Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain and Europe

HENRY VIII’S MILITARY REVOLUTION Dedication For John Joseph Hudson 1915-1988 HENRY VIII’S MILITARY REVOLUTION The A...

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HENRY VIII’S MILITARY REVOLUTION

Dedication For John Joseph Hudson 1915-1988

HENRY VIII’S MILITARY REVOLUTION The Armies of Sixteenth- Century Britain and Europe

JAMES RAYMOND

Tauris Academic Studies LONDON • NEW YORK

Published in 2007 by Tauris Academic Studies, an imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan a division of St. Martin’s Press 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2007 James Raymond The right of James Raymond to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Historical Studies 43 ISBN: 978 1 84511 260 8 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Replika Press Pvt. Ltd camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

Contents Abbreviations Conventions Acknowledgments Introduction

vi viii ix 1

Chapter 1:

Henrician Military Literature: Theory and Reality

Chapter 2:

Gunpowder Weapons

25

Chapter 3:

Training and Discipline

55

Chapter 4:

Infantry and Cavalry. A ‘British Art of War’?

80

Chapter 5:

Levying the Army

113

Chapter 6:

A Permanent Establishment?

136

Chapter 7:

The Gunners

163

Conclusion

The Military Revolution and Tudor England

180

Notes Bibliography Index

7

197 287 319

Abbreviations Manuscript Sources BL

British Library, London

Bodleian

Bodleian Library, Oxford University

CUL

Cambridge University Library

PRO

Public Record Office, Kew

TNA

The National Archives

Printed Sources APC

Acts of the Privy Council of England, J. R. Dasent (ed.), 32 volumes (London, 1890-1907)

Chronicles

Raphaell Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland, vol. 5, Scotland, vol. 6 - Ireland (London, 1808)

CPR

Calendar of the Patent Rolls

CSP Span FS

Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, Foreign Series, (14851558) (London, 1862-1954)

CSP Ven

Calendar of State Papers, Venice

English Military

D. Eltis, English Military Theory and the Military

Theory

Revolution of the Sixteenth Century (Oxford University D.Phil.Thesis, 1991).

History

Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie, The History and Chronicles of Scotland: From the Slauchter of King James the First to the Ane thounsande fyve hundrieth thrie sair fyftein zeir. (ed.) A. J. G. Mackay (Vol.1 Scottish Text Society, 1966)

ABBREVIATIONS

VII

HMC

Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports

LP

Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, 1509-47, J. Brewer, (ed.), vols.1-4; J. Gairdner (ed.) vols.5-13; J. Gairdner and R. Brodie (eds.) vols.14-21, (London, 1862-1910), vol. I (pt.1), no.5 (2).

Military Revolution

G. Parker, Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1996)

RWS*

J. R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London, 1983)

State Papers

State Papers, Henry VIII, 11 volumes (London, 18311852)

SR

Statutes of the Realm, A. Luders et al (eds.)

‘Trewe Encountre’

The Trewe Encountre,’ in A Ballade of the Scottyshe kynge by John Skelton (Detroit, 1969)

TRP

Tudor Royal Proclamations, P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larkin (eds.) (London, 1964)

Supply Services

C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services of the English Armed Forces, 1509-50 (Oxford, D.Phil Thesis, 1963)

The Chivalric

D. J. B. Trim, The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003)

* This book is a compilation of the author’s published articles. The individual chapter cited will be identified in the footnote, alongside the reference to the book and page, however, only the volume title will be described in the bibliography.

Conventions Transcriptions Transcriptions of manuscript source material, especially punctuation and spelling, have been kept as close as possible to the original document. Ligatures have been written out in full and contractions have been identified by placing brackets around the omitted letters. Capitals have been transcribed as in the original manuscript, abbreviations such as etc. have not been extended and the ampersand (abbreviating ‘and’) has been transcribed as ‘&’. The only exceptions to these rules have been in the case of ff, which has been transcribed as a capital ‘F’, whilst Roman numerals have been converted to Arabic for ease of reference. ‘F’ has also been modernised to ‘s’ where this was obviously the intention in contemporary printed material. This book has primarily followed, L. Munby, Reading Tudor and Stuart Handwriting (Chichester, 1988). Dates Except where the regnal year is directly referred to, all dates have been modernised, with the new year starting on 1 January. Reference has been made to C. R. Cheney (revised by M. Jones), A Handbook of Dates, new edition (Cambridge, 2000). Published Material Sections of Chapter One have been published in the journal archives, however, revisions have been made to this material since publication. See: J. J. Raymond, ‘Henry VIII and the English Military Establishment’, Archives: The Journal of the British Records Association, vol. 28 (2003), pp. 97-112.

Acknowledgments The completion of this book has left me with numerous debts of gratitude for academic and financial support. I must begin by thanking the Arts and Humanities Research Board for the award of a Doctoral scholarship, without which I would have been unable to complete this research. I must also thank the Department of History at the University of Exeter for the provision of a teaching scholarship, which provided invaluable teaching experience. The libraries of the University of Exeter, Leeds, Manchester, Oxford and Cambridge, the British Library and Public Record Office have all been extraordinarily supportive and helpful. Most especially I would like to thank the inter-library loans office at Exeter who have searched valiantly for various obscure references! Academically my first debt must be to my supervisor Professor Jeremy Black, who has helped guide me through the maze of literature on early modern warfare and steered me away from various ‘blind allies’. His support has been invaluable and for his honest appreciation of my work and generosity in entertaining me at his house on occasions too numerous to note I am very grateful. I must also acknowledge the influential support of Dr. Mike Duffy, Dr. Alex Walsham and numerous other staff and postgraduate members of the department at Exeter who have supported me throughout my research. The instructive comments and advice offered by my doctoral examiners Professor Nicholas Rodger and Dr. George Bernard have remedied various omissions and much developed this work. I would also like to thank the department of History at Lancaster University for inspiring me to postgraduate study. Most especially the charismatic and impassioned lectures of the late Dr. Marcus Merriman and his final year special subject, Mary Queen of Scots. I should also like to acknowledge the kindness and support shown by numerous academics in reading and commenting on my chapters over the course of this project. Most especially I would like to thank Dr. S. Gunn for remarking on draft chapters, suggesting corrections and providing encouragement. Likewise Dr. D. Grummitt has shown considerable academic generosity in allowing me to read a draft of his excellent forthcoming work on the military garrison at Calais. Gervase Phillips, whose book the Anglo-Scots Wars was so influential in developing my interest in the Tudor military, has also provided invaluable support, taking time to meet me and discuss my work and make suggestions about archives and publications. Finally, Professor Mark Fissel’s

X

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

encouragement in the final stages of writing up my thesis rejuvenated my enthusiasm and passion for the subject. Mark’s insightful comments and questions have been thought-provoking and profitable. Without their support and encouragement this would assuredly be a poorer study. The errors and omissions are, however, entirely my own. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their enormous and unstinting support, without which the book would never have been finished. My wife Kay, has valiantly waded through draft chapters and typing errors and has too long suffered the intricacies of Flodden and Pinkie, without wavering in friendship and care. My parents, (mum and pops) through seven years of university and enough room changes to have required a Pickfords van have shown patience above and beyond the call of duty while waiting for me to ‘get the job’ that I went off to University for in 1997. Thanks must also go to Jeanne, for encouraging and sharing a love of history. Lastly, I’d like to acknowledge the influence of my Grandad, whose wartime stories of the retreat from Dunkirk, capture and imprisonment in 1940, inspired my interest in military history. James Raymond

Introduction The Military Revolution Debate Roberts first proposed an early modern European ‘military revolution’ in 1956 in his inaugural lecture at Queen’s University, Belfast. Roberts’ thesis (in its most basic form) contended that developments in battlefield tactics and strategy, the associated growth in army size across Europe, and the greater impact of war on society connected with these developments in the years between 1560 and 1660, “brought changes which may not improperly be called a ‘military revolution.’ ”1 Roberts’ thesis developed out of a detailed study of early seventeenth century Sweden and a consideration of the reforms implemented by Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus. Setting aside for a moment the details of any criticisms ranged against Roberts’ ‘military revolution’, it seems clear that developments in the art of war during the Renaissance did exercise a “profound influence upon the future course of European history.”2 Since 1956 the debate has been extended chronologically to encompass a time span of over 300 years and expanded geographically from Sweden to Russia and Japan.3 Many pages have been dedicated to the piecemeal dissection of Roberts’ chronology, attacking his ‘unfortunate’ starting date and pointing out that by 1560 many of the ‘revolutionary changes’ he identified were far from complete. The main tracks of this debate are, by now, so well trodden as to need no further elaboration here.4 England and the ‘Military Revolution’ Gervase Phillips noted that, “there is a strange gap in the military historiography of England…from the defeat of the Yorkist Pretender Perkin Warbeck in 1497, which secured the Tudor succession”, to the overthrow of the Spanish Armada in 1588.5 Those historians who have tackled the subject have painted a picture of a nation essentially excluded from the ‘revolutionary’ developments gripping the European military system in the course of the sixteenth century. In what for a long time was the seminal work on the Tudor military establishment, Charles Cruickshank argued that, “England was physically separated from the rest of Europe and therefore insulated from military developments there.”6 Gilbert John Millar’s damning conclusions cast the Tudor soldier in the role of the ‘talented amateur’. He insisted that “the English high command...operated in the vacuum of

2


its own limited experience - and for better or for worse that experience was medieval...the British Isles lagged sadly behind the continent.”7 This view has been supported by a series of leading scholars who between them contrived to present a picture of an archaic Tudor military, falling far behind that of continental Europe, that is inefficient, unprofessional and hampered by a sentimental attachment to the ‘obsolete’ longbow.8 Oman claimed that “the first half of the sixteenth century was neither very notable nor a very glorious epoch in English military history.”9 He described an English army still based on fifteenth century models (a tag he attached in a derisory fashion), identifying “masses of billmen and spears, flanked by large wings of archery...with hardly any provision of cavalry, and was a force raised for a short campaign.”10 Meanwhile, across Europe a new modern, scientific, and crucially more effective form of warfare was being forged in the Italian Wars. The advent and application of pike and shot tactics was revolutionising the face of warfare.11 More recently, a growing body of scholars has sought to challenge this “distorted picture of England’s military capability.”12 Historians such as Gervase Phillips, Mark Fissel, David Trim, David Grummitt and Luke MacMahon have shown how in campaigns in France and Scotland, in the 1540s (and to some extent earlier), Henry’s armies were rapidly coming to grips with the latest military technology and tactics.13 Fissel identified the evolution of a “distinctively English form of warfare”, in which continental practices were integrated with the existing English tactical system, based on the old ‘bow and bill’ formations.14 Likewise, David Grummitt has argued forcefully for the relative modernity of English soldiers in the Calais garrison throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth century.15 The retention of the longbow has been shown understandable in the context of its consistent success in the first half of the sixteenth century.16 Mercenary troops were employed, principally German Landsknechts, to compensate for deficiencies in firearms, pike and heavy cavalry.17 It seems clear that, although reliant on mercenary troops, the English command understood the necessity of incorporating pike by the end of the reign. Phillips has convincingly demonstrated that, by the time of the 1547-1550 wars with Scotland, both Scottish and English armies were employing contemporary continental military techniques. In 1547 the rival armies fought with “canon, pike and arquebus”, alongside the more traditional “bow bill and axe”, and “mounted firearm, troops were prominent in the English army at (the battle of) Pinkie and throughout the ensuing campaign.”18 Somerset’s garrisoning policy witnessed the implementation of ‘modern’ methods of trace italienne fortification - most notably at Haddington. This process was, he argued, based on experiences at Boulogne where Henry’s extensive fortification

INTRODUCTION

3

programme fully acknowledged the latest developments in military fortifications; and surely built on the experiences of Henry’s earlier coastal fortification programme.19 It now seems increasingly clear that by the 1540s England was far from being isolated from European military practice. This book will build on these foundations seeking to demonstrate that English military theory and practice was broadly in-line with that of its continental neighbours from the outset of the reign of Henry VIII. The first section of this book has two broad goals. The first is to establish the essential character of the ‘English art of war’ in the early part of Henry’s reign, specifically did it conform to the changes being witnessed in the Italian wars (1494-1559)? Secondly it will explore the relationship between the proclamations of military theorists and the reality of life on campaign in Henry’s armies. In 1995 David Eltis published an extensive discussion of English military literature in the sixteenth century. Based on his analysis of over 40 such texts he came to the conclusion that, throughout the sixteenth-century, England “lagged behind the rest of Europe”, and more damagingly that “there was very little continuity in the Tudor military experience before”, 1585, indeed “peace and military decay prevailed.”20 Eltis’ approach was essentially a quantitative one, linking an explosion in the production of military literature in the latter half of the Elizabethan age with improvements in the military performance of English soldiers.21 Section A of this study will proffer an alternative qualitative assessment of the relationship between English military theory and military practice during the reign of Henry VIII. Chapter 1 will seek to demonstrate that military theory, based on the experiences of the early part of Henry’s reign, was being compiled in the 1540s. Moreover this literature was a reflection of a broader movement striving for military efficiency and modernity. The following three chapters will explore the relationship between theory and reality in five areas of expertise that have become synonymous with the notion of an early modern European ‘military revolution’: gunpowder-weaponry, training and discipline, the use of the pike and the role of the cavalry. It is worthwhile remembering that Eltis himself considered the “tactical combination of pikemen and infantry armed with firearms,” to lie “at the heart of the European military revolution.”22 Eltis was also heavily critical of what he called the ‘half-hearted’ adoption of firearms in England and the persistence of the longbow and noted that only 7% of Henry VIII’s native troops had firearms during his large-scale invasion of France in 1544. He further bemoaned the weak discipline of the Tudor soldier and a dearth of training before 1572-3.23 The first section of this thesis will therefore seek to test the validity of these criticisms and establish the extent to

4


which military theory reflected reality. As noted, historians increasingly accept England’s relative modernity by the 1540s. With this in mind, this section will focus on examples drawn from the early part of Henry’s reign, principally campaigns against the French in 1512, 1513, 1522 and 1523. However, battle was (and remains) the truest test of the professionalism, discipline and quality of any army it will therefore be necessary to consider the only set-piece battle of the period, Flodden (1513), a contest that provides a unique insight into the workings of the Tudor military. Detailed narrative accounts will not be provided, rather this will be a thematic analysis drawing pertinent, indicative examples from each of these campaigns. However, in order to provide a fuller picture of the nature of the early Tudor military, and the key factors that influenced its composition, one need necessarily consider English warfare within the British Isles. Campaigns in Ireland in the early 1520s and 1530s have been preferred for analysis, ahead of operations on the northern border against Scotland. In this instance a more narrative approach will seek to identify the extent to which the geography of the region, and tactics and character of the opponent, shaped the essential nature of ‘English warfare’ during this period. Border warfare with Scotland has been consciously excluded owing to constraints of time and space, and the already substantial literature on the role of Anglo-Scots skirmishes in shaping the character of the English army. Nonetheless, this will form the basis for substantial future research, most especially concerning the confrontation with the Duke of Albany in 1522 and 1523.24 Section B will consider the relative professionalism and permanence of Henry’s military establishment across the length of his reign. As we have seen, the notion of ‘professionalisation’ and of the development of the standing army formed a central tenet of Roberts’ original conception of the ‘military revolution’.25 Critics of the English military establishment in the sixteenth century have long attacked the absence of a ‘standing army’ in England, the employment of mercenaries and weak organisational structures. As this view would have it: “the military system bequeathed to the Stuarts was completely inefficient. It had broken down long before the Tudor period ended.”26 This section will determine how the army was levied, administered and armed across the length of Henry’s reign, although the survey will be in no sense comprehensive, extensive work having been done in this regard elsewhere.27 What it will do is ask new questions of the material, in the context of the clear modernising trend within Henry’s military establishment. I can make no claim to have examined the wider administrative or financial issues often associated with historical treatments of the early Tudors, this is unreservedly a work of military history, written under the auspices of the military revolution debate.28 Nonetheless, the relative professionalism of bodies like the

INTRODUCTION

5

Ordnance Office and Navy Board will be considered, and campaign examples used to illustrate successes and failures. The role of the small bands of ‘permanent troops’, such as the ‘Spears’ and men of the garrisons, will be briefly considered. Particular attention will be paid to the professionalism and permanence of the artillerymen who operated at the Tower of London, in Henry’s garrisons and on campaign with the army. This will break considerable new ground in detailing a process of professionalisation, exemplified in the career of Sir Christopher Morris. The concept of ‘institutional memory’ will be explored, seeking to identify whether or not this small body of military professionals retained the lessons of previous campaigns. Moreover, the level of command continuity provided by Henry’s nobility will be considered. It is necessarily the case that this study cannot be a comprehensive survey of the Henrician military establishment. The Tudor Navy, military fortifications29, wartime finances, military medical services, uniform and internal rebellion have been largely eschewed, whilst other important issues such as the role of chivalry, diplomacy and the nobility have received only a very light treatment. There is also much work still to be done on individual commanders, such as Surrey, and the more junior captains like Sir John Wallop. Finally the issue of victualling will only be attended to in passing.30 These topics have been excluded for various reasons: a lack of space and time, existing research and, most especially, to retain the focus of this study. All these themes will be referred to at different points, but the in-depth consideration, which they are due, must necessarily be reserved for future research. C. S. L. Davies shrewdly concluded that in studying military history, “the relevant question is not the absolute state of any country’s military technology but rather its quality relative to that of its main competitors.” Due consideration will thus be given to contemporary continental comparisons (most especially with France and Spain) throughout the thesis.31 It is especially important to recognise that early modernists have tended to under-estimate the sophistication of fifteenth century warfare and thus the state of the English military establishment at the turn of the sixteenth century. Accusations of medievalism, with all that this label entails, have consistently been leveled against English armies in the latter half of the fifteenth century, alongside unfavourable comparisons with the armies of continental Europe. A full discussion of the nature of the English army in the fifteenth century is beyond the remit of this study, but it is necessary to reemphasise that it was not the under-developed, ill-organised mass often described by ‘early modernists’. Anthony Goodman (amongst others) has effectively demonstrated the increasing technical and tactical refinement of English military techniques throughout the course of the Wars of the Roses. Goodman pointed out that there are numerous examples of the deployment of artillery and cavalry, in

6


conjunction with the more traditional bow and bill. It is Goodman’s sensible judgement that “the blending of traditional and innovatory methods in early Tudor armies was probably a development of precedents from the Wars of the Roses.”32 The employment of mercenary troops by the antagonists of the Wars of the Roses saw a strong dialogue develop between England’s military establishment and the new practices being perfected on the continent.33 It is important to remember that the English military establishment of the fifteenth century was advancing at a pace and was not lagging behind continental developments, indeed, the first Tudor, Henry VII, left his young son “an efficient military machine.”34 This thesis will be placed in its widest historical context. It will take into account the developments of the fifteenth century and second half of the sixteenth. Broadly speaking, the study will seek to demonstrate the clear modernising impulse amongst the commanders of Henry’s armies from the outset of Henry VIII’s reign.

Chapter 1 Henrician military literature: theory and reality Military Literature and Henrician England1 Early in the reign of Elizabeth I, Richard Barkhede, related to the young Queen the opinion of Lazurus von Schwendi a “colonell of the footmen at the late battaill of Graveline” on the state of the English military establishment. Von Schwendi considered that “we Englishmen stoode to moche in our own conceitte,” noting the lack of “warly discipline.”2 The relative ease with which England was recently dispossessed of Calais, Ambleteuse and Blackness were cited as examples of England’s ‘feeble’ soldiery as well as the “weaknes that was greatly found among our untrayned souldiers late at Lyeth.”3 This manuscript is plainly polemical, not least in advocating the establishment of a reserve of 15,000 men (organised into bands of 500 and trained twice a year). Nevertheless this document, and others like it, have been cited as representative of contemporary opinion on the English military establishment by a generation of historians. Until recently those historians who have tackled the subject of the Henrician military establishment have painted a picture of a nation essentially excluded from the important developments gripping the European military system in the course of the sixteenth century.4 Eltis maintained that, “the supporters of the military revolution and of up-to-date continental pike and firearm tactics needed to battle against opposition to their ideas as late as the 1590’s.”5 He based his conclusions on the analysis of over forty sixteenth century military training pamphlets. Although it is outwardly lucid and convincing, there are two key problems with his work. Firstly it is apparent that in drawing such sweeping conclusions on the actual conduct of specific campaigns, he relied on a series of secondary sources for the greater part of his information.6 Furthermore, important questions have been raised over his “rather uncritical...use of works (military pamphlets) which were often polemical and not infrequently self-serving as if they were objective commentaries.”7 Eltis emphasised the fact that of the forty-two editions of military literature he

8


examined, only four were written in the first two-thirds of the century.8 This fitted neatly into his general thesis that England’s military only caught up with the rest of Europe after 1585, and in conjunction with the rapid growth of literature in English on the subject. It is widely documented that the final third of the sixteenth century witnessed an exponential growth in military treatise across Europe.9 The works of men like Captain Barnaby Rich, Thomas Churchyard, Sir John Smythe and Thomas and Leonard Digges (amongst a plethora of others), open a window on the military practice of the Elizabethan age that has been thoroughly viewed and described by Eltis.10 Nevertheless Eltis’ account can and should be questioned. It is undeniably clear that in the first half of the sixteenth century “compared with the continent, the production of books on warfare in England was meagre.”11 It is instructive to note that between 1492 and 1570, 145 military related works were printed in Venice, of which 67 were “fresh and local to the public.” This compares against “14-plus,” in England in the same period.12 However, this does not indicate that there was no intellectual precedent for the Elizabethan literature described and employed by Eltis. Classical antiquity had provided the basis for much of the military literature of the Middle Ages and the works of Thucydides, Tacitus and Aelian were popularly referred to.13 However it was the De Re Militari by Vegetius that was the most widely examined text across Europe.14 Contamine commented that his work “was continually referred to throughout the Middle Ages and was rendered into French by Jean de Meun, at the instigation of Jean de Brienne, count of Eu,” as early as 1284.15 Notwithstanding, it is crucial to recognise that the translators and scholars of these classical texts equally understood the importance of making their ‘manuals’ relevant for contemporary audiences. In short it seems that “the translator’s options were limited. Either he could try to aim for accuracy but, in doing so, produce a work which, because of its rather … specialised vocabulary, might not make great sense to the contemporary reader….or…produce a version which reflected the spirit rather than an accurate rendering of the original text.”16 The first English rendition of Vegetius, in 1408, included a new section on the use of artillery pieces, a specific reference to the fact that the commissioner of the translation, Thomas, Lord Berkeley, was engaged in besieging Aberystwyth castle.17 Likewise Christine de Pisan’s Fayttes of Armes, translated by Caxton in 1489, although based on Classical authorities, in particular Vegetius, did include sections designed to be directly relevant to modern warfare.18 The underestimation of the relative sophistication of medieval military (and state) machinery is a common affliction of early modernists. It is instructive to note Contamine’s comments on “the historical culture of Captains of the time of Charles VIII and

HENRICIAN MILITARY LITERATURE: THEORY AND REALITY

9

Louis XII.” Whilst “a few great names,” could be “gleaned from antiquity,” what was deemed most important was “a good knowledge of the most recent events.”19 Henrician Literature Towards the end of the reign of Henry VIII, Sir Thomas Audley was commissioned to write a military treatise for the instruction of the young Prince Edward, the ‘Booke of Orders for the Warre both by Sea and Land.’20 This text survives in various forms at the British Library and in the Bodleian, Oxford (the Audley manuscript). The most complete of these is a child’s presentation copy in an immaculate secretary hand, other shorter versions in less well trained hands survive, (possibly drafts judging from the extensive crossings-out and corrections), now mixed in with miscellaneous military papers.21 It is almost impossible to ascribe an exact date to the ‘original’ manuscript - but what is clear is that the information contained therein is based on the experiences and lessons of Henry VIII’s reign. Thomas Audley had extensive military experience; it is possible he had served as a captain of foot during the 1513 campaign and in 1544 he was made Captain of Guisnes castle.22 In August 1544, Wallop (in a letter to the council), described Audley as “an honest man and as mete to s(er)ue…in the warres for his good vnderstanding and knowledge therin as any do know of his d(il)igence and can very well sett a nombre of men in ordre from one thowsand vnto ten and upwards, hardly to be amendyd.”23 When initially approached by Wallop and Poynings about the role of provost marshal at Guisnes, Audley hesitated.24 He claimed that although “gladly he wold do his ma(jestie) s(er)uice in any thyng that by vs shuld be appointed vnto hym if he had experence and could do it well but as in that case he thought hym self vnmeete being of his own nature to petefull for the same.”25 Nevertheless his appointment as ‘provost-marshal,’ at Guisnes was confirmed on the recommendation of Wallop. Between 1544 and 1545, he served at Berwick and in Scotland before being returned to France following the fall of Boulogne to take charge of the bulwark called the ‘Old Man.’26 The Audley manuscript (as it will hereafter be referred to) showed a detailed awareness of the latest military techniques, notably advocating the integration of pike and shot formations with the traditional bow and bill.27 Each of the manuscript versions differs slightly in content and format, with some providing detailed charts and tables demonstrating exactly ‘how’ infantry formations should be constructed.28 Audley also advised the young Prince Edward to seek “divuerse mens opinions, as well strangers as Englishmen.”29 This suggests that England did not adopt a separate position as regards interaction with European military

10


developments.30 This picture is substantiated by a second text (Text B), of which three copies survive (at Cambridge University Library, the Bodleian, Oxford and the British Library).31 This document also advocated the employment of pike and shot used in conjunction with the traditional bow and bill. In the case of Text B the question of authorship is less clear-cut. The Cambridge copy has no indication of the author. The Cotton manuscript however bears the signature of ‘Roberti Hare’ and the date 1557 on the first leaf and concluded with the statement ‘scriptus et finitus per me Robertu Hare ultimodie Junij 1557.’ 32 This has led David Eltis to attribute the work erroneously to Hare.33 Yet more erroneously, Charles Cruickshank suggested that this is the same manuscript as Audley’s ‘A, B, C for the Wars.’ This is manifestly not the case as the documents are distinctly different in format, if not in their support for pike and shot.34 It seems unlikely that Hare was the author - the text is evidently based either on experience or else leans heavily on another manuscript. Robert Hare had no military training, he had been admitted to the Inner Temple, on 2 February 1547-8, directly after leaving school.35 In later life he would become an antiquary and benefactor of the University of Cambridge.36 If he was the author, he must have leant heavily on either one, or a body, of other works. There is no evidence that either Text B or the Audley manuscript was based on the most comprehensive foreign treatise of the early sixteenth century, Machiavelli’s Art of War, which was not translated into English by Peter Whithorne until 1560.37 Nonetheless, references in the manuscript to “old writers” imply that there was a common body of military literature or pamphlets that soldiers could turn to.38 It is significant to note that Machiavelli’s Art of War, in large part, “simply reproduces Vegetius verbatim along with extensive passages from Frontinus and Polybius.”39 It is not unreasonable to suggest that Audley and the author of Text B had, at the very least, read De Re Militari.40 It is certainly the case that, as we will see in forthcoming chapters, many of the key themes of Vegetius’s work are echoed in the Audley manuscript and Text B, most notable perhaps are the preference for selection in military recruitment, the need for regular training and obedience.41 Returning the provenance of Text B, it is significant to note that in March 1558 Hare was in the service of William Paulet, Marquis of Winchester, and a copy of the ‘Audley manuscript’ is bound and stamped with the arms of the Marquis.42 It is possible that there is some connection here. In 1545, Henry VIII made Thomas Audley a Gentleman Usher of the Privy Chamber, and Paulet, Lord Steward of the household between 1545 and 1550, would clearly have known Audley.43 Although it is impossible to understand these links completely, the ‘social proximity’ of these three men (Audley, Paulet and Hare) paints a compelling


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case for their having known one another and having discussed military matters. This would imply that there was a wider movement striving for greater professionalism and uniformity inside the English military establishment. This impression is re-enforced when one considers that the third manuscript copy of this treatise bears the name Jane Seymour, identified by the catalogue as the daughter of the Duke of Somerset, followed by a series of biblical quotations on the first leaf (possibly a child’s gift to her father).44 It seems fair to assume then that Somerset, the premier English general of the mid-Tudor period, at the very least read this treatise. It would appear that the military elite of mid-Tudor England was striving for a better understanding of the latest technical and theoretical military developments. On the reverse of the first leaf of the Bodleian manuscript copy of Text B, a seventeenth century hand identified Sir Thomas Audley as the author.45 Based on this information, Hale has surmised that, “we should now speak of a second Audley treatise (substantially independent of A Book of Orders) and Hare’s copy of it.”46 This is certainly feasible; however, without further corroborative evidence, there necessarily remains a degree of doubt. This aside, internal evidence suggests that Text B was composed during the reign of Henry VIII. Frequent references made to the “king” or “prince,” seem to militate against its having being composed during the reign of Mary I.47 Although there are also references to the “king and quene,” it seems unlikely that Mary would have been intermittently ‘excluded’ by the author.48 This reference to a “king and quene” would also seem to rule out the possibility that it was written during the reign of Edward VI. I would therefore propose that it was written at some point in the reign of Henry VIII. Frustratingly, it is ultimately impossible to produce a definite identification of either author or date. Sixteenth century concepts of intellectual property rights were by no means as clear-cut as modern ones and it seems entirely likely that both groups of manuscripts are an amalgam of different people’s ideas, experiences and scholarship. One might note for example the ‘piracy’ of Robert de Balsac’s La Nef des Princes et des Batailles, by first an anonymous author and then by Beraud Stuart, Lord of Aubigny.49 P. Contamine described how, as “often happened in the Middle Ages, a time when writers were not afraid to borrow the ideas of others and when the notion of literary ownership was almost unknown, Balsac’s text was, within a very short time adapted, corrected, and completed.”50 Cruickshank, in his entry for the Guide to the Sources of British Military History, concluded that “a detailed study of the manuscript treatises of the earlier part of the century and the military books of Elizabeth I’s reign would reveal that some of them have so much in common that they could readily be conflated into a single ‘Great Tudor Military

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Book’.”51 The various translations and adaptations of Vegetius’s De Re Militari have been described in a similar light by C.T. Allmand, he related how the document was regularly “updated” by scholars and translators to increase its resonance for the contemporary reader.52 It is probable that, in part at least, this is what we are seeing in both Text B and the Audley manuscript as older ‘military themes’ are picked up, copied, adapted and discarded. J. R. Hale’s discussion of Henry Barrett’s Captain’s Handbook (1562) suggested that mid-sixteenth century theorists were “picking and choosing from and adding to a body of manuscript material about war that contained many chronological strata and included practical memoranda and instructions, humanistic strains and homespun moralizing culled from homilectic literature.”53 For example, one might note the qualities, identified by both Text B and the Captain’s Handbook, that were requisite for every good soldier. Text B focused on the importance of ‘scilence’, ‘obedience’ and ‘treuthe’, whilst Barrett similarly identified “silence, obedience, secrett, sober, hardie, treuth”.54 Likewise a document amongst the Lansdowne collection at the British library listed “syxe poynts in a soldiar being part of a code of military instruction drawn up towards the beginning of the sixteenth century.”55 The same headings as those described by Barrett were detailed, although there are various differences in wording and text, the thrust of each ‘characteristic’ is the same. Furthermore, the sections in Text B on military discipline bear a strong resemblance to many of the military codes published and proclaimed at the outset of military campaigns throughout the middle ages and into Henry’s reign.56 This suggests that there was a wide diffusion of scholarship, advice and instructions on ‘military issues’ in circulation during the early sixteenth century.57 It is also entirely possible that this second group of manuscripts (Text B) is one of these texts and that it in fact pre-dates the Audley manuscript. Returning to Eltis’ model for military development, it seems clear that any overarching theories linking Elizabethan military developments to the growth in the production of military literature must necessarily be treated with circumspect caution. These documents seem to make a clear case for the English understanding the latest military techniques - not least pike and shot formations well before the final third of the century. Moreover, they illustrate the extensive literary and intellectual heritage upon which military theorists of the Elizabethan and Stuart eras built their own work, a heritage which can clearly be traced back into the middle ages. It would, of course, be entirely naïve to suggest that these manuscripts represented a simple ‘descriptive narrative’ of actual military reality during the 1540s or earlier. However, it seems safe to assume that they do, in many instances, represent what was considered ‘best practice’.58 Early modern battles could be


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won in a number of different ways. There are examples of cavalry, infantry and of artillery all winning battles outright, however, the indisputable key to victory was the successful co-ordination of these arms. This necessity was clearly recognized by Audley as he urged that “everye standarde be lyke apointed, so many shotte so many pykes, so many bylles, then shall yo(ur) Armye of fotemen be in good ordere.”59 Likewise it was essential that ‘the horse’ be carefully divided between men-at-arms and light horse, “then shall you have a good ordere for battayle thorowghe owte yo(ur) holle Armye.”60 Armies were traditionally grouped into three broad formations known as ‘battles’: the vanguard, ‘main’ battle and rearguard (or rearward). However, one can identify the gradual adoption of more complex battle formations throughout the continent in response to the development of, and reactions to, firepower on the battlefield.61 Broadly speaking the pike squares of Europe were formed on the basis of two distinct formations, the ‘just square’ (or ‘square of men’) and the ‘broad square’ (or ‘square of ground’). The Audley manuscript considered the relative merits of both of these formations, again demonstrating that, as an experienced English military commander (in operations in and around Boulogne), he was well aware of the latest continental tactics; commenting that “most p(ar)te of men vsethe at this daye the brode square...w(hich)e me thinketh ys verye good bothe for thoccupying of many handes and also for the fayre p(re)sence made to theire enymes.”62 Text B, as we shall see, undertakes to examine many of the same themes as the Audley manuscript, similarly discussing ‘bow and bill’ alongside ‘pike and shot’. The principal difference between the two texts is that, whilst the Audley manuscript tells the reader how wars should be fought according to a modern model, Text B is concerned with the practicalities of just ‘how’ this should be carried out in the field.63 As we have seen, Eltis argued that “the tactical combination of pikemen and infantry armed with firearms,” was at “the heart of the European military revolution.”64 The development of these weapons, in this view, encouraged numerous military theorists to put pen to paper and, most importantly, encouraged the evolution of widespread training. Moreover, “the half-hearted adoption of firearms in England and the persistence of the longbow delayed the full impact of the military revolution in England until the final third of the century.”65 However, Phillips and Fissel (amongst others) have described the application of many of these military techniques in recent research on the 1540s.66 It is the contention of this thesis that many of these practices were identifiable in Henry’s early campaigns. It was the experience of these early campaigns that informed the approach of men like Hertford and Lisle in the 1540s. In order to test the hypothesis, it is now necessary to examine the military competency of Henry’s

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forces, between 1509 and 1523 as laid down in the introduction.67 Moreover, in an attempt to distinguish theory from reality, the exhortations of the military literature described above, will be outlined alongside this consideration of actual military practice. However, firstly it is necessary to sketch a brief outline of the campaigns from which these examples will be drawn. There is already a great deal of literature concerning the foreign policy, strategic and tactical aims of Henry’s overseas wars. With this in mind the following section will be brief and provide no more than an overview, with the intent of providing a context for the thematic analysis that follows in chapters 2 and 3. England at War: 1509-23 – An Overview 1509-1514 With the accession of Henry VIII, England again found itself committed to the ‘sport of kings,’ for, as Pollard first asserted, “Henry VIII sought to give the words rex et imperator a meaning unseen since the days of the Roman Empire.”68 The pursuit of glory on the battlefield and continental recognition as a major force in the ‘European power system’ were to form key elements of Henry’s reign. Henry had grown up in a court captivated by the chivalric motif.69 The received view of Henry VII’s ‘New Monarchy’, more concerned with frugality and state control than warfare and glory, has been shown, in part at least, erroneous. Rather, up to 1492 the first Tudor pursued an aggressive foreign policy, and was equally as concerned by the requirements of chivalry, honour and renown as any of his contemporaries or forbears. This sense of chivalric honour is most clearly demonstrated in his support for Breton independence, in tacit acknowledgment of the assistance the duke had given him during his own exile.70 Moreover, Currin has argued that in 1492, “the king’s plan, which miscarried in the end, may have included the briefly held dream of recovering the lost Plantagenet territories of Normandy and Guyenne and restoring the Lancastrian ‘dual monarchy’.”71 Memories of great English victories over the French remained fresh and resplendent in the psyche and pageantry of early Tudor England. The young Henry VIII was determined to re-create the glorious exploits of the Black Prince and Henry V.72 At Crecy, in 1346, dismounted English men-at arms stood amongst the ranks of the foot-soldiers to repulse the charge of the French cavalry. Yet more famously at Agincourt in 1415 the flower of English chivalry, under the leadership of Henry V, stood firm, as the French were destroyed in a hail of arrows. These gloriously romantic victories against the old enemy enjoyed pride of place in contemporary English history.73 The death of Henry VII “brought a


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foreign policy of chivalrous bravado and a domestic policy of knightly magnanimity and magnificence.”74 A fierce historical debate has centred around the nature of Henry’s foreign policy since Pollard’s seminal biography placed him in the role of rex et imperator.75 Traditionally, historians have discussed the evolution of modern concepts of foreign policy in the course of the sixteenth century, most prominently the development and employment of a strong Navy, and the promotion of ‘balance of power diplomacy’, by Wolsey and Henry, in an attempt to obstruct the complete domination of Europe by any single power.76 More recently (and convincingly) commentators have begun to recognise a series of fatal flaws in this model. Far from having any grand strategic or diplomatic ideals, similar to modern concerns about an illusory ‘balance of power’, Henry and his councillors were largely taking pragmatic political decisions in reaction to the opportunities or threats presented to them.77 The dangers of diplomatic isolation, invasion from Scotland and even dynastic challenge, seen most strongly in the instance of Richard de la Pole, played a tangible role in moulding English foreign policy. Moreover, it is now acknowledged that Henry and his court were more heavily influenced by the medieval traditions of chivalry and honour than notions of a ‘balance of power’.78 Rather than grand imperialistic designs on lordship over the whole British Isles, D. M. Head convincingly argued that, “Henry had never consistently sought more than a Scotland either at peace with England or in such disarray that no resistance could be offered to English adventures elsewhere.”79 Likewise M. Merriman maintained that in 1513-14, 1522-3 and 1542 Henry demonstrated “a purely defensive attitude towards Scotland, while sporting on a far more prestigious field of valour in France.”80 Following his accession to the throne, Henry quickly established his desire to in effect - re-open the Hundred Years War. In a letter of 26 April 1509, the Venetian ambassador reported that after the death of Henry VII on 21 April “his son was created (king), and swore…immediately after his coronation to make war on the king of France. Soon we shall hear that he has invaded France.”81 Henry VIII quickly set about making preparations to lead his country to war. In March 1510 Henry had been obliged by his council to renew his father’s peace treaty with France.82 Nevertheless, publicly, Henry still maintained an anti-French posture, and by May had concluded a treaty with Spain, virtually nullifying the one just made with France. In his eagerness to embark on the path to military glory and renown, Henry had twice commissioned English troops to go ‘to war’ in 1511, although, both were very limited expeditions. The first, led by Sir Edward Poynings, consisted of a force of 1,500 archers sent to assist Margaret of Savoy against the rebel, Duke of

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Guelders.83 The ‘campaign’ lasted from March to September with some measure of success; however the limited nature of this force negates much discussion.84 (Although it is well to note that English archers were still held in high enough regard to merit their aid being requested). English troops had also sailed from Plymouth in May to fight the Moors with Ferdinand, under the command of Lord Thomas Darcy. However the operation came to nothing and finding they were not wanted the troops were quickly returned home.85 It is possible to argue that these expeditions were insignificant in military terms, however they were, nonetheless, a clear indication of intent on behalf of the young king. He was determined to seek military renown in Europe. Late in 1511 Henry had committed himself to the ‘Holy League’, formed by the Pope against the schismatic Louis XII. On 17 November he agreed a treaty with Ferdinand obligating England to an Anglo-Spanish campaign to capture Guienne in southwest France.86 It is to this invasion that we must look to find the first serious military expedition of Henry’s reign. As we have noted, to the young Henry VIII, the pursuit of glory on the battlefield was the key to his achievement of ‘true majesty’. In a document dated 20 March 1512, Pope Julius II had stripped Louis XII of his title, ‘Most Christian king of France and of his kingdom’ and offered it to Henry in return for the prosecution of a successful campaign against the French king.87 This was a rare ‘carrot’ indeed for a king so eager to emulate the deeds of his illustrious ancestor and namesake, Henry V.88 Throughout 1512 the royal propagandists sought to present the French king as a usurper of Henry’s rightful claim to the crown of France and the lands of Anjou, Maine, Gascony, Guyenne and Normandy. Early in the year “it was concluded, by the body of the Realme in the high Courte of Parliament assembled, that warre should be made on the Frenche Kyng and his dominions.”89 The formal declaration of war was delivered in April and, by the end of the month, the English fleet, under the command of Edward Howard, had embarked to raid the French coast. Lord Thomas Grey, Marquis of Dorset was appointed to lead the main English army. Dorset was to join up with Ferdinand’s forces and invade Guyenne. It was agreed prior to departure that Ferdinand would supply the English with ordnance, cavalry and carriage for supplies.90 However, Ferdinand, who had now changed his mind and wanted to attack Navarre before turning to Guyenne, made no such preparations. Dorset’s proposal to attack Bayonne as a base from which to assault Aquitaine was refused. It soon became apparent that Ferdinand simply wished to use the English force to act as a cover for his seizure of the Kingdom of Navarre, which he quickly defeated and annexed. Ferdinand’s failure to follow the agreement laid down before the departure of Henry’s army effectively destroyed


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any hope of Dorset achieving anything meaningful. In the context of the military history of Henry’s reign, the campaign was relatively insignificant, so much so that Vergil insisted that, “nothing worth recording was done in these parts.”91 However, considerable sums of money were expunged on the campaign, in a series of payments executed by William Sandes in his role as treasurer of the army. Guyot Heull, Captain of the Almayns was paid for six weeks wages, cloth for coats and “houses,” and total payments for the wages, victuall and other costs incurred in the execution of this minor campaign totaled 80,857li. 17s. 4d.92 More symbolic of developments in the rest of Henry’s reign was his manipulation at the hands of an ally with a hidden agenda. Ferdinand’s failure to provide the ordnance and equipment determined in the negotiations before the campaign, and his alteration of the campaign objective, destroyed any hope of success - not simply the quality of the English troops.93 The ignominious failure of this campaign did not discourage the young king. By 5 April 1513 he had again committed himself to war “on the part of England, with the Pope, Margaret of Savoy (on behalf of the Emperor) and Ferdinand of Aragon, against Louis XII King of France.”94 In signing this ‘Holy League’ Henry committed himself to an invasion of “Aquitaine, Picardy, and Normandy...within two months,” and even Ferdinand’s withdrawal from this great coalition could not discourage Henry from leading his army personally.95 It was his opinion that “his English subjects were of such high spirits that they tended to fight less willingly and less successfully under any commander other than their king.”96 Moreover he maintained that: it behoved him to enter upon his first military experience in so important and difficult a war in order that he might, by a signal start to his martial knowledge, create such fine opinion about his valour among all men that they would clearly understand that his ambition was not merely to equal but indeed to exceed the glorious deeds of his ancestors.97 Whether Henry was indeed determined to exceed the deeds of his ancestors, and the extent to which he did so, remain beyond the remit of this thesis.98 It does however seem clear that the pursuit of glory, through military adventure and more importantly victory, weighed heavily in the mind of Henry VIII. Although Henry fought for tangible gains, diplomatic and territorial, “he also fought in the shadow of his ancestors…for an honourable place in the history of his country.”99 Indeed, his reign was to end with England at war with Scotland and France: the 1540s saw domestic concerns firmly subordinated to Henry’s pursuit of military renown.100 These concerns aside, in 1513, Henry agreed to “cross the sea with 30,000

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men,” and offered to negotiate with the Venetians and urge them to peace with the Emperor, so that the Spanish in Italy could turn to attack southern France.101 The Emperor would attend in person and retain an army of 3,000 horses, 6,000 Swiss and 2,000 Landsknechts, to be paid for by Henry.102 This represented Henry’s first personal venture onto the battlefields of Europe. In the company of such an auspicious ally, the king was determined that the campaign should be a successful one, so extensive preparations were made. Polydore Vergil claimed that “there had almost never been seen in England so redoubtable an army, whether in the toughness of the soldiers or the excellence of their equipment.”103 This statement is almost certainly guilty of the same hyperbole that characterises much of Vergil’s chronicle; however, the ‘Army Royal’ of 1513 was excellently equipped and well organised.104 The forward crossed to Calais in mid-May, followed at the end of the month by Lord Herbert with the rearward.105 Henry himself arrived with the middle-ward as late as 30 June, by which time both the forward and rearward had departed Calais and encamped at Therouanne. Henry set out from Calais with the ‘middleward’ on 21 July and “notwithstandyng that the forward and the rerewarde of the kyngs great army were before Tirwyn, the King of his awne battayle made 3 battailles after the fasshion of the warre.”106 Whilst in France, the army besieged and destroyed the town of Therouanne and seized Tournai (granted to the English in the peace of 1514 and garrisoned until 1519).107 They were also victorious in the grandly christened ‘Battle of the Spurs’. However, the “strategic value of Henry’s gains was negligible,” and the campaign has come in for extensive historical criticism.108 The Emperor, not Henry, enjoyed “tangible,” strategic advantages “when Therouanne was put out of action and Tournai was occupied by a friendly power.”109 Henry’s manipulation at the hands of his allies was completed when Ferdinand and Maximilian abandoned plans for a second invasion of France and made a separate peace with Louis XII. By August 1514 Henry had also concluded a peace, which, although outwardly beneficial (allowing him the retention of Tournai, the reinstatement of his French pension and assuring the marriage of his sister, Mary, to Louis), in reality left him with little more than empty coffers and an expensive, isolated outpost.110 The Battle of Flodden, 9 April 1513111 Perhaps the most significant outcome of Henry’s invasion of France was that “King James of Scotland, incited as much by the exhortations (of Henry VIII) as by the bribes of Louis King of France, prepared an army.”112 It was James’ aim “to attack the English borders so that King Henry should be distracted from his


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attacks on France.”113 The Scots mustered at Borough-Muir, outside Edinburgh, on 17 August accompanied by 50 French soldiers under the command of Count d'Aussi (sent by the French king to train the Scots in the use of the pike).114 The Scots crossed the Tweed at Coldstream on 22 August, razing Wark castle before crossing the Till at Twizel Bridge and marching downstream to Norham Castle. On 18 September Thomas Ruthal, Bishop of Durham wrote to Wolsey with “a right sorowfull hart,” relating how “the Kyng of Scottis had sieged assaultid and in a great stormy nyght scalyd and won the Castell of Norh(a)m.”115 The siege had lasted six days, but in the end Norham’s antiquated defences were no match for the impressive Scottish artillery train.116 James IV’s aims remained relatively modest in military terms. He did not have the time or manpower to besiege the major English stronghold on the northern border, Berwick, especially when faced with an advancing English army. He could not hope to by-pass the border forts and move south towards Newcastle or York, this would leave his supply lines open to attack and disruption. James was restricted to a small incursion in the hope of distracting the English from their objectives in France. However, with what amounted to the cream of English military might abroad in France, he must have felt that he would rarely be offered a better opportunity.117 Having destroyed Norham, James went on to take Etal, Chillingham and Ford he then encamped at Flodden. On 6 September the Earl of Surrey and the English army marched 14 miles north from Bolton-in-Glendale to Wooler Haugh. This placed the English 6 miles from the Scottish camp, although by the roads the army was forced to take the distance was in fact much greater.118 Estimates have placed the English army at some 22,500 whilst the Scots boasted a force of as many as 29,000 men.119 The two armies clashed in a bloody encounter on 9 September, and the English emerged victorious after a gruesome melee lasting some three hours.120 However, in as clear an indication as one could wish that Henry had no particular designs on uniting the ‘British Isles’ under his own Imperial kingship at this time, this decisive victory was not followed up. Flodden had claimed the lives of the king of Scotland and countless numbers of his nobility and gentry, rarely had England’s northern neighbour faced such disarray, yet still Henry showed no desire to ‘march on Edinburgh’.121 1522-23 In a damning assessment of the second major foray of English troops into France of Henry’s reign (in 1522), Oman insisted that “considered from the military no less than from the political point of view, the second war of Henry VIII with France...is uninteresting.”122 This view is highly questionable and considered from

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both the political and military perspective this campaign is revealing and illustrative of a number of long-term developments in the reign of Henry VIII. Diplomatically it adds credence to the contention that, far from pursuing balance of power politics, Henry and his counselors were largely ‘out for what they could get’ political pragmatism was the basis of Henry’s rule, not idealism or doctrine. In 1518 Wolsey presided over the ‘Treaty of London’. The negotiations began with relatively modest pretensions and agreements were undertaken to arrange for the return of Tournai to French control.123 By the start of October “the Pope, the Emperor-Elect, the King of France, the King of Spain, and the King of England undertook to make common cause against the Turk and to include in their league all the other powers of Europe,” in effect “a magnificent treaty of universal peace.”124 Henry found himself in a prominent position, right at the centre of European politics, attaining briefly the prestige which he had sought from the moment of his accession and which he would continue to crave for the duration of his reign.125 However, throughout 1520, Francis and Charles were drifting back towards war, over their respective claims to the Duchy of Milan. By mid-1521 French troops had annexed Spanish Navarre and the Emperor appealed to Henry for support. There was clearly nothing to be gained, for Henry, by maintaining a position as the champion of a now defunct peace. During 1521 Wolsey began to lay plans for the mustering of a force of 6,000 archers for a fresh assault on France.126 On 25 August 1521 a secret offensive alliance was negotiated by Wolsey with the Emperor. The agreement obligated England to declare war on France in 1522 and invade France alongside the Emperor before March 1523.127 Henry was not really concerned with the European ‘balance of power’, but rather with what position offered the most personal prestige and benefit to England.128 English armies made successive invasions of France in 1522 and 1523. The first, under the Earl of Surrey in 1522, disembarked at Calais and “in good order of battaill they passed over Newnam bridge the 30 dai of August.”129 Surrey’s army confined itself to what amounted to a raiding strategy in Artois and Picardy. After a series of successful sieges, the English were ‘defeated’ by the walls and defenders of Hesdin; having decided to abandon the siege they made the short march to the Somme River.130 A disagreement ensued amongst the commanders as to the continuation of the campaign, thereafter the army fell-back towards Calais. In 1523, Henry’s close friend the Duke of Suffolk led the army.131 Early in 1523 “in the parliament...it was concluded that the Kyng of necessities, muste nedes make strong warre on the realme of Fraunce...wherefore the noble Charles duke of Suffolk, was appoynted as Capitain generall, to passe with an army royall into Fraunce, in the ende of August.”132 The English campaign was based on an alliance with Charles V and Charles, Duc de Bourbon, Constable of France who


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had rebelled against the French King.133 Negotiations between Charles V and the English, in early 1523, had been dogged by mutual suspicion of the other’s motives. The original plans had envisioned the siege and capture of Boulogne as a staging post for “the Great Enterprise, which was still due next year.”134 However Wolsey, who had initially been opposed to the campaign, induced a last minute change of strategy, concerned, less England got caught up in an extended and expensive siege of Boulogne. Wolsey was encouraged by contact with Bourbon and Floris van Egmont, graaf van Buren, the leader of the Netherlands ‘auxiliaries’, in mid-September; Wolsey urged that a strike should be made for Paris, in coordination with attacks from the Duke of Bourbon from the east and Charles from the south.135 The aim of this would be to bring the French to terms quickly, and ensure a favourable financial settlement for the English. Henry VIII initially demurred at such a possibility, the campaigning season was already old, and supply problems would be magnified by a proposal that required a swift advance over a long distance. Furthermore, there was a danger that such a threat to Paris would provoke Francis to recall his army from Italy.136 Nonetheless after a number of days of discussion Wolsey won out and plans to capture Boulogne were shelved, instead “Suffolk was to strike for the heart of France and meet Bourbon at Compiegne - perhaps for a blow at Paris.”137 Suffolk departed for Dover on the 24 August and “a few days later he and all his people, noble and common, landed in Calais...and there they lay for a month waiting letters from the King and his council to tell them which way they should take to ravage France.”138 Numbering somewhere in the region of 10,000-11,000 men, the army advanced, via Montdidier, across the Somme striking to “within thirty miles of Paris.”139 For England, in purely military terms, the campaign can be seen as a success; “Suffolk, Buren and Sandys had shown what bold generalship could achieve by concentrating overwhelming strength against weak points in the French defences.”140 After the successful siege of Bell Castle on 27 September, the heavily fortified towns of Therouanne, Hesdin and Doullens were bypassed. This sensible decision, avoided the danger of getting bogged down in a long siege and “was followed by a fortnight of spectacular successes,” culminating in the capture of Montdider on the night 27/28 October.141 The capture of Montdidier was viewed as a considerable achievement, the account of the siege describes the city as having been garrisoned with 2,500 “men of warre which had byn able in that strong holde to w(ith)stande 100,000 men for they were well,” armed and supplied.142 Despite Henry’s desire that the army should remain in France for the winter, and the preparation of 6,000 reinforcements under William Blount, Lord Mountjoy, the capture of Montdidier signaled the effective end of the campaign.

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Poor weather conditions, pay problems for Buren’s troops and anger at the prospect of wintering in France, induced large-scale revolt.143 Suffolk and his army were forced to retreat towards Calais. Nonetheless, that the French did not attempt to engage so small an English army in the field was considered a great wonder to Gruffudd.144 Gunn convincingly pointed out that the French commander possessed only 10,000 men most of whom were local and untried - therefore he felt it wise to use them to strengthen the garrisons, leaving himself with a relatively small field force.145 Gruffudd, however, was more simply of the opinion that the French well understood that “as soon as winter came it was sure that they (the English) would keep to their custom,” and return home.146 It would seem that even contemporaries viewed the principal cause of failure of these English campaigns to have been strategic, rather than tactical or qualitative.147 It is apparent that the failure of the English army to achieve anything more meaningful than what amounted to a chevaucee was the result of a deficiency of strategy, and a poor choice of ally, as opposed to any inefficiency in the troops.148 The revolt of the Duc de Bourbon had failed even before the English reached Montdidier; his failure to muster the kind of widespread support he had promised undermined any hopes the ‘allies’ might of had of dividing France amongst them.149 Here again Henry was let down by his allies: “Charles V, with his commitments from Italy to Freisland and his readiness to promise...(too much)...had proved both too powerful and too unreliable to be an effective ally in England’s continental ambitions.”150 1524-5: The Treaty of the More and Anglo-French détente The conclusion of Suffolk’s expedition marked the end of active campaigning on the continent by English troops for over twenty years. Henry’s campaigns against the Scots and the French had placed great financial strain on the English people. In 1522 the crown had levied a forced ‘loan’ of £260,000 to fund Surrey’s abortive raid into Picardy and Artois. In 1523 a further parliamentary subsidy was demanded to fund Suffolk’s expedition, to be collected over a four year period.151 The English government was faced by a changing diplomatic environment and discontented populace and was increasingly persuaded towards peace. The English felt let down by Charles in 1523, as his proposed incursion into France failed to materialise in any meaningful sense, whilst at the same time, the portents for peace with France were good. Wolsey received news from Louise of Savoy that “although Francis is quite prepared for war, he is willing to make peace in order to avoid shedding Christian blood…according to the former treaties between them.”152


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England’s willingness to follow a peace policy was implicit in Wolsey’s instructions to Sampson and Jerningham on how to conduct their audience with the Emperor in January of 1524. Wolsey was keen to stress that in view of the Emperor’s “small ability…to continue the war…the King will forbear the advantage he expects from the war, and condescend to the Emperor’s wishes.”153 Behind the diplomatic manoeuvring obvious in this sentiment, a number of forces were at work. England was, in effect, operating a dual policy, both welcoming peace moves (led largely by Pope Clement VII), whilst reiterating her readiness to renew the war with France if a suitable alliance could be re-formed.154 This apparently cautious policy was not only a reflection of the delicate situation, both at home and abroad, but also of divisions within the English government.155 Wolsey faced a considerable task “to persuade the king and Council to peace…as they were all determined upon war.”156 Growing suspicion over the worth of Imperial promises of support must have proved a valuable point of leverage as Wolsey attempted to persuade the king against renewed hostilities.157 In 1523 Charles had, in effect, used Henry’s invasion of France as a cover for his own operations south of the Alps and south of the Pyrenees, a point that cannot have been lost on the king. Nevertheless, by July 1524, the early successes of Bourbon’s invasion of Provence, and the promise that he would advance on Lyons, ensured that an English invasion of France was again mooted as a very real possibility. Henry was “strongly urged to make use of this opportunity to invade France, which, by the advice of his council he intends to do.”158 Such was the enthusiasm for this project that Sir Richard Jeringham was already “despatched to the Lady Margaret, with orders to demand the 3,000 horsemen and 1,000 foot of the Emperor’s to join the king’s army.”159 However, Bourbon’s invasion collapsed and the prospect of another English invasion of France once more receded. The establishment of a new ‘Holy League’ by the Pope comprising himself, Venice and France on 12 December 1524 encouraged Wolsey and the English to negotiate for closer ties with the French.160 From the perspective of December 1524, a move towards closer links with the French must have appeared highly politic. The previous year had seen Charles fail utterly to fulfill his ‘obligations’ to Henry, and early in December Bourbon had fallen back from the siege of Marseilles; his assault on the French crown had again proved worthless. Moreover, Francis now marched confidently into Italy with the army of France. However, on 25 February 1525, the diplomatic and military pendulum swung briefly back in favour of the Emperor with the crushing defeat of the French at the battle of Pavia, and the capture of Francis. The Emperor had secured a crucial victory over the French, at the very moment that his English-alliance appeared all

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but defunct.161 Henry, nevertheless, sent Tunstal and Wingfield to “congratulate him on his recovery, on the success of his arms in Italy, and the great benefit to Christendom now that the inordinate pride of his enemy had been repressed.”162 A series of proposals were to be made to Charles V, the main thrust of which was to “urge the necessity of instant invasion by the Emperor and the king in person, offering as much as 200,000cr, and the personal aid of Henry in accompanying the Emperor to Rome; by which means, and possibility of his marriage to the princess Mary, he shall eventually become lord and owner of all Christendom.”163 This was a grand scheme indeed, however it fell on deaf ears and met with rejection. The Emperor, perhaps perceiving the inherent difficulties in invading even a leaderless France, or perhaps with his eyes on other challenges to his Empire, (not least the Turk), rejected Henry out of hand.164 This rejection marked a watershed in English diplomacy, pushing England further away from the old Imperial amity. This aside, the crucial determinant in England’s withdrawal from further continental incursions in the 1520s was financial. Simultaneously with his embassy to the Emperor, Henry had sent out commissioners to collect an ‘amicable grant’ amounting to one-third of the clergy’s income and one-sixth of the income of the laity.165 Coming as it did, in the wake of three years of heavy ‘taxation’, this ‘grant’ was received less than amicably by the English population. In a letter from Archbishop Warham to Wolsey, the cardinal was informed that, “it will be hard to raise the money…(with)…dissatisfaction prevailing.”166 The letter went on to relate how “the people speak cursedly, saying they shall never have rest of payments as long as some liveth.”167 Henry and Wolsey were forced ignominiously to back down: for “the only time in the century a Tudor monarch had been confronted and defeated by his subjects.”168 In the absence of sufficient funds to conduct a campaign, the refusal of Charles to even countenance Henry’s proposals became, in effect, totally irrelevant. It would be this lack of funds that terminated English adventures on the continent for the remainder of the 1520’s. It was not until the dissolution of the monasteries created a ready supply of cash for the royal coffers that England could once more seriously consider the prospect of military incursions on the continent. On 30 August 1525 the treaty of the More was signed between England and France, bringing to a close three years of warfare and ushering in a new period of Anglo-French détente.169

Chapter 2 Gunpowder Weapons i) Artillery It is possible to argue that the most influential development of the sixteenth century was the growing refinement, and increased use, of heavy artillery, deployed both in static fortifications and in the field. The evolution of heavy artillery had begun at the end of the fourteenth century, and continued at a pace throughout the 1400s.1 Initially returning the advantage to the offensive, the great bombards of the fifteenth century made short work of the tall, thin walls of medieval castles designed to prevent escalade. The French had fully demonstrated the potential of cannon on the battlefield in the fifteenth century, first in the eviction of the English from Normandy in 1449-50 and then famously during Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494. Italian historian Francesco Guiccardini captured the contemporary awe at the French artillery train “of sundry natures, both for batterie and seruice of the field, but of such sortes as Italy never saw the like.”2 In Guiccardini’s view: “Those artilleries were the cause, that all Italy stoode in great feare of the kinges armies.”3 However, despite contemporary admiration for French artillery “mobile gun carriages, the use of horses to draw artillery, metal shot and properly trained gunners were not unique to the French in 1494. Venice had shown a concern for and an acceptance of all these developments in the years preceding invasion, and the same was almost certainly true of Milan.”4 By the turn of the sixteenth century, Western Europe had long accepted the cannon as a central facet of ‘modern’ warfare. The advent of more sophisticated artillery fortifications in Italy - the trace italienne - soon returned the advantage to defensively arrayed positions. The aftermath of the battle of Pavia (1525) witnessed a dramatic reduction in decisive field engagements as commanders sought to avoid the lottery of open battle. This was the outcome of the technological refinement of artillery and, in response, the artillery fort. For much of Henry’s reign, Italianate fortifications were conspicuous by their absence in England. However the central importance of cannon to siege warfare was clearly acknowledged in the Audley manuscript. Audley provided detailed

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advice on laying siege to a town, emphasising the importance of artillery, and defensive trenches to protect your besieging army from the shot of the defenders.5 This appreciation of the value of artillery in siege warfare was surely a reflection of his experiences in and around Boulogne in the 1540s. In a letter to Henry VIII, commenting on his experiences, Sir John Wallop claimed that he “was never in a war where there was so much for youth to learn, both at the being before Landersey and then at the Emperor’s coming with horse and foot of all nations. Divers chiefs of Spanish footmen and Italian and Almain horse and foot offered to serve the king next year.”6 In operations in and around Boulogne, and the Calais Pale, English military engineers (notably John Rogers and Richard Lee) proved themselves adept in, and aware of, the latest fashions in fortification design. The fortifications around Boulogne displayed, for the first time, clearly Italianate principles. Nevertheless, even here, the English did not construct a ‘classic’ trace italienne. As elsewhere, the reason behind this was not a lack of understanding; but rather one of cost-effectiveness and practicality. The construction of an effective trace italienne required a reasonably ‘fresh’ site upon which to work - this was a rare luxury for English engineers in this period. Boulogne already boasted a series of older fortifications; the problem for English military planners (and indeed planners across Europe) was to adapt these older fortifications to fit with the latest thinking. It was a task they attacked with vigour and a good degree of success, demonstrating both knowledge and understanding to match that of their French adversaries.7 Theory The growing importance of artillery was mirrored in ‘open’ battle where it became preferable to fortify your position in preparation for an enemy assault - a tactic gainfully attempted by James IV at Flodden.8 It was also considered advisable, “knowinge to haue manie enemyes at hande,” to “entrenche yo(ur) campe.”9 Text B recommended a “trenche of 12 foote depe and 15 foote wide,” - alternatively, if you did not intend to remain in camp long, it was suggested that the camp might be encircled with “yo(ur) cariage placinge yo(ur) ordenannce amonge the same to the moiste advantage.”10 Audley showed a similar awareness of the importance of artillery cautioning that commanders must “plante the artillerye of every battayle towarde(s) suche places as you thinke be most dangerous where you think yo(ur) enymes maye assayle you.”11 In battle, it was assumed that artillery would be placed in front of the main body or on the wings to offer a vicious opening ‘salvo’ to the advancing enemy. It is worth briefly considering the different ‘types’ of artillery developed during

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the course of the sixteenth century and their relative ballistic performance. Contemporary records abound with multifarious names and designations of artillery that at times can appear bewildering to the modern reader. However, it is possible to identify three broad categories of ordnance and, for the purposes of clear comprehension, these will be referred to here as heavy, medium and light ordnance.12 The heavy ordnance of the sixteenth century developed out of the huge siege guns of the fifteenth. Biringuccio described how “the ancients used bombards…that shot heavy balls of stone with a great quantity of powder and the necessity of a great expenditure of workmen and sappers and a great number of animals.”13 In the sixteenth century, stone projectiles were replaced by iron and three types of heavy artillery piece emerged, the double cannon, cannon and demicannon.14 Various types of ‘medium ordnance’ were still in use by English and continental armies throughout the period. The most important of these were the culverin and demi-culverin, which served as excellent light-siege pieces in an age when transport of artillery still posed massive logistical problems; they were “easily loaded, and are easy to move to wherever they are needed.”15 The final category, light ordnance, included sakers, falcons and falconets, which served as excellent field pieces in support of the army.16 Contemporary treatises, such as those of Biringuccio, abound with descriptions of the different types of cannon in production, recommendations on manufacture, types of metals, quantities of gunpowder and so on. However the records remain relatively silent on the ballistic performance of contemporary ordnance, and much of what we now know of the performance of these guns comes from nineteenth century tests on older weapons.17 Nevertheless, such was the potency of these weapons to contemporary eyes that Biringuccio considered “they should be compared…to demons of hell, since these man-made thunderbolts are like those that come from the heaven of jove.”18 Even light ordnance had a potential extreme range of 1,000 yards and a projectile muzzle velocity of in excess of 300 feet per second; heavy ordnance had the capacity to dispatch an iron projectile as far as 1,950 yards and a muzzle velocity in the region of 500 feet per second.19 Cannon offered a very real, tangible threat to defensive fortifications; the old medieval curtain wall had rapidly been made obsolete during the course of the fifteenth century and offered no effective protection against sixteenth century cannon. These concerns aside, artillery salvos would continue to be valued as much for their psychological effect, as for their practical efficiency for much of the sixteenth century: “noise, smoke and all the features of the grand parade was their idea of firepower.”20 This conclusion is supported by a brief consideration of the names given to artillery pieces in the early modern period; “pieces called, respectively,

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Basilisk, Serpent, Griffon, Falcon, Falconet, and Merlin – all names that are as fearful to whoever considers them as are those of the basilisk or other poisonous serpents, as well as those of rapacious birds which always wound with their beak or claws.”21 Purchase and Manufacture22 An awareness of the growing importance of gunpowder weaponry was far from being a ‘mid-century’ development in England. Despite the romantic affection for the longbow, of a man widely recognised as a superlative archer, and its deadly employment by English armies throughout the period, Henry well appreciated the value of gunpowder from the outset of his reign and took a strong personal interest in the development of artillery and gunpowder weaponry.23 This is perhaps not surprising given his early commitment to warfare and continental glory and the extensive artillery trains of his neighbours.24 It is important to recognise that the size and power of a nation’s artillery train, much like the magnificence of the king’s court or residences, was seen as a direct reflection of the grandeur, wealth and prestige of any given monarch. In this context, the young Henry, desirous of achieving recognition as a true renaissance prince and warrior king was drawn to the power of artillery. From as early as 1509 one can identify extensive efforts to increase the size and quality of the English artillery train.25 On the occasion of a visit by a small fleet of Venetian vessels in 1518, Giustiniani reported to the Doge that “the king chose to have all the guns fired again and again, marking their range, as he is very curious about matters of this kind.”26 Indeed, in a reflection of contemporary esteem for Henry as a patron of artillery, Nicholas Tartaglia was to dedicate his seminal treatise on artillery and gunpowder weaponry “vnto the Royall Prince of most famous memorie Henrie the eight, late King of England, Fraunce and Ireland.”27 R. W. Stewart, in his comprehensive survey of the Elizabethan ordnance office, mistakenly suggested that, “the history of artillery production in England can truly be said to have begun with Henry VIII.”28 However, the supply of munitions and stores had to some degree been a function of the Wardrobe from as early as the reign of Edward III, and the seeds of an English domestic gunfounding industry, in any meaningful sense, can be found in the reign of Henry VII.29 Indeed by 1485 “the use of a variety of guns had become a commonplace of warfare in England.”30 On 11 March 1484, Richard III had appointed Patrick de la Mote to the office of “chief canoner or master founder and surveyor and maker of all the king’s cannon in the Tower of London and elsewhere.”31 Henry VII retained de la Mote as chief “canoner”, also keeping William Nele in his service as

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a gunner at the Tower.32 The first Tudor famously nurtured the native production of ordnance from as early as 1487 in Ashdown Forest, Sussex.33 A brief examination of the accounts reveal numerous payments to men like William Nele “gonfounder”, Robert wylly of London and William Marshal for the “kinges gonnes.”34 This certainly indicates a conscious attempt to establish a native industry, both at the Tower, and more widely, through subcontracting to privately owned forges. This has traditionally been understood as a pragmatic response to war with Scotland in 1496, for example, Schubert argued that “iron-founding increased … when King Henry VII, preparing to secure the borders against a Scottish invasion, gave orders to engage artificers, ‘founders’ and labourers for the building of foundries and the making of iron ordnance.”35 However more recently, Awty has demonstrated that “the building of ironworks in the forest and the employment of artificers from overseas had been contemplated by Henry five years earlier.”36 A document detailing English preparations for the invasion of France “included an agreement made by Henry on 20 July 1491 for a 10 year lease of ‘all the mynes of iren and iren werkes within his forest of Asshedown’ to Johannes de Peler and John Heron.”37 Henry was prepared to “sende over the see for such and as many artificers and workmen,” as required.38 Although, it is unclear in the surviving documentation if this scheme was ever executed, this does, nonetheless, demonstrate Henry’s commitment to establishing native foundries in the Weald five years earlier than previously recognised.39 These concerns aside, and despite an apparent commitment to the development of a native product, the greatest number of payments for the purchase of ordnance seem to have been made to foreign producers.40 This led Hooker to conclude that the “purchase of ordnance materiel seems to have been based upon the expectation of a continued availability of foreign supplies.”41 A similar pattern is identifiable in the reign of Henry VIII. The accounts from these early years reveal numerous payments made for the “castyng of gonnes, makyng of saltpetyr and hagbusshes bought,” providing some indication of a drive towards modernisation.42 There is ample evidence of payments for diverse types of gunpowder weaponry as Henry sought to expand and improve his artillery. For example on 2 December 1511 Cornelius Johnson, was paid 20li for making “two newe gonnes,” of ten inches “compass,” for the king’s use, or in November 1512 Fortuno de Catelenago was paid 248 ducats for 7 pieces of “great ornance.”43 These payments were supplemented by the purchase and production of “saltpetyr, coper, tynne cariage, gonnewheles w(ith) yron works,” and other supplies essential to the conduct of a ‘modern’ artillery train.44 An analysis of the account books from the period reveals a large number of such examples.45 What is more surprising is to find abundant orders for both the production and purchase of

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hackbutts and other ‘hand-guns.’ For example on 27 April 1512 Alexandre de la Sava, “marchante stranger,” sold Henry 332 “hagbusshes of Iron for eight shillinges the pece.”46 Similarly in November 1512 200li was paid to Lewez de la Sava for 500 “hackbushes,” and Peter Corsy was given a warrant for the production of 420 “hand gonnes.”47 Numerous receipts were issued for the purchase of “three score, foure score,” or even hundreds of “hagbusshes.”48 The weapons range in value from “five shillinges stirlinge,” to “thre and twenty shillinges and four pens stirlinge,” each.49 However, one must be careful not to over emphasise the extent of these orders which still paled in comparison to the production of bows, where individual orders could reach as high as 10,000 at one time.50 This aside, payments relating to the casting and purchase of guns and other munitions amounted to considerable sums and mark a clear modernising trend within the English military establishment. Over the course of Henry’s reign, significant stores of artillery, armour and small arms were developed at the Tower and at Greenwich; at the time of his death in 1547 there were 64 brass, and 351 Iron cannon in store at the Tower.51 This is especially impressive in the context of the 1540s and the fiscal demands placed on Henry’s England by war on two fronts – gunpowder weaponry must have been considered valuable to merit the expense.52 A good number of these weapons were purchased from foreign producers or merchants, and certain names appear regularly in the accounts as a “gonnemaker” or “merchant straunger.” A close inspection of the accounts reveals that much of the ordnance and harness purchased by Henry was imported from continental Europe. Payments were made to a plethora of foreign merchants and gunfounders throughout the reign. William Damsell, Henry VIII’s agent in the Netherlands, made various payments for “handgunnes”, ‘Ordn(a)nce of brasse’, ‘Saltpeter’ and other munitions between 1 December 1543 and 29 September 1547.53 Hans Popenruyter, chief founder at Mechlin (one of Europe’s premier foundries) made over 144 pieces for Henry VIII.54 Similar purchases were made from other foreign suppliers, for example “Casper Odenhauser merchant,” or “Francis de Berdes for Thomas Cavencant, M(er)chant of Florence.”55 It seems clear that foreign imports (especially from the Low Countries) were the single most important source of ordnance for much of Henry’s reign. It has been suggested that this was a departure from the reign of his father.56 However, as we have seen, Henry VII was equally reliant on the purchase of foreign ordnance and munitions.57 The reason behind this can be gleaned from a series of agreements between “Thomas Spynelley s(er)uant to the king of England…and maister hans popenruyter maister gonner dwelling at malynes.”58 The letters relate to orders for

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quantities of artillery, purchased for the king from Popenruyter in 1510. They reveal that guns could be produced at a lower rate outside England; and that “the duchesse of Savoy hathe p(ro)vided that the said Hans shalt make the said gunys as good chepe for the kinge hymselfe as he shalt do for the Prince of Castile.”59 Therefore it seems that financial expediency was the principal reason behind an English preference for imported guns. Nevertheless, there is definite evidence of a drive towards the further development of the domestic gun-foundry industry in the reign of Henry VIII. W. Page noted that the great majority of “skilled labour during the sixteenth century was executed by foreigners, and nearly all the tradesmen attached to the Royal household came from abroad.”60 It is thus not surprising to find a large number of foreigners employed in the king’s foundries.61 This was part of a policy that can be traced back to the reign of Henry VII; numerous French gunners and gunfounders were to be found working in Ashdown Forest and serving in garrison at the Tower and elsewhere - men like Graunt Pierre.62 Lacey argued that the first Tudor was firmly committed to military innovation and employed “foreigners skilled in the use of hand-guns as his guard, as gunners to maintain and fire his artillery, and as manufacturers of gunpowder and body armour.”63 Henry VIII, like his father, sought to recruit foreign specialists to support and enhance the establishment of an English industry. Awty noted that the “various Subsidy Rolls list over four hundred aliens in the iron-working areas of the Weald during the period 1524-1570.”64 Daunce’s account’s detail extensive and regular payments for guns made to ‘aliens’ in English service, such as Cornelius Johnson, “gonnemaker,” at the Tower.65 Evidence of an English gun-making industry is augmented by payments for the creation of “forges at Greenwich” and elsewhere.66 New forges were established at Salisbury Place and Hounsditch, and Henry sought to attract foreign specialists to work in them.67 For example, on 22 July 1511, John Blewbery received 18li 9s 4d for the “wages of armourers of Milan,” and the new forge commissioned at Greenwich on 18 September 1511 was “made for the armorers of Brussels.”68 Moreover, just as “the armouries and workshops at Greenwich and the Tower in time turned out armour that competed on equal terms with the finest productions of Milan or Augsburg,” so to “the work of the Italians and Frenchmen in the gun-foundries of London was in no way inferior to the masterpieces of Malines.”69 It is now widely accepted that “of the known traditions of foundry, the English seems to have advanced furthest during the 16th century.”70 David Hume famously argued that “shipbuilding and the founding of iron cannon were the sole (arts) in which the English excelled. They seem, indeed, to have possessed alone

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the secret of the latter, and great complaints were made every Parliament against the exportation of English ordnance.”71 These comments reflect a widespread demand for English ordnance in Europe in the latter half of the sixteenth century and first half of the seventeenth.72 Goring noted that “that demand for iron, particularly for military purposes, had grown considerably during the war-troubled years of Henry VIII’s reign and the early part of Elizabeth’s… (and)…by 1574 the number of furnaces and forges (in the Weald) which at mid-century had been around fifty, had passed the hundred mark.”73 This increase in demand was an indication of both the success of the industry and the skill of its craftsmen and a source of concern to the crown, which was eager to control the export of English ordnance to the continent.74 For example, in 1574, Christopher Baker, “an Admiralty employee,” voiced the widely held concern that “our merchant shipping…was…being put at risk by vessels armed with guns produced and sold from Wealden Iron works.”75 More important from the perspective of this thesis however, is the evident dominance of English ordnance. Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that “this dominance had already been made possible by events set in train during the reign of Henry VIII.”76 During the fifteenth century cannon had largely been constructed from wrought iron, this process saw iron-bars lashed “closely round the circumference (of a mandrel), and over those a series of rings were passed, at a white heat, which, when cold, shrank on the rods and compressed them firmly together.”77 At the start of Henry’s reign, his Master Smith, Cornelius Johnson, was still producing cannon in this manner.78 However, although relatively strong, these cannon were made very heavy by all the iron bars and were thus difficult to transport. The process was also incredibly intricate and as a consequence painstakingly slow and expensive. With this in mind, bronze (called ‘brass’ by contemporaries) was preferred as a material, which although still expensive, created a more accurate gun, which was stronger and lighter.79 The principal garrisons had a preponderance of bronze guns, and the metal remained the material of choice during peacetime for much of the reign.80 Indeed, “bronze was so valuable that a law of Henry VIII prohibited the export of bell metal or gun metal as a strategic resource of the kingdom, thus effectively reserving the use of bronze ordnance to the king’s forces.”81 The close technical relationship between the processes for casting church bells and cannon also provided a viable ‘dual industry’ for the men who worked the forges, during times when demand for cannon was low.82 However, as war loomed in the 1540s and the demand for ordnance increased dramatically, a cheaper alternative to bronze was required by the hard-pressed Henrician government, and this materialized in the form of cast-iron ordnance.83 Frenchmen working in Ashdown Forest had made the first attempts at this

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process – which, in effect, mimicked the procedure for casting bronze guns with iron - in 1509.84 Cast-iron gun-shot had been in production since the 1490s, however, the more complex procedure involved in casting something as large as a cannon took some time to develop. At the start of Henry VIII’s reign the process was only applied to the barrel, the chamber (which was detachable) was still constructed with wrought iron bars. However, “the two-part were guns were…unsatisfactory in that it was hard to form a seal between the barrel and the chamber.”85 By the 1540s the cannon was cast in one piece, creating a more reliable and efficient product.86 This development placed England at the forefront of the international cannon manufacturing market, and the English product was considered the best in Europe for much of the remainder of the century.87 Clearly there were limitations; the process of removing the metal from the cast broke the mould, ensuring that no two weapons were identical.88 Moreover, despite extensive efforts to produce a native product, England remained substantially dependent on foreign supplies of gunpowder throughout Henry VIII’s reign.89 Gunpowder was comprised of three key ingredients, charcoal, sulphur and salt-petre, however, the latter was difficult to procure in England.90 C. S. L. Davies argued that, “Not until a German, Gerrard Honrick, had taught Englishmen the artificial method of making salt-petre in 1561 did England cease to depend entirely on foreign supplies.”91 Thus the accounts are full of payments to foreign merchants and manufacturers for saltpetre and fully mixed gunpowder (although the English preferred to mix the powder themselves).92 Furthermore – for a variety of technical and production related reasons – England retained the use of the inferior Serpentine powder for a longer period than many of her European neighbours who were fast to adopt the more powerful ‘corned’ variety.93 Nevertheless, there are indications of an early Henrician drive to establish an English gun-making industry to supply his armies and keep pace with European developments.94 However, given the relatively small English expertise in this field, foreign specialists were employed in English forges, and merchants were paid to import high quality weapons from continental Europe. It thus seems clear that Henry was aware, from the outset of his reign, of the importance of artillery in ‘modern’ warfare and, like his contemporaries, was starting to experiment with the purchase, production and deployment of hand-held firearms. It now seems appropriate to consider how effective Henry’s artillery was in practice. English Artillery at War: 1513-1523 Henry’s French campaign in 1513 was planned in the context of the French

