim for the earl of March translated into relatively insignificant practical political power.6 By Edward III’s death English lords in Ireland were few and usually absentees, which emboldened the Gaelic Irish to expand their power at their former overlords’ expense. The Irish struck at the English with increasing frequency and ferocity throughout Richard’s reign.7 As early as 1378 Irish chieftains such as O Brien from Munster, had allied with the MacMurroghs in Leinster and swept through the English settlements in Leinster like a wind through the grass. An even greater alliance had been forged in 1384 with Gaelic Irish from Munster, Leinster and Connaught. The English government in Dublin proved militarily incapable of stopping these Irish raids and had to resort to paying blackmail to the Irish to get them to leave. Paying off roving bands of Gaelic terrorists did not cease in 1384 but instead

5 Dorothy Johnson, “The Interim Years: Richard II and Ireland, 1395–9” in England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1981), p. 190. 6 Curtis, Richard II and Ireland, p. 19. 7 Robin Frame, “English Officials and Irish Chiefs in the Fourteenth Century,” EHR 90 (1975), pp. 748–77.

richard ii and the “irish question,” 1390‒99

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became the norm, and English settlers and towns were forced to pay “Black Rents,” in essence protection money, or face the wrath of these chieftains and their men.8 The council in Ireland possibly asked the king to come to them in person as early as 1385. But, rather than attend to his Irish lordship personally, Richard removed his ineffective lieutenant there, Sir Philip Courtenay (uncle of Edward, Earl of Devon), and replaced him with the most notorious royal favorite, Robert deVere, Earl of Oxford.9 The king clearly wished deVere to succeed in his new post. Not only did Richard give him titles, such as duke of Ireland, he provided sufficient resources for de Vere to keep a force of 500 menat-arms and 1,000 archers in Ireland for two full years.10 The domestic crisis that culminated in the Merciless Parliament of 1388 brought Duke Robert’s short-lived tenure as lieutenant in Ireland to an end. Following deVere’s removal English policy towards the lordship drifted. Royal lieutenants came and went in bewildering succession with little appreciable impact on the problems facing them. Whatever factors motivated the king’s change in his Irish strategy are unclear, but on 16 June 1394 Richard announced his intentions to go to Ireland.11 Richard II crossed to Ireland in late September 1394 and arrived at Waterford on 2 October. He brought with him an impressive army and a number of important peers, including John Holand, Earl of Huntington; Edward of York, Earl of Rutland and Cork; along with Reginald Grey, Lord of Ruthien and the Irish liberty of Wexford. Richard spent about one month moving through the countryside of Leinster between the Barrow and the Blackstairs Mountains. During this brief campaign he took several thousand head of Irish cattle and burned no less than twenty-three villages. By early November the king arrived in Dublin and there set up his court. He called to him those who knew the area well, including the Irish Archbishops along with the bishops of Meath, Leighlin and Ossory who had knowledge of the conditions on the ground within their bishoprics. Over

8

J. F. Lydon, The Lordship of Ireland in the Middle Ages (Toronto, 1972), pp. 226–29. Anthony Tuck, “Anglo-Irish Relations, 1382–1393,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 69 (1970), pp. 15–31. 10 Saul, Richard II, p. 275. 11 Nigel Saul argues that the king changed his mind about going to Ireland himself because of the death of Queen Anne, Saul, Richard II, p. 277. 9

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the next seven months, Richard worked through the vehicle of diplomacy to make peace with the great Gaelic Irish chieftains within the lordship. By the time the king departed from Waterford on 1 May 1395, the greatest of the Gaelic Irish chieftains had submitted to him and peace had been restored to Ireland.12 Richard II’s efforts at peacemaking notwithstanding, the 1395 settlement did little to stem the tide of English emigration from Ireland that had begun as early as 1391 and continued through Richard’s 1399 campaign. Although the king had issued statutes disallowing absenteeism to his English subjects who held lands in Ireland and had enforced these statutes with some vigor, over the decade of the 1390s he had found it necessary to give exemptions from his statutes to an increasing number of émigrés who left the violence of the crumbling English lordship for safer environs in England. Jack Lydon demonstrates that between 1391 and 1399 twenty-one exemptions from the statutes were given to landholders or beneficed clerics, while 521 more exemptions were given to artisans and laborers, and “this number is probably only a fraction of the total in England.”13 It is clear from these royal exemptions that English landlords were expected to return to Ireland and that they were expected to use their time at home to recruit men for the defense of their Irish lands. Richard himself obviously foresaw the problems of this wave of English emigration from Ireland. When he made his nephew Thomas, Duke of Surrey, his lieutenant in Ireland in 1398, the duke was to have a man and a wife out of every parish, or every two parishes, in England and transport them to Ireland “to inhabit the said land where it is wasted on the marches.”14 Whether or not this form of medieval colonialism would have succeeded, it could not have been very far advanced by the summer of 1399. The institution of this plan, however, indicates that the king had been working to find some security for his English subjects in the years following the successful 1394/95 expedition. As Jack Lydon suggests, Richard’s triumph in 1395 was a military one first and a

12

Curtis, Richard II and Ireland, pp. 26–35; Tout, Chapters, III: 489–91. Lydon, “Richard II’s Expeditions to Ireland,” p. 137. Examples of these exemptions may be found throughout the patent and close rolls, CPR, 1397–1399, pp. 203, 209, 220, 284, 240, 244, 382; CCR, 1396–1399, p. 445. 14 Lydon, The Lordship of Ireland, p. 207. 13


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diplomatic one second,15 and via military means he intended to sustain his success for the foreseeable future. Upon his departure from the Emerald Isle in the spring of 1395 the king left his close friend and counselor Sir William Scrope as justiciar of Leinster, Munster and Louth.16 Scrope’s appointment was bolstered by Roger Mortimer, Earl of March, remaining on as the king’s lieutenant in Ireland. As Dorothy Johnson suggests, the royal appointment of a dual governorship of the lordship demonstrated not only the seriousness with which the king viewed the situation in Ireland but also his resolve to see his achievement of 1395 maintained.17 The king also gathered a number of important Irish hostages, including MacMurrogh’s son,18 with him after he left Ireland in 1395 to help ensure the good faith of his Gaelic Irish subjects. Richard left his joint lieutenants with more than scraps of parchment to secure peace with the Irish. Even before he left for home on 30 May 1395, the king ordered payments for standing garrisons of troops at a number of strategically important castles to ensure peace and prosperity among his subjects in Ireland. The English stick in Ireland was led by some of the king’s knights. By January 1397 king’s knights, such as Thomas Vale, held 5 men-at-arms and 20 archers in the castle at Carlow, while Sir Robert Hefford held Balymore with 12 men-at-arms and 50 archers.19 Although the numbers within each garrison shifted over the next eighteen months for which accounts survive, it is clear that the king intended to keep a standing body of men in the lordship to keep the peace. But as time wore on, the garrisons from the southern castles were at first depleted and then abandoned, as their men-at-arms and archers moved to the north where they were needed to confront the internecine warfare between the English and Irish at the local level. For example, in April 1395 the garrison at Carlow contained 11

15 Lydon, “Richard II’s Expeditions,” p. 146; Curtis, Richard II and Ireland, pp. 26–54. 16 PRO E 364/31/4. 17 This section of this chapter is drawn largely from Johnson, “Richard II and Ireland,” pp. 176–90. 18 For the submissions of the Irish chieftains see PRO C 47/10/25/2–11. These were edited and printed by Curtis, Richard II in Ireland, pp. 57–121. One of these hostages on Man was Art MacMorrogh’s son, PRO E 364/32 m. 8. 19 PRO E 101/41/9 m. 1.

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men-at-arms and 50 archers, but by January 1397 the garrison there had shrunk to a bare 7 men-at-arms and 25 archers. The castle at Wexford had undergone a similar scaling back of its garrison. From a peak of 10 men-at-arms and 34 archers in April 1395, the forces there were gradually reduced to a relatively insignificant 4 men-atarms and 12 archers by January 1397.20 The men-at-arms and archers from these more peaceful areas were moved to castles where their presence was needed. Wicklow, for example, saw the numbers in its garrison increase from 4 men-at-arms and 43 archers in April 1395 to 10 men-at-arms and 48 archers in January 1397. Likewise Ballymore’s garrison rose from 8 men-at-arms and 54 archers to 8 menat-arms and 64 archers over the same period. By far the greatest enhancement of garrison came at Kendleston, which boasted only 4 men-at-arms and 12 archers in April 1395. These numbers rose to 4 men-at-arms and 30 archers by January 1397.21 By that time Scrope and Mortimer had decided to abandon the garrisons of Cork and Wexford altogether in favor of a new establishment at Dunlavin with 8 men-at-arms and 64 archers under Peter Holt. Dorothy Johnson argues that this shifting of troops among the castles within Leinster demonstrates that Scrope and Mortimer soon found that those garrisons in the more peaceful southern portions of the province were too far removed from those in the north to provide timely aid and thus they were reduced and eventually disbanded. Further, the increased presence of men and the opening of new garrisons, such as Dunlavin, are suggestive of an inability to keep the peace in certain areas on the part of the English. However, even enhancing the garrisons of particular castles was not completely effective in keeping the peace and this lawlessness resulted in the increased numbers of men under the direct command of Sir Stephen Scrope, the younger brother of Sir William Scrope. The discretionary forces under Sir Stephen’s direct command had nearly doubled between the inception of the garrisons in 1395 and the end of the available accounts for the quarter year beginning in January 1397. Scrope’s initial standing body of men amounted to 25 men-at-arms and 100 archers, but this number gradually grew over the ensuing eighteen months to a force of 58 men-at-arms and 179 archers.

20 21

PRO E 101/41/9 m. 2, 7. Ibid.


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Although the increase force in the northern portions of the province was ineffective in keeping the peace among the local inhabitants, none of the greater Irish chieftains rose in rebellion before the end of 1397. This pacifying the major chieftains was not so much the result of the English stick of military force as it was the English application of the carrot of money. In the twenty-four months that separated the king’s departure and Scrope’s departure substantial sums flowed into Ireland from the English Exchequer. Upon his return to England in 1395, Richard II focused some of his attention on ensuring that Gaelic chieftains received preference at the English Exchequer for their annuities, which so often in the past had either fallen into arrears or been converted to bad tallies. Under the king’s watchful eye, for the next two years, payments to Gaelic chiefs were regularly paid and thus this royal attention paid the dividend of relative peace within the lordship. Although the existence of these garrisons and standing bodies of troops indicates that low levels of violence continued in Ireland, none of the great Gaelic Irish chieftains rose in rebellion for over two years after Richard’s departure in May 1395. What happened to disturb and ultimately destroy the peace the king had achieved in 1395 resulted from a combination of several factors: the return of William Scrope to England, the fact of Roger, Earl of March, remained as the king’s only lieutenant in Ireland, and a series of vexing (and ultimately fatal to Richard II) domestic problems that kept the king’s attentions focused away from Ireland. Sir William Scrope was clearly a man of much administrative ability. In the spring of 1397 he returned home to England and took up the office of treasurer of the realm. Within a year he would become deeply embroiled in the domestic politics of the court, which culminated in the Revenge Parliament, and receive an earl’s title for his efforts on the king’s behalf. Scrope’s departure left Roger, Earl of March, as the king’s sole lieutenant in Ireland. Although Mortimer was a capable administrator, his natural affinity with the Anglo-Irish nobles, such as James Butler, Earl of Ormond, combined with the fact that he owned large estates and interests in Ireland, left him incapable of filling the lieutenancy in such a difficult time. Caught between his own self-interest and his duty to the king, self-interest won out in Roger Mortimer’s case. Within months of Scrope’s departure, March took up an aggressive

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stance toward the most important Gaelic Irish chieftains. He first struck in his own lordship of Trim, where effective political control of the region had been taken by local Irish families such as the O Farrells and O Reillys. Mortimer’s success against the unprepared Gaelic Irish was both swift and complete, which probably emboldened him to embark on an even more aggressive policy of expansion. In mid-1397 Mortimer, now backed by Anglo-Irish nobles such as the earls or Ormond and Kildare, struck at the O Neills of Armagh. O Neill had been one of the Gaelic Irish that Richard II had specifically worked to bring into the royalist fold. O Neill’s land in Armagh impinged on some of Mortimer’s own territories and the two had feuded openly. In the wake of his 1395 expedition, the king had stepped into this dispute between March and the Gaelic chieftain as judge and had handed down his adjudication of their dispute in a letter to both on 4 November 1395. The complete success of Mortimer’s unilateral assault on O Neill’s lands and tenants in 1397 strongly suggests that O Neill had not prepared for war and still sought to abide by his agreement with the king. Mortimer’s unprovoked strike on O Neill resulted in an almost immediate and almost complete collapse of royal governance among the Gaelic population of the lordship. It was suddenly and abundantly clear that Richard would need to personally return to Ireland if the diplomatic efforts and agreements he had so painstakingly made in 1394/95 were not to be wasted. The first concrete evidence of Richard’s intention to return to Ireland comes in June 1397, when he ordered ships arrested for his voyage.22 Unfortunately for the king and his Gaelic and Anglo-Irish subjects, English domestic politics intervened. Rumors of conspiracy and treason were in the air at court, possibly fueled by John Holand, then Earl of Huntingdon. If indeed the rumors of fresh treasons were true, the king could not have taken ship to Ireland for an extended period of time with any hope of safely returning to his kingdom. Thus, the king’s plans for his Irish lordship had to be delayed while real or imagined English treasons were effectively dealt with in the Revenge Parliament. Nevertheless, Mortimer, Ireland and Irish affairs were not far from the king’s mind even in the difficult days of October 1397. On 26 October the king sent a letter close to Roger Mortimer ordering him

22

Saul, Richard II, p. 288.


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to stop the practice of giving pardons to both the king’s Irish and English subjects there because “the king has made disposition shortly to come to Ireland in person.”23 The clarity of Richard’s intention regarding an imminent return to Ireland is further revealed by a second letter close to Mortimer ordering him not to let any king’s officers, except justices, leave Dublin until he arrived or until further order. In addition, the keeper of the great seal of Ireland and the treasurer of Ireland were specifically ordered not to leave the environs of Dublin until Richard arrived.24 If the king intended to leave for Ireland before the end of 1397 or early in 1398 these hopes were dashed by another English domestic disaster. As further fallout from the Revenge Parliament, Henry of Bolingbroke, Duke of Hereford, and Thomas Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, had entered into a quarrel over supposed treasonable language between them. From Richard’s perspective this dispute could probably not have come at a worse time since it seriously disrupted his Irish plans. The Shrewsbury session of the parliament of 1398, which Stubbs thought “suicidal,”25 could not find a solution to the real or imagined treason of which Bolingbroke appealed Mowbray, and the king decided to charge a parliamentary committee with limited powers to resolve the dispute. This committee, so often seen as one of the most overt symbols of Ricardian tyranny, was, in fact, not that at all. As Sir Gronwy Edwards demonstrated, the section of the parliament roll which delineated the parliamentary committee’s powers exists in three copies.26 Two are verbatim copies which give the committee specific and restricted powers only to settle the Bolingbroke/Mowbray dispute and to adjudicate the backlog of petitions from the previous parliament. The third copy of the committee’s powers, the one printed in the eighteenth century, gave the committee broad powers and paints Richard as a vindictive tyrant.27 This version, as Edwards suggests, was nothing more than a corrupted copy of the original roll. In fact,

23

The letter was warranted “by king and council,” CCR, 1396–1399, p. 154. CCR, 1396–99, p. 157. 25 Stubbs, Constitutional History, II: 522. 26 J. G. Edwards, “The Parliamentary Commission of 1398,” EHR 40 (1925), pp. 321–33. 27 As Edwards suggests this third version is in a unified hand with no interlineations, like the other two, and clearly is the product of a later time, Edwards, “Parliamentary Commission,” p. 25. 24

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the third roll is the only source we have for the committee’s meetings of 18 March and 23 April, which disenfranchised Henry and Thomas Mowbray.28 Although Edwards argues that Richard II ordered the roll altered to reflect some new-found desire to use the committee in ways unintended at its creation,29 the third roll is more likely a product of post-deposition Lancastrian propaganda created to support the eighth charge of deposition against the king.30 Thus, Richard did not attempt to use the Parliamentary Committee of 1398 as an agent of tyranny to arbitrarily strike at Henry, and to employ it as a pliant replacement for the place and authority of parliament, rather Richard intended the committee to perform no more tasks than the ones set before it in the Shrewsbury session of the parliament of 1398. While Richard delayed his departure for Ireland because of these domestic political issues, his English subjects still remaining in Ireland found that events in the lordship proceeded without reference to English affairs. Unwanted or not, Roger Mortimer continued as Richard’s lieutenant in Ireland and conducted several campaigns against MacMurrogh and his allies, but the Earl of March’s death at the battle of Kells near Carlow on 20 July 1398, left English rule in a shambles.31 Neither Reginald Grey, Lord of Ruthien and the Irish Liberty of Wexford, who remained in Ireland as justiciar after Mortimer’s death, nor Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey, Richard’s next lieutenant, who possessed nearly vice-regal powers,32 could quell the rebellious Irish.33 It became clear that a second and more substantive military response than in 1394/95 would be needed to salvage the situation, lest, as some Anglo-Irish lords argued, English rule collapse completely.34 Richard’s military response to the decaying Irish situation was not only well conceived but far more elaborate than the one he had 28

Chrons. Rev., pp. 92–93. Edwards, “Parliamentary Commission,” pp. 329–30. 30 Chrons. Rev., p. 175. 31 Johnson, “Richard II and Ireland,” pp. 188–90. 32 Surrey received the power to receive the loyalty of rebels and to pardon offenders in January 1399 (CPR, 1396–9, p. 472), and he was also given power to receive oaths of loyalty from Richard’s Irish subjects, PRO C 255/20/1 m. 25. 33 Dorothy Johnson, “Chief Governors and Treasurers of Ireland in the Reign of Richard II,” in Colony and Frontier in Medieval Ireland, ed. T. Barry, R. Frame, K. Simms (London, 1995), pp. 96–115. 34 Frame, English Lordship in Ireland, pp. 334–9. 29


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undertaken in 1395. As we have seen, one of the key points in Richard’s military strategy in Ireland centered on the garrisoning of important castles. In addition to these garrisons, the Earl of March had kept a standing force of some 500 men under arms with him during his lieutenancy.35 These troops were reinforced in the summer of 1397 by an order to the sheriff of Chester to raise 2,000 archers, which was followed a month later by another order to move these troops to ports of embarkation for Ireland.36 Yet another round of reinforcements arrived in the summer of 1398 when Thomas, Duke of Surrey, crossed to Dublin with an army. Duke Thomas received £3,751 1s 4d in late-1398 and early-1399 for soldiers wages which would have paid for a force of around three thousand men.37 Much of Surrey’s force came from the principality of Chester,38 and Richard’s frequent presence there in the autumn of 1398 suggests that the king took personal interest in ordering the particulars of the expedition.39 Not surprisingly, a number of those who served with Duke Thomas were members of his affinity and household. John Cassus and Robert Swales were two of his esquires,40 while William Banaster had come to Surrey’s service following the death of the Earl of March.41 The duke’s household was also well represented by his household esquires Gilbert Langtre, Nicholas Orwell, Thomas Lacy and Robert Porter cross St. George’s Channel to Ireland.42

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March had under him a standing force of 100 men-at-arms and 400 archers, E 403/561 m. 11. 36 DKR 36: 98. 37 PRO E 403/561 m. 4, 5, 16. 38 Surrey’s forces left for Ireland from Chester in August 1398, CPR, 1396–9, p. 438. 39 Tim Thornton, “Cheshire: the Inner Citadel of Richard’s Kingdom?” in The Reign of Richard II, ed. G. Dodd (Stroud, 2000), pp. 86–7; Saul, Richard II, pp. 391–3; N. Saul, “Richard II, York, and the Evidence of the King’s Itinerary,” in The Age of Richard II, ed. J. L. Gillespie (Stroud, 1997), pp. 81–3. 40 For Cassus’s, (an esquire of the Duke of Surrey, CPR, 1396–9, p. 177) and Swales’s (an esquire of the Duke of Surrey, PRO E 101/247/5) protections for Irish service see, CPR, 1396–9, p. 409. 41 Banaster had been in Ireland with Roger Mortimer in 1396, CPR, 1396–9, p. 35. 42 For the writ of aid to Langtre and others see, CPR, 1396–9, p. 400. Also in Duke Thomas’s household went his wife, Margaret, Duchess of Surrey. Her role, of course, was not military but courtly and demonstrates that Richard II wished to take as many of the creature comforts of his court with him as possible to Ireland, E 364/36 m. 1.

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These troops were supplemented by commissions of array in February 1399 to raise more men within the principality of Chester. The seven knights and nine esquires named to these Cheshire commissions were to raise 560 archers, who were to embark from Cheshire on the Saturday on the eve of Pentecost (17 May) and reach Ireland, probably at Dublin, within three or four days.43 Whether or not Richard intended to overawe the other troops in his army with the size of this Cheshire contingent as Walsingham claimed is impossible to determine,44 but such a heavy reliance on raising men in the principality did have an unforeseen downside. In fact, by the summer of 1399 so few troops remained in the principality that the chief castles within Cheshire could not be adequately manned.45 In the midst of these preparations for Richard’s Irish expedition, John of Gaunt died at Leicester on 20 February 1399. On 18 March, for reasons still unclear, the less-than-reliable parliament roll records that the chancellor, Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, brought before parliamentary committee and the king evidence that the king’s promise to allow Henry to receive his inheritance should his father die while he was abroad had been given “inadvertently” and “contrary” to judgments agreed upon at Coventry in September 1398.46 Therefore, Richard decided to repeal the letters patent he had given Henry and give out the Lancastrian patrimony to his friends among the titled nobility “in keeping” until Henry or his attorneys would make proper suit through the royal court system. Exactly what the king sought to do by taking this action is unclear. The only accounts of Richard’s decision come to us through layers of forgery and Lancastrian propaganda, and therefore, his actions need to be carefully interpreted. It is possible that the king wished to use some of the massive income from the Lancastrian inheritance to help fund the Irish expedition, since the new round of forced loans that he ordered throughout the country were not well received

43 DKR 36: 491. Richard supplemented these forces with 576 horses who were collected at Chester before being transported to Ireland, Bennett, Richard II, p. 147. 44 Annales Ricardi Secundi, pp. 238–9. 45 Rees Davis, “The Principality of Chester,” p. 278; Holt castle had no more than one hundred men-at-arms and archers, while Chester castle had perhaps only thirty men-at-arms and archers, Philip Morgan, War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277–1403 (Manchester, 1987), p. 203; PRO SC 6/774/10 m. 2d; Adam of Usk, Chronicle, ed Thompson, p. 28. 46 Chrons. Rev., pp. 92–93.


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by all,47 and some of his collectors were rebuffed by at least one northern lord.48 It is more likely that Richard wished to use the opportunity that Gaunt’s death and Henry’s momentary exile afforded him to diminish both the size and power of the Lancastrian patrimony. In fact, Gaunt’s death may have been the falling into place of the last piece of a complicated and well-conceived strategy on the part of the king. Richard had begun to pick away at Gaunt’s base of power as early as the mid-1390s by retaining a number of men within counties where his uncle held estates. The king also worked in the months between Gaunt’s death and his departure for Ireland in late May to retain some of his uncle’s most significant retainers, provided they would be retained by the king alone and serve the king alone. The king’s gift to his friends among the titled nobility who “kept” Gaunt’s lands during Henry’s absence from the realm allowed them to change any and all estate officials without Henry’s consent, and some once-prominent Lancastrian retainers found themselves thrown in gaol over local disputes. These salient elements help to make the case that Richard wished to lessen, rather than destroy, the duchy of Lancaster. Perhaps the king thought that Henry, who had never had a mind for politics or domestic affairs, would not be overly concerned with what became of his inheritance as long as money to fund his life-style continued to flow. The king had no intention of deliberately mistreating Henry in France. Henry’s own lands as Duke of Hereford and Earl of Derby, in addition to those estates he held by right of his late wife, were undisturbed by Richard’s actions, and Henry’s sizable annuity continued to be paid,49 albeit from income produced by his late father’s estates.50 The claims by the chronicler of the Eulogium, Adam of Usk and John Capgrave, that Richard ordered Henry’s banishment extended from six years to life, are nothing more than a post-deposition forgeries, as pro-Lancastrian chroniclers worked to turn Richard of

47

See below, chapter 4. Ralph, Lord Greystoke, refused to give the king any money when collectors came seeking his assistance for the Irish expedition, Tuck, Richard II and the Nobility, p. 196. 49 Henry’s receivers, John Leventhorpe and Richard Ramsay, drew £1,586 13s 4d from the Exchequer on 20 June, PRO E 403/562 m. 12, 20 June. 50 The Receipt Roll shows that the £1,586 13s 4d from the Exchequer was allocated to Henry from income derived from his late father’s estates, PRO E 401/614 m. 4, 20 June; PRO E 401/615 m. 11, 20 June. 48

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Bordeaux into a tyrannical monster. It is more likely that Richard intended for Henry to return at an agreed upon point in the future to take up a reduced duchy of Lancaster.51 The escalation of English military force in Ireland was not completed until the last, royally led, portion of the army set sail for Ireland in the summer of 1399, and preparations for the crossing and campaign continued until the last minute.52 On 1 May Richard wrote to the heads of monastic houses seeking their help with horses and wagons, which strongly suggests Richard was short of transport.53 Short of transport or not, men kept on being shipped to Ireland as the summer progressed. As late as mid-June, two weeks after the king had already arrived at Waterford, protections for war were still being issued under the Cheshire seal for men to travel across the Irish Sea.54 It is clear that the king intended to stay in Ireland for some time. The royal indentures for war with his great captains ran for a term of one year,55 rather than six months as they had in 1395. Richard also left £ 40,000 and stockpiles of arms at Holt castle in the Principality of Cheshire to serve as a treasury for the campaign,56 and deposited the substantial sum of £14,148 15s at Trim, quite probably for troops’ wages.57 The king even brought some of the crown jewels with him to serve as a source of cash or collateral if needed.58 The king also traveled with a full household establishment as he had in 1394/95. Thus, the leadership and administrative organization of the campaign was modeled along the traditional lines of those

51 According to Creton, who was an eyewitness to these events, when Henry met Richard at Flint he asked the king to forgive him for returning to England before the date that had been set for his return, Chrons. Rev., p. 150. 52 For the royalist portion of the king’s army, see Appendix I. 53 BL, Cotton, Faustina, C. V. fo. 88v. 54 For the men who took protections for war at Chancery see, Appendix II. 55 John Holand’s indenture, E 101/69/300, Edward of York’s indenture, E 101/ 69/301, Thomas Percy’s indenture, E 101/69/296, 297. Interestingly Percy’s indenture was only for six months, and probably reflects his duties as Admiral of Ireland, CPR, 1396–9, p. 479. 56 Supposedly Richard had £40,000 in Holt castle which he used as a private treasury, RH&KA, pp. 90, 181. Certainly large sums were paid into the “Holt treasury,” PRO E 403/561 mm. 3, 7, 14. 57 PRO E 101/403/21; J. L. Gillespie, “Richard II: King of Battles?,” in The Age of Richard II, ed. J. L. Gillespie (Stroud, 1997), p. 157. 58 Thomas, Duke of Surrey had taken £ 200 worth of jewels to Ireland in 1398, PRO E 101/334/30, and Richard took more, PRO E 101/403/13 m. 6.


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so often employed by Edward III and the Black Prince.59 The king’s secretary, John Lincoln, along with the clerks of the signet office, served as the administrative arm of the campaign and provided the necessary manpower needed to write the writs, letters, and grants before they would be entered into the enrolled accounts at a later date.60 Thomas Brounflete, the king’s chief butler, accompanied the king,61 as did Richard Hamm, serjeant of the bakery,62 and Henry Bloxham, a yeoman of the scullery.63 William Walshale, marshal of the hall, accompanied Richard,64 as did John Lufwyk, a yeoman of the robes.65 A number of chamber officials also took protections for their time in Ireland including William Brauncepath, an esquire of the chamber;66 Adam ate Wood and John Wilton, both yeomen of the chamber;67 and Thomas Green, younger son of Sir Henry Green.68 William Mersshe, the king’s chief smith within the Tower of London accompanied the king,69 as did Peter Hermodesworth, one of the yeomen of the avenary to provide fodder for the king’s horses.70 Last and not least a number of buyers for the royal household accompanied Richard to ensure that the royal party was sufficiently victualized and cared for.71 Along with these officials went Nicholas Englefield, serjeant of the counting house;72 a band of minstrels;73 the king’s painter, Thomas Prince;74 Lady Margaret Sarnesfield, one

59

Tout, Chapters, IV: 55. Tout, Chapters, IV: 54. 61 Brounflete was also a king’s esquire, CPR 1396–1399, p. 48. 62 For Hamm’s office, CPR 1396–1399, p. 156. He also had an annuity from the king, PRO E 403/561 m. 10. 63 CPR 1396–1399, pp. 359, 527. 64 CPR 1396–1399, p. 197. 65 Lufwyk was also a king’s esquire, CPR 1396–1399, pp. 61, 323, 326, 452. 66 CPR 1396–1399, pp. 38, 152, 248, 351, 466. 67 For atte Wood, CPR 1396–1399, pp. 45, 103, 216, 218, 323, 376, 405, 478, 530. For Wilton, CPR 1396–1399, pp. 201, 224, 245, 270, 279. 68 For Green as a yeoman of the chamber see, CPR 1396–1399, pp. 201, 211, 349, 490. Mentioned as Sir Henry’s son, CPR 1399–1401, p. 21. Ralph Green was Sir Henry’s eldest son and heir, HoC, III: 228–30. 69 CPR 1396–1399, p. 279. 70 CPR 1396–1399, p. 285. 71 These buyers/purveyors included John Blakisley, Nicholas Beaconsfield, John Dunesmore, William Stondon and Robert Huwet. 72 CPR 1396–1399, p. 247. 73 William Dodesmore, the king’s harper since 1391, went along with Richard to Ireland, CPR 1391–1396, pp. 13, 450; CPR 1396–1399, p. 573. 74 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 573. 60

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of the late Queen Anne’s ladies and favorite of the king; and Sir Henry Ilcombe, who had “by divine visitation become blind” the previous January.75 The troops for the last portion of the Irish army were raised through indentures for war. Initial payments to captains for their contingents were ordered out of the Exchequer on 16 April, with supplemental payments for more contingents on 25 April, and a final list of contingents and captains with additional payments on 13 May.76 These payments provided for a paper strength force to 6 banneretts, 45 knights, 530 men-at-arms, and 2,500 archers.77 The size of the king’s own personal contingent is not specifically recorded, but it was probably substantial. Richard’s contingent in 1385 amounted to 800 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers,78 by the late 1390s the king’s bodyguard of Cheshiremen alone had swelled to over 400 and it contained more than just archers.79 This last portion of the army sent to Ireland came to at least three thousand men, which, when added to the English troops already on the ground with Surrey, and those men raised by Anglo-Irish magnates, probably produced a total Anglo-Irish army of nine or ten thousand men.80 As Chris Given-Wilson suggests, a heavily royalist complexion can be traced throughout the ranks of Richard’s portion of the army.81 The chief captains who assembled in Ireland were among Richard’s closest friends and those who possessed military experience. His halfbrother John Holand, Duke of Exeter, had seen military service in

75

CPR, 1396–9, p. 479. PRO E 403/ 562, mm. 2, 3, 4, 10. See Appendix I. 77 At least 59 ships were arrested to transport this army, PRO E 364/37 m. 3d, PRO E 364/ 38 m. 5, 5d. 78 N. B. Lewis, “The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385.” English Historical Review 73 (1958), pp. 5–8. 79 RH&KA, pp. 222–3; J. L. Gillespie, “Richard II’s Cheshire Archers,” Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Chesire 125 (1974), pp. 1–39; a list of the knights, esquires, and archers in the king’s Cheshire bodyguard exists for 22 Richard II. The 10 knights, 86 esquires, 56 valets and 317 archers organized into four companies and were paid £ 1,549 12s 1d for wages, see PRO E 101/42/10. 80 This was a force of conventional size, although it was a smaller army than the one he had led to Scotland in 1385, (Lewis, “Feudal Levy,” pp. 5–6), and smaller than the one Henry IV led to Scotland in 1400, (A. L. Brown, “The English Campaign in Scotland, 1400,” in British Government and Administration, ed. H. Hearder and H. R. Lyon (Cardiff, 1974), pp. 40–54. Nonetheless, this total was similar to the army in 1395, Otway-Ruthven, History of Medieval Ireland, p. 337. 81 RH&KA, 221–3. See appendix II. 76


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Scotland and France,82 while Richard’s nephew, Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey, had served in France and Ireland. The king’s cousin, Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, served with Richard in Scotland and Ireland and acted as warden of the western march towards Scotland since 1397.83 John Montague, Earl of Salisbury had served with Richard on both his Scottish and Irish expeditions. Out of the forty-nine knights and bannerets who sought protections, no fewer than thirty were Richard’s retainers. This number included chamber knights such as Sir William Lisle;84 Sir Richard Redman, master of the king’s horse;85 and Sir John Holand, the chief chamberlain. Some who sought protections, like Sir Edmund Noon, had been in Richard’s service since 1370s,86 while others, such as Sir John St. John, had come to royal service in the recent past.87 Richard brought with him some of his most experienced knightly soldiers. Sir Simon Felbrigge, the king’s standard bearer,88 Sir Robert Witteneye and Sir John Stanley, had fought with the king before on his Scottish and Irish expeditions,89 and Sir George Felbrigge, Sir Reginald Braybrooke, Sir John Howard, and Sir Thomas West had all served in Ireland in 1394.90 These king’s knights were supplemented by no less than forty-six king’s esquires. Like the knights above, some of these men were Richard’s most trusted confidants. William Brauncepath served in the royal household and had helped secure the king’s French marriage in 1395–6.91 Edward Hales had served Richard’s father as one of his esquires throughout the reign,92 and John Beauchamp of Holt, 82

For John Holand’s indenture for war, PRO E 101/69/1/300. For Edward of York’s indenture for war, PRO E 101/69/1/301. 84 HoC, III: 612–4. 85 HoC, IV: 183–7. 86 HoC, III: 841–3. 87 St. John had been a member of Thomas Mowbray’s council in the 1390s even though Richard had retained him in 1393. Before he left on his exile in 1398 Mowbray named St. John to be on the council of his son and heir. St. John did not serve however and his presence at court and on the Irish expedition suggests that he left the house of Norfolk for the greater rewards of royal service, HoC, IV: 280–3. 88 He succeeded Sir Nicholas Sarnesfield as Richard’s standard bearer in 1391, CPR, 1391–96, p. 563. 89 CPR, 1391–96, pp. 451, 523; CPR, 1396–9, p. 511. 90 Lewis, “Feudal Levy,” Felbrigge, p. 19; West, p. 18; Braybrooke, HoC, II: 349–50; Howard, HoC, III: 431–33. 91 RH&KA, p. 169. 92 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 32. 83

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son and heir of the Beauchamp destroyed by the Merciless Parliament in 1388, was knighted by Richard in Ireland.93 These Ricardian knights and esquires were among the most prominent representatives in their localities,94 and they were primarily from the southern shires: seven men who took out protections came from Northamptonshire, five came from Staffordshire and five from Gloucestershire. Many of these Ricardian knights and esquires had also been MPs in the recent past, and as such, were leaders in their counties. Their absence in the summer of 1399 made it more difficult for those loyalists who remained to rally support for the king. In addition to the loyalists from the southern shires, Richard’s Irish expeditionary force contained a strong Cheshire element. No less than thirty-six Cheshiremen took out protections to accompany the king, most of them under the Cheshire seal. With these Cheshire loyalists also came the king’s enlarged Cheshire body guard some 500 strong that contained men-at-arms as well as archers.95 Two more aspects of the make-up of the Irish expeditionary force are worthy of note; first, it had higher ratio of archers to men-atarms than was normal for English armies in this period;96 and second, it contained very few Lancastrians. The commissions of array Richard ordered for the Principality of Chester in early 1399 concentrated on recruiting archers and the portion of the expeditionary force that Richard led also contained a substantial number of archers. These archers were, it seems, the most flexible and perhaps most useful part of the army.97 According to Creton the Irish practiced a type of guerrilla-style warfare which meant English archers were often employed to drive Irish insurgents out of woods and places that the heavily laden men-at-arms could not easily traverse.98 John of Gaunt’s age and infirmity had prevented him from taking an active part in planning the early stages of the Irish campaign, 93

HoC, II: 153–4. Throughout the 1390s Richard had worked hard to bring important local men into his affinity as deliberate policy, RH&KA, p. 221. 95 In 1399 this force comprised a total of 478 men and contained no less than 10 knights and 85 esquires, PRO E 101/42/10. 96 Andrew Ayton, “English Armies in the Fourteenth Century,” pp. 32–33. 97 J. L. Gillespie, “Richard II: King of Battles?” in The Age of Richard II, ed. J. L. Gillespie (Stroud, 1997), pp. 156–7. Creton, Metrical History, pp. 33–34. 98 Creton said that the Irish were “afraid of arrows,” and they did not often escape when they raided the English because the archers were often upon them, Metrical History, p. 33. 94


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or from committing the duchy of Lancaster’s military resources from to the effort. These factors coupled with Henry of Bolingbroke’s banishment left the substantial military resources of the duchy of Lancaster virtually untapped by Richard’s recruiting efforts.99 Although Richard worked to retain a number of Gaunt’s knights and esquires following the duke’s death in February 1399, only three former Lancastrian retainers are known to have gone to Ireland: Sir John Cornwall who had been in John of Gaunt’s household since 1395; Sir John Dalton from Lancashire; and John Stafford, esquire, from Derbyshire.100 The only other known Lancastrian supporter possibly in Ireland in 1399 was Reginald Grey, Lord of Ruthien and Lord of the Liberty of Wexford. Grey’s service in Ireland began in the autumn of 1397 in the capacity of justiciar, but his exact movements in 1399 are unclear.101 He received a second protection for one year on 20 April 1399 which may suggest of his presence in England,102 but he does not seem to have accompanied the royalist portion of the army to Ireland in the spring of 1399. Even though Grey did receive a commission on 16 April to raise 35 men-at-arms and four hundred archers to accompany the king, his name is struck-through on the issue roll and replaced with John Carp, keeper of Richard’s great wardrobe. Thus, it seems that Grey neither raised the troops nor led them.103 It also seems that Grey either resigned from his post as justiciar or Richard replaced him, because William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire was described as justiciar in Ireland on the issue roll in December 1398.104 Given Grey’s close friendship with Henry of Bolingbroke and given his stature in Henry IV’s counsels following

99 The military potential of the duchy of Lancaster was undoubtedly great. In 1385 Gaunt had raised a force of 14 Baneretts, 136 knights, 850 esquires and 2,000 archers largely from his own estates for his contribution to Richard’s Scottish campaign. Gaunt received £666 13s 4d for forty days service for this force, ArmitageSmith, John of Gaunt, p. 295; Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 41. 100 HoC, III: 661–3; Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, for Dalton, p. 152, for Stafford, p. 221. Along with these retained Lancastrians may be found John Dymmok and esquire from Gloucestershire. His father, Sir John, was one of Gaunt’s retainers (Reg., I: 937), and John the younger was one of Henry IV’s king’s esquires by January 1400, CPR, 1399–1401, p. 182. 101 Grey took a protection for one year on 3 October 1397, CPR, 1396–99, p. 204. 102 CPR, 1396–9, p. 524. 103 PRO E 403/562 16 April. 104 PRO E 403/561 m. 11, 11 December 1398.

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the deposition, it is tempting to see Grey’s leaving the office of justiciar and his failure to fulfill his commission to raise and lead troops on the eve of Richard’s departure as indicative of Grey’s complicity in, or at least knowledge of, Henry’s invasion plans. Although this may indeed have been the case, Grey’s actions still remain within the realm of speculation. It is often claimed that Richard left the kingdom nearly defenseless when he set out for Ireland in July 1399, but it is difficult to accept this line of argument. Richard II had worked tirelessly throughout the 1390s to make a lasting peace with both Scotland and France and had little fear from invasion from either of those kingdoms during his absence. Nevertheless, defenses were shored-up while the king was abroad. The keeper of Berwick castle and the warden of the east march toward Scotland, Henry “hotspur” Percy, received £800 on 13 May 1399 for payment of soldiers’ wages.105 The warden of the west march toward Scotland, Edward, Duke of Albemarle, and the constable of Roxburgh, Sir John Stanley, had drawn over £2,000 paying wages to men on the northern marches between late 1398 and early 1399.106 To ensure peace on the northern marches Albemarle transferred his keeping of the western march to Henry, Earl of Northumberland before departing for Ireland.107 Earlier in 1399 the king had seen to his security in the channel. On 8 February the king granted letters under the privy seal to William Hanney, clerk, and John Orwell, one of the king’s serjeants-at-arms, to take ships of war and explore the coast of France and Flanders.108 These early letters of mark proved successful, and by 26 April Hanney had seized 600 quarters of wheat from Flemish ships in the Seine valley and transported the food to Calais, where it was to be used to feed the

105

PRO E 403/561 m. 9. PRO E 403/561, Albemarle took £300 for soldiers wages on the western march on 6 Nov. 1398 m. 4, John Stanley took £160 for soldiers defending Roxburgh on 7 Dec. 1398 m. 7, Albemarle took a further £333 on 11 Feb. 1399 m. 14, £66 on 5 Mar. 1399 m. 16, and £245 on 27 Mar. 1399 m. 17; PRO E 403/562 Albemarle took a final payment of £133 for the western march on 13 April m. 1. 107 The letter authorizing Earl Henry’s wardenship of the western march and keeping of Roxburgh was dated 11 July 1399, PRO C 47/22/11/10. 108 These men drew £8 6s 8d for their wages, PRO E 364/32 m. 1d. The extent of this internecine warfare is discussed in, Stephen Pistino, “Henry IV and the English Privateers,” EHR 90 (1975), pp. 322–30. 106


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garrison.109 The king had also arranged for defense of the Aquitaine by sending troops under John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, some of whom departed in February 1399.110 Richard also provided the Duke of York and the council with a standing body of troops, and on 23 March sheriffs received orders mandating that all yeomen in livery of the Crown were to hasten to London and await orders of the Custodian and Council.111 The exact number of these yeomen in royal livery is difficult to tell. Tout argued that Richard had “filled the land” with these men who were sworn to join the royal household when summoned.112 Although this may indeed be an overstatement on Tout’s part, it is clear that Richard had made a substantial number of men his yeomen in livery in the last twentytwo months of his reign. Although some came from East Anglian counties, such as Suffolk,113 and even as far away as Northumberland,114 but by far the majority came from the Principality of Chester.115 As one final piece of insurance, Richard saw that both Henry of Monmouth and Humphrey of Gloucester went with him to Ireland.116 If Richard had concerns regarding his wayward cousin, Henry of Lancaster, in France, they were apparently not very deep ones. It seems the king had not bothered to contact Henry since the preceding December,117 and it may have been that, from the negotiations 109 E 364/35 m. 2. This sort of privateering was not uncommon in the channel and even in times of peace it continued, on occasion escalating almost to the point of open war. Henry IV faced this problem as well early in his reign as Stephen Pistino suggests. 110 Although Beaufort himself never went to Aquitaine as Richard’s lieutenant, Robert Markley, serjeant-at-arms, arrested 87 ships between 14 November 1398 and 11 February 1399 and paid £573 10s 4d to mariners to carry Beaufort’s expedition to Bordeaux, PRO E 364/38 m. 5. 111 CCR, 1396–99, p. 388. Rymer, Foedera, VIII: 70. 112 Tout, Chapters, IV: 10. 113 One John Eliot, “yeoman in livery of the crown” received a reasonable grant in 1396 of 40 acres of land in Suffolk, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 149–50. 114 CCR, 1396–1399, pp. 489–90. 115 No less than 170 men were made Yeomen in livery between late 1397 and June 1399, see Appendix III. 116 On 6 May Peter Melbourne, one of John of Gaunt’s esquires, drew £40 from the Exchequer for expenses for Henry of Monmouth’s trip to Ireland, and on the same day Thomas Burgh, one of Thomas of Woodstock’s esquires, drew £46 16s for expenses for Humphrey of Gloucester’s trip to Ireland, PRO E 403/563 m. 4, 6 May. 117 Sir Roger Siglem, a Bohemian knight from the late-queen Anne’s household, had been sent to Henry in France in late 1398 bearing letters from Richard II, PRO E 364/34 m. 1. Peter Breton drew payment of £6 13s 8d on 11 December 1398 to conduct negotiations with Henry in France, PRO E 403/561 m. 11.

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spawned by those letters that a date had been fixed for Henry to return.118 From the king’s perspective, Henry could hardly be considered much of a threat. Although the young Henry may have been a popular figure within the kingdom, he had almost never been involved in politics, and when he had, it was in concert with his now deceased father. Henry’s nearly annual attempts to leave the kingdom for extended periods abroad beginning in 1390 also contributed to the impression of Henry being disinterested in politics. Richard probably believed that as long has he paid Henry a substantial annuity he would be content “playing” on the continent. In any event, even if Henry did chose to mount some kind of return to England, he could not do so alone, and his only potential allies were his fellow exiles. The first, Thomas Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, can be considered a most unlikely candidate to help Henry. The wounds of exile resulting from the quarrel over Norfolk’s supposed treasonable language upon the high road in December 1398 were still fresh. Henry had vehemently refused to be reconciled with Mowbray, and Henry been ready to kill Duke Thomas at Coventry the preceding September. The second exile, Thomas Arundel, exArchbishop of Canterbury, was another unlikely ally. At the Revenge Parliament Henry had been instrumental in helping John of Gaunt send the ex-Archbishop’s brother, Richard, Earl of Arundel, to his execution. As potential allies go, Henry could have hoped for better. Although there were some county gentry who might have been loyal to Henry as heir to the duchy of Lancaster, from the king’s perspective they, too, seemed few and of less significance than they first appeared. Throughout the late 1390s Richard had slowly but surely retained county gentry who opposed Gaunt in their localities, and the king even found some Lancastrians willing to wear the White Hart in the very core of Gaunt’s landed power—the Palatinate of Lancaster. On Gaunt’s death in February 1399, the king had further singled out important Lancastrian retainers, and confirmed their annuities and offices with royal letters patent on the stipulation that they be retained and serve the king only. These contracts of indenture with Lancastrian retainers are of greater significance when one 118

Creton, an eyewitness to the conversation between Henry and Richard at Flint, reported that when Henry approached the king he asked Richard’s forgiveness at returning to the kingdom before the date which they had previously agreed, Chrons. Rev. p. 150.


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considers that the king’s offer to these men opened up new opportunities for them. As Simon Walker has demonstrated, Gaunt had procured very little royal patronage for members of his affinity in his desire not to divide loyalties among those who wore his collar of S’s. Yet, as Chris Given-Wilson points out, even John of Gaunt’s splendid wealth and nearly kingdom-wide power could not compare to a place in the king’s affinity. Royal service represented the ultimate goal for the ambitious, late medieval gentry man; and nothing succeeded like success in the king’s service. Between 1397 and 1399 Richard had also exacted oaths of loyalty from civic corporations and significant individuals within county society, and from the frequency and breadth with which these oaths were demanded it seems reasonable to conclude that the king thought much of their efficacy. As the king moved from Westminster, which he left on or about 17 April, portions of his host were already being moved to Ireland. Accounts show that £70 13s 4d was spent on wages for sailors and masters on 13 April, which suggests a substantial sailing on or about this date from the western ports. A further £133 13s 4d was spent for shipping sent from Chester on 13 May, indicating an even greater number of transports embarking for Ireland from Chester, Liverpool and the Mersey on or about this date. It is all but certain that since the Crown retained over fifty of these vessels for fifteen weeks over the summer. Maintaining such a large number of ships was not only logistically sound as some would be needed to make voyages to bring supplies of arms and reinforcements to the king, but these ships served a more important role as they interdicted the Leinster coast and disrupted Irish trade and commerce and possibly also undertook raids on coastal Gaelic settlements. The ships the king maintained in 1394/95 had undertaken this sort of activity and some had even been enhanced with wooden crenellated towers. In John Chamberlain, clerk of the king’s navy, drew £100 from the Exchequer on 14 April to rebuild and refit ships destined for Ireland.119 Thus, by mid-June the English navy was probably spread across the Irish coast, engaged in economic warfare to supplement Richard’s land campaign.120 119 PRO E 403/562 m. 1; Frederick Devon, Issues of the Exchequer (London, 1837), pp. 269–70. 120 Lydon, “Richard II’s Expeditions,” p. 145.

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While his army and fleet continued to assemble in western ports, Richard moved westwards by easy stages towards Wales through the Vale of Glamorgan and Kidwelly, where he sampled the wines, and finally to Haverfordwest, which he reached on or about 15 May. He stopped at Haverford for eleven days while awaiting, as Creton related, the north wind so that they could depart. Over these eleven days, apparently, the king and his household enjoyed much merriment from the minstrels who could be heard “day and night.” The wind changed by the end of the month and Richard began loading his men, horses, pavilions and household paraphernalia in the last week of May. Then, probably on the afternoon of 29 May, with calm seas, the king made an easy crossing, reaching the safe haven of the estuary at Waterford on 1 June. The last portion of the Irish expeditionary force crossed the sea in a number of ships that had been pressed into royal service. The exact numbers of vessels used to transport Richard’s portion of the army are not known. John Newbold, a royal serjeant-at-arms, received £133 6s 8d from the Exchequer on 13 May 1399 to arrest ships for the king’s purposes in the port of Liverpool, and from his accounting at the Exchequer he pressed fifty-six ships into service and Newbold retained their services throughout the summer until 1 August.121 John Bentley, a king’s clerk, received a further £333 6s 8d on 13 May to arrest ships in the west-country ports of Barnstaple, Bridgewater and Bristol.122 Thus, a total of perhaps two hundred vessels were pressed into royal service to carry Richard’s portion of the army to Waterford. It is unknown exactly how much of the army went with Richard as he sailed from Haverford. The captains probably with the king in late May were John Holand, Duke of Exeter; Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester; John Heron, Lord Say; Thomas Despenser, Earl of Gloucester; and a collection of smaller contingents led by Ricardian

121 For the money he drew from the Exchequer, PRO E 403/561 m. 10. A total of £470 13s 4d was expended on mariners wages for these vessels alone, PRO E 101/531/31 and PRO E 364/37 m. 3d. 122 PRO E 403/561 m. 10. His accounts clearly state that these vessels remained in Ireland ready for service until 1 August. Other accounts corroborate these claims. Thomas Caudray, master of La Peter de Liverpool received a total of £20 13s 11d for wages for himself at 6d per day and eleven sailors at 3d per day for fifteen weeks beginning on April 13 and terminating on 1 August, PRO E 101/42/9.


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knights. This force amounted to 272 men-at-arms and 930 archers. It is unknown if Edward of York’s contingent of 140 men-at-arms and 800 archers sailed from Haverford or joined the king with Albemarle in mid-June; but as the king’s first letter to the duke of York from Ireland suggests, the forces that Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey, received pay for, 150 men-at-arms and 800 archers, were already in Ireland with him well before 1 June. One of Richard’s first actions upon arrival in Ireland was to write to York and the council with news of recent Irish events. The tone of Richard’s first letter to Duke Edmund was both upbeat and positive. The king dictated the letter from Waterford late in the first week of June. Richard informed the custodian and council that the weather had been as fair as could be for his crossing. The king also told York that prior to his arrival in Ireland Thomas, Duke of Surrey, and the troops under his command had undertaken several raids into Leinster. These “chevauchees” had netted a substantial quantity of cattle. Richard also informed his uncle that Surrey had already conducted a campaign against Richard’s most inveterate Irish opponents, MacMurrough, O Brien, “and the others,” and slain over 157 armed men and kerns.123 Thus, at the outset at least, news from the Irish front was all positive. It is difficult to know exactly where the king campaigned in 1399 because the only source for his movements is Creton. But, it is likely that the strategy that Richard followed in 1399 was similar to the one he had undertaken in 1394/95.124 From Waterford Richard moved first toward Kilkenney roughly 50 miles to the north,125 skirting the Booley hills on his left and possibly stopping at Jerpoint Abbey along the way. Upon arrival in Kilkenny Richard waited two weeks for the arrival of Edward, Duke of Albemarle who was to join the expedition from his position as Warden of the Western March toward Scotland, but even after Richard had waited for fourteen days Ablemarle had not arrived from England. On 23 June Richard marched into Leinster to find Art MacMurrogh and restore him to obedience or bring him to battle. The king probably

123 Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions, ed. Dominica Legge, Anglo-Norman Text Society, 3, (1941), pp. 346–47. 124 Lydon, “Richard II’s Expeditions,” p. 147. 125 Creton misjudged the distance calling it 80 miles between Kilkenny and Waterford.

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campaigned across the western face of the Wicklow Mountains, using the English garrisons at the castles of Carlow and Dunlavin as bases of operations. Any kind of move into the interior of Leinster would have been difficult at best and foolish by any standards. Passages across the Wicklow Mountains were few, and the terrain would have suited the Gaelic Irish who could have practiced their skirmish style of warfare on the English to great effect. According to Creton’s account the English army encountered the Gaelic Irish on several occasions which resulted in some skirmishing between the two sides. The lighter armed and armored Irish horsemen would not confront the heavily armed and armored English cavalry, and the substantial numbers of archers that the king had brought for just such a purpose were put to good effect in clearing woods and hills of Irish backed by English men-at-arms and knights. As Richard moved through Leinster he also used diplomacy to bring some Gaelic Irish chieftains back to obedience. Creton noted that MacMurrogh’s own uncle, with a number of his people, came in to do homage to Richard “naked and barefoot.” This diplomatic triumph for the king was in line with what he wished and he further hoped that MacMurrogh’s submission was only the beginning of a broader series of submissions. If Richard put forward to the Gaelic chiefs a policy of conciliation, as he had done in 1394/95, perhaps the Irish chieftains would return to obedience without resort to military force. Not surprisingly, the royal army could march most places they wished to go with impunity, but Art MacMurrogh could not be brought to battle. According to Creton’s version of events, the campaign began to falter and the king’s men encountered many difficulties in obtaining food. Some gentlemen, knights and esquires, he claimed, had not eaten anything for as many as five days. Fortunately for the army, three ships arrived from Dublin with provisions for the troops, which Creton intimates sated the men’s hunger. If Creton’s account here is accurate, it demonstrates two things about the king and his campaign: first, the English army had skirted the southern fringe of the Wicklow Mountains to reach the coast perhaps at Arklow; though more possibly at Wicklow, since a garrison was maintained there; second, that ships bearing food for the army were awaiting them demonstrates a powerful point of Richard’s overall strategy. As he had in 1394/95 Richard retained a large number of vessels throughout the summer months. In 1399,


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just as in 1394/95, some of these vessels had substantial alterations made to them, such as the adding of wooden crenellated towers, and these vessels were used to blockade the Irish coast and to conduct commerce raiding and economic warfare. Upon receiving the supplies on the coast Richard prepared to move up the coast to Dublin. Creton relates that a priest entered the king’s camp from MacMurrogh asking to treat with the king so that he might have Richard’s pardon. The king decided to send Thomas Despenser, Earl of Gloucester, to MacMurrogh and to find out what he wanted. In addition to Jean Creton himself, Gloucester took 200 lancers and 1,000 archers to ensure his safety. However, Despenser found MacMurrogh a less-than-pliant adversary. The Irish chieftain said that he would not return to obedience unless the king granted him full pardon, and he now claimed to be king of all Ireland as well as king of Leinster. Richard received the news of MacMurrogh’s intransigence at Dublin on or about 1 July. The king determined to lay waste to MacMurrogh’s lands to bring him to heel and he dispersed bodies of troops across the Irish countryside to accomplish the task of pacification, while Richard, himself, remained in Dublin with his court. Clearly, the court at Dublin was a magnificent affair. Not only did it include the duchess of Surrey and other ladies of standing, but the king spent no small amount of money on wine from Bordeaux, Spain and Alsace.126 In early July Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, arrived to join the king at Dublin. From Creton’s version of events it seems that Duke Edward’s arrival was later than expected by the king, who questioned him about the reasons for his tardiness.127 Creton claimed, with the benefit of hindsight, that Albemarle had turned traitor to Richard and his delayed arrival, coupled with his advice to delay the royal departure for England once the king had learned of Henry’s landing, are evidence of this. Given Edward of York’s penchant for Byzantine behavior both prior and subsequent to the events of 1399, such a possibility needs 126 In the summer of 1399 substantial quantities of wine were bought abroad for the king’s use and shipped to Dublin. One ship, one barge and one balinger were detailed to carry the cargo which amounted to 39 tuns and 8 pipes of Gascon wine, 8 tuns and 8 bastards of Alsatian wine, 5 butts of Romeney and 2 butts of Malmsey. The price for this wine amounted to £296 12s 6d, PRO E 364/39 m. 5; E 364/43 m. 1. 127 Chrons. Rev., p. 138.

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to be carefully considered. Throughout much of his political life from the second appeal of treason to the Archbishop Scrope’s rising in 1405, Edward of York was either directly involved or implicated in every major political upheaval in English politics. Historians have split on their views of Duke Edward and his treacherous nature. McFarlane thought that Edward was a traitor to Richard II, agreeing with Creton that Albemarle first convinced the king to divide his army at Dublin and then defected to Henry’s camp following Richard’s departure from South Wales.128 Anthony Steel thought that by the summer of 1399, Edward of York was “definitely plotting against the king.”129 T. F. Tout and Anthony Tuck were not so convinced of Duke Edward’s malicious intent towards the king, and thought him incompetent rather than treacherous.130 James Sherbourne, with some wisdom, noted both sides in the historical debate and concluded that “whether he [Albemarle] is to be regarded as a fool or a knave is a question which can only be answered by rejecting or favouring Creton.”131 To claim that Albemarle was a “traitor” to both Richard II and to Henry IV only clouds the issue of the duke’s actions. Throughout much of his political life Duke Edward seems to have been open to political change, especially if it could benefit him. He stood as one of the appellants in 1397 and benefited from the king’s largesse for his efforts. If the charges leveled against him at the Deposition Parliament may be believed, Edward gave the king advice that Henry should be exiled in 1398. Yet, in 1400 he betrayed the plot of the earls to his father, Edmund of Langley, whose night ride to Windsor saved Henry IV and his sons from death and his dynasty from extinction. Any evidence that Edward of York had foreknowledge of Henry’s intentions to return to claim his inheritance is conjectural, but there are several factors which suggest he could have had knowledge of Henry’s intentions. One factor centers on the fact that, as we have seen, Albemarle did not leave England for Ireland until late June.

128

LK&LK, p. 50. Steel, Richard II, p. 263. 130 Tout, Chapters, IV: 59; Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility, p. 218. 131 J. W. Sherbourne, “Richard II’s Return to Wales, July 1399,” in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth Century England, ed. J. A. Tuck (London, 1994), p. 121. 129


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Clearly, Richard had expected him in Ireland before this date and was perplexed by his tardiness. Albemarle’s exact movements in June are unknown, but it is clear that his father and the government in London thought that he might still be in the country in early July because they were sending orders to him to garrison castles.132 A second factor suggesting that Albemarle possessed some knowledge of Henry’s intentions concerns the general rising of Lancastrian estates for Henry in June. Although there is no evidence that Duke Edward overtly aided the rebels, he did have one point of contact with the them. Robert Waterton was one of the key members of the Lancastrian affinity that helped organize the rebellion of some of the more important Lancastrian estates. In the spring of 1399 Duke Edward had been given the keeping of Pontefract castle. One of his actions as keeper was to remove Gaunt’s constable of Pontefract, Robert Neville of Hornby, and replace him with one of his own retainers, Sir Edmund Fitzwilliam who also served Edward’s father, Edmund, Duke of York.133 Although it is possible that Fitzwilliam accompanied Duke Edward to Ireland in the summer of 1399, the fact that he took no protection for war suggests that he may have remained behind. If indeed Fitzwilliam did remain in England in the summer of 1399, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have learned of Robert Waterton’s raising of the castle and manor of Pontefract for Henry and informed Duke Edward. Even if Fitzwilliam could not stop Waterton from raising troops to support Henry, his position as Edward of York’s steward of Burchester in Holderness,134 and his place in Edmund of Langley’s affinity suggest that he could have raised some Yorkist castles and estates to defend against Henry and at least slow his progress southward, but there is no hint that Fitzwilliam ever did so. Whether he did so on Duke Edward’s orders or on his own volition is unclear. At least one notable contemporary believed Duke Edward was part of Richard’s deposition: Valerian of Luxembourg, Count of St. Pol. Valerian had good knowledge of the English body politic in the

132

See below Chapter 4. Simon Walker, “Yorkshire Justices of the Peace, 1389–1413,” EHR 108 (1993), p. 301 n. 1. 134 Mark Punshon, “Government and Political Society in the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1399–1461,” (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of York, 2002), pp. 254–56. 133

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late 1390s and had traveled to England in September 1398 to be the duke of Burgundy’s representative at the abortive combat between Henry and Mowbray at Coventry. On the king’s deposition, the count’s frustrations at the injustice done to Richard II found expression in his hanging Edward of York in effigy from one of the towers of his castle.135 Although it is possible that Duke Edward was playing both sides in the summer of 1399, his suggestion that the king should divide his Irish army and transport it back to England in portions was not an act of treachery, as Creton thought, but rather one of common sense forced on the royalists by simple logistics. Although the king did keep at least 50 vessels of various sizes under his control after his disembarkation for blockade duty of the eastern coast,136 the bulk of the fleet that had transported the royalist portion of the army to Ireland had been disbanded. Quite probably the 50 vessels paid for service throughout the entire summer was insufficient to carry the entire army back to England. In spite of the tardiness of Edward of York’s arrival, by the end of the first week in July, the king’s Irish expedition had gone relatively well.137 Richard had made a swift progress through the countryside, and although the more inveterate Irish chieftains such as O’Neill and Art MacMurrogh had not come in and sued for pardons, MacMurrogh’s uncle, and his people, had. More promising from the king’s perspective was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had been opened with Art MacMorrogh. Even though these first efforts had come to naught, the fact that MacMurrogh asked for the meeting with the king’s ambassadors was a positive sign and a good first step toward fulfilling the king’s desire to restore the settlement of 1394/95. Historians have often considered Richard’s Irish “campaign” in June 1399 to have been a frustrating failure for him and his policy, but such an interpretation is as uncharitable as it is unsound. It is difficult to accept the premise that Richard thought he would achieve any-

135

E. Monstrelet, Chronicles, I: 24. A number of accounts survive to demonstrate that substantial numbers of vessels were retained for the king’s service throughout the summer months of 1399 in Ireland. John Newbold’s account clearly shows that over 50 vessels of varying sizes were kept in royal service from 13 April to the last day of July, PRO E 101/531/31. 137 Even Walsingham reports that Richard had early success, Annales Ricardi Secundi, p. 239. 136


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thing more than what he had in barely one month. The damage that Mortimer, Ormond, Kildare and their supporters had inflicted on the Gaelic Irish chieftains, their followers, and on the Ricardian settlement of 1394/95, would take more than Richard’s physical presence in Ireland and a mere forty-five days to undo. The king clearly planned to spend a year in Ireland and establish in Dublin a fairly opulent court, full of minstrels, ladies, and all of the trappings of court life. Richard of Bordeaux was not a neophyte when it came to the virtues of propaganda. As he had done in 1394/95, he came as the ultimate arbiter of the dispute between the Gaelic Irish on the one hand and the English and Anglo-Irish on the other. To restore peace and authority would take time, and Richard believed that the time necessary to complete the task lay before him. As usual, he was wrong.

APPENDIX I

RICHARD II’S ARMY, ROYALIST PORTION 13991

Name Edward of York Duke of Albermalre John Holand Duke of Exeter Thomas Holand Duke of Surrey Thomas Despenser Earl of Gloucester Thomas Percy Earl of Worcester John, Lord Say Thomas Beston, John Lee Ralph Chomley, Adam Bastoke, Ralph Davenport Reginald Grey Lord of Ruthien7

1

Men-at-arms

Archers

£ paid

1402

800

£1,074

140

500

£649 15s 8d

1503

800

£1,282 10s

354

100

£220 8s

365 346

100 100

£215 6s 8d £213

2

100

£477 15s

25

30

£99

This table is drawn from E 403/651, 13 May and E 403/562 m. 3, 4, 10. This figure includes 4 bannerets and 12 knights. 3 This figure includes 2 bannerets and 14 knights. 4 This figure includes 4 knights. 5 This figure includes 2 knights. 6 This figure includes 2 knights. 7 It appears that Lord Grey did not go back to Ireland in the summer of 1399 since his name is crossed out and replaced with John Carp as keeper of the Wardrobe. For Carp as keeper, see Tout, Chapters, III: 489–91. 2

APPENDIX II

PROTECTIONS FOR RICHARD II’S EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO IRELAND, 1399

Peers and Barons John Montague, Earl of Salisbury1 King’s Knights (25) Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sri Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir Sir 1

John Howard2 Peter Craon Andrew Hake Hugh Luttrell John Lovell Simon Felbrigge John Stanley Richard Redman John St. John Hugh Despenser William Clifford William Clinton Robert Clifton William Farendon Reginald Braybrooke Thomas Littlebury Edmund Thorpe John Beauchamp of Holt John Howard Edmund Noon Richard Cradock William Lisle John Montague the younger Hugh Courtenay Richard Arundel Hugh Browe3

Local Interests Norfolk/Suffolk France Glouc Somerset Wilts/Oxon Norfolk Lancs/Ches Yorks Devon/Herts Northants W’morland Warwks Lancs Bucks Beds Lincs Norfolk Chesh Norfolk Norfolk Chesh Beds Gloucs/Hants Devon Crnwall Chesh

Protection dated 31 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 350. Had close associations with Sir Simon Felbrigge which accounted for his standing in Richard II’s affinity and also connections with Sir Thomas Erpingham and Joan, Duchess of Gloucester which accounted for his standing in the reign of Henry IV, HoC, III: 431–33. 3 His protection was dated 15 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 61. 2

66

chapter two

King’s Esquires (33) John Arden4 John Champ John Dymok John Humbleton Robert Whityngton John Molynton Nicholas Inglefield William Walshale William Brauncepath John Lowyk John Wyndsore William Stondon John Draper William Hay John Colshull Roger Jourdell Richard Cressey Peter Milburne Richard Hamm William Bredwardine Henry Thorpe John Haldon William Harpeden Thomas Sy John Mounceux Robert Thorley Thomas Brounflete John Pritwell William Barrok John Aldelyme Robert Teye Edward Hales Robert Felbrigge William Marsh

Cheshire Berks Glouc Glouc Cheshire Stafford Norhants Oxon Irish Cornwall Warwick Norfolk Carmarthern Yorks Carmarthen Carlisle

Irish Essex Norfolk

Household Officials and King’s Yeomen (24) Robert Lyndon, Clerks of K’s Chapel William Dodmore, King’s Harper William Winslow, King’s Pavilioner Nicholas Beconsfield, buyer for the household

4 Son of Sir Thomas Arden, he received his protection 15 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 7.

richard ii and the “irish question,” 1390‒99 John Dunsmore, buyer for the household Henry Bloxham, buyer for the household John Pope, king’s fishmonger John Carleton, keeper of Wardrobe at Eltham Thomas Green, Yeoman of Chamber (son of Sir Henry Green) Adam atte Wood, Yeoman of Chamber John Wilton, Yeoman of Chamber Richard Merston, Yeoman in Livery Thomas Christofer, Yeoman of Chamber John Philip, Yeoman of Kitchen Peter Hermodesworth, Yroman of the Avenary John Blakesley, Yeoman of Poultry Richard Butler, Yeoman of Pantry John Morville, Yeoman of Celler Gregory Ballard, Butler William Cawode, Yeoman of the Crown John Welford, Yeoman of the Crown John Eyr, Yeoman of Chamber John Holton, Yeoman of the Larder Richard Spenser, Yeoman of the Larder

67

Oxon

King’s Annuitants (1) Richard Kyghlay, esq

York

King’s Serjeants-at-Arms (3) Radulf del See Nicholas Skelton Richard Drax

Yorks

King’s Servants (11) Lady Margaret Sarnesfield John Langrich Cambs John Holton, Servant of Larder John Holt William Sendham William Sarnesfield Thomas Stoute Richard Misteley John Feld Richard Rayley John Stokes

Crnwall Yeoman of Pantry (?) Glouc Norhants Mdlsx & Surrey

Stafford Beds

chapter two

68

Knights and Esquires of John, Earl of Salisbury (1) Sir Thomas West Knights and Esquires of Edward, Duke of Albermalre (7) Baldwin Freville, Kt Sir Peter Tilliol Richard Ricson John Ricson Robert Saladyn Richard Dawkinson William Clinton, esq

Norhants Cumbs

Lancastrian Knights and Esquires (3) John Stafford, esq Sir John Dalton Sir John Cornwall

Norhants Cornwall

Esquires of Thomas, Lord Morley (2) Constantine Mortimer, esq John Toly

Norfs Essex

Unaligned Knights, Esquires and others (24) Thomas, son of Thomas Danyers, Kt Nicholas Hynton Sir Thomas Bardolf John Quynton, esq John Holand of Harlech William Savage of Smardale5 John Gelde of Plymouth Sir Henry Ilcombe Sir John Wiltshire Roberts Sutton John Riche, esq Sir Henry Lescrope Peter du Prake John Arderne Thomas Yalton Thomas ap Rees ap Griffith John Shepesheved

5

HoC, IV: 312.

Chesh Cumb (?) Essex Wales Westmorland Devon Cornwall Caernarfon Cambs Glouc Devon Warwick Stafford Pembroke Wales Leic (?)

richard ii and the “irish question,” 1390‒99 Thomas Stephen, Mariner Pontius, Lord of Castillion David Vaghn John Bedford Baldwin Freville, esq Thomas Woodville Thomas Malyns

69

Suffolk Dordogne Glouc Bucks Warwick Northants Beds

Unidentified Men who Took Out Protections (20) John Magot, Shield Bearer Robert Hughet William Pecok Thomas Clashe John van Havere William Coterell Guy Duke William Doyle Sir Walter de la Pole Robert Stanes Thomas Stafford William Cobeham William Rossale William Chynall, esq Henry Morecroft Richard Michael, esq. William Yoman Thomas de la Pole John Bredon Benedict Popoler Men from the Principality of Chester (36) David Bostock6 Richard le Bruen7 Peter de Bulkeley8 John de Burghall9 Richard Cholale10 Alexander, son of Edmund Cotton11 6

DKR, 36, Appendix II: 45. Protection dated 9 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 66. 8 Protection May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 74. 9 Protection dated 23 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 76. 10 Protection dated 16 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 107. 11 One of the king’s yeomen in livery. Protection dated 13 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 128. 7

70

chapter two

William, son of David Cotton12 Thomas Daniers13 Geoffrey Davenport14 Lawerence Fitton15 Thomas de Fouleshurst16 Nicholas Foxwist17 Vivian Foxwist18 Thomas de Grosvenor19 John Harding of Twemlowe (Cheshire)20 Thomas del Hough, son of Thomas21 John de Litherland22 John de Littleover23 John le Mainwaring24 Randal de Mainwaring25 Richard Manley26 William Mascey, son of Thomas27 Richard Newton, son of Richard Newton28 Thomas Plumpton of Frodsham29 William Rotor, esquire30 Ralph Rude31 David St. Pierre32

12

Protection dated 3 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 131. Protection dated 26 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 136. 14 Protection dated 26 April 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 138. He was in the service of Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey. 15 Protection dated 17 May 1399 and attorneys named 5 June 1399 when he “was about to depart for Ireland,” DKR, 36, Appendix II: 181. 16 Protection dated 19 Feb. 1399. He also raised archers for Richard from 24 Feb. 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 188. 17 Protection dated 15 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 189. 18 Protection dated 8 June 1399. He also raised a force of 60 archers and was to take them to Ireland with John de Litherfield. This commission was dated 15 May 1399. DKR, 36, Appendix II: 189. 19 Protection dated 15 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 208. 20 Protection dated 3 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 220. 21 Protection dated 16 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 252. 22 Protection dated 3 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 300. 23 Protection dated 15 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 300. 24 Protection dated 26 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 317. 25 Protection dated 26 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 317. 26 Protection dated 3 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 323. He was also one of the esquires in the king’s Cheshire bodyguard, PRO E 101/42/10. 27 Protection dated 3 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 332. 28 Protection dated 16 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 363. 29 Protection dated 4 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 384. 30 Protection dated 30 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 412. 31 Protection dated 17 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 413. 32 Protection dated 3 Jan. 1398, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 417. 13


71

John Scholehall33 John le Smith of Minshull34 Richard le Spenser of Macclesfield35 John Tildeslegh36 William Tranmore37 Thomas Venables of Frodsham38 Richard Vernon39 Reginald Wickstead40 Richard Winnington, Kt.41

33

Protection dated 4 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 424. Protection dated 9 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 436. 35 Protection dated 7 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 439. 36 Protection dated 1 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 471, he was going in the train of John Montague, Earl of Salisbury. 37 Protection dated 3 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 475. 38 Protection dated 5 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 491. 39 He took no protection by nominated attorneys on 4 June 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 498. 40 Protection dated 18 June 1399, he was mentioned as going in the train of Thomas de Fouleshurst of Edlaston, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 524. 41 Protection dated 17 May 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 531. 34

APPENDIX III

CHESHIRE RETAINERS AND YEOMEN IN LIVERY TO RICHARD II, 1397–1399

Men Retained by Richard II from 1397–1399 contained in: Welsh Records: Recognizance Rolls of Chester, Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, 36 (1875), Appendix II. (70 Names) 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 18 Sept. 1398 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 21 Sept. 1398 10 Oct. 1397 15 Sept. 1398 10 Oct 1397

John son of Hugh Arden, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 6) Hammo de Ashley, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 10) Robert de Ashton, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 11) Lawrence de Aston, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 13)1 John Beeston, son of William, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 30) William Beeston, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 30) William Bellew, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 33) Adam de Bostock, esquire, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 45) John Boydell, esquire, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 30) William Brereton, son of William, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 54) Thomas Brereton, son of William, Gt of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 54) Richard Bromley, Gt of £10 p.a. as the king has retained his services for life (p. 59) Roger Bruen, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 66) Richard Bruen, Gt of one stag yearly and also of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 66) Nicholas Bulkeley, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 73)

1 Lawrence Ashton was the son of Sir Richard Ashton, Gaunt’s steward of Halton in Cheshire who served as deputy steward there at least in 1402, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 510.

74 10 Oct. 1397

chapter two

George Carrington, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 86) 10 Oct. 1397 William de Crewe, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 131) 20 Sept. 1398 Thomas del Croke, Gt. of 10 marks p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 131) 12 Nov. 1397 Roger Cundecliffe, Gt. of 20 marks p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 134) 10 Oct. 1397 Richard Davenport son of Ralph, kt Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 138) 10 Oct. 1397 Arthur Davenport son of Ralph, kt Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 138) 10 Oct. 1397 John Domville, kt Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 150) 9 Oct. 1397 John Dunne, Gt. of £10 p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 154) 10 Oct. 1397 Richard Dunne, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 154) 10 Oct. 1397 Reginald del Downes, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 156) 10 Oct. 1397 Philip de Egerton, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 169) 10 Oct. 1397 David de Egerton, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 169) 10 Oct. 1397 Ralph de Egerton, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 169) 10 Oct. 1397 Ralph de Egerton the son, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 169) 10 Oct. 1397 John de Etton, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 175) 10 Oct. 1397 Gilbert Gilegge, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 197) 18 Sept. 1398 Robert Griffin, esquire, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 203) 17 Oct. 1397 Gilbert de Halshall, Kt., Gt. of £20 p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 214) 10 Oct. 1397 John de Handeforth, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 203) 10 Oct. 1397 John de Holford, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 240) 12 March 1398 John de Hulgrave, esquire, petition for a “grant of the livery of the Stag [i.e. the White Hart] with 100s yearly, and having heard that the king was desirous to be served by his lieges of Chester, and the said John being anxious to serve him, prays to be admitted to his service, having been in the army for 22 years at Berwick, where he was in the service of Sir Henry Percy.” King admitted him


10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 20 Aug. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 15 Sept. 1398 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 16 Sept. 1398 10 Oct. 1397

75

to the livery of the Stag with 100s retaining the services of the said John for life (pp. 254–55) Ughtred Huxley, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 257) John Lee, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 285) Robert de Legh, Kt, Gt. of £40 p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 291) William de Legh, Kt, Gt. of 20 mks p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 291) Hugh de Legh, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 292) John de Legh of Bothes, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 292) John de Legh of Maccesfield, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 292) Peter de Legh, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 292) John de Legh, son of Sir John de Legh, Gt. of 100 s p.a. and the livery of the Stag because the king retained his services for life (p. 292) John de Literhland, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 300) David Malpas, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 322) Richard de Manley, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 323) John de Mascey of Tatton, Kt, Gt. of 20 marks p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 331) Thomas, son of John Mascey of Tatton, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 331) Robert Mascey of Sale, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 331) Robert Mascey of Hale, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 331) Richard de Mascey of Pudington, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 331) Thomas Pigot, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 382) John de Poole, Kt, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 385) James de Poole, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 385) William Rixton of the county of Lancaster, Gt. of 10 marks p.a. as the king has retained his services for life (p. 407) Richard Roper, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 408)

76 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 11 Oct. 1397 20 Dec. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397 10 Oct. 1397

chapter two William Siddington, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 433) Robert Smethwick, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 435) Thomas Somerford, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 437) William Stanley, junior, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 445) Henry Tildesley, esquire, Gt. of £20 p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 470) Robert Toft, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 473) William Tranmor, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 475) Richard de Vernon, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 497) Thomas Weever, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 513) John Whalley, Gt. of 100 s p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 520) Richard Winnington, Kt, Gt. of 20 marks p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 531) Thomas del Worth, Gt. of 20 marks p.a. as the king retained his services for life (p. 541)

Yeomen in Livery, Richard II from Welsh Records: Recognizance Rolls of Chester, Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, 36 (1875), Appendix II. All of the following were retained at the rate of 6d per day. (170 names) 29 May 1398 3 June 1398 29 Sept. 1397 2 Feb. 1398 2 Feb. 1398 2 Feb. 1398 30 Jan. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 30 Jan. 1398 17 Dec. 1397 10 Jan. 1398 15 Oct. 1397 1 July 1398 29 May 1398 30 Sept. 1397 28 May 1398 20 May 1398

Richard Acton (p. 2) John Ainsworth (p. 2) William Aldencroft (p. 2) Robert Aldencroft of Denham (p. 2) John Aldencroft of Denham, brother of Robert (p. 2) Hamo Aldencroft of Denham, brother of Robert (p. 2) John de Aldersey (p. 3) William de Aldersey (p. 3) David Alpraham (p. 4) Thomas Arnekoc (p. 8) Thomas Ashton (p. 11) William Baillor [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 19) Richard Baily [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 19) John Baker [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 19) Thomas Ball (p. 20) Robert Barneby (p. 22) Roger de Barneschawe [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 22)

richard ii and the “irish question,” 1390‒99 2 Feb. 1398

77

William de Barrow [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 22) 23 May 1398 Richard de Barrow (p. 22) 29 May 1398 Hugh Barton (p. 24) 1 July 1398 William Barton (p. 24) 1 Oct. 1397 John Bate (p. 26) 30 Jan. 1398 Roger Beeston (p. 30) 16 Oct 1397 Ralph Bellew (p. 33) 20 Nov. 1397 Richard Bennet (p. 33) 1 Oct. 1397 Lawrence Bentley (p. 34) 1 Nov. 1397 William Berkeswell (p. 34) 17 Nov. 1397 John de Bernak of the county of York (p. 34) 16 Oct. 1397 Adam Berughby (p. 34) 30 March 1398 John de Bickerstath (p. 35) 2 July 1398 Hugh de Bickerton (p. 35) 3 June 1398 Roger Birkenhead (p. 37) 2 July 1398 John Blackenhall (p. 38) 12 Nov 1397 John Bodhum (p. 41) 1 Feb. 1398 Richard Boor (p. 42) 4 July 1398 John del Booth (p. 43) 30 Jan. 1398 Richard ate Boughey (p. 46) 3 June 1398 William Boydell (p. 48) 30 May 1398 Richard Bradford (p. 50) 1 Oct. 1397 John Bradley (p. 51) 22 May 1398 Lawrence Bradshaw (p. 51) 3 June 1398 Thomas Bradshaw (p. 51) 15 Oct. 1397 Thomas Brayn (p. 51) 15 Oct. 1397 Roger Brayn (p. 51) 15 Oct. 1397 William Brayn 15 Oct. 1397 Henry Hondekynsone Brayn 14 Dec. 1397 Henry, son of Thomas, Brayn 14 Dec. 1397 David Brayn (p. 51) 14 Dec. 1397 Henry, son of David, Brayn (p. 52) 18 April 1398 Robert Bressey (p. 56) 27 Dec. 1397 Roger Bromley (p. 59) 2 July 1398 John Brooke (p. 60) 31 Jan. 1398 John Brownwynd (p. 62) 29 March 1399 Peter Bryche (p. 68) 1 Feb. 1398 Henry Bryene (p. 68) 16 Oct. 1397 Hugh de Bulkeley (p. 73) 14 Dec. 1397 Richard Bulkeley archer of the crown (p. 73) 4 July 1398 John son of Peter de Bulkeley (p. 74) 30 Sept. 1397 Thomas Burwes an archer and yeoman of the Crown (p. 76) 30 Jan. 1398 Haukyn Burwes (p. 76) 30 Jan. 1398 John Came (p. 81) 1 July 1398 John Cans (p. 81)

78 30 Jan. 1398 2 July 1398 2 July 1398 29 March 1398 1 Feb. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 29 May 1398 31 Jan. 1398 2 July 1398 2 July 1398 1 Oct. 1397 29 Sept. 1397 15 Dec. 1397 3 June 1398 30 Jan. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 15 Dec. 1397 1 Oct. 1397 15 Dec. 1397 30 Jan. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 11 Dec. 1398 12 Nov 1397 29 May 1398 17 Dec. 1397 15 Oct. 1397 15 Dec. 1397 2 Feb. 1398 1 July 1398 1 July 1398 25 May 1398 30 Jan. 1398 29 May 1398 3 June 1398 3 June 1398 2 July 1398 5 Nov. 1397 3 Feb. 1398 31 Jan. 1397 30 Sept. 1397 2 Feb. 1398 29 May 1398 1 July 1398 1 Feb. 1398 1 July 1398

chapter two John Carden (p. 84) David Carden (p. 84) Owen Carden (p. 84) Robert Carrington, archer from principality of Chester (p. 86) William Chambre (p. 88) John, son of Hugh Chatterton (p. 88) Robert Cheadle (p. 89) Richard Cholmondeley of Cherley (p. 107) Richard Cholmondeley (p. 107) Hugh Cholmondeley (p. 107) Robert Colswaynesoke (p. 118) Thomas de Conway (p. 122) Thomas Cottingham (p. 126) Alexander Cotton (p. 128) John son of William Crewe (p. 131) Henry del Crewe (p. 131) John Cromwell (p. 132) Richard Crouther of Middlewich (p. 132) William Croxton (p. 133) John de Croxton (p. 133) John Dainteth (p. 134) Nicholas Daniel (p. 135) Richard Davenport, also archer of the crown (p. 138) Adam Denis (p. 145) Richard Derplegh, also archer of the crown (p. 145) William Dobyn, also archer of the crown (p. 147) David Dodd (p. 147) William Dodd (p. 147) William Dunne of Kendal (p. 154) John Dunne, brother of William of Kendal (p. 154) Thomas del Downes (p. 156) John Duncan (p. 159) John, son of John, Dysworth (p. 164) John the father Dysworth (p. 164) Thomas Eddesley (p. 165) John Eggesley (p. 170) John Elslak (p. 171) William Farrington (p. 178) William Ferrour (p. 179) Thomas Forester (p. 186, copy of grant 27 March 1398, p. 187) John de Frere of Douham (p. 191) William Glaskerian (p. 197) Hugh Gleave of Mobberley (p. 197) Philip Green (p. 203) Richard Green (p. 203)

richard ii and the “irish question,” 1390‒99 2 July 1398 30 Jan. 1398 3 June 1398 2 Feb. 1397 27 Dec. 1397 2 July 1398 30 Jan. 1398 1397 30 Jan 1398 15 Dec. 1397 30 Jan. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 1397 1 Oct. 1397 30 Jan. 1398 31 Dec. 1397 1 Oct 1397 29 Sept. 1397 30 May 1398 1 Feb. 1398 30 May 1398 31 Jan. 1397 1 Oct. 1397 1 Feb. 1398 4 July 1398 1397/98 30 May 1398 1 Oct. 1397 31 Jan. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 30 May 1398 29 Dec. 1397 24 Dec. 1397 31 Jan. 1397 30 May 1398

79

Richard Griffitson (p. 206) William Grimsditch (p. 206) John Grimsditch (p. 206) Robert del Hall (p. 213) David Hampton (p. 215) Richard de Hampton [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 215) Richard de Hankelow (p. 218) Thomas le Harper [marginal note has sagitarius] (p. 222) Robert Harper (p. 222) William Haselhurst [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 222) Robert del Hassal (p. 223) William de Hatton [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 224) Roger de Hawarden (p. 226) Thomas Haynson of Sandbach (p. 227) Nicholas Haynnos (p. 227) Thomas del Haywood (p. 228) Robert de Haywood of Overton (p. 228) Thomas Henshawe [also archer of principality of Wales] (p. 231) David Horton (p. 250) Thomas de Hough [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 252) John Hugge [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 253) Robert Kyng [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 271) John de Lancaster (p. 278) John de Legh [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 292) William de Legh son of Godfrey [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 292) Robert le Leper [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 298) Randal Mainwaring [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 317) John Mason (p. 327) John Mascey [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 331) Henry Moseok [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 353) William Moston [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 354) Robert Parker [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 375) Thomas Paver [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 377) Richard Platt [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 383) Matthew Radcliffe [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 397)

80 30 Sept. 1397 31 Jan. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 27 Dec. 1397 1 Feb. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 7 Aug. 1398 29 Sept. 1397 1 Feb. 1398 1 Feb. 1398 23 May 1398 1 Oct. 1397 27 Dec. 1397 24 Dec. 1397 20 Oct. 1397 4 July 1398 27 Dec. 1397 30 Sept. 1397 2 Oct. 1397 1 1 7 1

Feb. 1397 Feb. 1397 Aug. 1398 Feb. 1397

chapter two John Richardson of Dyseworth [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 405) Randal Rowley (p. 412) John de Rowley (p. 412) Thomas Sidnall [marginal note has archer] (p. 433) Ralph Somerford [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 437) John Somerford [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 437) Ralph Somerford of Congleton [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 437) Thomas, son of Ralph Somerford [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 437) William Stoke, son of Robert [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 453) William de Tattenhall (p. 465) John Taylor [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 466) Thomas Taylor [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 466) Henry Thornton [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 470) Robert de Tiverton (p. 471) William Underwood [marginal note has sagitarius] (p. 481) Nicholas le Vernon [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 497) Roger Waldene (p. 500) John Waleron [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 500) William Warburton [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 505) John de Williamson of Kingley (p. 527) Richard Williamson of Frodsham, on account of his great labor and expense the said Richard has undergone in the king’s service (p. 528) Stephen Wood (p. 537) William Wood, “vacheman” (p. 537) John Wythere [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 546) Robert Yate [marginal note has sagitarius de corona] (p. 546)


Map 1. Richard II’s Campaign in Ireland 1399

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CHAPTER THREE

HENRY OF LANCASTER AND HIS INVASION OF ENGLAND, APRIL–AUGUST 1399

After anticlimax of the lists of Coventry, Henry of Lancaster entered his six-year exile in France. Before Henry decided to return home after only six months, ostensibly to claim his inheritance, his easygoing manner and courteous words seem to have made him popular at the court of Charles VI. Many in France thought Richard had treated Henry poorly by exiling him and this general sympathy seems to have helped Henry’s cause.1 Henry moved freely about Paris, and in the spring of 1399, entered into negotiations for a marriage proposal with Mary, dowager countess of Eu, the daughter of Jean, Duke of Berry, one of Charles VI’s numerous uncles. News of this reached England and Richard reacted quickly by sending a magnate of no less stature than John Montague, Earl of Salisbury, to personally convey Richard’s displeasure at such negotiations. Salisbury told Charles VI in no uncertain terms that Henry was a traitor and negotiations ceased. Nevertheless, it does not appear that much of anything negative filtered into Henry’s lodgings at the Hotel de Clisson in the last months of 1398. Henry still possessed a substantial annuity from the Crown, along with the income from the estates he held in his own right as Earl of Derby and Duke of Hereford which were hardly insignificant. As long as John of Gaunt lived, Henry had little to fear and, in some ways, little of practical importance to accomplish. Clearly Henry’s presence was missing from England, but his attorneys were active in his interests, and his retainers and household officers were busy at the Exchequer. On 5 March Peter Melbourne, one of Henry’s esquires, received £10 from the treasury,2 and on 15 April John Leventhorpe drew £13 6s 8d.3 By far the most

1 2 3

Chronique de St. Denys, pp. 675–77. PRO E 403/561 m. 17. PRO E 403/562 m. 2.

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significant payment to Henry during the period of his exile, however, came on 20 June when John Leventhorpe and Richard Ramsay drew £1,586 13s 4d from the Exchequer for Henry of Lancaster.4 Henry did not want for money in exile. Henry also maintained a healthy correspondence with those in England during his stay in France. Richard had sent letters to Henry in December for “secret negotiations,”5 and even after Henry’s disenfranchisement had been announced, Sir William Bagot supposedly sent letters to Henry exhorting him to look after his interests and plead for restitution through the court system.6 It is also possible that his half-brother John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, corresponded with Henry during this period.7 Henry probably learned of his disinheritance by the middle part of March in Paris. How Henry reacted to this news is uncertain. It is clear that the lands that Henry held in his own right as earl of Derby and duke of Hereford as well as those he held from his wife Mary de Bohun were unaffected by the king’s pronouncement. It is also clear that Richard allowed Henry to receive significant preferment at the Exchequer when other lords, notably the king’s own uncle, Edmund, Duke of York, often received tallies for Exchequer annuities rather than cash.8 In addition Richard allowed Henry to sue through the court system to recover his inheritance and the Lancastrian estates, which the king had distributed to his friends and supporters, were only given “in keeping” until such time as Henry would enter into these lands. Whether or not, as the parliamentary commission and king claimed, the decision regarding Henry’s exile had been bureaucratically improper, the disenfranchisement clearly went against Richard’s promise to Henry

4 The money for this payment came, ironically, from the surplus income of John of Gaunt’s estates. All of the Lancastrian lands Richard gave in “keeping” were to send excess revenue to the crown. This surplus, it seems, was destined to support Henry of Lancaster while in exile. Whether or not Leventhorpe actually received this money in June is a difficult matter. Probably a large amount of this sum stayed on the Lancastrian estates and was used by Henry in the summer, PRO E 403/562 m. 12; PRO E 403/563 m. 4. 5 On 11 December 1399 Peter Breton drew £6 13s 4d for “secret negotiations” between the king and Henry in Paris, PRO E 403/561 m. 11. 6 Bennett, Richard II, p. 150. 7 Bennett, Richard II, p. 151. 8 D. L. Biggs, “A Wrong Whom Conscience and Kindred Bid Me to Right: A Reassessment of Edmund of Langley, Duke of York and the Usurpation of Henry IV,” Albion, 26 (1994), pp. 255–56.

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that, in the event of his father’s death during the period of his exile, Henry would be allowed to do homage and fealty to the king for these lands until such time as he could return and perform those tasks personally.9 While one could speculate on what Richard’s joint disenfranchisement of Bolingbroke and Mowbray would have come to mean in practical political terms, it seems that Henry’s disenfranchisement along with other royal action at least sent a shockwave through John of Gaunt’s Lancastrian affinity. Before his death Gaunt seems to have expected, or feared, that the king might try to break up or diminish the Lancastrian patrimony by claiming royal rights over lands forfeited by Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, in the time of Edward II. This uneasiness on Gaunt’s part found expression in charters and patents in the last two years of his life aimed at preserving the Lancastrian inheritance. In 1397 Thomas Despenser, the distant heir of the Despensers of Edward II’s reign, relinquished to John of Gaunt, Henry of Bollingbroke, and Henry of Monmouth, all claim to lands in England and Wales currently in Gaunt’s hands that Lord Thomas’s ancestors had held.10 To further protect his landed assets Gaunt sought and received a royal pardon for both himself and Henry of Bolingbroke against all treasons committed by Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, in the time of Edward II and also received Richard II’s confirmation of all lands within the Lancastrian patrimony.11 These patents, along with the plots against Gaunt’s life that royal letters patent made public, clearly demonstrate that a conspiracy against the aged duke of Lancaster, his son and the landed wealth they possessed was “highly probable.”12 This political reality would, by necessity, have forced Gaunt, Henry, and their most trusted servants to develop their own plan of action should/when such an assault on the Lancastrian patrimony took place. Viewed from this perspective, it is possible that the inaccurate news of Gaunt’s death in January may have been some sign to the

9 The letter patent promising this was dated 3 October 1398, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 425. 10 PRO DL 27/217. This was in spite of the fact that although Richard reversed the judgment of treason against Lord Thomas’s ancestors from the 1320s, he forbade him from seeking ancestral lands currently held by the king or members of the titled nobility, RP, III: 353, 360–68. 11 PRO DL 10/363. The same document is recorded on the patent roll, dated 20 February 1398, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 285. 12 Chrons. Rev., p. 20.

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duke’s son and members of his affinity that death was near and to be ready to put a plan of action into motion if it became necessary. Because of a vaguely reported bureaucratic snafu, Richard disinherited Henry on 18 March.13 What the king hoped to gain by disenfranchising both Bolingbroke and Mowbray in this way is uncertain. Historical tradition, based on a Lancastrian version of events (which it must be noted simply ignores what happened to the Mowbray estates), depicts Richard as a vindictive tyrant coveting Gaunt’s great patrimony.14 The difficulty with this traditional interpretation lies is that the only documentary evidence for the king’s supposedly tyrannical behavior is contained on the parliament roll. As Sir Gronwy Edwards demonstrated in the 1920s, this version of events is a later addition to the roll. Edwards thought it was added by King Richard in 1399,15 but it was more than likely added by Henry following the usurpation in September 1399 to bolster his cause. It may be that Richard maliciously intended to break up the Lancastrian and Mowbray patrimonies for the benefit of his friends among the titled nobility,16 but it is also possible that the king intended to reduce their kingdom-wide power and influence, and he believed that a political light-weight like Henry and a universally distrusted noble like Mowbray would not much care if the income they were to enjoy from their lands did not diminish greatly. In any event, the royal actions of 18 March, whether undertaken in malice or great folly, and the parceling out of Lancastrian estates to royal favorites in the weeks that followed seemed an obvious confirmation of John of Gaunt’s worst fears. 13 The text of what supposedly happened at the 18 March meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of 1398 is contained on the parliament roll (RP, III: 372) and is printed and translated in, English Historical Documents, gen. ed. David C. Douglas, Volume IV, ed. A. R. Myers (London, 1969), IV: 178–79, and Chrons. Rev., pp. 92–93. 14 Mowbray’s estates were first confiscated by royal order on 16 September 1398 (CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 280–81), and then given in keeping to Richard Mitford, Bishop of Salisbury; Guy Mone, Bishop of St. David’s; Sir John Bushy; and Sir Henry Green, on 20 March 1399, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 296. 15 Edwards, “Parliamentary Committee of 1398,” pp. 323–25. 16 There were certainly several serious plots against Gaunt’s life in the late 1390s. Thomas Mowbray Duke of Norfolk, admitted he had lain in wait for Gaunt, and in a bizarre series of letters patent Sir William Bagot promised never in the future to attempt to kill John of Gaunt under pain of death, and that he would not attempt to disinherit Gaunt or his children he would be forced to pay £1,000, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 291–92. Bagot also took out a royal pardon for any and all crimes committed before 7 January 1398, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 317.


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A little less than one month following his disenfranchisement, Henry exchanged some letters with his father’s retainers and supporters in England, who exhorted him to take action. As we have seen, Richard had already begun attempts to erode the unity and cohesion of the Lancastrian affinity by retaining key Lancastrians and making them promise to serve the king only for the remainder of their lives; and some members of the Lancastrian affinity, now without the protection of John of Gaunt, had fallen victim to local quarrels and found themselves gaoled at the king’s command. Perhaps anxiety over the fate of his father’s, and now his, affinity prompted Henry and members of his father’s retinue to act as they did, or more likely their actions were part of a premeditated plan of action. Quite probably Henry’s communications with his father’s supporters in England, or the rumor of them, were the intended targets in Richard II’s letters close sent to every sheriff in the kingdom to proclaim throughout the land that no letters from foreign parts were to be opened until shown to the king or his Council.17 Even though a number of Lancastrian retainers sought and planned for Henry’s eventual return to claim his inheritance, forces other the Lancastrian ones were at work in the spring and summer of 1399. Richard’s policies since 1397, as McFarlane noted, “required more tact than he was master of,”18 and these had earned him the enmity of many within the political community. Whether Henry could have succeeded in any or all of his aims with only his father’s affinity to back him is a moot point because Henry soon found himself at the head of a coalition of disaffected noblemen and gentrymen that grew as the summer went on and which was responsible for removing Richard II and placing Henry on the English throne. The first link in this coalition of the disaffected was arguably the most significant—Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of Canterbury. Although Henry had sworn to the king that he would not to correspond or meet with his fellow exiles the preceding October, by March 1399 such oaths meant little. The arrival of the Archbishop in Paris in the company of his young nephew, Thomas, heir to the earldom of Arundel who had supposedly been mistreated at the

17 Exceptions were granted for merchants who normally dealt with foreigners, CCR, 1396–1399, pp. 488–89. 18 McFarlane, “Lancastrian Kings,” VIII: 362.

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hands of John Holand, Duke of Exeter,19 brought Henry into direct contact with one of the most powerful politicians of the late fourteenth century. In his late forties at the time, Archbishop Arundel possessed a wealth of ecclesiastic administrative experience through his time as Bishop of Ely, Archbishop of York and Archbishop of Canterbury. Arundel had also served two stints as Richard II’s chancellor and knew the workings and personnel of government and court politics as well as any. For Henry, who did not possess Arundel’s breadth of experience or depth of knowledge in either politics or administration, joining forces with the Archbishop seemed a natural step. The significant role Archbishop Arundel played in the events of 1399 is apparent at many levels. For example, both Froissart and John Capgrave claimed that he was the prime agent in Henry’s decision to return to claim his father’s inheritance.20 In spite of the fact that Henry was also Archbishop Arundel’s kinsman,21 as Michael Bennett notes, the alliance between Henry and the Arundels cannot be considered an obvious one.22 In fact, by 1399 there was little love lost between the two great noble houses. Much, if not most, of the antagonism between the houses of Lancaster and Arundel stemmed from the execution of Archbishop Arundel’s elder brother, Richard, Earl of Arundel, during the Revenge Parliament. When Richard Arundel had been brought in for trial in 1397, he found John of Gaunt in his office of High Steward of the Realm heading the tribunal. Earl Richard was led into court but Ralph Neville, Lord of Raby, who was not only Gaunt’s retainer but was also his son-in-

19 Thomas Fitzalan’s treatment at the hands of his keeper, John Duke of Exeter, drew scathing criticism from contemporary narrative sources. Both Walsingham and Adam of Usk noted that John Holand and one of his knights, Sir John Schevele, supposedly made the young earl of Arundel perform a number of menial tasks far below his station, including blacking the duke of Exeter’s boots, Chrons. Rev., p. 116. 20 Capgrave reported that Henry had the “advantage of the presence and support of that venerable man, Thomas Arundel, late Archbishop of Canterbury, by whose counsel and foresight this matter [i.e. Henry’s return to England] was arranged,” John Capgrave, Liber de Illustribus Henricis, ed. and trans. F. C. Hingeston (Rolls Series, 1858), p. 107. 21 Henry was an Arundel through marriage. His wife Mary was the daughter of Humphrey de Bohun, last Bohun Earl of Northampton by Joan, daughter of Richard, Earl of Arundel. For the indenture of marriage between Bohun and Arundel in 1359 see, DKR, 35 (1874), p. 7. 22 Bennett, Richard II, p. 153.


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law. One of Earl Richard’s accusers was John Beaufort, Earl of Somerset, the eldest of Gaunt’s natural children by his long-time mistress and eventual third wife, Katheryn Swynford; and a particularly violent verbal exchange took place between Henry of Bolingbroke and the soon-to-be-condemned earl of Arundel. Thus, Earl Richard’s trial and condemnation was carried out by Lancastrians not by the king alone. Richard’s orchestration of this event could not have been more calculated or more successful. It seems that the political alliance between the houses of Arundel and Lancaster even required some explanation to contemporaries; because Archbishop Arundel related a story that on the night Gaunt died at Leicester in February his spirit appeared before the exiled Archbishop in Flanders. The Archbishop related that Gaunt’s ghost was tormented by the injustices he had committed on the Arundel family. The merciful Archbishop interceded with God on Gaunt’s behalf and would ask God to forgive him of his sins. Arundel also promised to pray for Gaunt and have masses said for the good of his soul.23 The story of Gaunt’s ghost is not only helpful in explaining Arundel’s allegiance to Henry’s cause, but is also indicative of the Archbishop’s relationship with Henry. It is clear from the story that in Archbishop Arundel’s mind Henry’s disenfranchisement had little or nothing to do with his joining forces with the titular duke of Lancaster. Rather, the exiled Archbishop’s unforeseen alliance with Lancaster centered on injustices done to and his own family; even those injuries perpetrated—at least in Archbishop Arundel’s view— by John of Gaunt. By far the most significant injuries heaped on Archbishop Arundel himself and on his family were those undertaken by Richard II, and these remained paramount in the Archbishop’s mind and actions throughout the events of 1399 and beyond.24 Arundel may have been motivated by mercy sought from beyond the grave or by simple political expedience to form this alliance, but the motives of Charles VI in this situation were more transparent. As long as the French king and his government remained in Paris, they would do just about anything in their power to see that Henry

23

John Hardyng, Chronicle, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1812), p. 356. R. G. Davies, “Thomas Arundel as Archbishop of Canterbury, 1396–1414,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 24 (1973), pp. 9–21. 24

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did not anything to threaten his son-in-law Richard II’s position or the peace with the English that the two monarchs had taken so long to achieve. Fortunately for Henry and Arundel from May until November 1399, the central provinces of France, including the Isle de France and Paris itself, were struck with a renewed outbreak of the plague that forced the king and many of the members of his government to flee to their estates. Philip, Duke of Burgundy, spent this entire time in the Netherlands on his Flemish estates, and his departure from the French political center left the Duke of Orleans in Paris and in control of the machinery of government.25 The departure of the king and the duke of Burgundy from Paris greatly aided Henry’s cause. But, it seems clear that plans were being laid for Henry’s return to England sometime in April, if not earlier, well before to the time that the plague began ravaging the environs of Paris. During these months complex planning and plotting were taking place on Lancastrian estates in England. The month of June saw a general rising of Lancastrian estates from North Yorkshire to the Vale of Glamorgan: from the castle of Dunstanburgh on the Northern Marches, which Robert Swynhoe held for Henry,26 to Kenilworth, where Robert Harbottle purchased food and artillery for the defenses of the castle there,27 to Pontefract and Tickhill where the steward and constable there, Robert Waterton, gathered troops for Henry;28 Hay-on-Wye where money was paid to place the castle in a state of defense from 1 June;29 to the lordship of Brecon where Sir Hugh Waterton the steward there gathered a body of troops for

25

J. J. N. Palmer, England, France and Christendom, p. 224. Swynhowe held the castle there with 20 men-at-arms and 12 archers and drew £29 8s for their wages, PRO DL 29/728/11987 m. 5. 27 PRO DL 42/15 f. 73. 28 Waterton had been steward of Pontefract as well as master forester there under Gaunt (For his appointment as steward, PRO DL 42/15 f. 71 v. and for his appointment as master forester, DL 42/18 f. 159 v., Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 378, 379). He had also served as constable of Tickhill under Gaunt, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 529. Sir Robert had also been with Henry at Coventry in 1398 and received a 10 mark annuity from Henry for “his [Waterton’s] good service in the duke’s [Henry’s] feat and gage with the duke of Norfolk,” which Richard II confirmed on 5 April 1399, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 514. 29 Hugh Waterton, the steward of Hay drew 72s 10d for castle defenses. John ap Harry, the porter of the castle, drew £20 for his efforts, and Thomas Toty, esquire, the janitor of the castle drew 60s 8d for his role in events, PRO SC 6/1157/4 m. 3. 26


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Henry’s use from 1 June;30 and finally to Kidwelly and Carreg Cennen in South Wales where Hugh Waterton, the steward of Kidwelly put the castle in a state of defense “in order to better resist the malice of King Richard or other enemies of the lord [i.e. Henry].”31 Thus, some of the most significant and insignificant estates owned by John of Gaunt rose nearly in unison for Henry of Lancaster. Coordinating a rising on this scale with any accuracy and unity of effort could not have been accomplished quickly or in a haphazard fashion, which strongly suggests that the planning for this had been going on for quite some time, well before the Lancaster/ Arundel alliance, and that it was not only Henry who undertook these efforts. E. F. Jacob remarked long ago that “Lancastrians looked well after their own,”32 and the events of 1399 prove this assertion. For example, the 200 “foresters” from the honor of Pontefract that Sir Robert Waterton met Henry with at Bridlington could not simply have been gathered up from the honor in a matter of days after Waterton discovered that Henry had made landfall.33 Estates like Brecon had a body of troops awaiting Henry’s orders paid from 1 June; Kidwelly had purchased materials to enhance its defenses against Richard; and the castle at Hay had also been put on a war footing from the beginning of June. For these things to occur required not only a substantial amount of organization, but also a substantial amount of desire on the part of the Lancastrian retainers who gathered the troops in Henry’s name and who purchased the supplies and organized the carpenters and stonemasons for the defense of castles.34 Thus, the Lancastrian affinity had just as much to do with the success of Henry’s return to England as Henry did, if not more. 30 Waterton was steward of Brecon on 10 December 1399 (PRO DL 42/15 f. 32 v), and was also paid for three-quarters of a year to 30 September 1399 as steward of Monmouth and the Three Castles (i.e. Grosmont, Skinfrith and White Castle) PRO DL 29/9840, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 646–47. Henry was at Brecon in November 1397, and there local notables like Sir John Devereux paid their respects to Henry, PRO DL 28/1/10, f. 8r. 31 PRO DL 29/584/9240 m. 2. The castle of Carreg Cennen was also probably held for Henry from this time since the keeping of that castle went along with the stewardship of Kidwelly, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 170 n. 1, 640. 32 E. F. Jacob, The Register of Henry Chichele (Canterbury and York Society, 1937–47), I: xxv. 33 The number of 200 comes from Adam of Usk but may be suspect especially considering that Usk claimed the men that Waterton led came from Knaresborough. 34 If indeed Lancastrian castles were normally empty, as Simon Walker argues, then the fact that so many castles and estates were held for Henry speaks to a very

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The Lancastrian affinity rose nearly as a whole to support Henry as much out of their own self-interest as a desire to aid the disenfranchised duke. Whether or not Henry had been a prodigal son, and had no mind for politics or estate management, he personified the Lancastrian patrimony, and the break-up of that patrimony affected many more political lives, ambitions, and livelihoods than his alone. By the late 1390s John of Gaunt’s affinity reached into nearly every county in the realm and was the ultimate retinue to enter if one could.35 The livery collar of Lancastrian S’s was a possession even more prized throughout the kingdom than Richard’s White Hart, and the men who were lucky enough to wear it thought it would give them the moon and the stars.36 More than the visual aspect of status a collar of S’s denoted, being a part of the Lancastrian affinity offered entrée into a kingdom-wide network of powerful and well-connected friends, where good relationships among members of the affinity could be turned to individual advantage. Being a member of the Lancastrian affinity opened doors throughout the kingdom for its members. Some sought important duchy offices because the duke had so many to fill; others looked to their lord for lucrative leases on lands or prized wardships in their counties or associations in marriage. As Simon Walker has shown, most of Gaunt’s retainers did not themselves marry into the families of other Lancastrians, but they did seek out the children of fellow Lancastrians for their own scion, which clearly served Gaunt’s interests in solidifying the power of the Lancastrian affinity.37 More importantly, these marriage alliances gave individual families promise of future reward; by intermarrying into worthy gentry families with good political and economic contacts within their respective counties, Lancastrians could turn to a mutual profit in the succeeding generation. This generational network also existed for those who had gone before. Henry of Grosmont had worked to make Kenilworth the geographic center for the Lancastrian affinity and the focus of its loyalty. Earl Henry had gone so far as to establish a chantry chapel there and services were said daily for his family, well-wishers, and

well coordinated plan of action on the part of his father’s retainers, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 96. 35 M. V. Clarke, Fourteenth Century Studies (Oxford, 1937), pp. 282–83. 36 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 95. 37 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 114–15.


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all those to whom he was bound.38 Although John of Gaunt apparently did not think much of this type of devotional worship, he continued to contribute 100 marks yearly to this chantry and it remained a focal point for many in the affinity and one that bound them together like a confraternity.39 Thus, by the time of John of Gaunt’s death in February 1399 the Lancastrian affinity was bound together not only by the rewards and status that being connected to Gaunt offered but through familial and religious bonds as well. As a whole these things helped to create a powerful and cohesive affinity; this cohesiveness would be tested from March to August 1399, and it would not be found wanting. This is not to suggest that the Lancastrian affinity represented a “political bloc” or “party” in any modern sense of the word. As Simon Walker has demonstrated, the loyalties to a retainer’s own local and familial concerns were always superior to the needs of service required by John of Gaunt.40 But, merely because John of Gaunt could not control each and every individual member of his affinity on any given occasion does not mean that, in periods of stress within the political community, the time expended in creating personal bonds with local gentry men, combined with the cash nexus that helped to solidify that bond between them, was not a resource well spent. Richard II’s actions in disenfranchising Henry of Lancaster and disbursing the Lancastrian patrimony among the king’s supporters in the nobility threatened to disrupt not only the Lancastrian affinity at the administrative level, but also the lives and familial concerns of Lancastrians at the local level. As long as a duke of Lancaster lived, even if he did not possess the mind and political abilities of John of Gaunt, his affinity would continue and thrive. If, however, the duke of Lancaster ceased to exist, and the lands of the duchy were parceled out to new lords, the lives of the many gentlemen who were Lancastrian retainers and office holders, along with those families who had married a son or daughter into these retainers’ families for their own profit, were all in jeopardy.41 Within the preceding two years the political community

38 39 40 41

Kenneth Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant (London, 1969), pp. 188–91. Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 97–99. Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 116. Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 231.

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had witnessed the break-up and destruction of the Arundel, Gloucester and Warwick affinities. Arundel retainers who had made their careers and become important county gentlemen in lordships like Oswestry on the Welsh March had been turned out by the king in favor of his men. All that these former Arundel retainers had worked for in their localities simply disappeared, and in the new political world that emerged after the Revenge Parliament these men faced the unenviable task of beginning again to build their place within local society without the benefit of a powerful benefactor. In fact, they tried to rebuild their place in local society in the face of the most powerful benefactor of all, the king, whose retainers could now act as the powerbrokers for their county and serve as the nexus for royal patronage. Many Lancastrian retainers feared a similar fate would befall them in the months following Henry’s disinheritance. This fear was perhaps more acutely felt among Lancastrians because Gaunt had rarely interceded for his own retainers with the king and thus few of them had received much in the way of royal patronage before 1399.42 Although Richard had retained some of these Lancastrians,43 he could not retain them all, even if he wished to do so. Lack of previous access to royal patronage was only one problem Lancastrian retainers faced in the political world without John of Gaunt as February became March in 1399. As the king parceled out the Lancastrian patrimony after the parliamentary committee’s decision on 18 March, some more prominent Lancastrian retainers suddenly found themselves at the mercy of local opponents backed by royalist nobles and, ultimately, by the power of the king himself. For example, Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey, not only removed Gaunt’s steward of High Peak, Thomas Foljambe, in March 1399,44

42

Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 87–88. Examples of Richard confirming Gaunt’s patents to his retainers so that they “stay with the king only” are too numerous to note individually, see, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 489–586, passim. 44 Foljambe was replaced by John de Leigh, a king’s esquire, as steward of High Peak on 5 March 1399. Richard also gave Leigh the office of riding forester of Peak forest, displacing another Lancastrian, Sir Thomas de Wyndesley, and also gave Leigh the constableship of Castleton castle, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 489. John Leigh of Booths was among Richard’s many Cheshire supporters (CC&C, pp. 38–39) and one of the leaders of the seven vigiliae into which the king’s Cheshire bodyguard had been divided in 1398, PRO E 101/42/10 m. 3. 43


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but a lack of any powerful patron left Foljambe vulnerable to the local maneuverings of Holand’s steward of his Derbyshire lands, Sir Nicholas Clifton, who also held the royal castle of Bolsover near Foljambe’s seat at Walton in the northeastern part of the county.45 In April 1399 Foljambe’s disagreements with Clifton reached the boiling point and Foljambe was arrested and placed in the gaol at Nottingham castle “until further order.”46 If acts like this were indeed part of Richard’s premeditated efforts to break the power of the duchy of Lancaster in the north midlands and replace it with the duchy of Surrey under Thomas Holand, as Simon Walker suggests,47 it not only affected Lancastrian retainers but the earldom of Stafford as well.48 Like Thomas, Duke of Surrey, Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, who received the keeping of Pontefract, also began to make personnel changes. He removed Robert Waterton as constable of Pontefract and replaced him with one of his own retainers, Sir Edmund Fitzwilliam. The real or imagined fear that changes such as these sent through the Lancastrian affinity may best be gauged by the charges leveled at Edward of York at the Deposition Parliament of 1399. Of the many accusations against him in parliament, one of the most telling was the charge claiming he had removed Lancastrian estate officials en masse.49 Although he vehemently denied this charge, it is clear that the Lancastrian affinity saw the parceling of Gaunt’s patrimony as a clear threat to their political status and very existence. Thus, it was Gaunt’s retainers as much as it was Henry who bore the responsibility for the Revolution of 1399 and the reign that came after. While Gaunt’s retainers were raising their estates in support of Henry, the new Duke of Lancaster engaged in one last act of diplomacy before leaving Paris for the channel ports. This diplomacy

45

Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 229–31; Castor, King, Crown and Duchy, pp. 201–02. 46 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 449; CPR, 1396–1399, p. 450; CFR, 1391–1399, p. 294. 47 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 231–32. 48 As Simon Walker suggests, in Staffordshire the Holand family were perceived as the murders of Sir Ralph Stafford and Sir Nicholas Clifton had been the chief accomplice in the crime. The Holand’s rise to power in the north midlands was bound to rouse “opposition from the Stafford affinity; Sir Nicholas Stafford, chief steward of the family lands had already been required to enter into a bond of 6,000 marks to keep the peace towards Thomas Holand.” Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 231–32; CCR, 1389–1392, p. 563. 49 Chrons. Rev., pp. 214–15.

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resulted in a treaty of alliance with Louis, Duke of Orleans. The duke and Henry apparently were on more than cordial terms. In December 1398 Orleans gave a sumptuous dinner-party in Henry’s honor,50 rumors circulated in late 1398 and early 1399 that the two men were on the verge of leading an embassy to Benedict XIII in Avignon in an effort to resolve the Great Schism,51 and in May 1399 the duchess of Orleans presented Henry with a gold buckle set with rubies, pearls and a sapphire.52 Whether Orleans intended to aid Henry in removing Richard II from the throne, or merely to aid a wrongfully disinherited nobleman, is impossible to tell, but a treaty of alliance between the two was concluded on 17 June, witnessed by the seemingly ubiquitous Sir Thomas Erpingham.53 Once this piece of diplomacy was concluded, Henry, with the Archbishop Arundel, the young earl of Arundel, and what few retainers he had with him, left Paris and headed north. Henry made for the port of Boulogne on the channel coast. Here ships had been hired and were awaiting him. Henry’s supporters may have hired shipping for his transit to England at Dover, where Henry’s half-brother John, Marquis of Dorset, was constable, and/or from other ports like Pevensey, where the Lancastrian knight John Pelham kept the castle. Narrative accounts of the size of Henry’s force at this point vary widely and claim Henry anywhere from as few as fifteen men to as many as sixty or an upward extreme of three-hundred.54 Narrative sources also disagree on exactly which noteworthy men accompanied Henry. Even with this variance it seems safe to conclude that Henry’s companions would include, Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of Canterbury, his nephew Thomas, Earl of Arundel, Sir Thomas Rempston, Sir Thomas Erpingham, and John Norbury, one of Henry’s esquires and close friends.55

50

E. Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orleans (Paris, 1889), p. 227. Chrons. Rev., p. 29 fn. 37. 52 Bennett, Richard II, p. 152. 53 Chrons. Rev., pp. 28–30, 112–14. 54 This number is found in Adam of Usk’s chronicle and its accuracy is highly doubtful. Throughout his work, Usk attempted as best he could to place Henry’s return within the context of fulfilling prophecies, especially those of John of Bridlington. One of Bridlington’s prophecies mentions the “double duke” returning with “scarce three hundred men,” Usk, Chronicle, pp. 50–52. 55 Walsingham claimed that Henry had no more than fifteen fighting men with him, but that Henry’s fleet numbered between ten and twelve ships (Chrons. Rev., 51


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Henry’s entourage left the port of Boulogne for England sometime in mid-June, but there is now word of Henry’s movements until 9 July, when he gave a grant under the great seal of the duchy at Knaresborough. It is possible that, following his departure from Boulogne, Henry made landfall at Pevensey in Sussex in late June. Sir John Pelham, the constable and steward of Pevensey castle was most probably a part of the confederacy of Lancatrians who held former Lancastrian estates for Henry from early June.56 In addition the town of Pevensey was one of the Cinque Ports whose constable at the moment was none other than Henry’s half-brother John, Marquis of Dorset.57 If indeed Henry did move west from Boulogne to Pevensey in late June, it was a good military move. Stopping at Pevensey would not only have offered Henry an opportunity to take on supplies of food and water, it would also have provided him with intelligence he needed regarding the king’s location and the opportunity to glean information regarding the Custodian and Council. It is possible that Henry also used a stop at Pevensey to distribute deliberate mis-information about the size of his forces still in France, and that Calais

pp. 116–17), and that Henry’s company included Thomas, ex-Archbishop of Canterbury; Thomas Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel; John Norbury and the seemingly ubiquitous Sir Thomas Erpingham (Chrons. Rev., p. 116). The Monk of Evesham claimed that Henry’s army amounted to only sixty followers including, Thomas, ex-Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, Philip Repington, John Lord Cobham, Sir Thomas Erpingham, Sir Thomas Rempston, Robert Waterton and Francis Court. For the problems with the Monk’s list of men who accompanied Henry see (Chrons. Rev., p. 126 n 1). The Kirkstall chronicler claimed Henry had about one-hundred soldiers with him (Chrons. Rev., p. 133). 56 Pelham had been steward and constable of Pevensey under Gaunt and since there is no evidence to suggest that he had gone to France to accompany Henry on his invasion, it seems more reasonable to conclude that Pelham was part of the mass rising of Lancastrian estates, PRO DL 42/15 f. 21v. It is also possible that Pelham drew forces from the Lancastrian estates clustered around Pevensey in Sussex, especially the manors of Folkington, Wannuck, Arlington, Seaford, West Dean, Willington, Wilmington and Excheat. 57 For Beaufort’s appointment as constable of Dover castle and warden of the Cinque Ports, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 289. Although it is nearly impossible to prove any collusion between Henry and his half-brother before they met at Berkeley, the fact that Beaufort delayed his departure to take up his post in Gascony, coupled with the fact that the castle of Pevensey in one of the ports under his wardenship rose to support Henry, the fact that in spite of holding the office of admiral of the southeast raised no ships to stop or even interdict Henry, and the claims of the Traison et Mort that the two had written letters before Henry’s return may be suggestive of such collusion.

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was the intended target for these men.58 After landing Henry would have spent little time at Pevensey. The Lancastrian estates in Sussex and his father’s affinity there were insignificant compared to those which lay in the north, and the castle at Pevensey was apparently not in the best state of repair.59 Henry could not expect to raise a force of any size from his landed holdings in the southeast and the house of Lancaster had not always been on the best of terms with the local gentry there.60 Had he chosen to remain at Pevensey he could easily have been besieged and trapped there, which, of course, is exactly what happened to Pelham. Perhaps following a brief stay at Pevensey of a day or two, Henry and his fleet headed east and then north. Supplies were purchased for Henry’s use on the north coast of Norfolk at the small manor of Cromer which had been given to, Edmund, Duke of York, in keeping earlier in the year.61 It is possible that Henry chose Cromer as a landing spot because it was a Lancastrian holding in York’s keeping which York which suggests that the aged duke possessed some knowledge of, if not involvement in, Henry’s plans. Cromer might also have been chosen because it lay close to Sir Thomas Erpingham’s estates in northeastern Norfolk that centered on the base of his landed power in the Hundred of South Erpingham, which Gaunt had given him in 1386,62 and where his influence with a number of Norfolk gentry was great.63 Henry might have gathered 58 Even as late at 10 July York and the Council at St. Albans were concerned about assaults on Calais and/or invasions from the continent by a phantom army, CCR, 1396–1399, p. 508. 59 Caroline Barron expresses a similar view as to the difficulties of Henry remaining in Sussex, “Deposition of Richard II,” p. 140. John of Gaunt had received the castle of Pevensey from Edward III in 1369 (CPR, 1370–1374, p. 183), but Gaunt spent little on the castle’s maintenance during his lifetime, and in May 1405 Sir John Pelham, still keeper, wrote to Henry IV that the keep at Pevensey was falling down and in need of repair, The History of the King’s Works, ed. H. M. Colvin, 2 vols. (London, 1963), II: 778–79. 60 For some of the problems that John of Gaunt had faced in Sussex see, Simon Walker, “Lancaster v. Dallingrigge: A Franchisal Dispute in Fourteenth-Century Sussex,” Sussex Archaeological Collections, 121 (1983), pp. 87–94; and Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 127–141. 61 PRO DL 42/15 f. 70v. Edmund, Duke of York, received the keeping of Cromer and other Lancastrian lands in Norfolk on 1 May 1399, CFR, 1391–1399, pp. 303–04. 62 For a discussion of Erpingham’s landed wealth in Norfolk see, Ken Mourin, “Norwich, Norfolk and Sir Thomas Erpingham,” in Agincourt, 1415, ed. Anne Curry (Sroud, 2000), pp. 84–88. 63 T. E. John, “Sir Thomas Erpingham, East Anglian Society and the Dynastic Revolution of 1399,” Norfolk Archaeology 35 (1973), pp. 96–109.