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victory at Ravenna, a battle that had opened with a two-hour artillery exchange.95 It is thus not surprising to find that the extensive preparations for the expeditionary force clearly acknowledged the importance of artillery in modern warfare. In a reflection of the scale of these preparations, a report was sent to the Doge from the Venetian ambassador to London claiming, “Henry, besides numerous cavalry and infantry had ‘enough cannon to conquer hell’.”96 Contemporaries clearly did not view his artillery train with the disdain adopted by many twentieth century historians. Late in 1512 a draft, in Wolsey’s hand, called for the creation of a force inclusive of 1,000 “pyoners,” who must be “abyll fyghyng m(e)n and 500 gunners,” plainly recognising the importance of artillery on the modern battlefield.97 Indeed, the 11,728 fighting troops of the “vanguard retinue” were ultimately supported by a further 1,079 under the command of the Master of the Ordnance, Sir Sampson Norton.98 It seems clear that the English, throughout the planning stage of the 1513 campaign, were well aware of the importance of artillery to victory in modern warfare. One might also note a document from the Exchequer Accounts listing “A proportion of the king’s orden(an)ce, artillery, and other habillements necessary for the rerewarde, with draught and carriage.”99 250 carts, 1,540 horses and 600 men were required to transport all manner of supplies including diverse classifications of artillery and ordnance. The manuscript takes the form of a long and detailed roll, listing a variety of ordnance from Bombardes, Serpentynes and Fawcons to one hundred “hagbusshes,” and a hundred “handgunys in chests.”100 Moreover “shot for thir goonys of all sortes,” sufficient “for the battrie of 8 daies and nightes,” accompanied the rearward.101 This limited selection goes some way towards indicating both the scale of preparations and Henry’s growing commitment to the latest military technologies. Indeed, on top of sufficient powder for an artillery barrage lasting 8 days, “a great staple of shot and powder (was) to remain at Calais,” as an additional sign of intent.102 Henry’s army “was equipped with the best artillery that money could buy and handled by the best gunners that Henry could engage from the Low Countries,” and throughout the course of the campaign it gave a good account of itself.103 The English boasted as many as eight discrete designations of artillery piece ranging from the Falconet, at 300 pounds to the Bombard, weighing as much as 6,000 pounds. For this expedition Henry had “twelve gonnys called the twelve appostelles,” (unusually large bombards), commissioned from Jeronimo Fustobald.104 Each of the ‘wards’ was supplied with as many as 60 guns apiece as well as forty ‘organs.’105 The ‘organ’ was a multi-barreled gun, which could fire ‘diced’ shot as opposed to one single large ‘canon-ball’. It was effective as an antipersonnel weapon and was especially potent when concentrated on a body of

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troops or a breach in a wall.106 The slow rate of fire and technical deficiencies of early sixteenth century canon made this magnitude of artillery necessary. Canon could only be fired a limited number of times each day. This is clearly indicated in a manuscript penned in 1513, possibly as part of the plans for the 1513 campaign (although this is not clear), detailing the “ordnance…and all appurtenances necessary for an army of 15,000 footmen and 3,000 horsemen.”107 The draft lists a series of artillery pieces detailing poundage and how many times each day a specific gun may be shot. For example “every apostle shoteth of Iron, 20lb wych may be shot,” 30 times each day, a Curtow could be shot 40 times a day, a culverin 36 times a day and a bombard a mere 5 times a day.108 Therefore, if the gunners were inaccurate, only limited space for improvement was available. Oman commented that, “on the whole we find two tendencies gradually growing,” across Europe, “the progressive importance of firearms, and (partly in consequence of that progress) the utilization of field entrenchments.”109 Certainly the clearest examples of the effective deployment of artillery and entrenchment in 1513, by the English, were the sieges of Therouanne and Tournai. Therouanne was Henry’s first objective; it was a crucial garrison town and in many senses the most important military base in Picardy. Therouanne was “strongly fortified with walls, ramparts, bulwarks, with divers fortresses in the ditches which were so broad and so plumb steep it was a wonder to beholde.”110 Following his arrival Lord Herbert, observing that there was an absence of natural defensive ‘obstacles’ ordered the digging of trenches to offer protection for both the English artillery and troops. This in itself showed awareness of modern siege warfare and the effective application of artillery. Judging themselves too few in number to mount a full-scale assault on the city until Henry arrived with the middle-ward, they set about establishing themselves and began a controlled artillery barrage. This barrage was upgraded with the arrival of Henry who ordered, “his great ordinaunce,” to “sore bet the toune walles.”111 The garrison of Therouanne was disciplined and well-armed and thus “slew divers Englyshmen in the trenches, among which shottes their had one gonne that every day and night was ordinarely shotte at certayne howres without fayle.”112 In a further reflection of their appreciation of the ‘modern’ military techniques, the English undertook an attempt to mine the walls - which although destroyed by a French counter-mine - illustrates the extensive military knowledge within the English camp.113 The English artillery was so effective in degrading the garrison’s will and ability to fight that, following the flight of the French at the ‘Battle of the Spurs,’ they “despaired of all relief and capitulated.”114 By 21 September 1513, Henry had moved his camp to within three miles of Tournai. Tournai, unlike Therouanne, boasted no garrison, its fortifications were

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distinctly medieval and its artillery antiquated. Henry planted 21 pieces of artillery in the field before the town “and when they were charged, they were immediately shotte, and the most part of the stones fell within the cytie, and so they shotte one after another.”115 Henry ordered the artillery to surround the city and great trenches were drawn up, the English artillery battered the town’s walls and by the 29 September Henry had received the ‘loyalty’ of the citizens of Tournai.116 Henry received the “keys of the towne...vnder a pavilion of clothe of gould,” the Friday before he entered the city.117 In short, probably the most significant contributory factor to the relative success of Henry’s 1513 campaign was the efficiency of the artillery train, which proved to be too strong for the defenders of Therouanne and Tournai to withstand. Turning our attention briefly back to the British Isles, any consideration of the English (or indeed ‘British’) understanding of artillery in these early years cannot be complete without some assessment of the battle of Flodden. Scotland and England had long sought to build up mighty artillery trains and Flodden was in many ways a gunner’s battle. Reports had been reaching Henry since February of Scottish preparations for war, for example Dacre relayed that James IV visited his arms manufacturers on a daily basis.118 Ruthal related that preparations had been ongoing for as long as seven years, and come the day of Flodden they lacked for no ordnance.119 His description of the battle pointed out that the Scots possessed a “g(rea)te nombre,” of “large peces of ordynannce as Colveryns,” and “S(er)pentynes,” mentioning “17 greate pees beside moche other smale ordynance.”120 More poignantly Ruthal commented after the battle and the capture of the Scotch ordnance that “it is the fynest and best,” that had been seen.121 This battle was one of transition, not for England alone, but for the British Isles as a whole.122 Throughout the sixteenth century it was increasingly the preference of commanders to fortify their positions whilst in the field. Thomas Audley advised that an army should “lodge youselfes upon the highest ground you can fynd so shall you be sure alwaies to hath advantage of your enemyes. And so being alwaies upon the highe you discover all lowe groundes with your Artillerie.”123 Audley considered it essential that a commander “plant the Artillerie of everie Battell towards such places as you thinke be most dangeroues where you thinke your ennemyes maie assaile you, to your grievaunce.”124 Artillery in the sixteenth century remained very difficult to move; teams of men and oxen drew the Scottish artillery train. The difficulties the transit of artillery pieces offered to sixteenth century commanders, especially over rough, broken or wet ground, meant that artillery was often deployed in front of a ‘defending’ force to offer one viscous

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opening discharge. Thus James IV’s position at Flodden was constructed to ensure “the enimies could not approach to fight with him, but with great losse and danger to cast themselves away.”125 N. Barr has recently argued that the positioning of the Scottish cannon was most probably at the behest of their French advisors, who were well aware of the relative tactical and technical deficiencies of the Scots army. 126

James was camped along the crest of Flodden edge, 509 feet high and protected by both a series of natural obstacles and by an impressive array of field artillery. The ‘Trewe Encoutre’ described James’ position as “encloofed in thre’ parties with thre great mountaynes, soe that there was noe passage nor entre vnto hym but oon waye, when was laied marvelous and great ordenance of gonnes ….. 5 Great curtalles 5 Great colveryns 4 Sacres and 6 great Serpentynes as goodly gounes as haue bene sene in any realme.”127 The English were presented with either charging directly into the waiting Scottish ordnance or attempting the near impossible negotiation of the broken ground, which protected the Scots flanks - a marsh, or the steep slopes of the moor. The Scots army was expertly positioned; it took fully into account the importance of artillery and displayed an excellent awareness of continental tactical doctrine. The response of the English commander, in the face of such an impressive artillery train, was not the reaction of a man who was unaware of the tactical merits and limitations of artillery. Surrey was a veteran of the Wars of the Roses and the deployment of field artillery had become increasingly common throughout the course of this conflict. He understood that a direct assault on James’ position was untenable and would only result in unpalatable English casualties. He would also have known of the great difficulties the Scots would face in moving artillery of this calibre with any speed. Therefore Surrey resolved to outflank the Scottish position and attack from the rear of their encampment, risking a hostile Scotland to the English rear in the event of defeat. Surrey ordered “the Vangarde with the ordinaunce,” to “passe over agayne the water of Tyll, at a bridge called Twysell bridge the 9 Daye of September and the rerewarde to passe over at Mylforde, puttynge theymselfes as nye as they could betwene the Scottes and Scotlande, and so to give battayll to the Scottes on the hyll called Flodden hyll.”128 It seems that the English were at home with the tactical implications of artillery. It is unclear exactly why James IV allowed Surrey to complete such a dangerous march in full view of his guns. A number of factors and possibilities require consideration, not least the poor weather conditions. In describing the events of the day Holinshead related how the “evill weather sure annoied both parties; for there had not beene one faire day, no scarse one houre of faire weather of all the time the Scottish armie had lien within England...but great cold and wind

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and raine.”129 However, it was not sufficiently bad to hide the whole English army, which was certainly observed by James. Hall believed that King James assumed the English were moving towards Scotland to burn and foray in revenge for Scottish actions in England.130 It is entirely feasible that this was the case, “if the English did not pick up the gauntlet he had thrown down, he could return to Scotland having fulfilled his duty to France and the victory would have been his.”131 However, this was not to be the case, and as the true English objective became apparent to the king he “caused hys tentes to be removed to an other hyll in grate haste,” - thus losing the advantage of his defensive position and to a large extent his great guns. The battle opened with an artillery barrage and the advantage had now shifted to the English. Artillery at the turn of the sixteenth century was notoriously hard to aim. Machiavelli commented that “because infantry stands so low, and because it is no easy matter to manage heavy pieces of cannon well - if you either elevate them or lower them the slightest bit too much, in one case the balls will fly quite over their heads, and in the other they will fall into the ground and never come near them.”132 Furthermore these problems were exacerbated by “the least inequality of terrain,” which “is also a great boon for them (the infantry), since any little bank or brake between them and the artillery serves either to hinder the shot or divert its direction.”133 Surrey’s manouvre had forced the Scots to re-position their artillery in a location which was no longer so favorable to their gunners, as a result of which the Scottish artillery “did thame nahurt, but flewe over thair heidis, be rasone that tha war sa laich and tha sa hich.”134 The English shot was much more effective, firing, as it did, up the hill. The “Trewe Encountre,” describes how “by the help of God our gounes did soe breke and constryn the Scottishe great army that some parte of thim wer enforced to come doune the said hilles towarde our army.”135 The impact of English shot on a waiting Scottish army, unable to offer any significant response, was to force them into a hurried advance on the English position. Historians and chroniclers later criticised James IV for descending the hill so readily; especially in view of the Scots being “on the toppe of the hyll being a quart(er) of a myle from the fote therof.”136 By descending the hill he spared the English a long hard climb, on an empty stomach after a days march. However in doing so he was only applying contemporary tactical doctrine. It was widely felt at the time that the pike should be used offensively. Thomas Audley considered that “if you list to meate with your enemyes, a little descending from the highe of the hill your force and strength is the more for a man going downewrd is of more force, than he that goeth upwarde.”137 Furthermore, it is crucial to remember that the Scots were being raked by English shot. The only effective response to this problem (adopted by both Swiss and Landsknechts) was

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to attempt to close with the enemy quickly, as once ‘handstrokes’ had begun shot became ineffective. In many respects James was simply following accepted tactical practice. At the battles of Cerignola in April 1503 and Ravenna in April 1512, the tactical and defensive merits of field fortifications defended by firearms had been made explicitly clear.138 The lessons of these battles had, it would seem, penetrated ‘British military thinking’, not least through the interaction of the Scots with 40 French ‘advisors’. Under the supervision of French advisors the Scots had created a formidable defensive position, however, Surrey’s risky but tactically brilliant flanking march undermined Scottish defensive preparations at a stroke. In this instance he revealed a clear awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of modern artillery. Cannon were heavy, cumbersome and awkward to move and the Scots were unable to re-position their cannon to good effect in the time provided for them. The English light cannon were then highly successful in goading the Scots into headlong assault. The Scots thus surrendered the advantage offered by their possession of the high ground and undermined the tight cohesion required for the effective application of the pike. The English were clearly in possession of a modern artillery train and fully appreciated the importance of cannon to modern warfare. It is therefore surprising to find that the 1522 campaign in Picardy and Artois would prove something of a failure due to the diminutive size of the artillery train that accompanied the Earl of Surrey’s army across the channel. The value of artillery and the importance of taking sufficient ordnance on the campaign, were made abundantly clear in the agreement between Henry and the Emperor. It was explicitly stated that Henry “shall have a strong band of artillery, sufficient for two good batteries.”139 It was further provided that “the Emperor will then join with the English artillery, 12 field pieces called falconets.”140 English plans for the campaign insisted that provision should be made for “a competent and sufficient proporcion of Artillary and ordenance,” to accompany the army.141 More specific plans suggested that the army should take eight “curtowes,” twelve “single curtowes,” and twenty four “culverners.”142 It is unclear in the manuscripts how much of this proposed train actually accompanied Surrey on campaign in 1522. The campaign started positively enough, after extensive preparation and following a safe disembarkation at Calais, “in good order of battaill they passed over Newnam bridge the 30 dai of August.”143 The army marched in three ‘battles’; the fore-ward under the command of Lord Fitzwater was followed by “the ordinaunce, artilerie and other trusses with vitail and necessaries.”144 The horse followed next under the command of Sir Edward Gylford, and then came the middle-ward with the Earl of Surrey and finally the rearward led by Sir William

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Sandes and Sir Richard Wyngfelde.145 On 8 September, the artillery was called into action for the first time making short work of casting “doune the Castle of Columberge and the Castle Rew.”146 The following day, at the town of ‘Bayardes’, the army encountered “the churche more like a castle then a church, for it was deep ditched with drawe bridges and with Bulwarkes, fortefied and lopes very warlike.”147 Despite these fortifications, the English army made short work of this building too. However, arriving at Hesdin, the English faced a sterner test; having taken the town with relative ease “they battered the castle on all sides with artillery fire.”148 It quickly became apparent that “the castle could not be obtained wyth out great ordnance...and also if they wyth the light ordinaunce shotyng should spend all their powder and not get the castle then in them might be reckoned great foly.”149 Having decided to abandon the siege, they made the short march to the Somme River, where a disagreement ensued amongst the commanders over the continuation of the campaign; before long the army found itself retreating to Calais. The insufficiency of the English artillery train has thus been widely heralded as the principal cause of the failure of the English campaign in 1522. Nevertheless, England’s military planners clearly understood the value of artillery in modern warfare, and this deficit was handsomely rectified in the campaign of the following year. Oman commented that the artillery “was numerous and heavy as the want of it had been the cause of Surrey’s futile operations the previous autumn.”150 The accounts reveal that considerable funds were made available for “provision of artillery and ordnance, carriage and wages of gunners (60,000l.).”151 The scale of these funds re-enforce to the historian the importance attached to providing the expeditionary force with sufficient artillery to fight a ‘modern campaign.’152 As in 1513, the English proved themselves most adept at the organisation and deployment of cannon in siege warfare. On the 20 September 1523 “my lordes grace the Duke of Suffolk toke his jornay out of Callye w(ith) his army ryall to Calkwell Churche,” and by the twenty-seventh they came to Bell Castell.153 The siege of Bell castle provided an excellent opportunity for the English army to ‘practice’ its tactics before embarking too deeply into France. The castle was “a strong hold…well watred,” and “ther Master Skevyngton was smytten thorow the sleve w(ith) a gonne and had no harme by grace of God.”154 It is interesting to note a senior English officer (the Master of the Ordnance) being ‘shot’ by a firearm early in the campaign. Incidents such as this one could not fail to have made an impression on the English commanders, if nothing else, raising the profile of firearm troops in the minds of the English. Hall related how “the ordinance with great difficultie was brought nere the castle, and all though it wer

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night, the gonnes cesed not and bet the place sore.”155 However, hearing the English command sound the trumpet for an assault, the captain, with his family and 60 men, surrendered the castle.156 Gruffudd’s account made clear that the weather was bleak throughout the campaign; “grey bearded winter began to show his face in black cold frost wind and short days and long nights which caused the decepit shivering soldiers to complain and groan to each other.”157 As such, the commanders of the English expedition concluded that a rapid advance was best and avoided the strongly fortified towns of Therouanne, Hesdin and Doullens. However, this period of relative failure (or at the very least failure to engage) “was followed by a fortnight off spectacular successes.”158 On the night of the 19/20 October the English assaulted ‘Braye’, proving again their expertise both in the deployment of artillery and the assault of a city.159 The English gunners began to “shote at the walle of Bray,” at four in the morning, and by six “they break downe great gaps in the walls the bred(th) of a carte besyde a towre at the corner of the towne.”160 Then “our men callyd ‘aswate aswate’ (“assault, assault,”) and toke a dyke that was 35 foote dype downe and won the walles w(ith)out ladders which was a marvellous great enterprise.”161 The English again showed themselves proficient in the effective deployment of artillery and siege warfare. The skill and understanding of English ‘gunners’ like Skeffington and Harte is clear. However, they would certainly have been strongly advised and guided by the foreign specialists that accompanied the campaign, like Francisco Arcano, “Master of Mynes.”162 As in any military campaign, the English ordnance would clearly have learnt a great deal from the foreign specialists that accompanied the campaign (like the 500 Namur pioneers). However, far from a sign of a weak military establishment, this should be understood as part of the natural learning curve that accompanies any military expedition. That the English looked to the employment of foreign specialists demonstrates a degree of selfawareness, an understanding of weaknesses in the army, and a desire to correct them and learn new techniques, in an age of technical and tactical transition. Regardless of this, while the campaign lasted the English troops proved themselves skilled in ‘modern warfare.’ On 27 October, the English “came before the strong toune of Montdedier where for defence of warre lacked neither ditches, walles, nor bulwarkes.”163 The English repeated the tactics that had been used to such good effect throughout the campaign. The ‘Master of Ordinaunce’, Sir Willyam Skevyngton, prepared the artillery and ordered ditches to be constructed: at 6 of the clocke in the nyght our gonners gave them a peall of gunnes…and by two of the clocke in the mornyng our great ordynannce

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was layd w(ith)in 40 foote of the walls and gave them 4 goodly pealls and brakedowne the walls a great bredth hard by the myghtie strong bulwekre the strongest that e(ver) I saw. 164 By seven o’clock the garrison had surrendered and were “glad to departe w(ith) ther lyves.”165 Here again the English had proved capable in the ‘scientific’ application of the latest siege techniques in order to breach a city’s defences - not least the careful construction of trenches to protect the besieging ordnance. The capture of Montdidier was viewed as a considerable achievement: the account of the siege describes the city as having been garrisoned with 2,500 “men of warre which had byn able in that strong holde to w(ith)stande 100,000 men for they were well,” armed and supplied.166 The obvious hyperbole of this statement aside, it was noted that the town was “lowly wallyd,” (bastioned) and as such a more difficult target for any assaulting army in the age of cannon.167 This is a strong indication of the growing English appreciation of the requirements of modern siege warfare and fortifications – lessons that were to be put to good use fifteen years later as the English modernised their own defences.168 The capture of Montdidier marked the end of the campaign in any meaningful sense, despite Henry’s desire that they “make the best provisions possible and to spend winter within the dominions of the King of France.”169 It would seem indisputably clear that the English fully appreciated the value of artillery on the modern battlefield and were adept in its practical application. The 1522 campaign aside, English armies of the period were well furnished with artillery pieces and employed a combination of native and European experts to operate their cannon. They displayed a high degree of proficiency in siege warfare in France in 1513 and 1523 and also demonstrated a good knowledge of the tactical manipulation of cannon on the battlefield at Flodden. ii) The Longbow vs. The Handgun The development of shot, both artillery and handguns, in the course of the fifteenth century, had served to radicalize the nature of warfare by the turn of the sixteenth century.170 The handgun grew in importance, as the Italian Wars (14941529) progressed, proving itself indispensable at Ravenna (1512), Bicocca (1522), Sesia (1524) and Pavia (1525). By the time of Henry’s accession, his European neighbours were investing heavily in the development of gunpowder weaponry and the English king would prove to be no exception. The chief small arms weapons of the period were the arquebus, and later the musket (and in England, the longbow). Sixteenth-century theorists developed numerous and diverse ideas

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on the deployment of firearms in the field and battle tactics. However, the chief task of the handgun by the middle of the sixteenth century was to harass and harry enemy formations in the hope of disorganising the main body of their infantry. These ‘skirmishers’ would then be drawn within the massed squares of pikemen (or billmen in England) who, in turn, would receive the cavalry charges and engage the enemy’s pike square.171 ‘Shot’ would also be employed in ‘sleeves’ around the pike square and called to action as and when required.172 Given the relative inaccuracy of sixteenth century firearms, arquebus fire was best deployed against the tightly packed bodies of enemy pikemen, rather than the moving target of enemy skirmishers. The importance of firearm troops and their tactical deployment in battle as skirmishers was clearly recognised by the mid-century English theorists. Text B, whilst praising “that most noble weapon,” the “long bowe,” gave instructions for the deployment of “hackbutters.”173 Captains were to “teache... (their men)...to charge and discharge to marshe and reterie in good distannce asounder ev(er)y kepinge there faces upon theire enemyes.”174 The author went on to advise “in Rayne myste or winde carie there touche hole of there pece beinge chargede prymed vnder there arme holes, there matche fired w(ith)in the palme of theire hande so shall they be redie at ev(er)y sodayne regardine.”175 It was essential that they “kepe matche and powder drye, (and) there peces cleane scoweredd within and withoute.”176 Audley went further, offering detailed advice on numbers of shot - archers and firearms troops - and how they were best deployed by an army commander: “Thalmaynes vse comonlye but 3 in a rank of shotte aboute there battayles But we, if we mingle o(ur) achardes and hargabusses togethere (as me thinketh nedefull so to do) the(n) must you haue aboute yo(ur) battaile 5 in a Ranke, theye to haue 3 Archardes and 2 hargabusses. And if there be 4 then to haue 2 Archardes and 2 Hargabusses.”177 Mid-century English theorists were thus clearly aware of the value of firearms in modern warfare, but favoured their use in conjunction with the time-proven longbow. Audley also showed clear awareness of their tactical deployment as skirmishers as detailed above.178 The descriptions of Franco-English engagements in and around Boulogne in the mid-1540s abound with examples of the English deployment of small-firearms. One might note the account of Giovacchino da Coniano, the sergeant major of a group of Italians serving alongside the English at Boulogne. He described an innovatory formation, which saw the English form up as follows: “archers and hackbutters combined in wings, a rectangle with pikes on the outside, halberds in the middle, and shot between.”179 The English commander explained to him how the pikemen crouched while the shot fired over the top of them; that is to say an Italian ‘learning’ from an English pike and shot formation.180 Similarly the Welsh

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soldier, Ellis Gruffudd, described how the English cavalry would “lure their enemies…within range of the bows and hand-guns which the English host let fly as soon as they saw the French.”181 It seems clear that the English were deploying archers and hackbutters in tandem, attempting to gel old and the new. One might further note the testimony of an anonymous steward from Lydingetone who has left us with a useful account of the campaign.182 He described how on 28 July the Duke of Suffolk rode to Boulogne “with the nomber of 300 horsemen, 200 hagbusshes 300 archers and 300 pykes to weve the grounde where they wold Campe.”183 This was a very modern troop composition, indicating that the English were well aware of the latest technological and tactical developments. He went on to describe a skirmish with French troops before Boulogne in which “our hagbussheres and archeres shoyte so holy together that thei made them of the towen to go backe and so persued them to the gates of bullayne.”184 By the 1540s the English were training their firearm troops and longbowmen to work in tandem. It is increasingly accepted that by this time the English were up-to-date with the latest continental techniques.185 However, the 1540s are not the principal concern of this study and we must now turn again to the early part of Henry’s reign. English acceptance of firearms was far from being a development of the 1540s. Although there is no evidence of large-scale English small-arms manufacture at this time, there is abundant documentation of payments to foreign suppliers for small arms, from the start of Henry’s reign. It is apparent that Italy “was the chief fire-arm manufacturing country of the sixteenth century, and Brescia was especially famous for its guns.”186 One might note, for example, payments made in April 1513 for “thre hundred theytty twoo hagbusshes of iron for eight shillinges the pece,” or the payment of 9s “the pece,” to Piete Corsy for “420 handgonnes,” in 1512. 187 Similar payments were also made to a plethora of foreign merchants from “Alex della Favia, Merchant of Florence,” to Alexandre de la Fava, marchante stranger for thre hundred theytty twoo hagbusshes of Iron…for eight shilling the pece.”188 By 1531 the Venetian ambassador reported that “the English were ‘beginning to use harquebuses and artillery.”189 Whilst between 1 December 1543 and 29 September 1547, William Damsell (Henry’s agent in the Netherlands) spent 1,800li 17s 10d on the procurement of small-firearms, most especially hackbutts.190 At the time of Henry’s death in 1547, the inventory of the Tower revealed a stock of 6,700 “demi-hakes or hand-gonnes,” and 275 “shorte gonnes for horsemen, w(ith) cases of lether furnyshed w(ith) hornes and purses.”191

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1513-23 campaigns In the build up to the 1513 campaign one finds quite extensive evidence of the appropriation of ‘hackbutts,’ for use on campaign. One might note a document from the Exchequer Accounts listing “A proportion of the King’s orden(an)ce, artillery, and other habillements necessary for the rerewarde, with draught and carriage.”192 250 carts, 1,540 horses and 600 men were required to transport all manner of supplies including diverse classifications of artillery and ordnance. It is interesting to minute that ‘carriage’ was required for “habuzshes in chests.”193 The manuscript takes the form a long and detailed roll, listing a variety of ordnance from Bombardes, Serpentynes and Fawcons to one hundred “hagbusshes,” and a hundred “handgunys in chests.”194 Moreover “shot for thir goonys of all sortes,” sufficient “for the battrie of 8 daies and nightes,” accompanied the rearward.195 This limited selection goes some way towards indicating both the scale of preparations and Henry’s growing commitment to the latest military technologies. More pertinently, that “handgunys,” and “hagbusshes,” were carried by the army, demonstrates that some of Henry’s troops must have been trained to use them. It would certainly be a misrepresentation to suggest that small firearms played a central role in the tactical execution of the campaign, in fact scant reference to them is to be found in the chronicle material. However, it seems clear that as early as 1513 they did have a role in Henry’s field armies and it is entirely feasible that Henry’s Almayns would have carried limited numbers of firearms. It seems useful to briefly compare the provision of firearms to Henry’s wellfunded French campaign, with that of the militia force that marched north under Surrey, late in the season, to meet the challenge of James IV at Flodden. Significantly, small arms seemed to have played only a very minor role in the battle of Flodden and there is no direct reference to the use of handguns by either side in the chronicle material. However, a list of charges made at the behest of the Earl of Surrey for the costs he incurred during the campaign include some interesting claims. Most notable of these are the costs and charges that “John Cragges,” laid out at Berwick for the carriage “of the King’s ordnance.”196 These expenses included the transport of “16 peces of bras and two lodes of hagbushes and pellettes in 18 waynes from the feld to Berwyk towne.”197 Payments were also made for the wages of 11 German gunners, for example 41s. to Albert Brabander, as well as further amounts for “storing pellets and hagbushes in a house,” and shipping the ordnance.198 It is not clear whether these were English weapons or Scottish ‘booty,’ however it seems apparent that small-firearms were employed, or at least available, to one (if not both) of the combatant armies at Flodden. The second major incursion into France of Henry’s reign, in 1522, included

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Spanish auxiliaries and Almayns (under Imperial command) among its number.199 Although not explicitly clear, it seems a reasonable supposition that these bodies of troops would have included some number of hand-gunners. Firearm troops are however clearly identifiable as having accompanied Suffolk’s army in 1523 and Gunn suggested that “companies of hand gunners and of demi-lances were raised by Flemish and Italian captains.”200 Margaret of Austria, Charles’ Regent in the Netherlands also sent 500 Namur Pioneers under the command of one of the best respected generals in the Low Countries, Floris van Egmont, graaf van Buren. A further indication of this trend is the inclusion of 269 English “hondgonners,” divided amongst the retinues of Harte, Fawconbrygge and Caser.201 Although only a small force, this number of small-firearm troops could have been effectively deployed as skirmishers or in a defensive array on the march or in camp.202 However, whilst there is evidence that the English were experimenting with the deployment of firearm troops, the great majority of missile-armed troops, on campaign with Henry’s armies between 1513 and 1523, remained archers.203 In April 1513, letters were sent out to the nobility, and leading gentlemen of the kingdom requesting that they muster set numbers of troops. One such letter, to Lord Hastings, required the peer to provide 100 men for the campaign, “wherof 60 to be Archers and 40 billes well and sufficiently apparrelled.”204 A similar letter was sent to Lord Fitzwater informing him that “for oure better assitence in that behalf we have appointed you amonge other to passe over w(ith) us,” into France “w(ith) the nombre of a hundred hable men mete for the warres to be by you p(ro)vided. Wherof fyfty to be archers and fyfty billes on fote sufficently harnesysed and appointed for the warres.”205 In 1523 the warrants for mustering the army requested that “as many of them (the soldiers) bee good archers as ye conuenyently maye get,” - we can safely assume therefore that a significant number of archers accompanied the force.206 The English retention of the longbow during the sixteenth century is a subject that has prompted no little debate, amongst contemporary commentators and historians alike. Multifarious explanations have been offered for the English retention of the longbow, from romantic affection and hard-nosed economics to simple naiveté. Eltis bemoaned the English for their tardiness in adopting firearms, commenting that “the chief reason for this backwardness was continuing faith in the merits of the longbow.”207 Cruickshank, however, whilst accepting the reality of this statement in 1513, maintained that, “Henry’s anxiety that England should make up the leeway lost in the heavy-guns arms race was matched by his interest in the development of the hand fire-arm.”208. There is scant time, or need, to rehearse all these arguments here, this has been provided for admirably elsewhere.209 However, some consideration of the most salient factors in

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determining the English retention of the longbow does seem necessary. The longbow was first adopted in the thirteenth century; before going on to play a central role in English victories for the next two hundred years at Halidon Hill (1333), Morlaix (1342), Crecy (1346), Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), to name but a few.210 These successes, and a peculiar exclusivity that saw few other countries adopt the longbow (and none as successfully), ensured a close association between the English and the longbow on the battlefield. This affiliation for the ancient weapon of the English, the physical manifestation of past victories in some sense, certainly played a role in its continued use throughout the sixteenth century.211 As we have seen, Henry and his court were enthralled by the chivalric magnificence of the victories of the Hundred Years War. It is widely documented that Henry himself was a keen patron of the longbow and a superb archer. However battle, even to a young Henry VIII, was considered, and is still understood as, a risky undertaking.212 It therefore seems misleading to suggest that the English retention of the longbow was based on something as flimsy as romantic affiliation.213 Indeed, while the code of chivalry was still widely heralded in the courts of sixteenth century Europe, little more than lip service was paid to such notions on the battlefields of the continent. The most obvious reason for the continued deployment of the longbow in battle was its persistent success. Throughout the 1513 campaign English archers performed with deadly efficiency, notably in the skirmishing outside Therouanne; “the Frenchmen issued out of the toune and skirmished with the Englishemen, but the archers shot so fast that they drove the Frenchmen into the citie, and slewe and toke diverse of them.”214 Even more convincingly for English exponents of the longbow, Hall described how “the Almaynes on foot woulde diverse tymes issue out with handgonnes and morish pycks and assaile the Englishmen, but by force of the archers their were ever driven home agayn.”215 Moreover “every day the Englishmen shott at the towne and dyd them much displeasure.”216 These examples of English archers driving back Almayns, who were perceived as amongst the best trained troops on the continent, armed as they were with ‘handguns’, must surely have encouraged English commanders in the belief that the longbow still had a healthy future. Similarly, at the battle of the Spurs, the only significant engagement of the 1513 campaign, Henry’s archers performed admirably. They were “set in order by a hedge all a long a village side called Bomy: the Frenchmen came on wyth 23 standardes displayed and the archers shot a pace and galled their horses,” while “the English speares set on freshly…and fought valyantly with the Frenchmen.”217 This is an excellent example of the tactical use of the longbow; light arrows fired at range to ‘gall’ and disrupt an enemy formation, before the cavalry or bill-men engaged the opposing force.

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The longbow continued to prove itself a valuable piece of the English armoury throughout the early 1520s. In the summer of 1522, following the breakdown of the 1518 Treaty of London, the earl of Surrey led the English fleet on a series of raids along the French coast, before disembarking at Calais to probe more extensively in Picardy and Artois. One such preliminary raid took place at Morlaix in July of that year; Hall described how during the English assault, “the Britons had set the gate full of hacbushes.”218 He went on to relate how “The Englishmen shot with long bowes, and the Brytons with cross bowmen, which defended themselfes manfully.”219 That the assault proved successful is a good indication of the continued viability of the longbow in the European warfare of the 1520s.220 Later that same month, another English captain landed his crew near Bolougne, leading a raid three miles in land on a town called “Newe Castle.” An encounter ensued between the Englishmen and the towns French defenders in which “Thwaites,” the English captain, “with his bowes and men whiche only was 6 score, he put backe 80 haugbushes and 300 men of warre of the countrey.”221 Here again, the longbow proved sufficient in the face of French troops armed with firearms. As we have seen, throughout the Duke of Suffolk’s invasion of France in 1523, the real key to the English victories was their cannon. However, once the cannon made a breach, English soldiers were repeatedly successful in overcoming the resistance of Frenchmen armed with handguns and pikes.222 This is surely evidence that the longbow was, at this time, still a very useful weapon in the face of slow and inaccurate hand-gunners. Similarly, on 27 January 1524 the garrison of Guisnes castle led a raid on the town of ‘Marguyson’ in the neighboring French pale. The raiding party comprised 70 archers and billmen, and whilst “the Frenchemen stode manfully at their defence with handgunnes and pykes…the Englishmen shotte so wholy together that they drave the Frenchmen out of the toune.”223 It would seem from this example, that when well ordered, the speed and weight of fire offered by the English archers, still allowed them to ‘overpower’ the French hand-gunners. Despite these successes the longbow was facing new problems, most especially the growing refinement of the armourers’ craft. At the moment of the longbow’s introduction onto the battlefield, mail armour had offered little resistance to arrowheads. However, by the time of Agincourt, there was a shift towards the wearing of plate armour with only the least vulnerable areas of the body covered in mail. The customarily formidable English archers failed to make any real impact on the ranks of advancing Scots at Flodden (1513). The bad weather would have left bowstrings damp, and combined with windy conditions would have heavily undermined the value of the bow.224 The front ranks of the Scottish army were

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also well stocked in armour. Hall claimed that they were all “chosen men...most assuredlyest harnessed that...they abode the most dangerous shot of arrowes, which sore them noyed, and yet except it hit them in some bare place it dyd them no hurt.”225 Similarly, Ruthal related to Wolsey that “the said Scotes er so sureley harnessed w(ith) complete harneys jakes, almaynes ryvettes…that shote of arrowes in regarde did them no harme.”226 By the sixteenth century the key question for any missile weapon, in the face of significant improvements in the strength of plate armour, was projectile penetration. A recent study attempted to replicate the impact of point blank arrow fire on early modern armour.227 Arrows were fired from a distance of 10 metres at iron 3mm, 2mm and 1mm thick; these thickness’ represent typical metal densities for the helmet, breast plate and arm and leg armour. At 3mm the arrows failed to penetrate the metal, whilst at 2mm the degree of penetration was so limited as to be unlikely to cause significant (i.e. incapacitating) wounds. Only at 1mm was a significant perforation of the metal achieved, “which would have caused loss of arm and leg function.”228 One necessarily need be aware that flights of arrows were often released over a long range, fired in a steep arc to cover the distance; arrows would regularly have found their mark at a range great than 10 metres and rarely at an angle of 90 degrees. Bearing this in mind, it seems clear that by the early sixteenth century, the issue of arrowhead penetration was an important one. The intense debates between military theorists of the 1590s made much of the issue of projectile penetration.229 The power of an archer’s shot was relative to the skill, not the strength, of the man wielding the bow.230 Contemporary commentators bemoaned the ‘decay’ of archery in the sixteenth century, which saw men turn away from the butts to pursue other ‘leisure’ activities. Writing in 1549 Hugh Latimer castigated the English for replacing the practice of this ancient art with “whoring in towns.”231 He described how a good archer had to be introduced to the bow as a child and practice regularly throughout his life.232 The decline in the number of Englishmen practicing with the diligence of their forefathers thus reduced the effectiveness of the English longbowman. Esper observed that “contemporary estimations of the longbow as a poor weapon can be reduced to this point: archery could not stop a charge – arrows did not penetrate.”233 This issue remains a controversial one today, notably in a recent debate in the journal War in History between K. DeVries and C. Rogers. DeVries argued that it was unlikely that arrow-fire “did any more damage than the killing of a few horses and the wounding of even fewer men.”234 Rather “the archers’ purpose was simply to narrow and confuse the attackers charge so that when it fell onto the infantry troops, it did so in a disrupted and relatively impotent manner.”235 In order to

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establish if DeVries was correct in his summary of the tactical usage of the longbow on the battlefield, it seems necessary to consider a brief case study. One might note, for example, the battle of Halidon Hill (1333); having divided his army into the traditional three battles, Edward III had his men-at-arms dismount and intersperse themselves amongst the front line of the infantry, with archers forming wings, angled forward from each division.236 As the Scottish infantry attacked the English centre, it found itself squeezed by arrow fire from the flanks. Thus far the description loosely matches the tactical role assigned to archers by DeVries (a role which is widely accepted, and not contested by Rogers). However, C. Rogers found “it hard to understand how one can doubt that the English archers’ clothyard shafts could and did inflict large numbers of serious wounds, for it is hard to see them having the disruptive herding effect which even DeVries acknowledges unless they could do so.”237 This argument is sustained by events at Halidon Hill; contemporary sources described the intensity of the flanking fire inflicted on the Scots by English archers, which raked them “as thik as motes on the sonne beme.”238 As the advance progressed, casualties on the flanks induced the three Scottish divisions to merge into one body of troops, before they broke and retreated.239 Whilst no absolutely conclusive decision can be arrived at, Rogers point – it seems – was a valid one. Moreover, in as much as the best plate armour was effective against arrow-fire (to a greater or lesser extent), it was very expensive, and available to only a small proportion of any battlefield army. Phillips sensibly observed that, “armour penetration was less of an issue against Scottish light horse…who might wear mail or reinforced ‘jacks’ but not cumbersome plate, than it was against heavily armoured French soldiers assaulting an earthwork.”240 Before further conclusions can be drawn it is important to consider the relative penetrating power of sixteenth century firearms, by way of comparison. In 1988, a series of tests were conducted on a variety of early modern ‘small-arms’ at the Provincial Armoury in Graz, Austria. Although the results are now well documented, they are worth re-considering in the context of my overall argument.241 Sixteen weapons were test-fired, dating from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The tests demonstrated early modern firearms to be extremely inaccurate; “only one musket had a significantly better than chance probability of hitting the target,” whilst “six out of ten long-barreled weapons scattered their bullets so badly that they effectively hit the intended target solely by random variation.”242 Furthermore, whilst lethal at close ranges, the penetrating power of an early modern bullet against a heavily armoured man-at-arms declined dramatically as the distance between marksman and target increased.243 The tests showed that only 2.7mm of modern steel was penetrated by a spherical musket bullet at 30 metres and a mere 2mm at 110 metres. A test was also conducted on

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the effect of pistol fire on original armour (c.1570) at a distance of 8.5metres. Whilst the bullet penetrated the breastplate, it lost 24% of its initial mass in doing so; “the experimenters judged that a man struck in the same manner would have survived with only light bruising to his chest.”244 Thus much like the longbow, whilst extremely potent at short-ranges and against closely packed un-armoured (or poorly armoured) troops, at greater distances or against well-armoured heavy cavalrymen, the small-firearm was an inefficient weapon.245 It would seem then that, at least during the early part of Henry’s reign, the firearm did not offer a significantly more accurate or powerful alternative to the longbow (although by the 1540s this was changing). More important then was the accurate range of the weapon and its rapidity of fire. An archer could confidently expect to hit a single man at a range of 180 to 200 yards, and was considered capable of releasing as many as 6 arrows per minute (although at this rate their fire was far from accurate). An arqubusier, by comparison, would find a target at a distance of 80 yards difficult to acquire and take up to a minute to re-load and fire a single bullet. More tellingly, when formed up for battle, an archer could be effective when arrayed as many as six deep, while the arquebusier could hope for two deep at best.246 In a withering attack on the effectiveness of the arquebus, Sir John Smythe insisted that: The harquebus and musket also, being discharged byt 7 or 8 shots in haste do grow hot and then do work small effect but danger to the soldiers that do occupy them. If the powder...be not well corned....it fireth the pieces and carrieth the bullets point and blank but a little way.247 Advocates of the longbow insisted that the bow was superior to the firearm in its very simplicity - the complexity of the handgun ensured that technically more things could go wrong. The elaborate loading and maintenance procedure led Smythe to conclude of the firearm that, “In action there were too many things for a frightened man to get wrong.”248 The longbow was as much as five times cheaper to produce as the arquebus.249 Even given Henry’s appetite for war, and his willingness to expunge large amounts of money on expensive ‘pass-times’, in light of the continuing success of the longbow, this equation must have carried some weight. Predictably the militia system, built so firmly into the fabric of the counties, restricted the level of control Henry could hope to exert over the composition of his armies.250 Given the socially constituted nature of the militia, under-pinned as it was by the Statute of Winchester (which required all able bodied men to provide their own weapons), the cheapness of the longbow would have been attractive to the average English

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militiaman.251 Furthermore, the longbow continued to have a role in the day-today life of rural England, ensuring that it would remain the weapon of choice for many. In an attempt to ensure the future of the longbow a number of statutes were enforced in the reign of Henry VIII. For example in May 1526 “his grace, considering the said decay of longbows and archery...straightly chargeth and commandeth all...his faithful officers...diligently execute(d) all acts, provisions, and statues made for the maintenance of the longbow and archery within this realm.”252 This was reinforced in 1528 by an act ‘Enforcing Statutes on Archery, handguns and unlawful games,’ which re-emphasised the importance of maintaining English skill with the longbow and decried “the newfangles and wanton pleasure that men now have in using of crossbows and handguns.”253 It went on to prohibit the use of the crossbow or handgun, giving as justification the “great number of people be given to felonies,” employing the new weapon.254 However, given the unreliability of firearms at this early stage in their development, a ‘felon’ armed with a longbow would be equally as effective, if not more so, as a man armed with an arquebus that could take to minutes to reload after a single use. It seems entirely feasible that rather than fearing their use by ‘felons’ the government feared the decline of skilled archers. In this context it is also worth remembering fears about the state of the nation.255 The population was falling, and Henry VIII’s reign had witnessed vicious epidemics of both ‘the sweating sickness’ and bubonic plague by the 1540s, all of which undermined living standards and the nation’s health. Indeed, “the social changes that were taking place, the inflation, the extravagance that was much complained of, the reduction in the size of households and the loss of belief in the ideas of duty and service, all worked together against the continuation of great numbers of strong and willing archers.”256 These fears are perhaps more representative of the motives behind the statutes that attempted to limit, or even prohibit, the use of the hand-gun, as opposed to any fanciful fear of felons or law and order. It is also valuable to understand these developments within the wider European context. Although the arquebus did not feature heavily in either Henry’s 1513 campaign or in the expeditions of the early 1520s, this did not demonstrate England to be falling behind her European contemporaries, who were similarly slow to adopt the arquebus. Oman suggested that in 1523 Henry “was still of the same mind as Francis I; it required the disaster of Bicocca, and still more that of Pavia to convince the French king that small firearms were indispensable.”257 Similarly, the French military chronicler Blaise de Monluc - recounting the defence of south-west France in 1523 against Spanish forces under Philibert de Chalon,

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Prince of Orange - related “that the company I commanded was no other than crossbows, for at this time the use of the arquebus had not as yet been introduced amongst us.”258 It is also interesting, and illustrative of contemporary feeling, to note the distaste in which he held the weapon which he, “would to heaven that this accursed engine had never been invented.”259 One must also keep in mind that “the performance of these early firearms...still left much to be desired, in terms of accuracy and range, they remained inferior to the bow.”260 At the outbreak of the Italian Wars the handgun was still a relatively insignificant weapon. Both the Swiss and the Landsknechts regarded the firearm as essentially an auxiliary to their pike formations. It was the Spanish, under the command of Gonsalvo de Cordova, who made the first serious steps towards the adoption of the small firearm.261 At the Battle of Ravenna, in 1512, the Spanish protected themselves by placing their arquebuses on wagons arrayed defensively. Although they failed to stop the German troops from breaking into their position, this did show an awareness of the defensive potential of the arquebus. In the clash between French and Imperial troops at Bicocca in 1522, the Imperial army filled its front four rows with arquebusiers, protected by a sunken road. They were ordered to wait until the Swiss were extremely close before firing to maximise the impact of their volley. Having fired they were to kneel and reload while the next rank fired over their shoulder. This manouvre was highly successful, driving off both the Swiss and the French gendarmes. This was perhaps the first significant example of the potential of firearms - although the weapon remained largely defensive. At the Battle of Sesia in 1524 the arquebusiers took a more pro-active role as they were moved forward to fire volleys from the flank and the rear, into the French army. At Sesia, more than any previous battle the arquebus had proven its offensive potential, relegating the pike to a subsidiary role.262 Oman placed the first serious success of Spanish arquebusiers a year later again at the Battle of Pavia (1525). Having “turned the flank of the French position and forced Franics I to come out and form ‘front to flank’ on unexpected ground...the desperate charges of the French gendarmerie are recounted to have failed not so much from the frontal resistance which they met, as from the perpetual rolling fire of arquebuses which beat upon them from the side.”263 The fact that Henry’s armies in 1513 and 1523 were not filled with companies of arquebusiers, far from reflecting any uniquely English limitations, simply mirrored what was going on in Europe. Whilst the longbow remained very much central to the English tactical system, it is important not to over-emphasise English resistance to firearms. As the mid-century manuscripts show, the handgun was adopted, not to replace but, to complement the older weapon. This is a view shared by Phillips, who concluded that, “the English adopted small arms not with

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a view to replacing the bow but rather combining the two weapons to give their formations of missile infantry the advantages of rapid discharge, harassing fire at long range, and stopping power at short range.”264 Henry was taking an interest in the arquebus - by the 1540s a very keen one – and was gradually building up his stocks of small firearms.265 Even Oman recognised that “though Henry VIII was a believer in the bow in his early days…by the middle of his reign he was, probably with reluctance, yielding to the tendancy of the age, and subsidizing the purchase of hackbutts and calivers.”266 The integration of firearms into the tactical systems developing in the Italian Wars was a gradual process. Moreover, combined with the continuing success and efficiency of the longbow, it is hardly surprising that Henry’s early French campaigns did not witness the mass introduction of the small-firearm. The key point however, is that during the reign of Henry VIII, there was not a question of the gun replacing the longbow, but rather one of fitting into, and adapting, existing tactical systems.

Chapter 3 Training and Discipline Training The art of war is now such that men be fain to learn it anew at every two years end, Granvelle to Sir Thomas Chaloner, 1559.1 In 1557, Mary Tudor’s act “for taking of musters,” formally incorporated training into the shire musters.2 By 1559, central government was sending a definite message to the counties that the training provided for militia troops was to be improved and the cost was to be born locally: The queen said that she was well aware that men did not know how to use their weapons, wear their armour, or even march in good order. All this was to be changed. There was little point in providing equipment for the militia if nobody knew how to use it.3 The obvious implication of these actions is that in the first half of the sixteenth century, training for war had been minimal in Tudor England. Eltis has argued that evidence of instruction is very limited in England until “regular training of bodies of troops began in the counties in 1572-3.”4 As we have seen, in Eltis’ view this improvement coincided with, and was partly contingent on, the expansion of writing on military subjects across Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century. He noted that, “works appeared in many European languages explaining training procedures, offering mathematical aids and other devices to help bring troops into exact formation.”5 One of the principal pillars of the ‘military revolution debate’ has been the expansion of training and the burgeoning importance attached to military discipline, identifiable across the continent, in the course of the sixteenth century. Lynn argued that whilst “in a certain sense training and discipline were not integrally linked to each other until the seventeenth century…monarchs and commanders of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had viewed training as

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important.”6 The reforms of first the Dutch army of Maurice of Nassau and later the Sweden of Gustavus Adolphus put both these facets at a premium. The importance of these factors in sixteenth century warfare was born of the complex battle formations that accompanied the co-ordination of pike and shot tactics. Roberts’ thesis described how, “Firing rank by rank required both discipline and training, and this led to an increase in the number of officers and the production of detailed training manuals.”7 Notwithstanding, training of some form can be traced much earlier; for example it had been instituted in the mid-fifteenth century in France under the auspices of Charles VII. With the establishment of the francs archers in 1448 “every parish had to provide one fully equipped archer, who was to dedicate feast days to training.”8 Whilst Louis XI had established a “training camp,” at Pont-de-l’ Arche, “where French infantry bandes (Lynn’s italics) received instruction from Swiss mercenaries.”9 Likewise, Mallett and Hale described how in the late 1470s, the intermittent requirement by the Venetians for the rapid mobilisation of an effective infantry arm prompted “the development of a selective, partially trained militia rather similar to that of the English trained bands.”10 Although not “systematically maintained,” some form of training continued to play a central role in militia service in the late fifteenth century. Particular emphasis was placed on the training of hand-gunners, in an attempt to relieve Venetian dependence on foreign mercenaries in this regard.11 Nonetheless, across Europe, “training was regarded as a one-shot affair (my italics). It went no further than teaching weapons-handling and combat technique, and, once troops had mastered their weapons and learned how to stand for battle, their training was considered to be complete.”12 Thomas Audley was especially critical of the absence of training in England during Henry VIII’s reign, commenting; “I wyshe...that Captaynes wold be as redye to take paynes to trayne there mene as theye be redye at the paye daye to take paynes to tell mony, for it ys a grevous payne to sett a Battayle w(ith) untrayned men.”13 He went on to complain that “as men be trayned nowe Theye maye goo iiij or v yeres in the warres and in the ende neu(er) the wyser because his captayen is as ignorante as he And was made Captayne before he was a soldiour.”14 He further endorsed the appointment of Captains based on merit and experience, “not by favore.”15 A number of explanations have been offered for this deficiency. Hooker has convincingly argued that to succeed as an infantryman no great skill was necessary. Indeed, “to a great extent the foot soldier was required to do little besides survive camp life and lend his body to the necessities of shock tactics. In the absence of all but the most elementary tactical moves the soldier was presumed, then, to be as knowledgeable as was necessary.”16 That physical strength was the primary

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concern of muster commissioners seeking infantrymen is reflected in their demand for tall, able men.17 However, in suggesting that, “training was no part of infantry discipline,” Hooker went too far.18 Let us turn first to those members of the nobility who were required to command Henry’s armies. It has become axiomatic to associate the diffusion of humanistic literature and educational schemes during this period with a decline in the traditional militaristic role of the nobility. At first glance there was, it seems, little common ground between education and militarism; humanism has widely been considered homogeneous with the pacifism of men like More and Erasmus. However, “all serious schemes for the education of the nobility included training in the qualities of knightliness, and assumed, indeed often explicitly stated, that military service would be required of the gentleman.”19 Throughout the Middle Ages knighthood was an obligation on male members of the aristocracy, and their education during childhood reflected this. Hale described how “the late medieval syllabus for a military career,” included “swordplay and riding skills learned at home if adequate masters were available, otherwise in a household or court distinguished for its martial tone…then experience in the field under a commander of fame.”20 Physical training was determined primarily by its success in developing strength and martial skill and boys were encouraged to pick up weapons from a very young age.21 Formal training in military skills began from as young as fourteen and the principal text book of the later medieval and early modern period was the De Re Militari by Vegetius.22 Vegetius’ fourth century text was based on Roman techniques, and continued to be viewed as a highly relevant ‘manual’ by the nobility of Europe throughout the middle ages.23 De Re Militari was comprised of four books that dealt in turn with recruitment, training and selection, the army’s organisation, command structure and equipment, the rules of battle and importance of obedience and discipline, and finally sieges and naval warfare.24 In the context of a chapter on training and military discipline in the Henrician army, it is particularly pertinent to note the emphasis placed on these factors by Vegetius. The first book of De Re Militari argued that a process of ‘selection’ should be undertaken in the recruitment of the army. Having ‘selected’ which men were best suited to serve, it was then incumbent on the armies’ commanders to ensure their soldiers were: trained in the use of arms; how to act and react together; how to conquer fear. All this should be achieved through regular training and exercises with the implied responsibility owed by each recruit to the legion, to the emperor and , to the good of the wider society.25

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In an age where an increasing emphasis was being placed on training and martial discipline to accommodate the introduction of ‘pike and shot’ tactics, it is not perhaps surprising that Vegetius’s work continued to cultivate a readership. It was these ‘underlying messages’, the clear expression of “perennially important military themes,” that ensured the continued popularity of the text for over a millennium.26 It is unclear to what extent this work was studied and employed by England’s aristocratic and military elite during Henry’s reign, indeed Anglo has suggested that whilst “it was the fundamental text for medieval military ‘theory’,” this “was the province not of soldiers but of scholarly clerics.”27 Nevertheless, there is certainly evidence to suggest that English military commanders - in a practice echoed across Europe in the early modern period - did look to antiquity for guidance on military matters.28 A manuscript in the British Library, bound in the late sixteenth century, and stamped with the arms of Paulet, marquis of Winchester (with a difference for a second son) included copies of both Thomas Audley’s contemporary treatise on the art of war - written mid-century and espousing the use of pike and shot formations - and a copy of “The Strategemes, Sleyghtes, and policies of warre, gathered togyther by S.Juilius Frontinus and translated into Englyshe, by Rycharde Morysine,” which in turn looked back to antiquarian precedent and experience.29 At first glance, Richard Morison, as a leading humanist, was perhaps an unlikely translator of military treatise. However, in 1539 (the year this text was penned): the defence of religion, the defence of the nation (and the two were inextricably linked) made war at the very least a regrettable necessity, a serious study for serious-minded men, and helped to heal the schism which was so apparent in the early years of Henry VIII, between honour and morality, between chivalry and practicality.30 It seems likely that Morison’s knowledge of classical military treatise dates to the period 1529-33; when, following the fall of his erstwhile patron Cardinal Wolsey, Morison spent time in Italy, learning Italian, and studying classical history.31 Interestingly, the manuscript copy, bearing Paulet’s arms, was a child’s presentation copy. The British library catalogue describes the coat of arms as bearing a “difference for a second son.” Outwardly then, this was a gift for Thomas, his second son, by his first wife Elizabeth. However, by 1545 Sir William Paulet was sixty years old and his first-born son, and heir, John (second Marquis of Winchester) had a ten-year-old son.32 One might justifiably speculate that such a manuscript might have been prepared for his young Grandson, William (later third Marquis of Winchester).33 This seems to suggest that the sixteenth century nobility in England still


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referred back to Roman and Greek approaches to warfare, although, this is very difficult to quantify based on the surviving records.34 Indeed Text ‘B’ explicitly stated that any man who sought to understand the difficulties of ordering and commanding an army, “let him reade tholde histories of the w(hich) w(ith)in this boke I have made some relacion touchinge the discipline of warres.”35 In this context it is worth remembering that translations of classical texts were very much ‘working documents’ both translated and ‘adapted’ to increase their relevance to a ‘modern’ reader. Allmand maintained that the translations were “not so much a rendering of a ‘historical’, ‘archaeological’ or ‘fossilised’ treatise as one which, by the omission of certain material, the addition of up-too-date examples, and the modernising of the vocabulary could be shown to have some practical contemporary value.”36 For example the first English translation of De Re Militari in 1408 included a new section on the use of artillery.37 It is instructive to remember Contamine’s comments on “the historical culture of Captains of the time of Charles VIII and Louis XII,” wherein, although “a few great names,” could be “gleaned from antiquity,” what was deemed most important was “a good knowledge of the most recent events.” 38 It seems increasingly apparent that although Vegetius continued to be referred to by military theorists and scholars, there was an increasing awareness of the need to study the changing face of sixteenth century warfare based on the experiences of ‘modern’ theorists. Writing in 1578, Thomas Procter called for more contemporary military treatise: “Vegetius being a writer, when warres were used in another course than they are nowe dayes: Yt is therefore wished more to be done in this behalfe.”39 Command and Control The practical application of any training system is ultimately command and control of troops in the field: what orders were passed and how? How did the troops ‘learn’ to understand these commands? How were they trained? Before progressing any further it seems useful to briefly sketch an outline of the command structure of the Tudor army and current ideas on command and control in the field.40 An examination of the muster records of Henry’s army in 1513 reveals a force that was gradually establishing a regular ‘company’ size of one hundred men.41 Although at this early stage in Henry’s reign, this development was only in its infancy, and far from being uniform across the army. It was represented most clearly in Henry’s own ward, where an even division of troops is extensively displayed in the surviving records.42 However, this is less evident elsewhere in the army, which still displayed greater divergence in the size of captains’ retinues, with smaller, and uneven troop divisions not uncommon.43 Nevertheless, in 1523, the

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muster records reveal the continuing progress towards the establishment of a regular company size of one hundred men.44 These early moves towards standardisation would have allowed greater organisational and tactical efficiency whilst in camp, on the march and in battle. In short, regular company sizes composed of similarly armed soldiers were easier to administer and deploy. However, this development was, as yet, by no means uniform across the army, and the records reveal numerous variations in both the size and contingent (i.e. bill, bow, demi-lance etc…) of different companies.45 The soldiers, paid at 6d were ordinarily officered by a Captain paid the sum of 4s and a petty-captain, paid at the rate of 2s. One might note for example the retinue of Edward Guildford in 1523, which was comprised of 100 infantrymen commanded by an Officer and pettycaptain.46 However, in an indication of the problems inherent in the analysis of sixteenth century muster lists, it seems clear that the records obscure the true complexity of ‘company command’ during the first half of the sixteenth century. Throughout the Middle Ages men had been divided into smaller groups of 20-5 under a protonon-commissioned-officer called a “vintenar.” Moreover, whilst “this grouping into hundreds and twenties was the usual way in which the arrayed men were organised…by the time of the Hundred Years War, organisation might be yet more complex.”47 The position of Vintenar survived into the sixteenth century and was widely described in the mid-century military literature.48 That it is obscured in the campaign records can be explained in one of two ways; it is possible that the men were not paid any more for this extra responsibility and ‘NCO’s’ were simply appointed based on experience.49 Otherwise, in a practice that was common to fifteenth century administrators, for the sake of administrative simplicity such men may have been recorded in the accounts as a ‘demi-lance’ earning 9d or an ‘archer on horseback’ at 8d per day. David Grummitt explains how the fifteenth century Treasurer’s accounts at Calais listed soldiers in three categories: mounted men-at-arms at 12d per day, men-at-arms on foot at 8d per day and archers at 6d per day. “This was,” he concludes, “an accounting fiction, designed to simplify the exceedingly complex task of mustering, paying and recording the garrisons wages.”50 Rather, the archers recorded at 6d per probably incorporated bill-men, whilst men recorded as ‘archers-on-horseback’ may have simply been skilled archers, and so on. If one looks at Surrey’s 1522 campaign in France in this manner, the 216 “archers on horseback,” paid at 8d per day and the 14 “demi launces,” at 9d per day recorded in Daunce’s accounts could in fact have represented the NCO’s of his army. Read this way, the ‘archers on horseback’ would represent one vintenar for roughly every 30 soldiers.51 The 14 demi-lances may hide the newer rank of “whiffler,” which developed during Henry’s reign to


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keep soldiers in order whilst on the march, and by the 1540s in battle.52 One can only speculate if this was in fact the case, but it does not seem an unreasonable assumption to make, as such a small body of cavalry could be of negligible value. Moving beyond the ‘company’ there was, it would seem, little formal structure between this very basic unit and the main ‘battles’ of the army. A document detailing preparations for the 1522 campaign recognised the importance of appointing “substannciall and expert p(er)sons for,” the senior positions in the army.53 A clear chain of command was observed, starting with “the lieuten(ent) if the king goo not in his own p(er)son,” followed by the commanders of the different wards, the chief marshal and an “vnder marshal in ev(er)y warde,” the treasurer, a chief master of ordnance and a master of ordnance in every warde, and masters of victualles and carriage with deputies in each ward.54 The command structure of English armies of the period would also include “the greate se(r)gent.”55 The obvious question to any student of the early modern English (or indeed European) army was how were orders passed from the ‘council of war’ and commanders of the various ‘battles’ to the captains and soldiers that were required to carry them out. Once the council and commanders of the army had selected where the battle was to be fought it was to the role of the ‘Great Sergeant’ to place the army into whatever order of battle was thought to suit “the nomb(re) of men in campe and as the grounde will s(er)ue.”56 The sources remain relatively silent on the issue of command and control and exactly how orders were communicated until the end of the sixteenth century. Specific details on the ‘words of command’ used on the battlefield were not published until 1594.57 Whilst it would be the early seventeenth century before the government formally recognised the need for a standardised training manual detailing drill and tactics and so on.58 However, it is impossible simply to accept that men could fight even a fifteenth century battle without at least some idea of command signals, where they should be stood, when to attack and when to retire, when to loose their arrows and so on. Throughout the Middle Ages trumpets had played a central role in command and control on the battlefield. Jean le Bel, in his account of the Weardale Campaign in 1327, described how on the first blast of the trumpet horses were to be saddled, on the second the soldier was to arm himself and on the third they were to mount-up.59 Furthermore, “there must have been an efficient system of using couriers to pass information to the various commanders so that they could make them known to the troops.”60 Some form of training was clearly implemented in order to transform “peasants into effective fighting men.”61 Based on his extensive study of Elizabethan military literature, Eltis concluded that drums were used to control the speed of marching and prevent disorder, whilst verbal commands and a ‘follow the

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leader principle’ was central to the expression of more complex orders.62 Text B described how “Dromes and fife” were deployed to pass orders across the army, “to sownde of the marshe, alarm, approche, assalte, battaile, retreate, skirmishe, or anie other calling that of necessitie should be knowen.”63 To men without training such signals would mean nothing at all, and it is therefore selfevident that some form of training must have been instituted, during Henry VIII’s reign, between the time of mustering the army and it being led ‘into combat’. Furthermore, verbal commands were, without doubt, used and understood across European armies of the sixteenth century. That this was the case is both reasonable deduction and evident in the manuscripts. Text B referred to orders passed by “Drome or secret callinge,” noting “They must often practise their instrumentes (and) teache the companies,” the different sounds.64 As well as stressing the need for silence amongst the ranks so “that alwaies they maie heare and well understande anie p(re)cepte comanndement or pointe of discipline geven unto them.”65 That these commands have not survived in the historical record, and are not commented on by chroniclers, is surely testament, not to the fact that they didn’t exist, but that their existence was considered so ‘everyday’ as to negate remark. Much the same can be argued about military training. Returning to Text B, it is clearly stated that “Capetaines and officers leadinge Morrispikes shoulde…teache the soldiers sometymes to pushe, traile and order the same.”66 Similarly, captains of firearms troops were to “teache them to charge and discharge to marshe and reteire in good distannce.”67 A significant section also detailed “training yo(ur) soldiers in tyme of musters in the lessons folowinge until they be p(er)fitte.”68 Lessons included the passing of the words of command from one of the battle to the next, practising ambushes, changing formations and filling the ranks of fallen comrades. The manuscript clearly stated that such ‘training’ would prove highly beneficial “in tymes of need.”69 Both horse and foot were instructed to “learn,” the different sounds of the trumpets and drums that served as the “mouthe of men,” during the clamour of battle.70 Captains and NCO’s were to practice placing the army and their companys in various different ‘shapes of battle’. The existence of this manuscript, explicitly describing the training needed by new recruits, would seem to indicate that the concept was not foreign to the Tudors military.71 The extent to which such exhortations reflected the reality of battlefield preparations for combat remains unclear. Manuscripts, such as the Audley document, were certainly increasingly referred to as aide memoirs, especially those, such as Text B, which included diagrammatic outlines and formulae for positioning and ordering battles.72 However, this is impossible to quantify, and would certainly have been limited by low literacy levels throughout the century.


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Furthermore the printing of military manuscripts did not expand significantly until the second half of the sixteenth century.73 It seems probable that Text B reflected desired best practice rather than ‘common reality’. Nevertheless, it is certain to contain some reflection of actual practice and unquestionably illustrates contemporary thinking. As we will see, the discussions of military discipline in Text B seem to have been closely based on the proclamations and enforcement of martial law that had accompanied every campaign since the Middle Ages. As such it is entirely likely, the sections on training would have, to some extent, represented actual practice. David Trim has convincingly demonstrated that whilst “Royal armies were only engaged in Europe on a haphazard basis…foreign troops often served in the British Isles as mercenaries, while even more frequently, Englishmen fought as mercenaries in Continental armies.”74 Examples of Englishmen serving as mercenaries abroad abound in the literature, perhaps most famously John Hawkwood and the White Company in medieval Italy. This point is similarly evidenced in the example of men like Peter Whithorne, who in 1560 penned the first English translation of Machiavelli’s Art of War; Whithorne had himself served in Charles V’s armies in North Africa. Likewise, another mid-century military author, John Shute, in dedicating his tract to the Earl of Leicester, described himself as “a simple souldior better practised abrode in martiall matters then furnished at home with cunnyng of the scoole.”75 It thus seems entirely likely that large sections of the armies Henry, and his lieutenants, led into Europe would have had military experience of some variety (be it as a mercenary in the Habsburg-Valois wars or as a Border Reiver). Furthermore, if one adds to this the experience provided by the foreign mercenaries in Henry’s employ, a substantial body of the men of Henry’s armies were already trained, and would certainly have passed on any advice and help to new recruits. It was in the interests of trained infantrymen, in an age where cohesion was their only defence against cavalry, that all their comrades knew what they were doing! As we shall see, some form of institutionalised training system was in operation for Henry VIII’s gunners.76 As for the longbowmen, their training began in childhood and was woven into the societal fabric of rural England, cemented in statutes making practice with the bow a legal requirement.77 Definite evidence on the level of training offered to archers before battle remains elusive. The surviving records for the 1522 General Proscription do suggest that some counties did indeed enforce practice with the bow (and the bill).78 However, this is far from widespread in the remaining manuscript evidence (limited as this is) and it is impossible to be certain on this point. A report on the English militia in the

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Venetian State papers described how “the whole male population capable of bearing arms…are all mustered on a spacious plain, where they perform their military exercises with such arms as they possess, in the presence of the commanders appointed for this purpose. The stoutest and most robust are then selected.”79 However, exactly how skill with the bow, very much part of agrarian life at the turn of the century, was translated into the disciplined battlefield drill of row upon row of archers firing in unison at their target is unclear. Prestwich related that “there is nothing in the written records to suggest that any attention was paid to the drilling of troops in the medieval period.”80 Text B provides some indication of training before troops were sent into battle commenting that Captains were to: teache them by musters to marshe shote and retiere kepinge there faces upon the enemyes and sometimes put them into gretter nomb(er) as to battaile ap(er)teynethe, and thus to see there hostes practicedd till they be perfectt.81 It seems likely that the archers received a one off induction into battlefield tactics, whereafter their years of experience with the bow were sufficient practice for battle. Turning briefly to the example of the cavalry, it is firstly important to acknowledge that the English lacked heavy cavalry.82 An important contributory factor here was surely financial, the equipment of a man-at-arms was hugely expensive (costing even as much as a small-holding) so only a small section of the populace had the necessary funds. Hence, one can identify the extensive recruitment of foreign specialists, who, although expensive in the short-term, were clearly a more cost-efficient solution.83 Moreover, as in the case of establishing a standing army, Henry’s government was unwilling or unable (or both) to afford the cost of widespread training of such a complicated arm. Nonetheless, in the absence of a standing force of heavy cavalry, the tourney offered some opportunity for honing the equestrian skills of England’s nobility and courtiers. Clearly, however, the changing face of sixteenth century cavalry warfare called into question the direct relevance of clashes in the tiltyard to the sixteenth century battlefield.84 Training then, it seems, was firmly ingrained in the Tudor military establishment. Although not the formalised ‘basic training’ of a modern army it was nevertheless an accepted and understood aspect of military life in the sixteenth century. The relative level of training and time expended on this activity is exceedingly hard to gauge. It seems likely that there would have been massive


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variations from company to company and campaign to campaign. Nevertheless, “sixteenth-century England was integrated into the European military system; and that this was so was, to a great extent, due to the martial inclinations of England.”85 Military Discipline Regardless of the numerous negative quality assessments of Henry’s soldiers, in terms of tactical and technological modernity, few have doubted the martial vigour of the English nation. Writing in the 1570s, even Blaise De Monluc was forced to admit: “We had heard our predecessors say that one Englishman would always beat two Frenchmen, and that the English would never run away nor never yield.”86 The validity of this assessment is certainly questionable, subjective and almost impossible to accept on face value during our period. It does, nonetheless, serve to emphasise that the early Tudor army remained a considerable foe - in the minds at least - of continental Europe. This section will explore the role of ‘discipline’ in the relative successes and failures of Henry’s soldiers during the campaign in Spain in 1512 and France in 1513, and 1522-3; seeking to tentatively draw some wider conclusions about discipline and the Tudor army.87 The concept of ‘discipline’ is central to the modern understanding of military efficiency and professionalism. However, as in the case of the ‘standing army’ there is a danger of anachronism in the application of modern conceptions of ‘discipline’ to early modern armies and societies. Soldiers arrived at the battlefield, on foreign campaign, in the retinue of their noble overlord. The lord might reasonably expect good discipline and loyalty from men, who worked ‘his’ land, owed him rents and looked to him for justice and ‘good lordship’.88 Equally the soldiery might reasonably expect this ‘good lordship’ to manifest itself in ‘just’ and competent command on the battlefield, on the march and in camp. The Tudor soldier was “the common man in arms,” and therefore “the common soldier of Tudor armies could engage in collective or individual protest in the same fashion as contemporary civilians and, like a civilian, could often expect a resulting measure of compromise from his superiors.”89 Similarly, David Trim convincingly argued that early modern military mutinies, specifically amongst the “Dutch Army of Flanders,” might have served a “sociological function.”90 In an article which sought to redress traditional historical interpretations of the role of the mercenary during the Dutch Revolt, Trim pointed to the overwhelming “dedication and devotion,” of mercenaries during the conflict.91 This is identifiable both amongst Irish Catholics serving in the Spanish army and particularly the Protestant English, Scottish and French soldiers amongst the Dutch Army of Flanders, and is

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attributed to ideological fervour and commitment, which in this view superseded ‘greed’ as the principal motivation to serve. Nonetheless, mutinies and revolts did occur – normally over conditions of service, for more food, better clothing and so on, and “in circumstances not directly endangering the common weal, military mutiny could be a legitimate step in the bargaining process.”92 Such a view is supported by the fact that the Dutch “typically” left wages unpaid until demands for the outstanding payments were received. Trim suggests that “this model of mutiny as potentially a form, or indeed a forum, of accepted (and acceptable) protest…might not be applicable to the Spanish Army of Flanders, but it may well have relevance for mutinies in other armies, at other periods, and in other countries.”93 One might easily view the near mutiny over pay in the garrison at Tournai, in 1515, in this light. The garrison was angered by proposals to move the date of their pay from the start to the end of the month. Whilst paid in advance, they could afford to buy food for the rest of the month; the change to this system would have forced them to rely on credit for four weeks. On 6 February they demonstrated in the market place; their demands were ultimately met and the new Marshal, Sir Sampson Norton, was sent home as a scapegoat.94 Throughout its occupation the garrison remained a loyal stalwart, when disputes occurred they related specifically to complaints over conditions of service, and were normally resolved by a ‘negotiated settlement’.95 The three strikes, which were ultimately decisive in the withdrawal of Suffolk’s army from France in 1523, can be viewed from a comparable perspective. Gunn contended that “each of the three mutinies expressed fairly specific grievances and was prompted by specific circumstances; in each, men from particular areas of England and Wales tended to act together.”96 By November 1523, the weather had deteriorated significantly, the third and final strike was a result of the atrocious conditions and the news that reinforcements were to be sent and the campaign continued through the winter. Henry desired that they “make the best provisions possible and…spend the winter within the dominions of the king of France.”97 However the English army of the sixteenth century was a temporary body, unused to year-round campaigning and at this stage unwilling to countenance it.98 Hall described the appalling conditions: after the great raynes and wyndes had fallen, came a fervent frost so sore that many a souldier dyed for coulde some lost fyngers and some toes, but many lost their nayles of their handes, which was to them a great grefe…ever the Welshmen muttered and grudged more and more.99


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The feeling spread that, ‘it was no worse being hanged in England than dying of cold in France’. The Council of War was also aware of their now depleted supply of cannon balls and powder, and that they possessed far too few people to garrison the towns they had taken.100 It was agreed that the army should retreat towards Calais, which it did in good order - despite the ‘strike’, by the Welsh contingents. Here then is a case where the noble commanders of the army took a decision not to remain in France, as the king specifically ordered, following ‘negotiations’, in the form of strikes, with the wider army.101 Whilst, as we shall see, the seeds of the modern model of soldiery and discipline were certainly sowed in this period, there were equally numerous instances of ill-discipline and debate between captains and soldiers. We must be wary, however, of characterising these cases too readily as examples of a ‘weak Henrician military’ or phenomena specific to the English army of the period.102 The Tudor army operated, to a greater or lesser extent, on a system of mutually co-operative discipline and loyalty. Nonetheless, the military literature of the period abounds with exhortations for discipline and obedience. Eltis described how the emphasis on training that accompanied the ‘new warfare’ demanded “the achievement of classical standards of order, discipline and training.”103 In 1576 Captain Francesco Ferretti insisted: “You must always remember that it is not the superiority in number of soldiers over the enemy that promises certain victory, but if there is good order in dispositions and ready obedience is observed and true understanding of discipline in executing (it).”104 Likewise, the famous French military commentator and captain Francois de la Noue confirmed that “if discipline and entertainment faile, the more is the disorder and confusion.”105 One needs look no further than the battles of Flodden (1513) and Pinkie (1547) to understand the truth of these exhortations. Whilst there are marked differences in the character of the armaments carried by the combatants in the two major engagements that enclose the ‘Henrician’ era, the defining factor in both battles was the temporary loss of cohesion among Scottish troops. The mid-Tudor military literature considered in this thesis is very specific about the importance of obedience and discipline on the battlefield. The virtues of ‘scilence’, ‘obedience’ and ‘treuthe’ are held up as important qualities for the ‘good’ soldier.106 It was suggested that the soldier “must vse suche scilence that alwaies they maie heare and well understande anie p(re)cepte comanndement or pointe of discipline geven unto them the officers in auchoritie in the name of y(our) prince and in tyme of service that they may heare the enemyes, but not be harde.”107 Secondly, it was determined that “obedience from godd so procedethe that the prince or anie speakinge in their names must be obeyd although the precept be

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contraries to the minde of some soldiers, who be not woorthie to know the secrette of the officers in auchorite yet must they in all pointes obey them by law of godd and prince.”108 The manuscript went on to warn soldiers against answering for another man who is absent from “musteringe or assemblinge.”109 It also insisted that any man who “be sicke or hurte beinge not serviable paie him his wage geve him pasporte,” and “send him howme.” Any soldier feigning sickness in order to get out of the army should be “ponisshedd…to the example of the residew.”110 Whilst on the death of a member of “the companie,” the soldiers “shall bringe the corpus to the gronnde w(ith) the pownde of a ball or a dromme sainge there devosion for the sowle dep(ar)tedd.”111 The importance of ‘truth’ related to loyalty to your prince, commander and country, whereby if “soldiers shalbe sometymes attemptedd by the enemies to be corrupted w(ith) money,” they shall “before godd…(be) condempnedd to p(er)dision.”112 Further punishment was suggested for soldiers who failed “in the kepinge cleare of his armures and weapons or in doing his dewtie.” Specific instructions were described for the equal division of the “spoile of bowtie”, whilst “any offendinge againste the said victualles shalbe ponishedd as to the lawe apertaynethe.”113 Multifarious other rules and regulations concerned the lodging of troops, watch and ward, and alarms. Whilst more specifically ‘military’ instructions were laid down for cavalry and infantrymen, billmen and archers, handgunners and artillerymen. The responsibilities of the various officers to enforce the martial disciplinary code of the army were rehearsed. It is particularly illustrative of the contemporary attitude towards disciplinary procedure to note the importance attached to good order in battle. It was considered crucial to retain “yo(ur) araie and strengthe together whether yo(ur) enemyes byde or flie yo(u) maye not breake yo(ur) araie to folowe them for longer than ye have good order.”114 Indeed, “ye have no strengthe,” when the soldiers were not formed correctly and “a few freshe enemyes lyinge in ambushe maye discomforte a gret companie being out of array.”115 It was also essential to retain good order in the aftermath of victory, to ensure that victorious soldiers “spoilinge the dede,” were not set upon by fresh enemies.116 Indeed: it hath ben many tymes sene that those that first wanne the battaile hath in thende lost the feilde wherefore all men of ev(er)y estaite must see the feilde kepte in most strong order and no man go about spoile… or anie other thinge where by aray may be broken save onlie sargeanntes and…thofficers of the feilde…(they) shall march and abide in good order usinge gret scilence until such tyme as the lorde or cheftaine of the felde shall commande them to draw towards their resting place.117