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more forces at Cromer from either his father’s or Erpingham’s estates, and it seems that some of Erpingham’s feoffees, such as John Gurney of Harpley, joined Henry immediately since Gurney received the nearly-immediate piece of royal largesse of being appointed sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk in 1399.64 Whether or not Henry gathered troops to him along his sea voyage up the eastern coast of the kingdom, even before he moved north, hovering about the coast for “a likely place to land.”65 Writing in the fifth BC the Greek tragic dramatist Aeschylus wrote that, “in war, truth is the first casualty;” and this was no less true in the fourteenth century. Henry of Lancaster and those who supported his cause waged war in the summer of 1399 with the written and spoken word as well as the sword, and propaganda needs to be counted among the most significant weapons in his arsenal.66 Henry, like John of Gaunt before him, made use of popular writers to support his cause. Between 1387 and 1389 Henry had seen first-hand how the production of an “official” version of events put forward by Thomas Favent aided the Appellant cause,67 and in 1399 a number of propagandistic texts surfaced to support Henry and the Lancastrian cause. Texts in the form of popular songs praising Henry and exhorting listeners to support him were probably in circulation throughout the political community well before his return to England in July. This circulation further suggests the planning and initiative on the part of Lancastrian affinity members since it is unlikely that these popular songs were composed in France and then transmitted to England. Two of these songs survive; one in Latin, “On the Expected Arrival of the Duke of Lancaster,”68 and the other, “On King Richard’s Ministers” in English,69 foretell the coming of Henry of Lancaster. “On the Expected Arrival of the Duke of Lancaster”

64

John, “Sir Thomas Erpingham,” p. 104. Chrons. Rev., p. 117. 66 As Malcolm Vale suggests, such propaganda, especially in the vernacular, proved to be particularly effective when aimed at those who only understood their vernacular language, “Language, Politics and Society: the Uses of the Vernacular in the Later Middle Ages,” EHR 120 (2005), pp. 20–21. 67 Thomas Favent, Historia sive Narracio Mirabilis Parliamenti, ed. M. McKisack, Camden Society, 3rd Series, 37 (1926). 68 “On the Expected Arrival of the Duke of Lancaster,” in Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, ed. Thomas Wright (Rolls Series, 1859), p. 366. 69 “On King Richard’s Ministers,” in Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, ed. Thomas Wright (Rolls Series, 1859), p. 363. This poem was also edited and printed in Archaeologia 21 (1826) under the title “Sarcastic Verses,” pp. 88–91. 65

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opens with a lamentation on the general state of affairs, and continues on to attack Richard’s most notorious councilors; William Scrope, Earl of Wilshire, Sir John Bushy, Sir William Bagot and Sir Henry Grene. Fraus latet illorum propter thesarum, Scrope,70 Bagge,71 Ver,72 dumus,73 tormentorum parat humus. Damnarunt forti justorum corpora morti, Sanguis qui quorum vindicta clamat eorum.74

The author concludes with a prediction of Henry of Lancaster’s return from France to bring order and restore good governance. The author of “On King Richard’s Ministers,” provides his reader with much the same story as the author of the “Expected Return.” His work, however, is more metaphorical and the first stanzas center on Richard’s notorious knightly councilors, Bushy, Bagot and Green. 70 Sir William Scrope, one of the Appellants of 1397 for which Richard made him Earl of Wiltshire. He served as Treasurer of the realm from 17 September 1398 until Henry summarily executed him outside Bristol on 29 July 1399. 71 Sir William Bagot, one of Richard’s “evil” knightly councillers, see below ff. 29. 72 Though the editor of the poem, Thomas Wright identifies this as Robert de Vere, Duke of Ireland, it seems unlikely he should be in this company. De Vere fled to Flanders to avoid judicial murder at the hands of the Appellants of 1387–9, and died from being gored by a boar during a hunting accident in 1393. Though Richard moved his body from Flanders to the priory of Colne in Essex in 1395, neither de Vere nor his ghost were political figures in the 1390s and they were never associated with Bushy, Green, and Bagot. Quite probably the name Ver refers to Sir Henry Green, one of Richard’s “evil” knightly councillers, since “vert” is the French word and the heraldic term for green, and the author makes a word-play out of the last “evil” counciller’s name since “dumus” is a Latin adjective for bushy, which refers to Sir John Bushy. 73 A Latinate reference (see ff. immediately above) to Sir John Bushy, the third of Richard’s “evil” Knightly councillers. Bushy held lands in Lincoln and in Yorkshire jure uxoris. He entered John of Gaunt’s service as a member of his retinue in 1382 ( John of Gaunt’s Register, ed. C.E. Lodge and R. Somerville (Camden Society, 3rd Ser., 1937), p. 9; DL 28/3/5 f. 8). Perhaps through his connections with Gaunt, Bushy received an appointment as JP for Kesteven later in 1382, then as Sheriff of Lincoln 1383–4, 1384–5 and 1390–91, (PRO List of Sheriffs, p. 79) Bushy then served as MP for Lincolnshire in 1383 (twice), 1388, 1390 (twice), 1391, 1393, 1394, 1395, and 1397 (twice). During the crisis of 1387–8 he supported the Appellants, and in 1394 Gaunt made him Chief Steward of North Parts of the Duchy of Lancaster, which included all duchy lands north of the Trent, (DL 29/6154). Sir Robert Somerville noted “it is awkward to identify [the Bushy in Gaunt’s service] . . . who took posession of Bristol for Richard II on Henry’s landing & was exectued on its surrender, as being opposed to John of Gaunt; yet there seems to be no alternative, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 367). 74 “On the Expected Arrival of the Duke of Lancaster,” in Political Poems and Songs, ed. Thomas Wright, p. 367.


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Ther is a busch that is forgrowe; Crop his welle, and hild his lowe, or ellse his wolle be wilde. The long gras that is also grene, Hit most be mowe, and raked clene; frogrowen his hath the fellde. The grete bagge, that is so mykille, Hit shal be kettord, and maked litelle; the bothom is ny ou3t, Hit is so roton on ych a side, Ther nul no stych with odur abyde, to set thereon a clout.75

The author then laments the fate of Richard II’s chief opponents among the nobility through the vehicle of their livery badges. The swan the author refers to is the livery badge of Thomas of Woodstock, Duke of Gloucester, murdered on Richard’s orders at Calais in 1397. The horse in the poem represents Richard Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, judicially murdered by Parliament that same year, while the bear in the poem is the livery of Richard Beauchamp, the sextegenarian Earl of Warwick, who suffered wretched imprisonment for his transgressions against the Ricardian regime in 1397. Finally, the author foretells Henry’s return, where he will land, the popularity of his cause, and his resolution of the problem regarding Richard’s “evil” councilors. A eron76 is up and toke his flyt; In the noth contre he is li3t; thus 3e alle men saye. The stede colt 77 with hym he brynges; These buth wonder and y thinges, to se hem thus to playe.

75 “On King Richard’s Ministers,” in Political Poems and Songs, ed. Thomas Wright, p. 363. 76 Henry is often portrayed as an Eagle in political poetry. Eagles were thought to be among the most noble birds and Chaucer portayed the eagle as “royal” in the Parliament of Fowls. Geoffrey Chaucer, “The Parliament of Fowls,” in Riverside Chaucer, p. 389, lines 330–334. 77 The horse was the primary livery badge of the house of Arundel. The “colt” in this passage refers to Thomas Fitzalan, son of Richard Earl of Arundel (d. 1397) and nephew of Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury (d. 1415). After his father’s attainder and execution in 1397, Thomas remained in the “care” of John Holand, Duke of Exeter. Reputedly his life in the Duke of Exeter’s care was humiliating,

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chapter three Upon the busch the eron welle reste, Or all places it liketh hym beste, to loke aftur his pray. He wolle falle upon the grene; Ther he falleth, hit wille be sene, they wille not welle away. The bag is ful of roton corne, So long ykep, hit is forlorne, hit wille stonde no stalle. The pecokes78 and the ges79 alleso, And odor fowles money on mo, schuld be fed withalle.80

The material in these two works illustrates that they were written between John of Gaunt’s death and Henry’s advent, sometime between February and July 1399. Although both works survive in anonymous copies, their content and date of composition so closely revolve around Henry and the political situation in the summer of 1399 there can be little doubt as to their origin. It is possible “Richard’s Ministers” did not receive circulation until after Henry’s landing on 4 July. Clearly the author possesses more knowledge of Henry’s companions and his general intentions to land in the northern part of the kingdom: two things which Henry would not have wished known before he actually stood on English soil. Both poems foretell Henry of Lancaster’s return from exile to restore good governance and root out Richard II’s “evil” councilors. Significantly, neither text makes any mention of how Henry is to accomplish this task, nor of any

and Fitzalan was forced to black Exeter’s boots. He made his escape to France where he joined his exiled uncle and Henry of Lancaster, and sailed in the small fleet which landed at Revenspur in early July. 78 Peacocks obviously refer here to the peers of the realm. John Wells’s contention that the peacock represents the house of Neville cannot be given much credence ( John Edwin Wells, A Manual of the Writings in Middle English [New Haven, 1916], p. 219), since the Neville’s were never associated with bird and their livery badge was a ragged stick, or (the heraldic color for gold). 79 The exact meaning of ges is unclear here. John Wells believes they represent the Percy family ( John Edwin Wells, A Manual of the Writings in Middle English, p. 219), but the Percies never used geese as a symbol, and their livery badge was a lion rampant, or (gold). Geese are sometimes representative of the great merchants, and it may be so here. 80 “On King Richard’s Ministers,” in Political Poems and Songs, ed. Thomas Wright, p. 365.


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plans for Richard’s deposition; in fact neither the “Expected Arrival” nor “On Richard’s Ministers” mentions Richard II or alludes to him in any way. These two short works could have been widely disseminated quickly, the propaganda within them spread easily across the kingdom the brevity of these poems allowed these poems would have allowed them to be read aloud at public meetings, given out as handbills, or posted on church doors and other such conspicuous places. Clearly the English text of “On King Richard’s Ministers” lent itself to such venues,81 and the widespread use of handbills to disseminate similar propaganda in the mid-fifteenth century suggests such may have been common practice half-a-century before.82 Though these two short texts support Henry, the propaganda contained within them is both traditional and relatively uncontroversial. The targets of these texts, Sir John Bushy, Sir William Bagot, and Sir Henry Grene, had a poor reputation with many in the political community by the autumn of 1399 because of their undue influence on the king. Both texts portray these three as low-ranking “evil” councilors of Richard II, of low rank who usurped the rightful position of counseling the king from the great nobles of the kingdom— one of the things which Henry is to set right. Neither text mentions any potentially volatile issues, such as Henry’s exile, disenfranchisement, or claims to the Lancastrian inheritance. Nor does either text mention the person of Richard II in any way or Richard II’s adhearants among the nobility, who may have had supporters in any audience. Although these examples of Lancastrian propaganda demonstrate Henry’s attempts to convince the more literate members of the political community of the justice of his cause, other pro-Lancastrian propaganda in the form of signs and portents—whether officially sanctioned or not—were also abroad in the land in the summer of 1399. The prophecy of Merlin, as related by Geoffrey of Monmouth,

81 The power of vernacular propaganda is well known in the later fifteenth century and there is nothing to suggest that Henry was not employing the same propaganda strategies of his successors in 1399, see Malcolm Vale, “Language, Politics and Society: The Uses of the Vernacular in the Later Middle Ages,” EHR 120 (2005), pp. 15–34. 82 For a discussion of Lancastrian propaganda at mid-century and before see, Ralph Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 217–28.

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supposedly mentioned Henry as the “boar of commerce,” who after a time of pestilence, “should recall the dispersed herds to the lost pastures; whose breast should be food for the needy and his tongue should quite the thirsty, out of whose mouth should proceed streams to moisten the dry jaws of men.”83 Adam of Usk claimed that in addition to the prophecies of Merlin, Henry also invoked the prophecies of St. John of Bridlington, of whom Henry was particularly fond.84 Froissart reported hearing tales in Edward III’s day from a book called Brut which claimed the descendants of the Duke of Lancaster would one day be king. This same prophecy Froissart heard spoken on the day of Richard of Bordeaux’s birth.85 Creton, who accompanied Richard II to Ireland in 1399, mentioned a similar episode and claimed an aged knight rode beside him while in the king’s company and told him how Merlin prophesied Richard’s ruin.86 These popular rumors quite possibly spread further and faster than any more regular form of propaganda, and reached even the most distant holt and heath. While gauging the effect of these prophecies on the political community is difficult, the tales surely grew with the telling.87 Nonetheless, many of these superstitions, no matter how far-fetched, including Creton’s contention that Archbishop Arundel had returned with a papal bull blessing Henry’s return, supported the Lancastrian cause.88

83

Geoffrey of Monmouth, 7:3. In spite of recognizing the power of Bridlington’s prophecies, Usk was not above questioning them. For Usk at least, portions of Bridlington’s prophecies were problematic, Usk, Chronicle, pp. 50–52, 51 n. 1. 85 Jean Froissart, Œuvres, ed. K. de Lettenhove (Brussles, 1867–77), 4:121. 86 Creton, pp. 168, 374. 87 Good examples of outrageous stories foreshadowing Richard’s deposition which made their way into chronicles are evidenced in the pages of Adam of Usk, Chronicle, pp. 41–42. 88 It is impossible to tell how many other bits of Lancastrian propaganda were first transmitted by word of mouth before finding their way into chronicles. One such likely piece centers around the excesses in fashion at Richard II’s court. Thomas Walsingham noted Richard’s courtiers were actually “knights of Venus rather than knights of Bellona, more valiant in the bedchamber than on the field of war, armed with words rather than weapons . . .” (Historia Anglicana, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols. [London, Rolls Series, 1863–4], 2: 156). George B. Stow has recently argued that Richard also invented the pocked handkerchief, (“Richard II and the Invention of the Pocket Handkerchief,” Albion 27 [1995], pp. 221–36). 84


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The military situation facing Henry in the early summer of 1399 must have seemed little short of divinely appointed. Richard had recruited an army for Ireland so large that it had to be assembled in stages. The king had drained much of the country of its military resources, and it was well known he would be out of the country for an extended period of time and could not return quickly in force. Although Henry’s late-father’s estates had been divided in keeping among Richard II’s chief supporters, few of Gaunt’s or Henry’s retainers or estate-officials had traveled to Ireland with the king or been removed from their offices and positions by their new lords. Thus, most Lancastrians remained in England, and the lords who had received forfeited Lancastrian estates from Richard in early 1399 had largely left the keeping of these ex-Lancastrian estates in the hands of Gaunt’s men, quite probably for sake of administrative continuity, who—as events proved—were staunchly loyal to the house of Lancaster.89 Determining the exact place and even the exact date for Henry’s arrival in the north is problematic given the variance in the narrative sources. The Monk of Evesham claimed that Henry arrived somewhere between Hull and Bridlington on 24 June,90 while Adam of Usk claimed that Henry landed “at a remote spot in the northern part of the realm,” on 28 June.91 Thomas Walsingham, the Kirkstall chronicler and Sir John Catesby, all claim that Henry made landfall at Ravenspur at the mouth of the Humber and began his march toward his estates from there, but they disagree on the date upon which Henry began his campaign.92 Walsingham claimed Henry landed “on or about the feast of the Translation of St. Martin” (4 July), while the Kirkstall chronicler claimed that Henry landed at Ravenspur on 4 July, “in a certain boat near Bridlington.” The recollections of Sir John Catesby claim that Henry landed “about the qunizaine of the nativity of St. John the Baptist,” or about 9 July,93 and Henry IV’s first biographer, John Capgrave, writing long after 89

Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 135. Chrons. Rev., p. 126. 91 Usk, Chronicle, pp. 52–53. 92 The Kirkstall chronicle and Walsingham both claim Ravenspur for the place, and 4 July for the date of Henry’s landing, Chrons. Rev., p. 132 (Kirkstall), 118 (Walsingham). 93 The Nativity of St. John the Baptist is celebrated on 24 July. Fifteen days after the feast day (i.e. the quinzaine) is 9 July. 90

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events in the 1440s, claimed that Henry landed at Bridlington on the Feast of St. Swithin (15 July).94 4 July is the traditional date for Henry’s landing, but simple issues of practicality and logistics make accepting this date problematic. The biggest difficulty in accepting the date of Henry’s arrival on 4 July lies in the time it would take to move messengers to Henry’s supporters in North Yorkshire with news of his arrival and the additional time required in moving these supporters to him. One good example of this logistical problem is the movements of the Percy family. Traditionally, Henry landed at Ravenspur on 4 July, seeking the shelter of the Humber estuary, and moved to Bridlington, where he made final landfall the next day, and met Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy. ‘Hotspur,’ who was probably at his family manor of Seamer, about 12 miles away, could not have known of Henry’s presence until the evening of 5 July, presumably when one of Henry’s messengers crossed Percy’s lands. Thus, he would not have met Henry until the afternoon of 6 July at the earliest. Even if ‘hotspur’ immediately sent messengers to his father, the earl of Northumberland, at Alnwick, about 95 miles away, they would have taken over two days to reach him by land and maybe by sea. Even if Earl Henry had all his troops with him and he possessed sufficient transport and supplies needed to feed them for a long march south, which is unlikely, the earl still needed to make a decision to join Henry immediately and march south the next day after receiving his son’s letter. Even so, it would take a Herculean rate of march at over 23 miles a day for six continuous days, for Percy to have covered the roughly 140 miles from Alnwick to Doncaster, where even Percy chroniclers tell of the family meeting Henry about 15 July. A similar difficulty with time and space may be exemplified by the presence at Bridlington of Sir Robert Waterton with 200 foresters from the honor of Pontefract who were said to have joined Henry shortly after his landing. Although Waterton, unlike Henry Percy, awaited word of Henry’s advent, Pontefract was approximately 60 miles from Bridlington. Assuming Henry landed at Bridlington on 5 July and riders left immediately for Pontefract, Waterton would not have learned of Henry’s presence until 7 July at the earliest. The forces at Waterton’s disposal, even traveling at a brisk pace of 20 miles a

94

Capgrave, Illustribus Henricis, p. 108.


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day, would not have arrived at Bridlington to meet Henry until 10 July—the day after Knaresborough fell to the disenfranchised duke of Lancaster. Although most Lancastrain estates had risen for Henry, he had to be careful with his initial moves from Bridlington. Henry needed to be certain of exactly who his friends were and where they were before simply plunging forward into East Yorkshire. It seems more likely that Henry made landfall, as Adam of Usk claims, on 28 June. This earlier date gives Henry more time to contact his friends and supporters and northern lords. Take, for example the Waterton case from above. At the earliest Waterton would have learned of Henry’s presence at Bridlington on 30 June, and assuming he moved the very next day to Henry, Waterton would have covered the 60 or so miles from Pontefract to Bridlington in four days and arrived to help Henry on 4 July. The date of 28 June also fits in better with the monk of Evesham’s account that Henry waited several days before moving forward to Pickering and spent several days there before moving on to Knaresborough on the Nidd, which he reached on 9 July. Just as the traditional date of 4 July for Henry’s landing is inaccurate, so too is the traditional claim that Henry began his campaign from Ravenspur. The settlement at Ravenspur had long since ceased to exist by 1399, and the area around the eastern tip of the Humber estuary was largely uninhabited. Even the small host of men who accompanied Henry would need sources of food and water and a quayside to unload their possessions. In addition, had they disembarked at Ravenspur, Henry and his men would have been forced to travel overland without the benefit of roads or transport (i.e., wagons and horses) and without supplies of food or water. These practical military facts would have slowed their progress, made communication with Henry’s supporters difficult, and left Henry and his men vulnerable to a royalist force of any size. It seems more likely, as the Dieulacres and Whalley Chronicles suggest, that Henry made landfall at Bridlington.95 The port of Bridlington, about 30 miles up the coast from the Humber estuary, possessed a number of points that commend it for Henry’s point of disembarkation.96 From a strictly military perspective,

95 96

Chrons. Rev., pp. 154, 156. Bridlington in the middle ages was essentially two towns, an Old Town with

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Bridlington offered much because it was the only port of any size between Newcastle and Hull that did not have a castle for its defense. Thus, Henry could easily make landfall there and unload his troops and goods without any military difficulties. As a port of some size, Bridlington also offered Duke Henry the advantages of a port town. Food could be found in plenty, as could horses and transport if he needed to purchase any. In addition, Bridlington was on part of the old Roman road network in East Yorkshire and, thus, part of the communication network that Henry could employ to his advantage to gather intelligence and use to send messengers to his supporters.97 Last, and by no means least, Bridlington offered Henry the advantage of being the port nearest to his great estates and those of his supporters in East Yorkshire. Henry also chose Bridlington as a place to make landfall because of his veneration of St. John of Bridlington whom Henry viewed as something of patron saint. St. John of Bridlington was born there in 1319 before entering the church and being educated at Oxford. He returned to head the Augustinian priory at Bridlington and died there in 1379.98 Throughout this lifetime, St. John’s reputation as a prophet spread far and wide. He also authored a number of obscure verses that centered on birds and other animals acting as symbols for kings and princes, and it is not surprising that Henry was represented as birds and animals in the in the pro-Lancastrian poems and songs of 1399. Cleary, Henry had a particular attachment to him. He had visited John’s tomb upon his return from Prussia in 1391 and placed his eldest son under the saint’s protection.99 The significance of Bridlington’s prophecies in Henry’s mind and their influence on the events of 1399 may be seen throughout Adam of Usk’s chronicle, as Usk claimed that Henry in his return in 1399 thus fulfilled the prophecy of Bridlington.100 Exactly how Henry perthe large priory church and the Quay with a large harbor, Nicholas Pevesner and David Neave, The Buildings of England: Yorkshire: York and the East Riding (London, 2001 edn.), pp. 340–42. 97 Ivan Margary, Roman Roads in Britain (London, 1967), p. 422. 98 Pevsner, Yorkshire, pp. 343–46. 99 Marie Bruce, The Usurper King (London, 1970), p. 115. The connection between the House of Lancaster and St. John of Bridlington may also be seen in the reign of Henry V. In the long pilgrimage the king undertook after the victory at Agincourt in 1415, the priory church at Bridlington and the tomb of St. John were among the sites Henry V visited to give thanks. 100 Usk, Chronicle, pp. 16–18, 50–52.


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ceived the power of John of Bridlington’s prophecies may be evidenced by the fact that as king, Henry IV sought to have John of Bridlington canonized, which he achieved in 1401. From Bridlington, which he probably reached on 28 June, Henry immediately sent letters to the northern lords to explain his position, and to his friends among the lords and his father’s retainers, who had gathered forces, to come to him as quickly as they were able. The time of transit for these letters to lords like Willoughby, Greystoke, Westmorland, and Northumberland,101 would have been several days. For example, the castle of Helmsley, the seat of the Roos family lay only about 30 miles from Bridlington, and such a small distance could easily be covered by a messenger in one day, whereas the roughly 55 miles from Bridlington to Raby, the seat of the earls of Westmorland, was probably one-and-a-half to two days in the distance. These days at Bridlington were probably the most difficult for Henry, Archbishop Arundel and the small band of Lancastrian supporters. Henry needed to wait for word from his estates that it was safe for him to move forward. Even though the priory precincts of Bridlington, where Henry and his entourage probably stayed, had been crenellated by royal license in 1388, this was more for cosmetic rather than defensive purposes,102 and the insignificant size of his force made him vulnerable to a royalist army of any size. Yet, no royalists were forthcoming and there was no need for Henry and his small band of followers to take ship again at Bridlington and seek refuge on the Continent. With the exception of Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy, whose presence at his manor of Seamer in East Yorkshire was, as we shall see, probably not part of Henry’s plan, the only men who came to Bridlington were loyal Lancastrian followers. Henry could now move forward from Bridlington to his estates with some impunity and embark on a campaign that, within a bare three months, would leave him in possession of the kingdom and enable him to place himself on Richard II’s throne.

101 These were the lords that Adam of Usk claimed came to Henry in Yorkshire, Usk, Chronicle, pp. 52–53. 102 The grant was given to the present prior and priory out of consideration for the former prior, John de Thweng, and was warranted by the king himself, CPR, 1385–1388, p. 439.

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Alnwick

Pickering Seamer Knaresborough (9 July)

York

Bridlington (c. 28 June)

Pontefract High Peak Chester Heleigh

Doncaster (c. 15 July)

Tutbury

Nottingham

Leicester Kenilworth Brecon

Hay on Wye

Spurn Head

Cromer

Norwich

Coventry Warwick

Gloucester Kidwelly

Berkeley (27 July)

London

Bristol Dover Pevensey

Conjectual Landing at Pevensey

Map 2. Henry of Lancaster and his Move from Bridlington to Berkely (c. 28 June–27 July)

CHAPTER FOUR

EDMUND OF LANGLEY AND THE DEFENSE OF THE REALM, JUNE–JULY 1399*

On 1 June 1399 Edmund of Langley, Duke of York, became custodian of the realm for the third and last time, and, no doubt, the aged duke expected to spend a relatively uneventful year as titular head of state while the king campaigned in Ireland.1 Under the duke of York’s leadership the machinery of government continued to function efficiently and effectively without the presence of the king. Certainly, nothing contained in the government documents for the first twenty-seven days of June 1399 betrays any knowledge of Henry of Lancaster’s intentions regarding his return to England. In fact, if anything, government business in this month might at best be considered routine, and at worst, dull. Duke Edmund testified to the authenticity of letters close and patent, ordered commissions of inquiry, ordered escheators to take forfeited lands into the king’s hands,2 interceded with the chancellor, Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, on behalf of a certain James Billingford for the timely receipt of his inheritance,3 and even witnessed a letter to the mayor and aldermen of London demanding to know why Beatrice, wife of Sir John Curson, had been arrested and imprisoned.4 The duke and council helped * Some of the research for this chapter was undertaken during the term I served as Visiting Professor at the Centre for Medieval Studies at the University of York. I am grateful to my colleagues there for their comments and suggestions, and to Chris Given-Wilson, Michael Bennett and the late James Gillespie for their correspondence and discussion on this topic. Portions of this chapter have been previously published as, “‘To Aid the Custodian and Council:’ Edmund of Langley and the Defense of the Realm, 1399,” Journal of Medieval Military History, I (2003), pp. 125–44. 1 For the patent making York Custodian, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 588. Duke Edmund had also been given the office of Steward of England until Henry could reclaim it on 20 March 1399, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 490. 2 CFR, 1391–1399, pp. 294–307. 3 PRO SC1/43/126. 4 Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London, 1381–1412, ed. A. H. Thomas (London, 1932), p. 262. Sir John Curson from Norfolkshire had connections with the pro-Ricardian Lord Bardolf before 1399, but also had strong ties to Bishop Stafford and, more importantly, Sir Thomas Erpingham with whom he served as a trustee of the Felton family estates in Norfolk. Probably this association

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to ensure the collection of monies granted by the king to the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel, in his fight against the Turks.5 After consulting the king the duke of York also ordered the parasitic Lady Mary de Courcy to leave Queen Isabella’s household establishment, currently in residence at Wallingford castle and return to France.6 On 11 June York sent a letter to the sheriff of Nottingham, ordering him to make proclamation with in Sherwood Forest of a certain capitula regarding restrictions on hunting and hawking before Michelmas.7 Even as late as 28 June, the date the Custodian and the Council learned of Sir John Pelham’s holding of Pevensey castle for Henry of Lancaster, the government was ordering letters close to pay several former Lancastrian annuitants their money since the king had confirmed their grants.8 Nevertheless, it seems that the king in Ireland had no intention of allowing the Custodian to occupy the whole of his time away with such mundane matters.9 One of the things that Richard wished York to oversee was the administration of a new series of forced loans throughout the country.10 These were apparently part of an with Erpingham was responsible for him joining the Lancastrian cause in 1399, HoC, II: 719–20. 5 John, Bishop of Chrysopolis received a commission to receive monies from 22 June to 1 September 1399 collected by deputies and keep this money in a chest in St. Paul’s cathedral, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 597. £2,000 had been granted to the Emperor Manuel by Richard II on 13 May 1399, PRO E 403/562 m. 10; Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, p. 272. 6 Traison et Mort, pp. 178–79; PRO E 403/562 m. 12. 7 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 504. For the capitula which was not calendared when the roll was published in 1927 detailing the restrictions on falconry and hunting of quail within the forest see, C 54/243 m. 3d. 8 The receiver at Pontefract was sent a letter ordering him to pay John Albertyn a 5 Mark per annum annuity (CCR, 1396–99, p. 506), and the receiver of the duchy received a letter ordering him to pay Sir Thomas Fleming 20 Mark per annum annuity (CCR, 1396–1399, p. 506). 9 It is possible that the king expected York to call and preside over a parliament as he had in 1395. A letter from the lords of the council to the king in Ireland remonstrating against holding a parliament at Nottingham and dated 1399 is preserved in the British Library (BL Cotton, Titus, B. XI m. 7d). The letter, however, is misdated. The letter refers to the Archbishop of York as the chancellor, and the chancellor in 1399 was Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter. In addition, the Archbishop of York in 1395 was Thomas Arundel, and he was also chancellor. 10 For a detailed discussion of these see, Caroline Barron, “The Tyranny of Richard II,” BIHR 41 (1968), pp. 2–6. As Caroline Barron notes a number of individuals, clerical corporations and civic corporations who received letters patent for repayment do not appear on the receipt rolls and some who loaned money never received letters patent, p. 3. In addition, the Exchequer did not always record the loans in the same place. For example, most of these forced loans to Richard II are kept in PRO E 34/1B, Loans to the Crown, but some such as an indenture between

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on-going series of recognizances for various amounts to be levied by various individuals in various counties that date back at least as far as 1397.11 Like the king’s previous forced loans, some of these recognizances were for relatively insignificant amounts of money.12 For example, on 26 April 1399 John Melton took a recognizance for a sum of £4 11s 4d to be levied in Yorkshire.13 But, other recognizances represented substantial amounts of income. Not only did John Inglewode, one of the king’s clerks, undertake a recognizance for 1,000 marks to be levied from the county of Northumberland,14 Richard Mile and Richard Dunn from Newent in Gloucestershire, undertook a recognizance to levy 1,000 marks in that county.15 William Bagot, one of the king’s most notorious knightly councilors who had used his Lancastrian and royal connections to become one of the most powerful men in the county,16 received a recognizance for 1,000 marks to be levied in Warwickshire.17 Exactly how much resistance, if any, this diverse group of men encountered in attempting to levy the amounts they promised is impossible to tell. As we shall see, Ralph, Lord Greystoke, refused to give the king’s agents any money, and it is clear that some ecclesiastics were more than reluctant to pay the second moiety of the clerical tenth given at the last convocation. Richard Medford, Bishop of Salisbury, found that within his diocese a royal writ of aid was necessary to collect the taxation.18 Sir Robert Constable of Flamborough and John Drax, the king’s serjeant-at-arms, for “a sum of money for the king’s use in his great need” in 1397 (PRO E 43/655), and an indenture between Henry, Prior of Pontefract, and John Drax for a loan of 20 marks that same year (PRO E 43/656) are found in the treasury of receipt, ancient deeds. 11 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 280. 12 For example, John Porter and Walter Grove of Beautre lent the king £6 13s 11d in April 1398, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 363–64. 13 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 500. 14 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 493. 15 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 503. 16 Alison Gundy argues that Bagot’s base of power in Warwickshire prior to the deposition rivaled that of the Beauchamp earls themselves, “The Earls of Warwick and the Royal Affinity in the Politics of the West Midlands, 1389–99,” in Revolution and Consumption in Late Medieval England, ed. M. Hicks (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 66–67. Nevertheless, Bagot seems to have been keenly aware of the reversals of fortune common in Richard’s reign as he took a pardon from the king for his actions while in Thomas of Woodstock’s retinue and for any mis-doings during the Merciless Parliament of 1388 on 20 October 1398, DKR, 36, p. 18. 17 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 505. 18 The patent/writ of aid received the great seal on 3 July, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 589.

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As we have seen, King Richard gave some though to the security of England before his departure for Ireland. He provided substantial financial resources for the defense of the northern marches, and sent orders to all the sheriffs in the kingdom on 23 March to proclaim that all yeomen in royal livery were to go to London and await the orders of York and the Council “by the Wednesday of Easter next [3 April].”19 The exact size of the force raised through these letters is difficult to determine. But, between 1397 and 1399 Richard II retained over 170 men specifically identified as yeomen of the crown under the great seal of Chester.20 Even though these actions on Richard’s part provided York and the Council with a standing body of men before his departure for Ireland, the aged duke and Council were unprepared for Henry of Lancaster’s moves from France. The military situation in England that confronted the duke of York and the Council in late June 1399 was an unenviable one. As we have seen, Richard II had spent the previous eighteen months creating a substantial Irish expeditionary force that had taken many of the most effective and experienced military personnel out of the country. The king had also taken his privy wardrobe with him and the personnel from that household department served as the administrative center of his campaign. Further compounding matters for York was the fact that Richard had also taken much of the excess transport in terms of horses and wagons to Ireland. Although, as we have seen, not all monastic houses responded affirmatively to the king’s request for horses and wagons, it is unlikely that requests from Duke Edmund for draft animals and wagons on short notice would always have found receptive ears. Thus, York and any forces he would raise faced the very real problem of securing adequate transport on short notice. Exactly how the Custodian and Council learned of Henry’s departure from France is a matter of conjecture, and not surprisingly the narrative sources differ in their accounts of York’s discovery of the news. The duke of Burgundy’s valet who wrote the Traison et Mort did not know exactly how the news reached York, but he did claim,

19

CCR, 1396–1399, pp. 489–90. Some of these yeomen followed the king to Ireland, but at least some remained in England in the summer of 1399. 20


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errantly, that William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, carried that news to Richard in Ireland.21 Walsingham claimed only that news of Henry’s intended invasion reached the Custodian and Council,22 while the monk of Evesham claimed York only heard of Henry’s intentions after he had landed in Yorkshire.23 The most detailed account of how Duke Edmund heard the news of Henry’s intentions comes from the chronicler of St. Denys who claimed the York had sent William, Earl of Wiltshire, on a diplomatic mission to the court of Charles VI to promise him that the English in Gascony would only take annual tribute from French subjects there in accordance with recent treaty obligations. Scrope dutifully made his way to Dover, but discovered that the shipping there had been commandeered by Henry, at which point the earl hurried back to London to tell York of the news.24 If only for its detail, this account is tempting to believe. Scrope had recently received the custody of Guines castle in the pas de Calais in early 1399, and thus had a personal interest in the English possessions in France which would have made him a natural choice as ambassador to the French court.25 The dearth of shipping at Dover also suggests complicity, if not collusion, between Henry and his half-brother, John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset. Dorset was constable of Dover castle and warden of the Cinque Ports which gave him broad statutory powers over arresting and detaining shipping in the area. In addition, to his powers as constable and warden, at this moment in late-June Dorset also held 90 ships under his command for carrying him and the troops he had raised the previous autumn to Aquitaine. Some of these ships may have been responsible for transporting Henry’s band of rebels. Although a search of the issue roll shows no payment to Scrope from the Exchequer for such a journey it is possible, given the administrative upheaval of the next three months that the entry was never recorded especially since Scrope was dead by the end of July and thus, he was never going to account.

21

Traison et Mort, p. 180. Chrons. Rev., p. 117. 23 Chrons. Rev., p. 127. 24 Chrons. Rev., p. 111. 25 For Scrope’s appointment see, PRO E 101/69/1/298. For a discussion of the pas de Calais and the English castles there, Colvin, King’s Works, I: 423–56. 22

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What is clear, however, is that by 27 or 28 June news had reached York that troops were massing in Picardy under Henry’s command and that they either planned to attack Calais or take ship across the channel and invade England. No sooner had the Custodian and Council received this news than they faced the Lancastrian occupation of Pevensey under the leadership of the Sussex knight and Lancastrian retainer Sir John Pelham.26 York and the Council quickly responded to this threat by ordering Roger Walden, Archbishop of Canterbury, to array men for defense,27 while Sir John Botiller, sheriff of Kent, received orders to raise the shire levies and to keep Rochester castle.28 In addition to these orders York sent letters to a group of Sussex gentlemen, including William Fienles the sheriff of Surrey and Sussex, and Sir William Burchester one of the king’s knights from Kent,29 on 3 July to raise troops and keep Pelham in Pevensey.30 These defensive measures were an undoubted success, and Pelham remained effectively shut-up in Pevensey by the shire levies of Sussex and Kent even as late as 25 July.31 Pelham’s force must have been small in size and only large enough to garrison the castle since it is doubtful that the shire levies could have rapidly responded and kept a force of any size so effectively confined. It may also be, that Edmund of Langley oversaw some of these measures personally. The author of the Traison et Mort reported that York along with Wiltshire and the Marquis of Dorset left London at the end of June and looked for Henry on the south coast before returning to London.32 26 For the siege of Pevensey see, Simon Walker, “Letters to the Dukes of Lancaster in 1381 and 1399,” EHR (1991), pp. 68–9. 27 The date on the patent is 16 July and most certainly this order would have gone out much sooner to the Archbishop since Henry was known to be in the north at that time, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 592. 28 John Botiller the sheriff of Kent was issued £20 for the purchase of artillery and other goods for the defense of Rochester on 12 July, PRO E 403/562 m. 15. He was apparently thought by Henry to have done his job too well in 1399 as he was deprived of his office in August 1399, and dropped from the local bench. It was several years before Henry gave him any office or responsibility, HoC, II: 456–57. 29 Burchester was closely tied to Thomas Despenser, Earl of Gloucester in 1399, and although he survived the deposition Henry IV never fully trusted him, HoC, II: 410–12. 30 This group included Thomas Poynings, William de Hoo, William Fienles, William Percy, William Burchester, William Echyngham, John Halsham and Richard Hurst, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 596. 31 Walker, “Two Letters,” p. 69. 32 Traison et Mort, pp. 183–84.


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The Traison’s claim that York moved quickly through the southeast in late June and early July has more to commend it militarily than appears at first glance. York possessed a force of some size raised via the king’s order to the royal yeoman in livery to concentrate on London for the Custodian’s use.33 Supplementing these troops, John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, had approximately 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers destined for Gascony under his command.34 A move through Kent, Surrey and Sussex helped Archbishop Walden and Sheriff Botiller raise men and seen to the defense of important royal castles there. For example, Rochester castle lay in the keeping of Sir William Arundel, a knight of the king’s chamber.35 Rochester castle dominated the Medway valley and lay astride the main road from Canterbury to London. Since the time of the Norman kings it had been one of the key links in the defensive network of the southeast, and Richard II spent reasonable sums of money between 1395 and 1397 maintaining the defenses there in addition to building a fortified stone bridge across the Medway between Rochester and Strood.36 Queensborough castle which stood on the Isle of Sheppey, like Rochester, was as one of the main links in the defensive network of the southeast lay in the keeping of the loyal William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire.37 It was by far the newest castle in this southeastern defensive network begun by Edward III only in 1361. Although an earthquake had seriously damaged the

33

York drew enough money from the Exchequer for 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers for 30 days, but because he did not account it is unknown how many of these men were yeomen in royal livery and how many were York’s own retainers. See Appendix I. 34 These numbers are drawn from the issue rolls (see appendix I), but it is clear that Beaufort’s army that was being assembled as early as October 1398 had undergone a number of defections. This fact combined with the fact that he never accounted for his forces at the Exchequer leaves one to conclude that the numbers under Dorset’s command need to be taken as speculative. 35 RH&KA, p. 282. Although Arundel had become a chamber knight in the 1390s he was also a nephew of Richard, Earl of Arundel and also a nephew of Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, RH&KA, p. 165. These natural connections with the Fitzalans probably led him to join Henry in 1399. He was also keeper of the former Fitzalan castle and lordship of Reigate from 27 July 1397, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 175, 207, 354. 36 Richard spent £91 12s 11 1/2d on improvements and repairs to Rochester castle between July 1395 and July 1397, and over £125 on construction of the fortified bridge there between 1395 and 1399, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 806–15. 37 For Scrope’s appointment to the constableship on 15 June 1397 see, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 89, 153.

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castle in 1382,38 the damages were made good before 1399 and Scrope’s lieutenant there, Sir Arnald Savage, was another of the king’s chamber knights.39 Last and not least, the constableship of Dover castle and wardenship of the Cinque Ports lay in the hands of John, Marquis of Dorset.40 These offices not only gave the marquis broad statutory powers in these ports, it also provided him with the office of admiralty of the south east which he could exercise to arrest vessels for either the defense of the coast or to hunt down Henry’s fleet if possible.41 In addition to these secular issues in the southeast, York also had some religious issues to contend with as well. Some significant components of the Archbishopric of Canterbury lay in the Kent, and with these temporalities in the hands of the loyal Roger Walden no problems could be expected from that quarter. Thus, in the southeast at least, the royalists were successful. The success of keeping Pelham within the confines of Pevensey was rapidly overshadowed by the fact that York soon found many of John of Gaunt’s former estates and his more important castles were being held for Henry. Food and other goods had been purchased for Henry’s use and awaited him at the Lancastrian manor of Cromer in East Anglia,42 and Robert Swynhoe, one of his father’s retainers, held Dunstanburgh castle for him at least from 1 July.43 Henry’s great northern fortress of Pontefract also rose and his father’s steward there, Robert Waterton, met Henry shortly after his landing with 200 men from the honor.44 Kenilworth castle, one of the 38 For a description and plan of the circular castle at Queensborough, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 793–804. 39 RH&KA, p. 283. In addition to being in the king’s service from the early 1380s, Savage apparently had connections to Richard, Earl of Arundel, from his Kentish origins as early as the 1380s, and served with the earl at sea in 1388. These Fitzalan connections combined with the fact that his daughter had married a kinsman of John, Lord Cobham, a Lancastrian adherent, probably helped him decide to join Henry in 1399. Clearly, his services were being utilized by the new regime even before Richard II was deposed as on 10 September 1399 Arundel received a commission to remove Roger Walden’s goods from the see of Canterbury, HoC, IV: 306–10. 40 For Beaufort’s appointment as constable of Dover castle and warden of the Cinque Ports, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 289. 41 K. M. E. Murray, A Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports (Manchester, 1935). 42 PRO DL 42/15 f. 70v. Edmund, Duke of York, received the keeping of Cromer and other Lancastrian lands in Norfolk on 1 May 1399, CFR, 1391–1399, pp. 303–04. 43 PRO DL 29/11987. 44 PRO DL 28/11987.


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most important Lancastrian strongholds in the north midlands, was held from 2 June by Gaunt’s constable Robert Harbottle who purchased food and artillery for its defense.45 Even in Wales the lordship of Brecon held itself in armed readiness against King Richard from mid-June,46 as did the castle at Hay-on-Wye,47 and the massive Lancastrian fortress of Kidwelly just south of Carmarthen.48 In addition to the rising of these Lancastrian estates, Warwick castle was seized by former Beauchamp retainers for Henry as early as 4 July,49 and probably a number of former Arundel estates on the Welsh March rose as well. The rising of Lancastrian estates for Henry was kingdom-wide, and Knaresborough remains the only estate known to have put up even token resistance.50 While it is impossible to determine York’s response to this rising of every Lancastrian estate, his proactive response to the rising of the Lordship of Brecon in Wales demonstrates these events did not paralyze him. His order to the sheriff of Hereford to hold Goodrich castle almost certainly represents a response to the Brecon rising since Goodrich lay less than thirty miles from the lordship.51 York sent similar orders to Edward Charleton, Lord of Powys, to hold his lordship of Usk, also near Brecon, in readiness to defend against Henry—until the enterprising Adam of Usk changed his mind.52 It is probable that the risen estates acted as islands of Lancastrianism in the heart of the country and served as bases for raids into the countryside with the aim of disrupting the government’s lines of supply and communication. Certainly Sir John Pelham attempted such raids out of Pevensey throughout June and July, and it appears this kind of activity also took place at least in Kent, Middlesex, and Sussex.53 Although the royalist success in the southeast in late June and early July cannot be considered insignificant, Henry of Lancaster still 45

PRO DL 42/15 f. 73. PRO SC 6/1157/4. 47 PRO SC 6/1157/4. 48 Hugh Waterton, Gaunt’s steward in Kidwelly put the castle in a state of defense, PRO DL 29/584/9240 m. 2. 49 R. Mott, “Richard II and the Crisis of 1397,” in Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages, ed. I. Wood and G. A. Loud (London, 1991), p. 176. 50 Chrons. Rev., p. 133. 51 CCR, 1396–9, p. 507. 52 Chrons. Rev., pp. 157–8. 53 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 597. 46

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remained at large off the eastern coast. Although York and the council were clearly worried about an assault on Calais, even as late as mid-July, it seems unlikely that York did not suspect that Henry would land near his estates in north Yorkshire at the very heart of his landed power. As we have seen, York could theoretically command the substantial forces under command of the Wardens of the Northern Marches. Rather than impeding Henry’s advance in north Yorkshire, however, ‘hotspur’ joined the Lancastrian cause after the disenfranchised duke promised the younger Percy that he had returned only to claim his inheritance. ‘Hotspur’s’ defection at Bridlington was followed by the defection of his father, Henry, Earl of Nothumerland;54 Ralph Neville, Earl of Westmorland; and a number of other northern barons after Henry’s more public oath at Doncaster, where he again claimed to seek only his rightful inheritance.55 Although York did not learn of these defections until mid-July,56 this was the first defeat for the royal cause, and one that made Edmund of Langley’s position in the south all the more difficult. As events moved forward in early July, Duke Edmund worked to hold what he could for the king in the northern shires. The duke ordered the city of York to hold against Henry and the sheriffs there paid out £4 12s 10d for carpenters, plasterers and masons to repair the defenses.57 The sheriff of Nottingham also received orders to hold the castle there from 7 July,58 and Holt castle in Cheshire where the king had stockpiled arms and money received £36 for its defenses.59 Duke Edmund dispatched a second messenger to Ireland on this date, and he also sent Henry Spenser north with letters to the Archbishop of York, the bishop of Lincoln, and the earls of Westmorland and Northumberland no doubt requesting assistance.60 Similar

54

Northumberland’s defection was all the more significant because Edward, Duke of Albemarle, had asked the king to give the Earl the wardenship of the western march and keeping of Roxburgh castle before Albemarle left to join the king in Ireland. Richard’s letter authorizing Northumberland’s appointment as warden was dated 11 July 1399, PRO C 47/22/11/10. 55 Chrons. Rev., pp. 192–3. 56 Chrons. Rev., p. 119. 57 PRO E 364/33 m. 1. 58 CCR, 1396–9, p. 507. Nottingham was one of the few royal castles in a good state of repair in 1399, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 764. 59 PRO E 403/562 m. 10, 13 May. 60 Henry Spenser received 33s 4d for his journeys to take letters to the Archbishop


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orders were sent to the southern and midland counties as well. The constables of Windsor,61 Leeds and Rochester castles, were ordered to hold their fortresses against Henry,62 and the bailiffs and men of Canterbury were granted murage to reinforce their city walls.63 John Hobildod, one of the king’s knights received £60 for wages to hire men-at-arms and archers and purchase artillery for the defense of Reigate castle in Sussex.64 Substantial sums of money were disbursed for the defense of Wallingford castle where young Queen Isabel was in residence and the constableship of the castle there changed hands.65 Further orders for putting castles on a war footing went to the Duke of Albemarle;66 William Genge, the Abbot of Peterborough;67 Sir Gerard Braybrooke, and Sir Thomas Latimer, both king’s knights, to hold Rockingham castle between Leicester and Peterborough for the king.68 Sir Peter Courtenay received £1,133 6s 8d from the Exchequer for the defense of Bristol castle and for the payment and provisioning of troops coming from Ireland where he expected Richard to make landfall.69 of York, bishop of Lincoln and the earls of Westmorland and Northumberland, while Simon Blackbourne, one of the king’s serjeant-at-arms received 13s 4d for his journey to Ireland, PRO E 403/562 m. 13, 4 July; E 403/563 m. 9, 4 July. 61 CCR, 1396–9, p. 507. All of the men who owed service to the castle’s defense were called to defend Windsor. Being a chief royal residence, Windsor was in good repair, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 883. 62 Rochester was in a good state by 1400, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 813; and so was Leeds castle, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 702. 63 The date of the grant to Canterbury was 14 July, CPR, 1396–9, p. 592. This grant was probably necessary considering the poor state of the castle there, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 589–90. 64 PRO E 403/563 m. 9, 4 July. 65 A total of £1296 12s 4d were issued for Wallingford’s defense on 12 July 1399, PRO E 403/562 m. 15. This payment no doubt followed patents issued to the earl of Wiltshire, Sir John Bushy, Sir William Bagot and Sir Henry Green for the joint keeping of Wallingford on 12 July (CPR, 1396–9, p. 588). Richard II had worked to keep the castle in a good state of repair and was a formidable obstacle in 1399, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 851. 66 It is possible that the government did not know exactly where Edward, Duke of Albemarle was at this point. He had just been up on the northern marches setting things in order before his absence and he probably did not leave the north until late May ( Johnson, “Departure of Richard II from Ireland,” p. 788), and York might not have known of his actual date of departure. 67 William Genge had received the temporalities of Peterborough on 8 February 1398, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 314. 68 CCR, 1396–9, p. 510. Rockingham was one of the most well-kept royal castles in the midlands, Colvin King’s Works, II: 818. 69 Quite probably the money sent to Bristol was to help pay wages for the men who were presumably coming from Irish ports rather than money to be spent on

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But by far the most substantial outlay of Exchequer resources for defense came on 4 July and was dispensed to Calais. By this date York and the council were clearly convinced of a danger to Calais and ordered £2,566 13s 8d to place the castles and city there in a state of defense.70 Duke Edmund also ordered ships from western ports pressed into service to ensure the return of as much of the Irish expeditionary force as possible. Exactly how many vessels were taken into the king’s service is difficult to determine, but certainly a number of relatively large Dutch and German ships were pressed into service during this period.71 As he dealt with these matters, Duke Edmund and the Council needed to raise troops of their own to defend the southeast from the invasion of the rumored army in France. On 28 June York sent letters close to all the sheriffs of England ordering them to raise troops in their counties and bring them to the duke’s aid at Ware in Hertfordshire,72 and a second set of letters were sent to the sheriffs on 4 July.73 In addition to these letters, Duke Edmund sent letters to the earls of Westmorland and Northumberland asking for their assistance in resisting Henry on the same date. York, with part of the government now worked to do what he could gather of an army. His first move was to leave London for St. Albans on 7 July. In all probability York and what troops he had mustered at this point arrived at the abbey there on or about 8 July. York and the council remained at St. Albans until probably 12 July.

shoring up any physical defenses within the town, PRO E 403/562 m. 15, 12 July. See also, James Sherbourne, “Richard II’s Return to Wales, July 1399,” in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), pp. 119–31. 70 PRO E 403/563 m. 14. 71 No orders for arresting these ships remain, but nine large Dutch and Hanse merchant-men were riding at anchor, still in royal hands, at King’s Lynn in March 1400, CCR, 1399–1402, p. 73. Clearly these had been used in transporting Richard’s army from Ireland as the name of a captain of one of the vessels is included in an inquisition carrying goods from Ireland to Plymouth, CIQMisc, #132–3. Holding pressed vessels in the king’s service for extended periods was the norm rather than the exception, see J. W. Sherbourne, “The English Navy: Shipping and Manpower, 1369–89,” in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England (London, 1994), pp. 31–2. 72 PRO E 101/42/12 m. 3. 73 The Exchequer paid 105 shillings to messengers to carry the letters to the sheriffs, PRO E 403/563 m. 9, 4 July.


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York’s move to the north of London has never received anything more than passing analysis by historians, and upon first glance it does seem militarily unsound. Chris Given-Wilson suggested that York’s move to Ware and then to Bedford represented the beginnings of an attempt to engage Henry in combat in the north, but such was probably not the case. It is doubtful that anyone who possessed as much military experience as Edmund of Langley would have wished to seek battle with Henry before all of his forces were collected. As we have seen, York’s efforts in the defense of the realm between 28 June and 4 July had been a success. John Pelham’s forces were contained in Pevensey castle and Duke Edmund knew that the castles in the chain of defense in the south east were in loyal hands and sufficiently garrisoned with shire levies to resist Henry. Thus, it was now safe to move from a well-defended London. York’s move to the north of London most likely rested on three factors. First, was an attempt to join forces with contingents, and probably much needed draft animals and wagons, coming from East Anglia.74 Bishop Despenser coming from Norwich led a contingent of nine knights, 61 men-at-arms, and 130 archers,75 William, Abbot of Walden,76 from Saffron Walden in Essex,—or more likely his lieutenant—led a contingent of one man-at-arms and 39 archers, while Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, led a contingent of four knights, 26 men-at-arms and 115 archers.77 These contingents of troops raised from East Anglia were among the most substantial in York’s army. Second, by moving north to Ware, York and his now growing army, were near the Lancastrian patrimony in East Anglia.78 If Lancastrian

74 One John Kigall received 20 shillings for his labors in attempting to acquire horses for the custodian’s household on York’s orders, PRO E 403/563 m. 14, 9 July. 75 PRO E 101/42/12 m. 14. 76 He was apparently loyal to Richard II. Abbot William had been one of the collectors of the clerical tenth voted by convocation in 1397, and found that some churchmen in the archdeaconry of Colchester (where he was to collect the tax) had no intentions of paying the said sum. To ensure that he was better able to collect the tax, Abbot William received a letter patent to aid his cause on 10 December 1397, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 171. 77 PRO E 101/42/12 m. 7. 78 While the Lancastrian patrimony in East Anglia was not insignificant, it cannot be considered substantial. It seems that the Lancastrian estates in East Anglia did not rise for Henry since Bishop Despenser, Abbot William and the earl of Suffolk seemingly encountered no difficulties in raising troops or moving them to meet with Duke Edmund.

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estates were rising throughout the country for Henry then his father’s estates in Norfolkshire were one potential spot for Henry to make landfall. York, with an army of any size, at Ware put him in a good strategic position to move into East Anglia if military necessity demanded such a move. In fact, Henry did make landfall at the Lancastrian estate of Cromer in Norfolk probably in early July before continuing on up the eastern coast toward Bridlington. Third, and most importantly, York’s move to St. Albans and Ware put his growing army near some of his own estates in Hertfordshire, such as his castle and manor of Anstey, from where supplies could be drawn and from where horses and wagons could be requisitioned for the army’s use. Also, Hertford castle barely four miles from Ware, was not in the hands of the king but rather lay in the estate of the duke of Lancaster that the king had given in keeping to Duke Edmund on 1 May.79 The castle of Hertford had been in John of Gaunt’s hands since the 1360s and throughout his life Gaunt ensured that the castle remained in a good state of repair.80 Edward Beauchamp, Gaunt’s constable there, had been an esquire in the duke’s retinue since 1372 and had been given the office of constable in 1395.81 Hertford castle not only provided York with what military supplies were stored in the castle but also provided his army with much needed horses and transport as well. Duke Edmund and the council probably reached St. Albans on 10 July and from the surviving documents they produced over the next 72 hours that they remained in St. Albans it is clear that the custodian and council learned more clearly about the military and political difficulties facing them. On 9 July Letters were sent from Duke Edmund to the sheriff of Lancaster,82 possibly the letter preserved on the close roll,83 and on that same day Richard Penry, Sir William Bagot’s valet, received wages for his journey to the king in Ireland.84

79

CFR, 1391–1399, pp. 303–04. Salzman, Building in England, pp. 459–60. Colvin, King’s Works, pp. 679–81. In 1397 Beauchamp had been given a royal writ of aid for three years to facilitate the repairs for the castle there, CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 148–49. 81 For Beauchamp’s indenture, Reg., I: 815. For his appointment as constable of Hertford castle, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 158; Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 370, 601. 82 PRO E 403/563 m. 12, 9 July. 83 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 505. 84 PRO E 403/563 m. 9, 9 July. 80


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It is also clear that York and the council still believed it necessary to ensure the security of Calais. On 10 July York sent a letter close to William Faryngton, the lieutenant of John Holand, Duke of Exeter and Captain of Calais, to ready Calais for an assault by troops assembled in France.85 The same day that Faryngton received orders to hold Calais, the sheriffs of the city of York who had previously been ordered to assemble a force of sixty knights and esquires, together with one hundred archers, and concentrate at Ware, received a letter close ordering them to use the troops that they had assembled to defend the city of York against either the Scots or against the king’s “other enemies.”86 These letters close provide some insight into how the custodian and council perceived their situation in the second week of July. Clearly, even this late in July York and his compatriots thought that there were substantial amounts of men in France awaiting an opportunity to besiege Calais, or to invade England. At the same moment York and the Council also believed that an invasion of the north from the Scots seemed a very real possibility, which suggests the even this early in July the royalists in the south had concerns over the loyalty of the troops and their commanders on the northern marches. Further complicating matters for the custodian was the fact that the sheriff of Yorkshire, Sir James Pickering, had died earlier in the year and apparently had not been replaced.87 In the three days the Custodian and Council stayed in the environs of St. Albans and Ware a number of decisions were made that affected the outcome of events in 1399. York and the council clearly decided to be pro-active rather than reactive to Henry’s movements. To this end they decided to assemble the army at Oxford rather than at Ware as they first ordered and then move from Oxford to the west to meet the king at Bristol as he returned from Ireland. Militarily, this move to Oxford was a sound one and gave York a good central strategic location from which to conduct further operations. Oxford stood a the hub of a good road and communications network and moving the army from St. Albans to Oxford would

85

CCR, 1396–1399, p. 508. CCR, 1396–1399, p. 518. 87 Pickering was retained by John of Gaunt as well as Richard II and had served as sheriff of Yorkshire on three occasions in the 1390s, HoC, IV: 77–80; RH&KA, p. 285. 86

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have lessened the time and distance that contingents from the western shires had to march to join forces with York. Thus, his army could be gathered more rapidly and this would perhaps lessen the opportunity for desertion from the ranks which chroniclers claimed, and documentary sources demonstrate, was occurring. New letters to the sheriffs were sent to this effect and preparations were set in motion for a westward move. York and the Council’s second decision at St. Albans centered on the necessity to move some of the machinery of government from London to the massive fortress of Wallingford where the young Queen Isabel currently resided. They probably believed that from the well-manned and well-maintained castle at Wallingford the government could operate in safety.88 Wallingford’s location on the River Thames meant that communications with the portions of the government, especially the Exchequer, that remained behind in London could be conducted by river as well as by land if travel by land became too dangerous. Many historians have debated the rationale for the custodian and council abandoning London for this westward move. Perhaps they feared that London would not remain loyal to the king.89 But, it seems most likely that York believed it necessary to move some of the more important components of government away from the capitol for simple reasons of security. The Council’s fear of invasion from France was still very real in mid-July and if York and the army moved west toward Oxford they would not be able to offer the chancellor or city of London any protection against foreign invasion. The walls of Wallingford offered not only security but also the ability to move further west with York and his army if the military situation demanded it. With significant components of the Chancery at Wallingford, even if London did fall, and the Exchequer with it, York’s gov-

88 The king had spent substantial amounts of money in the 1390s making extensive repairs and improvements to Wallingford castle, CPR, 1388–92, pp. 145–46, 201; CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 404, 589; Colvin, King’s Works, pp. 850–52. 89 It appears that such thoughts went through York’s mind as on 18 July he sent a letter close from Oxford to the mayor and sheriffs of London ordering them not to sell any arms, artillery or other fencible goods to any except true lieges of the king on pain of treason, CCR, 1396–9, p. 509. Caroline Barron argues that London remained loyal and Richard’s policy “for several weeks,” Caroline Barron, “The Deposition of Richard II,” in Politics and Crisis in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. John Taylor and Wendy Childs (Stroud, 1990), p. 140.


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ernment would still be able to operate, and with the ready source of cash stored away in Ireland, Bristol, Holt and Chester castles, York and the king would still have adequate financial resources for some time. In spite of deciding to pursue a sound military strategy at St. Albans, it seems that divisions within the council over how to defend the realm against Henry became evident here.90 According to Walsingham, who was probably present in the abbey at this time, York had made his thoughts on Henry public after his arrival at St. Albans and had proclaimed no desire to hinder Henry’s efforts to reclaim his inheritance.91 Given this fact, it is possible that Duke Edmund was responsible for the payment of John Spicer and Walter Salesbury two valets sent as ambassadors to Henry who was styled as “duke of Lancaster” on 12 July.92 In addition to the duke of York’s publicly expressed desire not to hinder Henry of Lancaster, the disenfranchised duke’s half-brother John Beaufort, Marquis Dorset, it seems did not wish to resist Henry either. As we have seen, the fleet to carry Marquis John and his forces to Aquitaine had been collected as early as November 1398, but royal order delayed his departure until the last day of April, and he was still in the country when on 7 July he received a letter patent from the custodian and council to remain in England for the aid of the council.93 Perhaps the question of Dorset’s loyalties, combined with York’s public pronouncements led to the royalist faction in the council to try to take charge of matters. Evidence for this is speculative at best, but it is possible that the appointments of Wiltshire, Bagot, Green, and Bushy to keep the castles of Wallingford, Rochester, and Leeds,94 are evidence of this rift because the man this “gang of four” replaced was none other than John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset who had held a life interest in the constableship of Wallingford since 1397.95

90 I am grateful to Mark Arvanigian who discussed the topic of the possible divisions within the council at St. Albans with me at length. Any fault with the interpretation contained herein, however, lies with myself and not Mark Arvanigian. 91 Chrons. Rev., p. 118. 92 Spicer and Salesbury drew 26s 8d for their labors, PRO E 403/562 m. 15, 12 July. 93 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 588. 94 The patent giving the three joint keepership of Rochester and Leeds was dated 7 July, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 591. 95 For Beaufort’s appointment, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 271.

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Divided or not, the Council made several decisions on 12 July before leaving for Oxford. The first was to send £2,639 to Robert Parys, the king’s treasurer in the principality of Chester, ordering him to raise 10 knights, 110 men-at-arms and 900 archers for the defense of the county. The custodian and his army left St. Albans on 12 July with Oxford as its goal. York followed a circuitous route to Oxford by way of Ware, where more troops were collected, and then to Bedford. The northern move to Bedford, like the move to St. Albans was probably for logistical reasons since Bedford was a county-town. It is also possible that York joined forces at Bedford with either Bishop Despenser coming from Norwich and/or the earl of Suffolk coming from Wingfield. York also probably took the opportunity while in Bedford of taking possession of all the worthwhile arms he could find and joined sheriff Worship’s contingent to the army. York then turned south through Buckinghamshire to Aylesbury, which he passed through on 15 July.96 The host then passed through Thame that same day before reaching Oxford probably on 16 July.97 The ninety-mile route had taken seven days at a rate of nearly 13 miles per day. Presumably the bulk of York’s army collected at Oxford since letters addressed to several sheriffs ordered them to concentrate there by Thursday, 17 July.98 As York and his army moved towards Oxford so too did the chancellor, Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, and the Treasurer, William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, and enough clerks to compose the proper writs and documents that Duke Edmund would need on his march westward. Documentary evidence suggests that the government had decided to remove to the safe environs of Wallingford by 10 July as letters close were issued to John Hilton to arrest sufficient horses necessary for the king’s purposes, and by 15 July, John Culleham, mason of Wallingford, received a writ of aid to take masons and carpenters to that place for the king’s works.99 Part of the machinery of government stayed with York until he reached Oxford on 17 July. Remaining at Oxford was clearly out of the question since the castle there was in such a poor state of repair,100 and Chancellor Stafford 96

A letter patent was issued from Aylesbury on 15 July, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 589. A letter close was issued from Thame also on 15 July, CCR, 1396–1399, p. 519. 98 PRO C 47/2/61/31, 32. 99 The writ of aid for Culleham was given at Aylesbury, CPR, 1396–9, p. 589. 100 Colvin, King’s Works, II: 774. In fact, Oxford castle was in such a state that prisoners were easily escaping from its gaol in the late 1380s, CPR, 1385–9, p. 442. 97


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moved to Wallingford, where he was issuing writs on 20 July. Possibly on 15 or 16, July Bishop Stafford took the extraordinary step of calling for the rolls of Chancery to be sent on to him. On 18 July the John de Coggeshale, Abbot of Coggeshale,101 near Waltham in Essex, received a letter close requiring him to send “one strong, not aged, horse” to bear the rolls of Chancery to Wallingford where the government had taken up residence. According to Thomas Stanley, keeper of the rolls, they arrived there by 21 July. From the safety of Wallingford, the government continued to operate in Richard’s name until August.102 Edmund of Langley acted with speed and resolve in ordering and organizing a field force during the emergency, although several factors conspired to complicate his attempts. As we have seen, Richard II had spent nearly eighteen months prior to his departure in June 1399 mobilizing troops for his Irish expedition. The king had taken many of his most important retainers from the southern shires with him to Ireland leaving few socially prominent Ricardians in England to rally their local friends to the royal banner.103 Second, the mere logistics of time and space compounded York’s difficulties. Delays were inevitable in collecting a military force of any size in the best of times,104 and trying to raise a battle-worthy force in a matter of weeks was especially difficult. Some of those Ricardians who remained in England and were available for military service probably had excuses for not serving.105 The time of year might have provided the main excuse for many who did not wish to serve—it was the beginning

101 Abbot John appears to have been one of the king’s supporters in this period. He served as one of the clerics who worked to ensure that recalcitrant churchmen paid the clerical tenth granted in the convocation of 1397 within the archdeaconry of Colchester on 15 November 1398, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 448. 102 The normal functioning of government was clearly disrupted by the move. Although the rolls of Chancery demonstrate that Stafford continued to conduct business through July and early August, the Exchequer seems to have ceased operation as of 12 July since both the Issue and Receipt Rolls record that date as their last day of business for Richard II’s reign, PRO E 401/614, 615; PRO E 402/562, 563. 103 Chris Given-Wilson, RH&KA, pp. 221–2. 104 A. E. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” in The English Government at Work, 1327–1336, ed. J. F. Willard and W. A. Morris (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), I: 355–64. 105 A number of men in Yorkshire during Henry V’s reign had a number of excuses for not attending Henry’s campaigns in France and it is more than likely that such a practice did not begin in the 1410s, A. Goodman, “Responses to Requests in Yorkshire for Military Service Under Henry V,” Northern History 17 (1981), pp. 240–52.

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of harvest season.106 Although several narrative sources claim that Duke Edmund offered higher rates of pay for those men who would come and fight for the royalist cause,107 such was not the case. Rates of pay for the men York’s captains raised were the usual rates for men-at-arms and archers.108 Nonetheless, York’s letters to the sheriffs produced an army of just over three-thousand men in less than three weeks, which clearly demonstrates the willingness of substantial numbers of men to quickly respond to York’s call for aid. Ordering the raising of troops was only one component of Duke Edmund’s task in putting his army in the field. He also had to consider the logistics of his operation. York not only needed food to feed the men, along with horses and wagons for transport, but he also needed the very material of war. Without adequate supplies of food and transport, the troops could become surly and intractable, they could lose their discipline and cohesion and become little more than roving bands of terrorists foraging there way through the countryside, taking whatever struck their fancy. Duke Edmund possessed first-hand experience of this sort of collapse of discipline from his time in Spain in 1381,109 and he worked to ensure that he would not repeat the same failure. On 8 July John Ewell, one of the king’s esquires, received a writ of aid to take any and all horses deemed necessary into the king’s hands.110 At the same time members of the king’s household who had remained in England received writs of aid for purveyance.111 Fortunately for York, the same harvest season that 106 Late June and early July hay was harvested while from mid-July to September wheat, peas, beans, barley, rye and oats were harvested, Barbara A. Hanawalt, The Ties that Bound (Oxford, 1986), p. 126. 107 Walsingham claimed that York let it be known that he would “willingly and generously” reward any who came to fight with him (Chrons. Rev., p. 118), the Traison et Mort claimed that York offered 24 d per day for “horsemen” and 12 d per day for archers, (p. 184), and the middle English Davies Chronicle claimed that York offered men “wonder [large] wages” but none would come, An English Chronicle, 1377–1461, ed. William Marx (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 22. 108 See Appendix 1. 109 Peter E. Russell, English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford, 1955), chapter 14. 110 CPR, 1396–9, p. 592. Exactly how many horses Ewell took into the king’s hands is unknown, but substantial numbers of horses were needed to keep an army on the move. For example, Richard II had taken at least 576 horses to Ireland earlier in the year, Bennett, Richard II, p. 147. 111 Two writs of aid for purveyance survive; one to John Caylock, a buyer of the household, and one to Robert Compnore, a king’s yeoman. They were dated 20 and 22 July respectively. Although these two writs were issued late in the campaign


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kept some who might have served from joining the army also made food and fodder plentiful as he trekked to the west.112 In addition to sustenance, York also had to consider adequately supplying his men with material of war; arms and armor, tents and saddles, shields and lances. Although technically men raised were to come with their own weapons, governments still found it necessary to provide them. Bows could be lost or broken, arrows could be used up, and even melee weapons could be in need of repair or replacement. On most campaigns the king’s privy wardrobe served as the logistical clearing-house for dealing with these matters. But, in June 1399 the king’s privy wardrobe had gone to Ireland along with its keeper, and the nearest stockpile or arms lay in Holt castle in Cheshire, far from Edmund of Langley and his army. In theory, stockpiles of bows, arrows, and arms were placed in the sheriff ’s castle in every county, but these stockpiles had to be maintained and replenished, and quite possibly, Richard had taken some of the weaponry in these castles for his Irish expedition. What supplies were left in the privy wardrobe in the Tower were no doubt requisitioned, but even with these York’s army was quite probably in dire need of weaponry. Such a need for weapons helps explain Duke Edmund’s circuitous route from St. Albans to Bristol through Bedford, Oxford, and Gloucester, since all three were county towns that contained the sheriff ’s castle—or in Bedford’s and Oxford’s case—what was left of one. York’s solution to the logistical problems of his campaign seems to have been completely successful. Whether this resulted from Duke Edmund’s military experiences, or those of Bishop Despenser, and in spite of the fact that the army York commanded contained men with shifting political loyalties none of the narrative sources describe any violent incidents, looting, or unruly behavior on the part of his troops as they marched across the country. Such behavior on the part of the men in York’s army is in marked contrast to that of the

there is nothing to assume that other men had not received such writs and that the two writs referred to above actually represent a thorough attempt on the part of the government to ensure enough purveyors for the government’s needs rather than rely on too few, CPR, 1396–9, p. 587. In addition, wheat had been purchased at Bristol for William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, by Richard Hawker, the Earl of Warwick’s bailiff of Tewskbury in July 1399. This wheat was subsequently stolen by one Harry May, merchant of Bristol and Hawker sued in the king’s court over the matter, PRO C 1/29/542. 112 See above, note 40.

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men who served with Henry’s ever growing host, who, as we shall see, narrative sources tell, plundered their way across the countryside despoiling friend and foe alike. The letters that the duke of York sent to the sheriffs in late June and early July produced a sizable, if rag-tag, mix of forces comprising captains’ retinues, sheriff ’s posses, and minor retinues that possessed a wide range of military abilities and political loyalties.113 The leader of the army, Edmund of Langley, was 58 years old and in poor health. Although he and his son, Edward, Duke of Albemarle, had received much preferment from Richard II, what overshadowed all other considerations for Duke Edmund in the crisis of 1399 was his relationship with his elder brother John of Gaunt. They had only been one year apart in birth, John born at Ghent in 1340, and Edmund born at Langley in 1341, the two grew up together and accompanied their elder brother, Edward the Black Prince, on his Limoges campaign of 1370, and each led contingents to Scotland in 1385 with Richard II.114 It is clear that Gaunt looked after his brother’s interests on many occasions throughout the last three decades of the fourteenth century. For example, in 1376 Duke John asked the abbot of St. Augustine’s in Canterbury to drop a suit against Edmund of Langley in his capacity as Warden of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover Castle.115 Edmund along with John took the hand in marriage of one of Pedro the Cruel’s daughters, and Langley was one of the key elements in Gaunt’s attempt to seize the Castilian throne in the early 1380s. That Edmund’s Portuguese expedition turned out to be a miserable failure,116 for which Gaunt perhaps never forgave him,117 this did not preclude a continued close alliance, both personal and political, between the two brothers for the remainder of Gaunt’s life.118 The close personal and political relationship between Langley and Gaunt was mirrored in their affinities as the

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See Appendix I. PRO SC 1/56/96 115 PRO SC 8/147/7374. 116 Peter E. Russell, English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford, 1955), chapter 5. 117 Sidney Armitage-Smith printed Gaunt’s will in his biography of Gaunt in 1904. In his testament Gaunt specifically refused to allow any of his money to pay any debts arising from Edmund’s expedition to Portugal in 1381, Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt, pp. 420–36, for Langley see p. 422. 118 Goodman, John of Gaunt, pp. 274–75. 114


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two dukes shared a number of retainers and officers. For example, Thomas Hasilden served not only as Edmund’s receiver for his Yorkshire estates, he also served as the controller of John’s household,119 while Robert Morton served not only as Langley’s steward in Yorkshire but also as Gaunt’s receiver in the county,120 and John Saville had been a retainer of Gaunt’s since 1386 and had served Langley as master forester of Langley’s lordship of Sowerby and Holmfirth throughout the 1390s and beyond.121 It is also clear that Yorkist and Lancastrian affinities were blended at the familial level as well. For example, Edmund Barry, one of John of Gaunt’s esquires, married a daughter of Sir Thomas Gerberge, Edmund of Langley’s steward in the late 1390s.122 In some ways it was natural for the two brothers to share officers as many of York’s great estates in western and central Yorkshire bordered Gaunt’s own, but in West Yorkshire at least throughout the last three decades of the fourteenth century, it was difficult to tell where the Yorkist affinity began and the Lancastrian affinity ended. Perhaps the best measure of how the two brothers were linked may be seen in the way others remembered them. When Richard Gest, the clerk of John of Gaunt’s kitchen, died in 1399 after nearly three decades of service to the duke, his will provided for memorials to both Duke John and Duke Edmund.123 It also seems that genuine friendship existed between Henry and his last surviving uncle. In the depths of the political crisis of 1387/88 Henry was losing money at games of hand ball to his uncle’s retainers.124 York was among those named by Henry in his treaty with the duke of Orleans in Paris on 17 June 1399 as being After Richard’s deposition King Henry gave his uncle the office of the keeping of the king’s hawks and hounds. This office, usually reserved for a man of knightly rank, no doubt represented a special gesture on the part of the king since hunting and hawking were two things of which the

119

CPR, 1374–1377, p. 398. CPR, 1381–1385, p. 78. 121 For his Lancastrian connections see, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 280, 289. For his Yorkist connections see, CPR, 1405–1408, p. 15. 122 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 203 n. 71. 123 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 102. 124 In the spring of 1388 Henry lost a reasonable sum of 26s 8d at hand ball, ad pilam manualem to two of York’s retainers, DKR, 30: 35. 120

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aged York was especially fond.125 Perhaps most telling of all as to the closeness of the relationship between Henry and Edmund of Langley rests in the formulary appellations the duke received in official government documents following the deposition. Without exception, very government document from Henry’s reign from warrants for issue to the charter rolls refers to York as, “our dearest uncle.”126 This stands in marked contrast to the appellations York had received in Richard II’s day where he was often referred to as “our uncle,” and on occasion merely as “duke of York.” No other member of King Henry’s family, save his sons, received such consistent and familiar formulary appellations as those Duke Edmund received until his death in 1402. For Duke Edmund to have done anything but support Henry, at least to recover his inheritance, in the summer of 1399 would have been most difficult. The two magnates who led the larger contingents in York’s army both possessed less military experience than their chief. The first of these, John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, had taken the Cross in the 1390s and accompanied John the Fearless, Count of Nevers on his disastrous campaign to Nicopolis in 1396, but other than this less than successful foray into the military sphere, Beaufort had seen limited service. Although Richard II had been generous to Beaufort in legitimizing his family and in creating him a Marquis after the Revenge Parliament, along with re-granting confiscated Lancastrian manors to him after Gaunt’s death in February 1399,127 it seems that Beaufort had little desire to defend the king or to fight for the Ricardian cause. No doubt the reason for Marquis John’s political stance in the summer of 1399 rested in his relationship with Henry of Lancaster. The Traison et Mort reported that Henry had exchanged letters of good faith with his half-brother John before his return.128

125 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 31. Edmund of Langely’s passion for the hunt is perhaps best represented in the often quoted passage from John Hardying’s Chronicle: “When all [the] lordes to councell and parliament [went]/ He would to hunt and to hawkeyng,” pp. 340–41. 126 Annunclo Carissimo Nostro. 127 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 532. Richard also took care to see to the estate of Katherine Swynford-Plantagenet, Gaunt’s last wife and Beaufort’s mother, before leaving for Ireland. On 23 May 1399 Richard granted her possession of all lands and goods that she and Gaunt had been jointly held by the couple, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 555. 128 Traison et Mort, p. 186.


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Beaufort also had connections with the Fitzalans through his wife,129 and he clearly looked out for Arundel interests in 1399 and his associations with the house of Arundel may lie behind Adam of Usk’s story that upon learning of Archbishop Arundel’s landing in England with Henry, Beaufort ordered six cartloads of the former Archbishop’s goods that Roger Walden had confiscated seized from Walden’s men and kept them safe at Saltwood castle until Arundel’s return.130 These claims, coupled with the report in the Chronicle of St. Denis that William, Earl of Wiltshire found all available ships in the port of Dover, where Dorset was constable, had gone to Henry in France, along with Pelham’s rising at Pevensey, one of the Cinque Ports under Beaufort’s care also hints at Marquis John’s complicity in Henry’s plans.131 The second magnate in York’s army was Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk. Upon first glance one would consider him squarely in the Ricardian camp. Earl Michael was the son of Richard’s chancellor who had been impeached by parliament in 1386. The early stages of Earl Michael’s career had not been particularly glorious. In 1385 he had accompanied the king on his less than completely successful expedition to Scotland with a smallish contingent of only 80 men.132 But, the fact of his marriage to Margaret the daughter of Hugh, late Earl Stafford, who was also Thomas, Earl of Warwick’s niece, made Earl Michael’s position more difficult in the summer of 1399. His marriage, perhaps combined with his connections to the house of Arundel gained by his service on Earl Richard’s ill-fated 1388 campaign seem to have proven in Pole’s case that blood was thicker

129 Before 1397 Marquis John had married Margaret, the daughter of Edmund, Earl of Kent, by Alice the daughter of Richard Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel. Cokayne, Complete Peerage, XII, part 1, p. 44. 130 Usk claims that Roger Walden sent these Arundel goods to the castle of Saltwood, Usk, Chronicle, pp. 80–81. It this was the case it would have been easy for Dorset to liberate these because Saltwood castle lay within the jurisdiction of the Cinque Ports and Beaufort was the Warden there in 1399, Murray, Cinque Ports, p. 74. 131 It is also important to remember that Dorest had command over a fleet of ships outside those he could control as constable of Dover. In August 1398 the king had ordered one of his serjeants-at-arms to arrest vessels on the eastern coast from Hull to Southampton and assemble these at Plymouth for Dorset’s departure for Aquitaine, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 432. Whether these vessels arrested for Dorest’s Aquitaine expedition were in fact the ships that carried Henry from Bolougne to Bridlington is unknown, but it is possible that they might have done so. 132 Lewis, “Feudal Levy,” pp. 17, 22.

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than water in 1399.133 Although he had his earldom stripped from him at the beginning of the 1399 parliament, Henry restored the Earldom of Suffolk to him for good service on 15 November 1399. The most martially experienced captain in the host outside York himself was the redoubtable Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich. But, like York, Bishop Despenser had a mixed record of military achievement behind him. He had won great renown in 1381 by riding down various elements of the peasants’ revolt in East Anglia. But slaughtering ill-armed peasants and townsmen was poor preparation for real warfare, and the “crusade” he led in 1382 to Flanders against the schismatic followers of Pope Benedict had ended, like York’s expedition to Iberia the year before, in disarray and defeat. He had not led men in war since that time. Despenser’s steadfastness to the Ricardian cause has never been questioned, but like so many in 1399, even Bishop Henry faced the problem of divided loyalties. Richard II had restored Despenser to the temporalities of his bishopric after they had been confiscated following his Flemish crusade, which would seem to endear him to the king.134 But, the king made the restoration in 1385 only on the supplication of Despenser’s good friend, Thomas Arundel, then Bishop of Ely.135 Although the presence of Bishop Despenser in York’s army is hardly surprising, the presence of a baron like Lord Ferrers may be considered so. Although a man of baronial rank Robert, Lord Ferrers of Chartley in Staffordshire appears to have been a man of relative insignificance.136 He had succeeded to his father’s estates in the 1380s,137 but seems to have made no impression in politics or war until 1399.138 Like so many in Duke Edmund’s army, Lord Robert’s loyalties were probably divided. Before 1399 he had married Margaret Despenser, the fourth and youngest daughter of Edward, Lord

133

J. S. Roskell, The Impeachment of Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk in 1386, in the Context of the Reign of Richard II, (Manchester, 1984), pp. 200–01. For Sir Michael’s service with Arundel in 1388 see, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, pp. 91–92. 134 Weber, “English Bishops,” p. 12. 135 CPR, 1385–1389, p. 34. 136 He appears to have been politically inactive almost his entire political life, Castor, King, Crown and Duchy, pp. 219–20. 137 The Lords Ferrers also held estates in Northamptonshire which were close to Duke Edmund’s estates and this relationship my account for Lord Robert’s presence with York, Cokayne, Complete Peerage, VI, 2: 305; Christine Carpenter, Locality and Polity (Cambridge, 1992), p. 32. 138 Cokayne, Complete Peerage, VI, 2: 315–17.


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Despenser which made him the brother-in-law of Thomas Despenser, Earl of Gloucester. This family connection would seem to place Ferrers squarely in the royalist camp. But, the marriage of Lord Robert’s eldest daughter, Mary, and the co-heiress of his estates, to Ralph, the earl of Westmorland’s second son, no doubt made Lord Robert’s position in 1399 very difficult. The remaining leaders in the army were a mixture of sheriffs with their shire levies, men of knightly rank leading small companies, with local gentlemen and even minor government officials leading small contingents from various counties. Some of the knights who brought contingents were solid supporters of King Richard. Sir John Bushy, Sir Henry Green, Sir William Bagot and Sir John Russell were the king’s closest knightly councillors and confidants. John Norton from Hampshire was a king’s esquire.139 Sir Nicholas Hauberk from Leicestershire was a knight of the king’s chamber and constable of Flint castle in Wales.140 Sir William Elmham’s zeal in Richard’s cause was so great that he had his arms taken from him at Berkeley rather than defect to the Lancastrian cause.141 The sheriffs who led contingents to York’s army were nominally at least pro-Ricardian in political affiliation. Of the ten sheriffs who came to the Duke of York’s aid, only one of them, Robert Russell from Worcester, had been newly appointed in November 1398. All of the others were in their second or third year in office, and were men who had gained Richard’s trust. Some of them were intimate members of his affinity. John Worship, from Bedford and Buckingham, was one of the esquires of the king’s chamber, while John Golafre from Oxford and Berkshire was an esquire of the royal household.142 William Audley from Hampshire, Richard Mawardyn from Wiltshire, and Andrew Neuport from Cambridge and Huntington were king’s esquires.

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Norton had been a king’s esquire since at least 1396, CPR, 1396–9, p. 60. Hauberk had been a king’s knight since 1393 and been given Flint castle and the office of sheriff of Flintshire from 19 December 1396, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 49; DKR, 36, pp. 224–25. 141 Elmham was a close friend of Bishop Despenser and served as a key member of the bishop’s “Crusade” in Flanders in 1383, James McGee, “Sir William Elmham and the Recruitment for Henry Despensers Crusade of 1383,” Medieval Prosopography 20 (1999), pp. 181–90. 142 His cousin, Sir John Golafre who died in 1396, had been one of Richard’s intimates and through him the younger John had been introduced into royal service. He was one of the few who had to have his arms taken from him at Berkeley, HoC, III: 199–202. 140

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But these staunch royalists were heavily out-numbered by retainers of Richard’s former opponents, retainers of the duke of York, or retainers of the duke of Lancaster. Sir John Mulsho the sheriff of Northampton had ties to Duke Edmund and his son Edward, Duke of Albemarle; while Sir John Trussel,143 Sir Thomas Astley and Sir Thomas Clinton were old Warwick retainers. Sir Giles Mallory not only served the house of Beauchamp, he also had been one of Thomas of Woodstock’s closest confidants. Mallory’s association with Woodstock had been so close and weighed so heavily on Richard II’s mind that the king had ordered Mallory and other former Gloucester retainers brought before him on suspicion of treason in April 1398.144 Sir Robert Turk, the sheriff of Hertford, and William Blake had also been in Gloucester’s retinue,145 while John Heron from Northumberland possessed strong family ties to the houses of Percy and Lancaster. Several former Arundel adherents were present as well in York’s host. Sir Ingelram Bruyn had served in Richard, Earl of Arundel’s, retinue in both his naval expeditions in 1387 and in 1388, while John Mitchell, a king’s serjeant-at-arms in 1399, had served with Earl Richard at sea in 1388, as had Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk.146 Although prior personal contacts and loyalties are not always a fool-proof measure of determining how any individual will react in any given military situation, given the fact that so many of York’s men had left him even before he reached the Severn valley combined with the fact that there was no fighting at Berkeley, this strongly suggests that in the summer of 1399 these prior commitments and contacts both personal and familial were more significant in the minds of the soldiers and captains involved than any forced oaths or political loyalties to Richard II. York’s call for all those who would come to aid the royal cause also brought some unlikely men into his army’s ranks. John Gedney, the clerk of the king’s works, and Adam Scalby, chauffer of Chancery, who heated the wax when the Great Seal was used, found themselves paid to recruit men.147 Even Laurence Dyne, who was too old 143

HoC, IV: 666–69. CCR, 1396–9, p. 227; HoC, III: 670–73. 145 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 54. 146 Adrian Bell, War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2004), p. 214. 147 John Gedney had been Clerk of the King’s Works at least since 1391, CPR, 1391–6, p. 29. Scalby had had the office of Chauffer of the wax of Chancery since 144


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and ill to continue in his duties as one of the coroners in Northamptonshire, received payment to bring three archers to the Duke of York’s aid.148 The presence of men such as these in the ranks of York’s host yielded him little, and it is doubtful whether many of them possessed the military experience or training necessary to actually fight in battle. If these minor officials possessed little or no military experience, at least three of the knights and esquires named to raise contingents for York’s army were apparently not even in the country. William Meynell and Richard Cressey received protections for Irish service in May 1399, while Edmund Seymour took a protection for Irish service the previous autumn.149 None of their protections were revoked nor was the Exchequer ever able to track them down to account for their military service. The record of payment for their service with York’s army may suggest that they were nothing more than war profiteers who, like many of their fellows before and after, claimed payment for military service which they did not perform.150 This payment for service never rendered can be put down to the speed with which events moved in July, there was too much pressure on the government to do things neatly. In fact, the Exchequer was still tracking down some of the leaders of contingents for their accounts as late as 1407,151 and one wonders how many of the minor retinues were merely military fictions created by their captains for their own profit.152 The question of ghost contingents aside, it is clear that a substantial number of men answered the summons to join York’s army,

1397, CPR, 1396–9, p. 116. For a discussion of the office of Chauffer see, B. Wilkinson, The Chancery Under Edward III (Manchester, 1929), pp. 86–7. 148 In 1398 the sheriff of Northamptonshire received orders to find a new coroner because Dyne could no longer continue in his duties, CCR, 1396–9, p. 476. 149 Maynell took out a protection for Irish Service on 9 April 1399, CPR, 1396–9, p. 494; Cressy did the same on 20 April, CPR, 1396–9, p. 525; Seymour took out a protection on 28 October and again on 3 November 1398, CPR, 1396–9, pp. 409, 429. 150 K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford, 1973), pp. 26–7. 151 PRO E 364/40. 152 It is also possible that some war-profiteering soldiers may have left one retinue for another and sought double pay, or that captains of companies actually enticed soldiers from other companies to join theirs through bribery. Henry V had to face such difficulties in the 1410s and possibly York had these problems as well, R. A. Newhall, Muster and Review (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp. 11–12.

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and a total of around 3,000 men were raised, judging from the payments made.153 On paper at least, York’s army was similar in composition to other English armies of the late fourteenth century. The two orders to the sheriffs that survive mention that they were each to assemble a force of 60 men-at-arms and 100 archers. In spite of the fact that some narrative sources claim that York had to promise double rates of pay to attract event a few men who would fight against Henry, documentary evidence clearly demonstrates that Duke Edmund offered standard rates of pay for the troop types raised and attracted a surprisingly large body of men within so short a time. If the moneys the ten sheriffs who served with York drew from the Exchequer are any guide, then it is probable that all the sheriffs received similar instructions. The sheriffs from the eastern counties such as Northampton, Bedford and Buckingham received enough money to pay for 60 men-at-arms and 100 archers for thirty days, while the sheriffs from the central and western counties received enough money for the same contingent for between fifteen and eight days.154 The dates of payments made to sheriffs’ posses suggest that Duke Edmund never intended to assemble the royalist army at Ware or St. Albans. He only waited north of London long enough to collect what troops he could from the eastern shires before moving westwards. The shireval contingents alone should have provided Duke Edmund with 600 men-at-arms and 1,000 archers with a ratio of 1.6:1 archers to men-at-arms: a good mix of troops who could have borne the brunt of a melee with sufficient archer support. Unfortunately this ratio of troop types and the desired numbers were not achieved. York’s contingent of 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers would have been difficult to assemble in a brief period of time. The most likely source of troops for the duke’s own contingent was his lands, the most significant of which lay north of the Trent centered on his manors of Sandal, Wakefield, Connisborough, Doncaster and Thorne. Dorset supposedly raised a contingent similar to York’s in size and composition, but he too might have encountered difficulties since some of his troops had left for Aquitaine in 153 Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility, p. 216; Chrons. Rev., pp. 250–1; see Appendix I. 154 The sheriff of Gloucester received enough money to pay for a full contingent for ten days, the sheriff of Worcester for fifteen days, the sheriff of Hampshire for eleven days, and the sheriff of Wilsthire for nine days, PRO E 403/562 m. 15, 12 July.


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February, while he had remained in England. Although a portion of his force raised for Aquitaine remained in England with Beaufort, the revocations of protections that were sealed between March and June demonstrate that this body of troops was beginning to disintegrate.155 Shrieval contingents also appear to have faced recruitment problems. Those contingents for which records survive fall far short of the desired figures, and further suggests Richard’s heavy recruiting of the southern shires had drained them of the best potential soldiery. For example, John Browning, sheriff of Gloucester, could only find twenty men-at-arms and one hundred archers; John Golafre, sheriff of Oxford and Berkshire, could only muster ten men-at-arms and sixty archers; while the sheriff of Hertford, Sir Robert Turk, could only raise one man-at-arms and ten archers. The most trusted Ricardian supporters in York’s army fared no better. Sir William Elmham could only find one man-at-arms (presumably himself ) and thirty archers, and Sir John Russell could only find five men-at-arms and twenty-two archers. It is clear that some of these contingents had melted away from the army even before others even joined. Sir John Golafre’s posse from Oxford composed of seventy men was paid only until 12 July. Sir John Browning’s posse from Gloucester and Sir John Russell’s contingent, which totaled 147 men, received wages until 24 July when they too left the Duke of York. Many chroniclers recorded defections from Duke Edmund’s army, and although it is impossible to know the exact dates when individual men left him, the number of days for which certain contingents received payments provides some suggestions. Those men who received wages for twenty or more days were likely with York when he met Henry at Berkeley on 27 July,156 whereas those paid for fifteen days or less probably had melted away long before. The last date recorded from which contingents set out to join York was 12 July. If no troops set out to join Duke Edmund after that date it is clear that the eight men-at-arms and 85 archers from the minor retinues of Hampshire, who were paid for only ten days, would have left York’s host about 22 July. Sir 155 Six revocations of protection for service with Dorset in Aquitaine can be found on the Patent Roll for the period, CPR, 1396–9, pp. 490, 501, 573, 592, 594. 156 12 July was the last date recorded on either the issue roll or the various accounts that men set out to join Duke Edmund’s army. The addition of twenty days or more to this date comfortably allows for the possibility that all these contingents could have been at Berkeley.

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Almeric St. Amand’s Hampshire contingent, which received payment for only eight days possibly defected even earlier, around 20 July. Contingents from the eastern counties who would probably have been with York before he headed west from St. Albans on 13 July, most likely had left him before 20 July, and William Driby’s force of seven men-at-arms and thirty archers from Lincolnshire, who received only ten days’ wages, were long gone before York reached the Severn valley. The main reason so many members of the army melted away was that many in the army from Duke Edmund on down, either believed Henry of Lancaster’s cause to recover his confiscated inheritance was just,157 or like many members of the political community in 1399, were simply ambivalent. The ease and speed with which many of the leaders of York’s army made the transition into the Lancastrian political world suggest a general defection among the ranks. One member of York’s army, Richard Mawardyn, a king’s esquire since 1390, quickly made peace with Henry. The new king confirmed Mawardyn’s grants from Richard II, and by 16 October 1399 Henry made Mawardyn was one of his king’s esquires.158 Although John Golafre preferred to have his arms taken from him at Berkeley rather than turn his back on Richard II, he too quickly made peace with Henry IV. Golafre received royal confirmation for several of his grants in October and November 1399, and by 3 November 1400 was being styled as a king’s esquire.159 A third notable defector, Sir Almaric St. Amand, continued to receive appointments as a justice of the peace for Hampshire from the new king, and his son received knighthood at Henry’s own hand on the eve of his coronation.160 The list of Ricardian retainers who received rewards from Henry for their support after leaving York’s army is long: Sir Walter Bitterley, retained as one of Henry IV’s knights with a £40 annuity in February 1400;161 William Trussell, appointed keeper of Northampton castle, and styled as a king’s esquire by the end of October 1399;162 John

157

Chrons. Rev., p. 118. CPR, 1399–1401, p. 72. 159 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 369. 160 For St. Amand’s appointment as JP (CPR, 1399–1401, p. 556), for Henry knighting his son see, F. Winkler, “The Making of King’s Knights in the Lancastrian Period, 1399–1461” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1943), pp. 165–6. 161 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 195. 162 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 43. 158


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Holand, a king’s esquire by 12 November 1399;163 Richard Cressy styled as a king’s esquire in 1399 and, by March 1400, a member of the royal household,164 and John Heron esquire to the king by 1401.165 Even the less significant members of York’s army received some of Henry’s largesse. John Drayton and William Blake were both styled as king’s servants within a month of Henry’s accession,166 even Adam Scalby, the chauffer of Chancery, received rapid confirmation of his office and received a supplemental annuity in early 1400.167 Like the three days York spent at St. Albans, the two days York spent at Oxford helped to shape the political events of 1399. Walsingham claimed that York and the Council learned of the defection of Neville and the Percies at Oxford and that Bushy, Green, and Wiltshire, now fearing for their own safety, rode on with some men to Bristol to prepare for Richard’s expected arrival.168 It is also likely that during their stay at Oxford the duke and Council learned of the rising of several former Beauchamp estates, Warwick the most significant of these had been seized by a number of Beauchamp retainers about 4 July. Sir William Bagot fled the Custodian and the environs of Oxford as well, but Bagot fled under the pretext of bearing a message to the king in Ireland. Yet, rather than travel to Ireland Bagot went to Cheshire instead where he possessed broad powers as steward of the former Arundel lordships of Bromefeld and Yale, Chirk, and Oswestery; no doubt in hopes of helping to raise the country for the king.169 Unfortunately for Bagot, his attempts were unsuccessful and he was finally tracked down in Cheshire, captured and brought before Henry.170 The flight of the most ardent

163

CPR, 1399–1401, p. 78. CPR, 1399–1401, p. 20. 165 CPR, 1399–1401, p. 489. 166 For Drayton see CPR, 1399–1401, pp. 9, 147, for Blake see CPR, 1399–1401, p. 41. 167 Scalby received letters patent confirming him in his office on 13 December 1399 (CPR, 1399–1401, p. 162), and a supplemental annuity of 2d per day on 16 March 1400 (CPR, 13991–1401, p. 324). 168 Chrons. Rev., p. 119. 169 The grant giving Bagot a life interest in the stewardship of Bromfeld and Yale, Chirk, Oswestry, the elevent towns and the castles of Pilip, Kynardeslegh, and Eggerlegh was given to him under the Cheshire seal on 28 May 1398, DKR, 36, p. 18. 170 Chrons. Rev., p. 110. 164

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Ricardian supporters left York and his army in a difficult position. It seems clear that, Duke Edmund and John Beaufort at least had no desire to fight Henry and it also seems that many in his company had similar sympathies toward Henry of Lancaster and his ever-growing army who were moving inexorably south. Abandoned by Richard’s councilors, York continued on his odyssey westward out of Oxford about 18 July. Presumably he continued to pick up contingents from the western shires along his route of march. The chancellor, Bishop Stafford, with a portion of the government also left Oxford on 18 July heading south for Wallingford castle, which they safely reached on 19 July. York’s route took him to the royal manor at Woodstock, where he possibly picked up more transport and supplies,171 then to Stow-on-the-Wold and through the northern shoulder of the Cotswolds before reaching Gloucester, possibly on 21 July. York covered the 40 or so miles from Oxford to Gloucester in four days. At Gloucester Duke Edmund faced another difficult decision; to move into Wales and join with the king at Haverfordwest or to head south towards Bristol. York knew the king would be returning from Ireland and that Richard would land in South Wales, in fact, money that he sent to pay for troops reached Richard at Whitland Abbey on 29 July,172 clearly demonstrates York knew of the king’s location well before this date. Although a small group of men could reach the king in South Wales, the duke found the passage for his army along the south coast of Wales barred to him. By 21 July York knew of the rising of many Lancastrian estates in the north, on the Welsh March and in South Wales. To move forward and join the king marching along the coast road through the Vale of Glamorgan would have placed his army of mixed loyalties beneath the walls of Ogmore and the imposing fortress of Kidwelly. Faced with this situation Duke Edmund probably left Sheriff Browning’s Gloucestershire contingent in Gloucester castle, together with the king’s esquire William Beauchamp of Powick the castillian of the castle,173 to cover his movement south through the vale of Berkeley toward Bristol.174 The

171 Woodstock was a royal residence of some standing and probably possessed much needed supplies, Colvin, King’s Works, II: 1009–17. 172 PRO E 361/5 m. 26d. 173 HoC, II: 161–63. 174 This seems to be the most likely explanation for what happened to Browning’s


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pace for this final stage of York’s journey was much slower, as he covered the twenty or so miles from Gloucester to Berkeley in six days. York certainly had enough time to reach Bristol, especially if he left Sheriff Browning’s contingent at Gloucester to bar, or at least impede, Henry’s pursuit. Perhaps Duke Edmund moved slowly because he anticipated orders from King Richard who had landed in western Wales on 24 July;175 perhaps the proximity of Henry’s army brought all movement to a halt while the two sides exchanged ambassadors; or perhaps as the monk of Evesham suggests, York chose to wait at Berkeley because he had already made up his mind to join Henry.176 When York did meet Henry fact to face at Berkeley on 27 July, the duke’s strength had dwindled from the 3,000 men under his banner at Oxford, but he still had at least 1,000 men under his command, including Dorset, Suffolk, Norwich, Sir William Elmham, and Sir John Golafre, without his posse.177 Their contingents, coupled contingent judging from the accounts. He was ordered to Ware by letters from the government but probably joined York at Oxford. Chris Given-Wilson argues that Browning’s contingent went to Bristol with Wiltshire, Bushy, and Green (Chrons. Rev., p. 248), but since they were only paid until 24 July and Bristol was still held for the king until 28 July it seems likely they were not there or they would have received wages for the missing four days. It is also possible that they were left at Gloucester castle to cover York’s movement down the vale of Berkeley and act as a blocking force for Henry’s pursuit since Gloucester was in such good repair. Possibly Henry arrived at Gloucester on 23 July and convinced Browning, either through force of arms or promises of loyalty to Richard II, to surrender the castle to him. 175 Usk, Chronicle, p. 27. For a discussion of Richard’s landing in Wales see G. O. Sayles, “Richard II in 1381 and 1399,” EHR 94 (1979), pp. 822–3. 176 The mystery of why York did not continue on to so well fortified a place as Bristol will likely never be known, but the Monk of Evesham’s claim that York decided to stay at Berkeley suggests he wished to meet Henry on his own terms away from the influence of such pro-Ricardians as Wiltshire, Green and Bushy, who were in Bristol, Chrons. Rev., p. 127. 177 The monk of Evesham claimed that Thomas, Lord Berkeley and Richard, Lord Seymour had joined York at this time, Chrons. Rev., p. 127. It is not difficult to believe that Thomas, Lord Berkeley was present at his own castle, the fact that neither Berkeley nor Seymour accounted for any troops they had collected at the Exchequer suggests that if either of these lords were present, they were present without a company of men. It is also an open question whether Berkeley’s presence at least can be considered of any aid to Richard’s cause. In view of Berkeley’s strenuous efforts in support of the Lancastrian dynasty after 1399, combined with the fact that he had married his daughter Elizabeth to Richard Beauchamp, who became Earl of Warwick in 1401, it is probable that Berkeley stood with Henry in 1399, Cokayne, Complete Peerage, II: 130–31 (Berkeley); XII/2: 381 (Warwick).

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with those from the sheriffs’ posses and minor retinues who were paid for twenty days or more, provide a paper-strength of at least 241 knights, esquires, and men-at-arms and 848 archers. York’s army at Berkeley relied heavily on men raised from minor retinues of questionable military value that accounted for around twenty-five menat-arms and 214 archers. With such a heavy proportion of archers in the force York’s army was also deficient in the troops on whom the brunt of any melee would fall. At Berkeley York found himself faced with an untenable position—leading an army of mixed loyalties and questionable fighting value to face a much larger force led by his nephew with whom Duke Edmund had expressed public sympathy. The aged duke was not alone in his position regarding Henry, and the vast majority of his army, for whatever reason, had little or no fight in them. What skirmishing did take place at Berkeley was both insubstantial and ineffective. Only Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich, along with William Elmham and Walter Bytterley, two of Richard’s king’s knights, and Laurence Dru and John Golafre, esquires, sought to rally troops in favor of the royalist cause, but these Ricardians were few.178 They were quickly arrested and had their arms taken from them rather than lay them down voluntarily. Although some contingents were paid until 4 August, Duke Edmund’s army ceased to be a factor after his meeting with Henry at Berkeley on 27 July. Whatever agreement uncle and nephew reached before the altar at St. Mary’s church in Berkeley will likely never be known, but it was possibly something akin to the oaths Henry had already sworn at Bridlington to Hotspur, and Doncaster to Northumberland, Westmorland and others. In any event, Duke Edmund joined the Lancastrian forces which gave Henry actions a guise of legitimacy,179 and moved on to open Bristol for his nephew on 28 July. York’s exact movements following the fall of Bristol are not known. He did not accompany Henry northwards and possibly remained in Bristol for several days before heading east towards London. Maude Clarke thought that Duke Edmund moved to Walling-

178 Walsingham claims that only Despenser and Elmham resisted Henry, (Chrons. Rev., p. 120), while the monk of Evesham adds Bytterley, Dru and Golafre to the list of Ricardians who had their arms taken from them by Henry’s supporters (Chrons. Rev., p. 127). 179 James H. Ramsay, The Genesis of Lancaster, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1913), II: 353.


147

ford because he was authenticating letters patent and close on 16 and 17 August from that venue.180 Thus, on his way to London York stopped at Wallingford to gather the pieces of government he had left there in mid-July before moving on to London to await Henry’s arrival. Thereafter, and for the remainder of his life, Duke Edmund became one of the key components of the Lancastrian establishment.181

180 M. V. Clarke, “The Deposition of Richard II,” in Fourteenth Century Studies, ed. L. S. Sutherland and M. McKisack (Oxford, 1937), p. 71. 181 For York’s place in the first years of Henry IV’s reign see my article, “‘A Wrong Whom Conscience and Kindred Bid Me to Right:’ Edmund of Langley, Duke of York and the Usurpation of Henry IV” Albion 26 (1994), pp. 253–67.

Men-at-arms

Archers

100

294

John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset

Michael de la Pole Earl of Suffolk3 1095

200

200

£93

£200

£5002

£ paid

5–31 July

20 days

30 days

days paid

E 101/42/12 m. 7, E 101/695/33, E 364/35 m. 1,

No, debt forgiven CPR, 1399–1401, pp. 410–1

No, debt forgiven CPR, 1399–1401, p. 318

Accounted at Ex

1 This table is first based on the Issue Rolls of the Exchequer (E 403/562&563) and also on the few surviving Exchequer Accounts Various (E 101) that survive. These records were collated and published by Chris Given-Wilson in his Chronicles of the Revolution, pp. 250–1. I have supplemented Given-Wilson’s figures by adding the numerous entries on the Foreign Rolls of the Exchequer (E 364) that provide more accurate information on numbers of men recruited and days paid. 2 £ 200 was drawn by the duke without restrictions as to how it would be spent while the remaining £ 300 was to raise the troops, E 403/562 m. 14. Pole had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1388, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 3 Oudeby’s roll has John Skerton receiving payment for 4 knights, 15 men-at-arms, and 120 archers. The payment is lost as the document is much damaged at this point, E 403/563 m. 12. 4 This figure includes 4 knights who were paid 2s per day. 5 This figure varied from account to account. A writ of 12 July (E 101/695/33) states that John Bakerton received £93 for raising 4 knights, 25 men-at-arms and 120 archers; the final accounting on the foreign roll lists the number of archers at 109 however.

100

Edmund, Duke of York

Lord’s Retinues and Retinues of Royal Councillors

Name

EDMUND OF LANGLEY’S ARMY JULY 13991

William Audley Hampshire

John Worship Beds and Bucks Andrew Neuport Cambs and Hunts Robert Turk13 Essex and Herts John Browning Gloucester

Sheriffs Posses11

49 10 100

33 914

20 c. 160

166

80 22

4712

5910 5

c. 200

Sir John Bushy

Sir William Bagot Sir John Russell

c. 150

39 30

130

62

1 149

50

Archers

176

Men-at-arms

William, Abbot of Walden (Essex) Sir William Elmham8 Sir Henry Greene

Robert, Lord Ferrers of Chartley Henry Despenser Bishop of Norwich7

Name

(cont.)

£50

£46 13s 4d

£ 25 15s £8

£137 10s

£93 6s 8d £20

£130 8s 4d

£20 10s £25 £88 3s 4d

£134 18s 4d

£34 5s

£ paid

unknown

10–24 July

12–21 July 12 July–2 Aug

6–27 July

12 July–4 Aug 30 June–24 July

unknown

20 days 3–28 July unknown

6–28 July

12–26 July

days paid

No

E 101/42/12 m. 3, 4, 5

E 364/34 m. 9 E 364/34 m. 3

E 364/35 m. 4

E 364/34 m. 4d E 364/35 m. 4 No, executed at Bristol, July 1399 No, executed at Bristol, July 1399 E 364/40 m. 2 E 101/42/12 m. 15

E 364/35 m. 5d E 101/42/12 m. 14

E 364/39 m. 5

Accounted at Ex

150 chapter four

59

10

91

46

1316

817

134

6

c. 160

10

815

£46 5s

£38 18s

£17

£24 4s

£133 6s 8d

£8

12–27 July

unknown

18–27 July

12–25 July

6 July–6 Aug

12 July–4 Aug

No, debt forgiven CPR, 1401–05, p. 61 E 364/34 m. 9

E 364/39 m. 4d

E 364/35 m. 6d

E 364/35 m. 1d

E 101/42/12 m. 1

7

6

This figure includes 8 knights who were paid 2s per day. Oudeby’s roll has Thomas Hegahm and Leonard Malory drawing £66 for a force of 8 knights, 13 men-at-arms and 61 archers, E 403/563 m. 11. 8 Elmham had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1387, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 9 This figure includes 8 knights who were paid 2s per day. 10 This figure includes 2 knights who were paid 2s per day. 11 It seems that all Sheriffs were ordered to bring 60 men-at-arms and 100 archers in addition to all those who would come, see above p. XX. 12 This figure includes one knight who was paid 2s per day. 13 Turk had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1387, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 14 This figure includes one knight who was paid 2s per day. 15 This number taken from E 403/563 m. 11. 16 This figure includes one knight paid 2s per day. 17 This figure includes one knight paid 2s per day.

Robert Russell Worcester

Robert Turk Hertfordshire John Mulsho Northampton John Golafre Oxon and Berks Thomas Oudeby Rutland Richard Mawardyn Wiltshire

edmund of langley and the defense of the realm 151

Men-at-arms

Archers

Thomas Willesden

Middlesex John Hall, esq21 John Lambkin, esq William Blake of Ruslip, esq22 John Gedney23 and John Pertyng, valets

Gloucestershire Robert Thorley, esq

Hampshire Sir Bernard Brocas Sir Ingelram Bruyn Sir Almric St. Amand Nicholas Merchant, esq Nicholas Bray, esq William Tauk, esq William Kingsham, esq and William Tangley, esq Nicholas Valence, esq Philip Popeham, esq19 John Norton, esq20 John Campflour, esq David Benbury

1

6 4 8 2 2

2 1 1 1 1 ?

£10 £20

19 38

20s

30s 30s

75s

100s 30s 15s 50s 20s £2 15s

£4 £8 £9 £8 50s £10 15s

£ paid

8 8

13

6 13 24 4 3 25

818 8 6 1 1 1

Minor Retinues and Individuals by County

Name

(cont.)

5–25 July

5–26 July

5–26 July

5–13 July 5–13 July

10 days

3–23 July 6–16 July 6–14 July 5–30 July 10 days

15 days 12–23 July 13–23 July 20 days 5–25 July 6–22 July

days paid

m. m. m. m.

4 4 4 2d

m. 1d m. 1d

m. 1d m. 6d

E 364/34 m. 9, E 101/42/12 m. 6 E 364/34 m. 9

E 364/34 m. 9d

E 364/34 m. 9d E 364/34 m. 9

No

E 364/35 E 364/35 E 364/35 E 364/35 No No

No E 364/35 E 364/35 No E 364/35 E 364/35

Accounted at Ex

152 chapter four

8 2 3 4 2 5 8 3 7

825

1 1 1

2

2

Sir John Holand

John Mantell, esq John Witherhale, esq John Maryns, esq Thomas Langport, esq and Gerard Waldeneye, esq John Preston, esq26 and John Hartwell, esq John Drayton, esq Lawrence Dyne, esq William Trussell, esq £4 10 36s 50s 60s

72s

40s £4 4s 72s

£7

£7

£15 12s

24 days 24 days 6–26 July 20 days

6–30 July

12–22 July 12 July–15 Aug 24 days

6 July–4 Aug

6 July–4 Aug

6 July–4 Aug

4d, m. 11 4d, m. 10 1d, m. 9 4 4

No No E 364/36 m. 1 No

E 364/38 m. 2

E 364/35 m. E 101/42/12 E 364/39 m. E 101/42/12 E 364/35 m. E 101/42/12 E 364/41 m. E 364/41 m. No

19

This number taken from E 403/563 m. 9. On the Chancellor’s roll Popeham is paired with Nicholas Merchant, and they drew only £4 for raising 4 archers, E 403/563 m. 9. 20 Norton had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1387, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 21 Hall had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1387, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 22 Blake had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1388, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 23 Gedney had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1387, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 24 This number taken from E 403/563 m. 12. 25 This number taken from E 403/563 m. 12. 26 Preston had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1387, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214.

18

8

824

Sir John Trussell

1

18

2

Northamptonshire Sir Giles Malory


Essex Sir Bart. Bouchier31 John Squerry, esq

5

95 2

18

9

60

57

Northumberland John Heron, esq

? ?

6 827 30

Archers

5

10

6

Men-at-arms

Warwickshire Sir Thomas Astley and Sir Thomas Clinton

Oxford and Berkshire Sir John Golafre30

Hertfordshire William Barker of Ashwell,29 Hugh Heymes of Baldock, and Robert Wight of St. Albans, valets

Derbyshire Sir William Maynell28 John Stratham, esq

Lincolnshire George Everyngham, esq Thomas Foxton, esq William Driby, esq

Name

(cont.)

£44 5s 20s

£8 5s

£9 15s

£20

£30

10 Mks 15s

£4 30s £11 10s

£ paid

12–28 July ?

?

12 July–1 Aug

12–23 July

6–27 July

? 15 days (?)

20 days 30 days 6–17 July

days paid

E 364/34 m. 6 No

No

No

E 364/41 m. 4, E 101/42/12 m. 3

E 364/35 m. 1d, E 101/42/12 m. 2

No No

No No E 364/38 m. 5

Accounted at Ex

154 chapter four

?

?

Leicestershire Sir Nicholas Hauberk33

Devon Walter Clifton, valet34 9

110s

5s

20 Mks

25 Mks

30s

30s

?

10 days (?)

10 days (?)

No

No

No

No

No

No

28

This number taken from E 403/563 m. 9. Maynell had taken a protection for Ireland and was possibly not even in the country. 29 Barker had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1388, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 30 Golafre accounted twice, once as sheriff and a second time for troops he apparently brought on his own initiative. 31 Boucher claimed 3s 4d per day for himself in his account at the Exchequer in his right as a baron. 32 Seymour had taken a protection for Ireland and was possibly not even in the country. 33 A knight of Richard II’s chamber who also held a life interest in the constableship of Flint castle and also the office of sheriff of Flintshire, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 224–25. 34 Clifton had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1388, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. 35 Crees had taken a protection for Ireland and was possibly not even in the country.

27

Cornwall Richard Cressey, esq35

?

8

Cheshire Robert Mascy, Sgt-at-Arms

Shropshire Sir Walter Bitterly

6

Somerset Sir Edmund Seymour32


Men-at-arms

Archers

?

? ? ? ?

days paid

days paid

No No

No No No No

Accounted at Ex

Accounted at Ex

37

Wodingfield had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel at sea in 1388, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214. This contingent taken from E 403/563 m. 11. Document much damaged here and part of the entry missing. Massey had served with Richard, Earl of Arundel, at sea in 1388, Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 214.

36

5 Mks 30s

? ? 8

10s 20 Mks 100s 100s

? ? ? ?

Alan Scalby, valet Sir Roger Siglem John Parvenet, Sgt-at-Arms John Mitchell, Sgt-at-Arms Thomas Wodingfield, Sgt-at-Arms36 Richard Massey37

£ paid

Men-at-arms

Archers

£ paid

Name

Unidentified men who served in York’s Army

Name

(cont.)

156 chapter four

Cotswold Hills

Pevensey

Dover

Rochester Canterbury

Woodstock Aylesbury Oxford Ware Thame St. Albans London Wallingford

Bedford

Map. 3. Edmund of Langley and his Move to the West, July 7–27

Bristol

Berkeley

Gloucester

Stow-on-the-Wold


ILLUSTRATIONS

illustrations

159

Spurn Head From 33,000 feet one can easily make out the outline of the Humber estuary. It is probable that Henry and his fleet sheltered from the open sea here on the night of 26 or 27 June before proceeding northwards to Bridlington. (Author’s Collection)

Bridlington Bay looking south from Flamborough Head The New Town is visible in the right of the picture with the coastline trailing away south towards Spurn Head on the left of the photo. The Old Town, where the Priory was located, is out of the picture to the right. (Author’s Collection)

160

illustrations Bridlington Priory All that remains of this once great priory is the gate-house, the west front, and the nave. It is probable that Henry of Lancaster and his band of followers stayed here for several nights following his landing in late-June. The priory is also the place where Henry met Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy and where he promised Percy by an oath that he had only returned to claim his rightful inheritance. (Author’s Collection)

The Motte at Pickering Castle Henry moved forward from Bridlington to the imposing Lancastrian fortress of Pickering on the southern shoulder of the North Yorkshire moors in early July. (Author’s Collection)

illustrations

161

The Keep at Knaresborough Henry moved from Pickering to his father’s castle at Knaresborough, high above the Nidd River, which he reached on 9 July. (Author’s Collection)

The Motte at Pontefract From Knaresborough Henry moved on to Pontefract, the greatest Lancastrian fortress in the North. Richard of Bordeaux was sent to Pontefract following his deposition in September 1399. The ex-king died in the Gascoigne tower in February 1400 following the failed rising of his supporters at Epiphany in January. (Author’s Collection)

162

illustrations

The Minister Church of St. Mary, Berkeley On 27 July 1399 Henry of Lancaster met with Edmund of Langley, Duke of York, before the altar in this church. Following this meeting York disbanded the vast majority of his army and joined forces with Henry. (Author’s Collection)

Beaumaris Castle Upon his return from Ireland and move to North Wales, Richard II spent several days at the great fortress of Beaumaris on the Isle of Anglesey. (Photo Courtesy of Gwilym Dodd)

illustrations

163

Conway Castle Richard moved forward to Conway where he met with Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland. It was here that Northumberland convinced the king of Henry’s intentions not to overthrow him. Richard, after Percy had sworn on the consecrated Host, rode out of Conway to meet with Henry at Flint. The king was captured in short order and was taken to Flint as a prisoner. (Photo Courtesy of Gwilym Dodd)

Flint Castle It was here that Henry met with Richard. Some chronicle accounts tell that Henry had to silence Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of Canterbury, who could not control his rage against the king and verbally berated him. In all probability, the meeting between Henry and Richard at Flint was a short affair that contained few witnesses. It was probably here that Richard learned he would be deposed. (Photo Courtesy of Gwilym Dodd)

164

illustrations

The Effigy of Ralph Neville Earl of Westmorland in the parish church at Staindrop. Ralph Neville lies here between his two wives: Margaret Stafford and Joan Beaufort.

The Altar Tomb of Edmund of Langley Duke of York in the parish church of All Saint’s, Langley. (Author’s Collection)

CHAPTER FIVE

HENRY OF LANCASTER, THE NORTH, AND HIS MARCH TO BERKELEY, 28 JUNE–27 JULY Henry’s final landfall at Bridlington in late June brought him near the very center of his father’s landed power in North Yorkshire. But, even though a number of Lancastrian estates had risen in his name before his landing, it would take time for Henry to communicate with his friends and supporters and for them to meet him at Bridlington or wherever Henry chose. Thus, the first days following his landing were no doubt among the most difficult for Henry and his small band of supporters. They were most likely ensconced in the priory at Bridlington, perhaps two miles from the quay where they landed. Although the priory had been given a license to crenellate in 1388, such defenses were for cosmetic effect rather than for actual defense.1 Thus, for these first days until Sir John Leventhorpe appeared to join his lord,2 and Sir Robert Waterton arrived with his 200 foresters from Pontefract,3 Henry and his band of followers were most vulnerable. One factor, probably not known to Henry before his landing that added to his security in Bridlington and aided his advance through Yorkshire in the following weeks, was the fact that the county of York was without a sheriff. Sir James Pickering, sheriff of Yorkshire since 1397, had died in late 1398 or early 1399 and a replacement had not been found for him.4 Therefore, the responsibility to raise the shire levy on behalf of the king would have devolved to the under-sheriffs of the ridings and could only have been undertaken with some difficulty. While Henry sent out messengers and awaited news from them at Bridlington, he was confronted with the first

1 The grant was given to the present prior and priory out of consideration for the former prior, John de Thweng, and was warranted by the king himself, CPR, 1385–1388, p. 439. 2 PRO DL 29/1087. 3 PRO DL 29/11987; Usk, Chronicle, p. 52. 4 HoC, IV: 77–80.

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unforeseen political problem that he would face that summer: the unexpected presence of Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy at Bridlington. In 1959 Malcolm Bean wrote that in interpreting the Percy family’s role in the events of 1399 one had to choose between two divergent poles.5 The first is that the Percies joined Henry of Lancaster out of intense frustration with Richard II and his policies and were willing participants in his deposition.6 The other alternative is that they went along with Henry in his desire to reclaim his inheritance, but put up “considerable opposition” when it came to removing Richard from the throne,7 which is what the Percies themselves claimed later in apologies for their rebellions against Henry. Most historians of the past half-century have tended to agree, some more strongly than others, with J. W. Sherborne’s assessment that the Percies were the “king-makers” of 1399.8 Chris Given-Wilson,9 Michael Bennett,10 and Nigel Saul,11 have all argued that the Percies and their support were key to Henry’s success. Malcolm Bean succinctly argued that the part that the Percy family played in the summer of 1399 was “second only to [Henry of ] Lancaster himself;”12 largely because, as Mark Arvanigian suggests, “much of [Henry’s] triumphal army was drawn from the border resources that were, at the time under the command of Hotspur and the earl of Northumberland.”13 In spite of a nearly overwhelming historical tradition, it seems that we are in danger of drowning out another viable rationale for the Percies actions: the fact that they had little practical political choice but to be involved in the events of that summer. As Robin Storey suggests we should not view the Percy family as a monolithic force

5

J. M. W. Bean, “Henry IV and the Percies,” History 44 (1959), p. 212. J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1892), I: 57; J. H. Wylie, History of England Under Henry IV, 4 vols. (London, 1884), passim. 7 Not surprisingly, the Percy family historian agrees with their version of events in 1399, E. B. de Fonblanque, Annals of the House of Percy (London, 1887), I: 177–78; 182, 188–91. 8 J. W. Sherborne, “Perjury and the Lancastrian Revolution of 1399,” in War Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, ed. J. A. Tuck (London, 1994), p. 153. 9 Chrons. Rev., pp. 37–38. 10 Bennett, Richard II, pp. 150–51. 11 Saul, Richard II, pp. 408–09. 12 Bean, “Henry IV and the Percies,” p. 215. 13 Mark Arvanigian, “Henry IV, the Northern Nobility and the Consolidation of the Regime,” in Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, 1399–1406, ed. G. Dodd and D. L. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 121. 6

henry of lancaster

167

in 1399 or thereafter.14 The three adult and politically active members of the family in the autumn of 1399 all had differing interests and ambitions. Earl Henry, for example, seems to have possessed little interest in English affairs by the late 1390s if not before. In fact, since 1385 (i.e. the last fifteen years of the reign) the old earl had held the office of Warden, which he supposedly coveted, for only five years from 1 June 1391 to 2 June 1396.15 Most of Earl Henry’s energies in these years were taken up with an on-going quarrel with the Douglas’s over possession of Jedburgh and the Jed forest in Scotland.16 If the patriarch of the Percy family had little personal interest on the English side of the Northern Marches, it seems his son did. ‘Hotspur’s’ pattern of office holding, if nothing else, suggests this idea. Unlike his father the earl, ‘hotspur’ held the Wardenship of the East or West March for thirteen of the last fifteen years of the century.17 Divergent from his elder brother and nephew was Sir Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester. His political path to prominence was much different than that of his more well-landed family members and strongly suggests that blood is not always thicker than water. Sir Thomas possessed a long-standing and close relationship with John of Gaunt; first as one of his retainers,18 then as a member of the duke’s council,19 and finally as one of the executors of his will.20 Not only was Sir Thomas a Lancastrian, but a courtesan as well who caught the king’s eye and rose to become Steward of the Royal Household. Perhaps his elevation to the earldom of Worcester following the Second Appeal of Treason in 1397 owed more to his position at court and his relationship to Gaunt and the king rather than to his familial relations, and his journey to Ireland in 1399

14

R. L. Storey, “The North of England in the Fifteenth Century,” in Fifteenth Century England, eds. S. B. Chrimes, C. D. Ross, and R. A. Griffiths (Manchester, 1972), p. 134–36. 15 Robin Storey, “The Wardens of the Marches of England Towards Scotland, 1377–1389,” EHR 72 (1957), pp. 611–12. 16 Cynthia Neville, Violence, Custom and the Law (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 55–56. 17 Storey, “Wardens,” pp. 611–12. 18 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 277. Gaunt had retained Sir Thomas at least as early as 1387 and paid him a hefty annuity of £100. 19 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 108. 20 Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt, p. 404.

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with the king is highly suggestive of where his loyalties lay.21 Thus, the adherence of the Percies to Henry’s coalition in 1399 is in some ways surprising, and possibly even Richard II considered it so, because as with the Arundels, the houses of Lancaster and Percy could not be considered natural allies.22 In fact, by the summer of 1399 the antagonisms between the houses of Lancaster and Percy were long standing ones. The origins of this antipathy between the two great houses dated back all the way to 1381 when Percy refused to allow Gaunt to take refuge in his castles during the Peasants Revolt.23 Anthony Goodman suggests, that John of Gaunt spent much of his last lieutenancy of the Northern Marches in the closing months of 1398 working to heal this rift.24 While Goodman’s reading of events is possible, it seems unlikely. John of Gaunt was only on the March for six weeks that autumn and was in ill-health during that period.25 It seems difficult to accept, therefore, that Gaunt’s brief time on the March could have reversed the antipathy between himself and Percy so completely that Earl Henry threw the substantial political and military weight of the house of Percy behind Henry of Lancaster in so risky a venture as the one Gaunt’s son undertook in the summer of 1399. Part of the difficulty in discerning the Percy family’s motivations for joining Henry in 1399 rests on the fact that on the national political stage at least, the Earl of Northumberland, his brother, and his son, had always been moderates. In 1388, for example, Earl Henry along with Edmund of Langley, Duke of York, tried to hold the political center against the radical actions of the Appellants.26 Throughout the 1390s, as Nigel Saul suggests, Earl Henry had been influential at council and court but had always been a political moderate,27 and in 1397 during the events surrounding the Second Appeal 21 Storey, “The North,” p. 135. In 1403 when ‘hotspur’ wanted to accept Henry’s terms before Shrewsbury Percy sent his uncle, Earl Thomas, to negotiate with Henry. Worcester, however, who disliked the king, returned after his negotiations with a negative report and battle ensued. 22 For a description of the growth of Percy estates in the last three decades of the fourteenth century, see J. M. W. Bean, The Estates of the Percy Family (Oxford, 1957), pp. 7–11. 23 Knighton, pp. 142–48; Saul, Richard II, pp. 59, 79–80; Goodman, John of Gaunt, pp. 89–91. 24 Goodman, John of Gaunt, pp. 282–83. 25 Goodman, John of Gaunt, pp. 166, 354. 26 Knighton, pp. 406–08. 27 Saul, Richard II, pp. 208–9, 253.