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It seems safe to conclude from this evidence that, in theory at least, the Henrician military establishment was not cut off from wider European concerns about the importance of discipline, notably classical models of discipline, to ‘modern’ warfare. Text B also demonstrates contemporary concerns over the ‘moral’ and physical well being of soldiers. Of particular concern, reflecting wider societal anxieties of the day was the issue of prostitution.118 During the 1544 campaign in France it was noted that: “The camp “is troubled with a sort of light women which daily do repair out of England hither.” Such was the concern that it was proposed that “the Council shall take order with the mayor of London,” to “permit no woman to pass out of any port within the city,” and “write to the mayor of Dover and other ports.”119 In 1513 it had been similarly proclaimed that if a “common woman,” came within three miles of the camp she would be “burned upon the right cheek at the first time.” If caught again she was to be imprisoned and punished at the discretion of the provost marshal.120 Furthermore, Text B stated that “no soldier in tymes of travailinge w(ith)in the Realme of Englande or dominions of the same, alure anie woman maide ne wedowe to ffolow the host unhonesttlie.”121 That is to say all women, not just prostitutes were to be banned from the camp. The 1513 “statutes and ordinances of war,” similarly warned soldiers against bringing a woman with him across the sea, threatening the deduction of a months wages for any man to do so.122 The proclamations reflected the fact that “the line between what we would think of as prostitutes and other woman involved in illicit sexuality is…difficult to draw.”123 The modern conception of prostitution does not sit entirely comfortably with early sixteenth century society where “many things were available for cash or kind…and sexual services might or might not be part of the bargain.”124 Thus, contemporary attitudes towards “kept women,” – be they ‘camp followers’ accompanying a soldier to war or otherwise women ‘living in sin’ in civilian society - might differ little from attitudes towards explicit prostitution. Ingram noted, “the distinction between a ‘whore’ (that is, any sexually transgressive woman by the standards of the time) and a ‘common whore', ‘strumpet’, ‘harlot’, or ‘common woman of her body’ was not so much a rigid distinction as a slippery slope.”125 It is partly in this context that one should understand concerns over women – be they “maide ne wedowe,” – following the camp.126 However although wider societal concerns over the regulation of illicit sexual activity were outwardly mirrored in wartime, in the regulations and proclamations described above, there was perhaps some room for latitude during the course of Henry’s reign. Text B suggested that “no woman follow the campe but suche as be by

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the marshall appointed … w(hich) shalbe licensedd by the marshalles bill and in his booke of recorde (my italics).”127 Here the document seems to be advocating the acceptance of prostitution so long as it was licensed and authourised by the central authorities, in particular the Marshal. This is not without precedent in civilian society. Ian Archer described the licensed conduct of prostitution in Southwark “where brothel-keepers were able to ply their trade subject only to a framework of regulation designed to provide a minimum of protection for the prostitutes and, more importantly, the necessary safeguards for the maintenance of public order.”128 That English army commanders would pursue a similar course is not surprising. They were after all concerned to keep their soldiers happy, to make them fight, and whilst not necessarily wanting to stop the practice, would clearly have wanted some level of control.129 We have already seen that it was Henry VIII’s considered opinion that without the “bare hope,” of personal gain, soldiers had “evill will to march far forward.”130 Furthermore, despite general disapproval of ‘looting’ Text B advocated ‘organised’ plundering of vanquished enemies.131 It seems likely that a regulated form of prostitution, in so far as it kept the army ‘happy’ and still ‘under control’, would have been applied.132 Similar concerns about the moral well-being and discipline of troops, appertained to the “dicing, carding, and all manner of games.” Such practices were frowned upon as morally reprehensible, a waste of money and likely to lead to disputes which were counter-productive to good order.133 They also took up useful spare time where men could be practicing with their weapons. Text B was concerned that Captains should enter the lodgings of their soldiers and check how they occupied their time. It was important to ensure that the soldiers lived a good “Catholicke and Christian life as Christian men ought to do.”134 It raised further concerns over “excessive drinkage bringinge the man… unto the estaite of a brute beste to his great despraise before god and man” 135 It was considered crucial that such vice was avoided as God would “senditth them good that servithe him trewlie and livethe the lawe.”136 The moral and religious undertones of this manuscript, and indeed the Audley manuscript, are interesting. It is important to remember these men were writing in an age of poltico-religious flux. At the end of Henry’s reign, and certainly during the reign of Edward VI, it would have done military authors, or indeed authors in general, no harm to demonstrate their devout religiosity and implicit approval of the king’s religious reforms. It is not the place of this study to consider the relative role of religion in the daily lives of Tudor citizens or soldiers. Nonetheless, it seems one must show some circumspection in accepting at face value the role of ‘religious exhortations’, in real terms, in controlling and disciplining the Tudor army. For example, the manuscript describes how a victorious army – gripped by


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blood-lust and the adrenaline of battle- should stop at the command of their officers, to “knele downe one there knes, liftinge up there handes to the heavens…(giving) thankes to almightie godd the gever of all victorye for,” their success and “beseching godd to take the soules dep(ar)tedd unto his mercy.”137 It seems not too cynical a conclusion to suggest that this was unlikely to reflect reality. This should perhaps sound a note of caution in accepting the remainder of the manuscript, at face value, as an accurate portrayal of ‘real practice.’ As we have already seen, the extent to which military manuscripts were read and employed remains unclear. Nonetheless, it seems safe to conclude that in an age of low literacy levels, and at best, basic training, relatively few members of any given army would have access to such material. How then would such ‘military theory’ find practical expression in the days before the standing army? One can only assume by the example of the captains and the proclamation of codes of martial law. Gervase Phillips emphasised the importance of strong leadership, and rightly so; soldiers were more willing to follow commanders who demonstrably shared in the privations and hardships of their men. For example, during construction work on the ramparts of Roxburgh Castle in 1547 “Edward Seymour, duke of Somerset and Lord Protector, had taken a shovel in his own hands to work on the ramparts.” Whereafter, “not just his soldiers but also his lords and knights ‘did their parts therein right willingly and uncompelled.”138 Various rules and regulations were issued before the onset of the campaign in 1513, mirroring to varying degrees the exhortations described in Text B. Read out two or three times every week, these appertained to everything from watch and ward, to mustering, punishments, lodging, uniforms and battle procedures, mirroring very closely the various topics covered in the military literature described above.139 Hale noted “the first printed military code was issued in 1544 as Statutes and ordynances for the Warre.”140 However, it is unclear just how many men could have actually read this document or indeed how widely it was dispersed. The apparently close relationship between the content of these ordinances, and the doctrine espoused in the mid-Tudor literature discussed, most especially in Text B, perhaps indicates some part of the heritage of the mid-century military literature. Strict military codes were issued at the onset of each campaign throughout Henry’s reign. The earliest body of military ‘regulations’ dates back as far as the reign of Richard I, and related to the behaviour of soldiers on the Crusades. Whilst those issued by Richard II, a hundred years later, would continue to form the basis for military codes throughout the medieval period and into Henry’s reign.141 The application of these rules was the responsibility of the ‘High Marshal’ who “chusethe unto him three p(ro)vost marshalles,” who were accountable for discipline in each of the three wards. The High Marshal normally

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remained with the “mayn battaile,” and also appointed “a sufficient nomber of s(ar)gentes bearinge tipstaves to staie and apprehende,” and “kepe all kind of prisoners.” These men were supported in their role by the “ghoostelie father,” – a priest appointed to hear the confession of the condemned men - and an “executioner,” to carry out the ultimate punishment available to the Marshal.142 The 1513 military regulations stated that “yf there be any man or persone that findeth them self grevyd in any thinge that touchith the office of my lord marshal let them reporte munday wensday and fryday vnto the Lord marshal court kept there w(ith)in this towne and cytie during the tyme that hit shal please the kinges highnes here to tary.”143 Furthemore “Al manner of men,” serving in the royal army were required “kepe and obserue all his statuts and ordennaces of warre.”144 These instructions demonstrate that a formalised system of complaint and punishment was in operation. It seems clear that, far from a disorganised mass, this was a highly professional expedition led by commanders that understood the value of discipline and order. Furthermore, the substance of these rules and regulations would form the basis for military discipline throughout the Tudor century. Much the same military code would govern the Earl of Warwick’s expedition against Le Havre in 1562, Leicester’s Netherlands campaign in 1585 and indeed Willoughby’s and Essex’s forces into France, in 1589 and 1591 respectively.145 Disease could rapidly spread through an army, especially in the mid-summer heat, and was responsible for the decimation of many a medieval and early modern force. Henry and his commanders worked hard to avoid such a scenario on the 1513 campaign. Hale described the period as “an age of actual or potential invalids,” and “for recruits escaping from undercaloried privation and finding wages too stripped to enable them to catch up, damp, sweat, cold and the swill of faeces no army regulation seemed to keep at bay, took an even greater toll than they were to in the next great underpaid herdings, those of the age of industry.”146 Thus it was proclaimed at the onset of operations, in Calais, that: “The king our souverain lord chargeth and expressly commanndethe that ev(er)y man kepe clene his loging not suffryng any careyn filthe …to be in hit or nere to the same loging but … to bury hit or to cause hit to be buryed depe in the erthe…upon payn of imprysonment after the descrecion of the maryshall.”147 These concerns were mirrored in the ‘penal ordinances’ of the mid-century military literature which explicitly stated “that no man killinge anie cattaile w(ith)in the campe,” was to leave the carcass about the camp but rather “if anie man or beast die…it shalbe conveyedd and buriedd immedatlie.”148 Furthermore, every effort was to be made to keep the drinking water used by the camp clean; men were not to throw rubbish into the water or wash their horses outside of the downstream area designated for


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this purpose.149 These concerns demonstrate some limited understanding of the relationship between cleanliness and disease. Nevertheless in 1522 and 1544 the weather would be blamed, by Wolsey and Norfolk respectively, for the high death rates amongst their soldiers, whilst “in 1596 there were bitter complaints about the climate of St. Valery and this was blamed for causing sickness among the troops stationed at that place.”150 To give some indication of the scale of the problem faced by sixteenth century armies, Bert Hall has recently estimated the quantity of provisions necessary, and concurrent waste created, in the sustenance of 2,500 horses. They would require 30,000 kilograms of feed and 40,000 litres of water every day, which in turn would produce as much as 50,000 litres of “liquid waste,” and 50,000 kilograms of “solid horse waste,” every day.151 It is thus not surprising to find that complaints about disease, food and hygiene continued throughout the Tudor century. The relative effectiveness of orders concerning camp hygiene, in 1513 or any other campaign is dubious – although it is likely greater exertions were made in this regard when the operations boasted the presence of the sovereign. Indeed, the dangers of disease on campaign would have been made abundantly clear to Wolsey and his fellow ‘planners’ following the dismal experiences of Henry’s forces under Dorset in 1512. Vergil described how as winter approached “many Englishmen, unable to bear the sultry climate of the area because they are unaccustomed to the greater heat of the sun, died of disease and many fell seriously ill.”152 Similarly Hall related how soldiers “dranke hote wynes in the hote wether, and did eate all the hote frutes that their could gette, which caused their bloudde to so boyle in their bellies, that there fell sicke three thousande of the flixe, and therof died 1800 men.”153 So the soldiers hired ships, “putte the lord Marquess in one,” who was himself ill, and returned to England, complaining, “thei would not abide and dye of the flixe in such a wretched country.”154 Nevertheless, the 1513 army orders demonstrate some attempt to impose discipline and order on the campaign, and control – to some extent at least- the ravages of disease.155 Cruickshank has suggested that “by far the commonest offence,” against the military regulations of the Tudor era was desertion.156 Indeed, desertion would prove a significant issue for both the English and Scottish armies in the build up to the battle of Flodden, and likewise in 1522 some degree of desertion affected Surrey’s army in during the preparation of the campaign – although this is hard to quantify.157 Similarly in 1523, Suffolk’s expedition was afflicted by the issue of desertion; “over 200 men received coats but never reached Kent, far more disappeared between Dover and the first payment of wages, and a French spy saw about a hundred on their way home between Canterbury and London.”158 Moreover, a large number of Burgundian troops were looting and pillaging local

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populations and then deserting.159 No doubt this situation was exasperated by the cessation of financial support to Buren (the commander of the Netherlands contingent), who by 23 October had turned to the English in need of aid.160 Another important concern was the relationship between soldier and civilian and the general ‘civilised behaviour’ of the army when it was billeted in foreign countries. It was considered important that captains “repove and diligentlie correcte all outragious p(e)rsones riotte(r)s quarrelles fighters hosekep(er)s, blasphemes drunkerdes barrators robber.” It was the responsibility of the High Marshal “to admonishe banishe and put to death,” as he saw fit, any men who broke the regulations in this regard.161 The experiences of 1512 would have been fresh in the mind of army planners in 1513. Hall related a dispute between an Englishmen and a “Spanyarde,” in a village called Sancta Maria. The English soldier, having received some form of verbal abuse proceeded to give “him a buffet on the face, the toune rose and sett on the Englishmen, and gathered in suche a multitude, that the Englisheman whiche was the first beginner was slain, because onely thre Englishemen came to his rescue.”162 The “Almyane,” mercenaries who accompanied the English force, raised the alarm and “the souldiers hearyng this, in a rage ranne to the toune in suche maner, that the capitaines could not staie them, and slew and robbed the people without mercy.”163 The army commanders waited for the soldiers to return before viewing the damage they had done to the town; many Spaniards were dead and the rest had fled. They then persuaded all the soldiers to return to camp by “sobre meanes and gentle exhortation.”164 This is a conspicuous example of Phillips’ broad point that the early Tudor understanding of discipline was far from the modern concept of “unquestioning obedience.”165 Nonetheless, having restored order, recourse was then made to the ‘judicial system’ as specified in the military regulations, which we have already seen governed all military campaigns of the period. A proclamation was made stating that “every man upon payn of death should bring in his pillage.”166 However twenty-one men had fled, with the considerable sum of 10,000 “duckates,” towards Gascony. They were pursued and captured and brought before the “lord capitayn,” and “adjudged to die.”167 Seven were immediately executed and a further fourteen were to die the following day, before the intervention of the “lordes of Spaine,” ensured clemency on the condition of the return of all the pillage.168 Here then is an indisputable illustration of early Tudor martial law executed to its fullest extent in order to set an example to the rest of the army as to the appropriate treatment of civilians.169 In 1513, shortly after Henry’s arrival at Ardes on 25 July, the “Almaynes (and) also sum(e)Engliyshmen began to spoyle (and) to robbe it.”170 Henry immediately “coma(n)ded that p(ro)clamation shoulde be made that no p(er)son vppo(n) payne


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of his lyffe should robe spoyle or take anything fro(m) the inhabitants of the said towne and also w(ith)in one hower to avoyd the towne vppon lyke payne.”171 It seems clear that every effort was made to ensure professional conduct and martial discipline throughout the army.172 Nevertheless, in an indication of the nature of the sixteenth century army, Gunn has shown that throughout the 1523 campaign in France, despite the efforts of commanders, “the troops could not be restrained from plundering.”173 Indeed, plunder of the civilian population was to cause animosity between English and Dutch troops on the campaign. The English were resentful of the ability of their allies to send their booty home noting “we bete the bushe and they take the byrdes.”174 A further concern, in an age of multi-national armies and mercenaries was the relationship between soldiers of different nationalities. At the outset of the campaign in 1513 it was proclaimed that: The King our sou(er)ain Lord stratly chargeth and commandeth that no Englishemen enter medyl or loge them self w(ith)in the ground assigned to the allemans for ther loginge or to give them any reproche or vnfitting language or wordyd by the wiche noyse or debate might ensew upon payne of imprisonement…And in like wyse yf that any alemne gyve any reproche or vnfitting language to any englishmen that then the englishemen to c(om)playn them to the capitaine of the allemans wiche shal se and prouyde for remedy.175 Nevertheless the campaign did feature a disturbance between “Almayne,” mercenaries and their English counterparts. Hall described how on Monday 13 August “by infortune, wythoute anye cause knowen, there fell a greate debate betwene the Almaynes of the kynges felde and Thenglyshmen, in so muche that they fell to fightinge and many men slayne.”176 The German soldiers then commandered some of “kynges ordinaunce,” and “embattayled them selfes, and bent the ordinaunce agaynst the kinge and his campe.”177 The English archers and German pikemen prepared to ‘join battle’ before the intervention of the captains. In a commendation of the martial discipline and skill of English captains in 1513, Hall related that the Emperor “was glad to se the discrete handelyng of the capitaynes.”178 Not only were the English attempting to enforce a strict military code, their captains and officers were demonstrating a great deal of skill in its application. Although it is pertinent to recognise that the officers of the Tudor army did not enjoy the ‘total and immediate’ control of their soldiers that has become synonymous with modern military discipline. These considerations aside, it seems that the early Tudor army was, by and

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large, a reasonably well-controlled force when called ‘to action’. It seems useful to briefly consider some examples of good discipline in 1512 and 1513. Eltis cited Dorset’s 1512 campaign as evidence that “without the support and advisers a major European power could provide, English unfamiliarity with the changed world of the sixteenth century” warfare was transparent.179 Certainly there were instances of ill-discipline and disorder on the campaign, however this is not the full picture. Hall’s description of an encounter between the French of Bayonne and Dorset’s troops painted the English in a highly professional light. He related how the English archers “chased the Frenchemen on horsebacks that thei fled,” moreover “thei retired to their campe in suche ordre, that the Spanyardes wondered much, bothe at their fierce courage and sobre ordre.”180 When they were faced with an encounter (however small) in the field they behaved with discipline and confidence. Likewise one might note the considerable discipline shown by the men of the English militia at Flodden. A strong Scottish defensive position, threatened almost certain defeat were the English army to launch a head-on assault into the mouths of the waiting artillery. Surrey, the English commander, felt confident enough in the professionalism of his troops to send them on a dangerous outflanking manouvre, which would at times leave them exposed to Scottish artillery. In practical terms this committed the English vanguard to an 8-mile march and then an uphill assault on a rested Scottish army.181 The success of this manouvre is made all the more impressive when one considers that the English had “no thing to drinke but onely water by the space of thre daies.”182 Moreover, as well as dividing his army, Surrey proposed to reunite the two forces in full view of his enemy; despite the “Scottes having the hill [and] the wynde … w(ith) them agenst o(ur) selfes.”183 The successful completion of this treacherous manouvre is surely a testament to the professionalism and discipline of the English army. The English also displayed discipline and good order both in making and organising their camps. While the infantry set about laying camp, the cavalry ranged itself in a defensive array, and scouts were sent out in every direction to gather intelligence.184 During the 1513 campaign the French threat was never sufficient to warrant the entrenchment of the English camp. Nevertheless, following Henry’s arrival at Therouanne “his campe was environed with artilerie, as Fawcones, serpentynes, caste hagbushes, and tryde harowes, spien trstyls, and other warlike defence.”185 Similarly, Gunn noted that in 1523, “the wooden fortifications to defend the camp, and large sacks of wool to protect gunners during sieges, were admired by the French.”186 A comparable sense of the professionalism and discipline of the English army was demonstrated in times ‘of action’ in 1513, notably during the progress of the


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English middleward to Therouanne. Cruickshank commented “the march through Artois was uneventful,” although “the scattered French garrisons sent out small forces to demonstrate against them...the enemy did not venture far from their hastily reinforced strong points and they made no attempt at a major attack.”187 Indeed, a report from the Venetian ambassador in Rome revealed that although “the king was in good spirits...Frenchmen did not go very willingly against Englishmen.”188 Henry set out from Calais with the ‘middle-ward’ on 21 July and “notwithstandyng that the forward and the rerewarde of the kyngs great army were before Tirwyn, the King of his awne battayle made 3 battailles after the fasshion of the warre.”189 Hall seems to suggest here that Henry was following the latest ‘fashions’ or developments in the art of war. An examination of the marching order of Henry’s army reveals both an awareness of, and adaptation to, the latest military doctrine. The ‘Scourers’ or Scouts were to lead the way forward, followed by “the great ordnance,” and 1,000 men. The king’s ward of 3,100 men was to be preceded by an ‘avauntgarde’ of 3,200 men under Charles Brandon, Lord Lysle and was to be flanked by two wings - each of 3,000 men in two formations of 1,500 men. To the rear was to be another screen of artillery and horsemen.190 The wards of the king and the Lord Lysle were to be flanked by the baggage train “meddled w(ith) ordnonance.”191 Throughout the march the French forces shadowed Henry’s army hoping to “take the Englyshmen at some advantage.”192 However, despite the fact that this was a recently levied ‘unprofessional’ army, “thei kept them so close in order, that they could not fynd them out of array.”193 One might similarly note Hall’s description of ‘Dry Wednesday’ - a stand off between the English and French forces, which culminated in a French withdrawal: the day was wonderfull hot and the kyng and his army were in order of battaile from six of the clock in the mornyng tyll three of the clock at after noone, some died for lack of moysture and almost in general every man was burned about the mouth with hete of the stomack for drynke lacked and water was not nere.194 This display of discipline and order in the face of an opposing army, on foreign soil, and in the heat of the day serves to emphasise that, although no standing army existed in England at this time, a long martial tradition, and the recent experience of bloody civil war, had created a nation well-schooled in the art of war. The English column found itself harassed throughout the march by French light cavalry, however owing to their inferior numbers the French shied away from

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offering battle. Moreover the English light cavalry under the command of Sir Rees ap Thomas repeatedly drove off the French; thus “the Kyng in good order of battaile came before the citie of Tyrwyn and planted his siege in most warlikewise.”195 Whilst acknowledging the importance of the military codes, regulations and disciplinary procedures described above, Cruickshank has emphasised the role played by the presence of the young Henry VIII in the good discipline displayed on campaign in 1513. The young Henry was, he noted, “a popular figure and the idea of following him into battle and sharing in the spoils of war appealed to many adventurous spirits.”196 A royal proclamation, although only “read out twice a week,” would “not be lightly disobeyed.”197 Thus far, one cannot but agree with Cruickshank, however, he goes too far in suggesting that because “there was a duty on all mortals to obey the law of God, and as the sovereign derived his authority from God, anyone speaking in his name must also be implicitly obeyed.”198 Certainly, Tudor society was ‘god-fearing’ and the notion of the ‘divine right of kings’ held much resonance. However, no such notional ‘restrictions’ stopped crimes against the king’s laws in civilian society, and it is far-fetched to believe they would do so within a military environment. Rather discipline derived from fear of the retribution of the High Marshal, who, as we have seen, was perfectly willing to execute soldiers as an example to others. In battle, it seems safe to conclude that discipline was principally based on the necessity of cohesion for survival: fear drove men to stick close to their comrades. This goes some way towards demonstrating that, although England possessed no standing army in the conventional sense, both the militia and indenture system, and the statutes enforcing the practice of arms, had created a nation largely at ease with the execution of war. It would of course be misleading to suggest that this is the full picture and examples of restless troops, lack of discipline and revolt have also be identified throughout the reign. However, Oman went too far in stating “English hosts of the early sixteenth century tended to become unruly mobs at the first failure or the approach of discomfort.”199 Despite instances of ill-discipline, and even revolt, almost always born out of supply shortages or poor weather conditions, the English army remained a well-disciplined efficient fighting force, in the overwhelming number of cases in 1512, 1513, 1522 and 1523. Furthermore ill discipline, where it occurred, was not specific to the English army of the period. For example, Trim pointed out “during the French Wars of Religion, it was commonplace for armies to be thwarted in their pursuit of success by the disorder of their soldiers.”200 Likewise Parker noted that the Spanish Army of Flanders (a force of some 70,000 men “was permanently at war between 1572 and 1607,”) was gripped by “no less than fourty-six mutinies,” – usually in disputes over pay and


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conditions.201 It is important to recognise that a different a notion of ‘good discipline’ was applied across Europe in the sixteenth century. The modern understanding of the soldier, who does not require “to know his reason why,” but is required to “obey without question the orders of his superiors,” is, to some degree, an anachronistic concept when applied backwards without caveat.202 Thus Phillips concluded, “for all the insistence on obedience,” as evidenced in the military codes and literature of the period, “the Tudor soldier was never reduced to an unthinking cipher.”203 Such a conclusion does not, nonetheless, paint the Tudor soldier as particularly ill disciplined or unprofessional, in the context of the times. Writing to the Doge in 1519, Sebastiann Giustinian, the Venetian ambassador to England, related how the English soldiers “insisted on being paid monthly, and did not choose to suffer hardship; but when they had their comforts, they would do battle daily, with a courage, vigour, and valour that defied exaggeration.”204 Similarly in 1554 it was noted that while “in battle they show great courage and great presence of mind in danger…they require to be largely supplied with victuals; so it is evident that they cannot endure much fatigue.”205

Chapter 4 Infantry and Cavalry: A British Art of War? Pike or Bill?1

THEORY During the fifteenth century the Swiss had developed the great pike phalanxes that dramatically altered the nature of warfare.2 The ability to manouvre in close formation allowed the evolution of more aggressive battle tactics for the infantry who could now ‘take the fight to the enemy’. This was famously demonstrated in the Swiss defeat of Charles the Bold, at first at Grandson and Morat in 1476 and later at Nancy in 1477.3 Initially armed with halberd and later the pike, the close formations developed by the Swiss could confidently advance upon, and break, less firmly drilled formations of troops.4 Moreover, these pike formations offered an “impenetrable barrier of steel points,” to the charging cavalry.5 Machiavelli remarked that: such is the general opinion of the excellence of these principles, from the many remarkable services they have done, that ever since the expedition of Charles VIII into Italy, all other nations in Europe have adopted the same weapons and manner of fighting.6 Such was the impression made on the Holy Roman Emperor by Swiss combat methods that steps were taken, as early as 1486, to raise his own pike-armed infantry units: the landsknechts.7 Moreover the continued success of pike-armed troops in the fifteenth century ensured that “it was rapidly becoming the standard infantry melee weapon of Western Europe.”8 By mid-century, the pike square could broadly be identified as being made up of the following composite sections. The general or commander stood at the centre of the force with the drummers, fife and ensigns that were so important for ordering the battle. They were surrounded by a square of billmen or halberdiers, who in turn were encased by a band of un-armoured pikemen (to add weight to

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‘the push’ at the moment of contact, hold those in front of them steady if they received a charge, or replace fallen men in the rows in front of them). On the outside of the square, there would be a number of rows of armoured pikemen. It was widely accepted practice that they must “haue white corslettes whiche must be alwaies cleane kepte for it is a bewtifull sight in the battaile and a gre(a)t terror to the enemyes.”9 It was also sensible that the men placed on the outside layer of the square wore armour as “those men so armedd and placedd be in more jeperdie than other men be.”10 An outer layer of ‘shot’ were then invariably placed under the pike-heads of the front rank to let off a volley just before contact between the two bodies of pike, before retreating within the protective safety of the square. Audley argued “that no shotte shold haue Armure vpo(n) hym but a murrion or a skulle vppon his hedde, for there can no shotte neytheyre archard no(r) hargabusse s(er)ve well beinge armed.”11 However, it is crucial to remember that “commanders usually formed their dispositions around field fortifications and often interspersed cavalry and infantry bodies in the line...for all the pikemen in an army to be in single pike square was unusual.”12 The importance of the pike was certainly recognised by the mid-century theorists in England. Text B stated that it was crucial that the “capetaines and officers leadinge morrispikes shoulde be experienced in that stronge and warlike weapon,” and “teache the soldiers sometymes to pushe, traile and order the same.”13 Audley similarly recognised the importance of the pike, whilst advocating “the dyversytye of everye kynde of weapon.”14 Audley recommended the employment of “pykes,” “holberdes” and “billes” although noted that “Thalmaynes vse comonlye but one Ranke of Halberdes or 2 at the moste to be placed where theye place there Ensynes in three p(ar)tes of the battayles And all the rest pyke.”15 Thus, although Audley did not advocate the sole adoption of the “pyke”, he was plainly aware of contemporary European trends, whilst favoring its deployment in partnership with the bill.16 This idea, of integrating the pike into existing tactical systems, with the older billhook, mirrors early Tudor notions about combining the longbow and handgun. This would seem to demonstrate an open-minded military establishment, which sought to improve their tactical effectiveness, whilst retaining the benefits of the older system. 1512-23: Reality Nonetheless, here again, this was not an exclusively mid-Tudor development, for example, Henry Tudor had employed mercenary pike at Bosworth in 1485. M.Jones described how they were “well-trained and drilled, in the Swiss fashion, and their formation against mounted attack was to serve Henry well at

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Bosworth.”17 Moreover, both German and Swiss pikemen had served in the army of Lambert Simnel at the Battle of Stoke in 1487. Polydore Vergil described how: both sides fought with the bitterest energy. Those rugged men of the mountains, the Germans, so practised in warfare, were in the forefront of the battle and yielded little to the English in valour; while Martin Schwartz their leader was not inferior to many in his courage and resolution.18 The English were evidently familiar with the growing importance of the pike on the modern battlefield during the reign of Henry VII. For the earliest registered use of pike in Henry VIII’s reign, one needs look no further than Dorset’s 1512 campaign. The total English expeditionary force numbered some 7,018 men and included a contingent of 400 Almayns (almost certainly pike-men); embarking from Southampton, it arrived at San Sebastian on 3 April.19 Henry had made extensive preparations throughout the winter and spring of 1511-1512. Hall related how he “caused Gonnes, Bowes, Arrowes, and all other artilery, and instrumentes of warre to be made, in such nombre and quantitee that it was wonderfull to see what thynges were doen, bothe for sea and lande in so shorte space.”20 Even given Hall’s penchant for exaggeration, it would seem that Henry had high hopes for his army and made every effort to ensure that it was properly equipped. A “paper showing distribution of bows, arrows, strings, pikes and gunpowder to the captains,” is noteworthy for a ratio of pikes to bills of 50:40.21 A preponderance of pike over bill was unprecedented and certainly indicates some sort of move towards modernisation. When placed in the broader context of the whole of Henry’s reign the campaign was relatively insignificant - so much so that Vergil insisted that “nothing worth recording was done in these parts,” - however this employment of pike armed troops was a visible recognition of the latest trends in European warfare.22 A similar commitment to the adoption of the pike was apparent during the 1513 campaign; this is made clear in a document detailing the terms of the agreement between Henry and his Imperial ally. Henry agreed to “cross the sea with 30,000 men,” and offered to negotiate with the Venetians and urge them to peace with the Emperor so that the Spanish in Italy could turn to attack southern France.23 The Emperor would attend in person and retain an army of 3,000 horse, 6,000 Swiss and 2,000 Landsknechts, to be paid for by Henry.24 This represented Henry’s first personal venture onto the battlefields of Europe and, in the company of such an auspicious ally, the king was determined the campaign should be a successful one, so extensive preparations were made. Polydore Vergil claimed that “there had almost never been seen in England so redoubtable an army, whether in


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the toughness of the soldiers or the excellence of their equipment.”25 This statement is almost certainly guilty of the same hyperbole that characterizes much of Vergil’s chronicle however the ‘Army Royal’ of 1513 was excellently equipped and well organised. Late in 1512 a draft, in Wolsey’s hand, advised Henry that the “sayd Army ryul shall numbrye of 30,000 fyhtyng men suffycyently armyd and arayed for the warres.”26 It further suggested that the footmen should include 10,000 archers and interestingly 4,500 “bills and marispikes, English & Welsh,” and 5,000 “pykes of Almaynes.”27 The preponderance of pikemen suggested by Wolsey here is sure evidence that the English hierarchy understood the importance of pike on the modern battlefield. It also demonstrates that, as well as importing foreign specialists there was at least some movement towards the development of English pike-men, even at this early stage in Henry’s reign.28 In this context it is interesting to note that preparations for the supply of armaments to the ‘rearwarde’ included the conveyance of 5,000 “fiyhtyng billes.” More interestingly, the ward was to be furnished with 4,000 “marespike,” clearly suggesting the expanding integration of the latest technologies and techniques into the English military system.29 The muster records for the 1513 campaign reveal that the vast majority of the English infantry were armed with the traditional ‘bow and bill’, with only the retinues of the Lord Lisle (900), the Duke of Buckingham (100) and Lord Burgany (100) adopting the pike.30 However, the English commanders fully grasped the benefits offered by the pike and serious attempts were made to supplement this deficiency with foreign mercenaries. The vanguard alone possessed 2,500 ‘Almayns’ and perhaps as many as 1,500 accompanied Henry’s middle-ward, although the figures are confusing and contradictory.31 Vergil suggested that 5,000 German mercenaries accompanied the force.32 This figure is supported by a document drafted in 1512 projecting the ‘ideal’ composition of the English invading army.33 John Taylor, clerk of the parliaments, in his diary of the campaign, claimed that, “the King left Calais with a magnificent army increased by 8,000 German mercenaries.”34 Regardless of the precise figure, Henry was attempting to incorporate a significant proportion of pike in the main body of his forces. This surely demonstrates that Henry and his advisers properly understood the latest military developments on the continent and were undertaking to adapt them, with best effect, to the English system. It is difficult to be sure about the exact troop designations of the army that accompanied Surrey into France in 1522. However, of the roughly 7,000 men that composed his army, it seems safe to suggest that the majority of English staffarmed troops were bill-men.35 The General Proscription of that year revealed a nation heavily stocked with bills and bows, but little evidence of the ownership of

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pikes or handguns.36 It is nowhere recorded, and highly unlikely, that Henry, Wolsey or Surrey would have decided to outfit this campaign with pikes. Rather, the majority of soldiers would have brought their own staff-weapons in accordance with the Winchester provisions, and these would assuredly have been the billhook or halberd. This is not to say, however, that the campaign lacked pikemen, any more than it necessarily lacked hand-gunners. The exact size of the Imperial contingent is unclear, although it probably numbered somewhere in the region of 5,000 men.37 Of these troops, a substantial number seem to have been Almain pikemen. On 6 September 1522, Surrey related back to the king that the Imperial council of war offered 4,000 men to help in the assault of “Terouenne.”38 The document went on to describe the troops as Spaniards and Almains; I would suggest that the great majority were Almains, armed with pike. This assumption is based on the example of Imperial troop designations on the Italian peninsula in the first half of the sixteenth century. Following the establishment of the Spanish tercio in 1534, Bert Hall has identified a pike to shot ratio of 3.23:1 (2,000 pikemen, with fewer than 700 firearms troops); indeed as late as 1571 Spanish tercios in the Netherlands displayed a pike to shot ratio of 2.25:1.39 These figures reflect the fact that throughout the sixteenth century, but especially in the first half of the century, “the main purpose of the infantry unit,” was “to maintain an intact formation in possession of the field,” and firearms remained most effective in defence of a fortified position.40 It is thus highly unlikely that over ten years before the establishment of the first tercio there could have been anything other than a preponderance of pike over shot. Using the 1534 ratio as a rough guide one might suggest that somewhere in the region of 3,000 Almains and 1,000 hand-gunners were present on the campaign.41 Final figures are again difficult to arrive upon, as is often the case in the analysis of early modern armies, nonetheless it seems safe to suggest that this campaign is yet another example of the English trying to integrate old and new tactical systems and technologies, in co-ordination with their allies. In 1523 (much as in 1522), the majority of the army, 8,311 men (out of a total of 10,688), was armed with the longbow and billhook or halberd. The muster lists only designated “solderes fotemen,” as such it is impossible to specify numbers of archers and billmen, only a broader umbrella figure.42 In a further indication of the growing English awareness of the value of pike armed troops in modern warfare, the English expeditionary force was to be supported by 4,000 Almayn mercenaries.43 This recognition of the importance of pikemen, implicit in this recruitment of foreign pike, is less surprising when one remembers that in 1513 Suffolk (then Lord Lisle) was accompanied by a retinue which included 900 English pikemen.44 In the context of Suffolk’s recognised closeness to the king,


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and importance in the English military establishment, the implication that the English military elite (if we can designate them thus) were increasingly aware of the latest military developments, and keen to experiment with new tactics and technologies, is difficult to escape. The Battle of Flodden: A Case Study45 On 9 September 1513 the armies of England and Scotland clashed on Brankston hill in what would prove to be the only significant battle of the reign. It was a mighty clash of arms and all accounts agree a cruel and hard fought contest: “the stremeis of blude ran on ather syde so aboundantlie that all the feildis and wateris was amid reid with the conflewence thairof.”46 Historians have tended to view the Battle of Flodden as an essentially fifteenth century encounter, fought out according to the traditions and practices of this earlier period. To some extent this view is justified, and one cannot deny that the victorious English army consisted primarily of the old bow and bill formations. Furthermore, the deployment of horse was minimal and there is scant evidence to suggest the use of small fire-arms by either side to any real effect. In the summer of 1513, in fulfillment of his commitment to the ‘Holy League,’ Henry VIII invaded France and “King James of Scotland, incited as much by the exhortations (of Henry VIII) as by the bribes of Louis King of France, prepared an army.”47 It was James’ aim “to attack the English borders so that King Henry should be distracted from his attacks on France.”48 The Scots crossed the Tweed at Coldstream on 22 August, razing Wark castle before crossing the Till at Twizel Bridge and marching downstream to Norham Castle. On 18 September Thomas Ruthal, Bishop of Durham wrote to Wolsey with “a right sorowfull hart,” relating how “the Kyng of Scottis had sieged asultid and in a great stormy nyght scalyd and won the Castell of Norh(a)m.”49 The siege had lasted six days, but in the end Norham’s antiquated defences were no match for the impressive Scottish artillery train.50 James’ aims remained relatively modest in military terms. He did not have the time or manpower to besiege the major English stronghold on the northern border, Berwick, especially when faced with an advancing English army. He could not hope to by-pass the border forts and move south towards Newcastle or York, as this would leave his supply lines open to attack and disruption. James was restricted to a small incursion in the hope of distracting the English from their objectives in France. However, with what amounted to the cream of English military might abroad in France, he must have felt that he would rarely be offered a better opportunity.51 Having destroyed Norham, James went on to take Etal,

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Chillingham and Ford, he then encamped at Flodden. On 6 September the Earl of Surrey and the English army marched 14 miles north from Bolton-in-Glendale to Wooler Haugh. This placed the English 6 miles from the Scottish camp, although by the roads the army was forced to take the distance was in fact much greater.52 Almost uniquely the battle of Flodden was to be decided by a gruesome melee fought out between bill and pike. A small English contingent of cavalry aside, the chroniclers unanimously describe a battle fought on foot between infantrymen. An examination of the equipment of the Scots army reveals a force aware of the latest developments in military technology. English agents reported that “the Scottes dayly shipped long speres called colleyne clowisters, armure and artilerie.”53 Moreover, in May 1513, forty French Captains under the overall command of Count D’Aussi had arrived in Scotland to train the Scots in the application of modern Pike tactics.54 The ‘Trewe Encountre’ rehearsed how the Scots were armed with “a kene and sharpe spere of 5 Yerdes longe.”55 The English by contrast were armed with their traditional bill. The battle opened with a Scottish success as their van, under the command of Home, the Chamberlain of Scotland, smashed the English right, commanded by Surrey’s youngest son, Sir Edmond Howard. Howard “had w(ith) hym 1,000 Cheshire men and 500 Lancashir(e) men and many gentilmen of Yorkshire,” however the “Cheshire and Lancashire men never abode a stroke and few of the gentilmen of Yorkshire abode but fled.”56 The English were saved from disaster by the timely intervention of Dacre with his border horse. Dacre “cam(e) w(ith) 1,500 men and put to flyght all the said Scottes,” allowing Howarde to escape within the protective confines of the Admiral’s battle.57 It seems probable that Dacre stayed, for the remainder of the battle, to the Lord Admiral’s right flank preventing the re-engagement of Home in support of his king (although this is not entirely clear from the contemporary accounts). “Secondly, Eastwarde from the sayde battayle,” the Lord Admiral “encountred the Earles of Crafforde and Montroos,” and “with pure fightyng...brought to grounde a great number, and both the Earles slayn,” by the end of the engagement.58 Meanwhile James IV, galled by English shot and encouraged by the initial successes of Home’s battle, “hurriedly dismounted from his horse, seized a weapon and thus inadequately armed, marched against the enemy. He rashly thrust himself to the front of the first line where he was followed by the majority of the nobility.”59 The Scots hoped that with the added impetus provided by the slope, their pike columns could break the English battles waiting for them at the bottom of the hill. However, the slope was steep in the middle and the bad weather preceding the battle would not have made the ground any easier to cross. Although the Scots initial impact was deadly, they “found the Englishmen not


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fleeing, but manfullie standing at resistance so that there was a right hard incounter.”60 Once this first contact had been weathered, the pike became unwieldy and difficult to use in the tightly packed melee that ensued. Ruthal explained how “billes disapointed the Scotes of their long speres wherin was their greatest,” strength, hacking them into pieces, the Scots were then forced to rely on the longsword.61 However, the sword was out-reached by the bill and the Scots again found themselves at a disadvantage. So “whene they came to hand strokes…the Scotes fought sore and valiantly w(ith) their swerdes yet they could not resiste the billes that lighted so thicke and sore vpon them.”62 The difficulties of using the pike in a melee were encountered across Europe, with the Landsknechts proving better able to adapt their techniques than the Swiss. The success of the bill in defeating the Scottish pikes at Flodden perhaps goes some way towards explaining its retention by the English at the same time it was being abandoned by armies across Europe. The English had developed a tactical system based on the rapid and accurate fire of their archers and the steadfast resistance of their bill-men. The battle of Flodden vindicated these venerable old weapons, once the initial impact of the pike column was absorbed, the bill continued to prove most adept in the melee. It might be argued that the success of the bill at Flodden was a result of poor Scottish technique, and certainly a lack tactical cohesion and co-ordination between units ultimately cost the Scots the day. However, we are told that the Scots “came down the hill and mette w(ith) the(m) in good ordre aft(er) the Almayns man(ner) w(ith)out spekyng any word.”63 Moreover the action between the ‘main’ battles of Surrey and James IV was hard fought and was only decided by the assault on the kings rear and flanks by the English right hand ‘main’ division, under the command of the Admiral. Therefore the success of English bill-men should be given equal, if not greater credit, than the relative failures of the pike in Scottish hands, regardless of whether this was a result poor technique or otherwise. There is some disagreement amongst the sources as to the final decision of the battle. Pitscottie suggested that the English did not know the outcome of the encounter until the following morning. He related how the English troops spent a long night on their feet expecting a renewed Scottish assault.64 By contrast Hall would have us believe that the English knew they had won the field on the evening of the battle.65 It is ultimately impossible to know for sure.66 As to casualties, the “Articles of the battail,” and Ruthal’s account of the battle both place the number of Scots “slayn,” that day at 10,000 men, whilst the former number’s English losses at 500, and the latter 1000.67 Although the exact

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number of English losses is unclear, it seems certain they were considerably smaller than those of the vanquished Scots. Shortly after the battle Dacre “founde the body of the King of Scottes slayne in the felde.”68 The king’s body was removed to Berwick and the “Articles,” related that “ther(e) is no grete man of Scotland returned home but the Chamberla(i)n.”69 As if to rub salt in the wounds, the Scots rout was so complete as to allow the English to capture their artillery train which was removed to “Etall Castle.”70 The majority of the English troops that accompanied armies to the continent in 1513 and 1523 continued to be armed with the traditional ‘bill’. This was in no small part a result of the continued success of the weapon within the English tactical system.71 This was reinforced, as we shall, by the socially constituted nature of the militia and the Winchester provisions.72 Furthermore, it important to remember that the bill was actually a sophisticated weapon requiring a high degree of skill to use effectively. Nonetheless it seems clear then that the English high command fully appreciated the benefits offered by the pike. They can be seen to have recruited foreign specialists (Almain pikemen) for campaigns against the French or ensured alliances with Imperial troops armed and drilled in the latest weapons technology, to make up for this deficit. This surely demonstrates a clear awareness of modern military technique from the very outset of the reign. Qualifying factors: The Cavalry By the latter stages of the sixteenth century traditional heavy cavalry were of increasingly “doubtful military value.”73 This decline has been attributed to various factors, notably the burgeoning importance and effectiveness of artillery, and in response the artillery fort, and the growth of siege warfare.74 An alternative view has been posited by B. S. Hall, who suggested that the heavy cavalryman retreated from the battlefield “as the direct consequence of the spread of the wheel-lock pistol….the horse-mounted pistoleer was able to match the traditional man-atarms in terms of mobility while outranging him in striking power.”75 Some synthesis of the two views seems the most acceptable explanation. Although their decline in the west is overplayed, their importance had certainly diminished considerably from the medieval heyday, which knew them as the heavily armoured arbiter of the battlefield. Notwithstanding, Robert Frost’s consideration of the role of the cavalry in the warfare of the east re-iterates the need for a regional understanding of military change in the sixteenth century.76 In the east, cavalry remained of central importance to the successful outcome of almost every campaign. For example,


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“Poland-Lithuania’s success in the first phase of the (Northern) wars was primarily due to the fact that the Commonwealth, instead of abandoning or downgrading cavalry, developed new ways of using it.”77 Indeed “success depended on the successful integration of cavalry with infantry firepower, and control of theatre operations depended on Cavalry.”78 Frost pointed out that the success of Peter the Great was as much a result of what he did not change (Russia was a highly centralised state when he came to power) as on the reforms he did make. Therefore no simple cause and effect model leading towards, or stemming from a ‘military revolution’ can be wholly satisfactory. From the perspective of this study, our understanding of the relative strengths and deficiencies of Henry VIII’s mounted arm must necessarily be context-specific. Henry’s armies have been heavily criticised for deficiencies in the mounted arm. Oman concluded that at the turn of the sixteenth century the English army was a force “with hardly any provision of cavalry.”79 Cruickshank similarly cited this as a sign of the relative deficiency of the English military system.80 Furthermore, the English horses themselves received heavy criticism from at least one foreign observer; who commented that the “island produces a greater number of horses than any other region in Europe,” suitable for service as ‘light horse’.81 However “the horses being weak and of bad wind, fed merely on grass, being like sheep and all other cattle kept in the field or pasture at all seasons...they cannot stand much work, nor are they held in much account.”82 As for horses suitable to bear a man-at-arms, it was noted that “the island does not produce any, except a few in Wales, and an equally small amount from the Crown studs.”83 This demonstrable lack of heavy cavalry has been set against the considerable strength of the French gendarmes. For example in 1523 the French boasted a force of 3,752 lances nationally, and 327 lances in Picardy alone.84 Nonetheless, the mid-Tudor theorists devoted considerable time to describing the tactical role of the cavalry and their continued relevance on the battlefield. Thomas Audley described how, “when ye haue sett the battayle of footemene in good Araye Lykewise must the battayle of horsemen be sett at the same tyme.”85 At the start of our period, the cavalry would normally be placed on the ‘wings’ of the massed blocks of infantry to protect the foot soldiers from the opposing cavalry. Light cavalry would often be employed as ‘skirmishers’, they would remain in open order riding up close to enemy formations and releasing arrows or spears in an attempt to disorganise the enemy’s formations. The shock tactics of the heavily outfitted men-at-arms would see them charge home with the lance to exploit any lack of cohesion or co-ordination amongst the enemy’s infantry. The Cotton variant of Text B included a section on the employment and “furnyshing,” of horsemen, absent from the Bodleian and Cambridge copies.86 This manuscript

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maintained that “their dewtie ys alwaies...to be in the felde in order of battell before the batels of fotemen,” to offer protection to the infantry.87 It emphasised the importance of “good order and safe keping of the standerd,” offering detailed advice on the deployment of “Demi lances,” scouts, the correct “order of array,” and “gallopyng the felde”.88 Audley similarly offered explicit advice on the deployment of cavalry commenting that “I wolde haue at the least thone halfe of the band light horses, that ys to saye, the men atarmes and his dimylance, and as many Barbes for the battayle Amonge yo(ur) men Atarmes as you shold thinke good.”89 As well as criticising the French who “thoughte yt best to haue no light horses.”90 Audley concluded that he: wold wyshe that there were for everye battayle of footemen two whingei(s) of horsemen w(hic)h ys a strengthe for the flankes of everye battayle of fottemen And an occasione to take thadvantage of the flanki(s) of thenemyes, when tyme is.91 Horse also remained the most effective foil to enemy skirmishers who could not stand against a cavalry charge, with any real chance of success, at this early stage in the development of the firearm. In large part historical criticism of the mounted arm during the reign of Henry VIII has rested on misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the nature of fifteenth century cavalry warfare in England. Most notably perhaps, the tendency of English knights to dismount in the wake of such famous victories as Agincourt (1415), has led historians to conclude that this remained the norm into the sixteenth century.92 However, not only is this a misrepresentation of English tactical doctrine during the reign of Henry VIII, but Anthony Goodman (amongst others) has shown how the cavalry charge played a critical role in various engagements of the Wars of the Roses.93 Similarly David Grummitt argues that the ratio of one man-at-arms to every archer during Henry IV’s invasion of France in 1475 was in every sense comparable with contemporary tactical doctrine across Europe. He notes that the Burgundian Ordinance Companies, established by Charles the Bold in 1472, had a ratio of 1:7, that is to say hardly a great disparity with English practice.94 Therefore, whilst historians such as Millar and Oman have been correct to emphasise continuity with the fifteenth century during the early years of Henry VIII’s reign, where they have gone wrong is in correlating this with the idea that England had fallen behind her European neighbours during the previous century.95 Rather, it seems increasingly apparent that English armies in the fifteenth century were operating in a similar fashion to their European contemporaries.


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Certainly England suffered under a chronic shortage of heavy cavalry during the years 1509-1547. Henry did maintain a nucleus of men-at-arms in his ‘Spears’ (and later his Gentlemen Pensioners), but they were very few in number.96 However, it is important not to over-emphasise the weakness of the English cavalry. The fact that Henry could not raise sufficient English men-at-arms was certainly a deficiency in his army. However his recognition of this and the employment of Burgundian (and other mercenary) horse surely reflects an understanding of the nature of ‘modern’ warfare and the importance of heavy cavalry on the ‘contemporary’ battlefield.97 By the time of the 1513 campaign in France, the English were showing a clear awareness of the importance of cavalry on the contemporary battlefield. The draft by Wolsey of recommendations for the campaign in 1513 had included 1,000 “bardyd,” horsemen, each having one page and one custrell able to fight. There would also be 1,000 horsemen who were “full armyd,” each with page and custrell but not “bardyd.”98 It was further advised that any army should include 3,000 demi lances, lightly armoured of which 500 would be Irish horse.99 This distinction was important as Irish horse were considered fast, agile and excellent skirmishers. Oman suggested that “of mounted men there were at most 3,000, including not only northern light horse and ‘javelins’ but also mounted archers who were apparently always intended to act with the cavalry.”100 Although, he admitted, that it is also possible to identify as many as 1,000 ‘demilances’ accompanying the army in France.101 It is difficult to be precise on the final numbers engaged, nonetheless the accounts reveal that extensive preparations were made for the provision of horses for the army, both fighting troops and carriage. Details of the king’s ward show many of the leading captain’s retinues to have been composed of both horse and foot, with total horse for this ward numbering as many as 1,533. The Duke of Buckingham was accompanied by 201 “horsemen strangers”, the Lord Darcy had 154 English horses, Sir Henry Marney 116 and so on.102 “The Order hough the Kinges bataill shall procede,” reveals that “the Knight Marshall Sir Richard Wyngfeld,” was to be accompanied by “the Lord Capitaine of the Speres...with 40 men of armes 300 dymy lances and 200 archers on horsebak.” The left wing was also to include a captain of the spears with a retinue of 600 men.103 Thus although there is truth to Oman’s claims, one would do well not to overstate the case.104 Moreover, the battlefield performance of the cavalry during the 1513 campaign was certainly not inadequate. Encamped near Dornham on 27 August the king’s ward was approached by the French, although “the fog was so dense they could scarce see each other.”105 Henry, taking advantage of the terrain, “arranged the places for the artillery,” although no clash emerged between the infantry as the French withdrew.106 The cavalry however did engage with the

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French, “a pleasant sight, if a man’s skin had not been in hazard,” related John Taylor.107 The French were comfortably driven off by Sir Rees Ap Thomas in a clear demonstration of the value and skill of the English cavalry. Similarly Hall recounts how “among the Frenchmen were certaine light horsmen called Stradiotes with shorte styroppes, bever hatts, smal speres and swerdes like semiteries of Turkey.”108 As they attempted to harass and disrupt English supply lines around Therouanne, they found themselves repeatedly driven back by the English “Northern light horsemen under the conduite of Sir Jhon Nevell.”109 The only significant encounter in the field between French and English forces was entirely a cavalry battle in which the English were again victorious. The Battle of the Spurs was lauded throughout the reign of Henry VIII as a great encounter in which the chivalry of France was driven from the field, Katherine of Aragon claimed that “the vicorye hath been soo grete that I think none suche hath been seen before.”110 The reality was somewhat less glorious, although nevertheless insightful for our purposes. Henry had arrived with the middle-ward outside Therouanne on 4 August and set his artillery about bombarding the city. After a few days Henry “was credibly enformed that the Frenchmen entended to reskew the citie of Tyrwyn, wherefore it was agreed that,” the siege should be tightened to make sure all sides of Therouanne were blockaded.111 There had been some debate amongst the commanders, who feared that in crossing the river to complete the circle, Henry might find himself attacked by the French while he was ‘alone.’ The other wards would have been unable to come to his aid because a river would block their path. Nevertheless, on Tuesday 13 August Henry raised his camp and crossed the river. While he was in the process of this move he was informed by “Sir Jhon Nevel ... that behynde the tower of Gingate was a great plumpe of horsemen.”112 Therouanne was suffering under the English bombardment and from the gradual exhaustion of supplies. The commander of the French forces in the region, the Duke of Vendome, “thought out an elaborate demonstration by which he would so distract the besieging army in its trenches that a rapidly moving detachment might pierce the line at a weak point and throw relief into the place.”113 However, by chance the English army was ‘in the field’ as the French approached and Henry drew up his forces to face the oncoming enemy. The French plan required a body of ‘stradiots’ under Sieur de Fontrailles to ride into the city carrying gunpowder and supplies, the French infantry was to remain in camp while the cavalry made two separate demonstrations - the aim of which was to distract rather than defeat the English. However the English, made aware of their approach, had formed up, “the horsemen marched before the footmen by the space of a myle.”114 Henry, at the insistence of his captains,


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remained with the infantry while “the Almaines...embateled them selfes on the lefte hande of the kyng.”115 Henry had also “by the counsayll of the Emperor...caused certayne peces of small ordinaunce to bee layed on the toppe of a longe hyll or bank.”116 There was some skirmishing between the French and English, however the main body of the English held back, waiting to be attacked, in the knowledge that their infantry was marching up close behind. Archers were placed in the hedgerows and caused tremendous difficulties for the French cavalry. The French commander, La Palice, failed to recognise that the English infantry was approaching until the last moment and therefore gave the order to retreat too late. The English horse charged and the Gendarmes panicked, at the same moment the Stradiots, having failed to get into Theouranne crashed into the side of the French heavy cavalry.117 The gendarmes were now in disarray and they retreated quickly “pursued for 10 leagues without great loss to the English.”118 The ‘Battle of the Spurs’ may have been little more than a skirmish in reality, however it is interesting to note that the English cavalry - so derided by historians like Millar as under-developed and deficient - drove the French gendarmes from the field in considerable disorder.119 It is particularly intriguing to note Hall’s suggestion that it was only when the French began to retreat that, “up pranced the Burgonions and folowed the chace.”120 Although Hall’s account is likely to emphasise the role played by Englishmen and must therefore be treated with caution, his praise of the performance of the English cavalry is compelling. This was, he noted a “battayle of horsemen to horsemen but not in eqal nomber, for the Frenchmen wer tenne to one, whyche had not bene sene before tyme, that the Englyshe horssemen gatt the vyctorye of the men of armes of Fraunce.”121 The English unquestionably lacked heavy cavalry and taken at face value one cannot deny that this was a significant chink in the armour of the English battle army. However, this deficiency was compensated for by the engagement of mercenary (or auxiliary) heavy cavalry to supplement and support the infantry.122 Furthermore, the English were provided with some the best light cavalrymen in the world, schooled in operations in Ireland and across the Anglo-Scots borders.123 Phillips described how “In the Anglo-Welsh Marches of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, light horse was found the most effective arm for pursuing raiders in difficult terrain and for undertaking border patrols.”124 The military literature of the mid-Tudor period hints at a vibrant ‘conversation’ over military matters during the reign of Henry VIII. The information presented in these manuscripts demonstrates an awareness of contemporary tactical and technological developments in warfare and an understanding of the practicalities of translating this ‘theory’ into battlefield practice. Thus far we have sought to identify to what extent this ‘drive for

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modernity’ was reflected in, or driven by, the reality of life on campaign in Henry’s armies, in the early part of the reign: did practice precede theory? In the development of gunpowder weaponry, the adoption of the pike, military training and discipline, a drive towards modernisation and adaptation of existing techniques, systems and technologies is identifiable. This picture must, nonetheless be qualified in recognising the weakness of English provision in heavy cavalry. Whereas the English government was demonstrably taking steps to rectify deficiencies in native ‘pike and shot’, there is scant evidence of successful moves to improve native provision of heavy cavalry. This is most obviously explicable on the grounds of cost. The recruitment of foreign specialists was a cheaper, clearly definable short-term expense vindicated by the success of English cavalry operations in 1513. Notwithstanding, the English military establishment of the early Tudor period was, it seems fair to conclude, developing along broadly comparable lines to those of the combatants of the Italian wars. However, it now seems necessary to turn to other theatres of war before concluding this analysis of the relative modernity of the ‘English art of war’ in this period. Geography is History: A ‘British’ Art of War? The nature of warfare within the British Isles was heavily dictated by its geography.125 Ireland and the north of England were the only areas of the country with a land frontier; and both boast rugged, undulating country unsuited to ‘open’ warfare and large bodies of footmen. T. I. Rae noted the importance of “the physical nature,” of the Scottish borders in “indicating the routes by which both war and justice would be brought.”126 The Scots fully appreciated the implications of this landscape and “avoided giving pitched battles and preferred a wasting and protracted war, which might tire out and exhaust the resources of their invaders.”127 Recent historiography has sought to emphasise the extent to which the specific requirements of warfare in these theatres went some way towards moulding the type of soldier that the crown required and the shire levy could muster.128 Fissel has forcefully argued that “the geographic seclusion of the British Isles,” ensured that “the English came to terms with the military revolution differently from the Europeans,” but “that did not necessarily prove the inferiority of English warfare against a universal standard.”129 Likewise Phillips sustained that while “English armies were heavily influenced by experiences of warfare on the continent,” the particular character of the English army “was always governed by the constraints imposed by insular warfare.”130 His seminal study on the AngloScots Wars demonstrates beyond doubt the significance of warfare in this theatre in


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shaping the character of the armies of Henry VIII. It is essential that this thesis make some study of the influence of warfare within the British Isles on the constitution of the English military establishment. C. S. L. Davies, arguably the premier historian of the early Tudor army, concluded that Scotland was “the most important theatre of war.”131 There is much to recommend this view of the importance of campaigns with Scotland in shaping the English approach to war. Henry well understood the dangers of leaving his northern border unguarded and when he crossed the channel “for the recovery of his realme of Fraunce, he and hys counsayll forgat not the olde Prankes of the Scottes which is ever to invade England when the kynge is oute.”132 In 1496 and 1497 James IV had threatened England, compelling Henry VII to send an English army north and a long history of border confrontations existed between the two nations.133 However, given Phillips’ excellent and sympathetic work on warfare with Scotland, the impact of operations in this theatre needs little further elucidation here. As such I have chosen to focus this case study on the effectiveness of Henrician military campaigns in Ireland. English warfare in Ireland plainly demonstrated Henry’s growing commitment to firearms and artillery, as well as going some way towards explaining English adaptations of the techniques forged in the Italian wars by the armies of Europe. Furthermore, operations in Ireland are of particular significance for the wider development of the Tudor army. Unlike Scotland, where hostile action by English troops can be seen to have ended at Leith in 1560 (and then only operated in support of the rebel Lords of the Congregation), English soldiers continued to be employed in Ireland (in increasing numbers) throughout Elizabeth’s reign. Ireland: A Case Study The strategic significance of Ireland to the English was widely recognized.134 In 1534 Chapuys wrote to his master Charles V to emphasise that “Ireland is of no little importance, especially considering its vicinity to Wales, which forms the chief strength of England.”135 Indeed, the danger of external intervention in Ireland became strikingly clear in June 1521 “by reason of suche confederacies as be made betwixt Onele and other Irishe rebelles and also w(ith) the Scottes being determined to enter that land this somer vnder the conduyting of Therle of Argyle and to joyne w(ith) the said Onele and other the kinges disobservannt subgiecttes.”136 Similarly, in December 1534, at the height of the Geraldine rebellion, John Alen reported to Cromwell that the rebellious earl of Kildare “expecteth for an army this somer ought of Spayn, comforting his frindes therwith.”137 However, despite its close proximity to England, and the consequent potential of Ireland being utilized as a base for an invasion by an unfriendly power,

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it had been somewhat ignored by Henry. On his accession, Henry’s thoughts were firmly focused on winning glory on the fields of France. Scotland too, not least because of its close alliance with France, was considered a high priority by the English king and his government. Ireland was, to some extent, neglected and this was reflected in the under-funding of English military initiatives in the lordship. Henry VII’s government of Ireland had been successful largely through the employment of trusted native nobles to govern the English pale in Ireland. At the time of the accession of the Tudors, the Fitzgerald family filled the role of Crown’s deputy, a position that was broadly continued until 1533.138 This system was favoured over more direct English rule, for “the ambiguity of their position was the key to their success, for they managed Gaelic lords in accordance with native customs, but maintained their own English identities as partners of the crown.”139 However, in 1534 the summons of the ninth Earl of Kildare to the Tower, and his subsequent death in captivity, sparked the outbreak of a popular rebellion against Tudor rule in Ireland. In the context of the Reformation politics of the 1530s, what would have otherwise remained a power struggle amongst nobles was transformed into a Gaelic war of independence against the schismatic king of England. Pleas were sent to Charles V for support and Ireland was suddenly magnified into a glaring threat to the security of the English crown. It was also feared that the adoption of the religious motif as the symbol of ‘a rebellion against a heretical overlord’ might spark insurrection closer to Westminster. It is important to examine the effectiveness with which the Tudor military reacted to this sudden threat, as well as identifying how campaigns against the Irish helped shape the particular nature of English warfare. However, before embarking on a discussion of the Geraldine rebellion itself, it is necessary to mark out the military and political context into which the English army of 1534 was sent. This is perhaps best achieved by an examination of the Earl of Surrey’s incumbency as Crown’s deputy in Ireland between 1520 and 1522. It is not my aim to create a detailed military-political account of this period, but rather to identify some of the broad strategic and military themes that shaped Irish warfare throughout the sixteenth century. In 1518 a series of complaints against the Earl of Kildare prompted Henry VIII to take an increasingly personal interest in the government of Ireland. In January 1519 Kildare was summoned to London to discuss his administration, and his departure in September was followed by a fresh quarrel between the counties of Waterford and New Ross. Growing numbers of disputes and complaints against Kildare combined to highlight the limitations of English rule in Ireland, and encourage Henry in the replacement of Kildare with the Earl of Surrey.140 The English pale covered roughly one-third of Ireland, although the


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boundaries between ‘Gaelic’ and ‘English’ Ireland were far from solid. In a situation mirroring that in England, all able-bodied men between 16 and 60 were required to do service for the crown and maintain weapons appropriate to their status. Ellis noted that “the English lordship was a society organized for war and accordingly the local community took great pride in its military traditions.”141 Surrey was dispatched to Ireland in May 1520 with a small army constituting “first of the Kinges garde, 400, of the Kinges gonners 24, of Irish horsmen oon hundreth.”142 On his arrival he found a country in considerable disarray; “in Ulster and Connaught, in the counties of Waterford, Cork, Kilkenny, Limerick, Kerry, Carlow, Westmeath, and Wicklow, and Wexford, there was neither magistrate nor sheriff.”143 English troops were manifestly better trained and prepared to fight a pitched battle, as a consequence the Gaelic chiefs denied them this opportunity, withdrawing quickly into the ‘Irishry’.144 Outside the Pale, the Irish were protected by “the heavily wooded or mountainous country which…was less suitable for English troops than the coastal plains and river valleys which constituted the heart of the lordship.”145 Surrey’s tenure boasted no major sieges and certainly no set piece battles; warfare in Ireland centred on raiding, small-scale skirmishes and the burning of crops and towns. Irish troops lacked the necessary ordnance and weaponry to fight a ‘modern’ war with England. Their horseman often rode without stirrups, their infantry (kerne) had no armour and they carried bows only half the length of the English longbow, which resulted in a dramatic decline in their penetrative power.146 However, Gaelic commanders fast became adept at turning these apparent disadvantages into their greatest strengths. George Rainsford, writing in 1556, described how “the horsemen carry both their lances and their reins in their left hand, so that they can throw darts with the other ... the foot soldiers also carry darts, bows, and a heavy sword with one straight and one serrated edge...outside their country they take no prisoners, but kill everyone...they run and jump very quickly.”147 This is reflected in a ‘Memoranda for Ireland’ issued in March 1520, before Surrey’s arrival in May. This document explicitly stated that “the Deputie can neyther well defend the Englishery from invasion ne doo conveniently displeas(u)re to the enymys without galoglas and kerne.”148 The memoranda complained that the “Irishmen bee light and delyver soo that when the Englishmen shuld follow theym they shuld labo(ur) all in vayne and not prevail in pursuyng theym.”149 If the Englishmen followed the raiding Irish into the marshlands or woods “theym neyther having experience nor knowlage...they shuld not oonly retourn w(ith)out doing any good but also be in great danger and p(er)ill.”150 The memoranda pointed out that if the Deputy were to employ gallowglasses and kernes himself, he could pursue the Irish into the woodlands,

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and if any of his own troops were killed, the loss would not be so great as had they been Englishmen.151 English commanders were furthermore impressed by the robust temperament of Irish gallowglass and kerne, “for in the winter season Inglishmen ca(n)not take payne like kerne as ye may be adu(er)tised by thois which haue had thexperience of the warre ther.”152 The conditions of engagement imposed on the English, by the Irish, unsurprisingly moulded the nature of the forces deployed in the Lordship. The wooded, undulating country of the ‘Irishry’ was ill suited to the longbow or indeed to heavy cavalry. English commanders throughout the period favoured the retention of northern horse, usually javelins or mounted archers.153 Surrey was infuriated by the central control, over the type and number of soldiers sent into Ireland that often denied him his favoured light horse. On 25 September 1520, in a letter to Wolsey, Surrey complained that the 100 horsemen sent with Sir John Bulmer “bee not soo good personage as were here before and many of them right yll horsed and amonge theym all not passing 30 speris.”154 Surrey firmly stated that his request was for “northomberland speris and with sume welsh speris,” that is to say English light horse, not “bowes on horsbak.”155 Light horse, or more specifically ‘spears’, were considered much more suitable to combating the guerrilla warfare the Irish conducted against the English, and would be the preference of English commanders in Ireland throughout Henry’s reign. Surrey argued that were he given “auctoitie to take into wagis and to discharge out of wages as we shall thynk expedient we doubt not to furnysh his grace for suche wages as they now takre with moche bettir personagis better horsed and more mete for the warr herr than the bowes on horsback that bee now come.”156 However, his complaints largely fell on deaf ears and central control would continue throughout his tenure. Moreover, even English light horsemen were considered to be at a disadvantage to the agile and swift native horse. As such “the marchouris of Englishmen next adioynyng vnto the Irishmen bee enforced to reteyn … galoglas and kerne for the defence of their landes which been not hable to defend without the said galoglas and kerne.”157 Although individual Irish chiefs were incapable of raising large enough forces to challenge a sizeable English army in the field, the Irish deployed gunpowder weaponry, both hand-guns and larger pieces at every opportunity. This also forced the English into closely incorporating firearms and artillery into the composition of their forces throughout the Tudor period. England’s greater wealth and military development handed them an advantage in this department, as we shall see more clearly in 1534. Indeed, “it became an axiom in Irish warfare that the government could always make its way with artillery.”158 The low priority afforded to Ireland by the English government was perhaps


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the most crucial factor in undermining English military (and political) operations in the Lordship throughout Henry’s reign. Surrey’s army was woefully under-funded, fatally impairing its operational effectiveness. The earl was required by the king to sign an indenture “wherin I shuld bynde me to s(er)ue the Kynges grace w(ith) 50 archers and demy lannces on horsbak and w(ith) 50 fotemen all to be Inglishmen and also one hundred horsemen off this contree and 300 kerne.”159 However Surrey insisted that he “haue long tyme past aduertised his grace to be content w(ith) the forsaid nomber off Inglishmen 50 horsmen off this contry and 150 kerne. Whiche no(m)bre god knows well coste me more (with) such other charges as I dayly susteyne here them all that I haue off the Kynges grace and all the revenewes of my landes in Ingland.”160 Surrey pointed out that “my lord marquis in Spayne,” and Sir Edward Ponynges at Tournay were accompanied by 20 nobles a day “and all there men in wages.” He asked that the king provide him with some “some reasonable s(u)m,” for his own charges, put his men in wages and order the Under-Secretary to “imploye the rest.”161 These shortfalls and the lack of parity with commanders in other theatres clearly demonstrate the low strategic priority afforded to Ireland by the king and his council. This is further reinforced when one examines the issue of victualling. The Irish Sea posed a considerable challenge to sixteenth century logisticians; victuals were principally transported into Ireland through Chester, although its significance as point of embarkation was closely followed by Bristol. Stewart has argued that “the sternest test of the military logistics system was Ireland – where the English forces were totally dependent upon support from home, for food, clothing and arms.”162 Indeed, by the second half of the sixteenth century the supply of the Tudor army in Ireland ensured that “military corridors radiated from the ports,” populated by “wagon trains of ordnance and victuals, as well as columns of disgruntled men.”163 Surrey’s experiences in Ireland would certainly suggest that victualling was a central problem for English operations in the pale. The king suggested that the price of transporting victuals to Ireland should be made from the sale of the supplies to the troops. However, Surrey pointed out that the soldiers in Ireland were woefully under paid, at 4d. a day, compared to the normal footmen’s wage of 6d. a day, and “both ale and bere is so dere here that it is not possible,” to increase prices any further. Indeed, Surrey felt the situation so serious that he “see not how they (the soldiers) can be kept here,” if a solution was not found. Until this point he had paid for carriage himself, but he was no longer able to do so.164 Similarly, in a letter dated 25 August 1520, Surrey complained to the king that there was only sufficient wages for a further month, whereafter “they shuld not oonly lack victuales which wyll not be had here without redy money but also shuld cause theym to surmyse sume reasonable ground to departe into England.”165 He further

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griped that no responses had been offered to the questions posed in his last two letters.166 It seems clear from this that Ireland was, as far as Henry was concerned, a side show, and this shortfall in funds for the maintenance of the army in Ireland was to hamper the campaign throughout its duration.167 Surrey was, nevertheless, one of the more successful English deputies in Ireland.168 On his arrival, in an attempt to “do the most hurt to the Irishmen of the West, who are in league to injure the king’s subjects,” Surrey had entered and burnt the territories of Connel O’More.169 By August 1520, having earlier warned Henry of “the danger of the four shires from confederacies between O’Neil and other rebels and the Scots,” Surrey took retribution in a similar fashion on MacMahon for his aid to O’Neil in raiding the English Pale.170 However, the earl clearly felt his forces were insufficient to effectively quell all threats to the ‘Englishry’. On 30 June 1521 he wrote to Henry insisting that “Ireland will never be reduced, except by conquest, and with not less than 2,500, for the Irish can always be helped by the Irish and English Scots.”171 Furthermore “to accomplish this briefly 6,000 men would be best.”172 Surrey drew comparison with Edward I’s conquest of Wales, a task to which he devoted ten years of personal attention, in a country considerably smaller than Ireland, and without the protection (albeit limited) of the Irish Sea. Surrey maintained that the effective reduction of Ireland would require the construction of fortresses and extensive colonisation to stamp out the old Gaelic customs.173 Nevertheless the summer of 1521 again saw him successful in overcoming the raids of O’Connor, O’More and O’Carroll into the Pale; O’Conner’s castle was quickly overthrown by the deputy’s artillery.174 However, Henry’s attention was rapidly returning to the continent throughout the course of 1521. In response to Surrey’s request for sufficient troops to achieve the submission of Ireland, Henry informed his deputy that the French king and the Emperor were soon likely to go to war. In which event “the Kinges highness by vertue of the treaties heretofore made and passed betwixt hym and those forces shalbe required to geve ayde and assistence to the country invaded agenst the invado(r) ...And if before that his grace on and aboue the army’s that is now in the retyne(we) of the Kinges lieutennate there shuld also send suche a nombre of horsemen and footmen thei(r) as is required and demanded And also shulde be required to make werre ageynst Scotland....his grace shuld then be charged w(ith) three,” armies to support.175 In a clear indication of the low strategic priority afforded to Ireland, the Lordship was deemed the least important of these operations and therefore the most expendable. The English government also balked at the huge expense of operations in the pale, in light of their seeming ineffectiveness in defeating the Irish. Costs of operations in Ireland already amounted to 16 or 17,000l, and in view of the requests already being made for


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taxation, further funds could not be expected in the next three years.176 This halfhearted commitment, both financially and strategically, was the key factor in the under-performance of English armies in Ireland. Their failure to swiftly establish their superiority reflects this. Henry’s instructions for Surrey made it clear that to “maintain such a costly army only for the defence of four shires,” would be “intolerable.”177 Ireland was seen as an essentially internal rebellion, not part of the “great matters,” which now drew Henry’s attention, that is to say continental Europe. The manuscript even suggested that “a bruit might be made both in England and Ireland, that the king was preparing a great army,” in order to scare the “rebels” into submission.178 Surrey was thus tasked with achieving the reduction of Ireland with insufficient funds and an army ill-prepared for the nature of warfare in the Irish Pale. Moreover, disease was rife and “victuals are so dear, the soldiers cannot live on 4d. a day. Wheat is sold for 16s. a quarter, and malt for a mark.”179 He told one story of eighteen soldiers conspiring to steal a fishing boat to go to sea, steal a bigger ship and ‘turn rovers’.180 By autumn 1521 Surrey was requesting a return to England in fear of his health and facing an impossible task.181 Henry, who valued Surrey too highly to lose him to “the Death” in Ireland, met his request.182 Surrey’s time in Ireland serves to accentuate the fact that the lordship enjoyed a relatively lowly position in the Henry’s military and diplomatic outlook. It furthermore helps us to identify the reasons behind some of the less ‘conventional’ aspects of English armies in the 1540s.183 In military history, perhaps more than any other sub-discipline, ‘geography’ becomes crucial historical source material. The landscape of the ‘Irishy’ denied English commanders the opportunity of ‘open battle’, forcing them to fight a ‘guerrilla’ war of raid and counter-raid. This in turn informed the composition of English armies, with English commanders seeking to employ large numbers of northern horse (light cavalry, usually javelins) as well as increasingly (as we shall see in 1534) endeavouring to deploy arquebusiers. Surrey was replaced by Sir Piers Butler who proved less adept than the earl at controlling the lordship, or protecting it from Gaelic raids. Henry soon reverted to the policy of his father and re-instated Kildare as his Deputy in Ireland, a policy that was broadly continued until Kildare’s summons to London early in 1533.184 In 1534 the Geraldine rebellion prompted Henry to dispatch the largest expedition to Ireland for over a century. Kildare was summoned to London to be questioned about the conduct of his government of the Lordship. At some level this was part of wider Cromwellian attempts to reorganise the governance of the outlying regions of Tudor England and centralise control in Westminster.185 However, in the context of the Reformation crisis, and growing fears concerning the ‘over-mighty subject,’

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Kildare was considered a potential threat.186 It was claimed that he had “furnished his owne piles and forts with the king his artillerie and munition taken foorth of the castell of Dublin.”187 Kildare’s response was that he had done so only for the protection of the English pale from the Irishry and had he intended treason he would not be so foolish as to trust in the defence of medieval castle walls, no matter how well furnished with artillery. Nevertheless by May ‘manifold enormities’ were proven against Kildare, he was forbidden from returning to Ireland. His son, Lord Offaly (deputy in his absence), was summoned to London. Offaly, forewarned by his father, “issued a proclamation that all Englishmen should leave Ireland immediately on pain of death, denounced the king as a heretic and demanded an oath of allegiance to himself, the Pope and the Emperor.”188 Ellis suggested that Offaly had initially intended little more than a demonstration of defiance in order to put pressure on Henry to restore his father, Kildare. However, in the context of the Reformation politics of the early 1530s, a jumpy Henrician government construed his protestations as outright rebellion. Kildare was imprisoned in the Tower and Offaly found himself committed to full-scale rebellion.189 Henry was clearly scared lest insurrection in Ireland might spark a politico-religious rebellion closer to home.190 From a military perspective many of the themes discussed in relation to Surrey’s expedition in 1520 were echoed in the Geraldine rebellion. The revolt witnessed numerous skirmishes, raids and two important siege actions, but the rebel army “though strong in number of souldoirs,” was “yet vnfurnished of sufficient munition and artillerie, to stand and withstand the King his armie in a pitcht field, or a maine battell.”191 The scale of the rebellion did not become clear at once, and “in response to the first reports of the rising, the government apathetically continued its preparations for the dispatch of “Sir William Skeffington ... with a retinue of 150 men.”192 As a result of the leisurely pace of the English response Offaly was able to make rapid progress, and Dublin quickly found itself assaulted. The siege of Dublin is an excellent illustration of both the limitations of Irish warfare and a growing commitment to the latest military technologies by the English. Offaly besieged the city with as many as 15,000 men, employing the very artillery his father had removed from Dublin, against the castle. The rebels made an agreement with the citizens of Dublin to be allowed to besiege the castle in return for their safety. One hundred rebel troops, under the command of James Field of Luske, entered the city and began the investiture of the castle. The rebels deployed “two or three falcons,” (medium sized artillery pieces) as well as digging entrenchments to protect their own position.193 In a demonstration of the vicious nature of Irish warfare, “to withdraw the consestable from discharging the ordnance, they


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threatened to take the youth of the citie, and place them on the top of their trenches for maister conestable to shoot at, as a marke he would be loth to hit.”194 Meanwhile, ‘Silken Thomas’ (as Lord Offaly was popularly remembered) attacked the lands of Lord Butler, raiding and burning throughout the county of Kilkenny. In a further deviation from the ‘rules of warfare’ as practiced in Anglo-French conflicts, reports reached England in August that “The Lord garrad hathe shamfully slayne the Arche (added above) Byshoppe of Debelyn and his chapl(ai)nes and such s(er)uantes as waited on hym. And the same lord garrad spareth not to put to deth man woman or child which be borne in England.”195 The rebels’ threat to the children of Dublin had been ill advised, as it spurred the citizens to resistance; the rebels retreated to the city limits taking a number of the citizens’ children as prisoners. On Offaly’s return the rebels attempted to besiege the city from Ship Street but were driven off by the defenders’ artillery. The fight for Dublin saw both sides deploy handguns and artillery, to varying extents, in a reflection of how gunpowder weaponry was clearly penetrating even the ‘backward-looking’ military environment of Ireland. In a letter to Cromwell, John Alen, Master of the Rolls, explained that “the rebell ... chieflie trusteth to his ordinance,” and “except he wynneth the Castell of Dublyn he is destitute of shoote which is a gre(a)t ... aduantage for the Kinges army.”196 Moreover, the rebels’ artillery was too light to do any serious damage to the castle, or later city, walls and only one hole was made in the gate. The siege displayed the limitations of the rebellion, large numbers of the besieging ‘army’ lacked weaponry and many of the arrows fired over the city wall were ‘un-headed’ thus offering no real threat to the citizens of Dublin. The siege lasted from August until 4 October before a lack of ordnance and the impending arrival of the English army saw the rebels withdraw from the city.197 Extensive preparations were made for the English army to be sent into Ireland. In July Chapuys reported the gathering of “a number of hackbuttmen and gunners,” and the levying of a force of “1,000 or 2,000 men on the frontier of Wales.”198 The army was to be well furnished with ordnance including “a demy cannon of brasse mountyd w(ith) shod whelys, 60 shott of yron for the same, 2 Fawcons of brasse monntyd w(ith) shod whelys, 2 brass falconets and twelve score shott of yron for the sayd Fawcons and Fawconnets.”199 The army was also equipped with 40 “hagbushes of iron,” as well as plentiful supplies of serpentine powder, corn powder and saltpetre.200 The force Henry prepared for Ireland was thus well equipped in the latest military technologies. Indeed, this commitment to firearms and ‘modern’ equipment was similarly demonstrated in Henry’s search for mercenaries to serve in Ireland. In October, William Panzion reported back to Cromwell that: “I have found here many Italian