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of Treason, the earl of Northumberland was noticeable by his absence from affairs. This moderate stance did have a down side. In the early 1390s the king began to distrust the earl and his son and pursued a conscious policy of depriving the Percy family of the wardenship of both Eastern and Western Marches toward Scotland. Although Earl Henry’s younger brother, Thomas, received an earldom from Richard II when the king rewarded his friends and supporters at the end of the Revenge Parliament, Earl Henry and ‘hotspur’ were given nothing. To make matters worse from a Percy perspective, the king’s policy of weakening their power on the Northern Marches continued in spite of Earl Thomas’s presence at court. Thus, it is possible that rather than the Percy family being frustrated with Richard II and his policies towards them in the late 1390s, it was especially ‘hotspur’ who felt these frustrations. Certainly, Richard II’s policy throughout this period of working to keep a monopoly on the governance of the marches out of the hands of the Percy family caused some antagonism between them and the Crown. A further point of confrontation between the Percy family and the king centered on Richard’s appointment of commissioners and conservators of the peace between Scotland and England. In 1398 Richard had appointed a committee of four of his favorites; Sir John Bushy, Sir Henry Green, William Ferriby—a king’s clerk, and Lawrence Dru, a king’s esquire,28 to see to the maintenance of the peace. None of these four had any previous experience in border affairs and, judging from subsequent events, had little appreciation for how their actions served as an affront to the Percy family. Richard continued to send diplomatic and administrative commissions to the marches in the last year of his reign, which demonstrats a conscious royal policy of keeping the Percy family on the margins of the border politics that they had dominated for the much of the previous three decades. In March 1399 the king sent two commissions to the march that both included Edward, Duke of Albemarle, already Warden of the West March;29 John Trevor, Bishop of St. Asaph; Sir John Bushy; Sir Henry Green; and Lawrence Dru.30 If

28

Rot. Scot., II: 143. For Albemarle’s appointment dated 28 November 1398, Rot. Scot., II: 151–52. 30 One commission was to treat with the Scots for maintaining the perpetual peace between the two kingdoms, and the other was to correct violations in the law. Both commissions were dated 22 March 1399, Rot. Scot., II: 149. 29

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some Ricardian supporters took a devil-may-care attitude toward the Percy family and their political frustrations, at least one prominent supporter of the king did not: Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle. For reasons not quite clear, Albemarle seems to have understood the problems of restricting the Percy family’s role in border politics and worked to convince his royal friend and cousin that such a policy was not one that would bear fruit. On 14 July 1398 Albemarle wrote to Richard II asking the king to allow a portion of the East March to be granted to Earl Henry, but the king refused.31 Further frustrating to the Percies was the problem of bad tallied that they received for their wardenships of the Marches.32 Percy frustrations, quarrels, and pre-1399 political associations notwithstanding, the event on which all Percy actions turned in 1399 was Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy’s presence at Bridlington. ‘Hotspur’s’ arrival there in late June and early July has never been explained or explored. Upon first glance it is especially problematic because Bridlington lies roughly 95 miles south of Alnwick and the East March, well outside ‘hotspur’s’ jurisdiction as Warden. It is possible that, as the author of the Traison et Mort claimed, ‘hotspur’ and his father the earl were among the lords that Henry had contacted by letter prior to his landing and that asked one of them to meet him at Bridlington. Modern historians as well argue that Henry “must certainly” have contacted the Percies,33 but such an explanation for ‘hotspur’s’ presence in North Yorkshire is unlikely. Henry could not have been exactly sure of his time of arrival in the north and it is difficult to believe that ‘hotspur’ would simply have loitered around North Yorkshire until Henry made landfall.

31 PRO C 47/22/1/10. This letter was calendared in Joseph Bain, Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, 6 vols. (Edinburgh, 1888), pp. 106–07. As Anthony Tuck demonstrates Albemarle’s letter was in imitation of Gaunt’s policy in the 1380s of allowing Earl Henry a portion of the Eastern March, in essence a Middle March, and a title to allow him to use his “natural weight” on the march for political and judicial good, Tuck, “Richard II and the Border Magnates,” p. 49. I am very grateful to Cynthia Neville and Mark Arvanigian for discussing the meaning and dating of this letter from Edward of York at great length and its effect on Percy motivations in 1399. Mark Arvanigian heartily disagrees with my interpretation on this point and argues for a later date for the letter (i.e. 1399). I look forward to his reply to my interpretation contained herein. 32 Steel, Receipt of the Exchequer, p. 81. 33 Michael Bennett argues that Henry “must certainly” have been in contact with Northumberland and other northern lords, Bennett, Richard II, pp. 151, 155.

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Further complicating this interpretation is the fact that if the Percies had foreknowledge of Henry’s intentions and if Earl Henry had decided to join Henry’s rebellion, then the younger Percy waiting for Henry of Lancaster at Seamer would most probably have brought with him some troops to immediately aid Henry. Such a gathering of Percy forces could be accomplished with some speed. Percy estates in the North and West Ridings of Yorkshire were of some substance,34 and an army would not have had to march from Northumberland through county Durham, where its presence would have aroused the episcopal suspicions of Bishop Skirlaw. ‘Hotspur’s’ arrival at Bridlington with troops would have been a calculated move that would have enhanced the standing of the Percy family in Henry’s political faction. Henry of Lancaster had few men with him immediately following his landing, and the adherence of a Percy with a substantial military force would have enhanced their importance in any movement he might lead. The fact that even pro-Percy chroniclers only mention Percy’s leading troops to Doncaster strongly suggests that ‘hotspur’ had only a few men with him at Seamer and further suggests the Percy family had no foreknowledge of events. It is also possible, though far less likely, that the duke of York ordered ‘hotspur’ off the March to intercept Henry. Although letters to the great magnates did not go out from London until 4 July, orders to sheriffs to raise troops went out from the capital on 28 June. It is possible that one of these 28 June letters ordered ‘hotspur’ off the March with sufficient forces to intercept Henry. If one assumes that letters to ‘hotspur’ left London on 28 June, they would probably have arrived in Alnwick about 3 or 4 July.35 If ‘hotspur’ answered the call immediately and took with him only a mounted force because infantry would have greatly retarded his progress, he could have covered the approximately 95 miles from Alnwick to Bridlington in three or four days of hard riding, arriving there on 7 or 8 July. Even if we allow for the movement of ‘hotspur’ and 34

Bean, Estates of the Percy Family, appendix I. This supposition is based on the time it took for news of the repulse of the Scots at Berwick in 1455 to reach London from Newcastle 276 miles away, before the postal system was instituted by Edward IV. News of the Scots defeat left Newcastle on 3 July 1455 and arrived in London on the evening of 9 July; seven days later. Alnwick is approximately 15 miles from Newcastle and this distance could probably be covered in seven days. The fact of the full moon on 23 June 1399 would have helped letters from York move even at night as the moon waned to its last quarter on 30 June, Armstrong, “Speed of News in England,” p. 455. 35

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his troops over this time and space (which is very unlikely), the problems with this explanation for ‘hotspur’s’ presence at Bridlington falls apart. By the time ‘hotspur’ would have arrived in Bridlington, Henry would already have taken Pickering and be well on his way to Knaresborough, which he reached on 9 July. Simply put, therefore, the twin enemies of time and space discount the supposition that the Custodian had ordered ‘hotspur’ to North Yorkshire. A less dramatic, though more plausible and probable reason for ‘hotspur’s’ presence at Bridlington involves the mundane realities of economics: ‘hotspur’s’ need to collect the cash payments due to him in his capacity as Constable of Berwick and Warden of the Eastern March toward Scotland. As early as 13 June the Exchequer can be found ear-marking funds for disbursal to ‘hotspur’ in his role as Warden. The money to be given to ‘hotspur’ came from the receipts due the Exchequer from customs duties on subsidies in the ports of Hull and Bath.36 Although these payments were earmarked as early as 13 June, the final allocations of cash were entered on the receipt roll on 30 June before they were, in turn, entered on the issue rolls.37 The issue rolls record a payment of £750 on 4 July to Thomas Reynald, one of ‘hotspur’s’ clerks.38 The reality of receiving money from the Exchequer, of course, did not involve ‘hotspur’s’ clerk journeying to London and withdrawing all £750 in silver pennies in one lump payment from the treasury. In fact, if indeed Reynald did receive any currency in July, he received only the £233 due to his master from the customs of the port London. Reynald received tallies for the remainder of the sum due him, and ‘hotspur’—or more accurately Reynald himself— armed with these tallies of account, would collect the actual silver pennies from the said customs officials in the northern ports. Because the Customers of Scarborough and Hull owed ‘hotspur’ a combined total of £162 13s 4d, the younger Percy had good reason to be at 36 On the chamberlain’s roll £300 was to come from duties from the port of Hull, £300 was to come from Bath and a further £128 from the port of Gyprewye, PRO E 401/615 m. 9, 13 June. 37 The treasurer’s receipt roll contained the final earmarking for the cash to be distributed to ‘hotspur.’ £233 6s 8d was to come from the customers of London, £140 from Hull, £140 13s 4d from Bath, £11 from Cumberland, £69 13s 4d from Scarborough, £22 from William, one time sheriff of Cumberland, and £133 6s 8d from Henry, Earl of Northumberland, one time sheriff of Northumberland, PRO E 401/614 m. 4, 30 June. 38 PRO E 403/562 m. 12, 4 July.

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his family manor of Seamer only about 12 miles from Bridlington. This explanation for ‘hotspur’s’ presence at Bridlington is further strengthened by the fact that the younger Percy had few, if any, troops with him to join Henry’s cause, and that ‘hotspur’ asked Henry to swear an oath to him at Bridlington that he (i.e., Henry) had come only to seek his rightful inheritance. This combination of factors suggest that Henry’s actions caught the younger Percy unawares and that Henry was also surprised by ‘hotspur’s’ presence at Bridlington. ‘Hotspur’ arrived at Bridlington probably on 29 or 30 June, and Henry would have delivered the oath to him on one of these two days. Henry of Lancaster’s presence, combined with that of the exArchbishop of Canterbury and his nephew the young Earl Thomas, no doubt convinced ‘hotspur’ that a major political upheaval was about to take place, and that the Percy family needed to be a part of whatever occurred. From his meeting with Henry, the younger Percy would have known that Lancastrian estates throughout the North had risen, and also that the major pro-Lancastrian northern barons such as Roos of Helmsley and Willoughby would join Henry. By far the most disconcerting aspect of Henry’s return in ‘hotspur’s’ mind at Bridlington/Seamer was the knowledge that Henry’s brother-in-law, Ralph Neville, Earl of Westmorland would lend total aid and support to anything that Henry attempted in the succeeding weeks and months. Since his creation as earl in 1397, Neville had been set up by the Crown as a rival to the Percies on the Northern Marches.39 If, ‘hotspur’ knew, or at the very least could surmise, Neville would play a key role in whatever occurred in the summer of 1399 and the Percy family did not partake in Henry’s efforts then Neville and not Percy could emerge as the leading family in the North. Possibly also in Percy’s thoughts was that he knew Henry on a personal level, though Percy was ten years senior to Henry of Lancaster. As younger men, the two had been in the company of English knights who had jousted in the great tournament at St. Inglevert in 1390. Given their personal history perhaps ‘hotspur’ saw in Henry what others did in 1399: a pliant, affable, political non-entity who 39

Charles Young, The Making of the Neville Family in England, 1166–1400 (Woodbridge, 1996), p. 137. Anthony Tuck makes a similar case for Richard II setting up the Nevilles as a direct block to Percy interests in the north, “The Emergence of a Northern Nobility, 1250–1400,” Northern History 22 (1986), pp. 1–17.

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had been unwittingly thrust into a position of political importance, someone who could be easily manipulated. Even if the Percy family joined forces with Henry in July 1399, the young Percy probably believed his family had several aces up their sleeve should Richard II emerge triumphant from political conflict with Henry in the succeeding months. The first ace, as we have seen, was their family reputation as moderates within the political community. From the perspective of later events, this point has more to commend it than is apparent at first. When Henry chose to send an emissary to Richard in his fortress of Conway in August 1399, he chose Henry, Earl of Northumberland. The fact that Richard II trusted Earl Henry and his protestations against any attempts to attack or harm his royal person speaks in favor of the Percies thinking they could act as a moderating force. The second ace up the Percies sleeve was the fact that Earl Henry’s younger brother, Thomas, Earl of Worcester, was Steward of the Royal Household and, as such, a close friend of the king. The last ace the Percy’s held was the oath that ‘hotspur’ made Henry swear at Bridlington, that he had returned only to seek what was rightfully his and not to remove Richard II from the throne. Securing this oath would allow the Percies to play the card of deniability (as they tried to do in 1403) if Henry’s desire to seek only his inheritance blossomed into something more radical. Possibly with these thoughts in mind, ‘hotspur’ headed north to Alnwick and the Eastern March following the oath that Henry swore to him at Bridlington in the last days of June. ‘Hotspur’s’ route of March is difficult to ascertain with any certainly. If he chose an overland route he might have taken the old Roman road out of Bridlington to Dere Street and headed north to Alnwick. If one assumes a rate of travel of 30 miles per day, somewhat less than a messenger but still of a man moving with speed and purpose, then ‘hotspur’ would have reached Alnwick about 95 miles from Bridlington in about three days, 3 or 4 July.40 It is also possible that to save time he took ship from Bridlington and arrived in Alnwick within a day or two, by 1 or 2 July, there meeting with his father who had, 40 It is probable that if ‘hotspur’ took an overland route that he could not have traveled at night. The moon waned to its last quarter on 30 June with the dark of the moon being 7 July. Thus, if he traveled overland his journey would probably have ended for the day about 10:30 pm, about one hour after sunset, http://sunearth.gsfc.nasa.gov/eclipse/phase/phases.-1399—1300.html.

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quite probably, been acting as his son’s deputy Warden while ‘hotspur’ was absence in the south collecting his payments. Having arrived at Alnwick, ‘hotspur’ would have sought a quick meeting with his father the earl. More than likely, Earl Henry would have known of the rising of the great Lancastrian fortress of Dunstanburgh and the lordship of Embleton in support of Henry in late June.41 In these first days of July, therefore, decisions were made that affected the fortunes of the Percy family for decades to come. It may have taken several days for father and son to come to the decision to gather forces and join Henry of Lancaster, but in the end the decision was made, forces were gathered and set in motion southwards towards Doncaster. The size of the forces at Northumberland’s and ‘hotspur’s’ disposal is another of the issues of 1399 that merits some in-depth discussion because the men they commanded have traditionally been interpreted as representing a large proportion of the men under Henry of Lancaster’s command based solely on the amount of payment to the Percies from the Lancastrian Exchequer—some 3,000 marks. Nevertheless, a more realistic appraisal of the numbers of men that Earl Henry and ‘hotspur’ brought with them may be achieved. Henry of Lancaster’s presence at Bridlington caught the Percies unaware and thus neither the earl of Northumberland nor his son had the time to raise large forces from their estates. As we have seen with both Richard II in Ireland and Edmund of Langley in southern England, raising forces of any size took time which the Percies did not have. In wartime, the Wardens of the Northern Marches had access to standing bodies of men. For example, in 1384 when Earl Henry served as Warden of the Eastern March he maintained a body of 120 men-at-arms and 200 archers, while the constables of Roxburgh and Berwick each held retinues of 20 men-at-arms and 50 archers.42 But, when peace came to the Northern Marches in 1386, the significance of the office of Warden shifted to a more profit-making role for the office holder rather than a military command. Throughout the 1390s the crown allotted £3,000 per annum for the keeping of Berwick and the Eastern March, and £1,500 for the keeping of Carlisle and the Western March. With the coming 41 Swynhowe held the castle there with 20 men-at-arms and 12 archers and drew £29 8s for their wages, PRO DL 29/728/11987 m. 5. 42 PRO E 403/478 mm. 25, 26.

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of peace the wardens were no longer required to maintain large bodies of troops, “only such forces as they thought necessary,” and usually these contingents of men were small, and made up of their retainers;43 such was probably the case in the summer of 1399. The actual payments made from the Exchequer of the Duchy of Lancaster to both Earl Henry and ‘hotspur’ strongly suggest that the forces under their command were not particularly large. Earl Henry drew a payment of £1,333 for his contingent, which represents a substantial sum. However, this payment covered wages for troops over a period of roughly six months from early July to mid-December when the Deposition Parliament adjourned. If we take the known size of Earl Henry’s 1384 wartime contingent as Warden of the East March and project rates of pay out for six months at normal levels,44 we can make some surmise about the size of Northumberland’s contingent. Wages for a force of 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers over six months yields a total cost of £1,350.45 If we assume the same ratio of men-at-arms to archers for ‘hotspur’s’ contingent, for which he received a payment of £666, or 1,000 Marks, then we have a force of 50 men-at-arms and 100 archers.46 Forces of this size, if they were not already standing, could be raised in relatively short order—especially if they were largely drawn from Percy’s own retainers that were thick on the ground in Northumberland and North Yorkshire.47 While it is possible that the Percies took more troops than these to aid Henry, and that Henry expected the Percies to pay troops from the money they had received from Richard II in their role of Warden of the East March, it seems unlikely.48 Henry of Lancaster’s actions in 1399, especially towards the Percies, betray no intention 43

Storey, “Wardens,” pp. 602–03. Normal rates of pay were, 6d per day for archers and 12d per day for menat-arms. 45 £900 for the men-at-arms at 12d per day and £450 for the archers at 3d per day. 46 £450 for men-at-arms at 12d per day and £225 for archers at 3d per day. 47 This Percy dominance of North Yorkshire was about to be challenged by the increased power of the Neville family backed by royal good lordship within the riding, but in 1399 the Percy power within the riding was substantial, Simon Walker, “The Yorkshire Risings of 1405: Texts and Contexts,” in Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, ed. G. Dodd and D. L. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 181–82. 48 I am grateful to Mark Arvanigian for arguing this point with me at length. His interpretation of events is different than mine and I look forward to reading his interpretation of events. 44

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on Henry’s part of expecting the earl or his son to pay for anything out of their own pocket. The long list of annuitants drawn from both the Exchequer and the duchy of Lancaster in the first weeks of the new reign strongly suggest, as McFarlane postulated,49 that Henry had little appreciation for economy.50 Henry had never given in to economy as a young man and seems to have believed that he possessed an endless amount of money. If one assumes that father and son had made their decision to join Henry as early as 4 or 5 July and gathered their already standing forces together with additional retainers, they could have begun their march south as early as 8 July. At a rather average rate of march of 12 miles a day they would have reached Doncaster by 15 July—the date given by several chroniclers as the date on which Henry gave his famous oath. It is possible that Henry and ‘hotspur’ were on friendly terms, but it is more likely that Henry was wary of the Percies. Nevertheless, Henry found himself compelled to lavish a substantial amount of good lordship on them in the succeeding weeks in order to secure their loyalty. In return for their involvement, the Percy family proved very useful to Henry in 1399—especially when it came to providing a believable voice to lure the king out of his Welsh hiding places in August. While the Percy family worked out the logistics of their involvement in the coming crisis of 1399, Henry needed to move forward quickly to the Lancastrian estates that had risen in his name. His first move forward from Bridlington was probably on 1 July to his father’s castle at Pickering, a substantial motte and bailey castle that dominated the road between Scarborough and Helmsley.51 The Kirkstall chronicler reported that it took Henry three days to reach Pickering,52 and such timing seems likely since Pickering lies roughly 35 miles from Bridlington. At the rate of about 11 miles per day, Henry would have covered that ground by 4 July. 49

McFarlane, “Lancastrian Kings,” VIII: 362. PRO E 163.6/35. Although this Exchequer document is listed in the index as “tempus Henry IV,” it is clearly from the first weeks before the deposition. For example, Thomas Walton was given the office of Parker of Windsor on the roll and a patent confirming that grant was made on 6 October 1399 (CPR, 1399–1401, p. 13) which demonstrates that the grant on the E 163 predates the deposition. For a long list of annuitants on the duchy side, see DL 28/4/1. 51 Colvin, King’s Works, II: 779–81. 52 Chrons. Rev., p. 133. 50

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In the summer of 1399, the castle and honor of Pickering lay in the keeping of William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire.53 But, it appears that Pickering’s new lord did little to change the administration of the honor; Gaunt’s steward there, Sir David Roucliffe, opened the castle gates to Henry on his arrival.54 It is possible that Lord Roos, who received £200 for soldiers’ wages and whose seat at Helmsley lay only ten miles from Pickering, joined Henry at Pickering on or about this date. The Kirkstall chronicler claimed that Henry spent the next two days at Pickering before moving on to Knaresborough, another Lancastrian estate high above the Nidd river, about 45 miles from Pickering, in the hands of William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire,55 on 6 July.56 Because Henry seems to have been unsure of the stance of the city of York and Archbishop Scrope, he probably took a more northern route to Knaresborough skirting the southern edge of the North Yorkshire Moors. This route took Henry and his band of revolutionaries through Helmesley, the seat of William, Lord Roos. Taking this northern route, Henry could have stayed the night of 8 July at Byland Abbey, half way between Pickering and Knaresborough. This chronology places Henry’s forces in the Nidd valley on 9 July and it fits with one of the only pieces of documentary evidence that suggests where Henry actually was in the early days of his rebellion. On 9 July Henry issued a letter patent under the great seal of the duchy that appointed Sir Peter Buckton as steward, constable and master forester of the honor of Knaresborough.57 This suggests,

53 Scrope received the keeping of Pickering Castle from Richard II on 20 March 1399, CFR, 1391–1399, p. 295. 54 The Krikstall chronicle claimed that the sub-custodian at Pickering opened the gates for Henry, which would have been Roucliffe, Chrons. Rev., p. 133. For Roucliffe’s appointment as steward of Pickering, PRO DL 42/15 f. 23 v; Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 378. His adherence to Henry’s cause in July may be evidenced from the fact that Henry granted Roucliffe the stewardship along with the offices of porter and riding forester of Pickering on 1 November 1399. For Roucliffe’s parliamentary career, HoC, IV: 236–37. 55 Scrope had been given the constableship and custody of the castle and manor of Knaresborough by the king on 2 April 1399, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 502. 56 Chrons. Rev., p. 133. 57 PRO DL 42/15 f. see next sentence. The foliation of this document makes it difficult to reconcile the different numbers on the membrane that this rather significant grant is found. A contemporary hand has the membrane Buckton’s grant is entered on as number 94 in Roman numerals in the uppermost left hand corner, while there is a later hand claiming this membrane to be number 103 in Arabic numerals also in the upper left. The number 100 is also stamped on this same membrane in the upper left hand corner (probably a late nineteenth or early twentieth century

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at least, that Henry was at Knaresborough on 9 July and found it necessary to remove the previous occupant of those offices who had been appointed by William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, sometime around in late March.58 It also helps to confirm our chronology since the 45 miles from Pickering to Knaresborough could be covered in three days at 15 miles per day. The appointment of a steward also lends credence to the Kirkstall Chronicler’s account that the surrender of Knaresborough was not so easy.59 At Knaresborough Henry’s rebellion took a more radical turn. To this point in his campaign, Henry had not publicly announced his intentions, and his only private oath recorded was that to ‘hotspur’ at Bridlington. But, Henry, at Knaresborough, began to make public promises to the members of the political community. No doubt these proclamations were made to help win support, for Henry promised not only to restore good governance to the kingdom, but to abolish all taxation.60 This bold move suggests that Henry, believing more in his security, had begun to attract a wider following among the political community in North Yorkshire. Henry next moved to his great northern fortress of Pontefract, which lay in the hands of the loyal Sir Hugh Waterton, who had marshaled forces in Henry’s defense before his arrival at Bridlington. Pontefract was not only the most substantial Lancastrian stronghold in the north;61 it had been one of Gaunt’s most profitable estates. Pontefract’s proximity to the old Roman road known as Dere Street, meant that Henry could easily send and receive communication, and that his supporters coming from the north could easily reach him. Yet, instead of waiting for these more local men from his Yorkshire estates to gather to him at his great fortress of Pontefract, Henry addition by the staff at the PRO), but at the bottom of the membrane the number 101 is written in pencil. It was not unusual for the steward to occupy all three of these offices within the honor of Knaresborough at the same time, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 523–26. Yet, Sir Robert Somverville is seemingly in error when he claims that Buckton succeeded Sir John Marmyon (p. 523) as steward since Marmyon was long dead by 24 April 1399, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 548. 58 It is unknown who Wiltshire’s constable was, but it is certain that he replaced Gaunt’s last constable, Thomas Chaucer by 20 March 1399 when Chaucer received a 20 mark annuity from the king in recompense for the loss of his constableship, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 494. See also, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 287. 59 Chrons. Rev., p. 133. 60 Thomas Gascoigne, Loci e Libro Veritatum, ed J. E. Thorhold-Rogers (Oxford, 1881), p. 230. For McFarlane’s comment on this promise, see LK&LK, pp. 48–49. 61 Colvin, King’s Works, II: 781–83.

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chose to move southward after waiting at the fortress for only a few days. Rather than move to another of his own estates, Henry moved forward to Doncaster. The castle and honor of Doncaster were part of the significant patrimony in southern and central Yorkshire that belonged to his uncle Edmund, Duke of York. The great manors of Thorne, Doncaster, Conisborough, and Wakefield had been given to young Edmund of Langley by his father on the death of the last Warrene Earl of Surrey in the 1340s. Since the duke of York’s allegiance had yet to be proved, these contiguous estates and their great castles that dominated the communications network of central and western Yorkshire had the potential for being a major impediment to Henry’s advance southwards out of North Yorkshire.62 Although no direct evidence of collusion between Henry and his uncle exists, several factors suggest such collusion might have indeed taken place. As Charles Ross and T. B. Pugh demonstrate, Edmund of Langley dominated the politics of western and southern Yorkshire, in fact, his position in South Yorkshire was only rivaled by the duchy of Lancaster. It is clear that none of these Yorkist estates, and no members of the Yorkist affinity, put up even token resistance to Henry.63 In fact, Henry traversed Edmund of Langley’s estates at will in these weeks of early and mid-July, and the castle of Doncaster, in the third week of July, served as Henry’s base of operations. There he not only gathered the forces of the Earls of Westmorland and Northumberland to him, he quite probably drew supplies from his uncle’s lands as well as transport and horses for his army. Doncaster served as the base from which Henry collected the bulk of his northern forces before moving south. Given the nature of the surviving source material, it may never be known when each of the northern lords joined Henry, but it does seem reasonable to conclude that the men who drew payments from the Pontefract, Knaresborough and Pickering receivers were with Henry by the time Henry reached Doncaster, on or about 15 July. Michael Bennett has noted the difficulties in trying to discern why the most important of 62 Douglas Biggs, “’A Wrong Whom Conscience and Kindred Bid Me to Right:’ Edmund of Langley, Duke of York, and the Usurpation of Henry IV,” Albion 26 (1994), p. 259. 63 C. D. Ross, “The Yorkshire Baronage” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford, 1950), p. 411, citing Pugh, “Dukes of York” (Unpublished B. Litt Dissertation, Oxford, 1948), p. 140. See also Punshon, “West Riding,” pp. 32, 72.

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the northern nobility joined Henry in the summer of 1399,64 but for a number of northern barons, the reasons for adherence to the Lancastrian cause, are relatively clear. The Neville family had been in John of Gaunt’s service for nearly five decades by July 1399. Earl Ralph’s father, John Neville, Lord of Raby, had entered Gaunt’s service as early as 1366, when the duke provided him with a substantial 100-mark annuity.65 Lord Ralph grew up in Lancastrian service,66 stood by Gaunt in the parliament of 1397 and received a 500-mark annuity from the duke of Lancaster in addition to an earldom from the king.67 In addition, Earl Ralph was married to Henry’s eldest half-sister and had taken the radical step of disinheriting his children from his first marriage to Elizabeth Stafford in favor of his second family born to him by Joan of Lancaster.68 In addition to these familial contacts, Earl Ralph had married some of his children from his first marriage to Lancastrian retainers. For Example, Westmorland’s eldest daughter, Matilda, married Peter, Lord Mauley, while the earl’s third daughter, Alice, married Sir Thomas Gray of Heton, and Westmorland’s fourth daughter, Anne, married Sir Gilbert Umfraville of Kyme. Neville could also be counted among the kinsmen of Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, since Earl Henry had married Margaret, the daughter of Ralph, Lord Neville of Raby who died in 1367. Thus, Henry, Earl of Northumberland, was Ralph, Earl of Westmorland’s, uncle. In much the same way that John of Gaunt and Edmund of Langley shared retainers and household officers because of their familial connections and geographical proximity of their estates, so too did Gaunt and Neville. In North Yorkshire so many gentlemen wore livery of both Neville and Gaunt that it was difficult to tell where the Neville affinity began and where the Lancastrian affinity ended. The realities of this local political and social alliance are brought into sharper focus by the fact that many of Neville’s estates lay within the old earldom of Richmond that Gaunt had acquired in 1362. A change in the overlordship of the earldom and honor of Richmond, which came so suddenly on Henry of Lancaster’s disenfranchisement in March 1399, threatened to disrupt the political status quo in the region 64 65 66 67 68

Bennett, Richard II, p. 151. Reg. II, p. 7. Young, Neville Family, pp. 130–38. CPR 1396–1399, p. 548; PRO DL 29/73812096 m. 4. Young, Neville Family, p. 139.

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and also to disrupt the Neville affinity and the very base of its power. As Earl Ralph went so went members of his family. For example, Thomas Neville, Lord Furnival, was Earl Ralph’s younger brother. When the call from Henry came, Lord Furnival also rode for Doncaster. For Earl Ralph, like Edmund of Langley, joining his kinsman Henry of Lancaster, at least in his quest to gain his rightful lands, must have seemed the right thing to do. Likewise, for William Roos of Helmsley, who probably joined Henry at Pickering on or about 8 July, held similar strong Lancastrian ties.69 Connections between the houses of Roos and Lancaster dated back nearly three decades by the summer of 1399. Lord William’s father, Thomas, had been retained by Gaunt in 1370,70 and had served on campaign with Gaunt in Castile during the 1370s.71 Lord Thomas had established a particularly close relationship with Lord John Neville of Raby,72 and Lord William had gone abroad in John of Gaunt’s service on no less than five occasions.73 Lord Roos also had close connections with Henry, Earl of Northumberland; in fact, they were kinsmen: Percy was Lord William’s uncle.74 Another northern baron with deep Lancastrian connections who joined Henry at Doncaster was William, Lord Willoughby. Lord Willoughby also enjoyed long term relationships with the Nevilles and John of Gaunt. Willoughby also had good reason to hold a grudge against Richard II. In spite of being heir presumptive to the substantial landed wealth of the Ufford Earls of Suffolk, the Willoughby family had been denied these estates in favor of the king’s close friend, Michael de la Pole. Ralph, Lord Greystoke, who joined Henry at Doncaster was similarly disaffected with the king and his government. His associations with Gaunt dated back over two decades, but his issues with Richard II were the relatively recent result the king’s demands for money for his Irish expedition, which Greystoke steadfastly refused to finance.75 69 For what follows in this paragraph see Mark Arvanigian, “The ‘Lancastrianization’ of the North in the Reign of Henry IV,” in Reputation and Representation in Fifteenth Century Europe, ed. D. L. Biggs, S. D. Michalove and A. C. Reeves (Leiden, 2004), pp. 22–23. 70 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 105. 71 Goodman, John of Gaunt, p. 213. 72 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 51, 62, 90, 105; Goodman, John of Gaunt, pp. 288–89. 73 Arvanigian, “Lancastrianization of the North,” p. 22. 74 Roos’s father, Lord John, had married Earl Henry’s youngest sister, Mary. 75 Tuck, Richard II and the Nobility, p. 196.

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In addition to these great men of the North who joined Henry in the days and weeks after his advent, lesser men who had Lancastrian connections also joined the cause. One of these was John of Gaunt’s trusted clerk Thomas Langley. Langley had been in Gaunt’s service for well over a decade by the duke’s death in February 1399 and was close enough to Gaunt to be an executor of his will. Even though Thomas Langley is not mentioned by name as one of Henry’s companions during his 1399 campaign, as Robin Storey suggests, it “may be safely presumed” that Langley was with Henry almost from the beginning.76 Not all of the northern magnates, barons, and gentlemen, however, joined Henry in the early days of his rebellion. One of the most significant political, economic, and potentially military, organizations not to rally behind him was the civic corporation of York. Richard II had visited the city often in the 1390s and had lavished much good lordship on York, including a royal charter that gave the city a number of privileges, including county status.77 It seems that Richard’s relationship with the city had deteriorated in the last years of the century because of forced loans, but in spite of this the city does not appear to have been ready to throw in their lot with Henry in early or mid-July.78 Instead, the civic corporation heeded orders from the duke of York ordering the sheriffs of the city to put York in a state of defense.79 Not only did the sheriffs spend £4 12s 10d to repair defenses there,80 they kept William Singleton, one of John of Gaunt’s esquires, whom Richard had ordered arrested in April, in the gaol there throughout the summer.81 Along with the civic corporation of York, the Archbishop of the Northern Province also remained aloof from events of July and August. As we have seen, the duke of York sent letters to Archbishop Scrope on 4 July,82 and it may be that Henry contacted Scrope directly,83

76 R. L. Storey, Thomas Langley and the Bishopric of Durham, 1406–37 (London, 1961), p. 8. 77 CChR, 1341–1417, pp. 358–80. 78 Nigel Saul, “Richard II and the City of York,” in The Government of Medieval York, ed. Sarah Rees Jones, Borthwick Studies in History, 3 (York, 1997), pp. 12–13. 79 CCR, 1396–1399, p. 518. 80 PRO E 364/33 m. 1. 81 For his being retained by Gaunt, see Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 281. For the letter close ordering Singleton’s arrest on 21 April 1399, CCR, 1396–1399, p. 476. 82 PRO E 403/562 m. 13, 4 July; E 403/563 m. 9, 4 July. 83 Bennett, Richard II, p. 155.

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although there is no direct evidence of this.84 By the date of Henry’s advent in late June, the Archbishop’s register records that he was at his manor of Cawood, south of York, living the semi-sedentary lifestyle that he favored.85 Perhaps the duke of York’s letter, which probably arrived at Cawood on or about 7 July, prompted the Archbishop to move to his palace within the cathedral close in York, where he could be found witnessing letters on 11 July.86 Whether the Archbishop moved within the city walls to help defend the city against Henry is impossible to tell, but it can be said that once Henry had left the Vale of York, Archbishop Richard moved from the city to his manor at Rest, where he was authenticating appointments by 26 July.87 Eventually both civic corporation and Archbishop decided to join the Lancastrian coalition but only after the success of Henry’s cause became more evident. The City of York sent ambassadors to Henry offering him a loan of 500 marks, “in his necessity, before he undertook the governance of the realm.”88 The Archbishop made his way to Westminster after he had received his summons to Parliament in August.89 The reasons for Archbishop Scrope’s failure to either resist or openly aid Henry in July 1399 remain an enigma, but his decision may have resulted from his close friendship with Archbishop Arundel. In any event, the fact that Scrope did nothing to hinder Henry’s advance was only an aid to the duke.

84

Michael Bennett’s claim that Henry contacted Scrope directly because Henry’s promise to abolish taxation at Knaresborough was later recalled by the Archbishop of York during his rebellion in 1405 seems rather thin, Bennett, Richard II, p. 230 n. 139. 85 Scrope was at Cawood at least as late as 3 July, R. N. Swanson, A Calendar of the Register of Richard Scrope, Archbishop of York, 1398–1405, part 1, Borthwick Texts and Calendars, Records of the Northern Province, 8 (York, 1981), p. 74. For Swanson’s commentary on the Archbishop’s sedentary lifestyle see p. v. 86 R. N. Swanson, A Calendar of the Register of Richard Scrope, Archbishop of York, 1398–1405, part 2, Borthwick Texts and Calendars, Records of the Northern Province, 11 (York, 1985), p. 7. 87 Swanson, Scrope’s Register, 8: 19. 88 HoC, I: 745. 89 Scrope was still at his manor of Rest as late as 24 August (Swanson, Scrope’s Register, 8: 101) and in London as late as 25 September 1399 awaiting the beginning of parliament (Swanson, Scrope’s Register, 8: 2). However, Archbishop Richard returned to the north well before parliament had adjourned. His last recorded date in London was 10 November (Swanson, Scrope’s Register, 8: 49), and he was back in his diocese at the manor of Newstead on 17 November (Swanson, Scrope’s Register, 8: 20) and at Bishopthorpe on 23 November (Swanson, Scrope’s Register, 8: 2).

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Another significant group of northerners absent from Henry’s growing host in early and mid-July were the great men of the Palatinate of Durham, such as Ralph Eure and Gerard Heron, the younger brother of William, Lord Say.90 Perhaps these men remained on the political sidelines because of their own inclinations or because of pressure from their lord, Walter Skirlaw, Bishop of Durham. Following Richard’s deposition, however, both Eure and Heron found lucrative careers in the service of King Henry IV.91 Along with the men from Durham, the retainers and affinity members of Thomas Mowbray, the exiled and disenfranchised Duke of Norfolk, also waited on events in the summer of 1399. In midsummer of that year Duke Thomas was on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Like Henry’s retainers, Mowbray’s men had been active at the Exchequer before Richard’s departure for Ireland since the king was good to his word of providing both exiled dukes their promised annuities. On 24 June, for example, the Exchequer paid out 1000 marks to Duke Thomas.92 In spite of the fact that Henry’s initial moves were close to the Mowbray estate of Thirsk, the Mowbray affinity, like the men from Durham, remained neutral. No Mowbray retainers were paid as captains of companies on either side in 1399. Most likely they were awaiting their lord’s return before committing themselves to either side in the political fray, especially since neither the king nor Henry was held in particular regard by Duke Thomas. In any event these Norfolk retainers did not have to wait long for their non-role in events to be determined for them. Duke Thomas died of the plague in Venice on his way home in September leaving a minor as heir. It is also clear that not all members of the Lancastrian affinity were ready to dessert their king for Henry’s cause. In regions of the country where the Lancastrian affinity was not strong, like Norfolk, most of the gentry remained aloof from either side.93 But in at least one case, that of John Kellowe forester of Shipley within the lordship of Dunstanburgh, inaction in Henry’s cause in the summer of 1399 led to repercussions following Henry’s coronation: Henry removed 90 Mark Arvanigian, “Landed Society and the Governance of the North in the Later Middle Ages: The Case of Sir Ralph Eure,” Medieval Prsopography 22 (2001), pp. 78–79. 91 Arvanigian, “Ralph Eure,” pp. 79–86. 92 PRO E 403/562 m. 12, 24 June. 93 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 177–79, 182–209.

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him from office and ceased payment on his annuity, thus effectively severing Kellowe’s position within the Lancastrian affinity.94 By the time Henry reached Pontefract, he had gathered a number of followers to his banner. As Henry consolidated his military position with the northern estates of his late father and uncle, he also consolidated his position through further use of propaganda. John Hardyng, an esquire of Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy who served with his lord and Henry in 1399,95 related that on his way south after collecting a large force of men, Henry, swore to us an oath at Doncaster [in central Yorkshire] upon the holy gospels, which [he] personally held and kissed, concerning the kingdom and the status of the king, excepting only [his] own inheritance and that of [his] wife in England; and that our lord King Richard would remain king for the term of his life, under the direction, and by the good advice, of the lords spiritual and temporal.96

Much like the letters that Henry sent to lords and bishops to which the author of the Traison refers, the “Oath of Doncaster” does not survive in a contemporary copy, but rather as a piece of propaganda from the house of Percy who used the “Oath” as one of the pretexts for their rebellion in 1403.97 Despite the clearly anti-Lancastrian nature of this source, historical opinion agrees that Henry did offer something resembling the “Oath of Doncaster” within the first weeks after his landing. The “Oath of Doncaster” displays a subtle shift in Henry’s propaganda efforts. The first poems foretelling his coming represent Henry

94

PRO DL 42/15 f. 127; Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 165. The actual form of the “Oath” as Hardying related it is as follows: i. He [Henry] sought only the inheritance of his father, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, his mother, Blance of Lancaster, and what had come to him through his marriage to Mary Bohun. ii. Richard would be brought under control “by good and whole provision.” iii. The king’s royal estate and household would be reformed by the appointment of officers of good disposition. iv. All Cheshiremen should be removed from Richard’s household. v. In future taxation would be levied by the assent of magnates and the estates in parliament, and only if they judged it necessary. John Hardyng, Chronicle, pp. 349–353. 96 Chrons. Rev., p. 196. 97 For an analysis of the Percy family’s behavior in the first years of Henry’s reign, see J. M. W. Bean, “Henry IV and the Percies,” History, 64 (1959), pp. 212–227; J. W. Sherbourne, “Perjury and the Lancastrian Revolution of 1399,” in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England (London, 1994), pp. 131–154. 95

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returning alone and restoring good governance, while the “Oath of Doncaster” put before the political community a plan for lords spiritual and temporal to “direct” and council Richard II. The “Oath of Doncaster,” is the first occasion on which Henry made public his views on the Lancastrian inheritance, and the first time that Richard II is mentioned by name in any Lancastrian propaganda. This propagandistic shift was most likely stems the result of several factors. First, the adherence of Northumberland and Westmorland to the Lancastrian cause meant Henry needed to take their wishes into account and placate their fears.98 Second, the oath is very specific in describing both Henry’s goals and the limits of his ambitions to the political community. Perhaps the most important factor in this change in propaganda was Henry’s early political successes, which engendered both confidence and boldness. Not only could he count two of the post important northern earls as adherents to his cause, a great press of men from his father’s estates joined him, and he traversed his uncle’s northern estates without incident.99 This combination of forces gave all facets of the Lancastrian cause increasing weight and credence as the summer of 1399 faded into autumn. The size of the force under Henry’s command at Doncaster was large enough to bolster Henry’s confidence in his success and was largely made up of Lancastrians. The nature of the sources do not stipulate where each captain of each company came from, but, if the honors from which these captains drew paid gives an indication of where the company originated, more may be said. Of the fortyeight men known to have received payments for military service by Henry from July to December 1399 twelve of them were either well known northern men, or drew their payments from the hands of Lancastrian receivers in North Yorkshire and thus, were probably at Doncaster with their contingents by 15 July. As we have seen some of the larger contingents were led by Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, and his son, along with Ralph, Earl of Westmorland, William Willoughby, and William Roos, but many Lancastrian retainers brought smaller contingents. Richard Gascoigne, a man of law who had served as one of Henry’s attorneys since the

98

Sherbourne, “Perjury and the Lancastrian Revolution,” pp. 221–22. For a discussion of Henry’s movements see my article, “Edmund of Langley and the Usurpation of Henry IV,” pp. 253–72. 99

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early 1390s, lived in Hunslet about ten miles from Knaresborough, and received £13 for wages at the hands of the receiver there.100 Sir Roger Swillington, the son of Sir Robert Swillington from Swillington in Yorkshire,101 received £66 from the receiver of Pontefract. Sir Gerard Usfleet, a knight retained by Gaunt in 1370, drew £40 in wages for his company from the receiver of Pontefract.102 Thomas Clavell, esquire, received £26 for wages for his company from Pontefract. Sir Robert Neville drew £20 for wages from the receiver of Pontefract; he had been a member of Gaunt’s retinue since the 1360s, and a former constable of Pontefract,103 had been given the part of the manor of Barnoldswick in eastern Lancashire about 25 miles west of Pontefract.104 Robert Rokeley had been Gaunt’s steward of Knaresborough,105 while William Kettering, who received £10 from the receiver of Pontefract for wages for his company, had been retained by the duke as one of his esquires in the 1380s,106 and had served Gaunt first as his receiver in Yorkshire and then, from 1398, as his receiver at Pontefract. Kettering had also been an executor of the duke’s will.107 Chris Given-Wilson has noted the slowness with which Henry proceeded in these early weeks,108 but it seems such a measured pace was exactly what Henry needed. Once he had reached Doncaster and traversed his uncle’s estates without opposition, Henry probably realized he had little to fear from the army Duke Edmund was busy collecting in the south, which also included his half-brother, John Beaufort. With so many Lancastrian estates under arms and in support of his cause throughout the country, Henry had the confidence to

100

Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 418. Sir Robert Swillington had been one of Gaunt’s most important retainers. He had served the duke as Chamberlain of his household in the 1370s and 1380s and died in 1391, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 363, 379; Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 282, 285. 102 For his indenture with Gaunt, DL 42/15 f. 53. Simon Walker printed this indenture, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 395–96. In 1418 a Gerard Useflete was serving as steward of the Bolingbroke honor and had married Elizabeth dowager duchess of Norfolk, but this was probably Sir Gerard’s son, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 576. He was from Yorkshire, CPR, 1399–1401, p. 209. 103 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 289. 104 DL 42/15 f. 103, 106v; Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 172 n. 5. 105 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 372. 106 Reg., II: 968. 107 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 378, 383. 108 Chrons. Rev., pp. 33–34. 101

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move forward at a pace that he chose, not one that was dictated to him. In addition, his propaganda efforts went well, and many men flocked to his banner from all quarters of the political community. Henry left Doncaster and headed south for his fortress at Leicester, about fifty miles away, which he reached on or about 20 July. On the main road south lay the city and castle of Nottingham, which the duke of York had ordered to resist Henry on 7 July. The gaol there also housed Thomas Foljambe and his associate John Calale, who had been arrested by order of the king himself on 6 April.109 The defenses at Nottingham were strong in the late 1390s,110 and the king had been there as recently as August 1397.111 Nottingham apparently offered no resistance to Henry July 1399, and the fact that Thomas Foljambe received £30 from the received of High Peak for soldiers’ wages, strongly suggests that, Robert Morton, the sheriff of Nottingham opened the castle gates and gaol doors to Henry.112 At Leicester on or about 20 July Henry, gathered more forces from his midland estates. As their fellow Lancastrians in the north had, many midland Lancastrian retainers joined Henry’s ranks as the disenfranchised duke of Lancaster made his way into the north midlands. Tutbury and High Peak were two of Gaunt’s estates whose receivers paid large sums of money to captains who joined Henry’s army. The men who joined Henry in the midlands were a mix of gentry from various affinities. Not surprisingly some who joined Henry here were stalwart Lancastrians. John Curson, who received £100 for troops from the honor of Tutbury, was one of Gaunt’s esquires and his steward of Tutbury.113 Sir John Cokayne, who received £66 from the receiver of Tutbury for raising troops, had been a retainer of Gaunt’s for over a decade and in 1398 had become the chief steward of the north parts of the duchy.114 Other Lancastrians who came were younger men prepared 109

CCR, 1396–1399, p. 449. Colvin, King’s Works, II: 755–65. 111 Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, in his defense before parliament in 1399 claimed that he had only known of Richard II’s plans to murder Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, on 5 August 1397 in the great hall of Nottingham castle, Chrons. Rev., pp. 214, 216. 112 Morton was the son of Robert Morton, one of Gaunt’s retainers and grandson of Thomas Morton, who had served in Edward III’s household. He never held the office of sheriff again, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 275, 289, 290. 113 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 381, 539. 114 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 367. 110

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to throw in their lot with Henry. Thomas Greseley was a Staffordshire esquire who received £50 in wages for the troops he led. Henry thought so much of Greseley and his service that he knighted him on the eve of the coronation for his good service. Much the same can be said for Sir Hugh Shirley, a Derbyshire knight who drew £20 for troops’ wages. Although he had some Lancastrian connections prior to 1399, his adherence to Henry’s cause in July brought him the office of constable of Donnington castle in 1400,115 followed by the office of master forester of Duffield Chase in the Peak District in 1402.116 The large percentage of the captains in Henry’s army that came from Tutbury, twenty-five percent, was not an accident. Henry had spent a substantial amount of time at Tutbury throughout the 1390s and retained heavily among the Staffordshire gentry during that time. Lancastrian retainers from county Stafford that Gaunt had retained in the 1380s, such as Sir Thomas Beek,117 Sir John Bagot, Sir John Ipstones and William Newport were supplemented by Henry’s retaining of important local men, such as Nicholas Bradshawe, Sir Alfred Lathbury, and Sir Ralph Braylesford.118 Henry also retained men of lesser social status in the north midland counties, such as Richard Chelmswyk from Shropshire, Thomas Toty from Staffordshire, and Ralph Staveley from Derbyshire.119 The increased Lancastrian presence could have complicated social and political relationships within the Staffordshire county community, since many Staffordshire gentry also wore the livery of the earls of Stafford, as well as the livery of the young earl Stafford’s protector throughout the 1390s, Thomas of Woodstock, Duke of Gloucester.120 Henry and his youngest uncle were not always on the best of terms in the 1390s, but Gloucester’s arrest and murder in 1397 left many Staffordshire gentry disillusioned with Richard II’s government and willing to join Henry’s coalition of the disaffected. Henry Bothe was 115 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 573. For a prosopographical analysis of Shirley’s life, HoC, IV: 364–66. 116 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 556. 117 Sir Thomas Beek received £86 for wages had been retained by Gaunt in 1380 (Reg., II: p. 9) and was Gaunt’s steward of the manor of Newcastle-underLyme (Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 550). 118 PRO DL 28/4/1 ff. 9; PRO DL 42/16 f. 155. 119 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 255. 120 Rawcliffe, Staffords, p. 12. For members of the Stafford affinity also wearing Gloucester’s livery, see Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 226.

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one such Gloucester retainer who joined Henry that July. Bothe, who drew £12 for his company from the receiver of Tutbury, had been in Gloucester’s service since the late 1380s and had accompanied him to Ireland in 1395. His associations with Duke Thomas were so close that Bothe took a royal pardon for whatever treasonable actions he might have committed in 1398, and it is not surprising to find him in Henry’s company.121 Thus, as Henry and his army progressed through Staffordshire, non-Lancastrians began to join his ranks. The fact that Gloucester and Stafford retainers flocked to Henry’s banner strongly suggests that an alliance between Henry and his sister-in-law, Eleanor, Duchess of Gloucester. Quite naturally, in any understanding between Henry and Duchess Eleanor, she would have needed to be circumspect and wary of showing too much overt support for the Lancastrian cause. After all, her only son and heir, Humphrey, was still in the hands of Richard II in Ireland.122 Others who joined Henry’s company in the midlands as he marched through Tutbury and Leicester were unlikely compatriots. Sir John Berkeley from Leicestershire received £33 for leading his company to Henry’s aid. Berkeley came from one of the several cadet branches of the Lords Berkeley of Berkeley, and although Sir John did not hold a duchy office or annuity, his father had once been a ward of Henry’s which probably accounted for Sir John’s actions in 1399.123 Clearly, Henry thought a good deal of Sir John; not only did he keep Berkeley and his contingent with him throughout parliament until December, on 22 August Henry appointed Berkeley as sheriff of Warwick and Leicester. The growth of Henry’s army in the midlands also saw the defection of seemingly committed Ricardians such

121

HoC, II: 288–91. Perhaps a more poignant example of the alliance between Eleanor and Henry rests in their treatment of John Holand, Duke of Exeter and Earl of Huntingdon, after the latter’s arrest at Pleshy following the Epiphany Rising of 1400. Henry ordered the young Thomas, Earl of Arundel, to travel to Pleshy and bring Earl John back to the Tower of London. It is difficult to believe, however, that Henry really anticipated his arrival in the capital. Huntingdon had been one of the chief conspirators against both Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, and Richard, Earl of Arundel, in 1397, and now that Holand lay in the hands of the murdered Duke’s wife and the murdered Earl’s son the considerations of vengeance outweighed those of mercy and justice, L. W. Vernon-Harcourt, His Grace the Steward and Trial of Peers (London, 1907), pp. 416–25. 123 HoC, II: 199–200. 122

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as John Ayresworth, one of Richard’s esquires from Lancshire.124 Ayresworth had been one of Gaunt’s opponents in the palatinate in the 1380s; the duke had overlooked his talents and services, which had led John to seek royal patronage. In his attempts to lessen his uncle’s influence even within his base of landed power, Richard found Ayersworth a particularly good find and retained him.125 Yet, in the summer of 1399 these royalist associations and former antagonisms with Gaunt were forgotten and Ayersworth joined Henry with a small contingent and received £8 for wages.126 From Leicester Henry continued southward towards Coventry where he arrived on 23 July.127 From Coventry he moved to Warwick castle on 24 July. Here, as John Catesby related, Henry tore down the crowned white hart (the livery symbol of Richard II) and the white hind (the livery badge of Thomas, Duke of Surrey).128 Historians generally argue that Henry moved south from Yorkshire to confront the army the duke of York had assembled at Oxford. But, Henry may also have had other motives for the move south. This relocation brought him into the very heart of his father’s midland estates, especially the great fortress of Kenilworth which represented the spiritual heart of the Lancastrian affinity, an excellent location from which to recruit supporters and gather supplies.129 Moving into Warwickshire also placed him at the core of the Beauchamp estates that had been confiscated by the king and distributed to his noble supporters after the Revenge Parliament of 1397. As early as 4 July a number of former retainers of Thomas Beauchamp, disenfranchised Earl of Warwick, rose in support of Henry, captured, and then held Warwick castle.130 These Beauchamp 124

DKR, 36, p. 2. Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 170–71, 176, 177n. 126 Chrons. Rev., p. 253. 127 The dates for Henry’s movements in the third week of July come from the narrative of John Catesby, one of the earl of Warwick’s retainers, Chrons. Rev., p. 135. 128 Chrons. Rev., pp. 135–36. From the works carried out at Warwick, especially the mounting of the White Hind—his livery badge—above the castle gates, it seems that Thomas, Duke of Surrey, intended to make the castle and manor one of his chief residences. By July 1399 his wife, Johanna had added “Dame of Warwick” to her list of titles, PRO E 101/698/32. 129 Kenilworth was also where Henry had deposited his jewels on his departure for exile in 1398 in the keeping of Roger Smart, one of his esquires, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 167. 130 Roger Mott, “Richard II and the Crisis of 1397,” in Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to John Taylor, ed. Ian Wood and G. A. Loud (London, 1991), p. 176. 125

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retainers not only rose to support Henry but, perhaps more significantly, to support Thomas, Earl of Warwick. In fact, some of Earl Thomas’s supporters gathered horses and rode towards the Isle of Man to free the aged earl of their own volition rather than on Henry’s order.131 In addition to rising in support of their disenfranchised lord, some Warwick retainers led contingents in Henry’s ever-growing army. Sir William Astley, who drew £33 for soldiers’ wages, was one of Earl Thomas’s retainers. Sir William Aston not only possessed strong connections to the house of Beauchamp, but also served as treasurer of the household to the young Edmund, Earl Stafford. Thus, the Beauchamp affinity became yet another link in the coalition of the disaffected who had more at heart their own interests more so than Henry’s. Following the capture of Warwick, Henry moved on Gloucester, which he probably reached on 25 July. There as we have seen, Sheriff Browning, who had been left to garrison the town and castle to cover the duke of York’s move down the Vale of Berkeley, delivered the town and castle to Henry without resistance. Exactly what occurred at Gloucester is unknown, but the constable of the castle there, William Beauchamp of Powick, was a king’s esquire in addition to being an old retainer of Thomas of Woodstock, Duke of Gloucester.132 Possibly this old connection with Duke Thomas was enough for Beauchamp to join the coalition cause and open the castle to Henry. Henry IV’s confirmations, new grants and the knighthood that came to Beauchamp so quickly after the deposition suggest that William was a man who merited rewarding.133 On 26 July Henry moved south towards Berkeley, where he knew his uncle had stopped to wait for him. The two armies met on the field outside Berkeley on 27 July.134 As we have seen, by this time Henry’s army had swelled with men from his father’s estates in the midland and western shires, with Warwick retainers and with Arundel retainers who had answered the calls of their lord, Thomas, Earl of Arundel. Narrative sources 131 Allison Gundy, “The Earls of Warwick and the Royal Affinity in the Politics of the West Midlands, 1389–99,” in Revolution and Consumption in Late Medieval England, ed. M. Hicks (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 66–67. 132 CPR, 1392–1396, pp. 200, 299. For Henry’s confirmations see, CPR, 1399–1401, p. 338. 133 HoC, II: 161–63. 134 Chrons. Rev., p. 128.

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claim that the leaders of Henry’s army at Berkeley were Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury; Philip Repington, the Abbot of Leicester; Henry, Earl of Northumberland; Ralph, Earl of Westmorland; Thomas, Earl of Arundel; and the lords Greystoke, Willoughby and Roos.135 Many who had come to serve with the duke of York’s army had deserted before he reached Gloucester, and at Berkeley, even with the addition of Lord Berkeley and Richard, Lord Seymour,136 York’s host could not have numbered much over 1,000 men of doubtful military ability drawn from the southern shires. They had little fight in them. Certainly, York and Dorset themselves had no desire to do Henry injury and they appear to have led the largest contingents in the army. The author of the Traison et Mort claims that the two armies exchanged messengers. The duke of York told Henry that he had actually gathered his army to aid Henry in his quest to recover his inheritance and that Richard had banished him without the duke’s consent. For his part, Henry replied, “Good uncle, you are right welcome and all your people.”137 York and Henry met to discuss matters in the small parish church of St. Mary at Berkeley. Possibly Henry promised his uncle much the same as he had promised the assembled masses at Doncaster earlier in the month, and perhaps Henry promised Duke Edmund that he would be included among the lords temporal whose advice would better guide Richard’s governance. But, the fact that Henry had traversed Edmund of Langley’s estates in Yorkshire without incident and even used his manor and castle at Doncaster as a base of operations to gather his forces strongly suggests the substance of their conversation before the altar at St. Mary’s church was more practical than propagandistic. Whatever the case, York agreed to join Henry

135 This list is from the monk of Evesham, Chrons. Rev., p. 127. Some of this list is confirmed by a certificate of Sir John Bushy ordering the disposal of various lands he owned before his execution at Bristol two days later, 29 July 1399, at the hands of Henry of Lancaster that was witnessed by William, Lord Roos, William, Lord Willoughby and Sir Thomas Rempston, the seneschal of Henry’s household at this point, PRO C 47/14/7/9. 136 The monk of Evesham places both Lord Berkeley and Lord Seymour at Berkeley with York, Chrons. Rev., p. 127. The presence of Lord Berkeley is difficult to question because Berkeley castle was his chief seat, but neither Berkeley nor Seymour drew any payment for forces that they raised from the Exchequer in 1399, and the Exchequer made no attempts to track down these men’s contingents as they did for others which was entered on the foreign roll. 137 Traison et Mort, p. 186.

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and the bulk of the custodian’s assembled force now either dispersed or went over to the duke of Lancaster. Nevertheless, there remained a small band of staunch loyalists who refused to surrender their arms when asked. Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich, Sir William Elmham, Sir Walter Bytterley, Laurence Dru and John Golafre, all refused to dessert their king and lay down their arms. Their arms were taken from their persons and the men were set free. This freedom, however, did not mean these Ricardian loyalists were free from being despoiled at the hands of Henry’s troops. Henry had encountered difficulties in the past in reining in the violent tendencies of his troops in Prussia and now his inability to keep control of his men again caused problems. Just as Richard’s supporters encountered difficulties with pro-Lancastrian looters in Wales, so too did at least some of the king’s supporters traveling with Duke Edmund. For example, one staunch royalist, Sir William Elmham, who became one of Henry’s king’s knights after Richard’s deposition, had his horses and their harnesses taken from him at Berkeley without process of law. Henry tried to make restitution to Elmham by a letter patent that these items were to be restored to Sir William.138 With the collapse of Edmund of Langley’s army, the only nominally royalist force of any size in England had simply ceased to exist. This left Henry the master of the country. All that remained for Henry to do was to close Richard’s last possible avenues of egress from Wales by land and by sea and then find the king and deal with him personally. The next series of political and military moves that faced Henry in the coming weeks of late July and August would be the most challenging for him and his coalition, for as Henry, Archbishop Arundel, Ralph Neville, Henry Percy and the retainers of Lancaster, Arundel, Stafford, Gloucester, and Beauchamp knew, Richard of Bordeaux was not an opponent to be taken lightly.

138 The patent was dated, 28 October 1399, which clearly suggests that Elmham had made peace with Henry early on, CPR, 1399–1401, p. 39.

CHAPTER SIX

THE CHOICES OF KING RICHARD, JUNE—AUGUST 1399

By late-June the king had spent roughly four weeks traversing Leinster and the up-lands of Wicklow seeking his enemies before moving on to Dublin. Modern historians generally agree that these weeks represent a failure for the king and his policies.1 They argue that by the time Richard arrived in Dublin he was no closer to restoring the “wild Irish” to royal authority than he had been at his landing at Waterford on 1 June. But the interpretation of these six weeks that Richard II spent in Ireland before news of Henry’s return reached him requires some revision. The fact that Richard had worked throughout the preceding eighteen months to build a large military force in Ireland, combined with his decision to stay in Ireland for one full year and the fact that he brought so much of his court with him strongly suggests that the king did not anticipate a quick solution to his Irish problems.2 It also seems that Richard did not expect to bring the Gaelic Irish to heel in a mere 30-day lightening campaign. Nevertheless, the king had achieved some of his goals. He put a large and impressive English and Anglo-Irish army in the field, and he had moved through the country of Leinster to Dublin with ease. Although the Irish chieftains had, not surprisingly, avoided open battle with the superior English army, the king and his men had killed some Irishmen and kerns and captured others. More significantly, some Irish chiefs including MacMurrogh’s uncle had returned to his suzerainty. Even though Art MacMurrogh, the principal rebel, remained unbowed and at large, Richard had opened communications with him in the hope that, as it had in 1394/95, more could be achieved by diplomacy than by fire and sword. Establishing his court at Dublin complete with minstrels, ladies, and a portion of his 1 Chrons. Rev., pp. 29, 32, 36–37, Bennett, Richard II, pp. 149–50; Saul, Richard II, pp. 288–90. 2 Edmund Curtis expressed a similar view in 1927 in regards to the king’s 1394/95 expedition and there is nothing to suggest that Richard regarded his position in 1399 any differently, Curtis, Richard II in Ireland, pp. 52–53.

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Chancery demonstrates that the king was creating for himself, as he had in 1394/95, the position of ultimate adjudicator for all Irish disputes. Time, it seemed in early July, was on King Richard’s side. Unfortunately for the king, his political and military situation in the emerald isle changed markedly for the worse in the second week of July when Richard first heard rumors and then confirmation that Henry of Lancaster had invaded England, apparently to reclaim his inheritance. Jean Creton claimed to have witnessed the king’s reaction to the news and said that he “turned pale with anger.”3 Although we have one eye-witness perspective of how the king received the news of Henry’s presence in England, exactly when and where Richard received that news is uncertain. It is probable that the king heard rumor of Henry’s impending invasion as early as the first week of July. Propaganda and rumor of Henry’s advent appear to have been abroad in the land for some time, and several chroniclers confirm this.4 As we have seen, Duke Edmund had sent letters to the shires to raise troops as early as 28 June, and these letters were the source of Chester castle being put into a state of defense when they reached the sheriff there on 3 July.5 The sheriff of Chester then dutifully sent letters to Richard in Dublin, so even as early as 5 or 6 July, rumor of Henry of Lancaster’s return to England could have reached the king in Ireland.6 3

Chrons. Rev., p. 137. “The Kirkstall Chronicle,” ed. M. V. Clarke and N. Denholm-Young BJRL 15 (1931), p. 133. Chrons. Rev., pp 120–21, 134. 5 The distance from London to Chester is approximately 190 miles. The duke of York’s messengers left London on the morning of 28 June and orders were given to place Chester castle in a state of defense on 3 July. A total of £33 19s 9d was paid to the 47 esquires and diverse willing men-at-arms (diversus quolibet homes ad arma) and willing archers (quolibet sagitari) to defend the castle there, PRO SC 6/774/10 m. 2d. Thus, the letters from York in London would have arrived on 2 July; a space of five days to cover the c. 190 miles or about 40 miles per day. It is also clear that repairs on Chester and other castles in North Wales were ongoing in 1398 and throughout the summer of 1399. On 18 June 1398 Robert Fagan had received a life interest as mason in Cheshire and North Wales and also received a warrant to take as many stonemasons and workers as necessary to repair the castles in North Wales, DKR, 36, p. 178. On 18 April Fagan and William Hampton, the king’s plumber in the said castles, received writs of aid under the great seal to help them find workmen so long as they were not engaged in other services for the king, CPR, 1396–1399, p. 552. As late as 11 June William Hampton, the king’s plumber for Chester and the castles in North Wales was busy collecting workers for repairs on the castles there and he had received “11 fother [and] 6 ‘ped’ of lead” from the lead mine in Flintshire for his work, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 216. 6 R. R. Davies, “Richard II and the Principality of Chester, 1397–99,” in The 4

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If indeed, Richard did receive news of Henry’s landing via Chester, he showed no evident signs of concern about the information he received, which suggests he wished to receive formal notification from the government in London before taking action. Not surprisingly, the news of Henry’s presence from official sources came more slowly to the king. The prime factor in York’s delay in informing Richard of Henry’s presence and intentions rested, as we have seen, on Duke Edmund first needing to discern what forces Henry had under his command and where they might land. Once the custodian and council had some idea of Henry’s intentions, they sent messengers bearing letters to the king. These messengers drew payments for their journey to Ireland from the Exchequer on 4 July,7 and there has been much speculation by historians as to when these letters arrived. Chris Given-Wilson and Nigel Saul argued that these letters reached Richard by at least 10 July,8 while Michael Bennett argued that they arrived “presumably . . . some time in the second week” of July.9 Yet, if the dates provided in the government documents are tested alongside Jean Creton’s often errant chronology, one can speculate with some validity on an arrival date for York’s letters in Dublin. Assuming that the royal messengers left from London on 4 July when they drew cash from the Exchequer and that these messengers took ship at Bristol, about 120 miles away, it would probably have taken nearly three days to reach Bristol, on or about 7 July. Official news of Henry’s advent had not reached the king earlier than 8 July since Guy Mone, Bishop of St. David’s, one of those who had accompanied the king, wrote a routine letter to the bishop of Hereford from Dublin that contained no mention of Henry.10 Once at Bristol, the duke of York’s messengers confronted the problem of crossing the Irish Sea. Richard had left Milford Haven on 29 May and took two days to reach Waterford where he landed his army on 1 June.11 Although the Traison et Mort claimed the weather in the Irish Sea Reign of Richard II, ed. F. R. H. Du Boulay and C. Barron (London, 1971), p. 276. Dorothy Johnson, “Richard II’s Departure,” p. 792. 7 Simon Blackburn, serjeant-at-arms was the first of the messengers sent to Richard in Ireland. He drew 13s 4d for wages, PRO E 403/562, m. 13, 4 July; PRO E 403/563 m. 9, 4 July. 8 Chrons. Rev., p. 36; Saul, Richard II, p. 409. 9 Bennett, Richard II, p. 159. 10 Episcopal Registers of the Diocese of St. David’s, 1397–1518, ed. R. F. Isaacson (Cymmordorion Record Series, VI, 2 vols. in 3 (1917–20), I: 118–21. 11 Creton, Metrical History, p. 23n.

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that July had become “so tempestuous . . . and so contrary that no barge or ship could live on the sea,”12 the fact that the king had news of Henry’s landing by 12 July suggests such was not the case. Rather, it seems that favorable winds awaited the duke of York’s messengers and after a two-day transit to Waterford, they made landfall there on 9 July. As the king and his army were in the environs of Dublin, about 90 miles away, it probably took another two days of hard riding, or sailing depending on the weather, up the eastern coast of Ireland for York’s messengers to reach Dublin on 11 July. This date seems to corroborate Creton’s version of events. It is doubtful that Richard would have received York’s letters as early as 10 July and then delayed meeting with his council for two days in such a severe crisis. Creton further reported that the king and his council agreed on a Saturday to put to sea on the following Monday without delay, 14 July.13 The Saturday that Creton identifies was 12 July since documents demonstrate that the king and his household began moving south towards Waterford on Thursday, 17 July. Exactly what news the official letters from York contained is impossible to tell, but considering what the duke of York and Council knew when they wrote them, the information they contained could neither have been particularly accurate nor especially useful. The only firm information that York and the Council could have know from their position at Westminster on 4 July concerned Pevensey, which had fallen to Sir John Pelham. The shire levies, however, had answered the royal summons and had effectively besieged Pelham within the walls of the castle there and the other castles in the defensive network of the southeast were firmly in royalist hands. As we have seen, the custodian and Council were clearly concerned that Henry held a large army in northeast France and was about to besiege Calais. The duke and Council probably did not know by the time the letters were sealed on 4 July of the general rising of Lancastrian estates across the kingdom, which would probably have caused them great alarm. The letters in all probability also contained news that York was in the process of assembling an army to meet Henry, in addition to the fact that ships would be arrested for the king’s return 12

Traison et Mort, pp. 177–78. Chrons. Rev., pp. 137–38. The Traison et Mort offers a similar chronology, Traison et Mort, pp. 170–71. 13


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journey from Ireland. Beyond these things, the custodian and Council, apparently, knew little or nothing of Henry’s movements or intentions and would apparently not attempt to find out about these until at least 12 July when ambassadors were sent to him.14 Certainly, these facts would have given Richard cause for alarm, as Creton suggests,15 but they did not convey impending doom. Unfortunately for Richard, the fact that York’s letters of 4 July did not reach him until probably 11 July, meant that the king would need to act on information that was already one week old. By the time Richard read York’s news at Dublin about 11 July, Henry had not only landed but had won over ‘hotspur’ at Bridlington, taken both Pickering, and Knaresborough, and was well advanced in his process of gathering forces from his northern estates. How far and wide the news of Henry’s return spread to Irish and Anglo-Irish subjects is also difficult to gage. Dorothy Johnson suggests the king and his advisers were understandably reticent to make the contents of York’s letters public for fear that news of Henry’s arrival in England would cause desertion,16 but on the other hand news of this magnitude could not be kept quiet for long. Even if deserters would have fled Richard’s army they would have found themselves as Englishmen in a foreign country seeking aid from the very Irish they had just been trying to kill only days and weeks before. If fleeing into the Irish hinterland was a poor option, flight by sea was little better. The king had commandeered all available vessels for the return journey of his army and he held a number of vessels fitted out for war to hunt down any ships. Thus, there was nowhere for potential deserters to flee. In any event, the army that Richard led to Ireland was composed of a large number of his most loyal followers and, therefore, mass desertions seem highly unlikely. In fact, troops loyal to Richard’s cause were still under arms in Dublin as late as the end of September 1399 and only began to disperse themselves for want of pay and after learning of the king’s capture and deposition. The chief military problem facing the king and his advisers at the extraordinary meeting of his council on 12 July was how to return to England as quickly as possible with as much force as possible. 14 15 16

PRO E 403/562 m. 15, 12 July. Chrons. Rev., p. 137. Johnson, “Richard II’s Departure,” p. 789.

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Orders from John Lowick, the receiver of the king’s chamber, demonstrate that the king’s army did not begin its move south from Dublin to Waterford on 17 July.17 Michael Bennett suggests Lowick’s account indicates the beginnings of the movement of men south to Waterford and not a departure from Ireland via sea as G. O. Sayles thought.18 If this was indeed the case, and it seems likely that it was, then clearly the king delayed for up to six days after receiving news of Henry’s invasion before setting out for England. As we have seen, Jean Creton, an eye-witness to some of these events, credited this delay to the treachery of Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle. According to Creton, Albemarle came to the king and said, “Do not vex yourself, for I have never heard of so ill-conceived a plan.” Creton further relates that Albemarle counseled the king to move to Waterford because such a course of action would give the king time to collect ships so that he could move across the Irish Sea to England in force.19 In hindsight, Albemarle’s advice bears the appearance of treason as Creton saw it, and historians such as Anthony Steel,20 George Sayles,21 and R. H. Jones accept the French valet’s version of events and his perception of Albemarle.22 But, there is room for a less dramatic and more practical interpretation of Richard’s nearly week-long delay before heading south from Dublin. Although, as we have seen, Edward of York most likely looked to his own ambitions in the summer of 1399, the most likely explanation for the delay in the king’s departure from Dublin is simple military logistics: the delay resulted from the king’s need to collect his forces before he could move south towards Waterford. Military necessity had forced Richard to spread his troops over the countryside in the opening weeks of his campaign because of the interspersed nature of lands held by English lords and Irish chieftains. This meant that it would take at least several days to gather an army of sufficient size at Dublin before setting out for Waterford. Further complicating the speed of a return journey was the problem of transport. As we have seen, as Richard had done in 1394/95, he had retained a 17 PRO E 364/34 m. 7d; G. O. Sayles, “Richard II in Ireland in 1381 and 1399,” EHR 94 (1979), pp. 822–23. 18 Bennett, Richard II, p. 160. 19 Chrons. Rev., p. 138. 20 Steel, Richard II, p. 266. 21 G. O. Sayles, “Richard II in 1381 and 1399,” pp. 823–24. 22 Jones, Royal Policy of Richard II, p. 102.


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number of vessels for service throughout the summer. No doubt, some of these ships were engaged in transporting supplies and reinforcements coming out of the principality of Chester, while others were blocking the western coast of Ireland and engaging in economic warfare against Gaelic Irish merchantmen. Quite probably on 11 or 12 July, the king and his advisers had no good idea of where all the ships they had retained for the summer were, and it would have taken time to bring sufficient numbers of them together to transport the army. The order from the king to gather these vessels engaged in the interdiction of the Irish coast at Waterford rather than further north up the coast at Dublin also turned on simple logistics. Waterford, like Haverford in South Wales, afforded a broad, sheltered estuary for ships to congregate; it was also the closest major Irish port to the west coast of England. Therefore, the pace at which the king personally responded to the threat of Henry’s invasion was forced upon him by logistical issues rather than treachery or lethargy. But, perhaps at the heart of the king’s and Albemarle’s reaction to the news of Henry’s presence in England was their perception of Henry of Lancaster.23 As we have seen, throughout the 1390s Henry had seemingly done everything he could to avoid politics and political connections. In spite of rank and wealth, Henry had never commanded an army in the field. Who of substance in the political community would follow Henry of Lancaster? King Richard could also recall his own seemingly successful work in the preceding five years in eroding John of Gaunt’s authority within the Palatinate of Lancaster. Richard began retaining men from Lancashire in larger numbers and injecting substantial amounts of royal good lordship into the Palatinate beginning in 1397. These actions in turn forced Gaunt to increase the money he spent on retaining to keep old loyalties and maintain control of his own lands.24 For example, in one day in March 1398 Richard retained 5 knights and 22 esquires from Gaunt’s Palatinate,25 including three knights and three esquires who were already Gaunt’s retainers.26 The 23 In parliament in 1399 Sir William Bagot claimed that Albemarle himself claimed not fear Henry by any means, Chrons. Rev., pp. 210–12. 24 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 175–76. 25 CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 321, 324. 26 Simon Walker expressed a similar view of the king’s retaining policies and his efforts to make inroads into the Lancastrian affinity, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 176–78.

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king’s efforts to gain the loyalty of these Lancastrian retainers did not seem to be in vain. By 1398 Richard appeared to gain the loyalty of one very prominent Lancashire man, Sir Ralph Radcliffe, the sheriff of Lancaster in 1398 and 1399.27 Last and not least, in the four months between Gaunt’s death in February and the king’s departure for Ireland in late May, Richard entered into sworn indentures with a number of Gaunt’s most significant retainers provided they would be retained by the king only. If indeed Richard did view Henry as a wastrel with little political ability and thought his own position secure through numerous contracts of indenture and with the disbursal of royal good lordship to Gaunt’s retainers, then the king’s actions in mid-July become more understandable. Taken as a whole, these factors suggest that Richard of Bordeaux believed he possessed an adequate amount of time to deal with Henry. It is not surprising, therefore, that the king took the opportunity and the time to order the political and military situation in Ireland before his departure for home. Richard decided to leave Irish affairs in the capable hands of his lieutenant, Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey, before heading to Waterford with a portion of his army. With the duke of Surrey in charge, government and military business in Ireland continued without interruption following Richard’s departure from Dublin. On 16 July Robert Faryngton, the king’s treasurer in Ireland, received a payment of 22 Marks into the treasury at Dublin Castle from Thomas, Duke of Surrey,28 and the following day Surrey paid a further £40 into the Irish Exchequer.29 Even after Surrey’s departure for England, some time in late July, Duke Thomas’s receiver, Robert Swale, drew £107 out of the Irish treasury to pay the sizable force of troops still in and around Dublin on 3 August.30 In fact, troops from the duke of Surrey’s forces were still in the Dublin area and were dispersing themselves for want of pay in September,31 and the dearth of money to pay the troops in Ireland in the autumn of 1399 probably resulted from the recovery

27

Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 178–79. PRO E 101/247/4 m. 1. 29 PRO E 101/247/4 m. 2. 30 PRO E 101/247/5. 31 In the autumn of 1399 the king’s council in Ireland wrote to Henry IV informing him that many of Surrey’s troops were left in Ireland in the summer and, as they were without pay, had disbanded, A Roll of the Proceedings of the King’s Council in Ireland, ed. J. Graves (Rolls Series, 1877), pp. 261–69. 28


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of money from the Irish treasury. On 28 August Henry’s esquires, John Waterton and Robert Heathcote received the substantial sum of £6,544 13s 4d from the duchess of Surrey at the castle of Trim.32 This suggests that the king left large forces in Ireland on purpose, either because he wished to hold on to his position there or because he did not possess the vessels to move them. In the midst of preparations for the move to Waterford, it is probable that Sir William Bagot’s valet Richard Penry, whom York sent to Ireland on 9 July, arrived with more letters from the Council on or about 15 July.33 Exactly what these new letters from York contained is impossible to tell, but one of the duke of York’s letters sent to the city of York on 10 July provides some insight into what the custodian and Council knew at this date.34 From this letter it is clear that the duke still believed a large force of men was gathered in Picardy; either to besiege Calais, or to invade the England itself. Exactly what the custodian and the government knew of Henry’s whereabouts is uncertain, but the letter to the city of York, ordering the men raised by the civic corporation and hold York against attacks from the Scots or from other enemies of the king, suggests that at they were unsure of the efficacy of royalist power in the north. This news, at least from the king’s perspective, was not encouraging. The duke also probably communicated to Richard his intentions to cover the move of the chancellor and government to the safety of Wallingford castle and then to gather his forces as he moved to the west, possibly to Bristol, and there join forces with the king’s army coming from Ireland. The letters Penry carried probably also informed the king that Duke Edmund had sent commissioners to arrest ships and traverse the sea to Waterford which would to enable Richard to return home, but the ships were clearly too few in number to transport the entire Irish expeditionary force back to England in one sailing. It is difficult to know how much, if any, communication took place between the Custodian and the king after the duke left St. Albans on 12 July. It is possible that other communications to the king were 32 It took £100 for wages for the guards and two and one half months to get this sum of cash from Trim through Chester to London where it was received by two of Henry’s most trusted friends, Sir Thomas Erpingham and John Norbury, on 14 November 1399, PRO E 364/36 m.1. 33 PRO E 403/562 m. 15, 12 July; PRO E 403/563 m. 9, 9 July. 34 CCR 1396–1399, p. 518.

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sent between 4 and 17 July when the king’s closest friends and councilors remained with the duke of York and that payments for these never found their way onto the issue roll. Following the departure of Bushy, Green and Wiltshire from York’s army at Oxford on 17 July, however, and discussion of exactly how much communication between York and Richard is purely conjectural. This lack of communication with York, coupled with the fact that the king’s loyal councilors could not escape Bristol by ship, left the king with no reliable source of information of Henry’s actions or his whereabouts. Perhaps this information black-out prompted the king’s decision to leave Ireland sometime around 24 July with the intention of making landfall in South Wales.35 The king’s decision to move forward to South Wales and to choose Milford Haven as his first base of operations can be considered a bold, if necessary, military strategy. The king possessed a large army in Ireland that was well provisioned and substantial amounts of liquid capital to pay these troops for further military action. A longer time in Ireland would have given the king opportunity to gather more ships for the return voyage and wait for better weather, which would have been made for a large force on the ground in South Wales. The army in Ireland contained many of Richard’s staunchest supporters among the titled nobility and gentry. To move away from this base of military support could be dangerous. Yet, Richard II probably considered the move to South Wales to be worth the risk. Some historians have criticized the king for not immediately advancing to Bristol, where apparently the duke of York was to meet him, and have interpreted this failure on the king’s part as an example of Richard’s timidity. But, a move to Bristol before possessing a good working knowledge of Henry’s intentions, the strength and state of his army, and his whereabouts would have been great folly. Moving to Bristol could have left Richard trapped by a siege or forced to withdraw by sea from Henry’s actions—both of which were politically unenviable options. South Wales provided a substantial number of geographical, political and administrative advantages to the king. The roadstead at Milford Haven offered the largest and most sheltered port facility on the western coast of Wales and thus was an excellent location 35 Adam of Usk claimed that Richard landed in Wales on 22 July, “the feast of St. Mary Magdalen,” Usk, Chronicle, pp. 58–59.


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for ships with troops coming from Ireland to gather. The Haven also allowed Richard the strategic freedom to move easily forward by sea to Bristol or by land down the southern coast through the vale of Glamorgan, Chepstow, and across the Severn. A position in South Wales also offered the king the ability to move by land or sea to North Wales and the principality of Chester, where the Earl of Salisbury had been sent to raise the country for the king. Last and not least, a base in South Wales also afforded Richard an escape route by sea back to Ireland, Bordeaux, or to France, if such an eventuality became necessary. Just as the landing at Milford Haven can be considered sound military strategy, so too can the king’s move to Haverfordwest.36 The town there had access to the sea through the estuary of Milford Haven, and the castle of Haverfordwest was large, strong, and wellbuilt. It had been in the Black Prince’s hands from 1359–67 and in the king’s hands from 1381–85. In 1393 Richard gave the castle to one of his intimates, Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester and Steward of the Royal Household.37 It also was strong enough to repel an attack of Glendower in 1405 and thus may be considered to have been in a good state of repair in 1399. The administrative advantages South Wales offered the king were substantial. The territories that made up the southern portion the principality of Wales, centered on the counties of Cardigan and Carmarthen, gave Richard a powerful base from which to operate. These counties were some of his oldest domains and areas that were among the most loyal to him. In addition, the officers in these southern Welsh lordships and counties were loyal to Richard II—at least in theory. The Steward of the King’s Household, Sir Thomas de Percy, Earl of Worcester, also held the office of Justiciar of South Wales.38 Percy accompanied the king to Ireland and his presence in South Wales could only be of aid to the king. His power as Justiciar gave him broad statutory powers within the principality, including power of justice and taxation in addition to raising and leading troops in

36 Haverford clearly served as the repository for the goods of the king’s household and the king moved large quantities of things to Haverford such as vestments, banners, and furniture, PRO E 101/355/3. 37 CPR, 1391–1396, p. 210. 38 R. A. Griffiths, The Principality of Wales in the Later Middle Ages, I South Wales, 1277–1536 (Cardiff, 1972), p. 126.

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time of need.39 The Chamberlain of South Wales, the king’s chief financial officer in the southern principality, was William Asshe.40 Asshe, an esquire from Hertfordshire, had caught on in Richard’s household service in the 1380s and rose to be usher of the king’s chamber by 1392.41 In addition to counting the chief financial officer and chief executive officer of the southern principality within the royal affinity, the king could also count on a large number of constables of castles who were loyal to him. Sir Lewis Clifford, a knight of the king’s chamber since 1391,42 held Cardigan for the king.43 Although it was an administrative seat, Cardigan was not in the best state of repair. A survey of 1343 showed the castle would need £814 to restore it to defensible condition and as no repair work can be accounted for until 1410,44 it is likely Cardigan was not the best of castles.45 By contrast, Roger Wigmore, a king’s esquire, held Carmarthen for the king.46 Substantial amounts were spent on works at Carmarthen in the early 1390s and the castle stood in a good state of repair in 1399.47 Sir Simon Felbrigge, another king’s knight,48 at Aberystwyth gave the king control of the most important costal castles in South Wales. Newcastle Emlyn,49 a strong fortress in the Teifi valley, had been in the king’s hands since the death of Sir Simon Burley in 1388.50 William Walshale, a king’s esquire, held the imposing motte and bailey castle at Dinefwr;51 along with William Houghton and William Bradwardyn, both king’s esquires, holding the equally imposing fortress at Dryslwyn,52 gave Richard effective control of the Twyi

39

Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 23–35. Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 180–81. 41 CFR, 1391–1399, p. 169. 42 Tout, Chapters, IV: 345. 43 CPR, 1381–1385, p. 185. 44 PRO E 163/4/42. 45 Colvin, King’s Works, II: 590–91. 46 Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 123–24, 199. 47 Colvin, King’s Works, II: 600–02. 48 RH&KA, p. 283. 49 Colvin, King’s Works, II: 646–47. See also G. Evans, The Story of Newcastle Emlyn and Atpar (Cymmrodorion Society, 1923). 50 Although it seems unlikely, it appears that Simon Burley was the last keeper of Newcastle Emlyn before Henry IV granted the keeping of the castle to Sir John Ashley in 1399, CPR, 1399–1401, pp. 68, 148. 51 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 197. 52 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 471. 40


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valley as far west as Llandieo.53 These castles were all in good repair in 1399,54 and as a group they provided Richard in Haverfordwest with a powerful network of defenses that blocked all major invasion routes down the Teifi and Twyi valleys. South Wales also offered the king access to a number of estates, houses and fortresses of his friend and councilor Guy Mone, the Bishop of St. David’s. Far from being one of the wealthiest Episcopal estates in the kingdom, the estates of St. David’s nevertheless spread across the Welsh countryside from Pembrokeshire to Carmarthenshire, Cardiganshire and Glamorgan. The bishop also possessed the great fortress/palace of Llanwaden, where it seems King Richard stayed for a time in late July.55 It is also clear that the king and his followers were not completely isolated from his supporters in southwestern Wales. On 29 July the king’s cause received a healthy infusion of much needed cash, the allocation of 1,000 Marks, from the custodian and Council at Whiteland Abbey between Carmarthen and Llanwhaden.56 This allotment was part of the monies ordered sent to the king by the duke of York earlier in the month. These royalists also brought news of the political world to the king.57 After establishing a base at Haverfordwest, the king then sent some of his most loyal supporters forward to raise the southern principality for him. Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, moved from Haverfordwest into Carmarthenshire to raise troops, Thomas Despenser, Earl of Gloucester, moved into his own lands in Glamorgan to do the same, and letters were sent to raise the lordship of Usk for the king.58 Other bodies of troops had already been raised in the king’s 53 Sir Hugh Waterton was Steward of Kidwelly in 1399 prior to Henry’s advent. He was also one of Henry’s attorneys during his exile, so probably Kidwelly was in rebellion in June 1399, DL 29/9240; Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 387. 54 The relatively good state of these castles may be argued from the fact that all of them except Dryslyn castle held out against Glendower throughout his rebellion. 55 Episcopal Registers of St. David’s, I: 120–21. 56 The king, of course, did not receive the money physically (i.e., in boxes full of silver pennies) in July but received tallies or simply news that the sum had been allocated to his use from the Exchequer, PRO E 361/5 m. 26d. 57 Henry Shelford and Thomas Miles received a recognizance for 60s levied in Somerset on 10 July 1399 from Edmund of Langely at St. Alban’s, CCR, 1396–99, p. 519. John Toupe and Edmund Oldhalle also received a recognizance for £233 6s 8d levied in Lincolnshire for the royalist cause that was given at St. Alban’s 12 July 1399 CCR, 1396–99, p. 518. 58 Usk, Chronicle, pp. 52–55, 58–9.

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name. One such contingent was raised by Edward Charleton, Lord of Powis. This body of troops was standing ready to fight against Henry, and if troops could be raised at Powis nearly fifty miles away from Haverfordwest, then in all probability other contingents were raised from other localities closer to the king’s base within the southern principality. It is difficult at best to know exactly how many men could have been called to the royal standard in such a brief time. Assuming Richard arrived at Haverfordwest on 24 July and left for North Wales on 30 July, then his recruiting attempts in South Wales lasted less than one week. As we have seen, the duke of York had encountered similar difficulties in raising forces quickly. Andrew Neuport, sheriff of Cambridge and Huntington, received letters from the duke dated 28 June ordering him to raise forces. Yet when the contingent he raised headed for Oxford on 12 July, it contained only 82 men; 33 men-at-arms and 49 archers.59 The contingents raised by Albemarle, Gloucester, Worcester, the bishop of St. David’s and others in the royalist entourage could not have been very large either, considering that Carmarthen, the largest borough in Wales, contained only about 1,500 people.60 Although South Wales did give the king a number of advantages, the king soon found that his position of relative administrative, financial and military strength in the southern principality had all the makings of a military trap. Although Richard could have stayed in South Wales and made Henry come to him, the king probably did not have the food or fodder to withstand a long siege. One of the most significant problems facing Richard lay well beyond his control; the very geography of the country. Wales could be considered, even by fourteenth century standards, as a backwards place. The terrain of the country was rough, mostly because of the “horrid and frightful” mountains that rose in the central sections of the country. To make matters more difficult, roads were poor and communications problematic.61 Although southwestern Wales could serve as a reasonable administrative, naval and military base if Richard II chose to remain there, in political terms, by late July, his presence in the southern principality had become a liability. Henry of Lancaster 59

PRO C 47/2/61/32; PRO E 364/36 m. 9. R. R. Davies, Owain Glyn Dwr (Oxford, 1995), p. 25 61 For a fine discussion of the problems Welsh geography posed to travelers in the late fourteenth century, see R. R. Davies, Owain Glyn Dwr, pp. 5–35. 60


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had marched through the rest of his kingdom with disturbing ease. Thus, political necessity dictated that the king needed to move east as quickly and efficiently as possible to confront his enemy. Walsingham argues that Richard and his councilors wished to force an engagement with Henry; however, their plans changed when the learned of the size of Henry’s ever-growing host.62 Although this may have been the case, it is just as likely that the reason for the king’s change of mind was that two of the three main routes out of South Wales to the east were barred to him. There were three main routes to the east from the southern principality that the king could have taken in late July: first, along the north coast of the Bristol Channel through Glamorgan, merely retracing the steps that Richard himself had taken in May; second, up the Tywi valley; and third, up the Teifi valley. Of the three options open to the king, the first represented the most direct route of advance to the east, along the south coast of Wales through the Vale of Glamorgan to Chepstow and thence across the Severn to the environs of Bristol. Richard knew that his uncle, Edmund of Langely, and the army he had collected would be in or near Bristol and probably knew that Duke Edmund expected him to join those forces. Unfortunately for Richard, this southern road was barred to his advance. Even though most of the Lancastrian lordships and castles in South Wales had been given in keeping to John Holand, Duke of Exeter,63 these Lancastrian lordships rose for Henry and not the king. The great Lancastrian fortress of Kidwelly, less than ten miles south of Carmarthen, rose for Henry that summer.64 Because the steward of Kidwelly, Sir Hugh Waterton, was also the steward of the smaller castle of Carreg Cennen, between Brecon and Kidwelly, there is noting to suggest that Carreg Cennen did not rise as well.65 Further down the coast to the east lay yet another Lancastrian fortress, Ogmore, which had probably risen as well.66 The king 62

Chrons. Rev., p. 122. CFR, 1391–1399, p. 293. These grants were dated 20 March 1399 and were to be in Exeter’s hands from the date of Gaunt’s death until Henry of Lancaster or his heir should sue to have them restored. 64 The walls at Kidwelly were repaired “in order to better resist the malice of King Richard or other enemies of the lord [i.e. Henry],” PRO, DL 29/584/9240. 65 The keeping of Carreg Cennen seems to have gone with the stewardship of Kidwelly and perhaps was held with Kidwelly in 1399, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 170 n. 1, 640. 66 Ogmore was among the estates given in keeping to John Holand, Duke of Exeter, earlier in the year, CFR, 1391–1399, pp. 293, 297. He also received keep63

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possessed neither the resources nor the time to reduce small castles such as Ogmore and Carreg Cennen and certainly did not possess the resources to reduce a massive fortress such as Kidwelly in short order. In addition to the problem of confronting these Lancastrian fortresses, few men could be found in Glamorgan to fight for the royalist cause. Thomas Despenser, Earl of Gloucester, was sent into his recently acquired estates in Glamorganshire to raise troops for the king, but he found few men to support the royalist cause. Further complicating a southern royalist advance was the fact that Henry’s large army lay close by in either Bristol or Gloucester. From what the king knew, Henry’s army was larger than his own force, and with the countryside in Glamorgan friendly to him, the duke and his allies could easily advance on the king’s position. Therefore, the route through Glamorgan could not be taken. The second avenue of advance to the east lay along the Twyi valley from Carmarthen through Llandovery and along the northern face of the Mynydd Eppynt through Builth Wells and Hay-on-Wye and, finally, out into the broad Wye valley to the west of Hereford. Not only would this route be difficult in terms of terrain, but the military obstacles along this avenue of advance made it unfeasible. Seventy-six men were paid from the lordship of Brecon to clean the moat at the castle there and put the defenses to readiness there “against the lord’s [i.e., Henry’s] enemies coming from Ireland.” Payments were recorded to these armed men to hold the lordship for Henry from 1 June.67 Another of Henry’s estates, Hay-on-Wye, also gathered troops at the castle there to defend themselves against Richard II’s attacks.68 Even if these problems were overcome, moving east down the Wye valley from Hay the king and his army would have been faced with the Lancastrian fortresses of Hereford and Monmouth—the very heart of Lancastrian landed power on the English side of the March.69 This was not all; moving up the Twyi ing of the manors of Monmouth, Skenfrith, Whitecastle, Grosmont, and Kidwelly. Considering that all of these other estates rose for Henry in 1399 there is nothing to suggest that Ogmore did not rise as well, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 134 n. 2. 67 PRO SC 6/1157/4. 68 PRO SC 6/1157/4. 69 Henry’s, or more accurately Gaunt’s, steward and constable of Monmouth along with the Three Castles (i.e., Grosmont, Skenfirth, and Whitecastle) was Sir William Lucy. Lucy had been in Gaunt’s retinue since the 1370s and held a life interest in the above offices from 1387. Although Lucy’s role in events in 1399 is


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valley also meant that Richard would be leaving a number of Lancastrian estates in his rear area. From fortresses like Kidwelly, Lancastrian loyalists could easily lead raiding parties into the Twyi valley and threaten Richard’s line of communications with his base at Haverfordwest and the Exchequer of the southern principality at Carmarthen, which as we have seen, men from other Lancastrian estates were doing at this time. The king’s third option for an avenue of egress from southwest Wales, up the Teifi valley through Newcastle Emlyn and Lampeter, afforded Richard more advantages than the other two. The Teifi valley was smaller than the Twyi and once the king and his forces moved past Lampeter and headed north, their movements were screened by the Cambrian Mountains. Richard could easily make Aberystwyth, which was still loyal to him, and he could then move by easy stages through northwest Wales and hope to arrive in the principality of Chester, where the earl of Salisbury had been recruiting men. Although Walsingham claimed that Richard fled north because he became “cautious and timid,”70 and the Whalley Chronicle claimed that Richard fled north because he learned that someone intended to seize him in the night,71 it is likely that neither was the case. Rather than a display of timidity, Richard’s move north might be considered a display of one who possessed a sound grasp of political and military strategy. The king’s move north was by far the most secure and least dangerous for him. Although many historians have difficulty with the king’s actions in his move to North Wales,72 as a military strategy it does have a number of points to commend it. First, the rugged terrain of the Cambrian Mountains served as a major impediment for Henry and his army trying to move west just as they were for Richard and his army trying to move east. By staying on the west side of the mountains, Richard could screen his movement northwards from Henry and advance into North Wales

not precisely known, the fact that he was selected as an MP for the 1399 Parliament, received a 100 mark annuity in February 1400 and received appointment as sheriff of Herefordshire in 1400 strongly suggests that Lucy and the Lancastrian estates he oversaw were not idle in Henry’s cause in 1399, Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 384; HoC, III: 648–49. 70 Chrons. Rev. p. 122. 71 Chrons. Rev, p. 156. 72 Bennett, Richard II, pp. 160–61.

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with ease. Staying on the western coast also offered the king a further measure of security against Henry because, if Richard did indeed find himself run to ground at a western Welsh port, he could easily take ship and return to Ireland. In addition to advantage of terrain screening the king’s advance, a move northwards into the friendly confines of North Wales and the loyal territory of the principality of Cheshire would place substantial political and military assets at his disposal. North Wales and Cheshire were the heart of his landed power. Contemporary chroniclers believed a military position in Cheshire strong enough that a force based there would “be strong enough to fight all England,”73 and historians have characterized Cheshire as the king’s inner citadel.74 Not only were the vast majority of his subjects there loyal to Richard and promised “Dycun, slep sicury quile we wake,”75 but gentlemen led by prominent royalists such as Thomas Talbot and John Mascy of Tatton had led rebellions in Cheshire in support of the king against his opponents, most notably the duke of Gloucester, in the early and mid-1390s.76 Cheshire was a large agricultural area and well populated. It could provide sufficient food for the men and fodder for the animals and maybe even provide horses and transport for the king’s army. Although the loyalty of his Welsh and Cheshire subjects was no doubt of comfort to the king, Richard also possessed tangible military assets in the recently created principality of Chester in the former Arundel castles of Chirk, Oswestry, Shrawardine and Holt. Possession of these not only gave the king a strong base to control the northern portion of the Welsh March, they served as a serious impediment to anyone foolish enough to invade the principality from the south or east. Since Richard Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel’s, execution in 1397, the king had taken the three Arundel marcher lordships of Chirk; Bromfield and Yale; and Oswestry to the Crown. He had reorganized these into a single administrative unit and undertaken wholesale changes in personnel in these lordships, replacing former Arundel adherents with men loyal to him. Richard also worked 73 This is what the Traison claimed the earls thought in the Epiphany Rising of 1400, Traison et Mort, p. 237. 74 Tout, Chapters, IV: 59. 75 Clarke, “Deposition of Richard II,” p. 98. 76 J. G. Bellamy, “The Northern Rebellions in the Later Years of Richard II,” BJRL 47 (1965), pp. 269–74.


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in the last two years before July 1399 to ensure that these castles were ready to withstand any onslaught thrown against them. The king spent nearly £200 on repairing the Arundel castles in 1398 and £210 more on securing the defenses of Chester that same year.77 Richard possessed confidence that the northern principality of Wales and the principality of Chester would rise for him if called upon to do so.78 The king knew that Chester castle had been put in a state of defense and that York had ordered over 1,000 men to be raised for the king in the principality.79 Richard’ many visits to the principality in the preceding eighteen months,80 would have given him knowledge that the castles were well provisioned with the material of war; bows and arrows, ballistas, and artillery of various shapes and sizes.81 Perhaps most indicative of the king’s confidence in Salisbury and in the loyalty of his followers in northwest England and North Wales is the fact that he left his Cheshire bodyguard behind in Haverford.82 Perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, a quick move up the west coast of Wales into Cheshire would allow Richard to turn the tables on Henry of Lancaster. The king probably knew that, by 29 July, the duke of York had joined Henry, and that Henry’s army was near Gloucester or Bristol. Richard probably also knew at least two further things about Henry’s army. First, if the chronicles are right in claiming that Henry’s army had become a

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CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 402, 443, 503, 552. R. R. Davies, “Richard II and the Principality of Chester, 1397–99,” p. 274. 79 Robert Parys’ accounts show that between 3 July and 5 August he paid £33 19s 9d in wages to 47 esquires (armigeri) at 2 shillings per day, diverse willing menat-arms (diversus quolibet hom ad arma) at 12 pence per day, and diverse willing archers (diversus quolibet sagittari) at 6 pence per day, PRO SC 6/774/10 m. 2d. 80 Saul, Richard II, pp. 468–74. 81 Robert Pary’s accounts show that there were 427 sheafs of arrows (at 24 arrows per sheaf ) in Chester, 26 sheafs of arrows in Flint, 34 sheafs of arrows in Rotheham. Included with these arrows were 26 gross (at 144 per gross) crossbow quarrels in Chester along with 18 gross of crossbow quarrels each in Flint and Rotheham. There were also 9 gross (at 144 per gross) bow-strings in Chester, 20 ballistas and 50 ballista strings at Chester, 5 ballistas and 10 ballista strings each in Flint and Rotheham, 4 bandrakes in Chester and 5 bandrakes each in Flint and Rotheham, PRO SC 6/774/10 m. 3d. 82 Richard decided to take most of the money recently received by his clerks at Whiteland abbey north with him. On 29 July Richard Maudelyn, a king’s clerk, and John Serle, valet of the king’s robes, drew £500 from the monies sent from York and keep it “to the personal use of the king,” PRO E 361/1/26; Johnson, “Richard II’s Departure,” p. 795. 78

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huge host of hangers-on and well-wishers, then the king knew of this also and perceived it as an opportunity. Such a large host would be unwieldy; it would react lethargically and move slowly. Second, the king also knew that Henry and his host had come from the north. Walsingham claimed that Richard and his men in South Wales were harried by men from Westmorland and Northumberland,83 and the presence of these northerners gave the king a key piece of intelligence. Henry and his army probably reached Gloucester on 24 July, the date from which the sheriff ’s contingent from Gloucestershire ceased to be paid. Thus, it is possible, if not probable, that some of the men in Henry’s army were sent into Brecon and Glamorgan to make contact with his own estates in South Wales but also to determine the strength and location of the king’s forces. Not only did Henry use these men to discover the whereabouts and strength of the king’s army, their presence also let Richard know for certain that Henry had already come to the south. Thus, the king and his advisers probably reasoned that a majority of the pro-Lancastrian element from the northern counties was already with Henry and those men who were left in the north, might be loyalists and join the king’s banner if it was brought there. If Richard, and a small entourage,84 could move with speed to the north they could move the seat of war to Cheshire where the king held advantages of ground and the loyalty of the principality. He would find the Lancastrian estates in the north less of a threat than those in Wales and southern England because most northern Lancastrians had already joined Henry on his triumphal march towards Gloucester in June and July. By moving to the north, Richard would also have the freedom to attack some Lancastrian estates and cut off Henry from his base of supply and support. Although this seems a good strategy in theory, it proved fatal to the king in practice because Richard and his supporters made a bold military move forward without sufficient military knowledge of their new destination. It is possible that the king had tried to communicate with his lieutenant Salisbury in North Wales. The distances involved, however, combined with the fact that Richard spent only six days in southwest Wales and that no chronicler claims any con83

Chrons. Rev., p. 122. Creton claimed that the king took only a few friends with him and that he disguised himself as a priest to avoid detection, Chrons. Rev. pp. 139–40. 84


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tact between the king and Salisbury, suggest that Richard did not communicate with the earl to assess Salisbury’s situation. Exactly what the king hoped Worcester and Albemarle would do with the portion of the army in South Wales is unknown. In South Wales Worcester and Albemarle occupied a strong, albeit defensive, military position. The two loyalist lords at least in theory stood to create and then command a substantial military force for a number of reasons: they controlled the estates of the southern principality, the Exchequer of South Wales had just been supplemented with 1,000 Marks from Westminster, the administrative machinery of the principality lay there, and other loyalist troops would be coming to Milford Haven from Ireland. Michael Bennett, following Creton,85 argues that Richard intended Albemarle and Worcester to marshal the forces in South Wales, supplemented with any troops returning from Ireland, and follow the king north, but such a strategy he further suggests, “cannot have been made with much optimism.”86 G. O. Sayles argued that Richard intended the army that Albemarle and Worcester created in southwestern Wales to move forward and challenge Henry’s fortresses in Glamorgan or Brecon and, with and a second royally led army from North Wales and Cheshire, wage a two pronged attack on Henry.87 But, given the length of time it usually took to raise substantial forces of men, the king could not have expected an army to have appeared from the southern principality in only one week. The traditional view of the royalist collapse in South Wales is well known and comes largely from Creton, who was not there. On the very evening that Richard left for the north, Albemarle ordered the troops that he and others had raised to disperse. After taking counsel with Worcester, the two decided to plunder the king’s household goods and head across Wales with the king’s jewels and other possessions. Yet, their treachery was seen for what it was by the common Welsh-folk, who in numbers of one or two thousand, attacked and despoiled these two lords’ for their faithlessness and ill-gotten gains.88 Some of Creton’s version of events is supported by Walsingham, who claimed that after Richard’s departure the earl of Worcester 85 86 87 88

Chrons. Rev., pp. 140–41. Bennett, Richard II and the Revolution of 1399, pp. 160–61. Sayles, “Richard II in 1381 and 1399,” pp. 823–24. Chrons. Rev., pp. 140–41.

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called the household establishment together and with heavy heart disbanded the household, broke his staff of office, and advised all those men with him who had formerly been loyal to Richard to save themselves. These Ricardian household servants were harassed by the Welsh as well as men from Henry’s army from both Northumberland and Westmorland as they tried to escape from Wales.89 Independent evidence for such an early collapse of the royal household in South Wales is suggested, as Dorothy Johnson demonstrates, by two things: Worcester’s order for household officers to deposit the goods in their custody in Carmarthen castle on 1 August, and the earl’s personal keeping of the key to the chest where these goods were stored in Carmarthen to keep them safe from the unrest in the countryside.90 Documents, dated 6 August at Bristol, bearing Worcester’s seal as admiral of the west adjudicating a dispute between foreign merchants suggest that by this time the earl was no longer in South Wales.91 But, perhaps the most telling factor indicating an earlier rather than later collapse of royalist authority in South Wales is the lack of control over the remaining vessels of the fleet ferrying troops and horses back from Ireland. For example, John Bigbroke and his ship, La Trinity de Heth, along with his friend Nicholas Shaw and his vessel, La Marie de Heth, made one last return voyage on the last day of July, and upon finding no one at Haverford, the continued on to port of Pole in Dorsetshire.92 Likewise without guidance, Richard Butte and his vessel, La Michael de Hampton, making their return journey from Ireland at the very end of July, made final landfall on the Isle of Wight.93 The reasons for the household’s break-up and the defection of the king’s household officers to Henry are difficult to discern. There is no direct evidence of communication between Henry’s forces and those under Albemarle and Worcester in South Wales. However, close familial ties and personal relationships existed between the two camps.94 Exactly what their respective family members told Albemarle 89

Chrons. Rev, pp. 122–23. Johnson, “Richard II’s Departure,” p. 795. 91 Although the final decision in this case did have Worcester’s seal affixed to it as admiral, it seems much of the work was carried forward by John Cawe, Worcester’s deputy in the admiralty, CPR, 1399–1401, p. 243. 92 E 364/45 m. 4. 93 E 364.45 m. 4. 94 Sir Thomas Percy had been retained by Gaunt in 1380 and had served abroad on several campaigns with him. At the end of Gaunt’s life his relationship with 90


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and Worcester is unknown, but Henry’s propaganda message since the Oath of Doncaster had remained consistent: he only wished what lands and titles were rightfully his. In any event, Albemarle, together with Worcester, Lord John Lovell, and Lord John Stanley all sought Henry, who they knew was busy moving his army up the eastern side of the Welsh March. Maude Clarke argued that this group of royalist refugees made their way up the Tywi valley.95 If they did indeed meet Henry at Shrewsbury,96 roughly 90 miles from Carmarthen, on 13 August as the Traison et Mort claims, then the final break up of Richard’s household came probably on 2 or 3 August. On his departure from the environs of Whiteland and Llanwhaden on 30 July, Richard and his small circle moved north and probably covered the 130 miles in four or five days, arriving in the environs of Conway on or about 3 or 4 August.97 Although North Wales offered the king many of the same defensive advantages as the southern portions of the principality, it also forced him to face similar disadvantages, the most important of which was trying to raise a sizable military force in a very brief period of time. Jean Creton, who wrote the only eye-witness account of what happened with Salisbury in North Wales, claimed that the earl amassed a large army of 40,000 men from North Wales and Cheshire in the space of only four days and held them together for a fortnight. But the Welsh possessed little faith in the earl; they feared the triumphal progress of Duke Henry. As the king did not come quickly to lead them, the Welsh began to disperse.98 Some of these men returned to their homes and others even deserted to join Henry of Lancaster. Thus, by the time the king arrived at Conway on or about 3 August almost no army remained for him to lead.99 Thomas, now Earl of Worcester, was so close that the duke made Earl Thomas one of the executors of his will, Goodman, John of Gaunt, pp. 282–83; ArmitageSmith, John of Gaunt, pp. 420–36. 95 Clarke, “The Deposition of Richard II,” p. 72. 96 Chrons. Rev., p. 129. 97 The king traveled during the period of the moon’s last quarter, 30 June and the dark of the moon, 5 August. Given the rugged country and less than ideal road conditions, it seems unlikely that the king would have traveled at night with no moon and thus his transit time from South Wales to Conway would have probably been extended, for the phases of the moon in 1399, see http://sunearth.gsfc. nasa.gov/eclipes/phase/phases.-1399-1300.html 98 Chrons. Rev., pp. 138–39. 99 Chrons. Rev., pp. 140–41.

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Although this version of events is tempting to believe, it is not as credible as it at first appears. The figure of 40,000 is an over-exaggeration. It is highly doubtful that there were as many as 40,000 people in that part of the kingdom, let alone 40,000 men of military age. Such outrageous numbers were used by Creton to evoke pathos in his reader. Numbers aside, questions also need to be asked about Creton’s chronology. Documents demonstrate that Salisbury received his commission as “governor of the principality of Chester and North Wales” only on 19 July.100 Michael Bennett accepted the date of 19 July as the date for Salisbury leaving the king to pursue his duties,101 but to accept a date this late is problematic. Assuming that Salisbury was with the king when he received his commission on 19 July and that he left Richard for North Wales immediately upon receipt of the appointment poses several difficulties. First, Richard had left Dublin on 17 July and was in the process of crossing Leinster, a portion of the Irish countryside that could be potentially dangerous to any Englishman. Second, it seems unlikely that the king would have waited until 19 July to settle on a governor of North Wales and Cheshire and then sent him off to find a ship from the middle of Leinster. Third, there is the simple problem of chronology. Even if Salisbury did not leave Ireland until he received his commission as governor on 19 July, he would not have arrived at Conway in North Wales, where Creton claims they made landfall, until at best 21 July. Richard arrived at Conway no later than 3 August—a space of thirteen days. Creton claims that Salisbury raised an army in four days and held the force for a fortnight waiting for the king. If Creton’s claims are accurate then Salisbury left before 19 July. Thus, from a strictly chronological perspective there is need for a different interpretation of these events. Salisbury’s commission came under the great seal of the palatinate of Chester, not from the Crown, and although there was little meaningful distinction between these two entities in Richard II’s day, the administrative history of the document provides some clues as to the date on which Salisbury actually received his office and orders. The document currently resides in a record classification called CHES 2 in the National Archives/Public Record Office.102 The CHES 2s 100 101 102

PRO CHES 2/73 m. 1; Davies, “Richard II and Chester,” p. 275. Bennett, Richard II, p. 160. PRO CHES 2/73 m. 1; DKR, 36, p. 99.


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were enrolled accounts, and like all enrolled accounts were entered onto the rolls neatly and cleanly sometime after the events in question. Although Richard had transported a portion of his Chancery with him to Ireland in June 1399, the conditions in the field coupled with the exigencies of the political moment suggest that Richard gave Salisbury his office as governor of North Wales and Chester probably at the extraordinary meeting of the king’s council on 12 July at Dublin. The earl received a signet letter for his office and that when the account was enrolled, after the deposition, the clerk wrote down 19 July as the date from which the enrolled patent was valid. Thus, if Salisbury received his office on 12 July and arrived at Conway with Creton in tow on 14 or 15 July, then Creton’s chronology fits neatly into the flow of events. From his arrival on 15 July, Salisbury took, Creton claimed, four days to raise a body of men, which the earl accomplished by 19 July. Creton further claimed that Salisbury held them for a fortnight before the Welshmen disbanded, fourteen days later gives a date of 2 or 3 August; roughly the same time the king arrived in Conway to receive the bad news that the majority of Welshmen had dispersed. Exactly what occurred in the principality of Chester in the eight weeks of July and August 1399 will likely never be known for certain. While it may be, as Walsingham claimed, that the people of the county were simply predisposed to unruly behavior,103 or as Wylie thought, that Cheshire “was an especially lawless district,”104 it is clear that before 1397 the king had found it necessary to put down rebels in Cheshire,105 and that in June and July 1399 political lines were being redrawn within the region. Initially at least the principality answered the royal summons loyally. Not only was Chester castle put into a state of defense on 3 July, but according to Walsingham, those men who answered Salisbury’s called formed small bands of loyalists and attacked Henry’s baggage, along with plundering local residents.106 Although the exact effect of these loyalist

103

Annales Henrici Quarti, p. 160. Wylie, Henry IV, I: 121. 105 PRO C 47/14/6/44. Between 1387 and 1397 instructions were issued by the king to John Holand, then Earl of Huntingdon, and Sir John Stanley to put down rebels within the county. 106 But Walsingham continued, these loyalists were little more than a nuisance and they were quickly put down by the efforts of Henry “hotspur” Percy, Chrons. Rev., p. 124. 104

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bands is unknown, following the king’s capture in mid-August at Flint, a number of these royalists came to Henry at Chester and submitted to him there.107 Nevertheless, a number of signs point to the fact that the efforts of Salisbury and the royalists within the enlarged principality were increasingly ineffective, not only in resisting Henry’s advance, but also in holding the principality for the king.108 News of the political and military disruption within the principality in June and July 1399 clearly reached York and the government in the south, and they tried to react, as best they could, to the situation in Cheshire. The chancellor, Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, sent a letter close to Sir Ralph Radcliffe, sheriff of Lancaster, and Sir Robert Leigh, sheriff of Chester, reminding both that they had sworn an oath before him on the gospels to defend the realm against the king’s enemies and to quit the realm if they failed to do so.109 Stafford’s letter is undated but a time frame for the missive may be surmised. York’s initial letters to sheriffs for the raising of troops were sent on 28 June; Chester would received these by 3 July—a space of five days. If Robert Parys, Chamberlain of Chester, knew of troubles within the principality as early as 4 July and sent a letter to York and the Council, they would not have received it before 9 July, which becomes the earliest possible date for Stafford’s letter.110 The government continued to operate from the safety of Wallingford castle until 18 July, when the last letters patent and close were issued by Stafford on the authority of the duke of York. Thus, Stafford’s remonstrance to Radcliffe and Leigh probably arrived in the principality sometime

107 These were, John Mascy, John Lee, John son of John Lee, John son of Robert Lee, Thomas Haslington and Robert Donne, PRO CHES 2/73 m. 7. 108 PRO SC 6/774/10. 109 Stafford’s letter is entered on to the close roll at membrane 2d with several other undated letters and one dated 20 June. Clearly, a date of 20 June is out of the question because York and the government did not even know of Henry’s intentions and he had not yet even left France. Since the letter is entered on the close roll chances are good that it actually was sent to Radcliffe and Leigh. Of course, it did not have the desired effect, CCR, 1396–1399, p. 505. The oath of loyalty to which the Bishop referred were taken on 8 May 22 Richard II (i.e. 1399), between Sir Ralph Radcliffe and Sir Robert Legh of Lancaster in Chancery and before the king himself. Not only did they take oaths of loyalty to Richard II, the two also promised not to rebel while the king was in Ireland, PRO, C 259/3 m. 33. 110 This date has a better pedigree than others. On 9 July messengers drew wages from the Exchequer to take letters from the duke of York to the sheriff of Lancaster, PRO E 403/563 m. 12, 9 July.


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between 14 and 23 July. Whatever the chancellor hoped to achieve by his letter neither Leigh nor Radcliffe abandoned the Lancastrian cause for the king. Another factor that speaks to the political and military disruption within the principality are the movements of the earl of Salisbury in mid- and late July. The fact that Creton, who accompanied Salisbury throughout July and August, never moved further east than Conway, strongly suggests that a substantial amount of political disruption had already occurred within the principality, and it was not safe for Salisbury to move into the king’s “inner citadel.” One piece of evidence supporting this contention is the date of Salisbury’s letter patent making him Governor of Chester and North Wales. As we have seen Salisbury most likely received his signet letter granting him office on 12 July. He arrived in North Wales on 14 or 15 July, but Salisbury’s signet letter did not become a letter patent under the Cheshire seal Robert Parys, Chamberlain of Chester, until 19 July. The distance from Conway to Chester is only about 50 miles and this distance could easily have been traversed in a day or two at most by a messenger. The fact that it took Salisbury four or five days just to have his signet letter arrive with Parys, coupled with the fact that other communication between the Salisbury and the king on the one hand and Parys on the other had to be done via messenger,111 is strongly suggestive of political upheaval within the principality and that the region was not safe for the king or for his supporters. Nevertheless, it seems that Salisbury did make at least one attempt to secure the north-west in Richard’s name. On 20 July Richard II made the last effective appointment to office before his capture at Flint when he appointed William Egerton to the constableship of Heleigh castle under the Cheshire Seal.112 This appointment has 111

The letter ordering Parys to bring the seals of Chester (i.e. the new seal and the seal he used when King Edward III still lived) was sent on the Tuesday before the Feast of St. Peter ad Vincula, or 28 July. But, Parys did not leave Chester until the Tuesday after the Feast of St. Peter, or 5 August. The two seals of the principality to deliver the seal to the king in North Wales on the orders of Thomas, Duke of Surrey. It appears, however, that these two seals never made their way to the king in Wales because Richard did not receive them until he was at Lichfield on 24 August “in the presence of the Duke of Lancaster,” DKR, 36, p. 376. It is probable that Salisbury never entered Chester and that his letter patent came to him through an intermediary. 112 The appointment was most likely made in Richard’s name by the Earl of Salisbury.

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caused some confusion among historians,113 and with some reason. To begin with, Heleigh was not a royal castle. In fact, it was the principal seat of the Tuchet barons of Audley where Richard II had visited in 1385.114 Although it is possible the castle may at one time have been in the king’s hands due to the minority of the heir, in 1399 John Tuchet, Lord Audley, was in his 20s and clearly not a minor.115 Further confusing matters is the fact that Heleigh castle lay outside of the recently enlarged principality of Chester where, technically at least, the Cheshire Seal had no authority. The reason for Egerton’s appointment to the constableship of Heleigh rests in the castle’s sudden strategic and geographic importance in July. By the middle part of July, Salisbury at Conway would have had some knowledge of Henry’s movements through Yorkshire. Although Montague could not have known Henry’s intentions, Henry’s position within the Palatinate of Lancaster, the fact that Lancastrian lands and supporters were thick on the ground in Derbyshire, and the nearby Lancastrian estate High Peak was raising troops to support Henry, made the north east of England a likely spot for Henry’s line of advance. Salisbury’s appointment of Egerton to the keeping of Heleigh represents an attempt to bar Henry from moving into the principality from the east. The castle at Heleigh, of which only the motte remains nestled up against the north wall of the church of St. James at Audley, sat at the upper end of the Trent valley. As such, Heleigh castle represented a serious impediment to anyone attempting to enter the principality from the southeast.116 Egerton’s appointment may also represent an act of desperation on Salisbury’s part. The upheaval within the principality meant that he could not rely on the loyalty of the defenses of the central and eastern portions of his jurisdiction and he had to seek the aid of members of the political community outside the principality. It is unknown if Egerton ever took 113 For example, the editor of the Deputy Keeper’s Report for which the Cheshire Rolls were calendared dated Egerton’s appointment as 30 July, but the roll itself (CHES 2/73 m. 1) clearly dates the appointment as 20 July. Michael Bennett misidentifies Egerton’s appointment as being the constableship of Harlech castle on the coast of North Wales, Bennett, Richard II, p. 231 n. 192. 114 Philip Morgan, “Audley Family,” DNB, II: 929–31. 115 John Tuchet, Lord Audley, inherited the lordship through right of his mother. He was born in 1371 and proved his age in 1392, Cokayne, Complete Peerage, 12:2; 60–61. 116 I am grateful to Dr. Philip Morgan for discussing this issue with me at length.


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up his office, but given the difficult conditions within the principality in July, and the fact that travel was considered dangerous, it is doubtful that he did.117 The most likely cause for the political upheaval in the principality, which kept Salisbury from moving further east than Conway and that kept Egerton from taking up his post at Heleigh, resulted from the former Arundel estates in the southern portion of the principality combined with the Lancastrian estate of Halton, between the Mersesy and the Weaver, joined the general rising of Lancastrian estates against the king.118 In the months following the royal seizure of Arundel lands after the Revenge Parliament, Richard had worked hard to remove Fitzalan officers from the former Arundel lordships of Chirkland; Oswestry; Bromfield and Yale. These former Arundel retainers and officers no doubt had the same fears and antagonisms as the former Warwick and Lancastrian retainers and officers in 1399. Richard’s heavy recruitment of Cheshiremen for his Irish army left few loyal men in the principality. Many of those who remained were these disenfranchised Arundel retainers. The fact that the young Thomas, Earl of Arundel, and Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, accompanied Henry of Lancaster rekindled old Arundel loyalties and these disenfranchised family retainers, combined with the fact that there were few Ricardians there to suppress them, led these Arundel lordships to join in the rebellion. In addition to the rising of these former Arundel lordships within the principality, a number of Ricardian loyalists defected to the Lancastrian cause. For example, even though Sir John Poole and Sir William Stanley, both members of the king’s retinue, were among 117 Even the earl of Northumberland reminded the king at his capture in midAugust that the countryside around them in Cheshire was “disturbed by war,” Chrons. Rev., p. 148. 118 Prior to Gaunt’s death in February Halton castle had been in the hands of Gaunt’s most important retainer in Cheshire, Sir Richard Aston who had been in the duke’s retinue since at least 1382 (Reg., I, p. 8). The castle and honor of Halton had been given “in keeping” to Thomas, Duke of Surrey, by Richard II on 1 March 1399 (CFR, 1391–1399, pp. 294–95). Surrey deprived Ashton of the stewardship of Halton and replaced him with Thomas Holford, one of the leaders in the king’s Cheshire bodyguard (Morgan, War and Society, p. 202; for Holford’s place in Richard’s bodyguard, see PRO E 101/42/10 m. 5). Holford’s absence in Ireland in July and August 1399 probably made it easier for Aston who remained in England to raise the honor of Halton for Henry. Following the deposition in 1399, Aston returned as steward of Halton (Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 370), and fought for the king in Wales, but was captured there in 1404 by the rebels (CC&C, p. 181).

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the commissioners to array 80 archers and to lead them to Ireland, on 15 May both men were arrested for treason.119 It may be that their defection and arrest was due to the influence of Sir John Stanley, Sir William’s kinsman, who joined Henry in 1399.120 Another Cheshireman charged with treason was Thomas Toun of Russheton,121 while William Stokton from the Lancastrian estate of Halton suffered arrest and imprisonment at the hands of royal agents on 13 July.122 By far the most significant defection from the royalist cause was that of Sir Robert Leigh the sheriff of Chester. In spite of the fact that both Leigh and Ralph Radcliffe, the sheriff of Lancaster, had sworn to Richard before his departure to “resist any rising of the people against him,” both of them joined Henry in the summer of 1399. The importance of Leigh’s decision to join Henry of Lancaster cannot be overestimated. The Leighs were one of the most important families in Cheshire in the late fourteenth century and the family held lands on both sides of the Mersey. As Michael Bennett notes evidence exists of collusion between Leigh and the sheriff of Lancaster, Sir Ralph Radcliffe,123 in the summer of 1399,124 and the relationship between these two men is possibly responsible for Leigh’s decision. Ralph Radcliffe of Blackburn and Smithills in Lancashire had been one of Gaunt’s retainers since the early 1380s.125 Although he also received annuities and hand entered into contracts of indenture with both the king and the Earl Marshal, his appointment as sheriff of the Palatinate in 1397, which lay within wholly within Gaunt’s purview, is openly suggestive of where Radcliffe’s loyalties lay.126 In addition to the rising of the former Arundel lordships and the defection of erstwhile loyal Ricardians, a number of important Ricar119 The commission of array was dated 24 February 1399, DKR, 36, Appendix II: 189, 385, 445. 120 CC&C, pp. 219–22. 121 DKR, 36, p. 175. 122 DKR, 36, p. 537. 123 Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, pp. 461, 493. 124 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 585; CCR, 1396–1399, p. 505; CC&C, p. 17. 125 Reg. II, 34, p. 9. 126 Simon Walker argued that Radcliffe had had a falling out with John of Gaunt in the late 1380s and became a willing part of Richard II’s attempts to make meaningful political inroads into Gaunt’s control over the county of Lancaster (Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 178–79), but the fact that Radclilffe whole heartedly supported and prospered under Henry IV (such as being receiver at Lancaster [DL 42/15 f. 112]) argues for a more standard interpretation of his role and loyalties, see J. A. Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility, pp. 209–10; CC&C, p. 17, 169.