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acquaintances, men of war, several of whom might do the king service in Ireland. I could be sure of engaging 300 good harquebusmen who would pursue the Irish into their woods and bogs.”201 Chapuys similarly reported that the English had been offered the service of the Count de Hoy “and I think the King will employ him, as he wants harquebus men to send to Ireland, seeing the difficulty people make about it here.”202 However, it would seem that ultimately Henry did not employ them, and the English suffered from a lack of firearms.203 Nevertheless these documents at least demonstrate an English appreciation for their value in ‘modern warfare’. The magnitude of Skeffington’s task was not lost on his contemporaries. John Husee, in a letter to Lord Lisle, commented, “M(aster) Skevyngton goeth in to Ireland. There to be Lord Lyvetena(n)t w(ith) 1,500 men god send him good luck bettere tha(n) the moste part wold he shold haue he is skantly belovyd.”204 Skeffington recruited much of his army in Wales and the North, and throughout the summer one can identify reports of the deputy mustering his forces all over north Wales.205 Skeffington was slow in preparing his army and Cromwell was soon informed that “he lacketh many of his number and diu(er)se of his horses.”206 By 4 October John Alen was complaining that Skeffington was “as yit,” still in “Bewmares and the northern men hooses hath been on ship bo(r)de theis 12 daies which is dannger of ther destruciton.”207 It was ultimately decided that “the shippes shall go to the holy hedd to him.”208 This poor organisation allowed the rebels to become stronger than they otherwise might, had the government reacted proportionately and swiftly. The late stage of the campaigning season went some way towards dictating the size of the force Henry could send to Ireland. At the end of August, Chapuys had reported to his master, Charles V, that Henry hoped to send as many as 12,000 men under the leadership of the Duke of Suffolk or Lord Felix, governor of Wales; although no such force would ever materialise.209 Chapuys himself pointed out the massive problems of preparing provisions and transporting a large army at such short notice.210 Early in September the Earl of Ossory had written urgently to Henry requesting 500 foot and 300 horses in order to keep up the fight against the rebel until the arrival of a relief army.211 However, campaigns in Ireland offered none of the potential for glory of a campaign in France, and men “generally dislike to enlist for an expedition in which there is nothing to be gained but blows.”212 Skeffington had immense problems finding men willing to serve, either from the northern borders or Wales, with the consequence that many men were imprisoned, as an example to others.213 Even the Duke of Norfolk was reported to be aghast at the prospect of leading a campaign into Ireland, allegedly commenting that “If the king really wishes to send me to Ireland he must first construct a bridge over the


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sea for me to return freely to England whenever I like.”214 As with most Tudor military expeditions, the exact size of the force that sailed to Ireland is a matter for some debate. The main force sailed in two parts from Bristol and Chester. Ellis has suggested that the total force numbered some 2,503 men, and offers a convincing breakdown of the different contingents, as well as details of where they sailed from.215 However, I have found difficulty in matching Ellis’ references, or indeed my own investigations, to the breakdown he offers.216 In the absence of any detailed muster records, the principal point of reference in identifying the size of Skeffington’s army has to be William Brabason’s ‘Irish Army Accounts’, a fact acknowledged in Ellis’s footnotes.217 This document, although detailed, does not identify which port the different contingents sailed from, nor does it provide the breakdown suggested by Ellis. For example, Ellis referred the reader to 466 northern horsemen, “under four Cumberland gentlemen,” sailing out of Chester, with Skeffington.218 This is unclear and there seems little basis for this statement. It is possible that the four ‘Cumberland gentlemen’ to whom he refers are Edward Aglionby, Leonard Musgrave, Laurance Hamerton and Thomas Dacre.219 They are shown in the accounts to receive “conduyte money for 300 horsemen,” - I cannot see where he identifies 466 northern horse under their, or indeed anyone else’s, command. Nor can I agree with his final figure of 2,503 men, my own calculations make the figure closer to 2,680, exclusive of the support staff and un-specified numbers of Irish mercenaries referred to in the accounts.220 Furthermore, many of the printed records he refers too seem to bear little or no relation to the point being expressed in the main body of the text.221 These errors take away from an otherwise excellent analysis of Tudor military operations in Ireland. What does seem clear, from the documents and contemporary accounts available, is that Welsh and northern foot and horse, formed the main body of the relief army.222 Moreover, in a further reflection of Surrey’s campaign of 1520, ‘Spears’ or javelins were considered preferable.223 However, it would appear that there were a number of problems in arming the force effectively. In August 1535 Aylmer and Alen, members of the Irish council, reminded Cromwell that on the arrival of Skeffington, out “of 1600 men,” that made up the Chester contingent of the force, “there were not 400 of them furnished with weapons.”224 This was a reflection of the problems Skeffington had in recruitment and also of the severe under-funding of operations in the Lordship. The prompt suppression of the rebellion was repeatedly hampered by the lack of, or the poor quality of, weapons supplied to the army. In February 1535 William Poulet complained to Cromwell of a great lack of handguns, and complaints were also received about the quality of the bows.225 It is important to recognise that these criticisms reflect the level of

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importance afforded, and financial support offered, to campaigns in Ireland, as opposed to the quality of the English military technology of the period. Having raised the siege of Dublin, Offaly had moved his artillery to Howth Head, in an attempt to oppose the deputy’s landing. However, despite limited rebel success, Skeffington landed two forces at Skerries and Dublin on 17 October and landed himself on 24 October. Having declared Offaly a traitor at the High Cross at Drogheda Skeffington had “summoned the gentlemen of Uriell and Meath to come in, and very few have refused.”226 The loyalty of much of the Lordship, when faced with the physical presence of the relief army and a new deputy, played a key role in the relative ease with which the rebellion was controlled and defeated. This loyalty was engendered both out of respect for the crown and more immediately fear of the army that had now landed. A report on the situation in Ireland, in late December, insisted that if the English would come to protect them, the gentlemen of the county of Kildare would abandon the rebel.227 By December John Alen could write to Cromwell that “this traito(ur) at the most may not make aboue 100 men on horsebacke and 300 footmen wherof is not oon archer, ne 10 handgunnes he carieth no orden(a)nce with hym wherif shuld men bein feare.”228 However, the Irish continued to show sympathy to his cause lest he should be pardoned and they opened up for revenge.229 John Alen advised Henry to make clear to the people of the pale that he never intends to pardon him, “for the gentilmen of the countrie hath saide plannely to diuerse of the counsaile that vntil this be doon they dare not be ernest in resisting him in doubte he shuld haue his p(ar)don herafter as his granndefader his fader and diuerse his anncessoures haue had and then wolde p(er)secute them for the same.”230 During the winter of 1534-1535, Skeffington was afflicted by illness and the English army for the most part lay idle in Dublin and Drogheda. The young rebel meanwhile set about burning “Trym, the Nowan, Athboy, the Naas, Kildare and other incorporate townes les Inglishmen shuld garison themseleves, be lodged and vitteld in the same.”231 Kildare adopted what might be termed a scorched-earth policy, for he broke and burnt his own lands and garrisons to deny them to the English.232 Alen complained to Wolsey that if the army would only leave the city the rebels could be quickly suppressed; “I haue p(er)fite knowledge by thois which haue privay intelligence w(ith) hym he loked for non other but to be banished a monethe paste. And now by o(ur) negligente lieng in Dublin which is situate in Ireland as it were Dover in Inglande farr from the defence of thollrealm he groweth in pride and strength agayne.”233 The winter brought disorder to the English army who were afflicted by the usual problems of campaigning in Ireland disease and poor victualling. The Welsh troops in particular developed a reputation


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for disorder, robbing both “friend and foe.”234 English commanders requested a further 300 Northern and Welsh spearmen; the ‘spears’ were considered the elite of the army, so much so that without them “no notable exploit can be doon.”235 It was feared that without these reinforcements the king’s “land be destroyed by a pevishe traiterous boy which is not hable to match the third part of this arraye this day.”236 The English army was suffering not through the quality of its soldiers but through the low strategic importance afforded to Ireland by the king. Moreover, Skeffington’s leadership was weak, during the period of his illness he refused to allow others to act lest they should gain credit in the king’s eyes. The result was to give the rebel almost free rein when he would otherwise have been swiftly crushed. Chapuys reported to his master that “It seems as if the king wishes to destroy Ireland, as he does not make provision of men, and sends such a governor who is the most incompetent for such a charge that could be chosen.”237 Alen “wold god yo(ur) Mastership [Cromwell] knewe howe negligently and how faintelie this matter is handeld it maketh the hartes of vs po(or) Inglishmen blede within.”238 He suggested that a marshal be appointed, as Skeffington was old and sick and unable to provide the leadership required of him.239 Skeffington lay sick for twelve weeks, during which the time the king grew increasingly impatient that the army lay uselessly in Dublin spending his money. However, by March the deputy had sufficiently recovered to write to the king excusing his inaction on account of illness and promising to act swiftly against the ‘traitor’.240 When English troops engaged the rebels they overcame them with relative ease. The young Earl of Kildare (his father had died in the tower in September 1534) had “warded the castel of Mainooth so stronglie, as he tooke it to be impregnable.”241 However, following Skeffington’s temporary recovery, the English swiftly overran it after only a ten-day siege.242 Maynooth was defended by extensive artillery and as many as sixty gunners, “as the like hath not been seen in Ireland.”243 On 16 March the deputy attacked “the northside of the base co(ur)te of the said castell at the northeast side wherof ther was new made a very stronge and fast bulwark well garnisshed w(ith) men and orden(a)nce.”244 The battery was sustained “nyght and day,” until the 22 March. Then between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. on 23 March the base court was assaulted and over-run. The castle’s commander, Christopher Paris, concluded that he could not win and sought his own private terms with Skeffington. Paris “shot a letter indorsed to the lord deputie, the effect whereof was, that he would deuise means the castle should be taken, so that he might haue some money for his paines, and a competent staie during his life.”245 Paris allowed the garrison to drink “so much, as they snorted all night like grunting hogs,” and then gave a signal to the English army who were ready with scaling

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ladders. The resistance was minimal and the deputy entered the castle the following afternoon.246 The massacre of the garrison and its commander which followed, in spite of Skeffington’s promises to spare the defenders, was widely condemned, but was, nevertheless, indicative of the cruel nature of warfare in Ireland. The deputy concluded that they must “be putte to execution for the dread and example of others.”247 In the wake of the massacre Kildare withdrew into the Irishry, launching a sequence of attacks on the English pale, whilst the English again fell into inaction. Kildare’s support was dwindling but he continued to raid the countryside, by 21 August Aylmer and Alen reported that “in the countie of Kildare there been 8 hundredis or baronies and 6 of them were in effecte brent few or no inhabitang ther.”248 Moreover, they claimed that this was allowed “withoute any effectuall prouision made for the resistance therof but oonlie what was doon by M(aster) thesourer.”249 The complaints arriving in London made it clear that the rebellion was prolonged, not by the skill of the rebels or any great support for them, but by the inactivity and weak leadership of the deputy.250 It was claimed that “our Deputie is as evell and wors(e) in his helthe....if he rise before 10 or a 11 of the clocke he is almost deade.”251 Moreover, the army was highly ill-disciplined, on 27 July 1535 Cromwell was informed that “the remisances and slouth of the gou(e)nor and Capitaines tharmy and shamefull misoder of the soldeo(r)s toward thinhabitantes of the countrie was and is thoccasion of the losse of the Kinges lande.”252 Corruption was rife and Henry required monthly musters to be conducted before permitting payment of his army to avoid any irregularities.253 Nonetheless, this directive was largely ignored and reports reached London of the falsifying of numbers by captains for their own financial benefit and the “robbing and ryffling of our subiectes.”254 English efforts were also hampered by the growing mistrust of the native Irish in English pay. In March 1535 Thomas FitzSymon, in a letter to Cromwell, commented that the English had not been well defended since they took Irish soldiers into pay for their defence. He suggested that the Pale would be better served by a further hundred “northyn speris.”255 The questionable loyalties of the Irish soldiers in English pay were exemplified in the capture and release of Kildare by Irish troops during a skirmish in early August 1535. Aylmer and Alen lamented to Cromwell that “if o(ur) owne Inglishmen,” had been to hand “the traitour and all his cumpany had been taken or killed.”256 English operations in the summer of 1535 were further hampered by the atrocious weather and heavy rains made the passage of carts and carriage highly difficult.257 However, with the end of the summer fast approaching the deputy had made ready to go into O’Connor’s country. But again, with his health failing him,


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Skeffington never departed Dublin, and the army sat in the field, spending their victuals.258 It seems clear that the swift suppression of this rebellion was undermined, not by the quality of the English soldiers, but by the weakness of Skeffington’s command. Moreover, the lack of support from Westminster was further underlined as Alen and Aylmer lamented to Cromwell that ‘the army cries out for money’ and requested the replacement of 100 Welsh foot with 100 horse, which would be more suitable to tracking down the fast moving rebels in the lordship.259 Nevertheless, Kildare’s rebellion lost support daily and the arrival Lord Leonard Grey, as marshal of the army, on 28 July had signaled the beginning of the end for the rebellion. Kildare “had a stronghold in a boggy wood near Rathagan, fortified with earthworks and wet ditches, and almost impregnable had it been well manned and armed.”260 However it was not well manned, and was quickly overcome. On 24 August, Kildare finding himself in an increasingly impossible situation offered to surrender on terms, in the belief that his life would be spared.261 It seems clear that only the ineffectiveness of the English command and the severe under-funding of operations in Ireland allowed Kildare’s rebellion any longevity. This was further demonstrated in the rapid dismissal of the army after Kildare’s surrender. Cromwell decided on creating a standing garrison and the army was reduced to 700 men. By June 1536 complaints were again reaching London that “the 7,000l. the king sends is not sufficient for the payment of the arrears of the army, three months of which will remain unpaid. Unless more is sent everything will be at a stay.”262 This, in effect, ended operations for that year. In September 1537 four commissioners initiated a further reduction of the garrison to 340 men, making the effective control of the Pale unrealistic and fatally undermining the validity of Cromwell’s garrison policy.263 English operations in Ireland were hampered by the low priority afforded to them and the concurrent under-funding of operations. By 1537 fears of reprisals from Catholic Europe against Henry had again drawn English attention away from Ireland, as the king looked to the defence of the English south and east coasts. Nevertheless English campaigns in Ireland certainly help to explain some of the ‘peculiarities’ of English armies of the 1540s; not least a preference for the light cavalryman who were tasked with combating the fast moving Gaelic raids. The English similarly demonstrated a growing appreciation for the value of smallfirearms in operations against the Irish. In November 1535, four months after the capture of Kildare, Chapuys was reporting the despatch of four or five hundred hackbutiers to the lordship.264 The longbow had shown itself ineffective in the heavily wooded ‘Irishry’, and the quality of bows available was also questioned.265 Therefore, to some extent, resort was made to small firearms during the

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campaign.266 Moreover “the 1534-35 campaign witnessed much the largest deployment of artillery in Ireland since its first introduction half a century earlier.”267 The suppression of rebellion in Ireland had a crucial role to play in the continuing transition, modernisation and shaping of the English military establishment.268 Furthermore, many of the same challenges described in English operations in Ireland in the early 1520s and during the Geraldine rebellion, were faced by Elizabethan soldiers later in the century. Despite increasingly modern armaments the Irish retained a tactical system based on ‘irregular warfare’, characterised by hit and run tactics and the avoidance of battle with the English. Thus in 1599 Essex suffered the embarrassment of leading a substantial English force on what amounted to a wild goose chase as the Irish declined open battle. The Irish, increasingly arming themselves with ‘modern’ firearms, most especially the musket and caliver, continued to enjoy success against Elizabethan soldiers, until Spanish intervention, in the form of 3,500 troops, prompted them to risk battle with the English at Kinsale in September 1601. The decisive defeat that ensued, delivered not least by the English cavalry, revealed “the risk of seeking to transform,” a successful guerrilla army, “into the standard Western European pattern and, specifically, of requiring them to maintain the tactical defensive.”269 In addition, and crucially from the perspective of a study of the ‘English art of war’, it “vindicated English arms at a time when guerrilla warfare had instilled self-doubt from within the ranks to the very highest level of government.”270 Section A: Summary The early Tudor army remained primarily a force of ‘bow and bill’ and suffered under a shortage of heavy cavalry, pike and harquebusiers. However, although each of these criticisms and conclusions is accurate, to take them at face value is to misrepresent the Henrician military establishment. The continued success of the longbow and bill on the battlefield, notably at Flodden, went some way towards informing the English retention of these venerable old weapons. Moreover, the English were demonstrably committed to the modernisation of their ‘armed forces’ and this was achieved through the gradual integration of existing formations with new technologies and tactics. Where specific weaknesses existed, such as in the mounted arm, efforts were made to recruit foreign specialists to supplement the English army. The information presented in the mid-century military literature and the evidence from Henry’s French campaigns between 1513 and 1523 would seem to argue strongly that English military theory, and practice, was broadly in-line and


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up-to-date with the latest continental developments. Although, as indicated in the manuscript evidence, the English adapted these techniques to suit their particular requirements and limitations; combining ‘pike and shot’ with ‘bow and bill’. Far from stagnation and under-development, the period witnessed evolution along, if not parallel, and then certainly similar lines to those were being forged in the Italian Wars. English military theorists and commanders were clearly aware of contemporary European trends in warfare, and the evidence thus far presented would seem to suggest that practice preceded theory. Indeed, Henry VII had shown a keen interest in the manufacture of gunpowder weaponry and had himself employed mercenary pike at Bosworth. It is therefore not surprising to find the young Henry VIII eager to pursue the purchase and production of firearms, and so willing to hire mercenary pike in 1512 to support Dorset’s expedition and again to support the ‘army royal’ 1513. As is so often the case, continuity and evolution are more readily evident than revolutionary change. Throughout the early years of Henry’s reign one discerns a distinct commitment to the expansion of the English arms manufacturing industry, and the effective utilisation of considerable artillery trains on campaign in France in 1513 and 1523. This process of ‘integration’ was also clearly in evidence in English operations in Ireland, as firearms and artillery continued to be adapted to the peculiar character of warfare in and around the Pale. It was speeded by the geography of the region, an often heavily wooded, boggy and undulating landscape, and Irish guerrilla tactics that saw them make use of fast agile horses to withdraw quickly. These factors left heavy cavalry redundant and limited the effectiveness of English longbow-men. This perhaps goes some way towards informing the English preference for, and preponderance in, light cavalry.271 Alongside this burgeoning commitment, to the employment of ‘modern technologies’, and their integration into existing tactical systems, went a growing awareness of the need for training (in light of the increasing complexity of the battlefield). Some form of ‘training’ in the art of war had long formed an element of the education of the nobility. It is evident that the sixteenth century aristocracy, the commanders of the king’s armies, continued to look back to antiquarian precedent, but were also, by the mid-century at the latest, starting to refer to contemporary ‘manuals’. The mid-century military literature discussed in this thesis described how troops had to be ‘trained’ to recognise battlefield commands and basic tactical manouvres. The extent of this training is hard to discern, in all likelihood it was a one-off induction and even this may have varied from captain to captain. Nonetheless, this was clearly an important issue amongst England’s leading soldiers and few military professionals. An evolutionary model of military development is hinted at in the discussion of martial discipline presented by the

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mid-century theorists. Their work rested heavily on ordinances and proclamations issued at the start of campaigns stretching back as far as the reign of Richard the Lionheart and one finds strong echoes of their remarks in the tracts of Elizabethan and early Stuart military authors. The English were demonstrably aware of the importance of discipline, and there is evidence that the early Tudor army was every bit as ‘disciplined’ as its continental contemporaries. Although there are abundant examples of what to our ‘modern understanding’ appears gross indiscipline, one needs to consider these incidents in the context of the day. The Tudor army, and the wider society from which the men of the retinues and militia were drawn, operated on a system of reciprocal loyalty and discipline. None of this is to deny that “had Francis I truly devoted himself to the conquest of the Calais Pale he would have achieved his goal.”272 In fact, the English “were lucky not to meet the full force of the French armies.”273 However English foreign policy clearly recognised that England was neither as powerful as her Valois or Habsburg ‘neighbours’ and always sought to avoid war without the support of one or other of these European ‘super-powers’. From the perspective of this thesis, it is important to recognise that the difference was more one of quantity than of quality (augmented by the greater financial clout that allowed Francis I and Charles V to hire greater numbers of mercenaries).

Chapter 5 Levying the army Julius Ruff noted that “In 1500...nowhere (across Europe) did the state monopolize the instruments of violence.”1 Outwardly England was no exception, lacking professional soldiers and reliant on a civilian militia and the military potential of its landed aristocracy for the bulk of its fighting forces. The apparently ad hoc systems and procedures for raising an English army, not only during the sixteenth century but throughout the early modern period, have come under heavy historical criticism.2 Anne Curry reasoned that one might have expected the English to establish a standing army in the early fifteenth century. The Lancastrian occupation of Normandy, she argued, afforded ostensibly ideal conditions for such a development and “the failure to establish a professional and bureaucratically controlled army, at a time which afforded a good opportunity to do so, illustrates the final victory of patronage.”3 Moving forward to the reign of Elizabeth I, whilst “the germ of a permanent organization,” was to be seen in the establishment of a reserve of officers and men in Ireland, “the greatest shortcoming of Elizabethan policy was the failure to provide a permanent paid army.”4

A Standing Army? There were some examples of proposals for the maintenance of a standing force in England during the reign of Henry VIII, and it seems unlikely that a king with such a demonstrable passion for warfare would not have considered the possibility. In 1518, an anonymous author advised Henry that, although they were “w(ith)out any likelyhod of warre...proudence and good policie it apptenyieth in tyme of peace to forsee the remedies agannst the danngers of warre.”5 The manuscript then went on to advise Henry “to provide a good substanciall and compent nombre of Captaynes and hable men of o(ur) subgecttes to bee in arredines to s(er)ue us at oure pleas(ure) when the case shal require.”6 A further proposal for a standing army seems to have been forwarded to Cromwell’s office by one Thomas Gybson around 1536-7. The document advocated the maintenance of ‘fotemen’ at 6d. a day and horsemen at 9d. “ev(er)y day as well yn the tyme of peace as of warr.”7 It then went on to suggest further administrative

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and organizational details.8 However, no such scheme was ever instigated and there is no evidence to suggest it was ever seriously considered. An anonymous paper amongst the Lansdowne manuscripts argued that there could be nothing “more pernitious or perilous,” than a standing army “for even as there can be no following or agreement betwene light and darkness, even so likewise can there be no consenting nor union betweene peace and warre.”9 Nevertheless it seems more feasible that the chief obstacle was the massive financial obligation inherent in the establishment of a standing force. A ‘standing army’ of sorts was instituted, under the auspices of the Duke of Northumberland, in February 1550.10 Even after the suppression of Ket and the western rebellion in 1549, the country remained gripped by disorder and unrest, and outwardly it was for the purpose of “the staie of the unquiet subjectes,” (as well as “other services in all events,”) that an English gendarmerie was established.11 The body consisted of 850 cavalrymen divided between 12 ‘trained bands’, 10 of the 12 bands commanded by a Privy Council member.12 However, Hoak has pointed out that in fact Edward got little service from his ‘army’; “musters were supposed to have been held every three months, and though two are recorded…nothing testifies to the use of the gendarmes in the manner ostensibly prescribed by the order of February 1551 namely, for the suppression of rioting and so on in the counties.”13 Rather, he argued, the body was created, as much, if not more as a political tool through which Northumberland could control the Privy Council, handing out the captaincy of a band to members of the council who then “formed a natural entourage,” for the duke.14 It therefore seems that this body was of relatively little military significance, and was in fact disbanded in the autumn of 1552 as part of a wider economy drive.15 At no time during Henry VIII’s reign was there a realistic prospect of the establishment of such a ‘standing army’ in the modern understanding of the term. One of the key thrusts of Gilbert John Millar’s attacks on the quality of the Tudor military has been the absence of such a force, leading him to cast the English soldiery in the role of the ‘talented amateur’. He maintained that “between 1485 and 1558...the conclusion that English armies were inferior to their counterparts on the continent could hardly be escaped.”16 Similarly Jeremy Goring argued that “England’s military weakness in the mid-Tudor period,” was a direct result of “the inefficiency and complexity of her military organisation.”17 These twin accusations of amateurism and inefficiency are at once accurate and misleading, and, as such require, further consideration. Before moving further, it is crucial to recognise that there is a danger of anachronism in this whole concept of the standing army. Hale notes that “tedious though the term ‘permanent establishments’ may be, it is preferable to ‘standing

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armies’ with its associations of barracks, training programmes, career structure, regularly topped-up quotas and regimental uniforms and traditions,” which were to be the products of a later age.18 The notion of early modern military professionalism is the central theme in D. J. B Trim’s recent volume, The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism.19 Trim’s excellent introduction to the edition seeks to tackle this notion of ‘military professionalism’, pointing out that “when discussing the chivalric ethos and military professionalism, scholars are very often using the same words but conducting very different discourses.”20 It seems vitally important to establish at the start of this section what this thesis will understand as ‘military professionalism’ in the context of the early sixteenth century.21 Perhaps a more useful concept for the sixteenth century than the ‘standing army,’ or indeed the ‘military professional’, is the idea of “institutional memory,” proposed by J. S. Nolan in his article on ‘The Militarization of the Elizabethan State.’22 Nolan discussed the Elizabethan expeditionary forces in the Netherlands and Ireland at the end of the century. He noted that there was rarely less than 6,000 English soldiers serving in the Netherlands between 1585 and 1603 and the English presence can be traced back as far as 1577. This level and consistency of deployment, he concluded, was enough “for a unit to develop the institutional memory and experience to justify calling it a permanent organization.”23 Moreover, “in a similar manner, the garrison of Ireland qualifies as a force with a long institutional memory.”24 Likewise M. Fissel has convincingly argued that “England had a standing army. From the 1580s to the Thirty Years War (1618-48), English companies served abroad continuously…The Netherlands garrisons and Irish military establishment were reservoirs of military talent that might be deployed wherever English strategic interests were threatened.”25 Thus, although Henry VIII’s England lacked a formal ‘standing army’ in the modern sense of the term, continuity between campaigns was to be provided by a ‘permanent establishment’ of sorts. One might argue that the administrators and gunners, garrison troops and the king’s bodyguard, all helped create some form of ‘institutional memory’26 This section will explore the permanence and professionalism of Henry VIII’s armies and wider military establishment and the concept of ‘institutional memory’. Particular attention will be paid to the role played by Henry’s gunners and the systems and procedures for levying the army. Other ‘permanent’ bodies, such as the ‘Spears’, ‘Gentlemen Pensioners’ and ‘Garrison troops’, the ‘administrators’, will be considered more briefly as excellent surveys have already been completed by Anita Hewardine, David Grummitt and C. S. L. Davies respectively.27

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Mercenaries and Auxiliaries28 Mercenaries played a central role in the English army during the early Tudor period.29 Whilst the information presented thus far demonstrates quite clearly that Henry VIII was firmly committed to the modernisation of his armed forces, it seems equally evident that in order to achieve this goal he relied heavily on the recruitment of foreign specialists.30 The first fifteen years of his reign was littered with examples of the recruitment of European ‘gunfounders’ and armourers to supplement and expand the English arms industry.31 Similarly the payment of European pike-men is identifiable from as early as 1512.32 Whilst the 1513 campaign in France was certainly heavily dependent on mercenary pike, with estimates ranging anywhere from 5,000 to 8,000 Almayn pike-men.33 The campaign was similarly contingent on the recruitment of “horseman strangers,” – that is to say Burgundian heavy cavalry.34 The army “was equipped with the best artillery that money could buy and handled by the best gunners that Henry could engage from the Low Countries.”35 Turning to the campaigns of the 1520s, much the same picture has been found, as many as 2,000 pike and 700 firearms troops can be shown to have served as either mercenaries or auxiliaries with Surrey’s army in Picardy in 1522.36 The 1523 campaign was heavily assisted by the Dutch and Italian gunners and the Emperor’s “Flanders horsemen.”37 Indeed, “companies of handgunners and of demi-lances were raised by Flemish and Italian captains.”38 This policy, of compensating for native deficiencies with foreign specialists, was to continue throughout the reign. Plans for the 1544 campaign in France suggested that as many as 4,000 mercenary horse and 8,000 Almayn pike should be raised for the expedition. In the event, the English army was composed of 33,000 Englishmen, supported by “4,000 auxiliaries from the Emperor led by Maximilian d’Egmont, Count of Buren,” whilst “4,000 mercenary foot were to be provided by Christoff von Landenburg and extra cavalry drawn from a number of lesser captains.”39 The 1540s saw English agents engage, with increasing commitment, in the German mercenary market as a direct result of her wars with Scotland and France.40 This has led Millar to conclude that “the employment of such specialists attests to the obvious deficiencies of Henry’s own national forces.”41 Similarly, Oman complained that “the armament of these strangers indicates the deficiencies in Henry’s own national army.”42 To some extent this was surely the case; in May 1557 Giovanni Michele commented that “the country cannot have any considerable quantity of heavy horse.”43 Similarly, an examination of the muster records for the last eight years of Henry’s reign is problematical to a thesis arguing for the relative modernity English forces. The returns are overwhelmingly filled

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with ‘bill and bow,’ and there is very little evidence of the ownership of firearms.44 Fresh musters in 1542, the levying of the army for Flanders in 1543 and the 1544 levies reinforce this picture.45 However, Millar’s conclusions seem naïve and introspective, based, as they are, on a quantitative assessment, rather than qualitative analysis of the role of mercenaries in English armies.46 Rather it seems clear that the employment of the mercenary reflected a clear understanding of the latest developments in European warfare, and a commitment to incorporate these new arms into the English tactical system, where appropriate.47 Massed pike-squares of hundreds (or thousands) of men and large bodies of heavy cavalry were central to the set-piece battle of the period. When English armies ventured onto the continent, Henry sought to employ specialist mercenaries to compensate for English deficiencies in this area. This was in every sense an intelligent and cost-effective solution to England’s strategic predicament, allowing English armies in France in 1513, 1522 and 1523 to operate effectively on a ‘modern’ premise.48 Grummitt suggests that “it may be the crown favoured recruitment of foreign mercenaries as it lessened the burden on local communities in England, particularly at a time of generally high taxation…and economic hardship.”49 Moreover, one must be wary not to overplay the extent to which such deficiencies, and the employment of mercenaries in response, was purely an English phenomenon.50 Potter has demonstrated how the French relied on the recruitment of mercenaries for their “crack troops,” – “theorists deplored this, but the facts of military life dictated it; the mercenaries were the professionals and it was this…that dictated their employment.”51 For example, the French had a long history of employing Scottish light horse (considered amongst the best in Europe) to supplement their gens d’armes.52 In short “despite the many theoretical objections on the grounds of loyalty and patriotism to the hiring of mercenaries, all nations did it...as war became more and more mechanized.”53 Perhaps the two most famous sources of mercenary soldiers were the Swiss and the German ‘Landsknechts’.54 During the course of the sixteenth century, Swiss failure to adapt their techniques to account for the emergence of shot saw them superseded to some extent by the Landsknechts (although this should not be overplayed). The Landsknechts similarly made their reputation in the deployment of pike formations, but were quick to diversify to include lances, artillery and smaller shot. They were “compted among all nations the flower of the worlde for good order of footemen. And all nacions have learned from them.”55 Both the Swiss and Landsknechts were employed extensively throughout the sixteenth century by the armies of Europe. In 1513 France was making extensive use of mercenary soldiers. On 26 May the Venetian ambassador to Paris, Marco Dandolo, reported both the

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arrival of the English ‘expeditionary force’ and French preparations of a response force, noting that “10,000 Swiss are already come.”56 By mid September, Ambassador Foscari in Rome was reporting the arrival of 14,000 Swiss “and also the Duke of Gueldres with 10,000 Landsknechts.”57 The accuracy of these figures are called into question as the document goes on to report the defeat of the English at the hands of the Scots and the withdrawal of the army from Scotland. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate that the French army was extensively based on the employment of mercenary soldiers.58 Indeed, Oman insisted that the Swiss formed the core of the French infantry.59 In the summer of 1558, the French royal army in Picardy included 6,000 Swiss and 16,000 German soldiers, out of a total of 37,360 infantrymen.60 The employment of the mercenary was accepted and necessary military practice across Europe. Henry’s problem was not one of a failure to understand the latest developments in modern warfare or indeed of any peculiarly English inability to apply them. The issue was one of quantity, not quality. The sixteenth century witnessed the rapid expansion in the size of armies and, as Phillips observed, “then as now, God favoured the big battalions.”61 Furthermore, the success and widespread employment of mercenary troops informed contemporary English feeling that “it seems...by no means profitable to the common weal to keep for the emergency of war a vast multitude of such people as trouble and disturb the peace.”62 It thus seems appropriate now to move away from the employment of foreign professionals and begin to explore further England’s native soldiers and ‘permanent establishment.’ Native Troops: The Quasi-Feudal host and the civilian Militia: ‘A Nation in Arms’ The purpose here is not to narrate the development of the English levying system at any great length but rather to consider it in the context of the overall modernisation of the English military establishment and this concept of the ‘permanent establishment’.63 On Henry VIII’s accession to the throne, the Tudor army was still organized along essentially medieval lines. Two systems of military recruitment were in operation; one a national ‘militia’ charged primarily with home defence, while the other, based on the indentured retinues of England’s aristocratic and landowning elite, has been labeled quasi-feudal. Cruickshank, amongst others, has been heavily critical of the early Tudor system, noting that while the seeds of the ‘professional army’ had been sown across Europe, England remained “the odd man out.”64 “Elizabeth,” he argued, “inherited from her predecessors little more that the withered remnant of a medieval military organization, which had to serve

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her in wars that were already becoming modern.”65 In this view Mary I, in the 1558 militia act, went some way towards the modernisation of the nations’ militia, in demanding that the weapons the nation brought to muster should include pikes and hackbutts.66 However, it was only with the formal establishment of the trained bands in 1572 (in many senses a reaction to the rebellion of 1569) and later the formalisation of the role of the lieutenancy that something approaching a ‘modern’ system was established.67 It is certainly true to say that “until the onset of open war with Spain in 1585 Lieutenants were appointed only when they were needed and for a limited period…(thereafter)…it became usual…for every shire to have its Lieutenant, responsible for supervising the musters of the militia.”68 The Lieutenant would also retain responsibility for the levying of men for service abroad, the maintenance of county armouries, and the encouragement of archery and horse breeding.69 However, at least in the case of the lieutenancy, “the difference was more apparent than real.”70 It is crucial to recognise that “in any given county there was not a great deal of choice,” and it is thus “more accurate to see the lord lieutenancy as a formalisation of existing regional powers and responsibilities of the nobility.”71 Moreover, whilst nothing truly akin to the ‘trained bands’ of the Elizabethan age existed in the reign of Henry VIII, the system was, perhaps, not as archaic and inefficient as it may at first glance seem. The militia system was still grounded in the Statute of Winchester (1285), which was in itself “for the most part a mere revision of the 1242 and 1253 writ of arms, and was manifestly concerned with police duties, not war.”72 The Winchester provisions required all men with lands to the value of £10 or goods to the value of 20 marks to possess a complete set of armour.73 Those with land worth 40 marks or goods worth £15 were, in addition, to keep a horse. The age of military service was set between 16 and 60, and all men falling within this bracket were expected to practice regularly with the bow and keep themselves ready to fulfill their ‘obligations.’74 In acknowledgment of England’s ‘strategic predicament’ (threatened to the south by France and the north by their Scottish allies), the militia system operated on the basis of a ‘geographical divide’. Threats from France were accepted as being the responsibility of those counties south of the River Trent (and it was from these counties that Henry raised the main body of his ‘Army Royal’ in 1513). Meanwhile, the defence of his northern border against the Scots was left to the ‘northern counties’. Thus in 1513, when charged with defence against a feared Scottish invasion, the Earl of Surrey retained authority to “reise the powers of the contrey of Chester, Lancaster, Duresme, Northumberlande, Westmerlande, and Comberlande, besyde other aydes to be poyncted by the quene.”75 However, an interesting exception was observed by Marrilac (the French

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ambassador to London), commenting on English preparations against a feared invasion in 1539, Marrilac noted that “the citizens of London...are exempt (from the general levy) being reserved for the defence of their own town.”76 Henry’s commitment to the militia system became clear early in his reign.77 On 5 July 1511 he issued a proclamation enforcing the observation of the Winchester provisions. The proclamation began by complaining that “the Statute of Winchester and other statutes which hereafter ensueth, have not been duly executed as appertaineth.”78 It went on to command “all and every of his subjects for their havior, degree, and authority to put as well the said Statute of Winchester as all the other behooveful laws and statutes hereafter following.”79 Henry’s desire to revitalize the militia system had been sign-posted two days earlier, when he had issued a proclamation radically altering the military obligations of private individuals. On 3 July Henry had proclaimed that ‘indentured captains’ may “prepare no man for the war but only such as be his own servants or inhabited within his office or rooms, according to the said letters.”80 Before this date, members of the gentry and nobility had no such restrictions on their sources of recruitment; thus dealing the indenture system a heavy blow.”81 Nevertheless, throughout the period, the government would repeatedly turn to the retinues of private individuals as they sought to mount a series of expensive foreign campaigns. On his accession the young king sought to continue Henry VII’s policy of ‘flexible control’ over livery and maintenance.82 Prosecution of peers for the infringement of the laws on retaining ensured that, even during the Pilgrimage of Grace, noblemen felt it wise to write to the king, before levying troops in defence of his crown.83 All the same, in a pattern that was to continue throughout the reign, Henry’s first major overseas war, an Anglo-Spanish expedition to capture Guyenne in Southern France in 1512, was mounted exclusively on the quasi-feudal system.84 The force, of roughly 7,000 men, was placed under the command of Lord Thomas Grey, marquis of Dorset. Sir Maurice Berkely was appointed Marshal and was accompanied by a retinue of 200 men, Sir Henry Willoughby, captain of the ordnance, with 324 men and Sir William Sandes, treasurer of war, with 110 men.85 Interestingly, a number of leading nobles were “granted to send (men) to serve the kings grace by land,” - that is to say that although not personally required to attend on the army, they were required to send soldiers. Amongst those to send men in this manner were the Duke of Buckingham and the Earl of Shrewsbury; 1,410 soldiers were raised in this way.86 Similarly, an army based on the indentured retinues of England’s nobility conducted Henry’s 1513 invasion of northern France in support of the “Holy League.”87 As in 1512, many of those not giving personal attendance on the king (through illness, age or otherwise) contributed soldiers to the Army Royal.88 Vergil

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claimed Henry had “ordered military levies to be raised throughout the kingdom to the number of 40,000 men.”89 In February 1513 Henry had sent out letters missive to the gentry and nobility demanding attendance with a specified number of men. The letters stated Henry’s intent “God willyng by the aide and assistence of such o(ur) confederates and alies as shal ioyne w(ith) vs in that good quarell,” to invade France.90 Before relating how “for oure better assitence in that behalf we have appointed you [in this case Lord Fitzwater] amonge others to passe over w(ith) vs.... w(ith) the nombre of a hundred hable men mete for the warres.”91 In an indication of the forethought and careful planning that went into the construction of the army, Lord Fitzwater was informed that he was to provide 50 archers and 50 billes on foot “sufficiently harnessed.”92 This seems to verify that as early as 1513 Henry was aware of the need for a structured levy, not a random muster. Further instructions were issued in April, echoing the sentiment of the first letter, as well as urging the recipients to “put your selfe in spedy redynes.”93 Lord Hastynges, having been required to provide one hundred men (60 archers and 40 billes), was informed that “we have named you amonge others to passe ou(er) in o(ur) forewarde vnder the ledyng of o(ur) trusty and right beloved cousyn therle of Shrewsbury steward of our household.”94 It is also interesting to observe the utilisation of stewardships on Crown estates in order to promote Henry’s most trusted attendants to the command of larger retinues than they would have been capable of mustering from their own estates. One might note the example of Charles Brandon, Viscount Lisle, who commanded one of the “largest contingents in the invasion of France in 1513, despite possessing only modest estates compared with other peers.”95 These were clearly the careful, methodical preparations of an efficient and experienced military establishment; however, overwhelmingly, the troops provided for the army were billmen. Vergil suggested that “these he summoned to London and himself took great pains to review, so that no one at all should be found in the army who might be considered unsuited for the rigour of a campaign.”96 It is doubtful, if not fantastic, to claim that Henry personally inspected his troops in order to weed out any soldiers unsuitable for the task - it is even highly doubtful that the army ever came to London. However Vergil’s ‘story’ does serve to emphasise that this was perceived as a carefully prepared force. One foreign observer even claimed that “choicer troops in more perfect order had not been seen for many years.”97 There is some dispute over the exact size of Henry’s army in 1513, this is worth briefly considering here, bearing in mind the inherent inaccuracy of sixteenth century muster lists. Henry “appoynted the valiaunt Lord George Talbot erle of Shrewesbury, and his Steward of his household to be capitain generall of

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his forward.”98 The “vanguard retinue,” was comprised of 11,728 fighting troops alongside a further 1,079 under the command of the master of the ordnance, Sir Sampson Norton - a total of 12,807.99 The largest retinue was that of Shrewsbury himself, totaling 4,335 men, Sir Rees Ap Thomas commanded 2,993 “fotemen souldiours marispykes and bylles,” while the Earl of Derby captained 511 men. Most of the remainder was made up of smaller companies of 100 men or less.100 The rearward was given to “the Lorde Herbert called Sir Charles Somerset, chief Chamberlayn to the kyng.”101 It totaled 7,545 men including 500 “Alymayns footemen,” and 1,000 “horsemen stranges,” - probably ‘Burgundian horse’ (i.e. heavy cavalry). Henry himself would command the middleward, which Cruickshank has numbered at 16,000 men.102 The manuscript evidence is inconclusive, a document amongst the exchequer accounts numbered the ward at 14,032 men, whilst another amongst the Cotton collection at the British library identified some 12,336 men.103 It would appear that the differences are born of the inclusion and calculation of numbers of ‘support’ and ‘household staff.’ The Cotton document simply designated fighting troops, whilst the figure proposed by Cruickshank and the Exchequer manuscript include, what one might term, support staff (such as fletchers, butchers, bowyers and so on). It seems fair to suggest that the total force numbered somewhere in the region of 32,688 men, a considerable host.104 The militia system proved itself similarly successful in answering Henry’s call to arms in defence of England in 1513. On 28 January a government writ claimed that the French had prepared an army and navy to invade England, “intending to burn, slay, and destroy all that they may overcome.”105 The document went on to call out the shires to the defence of the realm. In the event of a French attack Henry “hath deputed,” captains in the shires “by the seacoast,” who, with the assistance of the sheriffs, were to put themselves and the power of the shire in readiness “with all possible diligence.”106 The proclamation commanded that “Every man being of the age between 16 and 60 within this his shire prepare, and defensible make himself ready in harness to the uttermost of his power, to come and resort unto the said captains, knights, and gentlemen at every place and places as they shall assign them, upon one hour’s warning, for the surety of this realm and themself.”107 No French attack materialised, and it would be September before the Earl of Surrey led the militia to victory over the Scots at Flodden; “the success of what was in effect a levy of the northern counties fully demonstrated the fighting potential and efficiency of the shire levy.”108 The mobilisation of the English army that would defeat the Scots at Flodden was impressive for its speed and efficiency. Preparations began long before James IV had offered an official declaration of war. As early as October 1512 a small

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force was created around Surrey for the purpose of “war with Scotland.”109 Following the departure of Henry for France in the summer of 1513 “the Earle by tokens dayly perceived that the Scottes entended warre,” and called his retinue to muster on 21 July.110 He rode north from London to Doncaster and there dispatched Sir William Bulmer with 200 hundred mounted archers to strengthen the border fortresses. Surrey himself arrived in Pontefract on the first day of August and waited there.111 It seems likely that he was at once assessing his own position and receiving intelligence from the English ‘party’ in Scotland.112 Whilst at Pontefract Surrey wrote “to all Lordes Spirituall and Temporall...or other whiche (were)...(able to make men) to certifye what number of able men horsed and harnessed, they were able to make within an houres warnynge and to geve there attendaunce on hym.”113 To keep abreast of English and Scottish preparations, and to allow the swift passage of information, he “layed postes every waye.”114 Hall described how Surrey “had knowledge what was done in every coste,” and was further “enformed by the Lord Dacres, of the numbrynge and preparyng of men in Scotlande, and Proclamcions soundynge to the breche of peace.”115 Surrey’s request that his men be ready within an hour’s notice also implies a high level of co-ordination and sophistication.116 The ability of the English system to react to his requirements demonstrates the English to be far from naive in their understanding of warfare. The impression of a practised, well-organised system is accentuated when one considers that Surrey was still in Pontefract (south of York and Sheffield) on 25 August when he received news of the fall of Norham castle, and yet was able to take the field with his army as early as 5 September at Bolton in Glendale. This is a remarkable achievement and the speed of this journey would imply that the infantry might have been mounted, although this is not explicitly clear in the surviving source material. Thomas Audley suggested that “the commone distance of the waie that old warriors were want to lead there army in a somers daie was 5 miles in 3 hours.”117 It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that at least some of the English infantry would have been mounted for their journey north, and a number of significant clues suggest this to have been the case. Firstly, it important to note that in his request for soldiers Surrey inquired after the “number of able men horsed and harnessed,” that the recipient’s of the summons could provide.118 Furthermore, in a letter to Wolsey describing the events of the battle, Bishop Ruthal commented that while the battle took place and “in their absence from their tentes they being occupied wi(th) the Scotes ... all their goodes horses and necessaries were clerely taken away.”119 This lends weight to the notion that large sections of the English army may have been mounted, alighting from their horses to fight. Ruthal went on to criticise the borderers who he claimed “ne(uer) lyghtyd

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from theyre horsess but when the battaylis joyned.”120 The “Articles of the bataill,” suggested that as many as 4,000 or 5,000 horses were stolen by the borderers, further indicating that a substantial portion of the English army would have constituted ‘mounted infantry,’ facilitating the fast movement and mobilisation of the English force.121 Records survive for Cumberland and Northumberland detailing the mustering of “horses and mares.” The horses are described individually, for example “Geffrey Myddilton hath receyved a blak trottin nage,” - with Cumberland providing 221 horses and Northumberland 76.122 Finally, and most compelling, Hall described how, on the day of the battle as the English manouvred for position “they kept array on horsebacke from fyve of the clocke in the mornynge tyll foure of the clocke after none.”123 It therefore seems legitimate to assume that at least part of the English infantry would have been mounted, allowing faster progress to be made by the army, before dismounting to fight. The final size of the army is a source of some debate, Hall stated that the English army numbered 26,000 men, however Mackie has since argued convincingly for a figure much closer to 20,000.124 The manuscript accounts of the battle are inconclusive on the size of the English force. The two most extensive accounts of the battle, a letter from Ruthal to Wolsey and the “Articles of the battaill,” do not give a figure for the size of the English army.125 Although Ruthal does point out that “the multitude,” of the Scots were “in nombre aboue the Kinges armye.”126 On 16 September, in a letter to Maximilian, Duke of Milan, Henry VIII suggested that 10,000 Scots were “routed by 1,000 English.”127 These figures are interesting, given that they are so much smaller than any other estimates available to the historian. Further analysis of the letter reveals it to have been based on limited information. The main body of the text suggests that the fate of the king of Scots was not yet known; his death only being identified in a postscript, presumably as fresh intelligence reached Henry. It is possible that Henry was not aware of the scale of the battle, or else he was scared lest news of a larger clash of arms should over-shadow his own exploits in France. A document amongst the Egerton collection at the British library, which I have not seen referred to elsewhere, described “suche somes of money and p(ar)celles of prouysions and artillary as by the policie of the Duke of Norfolk saved at the late io(r)ney against the Scottis.”128 It related how the newly appointed Duke (restored to his father’s title in reward for his victory) had “spared” the “wages of 18,689 men by the space of 14 days.”129 It seems clear that this figure represented the number of Englishmen that survived the battle, with the Duke ‘sparing’ 14 days wages by releasing them from service quickly after the battle - as was often the practice, in an attempt to cut costs.130 A figure close to 20,000 men,

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for the English army on the eve of the battle, therefore seems acceptable.131 J. D. Makie has argued that Surrey was victorious because the English army was “better organised and more efficient than that of the Scots.”132 Given the context of the battle this is a bold statement and, if accepted, emphasises that the English militia was not the chaotic institution described by Eltis and Millar.133 Centuries of border incursions had bred a sense of obligation to muster for defence against the Scots, indeed “the north of England preserved many of the attributes of the feudal society and could be readily called to arms.”134 A combination of the militia system, indentures and a long tradition of border warfare had moulded the men of the north of England into a standing army on a grand scale. Moreover it is worth noting that Surrey had not initiated a levee en masse of the northern counties. Towns were requested to provide men according to a set quota, and the commissioners of array selected the men most appropriate for the campaign; it seems probable that in extremity a further force could be raised.135 All this seems to lend weight to Makie’s assessment of the English military establishment - organised and semi-professional.136 These examples (of war with France and Scotland) would seem to demonstrate that, at the start of our period, English armies were being levied successfully on two different systems (and on an essentially medieval model). Moreover the relative success of Henry’s incursion into France and the resounding success of Surrey’s army at Flodden certainly indicates some degree of sophistication in the system. Nonetheless, the question of England’s fighting potential was a complicated one for contemporaries. In 1519, one commentator noted that the real strength of the English rested in their infantry, which was “supposed to amount to 150,000 men, whose peculiar weapon is the longbow.”137 By 1554, the Venetian ambassador to London estimated that England could raise a force of some 100,000 men.138 Resistance to, and evasion of, militia duty further complicated the estimation of English fighting potential. The demands of agricultural cultivation, daily life and family did not equate well with a system that “generally took men away from work for three days, a day each side of the muster being allowed for travel.”139 Whilst it was possible, and often preferable, to muster parts of the county separately, this increased the chance of avoidance and allowed men to borrow weapons from friends elsewhere in the county to demonstrate their fulfillment of the Winchester provisions.140 The most accurate remaining assessment of the size of the ‘English army’ in the early Tudor period dates to the 1520s. In 1522, Wolsey initiated the largest military survey to date in an attempt to establish the full extent of England’s military capacity: “A view made owte of dyverse commyssioners bokes in the shyres,” - based on information collated

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during ‘the General Proscription,’ - numbered England’s potential soldiery at 128,250 men.141 However no single army on this scale was put into the field during the reign of Henry VIII.142 It is certainly questionable whether or not England would have possessed the bureaucratic sophistication to stage such a large force (not to mention the massive socio-economic ramifications of levying so a high a proportion of the male population).143 Rather, a system of selection was in place (in practice if not clearly in ‘statute’) that attempted to identify the best candidates for service in the wars. The Military Survey of 1522 was designed to collect information on the wealth and military capacity of the nation, with the former executed under the cover of the latter. The commissioners appointed to administer the survey were to draw “to yo(ur) remembrannce that the kinges highnes is entered into warres as well agenst Frannce as Scotlande being provoked and inforced soo to doo.”144 They were to require that “ye shall truly and playnely declare and shew as nere as ye can or may possible call to mynde or remembrannce...of what value and substannce ye be.”145 The commissioners were urged to “discrecion,” about the true (financial) purpose of the survey; rather they were to relate that “the same is done but only to knowe thereby after what rate ev(er)y man may be asked to contribute to the furnisshing of haryneys.”146 Many of the surveys have been lost and the surviving returns all differ slightly in format.147 They do, however, provide some indication of a ‘selection’ process more sophisticated than a simple levee en masse. The return for ‘Bekensfelde’ in Buckinghamshire identified 26 ‘single men’ of which 20 were declared ‘able.’148 The Buckinghamshire return also reveals that a distinction was being made by commissioners between ‘good bowe and bill,’ and those simply designated bow and bill. One hundred and seventy ‘good bowe,’ and one hundred and ninety four ‘good bill,’ are identified across the county.149 This would seem to indicate that commissioners were literally taking people out to the butts and requiring them to demonstrate their relative skills. However, most of the surviving returns do not demonstrate this level of sophistication, for example ‘the Hundred of North Grenehoe,’ and the ‘Hundred of Holte,’ are both restricted to the simple distinction of ‘archers’ and ‘bylmen.’150 The conclusion that has to be drawn is that this was not a common practice and that the commissioners rarely went to the trouble of collecting such detailed information. Although it is well to remember that these conclusions are only indicative, based on the eleven surviving returns not conclusive proof. The existence of this document does however seem to demonstrate the implausibility of Goring’s claim that the designation ‘billman,’ was “another way of saying that they had no military skill whatsoever.”151 Furthermore, the existence of this and other similar returns seems to indicate a preference for

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the selection of the most suitable men from the communities to serve in the wars. This conclusion is supported by a report on the English militia in the Venetian State papers. The report described how “the whole male population capable of bearing arms…are all mustered on a spacious plain, where they perform their military exercises with such arms as they possess, in the presence of the commanders appointed for this purpose. The stoutest and most robust are then selected.”152 The report went on to conclude that “no militia could equal that of England,” before describing the basis on which selection was made.153 It described how “the infantry is formed of taller men,” while “those who are neither tall nor short, but of agile frame, are mounted.”154 It thus seems increasingly clear that some form of selection based recruitment was in place during the first half of the sixteenth century, based on physical capacity and martial skill. Although obviously writing with an agenda, the author of ‘Certayne causes gathered together, wherin is shewed the decaye of England, only by the great multitude of shepe’ indicated that a differentiation was also made between different ‘professions’ aptitude for military service. The text complained that the “lacke of houshold kepynge and mayntenaunce of tylaage. It is great decay to artyllary: for that do we reken that shepeherdes be but ill artchers,” - reflecting contemporary opinion that ploughmen made the best archers.155 This differentiation is further highlighted by the inclusion of men’s professions in some of the military surveys.156 Although this information was by no means included in all the surveys (it seems clear that different groups of commissioners sought to collect different amounts of information), it does suggest that this knowledge was considered of value and played a part in a selection process. The 1522 surveys also tied the value of men’s goods and land to ‘the harness,’ they were required to possess. The return for the Babergh Hundred in Suffolk reveals this most clearly. For example William Manwode, a mercer from Sudbury was said to be worth 2 pounds “in londes by yeere,” and worth 100 pounds in “movables.” He was “ordred to fynde 3 harnes, 2 bowys, 2 shef of arowys and oon bill.”157 John Robert, also a mercer from the same town was said to be worth 2 pounds in lands and 40 pounds in moveable goods and was “ordred to fynde 2 harnes, oon bowe, oon shef of arowys oon bill,” while John Guybelon, a clothmaker worth 9 pounds in land and 20 pounds in moveable goods was required to provide oon harnes, oone bow and oon shey of arowys.”158 It is not apparent if the commissioners were operating an exact scale, and there is no way of telling if these instructions were complied with or simply ignored. However, it is yet another example of the budding ‘professionalism,’ of England’s ‘military planners,’ - in this case Wolsey (who had played a central part in the administrative planning of the 1513 campaign in France).159

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In March 1523 fresh commissions were ordered, of which only two remain, the surveys, for Hampshire and Gloucestershire.160 The Hampshire survey is of particular interest, detailing totals of ‘able men,’ with ‘harness’ and ‘able men’ without ‘harness’. These categories were themselves sub-divided in to ‘bowmen’ and ‘billmen’; whilst ‘harness’ was similarly broken down into “Almain Ryuettes, Jackes,” and so on.161 The obvious question here is; what was the value of ‘able men without harness,’ in an age where the government possessed relatively little by way of a central stock of weaponry? In 1522 the return for the Parish of St. Olave in Exeter recorded that of “those not able for the war,” a good proportion retained possession of weapons. For example Robert Hyll retained “a bow, harness for a man except a sallet”; William Wyxsted, a bow and a sword; whilst William Peryham retained “harness for himself; 2 bills, a sallet, a pair of splints, a gorget.”162 It further detailed that Richard Wolston, John Smyth and George Ayere (amongst others) were “able for the war,” but not in possession of weapons.163 It is certainly feasible to suggest that those in possession of harness would have been required to distribute their equipment to those most able to use it. The Gloucestershire survey included three lists for the greater number of parishes; individuals paying the forced loan and how much they were required to pay; men able to do service with harness and of men without harness who were able to serve in the wars. Based on the information contained in the Gloucestershire returns it has been argued that only the reasonably affluent members of the population possessed sufficient quantities of ‘harness’, but it was the poorer echelons of the community who would be nominated to take this ‘harness’ to war. Although it is important to recognise here that there is no definite evidence for this practice either before or after the 1522 surveys.164 It is noteworthy here to consider Cruickshank’s description of soldiers impressed for expeditionary service during the reign of Elizabeth I as the “dregs of society.”165 Similarly Boynton described how “the worst men, poachers, thieves and drunkards were often channeled into the expeditionary forces.”166 Whilst neither argued that such men formed the whole army, they do suggest that such a policy operated as a form of social control removing the poorest or “less savoury” elements of the county “who menaced the peace of the countryside and were a good riddance.”167 It is entirely reasonable to argue that, to a greater or lesser extent, this is what we are seeing in these returns.168 Moreover, it is entirely feasible that this level of sophistication was more widespread than is necessarily revealed in the remaining surveys. This indicates a government firmly committed to the adaptation and modernisation of its military establishment - and a preference for selection over a random levy of all subjects. Regardless of the relative sophistication of the 1522 military surveys, armies

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levied on the old, ‘quasi-feudal,’ pretext operated the subsequent French campaigns. For the 1522 campaign ‘the kynges letters,’ were sent out to the noblemen and gentlemen of England to put themselves and their servants in readiness for Surrey’s raid into northern France, a book was to be made “and persons chosen to s(erve) at the kynges pleasure.”169 There is some degree of confusion in the sources as to the exact size of the English army in 1522. On 31 January 1522 “A viewe by estymac(i)on of the charges of an army of 20,400 men to be sent oute of divers shires,” was drawn up.170 It is unclear if this was part of the preparations for the campaign against the French later that year, however I would suggest this could safely be ruled out. The force was to be created from contingents from Yorkshire, Lancashire Cheshire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Nottinghamshire - this would suggest it was to be prepared for defence against the Scots. A second “draughte concerninge an arme to be made this yere yf the caas shal so require by the kinges highness and themperour(e)r,” suggested that the force would number 24,000 men.171 That England could even contemplate the assemblage of two armies numbering in excess of 20,000 men early in 1522 is surely a testament to England’s military potential, as understood by contemporaries; as well as indicating the growing administrative sophistication and confidence of government under Wolsey. Although, it is important to note that the second manuscript included 3,000 horsemen and 3,000 Almayns “at thempoures charge.”172 A third manuscript placed the total figure at 25,000 men, including 16,000 English foot, 2,000 English archers on horseback “4,000 fotemen strangers and 3,000 horsemen strangers.”173 Hall related how in August 1522 Henry “commanded certain persons with their powers to come to London.”174 According to Hall, the force numbered nearly 12,000 men and was sent to the Earl of Surrey who was waiting at Dover with 4,000 men. Establishing the size of Surrey’s army in 1522 is an excellent example of the dangers inherent in trusting either government projections of troop numbers before a campaign, or chroniclers rose-tinted, retrospective accounts. Perhaps the most reliable way of ascertaining the size of any given force in the early modern period is to look at payments made by the government for soldiers.175 In this instance it is necessary to examine the accounts of Sir John Daunce, “assigned and appoynted by our seid soveraigne lord the kynge to be expenditor and payour of soundre sommes of money…for wages of warre,” and “diverse and other soundre the kynges affaires.”176 This account revealed that in the region of 7,000 English soldiers (infantry and cavalry) were sent into France in the late summer of 1522 by Henry.177 This figure is substantially less than the number Hall would have us believe or the figures suggested in the pre-campaign projections and even now we have not identified the total size of the army under Surrey’s command.

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The crucial factor in establishing the total size of Henry’s army in 1522 was the Imperial contingent. Historians have long argued that Charles saw this operation as little more than a diversion, and “the succours which he sent to join the expeditionary force were inadequate, and their co-operation half-hearted.”178 The second projection of ‘ideal’ numbers to be provided by Henry and the Emperor suggested, as we have seen, that the Emperor would provide as many as 6,000 auxiliaries (equal numbers of horse and foot).179 However the draught further revealed that Sir Robert Wyngfeld was “sent to the Lady Margaret (acting on behalf of the Emperor) aswel to knowe and vnderstande what aide and assitence of horsemen and fotemen and ordenance the kinge grace shal haue oute of those parts at their charge.”180 That is to say that the Imperial contingent was yet to be firmly established, and this would naturally affect the final size of the army to be sent into France. Vergil reported that by winter (presumably he meant the start of September – yet another example of the inaccuracy of chroniclers and their loose use of facts), despite the arrival of a substantial Burgundian contingent (probably horsemen), “the total force numbered scarcely more than 18,000 men.”181 Bearing in mind the evidence of Daunce’s account, this would require the emperor to have provided in the region of 11,000 troops. This is far in excess of the figures presented in the projections before the campaign, and even on this basis can be rejected as highly unlikely. Hall’s chronicle suggested that the Imperial contingent was as few as 300 Spaniards (Spanish mercenaries and auxiliaries often took the form of arquebusiers) and 500 horsemen, “like men of warre.”182 These auxiliaries were under the command of two “capitaines of the Burgonions, the one called therle of Egremond the Seneschal of Henaude, and the lorder Bavers, Admyral of Flaunders.”183 Hall’s figures, as we have seen, are open to question, however, these statistics further bring the size of the Imperial contingent into doubt.184 A letter from Surrey to Wolsey on 3 September confirmed the troop designations identified by Hall: “last night, the (Emperor’s) army, horse, Almains and Spaniards, came and made their camp within a mile of us.”185 On 6 September, Surrey related to the king the outcome of a meeting between the English and Imperial war councils. The Imperial commanders had been arguing for an assault of “Terouenne,” in order that the allied army might provoke the French to battle. Surrey revealed that “they offer us 4,000 men to go first to the assault…They say they will lay the Spaniards and Almains at the gate of St.Omer’s…and offer, if the French king come to give use battle, 200 men of (armes) and 500 light horse.”186 It is thus difficult to identify, with certainty, a final figure for the size of Surrey’s army, although it is clear that the initial plans were scaled down. Hall has suggested that there were supply problems at Calais; “because (the) harvest was not done, the vitayle at Caleys was to litle for so great an armye, wherefore they lay

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in Kent at tounes there a good space.”187 If one accepts this premise, it seems entirely probable that this would have led to some degree of desertion, it is even possible that some of the soldiers would have been disbanded due to a lack of victuals. Regardless of which, based on the above figures, it seems safe to suggest an Imperial contingent of somewhere in the region of 5,000 men accompanied Surrey; giving us a total army size of some 13,000 troops.188 In view of the stated aims of the allied commanders, that was to provoke the French to battle, it is difficult to imagine a force any smaller than this.189 Indeed, Wolsey’s warning to Surrey to take “care to do everything with the consent of the emperor’s army, so as to avoid all jealousies,” indicated that this was seen as joint operation, and implies that a considerable Imperial contingent must have taken part in the campaign.190 1523 brought a fresh campaign in France, under the command of the Duke of Suffolk. Early in the year warrants for musters were sent out declaring that “it is finally resolved and fully determyned that we shall put,” an army “in a redynes to bee sente for pressing thennemy and the constraynyng of him.”191 Furthermore, the warrant related to the recipient that “we haue amonges other thinges appoynted oure right trustie and right truly welbeloued cousyn and counsailloure the duke of Suffolke marshall of this oure Realme of Englande to bee leder chiftaine and gouernoure of the same.”192 The warrants further specififed that “tall and able men,” be provided, “whereof as many of them bee good archers as ye conuenyently maye get to bee takene of your tennantes or other being w(ith)in any youre rule.”193 The request for tall men is interesting, indicating the continued importance of physical strength in an early modern army. When mustered the army numbered some 10,688 English cavalry and infantrymen, alongside a further 1,648 artillerists, pioneers, artificers and other support staff who were attached to the ordnance.194 Henry would turn to the quasi-feudal system again in 1536 for the suppression of “dyu(er)se lewde and traitorous p(er)sons,” who “haue lately contrary to ther dewties of allegeance assembled themselfes together in grete number.”195 The Pilgrimage of Grace fully demonstrated both the potential of the shire levy - it was in effect an assemblage of the able men of the northern counties - and the ability of the ‘quasi-feudal,’ system to react quickly in defence of the sovereign to suppress rebellion.196 In response to the insurrection, Henry sent letters “sealed but not signed com(an)dyng me by the same that immdyatly vpon the sight therof to assemble and gather my s(er)uantes ten(a)nttes and frendes togeyther.”197 They were then “to travyle by all the wayes and meanes I can for the oppressyng and repressing of the moltytude of the lawde and yvell dyssposed p(er)sons which haue lately assembled them seldde in thies p(ar)ties.”198 However, despite the relative

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rapidity of the king’s response, Shrewsbury had already begun to make preparations against the rebels; preparations, which without direct instruction from the king, were in substance tantamount to treason.199 Having heard of the rebellion on 4 October 1536 he began to muster his forces on the fifth, and by 10 October had successfully mustered a retinue of 3,654 “from his servants, tenants and friends.”200 Substantial armies were raised to confront the threat to the king, however, meeting the rebels at Doncaster Bridge on 27 October, Norfolk and Shrewsbury soon realised they were heavily outnumbered, perhaps by as many as 20,000 men.201 Thereafter, recourse was made to negotiations and ultimately the “rising was ‘defeated by bluff’ not force.”202 From the perspective of this chapter it is significant only to recognise that Henry employed the same system utilised to raise armies for overseas service in this internal policing matter.203 More pertinently this rebellion brings into sharp focus the importance of two key elements in the successful mustering of the Tudor army: the loyalty of the commons and the loyalty of their noble and, or, landed commanders. The revolt demonstrated the relative frailty of a system that placed so much emphasis on the loyalty of a small group of nobles. It was the ultimate loyalty of Suffolk and Norfolk, and the Earls of Cumberland, Derby, Northumberland, Westmoreland and most importantly Shrewsbury that safeguarded Henry’s throne in this instance.204 By way of contrast one might note Darcy’s failure to mobilise his men against the rebels and retreat to Pontefract Castle in October 1536. Regardless of whether he saw himself as a rebel or his relative involvement and sympathies with the rebellion(s), his failure to muster a force in defence of the king certainly facilitated the spread of the revolt. Thus emphasising the danger inherent in a system that relied on the allegiance of regional magnates as opposed to a standing army.205 The attitude of the commons is also central at times of internal revolt (and war); for example, despite the commitment of the Earl of Cumberland to the defence of his king, forsaken by his retinue and the populace his importance was greatly reduced. Similarly concerns regarding the potential allegiance of Shrewsbury’s retinue were raised by, amongst others, the Duke of Norfolk.206 However, Shrewsbury successfully avoided any such problems, “partly because (if Holinshead is to be believed) he swore an oath which assured his men that he would not betray them, partly because he gave careful attention to the payment of wages.”207 As we have seen, J. J. Goring has argued that over the course of Henry’s reign, the quasi-feudal system was to become gradually more troublesome to use and administer.208 The period was, he noted, one of significant socio-economic change as many of the ‘old’ aristocratic families died out and were replaced by a larger number of ‘lesser’ gentry. The ‘military potential’ of these country gentlemen was

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to prove even more difficult to gauge than that of the older noble elite who had traditionally provided the heart of English armies for service in times of war. These problems were further aggravated by the fluid nature of tenurial relationships in the early Tudor period. The military obligation of copyholders and cottagers to their gentry landlords was not entirely clear and this ‘obligation’ was beginning to be questioned by tenants.209 Furthermore the poor financial returns of copyhold leases and the economic problems of an age of rapid inflation (and later heavy taxation and currency debasement) resulted in a decline in the size of a gentlemen’s household. The decrease in the number of personal servants’ gentlemen could afford, translated into a fall in the number of able men ready to serve the king (and servants were considered amongst the best and most loyal soldiers). In short, in Goring’s view, the expansion of the gentry meant the multiplication of the number of men the crown would now have to approach to levy their own smaller numbers of ‘quasi dependents’. In turn, this reduced the efficiency and fighting potential of the ‘quasi-feudal system’.210 This argument is in places compelling; however, it does rest on the notion of a ‘crisis’ of the aristocracy and a decline in their number. Increasingly such a view seems outmoded; rather in Millar’s words “the fall and rise of families shifted the individual pieces in the mosaic without destroying the underlying power structure.”211 George Bernard has forcefully argued that the notion of a declining nobility in Tudor England is “one of the most enduring historical myths,” and moreover “seriously misleading.”212 Bernard made the point that there had always been tenants who were reluctant to serve in the wars, they had never “unthinkingly followed their noble leaders into the field.”213 Furthermore, there were conscious efforts made to maintain the role of the aristocracy in the government of the regions. One might take the example of the Marquis of Exeter who, in 1538, was beheaded on the charge of treason. “Here,” Bernard suggested, “was an opportunity for the Tudor government to replace that noble patrimony by something else: but far from eliminating noble power, the Crown…revived it.”214 This revival took the form of the ennoblement of John Russell first as Lord Russell and later as first Earl of Bedford. Russell, himself a west-countryman, was a natural choice to replace the marquis in the region.215 Furthermore, as we have seen, the nobility continued to provide and command Henry’s armies on the continent and the borders; “the large-scale campaigns in France in 1513 and 1544 were led by noblemen, as were virtually all armies and navies in this period. Noble commanders were not figureheads but actively involved in the laborious tasks of supplying forces and making tactical decisions.”216 If one accepts, as I do, the validity of Bernard’s case, then important questions need to be raised about Goring’s conclusions. However, the focus of this thesis dictates that any such

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assessments must necessarily be postponed.217 For now, it is enough to recognise that the armies raised for Henry’s French campaigns in the 1540s would again draw heavily on the quasi-feudal system, that is in large part, the military potential of England’s noble elite.218 It is important to recognise that licences to retain continued to be issued to councillors (amongst others) well into the 1560s and beyond. Indeed, S. L. Adams has shown that as late as the 1585 campaign in the Netherlands, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester commanded a contingent whose “dominant characteristics were the obligation of the tenants of a marcher lord to give military service and the allegiance of the administration of his estates.”219 Regardless of which, the second half of Henry’s reign saw important changes to the militia system, as Henry’s government endeavored to improve its defences in the face of heightened diplomatic tensions.220 From 1535 musters were held at three yearly intervals in every shire, administered by crown appointed commissioners.221 As in 1522 the commissioners were to establish the number of ‘able men’ in each county and, based on their relative wealth, designate the ‘harness’ each man was to provide. However, although the records do demonstrate what each individual was required to provide it is impossible to tell if these instructions were complied with.222 The year 1539 was the beginning of a period of intense military activity in England and extensive musters were taken throughout the country.223 Fresh efforts were made to re-organize the militia, in a bid to increase efficiency. Clearly prompted by the threat of Catholic invasion, the “Articles for the ordering of the manrede of this the kinges Realme,” were composed by Sir Ralph Sadler. The directive urged “the kinges highness to have a book of all,” offices and officers and “the nombre of all suche able p(er)sones as may be made w(ith)in the same offices that may s(er)ue the kinges highness when it shal please his grace to command.”224 Commissioners were to be appointed and musters were to be taken immediately and repeated annually.225 There is no evidence that Sadler’s suggestions were implemented, but it is nevertheless indicative of the wider preparations being made against the threat of invasion across the country.226 The 1540s witnessed important steps towards the establishment of a county-based system of military recruitment. Using the information collected in 1542, the army for Flanders in 1543 was still composed of troops levied by private individuals.227 It is, however, significant to note that the lists of gentlemen and their retinues are later arranged by counties, and grouped together in companies of 100 or 200. For example “S(ir) Thomas Seymo(ur),” is identified as the Captain for “Berks,” - he was accompanied by his own retinue of 100 men as well as 7 other Captains with 10 or 20 men each (John Cheyny - 10 etc…). They are grouped together to form a company of 200 men.228 Similarly Sir J.Gascon is the Captain for “Cambs,” with 60 of his own men and 40

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from the county arranged together in a company of 100 men and so on.229 A further important step was taken in 1544, when militiamen were sent abroad to supplement English forces at Boulogne.230 This was the first time the militia had been used in such a way and marked a radical departure from their traditional defensive imperative. Moreover, although the remainder of the army had been levied on the ‘quasi-feudal’ system, the growing professionalism of English military planners is revealed in the detail provided by “a muster book showing how many men should be furnished by the gentlemen of England.”231 The manuscript provided detailed lists of the different obligations of the leading men of the land from the ‘counsail,’ to the ‘bisshoppes,’ and ‘privie chamber,’ and so on.232 By January 1546 the increasingly sophisticated system of military recruitment was firmly and clearly rooted in the counties, levied under specially designated commissioners. Fresh levies were conducted and “A bocke contening aswel the nombres of men appointed presently to be levyed in the shires following, as also the names of the commissioners chosen to take the musters of the same,” was created.233 Bedford was to provide 300 men under Sir Frannces Bryan, Buckinghamshire 300 under the Lord Windsor, Sir Robert Dormer and Berkshire 300 under Sir Humphrey Foster, to name but a few.234 If it is to be accepted that professionalism is designated by the large-scale employment of full-time, paid practitioners, it is undeniable that England lacked a ‘professional army’. However, the growing refinement of the English national militia created the male population of England as a standing army on a grand scale. It seems indisputably apparent, from the gradual improvements made to the systems of military recruitment over the period, that a real sense of professionalism and state planning was gradually being introduced to England’s military establishment. Furthermore, this progressive professionalisation would seem to militate against the claims of endemic organisational in-efficiency made by Eltis and others.235 Moreover, a degree of continuity is identifiable in the experience of the commanders of England’s armies, the garrison troops, the king’s small personal bodyguard - the Spears (later his Gentlemen Pensioners) - and his gunners. This study will now further explore the role of these bodies and consider both their relative professionalism and whether or not they constituted a ‘permanent establishment’.

Chapter 6 A Permanent Establishment? The Nobility and War: Continuity in Command Across Europe society was inherently violent for much of the sixteenth century, and noblemen bore swords as an indication of standing. Many viewed the use of violence as a rightful privilege of their rank and disputes were regularly settled by force of arms. Common people were equally likely to carry knives for use at work or meal times, and many owned bows for both hunting and war throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Given the obligations of the Statute of Winchester, private armament was particularly widespread in England.1 However, it was the noble elite who posed both the most serious danger to the state and antithetically justified their life of privilege on the basis of their integral role in the defending the realm against the king’s enemies.2 Henry’s court has been shown a “world of lavish allegory, mythology and romance,” his was “a world of chivalry – of Fame, Renown, Hardiness, of Sir Gallant and Coeur Loyal.”3 The retention of the ‘high chivalric’ culture of the medieval world, in the early 1500s, has been variously contrasted against the more ‘scientific’ approach to warfare of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; “In 1500 it (war) was still sometimes the sport of kings. By 1700 it was no longer in any sense a game.”4 The implication is clear; the ‘cult of chivalry’ amongst England’s nobility has been labeled synonymous with amateurish, anachronistic and unprofessional soldiery. That the second Tudor monarch and his nobility, collectively and individually sought recognition “as the ‘very perfect’, valourous knight,” is certain.5 However, that such a goal resulted in a weak military establishment is less certain.6 Moreover, this chivalric attachment to warfare resonated through the nobility of Tudor England.7 The nobility fought for a number of different reasons, not least for honour, in an age where their chivalric heritage was still highly valued. Mid-century military literature still requested “all good souldiers to be no more blooddie than the Law of Armes doth require, for then no doubte thei shall have long countynaunce in the warres with good successe.”8 Chivalric organisations, such as the Order of the Garter, retained an important political role as a result of royal patronage.9 To the nobility, war brought

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opportunities for advancement and renown, and was in this context welcome, playing an especially critical role in the creation of new nobles during Henry’s reign.10 For example Charles Brandon’s swift rise to prominence was in no small measure a result of his martial prowess, in the tiltyard and on campaign with Henry in 1513.11 Indeed his exertions on the fields of northern France, in the late summer of 1513, in no small part earned him his dukedom.12 Similarly men such as Edward Seymour and John Dudley rose to prominence towards the end of the reign not least as a result of their military expertise and reputation.13 Henry VIII established close ties with the leading nobles of his court, from the outset of his reign, in jousts and tournaments; “valour in the tiltyard,” was the road to high office for many a young nobleman, such as Sir Edward Howard.14 It is also important to recognise that as well as lofty chivalric ideals, nobles (and their men) fought for concrete gains: notably financial. K. B. McFarlane has discussed the potential financial benefits to nobles and soldiers who fought in the Hundred Years War. He noted that “retainers made no pretence of fighting for love of king or lord, still less for England or for glory, but for gain…since they staked their lives it is evident that they thought the prizes worthy of strife.”15 Wages aside (which were not significantly beneficial to noble, captain or soldier), the potential for looting, financial rewards for bravery, and most importantly the ransom of notable enemy captains (as happened after the siege of Belle Castle in 1523) drew nobles and soldiers alike to the battlefield.16 During the planning of the 1523 campaign, Henry VIII was wary of declaring his force “an army of conquest rather than as raiders, proclaiming liberty and sparing the country from burning and spoil, that would be demoralising for the men.”17 It was Henry’s view that without the “bare hope,” of the spoils of war the men would have “evill will to march far forward.”18 Thomas Audley maintained that “mony gyve the life and courage to a souldier,” and in turn “if your souldier be well paid then your campe flourishe like a cytie with all maner of victualles, and other necessarie for the souldier.”19 It was also suggested that the ‘treasure-at-war’ should make an ‘oration’ to the army before battle, promising financial inducements to fight bravely: Then shall the treasurer of the feilde also appere, and shall saie be ye all of good chere I have treasure inoughe in the cases to paie unto ev(er)y man one monthes wages for that one dayes s(er)vice I will also labo(r) in that behalf that ye shall enjoye the same wherefore feare no thinge to spende horse weapons nor armoures in this behalf and before they enter into order of araye to be enbateledd the Capetynes shall cause the companyes to be refreshedd w(ith) good meads and drinkes gevinge them courage and

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comfortable words.20 Furthermore, to the nobility, the potential for substantial pensions from foreign monarchs must also have been a considerable allure to men with lavish lifestyles to support. The focus of this study must remain ‘how’ men fought, not ‘why’ or ‘where’ or indeed ‘how they were rewarded’.21 From this perspective, it is enough to recognise that the pursuit of chivalric renown (and its concurrent benefits – high office and financial reward) drew the nobility of England (and their retinues) to war. The nobility would ride out in its (near) entirety in 1513, and would repeatedly be drawn to the king’s banner throughout his reign. This therefore ensured continuity of experience amongst the commanders of Henry’s armies throughout his reign.22 As we have seen, over-arching theories concerning perceived ‘crises of the aristocracy’ in the sixteenth century have long incorporated a decline in the military role of the nobility.23 J. J. Goring accepted that the quasi-feudal system of military recruitment had “worked tolerably well in an age when the high nobility, in return for the king’s ‘good lordship’ had placed their powers at his disposal in the event of war.”24 Nevertheless, as the reign (and indeed the Tudor century wore on) it “functioned less effectively in an age when the old aristocracy was losing its distinctive role and the work of harnessing the ‘power’ was passing to a multiplicity of lesser landowners.”25 However, it is increasingly recognised that such concerns have been over-emphasised.26 David Grummitt has observed the continued importance of the nobility, alongside the lesser gentry, in the military command of the Calais Pale. Grummitt acknowledges that “the defence of Calais was no longer the private endeavour of the great lord.” 27 The expansion of the royal affinity and demesne, meant a growing ability on the part of the crown to both finance and levy sufficient manpower from its estates for the defence of the Pale. However, “this was not achieved, as was once thought, through a parallel decline in the role of the nobility in the government of England,” instead, “the nobility continued to be employed as soldiers and governors but their authourity and the means to carry out their duties derived increasingly from the crown.”28 Moreover, on England’s other significant, strategic land frontier – Scotland – Bernard noted that “noble families whose lands lay near frontiers, such as the Dacres in Cumbria, devoted a great deal of their energies and resources to war and defence.”29 The ‘old’, or more pertinently ‘great’, nobility continued to play a central role in the recruitment, command and control of English armies.30 This is amply demonstrated by a brief examination of the various commanders and senior officers of Henry’s armies. In 1513 the vanguard of the English army sent to


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France was commanded by George Talbot, 4th Earl of Shrewsbury, the rearward by Charles Somerset, Lord Herbert - the lord steward and lord chamberlain respectively. Henry’s ‘favourite’ Charles Brandon, a knight who had done much to establish his reputation on the tiltyard, was appointed high marshal.31 Whilst almost the whole nobility of England was committed to the French campaign, the Earl of Surrey was left at home to guard against attack from Scotland. Surrey, and his son the lord Admiral, would famously overthrow the Scots at Flodden, in many senses stealing Henry’s chivalric thunder.32 The early 1520s, perhaps as a result of the fortunes of 1513, would see a great many more nobles committed to warfare on the northern border than accompanied the expeditionary forces to France. As we have seen 1522 witnessed the Earl of Surrey, (the commander of the van at Flodden whose father had regained the dukedom of Norfolk in reward for his great victory at Flodden), lead an English army against the French. Sir William Sandes, who he made joint captain of the rearward, accompanied him in this venture.33 Sandes was a veteran of the 1512 and 1513 campaigns, who had been earmarked by Wolsey to command a force of 6,000 men destined for France in 1521 (the plan proved abortive).34 Sir Richard Wingfield, a man of considerable military and diplomatic experience, who in 1513 had acted as joint deputy (captain) of Calais, joined him in his command of the rearward.35 The middleward was placed under the command of Robert Ratcleffe, Lord Fitzwater, whilst Sir Edward Guildford acted as master of horse. Edmond Howard, Surrey’s brother and himself a veteran of Flodden, was also present on the campaign.36 Meanwhile extensive defensive preparations were made against the eventuality of an attack on England, from a Scotland, which had recently reinvigorated its commitment to the ‘auld alliance’ under its regent, the Duke of Albany. The 4th Earl of Shrewsbury, commander of the van in France in 1513, was commissioned lieutenant general of the north.37 Henry Percy, fifth Earl of Northumberland and his son were appointed members of his council, reflecting the traditional Percy influence in the northeast and their close association with border defence.38 The earl had served Henry’s father at Blackheath in 1497 and accompanied the king to France in 1513.39 Therefore, his experience of border warfare and local influence aside, he was a man of considerable military pedigree. Moreover, his friendship with Shrewsbury made him a natural candidate for the role (indeed his son was to marry Shrewsbury’s daughter). In 1523 the Earl of Surrey took over the command. Surrey was, by this time, England’s premier soldier. He had, as we have seen, led the van at Flodden, before going on to command English forces in Ireland, at sea and conduct extensive raids across Picardy and Artois.40 Meanwhile, Charles Brandon, now Duke of Suffolk, was leading yet another English army across the sea to France. He was to be assisted by the recently

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ennobled Sir William, Lord Sandes, acting as high marshal (the role Brandon had fulfilled in 1513 as Lord Lisle).41 Other significant captains included Sir Richard Wingfield who had served Surrey in the previous autumn’s campaign, as commander of the rearward and lord Leonard Grey, who attended the campaign with 12 demi lances, 12 archers on horseback and 16 footmen. Grey would later serve as a commander of the army in Ireland during the Geralidine rebellion.42 One might also note the “master of thordyn(an)nce,” Sir William Skeffington, who would serve as lord deputy of Ireland during the Geraldine rebellion, or Thomas Hert, “m(aster) gonner,” who, as we have seen, continued to play a crucial role in Henry’s ordnance establishment.43 Moreover, a select few captains in the 1523 campaign would later emerge as leading lights of the Tudor military establishment, and would certainly have drawn heavily on their experiences in the 1523 campaign. For example amongst Suffolk’s retinue in 1523 was “Edwarde Seymour after erle of Hartfoord, and now duke of Somerset.”44 Indeed both Seymour and John Dudley (who would also achieve renown and notoriety as duke of Northumberland for his military and political exploits), were knighted by Brandon during the campaign.45 Dudley’s first taste of military action had come during the previous year’s skirmishes around Calais, where, by the summer of 1523, he had attained the position of ‘lieutenant of the spears’, before joining Suffolk’s army as a lieutenant under his guardian Sir Edward Guildford.46 Dudley’s wardship under Guildford is interesting in so far as it highlights the bonds of family and friendship that tied together England’s ‘military elite.’ The Guildfords were a family of considerable military pedigree, Sir Richard had served as Henry VII’s master of the ordnance, and his sons, Edward and Henry, “soldiers by talent and inclination,” were “both prominent in the jousts and other entertainments of the court.”47 By 1511 Edward had already been appointed warden of the Cinq Ports and accompanied the king to France in 1513. Clearly then the same men dominated these early years, most notably Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk and George Talbot, 4th Earl of Shrewsbury.48 Furthermore, it was to be these three figures who, in 1536, would lead Henry’s armies against the Pilgrimage of Grace, ably supported by captains like John Russell and Christopher Morris. Moreover, their importance in the military establishment continued into the 1540s. In 1542 it was Howard, who was to lead a spoiling raid against the Scots, and in 1543 the new lieutenant of the North was none other than Suffolk. During the 1544 invasion of France, Norfolk was appointed commander of Henry’s forward, Suffolk was assigned, under the king, to the middleward whilst Russell was placed in command of the rearward. Similarly as the threat of a French invasion loomed in 1545, it was Norfolk, Suffolk and Russell who were appointed to command the three armies prepared


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against this eventuality. Here then was military continuity, experience and professionalism even.49 C. S. L. Davies has argued that “the 1540s saw in effect the creation of that characteristic Elizabethan figure, the professional captain.”50 He cited the example of William, Lord Grey of Wilton, who had served at Calais and Guisnes throughout the1530s and 1540s, taken part in the siege of Montreuil in 1544 and in 1546 was made captain of Boulogne.51 He accompanied Protector Somerset north in 1547 for the Pinkie campaign, was a member of the last garrison of Guisnes after the fall of Calais in 1558 and then took a leading role in the siege of Leith in 1560.52 As is so often the case, Davies’ argument is compelling, however I would question his identification of the 1540s as a watershed in the development of the professional captain.53 Indeed, Grummitt has argued that Grey’s experience of service in France had a lot in common with “his Lancastrian predecessors.”54 The reign of Henry VIII is littered with ‘professional captains’ of this nature, who served to provide continuity of experience from one campaign to the next. We have already considered the important roles played by men such as Sir William Sandes and Sir Richard Wingfield, who it might be argued, exemplified the role of the ‘professional captain’. Similarly one might consider the case of John Russell, whose family were important merchants in the West Country. Russell served the king variously across the length of the reign, as a linguist, diplomat, spy and perhaps most significantly as a soldier. Whilst it was “linguistic talent,” which “introduced him to the English court in 1506,” and his political acumen at court that ensured his steady rise to power, he also enjoyed a considerable military reputation.55 Having first served as a ‘spear’ at Calais, Russell distinguished himself on campaign with the king in 1513, at the sieges of Therouenne and Tournai. He then served, with distinction as a captain, at Tournai (in command of in the region of 80 men). Following the surrender of Tournai, he played an important diplomatic role in Anglo-French relations before returning to the business of war, with the earl of Surrey, in 1522. He fought at Morlaix in August, losing an eye in the assault on the town, and after the battle Surrey knighted him. In 1523 he played an important role in the negotiation of the alliance between the English and the rebel Duke of Bourbon, although he would play no part in that year’s campaign. Russell next served in a military capacity during the repression of the Pilgrimage of Grace; mustering, alongside Sir William Parr, a small force at Stamford in October 1536. He was a member of Norfolk’s council during late October, before being sent to occupy and defend Newark by the duke of Suffolk on 8 November. By December Russell was being employed as an emissary between Henry and his commanders in the field, Norfolk and Shrewsbury, and on 2 December was entrusted, as Henrys’ agent, to deal with Robert Aske and

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Thomas Lord Darcy, two of the revolts leaders, issuing a general royal pardon. In 1540 he was made Lord High Admiral of England and in the summer of 1544 commanded the vanguard of Henry’s army royal, playing an active role in the unsuccessful siege of Montreuil.56 Here then was a captain of vast military experience who had served on multiple campaigns spanning the length of Henry’s reign. If one accepts the validity of William, Lord Grey of Wilton’s case for being accepted, in Davies’ term, a ‘professional captain’, then surely a similar case can be made for Russell. The same might be said of Sir Edward Poyning’s; writing in the 1530s, John Coke “was struck above all by the length and depth of his military experience.”57 Poyning’s had joined Henry Tudor’s forces in Brittany in 1483 and by 1484-5 was heralded as a senior commander of his forces. In 1489 he had seen service amongst the English troops fighting in the battle of Diksmuide against the Flemings and commanded English troops at the victorious siege of Sluis in 1492 and the ineffectual siege of Venlo in 1511. He had served on various commissions tasked with inspecting fortifications and defences at Calais before taking up the role of Governor of Tournai from 1513-1515. Much like Russell he also fulfilled various diplomatic functions accompanying first Henry VII, and then his son, on important engagements with other European monarchs.58 Willen pointed out that many such men “specialized neither as an administrator nor as a bureaucrat but continued to perform a variety of functions at court and on the battlefield.”59 Thereby, although not ‘professional captains’ in the full modern understanding of the term, they did provide clear continuity of experience from one campaign to the next. Luke MacMahon has demonstrated that “many of the gentry and nobility later accredited to the French court had first served as officers in either the Calais Pale or Tournai.”60 For example both Richard Wingfield and William Fitzwilliam, had extensive military experience before being appointed to the French court in 1520 and 1521 respectively. Such experience was “particularly useful,” in the “technical information they could supply to Henry and his advisers,” on French military preparations.61 To this list one might add Sir John Wallop, a member of the gentry, whose family had long been settled in Hampshire acting as sheriffs of the county. “Wallop, even though a resident ambassador at the court of Francis I in the early 1540s, typified the English military aristocracy who were as much at home on the battlefield and in the camp as at the princely courts of Renaissance Europe.”62 Wallop had accompanied Poynings on his ‘campaign’ in the Low Countries in 1511 and was at sea with Sir Edward Howard in 1513. He served as a ship’s captain throughout 1513-14 and “in these years he did a great deal of damage to French shipping.”63 In 1516 Henry sent him to Portugal, where he served


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Emmanuel, King of Portugal, with distinction (at his own expense) against the Moors and on his return to England was made a knight of the order of Christ. From 1518 until 1521 he served in Ireland, often carrying correspondence back and forth between Surrey and the king. He was heavily involved in the fighting in France in 1522 and 1523. On 31 March 1524 was made high marshal of Calais in recognition of his service, and by June 1530 had been promoted to the position of lieutenant of Calais, the commander of the citadel and second-in-command to the deputy. By 1541 he had been made captain of Guisnes taking an active role in engineering works there. In 1543 he was chosen, ahead of the Earl of Surrey, to command the English auxiliary force sent to support the Emperor’s army in northern France. Whilst the campaign achieved very little, Wallop “gained great glory, and Charles V commended his conduct to Henry VIII.” Throughout 1544-6 he played an active role in operations in and around the Boulonnais - he was in every sense a professional military captain.64 In his excellent article, on Suffolk’s 1523 expedition into France, Gunn discussed the issue of ‘continuity of experience’ in the early campaigns of Henry VIII. He pointed out that a number of the officers and men of Suffolk’s army had served with him in 1513 including “Sir William Essex and Sir John Brydges,” both of whom “commanded companies in Suffolk’s (then lord Lisle’s) retinue in 1513.”65 Various captains can be seen to have served in both the 1513 and 1523 campaigns, for example Sir Andrew Wyndsor, the Lord Willoughby and sir Edward Bray, amongst others.66 As we have seen, campaigns overseas were levied on a ‘semi-feudal’ basis from the tenants and other dependents of regional noblemen.67 Given this fact, it seems far from fanciful to suggest that ordinary soldiers would too have been compelled to serve on both campaigns with their masters or liege-lords. The muster lists also provide examples of families sending soldiers to France in 1513 and 1523, for example Sir Henry and Sir Edward Guildford. In this event it would also seem probable that old soldiers who had served in the first campaign would be required to do service in the second.68 It seems likely that ordinary soldiers could have served on more than one campaign.69 This is especially probable in the north of England, where constant border warfare with the Scots schooled generations in warfare. During the 1540s Henry’s England was at war on a semi-permanent footing and here again it seems likely that troops would have seen service on more than one occasion.70 One might note the example of the Welsh soldier E.Gruffudd, who served in both the 1523 and 1543 campaigns and left detailed manuscript accounts of both campaigns.71 Moreover “there were elements of useful continuity in the experience of the victuallers.”72 The 1523 campaign, like the campaign of the previous year had

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witnessed Wolsey take sole charge of the supply and logistics of the army.73 Amongst the administrators preparing for the campaign was Sir John Daunce.74 In 1523, as in 1513, Daunce’s role was to oversee the allowance of funds to the victuallers, like Edward Weldon and William Brysewood who had again been appointed to the acquisition of supplies for the campaign.75 Daunce’s 1513 experiences would certainly have been invaluable to the supply and organisation of the army in 1523. So, although other key figures from the 1513 campaign had died, (like Thomas Wyndham), the experiences and lessons of the earlier campaign were assuredly not lost. To this list one must necessarily add Sir John Gage, who served Henry (and later Edward) with distinction in various military commands across the length of his reign. Potter, in a scrupulously researched article described him as “a slightly unheroic technocrat,” whose substantial “expertise was in logistics and supply.”76 Having, in all likelihood, accompanied Henry’s expedition to France in 1513 Gage can be found serving as deputy to Sir Nicholas Vaux at Calais by 1522. Under the patronage of Sir William Sandes he was later appointed Comptroller of Calais. He was heavily involved in the wars with France in the early 1520s, and skirmishes around the Calais Pale in 1524; in 1525 he was knighted. He served in various capacities at Court throughout the 1520s and 1530s, for our purposes it is significant to note commissions to inspect Calais in early 1532, before being sent north to check on the supply and readiness of the border garrisons.77 The 1540s saw Gage heavily involved with the organisation and supply of English armies in Scotland and in France; indeed he was critical of the shortages of bread, for the troops, during Norfolk’s 1542 ‘raid’ into Scotland. During the 1544 campaign in France Gage played a crucial role in the organisation and transport of supplies for the army; after the capture of Boulogne he was appointed “the Council’s expert on military supplies.”78 It therefore seems clear that, at least in terms of their commanders (and to some extent their administrators), Henry’s campaigns boasted a degree of continuity. Chivalric ideals, far from inhibiting the development of English warfare, ensured the continued commitment of English nobles to the battlefield. This commitment reflecting, not least, the potential for royal patronage that came with martial prowess, as exemplified in the ennoblement of men like Brandon, Russel and Sandes. Furthermore, the continued reliance on the retinues of great men, in the construction of Henrician expeditionary forces, in all probability, ensured that numerous soldiers and captains would also serve in the wars time and again. England could and did learn from the experiences of each campaign. Although England possessed no standing army in the strictest sense of the term it did possess a nation largely at ease with the martial requirements of its king.


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The Spears79 It is crucial to remember that the English did retain a modest number of professional troops. Perhaps the most notable of these bodies were the ‘King’s Spears’ (later his Gentlemen Pensioners).80 They were in the first instance heavy cavalry, and served as a personal bodyguard to the king. This body was comprised of “50 fully-equipped men-at-arms, each accompanied by two mounted archers and a custrell (light cavalryman) armed with a light lance or javelin,” – in all a body of two hundred men.81 The ‘Spears’ were principally young men, normally the heirs of influential members of the gentry whose appointment was as much political as military, with “the great patrons of the court…eager to place their protégés among the spears.”82 This aside, in times of war, they provided a nucleus of highly trained soldiers who could act as Captains for less experienced troops, raised through the militia or quasi-feudal system.83 They were also to be found acting as Captains at sea. One might note for example the accounts of Sir Edward Howard, Admiral, as governor and conductor of the king’s navy and army by sea. In a document detailing receipts of money, dated 28 October 1512, a number of Spears are identified as ships’ Captains, for example, “Syr John Burdett Capeteyn paied…(as)… a Spere owte of the kynges cofers,” in command of the “Lyon of Grenewych.”84 Similar payments were made to Sir Wialliam Sydney Captain of the Dragon of Grenewych, Sir Edward Cobham Captain of the Barbara of Grenewych to name but a few.85 That is to say they received only their normal wage as a ‘spear’ for these duties. John Power, by contrast, “capteyn,” of “the Petre of Fowey,” was paid “for his vittayle & wages at 18d a day by the said tyme of three monthes,” a sum totaling 6li. 6s.86 That is to say he was paid a contracted fee over a fixed-term of three months. The ‘Spears’ could provide professional leadership and experience for the semi-professional army that remained the mainstay of Henry’s military establishment. The Yeomanry, a body of archers formed by Henry VII also for the protection of the king, supplemented the ‘Spears,’ but gradually adopted a more ceremonial role during the reign of Henry VIII.87 Moreover, added to this, and often ignored by historians of the period were the soldiers of the Navy, who were regularly used to supplement land forces at times of need (strikingly at Flodden in 1513, 1,000 ‘mariners’ were present in the Vanguard under Lord Howard, Admiral of England).88 The Garrisons The men of the garrisons, most notably those of Berwick and Calais, supplemented these troops.89 The garrisons provided a small, dispersed body of ‘professional’ soldiers; Gilbert John Millar has suggested that troops from this

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quarter numbered somewhere in the region of 3,000 men.90 However, David Grummitt, in his meticulous research on Calais has demonstrated that the peacetime garrison customarily numbered some 700 men, “divided between the town and castle of Calais and the outlying fortresses of Guines, Hammes, Rysbank Tower (in the harbour) and from the 1520s Newnhambridge.”91 Given that Calais was the largest single garrison, Millar’s figure of 3,000 men seems somewhat unlikely in ‘peacetime’. Millar himself acknowledges, for example, that “on the Scottish border…the typical tower or bulwark – excluding the major strongholds at Carlisle and Berwick – was garrisoned by no more than a constable or deputy and his household retainers.”92 Even Berwick, the largest single garrison on the northern border was ordinarily garrisoned by no more than a hundred men.93 Indeed an accurate estimation of ‘peacetime’ garrison strength is complicated by the incessant nature of border conflict with the Scots (and to a lesser extent the Irish), which witnessed regular fluctuations in garrison strength.94 Moreover, garrison strengths would have increased dramatically in time of crisis, and in the 1540s “several thousand,” men were in garrison in the Calais Pale.95 Similarly in 1513, immediately after the occupation of Tournai, the English garrison numbered somewhere in the region of 5,000 men. From 1515 every effort was made to reduce the size, and thus the cost of the garrison; by August 1517 (with the completion of a new citadel) the English hoped to reduce the garrison to just 600 men, withdrawn inside the fort. However, the refusal of the citizens of the town to pay for their own defence forced Henry to recruit a further 200 men to man the city gates.96 Nevertheless, the garrisons were necessarily reduced when there was no imminent or apparent threat.97 The garrisons at Calais and Berwick served as vital staging posts for English armies into France and Scotland. In 1513 the fore-ward crossed to Calais in midMay, followed at the end of the month by Lord Herbert with the rearward.98 Welsh captain Sir Rees Ap Thomas was made commander of the light cavalry while “the chief counsellors on military matters” included “Edward duke of Buckingham, Edward Poynings,” and many others.99 Even had there been sufficient shipping to transfer the force all together the descent of so many men on Calais would have proved a great strain on the city. In preparation for the arrival of the ‘army royal’, stores had been slowly building up, and intelligence gathered on the movements of French forces.100 Indeed the population of the Pale of Calais proved “an excellent source of information about troop movements, the state of fortifications, and so on.”101 Henry himself arrived with the middle-ward as late as 30 June, by which time both the forward and rearward had departed Calais and encamped at Therouanne, thus easing supply and logistical strains on the town itself.


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Over the course of Henry’s reign the total number of troops in garrison increased, not least as a result of the 1539-40 building programme which saw the construction of as many as 19 fortifications garrisoned by a total of 220 men.102 Although it is essential to recognise that the number of men in each garrison was often relatively small (Calais, Tournai. Berwick and Boulogne were the exception, not the rule), the men of the local militia would have supplemented them during a crisis. Moreover, Hogg has suggested that the regular troops would have acted as instructors to the civilian levy who brought “the detachments up to strength in a time of crisis.”103 There is also evidence of a desire to install a sense of discipline and professionalism to the garrisons; illustrated in the “Ordinances and statutes deuised by the king ma(jestie) for the good rule establishment and suretye of his highness Castells, bullwarks and other fortresses.”104 These ordinances insisted that a Captain must spend no more then eight nights away from his ‘fort’ in any one-month as well as laying out conditions for ‘watches.’ Peculiar punishments were reserved for anyone found asleep on watch; if caught asleep three times in one night the offender was held in prison until the ensuing market day, he was then placed in a basket and hung over the harbour wall. A knife was provided, with which he was to cut the rope holding the basket (as well as bread, and wine for Dutch courage). He was then dragged out of the water (if he hadn’t drowned), held in prison until the following market day and subsequently banished from the town for “one yere and a daye.”105 The importance of the ‘chain of command’ is revealed in their insistence that no gun be fired without the “speciall commandement or license of ye Captayne or of ye deputy.”106 However, one must be wary of over-emphasising this sense of professionalism; especially when one notes that the onus fell on “every of ye said garrison (to) furnish himself w(ith) convenient weapon as a dagg(er) and a sword w(ith) an halbard or a bill and also harness and every gunner also to have a handgunne or hagbushe at his owne charge.”107 As with the militia, it was the responsibility of the garrison to furnish themselves with ‘personal’ weapons - the government clearly still balked at the cost of arming and training too many soldiers.108 The men of the garrisons would have been drawn from a variety of different sources, ranging from local men, to the poor and otherwise unemployed, young men seeking adventure and, or, fortune (although they’d be lucky to find the latter), and, in the larger garrisons, mercenaries.109 Gruffudd’s account of the ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne’ leaves one with an impression of the preponderance of Welsh troops in the Garrison at Calais, and throughout Henry’s armies, at the very least in the late 1520s and early 1530s. It is suggested that “if a Welshman is lost he is sure to turn up in Calais, and that sons follow their fathers in service there.”110 This claim should be treated with some scepticism, but could

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reasonably be indicative of the compositional background of garrison troops. This aside, Gunn has rightly pointed out that “places at Calais were eagerly sought by courtiers and commoners alike, for distinguished service in the garrison was a means to promotion of all sorts, including election to the garter.”111 For example Sir John Russell took the first steps in his distinguished career as a spear, at first Calais, and then Tournai. Russell came to the king (and Wolsey’s) attention in 1515, following his involvement in a plot to assassinate Richard de la Pole; he also played an active part in the pageantry and jousts so beloved of his king.112 If military renown or honour was an important road to advancement in Tudor England, Calais was surely a more attractive route than service in the far north at Berwick, or yet worse in Ireland. Campaigns in Ireland offered none of the potential for glory of a campaign in France, and men “generally dislike to enlist for an expedition in which there is nothing to be gained but blows.”113 During the Geraldine rebellion, as we will see, Skeffington had immense problems finding men willing to serve, either from the northern borders or Wales, with the consequence that many men were imprisoned, as an example to others.114 At the time, the Duke of Norfolk was reported to be aghast at the prospect of leading a campaign into Ireland. He was heard to have exclaimed: “If the king really wishes to send me to Ireland he must first construct a bridge over the sea for me to return freely to England whenever I like.”115 Potter observed that in France, “both peacetime and wartime garrisons included substantial numbers of mercenaries.”116 The English case was, it would seem, somewhat different. Calais’ role as a staging post for successive English armies, would see the town fill with mercenaries in the build up to and aftermath of a campaign. In 1545, as England faced war on two fronts as well as the need to defend Boulogne and Calais, Gruffudd vividly described the profusion of foreign mercenaries: “There were many depraved and brutish foreign soldiers from all nations under the sun – Welsh, English, Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Gascons, Portingals, Italians, Arbannoises, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgundians, Flemings.”117 However, it is important not to overplay the role of mercenaries in English garrison establishments.118 Grummitt has shown that the 1530s had witnessed significant ‘Anglicisation’ within the Calais Pale. The 1536 Calais Act had included clauses debarring ‘aliens’ from military service in the English Pale, in the highly charged context of Reformation diplomacy, there was “a real sense of conspiracy: the aliens, outside the allegiance of Henry VIII…threatened to betray the Pale to the adherents of the Pope.”119 Indeed, as late as 1543, the Pale witnessed the expulsion of significant numbers of ‘aliens’ and the confiscation of goods.120 This mirrored wider attempts at the Anglicisation of the English military establishment in the mid-1530s, notably among gunners at the


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Tower.121 Similarly in the early phase of the English occupation of Tournai, substantial numbers of mercenary troops remained in the garrison. However, as Henry sought to reduce the crippling financial burden of the outpost, the possibility of discharging the remaining auxiliaries from the Low Countries was seriously mooted. Although the matter was complicated by the fact that “they had served the king well in the 1513 campaign and he must not forget his obligations towards them.”122 This specific concern aside, it seems clear that one should be wary of over-emphasizing the importance of foreigners in England’s garrisons. Although a significant number of foreign specialists were certainly employed, they were accompanied in the work by a larger number of Englishmen. Questions have been raised about the relative military efficiency of these men, many of whom found only “transitory,” employment in the garrisons.123 The question is a valid one, and difficult to answer outside of a dedicated study of this sector of Henry’s military establishment. It seems probable that there would have been great disparity in the relative abilities of both different garrisons, and individuals within the garrisons themselves. Nevertheless, at England’s most important military outposts – at Berwick and Calais – skirmishing, with the Scots and French respectively, was commonplace. This would certainly have ensured that a relatively high level of military competency was instilled in these men. On the Scottish border, the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed, were kept in regular employment, in a quasi-policing capacity, patrolling the border against raids on English cattle, sheep and farmland, and indeed in retaliatory strikes.124 Between 1547 and 1550, Somerset’s ‘garrisoning policy’ in the Scottish Lowlands saw numerous small forts established as “bases for highly mobile forces of light cavalry which could police wide areas.”125 At Calais, the garrison “cultivated aggression against the French,” and skirmishing on the edges of the Pale was a normal part of garrison life.126 Similarly, the Boulogne garrison would sally out to skirmish with the French on numerous occasions throughout 1545 and the early months of 1546 (to varying degree of success it has to be admitted).127 In short, the men of the garrisons, although few in number, would have had ample opportunity to hone their fighting the skills.128 Furthermore, David Grummitt’s forthcoming work on Calais demonstrates that the weaponry and fortifications of Calais, during the reign of Henry VIII (and indeed throughout the fifteenth century), bore favourable comparison with those of any European army. Calais boasted a long history of the production and deployment of heavy artillery and by 1547 there was, he notes, enough handguns to arm the majority of the garrison as well as the reinforcements based there. It seems increasingly clear that “the Calais garrison was by no means isolated from European developments, and moreover, that these changes were not restricted to

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the unique circumstances of the Pale but were adopted widely throughout English armies.”129 The small number of permanent professional soldiers in Henrician England was, however, not totally unusual in Europe at this time. It is illustrative to make a brief comparison with the situation on the continent. Relatively substantial numbers of permanent troops, both infantry and cavalry were being retained by a small group of European states by the end of the century (most notably Spain and, slightly earlier, pre-civil war France). Mallet and Hale made a less than favourable comparison of English permanent forces, an “average of 2,000,” with those of Spain at the end of the century, which maintained 23,500 soldiers in Italy, North Africa, the Azores and Canaries, Portugal and Spain.130 However, from our perspective, this comparison is misleading, based as it clearly is on the Elizabethan period, and it is worthwhile to consider briefly some earlier European examples. Over the course of the century, warfare underwent an “escalation in army numbers,” as a result of the growing incidence of siege warfare rising out of enhanced artillery fortifications.131 The changing face of warfare necessitated compositional changes, notably “the outmoding of expensive heavy cavalry by comparatively cheap foot soldiers armed with pike, arquebus or musket.”132 These developments, now widely accepted and extensively chronicled, need little elucidation here. From the perspective of this study, the important factor is the chronology of these developments; overwhelmingly the emphasis at the end of the fifteenth century and in the first half of the sixteenth century remained on heavy cavalry.133 Those countries that did retain permanent forces (such as France and Burgundy) thus principally employed heavy cavalry. For example on 31 July 1471 an ordinance was issued by Charles the Bold for the establishment of 1,250 permanent ‘lances’, with each ‘lance’ comprising nine men.134 Similarly the French retained a core of professional heavy cavalry; the gens d’armes, in compagnies d’ordonnance. In 1523 there were 3,752 ‘lances’ nationally; established in the fifteenth century, the lance comprised a man-at-arms, two archers and a coutillier (swordsman). However, by the reign of Francis I, the fighting ‘lance’ had become somewhat of a myth. Despite the notional retention of the cavalry ‘lance’, the gens d’armes fought in companies, with a ratio of men-at-arms to archers of 1:1.5 being promoted by 1534. The 1530s witnessed a reduction in their number, but the outbreak of war in the 1540s ensured a renewed period of expansion.135 However, whilst they were certainly a formidable heavy cavalry unit, Potter has described various organisational difficulties, including “irregularities of pay,” and “chaotic billeting.”136 Indeed, “desertion was as much a problem among the gendarmerie as with the notorious foreign mercenaries.”137 The Spanish too, boasted “the foundations for a military structure of a permanent nature,” based around the


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Castilian cavalry.138 This body, of 5,000 combatants was considered somewhat inferior to its French equivalent. Despite numerous reforms in the 1490s designed to improve efficiency – notably a gradual move away from heavy cavalry towards the mounted lancer – it would remain an inferior force to the gens d’armes.139 Nevertheless Henry’s meagre number of Spears did not bear much comparison with these bodies. The picture was somewhat different as regards infantry forces; Wood pointed out that “the peacetime army (in France) was small and for the most part widely dispersed, and where it was concentrated in any numbers it was tied to the frontier provinces.”140 Louis XI had attempted to create a French ‘standing force’ with the development of the ‘Francs Archers.’ However, their abysmal performance at the Battle of Guinegate in 1479 saw this force somewhat disregarded.141 It was not until the 1530s that the first serious moves towards organized, professional companies of native French forces were made, with the creation of seven infantry legions of 6,000 men. However, they were ultimately proved unsatisfactory and “fell into disuse in the second half of the sixteenth century.”142 It is also interesting to note More’s damning assessment of the performance of the French ‘professional army; “how unnecessary it is to maintain them is clearly proved by this consideration: not even the French soldiers, assiduosly trained in arms from infancy, can boast that they have very often got the better of it face to face” with your civilian militia.143 Although it is important to remember that More wrote very much with a pacifist agenda, this serves to illustrate strong contemporary feeling that England was far from lagging behind a European ‘military revolution’. Similarly it is not until 1534 that we can identify the development of the Spanish ‘tercios’.144 Efforts were made towards the establishment of a ‘permanent army’ during the reign of the Catholic kings. Luis Ribot Garcia has even suggested that “the Hermandad (military association) of Castilian towns…was in fact a standing army, although its proper function was the maintenance of public order and the pursuit of wrongdoers.”145 In 1516-17, following the death of King Ferdinand, the regent of Spain attempted to establish a standing army to oppose the power of the nobility. However, faced with considerable opposition, the plan was to prove abortive.146 Thus the absence of an English standing army and small number of ‘permanent professional soldiers’ was not unusual in Europe at this time. Military Administration: A ‘Department of War’?147 The absence of a standing army militated against the establishment of a permanent bureaucratic cadre. However, closer inspection of the surviving records indicates the evolution of something akin to a fledgling department of war, that is to say the

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creation of a small number of centralised administrators known to each other, and the king, who took responsibility for this particular category of ‘payments.’148 Detailed accounts books specify extensive payments for military supplies and hardware, as well as indicating the growing army of accountants and administrators detailed to make orders and payments. This work is in no sense an administrative history, and makes no claims to take part in the wider ‘revolution in government’ debate.149 Over the course of Henry VIII’s reign, “pressure of circumstance produced a multiplication of offices and an increasingly complicated administration, which resulted in a large scale reorganisation and the emergence of bureaucratic departments of state in place of (more or less) household offices.”150 This has been extensively detailed elsewhere and only the briefest of overviews will be presented here. What is more important for this study is the relative professionalism of this body and its implications in terms of continuity of military experience. In examining the evolution of the ordnance office, and the navy board, I hope to establish that a relatively professional, and indeed permanent, body of officials existed by the end of the reign. Moreover, not only did they provide administrative continuity in peacetime, they also formed a small nucleus of skilled professionals in time of war.151 The supply of munitions and stores had, to some degree, been a function of the Privy Wardrobe, from as early as the reign of Edward III.152 The wardrobe’s responsibilities were diverse; from the purchase of jewels, food, wine and other necessities of the king’s household, to the mustering, payment and supply of troops, the appropriation and distribution of supplies, and even the transmission of orders.153 Early in the fifteenth century, it became apparent that the two aspects of the wardrobe’s work were so disparate as to demand a separate organisation for military affairs. The Ordnance Office can be traced to 1414 with the appointment of Nicholas Merbury as master of the ordnance.154 However, the ‘organisation’ retained an essentially administrative role throughout the fifteenth century; appointments to the position of ‘master’ were issued as a reward for loyal service to the king, and they were usually chosen from ushers of the chamber. They did, however, oversee the small professional nucleus of craftsmen, of gunners and master gunners, of bowyers, fletchers and founders, who plied their trade within the Tower and its precincts. Preparation for war required the co-ordination of vast numbers of men, the appropriation of diverse types of supplies, and management of large sums of money. A brief examination of English preparations for war with Scotland, in 1496-7, makes this eminently clear. Multiform commissions were issued for the “making of harness for the carriages, horses and mares for conveyance of the ordnance towards Scotland.”155 Similar commissions were issued for workmen,


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artificers and joiners for “making of necessaries for the conduct of the ordnance,” all authoursied “by the bill of the Master of the Ordnance of the household.156 By 8 December 1496 orders had been sent out for the purveyance of grain in Lincoln, Northampton, Bedford, Essex and Rutland. Commissioners were also appointed to “purvey empty vessels…for the carriage of victuals to the army.”157 Fletchers, smiths and sawyers were all required for the maintenance and supply of the army.158 Henry Fyner was required to levy artificers, founders and labourers to build foundries for the making of iron ordnance.159 On 26 December 1496, Henry Atkynson was commissioned to “take blacksmythes for making divers necessaries for the ordnance and to purvey iron, led, coal and other necessaries.” Further commissions were issued on the same day for ‘ropers’ and ‘whelewrightes’.160 On 19 January 1497, Humphrey Metcalf was ordered to inspect and seize ships in York and the ports of Northumberland, Holderness and ‘other northern parts’ and to enlist their ‘masters, governors and boys’, to convey the army itself to Scotland. Robert Brigandine, Clerk of the Navy, and William Barnefeld and Benedict Wever, yeomen of the crown, received similar commissions for the counties of Kent, Sussex, Dorset, Somerset and Southampton. Commissions were also issued for Somerset, Cornwall, Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, North Devon and South Devon, and the towns of Bristol and Lincoln. The truly national scale of these preparations quickly becomes apparent. On 26 January, patents were issued to John Sympson to take ‘bowyers, artificers and workmen’ to make bows for the army, again by the bill of the master of the ordnance of the household. All these arrangements pre-date the order of 21 February 1497 for the levying of “two thousand men for the expedition…in the counties of Wiltshire, Hampshire, Gloucestershire and Somerset and in the town of Bristol.”161 The scale of these arrangements is impressive in its enormity and the breadth of its requirements, from bowyers to gun founders and smiths to joiners. It also necessitated the coopting of a fleet to supply and transport the army north, this was in every sense a ‘combined arms’ operation, presenting a mammoth logistical and administrative challenge. The Ordnance Office at the Tower was principally a storehouse; private manufacturers ordinarily made guns, gunpowder and military supplies.162 Although often paid a ‘retainer’ and supplied by the crown, they were in no sense ‘crown employees’.163 At the outset of Henry VIII’s reign, the Ordnance Office comprised three key officials, a master, clerk and yeoman. The master was responsible for much of the day-to-day supervision of the office’s duties, overseeing multifarious payments, issuing supplies and commanding the artillery in time of war.164 The clerk and yeoman of the ordnance meanwhile had no set duties. The Ordnance Office also endured a very complicated financial system,

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that saw payments made on four different levels in the first half of the reign; direct from John Heron and the Chamber Treasury; between 1509 and 1512 from an account he retained specifically for the wars; from Daunce’s account for the wars; or by the special treasurer for military equipment, Sir John Cutte.165 The Ordnance Office did not escape the process of rationalisation and restructuring that was dramatically altering the face of Tudor government in this period. Over the course of the 1520s and 1530s, the offices of yeoman and clerk declined significantly. By 1545 one could clearly see the outline of the later Board of Ordnance; the clerk had been reduced to the role of internal bookkeeper, and two new posts established – Surveyor and Lieutenant.166 Moreover, although there was still no official ‘treasurer of the ordnance’, there had been a process of financial streamlining. The special accounts of Daunce and Cutte had come to an end in the late 1520s, dramatically simplifying peacetime payments; and from 1542, until the end of the reign, the Lieutenant of the Tower was seen to act as unofficial Treasurer to the Ordnance. However, this was only the start of a process of centralisation not finally consolidated until the reign of Elizabeth.167 Some form of discretionary fund began to appear in 1546. However, Ordnance finances remained far from independent during the reign of Henry VIII, “the normal procedure was for the Office to send in a bill of the money it owed at any given moment, and for a warrant to be issued on one of the central accounts for the amount involved.”168 Administration in Action: Campaign Examples, 1513-23 The successful outcome of the battle of Flodden necessarily need be understood in the context of the massive administrative and logistical challenge posed by warfare on the northern borders. While at Pontefract, massing his forces in the build up to the battle, the Earl of Surrey gave orders for Sir Nicholas Applyarde, Master of Ordinance to convey the Royal Ordinance north from London to Newcastle in anticipation of a Scottish invasion.169 The accounts of Miles Gerrard detail payments for “shippis of warre,” for the transporting of the “Kingis Armye Royall and other charges,” and for “the carriage of artillery northwards.”170 It is unclear exactly how many ships sailed north or exactly what they carried from these manuscripts. However, this does demonstrate the early institution of what one might term combined-arms operations, with the navy supporting the army in the field. The growing importance of administrators and accountants to the organisation of the army is also amply demonstrated in these papers, not least by the fact that Myles Gerrard, “treasorer of the werres,” for the “armye passed in a readines agenst the Scottis,” was ordered to give attendance on the army by the


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Queen and council.171 Gerrard “therupon dep(ar)ted oute of London with 26 men horsed besidis the cariage of treasoure and went therwith… to Stamford And ther taryed till he was commmanded by his que(en).”172 I would tentatively suggest that a very gradual advance towards greater professionalism could be seen here. Careful preparations were made for the shipment north of grain and other victuals for the army. Again the Navy had a crucial role to play in the supply of the army, the coordination of the two arms required a degree of administrative sophistication that many historians of the period would have us believe England lacked.173 Likewise the successful organisation of the campaign in France, in that same year, owed much to the administrative efforts of Wolsey. The abortion of Dorset’s expedition in 1512 had reflected badly on him, as much of the correspondence with Ferdinand was addressed to ‘Mr Almoner’.174 Wolsey was thus eager to eradicate memories of this failure, “he not only drew up estimates of the nature, amount and expenses of the armaments required, but was busy for months providing shipping, victuals, conduct-money, and other details.”175 Late in 1512 Henry was advised that the “sayd Army ryul shall numbrye of 30,000 fyhtyng men suffycyently armyd and arayed for the warres.”176 This document not only recognised in its suggestions the latest developments in ‘the art of war,’ but also hinted at a degree of sophistication in the planning and execution of Tudor military campaigns. Accounts for the campaign further reveal the provision of “fellyng axes, hedging billes, pykaxes,” and a plethora of practical tools and victualles necessary for the successful execution of the war.177 Lists for the rearward go so far as to reveal a cart designated to the transit of “sope and candell,” alongside more traditional military supplies such as “scalyng ladders,” and rope.178 It seems clear that extensive planning and preparation were put into the professional administration of the campaign. Detailed accounts books specify payments for military supplies and hardware as well as indicating the growing army of accountants and administrators detailed to make orders and payments. At this early stage in Henry’s reign, five people appear with particular regularity in the accounts, and were clearly at the heart of the system. Firstly, Sir John Daunce, who held various roles in the administration, including ‘Teller of the Exchequer,’ ‘Customer of London,’ and during the 1513 campaign in France, ‘paymaster’ (where he also acted as a liaison with the victuallers). Similarly John Heron held a number of key positions and was central to the financial supervision of Henry’s military acquisitions. Perhaps his most notable position was that of ‘Treasurer of the Chamber,’ other key posts were ‘clerk of the hanaper’ and the supervisor of the king’s customhouse. Sir Sampson Norton, master of the king’s ordnance and Sir Edward Guildford, master of the king’s armoury were also significant figures in

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the acquisition and production of new weaponry.179 The 1513 campaign would also reveal the importance of Sir Thomas Wyndham, treasurer of the fleet and vice admiral, who played a crucial role in recruiting and conducting soldiers and sailors. Alongside an army of deputies and other administrators (for example Sir John Cutte, John Blewbery or Hugh Fuller) they were closely engaged in Henry’s early military campaigns.180 It is important to be clear that no formal ‘department of war’ did conceptually or systemically exist, however, their roles in supervising, recording and authorising payments, had something approaching the same practical effect. Although, it is crucial to remember that, in France in 1513, ultimate responsibility in the absence of a formalised system rested with one individual, Wolsey.181 Similarly in 1522 the extensive arrangements made for the campaign do reveal something of the military acumen of the English State. Preparations were to be made to ensure that expert victuallers provided the army with sufficient supplies.182 The plans recognised that the nature of such an expedition raised the spectre of the army being “secluded from the passage of his victailes and folke to and from this realme.”183 With this in mind it was suggested that it would be “expedient to describe and appoint also an army for garding of the narowe sees w(ith) shippes,” to the number of 3,000 men.184 Arrangements were also to be made for defence against an attack from Scotland under the Duke of Albany.185 Victualling In France, in 1513, given the complexities of feeding such a large number of men, “the backbone of the wartime victualling services had to be provided...by the Royal household, the only body with experience of feeding large numbers.”186 Wolsey was closely engaged with this process, assisted in his preparations by William Hatteclyf, a Clerk of the Green Cloth.187 “Vittailles,” were carefully collected and shipped from “lyme, Sandwich and London,” amongst other ports. John Heron (Supervisor of the king’s Customs in London) was responsible for the negotiation and co-ordination of victualles and victuallers and detailed accounts reveal the sophisticated organisation involved in shipping bread, beer and oxen.188 John Rycroft, Sergeant of the Larder, was given responsibility for the provision of “malt what, beans and oats.”189 Whilst Roger Moore, Clerk of the Larder, took responsibility for the “payment of waggons,” and ‘carters.”190 John Shurley, Cofferer of the Household, provided for the “carrying of pavilions, tents, and other articles of the household,” as well as working alongside John Heron in the provision of general supplies, such as “beef, beer and biscuit.”191 The logistical success of the 1513 campaign was a reflection of the administrative capacities of


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Wolsey and the Household officers.192 Provisions were similarly successful for the 1523 campaign in France; extensive and careful preparations under the supervision of Sir John Daunce, Edward Weldon and William Stone, ensured the purchase of sufficient “p(ro)vysions,” such as “hoggsheddes, barrelles,” and “other necessaryes as well for the vytuylynge of the kinges shippes and other for his Armye royall into France.”193 Numerous payments were made for the shipping of “byer, byef…vnto the towne of Calais,” for the supply of the army.194 The success of this process is made clear by Gruffudd who related how “there was no lack of food or drink for fire or making huts, and plenty of straw to roof them and to lie on if they only fetched it.”195 The third campaign of Henry’s reign was already showing every sign of having learnt from the experiences of the first two. However, all did not always run so smoothly for the military administrators of early Tudor England.196 It is important to recognise that England, “relied almost exclusively on the Low Countries to provide them with food, munitions, carts and other forms of transport.”197 As we have seen, the Habsburgs proved themselves time and again, to be unreliable allies. They were equally as likely to change campaign objectives, as Ferdinand had done in 1512, or make a separate peace, as Charles V would do in 1544, as supply and support an English army in the manner stipulated at the outset of a campaign. In 1522, victualling problems, as well as insufficient artillery, blighted the campaign. The English had committed themselves to the invasion on 2 July by the Treaty of Waltham. However “this gave the Netherlands government inadequate time to prepare transport...and the shortage of horses and carts resulted in a glut of victuals at Calais and St Omer and a desperate shortage at the front line.”198 Despite the employment of two “expert purveyors of victuals,” Edward Weldon, Clerk of the Kitchen and William Brysewood, a merchant of Calais, the victualling of the campaign was rapidly proving a disaster.199 The situation is clearly illustrated in a letter from Brysewood to Nicholas Waryn, Customer of London. Brysewood bemoaned the “great want of carriage and conduct,” and complained that there “is 40li. (worth) of bread and 300 tuns of beer there (at Calais), which will soon be spoiled if not sent for,” – moreover he had written to Weldon, in the field, to this effect.200 Brysewood went on to warn Waryn not to send any more beer until asked “for your beer is so feeble it may not abide.”201 Thus, faced with a weak artillery train, disease and desertion, and after many debates, it was concluded that they should return to England - this in effect marked the end of the ‘campaign.’202

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The Navy Board The evolution of the Ordnance Office mirrored developments in naval administration (although the Ordnance Office did not enjoy the same level of financial independence). Whilst specific consideration of the navy remains beyond the remit of this thesis, the following outline of naval administrative expansion provides a useful context for our discussion of ‘continuity of experience’ and ‘professionalism’ amongst Henry’s ‘land based’ military establishment. In 1509 Henry possessed a meagre five ships, but during the course of his reign 47 more were built and 35 purchased in a massive programme of naval expansion. Concurrently, dockyard capacity was increased with new yards constructed at Portsmouth, Gillingham, Deptford and Woolwich by 1550. C. S. L. Davies has convincingly attributed this to England’s “strategic isolation,” and reliance on the continent for a number of crucial military supplies; most especially “gunpowder (because of the English failure to manufacture saltpetre) copper (for bronze guns) and cordage, for the Navy.”203 In this context, an alliance between France and the Holy Roman Empire (as would threaten in 1539) could potentially have seen England starved of military supplies from the continent. A strong Navy was thus essential to enforce continued access to the Italian and Baltic markets.204 Concurrent with this expansion was the development of increasingly sophisticated administrative systems. By the reign of Elizabeth I a board of seven officials, the ‘Office of the Admiralty and Marine Affairs’, had been established, with clear guidelines on the administrative and financial management of the Navy.205 The maturation of the Navy Board has been identified by N. A. M. Rodger as “the single most important achievement of sixteenth-century England in relation to sea-power.”206 This board had its origins in the final years of Henry VIII’s reign. References to the “admiralles cowrte,” appear in the Acts of Privy Council during May 1545, indicating some understanding of an operational ‘Admiralty’.207 However, the exact date of its operational emergence remains unclear. At the start of Henry’s reign a specifically commissioned treasurer made naval payments on an ad hoc basis, whilst all-important Naval decisions were the prerogative of ‘central government’ or more clearly Henry himself. Although the position of ‘Clerk of the Ships’ existed (held by Robert Brigandine until his retirement in 1523) he had no budget of his own, indeed any warrants issued by the treasury were assigned to a specific named task.208 Moreover, he remained just one of a number of informal channels through which the Tudor navy was administered. Tudor government was very much centred on the household, in the early part of his reign, and this was reflected in the administration of Henry’s


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Navy, with various members of the nobility, court and household customarily seconded to some specific task. For example in 1513 the responsibility for victualling fell to Bishop Fox and the Southampton Customers, whilst the wages of sailors and hire of ships was the responsibility of a specifically commissioned treasurer, Sir Thomas Wyndham.209 In 1539 William Gonson, Clerk of the Erith Storehouse, received an unspecified payment of £500 “to be employed by him about his Highness’ affairs upon the sea.”210 This marked the first instance of a discretionary budget for a naval administrator; during sustained warfare, from 1539 until the time of his death in 1544, Gonson was to all intents and purposes the ‘paymaster’ of the navy.211 A memoranda of July 1545 identified a ‘Navy Board’ inclusive of Sir Thomas Clere, vice admiral; Sir William Woodhouse, Master of Ordnance; Robert Legge, Comptroller; William Broke, a surveyor and rigger; as well as Benjamin Gonson, Clerk of the Ships and Richard Howlet clerk of the Store under the comptroller. Most of these positions were confirmed by patents of April 1546 ‘payable from Christmas last’.212 From this one might deduce that a formal ‘administration’ was in operation from Christmas 1544/45. Each member of the board had responsibility for a particular aspect of naval administration; meeting together regularly the board served as an advisory body to the Lord Admiral. All were experienced in naval matters, indeed the summer of 1545 saw three of its members in command of ships or squadrons at sea.213 Moreover, with the exception of the tenure of the child Duke of Richmond (1525-36), and Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford (who held the post for less than a month in 1542), all the Lord Admirals of the period had naval experience. Indeed in 1522 and 1546 the Lord Admiral would lead his fleet into combat with the French.214 It is necessary to recognise that the administration of the Ordnance Office and the Navy remained elementary for much of the reign. However, the period was one of great significance, laying the foundations for the more professional administration of the Elizabethan Navy and Board of Ordnance. This is a matter for administrative historians; what is more important here is the evolution of a body of ‘military professionals’ - a ‘department of war’ that provided continuity of experience from one campaign to the next. It is crucial to recognise that “the two establishments were very comparable and both indicated the high priority which the king gave to military technology.”215 Moreover, there was a degree of co-operation between the two boards and it is worth briefly considering here the issue of naval ordnance. Sir William Woodhouse was appointed master of the ordnance for the Navy in 1546. This role saw him accountable to both boards for the ordnance he issued to the fleet; although he bought small arms separately, he relied on the Ordnance Board’s

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habiliments for heavy ordnance. Prior to this appointment ships had been issued with ordnance directly from the stores at the Tower, or else the ship’s treasurer purchased ordnance independently and claimed the money back from the government.216 As the reign progressed, there appears to have developed a growing sense of co-operation amongst a small body of military administrators, a rudimentary department of war one might suggest. The king’s armourers and regional ordnance establishments, for example in Ireland and at Calais, supplemented these central administrators. The armoury was “a much less important office,” than either the Ordnance Office or the Navy Board. A master supported by a clerk and a yeoman governed the Office and oversaw the payment of wages and purchase of raw materials and complete sets of harness.217 There were “no large scale changes in this period,” to the administration of the armourers.218 The exchequer accounts at the outset of the reign abound with payments to John Blewbery, yeoman of the ordnance, for the wages of the foreign armourers in Henry’s pay, Italian, Belgium, and more famously ‘Almain’ armourers.219 The king’s ‘Almain armourers’ “turned out work that competed on equal terms with the finest productions of Milan or Augusburg.”220 However, the celebrity now enjoyed by the ‘Almain armourers’ is far beyond their real importance to the wider ordnance establishment. Their principal role was to make aesthetically pleasing armour for jousts and state occasions, to be worn by the king and certain members of his household.221 They would also have been required, intermittently, to repair and maintain the armour in stock. The armoury itself functioned more widely as a storehouse for the harness purchased by the king. The officials of the ordnance establishment made payments and received various supplies and material; for example “a hide of leather to cover new harness conveyed to the king at Nottingham,” or “a great bekehorne, a small bekehorne, a hanging pype stake,” for the “newe forge at Greenwich.”222 However, it is important to remember that the king had no responsibility to provide harness for his troops and consequently the amount of armour in store varied considerably. The king’s artillery was operated, administered and commanded on a national, regional and ‘extraordinary’ basis, whereby as well as the Master of the Ordnance and Master Gunner at the tower, Master Gunners and Masters of the Ordnance were locally, and extraordinarily appointed (i.e. for some specific campaign). For example, Christopher Morris, a gunner at the Tower, was serving as ‘Master Gunner’ with the fleet in 1522.223 Similarly, in 1513, Sir Sampson Norton was in overall command of the artillery in France, serving in the vanguard, Norton’s retinue totaled 1,079 men comprising smiths, carters, miners, wheelers, soldiers, carpenters, masons, gunners and so on.224 However, each ward of the army had its


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own distinct ordnance establishment, complete with a master of the ordnance (Lord Berners in the middleward, and Lord Curson for the rearward).225 This is perhaps more clearly illustrated in the garrisons; in December 1514, Sir Sampson Norton held the position of national Master of the Ordnance, however ‘masters’ were also appointed to command the artillery at Calais and Berwick.226 Thus, the key garrisons retained their own Master of the Ordnance, Master Gunners, founders and supporting administrative staff, separate from that in London, over which the central office at the tower had little direct, day-to-day control.227 However, these garrison establishments were invariably (although not exclusively) diminutive by comparison with the Tower of London.228 The Irish Ordnance office in Dublin acted simply as a storehouse. Trainor noted that “the Dublin office had no independent life of its own as a manufactory,” and “even as a clearing house its range was restricted, for munitions and equipment going to the common soldiers were passed on to him without direct financial dealing with the office.”229 The ‘treasurer-at-war’ recouped the cost through deductions from the soldiers next wage packet. Turning to Calais, the case is a little different; Grummitt has argued that under Edward IV “it may be that manufacture and storage of ordnance in the Tower was on a smaller scale than that in Calais.”230 However, during the reign of Henry VII, “the Tower of London was reestablished as the central supply depot,” and “the manufacture of and storage of ordnance was tied even closer to the royal household.”231 Nevertheless, Calais continued to be an important ordnance depot during the reign of Henry VIII, a reflection, no doubt, of its role as the principal staging post for Henry’s continental incursions. Indeed, it was invariably the case that much of the ordnance that had accompanied the ‘army royal’ onto the continent found itself left at Calais.232 Ffoulkes commented that the foundry at Calais “must have been of some importance, as the brothers Owen cast the great double cannon and other guns there for Henry VIII.”233 A survey of ordnance at Calais in May 1536 amply demonstrates the enormity of its ordnance establishment. The survey identified 38 guns positioned on the walls including “sacres, falcons, culverins, bastard culverins, mortars, and serpentines.”234 The foundry at Calais boasted “35 double cannons, demy cannons, port-pieces,” and 10 handguns, with 25 brass mortars with iron and stone shot in the ‘yard of ordnance.’235 The ‘house of ordnance at Bullen gate’ harboured “2,740 good yew bows,” iron and dice or iron shot for sacres and hackbutts, 152 hackbutts, holywatersprinklers, saltpetre, sulhpur, coal and powder, in short all manner of supplies. Moreover, in the storehouse “over against the house of ordnance,” there were 16 double cannons, “culverins of Hans Poppenrutters making, and mortars, iron shot, spears unheaded after the North fashion, Cullyn Clyffs,” and more.236 Similarly, a substantial amount of artillery

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was left at Tournai after its capture in 1513, maintained and manned by a sizable ordnance establishment.237 On 4 July 1516 a request was made to the king for “200 or 300,” gunners “to be sent till the citadel is out of danger.”238 Although this number was not authorised, the treasurer’s accounts show 10 Master gunners and 80 gunners under Thomas Hert ‘Master of the Ordnance, a not inconsiderable number, served the purpose in the event. A wider establishment inclusive of one clerk of the ordnance, ten manservants, twenty-two pioneers, a bowyer, a fletcher, a master smith and a master carpenter supported these men.239 These establishments were replicated at Berwick (although on a substantially smaller scale) and later at Boulogne, and clearly demonstrate that a growing body of military professionals was able to provide continuity of experience during peace and war.240 It seems apparent that England boasted a ‘permanent establishment’ of sorts. The nobility provided some degree of continuity in command, and on some level men like Thomas Howard and Charles Brandon assuredly retained the experiences of one campaign for the next. This ‘institutional memory’ was augmented by the small body of permanent ‘professionals’ that served in the garrisons, Yeoman of the Guard, Spears and later the Gentlemen Pensioners. This fledgling ‘professionalism’ was likewise evident in the expanding body of military administrators, exemplified in the administration of the Navy and Ordnance Office. Henry’s England was demonstrating a distinct willingness to adapt and improve existing systems to increase military efficiency.

Chapter 7 The gunners This chapter will explore the practical role of the gunners who were “administered by the Board of Ordnance,” and serviced and commanded the nation’s artillery in time of war and peace.1 C. S. L. Davies has suggested that the role of gunner at the Tower of London was principally an honourific one, concluding “the position, in fact, seems to have been primarily a mark of favour.”2 However, it is my contention that these men formed a small core of skilled professionals, able to fight, train, prove and manufacture the king’s artillery. Their employment at the Tower was not principally or solely a form of retainer or license for them to secure crown contracts to manufacture artillery, rather they were required to command their pieces in battle. More importantly, they provided much of the continuity of experience historians have claimed to be sadly lacking in England at this time. Under Henry VII, the number of gunners employed in England had increased dramatically from 30 in 1489 to almost 50 by the turn of 1497. The Spring of that year brought preparations for war with Scotland and an “influx of Dutch gunners,” so that “by midsummer Henry had 200 gunners employed in his realm, the majority of whom were Englishmen who had adapted continental practice to English circumstances.”3 However, on 8 July 1503, the number of permanent gunners at the tower stood at “elleven,” with “ev(er)y of them at six pence the day.”4 This anomaly is explicable on two levels; firstly, the number of gunners in crown employ was naturally increased in time of war or crisis – as of course was the case with the ‘infantry’ or cavalry. Therefore it seems likely that this figure of 200 men was raised specifically in preparation for war that year. Secondly, there is an important differentiation that needs to be made between ‘gunners at the tower’ and the gunners employed in garrison across the kingdom. For the moment, my principal concern will be with gunners employed as part of a ‘permanent establishment’ at the Tower. By 1508, the last year of Henry VII’s reign, this figure had risen to 12 and Roger English, Master Gunner.5 This number was sustained for the opening years of Henry’s reign; however it was not long before Henry VIII too sought to expand the number of gunners in his permanent employ. By January 1526 thirty gunners were counted amongst the permanent staff at the Tower.6 This was matched by an expansion in the number of gunners in the wider establishment as Henry recruited both foreign and domestic gunners to serve in the major garrions; “during his

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reign he added appreciably to the establishment.”7 At the head of this establishment sat the Master of the Ordnance. The earliest Masters had been selected from the king’s household; the fifteenth century post was in many ways a sinecure, a reward for loyal service to their king. Furthermore, and crucially from our perspective, the post was essentially an administrative one. However by the turn of the sixteenth century, they also retained a practical role in the field: “they were men of action, not sedentary officials…theirs was the life of the camp rather than that of the office.”8 During Henry VIII’s reign four men were employed as Master of the Ordnance, Sir Sampson Norton, Sir William Skeffington, Sir Christopher Morris and Sir Thomas Seymour. Their responsibilities were various from the purchase and production of cannon and command of artillery in the field, to the assessment of fortifications, training of gunners and proof of artillery pieces. They were in every sense administrators, craftsmen and warriors.9 The ‘Masters of the Ordnance’ would accompany the king’s artillery to France in 1513, 1522-3 and 1544-6, serve in suppression of rebellion in Ireland, in garrison at Calais and Tournai, and successive invasions of Scotland. They provided a form of professional continuity perhaps absent elsewhere in the ‘army’. The first ‘professional’ gunner to rise through the ranks of the ordnance establishment to take the position of ‘Master’ was Sir Christopher Morris.10 It seems appropriate that the analysis of the professionalism and continuity of experience provided by the ordnance establishment should take the loose form of a career biography of this man.11 Morris, Master of the Ordnance from 1537-1544, had first served in command of a culverin on the 1513 campaign in France, and was confirmed as a ‘gunner’ at the Tower of London by patent in December 1513.12 After a brief spell in garrison at Tournai in the early months of 1514, a second patent appointing him ‘gunner at the tower of London’ in August of that year confirmed Morris’ return to London.13 In November 1515 he again turned up at Tournai as a ‘gunner quartermaster’. The exact nature of Morris’ role in Tournai at this time is unclear. The Governor was informed that Morris was appointed to do some special service for the king and was to be allowed to come and go freely. Such autonomy over his movements was unusual for a gunner at this time.14 This has led Cruickshank to suggest that he was probably serving as a spy for the king.15 In the summer of 1522, he was aboard one of the ships in Surrey’s fleet, serving as the “lorde Admyrall’s” master gunner, a role that saw him play an integral part in the capture of a small French coastal town.16 Having landed in the ‘haven of Morles’ (Morlaix) in ‘Brytaigne’ “all men were commaunded to geve their attendance on their capitaines,” as an attack on the town was prepared. Fourteen pieces of small ordnance, ‘Falcons’, were brought on land and as many as 7,000 soldiers (although given Hall’s penchant for exaggeration this figure may well have been somewhat smaller).17 Amongst the landing party were Sir William Skeffington, Master of the Ordnance, and Christopher Morris. The citizens of Morlaix raised the alarm and

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closed the gates, laying ordnance to guard the weakest approaches to the city walls.18 A tumultuous exchange between English longbow-men and Breton crossbow-men ensued, in which the Bretons “defended themselves manfully.”19 An assault was launched, led by Sir Richard Wingfield, Nicholas Carew, Fraunces Bryan and Sir John Wallop; and supported by three ‘Falcons’ under the command of Morris. At first Morris was thwarted by hackbutters placed in and around the gate by the Bretons; “the master gunner of tymes shot, but the Britons had set the gate full of hacbusshes.”20 The first approach having failed, Morris resolved to “strake the locke of the wicket,” - in effect blowing open the gate and “in the smoke of the gunnes let us entre the gate.” The town was soon taken and the soldiers fell to looting and pillage.21 This exchange is illustrative of a number of key points, not least an early engagement between English light artillery and French small firearms. Morris showed himself to be a highly skilled and accurate gunner. Yet more interesting is Hall’s description of Morris as ‘the master gunner’ and his apparent command of the artillery, despite the presence of “the Master of the kynges ordinaunce, Sir Willyam Skevyngton.”22 Furthermore, Morris’ formal appointment as master gunner, or ‘chief gunner at the tower’ would not take place for a further five years. This is indicative of the ‘extraordinary’ appointment of master gunners and masters of the ordnance described above.23 1523 proved a busy year for the king’s gunner, who served as a lieutenant of the ordnance in the Duke of Suffolk’s invasion of France.24 Morris was a member of the retinue of Sir William Skeffington, the king’s Master of the Ordnance. Something of his position within the ordnance establishment can be gleamed from his pay and that of the other ‘officers’ of the ordnance. The Master of the Ordnance was paid the substantial sum of 10s., whilst Thomas Hert, the Master Gunner, received 4s and Morris as lieutenant received 3s.4.d.25 These three men formed the ‘executive officers’ of a much larger ordnance establishment. The role of these men in the field was clearly laid down in the Cambridge variant of the mid-century military manuscripts discussed above (Text B).26 The Master of the Ordnance took overall responsibility for the artillery on campaign, the performance of his guns and gunners - supplies, transportation, placement on the battlefield and entrenchment - ultimately rested with this man. Text B stated that he “ought to be a man skilfull in all pointes canonarge,” and able to instruct his “Lieutenannete comptrollers clerkes conductes commoners and artificers teaching them best to convey their chardges.”27 He was to ensure that “everye pece of ordennance,” was well mounted “wheles shodd and stronglie bounde w(ith) yron in all pointes.”28 Finally he was to ensure all men under his command were doing their jobs properly.29 The Lieutenant of the Ordnance was to be qualified “in all pointes as the M(aster).” He was to be able to instruct, reform and correct all gunners and artificers in their ‘science’. He was also to view the artillery regularly, and in the event of finding it “unredie and not s(er)vicable shall cause it to be amendid or elles shew it to the M(aster) of the Ordennance who shall see redresse.”30

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Although, in 1523 the pay scales described above would seem to suggest that Morris was either serving as a deputy to Hert, the chief Master Gunner, or else the position of lieutenant to the Master of the Ordnance was considered of less rank and importance than that of Master Gunner. It is difficult to be conclusive on this point. The next link in the chain of command was the Master Gunner who similarly “must be experte in that science,” and competent to appoint “suche men to be cannoners as have like experience.” More importantly he was to “see that ev(er)y cannoner appointedd to anie pece of ordenannce be able to governe the same as to that coninge science apteynethe.”31 He performed the role of ‘company commander’, overseeing the performance of the gunners, training them where necessary and ensuring the proper maintenance of the cannon in his charge.32 In 1523 two figures stand out as ‘chief’ master gunners, both paid at the rate of 4s. per day, Thomas Hert and Hans Van Andwarpe (almost certainly a Dutch specialist recruited by Henry for the campagin). Hert’s ‘retinue of gunners’ further included 11 ‘master gunners’ paid at 16d. per day, and 2 at 12d per day, overseeing 30 gunners, a ratio of just under 1 ‘Master’ for every two gunners.33 The staggered pay scale hints at the development of a chain of command; clearly different levels of pay must have been associated with varied levels of responsibility. The gunners themselves were captains of large teams of artificers, labourers and pioneers. The gunner was thought to be above “loading and other less technical matters,” which were rather the responsibility of labourers and, or, “servitor (trainee) gunners”.34 A further examination of Thomas Hert’s retinue of gunners in 1523 demonstrates a discrepancy in the pay of the gunners: 24 were paid at 8d. per day 6 were paid at 6d. a day. It is possible that this differentiation represents the distinction between the gunner and the ‘servitor’ gunner. However, a glance back to 1513 provides an alternative perspective. In a document detailing the wages of the rearward, two gunners were assigned to each piece (this is an unusually high ratio if one takes this to mean two trained gunners, a trained gunner and a trainee seems more likely). The document identified 200 gunners, paid as follows: “such as shoot bombardes and bombardyns, 2s. a day, such as shoot a great piece as curtowe or postill, 16d., such as shoot orgonnes or fawconys 8d.”35 That is to say a distinction was made in the gunner’s pay scale reflecting the relative proficiency or importance attached to the specific piece of ordnance. An intriguing payment of 8d. per day was made to “their men in each case,” – a possible reference to the servitor gunner. The “chief conductor of the guns,” received a sum of 4s per day; in 1513, as in 1523, this funtion was fulfilled by Thomas Hert, Master Gunner.36 This is another important indication of continuity of experience within the Tudor ordnance establishment.37 There are also indications of the responsibilities and expectations placed on the gunner. The gunner, or “cannoner”, was to “be skilfull in the height and weight of his powder and shotte,” was to “diligentlie serche and trye that she be clene from honie combes righte boredd and … her toche hole clere.”38

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Furthermore, he was to ensure it was well mounted and that he had all the appropriate equipment, for example “ladle spunge pryminge yron mowldes for haile shott,” and so on.39 The gunner was to be proficient in all elements of aiming and firing his piece and apprised of all the classifications of ordnance in common use at this time. He was to know how much powder should be used, how many times a day it could be fired and how many horses or oxen were required to draw it, and to be able to repair and maintain his piece in the field and keep it clean. The gunner would have been able to make and refine saltpetre, and fully grasped the relative ballistic qualities of dry and moist powder. He would have had some idea of the relative effect of atmospheric pressure on the trajectory of cannon fire, and would have been skilled in mathematics and geometry so as to be able to chart any patch of ground, construct mines, countermines and earthworks.40 The gunner was in every sense, therefore, a highly skilled battlefield combatant and peacetime artificer.41 A relatively sophisticated chain of command was in place by 1523 (at the latest, and probably earlier), with one master gunner supervising roughly two gunners; each cannon would have been commanded by a gunner, supported by a team of labourers, pioneers and or servitor gunners. Two chief ‘master gunners’, Thomas Hert and Hans van Andwarpe, took responsibility for the overall supervision of the English and Dutch gunners. Christopher Morris, it seems, supported Hert, in this role, as lieutenant. Atop the whole establishment sat the Master of the Ordnance, supervising all the cannon, gunners and multifarious support staff. This was in every sense a ‘modern’ artillery train operating a relatively advanced command structure, which at times is hidden to the modern eye by the absence of recognisable nomenclature distinguishing noncommissioned officers (NCO’s). April 1524 saw Morris in command of the ordnance at Valenciennes; however, much of the remainder of the 1520s would see him employed on ‘special’ engagements for the king.42 One is drawn back to his special engagements for the king at Tournai in 1515. In the early months of 1527 he was responsible for delivering letters to and from London and Henry’s envoys in Valladolid.43 In February of that year he was appointed ‘Chief Gunner in the Tower’, at 12d. per day, most probably in recognition for his service to the king. The trust placed in Morris by the king became clear in September as he carried messages to and from Compiegne, as Henry sounded out the possibility of divorce with his envoys to Rome.44 Thus far we have seen Morris as a gunner, master gunner, spy and special envoy. 1530 and 1531 would see him adopt the role of fortifications engineer, or at the least inspector of fortifications. After a brief spell in Ireland in 1530, he was sent to Calais, were he spent the remainder of the year, and the early months of 1531, inspecting the town’s fortifications and those at Guisnes Castle.45 By 1532 he was being employed inspecting fortifications at Carlisle.46 This was a role adopted on numerous occasions by Henry’s master gunners and successive

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Masters of the Ordnance. Francis Markham concluded, in 1622, that the Master of the Ordnance ought to draw into his consideration the nature and quality of all fortifications, and that they are made and framed as well to withstand the offence of artillery, as to defend and keep themselves with the help of artillery.”47 Although drafted in 1622, this statement rang true of the master gunners and masters of the ordnance of the sixteenth century. In November 1522, Wolsey wrote to Dacre that he had sent him, “at his request, Thomas Herte, the king’s Master Gunner for the fortifying of places on the borders.”48 Similarly, in January 1529, Sir William Skeffington, Master of the Ordnance, was closely involved in rebuilding work and the “ord(ering) and mounting (of) Henry’s ordnance,” at “Guynes, Hamps and Newnhambridge and the castle at Calais.”49 By 1537 Morris himself was again closely engaged with the re-fortification of Berwick, Carlisle and Guisnes Castle.50 Similarly, throughout much of 1546, Sir Thomas Seymour, recently appointed master of the ordnance, was accompanying his brother, the Earl of Hertford, ‘inspecting fortifications’ in and around Calais and Bolougne.51 Evidently the role of gunner and fortifications engineer were closely linked; it is worthwhile remembering that John Rogers, perhaps England’s foremost military engineer, had himself been appointed a gunner at the tower in 1541 and Clerk of the Ordnance in 1544.52 Returning to Morris’ career path, a payment from the privy-purse expense account of the king, in 1532, details how ‘Christopher Morys, gunner, Cornelys Johnson, the Master Smith and Henry Johnson’ were paid 10s. each a day each, to ride to Portsmouth and view the ordnance there.53 Furthermore, as early as April 1524, a patent had referred to Christopher Morris as ‘overseer of the ordnance’.54 This is intriguing; C. S. L. Davies described the responsibilities of the surveyor as “the inspection of new materials and the taking of ordnance brought back from ships or military ventures.”55 However, whilst admitting that Henry Johnson “had been active about the surveyor’s duties before he was officially appointed,” the post itself was not formally created until 1538.56 Seemingly the post existed in some sense, be it locally, extraordinarily or even on a national level, as early as 1524. Furthermore, the 1532 privy-purse payment shows Morris working closely with Henry Johnson, himself a master gunner, and the man Davies credits with being the first appointee of the office.57 Cornelius Johnson, as well as being the king’s Master Smith, had also been created a gunner at the tower in November 1510; all three men were gunners.58 Here again this study can peal away a layer of the command structure and responsibilities of the gunner in the ordnance establishment. It seems indisputable that the role and responsibilities of the ‘overseer’ existed prior to the national ‘creation’ of the post in 1538. Moreover, the responsibilities of the ‘overseer’ had always been part of the role of the gunner, and more clearly the master gunner. Francis Markham specified that the master gunner, as well as being responsible for “the care and maintenance of the equipment in his charge…was to keep a register of all ordnance, iron as well as brass, in all ships, castles, forts, blockhouse or garrisons, as well as those remaining

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in store, giving their natures, weights, lengths and dimensions at base, trunnions and muzzle, so that it could be produced….when required.”59 This process of inspection also brings us to the question of the ‘proof’ of artillery pieces. Hogg described how “the complete process of deciding whether a store is serviceable – consists of proof and examination, and the duty of inspection was laid down as long ago as 1456 in the patent appointing John Hudde, Master of the Ordnance.”60 The proof of guns was achieved by submitting them to a strain they were never likely to be placed under in active service. That is to say repeated firing to find out how many times a given piece of ordnance could be fired in one day, and what charges of powder it could safely receive.61 Clearly this process of inspection would have involved the firing of the cannon to establish their operational readiness. The accounts of the period are full of payments detailing the testing of guns at ‘myle end’ in London. For example, in August 1514 Thomas Hert, Master Gunner, was provided with seven barrels of gunpowder for the purpose of ‘proving’ cannon.62 However, a document relating to Norfolk’s raid on Scotland in 1542 would seem to suggest that this process was not always carried out either as efficiently or as regularly as it should have been. The letter, from Sir Arthur Darcy to the Duke of Norfolk, described how “by the advice of the Master Gunner and of Best, Master gunner of Berwick, I have proved all the bassys and find but one whole.”63 He complained that “the forlowkes breakys and pynes evyn bye the chambrys, so that noon off them wyll serve.”64 Blame is attributed to Cornelius Johnson, the king’s master smith, and the master of the ordnance (by this time Sir Christopher Morris) for not “assaying (examining or proving) them.”65 This document is, at face value, a damning indictment of the inefficiency of the king’s master smith and master of the ordnance, in this instance. However, what it does demonstrate is that a definite system of manufacture and proof was in operation, and that, although they failed in this example, these two men were the recognised ‘heads’ of ‘quality control’. However, we are rushing ahead of ourselves as far as Morris’ career path goes, and must now step back to the 1530s. In 1535 Morris was outwardly engaged in a search for gunners in Denmark and North Germany.66 At the end of June 1535, Chapuys, the Imperial ambassador, was writing to his master Charles V that “the king’s master gunner returned 3 days ago from Lubeck and Denmark, and it said that he has brought with him 100 fellows, gunners, and captains, and old soldiers.”67 However, further investigation indicates that Morris’ mission may rather have been one of intelligence gathering and diplomatic manouvre. Denmark played an important role in the supply of material for the English fleet. Henry VIII noted that “the most parte of thinges for the quipage of ships commith…(from)…or must passe by,” Denmark.68 In 1535, as the Danes grappled with a succession dispute, Henry considered the possibility of becoming king of either Denmark or Sweden; and with this in mind he allied himself with “the revolutionary Lubeckers under George Wollenwver.”69 By 6 September, Chapuys was writing that the king was “equipping three ships,” under the

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command of Morris to intervene in the crisis.70 He continued that “to cover the affair they give out that these ships are going to Holland…but I think he will soon not only confess the truth of the said voyage, but some particulars of his charge besides.”71 Confirmation of Morris’ captaincy of the ship, ‘the Sweepstake’, and the muster of 92 soldiers to serve on that ship, for the initial period of one month, was provided on 19 September.72 However, news of reversals for the Lubeckers, the capture of in excess of a dozen English merchantmen by the Danish fleet, and the false report of the fall of Warberg castle, led Henry to cancel the proposed expedition at the eleventh hour.73 Thus, by 23 September Morris was reporting the discharge of all soldiers and the return of the provisions and ordnance he had received by the king’s warrant.74 Returning to Morris’ earlier visit to Denmark, ostensibly for purpose of recruiting gunners and soldiers, one is reminded that of all the men Morris brought back from Denmark, only two accompanied him to London, one of whom was the brother of the Captain of Lubeck.75 On 25 September 1535 Chapuys described to his master the king’s astonishment at the news of the defeat his allies had suffered; noting that he and his council had “used big words against the captain (Christopher Morris) under whose charge the ships were to go, because he had disguised matters in a different fashion from what appears by the event.”76 Bearing this in mind, it appears unlikely that Morris was trying to recruit gunners, soldiers or engineers to serve the English, as has been suggested by Pollard and Hogg.77 Rather, as had so often been the case throughout his career, he was engaged on a sensitive ‘diplomatic’ engagement for Henry; clearly he was a trusted part of his intelligence and diplomatic network, as well as a gunner and captain. Morris was finally appointed as Henry’s Master of the Ordnance in February 1536 at a rate of 2s. a day.78 The first man to achieve this rank from within the establishment had done so by a mixture of his expertise in the science of gunnery (not least demonstrated in France in 1513, at Morlaix in 1522, and under Suffolk in 1523) and by serving Henry loyally on a variety of ‘sensitive’ missions to the continent throughout his career (in 1515, 1527 and 1535). This was therefore not a complete departure from the tradition of rewarding loyalty through the bestowing of the Mastership. However, in Morris, the king was appointing a knowledgeable gunner and administrator, with experience in the operations of the Ordnance establishment during war and peace. In October 1536 Morris was involved in the preparation of ordnance for the expedition against the Pilgrimage of Grace. Writing in Morris’ absentia “this present Sunday,” Sir Edmund Walsingham described to the Duke of Suffolk the ordnance he could expect to receive. This was to include as many as 16 Falcons with shot and powder.79 It is unclear if Morris actually marched north or remained in London; he was closely involved in these military preparations providing continuity of experience. In 1537, Morris was again demonstrating his skill as a fortifications engineer at Berwick and Carlisle, while he was also closely involved in the upgrading of the fortifications at Guisnes, in the Calais Pale, in the April of