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dian retainers who did remain loyal were arrested in late July and early August. James Darteys, John Dunne, William Dunne, John de Legh, and John Mascy of Tatton who had helped Thomas Talbot lead the rebellions in Cheshire against the king’s enemies in the mid 1390s all were arrested before Henry arrived in Chester on 8 August,127 and were only released by Henry in late August and even then only after substantial sureties for their good behavior had been guaranteed. By far the most significant Ricardians who suffered arrest and imprisonment were Sir William Bagot and Peter Legh. As we have seen, Sir William Bagot had been in London with the custodian and Council but had fled from York and his army about 17 July at Oxford under the pretext of bearing a message to the king in Ireland. Bagot traveled to the principality of Cheshire instead where he possessed broad powers as steward of the former Arundel lordships of Bromefeld and Yale, Chirk, and Oswestery, no doubt in hopes of helping to raise the country for the king.128 Yet, Bagot found his attempts were unsuccessful and he was captured, imprisoned, by local—probably Arundel— interests, and finally brought before Henry at Chester.129 Perhaps the most significant episode of Henry’s dealings with Ricardain loyalists in Chester, however, involves the arrest and summary execution of Peter Leigh, one of the king’s esquires. Peter Leigh of Lyme could not only be counted as an esquire of the royal household, but he was also a retainer of the king’s half-brother, John Holand, Duke of Exeter, from whom he had a £10 annuity.130 Leigh’s association with the king was exceedingly close and so well known that one of Richard’s Cheshire bodyguards even wrote several lines of poetry about him in English.131 Peter Leigh also served as one of the esquires in the king’s Cheshire bodyguard and drew payments for his service in 1398/99.132 His association with these troops meant that he probably served with Richard in Ireland and that he came 127 For Mascy’s role in the Cheshire rebellions in the early and mid 1390s, see Bellamy, “Northern Rebellions,” pp. 270–72. 128 The grant giving Bagot a life interest in the stewardship of Bromfeld and Yale, Chirk, Oswestry, the eleven towns and the castles of Pilip, Kynardeslegh, and Eggerlegh was given to him under the Cheshire seal on 28 May 1398, DKR, 36, p. 18. 129 Chrons. Rev., p. 110. 130 CC&C, pp. 177, 208. 131 BL Addl MMS, #35295 ff. 260 r–v; CC&C, p. 234; Clarke and Galbraith, “Deposition of Richard II,” p. 164. 132 PRO E 101/42/10.

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back to North Wales and Chester with Salisbury to raise the county for the king. Peter’s landed interests were in the eastern extremes of Cheshire and they extended into Staffordshire as well.133 It appears that Leigh attempted to work for King Richard in the last weeks of July,134 but with strong pro-Lancastrian sentiment apparently running in the west midlands at this time, his efforts were less than successful.135 Leigh suffered imprisonment at the hands of his kinsman and sheriff Sir Robert Leigh and was gaoled at Chester castle. Following his appearance before Henry of Lancaster on 9 August, his head was severed from his body and placed above the highest of the town’s gates.136 This act not only removed a well-known Ricardian follower, it also served notice as to Henry of Lancaster’s position and his control over political events in the very heart of Richard II’s personal domain. For Richard II, who had arrived in North Wales by 3 August, the political and military situation deteriorated rapidly. The sound military strategies that he had employed by first sending Salisbury to the heart of his domains to raise troops, then moving to South Wales to gather information and create a base for his returning army, before moving to North Wales to change the seat of war and catch Henry with a large and unwieldy army in the south and cut him off from his base of support in the north, had collapsed in ruin. Creton describes the king as “downcast and miserable,”137 and it is easy to see why. As the month of August progressed Richard found himself with a dwindling number of political and military choices. With so a small number of men around the royal standard in North Wales, any move to the east to confront Henry or castles being held for him would be folly, especially with the castles in the principality of Chester now closed to him. The forces he had collected in South Wales had dispersed by the second week in August and with Albemarle and Worcester along with a large number of Ricardians 133

CC&C, p. xii. Usk, Chronicle, pp. 56–58. 135 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 231–32. 136 Leigh’s execution attracted not only the attention of the Monk of Evesham (Chrons. Rev., p. 129) but also the chronicler at Dieulacres, who claimed Henry executed Peter Leigh “for no good reason” (Chrons. Rev., p. 154). The Dieulacres chronicler further noted that his head was reunited with his body in the following year when the men from Chester rose against King Henry IV. See also, Peter McNiven, “The Cheshire Rising of 1400,” BJRL (1970), pp. 375–96. 137 Chrons. Rev., p. 141. 134


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in the household establishment seeking to make peace with Henry, the king found that some of his closest friends as well as his troops had deserted him. The king’s movements from early to mid-August are a source of concern. Although Walsingham claimed that he king moved from Anglesey, to Conway, Beaumaris, Flint and Holt,138 in all probability such could not have been the case. As we have seen, Creton, who accompanied the king during these weeks, claimed that the king did not move further eastward than Conway. He then turned back to the west and crossed the Meani Strait to Beaumaris on Angelsey and then finally back eastwards to Caernarvon.139 Here external evidence seems to corroborate Creton’s version of events. The king would have reached Conway on 2 or 3 August and take a day or two to get his military and political bearings. Messengers sent from Conway on 4 August would have arrived in the Principality of Chester on 5 August and returned with the news of Sir Robert Leigh’s defection to Henry on 6 August and with him went the legitimate power structures of the Principality and probably all the money stored in Holt castle as well.140 Faced with the collapse of his position in the principality of Chester, Richard, according to Creton, remained at Conway and summoned his forces collecting in South Wales. Although calling for these troops may be considered the best option for the king at this moment, it is highly unlikely that moving troops up the western Welsh coast would be successful. The geography of western Wales made such a move problematic. The landscape was rugged and the roads were poor. The dearth of urban centers of any size north of Aberystwyth made supplying a large military force with such basic items as food and water almost impossible without some logistic preparations, for which there was no time. Nevertheless, the body of troops under the command of Albemarle and Worcester, which contained Richard’s much vaunted and feared Cheshire bodyguard, was the only force of any size left to the king outside of Ireland, and the king soon learned that this force had ceased to exist.

138

Chrons. Rev., p. 122. Chrons. Rev., p. 142. 140 Chrons. Rev., p. 143. It is possible that the story of the fall of Holt castle is how Creton related the event, although it is just as likely that Holt simply surrendered. 139

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Creton relates that the king did not know of the dispersal of his household and his army in South Wales for some time. Thus Richard remained at Conway for over one week until news of the army’s dispersal came to him. Assuming that Richard called for his forces in South Wales on 4 August, the day following his arrival at Conway, the messenger would have arrived in Cardigan about 8 August. The messenger then took another four days to cover the roughly 130 miles from Cardigan to Conway arriving there on or about 12 August to convey the bad news to the king. Creton claimed that on hearing the news of the breakup of the army in South Wales the king fled first to Conway, then to Beaumaris, the to Caernarvon, and finally to Beaumaris. According to Creton this movement between northern Welsh castles continued for between “four and six nights.”141 It seems most likely that it was five nights total since the Monk of Evesham claims that Henry of Lancaster sent Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, westward on 17 July to seek the king.142 Although Richard’s military and political options had dwindled since he first set foot on Welsh soil at Milford Haven less than a month before, the king still had a number of choices open to him. One viable option for the king to choose was a return to Ireland. He still held a portion of the army and substantial economic resources there; and with hindsight it seems that returning to Dublin or Waterford was Richard’s first, and best, choice. The king’s movements from Conway, to Beaumaris, to Caernarvon, and finally back to Beaumaris are suggestive of such a plan since all were ports. Unfortunately for Richard II the prevailing winds in North Wales are from the southwest and these would have put Richard at a substantial disadvantage in trying to get back to Ireland. Had the king taken ship at any of these ports and found himself at the mercy of the prevailing winds he could have been forced ashore on the northeastern coast in Lancashire or Cumberland which were in the hands of Lancastrian loyalists. Even if the king avoided making landfall in northeastern England the prevailing southwesterly winds might have brought him to Scotland where the unexpected and unwanted presence of a fugitive English king would have made the difficult political situation in the Scottish kingdom only more turbulent.

141 142

Chrons. Rev., p. 142. Chrons. Rev., p. 128.


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Even if Richard faced contrary winds that barred his route of escape and did not possess sufficient military force to counter Henry’s own in the open field, the king still had a number of options open to him. The king knew by 12 July that Henry had been in Chester for four days but had not moved further to the west. It appears that for several days both the king and Henry played a political waiting game to see who would make the first move. Henry had the option to move westward in force and besiege Richard in one of his great fortresses in North Wales. But, such a strategy would have played to the king’s advantage in several ways. Henry had not yet taken up army directly against the king. All of his propaganda to this point had spoken of Henry’s desire to aid Richard in governance and that the king’s councilors and not the king were to blame for the kingdom’s difficulties. A direct military move against the king would be a clear propaganda boon for Richard and one he could use to drive a wedge between Henry and his allies. A siege of one of Edward I’s great castles would have taken weeks if not months. The longer the siege took the more it would have tested Henry’s alliance that Henry and would have given Richard time to call for aid from his father-in-law Charles VI. Narrative sources tell us that during these days, the friends whom Richard had with him in North Wales counseled further options. The Traison et Mort claims that Salisbury advised the king to take ship and head for his possessions in Bordeaux.143 Salisbury, the Traison et Mort goes on to suggest, along with Thomas Merks, Bishop of Carlisle, the king’s esquire Janico Dartas, and the king’s clerks, William Feriby and Richard Maudeleyn, argued that in Bordeaux the king would find friends from France, Brittany and Gascony, where the English had a large number of troops.144 Yet, the king’s half-brother John Holand, Duke of Exeter, advised Richard that such a move to France would seem an act of cowardice. Rather than flee to France, he suggested, the king should first seek to make contact with Henry and discover his wishes. In retrospect it seems extremely foolish for Richard to have followed Exeter’s advice, but if the king’s and Exeter’s perception of Henry as one disinterested in politics and pliant in person were accurate,

143 144

Traison et Mort, pp. 191–92. Traison et Mort, p. 192.

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then sending Exeter to Henry has something to commend it. With Exeter went Thomas, Duke of Surrey, to seek Henry on 15 or 16 August. Creton claims that Exeter and Surrey “traveled all morning and night” until they came to Chester and there met with Henry. According to Creton, Exeter offered Henry his lands and the king’s pardon for all his actions. In addition, Creton also suggests that Exeter “spoke quite boldly” to Henry berating him for his actions “because he was his kinsman.”145 Henry, in response, had Surrey committed to the keep at Chester and refused to allow Exeter to return to the king. For the king who awaited news at either Beaumaris or Conway, political and military choices continued to dwindle. Creton claims Richard had called ships to Conway for escape but continued to wait for word from Exeter and Surrey. Since both were, in effect, Henry’s prisoners no word could come from the mouth of Ricardian loyalists. On Henry of Lancaster’s orders, Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, arrived before the walls of Conway on 17 August with a small contingent of men to seek the king. Henry probably chose Northumberland to seek Richard not only because his age would give his words credibility, but also because Northumberland had received a substantial amount of good lordship from the king on 1 May,146 and had the past reputation of being a political moderate. In essence, of all the great men of the realm in Henry’s entourage in August 1399, Northumberland alone stood the best chance of convincing Richard of the truth of Henry’s promises. Since neither his half-brother nor nephew returned to him with news, Richard had little choice but to come forward from Beaumaris and meet with the earl to find out what Henry wished of him. Probably unknown to Richard, Northumberland had taken both Flint and Rhuddlan on his journey to Conway, although at this point possession of these castles meant little to the king. The demands that the Earl of Northumberland brought to the king at Conway had, in many ways, become common in the reign of Richard II. According to Creton, Northumberland wished the king to call a parliament and with Henry acting in his position as hereditary steward, to judge with him the five men whom Henry claimed had advised Richard

145 146

Chrons. Rev., pp. 142–43. CPR, 1396–1399, pp. 482–83.


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to kill Thomas of Woodstock, Duke of Gloucester. The five Northumberland named were, John Holand, Duke of Exeter; Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey; John Montague, Earl of Salisbury; Thomas Merks, Bishop of Carlisle; and Richard Maudeleyn, king’s clerk. Northumberland assured the king that Henry sought nothing but the lands of his father that were rightfully his and that if Richard wished to go by a different route than Henry to London for the Parliament, then he was free to do so.147 Rather than accept his fate in a fit of melancholia as English chroniclers and some modern historians claim, the king, Creton reported, agreed to speak to Henry. Although Nigel Saul argues that by this time Richard believed the “struggle was as good as over,”148 it seems more reasonable to conclude that Richard believed the struggle was just beginning. If indeed the king saw Henry as pliant and easily led, then Creton’s claim that Richard hoped to use this parley with Henry for his own purposes. It seems that here the king believed Northumberland’s claim that Henry had no intention of restricting the king’s movements or of taking him prisoner. Richard wished to use his time with Henry first to grant him whatever the duke wished, and then to move back into Wales. This would give the king not only time raise the Welsh against Henry, but also give him the opportunity with his royal words to draw “half ” of those who stood with Henry at the moment to the royalist camp. Once his own forces had been collected he would exact his revenge on Henry and put him to a “bitter death.”149 Although Creton’s claims on the part of the king seem out of line with the realities of the political situation facing him, if the French valet’s reports are accurate, they reveal much about the mind of the king at this time. Rather than wallow in a fit of self-pity or display signs of mental instability in these difficult days of mid-August, the king acted with rational thought and some wisdom as he played the political cards remaining to him. Richard of Bordeaux had been in political situations no worse than this in the preceding two decades of his reign; not only had he survived them all, he had ultimately triumphed. His councilors had underestimated him in 1381 when his bold action had brought about the end of the Great Revolt at 147 148 149

Chrons. Rev., pp. 144–45. Saul, Richard II, p. 415. Chrons. Rev., p. 146.

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Smithfield; his enemies had underestimated him in 1386, and though they triumphed in 1388, their victory proved ephemeral. Richard returned to personal rule in 1389, and between 1397 and 1399 he had turned the tables on his enemies and removed them, one way or another, from the political community. Given the demands and program of action that Northumberland brought before the king at Conway, there was really nothing to suggest that Richard would not triumph now. His chief opponent, Henry of Lancaster, had never in his life taken an interest in politics, and the king clearly doubted that the coalition of the disaffected that Henry had cobbled together in June and July could long endure, especially after the majority of the royal affinity returned from Ireland. Richard’s plans, as Creton relates them, suggest that the king believed he could easily mollify Henry, if not dominate him. The thought that the political community would allow Henry of Lancaster to capture him and then replace him as king was inconceivable to Richard at Conway. Nonetheless, the advisers that remained to him counseled prudence, and asked the king to make the old earl of Northumberland swear on a consecrated host that he was telling the truth and held no ulterior motives. Once Northumberland had sworn to this on the “body of our Lord and savoir” the king agreed to join the earl and meet with Henry. Whether or not the king thought Henry Percy to be loyal or believable is impossible to tell, but not far from Conway the body of troops Northumberland had stationed out of sight of the castle approached Richard and made him prisoner.150 Richard was then led forward to Flint. Here he met not only Archbishop Arundel, but also Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, and Thomas, Earl of Worcester, the latter of whom now wore Henry’s livery collar of S’s rather than the king’s White Hart.151 Here Richard had a brief meeting with Henry, before they moved on to Chester. Throughout the remainder of August and throughout September Henry ruled in Richard’s name. On 19 August letters close were sent from Chester in Richard’s name to the lords spiritual and temporal summoning them to parliament. Sheriffs of every shire and town councils of those boroughs who held the privilege also received letters close asking them to select members of the Commons and 150 151

Chrons. Rev., pp. 146–151. Traison et Mort, pp. 201–15. Chrons. Rev., p. 149.


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for them to assemble at Westminster.152 On 20 August Henry set out for London with Richard II in tow. As Henry moved the captive king through Nantwich and Lichfield men from Cheshire made an attempt to rescue Richard near the town Cholmondeston.153 Unfortunately for Richard, this attempt to rescue him proved a failure. It also seems that Richard himself tried to escape his captors by lowering himself down into the garden at Lichfield castle from the great tower where he had been lodged on or about 24 August.154 This bid for freedom also failed, and following the foiled escape attempt, Henry ordered a dozen armed men to guard Richard lest the king should try his hand at escape again.155 The remainder of the Richard’s last journey to London save one cannot be considered a pleasant experience for him, and Henry made it only more so by openly seating him on a palfrey and forcing Richard to wear the same clothes for the entire journey.156 When Henry entered London, political events assumed the character of well-staged Lancastrian political theatre. Henry addressed a crowd of Londoners and showed off his captive to the approving crowd. For Creton, the scene brought to mind a similar episode from scripture in which Pilate presented Jesus Christ to the Jews.157 On 30 September 1399 parliament assembled to an empty throne. In another clearly staged act of political theatre, Henry left his place among the lords, placed his hand on the throne and “challenged” the realm. Richard of Bordeaux was packed off to Pontefract castle and only seen in public again on his last journey to the priory at King’s Langley in 1400 where his uncovered face in his lead-lapped coffin remained visible to all so that they would know their former king was indeed dead.

152

CCR, 1396–1399, pp. 520–21. Morgan, War and Society, p. 204. 154 Chrons. Rev., p. 152. At Lichfield the king received custody of the seals of the principality and earldom of Chester that had left the keeping of the chamberlain, Robert Parys, on Tuesday, 5 August. These were supposed to be sent to the king in Wales but apparently only made it to Richard II at Lichfield on 24 August by which time he had been in Henry of Lancaster’s keeping for over a week, DKR, 36, p. 376. 155 Creton, pp. 175–76. 156 The monk of Evesham claimed that Richard was dressed in a simple set of garments, Chrons. Rev., p. 130. 157 Creton, p. 179. 153

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Map 4. Richard II in Wales

CHAPTER SEVEN

FROM REBEL TO KING, AUGUST–SEPTEMBER, 1399

Following the meeting at St. Mary’s church, Berkeley, on 27 July, Henry joined his forces with those of his uncle, Edmund of Langley. The duke of York’s adherence to Henry’s cause changed the military landscape. The only military body raised in England in the king’s name had ceased to exist, and the king’s most loyal supporters left in England had either been captured, like Sir William Elmham, Lawerence Dru and Bishop Despenser, or, were fugitives like Sir John Bushy, Sir John Russell, Sir Henry Green and William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, and had gone to ground. As we have seen, for Henry of Lancaster, his uncle’s decision to join his cause and disband his army gave him the military advantages he needed to block the king’s routes of egress out of South Wales. With the unrest in the Principality of Chester, and the rising of the Lancastrian estates in the west Midlands and the Vale of Glamorgan, men loyal to Henry held all land routes out of Wales. By 27 July the only open route of egress to the east to King Richard was a naval one from Haverfordwest to Bristol. The following day Henry and York proceeded to Bristol to bar this last possible avenue of royalist advance. Within the city William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, Sir Henry Green, Sir John Bushy, and Sir John Russell were ensconced. Since Scrope purchased wheat in the city for the king’s men earlier in the month it seems that the four Ricardian loyalists expected the king to move forward to Bristol.1 However, on 28 July Henry’s army appeared before the walls of Bristol. Duke Edmund convinced the constable there, Sir Peter Courtenay, to open the city and castle to him.2 Courtenay’s decision to open the

1 Richard Hawker, one of the Earl of Warwick’s officers, claimed in the court of Chancery in the first year of Henry IV’s reign (i.e., 1399/1400) that one Henry May, merchant of Bristol, had stolen 5 quarters of wheat from the supply that William Scrope, late Earl of Wiltshire, had purchased for the use of Richard II and had placed in warehouses in Bristol, PRO C 1/29/542. 2 Chrons. Rev., p. 120.

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gates of Bristol and join Henry of Lancaster’s coalition meant that the four Ricardian loyalists; the earl of Wiltshire, Bushy, Green, and Russell, were quickly arrested and brought before Henry. A brief series of trials ensued before the earls of Northumberland and Westmorland. The judges concluded that Wiltshire, Bushy and Green were guilty of treason and executed.3 Sir John Russell, who feigned madness, was spared his fellows’ fate. These three summarily executions were out of character with what had gone before in Henry’s rebellion and prompted some comment by contemporaries. Walsingham claimed that they were executed because the common people clamored for their deaths and because Henry and his supporters learned shortly after taking Bristol that Richard had landed with a large army and they did not think it safe to carry Bushy, Green and Wiltshire around alive.4 Such rationale is, of course, absurd, and more sober historical tradition argues that their position as some of Richard’s notorious “evil councilors” merited their executions.5 But even this historiographic explanation seems a bit thin. None of these men had given Henry himself sufficient cause to warrant their deaths by his order, and to summarily execute these three was unusual for Henry of Lancaster, who both before and after worked hard to reconcile himself with rebels. Throughout the events of 1399 and during the Epiphany Rising of 1400, Henry usually sought to keep his opponents alive. There can be little doubt that Richard of Bordeaux owed his survival after his deposition to Henry’s aversion to murder—judicial or otherwise. Thus, these executions at Bristol might have been part of the price that Henry had to pay to members of his coalition for their joining him. Seen in this light, a more realistic appraisal of the execution of Bushy, Green and Wiltshire may perhaps be gleaned from looking at their individual careers prior to 1399, and in determining which members of Henry of Lancaster’s coalition they had particularly offended in the preceding years. Given which prominent noblemen William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, had offended in the 1390s, it is not difficult to explain his execution. Although, some in the political community might have perceived that his ambitions and his abilities had permitted him to rise in the 3

Chrons. Rev., pp. 120, 128, 156. Chrons. Rev., p. 120. 5 Bennett, Richard II, pp. 161, 235 n. 38; Saul, Richard II, p. 411; Kirby, Henry IV, p. 53. 4

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king’s favor beyond his station,6 the most likely cause for his death at the hands of a tribunal led by the earls of Northumberland and Westmorland rested in his acquisition of lands in the north. Throughout the 1390s Scrope had busied himself by building up significant holdings in North Yorkshire and Cumberland, which brought him into direct competition and conflict with the houses of both Percy and Neville. In the cases of Sir John Bushy and Sir Henry Green, the two earls who sat in judgment at Bristol probably considered their actions, and perhaps crimes, in the preceding twenty-two months worthy of execution. As we have seen, both Bushy and Green had served as conservators of the truce with the Scots that had been hammered out by John of Gaunt and David Stewart, Duke of Rothesay, in October 1398.7 It is clear that Bushy and Green had little appreciation for the task that faced them on the Northern Marches and their presence there and methods they employed to complete their tasks resulted in failure.8 Not only was the presence of these four men an affront to the Percy family, who were used to holding sway in the north, it was also a constant reminder to the Percies that Richard had undertaken a conscious policy to freeze them out of governance on the marches, which ‘hotspur’ bitterly resented.9 In addition to having the earl of Northumberland as an enemy, Sir John Bushy also had quite probably had a fierce enemy in Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury. Not only did Bushy unleash vitriolic attacks against the Archbishop’s brother, Richard, Earl of Arundel, when he served as speaker of the House in the Revenge Parliament of 1397, but Bushy also leveled charges of treason against Archbishop Arundel in the same parliament and further, out of fear of the Archbishop’s quick wit and influence, requested that the Archbishop not be allowed to defend himself.10 If the true tone of Bushy’s attack on Arundel is anywhere near as colorful as Usk portrays it in his chronicle, it is not difficult to see why the Archbishop despised Sir John and why his all but summary execution occurred. Sir John 6 The lordship of Man that Scrope received in 1392 included a kingly title, Saul, Richard II, pp. 219–92. 7 Two other Ricardian loyalists, the king’s esquire Lawrence Dru and the king’s clerk William Ferriby, rounded out the four conservators, Rot. Scot, II: 143–44. 8 Neville, Violence, Custom and Law, p. 81. 9 Arvanigian, “Henry IV and the Northern Nobility,” p. 123. 10 Usk, Chronicle, pp. 22–28. Davies, “Richard II and the Church,” p. 338.

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Russell was the only one of the four Ricardians captured at Bristol not sent to the block. Contemporary chroniclers claimed that he had “lost his mind,” or “gone mad,” and so was spared,11 and at least one extant letter patent does confirm Russell’s infirmities.12 The capture of Bristol removed yet another of the king’s military options. If Richard now chose to move forward from his base in South Wales, he would have to confront Henry in the Vale of Glamorgan where the duke of Lancaster was strong. With the Lancastrian estates of Kidwelly, Ogmore, Hay, and Brecon in arms, Henry knew that his men blocked the king’s egress from Wales as far north as the Wye valley. For Henry all that remained was to deal with the king directly. More than likely, Henry and his advisers realized by late July that they, for the moment at least, held the military advantage. Yet, this was an advantage that, if squandered by poor politics, could easily prove ephemeral. Thus, the next weeks for Henry would be critical. Everyone in Henry’s camp knew that Richard of Bordeaux had been in similar political and military situations before. Henry and his advisers also knew the king to be a skilled politician, who still held a number of cards to play and options to pursue. As Henry moved forward in late July and August he entered into the most delicate and dangerous part of his attempt at removing Richard II. He had to convince the king that his actions were nothing more than a third Appeal of Treason against the king’s evil councilors and that Henry had no designs on the Crown. Technically, at least Henry could make these claims with at least some validity. After all, in the heady days of 1387, it had been Henry who had stood apart from the senior Appellants in speaking out against removing Richard II following the royalist defeat at Radcot Bridge. Thus, the work of deposition now moved from the battlefield to the realm of politics, and the key player in convincing Richard of Bordeaux of the sincerity of Henry of Lancaster’s cause would be, ironically, Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland—perhaps the only one among Henry’s entourage by August whom Richard would find believable. Following the capture of Bristol, Duke Henry moved up the eastern side of the Welsh March. On 30 July Henry left Bristol and returned to Berkeley. The next day he moved to Gloucester, about

11 12

Chrons. Rev., pp. 128, 136. CPR, 1396–1399, p. 589.

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ten miles to the north. During this period Henry made some important decisions. As we have seen, the king with a small band of followers left Haverford on 30 July. News of the disintegration of Richard’s Household and the king’s rapid move to Chester reached Henry by 1 August since on that day he left Gloucester moving north.13 Henry moved by stages up the south easternside of the March from Gloucester through Hereford. Both Henry and the Archbishop of Canterbury had many friends here, especially among the great churchmen. Ralph Erghum, Bishop of Bath and Wells, had been a life-long Lancastrian and was one of the executors of John of Gaunt’s will,14 and when passing through Hereford, Henry and his entourage stayed with Bishop Trefant at his palace there,15 before arriving at Leominster on 3 August, making about 12 miles a day. Edward Charleton, Lord of Powis, with his contingent of men raised on Richard II’s order, joined Henry at Leominster on his march northwards.16 On 4 August Henry and his army moved to Ludlow, about ten miles from Leominster, and on 5 August the duke of Lancaster proceeded roughly eighteen miles to Shrewsbury. Here Sir Robert Leigh, sheriff of Chester, came to join Henry and give him the castle and town of Chester.17 Henry rested at Shrewsbury on 6 August, and on 7 August moved roughly ten miles to Prees. Finally, on 8 August, Henry’s force completed the twenty mile leg to Chester. Chris Given-Wilson has noted that Henry moved up the eastern side of the March with no great haste,18 but Henry faced a number of practical military and political concerns that helped to dictate the 13 Even by this early date Henry was receiving supplications and adjudicating them under the great seal of the duchy. The case that prompted the 1 August letter patent from Gloucester was a plea for Henry’s intercession as Steward of England over wrongful seizure of a French merchant ship and goods it carried, CPR, 1399 –1401, p. 243. 14 Erghum appears to have nearly been a victim of Richard’s attempt to remove him from his wealthy see of Bath and Wells and translate him to an Irish see in favor of Richard Clifford, Davies, “Richard II and the Church,” pp. 349–50. 15 Chrons. Rev., p. 158. It is difficult to know exactly why Bishop Trefant welcomed Henry so graciously in 1399. It is possible Trefant’s connections with the earls of Arundel were close because they held substantial estates in his diocese (Registrum Johannis Trefnant, Episcopi Herefordensis, 1389 –1404, ed. W. W. Capes [Canterbury and York Society, 1916], p. 6), but it is also possible that his zeal in prosecuting heretics brought to his court endeared him to Archbishop Arundel who had similar ideas on heresy, ibid., pp. 145–50, 231. 16 Chrons. Rev., p. 128. 17 Chrons. Rev., pp. 128–29. 18 Chrons. Rev., p. 38.

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speed at which he moved north. Although the Cambrian Mountains and the rugged Welsh terrain concealed the king’s movements and intentions, they also proved an impediment to Henry. He was forced to send scouts into these areas to ascertain the king’s whereabouts and progress. Henry’s measured pace up the march also gave him time to send and receive diplomats to ascertain the standing of various local lords and gentry and to bring those who were willing into the Lancastrian cause. This not only happened with Adam of Usk and Sir Edward Charleton, Lord of Powis,19 but it also seems to have been the case with large numbers of county gentlemen from the heavily pro-Lancastrian Marcher counties of Derbyshire and Staffordshire.20 In addition to these considerations, Henry also had to look to the practical matter of feeding and providing for his large and ever-growing army. Unlike the duke of York, even after 27 July, Henry did not have access to the regular machinery of government that could be mobilized to supply his troops with food and his horses with fodder. It is possible that Henry issued writs of purveyance under the great seal of the duchy, but if so, none survive. It seems, rather, that Henry either allowed his army to live off the land or was unable to stop them from doing so as they moved through portions of the English countryside, and even pro-Lancastrian chroniclers commented on his troops’ actions.21 Given the upheaval occurring in the Principality of Chester Henry would have been able to rest assured that Richard would not be able to count on unanimous support from that quarter. No doubt the most important practical political issue that loomed before Henry in these “dog days” of August, as Adam of Usk described them,22 centered on the person of Richard himself. In just one month 19

Usk, Chronicle, pp. 52–55. It seems that from the gentry of both counties only Sir John Stathum stood by Richard II in 1399, Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 232. 21 Creton claimed that even the king knew of the wastage Henry’s troops had committed on their march through the countryside, Chrons. Rev., pp. 146–47. The Dieulacres chronicle claimed that the citizens of the principality feared his army’s approach, but Henry had proclaimed at the High Cross in Chester that his men would not take anything, kill anyone, or seize any food save for themselves and their animals. In spite of these promises, Henry’s men robbed the citizens of Chester and devastated the surrounding countryside, slaughtering cattle and leaving their carcasses to rot and burning farm implements so essential for rural life, Chrons. Rev., pp. 153–54. Adam of Usk also reports the general pillaging of Henry’s troops, Chrons. Rev., pp. 158–59. 22 Usk, Chronicle, pp. 52–53. 20

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Henry had gone from landing at Bridlington with a force of insignificant size to receiving the surrender of Chester and, with it, control of the very heart of the king’s base of landed power in England. But, the question that probably occupied Henry and his councilors in these days was how to approach the king? Unless Richard fled to Ireland, or the continent his capture was necessary, but this fact cut both ways politically. Promising to help Richard govern the kingdom with a council of the good and wise men of the realm made for good propaganda, and appears to have been very successful in attracting large numbers of lords and gentlemen to Henry’s cause, but transforming these amorphous promises into political reality was another thing altogether. During the period from the fall of Bristol until Henry’s communication with the king at Conway, the duke of Lancaster and his advisers worked out the manner in which they would address their concerns with the king. The addressing of such a volatile political subject took a considerable amount of time and effort. James H. Ramsay argued that Edmund of Langley’s “adhesion [to Henry] seemed to clothe Henry’s subsequent acts with the authority of Richard’s government,”23 but as James Sherborne noted, “this is not easy to see.”24 Although Duke Edmund’s army, or more correctly, what was left of it by 27 July, had been neutralized, York did not have any of the legitimate tools of government with him at Berkeley. The chancellor, Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, remained at Wallingford and continued to operate as an organ of the legitimate form of government until mid-August. The king himself possessed one Great Seal in Ireland, and as we have seen Robert Parys, chamberlain of Chester, possessed no less than two seals from the principality of Chester, which the king and the earl of Salisbury used in July to authenticate government actions. Most likely, as James Sherborne suggested, Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of Canterbury, was “influential” at this time.25 Not only did Arundel offer Henry political advice, but he also gave him practical administrative experience.26 The delicateness of Henry’s political position in late July and August found its expression in the necessity of liberally granting annuities 23 24 25 26

Ramsay, Genesis of Lancaster, II: 353. Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 138. Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 150. Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 153; Davies, “Thomas Arundel,” p. 14.

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and offices to his friends and confirming offices and annuities in Richard’s name even before he had made the king his captive. As Michael Bennett notes, throughout Henry’s movements in July and August, the duke attempted to involve as much of the political community as possible in his cause, which clearly suggests that the early stages of the rebellion were not as broad based as some historians have assumed.27 Although, as McFarlane noted, such attempts proved expensive and Henry did not appreciate the gravity of his actions,28 nonetheless Henry’s grants and attempts to cement relationships with the many Ricardians who came to him in these weeks were not in vain.29 One of the most important grants Henry gave in this period came 2 August when he issued a patent under the great seal of the duchy to Henry, Earl of Northumberland, granting him the Wardenship of the Western March toward Scotland.30 J. M. W. Bean argued that in accepting this appointment Earl Henry knew, understood, and largely approved of Henry’s intentions to remove Richard from the throne,31 while Robin Storey claimed that in Percy accepting such an “unconstitutional” grant demonstrates a clear “complicity in the usurpation of Henry IV,”32 and James Sherborne perceived this grant as the first step in Earl Henry becoming the “king maker” of 1399.33 McFarlane was not so sure and thought that the Percies never fully accepted the Ricardian deposition, and also thought that strong words passed between Henry and the earl on more than one occasion in these days of July and August 1399.34 Given under the great seal of the duchy or not, the grant of the Wardenship was 27

Bennett, Richard II, p. 200. McFarlane, “Lancastrian Kings,” VIII: 362. 29 The number of Lancastrians who received annuities from Henry out of the duchy in the final month of Richard’s reign was substantial. Henry’s receiver, Sir John Leventhorpe recorded payments of £518 3s 4d for these annuitants in the last month of Richard II’s reign, PRO DL 28/4/1 m. 6v–11. Henry also gave substantial annuities to others outside the Lancastrian affinity and these are reflected in PRO E 163/6/21 and PRO E 163/6/35. 30 PRO E 404/13/46, 108; PRO E 404/15/52; English Historical Documents, ed. A. R. Myers (London, 1969), IV: 179; Storey, “Wardens,” p. 612. For ‘hotspur’s’ formal appointment by Henry IV as warden of the East March together with the keeping of Roxburgh and Berwick, Rot. Scot., II: 151. For Earl Henry’s appointment by Henry IV as warden of the West March with the keeping of Carlisle, Rot. Scot., II: 151. 31 J. M. W. Bean, “Henry IV and the Percies,” p. 220. 32 Storey, “Wardens,” p. 603. 33 Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 153. 34 LK&LK, pp. 52, 74. 28

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indeed a step up from the grant of a portion of the East March that Earl Henry had received from Richard II in June,35 and seems to support McFarlane’s vision of events and suggest that Percy, even at this late date, needed to be rewarded before proceeding further with Henry of Lancaster’s plan. Henry entered Chester in triumph on 8 August, where the clergy came out to meet him,36 but it was not until Richard approached Henry through the Dukes of Exeter and Surrey, four days later, on 12 August, that the two sides actually communicated with each other. It seems that over these four days Henry was in no hurry to force the king to do anything, and in practical terms—even with the massive array of troops under his command—he could really do little. An attempt to advance into North Wales to either besiege or capture Richard would have given the king more of a political advantage than Henry.37 Although Henry had taken the heads of several of the king’s “evil councilors,” he had not yet taken up arms directly against the king’s person, and this was not something to be done lightly. As Richard himself knew, North Wales was a difficult place to conduct a campaign, and if Henry had attempted to lay siege to Conway,38 or worse yet to Beaumaris on the Isle of Angelsey,39 the operation would have taken weeks or months. This time in siege would have tested the strength of the political alliance that Henry had forged so quickly in July, and allowed royalist propaganda to work throughout the kingdom. Any protracted siege would also have given Richard time to recall the remainder of his Irish host and allowed for the king to call on his father-in-law in Paris to come to his rescue. The embassy of the dukes of Exeter and Surrey reached Henry at Chester probably on 13 August. Henry received both dukes, had Surrey gaoled and kept his brother-in-law, Exeter, “close to him” throughout the following weeks. With two of the king’s chief councilors 35 For the letter from Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, requesting Richard II to grant Percy a portion of the East March dated 11 June 1399, PRO C 47/22/1/10. 36 Chrons. Rev., pp. 128–29. 37 McFarlane expressed a similar sentiment, LK&LK, p. 31. 38 Conway was apparently in a good state of repair in 1399, Colvin, King’s Works, I: 337–54. 39 Beaumaris was one of the many castles in North Wales built by Edward I. Richard had given the castle to William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire in 1397 (CPR, 1396– 1399, p. 82), and the castle seems to have been in a fine state of repair in 1399 (Colvin, King’s Works, I: 406).

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in his hands, Henry, seized the initiative and moved forward. It seems that Henry, with the group of men who acted as his council by this time, thought it best to use some sort of ruse to lure the king out from one of these great fortresses with few men and capture him. The group advising Henry at this time consisted of Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, Ralph, Earl of Westmorland, Philip Repington, Abbot of Leicester, and Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland. In addition to these great lords, Henry’s “council” contained some of Gaunt’s more important retainers such as Sir Thomas Rempston, John Norbury, John Cokayne,40 and the ubiquitous Sir Thomas Erpingham. By mid-August at the latest, Henry and his advisers decided to remove Richard II from the throne, for they knew if they did not do so, the king would at some point in the future exact revenge.41 With Exeter and Surrey safely in Henry’s hands, the coalition sent its own embassy to the king in North Wales. Not surprisingly, narrative accounts of the particulars of Henry’s embassy differ. Walsingham related the very unlikely story that Richard himself, well understood his position, and on condition that he would not be put to death and live honorably he offered to Archbishop Arundel and the earl of Northumberland a willing resignation of the crown in Henry’s favor.42 The monk of Evesham remained silent as to the particulars of what Henry’s ambassadors brought to the king,43 while the Traison et Mort described another unlikely scene in which Northumberland told Richard that the issues between Henry and the king would be resolved by a committee of five. This committee consisted of John

40 Cokayne, a man with much legal experience, received a payment of £69 as one of Henry’s councilors out of the Exchequer of the duchy on 28 September. Although it is not known how long Cokayne had acted in his capacity as a member of Henry’s council, his status in Gaunt’s affinity, the relatively large payment, and his relationship to Henry before and after the usurpation suggests that he was advising Henry even as early as mid-July, PRO DL 28/4/1 m. 12v. 41 It is also possible that the 1398 statute that extended the scope and definition of what Richard considered treason may have contributed to their actions. Following the Shrewsbury session the king ordered a statute that extended the definition of treason to any who plotted against the king or who took up arms against him in addition to anyone who tried to repeal or reverse any of the measures of the preceding parliament, Statutes of the Realm, II: 98–99; EHD, IV: 406. In the Deposition Parliament of 1399, Henry IV repealed all statutes dealing with treason enacted between 1352 and 1399, Statutes of the Realm, II: 114. 42 Chrons. Rev., p. 123. 43 Chrons. Rev., p. 129.

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Holand, Duke of Exeter, Thomas Merks, Bishop of Carlisle, John Montague, Earl of Salisbury, Richard Maudelyn, king’s clerk, and Ralph Neville, Earl of Westmorland.44 The most reliable narrative account of these events comes from Creton who, although not an eyewitness to every aspect of the events in question, had the benefit of being in closer proximity than any other narrative source. Creton recounted that Henry and his advisers thought Henry Percy, the aged Earl of Northumberland, the best person to deliver their message. Although the Creton claim that Percy was old and his age would give weight to his words, it is also likely that the king would have been more inclined to trust Percy because the two were apparently on good terms and, as we have seen, Earl Henry had the reputation of being a moderating political influence. The form of Henry’s embassy to the king was based on one that had become familiar in the last two decades of the fourteenth century: an Appeal of Treason. Five men were named by Henry as being guilty of treason for their role in the murder of Thomas of Woodstock, Duke of Gloucester, at Calais in 1397. Richard would call a parliament to meet at Westminster, and these five would be tried before both the king, and Henry, as hereditary Steward of England, would preside.45 At the parliament Richard would be “crowned with honor as lord and king.” Before this event the king and Henry would meet at Flint. Henry assured Richard that he wished to do nothing unreasonable and wished them to make peace between themselves before they would journey to London together, or if the king so wished, he could take his own road to the capital and parliament.46 Whether or not Henry’s proposal was an act of perjury, as Sherborne and McFarlane perceived, is of little practical relevance.47 Henry needed to gain control of the king quickly and achieving this without military force was desirable. Henry and the members of his coalition no doubt realized that any protracted siege would give time for many Ricardian supporters in Ireland to return home and also threatened the cohesiveness of their coalition. Henry and his advisers knew

44

Traison et Mort, p. 198. For the importance of this office and possibly how Henry viewed it, see Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” pp. 146–47. 46 Chrons. Rev., p. 145. 47 Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 153; LK&LK, pp. 47, 58. 45

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their opponent well, knew much of his mind, and could predict with some degree of certainty how he would react in a given situation. Rather than expecting the king to wallow in self-doubt and sink into mental instability, the proposal they put forward demonstrates that Henry and his friends knew that they were dealing with a king who had all his wits about him and for whom they had a healthy respect. It is possible that they believed their proposal played to Richard’s vanity. The most important consideration of the political moment for Henry, Arundel and the leaders of the coalition was to hide their real intentions from the king. If Richard even suspected that they intended to remove him from the throne, Henry and his allies would have a very difficult time ahead of them. This “Appeal of Treason” had the added effect of confirming the pro-Lancastrian propaganda that had been spread abroad in the land since May or June, that Richard’s advisers and not the king himself were the targets of Henry and his friend’s wrath. This fact, combined with the suggestion of yet another coronation, harkened back to the crisis of 1388, when Richard had undergone a second coronation as a symbol of “the healing of wounds after a time of strife.”48 The promise that the king could leave Henry’s company and choose his own road to London if he wished, suggests that Henry and his advisers wanted Richard to believe that, in much the same way as in 1388, the king’s regality would not be harmed or diminished in any way.49 Henry’s choice of Northumberland as his ambassador to Richard may be considered a wise one. As we have seen, Creton thought Northumberland believable because of his age, and the fact that he had been on reasonably good terms with the king prior to July 1399. Although Walsingham and Adam of Usk claimed that Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of Canterbury, came to Richard at Conway and convinced him to abdicate,50 this is certainly a product of post-deposition Arundel propaganda. Richard thought very little of Arundel and perhaps even despised him, and it seems that the Archbishop despised the king. Richard would probably not have believed anything that Arundel would have said, and Arundel, if we

48

Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 145. McFarlane perceives Richard’s reaction in a similar way, LK&LK, p. 31. 50 For Walsingham’s comment on the role of the Archbishop Arundel, see Chrons. Rev., p. 129. For Usk’s comment on the role of the Archbishop Arundel, see Chrons. Rev., p. 159. 49

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can take the passage in the Eulogium as a true indication of his feelings towards the king, would not have been able to control his emotions.51 Thus, it is probable that Henry and his advisers thought it best to keep the Arundel and the king separated as much as possible. Richard accepted Northumberland’s protestations of his good faith and rode out of Conway toward Flint. Awaiting the king and his small entourage was a large force that Earl Henry had hidden in the hills under the command of the ever-present Sir Thomas Erpingham.52 When the king’s company drew near, they surrounded and captured the king, who reacted first with anger and then with fear. Northumberland first took Richard to Rhuddlan, where they ate, and then on to Flint where the king met with Henry on 16 August. The interview at Flint between Henry and Richard was brief and polite. The king followed Henry to Chester, and for three days Henry and his councilors worked out the particulars of how to proceed. On 19 August letters close were sent from Chester in the king’s name for a parliament that would meet in Westminster on 29 September.53 Although the letters to the lords and sheriffs are conventional, several of these summonses are noteworthy. Thomas Beauchamp, disenfranchised Earl of Warwick, received an individual summons which strongly suggests that even before this time the coalition had made overturning the events of the Revenge Parliament a political reality. Thomas Erpingham also received a summons in his capacity as warden of the Cinque Ports and constable of Dover castle to have two burgesses from each of the five ports elected to parliament. Erpingham replaced John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, in an office important in the defensive network of the southeast, and his life interest in these offices was unusual and is suggestive of the power of the Lancastrian affinity.54 Before leaving Chester on 20 August, Henry pardoned a number of former Ricardian loyalists from Cheshire who had submitted to him.55 Henry’s mercy towards former opponents did not mean that

51

Eulogium, III: 382. Traison et Mort, p. 201. 53 CCR, 1396–1399, pp. 520–22. 54 Erpingham’s letter close dated 19 August (CCR, 1396–1399, p. 521) directing him to elect burgesses for parliament was sealed two days before the letter patent giving him life interest in the office which he received on 21 August (CPR, 1396–1399, p. 592). 55 Thomas Hasilington and Robert Sondbach, two archers of the king’s body 52

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he failed to use his position to appoint men to government office in Richard’s name that would see to his security. The first appointment to high office made by Henry in Richard’s name came on 16 August, significantly three days before Richard surrendered at Flint. The Duke of Lancaster placed John Trevor, Bishop of St. Asaph, in the chief civil office in the Palatinate of Chester, as chamberlain of Chester and North Wales.56 The choice of Bishop Trevor to fill so important an office is somewhat puzzling. Certainly, he cannot be counted among those great in statecraft prior to 1399, since most of his early career was made at the papal Curia. It is possible that he formed a personal bond with John of Gaunt, but their only known official connection was a joint diplomatic mission to Scotland in 1397.57 Trevor does not appear to have been a favorite of Archbishop Scrope, and later events prove his relations with Archbishop Arundel were cordial but not overly warm. Though Bishop Trevor forsook the Lancastrian establishment for the cause of Glendower and Percy, reading a close relationship with either before 1403 without evidence would be reckless. Most likely, Bishop John’s appointment turned on his adherence to Henry’s cause close upon his landing at Ravenspur and on the possibility that Henry liked him. Henry’s remaining appointments to high office in the period before his entrance into London illustrate the duke of Lancaster’s concern over military affairs. Sir Thomas Erpingham, one of Gaunt’s most trusted retainers who had looked after Henry throughout his lifetime, received a life appointment to the office of constable of Dover castle and warden of the Cinque Ports in King Richard’s name on 21 August.58 Erpingham replaced John Beaufort, Marquess of Dorset, who surrendered his letters patent in Chancery. Henry’s next appointment to high office in Richard’s name immediately preceded his entry into London on 31 August. Sir Thomas Rempston, one of Henry’s closest friends and retainers who shared his French exile, received a life appointment to the office of constable of the Tower

guard submitted themselves to Henry’s mercy by 20 August. Sir John Stanley and Sir Robert Legh gave sureties for their actions, DKR, 36, p. 222 for Hasilington, 420 for Sondbach. John de Legh also submitted to Henry by this date, DKR, 36, p. 292. 56 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 591. 57 Rot. Scot., II: 142. 58 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 592.

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of London.59 Rempston replaced Edward of York, Duke of Albermarle, who surrendered his letters patent in Chancery. The offices Bishop Trevor, Rempston and Erpingham received in August 1399 were of immediate political and military importance. Appointing Trevor to the highest administrative office in the palatine of Chester ensured a strong Lancastrian presence in the greatest bastion of Ricardian sympathy and served as a focal point for Lancastrian patronage for the local gentry.60 Both Erpingham’s and Rempston’s appointments were unusual because each received life interest to offices normally held during royal pleasure or good behavior, which demonstrates not only Henry’s trust in their abilities but the importance of the offices which he gave them. In addition, these offices were of tremendous importance to Henry’s security. Erpingham’s appointment as warden assured Henry that six ports of commercial and military significance lay firmly in his control. By holding these ports, not only could Henry halt any Ricardians who might attempt flight to the continent, but also prepare the southwest coast for defense against any French effort intended to aid Richard of Bordeaux. Rempston’s appointment as constable offered Henry legitimate control of the strongest royal residence east of the Welsh Marches. The Tower’s geographic location at the seat of government offered the Duke of Lancaster several advantages: Henry could govern from the Tower, in addition to employing it as a prison for Richard II, and defend himself within it if the need arose. Though the rapid appointments to these high offices in the first weeks following Richard’s surrender demonstrate the Duke of Lancaster’s concern over his security at one level, Henry’s desire to consolidate his position in certain localities in August may be evidenced by the installation of important members within his affinity to the office of sheriff. On 22 and 27 August the Duke of Lancaster made five appointments to shrivel office in Richard’s name, covering the seven counties of Cambridge, Huntington, Essex, Hertford, Lincoln, Warwick, Leicester, Nottingham, and Derby.61

59

CPR, 1396–1399, p. 593. For commentary on Henry IV’s attempts at accommodation in the Palatinate of Chester, Bennett, CC&C, p. 186. 61 CFR, 1391–1399, p. 308. 60

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Thomas Hasilden, a Cambridge esquire and a member of John of Gaunt’s retinue since at least 1365 became sheriff of Cambridge and Huntington.62 John Doreward, an Essex esquire, who served on the councils of the late Thomas of Woodstock as well as being a close friend and supporter of Archbishop Arundel Arundel, received the shrivel office of Essex and Hertford.63 John Copuldyk, a Lincoln esquire with much past local government experience and some Lancastrian connections, received appointment as sheriff of Lincoln.64 John Berkeley, a Leicester esquire who served the house of Beauchamp, became sheriff of Warwick and Leicester, and John Leek, a Nottingham esquire and brother-in-law of Sir Thomas Rempston, received shrivel appointment to the counties of Nottingham and Derby.65 The special attention Henry gave to the occupants of these shrivel offices was not random. Not only did a large portion of the Lancastrian inheritance south of the Trent and west of the Welsh March lay within these counties, so too did a large share of the former Gloucester and Warwick estates, which Richard had distributed to the Appellants of 1397.66 In addition, the five men these Lancastrians replaced were all members of Richard’s affinity. Andrew Newport who served as sheriff of Cambridge and Huntington was a king’s serjeant-at-arms, John Littlebury, the sheriff of Lincoln, was one of Richard’s knights, Robert Morton was an esquire of Richard’s Household.67 Though Aymer Lichefield, who served for Warwick and Leicester, and William Bateman, who served for Essex and Hertford, were not formally retained by Richard, it appears they were closely tied to the king. Both served in numerous royally appointed offices such as escheator,

62

Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 217. Round, “John Doreward, Speaker 1399, 1413,” EHR 29 (1914), pp. 717–719; John Roskell, The Commons and Their Speakers in English Parliaments; 1376–1523 (Manchester, 1965), pp. 139–140, 64 Elisabeth Kimball, “Lincolnshire Justices of the Peace.” Lincolnshire Record Society 49 (1953), p. xxiii. 65 Payling, Political Society in Lancastrian England (Oxford, 1991), pp. 108–137. 66 CIPM, 1399–1406, pp. 336, 339, 459. 67 RH&KA, p. 249. Worship began his service in Richard’s Household as a yeoman of the king’s cuphouse from 23 May 1387 (CPR, 1385–1389, p. 306), he received a new office as the usher of the king’s chamber on 23 January 1399 (CPR, 1396–1399, p. 470). Neuport began his service as a king’s esquire from 9 December 1392 when he received a life interest in the office or warden of the mint in the Tower (CPR, 1391–1396, p. 199). Littlebury was retained by Richard for 50 Mks per annum for life on 9 December 1392, Henry confirmed the grant in 1399 and increased the annuity to 100 Mks (CPR, 1391–1396, p. 202). 63

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sheriff, and JP for their counties in the last decade of Richard’s reign, though perhaps most telling about their close relationship with Richard is that neither returned to these offices or commissions after the usurpation.68 By placing his supporters in the chief administrative position in the county, cloaked in the guise of Ricardian legitimacy, Henry ensured these men could not only exercise their broad shrivel powers for the common Lancastrian good, but also see to the security of the Lancastrian estates in their particular counties. These Lancastrian sheriffs also helped select a large number of their Lancastrian fellows as MPs in the Deposition Parliament. In fact, of the eighteen knights of the shire returned by these nine counties with Lancastrian sheriffs, no fewer than sixteen possessed firm connections with Henry of Lancaster or a noble member of his coalition. Of the two that remained, John Gateford, who sat for Nottinghamshire, had close connections with Sir Thomas Rempston, one of Henry’s closest friends who had shared his exile,69 while John Herlington, who sat for Huntingdonshire, seems to have been a pro-Lancastrian as early as 1397; because from that date he lost his place as JP only to have it restored by Henry IV in 1399 and see his career blossom.70 From Chester, with his captive Richard in tow, Henry moved on to Nantwich and then to Newcastle-under-Lyme. At Newcastle Thomas Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, saved from exile on the Isle of Man, joined him on or about 22 August.71 Henry reached Lichfield on 23 August and stayed there for two days. While at Lichfield Henry took time to receive the burgesses William Hulle and William Walters from the borough of Salisbury. These two men had been present at Coventry in 1398 when Henry was banished and the king made them swear to uphold Henry’s banishment. In addition to the good will of the city of Salisbury, the two brought Henry a gift of £200 that had been raised for Richard II.72 Henry received them with 68 Bateman received appointments to all of the commissions of the peace for Cambridge in the 1390s, while Lichfield served as escheator in Stafford and Salop in 1395 (CPR, 1392–1396, p. 590), Stafford in 1396, (CPR, 1396–1399, p. 32) as a commissioner of array for Stafford from 1392 to 1396 (CPR, 1392–1396, pp. 92, 233, 295, 547), as sheriff of Warwick and Leicester in 1390–1391 (CPR, 1388–1392, p. 348) and as JP for Stafford throughout the 1390s. 69 HoC, III: 164–65. 70 HoC, III: 352–53. 71 Chrons. Rev., p. 130. 72 Exactly where this £200 came from is a bit of a mystery. On 5 October 1397 Salisbury had been ordered to pay £200 to the king with his promise to repay the

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thanks and promised to uphold all Salisbury’s ancient privileges.73 From Lichfield Henry moved to Coventry on 25 August, then to Daventry on 27 August, Northampton on 28 August, Dunstable on 29 August, St. Albans on 30 August and finally to London on 1 September. Exactly when Henry and his advisers decided to depose Richard is a question that will probably never be resolved with any accuracy. It seems unlikely that Henry was merely an “ambitious opportunist” as J. W. Sherborne suggests,74 or that he developed his ideas of what to do as events unfolded before him in July and August as McFarlane argued.75 It seems more likely, as Chris Given-Wilson suggests, that Henry and his friends knew, from the moment that they left Paris that if they succeeded Richard would need to be removed.76 Henry knew forcing the king to return his inheritance to him and leaving him in power would only expose him and those who aided him to Richard’s wrath, and as the events of 1397 demonstrated all too clearly, Richard of Bordeaux had a long memory.77 While Henry and Richard moved at a measured pace toward London, the process for the selection of the members of parliament who would come Westminster at the end of September proceeded.78 loan by the quinzaine of Easter next (i.e. 1398), CPR, 1396–1399, p. 181. It seems unlikely that the £200 that Hulle and Walters gave to Henry in August 1399 was the same amount ordered raised in 1397. Probably, the money in 1399 was raised as the result of another series of forced loans that, as we have seen, the king pressed on the kingdom. 73 HoC, III: 441–42. 74 Sherborne, “Perjury and Revolution,” p. 152. 75 LK&LK, p. 47. 76 Chrons. Rev., pp. 40–41. 77 Henry’s actions were also clearly treasonable as defined by the expanded definition of the Statute of Treasons instituted after the Shrewsbury session of the parliament of 1398, Statutes of the Realm, II:98–99; EHD, IV: 406. 78 Some debate exists as to the exact procedures followed in electing the Commons to this Parliament. Both Stubbs and Sir James Ramsay believed the men elected to Richard II’s last Parliament, summoned on 30 September, were ordered to return themselves to Henry’s Parliament which met on 6 October. H. G. Richardson pointed out, however, that the writs which went to the counties on 19 August contained no order for these MPs to return themselves to any assembly other than the one due to meet on 30 September. In Richardson’s opinion, Henry and his advisors paid strict attention to the Constitution in ordering new writs of election to be duly acted on after the dissolution of the 30 September assembly. The new orders for election took several weeks to get to the counties and for new elections to be held, thus many of the MPs who actually sat and conducted business had not yet been formally appointed, which in Richardson’s opinion, cast some doubt as to the validity of the proceedings, “Elections to the October Parliament of 1399,” BIHR 16 (1939), pp. 142–3.

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Almost certainly the Lancastrian sheriffs in the nine counties named above worked to select pro-Lancastrian MPs and send them to Westminster, but the question remains of what effect pro-Ricardian gentlemen in these counties had in the 1399 selection process. More research needs to be done on this question, but probably the answer is, little. The early date of summons to parliament, 19 August, meant that many pro-Ricardian gentry were still in Ireland and could not influence the selection process in their county. If Henry and his advisers did indeed choose the date to issue summonses for such a reason, it demonstrates ever more clearly how wise they were and how much foresight they possessed. Following Henry’s entry into London, his focus turned to controlling the offices of central administration. On 3 September Henry appointed John Norbury, another of his closest friends and retainers, to the office of treasurer of the realm.79 Norbury replaced William Scrope, Earl of Wiltshire, who had been executed outside Bristol in late July. Henry made his last appointment to high office in his cousin’s name on 5 September, when he conferred the chancellorship on John Scarle, an experienced and important Chancery clerk, who spent nearly a decade in Lancastrian service as chancellor of the Palatinate from 1383 to 1392.80 Technically, Scarle replaced Edmund Stafford, Bishop of Exeter, whom Richard appointed chancellor in 1398, but in reality Scarle replaced Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, who, as we have already seen, had been acting as Henry’s unofficial chancellor since their arrival at Bridlington in late June. Taken as a whole these appointments made before Richard’s formal deposition reveal not only the rapidity but the totality of Henry of Lancaster’s success, at least in terms of his security. Though Henry could count on the military support of the Houses of York, Gloucester, Stafford, Warwick, Beaufort, Neville, Percy, and Courtenay and the large army that he had collected in July and early August, the effects

79 CPR, 1396–1399, p. 595. For an extensive study on Norbury’s career, Madeline Barber, “John Norbury an Esquire of Henry IV,” EHR, 80 (1965), p. 68. For Norbury’s ability to raise loans, Kirby, Henry IV, p. 43. For the marriage of his daughter, Joan, to William Parker, alderman of London, Legge, Anglo Norman Letters, p. 422. 80 Scarle was appointed as chancellor in Richard’s name on 5 September 1399, E. B. Fryde, D. E. Greenway, S. Porter & I. Roy, A Handbook of British Chronology, 3rd edition (London, 1986), p. 87. Mentioned as Chancellor 22 September 1399 (CPR, 1396–1399, p. 595).

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of these appointments made continued reliance on the sword and lance unnecessary. Though the king’s personal security necessitated Rempston’s appointment and matters of the kingdom’s defense necessitated Erpingham’s, the most interesting and perhaps most significant appointments of all were Henry’s shrivel grants along with Bishop Trevor’s. The skillful employment of Henrician retainers and members of the Lancastrian affinity in these offices removed important Ricardian officers in counties where supporters of the ex-king held lands and power. As a group these appointments went a long way toward ensuring that if armed rebellion against the Duke of Lancaster did occur, the leaders of any such rebellion would not be able to march upon Henry with the shire levy at their backs. Over the next several weeks before parliament convened, Henry and his councilors met to determine the political niceties of the deposition. For a host of reasons, Henry had no desire to claim the throne simply by force, and Justice Thirning strongly argued that he could not use such a claim. The Tudor historian, John Hayward, thought that the final form of the deposition came from the mind of Edmund of Langley, Duke of York. Hayward related that York argued to Henry and his assembled council that the king should resign the crown of his own will and also be deposed by an act of parliament.81 It seems that York’s ideas were agreed upon and that it was also decided that Henry would claim the throne through birthright. His claim centered on the idea that Henry III had passed over his first son Edmund “Crouchback,” Earl of Lancaster, because of his deformity and had given the crown to his second son Edward. The absurdity of this fabrication was not lost on contemporaries and might have raised some eyebrows if not some outright laughter when it reached public circulation.82 This, then, represented the famous “threefold” claim to the throne that attracted the notice of Chaucer, who recited it in late 1399 in his “Complaint to his Purse.” The parliament that gathered at Westminster on the last day of September, 1399, would be one of the most significant in the fourteenth century: the

81

Hardying, Henrie the Fourth, p. 131. Paul Strohm postulated that Lancastrian supporters in the audience when this claim was announced to Parliament thought “oh no, not that Edmund thing!” Paul Strohm, “Saving the Appearances: Chaucer’s Purse and the Fabrication of the Lancastrian Claim,” in Chaucer’s England: Literature in Historical Context, ed. B. A. Hanawalt (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 28. 82

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assembly that would depose Richard II and place Henry of Lancaster upon the English throne. The Deposition Parliament of 1399 is noteworthy for a number of reasons. One of these reasons centers on the fact that only 27 of the 255 members had served in the previous parliament (i.e., the Revenge Parliament of 1397/98), and this represents the lowest re-election rate in the fourteenth century.83 Not surprisingly, the membership of the Deposition Parliament reflected the coalition of the disaffected that had assaulted Richard and his government the preceding summer. In this parliament twenty of the seventy-four knights of the shire were Lancastrian retainers, or 27%.84 Of these twenty no fewer than four, William Bipsham, Walter Blount, John Curson and Robert Neville also held troops under their command throughout the proceedings. In addition to these Lancastrian retainers, no fewer than four, William Argentine, Robert Berney, John Furney and John Heveningham, were close associates of the ubiquitous Sir Thomas Erpingham. Although these Lancastrians represented a substantial portion of the membership of the Deposition Parliament, this assembly was more than merely a Lancastrian forum. Five knights of the shire were members of the late duke of Gloucester’s retinue and affinity,85 while eight knights of the shire were retainers, office holders, and/or annuitants of the earls of Arundel,86 and five more MPs were members of the Warwick affinity.87 When totaled the number MPs who were associated with the coalition that removed Richard from the throne made up 56.7% of the knights of the shire.88 Quite possibly the large number of pro-Lancastrian knights of the shire in Henry’s first Parliament was a direct result of the broad influence and power which Henry commanded, though it is equally possible the return of so many Lancastrians stemmed from a combination of the high political emotions running against Richard II and his practice of kingship,

83

HoC, I: 209–10. HoC, I: 209–17. 85 Sir Gerard Braybrooke, Sir John Cheyne, Thomas Coggeshall, John Doreward and John Heveningham. 86 Sir Robert Berney, John Burley, John Doreward, Sir Thomas Fitznichol, John Gurney, Thomas Horde, Sir Payn Tiptoft, Thomas Young. 87 Sir Ralph Euer, William Ruding, William Spernore, Toger Trewythenick, Sir Alfred Trussell. 88 HoC, I: 210–12. 84

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the belief in the justice of Henry’s cause, and the effects of Lancastrian propaganda. Not surprisingly, neither official government nor narrative chronicle account mentions the large army that Henry maintained throughout the sitting of this parliament. It is more than likely that Henry’s troops did not ring the meeting of parliament as Richard II’s Cheshire archers are said to have done in 1397.89 But the presence of a large military force under the command of so many lords and MPs certainly would have made any of Henry’s opponents in the assembly think twice before speaking their mind. The parliament roll records that the Archbishop of Canterbury opened the proceedings with a sermon centered on the folly of youth and the wisdom of age. One of the most barbed examples the sermon as Arundel sought to prove his point was the claim that “when a boy reigns, therefore, willfulness reigns, and reason is exiled. And where willfulness reigns and reason is exiled, constancy is put to flight, and the great danger threatens. From this danger we are now liberated, for a man is ruling.”90 Clearly the Archbishop’s message was allegorical since Henry and Richard were only a year apart in age, and represents yet another layer of pro-Lancastrian propaganda. Not only did Arundel paint Richard and his reign as both thoughtless and petulant, he painted Henry of Lancaster, who had never been seriously involved in national politics before as a thoughtful adult, more than capable of correcting Richard’s late abuses but also of governing the realm. Henry and his coalition did not forget the promises made at Knaresborough to abolish taxation. On 7 October, the day after the opening of Deposition Parliament, Convocation met at St. Paul’s cathedral. Rather than give the opening himself, Archbishop Arundel chose his close friend, William Bottlesham, Bishop of Rochester, to deliver the opening sermon. Bishop Bottlesham’s relationship with Arundel was so close that contemporaries often referred to him as the “Mercury of the Lord Canterbury” because he proclaimed in public forums what the Archbishop thought. Bottlesham’s text for his sermon was drawn from the Book of Judges and centered on The Song of Deborah and Barak, chapter 5, verse 9. The theme of the Bishop’s sermon came from the fourth chapter dealing with the

89 90

Chrons. Rev., pp. 73–74. Chrons. Rev., p. 186.