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that year.80 The patent ostensibly establishing England’s oldest surviving regiment, the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) as it now is, or “the fraternity or guild of St. George” as it was constituted, was issued in August 1537. It entrusted the oversight of “the science of artillery,” (longbows, crossbows and ‘hand-gonnes’) to, amongst others, Sir Christopher Morris, Master of the Ordnance.81 The Guild would be principally concerned with the shooting of small-firearms, both handguns and muskets, and longbow and crossbows. It is clearly indicative of the importance of ‘small artillery’ to the English tactical system in the mid-1530s, and indeed of a growing move towards firearms. G. Goold Walker, the biographer of the HAC, went further to suggest that the Guild was in fact in existence much earlier, citing a payments on the ‘king’s roll’ to the ‘Fraternity of Saint George’s Guild’ of 13s. 4d. Walker argued that although “Guilds of that name were not uncommon in England at that period,” when one remembers Henry’s “well known love for archery…these records may well be taken to indicate royal support of a Guild of Archers and an interest which culminated later in the Grant of a charter.”82 Sadly, as Walker himself admits, firm evidence for this is insufficient, especially given the loss of the HAC’s early records during the Civil War. Nevertheless, it is entirely likely that Henry would have sought to promote archery, and ‘small artillery’, in this way from the outset of his reign. In 1539 the threat of a Catholic crusade against the heretical English loomed large, and extensive defensive preparations were made against this eventuality. Henry initiated a mammoth building programme, adapting old fortifications and constructing new ones.83 Not the least of the problems faced by Henry’s government in 1539 was a shortage of gunners. In February 1539 Cromwell’s ‘Remembrances’ included provision for “a book to be made of the king’s gunners and musters to be taken of them.”84 In April Sir Thomas Cheyney, writing to Cromwell describing preparations for the defence of the Cinque Ports, complained that “I have only two gunners; a dozen at least are wanted.”85 Such concerns were echoed in correspondence between garrison commanders and London throughout the country over the course of 1539.86 On 23 April John Marshal wrote to Cromwell from Nottinghamshire explaining, “there are no gunners here by reason of the statute against cross bows and guns.”87 Extensive preparations were made to rectify this by the recruitment of foreign specialists and letters were sent to agents on the continent to recruit as many experienced gunners, willing to serve on land and at sea, as possible.88 In March 1540 Sir Christopher Morris compiled a “booke of rates for Capitaines constables deputies souldeours porters and gonners for the safe keping of the kinges castelles and bullwekes of late newe divised by his Ma(jesties) commaundment.”89 Nineteen separate bulwarks or blockhouses were identified as operational by this stage, garrisoned by a total of 220 men; a figure that would be substantially supplemented by the civilian militia in the event of invasion. A breakdown of these troops reveals over 50% of the contingent to be gunners.90

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March 1540: Garrisons: 220 Soldiers

Capitaines 8%

Soldiers 24%

Deputies 7%

Porters 7%

Gunners 54%

(See: BL., Royal App.89, ff.23-f.26) The English government clearly recognised the value and importance of artillery, and trained growing numbers of ‘gunners’. This chart illustrates that the English were not only aware of the new ‘conditions’ created by artillery but were rapidly training their troops to fight in a new, more scientific era of warfare. The training of new gunners, for service on land and with the fleet, was conducted centrally by the gunners at the Tower. Training was undertaken in the ‘Teasel Ground’ off Bishopsgate in London, on a site shared by the ‘Guild of St.George’ and the gunners of the Tower. Indeed it was not until 1581 that that a request was made to allow training to be conducted at the seaport towns and garrisons in the ‘science of artillery.’91 In July 1541 the Privy Council drafted a letter to Sir Christopher Morris “to give him quarterly a barrel of saltpetre to make powder and pellets for their use which the king’s majesty had appointed him to teach to shoot a gun.”92 However, whilst overall responsibility for training rested with Morris as the ‘executive head’ of the ‘Ordnance establishment’, specific responsibility for the instruction of new gunners rested with the Master Gunners (who themselves had been appointed by the Master of the Ordnance). The position of ‘Chief Master Gunner at the Tower’ was held successively by Thomas Hert (1509-26) and Morris himself (1526-37). In

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1537 Christopher Gold was made ‘Master of the King’s Gunners in the Tower of London and England.’93 The new title recognised the national responsibilities that the post had always carried for supervising guns and gunners across the country. As ‘Master Gunner’, he was required to oversee the instruction of new gunners and the training of experienced gunners, exercising “them once a month in winter and twice a month in the summer.”94 As Master Gunner, Gold was required to report on each of his students to the Master of the Ordnance, Morris, and “was not to recommend anyone for the fees of an established gunner,” unless he was fully satisfied of their ability in all aspects of gunnery.95 Markham also recognised that that any gunner that “had served abroad with artillery in the field therby attaining his proficiency in the subject,” would be required to demonstrate their ability to the Master Gunner.96 This is interesting, as we have seen, in the field, the gunners enjoyed the assistance of a large body of support staff, from ‘servitor gunners’ to artificers of various types. It would seem that gunners often completed the training of ‘servitor gunners’ in the field and this was then simply tested and certified by the Master back in London. Moreover, Adrian Caruana has demonstrated that a standardised system of instruction had been instituted by the late 1530s, which would seem to suggest that the formalised incorporation of artillery into the English tactical system was proceeding at a pace.97 The expansion of this establishment was supported by the introduction of foreign specialists into England, to serve in garrison, at the Tower and elsewhere, as well as with the army in the field. In this instance there would have been no need for training; rather it seems likely that Henry’s gunners would have learnt much through their dialogue with these men. Exact numbers for the foreign gunners in English service at any one time are hard to estimate, especially given that it is often unclear how long they remained in English service, and not entirely necessary.98 It is everywhere accepted that their employment was widespread, a fact that can be amply demonstrated by a brief examination of the lists of gunners at the Tower, in garrison across the country, and in the various field armies that crossed into France.99 Indeed Page went so far as to argue that “no occupations were, perhaps, more influenced by foreigners than those of the art of warfare and the making of weapons.”100 This was a policy that can be traced back to the reign of Henry VII; numerous French gunners and gun-founders were to be found working in Ashdown Forest and serving in garrison at the Tower and elsewhere men like Graunt Pierre.101 The large-scale employment of French gunners by Henry VII at this time was attributed by Schubert to the massive successes of French cannon in driving the English from almost all the French possessions in 1449-50 and the impact made by Charles VIII’s artillery in Italy in 1494.102 This is an entirely reasonable supposition; however clearly other nationalities were

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employed in this capacity, notably Dutch gunners. Henry VIII continued his father’s policy of recruiting foreign gunners to supplement, and indeed to teach his English artillerymen.103 One might consider, for example, the Arcana Family of Cesena recruited by Sir Gregory Casalo, Henry’s Italian agent, in February 1523. Sir John Daunce’s accounts reveal payments “to Fraunces Archano, Archan his son, Christofer Florent, Jacano Florent, Jerom de Melan, Anthony de Napoll, Michael de Monua, Magnus de Monfera, Buttasago de Cezena, Italyons, gonners, reteyned to do the kynges grace servyce in his warres, for their wages,” totaling 206li. 9s. 10d. Numerous Italian gunners served in Suffolk’s 1523 campaign, many returned home, but some were retained in English service, notably the Arcano family who, as we have seen, would become important gun-founders.104 Suffolk’s campaign also boasted the services of Hans Van Andwarpe, paid at the rate of a chief master gunner, and in command of a retinue of 16 gunners. It seems safe to assume that he was of Dutch origin, as he does not appear in the lists of gunners at the Tower and his name would appear to indicate as much. In 1513, the ‘army royal’ had been accompanied by as many as 38 Dutch gunners, 20 of whom were designated “Master Shooters.”105 This policy of recruiting foreign gunners continued throughout the reign: a brief examination of the king’s payments in 1541 reveals payments to gunners such as Nicholas Van Whitingbrugh, Henry Van Suttenfende, Matthew Van Swollene, Courte Van Hammell and so on.106 However, the employment of foreign gunners remained controversial, and was certainly not universally popular. On 3 September 1534, Christopher Morris (at this time still Chief Master Gunner) had written to Cromwell to insist that in filling gunners positions at the tower he “had rather have one Englishman, as he is, than five strangers.”107 Indeed, many of these foreign gunners were ultimately made denizens as part of the wider attempts to anglicize the English military establishment.108 For example in November 1541 letters of denization were issued to “Bernardyn de Valois, gunner, a servant of the King and native of Piedmont,” and “John Hart, gunner, a servant of the king and native of Luca.”109 Bernadyn de Valois as he is identified in his denization letter, was presumably the same man as ‘Bernard de Valeys’ who had been made a gunner at the tower for the first time in November 1514 just over three months after Morris’ own position as gunner at the tower had been confirmed.110 This is a good illustration of the recruitment of foreign gunners, and serves as a reminder of the time period over which the changes took place. He was a gunner roughly 27 years before the clamour of Reformation and threat of invasion saw Henry rethink his policy towards foreign specialists serving in his ordnance establishment. Throughout 1542 Morris was to be found in London fulfilling his responsibilities as chief administrator to the ordnance establishment; issuing wages

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for the castles, fortresses and bulwarks; overseeing the delivery of supplies of bows, sheaves of arrows, artillery, shot and powder to the Calais Pale, and shipping hackbutts, bows, arrows, bills, artillery and powder north to Berwick.111 He was also closely involved in the supply and transport of Norfolk’s 1542 invasion of Scotland, providing carts and “great pieces”; although, as we have seen, to varying levels of success, with all but one of the artillery pieces shattering, and complaints reaching London of a shortage of bow strings.112 Similarly, in 1543 Morris was to be found in London overseeing the disbursement of ordnance supplies; in January furnishing “the Marye Harfford with munition, powder and guns,” (it is interesting to find Morris still outfitting the Navy), and in June receiving orders from the Privy Council to send pikes and “other munitions,” to Guisnes.113 A brief examination of the Augmentation accounts similarly shows him responsible for the “wages and victuals to ships and other charges for conveyance of munitions of war from the Tower to Barwyk.”114 It is important to recognise these administrative functions, and emphasise the link between the administrator one described in the previous section and the hands-on responsibilities of a Master of the Ordnance. 1544 brought a return to the field and would see Morris in command of the ordnance in Scotland and France – every inch the field commander. The renunciation of the Treaties of Greenwich by the Scots at the end of 1543 and the victory of the French faction in the Scottish polity ensured the renewal of the Auld Alliance and the wrath of their southern neighbour. Despite a commitment, signed in February 1543, to invade France, Henry determined on punitive strikes against the Scots to secure the marriage of his son Edward to the infant Mary, Queen of Scots. Henry’s pride had been damaged, his plans undermined and his northern border was now a dangerous open door to his kingdom, should he invade France.115 In the early months of 1544, it was decided that the Earl of Hertford would be sent north at the head of an army to raid Edinburgh and the lowlands. By 9 March, Hertford was writing urgently to Paget in London that Morris might be sent “north to Scotland with all haste to help him on campaign.”116 The urgency of the request demonstrates the clear value Hertford placed on having Henry’s master of the ordnance at his side on campaign. Morris was an experienced artilleryman who had served on campaign in France on three occasions (twice on land and once with the army at sea) and also had extensive experience of the northern border from his numerous trips north inspecting fortifications and defences. By 30 March 1544, Morris could write to Hertford of the thorough preparations for ordnance and munitions that he had made. He had “set forward the proportion,” he had appointed including “2 demi-culverins, 2 sakers, 7

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fawcons, 3 fawconets, 8 bassys mounted on four carriages with two chambers apiece and 3 last of powder.”117 It is interesting to note specific concerns about the problems of mobility on the Scottish border. Morris warned Hertford that the 2 demi-culverins were “slenderly mounted, there being no elm or other timber for stocks,” although he “trusts that with the smith’s craft they shall serve.”118 Bows and arrows were to be provided as soon as Hertford confirmed necessary numbers, alongside the shipment of 200 demi-hakes and 500 ‘morespykes’ and bills. Morris had also provided for 16 ‘fair carts’ of which 4 were covered with hair, noting that “bows, arrows, strings and powder must be covered,” to protect them from the damp and that “sufficient hair is said to be at Newcastle.” However, the preparations were not without problems, Morris complained of a lack of planks and hurdles to serve the battery pieces, a lack of ships to transport materials, and insufficient pioneers’ tools to furnish 200 men. Furthermore, victuals were so expensive that his men were paying 3d for every meal (a considerable sum for men earning as little as 6d. a day at worst or 12d. as a fully qualified, experienced gunners, at best); clearly the supply and organisation of the campaign was proving problematic and highlighted definite weaknesses in the Tudor military establishment. Nevertheless, Morris succeeded in shipping his material north as is attested by payments on the Augmentations account in April 1544.119 Morris’ importance to the campaign was demonstrated in the assault on Edinburgh, as he commanded the artillery that blew open the city gates. Hall described how “the English gonners manfully set on the gates, especially Sir Christopher Morice, that they did beat the Skottes from there ordinaunce, and so entred the gate called Cany gate by fine force, and ther slew a great nombre of the skottes.”120 However, demonstrating a lack of discipline, Morris and his gunners attacked the castle – against Hertford’s orders. The castle replied with artillery fire, dismounting a piece of English artillery and causing casualties amongst Morris’ men. Hertford, having halted the assault, ordered Morris and the military engineer Richard Lee to survey the castle with a view to an assault. However, it was soon “pronounced impregnable, as there is no cover under which to approach it and the ground, being hard rock, could not be trenched.”121 Indeed, despite a two hour barrage from Morris’ artillery on the castle walls, “nothing imparied them.”122 Thereafter Hertford ordered the withdrawal of the artillery, presumably under the supervision of Morris, who burst the dismounted piece, “the place being too dangerous for men to stand to mount it again.”123 After burning the town, the soldiers of Hertford’s army returned to their camp. The following day Hertford returned to Edinburgh “which had chosen a new provost, and ‘rampared’ the chief port with stone and earth; but the assault was quickly handled, the gate set open with artillery, and the town won again.”124 Thereafter, the campaign descended

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into the normal process of burning crops, and looting “cattle, money and plate,” along the path of the armies return to England. Hertford wrote to the king that he “will so devastate this realm and annoy the king’s enemies as to make punishment of their falsehood an example to the world.”125 The performance of the artillery on this campaign was mixed; Morris’ concerns about problems of mobility were clearly expressed in his letter to Hertford describing preparations for the ordnance. Furthermore, the assault on the castle was both against orders and a dismal failure. However, Hertford’s concern to have Morris on the campaign is a testimony to the esteem in which informed contemporaries held him. Moreover, he did overcome an initial shortage of shipping to ensure the safe transport of his ordnance and munitions, which performed well in breaking into the city. The professionalism of the ordnance establishment seems increasingly clear in the context of the continuity of experience brought into the field by Morris. The early months of 1544 brought a demotion, of sorts, to Morris, who found himself replaced as Master of the Ordnance by Sir Thomas Seymour, the king’s brother-in-law (and brother of England’s premier general, the Earl of Hertford). Morris was appointed as the first “lieutenant general the Ordnance in England for life,” at a rate of 100 marks a day – double his pay as Master.126 This led C. S. L. Davies to conclude that “an honorific position had been created at the top and the real duties transferred to the Lieutenant.”127 The change in the social status of the Master of the Ordnance was significant in bringing the Ordnance office into line with the Navy Board; the Lord Admiral was no longer of a higher social rank than his opposite number in the Ordnance Office.128 However, whilst this consideration seems certain to have been central to the decision to change the organisation of the ordnance office, as indeed was the need to find a suitable post for the king’s brother-in-law, Seymour was not without pedigree for the role. He had served in a series of diplomatic roles between 1540 and 1542, he was made marshal of the English army in the Netherlands, under Sir John Wallop, in 1543; indeed he held overall command for a short period in August during Wallop’s illness.129 He also played an active role in the preparations for the Boulogne campaign in 1544 and in the operations of the ordnance establishment throughout the period of conflict.130 However, it is unclear if he was personally involved when described in documents, or if his subordinates were working in his name. For example on 4 May 1546 the Privy Council had written to “Flemyng deputy to Sir Thomas Seymour, to deliver Lewson, Captain of Portland Castle, four barrels of Serpentine powder.”131 It seems likely, given his commitment to command the Cinque ports during the illness of Sir Thomas Cheyney and role as an Admiral of the Fleet, that his subordinate officers were fulfilling the role in his stead.132

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Thus in 1544, Sir Christopher Morris retained a central role in the Ordnance establishment, fulfilling many, if not most, of the duties he had fulfilled as Master – just under a new title. In the summer of 1544 he was required to accompany Henry’s ordnance into France for a final time. There are various explanations vaunted for this campaign, from Henry’s old age to his embarrassment at the adultery of Catherine Howard; this question remains beyond the remit of this thesis. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to understand that by the terms of an alliance with Charles V, finalised in the last week of 1543, Henry and the Emperor would invade France in the summer of 1544 with 42,000 men apiece. The Imperial army was to strike west through Champagne, while the English were to launch themselves from Calais, for an assault on Paris. However, both invasions stuttered and stalled on drawn-out sieges, the Imperialist army at Saint Dizier and the English at Montreuil and Boulogne.133 The artillery train that accompanied Henry’s army was immense, totaling in excess of 250 pieces of artillery.134 Elis Gruffudd, described the extensive preparations made in siting and protecting the artillery: “the pioneers were working day and night to make a trench,” to protect the artillery which, when finished allowed the artillery to do “a good deal of damage to the town.”135 He described the construction of several firing points around the town, the raising of mounds of earth to further protect and elevate the English guns and the use of heavy and light cannon. He especially noted “the murderer,” - a weapon “full of small stones which flew out of the gun when it was fired like a storm of hail among the people, the smallest stone of which killed or maimed the man struck by it.”136 The bombardments were fierce, lasting throughout the day from early morning until 3 o’clock, while “sappers,” were mining the castle walls in order “put powder under it to open a breach.”137 ‘A Diary of the Expedition of 1544,’ attested to the intensity of the English artillery assault.138 The document related how throughout 19 July 1544 “our gonners never cest schutyng of there greyt peces.”139 Furthermore, the French counter-battery succeeded in “lyttell but,” shooting “the toppes of somwhat of our tentes,” -indicating both the success of English defensive measures (ditches, mounds of earth and so on) and the difficulties of firing cannon ‘down’ on to an entrenched army. 140 Similarly, on 3 August the English battery was so intense that the French barely fired a shot in response.141 Boulogne eventually surrendered in mid-September, having almost run-out of munitions; the keys to the town were handed to Suffolk on fourteenth of the month. The English siege had been very intense, “within the high town of Boulogne not a house was left whole.”142 The English ordnance supposedly fired in excess of 100,000 rounds of heavy shot into the city, and the French responded with similar intensity (although such figures are impossible to verify and should

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not be bandied without caution).143 Despite the failure to take Boulogne (or Montreuil) by storm, the English ordnance establishment can be seen to have played a vital role in operations in France in the summer of 1544. Sir Christopher Morris served as chief director of batteries at Boulogne. The anonymous diary of ‘the Siege and Capture of Boulogne’ described how on 3 September Morris, “was hurt on the Brest with a Handgon against the Castell,” the wound was to prove fatal.144 It is interesting, if a little fanciful, also to note the diary’s claim that Morris had before this “killed all the Master Gonners of Bulloin,” havin fought very “valyauntly.”145 Such a statement was certainly hyperbole, but also acts as a further indication of the esteem in which the man was held. Morris had served Henry’s ordnance establishment with distinction for in excess of 31 years; he was in every sense the personification of the growing professionalism of that establishment: as an administrator, artillery-man and commander. The ordnance office and the gunners they supervised represented a permanent establishment that, over time, came to grips with the growing refinements to the new science of warfare. Section B: Summary Henry’s military establishment was unmistakably engaged in a process of professionalisation and modernisation. The levying of the Henrician army was refined and improved over the course of the reign, and there is some evidence of a preference for ‘selection’ over and above a random levee en masse. Deficiencies in the English army were overcome by the recruitment of foreign specialists who could provide a professional core to Henry’s field armies. Furthermore, a degree of continuity was created by the employment of captains and soldiers on successive campaigns. The nobility helped to establish some sense of ‘institutional memory’, with men such as Brandon and Howard, providing continuity in command from one campaign to the next. Furthermore, they were supported by a number of professional captains, who were to be found in service in the garrisons, and on successive campaigns with Henry’s field armies (for example, Sir John Russell). The administrators of the Ordnance Office and Navy augmented this growing sense of ‘institutional memory’. However, this fledgling professionalism is nowhere more evident, than in the example of the king’s gunners, who maintained, manufactured and operated England’s artillery in war and peace. These men were skilled peace-time artificers, and experienced battlefield combatants. The example of Sir Christopher Morris, emphasizes the continuity and professionalism of this establishment, which epitomised England’s commitment to modernisation during this period.

Conclusion The Military Revolution and Tudor England In May 1557 a Venetian ambassador curtly observed that English troops, “although armed,” undertook such limited training that “there would be few among them who would know how to move under arms, and to handle the pike, harquebus or other sort of weapon, it not being custom in that kingdom for the inhabitants to perform any sort of exercise.”1 A long historiographical tradition sought to demonstrate the validity of such a damning assessment of English military prowess. Whilst Europe underwent a period of rapid and dramatic military development during the 1500s, “England fell far behind the leading powers of the continent in both training and experience, until the last decades of the century.”2 Oman declared the period “singularly dull from the point of view of the historian of the Art of War.”3 More recently Hale concluded that “for the student of Tudor military affairs the middle decades of the sixteenth century are dark…military activity in Scotland, Ireland and France was not on a scale, nor had lasting enough results to have encouraged its investigation in depth.”4 Indeed, in a damning indictment of the Tudor military establishment Downing insisted that “whatever the scope of Henrician and Elizabethan state building, the Tudor period experienced no military revolution or military centred bureaucracy.”5 Critics of the English military under Henry VIII have argued that the English ‘tactical system’ continued to be based on the old ‘bow and bill’ formations that had served the English armies of the Hundred Years war so well.6 To some extent, such a view is justified. At Flodden, in 1513, it was with a force armed primarily with the traditional ‘bill and bow’ that the Earl of Surrey marched north to meet the challenge of the Scots.7 The General Proscription of 1522 painted a picture of a nation rich in these traditional weapons but distinctly lacking in firearms or pike.8 The muster lists for the period 1539-1544 do not suggest that the armament of the civilian militia had changed considerably by this time. The militiamen continued to be armed primarily with ‘bow and bill’ and evidence of the ownership of firearms is negligible.9 This was a reflection of both the prohibitive cost of the firearms and the laws against owning them.10

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However, whilst one cannot deny the accuracy of such an analysis, it distorts the more complex reality of the English military establishment under Henry VIII. Far from falling behind, it seems clear from this study that England was in fact engaged in the same transitional process that was taking place on the battlefields of Italy. Theory and Reality The relative modernity of English military thinking by the 1540s is clearly attested to by the military literature described in this thesis. Thomas Audley’s Book of Orders for the Warre both by Sea and Land demonstrated a lucid awareness of the latest pike and shot tactics, advocating the integration of these new weapons and techniques with the established older technologies and tactical systems, such as the bow and bill.11 The information presented in this manuscript suggests that English military practice was, by the end of Henry’s reign, broadly in-line and up-to-date with the latest continental developments. Cruickshank’s claim that “England was physically separated from the rest of Europe and therefore insulated from military developments there,” can now be dismissed.12 The picture, of military modernization and engagement with European developments, is further underlined by the existence of Text B.13 Previously described as a document of the Marian era, Text B has been demonstrated an earlier treatise, almost certainly dating from the reign of Henry VIII. Unlike the Audley manuscript, which is a descriptive account and plea for how ‘modern wars’ should be fought, Text B is a Captain’s field manual, which described to the reader ‘how’ to execute a ‘modern’ campaign. The manuscript unequivocally mirrored Audley’s patronage of the integration of bow and bill with pike and shot. The question of authorship (in the case of Text B) remains, as we have seen, unresolved. The antiquarian Robert Hare could have penned the manuscript, and this is a view endorsed by David Eltis.14 Hare’s signature on the last page of the Cotton variant of the document would outwardly support this view, or else it could, as Hale suggested, represent a second Audley treatise. 15 Given Hare’s youth in 1558, and demonstrable lack of military experience, alongside the absence of manuscript evidence to suggest that Thomas Audley was in fact the author, it seems safe to reject both views.16 All that it does seem safe to conclude is that this manuscript, much like the Audley treatise, was in all likelihood a combination of various soldiers’ and scholars’ ideas, experiences and deliberations.17 The antecedents of the information presented therein can be traced back into the middle-ages, most clearly in the instance of military discipline. Furthermore, sentiments regarding the

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deployment of pike and shot, the moral and physical well-being of the soldiers and other issues too numerous to list, would form the scholarly legacy upon which military writers later in the century would rest their own studentship.18 In an age before modern notions of intellectual ‘ownership’, the sharing of ideas is striking and the notion that the military treatise of sixteenth century England “could readily be conflated into a single Great Tudor Military Book,” is compelling.19 Importantly, Audley’s account was based on his extensive military experience during the reign of Henry VIII, possibly dating back as far as 1513, and certainly taking in important commands in Scotland and France in 1544 and 1545. It is, at the very least, a document indicative of contemporary thinking amongst English military commanders. This conclusion is further recommended by the glowing references given to Henry VIII on his behalf by Poynings and Wallop, men who clearly valued Audley’s judgement and in all probability enjoyed a shared military outlook. As we have seen, in recommending Audley for the command of Guisnes Castle (arguably the most dangerous command of England’s ‘border strongholds’) Wallop described him as “an honest man and as mete to s(er)ue…in the warres for his good vnderstanding and knowledge therin as any do know of his d(il)igence and can very well sett a nombre of men in ordre from one thowsand vnto ten and upwards, hardly to be am(en)dyd.”20 Furthermore, the interlocking relationships described between Audley, the Marquis of Winchester and Robert Hare (in the context of the Duke of Somerset’s probable knowledge of Audley’s manuscript) is significant. The search for military modernity, for professionalism, was evidently a ‘hot topic’ among England’s few ‘professional soldiers’, and more crucially its leaders, at least from the 1540s, and well before the more famous ‘literary’ debates of the 1580s and 1590s. Thus, where Eltis rightly observed a dramatic expansion in the publication of military literature in the second half of the Tudor century, he was too eager to link this to a ‘new’ commitment to military modernity, or a ‘fresh’ desire among England’s leading soldiers and nobles to discuss military matters.21 His quantitative measure is, in real terms, fairly meaningless and risks drastically underselling the relative ‘academic’ and practical sophistication of the early Tudors and indeed their medieval forbears.22 Rather one can glimpse a vibrant military conversion in the 1540s, through which the English were clearly trying to reconcile their own military traditions and financial constraints with the new style of warfare heralded by the ‘pike and shot’ of the Italian wars. Of course, it would be wrong without corroborative evidence, to simply assume that the material presented in these manuscripts described military reality during the reign of Henry VIII. However they do seem to verify, in support of a growing body of scholarship, that by the 1540s Henry’s England was “better

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prepared militarily than ever before.”23 English soldiers and engineers fully embraced gunpowder weaponry, new models of fortification and tactical systems in the wars against France and Scotland sign-posting the final arrival of a new military system. In Scotland alone, Phillips identified a “tactical sophistication that has, so far, been largely unrecognised,” wherein “English infantry units, combinations of bow, bill, pike and arquebusier, proved capable of operating in small, flexible units of a few hundred men.”24 This thesis has sought to explore the relationship between this military theory and the reality of Henry’s early campaigns. Was there a distinct English art of war and to what extent were the English falling behind a continental military revolution, forged in the battles for control of the Italian peninsular? To what extent did the experiences of Henry’s early campaigns precede and inform the thinking of mid-century military writers? The picture that has been uncovered is one of gradual modernisation, innovation and experimentation, both in war and peacetime. The English adapted new technologies to work alongside the existing tactical and technical systems. The period witnessed the evolution of a distinct ‘English art of war’, informed by financial restrictions and the nature of the campaigns they were required to fight (in Europe and within the British Isles), and fully up-to-date with the latest European developments. Furthermore, practice clearly informed and preceded the theory of the mid-Tudor years. The early years of Henry VIII’s reign witnessed the gradual evolution of military technologies and tactics, not least in the production and employment of gunpowder weaponry. The Audley manuscript strongly advocated the utilization of field artillery, cautioning commanders to “plante the artilleyre of every battayle towarde(s) suche places as you thinke be most dangerous where you think yo(ur) enymes maye assayle you.”25 As would so often prove the case, practice preceded theory. Firearms and gunpowder weaponry were purchased and produced in increasing numbers from the outset of the period, part of a process, which can be traced back to the reign of his father, Henry VII.26 Henry VIII enjoyed a strong personal curiosity about “matters of this kind,” and an early drive to establish an English gun-making industry both at the Tower, and through subcontracting to private forges is apparent.27 Henry’s England did resort to considerable numbers of purchases from foreign producers, not least because foreign imports were often cheaper. Nonetheless, as early as 22 July 1511 payments were being made for the “wages of armourers of Milan,” whilst a new forge was commissioned at Greenwich in September of that year for the use of armourers from Brussels.28 The development of cast-iron ordnance in the 1540s, (by which cannon could be cast in a single piece thus increasing reliability, efficiency and cost-effectiveness) turned English gun-founders into world-leaders for the remainder of the century.

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Whilst limitations remained, notably a reliance on foreign supplies of gunpowder and reticence in the adoption of the more powerful corned powder, England was clearly engaged in a process of gradual modernisation. These preparations were mirrored during wartime. The 1513 campaign in France, planned in the shadow of the battle of Ravenna, saw heavy provision made for the use of cannon on campaign. Indeed an ordnance establishment of some 1,079 men under the command of Sir Sampson Norton accompanied Henry’s ‘army royal’.29 In 1513, 1522, and 1523 English soldiers proved themselves capable professionals, well aware of the requirements of a ‘modern military campaign’ and accomplished in applying the latest techniques. At Flodden, the English commander showed a strong understanding of the power of modern cannon in eschewing a direct assault on the entrenched Scottish position. Furthermore, English light ordnance was influential in prompting the hasty and ill-advised Scottish descent towards the waiting English. Likewise at the sieges of Therouanne and Tournai in 1513, and Bray and Montdidier in 1523, the English proved themselves adept in the deployment and effective application of ‘modern’ artillery. Their placement of artillery pieces, the digging of entrenchments and tactical awareness, revealed a competency that was far from inferior to their French adversaries. The insufficiency of Surrey’s artillery train in 1522 and its defeat at the walls of Hesdin aside, Henry’s early French campaigns reveal an English military establishment undergoing the same transitional process that could, during this period, be observed across Europe. The English retention of the longbow is a subject that has received considerable historical attention. The gradual refinement of armour and the increasing penetrative power of the handgun, over the course of the sixteenth century, would gradually undermine the long-bow’s position in English armies. A growing number of voices aired concerns over the quality of English archers and the continued viability of the bow as a weapon in the face of improvements to firearms: “contemporary estimations of the longbow as a poor weapon can be reduced to this point: archery could not stop a charge – arrows did not penetrate.”30 The debates of the 1580s and 1590s have to some extent coloured historical interpretations of the role of the bow and handgun in the reign of Henry VIII. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to suggest that the majority of missile armed troops in this period were anything other than archers. The English retention of the archer during the reign of Henry VIII can be attributed to various factors, most obviously its repeated success. For example at the siege of Therouanne in 1513 “the Frenchmen issued out of the toune and skirmished with the Englishmen, but the archers shot so fast that they drove the Frenchmen into the

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citie.”31 Similarly in skirmishing around Calais in 1524 Hall described how English archers drove off a French force comprised of pikes and hand-gunners.32 The early campaigns of Henry’s reign demonstrated the continued viability of the longbow on the battlefield. Its retention (most especially in these early years), as the principal ‘missile’ weapon of English armies, is hardly surprising given that it was cheaper to produce and continued to prove itself effective in battle. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the first significant success for firearms on the battlefields of Italy did not take place until Imperial victory at Bicocca in 1522. Indeed, one might argue that it was only in the aftermath of Pavia (1525) that the hand-gun began to adopt a prominent place in the armies of Europe. Viewed in this light Henry’s armies were not, in any meaningful sense, falling behind the combatants for the Italian peninsular in the period 1509-1523. Nonetheless, over the course of the reign increasing resort was made to the hand-gun, not least in operations in Ireland. Even the staunchest critics of Henry’s armies have recognised that by the 1540s there was an increasing commitment on the part of the king to the adoption of the handgun.33 Moreover, moves towards the purchase and employment of the firearms can be traced to the earliest years of the reign. As early as 1512 Piete Corsy was paid 9s “the pece” for 420 “handgonnes”, whilst records for the 1513 campaign reveal that provision was made for the carriage of “habuzshes in chests.”34 The 1522 and 1523 campaign in France would also witness the employment of limited numbers of hand-gunners. However, this was part of a process of ‘tactical integration’ not replacement. By the mid-century both Text B and the Audley manuscript were advocating the use of the arquebusiers and archers, a system which was proving increasingly important in operations around Boulogne.35 Audley, suggested that “if we mingle o(ur) achardes and hargabusses togethere (as me thinketh nedefull so to do) the(n) must you haue aboute yo(ur) battaile 5 in a ranke, theye to haue 3 Archardes and 2 hargabusses. And if there be 4 then to haue 2 Archardes and 2 Hargabusses.”36 His views on the necessity of combining the two weapons systems, were reflective of military reality in the 1540s, practice again preceded theory. Henry’s England was firmly committed to military modernity, and more importantly effectiveness. In the early years, the limitations of firearms, most especially their short range and unreliability, demanded tactical ingenuity in their battlefield deployment. The tactical combination of longbow and hand-gun was a complementary compromise, utilising the rapidity of fire offered by the archer and the superior penetrative power of the hand-gun.37 A similar commitment to the integration of modern weaponry into existing tactical systems was demonstrated in the case of the pike and bill-hook. The midcentury theorists clearly stated that “morrispikes,” were essential on the modern

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battlefield, but they favoured their deployment in partnership with the older billhook.38 Here again the manuscripts reflect the reality of English armies throughout the early Tudor period. English armies were overwhelmingly comprised of the traditional bill-armed infantry in 1513, 1522 and 1523. Indeed, the retention of the bill was informed both by its repeated successes, most notably against the pike-armed Scots at Flodden, and the socially constituted nature of a militia system which could only expect the subjects of England to invest so far in military equipment. Nonetheless, Henry VII had employed mercenary pike at Bosworth in 1485, whilst English soldiers had confronted the German and Swiss pikemen in the service of Simnel at Stoke in 1487. It is thus not entirely surprising to find that, in 1512, Dorset’s abortive expedition boasted a preponderance of pikes to bills of 50:40; the young Henry VIII had clearly observed and noted the experiences of his father’s reign.39 This perceptible commitment to the pike and the latest trends in European warfare is likewise evident in the planning and execution of the 1513 campaign in France. Not only were substantial numbers of Landsknecht pikemen engaged, but in excess of 1,000 English pike accompanied the army in the retinues of Lisle, Buckingham and Burgany.40 A similar picture is identifiable in 1522 and 1523, where, although evidence of English pike is scant, Henry’s commanders were anxious to acquire mercenary and auxiliary pike to support their native bill-men. From the outset of the reign the English were entirely aware of the importance of the pike on the battlefield, and were eager to integrate it into existing tactical systems. England was adopting a policy of blending old and new weapons, and tactical systems. This was achieved through the gradual expansion of English practitioners and the support provided by mercenary and auxiliary soldiers.41 Likewise, England was seeking to expand native production of military weaponry, whilst also retaining a commitment to the procurement of comparatively ‘inexpensive’ European imports.42 Henry’s army was resolutely marching up the road to military modernisation, whilst acknowledging the limited financial resources that ensured it could never truly compete on a scale with France and Spain.43 Furthermore, it is important to recognise that military reality preceded and preempted the theory of the 1540s. Turning to the cavalry, one cannot but acknowledge a considerable weakness in the provision of heavy cavalry.44 However, in France, in 1513, 1522 and 1523 this was overcome by the recruitment of foreign specialists, normally Burgundians, or by the auxiliary contingent provided by their Imperial allies.45 The resort to mercenaries, far from a symptom of an under-developed military system, was simply a pragmatic response to the deficiency in numbers. Moreover, it was

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mirrored across Europe, France was equally if not more guilty of deploying mercenary troops and subject to her own set of socio-political restrictions. 46 Furthermore, the English boasted some of the best light cavalrymen in Europe, schooled in operations in Ireland and Scotland.47 The case-study of English warfare in Ireland demonstrates the importance of warfare within the British Isles in shaping the English army. The geography of countryside surrounding the English pale required lightly armoured, fast moving horse to combat the hit-and-run guerrilla tactics of Irish rebels. This is reflected in a ‘Memoranda for Ireland’ issued in March 1520. It complained that the “Irishmen bee light and delyver soo that when the Englishmen shuld follow theym they shuld labo(ur) all in vayne and not prevail in pursuyng theym.”48 When the English soldiers chased the Irish into the marshlands or woods surrounding the pale, “theym neyther having experience nor knowlage...they shuld not oonly retourn w(ith)out doing any good but also be in great danger and p(er)ill.”49 It was suggested that Irish mercenaries be employed to overcome the guerrilla tactics of the rebels.50 This expedient aside, successive English commanders demonstrated a strong preference for Northern light horse.51 Gunpowder weapons also proved of increasing value, both light artillery and small firearms, whilst the longbow found the terrain prohibitively restrictive.52 It is inescapably apparent that “the nature of English warfare from 1511 to 1642 was dictated by the predicament of the island kingdom’s strategic position.”53 A central facet of the military revolution, as understood by historians, has been the development and expansion of training. Critics of the English army during the reign of Henry VIII have often noted that it was not until 1557 that Mary I incorporated training into the shire musters, whilst it would be 1572-3 before “regular training of bodies of troops,” could be observed in the counties.54 Indeed detailed ‘words of command’ and instructions for battlefield command and control were not published until 1594.55 However, to suggest that training played no part in military affairs before these years is to badly undersell the relative sophistication of medieval and early Tudor warfare. Induction in the qualities of knightliness, skill with the sword and proficiency in the saddle, had long been a central element of the education of male members of the nobility, for whom military service continued to be seen as an obligation well into the sixteenth century.56 Throughout the middle ages, Vegetius’ Epitmoa Rei Militaris had been a key component of this ‘military education’ and there is evidence that the nobility of Tudor England continued to look to antiquarian precedents in military training. A central aspect of training must have been concerned with ‘how’ orders were passed down from the council of war and translated into battlefield ‘reality’. The

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dearth of unequivocal evidence on this subject has often led to a rather negative historical assessment of the complexity of battlefield manouvre. Text B demonstrates quite irrevocably that “dromes and fife” were used to pass orders through the army, as well as stressing the need for silence in order that words of command were plainly audible. That these commands have not been retained in the historical record does not suggest that they did not exist, or even more improbably that they were an Elizabethan construct. Rather “Drome and secret callinge,” were, quite naturally, a normal part of daily life in the Henrician army.57 Furthermore, some form of training would clearly have been necessary in order to demonstrate to untried men the meaning of the various commands; captains were urged to train their soldiers “in tyme of musters in the lessons folowinge until they be p(er)fitte.”58 The extent to which the military literature of the period reflected reality or simply ‘desirable best practice’ is hard to discern with any final certainty and one must necessarily be cautious. Audley himself issued a plea for greater commitment to training: “I wyshe...that Captaynes wold be as redye to take paynes to trayne there mene as theye be redye at the paye daye to take paynes to tell mony, for it ys a grevous payne to sett a Battayle w(ith) untrayned men.”59 Clearly, the modern notion of ‘basic military training’ was not applicable in the context of Henry VIII’s military establishment. However, this is not to say that training played no part in military life in sixteenth century England. The level of training required and offered was highly context and weapon specific, and it is entirely likely that the extent to which instruction was provided varied enormously from captain to captain. Nonetheless, some form of training in “weapons handling and combat technique,” was surely required, even if this was only a “one-shot affair.”60 In much the same way this study has been careful about applying modern notions of military discipline to sixteenth century armies. The military literature of the mid-Tudor period reflected contemporary European discussions on the renewed importance of discipline on the battlefield, especially in the context of pike and shot tactics. The manuscripts are specific about the importance of a wide range of issues from silence and obedience, to the cleaning of weapons and the moral and physical well-being of the troops. It is also significant to note the close relationship between the exhortations of the theorists and the proclamations and ordinances issued at the opening of campaigns since the reign of Richard I. Given low literacy levels and the relatively small circulation of such manuscript material, practical expression of the disciplinary ordinances was to be found in the reading out of proclamations once or twice a week. Such codes predated the military literature of the mid-Tudor era and certainly formed the intellectual heritage upon which their work was built. Here again practice preceded and informed the theory

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of the mid-Tudor years. However, the concept of unquestioning obedience, so familiar to the modern understanding of the armed forces, is an incongruity when applied to any army of sixteenth Europe. Some elements of the modern understanding of discipline are discernible in this period. For example during the march from Calais to Tournai in 1513, Hall described how despite the persistent attention of French light cavalry the English army remained “so close in order, that they could not fynd them out of array.”61 However, the English army practiced a policy of mutually co-operative discipline and loyalty, “the common soldier of Tudor armies could engage in collective or individual protest in the same fashion as contemporary civilians and, like a civilian, could often expect a resulting measure of compromise from his superiors.”62 Thus at Tournai in 1515 and as winter closed in on Suffolk’s army in France in 1523, disputes over pay and conditions were resolved through negotiation and compromise, not unthinking obedience. This approach to military discipline was not specific to England, and nor was it indicative of a weak Henrician military establishment.63 It was simply an expression of the fact that the Henrician army was comprised of citizen soldiers, who could reasonably expect the same ‘good lordship’ from their noble overlords on the battlefield as in the fields of Surrey or Kent. Henry’s French campaigns have been described by G. J. Millar, as “wars that in their sterility and expenditure bankrupted the nation and marred an otherwise brilliant reign.”64 However, the failure of Henry’s French campaigns to achieve anything more meaningful than a chevaucee was more clearly a deficiency of strategy than a sign of the insufficiencies of the English military establishment. Henry was let down by his allies: “Charles V, with his commitments from Italy to Freisland and his readiness to promise...(too much)...had proved both too powerful and too unreliable to be an effective ally in England’s continental ambitions.”65 This is not to say that “had Francis I truly devoted himself to the conquest of the Calais Pale he would not have achieved his goal.66 Henry’s armies were by no measure a match for the full combat strength of Charles V or Francis I. However, this was clearly understood by the English government who would eschew intervention in continental affairs without the support of one or other of the true arbiters of Europe. This policy would ensure that no English army would come face to face with the full battle strength of France in 1513, 1522 or 1523. Potter noted that “there were usually between five and eight companies in Picardy during peacetime, though in July 1521, the province had been stripped of men for other fronts, like Italy.” Moreover, “even by 1523 there were only 327 lances in the province out of a national total of 3,752.”67 Gunn convincingly pointed out that in 1523 the commander of the French defence forces possessed only 10,000 men,

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most of whom were local and untried, thus he felt it wise to use them to strengthen the garrisons, leaving himself with a relatively small field force.68 Furthermore, the French were well aware that “as soon as winter came it was sure that they (the English) would keep to their custom,” and return home.69 In 1544, Lord De Biez, commander of Montdidier, sent a message to the general of the besieging English army, the Duke of Norfolk. De Biez asked the English herald to tell Norfolk “he can take his pleasure in hunting with hawks and hounds about the country while the weather is fine and mild and by winter according to the old English custom you will go home to your kinsmen.”70 Nonetheless, although Henry’s armies were in no sense as powerful as those of Charles V or Francis I and were often let down by poor strategic planning, the difference was one of scale and capacity of resources not quality or type of soldiers. The data collected in this thesis would suggest that the period was in every sense a transitional phase for England and Europe. There seems scant evidence that England was falling behind any radical continental military revolution. The English, much like their European counterparts, sought to blend modern technologies into existing tactical systems, capitalising on the advantages offered by old and new weapons. They were concerned with the modernisation, and effectiveness of their armies in the field from the outset of the reign, not least demonstrated in a growing commitment to discipline and training. Furthermore, theory was clearly preceded by practice and the mid-century literature discussed in chapter one is demonstrably based on the experiences of these early campaigns and their medieval forbears. A Professional Army? Historians such as Gilbert John Millar have suggested that, because England lacked a standing army, the experiences of one campaign were lost to the next one and the same lessons had to be learnt again and again.71 R. W. Stewart argued that “The ordnance office during wartime learned slowly and having learned had no mechanism to retain and use that knowledge without the constant practice provided by war. Peace inevitably ended what relative efficiency had been acquired during war.”72 Likewise, Cruickshank maintained that “the absence of a standing army meant that the lessons of a single perhaps isolated campaign were not necessarily carried into the planning of the next.”73 To a certain extent, the logic of their arguments cannot be denied. England outwardly lacked what we would now understand as a substantial standing force of military professionals. It relied heavily on the recruitment of mercenaries and invariably turned to the king’s household in search of campaign administrators (for victualling), as the only people with

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experience of feeding such large numbers of men, in time of war. The Spears were a very small body, disbanded early on in the reign as part of Wolsey’s financial cuts, and not re-instituted until the last decade of the reign (as the Gentlemen Pensioners). However, there is a danger of anachronism in applying a modern understanding of the term ‘professional standing army’ to the early modern military establishment. This thesis has considered the concept of ‘institutional memory’ – wherein the experiences of one campaign were retained, remembered and re-deployed in later campaigns. It has been demonstrated that the English military establishment of the Henrician age built up a considerable ‘institutional memory’, and visible signs of maturing professionalism and permanence have been identified. The combination of the quasi-feudal levies of the nation’s nobility, and the older militia, created England as a nation-in-arms that time and again competed effectively on the continent and within the ‘British Isles’. In examining the processes and procedures for levying the Tudor army it became clear that forces were repeatedly raised successfully through both the quasi-feudal and militia system, notably for the 1513 campaigns against France and Scotland. It is significant to note that during the course of Henry’s reign he successfully levied armies for eight offensive campaigns (1511, 1512, 1513, 1522, 1523, 1543, 1544 (Boulogne), 1544 (Scotland) and three defensive campaigns at Flodden (1513), Solway Moss (1542) and the defence of Boulogne (1545).74 This, Trim has pointed out, amounted to an average of one campaign every three and a half years during his thirty eight-year reign.75 The levying system and the armies it created cannot have been completely ineffective. Moreover, some degree of sophistication was hinted at in the remaining muster lists which, to varying degrees, demonstrated a preference for selection over and above the random levee en masse that one might initially observe in such a system. In some instances this took a rather negative aspect from the perspective of military efficiency. Affluent men are seen to have avoided service in the wars by sending less prosperous souls, who could not afford military harness, in their stead with their equipment. Therefore, in these instances men were going to war, not on the basis of their martial prowess, but their lack of financial clout and local political influence. Nevertheless, there is evidence that more strictly military criteria were being applied at least some of the time. For example, during the General Proscription of 1522 the Buckinghamshire return reveals that a distinction was being made by commissioners between ‘good bowe and bill,’ and those simply designated bow and bill. One hundred and seventy ‘good bowe,’ and one hundred and ninety four ‘good bill,’ are identified across the county.76 Furthermore, single

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men and those considered ‘able’ for the wars are identified in the returns.77 Although this level of sophistication is not uniform in the surviving records (or even extensive) it does show some inclination towards a more complex ‘selective’ levying system. Moreover, a Venetian report described how “the whole male population, capable of bearing arms…are all mustered on a spacious plane, where they perform their military exercises with such arms as they possess, in the presence of the commanders appointed for this purpose. The stoutest and most robust are then selected.”78 The infantry was to be composed of taller men, whilst the most agile were to be mounted.79 It seems absolutely clear that physical capacity and martial skill were considered in the selection of men for service in Henry’s armies. Moreover, attempts to ‘modernise’ and improve the militia, from 1535, demonstrate that the system was to some degree self-aware. The Henrician government was seeking to improve military efficiency and professionalism. The relative success of this process is hard to discern, as the record is fragmentary and no details remain as to whether or not commissioners’ demands for individuals to improve their personal ‘harness’ were met. Nevertheless the awareness of a need for improvement based, in some sense, on the government’s ‘institutional memory’ is surely evident. The nobility provided continuity of experience amongst the commanders of Henry’s armies. Many of the same nobles who led the country to war in France and Scotland in 1513 would do so again in 1522 and 1523. The very nature of the quasi-feudal system would ensure that many of the same captains, and in turn the same retinues, would serve time and again throughout the reign. For example Gunn described how in 1523 most of the Duke of Suffolk’s “own retinue of 1,700 men came from North Wales, and the Marcher lordships of which he was steward, as had his retinue in 1513.”80 Similarly, on the Anglo-Scots border, incessant fighting created a population well-schooled in guerrilla warfare. Furthermore the early years of Henry’s reign witnessed the emergence of three key figures, whom time and again were called to the command of the king’s armies: Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk and George Talbot, fourth Earl of Shrewsbury.81 They were supported by a small, but significant body of ‘professional captains’, men like Sir Richard Wingfield, Sir William Sandes and John Russell who exploited personal military prowess for significant political and financial betterment. In the development of the Ordnance Office and Navy Board something akin to a ‘department of war’ was seen to develop. Likewise Henry’s gunners, over the course of the reign, developed a clear sense of institutional memory. Training programmes are evident and some sense of ‘merit based’ promotion – although

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this should not be over-emphasised. It is apparent that Henry’s gunners provided that continuity of experience between campaigns that would potentially have been lost in the absence of a standing army. Moreover, this was not restricted to the centre (that is to say the Tower) but was reflected across the country in the garrison establishments – which themselves had expanded dramatically by the end of Henry’s reign and (temporarily at least) amongst the king’s Spears and later his Gentlemen pensioners. Therefore, although lacking a standing force of military professionals, Henry’s military establishment was capable of learning from past campaigns and building up a body of knowledge and experience designed to improve the professionalism and efficiency of the military establishment. A Henrician Military Revolution? Henry’s England demonstrated an ability to learn from, and retain lessons from one campaign or engineering project to the next. This was facilitated by a civilmilitary partnership of nobles, garrison-troops, engineers, artisans, administrators and foreign specialists. This was not a standing army or indeed military professionalism as we now know it, but it did demonstrate a degree of ‘institutional memory’ and a drive for efficiency and modernity. Luke MacMahon recently echoed the findings of this thesis in stating that although it can “hardly be disputed,” that many Tudor soldiers “lacked experience and expertise…(but)…there was also present useful numbers of men with considerable military experience and skill, capable of providing a functional command structure.”82 The long historiographical tradition that painted a picture of military stagnation in the reign of Henry VIII can now be discarded. Rather the second Tudor was firmly committed to military modernisation, to the integration of hackbutt, longbow, cannon, bill and pike. This was not a radical revolution, old methods were not abandoned, rather they were adapted to operate in cooperation with new military technologies and the new tactical systems being forged in the Italian wars. One can only conjecture as to Henry VIII’s earliest impressions of gunpowder weaponry but the commitment shown to ‘new technologies’ by his father was surely influential in shaping the younger Tudors’ curiosity “about matters of this kind.”83 The role of Henry VII in shaping his martial inclination has perhaps been obscured by now increasingly shaky historical assessments of the first Tudor’s pacifism. Recent revisions have instead shown him to be no pacifist.84 Rather “in war in Brittany, France and Scotland he attempted to live up to the martial reputation of his predecessors and underline his royal authority through success in war.”85

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This martial vigour was augmented by a commitment to modern military techniques, most evident in the meaningful establishment of an English ordnance and artillery manufacturing industry in the late 1480s. From this perspective considerable continuity is identifiable between Henry VII and Henry VIII and the improvements to the military establishment here described in the period 15091523 can be seen as part of a process of gradual evolution. English troops would not again be engaged on the continent until the 1540s, during which decade they fully mastered and embraced many of the techniques they had been experimenting with throughout the reign. Gervase Phillips has convincingly identified an “adaptive pattern of military development,” within which “strong connections with the tactical practice of preceding centuries,” were maintained.86 As Phillips astutely pointed out, the idea of an “early modern military revolution rests on the belief that medieval warfare was a deeply primitive affair...this...is a modernists conceit.”87 Phillips identified the ‘grand strategies’ employed in the execution of the Crusades against the Latin East, the responses of military architects of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to improving siege engines (e.g. the trebuchet) and indeed the large and tactically competent forces that often constituted the medieval army.88 Phillips’ model repeatedly emphasised continuity between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, “firearms...did not revolutionise warfare but slotted neatly into existing tactical systems.”89 One cannot escape the relative merits of what one might term the ‘evolutionary model’ of military development. Throughout the early modern, and indeed medieval, period, continuity appears to be the dominant theme - as opposed to any sudden revolutionary change - in continental military practice. Such a view, for the period 1494-1559, was recently endorsed by J. Black who concluded that a “consideration of the warfare of the period suggests that ‘military adaptation’ is a more appropriate term than revolution.”90 This new approach is most clearly evident in contemporary reflections on the Italian wars. The French descent into Italy, in 1494, had long been held up as marking the differentiation between medieval and early modern warfare, however the relevance of this periodisation has come in for increasing criticism.91 Thus “rather than arguing that firearms revolutionised warfare, it is important to focus on the way in which they slotted into existing tactical systems.”92 At first glance these conclusions find resonance with those of M. Prestwich who noted that “many of the elements considered to typify the early modern military revolution also featured in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century: the increased size of armies, elaborate supply arrangements, complex strategy and effective tactics.”93 However, Prestwich added the important caveat that:

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Although this weakens the case for the early modern military revolution, it does not make an alternative case for gradual steady evolution. Rather, it demonstrates that in different periods, when similar problems presented themselves, closely comparable solutions were developed. Change was not even paced.94 R. I. Frost, in his excellent appreciation of The Northern Wars, came to a sympathetic conclusion for the period 1558-1721, wherein “what took place was a series of individual military revolutions, not one Military Revolution.”95 For Frost, like Prestwich, the “course and timing of change,” was context-specific and “although the process of change was essentially evolutionary, in every case there was a critical point which can be seen as the definitive breakthrough of a new military system.”96 The difference between Frost and Phillips is only one of nuance, but this in itself is significant when constructing models of military change. The conclusions of Frosts’ regional study find striking resonance with the pattern of military development and maturation here identified in Tudor England. Employing Frost’s paradigm, the period 1509-23 was essentially a period of evolutionary change, while the 1540s can be seen to have represented, for England, the ‘critical point’. Ultimately, it seems unlikely that a satisfactory compromise will ever be reached between the proponents of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘evolutionary’ change to the nature of early modern European warfare. 97 Although it is certainly safe to conclude that the ‘military revolution’ can now no longer be understood in its original context. Roberts’ ‘definitive model’ appears flawed in the light of recent revisions. To historians and social scientists alike the term ‘revolution’ has developed a plethora of interpretations, and indeed ‘definitive definitions’. Nevertheless, to most of us, it still denotes a ‘violent change’ to the status quo, normally over a relatively short period. Therein lies the problem with attaching the label, ‘revolution’, to military developments over time. Nevertheless, ‘revolution’ has become synonymous with the military history of Europe in the early modern period. Roberts’ original model spanned over one hundred years, a period which in itself seems so long as to negate the application of the term ‘revolution.’ Moreover, recent revisions have extended the ‘military revolution’ to such an extent, in some cases spanning over three centuries, that there seems very little revolutionary in the model whatsoever. The term is highly subjective; who is to say the development of the trace italienne fortification was any more revolutionary than the crossbow before it, the flintlock or later the bayonet? The application of the term ‘revolutionary’ immediately gives

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added significance to the item to which it is attached - often without sufficient corroborative evidence. In the face of these problems what are we left with? Is the military revolution debate thus left bankrupt? Is it simply an academics’ paper chase? This, it seems, would be to go too far. The military revolution debate, like any other form of historical classification has provided a necessary and thoughtprovoking framework. However the profusion of alternative interpretations has ensured the concept now bears little resemblance to any reasonable definition of a revolution. It seems fair to conclude that the original notion of an early modern European ‘military revolution’ is now defunct.

Notes

Introduction 1

M. Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560-1660’, (1956) reprinted in M. Roberts, (ed.)

2

Ibid., p.13.

3

See especially: G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West

Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), p.13.

(Cambridge, 1992); J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800 (London, 1991); C. J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Westview, 1995); B. M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: 1992); S. Morillo, ‘Guns and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan’, The Journal of World History, vol. 6 (1995), pp.75–106; R. Frost, The Northern Wars, 1558 - 1721 (London, 2000). 4

The best recent summary of the debate is provided by J. Black, European Warfare, 1494-

5

G. Phillips, ‘The Army of Henry VIII: A Reassessment’, The Journal of the Society for Army

6

C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army (Oxford, 1966), p.1.

7

G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, (Charlottesville, 1980), pp.16-7.

8

For example, Downing insisted that “whatever the scope of Henrician and Elizabethan

1660, (London, 2002), Chapter 3, pp.32-54. Historical Research, vol. 75 (1997), p.8.

state building, the Tudor period experienced no military revolution or military centred bureaucracy.” B. M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, p.163. 9

C. Oman, ‘The Art of War’, in Social England vol. III (ed.) H. D. Traill, (London, 1895), p.70.

10

C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1937), p.285.

11

See esp. F. L. Taylor, The Art of War in Italy (London, 1993).

12

D. J. B. Trim, ‘The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth-Century English Society’,

13

G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars; ‘Longbow and Hackbutt, Weapons Technology and

Journal of Early Modern History, vol. 3 (3), (1999), p.254. Technology Transfer in Early Modern England’, Technology and Culture, vol. 40 (1999), pp.576-593; ‘The Army of Henry VIII: A Reassessment’; M. C. Fissel, English Warfare, 1511-1642 (London, 2001); D. Grummit (ed.) The English Experience in France, c.1450-

198


1558: War, Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange (Aldershot, 2002); D. Grummitt, ‘For the Surety of the Towne and Marches: Early Tudor Policy Towards Calais, 1485-1509’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, vol.44 (2000), pp.184-203; D. Grummitt, ‘The Defence of Calais and the Development of Gunpowder Weaponry in England in the late Fifteenth Century’, War in History, vol. 7 (2000), pp.253-72; D. Grummitt, ‘One of the mooste pryncipall treasours belongyng to his Realme of England’: Calais and the Crown, c.14501558’, in D. Grummitt (ed.), The English Experience in France, c.1450-1558 (Aldershot 2002); L. MacMahon, ‘Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army in Renaissance Europe: A Reassessment,’ in D. J. B. Trim, The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism, (Leiden, 2003), pp.183-212 ; D. J. B. Trim, ‘The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth Century English Society’, Journal of Early Modern History, vol. 3, (1999), pp.233-55. 14

M. C. Fissel, English Warfare, quote p.18, see also chapters 1 & 2. See also M. Fissel (ed.),

15

See especially: D. Grummitt, ‘ “For the Surety of the Towne and Marches”: early Tudor

War and Government in Britain, 1598-1610 (Manchester, 1991). Policy Towards Calais’; D. Grummitt, ‘The Defence of Calais and the Development of Gunpowder Weaponry in England in the late Fifteenth Century’; D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison: warfare and military service in England, 1450-1558 (forthcoming). I must take this opportunity to thank Dr. Grummitt for his generosity in allowing me to read a manuscript copy of his forthcoming book. 16

Phillips’ excellent article described a much more complex argument for the retention of the longbow and demands the attention of any student of the period, G. Phillips, ‘Longbow and Hackbutt’. T. Esper provided a good summary of sixteenth century controversy between proponents of the bow and those of small firearms, T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Army’, Technology and Culture, vol. 6 (1965), pp.382-93.

17

See esp. D. Potter, ‘The International Mercenary Market in the Sixteenth Century: AngloFrench Competition in Germany, 1543-50’, English Historical Review, vol. 111 (1996), pp.24-58.

18

G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.7. For the relative modernity of the English army at the battle of Pinkie (1547), see esp. D. H. Caldwell, ‘The Battle of Pinkie’, in N. MacDougall (ed.), Scotland and War AD 79-1918 (Edinburgh, 1991), p.61 (pp.61-94).

19

Ibid. pp.89-96. The trace italienne “was to have a considerable impact on the war in Scotland between 1547 and 1550”, and this was largely a result of he experience gained on the continent in 1543 and 1544.” (p.92)

20

D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.99.

21

D. Eltis, English Military Theory and the Military Revolution of the Sixteenth Century (Oxford University D. Phil. Thesis, 1991).

NOTES

199

22


23

Ibid., Chapter 5 (pp.99-135).

24

There is too large a body of literature on English warfare in Scotland to begin to outline it here. G. Phillips’ Anglo-Scots Wars and M. Merriman’s The Rough Wooings (Linton, 2000), however, proffer particularly perceptive analysis of the character of Anglo-Scots border warfare in the mid-Tudor period. Additionally, G. Bernard’s The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility: A Study of the Fourth and Fifth Earls of Shrewsbury (Brighton, 1985) is an essential starting point for any student of the role of the nobility in Anglo-Scots border warfare.

25

More recently the relationship between Europe’s chivalric heritage and the development of ‘military professionalism’ has been explored in David Trim’s excellent edition, The Chivalric Ethos.

26

C. H. Firth, Cromwell’s Army: a history of the English soldier during the Civil Wars, the

27

On levying see especially: J. J. Goring, The Military Obligations of the English People, 1511-1558

28

For a consideration of these issues during the Stuart regime see M. J. Braddick, ‘An

29

H. M. Colvin has already provided a scholarly architectural history that this work cannot

Commonwealth and the Protectorate (London, 1902), p.1. (London, University Ph.D thesis, 1955). English Military Revolution?’, The Historical Journal, vol. 36 (1993), pp.965-75. claim to compete with in detail. H. M. Colvin (ed.) The History of the King’s Works. vol. III, pt I, 1485-1660 (London, 1975) and vol. IV 1485-1660 (pt II), (London, 1982). 30

For an exhaustive survey of this subject see: C.S.L. Davies, Supply Services of the English Armed Forces, 1509-50 (Oxford, D.Phil Thesis, 1963). The findings of this thesis in regard to victualling are succinctly summarised in, C. S. L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies, 1509-50; A Study in the Effectiveness of Early Tudor Government’, Economic History Review, vol. 17 (1964-5), pp.234-48.

31

C. S. L. Davies, ‘Henry VIII and Henry V: The Wars in France,’ (ed.) J. L. Watts, The End

32

A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 1452-97 (London,

33

Ibid.

34

J. D. Mackie, ‘The English Army at Flodden’, Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, vol. 18

of the Middle Ages? England in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Stroud, 1998), p.244. 1981), p.194.

(1951), pp.35-85. Chapter 1 Henrician military literature: theory and reality 1

Sections of this chapter have been published in the journal Archives. Since publication this piece has undergone considerable revision and a number of important new issues have

200


been considered in this chapter. See: J. J. Raymond, ‘Henry VIII and the English Military Establishment’, Archives: The Journal of the British Records Association, vol. 28 (2003), pp.97112. 2

British Library (BL) Harleian MS 68, f.4. R. Barhede, ‘A Brief Discourse for the Maintenaunce Exercise and Trayning of a Convenient Nombre of Englishemen whereby they may be the soner made souldiours for the redier defence of this Realm of England.’ C.1560. Lazarus von Schwendi was an important military reformer in mid-sixteenth century ‘Germany’.

3

Ibid. This refers to the siege of Leith (outside of Edinburgh) by English forces in spring 1560. Elizabeth I sent a force in support of the Protestant Lords of the Congregation, against the Catholic regent of Scotland, Mary of Guise. Mary was supported by a French garrison, and the English campaign though successful, in part due to naval strength, was plagued with problems: “Victualling, pay shortages, slow transport of ordnance, inadequate troop strength, shoddy military engineering, and inexpert command all came into play.” M. C. Fissel, English Warfare, p.119.

4

Notably: D. Eltis, Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe; B. M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change; G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries; C. Oman, Art of War.

5

D. Eltis, Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.104.

6

Ibid., chapter 5, notes: 9, 10, 17, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193 and so on.

7

J. L. Price, review of D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe in The English

8

D. Eltis, Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.103. These criticisms aside however,

Historical Review, vol. 112 (1997), pp.977-8. it would be entirely incorrect not to point out that this is otherwise an excellent survey of Elizabethan military literature, that principally falls down in attempting to apply these rules backwards to the reign of Henry VIII. I must acknowledge the considerable intellectual debt owed to his work, in guiding me through the complexities of Elizabethan military literature. 9

See: M. J. Cockle, A Bibliography of English and Foreign Military Books up to 1642 (London, 1957). Cockle’s survey includes 59 works between 1560 and 1599; H. J. Webb, Elizabethan Military Science: the Books and the Practice (London, 1965). C. G. Cruickshank noted that “it was not until the time of Elizabeth I that military books began to come off the printing press in any great numbers,” – ‘Military Developments of the Renaissance,’ in R. Higham (ed.) A Guide to the Sources of British Military History (London, 1972), p.68. Moreover, J. S. Nolan commented that “while such books were common in the later sixteenth century, a large number of new English military manuals appeared in the period between 1600 and 1640.” – ‘The Militarization of the Elizabethan State’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 58 (1994), p.403.

10

R. Barnabe, A Right Excelent and Pleasaunt Dialogue betwene Mercury and an English Souldier

NOTES

201

(London, 1574), STC (2nd ed.)/20998, A Path-way to Military Practise, (London, 1587) STC (2nd ed.)/20995; T. Churchyard, A Generall Rehearsall of Warres, (London, 1579) STC (2nd ed.) /5235.2 ; Sir J. Smythe, Certain Discourses Military ( London, 1590), STC (2nd ed.)/22833; L. and T. Digges, An Arithmeticall Militare Treatise Named Stratioticos ( London, 1579) STC (2nd ed.)/6848. See also D. Eltis, English Military Theory. 11

J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground: The Captain’s Handbook, 1562’, Renaissance War

12

J. R. Hale, ‘Printing and Military Culture of Renaissance Venice’, RWS, p.429.

13

By the end of the 16th century, “those who still considered the ancients to be relevant

Studies (RWS) (London, 1983), p.259.

were finding that other authorities, and especially Aelian Tacticus, were more immediately useful than Vegetius, and that ancient military systems other than Rome (especially the Greek and Macedonian) were worth analysing in detail.” S. Anglo, ‘Vegetius’s ‘De Re Militari’: The Triumph of Mediocrity’, Antiquaries Journal, vol.82 (2003), p.252. For the influence of classical thought on Machiavelli see T. R. W. Dubik, ‘Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History’, Journal of Military History, vol. 61 (1997), pp.7-30 and M. Mallett, ‘The Theory and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli’s Republic’, in G. Brook, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge, 1993), pp.173-80. 14

For the extent to which the military theory of the Middle Ages was based on the work of Vegetius see H. Delbruck, History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History, vol. III, The Middle Ages (London, 1982), pp.635-48. The continued relevance of antiquity to the military thought of the early modern period is considered in depth by D. A. Neill, ‘Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of Military History, vol. 62 (1998), pp.487-520.

15

P. Contamine, ‘The War Literature of the Late Middle Ages: The Treatises of Robert de Balsac and Beraud Stuart, Lord of Aubigny’, in C. Allmand (ed.), War Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool, 1967), p.102.

16

C. Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century English Versions of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, in M. Strickland (ed.), Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the Harlaxton Symposium (Stamford, 1998), p.33.

17

D. Bornstein, ‘Military Manuals in Fifteenth Century England’, Medieval Studies, vol. 37

18

W. Caxton, The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry, A. T. P. Blyes (ed.) (London, 1926). Similarly,

(1975) p.470. see Z. M. Aren and R. Dyboski (eds.) Knyghthode and Bataile (London, 1935), pp.xvi-xxiv. I must thank Gervase Phillips for referring me to these examples. 19

P. Contamine, ‘The War Literature of the Late Middle Ages’, p.121.

20

BL Harleian MS., 309, ff.5-14.

202

21


BL Additional MS., 23791, BL Lansdowne MS., 818, ff.15-26v; Cotton MS., Titus B V ff.45-.57v; and finally Bodleian Library, Oxford (Bodleian), Tanner Ms. 103 - this version was “newelie corrected in the first yeare of Queene Marie by the sayde Thomas Audeley.” (f.30) See also W. St. P. Bunbury (ed.) ‘A Treatise on the Art of War by Thomas Audley’, The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 6 (1927), pp.6578, 129-33, for a printed version of text.

22

The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) SP1/172 ff.97-100 (LP, XVII, 464 [p.275]); SP1/172 ff.22-22v (LP, XVII, 561); SP1/172 ff.32-32v (LP, XVII, 575); SP1/172 ff.109-110, (LP, XVII, 632); SP1/172 ff.111-112, (LP, XVII, 637); SP1/172 ff.118-119, (LP, XVII, 649); SP1/172 ff.131-131v, (LP, XVII, 691); SP1/173 ff.205-206v, (LP, XVII, 934 [p.531]); LP, XVII, 594. For a mini-biography see S. T. Bindoff, The House of Commons 1509-1558, vol. I (London, 1982), pp.353-4.

23

TNA: PRO SP1/172 f.109v (LP, XVII, 632). Sir John Wallop was one of the principal

24

Thomas Poynings was an illegitimate son of the famous military captain, Sir Edward

‘professional’ English captains of the age. See below p.292. Poynings (DNB, pp.271-4). Distinguishing himself during the capture of Boulogne, he was created Baron Poynings on 30 January 1545. He died at Boulogne on 17 August 1545. DNB, p.275. 25

TNA: PRO SP1.172 f.131 (LP, XVII, 691). In demurring of his own capacity for the command, Audley was following the etiquette demanded in the chivalric court of Henry VIII.

26

LP, XIX (1), 813; XIX (2), 303. Thomas Audley, the soldier and author, has been confused by John Bald and by the Navy Records Society with his more illustrious namesake, Sir Thomas Audley who served as Lord Chancellor from 1533. See: J. Bald, ‘Naval Regulations, c.1530’, History Today, vol. 41 (June 1991), p.30; ‘Audley’s Fleet Orders, circa 1530’, Publications of the Naval Records Society, Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 (London, 1905), pp.14-24. T. M. Hoffman’s entry in The House of Commons commented that: “Of the dozen and more Thomas Audleys living in the second quarter of the 16th century two were preeminent, the Chancellor and the soldier. They appear to have been unrelated…(the Chancellor)…being the son of an Essex yeoman whereas his namesake came from Lewes in Sussex.” p.353.

27

BL Additional MS., 23971 - the details of the military techniques advocated by this document will be expanded on later.

28

BL Lansdowne MS., 818, f.17v, f.18v.

29

BL Additional MS., 23971, f.1.

30

For a contrary perspective see: D. Eltis, Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe; G. J.

31

Cambridge University Library (CUL) F.f.2.10, Bodleian, Rawlinson D.363 and BL Cotton

Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries.

NOTES

203

Julius F.V. These manuscripts are largely identical. There is some variation in spellings/order. The Cotton/Bodleian manuscripts also contain an index and a ‘section’ on the deployment of horse absent in the CUL version. 32

BL Cotton Julius F. V, f.57v. The Cambridge variant is from the ‘Moore Collection,’ acquired by King George I for the library in 1715 from the ‘Moore Collection,’ after the death of the Bishop of Ely in the previous year. Further details on the acquisition of the ‘Moore Collection’ can be found in D. Mckitterick, Cambridge University Library. A History.The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1986). However the manuscript is not specifically identified here.

33

D. Eltis, English Military Theory, p.186.

34

C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal (Oxford, 1969), p.106 - Cruickshank also made the error of concluding that all the ‘Audley Manuscripts’ (BL Lansdowne MS., 818, ff.15-26v; Cotton Ms. Titus B V ff.45-57v, Bodleian, Tanner MS., 103,) are identical. This is clearly not the case. Although very closely related, there are important deviations between the manuscripts (and omissions / additions).

35

DNB, p.373. It is interesting to note that, like Hare, Vegetius “was not a military man but a well-read and versatile functionary.” C. Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century English Versions of Vegetius’, p.32.

36

Ibid.

37

N. Machiavelli, The arte of warre, written first in Italia(n) by Nicholas Machiaull, and set forthe in

38

CUL F.f.2.10, f.24 –“Yt maie seme good by counsale of the ‘olde writers’ that yo(ur)

Englishe by Peter Whitehorne, studient at Graies Inne (London, 1562) STC (2nd ed.) / 17164. Scowte watches both on horsebacke and on foote have alwaies with them certayn bagges...” 39

S.Anglo, ‘Vegetius’s ‘De Re Militari’: The Triumph of Mediocrity’, p.250. Anglo further noted that “this is perfectly understandable, since the message of De Re Militari with regard to the superiority of native troops over mercenaries, and its confidence in the benefits of military training, were as much in accord with Machiavelli’s ideals as with those of his humanist predecessors.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, it is pertinent to remember that “Vegetius himself makes no claim to originality and declares that he has merely epitomized a number of earlier writers.’ (Ibid.)

40

However, it is important to be clear that there is no evidence to demonstrate Audley had read Vegetius, and despite some thematic resonance there is little to directly link the manuscripts.

41

C.Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century English Versions of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, p.40.

42

BL Additional MS., 23971; For Robert Hare see: DNB, p.373; for William Paulet, Marquis

43

S. T. Bindoff, The House of Commons 1509-1558, p.353; DNB, pp.92-4.

of Winchester, see DNB, pp.92-4.

204


44

Bodleian, Rawlinson, D 363, f.1. The quotations are; John. 6, Mark. 14, Luke. 22.

45

Ibid.

46

J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.264; although he does acknowledge that

47

CUL F.f.2.10, f.15v and f.29v.

48

Ibid., f.15v and f.29v.

49

This text was translated into English in 1525 and 1540. See: J. Bury, ‘Early Writings on

50

P. Contamine, ‘The War Literature of the Late Middle Ages’, p.115.

51

C. G. Cruickshank, ‘Military Developments of the Renaissance’, pp.74-5.

52

C.T.Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century English Versions of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, p.42.

53

J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, pp.264-5.

54

See: CUL.Ff.2.10, f.12; BL Cotton. MS. Julius.F.V, ff.10v-11v; J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor

55

BL Lansdowne.MS.818, f.14. The title is clearly a later addition and no further detail is

56

For a discussion of military theory, military codes and discipline, see pp.141-70.

57

Furthermore, many of the same the themes are echoed in Elizabethan and Stuart treatise.

58

For the purposes of clarity a single manuscript copy of each text will now be referred to,

this “cannot be said to clinch the matter of authorship beyond all shadow of doubt.”

Fortifications and Siegecraft: 1502-1554’, Fort, vol. 13 (1985), pp.7-8.

Parade Ground’, RWS, pp.280-1. available describing the origin of the document.

where possible, throughout the remainder of the thesis. Quotes from the Audley manuscript will be drawn from BL Additional. MS, 23971, as this is the most comprehensive, and legible, of the surviving copies. References from Text B will be principally drawn from the Cambridge copy of the manuscript: CUL F.f.2.10. The only deviation from this principle will be in the discussion of the cavalry. The Cambridge copy says very little on the cavalry, whereas the version amongst the Cotton collection at the British Library includes a significant additional section. BL Cotton MS Julius F.V, ff.50-7v. Otherwise, all three manuscripts (at Cambridge, the Bodleian and the British Library) are near identical. 59

BL Additional MS., 23971, f.2.

60

Ibid.

61

A process it must be noted that is evident throughout the fifteenth century. See A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses.

62

BL Additional MS., 23971, ff.27-27v.

63

CUL F.f.2.10.

64


65

Ibid.

66

G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, M. Fissel, English Warfare.

67

It seems worthwhile to reiterate that what follows will be a thematic analysis, the provision

NOTES

205

of detailed narrative ‘campaign accounts’ is not the purpose of this study. 68

J. Guy, Tudor England (London, 1990), pp.80-1. The term ‘Sport of Kings’ derives from a

69

See: S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court,’ in S. Anglo (ed.),

reference by John Guy, p.82; A. F. Pollard, Henry VIII, (London, 1963). Chivalry in the Renaissance, (Woodbridge, 1990), p.127; S. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk (Oxford, 1988) pp.5-8; D. J. B. Trim, The Chivalric Ethos. 70

D. Potter, ‘Anglo-French relations 1500: The aftermath of the Hundred Years War’, Journal of Franco-British Studies, vol. 28 (1999/2000), pp.45-9. However, Currin equally emphasises that Henry’s intervention, between 1489 and 1491, in “Brittany, and to a lesser extent…Flanders,” was “an attempt to influence political events abroad and to keep these regions from falling under French control.” J. M. Currin, ‘The King’s Army into the Partes of Bretaigne’: Henry VII and the Breton Wars, 1489-91’, War in History, vol. 7 (2000), p.379. For a further example of Henry VII’s aggressive foreign policy stance see: I. Arthurson, ‘The King’s voyage into Scotland: the war that never was’, in D. T. Williams (ed.) England in the Fifteenth Century, (Woodbridge, 1987), pp.1-22.

71

J. M. Currin, ‘To Traffic with War? Henry VII and the French campaign of 1492’, in D. Grummitt (ed.), The English Experience in France, pp.107-8. Grummitt has argued that, at the outset of his reign, Henry VII had used war as a means of “healing the rifts in the political nation.” However, “by the last decade or so of Henry’s reign the need to assert royal authority through successful war was lessened owing to his final victory over the pretender, Perkin Warbeck, and the king’s own desire for financial security.” D. Grummitt, The English Experience in France, p.4.

72

See: C. S. L. Davies, ‘Henry VIII and Henry V: The Wars in France’, in J. L. Watts (ed.), The End of the Middle Ages? England in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, (Stroud, 1998), pp.235-62; G. L. Harriss, ‘Introduction: the exemplar of kingship’, in G. L. Harriss (ed.) Henry V: the practice of kingship (Oxford, 1983); J. Vale, Edward III and Chivalry (Woodbridge, 1982).

73

One might note for example the commissioning in 1513, by Henry VIII, of a translation of Titus Livius’ biography of Henry V – See. C. L. Kingsford, The First English Life of Henry V (Oxford, 1911).

74

S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry’, p.127. Gunn has demonstrated that “as Henry VII lay dying, it was the men who dominated the Order of the Garter – certainly Shrewsbury, Herbert and Surrey, probably Lovell and Poynings – who stood around, not Empson, Dudley and the council learned in law.”

75

A. F. Pollard, Henry VIII (London, 1905). Pollard painted a picture of a king determined to expand his dominion across the British Isles, see. pp.362-4, 405-7. For similar, or complementary, views see also, G. Donaldson, Scotland, James V to James VII (London, 1965), pp.26-30; R. G. Eaves, Henry VIII’s Scottish Diplomacy, 1513-24: England’s Relations

206


with the Regency Government of James V (New York, 1971). For a comparable perspective on the 1540s, most especially the negotiations over the Treaty of Greenwich in 1543, see A. J. Slavin, Politics and Profit: A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507-1547 (Cambridge, 1966). For Somerset’s desires on the ‘dynastic union’ of England and Scotland see esp. M. L. Bush, The Government Policy of Protector Somerset (London, 1975). 76

See especially, R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada: the emergence of the English nation, 1485-1558

77

For example, G. Bernard, perceptively argued that “English foreign policy in these years

(London, 1966). (1521-25) was…highly opportunistic, in turn cautious and aggressive”, War, Taxation and Rebellion in Early Tudor England: Henry VIII, Wolsey and the Amicable Grant of 1525 (Sussex, 1986), p.10. Bernard argued the key factors were finance, and how well Charles’ armies were performing on the Italian peninsular. If he was winning then the alliance with England might be strengthened, if not, then the English “might seek an understanding with the French.” Ibid. 78

Numerous studies have been made of Henry’s foreign policy aims, for an excellent survey see: S. Doran, England and Europe, 1485-1603 (London, 1986); S. Doran, England and Europe in the Sixteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1999), pp.13-30. See also: S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe,’ (Edinburgh, 1987), pp.28-51; D. Potter, ‘Anglo-French relations 1500: The Aftermath of the Hundred Years War’, pp.41-66; D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy,’ in D. MacCulloch (ed.) The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy and Piety (London, 1995), pp.101-33.

79

D. M. Head, ‘Henry VIII’s Scottish Policy: A Reassessment’, Scottish Historical Review, vol.

80

M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings, p.13.

81

LP, I (1), 5 (ii).

82

TNA: PRO E30/724.

83

TNA: PRO E 36/1, f.39, (LP, I (1), 1463), Payments included 4,500li to Ponynges “for

61 (1982) p.22.

himself and his retinue, to Sampson Norton for conveying ordnance into Guyderland, 116li 8s, amongst others. Total payments were 6,265 li. 2s. 6.d.” See also: S. Gunn, ‘Sir Edward Poynings: An Anglo-Burgundian Hero,’ Publication du Centre europeen d’etudes bourguignonnes, vol. 41 (2001), p.158. 84

TNA: PRO E36/1, f.39. Payments began in March, “To John Iseham and George Hayrward for the victualling, wages and tonnage for one month of the ‘Barbara and Mary Berking’ to attend upon Sir Edward onynges into Guyderland.” Ponynges retinue is not taken on until June, and final conduct money home was paid in December. See: S. Gunn, ‘Sir Edward Poynings,’ pp.158, 160.

85

See: E. Hall The Triumphant Reigne of Kyng Henry The VIII, vol. I, C. Whibley (ed.) (London, 1904) VIII, vol. 1, pp.30-3.

NOTES

207

86

LP, I (1), 969; CSP Span. FS., vol. II, Documents, 59-65; TNA: PRO E30/733.

87

See Ferrajoli, ‘Un breve inedito di Giulio II per la Investitura, del Regno di Francia ad Enrico VIII d’Inghilterra’; Arch. Della R.Societa Romana di Storia Patria, xix (Rome, 1896) 424 FF. Cited in J.J Scarisbrick Henry VIII (London, 1968), p.33.

88

Although it is important to recognise that no such promise was ever fulfilled, or likely to

89

E. Hall Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.41.

90

Ibid., p.42.

be.

91

Polydore Vergil, The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, A.D.1485-1537, D. Hay (ed.) (London, 1950) p.175.

92

TNA: PRO E36/1, f.36.

93

Likewise in 1544, the English campaign around Boulogne “was unsuccessful in its original grandiose aims not because of the failure of the English armies but because of the withdrawal of support for the English cause by their erstwhile Imperial allies.” D. Grummitt, The English Experience in France, p.6. For the 1544 campaign in France see especially, M. Fissel, English Warfare, pp.13-9 and P. E. J. Hammer, Elizabethan Warfare (Basingstoke, 2003), pp.16-25.

94

LP, I (1), 1750 (TNA: PRO E30/741).

95

Ibid.

96

Polydore, Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.197.

97

Ibid.

98

Nonetheless, it is worthwhile acknowledging the notes of caution sounded by Lander, as to the continued importance in real terms of the claim to the French throne. Lander concluded that for Edward IV and his subjects, “the old enthusiasm (such as it had been) for the king’s claim to the French throne had long since departed.” Moreover the campaign of 1475 was not so much a fervid renewal of ancient glories as a defensive reaction of the government to the complications and dangers of the international situation in northwestern Europe as it had developed since 1454.” J. R. Lander, ‘The Hundred Years War and Edward IV’s Campaign in France’, in A. J. Slavin (ed.) Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government (Baton Rouge, 1972), p.100. Pragmatism, not ‘chivalric idealism’, honour or even dynasticism, guided policy in this view.

99

S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, p.47; see also, C. S. L. Davies, ‘Henry VIII and Henry V: the Wars in France’, pp.235-62.

100

A policy which he hoped would unite the country and aid the domestic situation.

101

BL Cotton Galba B.III, ff.64v-65, (LP, I (1), 1722).

102

Ibid., ff.62, 66, 64.

103

Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.209.

208


104

For an excellent campaign history see: C.G.Cruickshank, Army Royal.

105

E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.1, p.61.

106

Ibid., p.66.

107

For details on the English at Tournai see: C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of

108

S. Doran, England and Europe, p.24.

109

C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.l86.

110

In light of this, Henry’s French campaigns have been described by G. J. Millar, as “wars

Tournai (Oxford, 1971)

that in their sterility and expenditure bankrupted the nation and marred an otherwise brilliant reign.” G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.43. 111

The most convincing accounts of the events of 9 September 1513 are to be found in, G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp.109-33, N. MacDougall’s, James IV (Edinburgh, 1989) and N. Barr’s, Flodden, 1513 (Stroud, 1513). These should be the starting point for any student of the action and both have been highly instructive in guiding my own analysis of the battle.

112

Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.215.

113

Ibid.

114

CSP Ven. vol. 2, 1509-19, doc. 316.

115

TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.42, (LP, I (2), 2279).

116

Ibid., ff.42-42v.

117

G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.115.

118

E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.104.

119

See: N. Barr, Flodden, 1513, Appendix II. The size of the combatant armies will be

120

Further details regarding the size and composition of the two armies and the character of

121

It is worthwhile emphasising that in 1513, it was the French alliance that caused the Scots

discussed at greater later, see: Chapter 5, pp.254-9. the armies will be provided in the chapters that follow. to invade, culminating in the defeat at Flodden. Similarly, in 1522 and 1523 the threat of Scottish invasion, under French auspices, was again magnified by the regency of the Duke of Albany. The Franco-Scottish alliance, and the danger of an invasion of England’s northern border, was a recurrent theme in the foreign policy of Henry VIII’s reign. 122 123

C. Oman, Art of War, p.322. For the treaty see: TNA: PRO E30/831, E30/814 and E30/829. For an instructive discussion see: P. Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal: the rise and fall of Thomas Wolsey (London, 1990), pp.144-51.

124 125

J. D. Mackie The Earlier Tudors 1485-1558 (Oxford, 1952), p.308. This survey is necessarily brief, and what was perhaps the apogee (or at least most

NOTES

209

prominent pretence) of this period of peace, The Field of the Cloth of Gold, is excluded from discussion. See: G. Richardson, ‘Good Friends and Brothers? Francis I and Henry VIII’, History Today, vol. 44, (Sept., 1994), pp.16-25. 126

BL Cotton Otho E XI, f.40 (ff.34-40).

127

See: TNA: PRO E30/866 + LP, III (2), 2360, for details of agreement between Emperor

128

P. Gwyn has forcefully demonstrated the importance of Henry’s ‘honour’ in the

and Henry VIII formation of English foreign policy: see. P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s foreign policy: the conferences at Calais and Bruges reconsidered’, Historical Journal, vol. 23 (1980), pp.75572. 129

E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.267.

130

It is interesting to note that the same commander who thwarted Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey at Hesdin in the autumn of 1522, did so again, when Howard, now Duke of Norfolk, besieged Montdidier in 1544. As Norfolk began the insufficient masking of Montdidier in the late summer of 1544 he sent York herald to Lord de Biez, the captain of the town, demanding its surrender to the English. De Biez told the herald that Norfolk was in fact “the cause of his rising to his present ascendancy and the esteem and the trust in which he stood with the King (Francis)… ‘Let it be known to him that I will keep this town as well as I kept the castle of Hesdin against him’.” M. B. Davies (ed.) ‘The Enterprise of Paris and Boulogne’, (ed.), Fouaad I University, Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, vol. 12, (1949-50), p.55. De Biez proved as good as his word; the English failed to mask even half the town and were ultimately forced to withdraw by the imminent threat of a large French field army.

131

Suffolk’s 1523 campaign has been excellently dealt with by S. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris’, English Historical Review, vol. 101 (1986), pp.596-634; It can also be approached through J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, chapter 5. See also the chronicles of E. Hall, Henry VIII, E. Gruffudd ‘Suffolk’s Expedition to Montdidier, 1523’, in M. B. Davies (ed.), Bulletin -Faculty of Arts Fouad 1 University, (vol.7, 1944), pp.33-43; and to a lesser extent that of Polydore Vergil. For the political and diplomatic aims and complexities, which surround the campaign, Gunn’s work is superb.

132

E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.1, p.296.

133

Bourbon had been enraged by the Crown’s appropriation of his deceased wife’s estate.

134

J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.129.

135

For Sir John Russell’s report on the views of Bourbon and Buren’s petition to Wolsey see:

136

Ibid. Scarisbrick’s Henry VIII (Chapters 5 and 6) provides a clear and concise narrative

For more detail, see R. J. Knecht, Francis I (Cambridge, 1982), pp.148-52.

LP, III (2), 3315. account by which one may approach this period of intense diplomatic and political

210


manouvre. The narrative account provided here is necessarily brief, leaving aside most of the detail of a profoundly complex period. The focus of this study remains the military effectiveness and technological development of Henry’s armies, not diplomacy or grand strategy. See also State Papers, vol. 1, no.75, pp.135-40 (LP, III (2), 3346). 137

C. Oman, Art of War, p.325.

138

E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolk’s Expedition to Montdidier’, p.34.

139

Ibid., p.38. The size of the army will be discussed later, but it is important to acknowledge here that they were to be supported by a contingent of Netherlanders under the command of Buren.

140

S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.628.

141

Ibid., p.615. These English successes are considered at greater length in chapter 2, see:

142

BL Additional MS. 10110, f.219.

143

For further discussion on this issue see: pp.144-5.

144

E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolk’s Expedition to Montdidier’, p.34.

145

S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.617. Before the arrival of the large relief force

pp.97-100.

under the Dauphin, the French, during the English sieges of Montdidier and Boulogne, employed much the same policy in 1544. See also, D. Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces, Picardy, 1470-1560 (Cambridge, 1993). Potter noted that “there were usually between five and eight companies in Picardy during peacetime, though in July 1521, the province had been stripped of men for other fronts, like Italy.” Moreover, “even by 1523 there were only 327 lances in the province out of a national total of 3,752.” p.159. 146

E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolks Expedition to Montdidier’, p.38. A similar sentiment was expressed by the Lord De Biez, commander of Montdidier, to the Duke of Norfolk in 1544. De Biez asked the English herald to tell Norfolk “he can take his pleasure in hunting with hawks and hounds about the country while the weather is fine and mild and by winter according to the old English custom you will go home to your kinsmen.” M. B. Davis, ‘The ‘Enterprise’ of Paris and Boulogne’, p.55.

147

Although, in defence of the 1523 campaign, it is interesting to note that this operation marked the furthest foray in France since the days of Henry V and until that of the Duke of Wellington in the nineteenth century - a not inconsiderable achievement. C. Oman, Art of War, p.322.

148

Although Suffolk would have done well not to have left Calais so late in the campaigning

149

Scarisbrick noted how “the Spanish troops had crossed the Pyrenees,” but were easily

season. contained by the French commander Lautrec. Whilst Bourbon “had scarcely got out of Besancon (where he started) when he turned tail and bolted to Genoa.” – J. J.

NOTES

211

Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.130. 150

S. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.630. The other problems that afflicted the campaign, such as instances of ill-discipline from the English, Dutch and German contingents, and the financial difficulties of Buren, from 23 October, will be discussed in Chapter 3, pp.141-70

151

Although it was termed a loan, in 1529 parliament relieved the king from any obligation to pay back any of the money - meaning most people never saw their money again. F. C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1485-1641, vol. 1 (London, 1964), p.94; LP, IV (3), app. 6; LP, IV (1), 377-8, 969. Cf. LP III (2) 2483 (3), 3082.

152

LP, IV, 271.

153

LP, IV, 61.

154

J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.131. For de’ Praet’s views on Henry’s desire to invade

155

It is important to emphasise here that such a view does not imply that Wolsey was a

France again in 1524 see CSP Span FS, vol. II, 1509-25, p.318. pacifist, or opposed to war on any principled grounds. Rather, he was a pragmatist, keen to promote warfare when it, in his view, offered tangible benefits to the English government. Bernard has emphasised that in the autumn of 1523 Wolsey, was arguing for a highly aggressive foreign policy, and was “fully involved in military preparations and discussions of strategy and tactics.” Moreover, “it is hard to see king and cardinal as fundamentally opposed, to see Henry as warlike…and Wolsey as a man of peace.” G. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, pp.43-4. 156

LP, IV, 446.

157

Bernard argued that the other key issue was the relative strength, and success in Italy, of French armies; indeed it would be “unwise to take them on if they were proving overwhelmingly successful in Italy.” G. Bernard, War, Rebellion and Taxation, p.19. However, “from late May, when the French retreated, till October, the French threat in Italy looked less serious.” Ibid.

158

LP, IV, 615.

159

Ibid.

160

CSP Span FS, vol. II, 1509-25, docs 684, 692.

161

R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada, p.106.

162

LP, IV, 1212.

163

Ibid.

164

LP, IV, 1371.

165

For the best discussion of the Amicable Grant see: G. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion.

166

LP, IV, 1234.

167

Ibid. Moreover, a series of arguments against taxation were relayed in the document as follows: “1. The complaint is made that the loan (of 1522) is not repaid, nor will this

212


grant be. 2. Too much coin of this realm is already exported into Flanders. 3.It would be the greatest means of enriching France to have all his money spent there, out of the realm; and if the king win France, he will be obliged to spend his time and revenues there. 4. That all the sums already spent on the invasion of France had not gained the king a foot more land than his father had which lacked no riches or wisdom to win the kingdom of France if he thought it expedient.” 168 169

P. Williams, Tudor Regime (London, 1979), p.316. TNA: PRO E30/923. The late 1520s would witness a series of further agreements, treaties and alliances between England and France. However, from 1527, dynastic concerns and negotiations over divorce began to take precedence. 1529 brought yet another crushing defeat for the French at Landriano; Charles was now master of Italy. By 29 June the Pope had committed himself to the Imperial camp at the Treaty of Barcelona and a month later peace was secured between France and the Empire at Cambrai. Thus, at the close of the 1520s, England was left without funds and without allies, as the Habsburg-Valois struggle appeared to be (at least temporarily) at a close.

Chapter 2 Gunpowder Weapons See B. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore, 1997), Chapter 5. F. Guicciardini, The Historie of Guicciardini Conteining the Warres of Italie and Other Parts, STC (2nd. Ed) /12458, Lib. I, p.45. 3 Ibid. 4 M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice c.1400-1617 (Cambridge, 1984), p.87. 5 BL Additional MS., 23971, ff.32-34v. 6 LP, XVIII (2), 384. 7 For a full discussion of the English artillery fort and the work of men like Rogers and Lee, see: Chapter 8. 8 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. I, p.105: ‘The kynge laye uppon the syde of a hyghe mountayne, called Floddon on the edge of chevyot, where was but one narrowe felde for any manne to ascende up the sayde hyll to hym, and at the foote of the hyll laye all hys ordinaunce.’ 9 CUL F.f.2.10, f.19v. 10 Ibid. 11 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.17v. 12 These descriptions are based on the treatise of prominent contemporary theorist (and practitioner), Vannoccio Biringuccio, see: C. S. Smith and M. T. Gradi (translated and editors), The Pirotechnia of Vannoccio Biringuccio: The Classic Sixteenth-Century Treatise on Metals and Metallurgy (New York, 1990). Biringuccio described types of cannon still in production, whilst other types of cannon were still in store, and in use, at this time these were 1

2

NOTES

213

increasingly viewed as outdated and obsolete. C. S. Smith (ed.) Pirotechnia, pp.224-5. 14 Ibid., p.225. 15 Ibid., p.226. 16 Ibid. 17 It is instructive to note that ballistic performance did not improve significantly until the nineteenth century. Indeed, “muzzle-loading cast-iron guns dominated European naval and military artillery until they were replaced by the breech loaders of the nineteenth century.” C. Lloyds, ‘Sussex Guns’, History Today, vol. 23 (no.11), (1973), p.786. 18 Ibid. 19 These figures are suggested by O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, 1326-1716 (London, 1963), pp.23-4. They are, he acknowledges, problematic, lacking clear contemporary evidence they are based on nineteenth century data and estimation. One needs to be aware that the type and composition of gunpowder and the size of the charge, the build material and structure of the cannon were all significant variables that could dramatically alter the performance of the weapons. Biringuccio commented that “There is a great difference between one master and another in making these, for each one wishes to show that he has the great knowledge and secrets about this.” C. S. Smith (ed.), Pirotechnia, p.225. With this in mind, it seems certain that performance would have varied dramatically from one cannon to another. 20 O. F. G.Hogg, English Artillery, p.23. 21 C. S. Smith (ed.), Pirotechnia, p.227. Although he went on to note: “it could indeed be that princely patrons, in order to show a certain boasting strength and pride of mind at having things harmful to their enemies, imposed these horrible names on them with a certain shadow of appropriateness according to their size and quality.” 22 The development of English gun-founding is a subject that has received a great deal of academic attention, and there exists a considerable body of literature on this topic. In an effort to retain the originality of a thesis that has sought to base its conclusions, where possible, on archival investigation, only the briefest of outlines will be provided here. This is, nonetheless, an important area of English military development that supports the overall thrust of the arguments presented in this thesis, and that will therefore form a substantial element of any future publication of the thesis. 23 For example, on 29 April 1536 Sir Christopher Morris wrote to Lord Lisle: “The king desires you to send over the fair double cannon, which you praised so much, that he may have sight of it.” – LP, X, 756. 24 Both France and Scotland boasted impressive artillery trains. Even more impressive and extensive was the artillery park of Maximilian.of Austria, indeed Ffoulkes commented that “Henry’s friendship with Maximilian and his envious emulation of the German monarch’s absorbing interest in, and encouragement of, military science in all its branches were the cause of the importation of ‘Almain’ or foreign armourers and gunfounders from France and the Low Countries to form schools for the production of war 13

214


material in England – about the year 1515.” C. Ffoulkes, The Gun-Founders of England (Cambridge, 1937), p.4. On Scottish artillery production see N. Macdougal, James IV, pp.69, 74, 75, 131-2, 135-6, 137, 138-9, 146, 264, 308-9. 25 TNA: PRO SP1/1, ff.123-123v (LP, I (1), 311), SP1/7, ff.80v-91 (LP, I (1), 1496), LP, I (1), 1420. 26 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour at Westminster, the Tower and Greenwich, 1547’, Archaelogia, or Miscellaneous Tracts relating to Antiquity (London, 1888) vol. 51, p.228. 27 N. Tartaglia, Three Bookes of Colloquies Concerning the arte of Shooting (1588) Early English Books Online, 1475-1640/1010:15; STC (2nd ed.) 23 689, p.1. Tartaglia’s work was translated into English 1588, however, had originally been penned in 1537. It was Tartaglia who identified a 45-degree angle as the optimum firing position for cannon and invented the ‘gunners quadrant’ – not replaced as a sighting tool until the development of the ‘target scale’ in the eighteenth century. Hogg has argued that “most subsequent authors of the sixteenth century based their writings on Tartaglia.” English Artillery, p.29. 28 R. W. Stewart, The English Ordnance Office, p.64. Stewart’s book is excellent in its awareness of the further development of the Ordnance Office in the seventeenth century, however is less forthcoming about the pre-Elizabethan origins of ordnance administration. 29 For the development of the English artillery train under Edward III see: T. F. Tout, ‘Firearms in England in the Fourteenth Century’, The English Historical Review, vol. 26 (1911), pp.666-702. Tout noted that while the “Tower Wardrobe was not to any large extent a cannon factory…it had a small permanent staff under an officer such as William Byker, which was able to repair guns frequently, and occasionally to make a few small ones,” (p.680). On the incorporation of canon within English administrative systems, the development of the post ‘Keeper of the Artillery’ and later ‘Master of the Ordnance’, see esp. R. Ashley, ‘The Organisation and Administration of the Tudor Office of the Ordnance’, Oxford University B.Litt. thesis (1972), pp.20-6. Also, see below, Chapter 6, pp.310-330 for the administrative developments of the Ordnance Office and Navy Board, and Chapter 7 for an assessment of the development of the ‘gunners’. 30 Anthony Goodman, The Wars of the Roses, p.173. 31 CPR, 1476-85, p.405. 32 H. Schubert, ‘The First Cast-Iron Cannon made in England’, The Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, vol. 146 (1942), p.133. 33 For a comprehensive survey of gunfounding in the Weald, see: E. B. Teesdale, Gunfounding in the Weald in the Sixteenth Century (Royal Armouries, 1991). 34 TNA: PRO E36/124, pp.172, 174, 186. 35 H. Schubert, ‘The First Cast-Iron Cannon’, p.132. See also CPR, Henry VII, p.92. 36 B. G. Awty, ‘Henry VII’s First Attempt to Exploit Iron in Ashdown Forest, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.11 (1991), p.11. 37 Ibid., p.12. 38 Ibid.

NOTES

39

215

Ibid., p.13. TNA: PRO E36/124, p.77, 132, 133, 138, 143, 186. 41 J. R. Hooker, ‘Notes on the Organisation and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII’, Huntington Library Quarterly, vol. 23 (1959), p.36. 42 TNA: PRO E101/55/28. 43 TNA: PRO E36/1, p.60 and PRO E36/1, p.33 (see pp.29-41 for further examples). 44 TNA: PRO E101/55/28. For example ‘Alexandre de la Sava, me(r)chant of Florence,’ was paid ‘payd for 24 barelles of gonnepowedre.’ 45 E.g. TNA: PRO E101/55/29, E101/61/228, E101/56/9, E10156/10,E101/ 56/10/1, E101/58/4, E36/285, E36/1, E351/9 PRO SP1/1, f.123-123v, SP1/7, f.80v-91, SP1/8, f.78, SP1/230, f.327, BL Cotton Galba B III, ff.3v-4 (LP, I (1), 314). The most fruitful areas of research for this topic are the State Papers, Exchequer Miscellaneous (E101) and E36. There is also substantial information as regards artillery and the ordnance office in TNA: PRO E404, E351 and A0 1. The patent rolls and privy council proceedings also offer some enlightenment; however only at the end of the century do records of the board of ordnance become standardised with their own distinct administrative ‘categorisation.’ 46 TNA: PRO E101/56/9, f.139. 47 TNA: PRO E36/1, p.32 and p.33. 48 BL Stowe MS 147, f.33, 47, 50, 56, 68, 69. The largest warrant for payment I can find here is for ‘thre hundreth and thirty two hagbushes at eight shillynge the pece,’ (f.69). 49 Ibid., f.56. 50 TNA: PRO E36/1, p.31. 51 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and armour at Westminster, the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547’, p.223, 262-3. During the reign of Elizabeth, R. W. Stewart has argued that whilst “during time of war, various local and national initiatives were undertaken to establish the rudiments of a standard system of arms storage for England and Ireland…when the need was less, during time of peace, stores were allowed to decay and fall into disuse.” The English Ordnance Office: A Case-Study in Bureaucracy (Woodbridge, 1996), p.140. 52 I must thank Professor Mark Fissel for making this point to me. 53 TNA: PRO E351/9. 54 C. Ffoulkes, The Gun-Founders of England, p.123. See also LP, I (2), 3613 (178). 55 TNA: PRO E101/56/9, f.16, 18. 56 H. Schubert, ‘The First Cast-Iron Cannon made in England’, p.135. 57 It is interesting to note Tout’s comments on the manufacture of cannon in England in the fourteenth century: “It has often been said that the earliest English cannon came from abroad, but the evidence of our records is that all persons mentioned as having anything to do with the making of cannon or ammunition were Londoners, or at least men with apparently English names who did their work in London.” T. F. Tout, ‘Firearms in England in the Fourteenth Century’, p.680. 58 BL Cotton Galba B. III, f.4, (LP, I (1), 324). 40

216


Ibid., f.5, (LP, I (1), 325). W. Page, ‘Denizations and Naturalizartions of Aliens in England’, p.vii. 61 Indeed Page went so far as to argue that “no occupations were, perhaps, more influenced by foreigners than those of the art of warfare and the making of weapons.”61 Ibid., p.xlii. On the employment of foreign specialists in the Tudor ordnance industry see, B. G. Awty, ‘Denization Returns and Lay Subsidy Rolls as Sources for French Ironworkers in the Weald’, Wealden Iron, 1st series, vol.13 (1978), pp.17-19; ‘Provisional Idenitification of Ironworkers among French Immigrants listed in the Denization Rolls of 1541 and 1544’, Wealden Iron, 1st Series, vol.16 (1979), pp.2-11; ‘Identification of Places of Origin of French Ironworkers’. Wealden Iron 1st Series, vol.17 (1980), pp.2-6; ‘Aliens in the Ironworking Areas of the Weald: The Subsidy Rolls, 1524-1603’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.4 (1984), pp.13- A. Dalton, ‘ ‘Dutch’ Labourers at Salehurst in 1566-1568’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol. 16 (1996), pp. 19-23; Wealden Iron Research Group (W.I.R.G), ‘Gazetter of Furnaces and Forges in the Pays de Bray, France’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.10 (1990), pp.19-35. 62 TNA: PRO C1/222 m.12.; CPR, 1476-85, p.405; See also: H. Schubert, ‘The First CastIron Cannon’, pp.132-3; J. R. Hooker, ‘Notes on the Organisation and Supply of the Tudor Military Under Henry VII’, p.27; P. W. King, ‘Wealden Ironmasters in the Midlands’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.21 (2001), pp.20-7; B. G. Awty, ‘The Continental origins of Wealden ironworkers’, Economic History Review, vol.34 (1981), pp.524-39. One might similarly note the example of Peter Bawde (Bawood) “maker of our bombards,” who had originated in France and received his denization on 10 October 1542. W. Page, ‘Denizations and Naturalizations of Aliens in England’, p.17. See also p.196 for Francis Poyes, an armourer from Normandy, who, having arrived in England in 1525, received his letter of denization on 1 July 1544. 63 K.Lacey, ‘The Military Organisation of the Reign of Henry VII’, in M.Strickland (ed.), Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceeedings of the Harlaxton Symposium (Stamford, 1998) p.254 64 B.G.Awty, ‘Denization Returns and Lay Subsidy Rolls as Sources for French Ironworkers in the Weald’, p.18. 65 See for example: TNA: PRO E36/1, pp.57, 59, 60, 65, 68, 74. TNA: PRO E101/61/28/68, E101/56/9/39. Cornelius Johnson, the ‘Kings’ master smith,’ was himself ‘an alien from the Dominions of the German Emperor, probably from the Low Countries’, (H. Schubert, ‘The First Cast-Iron Cannon made in England’, p.136). Furthermore, efforts were made to ensure the training of Englishmen and a number of English gun-founders are identified in the accounts, notably men like “Humphrey Walker of London, Simon Giles and Thomas Herte the Kinges gonn(er).” TNA: PRO E36/1, p.78, E101/56/9, f.3, 4, 5 (lots of payments were made to these and other Englishmen, for the production of ordnance). Cleere and Crossley noted that by “the middle of the century…immigration had virtually ended,” and the “continued expansion” came to depend “on the spread of experience in founding and forging 59

60

NOTES

217

among the local population as well as on the French families.” H. Cleere and D. Crossley, The Iron Industry of the Weald, p.130. 66 TNA: PRO E36/1, p.52. The ‘Almain armourers’ were famously established at Greenwich in 1515. 67 See esp.: B. G. Awty, ‘The Arcana Family of Cesena as Gunfounders and Military Engineers’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society for the study of the history of Engineering and Technology, vol. 59 (1987-8), pp.61-80. The Arcana family, Italian gun-founders, were established at Salisbury Place, whilst the Frenchman Peter Bawde, joined Englishmen John and Robert Owen at Hounsditch. 68 Ibid., p.50, 52. It is also worth noting that Henry VII also followed the policy of employing foreign specialists in English forges. For the employment of French iron founders, see TNA: PRO C1/222/12 and TNA: PRO E36/124, p.77, which details ordnance ‘made by Britton(s) w(ith)in the Towre of London.’ 69 C. J. Ffoulkes, The Gun-Founders of England, p.5. 70 J. F. Guilmartin, ‘The Guns of “Santissimo Sacramento”’, Technology and Culture, vol.24 (Oct., 1983), pp.597-8. 71 D. Hume, ‘The History of England’, cited in H. R. Schubert, ‘The Superiority of English Cast-Iron Cannon at the Close of the Sixteenth Century’, Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, vol. 161 (1949), p.85. 72 It is important to note, however, that in the final decade of the 16th century and the early years of the seventeenth century the importance of crown patronage in the expansion of the Wealden iron industry had declined considerably. Brown argued that the period was one of decline for the Navy and “few ships were built to replace the aging Elizabethan vessels so that when the Prince Royal was built in 1610, it was armed with old bronze guns, rather than new ordnance.” R. R. Brown, ‘The Ordnance Records: Thomas Browne’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.24 (2004), p.24. More important, it would seem, to the continued expansion of the English iron industry, were the burgeoning export markets, most especially the Netherlands and merchant companies “such as…the East India Company, with a need to arm large merchant ships.” (p.25) 73 J .J. Goring, ‘Wealden Ironmasters in the Age of Elizabeth’, in R. W. Ives et al (ed.), Wealth and Power in Tudor England (London, 1978), p.204. 74 H. Cleere and D. Crossley, The Iron Industry of the Weald, (Leicester, 1985), p.131. These fears “came to a head in October 1588, fuelled by reports that large numbers of guns had recently been sent abroad.” (p.170) Whilst the supply of States-General of the Netherlands was an important concern of Crown policy, they were equally concerned with the prevention of “the guns reaching the Spanish Netherlands.” (p.171) See also, J. J. Goring, ‘Wealden Ironmasters in the Age of Elizabeth’, pp.217-8; R. R. Brown, ‘Extracts from the Debenture Books of the Office of Ordnance, 1593-1610’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.21 (2001), pp.14-20, esp.p.17. Brown noted the “frequent intervals,” at which the government showed concern at “the export of cast-iron guns which could fall into the hands of enemy countries, principally Spain, or rival trading nations such as

218


the Dutch.” (p.17) E. Teesdale, ‘The 1574 lists of ironworks in the Weald. A re-examination’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol.6 (1986), p.8. 76 B. G. Awty, ‘Parson Levett and English Cannon Founding’, Sussex Archaeological Collection, vol. 127, (1989), p.142. 77 C. J. Ffoulkes, The Gun-Founders of England, p.8. 78 E.g. LP, I (1), 395. Indeed, it is important to recognise that “wrought-iron guns, with all their deficiencies, remained in use for some time, as has been shown by the presence of such pieces on the Mary Rose.” H. Cleere and D. Crossley, The Iron Industry of the Weald, p.116. 79 See: R. Towes, ‘The Casting of Bronze Guns in the Weald in the Seventeenth Century’, Wealden Iron, 1st Series, vol.11 (1977), pp.15-20. 80 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.32. Davies noted that in 1547 “Deal, Walmer and Dover castles had no large iron ordnance.” Bronze guns were also preferred at sea, not least because “canon of cast iron were larger and heavier than cannon of bronze designed to fire a ball of the same weight.” (J. F. Guilmartin, ‘The Guns of the Santissimo Sacramento’, p.567). 81 R. W. Stewart, The English Ordnance Office, p.72. 82 Ibid. 83 The development of cast-iron ordnance also eased English supply difficulties, as iron was a native product, whilst (during the reign of Henry VIII) copper needed to be imported in order to manufacture bronze cannon. C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, pp.34-5. 84 H. Schubert, ‘The First Cast-Iron Cannon made in England’, pp.131-40. 85 H. Cleere and D. Crossley, The Iron Industry of the Weald, p.116. 86 Ibid., pp.124-5. See also: H. R. Schubert, History of the British Iron and Steel Industry from c.450 B.C. to A.D.1775 (London, 1957), pp.157-72; E. Straker, Wealden Iron (London, 1931) pp.142-6, pp.48-9. See also J. Hodgkinson and A.Dalton, ‘Swedenborg’s Description of English Iron-Making’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol. 19 (1999), pp.47-63, esp.p.56. This article details an eighteenth-century manuscript account of the English iron-making process and iron-blast furnaces for casting guns in England, which, although from a later period, is nonetheless instructive. 87 H. Schubert, ‘The Superiority of English Cast-Iron Cannon at the Close of the Sixteenth Century’, pp.85-6; B. G. Awty, ‘Parson Levett and English Cannon Founding.’ Such was the quality of English cannon of this period that they were still to be found in the arsenal of a Poruguese galleon of the 1660s. Moreover, despite being “over a century old when Sacramento was launched,” the “English cannon were every bit as well made as the rest of the ship’s ordnance and a good deal better than some of it.” J. F. Guilmartin, ‘The Guns of the Santissimo Sacramento’, p.586. See also, B. G. Awty, ‘English CastIron Ordnance of 1564’, Wealden Iron, 2ns Series, vol.11 (1991), p.15. Awty argued that little progress was made in the production of lighter guns of equivalent power between 1564 and the 1650s. 75

NOTES

88

219

Not until 1549 would a decree standardising the calibres of his cannon be passed by Charles V, whilst attempts at standardisation are identifiable in England and France from 1550 and 1552 respectively. See B. G. Awty, ‘The Arcana Family of Cesena as Gunfounders and Military Engineers’, p.72; Caruana has argued that standardisation was achieved in England in either 1537 or 1543, however, his references are vague and unconvincing. A. B. Caruana, Tudor Artillery, 1485-1603, Historical Arms Series, No.30, pp.6-8. 89 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, pp.45-50. See also R. W. Stewart, English Ordnance, chapter 5. For examples of English native production:- TNA: PRO E36/1, p.31 - a payment to “John Stanyet of Ippswich,” for “making of Saltpeter,” in 1511; p.31, “Thom(a)s Herte….for making of gonnpowdr(e) w(ith)in the castell of porchestre.” 90 See: J. F. Guilmartin, ‘Ballistics in the Black Powder Era’, in R. D. Smith (ed.), British Naval Armaments (Royal Armouries, 1989), pp.73-98, esp., pp., 73, 75-6. It is interesting to note that “early smiths and gunners believed that the kind of wood from which charcoal was burned significantly affected ballistic performance.” (p.85) 91 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.48. However, during the summer of 1588 the threat of war with Spain continued to cause problems to ‘ironmasters’ in the Weald. One complained that “because he and his workmen had been ‘imployed in the service of Her Majesty’ throughout the ‘troublesome somer’ of 1588, they had been unable to get sufficient supplies of charcoal and his furnace had subsequently ‘stood still’ for lack fuel.” J.J.Goring, ‘Wealden Ironmasters in the Age of Elizabeth’, p.216. 92 E.g. TNA: PRO E36/1, p.31 – A payment to “Frannes de Crona espanyerd,” of 15li 3s 4d for gunpowder and saltpetre; TNA: PRO E101/56/9/39 – a payment to Hans von colen for “Saltpetre.” 93 E.g. TNA: PRO E101/56/9/10 – A payment to John Bere for making “gonpowdre called s(er)pentyne powder for the use of o(ur) sou(ver)an lorde the king.”; TNA: E101/56/9/30 – a payment to “Thomas Herte for “S(er)pentyme powdre.” For an explanation of the differences between Serpentine and Corned powder, see: J. F. Guilmartin, ‘Ballistics in the Black Powder Era’, p.76 94 It is well to note that the development of English expertise in the manufacture of ordnance went hand in hand with the development of the Tudor navy, indeed, “the Navy was the true consumer of the Wealden iron industry.” R. R. Brown, ‘Notes from the Ordnance Office of the 1650s’, Wealden Iron, 2nd Series, vol. 20 (2000), p.40 95 J. Black, European Warfare, 1494-1660, pp.74-5. Although it is important to recognise that: “The French had won, largely thanks to their heavy cavalry and to superior coordination of the various arms of their forces.” (p.74) 96 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour at Westminster, the Tower and Greenwich, 1547’, p.225. 97 TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.157v. 98 TNA: PRO E101/62/11, (LP, I (2), 2053 (2)). 99 TNA: PRO E101/62/16, (LP, I (1), 1725). 100 Ibid.

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Ibid. Ibid. The document further details how the ward was to be provided with 2,000 demilances, 5,000 bowes, 10,000 “sheffes of arrowes,” and 600 gross (or 86,400) “bowstringes.” 103 C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.204. 104 BL Stowe MS. 146, f.107. 105 TNA: PRO E101/62/16, E101/62/31. 106 C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, pp.72-5. 107 TNA: PRO SP1/7, f.97, (LP, I (1), 1726). 108 Ibid., ff.99-100. 109 C. Oman, Art of War, p.33. 110 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.62. 111 Ibid., p. 72. 112 Ibid. 113 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp.72-3. 114 Poldore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.213. See also BL Haleian MS. 6064, f.70, for “The Summoning of the Citie of Terevan.” 115 E. Hall, HenryVIII, vol. 1, p.95. 116 Ibid., p.115. 117 BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.8. 118 LP, I (1), 1645. See also LP, I (1), 1628 for further reports on Scottish preparations for war. 119 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.48, (LP, I (2), 2283). 120 Ibid., f.47. 121 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.45, (LP, I (2), 2284). 122 For its significance in shaping the future development of the Scottish army see: G. Phillips, ‘In the Shadow of Flodden: Tactics, Technology and Scottish Military Effectiveness, 1514-1550’, Scottish Historical Review, vol. 77 (1998), pp.162-82. 123 BL Additional MS. 23971, f.16v. 124 Ibid., f.17v. 125 R. Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland, vol. V, Scotland (London, 1808), p.429. 126 N. Barr, Flodden, 1513, (Stroud, 2001), p.75. Thus, “by entrenching his camp, digging in his guns and choosing a position with entrenched flanks, James was giving his soldiers every possible advantage to tip the scales in the Scots’ favour.” N. Barr, Flodden, 1513, (Stroud, 2001), p.75 127 ‘The Trewe Encountre,’ in A Ballade of the Scottyshe kynge by John Skelton (Detroit, 1969), p.69. 128 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.106. See also PRO SP49/1, f.18: “The Lord Haward at 11 of the clok the said 9 day passed on the brigge of Twyssel w(ith) the vaward and artyllary And the said Erle folowyng w(ith) the Rereward.” 101 102

NOTES

129

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R. Holinshead, Chronicles, vol. 5, Scotland, p.430. E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.107. 131 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.121. 132 N. Machiavelli, The Art of War (New York, 1965), p.97. 133 Ibid. 134 J. Leslie, Bishop of Rosse, The Historie of Scotland (The Scottish Text Society, 19, 34 vol. II, London, 1968), p.145. When considering Leslie’s testimony it is important to remember that he was writing in 1571, nearly 60 years after the battle. 135 ‘Trewe Encountre’, p.70. 136 TNA: PRO SP49/1, f.18. 137 BL Additional MS. 23,971, ff.16v-17. 138 For a useful summary of both these battles see B. S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, pp.167-71 (Cerignola) and pp.171-73 (Ravenna). 139 LP, III (2), 2360. 140 Ibid. 141 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV.29, f.30. 142 BL Royal MS.7 F XIV.10, f.71. 143 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.267. 144 Ibid., p.266. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., p.268. 147 Ibid., pp.268-9. The fortification of churches was a common practice in sixteenth century Europe, they were often the best built structure in a town. 148 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.299. 149 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.1, p.270. 150 C. Oman, Art of War, p.324. 151 LP, III (2), 2745. 152 BL Royal MS. 14. B XLI. 153 BL Additional MS. 10110, f.218. 154 Ibid. 155 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.1, p.298. 156 LP, III (2), 3516. 157 E. Gruffudd, ‘ Suffolk’s Expedition to Montdidier, 1523’, p.40. 158 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.615. 159 BL Additional. MS. 10,110, f.218v. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.198v. 163 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.309. 164 BL Additional. MS. 10,110, f.219. 165 Ibid. 130

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Ibid. Ibid. 168 For further detail on English siege techniques, Thomas Audley is instructive. See BL Additional. MS. 23971, ff.33-4v. 169 E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolk’s Expedition to Montdidier, 1523’, p.39. 170 B. S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, chapter 5. This is now widely accepted by historians. 171 Although as the numbers of shot deployed by armies increased over the course of the century, it became impossible for them all to shelter within the pike-square and many would simply have to flee to the rear as the pike and cavalry clashed. 172 BL Additional. MS., 23971, f.30. 173 CUL F.f.2.10, f.10, f.9v. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.4. 178 Ibid., ff.29-30. Clear comparisons can obviously be made with the debates of the 1590s when even staunchest proponents of firearms did not suggest the complete abandonment of the bow. See: T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Army’, Technology and Culture, vol. 6 (1995), pp.382-393, for the best summary of the debates amongst theorists as to the relative merits of the bow and handguns. 179 J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, pp.266-7. 180 Ibid., p.267. 181 M. B. Davies, ‘The Enterprises’ of Paris and Boulogne’, p.68. 182 W. A. J. Archibold, ‘A Diary of the Expedition of 1544’, English Historical Review, vol. 16 (1901), pp.503-7. 183 Ibid., p.504. 184 Ibid. 185 See esp., M. Fissel, English Warfare and G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars. 186 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour at Westminster, the Tower and Greenwich’, p.229. By way of context, it is important to recognise that during the same period the import of long-bow staves was not unusual; “the import of yew bows from Western Russia and the Corpathians by way of Danzig was well established before 1500, and by the same date large quantities were also brought south from Germany.” C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.51. 187 TNA: PRO E101/56/9, f.139; E36/1, p.33. 188 TNA: PRO E10156/9/68, E101/56/9/139. See also: BL Stowe. MS 146, f.56, 68, 69 etc…(Warrants for the payment of various merchants for hackbutts). 189 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour at the Tower and Westminster’, p.230. 190 TNA: PRO E351/9. 191 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour at the Tower and Westminster’, p.228. 166 167

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TNA: PRO E101/62/16, (LP, I (1), 1725). Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 196 TNA: PRO E101/61/27. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.266, 267-8. For a fuller discussion, see below, pp.265-9. 200 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.600. 201 TNA: PRO SP1/28, ff.199v, 206v, 195v. 202 BL Add. MS. 23971, f.29-30. 203 TNA: PRO E101/62/11, (LP, I (2), 2053 (2) ) and BL Cotton Caligula E.I, ff.7v-8. See also, C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.78. 204 TNA: PRO C82/389 (LP, I (1), 1804 g.28). 205 TNA: PRO C82/387 (LP, I (1), 1662 g.50). 206 BL Cotton MS. Otho E. XI, f.43. 207 D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.101. 208 C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.79. 209 The most convincing survey of the reasoning behind the English retention of the longbow is G. Phillips, ‘Longbow and Hackbutt: Weapons Technology and Technology Transfer in Early Modern England,’ Technology and Culture, vol. 40 (3) (July 1999), pp.57693. This section must necessarily acknowledge the influence of Phillips’ work and point the reader in the direction of this article for a more complete survey of the subject matter. 210 The arrival of the longbow-man on the Battlefields of Europe did much to regenerate the fighting potential of the infantry; decimating the mail armoured French cavalry at Crecy. See: J. E. Morris, ‘The Archers at Crecy’, The English Historical Review, vol. 12 (1897), pp.336-427. 211 Furthermore, “the defenders of archery in the sixteenth century – Ascham, Latimer, the military men –all ascribed superior moral qualities to those who practiced archery,” (T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow’, p.392). This association certainly had a role to play in the continued practice of archery, although this is difficult to quantify with any certainty. 212 Thomas Audley cautioned that “Many olde and auncient men of warr be of thopinion that it is not good for a prince or leader of an Army to be overhastie to give Battell to his ennemyes, unlesse it be greatlie to his advantage, for it is a thing very weightie and ought very sagelye to be foreseen. And also to be dreddyd for the wealth and honour of a King and his realm liethe thereupon.” T. Audley, ‘A Treatise on the Art of War’, The Journal of Army Historical Research, vol. 6 (1927), p.76; BL Additional. MS., 23971, ff.2222v. 213 Equally as flimsy was Cruickshank’s suggestion that longbow was retained simply because 192 193

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it was England’s “traditional weapon,” and “no government likes to interfere with tradition, unless absolutely necessary,” (C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.80). It is in fact difficult to find a king so demonstrably ready to break with tradition or indeed one so passionate about warfare. 214 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.62. 215 Ibid., p.66. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid., p.86. 218 Ibid., p.260. 219 Ibid. 220 Although it should be noted that the decisive factor in the English success was the destruction of the city gates by a cannon (a ‘falcon’ ) fired by Christopher Morris, one of Henry’s gunners. This will be discussed further in chapter six. 221 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. I, p.262. 222 Ibid., p.307, 312. 223 Ibid., p.319. 224 ‘The Trewe Encountre’, in A Ballade of the Scottyshe kynge by John Skelton (Detroit, 1969), p.76. “In this batayle the Scottes hadde many,” great advantages, for example. “the hyghe hylles and mountaynes a great wynde with them and sodayne rayne all contrary to our bowes and archers.” 225 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.108. 226 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47v. 227 P. N. Jones, ‘The Metallography and Relative Effectiveness of Arrowheads and Armour’, Materials Characterisation, vol. 29 (2) (1992), pp.111-7. 228 Ibid.,p.116. 229 The debates of the 1590s have been sufficiently summarised by T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow,’ and as such will not be considered at any length here. Furthermore, they represent the final chapter of a struggle for supremacy that began as much as two centuries earlier. On the earliest development of firearms in England see: T. F. Tout, ‘Firearms in England in the Fourteenth Century’, pp.666-702. The focus of this section must necessarily be on the early part of Henry VIII’s reign - explaining the retention of the longbow in this specific context. 230 R. Ascham, a proponent of the merits of the bow concluded, in his treatise Toxophilus, that “strong men, without use, can do nothing in shooting to any purpose, neither in war nor peace.” Cited in T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow,’ p.391. See also: R. Ascham , Toxophilus (Westminster, 1902). 231 H. Latimer, Sermons, p.197, cited in T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow’, p.391. 232 Ibid. When considering testimonies, such as those of Latimer, it is important to recognise that by the mid-sixteenth century the bow had become, in some sense, a political tool. It found itself entwined in disagreements about enclosures and the social conditions of the poor. It is therefore necessary to sound a word of caution, that is to say, that the extent

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of archery’s decay may have been exaggerated for the sake of some political or ideological argument about the state of the nation. 233 Ibid., 390. It was thus Esper’s conclusion that the decline in practicing archery in the sixteenth century, caused significant reductions in its penetrative power and if “archery could have been restored to its previous condition, the longbow could have remained the primary projectile weapon of the English infantry for generations longer.” p.393. 234 K. DeVries, ‘Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of ‘Effectiveness’, in Pre-modern Military Technology’, War in History, vol. 4 (1997), p.462. 235 Ibid., p.463. 236 It must necessarily be acknowledged that the precise English formations remain blurred in the available source material, however, this description is a reasonable assumption based on the surviving evidence. 237 C. Rogers, ‘The Efficacy of the English Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries’, War in History, vol. 5 (1998), p.237. 238 B. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, p.27. 239 Ibid. 240 G. Phillips, ‘Longbow and Hackbutt’, p.592. It is worth noting here that the majority of the fighting English troops were engaged in, during the first half of the sixteenthcentury, was of the character of raids and counter-raids against the Scots and Irish. Formal warfare, in the sense of large-scale invasions of France, was relatively unusual. In this context then, the retention of the longbow by English soldiers becomes even clearer. The nature of English warfare in Ireland will be considered in Chapter nine, while the character of Anglo-Scottish warfare has been excellently dealt with by G. Phillips, in his Anglo-Scots Wars and M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings amongst others. 241 P. Krenn, P. Kalaus and B. Hall, ‘Material Culture and Military History: Test-Firing Early Modern Small Arms’, Material History Review, vol. 42 (1995), pp.101-09. 242 Ibid., p.106. It is important to note that the guns were mounted on “firing blocks,” and “none of this variation can be attributed to human error in firing,” (p.106). 243 Ibid., p.107. 244 B. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, p.145. 245 However, it did have a significant edge, in terms of penetrating power, at very short range. 246 T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow’; G. Phillips, ‘Longbow and Hackbutt’; C. C. Trench, ‘From Arquebus to Rifle: The Pursuit of Perfection’, History Today, vol. 23 (June, 1973), p.408; C. Oman, Art of War, p.382. 247 Sir J. Smythe, Certain Discourses Military, (ed.) J. R. Hale, (New York, 1964), p.67. Cited in D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.14. 248 D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.15. 249 Although, it is important to acknowledge that the wood for the bow had to be imported and this could potentially have posed supply problems. 250 The General Proscription of 1522 painted a picture of a nation rich in traditional weapons (the longbow and bill-hook) but distinctly lacking in firearms or pike See J. J. Goring,

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‘The General Proscription of 1522’, The English Historical Review, vol. 86 (1971), pp.681705. This pictured had not altered substantially by the end of the reign. 1539 was the beginning of a period of intense military activity in England and extensive musters were taken throughout the country (LP, XIV (I), 652-654). The information gathered at this time is problematical for a thesis arguing for the relative modernity of English forces. The returns are overwhelmingly filled with ‘bill and bow,’ and there is very little evidence of the ownership of firearms. This image is reinforced by fresh musters in 1542, the levying of the army for Flanders in 1543 and the 1544 levies (TNA: PRO SP1/180 f.137v, (LP, XVII, 882), LP, XVIII (I), 832, PRO SP1/184 ff.29 - 220v. This was a reflection not only of the prohibitive cost of the new firearms, but also the laws against owning them e.g., P. Hughes and J. F. Larkin (eds.) Tudor Royal Proclamations (TRP), vol. 1 The Early Tudors, 1485-1553 (London, 1964), p.178. 251 13 Edward I (Statue of Winchester), 1285, SR I, 96. The militia system and Statute of Winchester will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Seven. 252 TRP, p.152. 253 Ibid., p.178. 254 Ibid. 255 These issues are only mentioned here in so far as it is important to acknowledge them. Clearly there is room for more research into war and society in Henrician England, however, this remains beyond the remit of this thesis. 256 R. Hardy, Longbow: A Social and Military History, (London, 1995), p.133. 257 C. Oman, Art of War, p.327. 258 I. Roy (ed.) Military Memoirs: Blaise de Monluc; The Habsburg-Valois Wars and the French Wars of Religion (London, 1971), p.41. 259 Ibid. A feeling that may have been informed by the painful injury inflicted on him by a firearm. 260 G. Parker, The Military Revolution, pp.16-7. 261 D. M. R. Esson, ‘The Italian Campaigns of Gonsalvo De Cordoba’, Army Quarterly, vol. 80 (1959-60), pp.235-46, and vol.81 (1960-1), pp105-20; P. Stewart, ‘The Santa Hermandad and the First Italian Campaign of Gonzalo de Cordova, 1495-1498’, Renaissance Quarterly, vol. 28 (1975), pp.29-37, G. DeGaury, The Grand Captain, Gonzalo de Cordoba (London, 1955). 262 F. L Taylor, Art of War, pp.41-55. 263 C. Oman, Art of War, p.58. 264 G. Phillips, ‘Longbow and Hackbutt’, p.583. 265 Firearms were perfectly suited to nature of warfare around Boulogne between 1544 and 1546, and increasing numbers of native (and foreign mercenary) arquebusiers were deployed. In 1544, a new Royal Proclamation over-ruled previous pronouncements prohibiting the use of, or practice with, the handgun. However, this was counter-acted in 1546 as the war drew to a close and there was no longer the same need for firearm troops. See: LP, XXI (1), 1146; C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, pp.80-1.

NOTES

266

227

C. Oman, Art of War, p.286.

Chapter Three Training and Disicpline 1

J. R. Hale, ‘The Military Education of the Officer Class in Early Modern Europe’, RWS, p.226. 2 4 & 5 Philip and Mary, c.3. 3 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.133. 4 D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.103; See also L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (London, 1967). 5 Ibid., p.20. It is significant that, whilst military textbooks were popular in England, Spain and Italy in the second half of the sixteenth century, the French never took to them, preferring instead to refer to “rich literature of military memoirs.” 6 J. A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660’, French Historical Studies, vol. 14 (1985), p.187. 7 J. Black, European Warfare, 1494-1660, p.33. 8 L. R. Garcia, ‘Types of Armies’, in P. Contamine (ed.) War and Competition between States (Oxford, 2000), p.41. 9 J. A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army’, p.187. 10 M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State. 11 Ibid., p.79. Moreover, “in 1507, with the German threat mounting…a systematically organised militia was once more created.” 12 J. A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army’, p.187. 13 BL Additional MS., 23971, ff.7-7v. 14 Ibid., f.7. 15 Ibid., f.6v. 16 J. R. Hooker, ‘Notes on the Organization and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII’, p.20. Although, Hooker does take his point too far in describing the impressment of seamen and soldiers for vessel Regent, in the summer of 1490. The commission to impress a crew was given on 28 June and the ship sailed on 12 July, leading Hooker to conclude “no training could be accomplished in this brief time.” Surely, however, the point is that, at the very least, the majority of the crew would have to have been experienced sailors that did not need training if they could put to sea in this time. 17 H. A. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 1, (1921-22), p.202; see below, Chapter 5, pp.261-2. 18 J. R. Hooker, ‘Notes on the Organization and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII’, p.20. 19 C. S. L. Davies, ‘The English People and War’, Britain and the Netherlands, Volume VI, War and Society: Papers Delivered to the 6th Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference (ed.) A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse (The Hague, 1977), p.10. See also, J. R. Hale, ‘The Military Education of

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the Officer Class in Early Modern Europe’, RWS, pp.225-37. J. R. Hale, ‘The Military Education of the Officer Class’, RWS, p.225. However, the page system was gradually collapsing, under the weight of external concerns about “its suitability as a preparation,” for modern warfare, and under internal pressures as “the military training in great households,” became “more perfunctory.” pp.231-2. 21 In 1392 Vergerio, in his treatise on education, concluded that “arms and methods of warfare change from age to age…but whatever the method or weapon of the time, let there be ample practice for our youth, with as great variety of exercises as can be devised, so that they may be ready for combat hand to hand or in troops, in the headlong charge or in the skirmish.” Ibid., p.230. 22 W. Caxton, The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry, A. T. P. Blyes (ed.) (E.E.T.S., 1926) 23 N. Orme, From Childhood to Chivalry: The Education of the English Kings and Aristocracy 10661530 (London, 1984), pp.182-5. 24 C. Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century Versions of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, pp.40-3. 25 Ibid., p.40. 26 S. Anglo, ‘Vegetius’s ‘De Re Militari’: The Triumph of Mediocrity’, p.264. 27 Ibid., p.249. 28 N. Machiavelli’s The arte of warre, written first in Italia(n) by Nicholas Machiaull, and set for the in Englishe by Peter Whitehorne, studient at Graies Inne (London, 1562) STC (2nd ed.) / 17164. Machiavelli made much of the relevance of antiquity; the instructive value of Roman, Macedonian and Greek battle formations was a commonplace theme in the military treatise of late medieval and early modern Europe. Hale concluded that “the relevance of ancient to modern warfare became axiomatic. It was the bridge between arms and letters.” He went on, “one of the arches of the bridge was…(the)...insistence on preparation in peace for war, a preparation seen increasingly in terms of studying, of reading.” J. R. Hale, ‘Printing and Military Culture of Renaissance Venice’, RWS, pp.4378. 29 BL Additional MS., 23971. It is interesting to note that Vegetius himself openly based much of his treatise on “the Stratagema of Julius Frontinus, written in the first century A.D.” C. Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century English Versions of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, p.32. 30 C. S. L. Davies, ‘The English People and War’, pp.17-8. In that year Morison also wrote An exhortation to styr all Englyshemen to the defence of theyr countreye. For a brief biography see S. T. Bindoff (ed.) The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1509-1558, vol. II, (London, 1982), pp.633-5. 31 S. T. Bindoff (ed.), House of Commons, p.633. 32 For a biography of William, third Marquis of Winchester, see: DNB, p.95. 33 However, owing to the paucity of conclusive evidence on this matter, one can only speculate. 34 It is useful to reiterate here that in France, throughout the sixteenth century, the preference was for military memoirs over and above, ‘modern training pamphlets’. 20

NOTES

35

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CUL F.f.2.10, f.18v. C.Allmand, ‘The Fifteenth-Century English Versions of Vegetius’ De Re Militari’, p.43. 37 D. Bornstein, ‘Military Manuals in Fifteenth Century England’, Medieval Studies, vol. 37 (1975) p.470. 38 P. Contamine, ‘The War Literature of the Late Middle Ages’, p.121. See also D. Bornstein, ‘Military Manuals in Fifteenth Century England’. 39 S. Anglo, ‘Vegetius’s ‘De Re Militari’: The Triumph of Mediocrity’, p.252. Although it is significant to note that Procter’s own text was “largely derived from Vegetius or from derivatives such as Machiavelli.” (p.252). Furthermore, as late as 1616, Vegetius’s De re militari was described as a “work of ‘singular importance and curiosity as much for new soldiers as for old and experienced captains’,” by Johann Jacovi-Tautphoeus von Wallhausen, the director of a Westphalian military school. (p.257) 40 This is a brief outline as this subject is more thoroughly dealt with by C.G.Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France, see esp. chapters 3 and 8; D. Eltis, English Military Theory; J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, pp.247-84. 41 BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2b, Cotton Faustina E.VII, f.6. 42 Ibid. 43 Progress in this regard was, to some extent, undermined by the continued links between the relative size of a captains’ ‘command’ and his personal prestige. 44 TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.196 – e.g. Richard Battisford, Edward Isley, Robert Jernegan all boasted company’s of one hundred men. 45 Ibid., f.201 – e.g. “The retynew of Robert Wyngfeld, 10 demy lances 3 archers on horseback, 308 soldiers fotemen,” or f.201v, Sir Richard Weston, 5 demilances, 12 archers on horseback, 149 “souldiers fotemen.” E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.1, p.66. 46 TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.196v. 47 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (London, 1996), p.238. 48 BL Additional.Ms., 23971; CUL.Ff.2.10, f.11.v. Henry Barrett’s ‘Captain’s Handbook’, in J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.275. It was also used on a muster list at Calais in 1533, see: J. G. Nichols (ed.), The Chronicle of Calais in the Reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, pp.136-7. 49 This is unsatisfactory as their medieval counterparts received ‘double pay’. 50 D.Grummitt, The Calais Garrison (forthcoming), p.3 chapter 2, The Organisation of the Calais Garrison. 51 C. T. Martin, ‘Sir John Daunce’s Accounts of Money Received from the Treasurer of the king’s chamber’, p.328. 52 See: G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.84. 53 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV.10, f.72. 54 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV.29, f.30. 55 Ibid., f.9. 56 CUL F.f.2.10, f.25.v. For further details on setting the battle see f.26. F. J. Davies 36

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suggested that the first use of the rank ‘great sergeant’ or ‘sergeant major’ can be dated to 1518. The Sergeant –Major, The Origin and History of his Rank (London, 1886), p.5. Although someone must have been tasked with the essentials of his role, putting the army into order of battle, throughout the Middle Ages. 57 Sir J. Smythe, Instructions Obseruations and Orders Mylitarie, Requisite for all Chieftaines, captaines, and higher and lower men of charge, and officers to vnuderstand, knowe and oberue (London, 1595) STC (2nd ed.)/ 22885, Early English Books, 1475-1640/399:02. 58 Sir C. Edmonds, The Manner of our moderne training or tacticke practise, (London, 1600); Jacob de Gheyn, The Military art of Trayning, with the discipline of drilling all in lively portraits (London, 1622) STC (2nd ed.)/794, Early English Books, 1475-1640/1298:08. For a further discussion, see J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.254, and D. Eltis, English Military Theory. 59 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, p.178. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., p.139. 62 D. Eltis, English Military Theory, pp.286-98. 63 CUL, Ff.2.10, f.11. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., ff.11, 12. 66 CUL F.f.2.10, f.10. 67 Ibid., f.9v. 68 Ibid., ff.13-14. 69 Ibid., f.14. 70 Ibid., f.17v. 71 The composition, in 1562, of Henry Barrett’s ‘Captain’s Handbook’, is a reflection of the fact that there was a concern amongst English military circles to see an improvement in the training offered to its soldiers. The book was written as a ‘training manual’ that “would have enabled an English country gentleman to organize a couple of hundred farm labourers and tradesmen into an infantry company.” J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.258. However, Hale goes some way in this article towards establishing the intellectual independence of Barrett from either the Audley manuscript or Text B (described as we have seen as a second Audley manuscript by Hale). Moreover, this was very much a document of the mid-Tudor years based on Barrett’s experiences as a Yeoman of the Guard during the reign of Edward and Mary and written in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign. As such, although it is worthy of note in so far as it mirrors many of the conclusions of Text B and casts light on Elizabethan developments, it has not been included here. A full discussion and transcript is provided for by Hale. 72 CUL F.f.2.10, ff.36-52v. See also, Bodleian, Rawlinson D363, ff.45-62v; BL Cotton. Julius.F.V., ff.40-47. 73 See: M. J. Cockle, A Bibliography of English and Foreign Military Books up to 1642; D. Eltis,

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English Military Theory; J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, pp.247-84. D. J. B. Trim, ‘The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth-Century English Society’, p.242. 75 J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, pp.247, 251. 76 See below, Chapter 7, pp.350-2. 77 TRP, p.152, 178. 78 As we shall see in the next chapter, the Buckinghamshire return reveals that a distinction was being made by commissioners between ‘good bowe and bill,’ and those simply designated bow and bill. See: Bodleian Library, Oxford, Eng. hist. e.187., f.128v. One hundred and seventy ‘good bowe,’ and one hundred and ninety four ‘good bill,’ are identified across the county. Ibid., ff.105-199. This would seem to indicate that commissioners were literally taking people out to the butts and requiring them to demonstrate their relative skills. 79 CSP Ven, vol. 5, 1534-54, no.703 in C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, pp.201-2. 80 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp.137-9. 81 CUL F.F.2.10, f.10. 82 Oman concluded that at the turn of the sixteenth century the English army was a force “with hardly any provision of cavalry.” C. Oman, Art of War, p.285. Cruickshank similarly cited this as a sign of the relative deficiency of the English military system. C.G.Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.195 83 For example, plans for the 1513 campaign in France stated that the Emperor should attend personally with as many as 3,000 horse. BL Cotton Galba B.III, ff.62v-66, (LP, I (1), 1722). 84 S. Gunn, ‘Tournaments and Early Tudor Chivalry,’ History Today, vol. 41 (June, 1991), pp.15-21; H. Watanabe-O’Kelly, ‘Tournaments and their Relevance for Warfare in the Early Modern Period,’ European Studies Quarterly, vol. 20 (1990), pp.451-63. On sixteenth century cavalry developments see, G. Phillips, ‘Of Nimble Service: Technology, Equestrianism and the Cavalry Arm of Early Modern Western European Armies’, War and Society, vol. 20 (2) (2002), pp.1-21. 85 D. J. B. Trim, ‘The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth-Century English Society’, p.242. 86 I. Roy (ed.) Blaise De Monluc, The Habsburg-Valois Wars and the French Wars of Religion (London, 1971). Monluc, a senior French officer, presents a largely anti-English account in his Commentaries, stemming not least from his embarrassing involvement in the disastrous Camisdade of Boulougne. Monluc claims his own his experience of the English did not match this expectation (but what other view could you expect from a French patriot). Thus, his acknowledgment that this opinion was held in France adds credibility to what is clearly hyperbole. 87 The examples presented here are indicative rather than exhaustive. The issue of naval discipline is excluded from this discussion but can be approached through C. S. L. 74

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Davies, ‘Naval Discipline in the early sixteenth century’, Mariners Mirror, vol. 48 (1962), pp.223-4. Other issue cogent to the idea of discipline, such as the development of uniform have also been excluded, not least as “the word is something of a misnomer at the beginning of the sixteenth century.” C. G. Cruickshank, ‘A Guide to the Sources of British Military History,’ p.73. Nevertheless, by the mid-century, “the term white coat was synonymous with soldier,” – a reference to the “white surcoat,” emblazoned with the cross of St. George. G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.80. On this subject see especially C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, chapter 6. See also: P. Cornish and A. McBride, HenryVIII’s Army (London, 1987); W. Y. Carman, British Military uniforms from Contemporary pictures, Henry VII to the present day (London, 1957); C. C. P. Lawson, A History of the Uniforms of the British Army, vol. 1, From the Beginnings to 1760 (London, 1940); J. Luard, A History of the Dress of the British Soldier from the earliest period to the present time (Clowes, 1852); G. Gush, Renaissance Armies, 1480-1650 (London, 1975), pp.36-8. 88 It is important to recognise that by the end of the Tudor century, the changing nature of military recruitment undermined this system of mutual obligation and loyalty. As soldiers began to be levied on behalf of the ‘state’, in an entirely more recognisable manner to the modern reader, the ties which had traditionally bound them to their commander (i.e. they were ‘ruled’ and ‘protected’ by them in civilian society) were no longer as strong. Most clearly, “the idea of the state…was as yet too abstract for the average soldier to understand it and to fight for it with enthusiasm.” - C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.173. 89 G. Phillips, ‘To Cry “Home! Home!”: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 65 (April, 2001), p.315. On the causes of insurrection amongst the ‘lower-orders’ and ‘compromise between landlord and tenant’ see esp. S. E. Kershaw, ‘Power and Duty in the Elizabethan Aristocracy: George, Earl of Shrewsbury, the Glossopdale Dispute and the Council’, in G. Bernard (ed.) The Tudor Nobility (Manchester, 1992), pp.266-95. It important to note, that just as soldiers in dispute over ‘conditions’ were eager to emphasise their continued loyalty to the sovereign, venting their anger more towards administrators and victuallers, so to in the Glossopdale dispute the tenants (and Council) were keen to blame Shrewsbury’s agents before Shrewsbury himself. They were careful to stress their continued adherence to ‘their lord’ and indeed the social order generally. 90 D. J. B. Trim, ‘Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 1568-1609’, in J. Hathaway (ed.) Rebellion, Repression and Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective (London, 2001), p.54. 91 Ibid., p.49. 92 Ibid., p.53. 93 Ibid., p.54. 94 C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai, 1513-1519, pp.68-73. 95 Ibid.

NOTES

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S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.625. E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolk’s expedition to Montdidier’, p.39. 98 Although it would be forced upon them from 1544-46. 99 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.1, p.314. 100 See: S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, pp.623-5; E. Grufudd, ‘Suffolk’s expedition to Montdidier’, pp.38-41. 101 Although, other factors clearly played a significant role. 102 One might note the example of the Spanish Army of Flanders, arguably the ‘best’ army of the sixteenth century, which was not above the danger of ‘mutiny and discontent.’ G. Parker, ‘Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1571-1607’, Past and Present, vol. 58 (1973), pp.38-52. 103 D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.52. 104 F. Ferretti, Della Osservanza Militare (Venice, 1576), p.53 cited in D. Elitis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.53. 105 F. de la Noue, The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de la Noue (1587), p.170 cited in D. Eltis, The Military Revolution, p.53. 106 CUL.Ff.2.10, f.12. Such concerns echo those of Henry Barrett’s ‘Captain’s Handbook’ published in 1562. Barrett emphasised that the good soldier must embody “six principall poyntes,” – “scilence, obedience, secrett, sober, hardie, treuth.” See J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Pararde Ground’, RWS, pp.280-1. This further demonstrates the extent to which Tudor military writers were drawing from a common body of military literature. 107 CUL F.f.2.10, f.12. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., f.12v 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid., ff.13-16. 114 Ibid., f.27v. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. Rather, specific people were to be appointed to “spoil or rifell the deade carcoses.” (f.28v). 117 Ibid., f.31v. 118 On wider concerns over this issue see M. Ingram, ‘Regulating Sex in Pre-Reformation London’, in G. Bernard and S. Gunn (eds.), Authourity and Consent in Tudor England: Essays Presented to CSL Davies (Aldershot, 2002), pp.79-95. 119 LP, XIX (2), 187. 5 September 1544, The Council with the king to the council with the Queen. 120 TRP, vol. 1, p.113. 121 CUL F.f.2.10, f.14v. 122 TRP, vol. 1, p.113. 97

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M. Ingram, ‘Regulating Sex in Pre-Reformation London’, p.86. Ibid. 125 Ibid., p.87. 126 Further worries would have included having ‘more mouths to feed’ and the reaction of the soldiers during times where the camp was placed under direct threat – would they remain with their company or return to find their sweetheart? 127 CUL F.f.2.10, f.17. 128 M. Ingram, ‘Regulating Sex in Pre-Reformation London’, p.81 citing Ian Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London (Cambridge, 1991), pp.249-50. 129 In the same vein, B. Montgomery, whilst in command of 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks in Alexandria in 1931, was so concerned over the safe and healthy “horizontal refreshment,” of his troops that he established a regimental brothel – much to the consternation of GHQ in Cairo. N. Hamilton, The Full Monty: Montgomery of Alamein, 1887-1942 (London, 2001), pp.201-2. 130 G. W. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, p.14. 131 CUL F.f.2.10, f.28v. 132 Although, chronicle evidence, or otherwise, for this practice is slim throughout the reign. 133 TRP, vol. 1, p.113. 134 Ibid., f.15. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., ff.15-15v. Similar religious reassurance was to be offered by the Captain as the day of battle approached; “godd will except that sowle that comyth to him in the quarrel of his prince,” and “in that cause godd hath comanndedd rather to kill than to be killed.” – f.15v. See also, TRP, vol. 1, pp.107-8. 137 Ibid., f.31. 138 G. Phillips, ‘To Cry “Home! Home!”: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies’, p.325. 139 TRP, vol. 1, pp.106-122, docs, 73-74. It is interesting to note that a separate procedure existed in the case of the Ordnance establishment owing to the large number of ‘civilians’ which manned this section of the army: TRP, vol. 1, p.116. 140 J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.259. 141 C. G. Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France, p.86. Cruickshank noted that “the substance of the successive codes differs very little.” See also, M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp.178-83. 142 CUL F.f.2.10, f.18v. 143 BL Arundel MS. 26, ff.56v-57, (LP, I (2), 2219). 31 August 1513. 144 Ibid. 145 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, pp.160, 161-3, 163-4. 146 J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe (Stroud, 1998), p.120. This was a problem that gripped all European armies of the age, “news of sickness in the Adriatic fleets in 1538 made Venice’s recruiters despair of filling the reinforcement quotas,” whilst “word 124

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that Palmanova had become a vast hospital in 1616 led the inhabitants of the terraferma to present a plethora of excuses and refusals ‘because they saw many returning sick and (knew) that the war, through disease and in other ways, had consumed a large proportion of them’.” (p.121) 147 BL Arundel MS. 26, ff.56v-57, (LP, I (2), 2219). See also the regulations issued at the “Therouanne Camp,” on 4 August 1513 – TRP, vol. 1, p.121. 148 CUL F.f.2.10, f.17. 149 Ibid. See also, TRP, vol.1, pp.114-5. 150 D. Stewart, ‘The Causes of Disease in the Sixteenth Century Army’, Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, vol. 92 (1949), p.39. It is interesting to note, by way of mitigation of the poor Tudor performance against disease, that Wellington “could not reduce the numbers permanently sick in the Army under his command too less than 22.5%.” (p.41) 151 K. DeVries, ‘Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of ‘Effectiveness’ in Premodern Military Technology’, War in History, vol. 4 (4) (1997), p.469 – citing B. S. Hall, ‘The Changing Face of Siege Warfare: Technology and Tactics in Transition’, in I. A. Corfis and M. Wolfe, The Medieval City Under Siege (Woodbridge, 1995) pp.265-7. 152 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.183. 153 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.46. 154 Ibid., p.51. Similarly the 1544 campaign in France would be heavily afflicted by disease driven desertions among the soldiery, to the grave concern of Norfolk and other army commanders. See, G. Phillips, ‘To Cry “Home! Home!”: Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies’, p.321. 155 The relative efficiency of Tudor military medical services remain a heavily neglected subject area, and will form the basis of my own post-doctoral research. Further information on the subject can currently be found in C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, chapter 11. See also: C. L. Heizmann, ‘Military Sanitation in the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Annals of Medical History, vol. 1 (1917-18), pp.281-300; D. Stewart, ‘The English Army Surgeon in the Sixteenth Century,’ Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps, vol. 88 (1947), pp.231-47; D. Stewart, ‘Disposal of the Sick and Wounded of the English Army during the Sixteenth Century’, JRAMC, vol. 15 (1948), pp.31-2; D. Stewart, ‘Sickness and Mortality Rates of the English Army in the Sixteenth Century’, JRAMC, vol. 92 (1949), pp.35-49. More generally see: R. A. Gabriel and K. S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine: vol. 2 – From the Renaissance through Modern Times (London, 1992) 156 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.165. 157 See below, p.269. 158 S. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris in 1523’, p.599. This problem would continue well into Elizabeth’s reign and beyond. Cruickshank described significant problems during the siege of Leith in 1560, Le Havre in 1562 and from the commands of Sir John Norreys and the Earl of Leicester in 1585 and 1586. Nor was desertion an issue specific to England, see: G. Parker, ‘Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army

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of Flanders’, pp.38-52. CSP Span FS, vol.3, 1520-26, pp.288-90; LP, IV (1), 7. 160 LP, III (2), 3462. 161 CUL F.f.2.10., f.16v. 162 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.48. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid., p.49. 165 G. Phillips, ‘To Cry “Home! Home!” Mutiny, Morale, and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies’, p.315. 166 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.49. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 In this instance an especially pertinent point in so far as the English army remained in and around the territories of their erstwhile Spanish allies. Nevertheless, the relationship was an equally important one in France, a country which Henry claimed sovereignty of, thus making the French civilians fellow subjects of Henry VIII. More pertinently, they were also a local source of supply and logistics, and it was easier to extract the necessary victuals from a co-operative populace. On supply see: C. S. L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies’, pp. 234-48. 170 BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.7. 171 Ibid. 172 See also: TRP, vol.1, pp.111-12 173 S. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris in 1523’, p.617. For an example of the looting conducted by German mercenaries see: LP, III (2), 3498, 3525; CSP Span FS, vol.3, 1520-26, pp.281, 291. 174 Ibid., p.619. 175 BL Arundel MS. 26, ff.56v-57, (LP, I (2), 2219). See also TRP, vol.1, 113-4 on “debate making,” and p.114 on treatment of foreigners within the army. 176 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.84. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 D. Eltis, The Military Revolution, p.117. 180 E. Hall Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.44. 181 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47. Hall suggested that the English “kept array on horsebacke.” (p.107) However the other sources suggest that the English undertook this manouvre on foot. This would seem to me the most likely scenario. 182 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47. 183 Ibid. 184 For more detail on setting up camp see: BL Additional MS, 23971, ff.18-18v. 185 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.72. 186 S. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.600. 159

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187

C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.28. LP, I (2), 1937. 189 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.66. 190 TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.160 (LP, I (2), 2053), BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, ff.1-4 and Cotton MS. Caligula E. I. ff.7b-8. 191 BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2.; BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2.; BL Cotton Caligula E.I, ff.7b-9. 192 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.67. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid., p.69. 195 Ibid., p.72. 196 C. G. Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France (Stroud, 1990), p.85. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 C. Oman, ‘The Art of War,’ in H. D. Traill (ed.) Social England: A Record of the Progress of the People In Religion Laws Learning Arts Industry Commerce Science literature and Manners from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, Volume III, (London, 1895), p.72. 200 D. J. B. Trim, ‘Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent’, p.48. 201 G. Parker, ‘Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders’, p.39. 202 G. Phillips, ‘To Cry “Home!Home!: Mutiny, Morale and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies’, p.332. 203 Ibid. 204 C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, p.201 (LP, III (1), 402). 205 Ibid., pp.202-3. 188

Chapter Four Infantry and Cavalry: A British Art of war? 1

Various other weapons remained in use in the Tudor period, such as the two-handed pole axe, a favourite amongst dismounted men-at-arms in the fifteenth century, the battleaxe, often employed by mounted troops, holywater-sprinklers (a combination of spear and mace), boar-spears and multifarious others. However, the bill and halberd remained the most commonly used. 2 The pike was a long wooden shaft with a sharp iron head, between 12 and 20 feet in length. 3 See esp. R. Vaughan, Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy (London, 1973). 4 A halberd was a shaft 8 feet long carrying a hatchet blade as well as a spike at one end. 5 F. L. Taylor, Art of War in Italy, p.32. 6 N. Machiavelli, The Art of War (New York, 1965), p.47. 7 A decision hastened by Swiss hostility to the Habsburgs; while the Swiss refused to fight for the Emperor, they remained happy in the employ of his French enemies. For a useful introduction into the history of the landsknechts. See, D. Miller, The Landsknechts

238


(London, 1976). G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.78. 9 CUL F.f.2.10, f.10. 10 Ibid., ff.10-10v. 11 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.7v. 12 D. Eltis, English Military Theory, p.299. 13 CUL F.f.2.10, f.10. 14 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.3. 15 Ibid., f.4, f.5v. 16 This is possibly a hangover from his successful experiences with the bill in France in the 1540s. 17 M. K. Jones, ‘The Myth of 1485: did France really put Henry Tudor on the throne?’, in D. Grummitt (ed.) The English Experience in France, p.104. 18 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.25. 19 TNA: PRO SP 1/2, f.114, (LP, I (1), 1176). 20 E. Hall Henry VIII, vol.1, p.41. 21 LP, I (2) Appendix 22 (TNA: PRO SP1/230, f.329). 22 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.175. 23 B. L. Cotton Galba B.III, ff.64v-5, (LP, I (1), 1722). 24 Ibid., f.62, 66, 64 (LP, I (1), 1722). The 8,000 Swiss and Landsknecht auxiliaries referred to here would almost certainly have been pike-men. 25 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.209. 26 TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.157, (LP, I (1), 1412). 27 Ibid., ff.157-157v. 28 TNA: PRO E101/55/28. An account made by Sir John Cutte for “habillementes of warre,” between October 1509- 4 Hen. VIII includes a payment for 15,318 “marispikes,” in a further indication of the growing recognition of the value the pike. 29 TNA: PRO E101/62/16, (LP, I (1), 1725). “A proportion of the King’s orden(an)ce, artillery, and other habillements necessary for the rerewarde, with draught and carriage.” 30 B. L. Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2v, (LP, I (2), 2053). 31 TNA: PRO E101/62/14, (LP, I (2), 2052). BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2v suggests a figure of 1500 “Almaynes” accompanied the main body. However TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.160, “The Order how the kings battle shall proceed,” identifies only 700 “Almaynes,” in the “left wynge.” See also: E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.67, Oman, Art of War, p.291. 32 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.211. 33 TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.157, (LP, I (1), 1412). 34 LP, I (2), 2391. 35 C. T. Martin, ‘Sir John Daunce’s Accounts of Money Received from the Treasurer of the king’s chamber, temp. H.8’, Archaeologia or Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Antiquity, vol. 47 (1883), p.328. 36 See below, pp.259-65 for a more in-depth discussion of the General Proscription and the 8

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levying of Surrey’s army in 1522. See Chapter 5, p.267-9 for a further discussion of this subject. 38 LP, III (2), 2511. 39 B. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, p.178. See also G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries Wars (Cambridge, 1972), p.274- Appendix B, ‘The Organization of the Army of Flanders.’ 40 Ibid. 41 Clearly these figures are based on a degree of supposition and must, as such, be treated with a high degree of caution. However they do serve as a useful illustration of the importance of taking into account the auxiliary and mercenary contingents on any given campaign. It must also be noted that Hall’s chronicle suggested that as few as 300 Spanish troops 500 horsemen, “like men of warre,” accompanied the campaign. E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. I, p.268, 269-70. Taking into account the other documentary evidence, these figures seem unlikely. Aside from the substantial Imperial offer of support in for the siege of Theourenne (LP, III (2), 2511), it is informative to note Wolsey’s instructions to Surrey on 9 September: he was to take “care to do everything with the consent of the Emperor’s army, so as to avoid all jealousies.” (LP, III (2), 2526) The description of the troops as an ‘army’ would seem to imply that it was a considerable force, who acted as partners, or allies, not simply auxiliary soldiers under Surrey’s command. This impression of a substantial body is reinforced by the fact that both forces had ‘war councils’. Indeed, the Imperial contingent seem almost to have had the deciding vote; Surrey complained to Wolsey that “purposes change here, much against our minds,” – and the Imperial council, though they “are of very good minds, they who bear rule are chiefly young men.” (LP, III (2), 2511). 42 TNA: PRO SP1/28, ff.195-211, (LP, III (2), 3288). 43 BL Royal MS. 14 B XLI. 44 BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2b. 45 Detailed ‘battle narratives’ of this encounter abound and I will as such avoid, where possible, a repetition of the narrative detail already extensively provided for elsewhere. This brief account is simply concerned with the relative success of the pike and the bill in the battle. Other factors such as the constitution of Dacre’s force (i.e. was it mounted) are consciously excluded. 46 Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie, The History and Chronicles of Scotland: From the Slaughter of King James the First to the Ane thounsande fyve hundrieth thrie sair fyftein zeir. (ed.) A.J.G. Mackay (Vol. 1 Scottish Text Society, 1966), p.271. 47 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.215. 48 Ibid. 49 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.42, (LP, I (2), 2279). 50 Ibid., ff.42-42v. 51 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.115. 52 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.104. 37