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downfall of Sisera after his oppression of the Jews to a period of one score years; roughly the same period of time as Richard II’s reign. Quite probably, as Robin Storey suggests, Henry of Lancaster was compared to Barak, and Archbishop Arundel with Deborah, the judge of Israel who convinces Barak to overthrown Sisera. The Song of Deborah also mentions the delivery of the chosen people of God “from the noise of archers ( Judges, V:11),” “another topical illusion which the preacher was unlikely to have omitted.”91 Following the sermon, the Earl of Northumberland came as a special messenger from Henry IV. The earl told the assembled prelates, abbots, and proctors of both provinces that the new king had no wish to exact taxation from them as some of his predecessors had done (i.e., Richard II) and continued on to inform the clergy that the new king would only ask for money from the Church in cases of war or inevitable necessity. Although, Earl Henry occupied the important place as deputy for Henry IV at this meeting, Archbishop Arundel’s register records that the opening of the convocation was delayed “for some time for the arrival of the Earl of Westmorland and Sir Thomas Erpingham.”92 Unlike the leaders of his uncle’s host, some of the men who led Henry of Lancaster’s contingents possessed much military experience. Although Henry himself had seen little in the way of practical military experience and never led an army so large before, others in his host possessed much military experience. Henry, Earl of Northumberland, and Ralph, Earl of Westmorland, had seen much fighting on the Northern Marches, while Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy was called “the best knight in England.” Walter Blount, Robert Rokeley, and Hugh Shirley had all seen service with Gaunt in Spain in the 1380s, while John Dabrichcourt and Thomas Aston spent time in France on military service.93 Sir Thomas Rempston had been with Henry in Prussia, and Sir Thomas Erpingham had campaigned with Gaunt in France in the 1370s and Spain in the 1380s and with Henry on his Crusade to Prussia in 1391. As such, Henry’s army was much like Richard’s; containing many loyal men, substantial in size, and well led. 91

Storey, “Episcopal King-Makers,” p. 86. EHD, IV: 664–65. 93 For Blount see Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 50 n. 47; for Dabrichcourt, p. 45 n. 25; for Rokley, p. 69 n. 141; for Shirley, p. 71. 92

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For Henry of Bolingbroke the unlikely alliance of Lancaster, Arundel, Gloucester, Westmorland, Warwick, and Percy had quite probably succeeded beyond their expectations. The king had presented Henry and Arundel in France with a golden opportunity by taking his most important supporters out of the country. Without effective means of return after having stripped much of the country of its best non-Lancastrian military personnel, and left Gaunt’s estates largely in the hands of men who were loyal to Henry, Richard had unwittingly opened the door to rebellion. John of Gaunt’s most important castles and lordships across the country rose for the disenfranchised duke, and Henry probably knew he had little to fear from an army led by his uncle and half-brother. Like so many times in Richard’s reign, in 1399 the king believed he was doing the right thing, and he was wrong. He did not fully consider what Henry of Lancaster might do in France. It was a small oversight, but it proved a fatal one: small oversights often do.

APPENDIX I

HENRY OF LANCASTER’S ARMY, JULY–DECEMBER 1399

The following list represents the Lancastrian portion of Henry’s army in 1399. It is taken from Chris Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, pp. 252–53. Any attempt to determine the size of Henry’s army in 1399 is educated guess at best. The military potential of the duchy of Lancaster was undoubtedly great. In 1385 Gaunt had raised a force of 14 Baneretts, 136 knights, 850 esquires and 2,000 archers largely from his own estates.94 Gaunt received £666 13s 4d for forty days service for this force in 1385 and the fact that Henry paid some £4,900 for the force below suggests that Henry’s army in 1399 was indeed substantial.95 Captain of Company Henry, Earl of Northumberland Sir Henry “hotspur” Percy William, Lord Willoughby Robert Waterton, esquire Sir Walter Blount William, Lord Roos Sir Thomas Wendesley Ralph, Earl of Westmorland John Curson, esquire Sir Thomas Gerard

Wages (£) 1,333 666 623 285 233 200 160 146 100 93

Paid by the Receiver of

Pontefract Tutbury High Peak Tutbury Lancaster

94 Sidney Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt (New York, 1904), p. 295; Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, p. 41; N. B. Lewis, “The Last Summons of the English Feudal Host, 1385,” EHR 73 (1958), pp. 1–26. 95 The figures for Gaunt’s army come from Lewis, “Feudal Levy,” p. 17, 22. The figure of c. 6,000 men is suggested by taking the payment for Gaunt’s forces and the ratio of men-at-arms to archers and then spreading them over 160 days roughly from mid July to early December when Parliament adjourned. This means that the force under Henry’s command in 1399 would receive a payment of £2,666 over this period. Since the duchy of Lancaster paid out nearly £4,900 deducting the £2,666 for payment to roughly 3000 troops still leaves over £2,333 to pay for more, hence the figure of c. 6,000 for the entire 160 day period. It is more than probable that many of the men raised went home soon after Richard’s capture in mid-August which suggests an army of larger size, but c. 6,000 seems a reasonable base line figure.

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Table (cont.)

Captain of Company Sir Thomas Beck Sir John Cokayne Sir Roger Swilington Sir Nicholas Montgomery Sir John Dabrichcourt Sir Robert Rokley and William Drummond Thomas Gresley, esquire Sir Gerard Usfleet Sir Thomas Hercy Sir Nicholas Langford Sir John Berkeley Sir William Astley Sir Thomas Aston Thurstan de Boure, esquire Thomas Foljambe, esquire Sir Richard Stanhope Thomas Clavell, esquire Sir Robert Neville John Langeford Sir Hugh Shirley Thomas Merward Roger Bradbourne, esquire Bartholomew Montegomery, esq. Henry Vanes, esquire Richard Gascoigne, esquire Simkin Franceys, esquire Sir Henry Husee Henry Bothe, esquire Edmund Barry, esquire John Leventhorpe, esquire William Kettering John Reynes, esquire John Ayersworth, esquire Ralph Burburgh, esquire John de Normanton Henry Bradfield, valet Autlyn Houby Thomas Cokfeld, esquire

Wages (£) 86 66 66 66 60 51 50 40 40 40 33 33 33 30 30 30 26 26 20 20 20 17 16 14 13 12 12 12 10 10 10 10 8 8 7 6 6 5

Paid by the Receiver of Tutbury Tutbury Pontefract Tutbury Lancaster Tutbury Pontefract Bolingbroke Lancaster Tutbury High Peak High Peak Bolingbroke Pontefract Pontefract Leicester High Peak Lancaster Bolingbroke Knaresborough Tutbury Bolingbroke Tutbury Norfolk Hertford Pontefract Norfolk Lancaster Tutbury Tutbury Leicester Tutbury

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS: THE EFFECT OF THE LANCASTRIAN REVOLUTION ON THE ENGLISH POLITICAL LANCSCAPE

In 2003 Michael Bennett wrote that in the “autumn of 1399 Henry of Lancaster was the all-conquering hero.”1 One of the most important conclusions from this present study is that such was not the case. For too long historians have been misled to reach conclusions similar to Bennett’s by accepting chroniclers’ versions of events, even though these are laden with layers of dynastic propaganda, and by accepting as genuine forged government documents, such as the parliament rolls. This work has argued that Henry did not bestride the political community like a colossus, but rather—as Richard of Bordeaux himself perceived at Conway—stood at the head of a coalition of disaffected noblemen and members of their affinities who flocked to the Lancastrian banner in the weeks following his landing at Bridlington in late June. This work has also argued that the traditional interpretation of Henry as a “perfect knight,” blessed with uncommon ability and a wealth of experience on the battle-field and in politics prior to his exile in 1398, is false. Rather, Henry was prodigal, impulsive, and was a wealthy nobleman who rarely tended to think matters through. Henry of Lancaster was alone among the titled noblemen of his generation never to have held high government office or held a military command before his exile in 1398 at the age of thirtey-one. It is possible that John of Gaunt wanted to shelter his son from Richard’s real or imagined wrath and so kept him from occupying any of these positions. Such a scenario, however, seems unlikely. Gaunt, of all noblemen, well knew the importance of experience and leadership in government matters, and it is difficult to believe that he would have knowingly barred his son from gaining experiences that serving in these offices would have given him. It is probable that Henry’s return

1

Bennett, “Henry of Bolingbroke,” p. 25.

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to England in 1399 was engineered more through the efforts of his father’s retainers and his fellow exile, the Archbishop of Canterbury, than through his own. Whether the cards of politics and deception played by Henry, Arundel and the other member of the coalition of the disaffected in 1399 in their drive to remove Richard II from the throne constitute “perjury,” as McFarlane and Shebourne perceived it, is of little relevance, as is the question of whether or not Henry of Bolingbroke actually wanted to become king in March, June or July 1399. In point of fact by mid-August, Henry had little choice but to remove Richard and place himself upon the throne. For Henry and his companions of 1399 to have allowed Richard of Bordeaux to return to rule, with restrictions or without, would have been most unwise, and no one else in the coalition of the disaffected of 1399 possessed a claim to the throne as good as Henry of Lancaster. Thus, perhaps the greatest irony of 1399 is the fact that Henry, who had seemingly spent so much of his life prior to 1399 avoiding politics, administration, and diplomacy as much as possible, suddenly found himself, maybe against his better judgment, at the center of it. In the weeks following his landing at Bridlington in late June, Henry of Lancaster became the most obvious symbol for this disaffection. The great men of the realm who joined Henry did so for their own reasons rather than, as layers of pro-dynastic propaganda would have us believe, to aid the cause of the disenfranchised heir of John of Gaunt. Edmund of Langley, Duke of York, joined Henry because his natural connections with John of Gaunt made doing anything other than aligning himself with Henry most difficult. Ralph Neville, Earl of Westmorland, joined Henry for familial and also political reasons. The Neville family had been part of the Lancastrian affinity for three decades and more by 1399. Earl Ralph was Henry’s brother-in-law, and had disinherited his own children from his first marriage in favor of those from his second wife. A further complication of the personal and political situation from Neville’s perspective, centered on the honor of Richmond and what would/might become of it in the future. The great bulk of Neville’s estates lay within the honor of Richmond. As long as Gaunt or his heir held the honor and the earldom that went with it, the political and personal contacts and alliances that Neville and his father had built with Gaunt’s retainers within the honor assured that his estates would be run as they always had been. Richard’s disenfranchisement of Henry of Lancaster placed all of these things in jeopardy, or at least in ques-

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tion, and it is not difficult to see why Earl Ralph threw the full weight of his northern earldom behind Henry. The last of the great families who threw in their lot with Henry that summer were the Percies. This study has also argued strongly for a revisionist perspective on the position of the house of Percy in the events of 1399. Rather than perceive the Percy family as a monolithic political bloc, who knew each other’s ambitions and shared a common goal, I have argued that each of the three members of the family acted as individuals with different and sometimes conflicting interests. It is also more than likely that as a group the Percy family represented a largely unwanted contribution to Henry of Lancaster’s coalition in the summer of 1399 and after. Earl Henry had little reason to quibble with his treatment at the hands of the king in the twenty-four months preceding the deposition. Northumberland seems to have largely left politics on the English side of the March to his son and pursued interests in his Scottish estates with vigor. King Richard’s gift of the honor and lordship of Cockermouth on 1 May 1399 increased Earl Henry’s estates on the Western March and represented a clear measure of Richard II’s trust in him. The king’s tampering with the offices on the Northern Marches in the decade prior to 1399 probably upset Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy more than Earl Henry. In the previous decade the March had seen the king make serious in-roads into what ‘hotspur’ probably considered to be Percy territory on the Northern Marches. Richard had taken many of the marcher offices that Percy coveted and distributed them first to John of Gaunt, then to John Holand, and finally to Edward, Duke of Albemarle. Further concerning to any Percy power on the English side of the March was the fact that the Percy family rented substantial amounts of land in North Yorkshire, including some from John of Gaunt, and any change in the ownership of the lands Percy rented threatened to unbalance his base of power there. But, more importantly Percy seems to have harbored dreams of creating a sort of “mittlemark,” or palatinate, on the Northern March, over which his family would hold sway.2 As long as Richard II was king, earl Henry had no hope that such a plan could come to fruition. With a king like Henry of Lancaster, who most everyone 2 Cynthia Neville, “Scotland, the Percies and the Law in 1400,” in Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, 1399–1406, ed. G. Dodd and D. L. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 88–90.

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liked but who seemed to have no head for politics or ability to govern, Percy could indeed have tried to create such a northern lordship—and there is some evidence to suggest that he did attempt to do so. Yet, within six months, Henry IV was already seeking ways of undoing what he had done for and with the Percy family in the autumn of 1399. Walsingham thought Earl Henry an impetuous rough-tongued northerner,3 and perhaps the courteous, well-liked, sliver-tongued, courtier Henry of Lancaster agreed with the chronicler’s assessment. J. L. Kirby argued that Henry had second thoughts over what he had given to the Percies in the summer of 1399 and worked hard to undo his extravagance, but it seems more likely that rather, these were first thoughts. The Percies were not Lancastrians and never had been. Their own self-interest and their desire to carve out a preserve—politically, militarily, and legally—on both sides of the Northern March was more than Henry could tolerate. Not only did his campaign in 1400 target the Scots, it also targeted the Percies’ control over the region,4 and the new king consciously set up Ralph, Earl of Westmorland, someone whom the king deemed more trustworthy, as a foil to Percy authority and power in the north.5 Not only did the keeping of the important Dacre estates during minority fall to Neville,6 so too did the king grant to his brother-in-law the right to be on the March with an armed body of men, and the king even went so far as to retain large numbers of Northumbrian gentry7—few things could be a more direct affront to Percy power and authority. These were not the actions of a Henry of Lancaster who had much—if any time—for the Percies; and they may indeed not only have been the odd-men-out in the coalition of 1399, but the unwanted ones as well. Equally important to the coalition that Henry led, however, were the vast numbers of gentry men who flocked to his banner from every corner of the kingdom in the summer of 1399. Although, as Sir Robert Somerville noted, “Henry’s progress after his arrival in

3

Goodman, John of Gaunt, p. 282. C. J. Neville, “Scotland, the Percies and the Law in 1400,” pp. 87–89. 5 Mark Arvanigian, “Henry IV, the Northern Nobility and the Consolidation of the Regime,” in Henry IV: The Establishment of the Regime, 1399–1406, ed. G. Dodd and D. L. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 127–29. 6 Robin Storey, The End of the House of Lancaster (Gloucester, 1986), p. 106. 7 King, “Hertes of the People by North,” pp. 157–58. 4

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England in 1399 had been marked out by duchy castles,”8 by no means was Henry’s campaign in 1399 based around only his own estates and those of his late-father. Many of the men who joined Henry that summer had were not Lancastrian retainers. As the long litanies of annuitants from both Exchequer and Duchy sources demonstrate, a large segment of the political community rose up and rejected Richard II and his policies in the summer of 1399.9 Adrian Bell has argued that in the late fourteenth century men tended to go to war based on familial connections.10 Some of his supposition may be borne out by the fact that much of Henry’s coalition emerged from familial contacts. But family did not count for all in 1399; some of those who came to join Henry in July and August 1399 did so out of their own self-interest. For county gentlemen like Beauchamp of Warwick retainers, such as John Catsby11 and Alvred Trussell;12 Thomas of Woodstock’s retainers, such as John Dabrichcourt13 and Hugh Browe;14 and Arundel retainers, such as John Burley15 and Thomas Young,16 Henry’s victory was their victory as well. They rapidly returned to positions of prominence and power within their counties and/or within the respective affinities of their lords. It is also worth remembering that the decision of those county gentlemen who came to join Henry as he marched south in the summer of 1399 was not made lightly. Richard II had proven already that he had a long political memory and that he would, in time, exact his revenge. If Richard of Bordeaux were ever again to rule England unhindered, these county gentry, royal pardon or no, could be in grave danger. This study has also argued for the prominent role of Thomas Arundel, Archbishop of Canterbury, in events. There is little doubt that the alliance between Henry and Arundel surprised some, and the story of the Archbishop’s vision of Gaunt asking his forgiveness for damages done to the Arundel family says more about Arundel than it does Henry. Perhaps at its core the rationale for Arundel’s 8

Somerville, Duchy of Lancaster, p. 167. PRO E 163/6/35 and PRO DL 28/4/1 contain large numbers of gifts given to those who asked in the summer of 1399. 10 Bell, Fourteenth Century Soldier, p. 224. 11 HoC, II: 501–03. 12 HoC, IV: 664–66. 13 HoC, II: 729–31. 14 HoC, II: 384–86. 15 HoC, II: 430–32. 16 HoC, II: 938–39. 9

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alliance with Henry in 1399 and after resulted from the oldest logic of all: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Although Henry of Lancaster seems to have harbored no deep personal resentment towards Richard II, Thomas Arundel did. Not only did Arundel hold Richard II responsible for the judicial murder of his elder brother, Richard, in 1397, but personal antagonism between the two may also be evidenced by Richard’s letters to the Pope berating Archbishop Arundel in 1398. Arundel’s anger toward the king boiled over at Flint in August, when the Archbishop launched into a tirade against the king which Henry himself had to put an end to. Further evidence of Arundel’s feeling is the fact that the Archbishop wrote several of the articles of deposition. His role in the events of 1399 saved his family from an uncertain fate. Not only did he recover his lost Archbishopric and his place at the head of the English Church, but his young nephew, Thomas, Earl of Arundel, recovered all the Arundel lands and estates that Richard II had stripped from the earldom in 1397. This study has also argued that Richard of Bordeaux was not possessed of some form of mental instability, narcissism, or personality disorder, but rather was in full command of his mental faculties throughout the events of summer and autumn. The king acted accordingly and was treated as mentally sound by his opponents. In 1986 Chris Given-Wilson wrote that in 1399 the king’s affinity “came to be lead, but there was nobody capable of leading it.”17 One of the most significant conclusions of this study is that, rather, there was precious little of the king’s affinity left in England in 1399. Much of the royal affinity had gone to Ireland, and of those that remained, many were won over by Henry, or his personal charm, his propaganda; joined him for their own ambitions; or joined Henry because of regional politics. Was it indeed the case that military incompetence and absence of political will rather than treachery were responsible for the collapse of Richard II’s government in the summer of 1399? This study has argued that upon receipt of the news of Henry’s invasion, the king acted with a sound military strategy. In spite of the fact that recent historiography has disparaged Richard II’s military ability and judgment, as G. O. Sayles noted, Richard of Bordeaux had been the pupil of both Guichard d’Angle and Sir Simon Burley,

17

RH&KA, p. 226.

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two of the most renowned knights of his youth, and Richard was also the only commander of English forces in the fourteenth century to have any military success in Ireland.18 Richard’s initial reaction of sending the earl of Salisbury to North Wales and the principality of Chester to raise men in what he thought was the very heart of his base of support was a sound military move. The king’s move from Dublin to Waterford was also a good strategy. He left a loyal lieutenant, Thomas, Duke of Surrey, in charge there with a body of men and a substantial amount of ready cash to maintain their presence in Ireland for some time. The week-long move to Waterford allowed time for ships coming from England and those vessels that his own serjeants could arrest in Ireland to collect in the sheltered roadstead outside Waterford and await his arrival. It also allowed the king one last progression through Leinster and demonstrated to his Anglo-Irish and Irish subjects that he was still in charge of affairs and would not run home on the strength of mere rumors. Richard’s move forward to South Wales was both equally well considered. South Wales offered the king a number of strategic and administrative advantages. The castles he held on the Twyfi and Telfi valleys blocked any advance from the east and his base at Milford Haven provided a large, sheltered harbor where vessels coming from Ireland with men and material could drop anchor safely. Even the move to North Wales made sound military sense. By late-July Richard was aware that Henry possessed a large army in the Vale of the Severn. The king had also learned that men from Northumberland and Lancaster were with the army and that Henry’s army was very large and included a substantial number of hangerson. Moreover, Richard counted on the fact that Henry had never led an army of any size in battle before; and the only time he had exercised independent command, that of a small body of troops in Prussia in 1392, he had not performed particularly well. If the king could move quickly to North Wales and Chester, where he believed a large body of men awaited him drawn from his “inner citadel,” he could turn the tables on Henry. Not only would Richard find a base of support in the principality, he possessed substantial financial resources at Holt castle to pay for the troops he raised. Perhaps more importantly, Henry had already come from the north, and the

18

Salyes, “Richard II in 1381 and 1399,” p. 824 n. 1.

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king and his advisers in South Wales probably reasoned that those men who wished to join Henry had already done so. Thus, Richard and his friends would be able to raise the loyalist element in those areas and strike at Henry’s base of power and support. It may indeed also be that Richard’s move to North Wales was a way to avoid a military confrontation in the Vale of Glamorgan because such a strategy did not suit him. As we have seen, the king possessed a number of vessels under his command in Ireland, and these, combined with vessels arrested on the orders of Edmund of Langley, were engaged in ferrying troops from Ireland. Had Richard chosen to stay in South Wales, more men could easily have been transferred from Ireland, giving the king a force of some size, with or without his uncle’s army. But, if the king had indeed waited for another week, marshaled his forces, moved forward, and sought to engage Henry in Glamorgan in mid-August, he would have forced some of his closest friends and companions to make a difficult choice: to remain loyal to the king and fight their own family members or to desert the royalist cause. Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, had his elder brother Henry, Earl of Northumberland, and nephew, Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy, in Henry’s camp. Edward of York, Duke of Albemarle, had his father Edmund, Duke of York, in Henry’s camp. The king’s own half-brother John Holand, Duke of Exeter, was Henry’s brotherin-law, and many of the knights and esquires in Richard’s army were married into the families of Lancastrian retainers who stood around Henry’s banner. A full-scale battle with the king himself taking up arms against his own subjects could have resulted in his defeat and death or his overthrow. More significantly, such an action on Richard’s part would have changed the rules by which politics had been played in the last decades of the fourteenth century. In all of the previous troubles in his reign, Richard had never personally led troops against English rebels. The king had always been careful to let his friends, like Robert de Vere, lead men-at-arms and archers in the king’s name, and when these forces had been defeated, Richard’s friends suffered the consequences not the king. Perhaps the king’s lack of self-confidence was at the root of his decision to abandon his army and move into North Wales. Richard of Bordeaux was not one who trusted to chance, especially military chance. His campaigns to Scotland in 1385 and to Ireland in 1394/95 and 1399 clearly demonstrate a powerful mind; one which developed carefully considered plans and brought massive force to bear in con-

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ducting war at the strategic and tactical military levels as well as at the diplomatic and economic levels. On the three campaigns that Richard personally led, he commanded forces of such overwhelming size that the Scots and Irish shrank from an encounter with him in the open field.19 Thus, as he had done in 1386 and in 1387/88, in August 1399 Richard chose to become politically and militarily passive and allowed the political and military initiative to pass to Henry and his coalition. Richard II had been in difficult political situations in the past and there was nothing to suggest to him in early August that he would not triumph again—especially with a political neophyte as the nominal leader of the coalition against him. If the coalition Henry led attacked him, the king could use the great fortresses of North Wales and his loyal Cheshiremen to defend himself. As Henry well knew such a move on his part would play to the king’s hands rather than his own, and although by all accounts the duke of Lancaster commanded a huge army in the middle weeks of August, Henry and his advisers knew that a protracted siege of Richard II at Conway or Beaumaris would have strained the relationships of the fragile coalition they had formed in July. Any long siege would have allowed time for pro-Ricardian nobles and gentrymen to return to England, and afforded the opportunity for great churchmen, such as Skirlaw of Durham, and gentry who had remained to this point uncommitted to join the royalist banner. Thus, for Henry by mid-August 1399, politics, speed, and deception, rather than force of arms, would be necessary to see his cause to a successful conclusion: the removal of Richard II. Richard of Bordeaux did not realize that the rules of the political game he had been playing for over two decades had changed. It was not until he was captured by Northumberland and the ubiquitous Sir Thomas Erpingham outside of Conway that he understood his was deposition possible and even imminent. One can only speculate on the king’s mood when this realization came over him, but it is probable that Richard was plainly surprised. The last major conclusion of this study is that the Ricardian deposition greatly changed the English political landscape. It is customary at the dawn of the twenty-first century to disparage any notion of Henry IV’s accession to the throne as representing a “Revolution of 19 For the summonses to military service in Scotland in 1385, see PRO SC 1/56/96. For a discussion of the campaign, see Saul, Richard II, pp. 144–45. For his campaigns in Ireland in 1394/95 and 1399, see above chapter 2.

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1399” as William Stubbs saw it in the late nineteenth century. Although historians would no longer argue that Henry’s usurpation of the throne created the sort of proto-Victorian democracy that Bishop Stubbs wished upon it, it is still appropriate to perceive the Lancastrian usurpation as a revolution. McFarlane noted in 1936 that Henry had little appreciation for government affairs in the summer of 1399 and cited Henry’s promise at Knaresborough to abolish taxation except in time of war or great need as evidence of the new king’s lack of knowledge.20 This lack of experience and knowledge came back to haunt Henry IV again and again in the first years of his reign. First and foremost Henry needed to see to his own security and that of his dynasty. Perhaps the most significant practical political way Henry and his advisers went about achieving this goal was to place men loyal to the new king in important local offices throughout the kingdom. The two most important offices taken over by the king’s supporters were those of sheriff and justice of the peace. As I have argued elsewhere, well over than half the sheriffs in any given year were men of Lancastrian sympathy,21 and the local bench in the twenty-four months following Richard’s deposition became a governmental organ dominated by Lancastrians. 22 In county affairs as well, the Revolution of 1399 ushered in a period of Lancastrian political ascendancy. Local studies of Nottinghamshire and East Anglia have demonstrated that placing Lancastrian retainers in county office in East Anglia and the West Midlands “was crucial” to Henry’s survival;23 Anthony Pollard concluded that in order to secure his position as king, Henry “fell back on his close associates . . . and the personnel of the Duchy of Lancaster.”24 Blending all of this historiography together Mark Arvanigian, has most recently argued for a “Lancastrian Polity;” a well-defined political grouping made up of Lancastrian retainers, the retainers of Henry’s friends among the titled nobility, and the retainers of his sons. John of Gaunt, Arvanigian argues, founded this

20

McFarlane, “Lancastrian Kings,” p. 362. Biggs, “Sheriffs and JPs,” pp. 149–52. 22 Douglas Biggs, “Sheriffs and JPs,” pp. 149–66. 23 Helen Castor, The King, the Crown, and the Duchy of Lancaster: Public Authority and Private Power, 1399–1461 (Oxford, 2000), pp. 25–31. 24 A. J. Pollard, Late Medieval England, 1399–1413 (London, 2000), p. 29. 21

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“Lancastrian Polity” on a model created by Edward III,25 and through this close-knit association of like-minded and loyal individuals, Henry IV governed the realm.26 Thus, in a very real sense it was the Lancastrian political community that triumphed in 1399. Henry of Lancaster’s victory ensured that these retainers’ collective world would continue largely as it had before. But, the Ricardian deposition opened a whole new series of opportunities for the retinue and affinity that John of Gaunt had so painstakingly crafted and so expensively maintained. Before 1399 Lancastrian retainers such as Robert Waterton wore the livery of the most important nobleman in the kingdom; after 1399 retainers like Waterton had direct access to the an even greater patron than Gaunt had ever been: the king. The events of 1399, therefore, created a great gulf between what had gone before in the Lancastrian affinity and what came after. Although John of Gaunt had been able for brief periods of time in certain counties to influence the king to appoint his retainers to offices within royal government, such as the county bench, or ensure his retainers were returned to parliament, he could never dominate the appointment to these offices.27 After 1399 this situation was reversed. Not only did Henry IV’s retainers dominate the local benches in every county, so too did royal retainers dominate the office of sheriff, and each and every one of Henry IV’s parliaments saw Lancastrian retainers make up over 50% of the knights of the shire. Simply put, after 1399 England had become a Lancastrian country, and the only way to succeed in royal service was through Lancastrian means. For those who dissented, such as the house of Percy and the Archbishop of York, the only options were either to conform or to undertake armed rebellion. Even Alfred Brown was astute enough to conclude that in the three great English risings of the reign, 1403, 1405 and 1408, Henry IV only had to fight rebels once.28 In both 1405 and 1408, the rebellions were quelled by members of the king’s affinity long before Henry could reach

25 W. M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III: Crown and Political Society in England, 1327–1377 (Yale, 1990), p. 248. 26 Mark Arvanigian, “The Affinity of Ralph, Earl of Westmorland, and the Governance of England,” Conference Paper, 37th International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 3 May 2002. 27 Walker, Lancastrian Affinity, pp. 237–40. 28 Brown, “Reign of Henry IV,” p. 24.

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North Yorkshire. In Wales, for example, fraught with rebellion throughout most of the reign, members of the affinity fought and died for their king. Although, Sir Richard Aston may have been “ignominiously” captured by the Welsh, still he fought there.29 Although Henry possessed the great advantage of the Lancastrian affinity to support his government, he also relied heavily on the affinities of his coalition members from 1399 to aid him in governing the realm. For example, Courtenay retainers were relied on in large number to fill important posts and local offices. Thirteen out of the nineteen JPs for Devon between November 1399 and May 1401 were Courtenay retainers, and the commission of inquiry into the goods of John Holand in the county had a decidedly Courtenay complexion.30 As the reign wore on, Courtenay retainers not only remained on the local bench, but served in the office of sheriff, as well. Much the same story may be told of Beauchamp retainers being employed on commissions and offices in Warwickshire. From the beginning of the reign, Beauchamp retainers filled important commissions, a number of them were directly connected to the king through their membership in the Trinity Gild of Coventry.31 The political ramifications of these appointments for Henry are hardly insignificant, since so much of the success of royal policy in the county turned on the person of the sheriff. Significantly, the large-scale injection of Lancastrian supporters, so many of whom were serving for the first time, into what some have argued were “independent” or “world unto themselves” county political communities drew no direct criticism of the type leveled at Richard II for such practices and caused no local rebellion or resistance to governance.32 Part of this local acquiescence to such royal policy may rest in Henry’s practice of appointing men with existing local connections in the office of sheriff that did not threaten or impinge on the ambitions of other county elites.

29

CC&C, p. 181. Martin Cherry, “The Courtenay Earls of Devon: The Formation and Disintegration of a Late Medieval Aristocratic Affinity,” Southern History 1 (1979), p. 92. 31 Douglas Biggs, “The Trinity Guild of Coventry and the Royal Affinity, 1392–1413,” Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association 16/17 (1995/96), pp. 91–113. 32 Though Commons complained about shrieval abuses in the Parliaments of 1405 and 1407, none of these complaints mentioned royal interference in the shrieval appointment process. 30

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Yet, every Parliament until 1407 asked the king for a restoration and continuance of what they called “good and abundant governance.” Historians have long seen this call as part of the House of Common’s opposition to the king and his policies,33 but the fact that more than half of the members of parliament in any given year were Lancastrian retainers and that these retainers voted ordinary and extraordinary taxation at high levels strongly suggests that these calls for “good and abundant governance” were not opposition to the king or his policies. It is more realistic to see these calls for “good and abundant governance” for what they were—calls for a restoration of efficient government. Henry’s need for his own security led him to appointment men loyal to him, but they lacked experience in these offices. Anthony Steel long ago outlined the case for a general fiscal weakness in Henry IV’s reign,34 and demonstrated that from the outset Henry’s income ran at about £20,000 less than Richard II had collected in his last years.35 In particular, Steel noted, that local officers under Henry IV were an administrative liability,36 which manifested itself in, “an inability to get revenue on the part of local officers of the Crown.”37 Writing four decades after Steel, Roger Virgoe found in his study of local government in East Anglia in the last decades of the fourteenth century, that the appointment of new men to local office, particularly the office of sheriff in large numbers, tended to disrupt the normal flow of local government and created administrative inefficiency as the freshmen officials scrambled to learn the intricacies of their office.38 33 McFarlane, “Lancastrian King’s,” VIII: 362; Alfred Brown, The Governance of Late Medieval England (Stanford, 1989), p. 145. 34 Anthony Steel, “Receipt Roll Totals Under Henry IV and Henry V,” EHR 47 (1932), pp. 204–15; Anthony Steel, “English Government Finance, 1377–1413,” EHR 51 (1936), p. 30. 35 Steel, “English Government Finance,” pp. 31–2; Anthony Steel, The Receipt of the Exchequer, 1377–1485 (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 103–48; for a different view than Steel’s see, J. H. Ramsay, Revenues of the King’s of England, 1066–1399, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1925), II: 410–22; and Mabel Mills, “Review” of Ramsay’s work, EHR 41 (1926), pp. 429–31. 36 Steel, Receipt of the Exchequer, p. 185. 37 Steel, “English Government Finance,” p. 33; A. B. Steel, “Muta Per Talliam, 1377–1413,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 13 (1935), pp. 74–75, 84. 38 Roger Virgoe, “East Anglia Under Richard II,” in The Reign of Richard II, ed. F. R. H. DuBolay and C. Barron (London, 1971), p. 220. There is little doubt that Henry faced administrative weakness at all levels of government. For example, his first keeper of the wardrobe, Thomas Tutbury, though a loyal retainer, proved so incompetent in his office that his accounts were never finalized, RH&KA, p. 108;

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The inexperience of his appointees came back to haunt Henry, especially in the first half of the reign. Many of these men were completely new to their offices, particularly the sheriffs. It took these men time to learn the administrative routine of their offices and this was especially true with the administrative routine of so complex an office as sheriff at a time when the shire farm was so high. Because there was such a decisive revolution in personnel appointed to the office of sheriff in 1399, and because there were so few men appointed more than once to the office, inefficiency was bound to result. Novices would have begun to learn the procedures and practices of their office only upon leaving it, and with another novice being brought in the next year county administration was in a constant state of flux. It was only after 1406, when some men began to be reappointed to the office and complaints in the House of Commons regarding “good and abundant governance” lessen, that some modicum of administrative efficiency was restored. In fact, much of the first two years of the reign—down to the government “shake-up” of 1401—I hesitate to use the word “crisis” as Alan Rogers does39—Henry spent working to fix some of the impulsive promises he had made in 1399, along with learning how to be king. In the end, however, Henry of Bolingbroke proved to be a better king than many had expected and some had feared. Like his son would after him, Henry grew into his position as king. Henry was not successful at every turn but his successes outweighed his failures. In the end, the Ricardian deposition brought to power a new political community that had rejected Richard II and his governance. It was not the easy, popular rebellion, that Lancastrianized chronicles and forged government documents would like us to believe, and Richard of Bordeaux was not a mentally incompetent tyrant who gave up his crown with an ease bordering on alacrity. It is often said that “history is written by the winners.” This was certainly true of 1399, and that history has smoothed over the dirty parts and rough spots of Richard’s removal. The Revolution of 1399 was a Alan Rogers, “The Royal Household of Henry IV, 1399–1413,” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nottingham, 1965), pp. 244–49; Edmund Wright, “Henry IV, the Commons and the Recovery of Royal Finance in 1407,” in Rulers and Ruled in Late Medieval England, ed. Rowena Archer and Simon Walker (London, 1995), p. 67. 39 Alan Rogers, “The Political Crisis of 1401,” Nottingham Medieval Studies 12 (1968), pp. 85–96.

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close-run affair, and one that rested on a series of unlikely alliances and on no small amount of luck for Henry of Lancaster and his coalition of the disaffected. It may only be guessed what those members of the political community who were present at the coronation of Henry IV on St. Faith’s day, 6 October, 1399, felt when the Archbishops of Canterbury and York placed the crown of St. Edward on Henry of Bolingbroke’s brow. Some, no doubt, would have felt satisfaction, others might have found it political necessity, and others, like Shakespeare’s reading of Edmund of Langley still might have contented themselves by saying it was “God’s will.”40 But, all of those present, when they considered the broad sweep of events from July to October 1399, would have felt surprise.

40 William Shakespeare, “The Tragedy of King Richard II,” in The Riverside Skakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans, et al. (New York, 1974 edn.), Act V; Scene ii; lines 23–40.

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INDEX

Anne of Bohemia, Queen of England 8, 33 n. 11 Arundel, William King’s knight and keeper of Rochester castle 117, 117 n. 35 Asshe, William Esquire of the king’s Household, Chamberlain of South Wales 208 Audley, William King’s esquire, troops he brought to aid Edmund of Langley 137 Bagot, Sir William 100, 100 n. 71 & 72, 124, 127, 137, 205 Forced loans in Warwickshire 113, 113 n. 16 His attempts to raise Bromfield and Yale, Chrik and Owestry for the king 143 Barry, Edmund Connections to Edmund of Langley 133 Beauchamp, Thomas, Earl of Warwick 13 His retainers rising in support of him by 4 July 192, 192 n. 28, 193 His summons to Parliament in Richard II’s name 249 His arrival at Newcastle-under-Lyme to join Henry of Lancaster 253 Beaufort, John, Marquis of Dorset, Earl of Somerset 14, 84, 144, 188 His army destined for Bordeaux 51 Constable of Dover castle and Warden of the Cinque Ports 96, 97, 97 n. 57, 115, 118 His sweep through Kent in late June with Edmund, Duke of York, seeking Henry in the southeast 116–17 His role in Edmund of Langley’s army chapter 4 His replacement as Constable of Dover castle by Sir Thomas Erpingham 249

Berkeley Encounter there between Henry of Lancaster and Edmund of Langley 144–46 Botiller, John 117 Sheriff of Kent 116, 116 n. 28 Brauncepath, William Esquire to Richard II 47 Braybrooke, Reginald King’s knight 47 Bridlington 120, 124, 177 Henry of Lancaster’s landing there c. 28 June 105–08, 165 Henry of Lancaster’s meeting there with Henry ‘hotspur’ Percy 170–74 Browning, John Sheriff of Gloucestershire 141 His contingent left in Gloucester as a blocking force by Edmund of Langley 144, 144 n. 172, 193 Bukton, Peter Lancastrian Knight, appointed keeper of Knaresborough 178, 178 n. 37 Burchester, William King’s knight from Kent who helped keep Sir John Pelham under siege in Pevensey 116 Bushy, John 100, 100 n. 72 & 73, 127, 137, 237 His flight from Edmund of Langley at Oxford 143 Commissioner for maintaining the peace on the Scottish March 169–70 His execution at Bristol 238–40 Butler, James, Earl of Ormond 37 Calais Perceived threat to the town and castle there by Edmund of Langley and the Council from Henry of Lancaster 122 Carp, John Keeper of the king’s wardrobe in Ireland 49

290

index

Chamberlain, John Clerk of the king’s navy 53 Charles VI, King of France 83, 231–32 Charleton, Edward, Lord of Powis 119, 210, 241, 242 Cheshire Disruption within the Principality in July/August 1399 220–28 Clifton, Nicholas Knight and steward of Thomas Holand, Duke of Surrey’s, lands in Derbshire and opponent of Thomas Foljambe 95, 95 n. 48 Coggeshale, John de, Abbot of Coggeshale 129, 129 n. 101 Cokayne, John 189 Compnore, Robert Buyer for the Household, writ of purveyance from Edmund of Langley 130 n. 111 Cornwall, John Lancastrian knight who went to Ireland with Richard II 49 Courtenay, Edward, “the blind earl,” Earl of Devon 33 Courtenay, Peter Constable of Bristol 237–38 Courtenay, Philip 33 Craylock, John Buyer for the Household, writ of purveyance from Edmund of Langley 130 n. 111 Cromer Lancastrian manor in East Anglia in the keeping of Edmund of Langley were supplies were purchased for Henry of Lancaster’s return 98, 118 Culleham, John Mason at Wallingford castle 128 Curson, John 26, 26 n. 100, 189 Dalton, John Lancastrian knight who went to Ireland with Richard II 49 Despenser, Henry, Bishop of Norwich 23, 123 n. 78, 128, 131, 194, 237 His role in Edmund of Langley’s army 136–37 Despenser, Thomas, Earl of Gloucester 54, 209 Relinquishing title to ancestral lands to John of Gaunt and his heirs 85, 85 n. 14

Marital connections to Robert, Lord Ferrers 137 Doncaster Yorkist estate where Henry gathered the bulk of his forces in the north 180–81 Oath of Doncaster 186–87 Dru, Lawrence 237 King’s esquire, on commission to maintain peace with Scots 169–70 One of the royalists at Berkeley 194 Dunn, Richard Recognizance for forced loans in Gloucestershire 113 Edmund of Langley, Earl of Cambridge, Duke of York 3, 27, 28, 29, 55, 59, 84, 98 n. 61, 180, 188, 211, 215, 242, 243, 277 His expedition to Portugal, 1381 25, 132 His army in 1399 25–26, chapter 4 Yeomen in livery of the Crown ordered to London to aid him 51 His defense of the realm, June-July 1399, chapter 4 His reputation as a political moderate 168 His meeting with Henry of Lancaster in the Minster church of St. Mary’s, Berkeley 194, 237 His letters sent to Richard II in Ireland informing him of Henry of Lancaster’s landing 198–202 His opening of Bristol to Henry 237–40 His suggestions for the exact form of Richard II’s deposition 256–57 Edward of York, Earl of Rutland and Cork, Duke of Albemarle 33, 47, 55, 95, 120 n. 54, 120, 132, 189 n. 111, 209, 228 Keeper of the West March toward Scotland 50, 169–70 His potential treason against Richard II in Ireland 57–58, 60 His “wholesale” replacement of Lancastrian estate officials 95 His advice to Richard II on returning from Ireland 202–03 Breakup of the Royal Household in South Wales following the king’s departure for Conway 217–18

index His presence at Flint wearing Lancastrian livery when Richard brought before Henry of Lancaster 234 Elmham, William 137, 194, 237 King’s knight, his weapons taken from him at Berkeley rather than surrender to Henry of Lancaster 195 Erghum, Ralph, Bishop of Bath and Wells Supporter of Henry of Lancaster 241 Erpingham, Thomas 12, 12 n. 44, 13, 98, 205 n. 32, 256, 271 Witness of treaty of alliance between Henry of Lancaster and Louis, Duke of Orleans 96 His presence at Conway 249 His presence at Convocation 259 Eure, Ralph Durham Knight who remained aloof from events of 1399 185 Ewell, John King’s esquire who received a writ of aid to arrest horses for Edmund of Langley’s army 130, 130 n. 110 Faryngton, William Lieutenant of John Holand, Duke of Exeter, in Calais warned to beware of invasion by Henry of Lancaster 125 Felbrigge, George King’s knight with Richard II in Ireland 47 Felbrigge, Simon King’s knight and standard bearer to Richard II in Ireland 47 Ferrers, Robert, Lord of Chartley His role in Edmund of Langley’s army 136–37 Ferriby, William King’s clerk, on commission to maintain peace with the Scots 169–70 Fienles, William Sheriff of Kent who helped to keep Sir John Pelham under siege in Pevensey 116, 116 n. 30 Fitzalan, Richard, Earl of Arundel 13, 88, 117 n. 35, 118 n. 39, 135 n. 129, 214 Fitzalan, Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury 7, 242, 243, 248, 255 His character 20–23, 267–68

291

Potential as an ally to Henry of Lancaster 52 Joins Henry of Lancaster 87–90 His friendship with Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich 136 Meeting with Richard II at Flint 234 His resentment towards Sir John Bushy 239–40 His opening of Parliament 1399 258 His opening of Convocation 1399 258–59 Fitzalan, Thomas, Earl of Arundel His wretched treatment at the hands of John Holand, Duke of Exeter, following his father, Richard’s, execution in 1397 88, 88 n. 19 His role in the death of John Holand, Duke of Exeter, following the Epiphany Rising of 1400 191 n. 122 Fitzwilliam, Edmund Edward of York’s constable of Pontefract castle in 1399 59, 95 Foljambe, Thomas John of Gaunt’s steward of High Peak 94 His gaoling following Gaunt’s death in 1399 95 His release by Henry of Lancaster and the troops he raised from the Peak district to aid Henry 189 Gerberge, Thomas Knight of Edmund of Langley and the steward of York’s household 133 Gest, Richard Clerk of the kitchen in John of Gaunt’s household 133 Golafre, John 141, 142 Sheriff of Oxford and Berkshire who brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 137 One of the royalists at Berkeley 194 Green, Henry 100, 100 n. 72, 127, 137, 237 His flight from Edmund of Langley at Oxford 143 Commission to maintain truce with the Scots 169–70 His execution at Bristol 238–40 Grey, Reginald, Lord of Ruthien In Ireland before 1399 33 His whereabouts in early 1399 49

292

index

Greystoke, Ralph, Baron Greystoke 6, 109 His refusal to give money to aid Richard II on his Irish campaign 1399 113 Reasons for joining forces with Henry of Lancaster 182 Harbottle, Robert John of Gaunt’s steward of Kenilworth 90 Hasilden, Thomas Knight, retainer of both John of Gaunt and Edmund of Langley 133 Hauberk, Nicholas King’s knight who brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 137 Hefford, Robert Constable of Balymore castle in Ireland 35–36 Heleigh Castle 223–25 Henry of Lancaster, Earl of Derby, Duke of Hereford, Duke of Lancaster, King Henry IV 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 27, 29, 39, 119, 127, 132, 203, 215, 255, 264, 277 His character 7–16, 263–65 His exile 19 His dispute with Mowbray 38–40 Confiscation of the Lancastrian inheritance 42–44 Richard’s concerns about him in France 51–52 His exile in France and his return to England chapter 3 Treaty of alliance between him and Louis, Duke of Orleans 95–96 List of men who accompanied his advent at Bridlington 96 His friendship with Edmund of Langley 133–34 His march south to Berkeley chapter 5 Richard II in Ireland learns of his invasion 198–202 Difficulty of advancing his army in to North Wales 231 His acquisition of the king and the throne chapter 7 Henry of Monmouth With Richard II in Ireland 51, 85 Heron, Gerard Durham gentleman who did not join Henry of Lancaster in 1399 185 Heron, John, Lord Say 59

Holand, John King’s knight, chief chamberlain of Richard II’s Household 47 Holand, John, Earl of Huntingdon, Duke of Exeter 14, 38, 46–47, 54, 125, 211, 234 His mistreatment of Thomas Fitzalan 1397–99 87–88, 88 n. 19 His death at the hands of Duchess Eleanor of Gloucester, Thomas Fitzalan, and the Pleshy mob after the Epiphany Rising 1400 191 n. 122 Sent by Richard II as ambassador to Henry of Lancaster 231–32, 245–46 Holand, Thomas, Earl of Kent, Duke of Surrey 34, 47, 55, 94 King’s lieutenant in Ireland 40–42 Members of his household in Ireland with him 41, 41 n. 40, 41, 42 Remaining in Ireland with a large force of men following Richard II’s departure 204–05 Sent by Richard II as ambassador to Henry of Lancaster 231–32, 245–46 Holt, Peter Constable of Dunlavin castle in Ireland 36 Howard, John King’s knight with Richard in Ireland 47 Humphrey of Gloucester Taken to Ireland with Richard II 51 Inglewood, John Recognizance for forced loan in Northumberland 113 Isabella, Queen of England 112, 126 Money allocated for her safety at Wallingford Castle 121, 121 n. 65 John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster 10, 12, 14, 48, 83, 85, 87, 92, 124, 132 n. 117, 133 Role of his affinity in 1399 15–16, 271–75 His death 42 Confiscation of his estates by Richard II 42–43 His ghost appearing to Thomas Fitzalan, Archbishop of Canterbury 89–90

index His quarrel with the Percy family 168 His treaty arrangements with David, Duke of Rothsay, regarding Scotland 289 St. John of Bridlington 96 n. 54, 104, 109 Kanresborough

97, 178–79, 201

Langley, Thomas 183 Leigh, John King’s esquire, Thomas Holand’s steward of High Peak 94 n. 44 Leigh, Robert Sheriff of Cheshire 27 His defection to Henry of Lancaster 229, 241 Leventhorpe, John Drawing money for Henry of Lancaster while in exile 83–84, 84 n. 4 Henry of Lancaster’s receiver, his payments to various annuitants 244 n. 29 Lisle, William Chamber knight of Richard II 47 London The city’s loyalty to Richard II during the summer of 1399 126 n. 89 Lowick, John Receiver of Richard II’s chamber 202 Loudenham, John 12, 12 n. 45 MacMurrogh, Art, King of Leinster 2, 32, 35 n. 18, 40, 55–56, 60, 197 Manuel II Paleologus, Byzantine Emperor 1, 112 n. 5 Mawardyn, Richard 142 King’s esquire who brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 137 Medford, Richard, Bishop of Salisbury 113 Melbourne, Peter Lancastrian esquire who drew money from the Exchequer for Henry of Lancaster while in exile 83 Melton, John 113 Merlin Prophecy of 103–04 Mille, Richard 113 Mone, Guy, Bishop of St. David’s 119 Montague, John, Earl of Salisbury 47, 217 Sent by Richard II to block Henry of Lancaster’s proposed marriage to Mary, Countess of Berry 83

293

His commission to raise North Wales for Richard II 220–28 Mortimer, Roger, Earl of March King’s lieutenant in Ireland 35–36 Number of troops under his direct command in Ireland 37 His campaigns against the Gaelic Irish chieftans 37–39 His death at the Battle of Kells 40 Morton, Robert Retainer of both Edmund of Langley and John of Gaunt 133 Sheriff of Nottingham who opened Nottingham Castle to Henry of Lancaster 189, 189 n. 112 Mowbray, Thomas, Duke of Norfolk 85, 86, 86 n. 16 His dispute with Henry of Lancaster 38–40 Potential political ally of Henry of Lancaster 52 Mulsho, John Sheriff of Northamptonshire, brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 138 Neuport, Andrew King’s esquire, brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 137 Neville, Ralph, Earl of Westmorland 6, 88, 109, 120, 259 Marital contacts to Robert, Lord Ferrers 137 Reasons for joining Henry of Lancaster 181–82 Joins Henry of Lancaster at Doncaster 187 His role as judge of Bushy, Green and Scrope at Bristol 238–40 Neville, Robert, of Hornby 59 Newbold, John King’s serjeant-at-arms paid to arrest ships for the king’s Irish voyage 54 Norton, John King’s esquire, brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 137 On King Richard’s Ministers 99, 100–03 On the Expected Arrival of the Duke of Lancaster 99–100 Pelham, John 200 Constable of Pevensey castle 97, 97 n. 56, 116, 119, 123

294

index

Percy, Henry, Earl of Northumberland 109, 120, 170, 259 The choices of the Percy family in 1399 166–78, 265–66 His quarrel with John of Gaunt 168 Joins Henry of Lancaster at Doncaster 187 His embassy to Richard II at Conway 232–33, 248–49 His role in the execution of Bushy, Green and Scrope at Bristol 238–40 His appointment as Warden of the West March 244–45 Percy, Henry ‘hotspur’ 8, 109, 120, 146, 170, 259 Payment for soldiers wages as Warden of the East March 50 His presence at Bridlington 166–78 Joins Henry of Lancaster at Doncaster 137 His resentment towards Richard II for the king’s appointments as Wardens of the Northern Marches 239 Percy, Thomas, Earl of Worcester 54, 228 His place in the Percy family 167–78 Steward of the royal Household 207 Break-up of the royal Household following Richard II’s departure for North Wales 217–18 His meeting with Richard II at Flint 234 Penry, Richard Valet of Sir William Bagot sent to the king in Ireland 124, 205 Pickering 177–78, 201 Pickering, James Sheriff of Yorkshire 1398/99. Dead by June 1399 125, 125 n. 87, 165 Pole, Michael de la, Earl of Suffolk 138 Raising troops to support Edmund of Langley 123 The dilemma facing him in 1399 135–36 Pontefract Henry of Lancaster moves to this fortress 179–80 Redman, Richard 47 Rempston, Thomas 224, 250, 253 Richard II, of Bordeaux, King of England 1, 3, 4, 7, 29, 87, 114, 117, 129, 240, 276, 277

His supposed mental instability 2 n. 11 His character 16–20, 268–71 In Ireland chapter 2 Names of the king’s household traveling to Ireland, summer 1399 45–46 His concerns over Henry of Lancaster in France 51–52 His attempts to break the power of the duchy of Lancaster in the midlands 95 His attempts to control the Wardens of the Northern Marches 168–70 His choices from June-August chapter 6 Roos, William, Lord Roos of Helmsley 6, 178 Reasons for joining Henry of Lancaster 182 Joins Henry of Lancaster at Doncaster 187 Russell, John 137, 237 His feigned madness at Bristol 238–40 Savage, Arnald King’s knight, lieutenant of William Scrope as constable of Queensborough castle 118 Saville, John 133 Scarle, John 255 Scrope, Richard, Archbishop of York 23, 120, 273, 277 Reasons for not joining Henry of Lancaster immediately 183–84 Scrope, Stephen Younger brother of William Scrope. In Ireland 36 Scrope, William, Earl of Wiltshire 100 n. 70, 127, 237, 255 Justiciar in Ireland 35, 36, 37–38 Learns of Henry of Lancaster’s landing 114–15 Keeper of Queensborough castle 117–18 Wheat purchased in Bristol in his name for use of Richard II 131 n. 111 His flight from Edmund of Langley at Oxford 143 Keeper of Pickering castle 178 His execution at Bristol 238–40 Seamer 109 Skirlaw, Walter, Bishop of Durham 185, 228

index Stafford, Edmund, Bishop of Exeter 23, 42, 128–29 Stafford, John Lancastrian esquire who went to Ireland with Richard II 49 Stanley, John King’s knight to Richard II 47 Keeper of Roxburgh castle 50 Swynford, Thomas 12, 12 n. 45 Swynford-Plantagenet, Katherine Third wife of John of Gaunt Richard II’s provision for her 134 n. 127 Swynhowe, Robert Constable of Dunstanburgh 90, 118 Thomas of Woodstock, Duke of Gloucester 13 The role of his affinity in aiding Henry of Lancaster 190–91 His murder as the rationale for the Third Appeal of Treason 247–48 Trefant, John, Bishop of Hereford Supporter of Henry of Lancaster and friend of Archbishop Arundel 241, 241 n. 15 Trevor, John, Bishop of St. Asaph On commission to maintain peace with the Scots 169–70 Appointed as chamberlain of Chester and North Wales 250 Vale, Thomas Constable of Carlow 35–36

295

Valerian of Luxembourg, Count of St. Pol His belief in Edward of York’s treachery toward Richard II 59–60 Vere, Robert de, Duke of Ireland His lieutenancy of Ireland 33 Walden, Roger of, Archbishop of Canterbury 116, 117, 118, 135 n. 130 Waterton, Hugh 16, 26, 26 n. 98 Steward of Hay-on-Wye 90, 90 n. 29 Steward of Kidwelly and Carreg Cennen 91, 91 n. 30, 209 n. 53 Waterton, John 16, 26 Waterton, Robert 16, 26 n. 99, 273 Constable of Pontefract and Tickhill 90, 90 n. 28, 118 The 200 foresters he met Henry of Lancaster with at Bridlington 91, 91 n. 33 Wednesley, Thomas 26 n. 101 William, Abbot of Saffron Walden Troops organized from his abbey lands to aid Edmund of Langley 123 William, Lord Willoughby 6, 109, 187 Worship, John Sheriff of Bedford and Buckingham who brought troops to aid Edmund of Langley 137 York, City of Ordered to defend against Henry of Lancaster 125 Reasons for not joining Henry of Lancaster 183

HISTORY OF WARFARE History of Warfare presents the latest research on all aspects of military history. Publications in the series will examine technology, strategy, logistics, and economic and social developments related to warfare in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East from ancient times until the early nineteenth century. The series will accept monographs, collections of essays, conference proceedings, and translation of military texts.

1. HOEVEN, M. VAN DER (ed.). Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10727 4 2. RAUDZENS, G. (ed.). Technology, Disease and Colonial Conquests, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. Essays Reappraising the Guns and Germs Theories. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11745 8 3. LENIHAN P. (ed.). Conquest and Resistance. War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11743 1 4. NICHOLSON, H. Love, War and the Grail. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12014 9 5. BIRKENMEIER, J.W. The Development of the Komnenian Army: 1081-1180. 2002. ISBN 90 04 11710 5 6. MURDOCH, S. (ed.). Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12086 6 7. TUYLL VAN SEROOSKERKEN, H.P. VAN. The Netherlands and World War I. Espionage, Diplomacy and Survival. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12243 5 8. DEVRIES, K. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12227 3 9. CUNEO, P. (ed.). Artful Armies, Beautiful Battles. Art and Warfare in Early Modern Europe. 2002. ISBN 90 04 11588 9 10. KUNZLE, D. From Criminal to Courtier. The Soldier in Netherlandish Art 15501672. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12369 5 11. TRIM, D.J.B. (ed.). The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12095 5 12. WILLIAMS, A. The Knight and the Blast Furnace. A History of the Metallurgy of Armour in the Middle Ages & the Early Modern Period. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12498 5 13. KAGAY, D.J. & L.J.A. VILLALON (eds.). Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon. Medieval Warfare in Societies Around the Mediterranean. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12553 1 14. LOHR, E. & M. POE (eds.). The Military and Society in Russia: 1450-1917. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12273 7 15. MURDOCH, S. & A. MACKILLOP (eds.). Fighting for Identity. Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12823 9 16. HACKER, B.C. World Military History Bibliography. Premodern and Nonwestern Military Institutions and Warfare. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12997 9 17. MACKILLOP, A. & S. MURDOCH (eds.). Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers c. 1600-1800. A Study of Scotland and Empires. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12970 7 ISSN 1385–7827

18. SATTERFIELD, G. Princes, Posts and Partisans. The Army of Louis XVI and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678). 2003. ISBN 90 04 13176 0 20. MACLEOD, J. & P. PURSEIGLE (eds.). Uncovered Fields. Perspectives in First World War Studies. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13264 3 21. WORTHINGTON, D. Scots in the Habsburg Service, 1618-1648. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13575 8 22. GRIFFIN, M. Regulating Religion and Morality in the King’s Armies, 1639-1646. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13170 1 23. SICKING, L. Neptune and the Netherlands. State, Economy, and War at Sea in the Renaissance. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13850 1 24. GLOZIER, M. Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King. Nursery for Men of Honour. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13865 X 25. VILLALON, L.J.A. & D.J. KAGAY (eds.). The Hundred Years War. A Wider Focus. 2005. ISBN 90 04 13969 9 26. DEVRIES, K. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology, Update 2004. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14040 9 27. HACKER, B.C. World Military History Annotated Bibliography. Premodern and Nonwestern Military Institutions (Works Published before 1967). 2005. ISBN 90 04 14071 9 28. WALTON, S.A. (ed.). Instrumental in War. Science, Research, and Instruments. Between Knowledge and the World. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14281 9 29. STEINBERG, J.W., B.W. MENNING, D. SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE, D. WOLFF & S. YOKOTE (eds.). The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero, Volume I. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14284 3 30. PURSEIGLE, P. (ed.). Warfare and Belligerence. Perspectives in First World War Studies. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14352 1 31. WALDMAN, J. Hafted Weapons in Medieval and Renaissance Europe. The Evolution of European Staff Weapons between 1200 and 1650. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14409 9 32. SPEELMAN, P.J. (ed.). War, Society and Enlightenment. The Works of General Lloyd. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14410 2 33. WRIGHT, D.C. From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century China. Sung’s Foreign Relations with Kitan Liao. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14456 0 34. TRIM, D.J.B. & M.C. FISSEL (eds.). Amphibious Warfare 1000-1700. Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion. 2006. ISBN 90 04 13244 9 35. KENNEDY, H. (ed.). Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria. From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14713 6 36. HALDON, J.F. (ed.). General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics. Sources, Problems and Methodologies. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14769 1 37. CHRISTIE, N., & M. YAZIGI (eds.). Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities. Warfare in the Middle Ages. 2006. ISBN 90 04 15024 2 38. SHAW, C. (ed.). Italy and the European Powers. The Impact of War, 1500–1530. 2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15163 5, ISBN-10: 90 04 15163 X 39. BIGGS, D. Three Armies in Britain. The Irish Campaign of Richard II and the Usurpation of Henry IV, 1397-99. 2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15215 1, ISBN-10: 90 04 15215 6

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Languages Of Power In The Age Of Richard II

Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (History of Warfare)

The Armies of Agincourt

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The Armies of Rommel

The Armies Of India

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Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain and Europe

Criticism in the History of Science (II)

The Complete Soldier (History of Warfare)

The Story of Ireland: A History of the Irish People

The First World War (History of Warfare)

A History of the Irish Short Story

A History of the Irish Short Story

The Jeune École (History of Warfare)

History of Warfare: The Wars of the Ancient Greeks

The Famous History Of The Life Of King Henry VII

The Battle of Hastings: Sources and Interpretations (Warfare in History)

The History of Warfare: Cold War

Armies of the Irish Rebellion 1798 (Men-at-Arms)

Three Armies in Britain: The Irish Campaign of Richard II and the Usurpation of Henry IV, 1397-1399 (History of Warfare)

The History of Britain

The History of the Kings of Britain

History of Warfare: The Second World War In The East (The History of Warfare)

The Oxford History of Britain

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