240

53


Ibid., p.96. CSP Ven. Vol. 2, 1509-1519, no.316. 55 ‘The Trewe Encountre’, in A Ballade of the Scottyshe kynge by John Skelton (Detroit, 1969), p. 77. 56 TNA: PRO SP49/1, f.18. It is in instructive to note the extent to which discipline in battle was dependent on loyalty to local nobles who enjoyed significant control over their soldiers ‘civilian’ livelihood’. Thus “although wont to follow a Stanley to war”, the men of Cheshire and Lancashire “now found themselves under the command of a Howard and in the path of a ferocious assault.” G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.125. 57 Ibid. See also: R. Holinshed, Chronicles, vol.5, Scotland, p.431, Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.220. E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.108 etc... 58 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.108. 59 Poyldore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.220. 60 R. Holinshead, Chronicles, vol. 5, Scotland, p.431. 61 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47v. 62 Ibid. 63 TNA: PRO SP49/1, f.18. 64 Pitscottie, History, p.272. 65 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.110. 66 Given the humiliating nature of the Scottish defeat, it seems likely that Scottish chroniclers would have wanted to take something of the victory away from the English, and this needs to be taken into account in reading their testimony. However, Hall was equally as culpable of ‘glorifying’ the exerts of Englishmen and must also be read with circumspection. 67 Ibid., f.18v, and TNA: PRO SP1/5, ff.47v-48. A letter from Spinelly to Cardinal Bainbridge suggests that 12,000 Scots and 500 English fell at the battle, LP, I (2), 2286. 68 BL Cotton Caligula B II, f.200v. 69 TNA: PRO SP49/1, f.18v. 70 BL Cotton Caligula B VI, f.48, f.54. It is interesting to note that, by the following March, the fate of the Scottish artillery was still not confirmed. Dacre wrote to Henry advising “the orinance takyn at the last felde against the Scottes shuld be brought in all haist possible to yo(ur) towne of Newcastell by lande in avoiding all p(os)ible danngiers that might chance vpon the northe sea aswell by storm.” (f.54). 71 The pike was far from being an invincible force, for example one might note the success of Spanish sword and buckler men at the battle of Ravenna, 11 April 1512. For useful summaries of Ravenna see, F. L. Taylor, Art of War, pp.180-204; C. Oman, Art of War, pp.130-50; A. Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, (Oxford, 1987), pp.186-7. 72 This will be discussed at greater length in chapter 5. See below, pp.245-78. 73 G. Parker, The Army of Flanders, p.25. 74 G. Parker, The Military Revolution. 75 B. S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, pp.190-1. 54

NOTES

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241

R. I. Frost, The Northern Wars, 1558-1721, p.311. Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 C. Oman, Art of War, p.285. 80 C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.195. 81 CSP Ven, vol..6 pt.2, 1556-7, 884, cited in C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, p.204. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. For discussions of the medieval and early modern war-horse see, A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1993), R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment (London, 1989), C. Gladitz, Horse Breeding in the Medieval World (Dublin, 1997), A. Hyland, The Horse in the Middle Ages (Stroud, 1998). 84 D. Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces, Picardy, 1470-1560 (Cambridge, 1993), p.159. Although it is also important to note that “the startling fluctuations in the size of the gendarmerie noted by Contamine for the fifteenth century, with all their attendant social, economic and psychological problems for the militarily active nobility continued throughout the Habsburg-Valois Wars.” Ibid, p.160. 85 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.30. 86 BL Cotton. MS., Julius. FV, ff.50-57v. 87 Ibid., f.54. 88 Ibid., f.56. 89 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.8v. ‘Barbes’ = Bardes: This refers to a protective plate covering the breast and flanks of a horse. 90 Ibid., f.8. 91 Ibid., f.30v. 92 C. Oman, Art of War, p.289: “The English military classes had ceased for the most part to fight on horseback in the fifteenth century and few had recovered from this habit”, by the reign of Henry VIII. G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.23, “the tactics of the Hundred Years War and the Wars of the Roses had conditioned English knights to fight on foot.” 93 A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses. For example, Goodman pointed to the involvement of Cavalry at the battle of Towton (1461) and at Tewkesbury. See especially, pp.178-81. 94 D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison: warfare and military service in England, 1450-1558, Chapter 2; see also R. Vaughan, Charles the Bold, p.207. Grummitt contrasts this against the highly negative assessment of English cavalry provision during 1475 presented by J. R. Lander, ‘The Hundred Years War and Edward IV’s 1475 campaign in France’, in A. J. Slavin (ed.)Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government,, p.96. 95 For a recent evaluation of the relative modernity of English armies in the fifteenth century see: Anne Curry, ‘English Armies in the Fifteenth Century’, Anne Curry (ed.) Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War (Woodbridge, 1994). For the older view 77

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see: M. Powicke, ‘Lancastrian Captains,’ in T. A. Sandquist and M. Powicke (eds.), Essays in Medieval History presented to Bertie Wilkinson (Toronto, 1969), pp.371-82. 96 See: J. G. Sandeman, The Spears of Honour and The Gentlemen Pensioners (Halying Island, 1912); A. R. Hewerdine, The Yeomen of the king’s Guard, 1485-1547, (University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1998). See also below, Chapter 6, pp.296-8. 97 For example a thousand “horsemen strangers”, accompanied the rearward in 1513, See: BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.5v. During the Spring Sir Edward Poynings had been busy in the Netherlands contracting noblemen to supply cavalry for Henry’s coming invasion of France – LP, I (1), 1918, 1934 98 TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.157, (LP, I (1), 1412). 99 Ibid. For a discussion of the levying of the English army in 1513, see below, pp.250-3. 100 C. Oman, Art of War, p.291. 101 Ibid. and LP, I (2), 2052, 2053, 2054. 102 BL Lansdowne. MS.818. f.4. 103 TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.160. 104 The accounts reveal that in the build up to the campaign careful preparations were also made for the provision of horses for carriage. County commissioners were appointed to acquire horses in the different shires, for example Thomas Bryan and John Stokys raised 558 horses in Surrey. TNA: PRO E101/56/3. See also, E101/56/24, E101/60/24, SP1/230, ff.7v-8. The accounts for Buckingham and Hereford detail the different hundreds and townships in which the horses were acquired, the colour, the owner and the price of each horse (Buckinghamshire provided 268 horses while Hertfordshire contributed 324. TNA: PRO E101/107/27). 105 LP, I (2), 2391. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 E. Hall Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.73. 109 Ibid. 110 BL Cotton Caligula D. VI, f.94. 111 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.84. 112 Ibid. 113 C. Oman, Art of War, p.292. 114 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.85. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., and Vergil, Anglica Historia, C. Oman, Art of War, p.294. 118 LP, I (2), 2170. 119 Gilbert John Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, pp.23-4. 120 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.87. 121 Ibid. 122 In 1523 the contingent of English heavy cavalry was again very small, the muster lists

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describe a host containing 595 demi-lances and 377 archers on horseback. TNA: PRO SP1/28, ff.195-211, (LP, III (2), 3288). Plans laid before the campaign had suggested that this deficiency was to be compensated for by 8,000 of the Emperor’s “Flanders horsemen.” BL Royal MS. 14 B XLI. However, by the end of September “only 500 heavy cavalry,” had turned up. C. Oman, The Art of War, p.325. 123 This will be discussed further in the context of operations in Ireland. 124 G. Phillips, ‘'Of Nimble Service': Technology, Equestrainism and the Cavalry Arm of Early Modern Western European Armies’, pp.12-3. 125 This point was first made to me in conversations with Dr. Marcus Merriman on a field trip around the border forts of the Scottish lowlands in 1999, and is eloquently presented as a central pillar of his own analysis of the The Rough Wooings (Linton, 2000). 126 T. I. Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier: 1513-1603 (Edinburgh, 1966), p.3. 127 W. Scott, The Border Antiquities of England and Scotland, vol. I (London, 1814), p.li. For a useful description of the physical character of the Anglo-Scots borders see: T. Hodgkin, The Wardens of the Northern Marches (London, 1908), esp.pp.2-10. 128 Bernard noted that Anglo-Scots warfare “cannot be understood without prior appreciation of the general characteristics of border society…the borders were forbidding mountainous areas whose people reared cattle, sheep and horses.” G. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility: A Study of the Fourth and Fifth Earls of Shrewsbury (Sussex, 1985), p.109. 129 M. Fissel, English Warfare, p.47. 130 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Warfare, p.257. 131 C. S. L. Davies, ‘The English People and War’, p.3. 132 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp.95-6. 133 See: G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp.104-37. For a further insight into the history of the border conflict, A. J. Macdonald, Border Bloodshed: Scotland, England and France at War, 1369-1403 (East Linton, 2000), is instructive. 134 Furthermore, this would continue to be the case throughout the century. ‘Plantation’ of English settlers began in the reign of Edward VI and proceeded at a pace from the 1560s. The expansion of this policy had, by the 1590s, provoked rebellion in Ireland and persistent concerns were raised in England over the danger of Spanish intervention in support of the Catholic Irish. These concerns came home to roost in the autumn of 1601 as Philip III deployed a Spanish force of some 3,500 men under Juan del Aguila at Kinsale. For an excellent appreciation of the 1595 revolt and Kinsale, see M. Fissel, English Warfare, esp.pp.226-35. One should also consult Father John Silke’s Kinsale: The Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars (New York, 1970) – although one needs to be wary in the use of this source and sceptical about some less than objective judgments. More generally Elizabethan warfare in Ireland can be approached through Cyril Fall’s, Elizabeth Irish Wars (New York, 1950), and the many works of G. A. Hayes-McCoy, esp. Irish Battles. A Military History of Ireland (Belfast, 1990) and ‘Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare, 1593-1601’, Irish Historical Studies, vol. 2 (1940-

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1), pp.225-79. One should also note J. McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland (Manchester, 1997). Most importantly, one need consider the work of S. Ellis, especially, ‘The Tudors and the Origins of the Modern Irish States’, in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffrey (eds.), A Military History of Ireland, (Cambridge, 1996), pp.116-35. Ellis’ meticulously researched work has been particularly influential in developing my own understanding of Tudor warfare in Ireland. 135 LP, VII, 957. 136 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.56v. 137 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.79v.In March 1535 Skeffington, the king’s deputy, reported that the Emperor was preparing a force of 10,000 men to aid the rebellion, and “the King of Scottes p(ro)mised to geve aide to yo(ur) rebell lykewise”, (f.98). However, no such aid would ever materialise. Charles was preparing a force at this time, but it was dispatched to Tunis to fight the Turk. See also, CSP Span FS, 1534-8, pt.1, nos. 84, 86-7. 138 Although the period of their tenure was by no means unbroken. 139 J. Guy, Tudor England, p.357. 140 S. G. Ellis, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1477-1603: English Expansion and Rule (London, 1998) pp.114-8. 141 S. G. Ellis, ‘The Tudors and the Origins of the Modern Irish States: A Standing Army’, in A Military History of Ireland, T. Bartlett & K. Jeffery (eds.) (Cambridge, 1996), p.116. 142 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.70, LP, III (1), 670. 143 R. Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors (London, 1885), p.128. 144 In 1601, Spanish intervention, outwardly a fearful prospect, in fact worked against the Irish as “the English would obtain the confrontation they had long sought, and the Irish, who excelled in guerrilla fighting, now had to contemplate set-piece battles.” M. Fissel, English Warfare, p.226. 145 S. G. Ellis, ‘The Tudors and the Origin of the Modern Irish State: A Standing Army’, p.118. 146 Ibid., p.117. 147 G. Rainsford, ‘Ritratto d’Ingliterra’, Camden Miscellany, (ed.). P. S. Donaldson (vol. 27, Fourth Series, Vol. 22, London, 1979), p.105. 148 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.71 (LP, III (1), 670). Gallowglasses were Irish Mercenaries of Scottish descent. They were renowned for their strong discipline and hardiness. They were usually armed with a two handed sword or battle-axe. Kernes were Irish infantry usually armed with bows, swords and javelins and were extensively employed by the English. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.134 (LP, VIII, 1124). 153 K. Durham and A. McBride noted that the English border horse held their “own against the light Irish cavalry, whose main disadvantage it would seem was their practice of

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riding without stirrups.” Indeed “this, combined with a shallow quilted saddle invariably resulted in their being unhorsed when they clashed with their English counterparts.” The Border Reivers (London, 1995) pp.33-4. 154 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.48. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.71. 158 R. Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, p.136. 159 TNA: PRO SP1/20, f.110 (LP, III (1), 889). 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 R. W. Stewart, The English Ordnance Office, p.141. 163 M. Fissel, English Warfare, p.194. See also R. Stewart, ‘The “Irish Road”: military supply and arms for Elizabeth’s army during the O’Neil Rebellion in Ireland, 1598-1601’, in M. Fissel (ed.), War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650 (Manchester, 1991), pp.16-37 and J. J. N. McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, pp.137-91. 164 TNA: PRO SP1/20, f.110 (LP, III (1), 889). 165 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.41. 166 Ibid. 167 LP, III (1), 1447. 168 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.74. In December 1521 the council of Ireland wrote to Wolsey to “praise the lord Lieutenant Surrey on occasion of his return to England...this land is bro(u)ght in towardues Reformacion by the actyve proues and great pollycy of the said lord lieuten(a)nt which hath right substancially and wisely demeanyd hym self in feaultes (feates?) of warre.” 169 LP, III (1), 1377. 170 LP, III (1), 1252. See also, TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.40, 41, 44. 171 LP, III (1), 1377. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. It is, however, pertinent to note that the ‘plantation’ of the second half of the century would do little to quell Irish nationalism and rebellion. 174 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.67. 19 October 1521, Sir John Stile to Wolsey: “Now of late my lorde levetenant hathe taken a peas w(ith) yrysshe rebelles Ocarreol Oconor and connell and dyvers yrysshmen.” 175 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.58 (LP, III (1), 1252). 176 Ibid. f.59v. 177 Ibid., ff.59v-60. 178 Ibid., ff.60v-62. 179 LP, III (1), 972. 180 Ibid. 181 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.66, f.69.

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182


LP, III (1), 1646. Conventional in the sense of mimicking their European counterparts. 184 Although, it would be misleading to suggest that Kildare served as deputy throughout this time, being deprived of office again between 1528 and 1532 in a period of instability in the lordship. 185 In Ireland the centralising drive culminated, in 1541, in the “Act of Kingly Title…which changed Ireland’s status from separate lordship to puppet kingdom, to be ruled according to the principles of English kingship.” M. Merriman, ‘The High Road from Scotland’, in A. Grant and K. Stringer, Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History (London, 1995), pp.111. However, as Merriman rightly noted, “while the integration of Wales into the English administrative system was reasonably successful, it encouraged,” the English “to treat Ireland in roughly the same way…(alienating) the Anglo-Irish and the Gaelic Irish alike.” p.112. 186 S. G. Ellis, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, pp.135-6. 187 R. Holinshead, Holinsheads Chronichles of England, Scotland and Ireland, vol.6, Ireland (London, 1808), p.287. 188 S. G. Ellis, Tudor Ireland: Crown Community and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603 (London, 1985), p.125. 189 S. G. Ellis, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, p.136. 190 CSP Span FS, vol.5, pt.1, 1534-8, no.86. 29 August 1534, Eustace Chapuys to the Emperor, “The King [Henry] has hitherto tried to dissemble, in order, as I think, to keep his subjects ignorant of what is happening in Ireland, for fear they [the English] should take it into their heads to imitate the Irish.” 191 R. Holinshead, Ireland, p.297. 192 S. G. Ellis, ‘The Tudors and the Origins of the Modern Irish States: A Standing Army’, p.122. 193 R. Holinshead, Ireland, p.295. 194 Ibid. 195 TNA: PRO SP3/14, f.52 (LP, VII, 1064). 196 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.60. 197 R. Holinshead, Ireland, pp.295-8. 198 LP, VII, 980, LP, VII, 1013. 199 TNA: PRO SP2 Q, f.140 (LP, VII, 1682). 200 Ibid. 201 LP, VII, 1291. 202 LP, VII, 1368. 203 LP, VIII, 287. 204 TNA: PRO SP3/5, f.125 (LP, VII, 1014). 205 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.59 (LP, VII, 1186). 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid., f.60. 183

NOTES

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Ibid. See also: LP, VII, 1141. CSP Span FS, vol.5, pt.1, 1534-8, no.86. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid., no.87. 212 Ibid., no.86. 213 Ibid., no.87. 214 Ibid. 215 S. G. Ellis, ‘The Tudors and the Origins of Modern Irish States: A Standing Army’, pp.123-4. 216 Ellis refers the reader to LP, XI, 934; LP, VI, 615, 1379; VII, 674,679,895,1498; X, 1045, XII (2), 249-50,696(2) 712; LP, VIII, 449; LP, VII, 1366; XII (2), 537 - however these documents do not offer the detailed breakdown or correspond to the figures in his article. 217 TNA: PRO SP65/2, ff.1-5 (LP, XI, 934). - Irish Army Accounts. 218 S. G. Ellis, ‘‘The Tudors and the Origins of Modern Irish States: A Standing Army’, p.124. 219 TNA: PRO SP65/1, ff.4v-5. 220 Ibid., ff.1-5. 221 E.g. Note 19, LP, VI, 196 (8), 1481 (5,29), VII, 1026 (26), 1455. These documents shed little light on the breakdown of the ‘Bristol contingent’ referred to in the text. 222 CSP Span FS, vol. 5, pt.1, 1534-8, nos.86-7. 223 TNA: PRO SP60/2, ff.81-2 (LP, VII, 1574), PRO SP1/86, f.153 (LP, VII, 1366), See also: LP, VII, 1013, 1186, 1574, 1682. 224 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.147. 225 TNA: PRO SP1/90, f.185 (LP, VIII, 287), PRO SP1/91, f.57v (LP, VIII, 345). 226 LP, VII, 1418. 227 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.81. 228 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.79v (LP, VII, 1573). 229 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.81. 230 Ibid., f.79v. 231 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.79v (LP, VII, 1573). 232 Ibid., f.79v. 233 Ibid., f.79. These concerns aside, the size of the rebel force should not be over-estimated. Alen went on to identify 100 horse and 300 foot, “wherof is not oon archer, ne 10 handgunnes he carieth no orden(a)nce with hym wherof shuld men be in feare.” (f.79v). 234 Ibid., f.80. 235 Ibid. 236 Ibid. f.81v. 237 LP, VII, 1057, CSP. Span FS, vol5, pt.1, 1534-8, no.84. 238 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.79v. 239 Ibid., f.80. 240 Ibid., f.106. See also TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.89: Brabazon to Cromwell, “my lord deputie 209

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hath bene sore seke, and now he is sumwhat amendyd so that he intendeth to lay siege to maynoith the tewsday in the second weke of lent.” 241 R. Holinshead, Chronicles, vol.6, Ireland, p.299. 242 TNA: PRO SP3/6, f.30 (LP, VIII, 487). Sir William Kyngston to Lord Lisle, 1 April 1535, “The Kynges army hathe won the stronge howse that the yerle of kyldare had in yreland it ys called mynehoth (Maynooth) & the Kinges army la(y) affore it 10 day(s)...ther slew above won hund(re)d of yrysmen (Irishmen) & lost but 2 yenglys(h) men.” 243 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.98. 244 Ibid. 245 R. Holinshead, Chronicles, vol. 6, Ireland p.300. 246 Ibid. 247 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.98. 248 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.145. 249 Ibid. 250 TNA: PRO SP60/2, ff.79-80v, ff.145-147, f.149. 251 Ibid., f.146v. 252 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.134 253 Corruption, accounting irregularities and fraudulent claims over troop numbers continued to afflict English and European armies throughout the sixteenth century. 254 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.176. 255 Ibid., f.97. 256 Ibid., f.145. 257 Ibid., ff.146v-147. 258 Ibid., f.146v. 259 Ibid., f.147. 260 R. Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, p.177. 261 TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.151, 152, 156, 160, 161. 262 LP, X, 1029. 263 S. G. Ellis Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603, pp.132-3. 264 CSP Span. FS. Vol. 5, pt.1, 1534-1535, p.563. 265 LP, VII, 287, 345. 266 LP, VII, 1291, 1368; LP, VIII, 48. 267 S. G. Ellis, ‘The Tudors and the Origins of the Modern Irish States: A Standing Army’, p.126. 268 In 1540 “it was pointed out that a hundred ‘English spears, Northern on horseback’, combined with a like amount of hackbutters and longbowmen would be a much more appropriate force than a thousand regular troops.” K. Durham and A. McBridge, The Border Reivers, p.34. 269 J. Black, European Warfare, p.119. 270 M. Fissel, English Warfare, p.235. 271 Moreover, in Ireland, as in operations in France in 1522 and 1523, many of the relative

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failures of the English army can be attributed to deficiencies in strategy, as opposed to the quality of the soldiery. 272 L. MacMahon, ‘Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army’, p.210. 273 C. S. L. Davies, ‘Henry VIII and Henry V’, p.248. Chapter Five Levying the army 1

J. R. Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 2001), p.45. Mallet and Hale commented that “In England the relative invulnerability of the state and the limitations of its fiscal structure discouraged the English kings from attempting to maintain more than token standing forces.” M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, Military Organization of a Renaissance State, p.2. Oman surmised that “the want of a permanent national standing army had a great deal to do with his (Henry’s) failures”, at a time when “all other contemporary sovereigns were building standing armies on a greater or smaller scale.” – C. Oman, Art of War, p.288. 3 A. Curry, ‘The First English Standing Army? Military Organisation in Lancastrian Normandy, 1420-1450’, in C. Ross (ed.) Patronage, Pedigree and Power in Later Medieval England (Gloucester, 1979), p.208. 4 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.286, 285. 5 TNA: PRO E101/59/5. 6 Ibid. 7 BL Cotton Cleopatra E. IV, f.218v. 8 This document has been discussed at length by Lawrence Stone and Geoffrey Elton. See: L. Stone, ‘The Political Programme of Thomas Cromwell,’ Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol.24 (1951), pp.1-18 and G. Elton, ‘Parliamentary Drafts, 1529-1540, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research., vol. 25 (1952), p.130. 9 BL Lansdowne MS., 863, f.54. 10 See esp. M. M. Norris, ‘The 2nd Earl of Rutland’s Band of Men-At-Arms, 1551-2’, Historical Research, vol. 68 (1995), pp.100-16. 11 APC., iii, p.225. 12 D. E. Hoak, The King’s Council in the Reign of Edward VI, (Cambridge, 1976), pp.198-9. 13 Ibid., p.201. 14 Ibid. Hoak further suggested that “In retrospect, the positioning of bands of one hundred and two hundred members of the Boulogne garrison in a coastal arc around London (July 1550) appears to have been a more deliberate step in the direction of creating a standing army ready to serve at quick notice.” (p.200) 15 J. Loach, Edward VI (London, 1999), p.96. 16 Ibid., pp.4-5. 17 J. J. Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline in Mid-Tudor England’, History, vol. 60 (1975), p.188. Goring is widely accepted as the principal authority on the systems and procedures of levying the Tudor army. His 1955 London University Ph.D. The Military Obligations of the English People 1511-1558, is meticulously researched and an essential 2

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starting place for any student of this subject. See also, J. J. Goring, ‘The General Proscription of 1522’, English Historical Review, vol.86 (1971), pp.681-705. 18 J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, p.66. 19 D. J. B. Trim, The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003). 20 Ibid., p.5. 21 For a scholarly and insightful discussion of these concepts see D. J. B. Trim’s ‘Introduction’ to The Chivalric Ethos, pp.1-35, esp.pp.5-13. 22 J. S. Nolan, ‘The Militarization of the Elizabethan State’, p.397. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 M. Fissel, English Warfare, p.154. 26 It would be a misrepresentation of Gilbert John Millar not to acknowledge his recognition that the “few professionals,” of the Henrician military (the garrisons, spears, sailors and yeoman) “could furnish a little continuity in military affairs” (Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.7). However, Millar underestimated the extent of this establishment, its influence over military policy in peace and war, and failed to consider the issue of gunners and administrators at the Tower of London, and indeed within the garrisons. 27 D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison (forthcoming); Anita Hewerdine, The Yeomen of the king’s Guard, 1485-1547, (University of London, Ph.D. thesis, 1998); C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services. 28 Much has been written on the subject of sixteenth century mercenaries, serving in England and across Europe, see esp: A. Corvisier, Armies and Society in Europe, 1494-1789 (Indianapolis, 1979); J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, pp.146-52; M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters and G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries; more recently one might note D. Potter, ‘The International Mercenary Market in the Sixteenth Century: Anglo:French Competition in Germany, 1543-50,’ English Historical Review, vol.111 (1996), pp.24-58; D. J. B. Trim “Fighting ‘Jacob’s Warres’: English and Welsh Mercenaries in the Euopean Wars of Religion (France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610) (University of London, Ph.D. Thesis, 2001); ‘Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 15681609’, in J. Hathaway (ed.) Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective (London, 2001), pp.47-61 – to note but a few. 29 The differentiation between mercenary and auxiliary is often a difficult one to make, and for the purposes of this study not an important one. The important issue is that Henry did seek to recruit foreign soldiers, paid for by someone else preferably and if not paid for himself, to supplement his armies. 30 It is important to recognise that this policy is equally identifiable throughout the fifteenth century. For example, Henry VII had employed them on his expedition to Brittany in 1495. 31 See B. G. Awty, ‘The Arcana Family of Cesena as Gunfounders and Military Engineers’, pp.61-80. See esp. p.50, 52. It is also worth noting that Henry VII also followed the

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policy of employing foreign specialists in English forges. For the employment of French iron founders see TNA: PRO C1/222/12 and TNA: PRO E36/124, p.77, which details ordnance ‘made by Britton(s) w(ith)in the Towre of London.’ 32 TNA: PRO SP1/2, f.114 (LP, I (1), 1176). 33 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.211; TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.157, (LP, I (1), 1412); LP, I (2), 2391. 34 E.g. BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.5v. 35 C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.204. 36 See below, pp.267-9. 37 See: BL Royal MS 14 B XLI; TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.198v; TNA: PRO SP1/28, ff.199v, 206v, 195v. 38 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.600. 39 D. Potter, ‘The International Mercenary Market’, p.27. See also G. J. Millar, ‘Mercenaries under Henry VIII, 1544-46’, History Today, vol. 27 (1977), p.174. For pre-campaign plans see TNA: PRO SP1/184, f.228 (LP, XIX (1), 273 (5)). 40 D. Potter, ‘The International Mercenary Market’, pp.24-58. Although it interesting to note that the bulk of fresh troops sent to supplement the Calais garrison in the 1540s were English! See, D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison (forthcoming), chapter 2. 41 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.45, 44. 42 C. Oman, Art of War, p.289. He described how “the foreigners,” employed in Henry’s armies, at the start of his reign, were principally heavy cavalry and pikemen (always of Burgundian and German extraction); by the end of his reign he was also recruiting Spanish and Italian companies of arquebusiers. 43 CSP Ven, vol. VI, pt. II, 1556-7, no.884, cited in C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, p.204. This deficiency was attributed to an English inability to breed horses strong enough to hold a man-at-arms. Indeed, questions are also raised about the quality of the mounts reserved for English light horsemen; “the horses being weak and of bad wind, fed merely on grass, being like sheep and all other cattle kept in field or pasture at all seasons…they cannot stand much work, nor are they held in much account.” (p.204). 44 E.g. 1539 musters, LP, XIV (I), 652-654. 45 TNA: PRO SP1/180 ff.1-37v, (LP, XVII, 882), LP, XVIII (I), 832, TNA: PRO SP1/184 ff.29 - 220v. Nevertheless, this argument needs to be tempered by an awareness that there were moves towards the development of English firearms troops, pikemen and bodies of heavy cavalry from the outset of the reign. The reasons behind such deficiencies and attempts to relieve them have been, or will be, discussed elsewhere. 46 “It has not been demonstrated anywhere in this work that alien soldiers won so much as a single battle. Still, based solely on the sheer numbers in which they were hired, it seems to this authour, that mercenaries and, when available auxiliaries formed the backbone of virtually every major force…between 1485 and 1547.” G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries, p.173.

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47


It is important to recognise, however, that mercenary pike or indeed heavy cavalry were not always necessary in the theatres in which Henry required his armies to operate. As we have seen operations in Ireland required light horse (an arm in which the English were well provided), although increasing resort was made to the recruitment of mercenary shot to serve over the course of the Tudor century. 48 See Chapter One, pp.44-66 for a brief discussion of England’s strategic imperatives. 49 D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison (forthcoming), chapter 2. 50 G. Phillips, ‘The Army of Henry VIII: A Reassessment’, pp.13-4; D. Potter, ‘The International Mercenary Market’, - Henry “quickly found, as had the major European powers, that there could be no effective army without professional mercenaries,” p.24. 51 D.Potter, War and Government, p.177. “There were usually formations of foreign troops in Picardy during the Habsburg-Valois Wars, Swiss and Italian in earlier phases. German Lansquentes and pitoliers later on.” 52 Ibid., p.166. For further examples of Scottish ‘auxiliaries’ serving in French armies see: R.C.Patterson, My Wound is Deep: A History of the Later Anglo Scots Wars, 1380-1560, (Edinburgh, 1997), Chapter, 4. 53 W.L.Wiley, The Gentlemen of Renaissance France (Cambridge, 1954), p.161. 54 D.Millar, The Lansdkenchts (London, 1976); The Swiss at War: 1300-1500 (London, 1979); F.Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964-5). 55 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.3. 56 LP, I (2), 1931. 57 LP, I (2), 2307. 58 See also, LP, I (2), 83, 266,1265, 1931,1937,2307, 1071, 1146, 1265, 1437, 1509, 1511, 1575, 1601, 1647, 1655, 1665, 1837, 1993, 2095, 2259, 2307, 2561, 2577, 2681, 2736, 2854, 3004, 3160, 3165, 3173, 3548. 59 C. Oman, Art of War, p.36. 60 D. Potter, War and Government, p.179. 61 G. Phillips, ‘The Army of Henry VIII: A Reassessment’, p.14. 62 E. Surts and J.H. Hexter (eds.) The Complete Works of St. Thomas More vol. 14 Utopia (London, 1974), p.65. 63 This has been done admirably elsewhere. Notably J. J. Goring’s excellent Ph.D. thesis, ‘The Military Obligations of the English People 1511-1558’ (University of London, 1955). Nor is it the purpose of this thesis to consider at any length the impact of changing socioeconomic conditions on the military role of nobility and gentry or any concurrent impact on levying and recruitment of the army. 64 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.1. See also L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia. 65 Ibid. 66 4 & 5 Philip and Mary, cc.2, 3. Moreover, this statute “brought the ‘quasi-feudal’ obligation within the national system by introducing a national rate for the provision of horse and armour while in the same year commissioners were instructed not to spare the tenants of lords and gentlemen in making their assessments.” M. J. Braddick, State Formation in

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Early Modern England, c.1550-1700 (Cambridge, 2000), p.182. See also, L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, pp.249-50. Of particular interest is I. Roy, ‘The Profession of Arms’, in W. Prest (ed.) The Professions of Early Modern England (London, 1987), pp.181-195 who argued at some length that Elizabethan reforms marked the transformation of the military system, from one contingent on the military potential of the nobility to a trained militia dedicated to national defence. 67 By ‘modern’ one means a ‘professionally trained force’ equivocal to the armies developing on the continent at this time. 68 P. Williams, The Tudor Regime, p.122. 69 On the lieutenancy, see especially: G. S. Thomson, Lords Lieutenant in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1923) and A. G. R. Smith, The Government of Elizabethan England (London, 1967), pp.86-90. 70 G. Bernard, ‘The Continuing Power of the Tudor Nobility’, in G. Bernard (ed.) Power and Politics in Tudor England (Aldershot, 2000), p.35. 71 Ibid. 72 M. Powick, Military Obligation in Medieval England (Oxford, 1962), p.119. 73 A consistent assessment of what a complete set of armour would include is difficult to pinpoint. One might tentatively suggest: a jack (a leather or canvas jerkin covered with small iron plates), a sallet (helmet), splints (pieces of armour to protect the elbows), and possibly a gorget (a small armour plate to protect the throat). They would also have kept either a longbow or bill/halberd (an axe-blade and spear combined on a pole) - or possibly both. 74 13 Edward I (Statue of Winchester), 1285, SR I, 96. 75 Ibid. 76 LP, XIV (I), 670. 77 In considering the impact of Henry VIII on the levying of the English army, it is important to note that “what the Tudors wanted was not to eliminate the existing systems of military recruitment, but to control them.” S. J. Gunn, Early Tudor Government, 1485-1558 (London, 1995), p.39. 78 TRP, no.63. 79 Ibid. 80 TRP, no.62. 81 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.14 - quotation and paragraph. 82 S. J. Gunn, Early Tudor Government, p.41. Henry VII’s attitude towards, and actions against, the problems presented by livery and maintenance are so widely known as to need no substantial reiteration here. Henry VII sought not to abolish retaining, but rather to harness its military potential to his own purposes; obtaining agreements from trusted nobles for the procurement of specified numbers of men to serve the ‘army royal’. Central to these agreements was the provision for regular musters and the central submission of the names of retained men to the king’s secretary; “the combination of prosecution and licensing gave the king very flexible control over the distribution and

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use of effective armed force.” Ibid., p.40. G. W. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, pp.31-2. For example one might note the Earl of Huntingdon who “cautiously wrote to the king on 6 October that, if he was to be commanded to raise any of the king’s subjects, he might have the king’s authority to do so. Then neither he nor any who went with him would incur ‘the daunger of your lawes which is to hevy for anny of vs to bere.” 84 TNA: PRO SP1/2 ff.111-114; 1/229 ff.48-52. 85 TNA: PRO SP1/2, f.112. 86 Ibid., f.113. 87 For details of the “Holy League,” see: TNA: PRO E30/741, E30/744, BL Cotton Galba B. III, f.69 (LP, I (2), 1750).For details on the army sent into France in 1513 see: TNA: PRO SP1/5 ff.52-4 (Rearward), E101/62/14 (Foreward) and E101/62/11 (Middleward). 88 TNA: PRO SP1/2 ff.112-114. 89 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.199. Although, as we will see, this number was somewhat of an exaggeration. 90 TNA: PRO C 82/387. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 TNA: PRO C82/389. 94 Ibid. 95 S. J. Gunn, Early Tudor Government, p.39. The use of stewards to command the military potential of crown lands is a policy that can be traced back to Henry VII, during the 1490s. See S. J. Gunn, ‘Sir Thomas Lovell (c.1494-1524): a new man in a new monarchy?’ in J. L. Watts (ed.) The End of the Middle Ages?, pp.117-54; D. Luckett, ‘Crown Office and Licensed Retinues in the Reign of Henry VII’, in R. E. Archer and S. Walker (eds.), Rulers and Ruled in Late Medieval England, (London, 1995), pp.223-38. 96 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.209. 97 Antonio Bavarino, quoted in Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.205. 98 E. Hall, HenryVIII, vol. 1, p.61. 99 TNA: PRO E101/62/11, (LP, I (2), 2053 (2) ). 100 Ibid. 101 E. Hall, HenryVIII, vol. 1, p.61and LP, I (2), 2051. See also BL Stowe MS. 692, f.12. 102 C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.33. 103 TNA: PRO E101/62/11 and BL Cotton Caligula E.I, ff.7v-8. 104 This figure is based on an assessment of ‘fighting troops,’ excluding Henry’s servants and household staff as I have been unable to satisfactorily establish their number. Cruickshank suggests the total figure, inclusive of the support staff, is somewhere nearer to 35,000 (Army Royal, p.28). 105 TRP, no.69. 106 Ibid. 83

NOTES

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Ibid. G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.116. 109 TNA: PRO E 36/1, p.103, (LP, I (1), 1450). 110 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.96. 111 Ibid., p.96. 112 It is well to remember that the Queen of Scots was a Tudor and was set against war with England. It is quite possibly that she was the root source of much of Surrey’s intelligence. 113 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.98. 114 Ibid., p.98. See also TNA: PRO E101/56/27 for the “cost of certeyn post layed aswell betwene Pountfret and Manchestre,” as well as to the “County Palatine, to York and elsewhere.” 115 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.98. 116 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.98. 117 BL Additional MS. 23,971, f.16. Although he accepted that an army could move faster, it would leave its soldiers more tired, and a tired army was open to attack, and defeat. 118 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.97-8. 119 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47v, (LP, I (2), 2283). 120 Ibid., f.48. 121 TNA: PRO SP49/1, f.18v. 122 TNA: PRO 36/254, f.121, f.125 and f.135, (LP, I (2), 2460). 123 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.107. 124 J. D. Makie, ‘The English Army at Flodden’, p.65, E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.102. 125 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47-48v and PRO SP49/1, f.18-18v. 126 TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.47. 127 LP, I (2), 2270. 128 BL Egerton MS. 2,603, f.30. 129 Ibid. 130 That the earl disbanded his army so quickly is all the more understandable when one remembers the paucity of supplies. 131 For a discussion of the Scottish levying system see: J. Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442-1603, (Edinburgh, 1985). In theory, all men between 16 and 60 were liable for 40 days military service every year, and were compelled to provide sufficient rations to last the length of the campaign. Pitscottie, History, p.257. There is substantial disagreement amongst the chronicles as to the size of the Scots army, most of which seem to give way to the chroniclers penchant for exaggeration. Hall claimed that “the brute was that they were twoo hundred thousand, but for a surety they were an hundred thousand good fightynge men at the lest.” E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.98. The Trewe Encounter similarly placed the number at around 100,000, whilst the “Artcles of the bataill,” suggests that “the Scottes were 80,000.” ‘Trewe Encountre’, p.63, and TNA: PRO SP49/1, f.18v. Pitscottie maintained that James initially levied a force of some 108

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100,000 men, but by the time of the battle this had fallen away to 30,000 men. Pitscottie, History, p.262, 270. Given the widespread desertion referred to by all sources it is possible the final figure was ultimately even lower than this. Henry VIII, in his letter to Maximilian, suggested a Scottish force as small as 10,000 men had attempted an invasion of England. LP, I (2), 2270 Ruthal related that after James had attacked Norham 20,000 men left him “foreboding mischief.” TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.48. It is ultimately impossible to identify a concrete figure for the Scottish force on the day of the battle, although Henry’s number seems unrealistically small. One should remember that James IV’s popularity was likely to have induced an enthusiastic response to the call to arms. As such, and given the size of the English army, a Scottish force somewhere in the region of 25,000-30,000 men seems most likely to me. 132 J. D. Mackie, ‘The English Army at Flodden’, p.42. 133 D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, Gilbert John Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries. 134 J. D. Makie, ‘The English Army at Flodden’, p.54. 135 A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses, J. D. Makie, ‘The English Army at Flodden.’ 136 J.D. Makie, ‘The English Army at Flodden.’ 137 LP, III (1), 402. 138 CSP Ven, vol. 5, 1534-54, no. 934. 139 M. J. Braddick, State Formation, p.183. 140 See esp. M. J. Braddick, State Formation, p.184 and L. Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp.8-30. Not until the early years of the seventeenth century were serious schemes to mark weapons, facilitating identification and preventing this process, undertaken. See: R. W. Stewart, ‘Arms accountability in early Stuart Militia’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol. 57 (1984), pp.113-17. 141 BL Royal MS., 14 B.X. 142 Although, during the summer of 1545 England had as many as 150,000 men in arms; see P. E. J. Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, p.22. 143 The question of ‘spare labour capacity’ during sporadic periods of warfare is one that would bear further investigation. 144 BL Cotton Cleopatra Fvi., f.255v. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., f.250v. 147 For detailed accounts of the General Proscription see: J. J. Goring, ‘The General Proscription of 1522’; J. Cornwall, ‘A Tudor Domesday. The Musters of 1522’, Journal of the Society of Archivists, vol. 3 (1965-9), pp.19-24. 148 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Eng. hist. e.187., f.128v. 149 Ibid., ff.105-199. 150 TNA: PRO E315/466 f.1-27v & TNA: PRO E315/466 ff.28-61. 151 J. Goring ‘Social Change and Military Decline’, p.193. 152 CSP Ven, vol. 5, 1534-54, no.703 in C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth

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Century’, pp.201-2. Ibid., p.202. 154 Ibid. 155 R. H. Tawney and E. Power (eds.), Tudor Economic Documents, vol. III (London, 1951), p.55. 156 See for example: J. Pound (ed.), The Military Survey for the Babergh Hundred (Woodbridge, 1986), or ‘The Military Survey of 1522’, in M. M. Rowe (ed.) Tudor Exeter, Tax Assessments 1489-1595 (Devon and Cornwall Record Society, xxii). Although, in this instance, one must necessarily remember the underlying financial purposes of this survey. 157 J. Pound (ed.), The Military Survey for the Babergh Hundred., p.21. 158 Ibid. 159 Whilst acknowledging the success of Wolsey’s planning in 1513, C. S. L. Davies has been heavily critical of Wolsey’s efforts in 1522 and 1523, when victualling problems were “the results of bad planning on Wolsey’s part.” – C. S. L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies’, p.243. 160 TNA: PRO E36/19; Bodleian Library., MS., Film Dep. 695. 161 TNA: PRO E36/19 f.279. 162 M. M. Rowe (ed.), Tudor Exeter, pp.21-2. 163 Ibid. Of these three examples Smyth and Ayere were worth “nill,” and Wolston a mere 10s. It seems unlikely they could have afforded, or would have been compelled, to purchase ‘harness.’ 164 W. Hoyle (ed.) The Military Survey of Gloucestershire, 1522 (The Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society, Gloucestershire Record Series, Volume 6), p.xvi. 165 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.27. 166 L. Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, p.108. 167 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.26. 168 It is also interesting to note contemporary feeling that “experience taught that those who returned from the wars little resembled the men who went away. Employers were reluctant to take them back, even if their jobs had not been filled in the mean time.” Ibid. With this in mind it seems yet more likely that those who could afford to do so, would have been inclined to avoid impressment; doubtless in favour of another man taking his ‘harness’ to war. 169 BL Royal MS., 7 F XIV.29 (LP, III (2), 2012). 170 BL Royal MS. 14 B.XXX. 171 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV no.10, f.71, (LP, III (2) 2013). 172 Ibid. 173 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV.29, f.29. 174 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.264. 175 Although even here one need be aware of multifarious pitfalls, such as dedshares, deadpays and so on. 153

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C. T. Martin, ‘Sir John Daunce’s Accounts’, p.326. Ibid., p.328. 178 C. Oman, Art of War, p.323. “Charles merely made use of the English army, as a covering force, to protect the frontier of his Netherlands dominions while he was turning his main strength to the frontier against the French in Italy.” (ibid). 179 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV no.10, f.71, (LP, III (2) 2013). 180 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV.29, f.29. 181 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.299. 182 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol.I, p.268, 269-70 (quote) . 183 Ibid. 184 It is, of course, entirely likely that Hall would have sought to emphasise Henry’s contribution whilst minimising that of his allies. 185 LP, III (2), 2499. (BL Cotton.Caligula.D.VIII, f.255) 186 LP, III (2), 2511. (BL Cotton.Caligula. D VIII, f.259) 187 E. Hall, Henry VIII, p.264. 188 Although, it is important to emphasise that this figure represents no more than an ‘educated estimate’ in the absence of clear documentary evidence in the English records. This figure could possibly be rectified by looking at French and ‘Imperial’ accounts of the campaign, however, in the context of this study this seems unnecessary (and impractical). More important from our perspective is the size of the English contingent, and this clearly numbered 7,000 men. 189 LP, III (2), 2500, (BL Cotton. Caligula.D VIII, f.257) Surrey to Wolsey, 3 September 1522, “The Council here are determined with me to seek battle with the French king near Amyas.” See also: LP, III (2), 2511, 2540. 190 LP, III (2), 2526. 191 BL Cotton Otho E XI, f.43. 192 Ibid. 193 BL Cotton. MS., Otho E.XI, f.43. 194 TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.208v and f.211, (LP, III (2) 3288). 195 TNA: PRO SP1/106 f.272. 196 This thesis is primarily concerned with forces raised to fight ‘foreign’ armies, the Pilgrimage of Grace was a matter of internal policing and as such a separate issue. The study of the Pilgrimage is clearly of great value to all military historians of the period, however much work has already been done on this subject and therefore its in-depth consideration has been avoided here. What is presented here is a brief re-consideration of elements of the ‘pilgrimage’ most pertinent to a discussion of the relative weaknesses and strengths of the levying system under Henry VIII. On the Pilgrimage of Grace see especially: G. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, pp.30-58; M. L. Bush, The Pilgrimage of Grace: A Study of the Rebel Armies of October 1536 (Manchester, 1996); C. S. L. Davies, ‘The Pilgrimage of Grace Reconsidered’, Past and Present, vol. 40 (1968), pp.5476; Anthony Fletcher, Tudor Rebellions (London, 1983), pp.9-10, 69-81, 99, 100; M. E. 177

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James, ‘Obedience and Dissent in Henrician England: The Lincolnshire Rebellion 1536’, Past and Present, (1970); J. D. Mackie, Earlier Tudors, pp.90-1, 538-40; J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.339-48; D. Willen, John Russell, First Earl of Bedford: One of the King’s Men (London, 1981) pp.25-8. 197 TNA: PRO SP1/106 f.283. 198 Ibid. Whilst the “gentlemen were mostly arrayed in counties…each seems to have brought his own contingent to make up the county’s levy.” – P. Williams, The Tudor Regime, p.114. 199 H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility (Oxford, 1986), p.149 citing R. Holinshed, English Chronicles, vol. III, p.800. 200 G. W. Beranrd, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, p.32. 201 Details on the levying of soldiers during the 1536 rebellions can be found in M. L. Bush, The Pilgrimage of Grace; G. W. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, Chapter 2, Helen Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, pp.149-54. 202 D. J. B. Trim, ‘The Context of War and Violence in the Sixteenth Century’, p.238. It is interesting to note Norfolk’s annoyance and embarrassment at being unable to pay or indeed clothe and feed his force. LP,XI, 580, 727, 738, 775-6, 803; P. Williams, The Tudor Regime, p.115. 203 It is important to recognise that although the loyalist forces were initially outnumbered, it is unlikely this would have remained the case had Henry concluded that the negotiations had failed. Norfolk’s instructions included a provision whereby, if the rebels remained unhappy with Henry’s concessions, he was to offer a truce to consult further with the king, using this time to raise further soldiers and crush the rebellion militarily. See: LP, XI, 1227. 204 Shrewsbury’s rapid moves in support of the king did much to prevent the wavering of other key figures such as Norfolk and Derby. See G. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, p.54; J. Guy, Tudor England, p.152. Similarly Miller has argued that “the loyalty of the nobility was indeed crucial. Whatever they thought of the aims of the rebellion, most noblemen had rallied to the king.” Henry VIII and the English Nobility, pp.153-4. 205 Although, it is crucial here to emphasise that this danger was disproportionately more significant during times of internal revolt. Moreover, at such times it is highly questionable if a standing army provides significantly better security for an embattled sovereign or government. 206 G. W. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, p.39, 41. 207 Ibid., p.41. It is also worth considering here the rebels themselves, many of whom, Scarisbrick has suggested, “may have been carried into rebellion by more or less blind obedience to their noble or gentry landlords.” J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.340. 208 He is supported in this view by a number of historians; Braddick similarly argued that “the social basis of ‘quasi-feudal’ recruitment was disappearing…with the decline of great households and the crown was reluctant to support a military nobility.” – M. J. Braddick, State Formation, p.181. 209 There are numerous examples of both copyholders and cottagers challenging their

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military obligation. One might note, for example, John Part, a Derbyshire Landowner who in 1542 required some of his servants to serve in his retinue, against the Scots. They replied that since their leases made no mention of it, it was not their duty to do so. Cited in J. J. Goring ‘Social Change’, p.189 (TNA: PRO C1/1053/48). 210 The information presented in this paragraph is based on J. Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline in Mid-Tudor England.’ 211 H. Millar, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, p.256. 212 G. Bernard, Power and Politics in Tudor England, p.20, 21. 213 Ibid., p.21. 214 Ibid., pp.31-2. 215 See also, D. Willen, John Russell. All told 25 new nobles were created during Henry’s reign, pp.30-1. 216 Ibid. 217 ‘War and Society’ is now a field that, justifiably, enjoys substantial investment of historians time. Henry’s military establishment would surely benefit from such a survey, considering the changing face of military recruitment and its links to changes in wider society, the ‘second and third estate.’ Other themes such as military medical services, nutrition in the army and in wider society, the economy, why did people fight and many others, would benefit from further consideration. This thesis, however, is a work of traditional military history, more concerned with changes in how armies fought, technology, tactics, professionalism and efficiency. For my views on the nobility and warfare see chapter 6 pp.281-98. 218 E.g. 1544 French campaign, TNA: PRO SP1/184, ff.85-221 (LP, XIX (1), 273). Although, it is important to recognise that “the retinues of the nobility constituted a smaller proportion of the whole than they had done in 1513.” H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, p.157 For further details see below, p.123. 219 S. L. Adams, ‘The Gentry of North Wales and the Earl of Leicester’s Expedition to the Netherlands, 1585-1586’, Welsh History Review, vol.7 (1974), p.145. Notwithstanding, it is important to recognise that this case was not, perhaps, the norm at this time, rather the army was “a complex mixture of genuine volunteers, neo-feudal retinues and conscripts.” (p.130). 220 Although the threat of a ‘Catholic crusade’ did not crystallize until 1539, pre-tremors were surely felt throughout the 1530s as Henry’s religious policy continued to isolate England from Catholic Europe. 221 Such attempts at improvement were hindered by corrupt practice, as commissioners often times “spared their own tenants or the tenants of lords who might be called on to furnish retinues of their own.” M. J. Braddick, State Formation, p.181. 222 J. Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline’, p.192. 223 LP, XIV (I), 652-654. 224 TNA: PRO SP1/144, f.206. 225 Ibid., ff.208-12.

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226

See Chapter 8, ‘The Artillery Fort’, for a fuller discussion of the 1539 invasion scare, pp.377-91. 227 LP, XVII, 882. 228 TNA: PRO SP1/180, f.30. 229 Ibid. 230 LP, XIX (2), 292, 347- Militiamen sent to Boulogne. 231 TNA: PRO SP1/184, f.76. 232 Ibid. 233 TNA: PRO SP1/213, f.109. 234 Ibid. 235 D. Eltis, Military Revolution, chapter 5; J. J. Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline’; C. G .Cruickshank, Army Royal, Elizabeth’s Army; L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia. Chapter Six A permanent establishment? 1

See above, pp.247-9. J. R. Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe, pp.45-9. 3 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.20. 4 E.g. C. G. Cruickshank, ‘Military Developments of the Renaissance’, p.65. 5 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.20. 6 Indeed, D. J. B. Trim’s recent foray into this subject concluded that “while the development of military professionalism did trigger a decline in chivalry, the latter is not a prerequisite to the former.” D. J. B. Trim, ‘Introduction’, in D. J. B. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos, p.31. 7 The role of chivalry in Henry VIII’s military establishment is well documented elsewhere. As such only a brief consideration is presented here. On the chivalric tradition in England and Europe see, J. R. V. Barker, The Tournament in England, 1100-1400, (Woodbridge, 1986); D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison: warfare and military service in England, 1450-1558, chapter 4 – ‘Chivalry and Professionalism in the Calais Garrison.’ (Forthcoming); M. H. Keen, Chivalry, (London, 1984); R. W. Kaeuper, ‘Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe’, (Oxford, 2001); D. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003), E. Prestage, Chivalry: Its Historical Significance and Civilizing Influence (London, 1928); A. Scaglione, Knights at Court: Courtliness, Chivalry and Courtesy from Ottoman Germany to the Italian Renaissance (Oxford, 1991); M. Vale, War and Chivalry. Warfare and aristocratic culture in England, France and Burgundy at the end of the Middle Ages (London, 1981); W. L. Wiley, The Gentlemen of Renaissance France. 8 BL Additional.MS, 23971, f.37. 9 See esp. S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and Politics in the Early Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo (ed.) Chivalry in the Renaissance (Woodbridge, 1999), 10 C. S. L. Davies has similarly argued that “military service was a frequent route to high 2

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honours in the sixteenth century.” - ‘The English People and War’, p.11. One might similarly note Sir William Sandes and John Russell, both of whom were to achieve ennoblement in reward for their military endeavors. See below, p.285 and 28991. 12 See: S. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk (Oxford, 1988) 13 See below, pp.287-8. 14 S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, pp.121-2; ‘Tournaments and Early Tudor Chivalry’, History Today, vol. 41 (1991), pp.15-21; H. Watanabe-O’Kelly, ‘Tournaments and their Relavance for Warfare in the Early Modern Period’, European Studies Quarterly, vol. 20 (1990), pp.451-63. 15 K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford, 1973), p.21. 16 Another route to financial betterment, open to army captains of the sixteenth century, was administrative corruption. McFarlane commented that “if wages made any soldiers’ fortune, it was because it was possible for captains to illegally help themselves.” p.27. J. R. Hale described how “two devices were employed: falsifying numbers in order to receive money for non-existent men, and manipulating the company bonus fund.” – War and Society, p.113. See also, TRP, vol. 1, pp.108-109. A further provision insisted on the payment of “thirds” by every soldier to “his captain, lord and master of all manner winnings by war.” Similarly the captains were required to pass on a third of their booty to the king. 17 G. W. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, p.14. 18 Ibid. (State Papers, I, no.lxxv, pp.135-40; LP, III (2), 3346). Nevertheless, the army orders for the campaign specifically stated that “no man rob no victualer nor merchant nor none other person coming unto the market with victual or other merchandises for the refreshing of the host, or returning from the same…nor of any other goods, upon pain of death; nor also no man murder nor rob no manner of person, except he be the King’s enemy, upon pain of death; nor ravish no woman, upon pain of death.” TRP, vol.1, p.112. 19 BL Additional MS. No.23971, f.11. 20 CUL F.f.2.10, f.25v. 21 S. Gunn has argued that “fathering Edward and capturing Boulogne were in the eyes of most of his subjects Henry’s two greatest achievements.” See S. Gunn, ‘War, Dynasty and Public Opinion in Early Tudor England’, in G. Bernard and S. Gunn (eds.), Authourity and Consent in Tudor England, p.141. Although, he acknowledged that not everyone celebrated wars, and they were not uniformly popular throughout the reign, they did nonetheless provoke popular support for the king. Henry’s campaigns in France in 1513, 1522 and 1523 remained largely popular, and it was only with the build-up of years of taxation, reaching its apogee in the attempts to impose the amicable grant of 1525, that opposition to war with France became pronounced. See: G. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion, pp.3-7. 22 This is a view echoed by Luke MacMahon who, whilst acknowledging that “many captains 11

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in Henry’s armies may have been unsuitable and certainly lacked military experience,” also pointed out “that considerable numbers served in several campaigns and were often highly competent.” L. MacMahon, ‘Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army in Renaissance Europe: A Reassessment,’ in D. J. B. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos, p.188. 23 On the concept of a ‘crisis of the aristocracy’, see L. Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 15581641 (Oxford, 1965); see also the review article by D. C. Coleman, ‘The “Gentry” Controversy and the Aristocracy in Crisis, 1558-1641’, History, vol. 51 (1966), pp.165-78. 24 J. J. Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline in Mid-Tudor England’, History, vol. 60 (1975), p.195 25 Ibid. 26 G. W. Bernard, ‘The Continuing Power of the Tudor Nobility’, Power and Politics in Tudor England (ed.) G. W. Bernard (Aldershot, 2000), pp.20-50; See also Bernard’s highly valuable The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility: A Study of the Fourth and Fifth Earls of Shrewsbury (Sussex, 1985), especially Chapter Six; C. S. L. Davies, ‘The English People and War’, pp.10-11. This issue aside, the following are instructive on the relationship between the nobility and warfare P. H. Williams, The Tudor Nobility, chapter four; A. Cameron, ‘The giving of livery and retaining in Henry VII’s reign’, Renaissance and Modern Studies, vol. 18 (1974), pp.17-35; S. J. Gunn Charles Brandon; C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army; L. J. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia. However I make no claims to a full assessment of the changing status of the nobility in the sixteenth century, in relation to war or any other aspect of government, economics or otherwise. Such an assessment merits more research, perhaps regional and familial studies and this is beyond the remit of this study. 27 D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison (forthcoming), chapter 3. – Final page. 28 Ibid. 29 G. Bernard, ‘The Continuing Power of the Tudor Nobility’, p.35. 30 In the tradition of men like the Earl of Warwick and Dukes of Somerset, York and Gloucester in the fifteenth century. See for example M. Hicks, Warwick the Kingmaker (Oxford, 1998), pp.308-10. 31 See: TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.160, LP, I (2), 1948, g.62, 93 2053 (7), E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.61. 32 See N.Barr, Flodden, 1513. 33 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.267: “The last battail was ledde by twoo valiaunt knightes of the Garter syr Wyllyam Sandes and syr Richard Wyngfelde.” It is instructive to note that Hall clearly thought their membership of the Order of the Garter, and perceived valiant natures, significant enough to be worthy of mention. 34 In 1512 he had accompanied Dorset as his ‘treasurer of war’ – TNA: PRO SP1/2, f.112. He had served in the king’s retinue in France in 1513 – BL Cotton MS. Faustina E VII, f.6; Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2b. For 1521 see esp. BL Cotton.Otho E XI, ff.33-40. It is interesting to recognise that Henry would not consider him for such a command as he

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feared it might besmirch his honour to send an English army abroad under any figure of lower rank than an earl. S. Gunn commented that “William Lord Sandys, Suffolk’s second-in-command (in 1523) and leader of the van, was one of England’s most respected soldiers.” – ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.598. 35 See, E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp.266-7; BL Cotton Faustina E VII, f.6, PRO E101/62/11, E101/62/14, SP1/3, f.166; DNB, pp.187-90. 36 See: E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp.266-7. 37 On Shrewsbury see: G. W. Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility: the fourth and fifth earls of Shewsbury. In 1513 Shrewsbury had led an enormous retinue of 4,437 men across the channel to France. TNA: PRO E101/62/14 (LP, I (2), 2052). 38 DNB., pp.859-62. 39 BL Stowe MS. 692, f.12. 40 The Howards were a family of considerable military pedigree. Surrey’s father had regained the dukedom of Norfolk for the family (lost after his support for Richard III at Bosworth) with victory at Flodden. Surrey’s brother Edward, lord Admiral of the fleet, was killed in a gloriously chivalric (or some might argue reckless) assault on the French off Brest in 1513. Surrey’s younger brother Edmond, as we have seen, accompanied him at Flodden and in France in 1522. Finally his son would go on to command the garrison of Boulogne in 1545-6; famously delighting Henry with his tales of gallantry and earning a stiff rebuke from his father for fanning the king’s martial ardor. 41 For details of the commanders, captains and their retinues see: TNA: PRO SP1/28, ff.193210 (LP, III (2), 3288). It is significant to note that Sandes’ ennoblement rose out of his military accomplishments. 42 TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.203v. 43 Ibid., f.209. 44 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp.312-3. 45 Ibid., pp.312-3. 46 D. Loades, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, 1504-1553 (Oxford, 1996), pp.20-2. 47 Ibid., p.18. 48 In 1524 Howard succeeded his father as third Duke of Norfolk, for ease of reference he will continue to be referred to as Howard. 49 Helen Millar has argued that, with the appointment of Hertford, and under him Lisle and the young earl of Shrewsbury, to replace Suffolk on the Scottish border in 1544, “at last a new generation of military leaders had been given their opportunity by Henry VIII.” H. Millar, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, p.156. Certainly they had been given their first opportunity of independent command; however, it is well to remember that both Hertford and Lisle had served under Suffolk in France in 1523- here again command was given to men of proven experience and skill. See: Somerset: DNB, pp.1237-46; Dudley, DNB, pp.109-11. 50 C. S. L. Davies, ‘The English People and War’, p.9. It is important to be clear that Davies excludes from this categorization the ‘professional’ mercenary captain, rather using the

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term ‘professional captain’ in its ‘modern’ context. However, perhaps the epitome of the professional Elizabethan captain is to be found in the example of Sir John Norreys. See J. S. Nolan, Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World (Exeter, 1997). 52 Ibid. 53 Indeed, numerous Englishmen had served in a capacity akin to that of the ‘professional captain’ in Normandy during the previous century. One might note the example of Andrew Trollope, whose career is described by David Grummitt in The Calais Garrison, chapter four, (forthcoming). 54 D. Grummitt (ed.), The English Experience in France, c.1450-1558, p.8. 55 D. Willen, John Russell, p.3. However, it important to recognise that “Russell’s ability to cultivate and maintain Henry’s favour and goodwill rested largely on his own powers of perception and his understanding of Henry’s nature,” pp.31-2. 56 For biographical information on Russell see: D. Willen, John Russell and DNB, pp.444-7. Russell was ennobled in 1539 as Baron Russell of Cheneys and in 1549, following his successful role in the suppression of the western rebellion, he was created Earl of Bedford. This is an excellent example of the link between military (and political) aptitude and the creation of ‘new nobles’. 57 S. Gunn, ‘Sir Edward Poynings’, p.158. Coke described him thus: “the valiau(n)t knyght Syr Edwarde Ponynges…had in his dayes ben in 26 fought battayles, in England, Fraunce, Scotlande, Irlande, Flaunders, and Gelderlande, besydes many assaultes, turnois, scremuses, and syges,” p.157. 58 Ibid. For information on his time at Tournai see: C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai. 59 D. Willen, John Russell, p.29. 60 L. MacMahon, ‘Courtesy and Conflict: the experience of English diplomatic personnel at the court of Francis I’, in D. Grummitt (ed.) The English Experience in France, p.194. In the same volume Edward Meek demonstrated the very important diplomatic role of ostensibly ‘military men’ during the fifteenth century: E. Meek, ‘The Practice of English Diplomacy in France, 1461-71’, pp.63-84. Most notably Richard Whetehill and John, Lord Wenlock, both of whom “traveled to Hesdin in order to meet Louis XI and Philip the Good in order to prolong the truce between England and France and to again prorogue the formal conference between England, France and Burgundy to 1 October.” p.71. 61 Ibid., p.195. 62 D. Grummitt, ‘Introduction’, in D. Grummitt (ed.) The English Experience in France, p.7. 63 DNB, pp.152-5. 64 Ibid. 65 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.598. 66 Sir Andrew Wyndsor, 1513, BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, 1523, TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.205v; The Lord Willoughby, 1513, BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.4, 1523, TNA: PRO SP1/28, 51

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f.202; Sir Edward Bray, 1513, BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.5v. 1523, TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.204v. 67 See Chapter 5, esp. pp.250-1. 68 BL Lansdowne. MS. 818. f.2b, TNA: PRO SP1/28, f.206. 69 J. S. Nolan pointed out that in Elizabethan England, although new recruits were often sent to war with little experience and only a few weeks training, “it is probable that many of these men, having left jobs and other connections behind when “pressed” into service, returned for later expeditions, stiffening the recruits with a few “professional” soldiers.” Although, he admits, it is impossible to quantify the number of men that re-enlisted, “the Privy Council did keep lists of experienced captains,” while “it was up to the captains to keep tabs on experienced men.” See: J. S. Nolan, ‘The Militarization of the Elizabethan State’, p.398. 70 There is certainly a need for regional case studies on this issue. 71 E. Gruffudd ‘Suffolk’s Expedition to Montdidier, 1523’, ‘The Enterprise of Paris and Boulogne’. 72 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.598. 73 C. S. L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies’, p.241. 74 TNA: PRO E101/57/28. 75 LP, III (2), 3288. 76 D. Potter, ‘Sir John Gage, Tudor Courtier and Soldier (1479-1556)’, English Historical Review, vol. 117, cxvii.474 (Nov.2002), p.1145. 77 Moreover, he acted as a muster commissioner and inspector of coastal defences in 1539. 78 D. Potter, ‘Sir John Gage’, p.1133. All the information presented here on Sir John is taken from Potter’s article, pp.1109-1146. 79 A fuller survey than the brief overview given here was provided for by Anita Hewerdine, The Yeomen of the king’s Guard, 1485-1547, (University of London, Ph.D. theis, 1998). 80 J. G. Sandeman, The Spears of Honour and The Gentlemen Pensioners (Halying Island, 1912). The Spears were in existence a mere six years from 1509 to 1515, and it is important to recognise that the Gentlemen Pensioners were not constituted until 1539, over twenty years later. 81 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.45. Three men - an archer, a demi-lance and a custrel similarly supported the Gentlemen Pensioners. 82 S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and Politics in the Early Tudor Court’, p.117. 83 This point is also made by G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.7. 84 TNA: PRO E 36/2, f.19. 85 Ibid., f.20. 86 Ibid., f.19. 87 At the time of its inauguration in 1485, this body amounted to 200 men, peaking at 600 in 1513. Thereafter, as part of financial cutbacks, the body was reduced to 300 men in 1520, less than 250 by 1541 and as low as 125 by 1545. (G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.6).

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G. Phillips, ‘The Army of Henry VIII: A Reassessment’, p.15. Information on deployment of mariners at Flodden from: Edward Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.99: “Lord Hawarde....Admyrall of England...promised to land at Newcastell with a thousand men, to accompanyie his father, whych promyse he accomplished.” It is important to be clear, however, that such ‘mariners’ were no more regularly or permanently engaged than land forces. 89 Geoffrey Parker recognised that after 1530 the massive expansion in the size and composition of armies necessitated the retention “a certain nucleus of trained, equipped troops in permanent readiness, to maintain a standing army.” He went on, “many states in the sixteenth century, even Tudor England, adopted this expedient and paid a number of companies to garrison important frontier strongholds.” G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659, p.25. 90 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.5. 91 D. Grummitt, ‘One of the mooste pryncipall treasours belongyng to his Realme of England’: Calais and the Crown, c.1450-1558’, in D. Grummitt (ed.) The English Experience in France, c.1450-1558, p.50. 92 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.5. 93 LP, XIX (1), 141,151. I must thank Dr. D. Grummitt for this reference and for allowing me to read sections of his unpublished (forthcoming) book The Calais Garrison:warfare and military service in England, 1450-1558, which has heavily clarified my own understanding of the nature of garrison service in Tudor England, and the size of the garrisons. 94 For example, on 11 October 1523, as the northern border was menaced by the Duke of Albany’s threatened invasion, Wosley inquired if Surrey thought it “requysite too haue a gariyson of 1500 or 2000 men for defence of the borders.” Surrey responded that “Vndoubtedly I see no remedy but that the kingis grace shalbe enforced too bere the charge therof.” BL Cotton.Caligula. B VI, f.339. 95 D. Grummitt, ‘Calais and the Crown’, p.50. During the winter of 1522-3, Surrey complained to Wolsey, there had been 1,700 men stationed at Calais, while he waited at Berwick with a smaller garrison, which, in his view, was under the greater threat. See BL Cotton.Caligula B. VI, f.333 (ff.331-33v for letter). 96 C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai, pp.67-85. 97 It is also important to recognise that Tudor garrisons were often maintained at less than their full strength for a range of financial, recruitment and other reasons. D. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison (forthcoming), chapter 2. 98 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.61. 99 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.209. 100 C. G . Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.18. 101 Ibid., p.18. A similar function was performed by Henry’s Scottish border garrisons throughout the reign - a role that was expanded during Somerset’s ‘garrisoning’ of the Scottish lowlands. 102 BL., Royal Appendix.89, ff.23-26.

268

103


O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.161. BL Lansdowne MS. 170, f.303v. 105 J. G. Nichols (ed.) The Chronicle of Calais: in the reign of Henry VII and Henry VIII to the year 1540 (London, 1846, Camden Society), pp.150-1; C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.24. A similar punishment was prescribed at Berwick-upon-Tweed. 106 BL Lansdowne MS. 170, f.304v. 107 Ibid. 108 This assessment of garrison troops is necessarily brief and there is certainly room for much more research into this area. For a detailed and perceptive treatment of the subject see the works of Dr. D. Grummitt, Esp The Calais Garrison, chapters 2 and 3. 109 More specifically the garrison of Calais was constructed from three broad categories of soldier, those in regular wages, indented for service by a captain who himself had been indented by the king. These men were paid for the Treasurer of Calais. Secondly there were the ‘crews’ – men sent to Calais during times of crisis to supplement defences and finally those in ‘petty wages’ who were not part of the “regular establishment.” Dr. D. Grummitt, describes the recruitment and organisation of these men in his forthcoming book The Calais Garrison. 110 M. B. Davies (ed.) ‘The ‘Enterprises’ of Paris and Boulogne’, p.45. 111 S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, p.118. Similarly, Grummitt has described how members of the king’s household were increasingly to be found filling positions in the garrison, a policy which was clearly identifiable during the reign of Henry VII and expanded during the reign of Henry VIII: D. Grummitt, ‘ “For the Surety of the Towne and Marches”: early Tudor Policy Towards Calais’, pp.184-203. 112 D. Willen, John Russell, pp.5-8. 113 CSP Span FS, vol. 5, pt.1, 1534-5, no.86. (Chapuys to Charles V). 114 Ibid., no.87. 115 Ibid. 116 D. Potter, War and Government, p.169. 117 M. B. Dabies (ed.), ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550’, Fouad I University, Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, vol. 12 (1950), pp.14-15. 118 Excluding the ‘gunners’ and engineers employed individually, and in very small numbers, from the outset of the reign, mercenary troops were not deployed within the British Isles, during the reign of Henry VIII, until the summer of 1545. See G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.133. 119 D. Grummitt, ‘Calais and the Crown’, p.56. 120 Ibid.,p.53-7. 121 See below, pp.354-5. 122 C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai, p.84. Moreover, it was at this time “politically important to keep on good terms with the Low Countries’ nobility, who retained these men, and were in effect receiving pensions from Henry.” (p.84). Similar political obligations, especially in the religiously charged context of the Schmalkaldic 104

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wars, would have encouraged the English to ‘look after’ certain mercenary bands after the Treaty of Crepy in June 1546. For example, Henry tried to secure safe passage for his discharged mercenaries through the Low Countries. However, the Lutheran mercenaries in Henry’s employ “dare not return to the Baltic through the Netherlands. The way was blocked by the count of Buren who, under orders from the emperor, was mobilising the Catholic forces of the region for the Schmalkaldic War.” Whilst Italian, Spanish and Catholic mercenaries were recruited for the war by the emperor’s agents in the Low Countries, the Lutherans had to be taken to England and then transported by sea back to Hamburg. G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.166. 123 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.44. 124 See: T.I.Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 1513-1603. 125 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.180. See also M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings. It is significant to note that the garrisons also had an important intelligence gathering role (much the same was true of the garrison at Calais). 126 S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry’, p.118; e.g. M. B. Davies, ‘The ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne’, p.45. For a description of a particularly vicious skirmish at “Guysnes,” on 3 July 1523, see E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.262. It is interesting to note that the men that issued from the garrison were Welsh. 127 For example, the appointment of the young Earl of Surrey to the command of the Boulogne garrison in mid-1545 “was marked by a sharp increase in hostile contact,” (G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.156). However, a substantial numerical reverse in January of 1546 saw the young earl, considered something of a hothead by even his own father, replaced by Hertford. Ibid., pp.157-8. 128 Although it is important to recognise, that even as late as the reign of Elizabeth I, “there was no system of guaranteeing that private soldiers would be rotated through,” one of the larger garrisons like Berwick or Ireland, unlike the Spanish, whose recruits “were rotated through the Italian establishment.” J. S. Nolan, ‘The Militarization of the Elizabethan State’, p.398. 129 D. Grumitt, The Calais Garrison, chapter 5. 130 See M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, Military Organization, p.485. 131 M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, Military Organization, p.487. In 1494, Charles VIII led an army of some 28,000 men into northern Italy – a considerable force in the context of the times; by 1552 Charles V was boasting a military mobilisation of some 150,000 men across the empire. See J. R. Hale, War and Society, pp.62-3; G. Parker, The Military Revolution; J. A. Lynn, ‘The Pattern of Army Growth, 1445-1945’, in J. Lynn (ed.) Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871 (Chicago, 1990), pp.1-27. 132 M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, Military Organsiation, p.487. 133 Ibid., p.2, 485. For a more in-depth discussion of the cavalry see Chapter 4. pp.187-97. 134 R. Vaughan, Charles the Bold, p.206. 1472 and 1473 witnessed the enactment of the two more celebrated ordinances relating to the discipline and organization of the army. 135 D. Potter, War and Government, pp.158-60. By the mid sixteenth century, the heavy cavalry

270


was being supported by new bodies of light horse and ‘arquebusiers-on-horseback.’ Ibid., p.158. 137 Ibid. 138 L. Ribot Garcia, ‘Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain’ in P. Contamine (ed.) War and Competition between States (Oxford, 2000), p.42. 139 Ibid. 140 J. B. Wood, ‘The Royal Army During the Early Wars of Religion, 1559-1576’, M. P. Holt (ed.), Society and Institutions in Early Modern France (London, 1991), p.2. 141 D. Potter, War and Government, p.170. 142 W. L. Wiley, The Gentlemen of Renaissance France, p.161. 143 Ibid. p.63. This quotation has been rendered in modern English (American) by W.L.Wiley. 144 B. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, p.178. For a description of the organisation of the Spanish tercio see G. Parker, The Army of Flanders, Appendix B, p.274. 145 L. Ribot Garcia, ‘Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain’, p.42. 146 Ibid., p.43. Spain’s defensive requirements were satisfied, in no small part, by recourse to the obligation of all able bodied men to defend the kingdom. Garcia described how “one in every twelve Castilians on tax registers, between the ages of twenty and fourty five, could be called up to serve as a foot soldier, giving way to a more general summons at times of special emergency.” Garcia based much of this on the work of Spanish historian Rene Quatrefages. 147 It is important to recognise that no ‘department of war’, in the modern sense of the term, existed anywhere across Europe at this time, and one must necessarily be cautious to avoid the danger of anachronism in applying this title to early modern military establishments. 148 Although, by the end of Henry’s reign, the ordnance officers were still appointed by individual letters patent and their ‘formalisation’ as the ‘Board of Ordnance’ would not take place until 1597. 149 For an administrative history of the Tudor military between 1509 and 1550 see: C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services of the English Armed Forces, 1509-50 (Oxford, D.Phil Thesis, 1963). 150 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.97. 151 Although focused on the Elizabethan ordnance office in comparison with its Stuart successor, R. W. Stewart’s The English Ordance Office: A Case-Study in Bureaucracy (Woodbridge, 1996) is an important starting point for any consideration of the sixteenth century ordnance office. Stewart’s book considers the nature of Elizabethan (and more generally Tudor) office holding, describing at length the internal feuds, back-biting and corruption that hampered the effectiveness of the office: “There were problems within the office involving personality clashes, patronage disputes and the reversion of the office.” (p.34). This ‘administrative history’ has been largely ignored in this thesis which has not considered the nature of office-holding as part of its central remit. Moreover, evidence for such an analysis is considerably more bountiful in the Elizabethan, than the Henrician period. 136

NOTES

152

271

On the development of the Ordnance Office see: R. Ashley, ‘The Organisation and Administration of the Tudor Office of the Ordnance’, Oxford University B.Litt. thesis (1972). 153 O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, pp.80-5. 154 See: Rymer, Foedera, IX, p.159 for the appointment. 155 CPR, Henry VII, vol. II (1494-1509), p.89. 156 Ibid., p.89,92. 157 Ibid., p.92. Furthermore, on 15 February 1497, Richard Cok was commissioned to “take workmen and purvey materials for the making of pipes, casks and other vessels to keep the victuals for the army at Berwick”, (p.93). 158 Ibid., p.92. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid., pp.90-1. 161 Ibid., p.93. 162 Numerous contracts were made between Henry VIII’s government and foreign contractors, most notably Hans Poppenruyter, Master Gunner at Malines, e.g. BL Cotton Galba B III ff.3v-4 (LP, I (1) 324). Founders are also seen to have been at work at the tower from the reign of Henry VII, and various payments were made for cannon “made by Britton w(ith)in the Towre of London.” (TNA: PRO E36/124, p.77). 163 Men like Cornelius Johnson (TNA: PRO E36/1, p.57) and Humphrey Walker (TNA: PRO E101/56/9/4). Moreover small-scale repairs were often conducted at the Tower. 164 Sir S. Norton commanded the English artillery in France in 1513, See: LP, I (2), 2392, 2834. Sir Christopher Morris was killed while commanding the ordnance at Boulogne in 1544, See J. H. Leslie, ‘Diary of the Siege and Capture of Boulogne’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 1 (1922), p.194. Various payments were overseen by the Masters of the Ordnance throughout the reign, e.g. LP, XIII (2), 1280, f.2b, 7, 22, 41; XIV (2), 781, f.57, 64, 84b, 85, 85b, 91b; XVIII (2), p.129. 165 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, pp.121-2. 166 The Surveyor was responsible for examining new materials and ordnance, whilst the Lieutenant developed out of a change in the social status of the Master. From 1544, the Master would be a noble man not concerned with the day-to-day administration of the office, leaving these responsibilities to his lieutenant. 167 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, pp.122-33. 168 Ibid., p.129. 169 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp. 95-7. 170 TNA: PRO SP1/7, f.5. 171 Ibid., f.19 172 Ibid. 173 TNA: PRO E101/56/28, e.g. f.5 “It(e)m payde for the freght from Hull to Newcastell of 150 cases whete beanes and pro(vi)sion(s).” 174 A. F. Pollard, Wolsey, p.18.

272

175


DNB., p.297. TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.157, (LP, I (1), 1412). 177 TNA: PRO E101/62/31. 178 TNA: PRO E101/62/16. 179 It is worthy of mention that Sir Edward Guildford’s father, Sir Richard, had been Henry VII’s master of the ordnance. Edward and his brother Henry were prominent soldiers in the early part of the reign and friends of Charles Brandon. Sir Edward was also guardian of John Dudley later to gain first renown, then infamy, as the duke of Northumberland. See D. Loades, John Dudley, pp.17-19; DNB, p.327-30. 180 E.g. TNA: PRO E101/56/9, f.139. On 27 April 1512 Sir John Cutte, under-treasurer, authourised the payment of “Hugh Fuller in the absence of Sir Sampson Norton knight master of the kynges ordynnance Fyve hundredth poundes sterlynge to be employed for the makynge of Bows, Arroues, horseharnesse and odyr artillery & ordynnance.” 181 It is interesting to note that whilst reasonably successful in 1513, supply shortages in 1522 and 1523 were, in the view of C. S. L. Davies, “the results of bad planning on Wolsey’s part.” – ‘Provisions for Armies’, p.243. 182 BL Royal MS. 7 F XIV.29, f.30. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid., ff.31-32. 186 C. S. L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies’, p.239. As with the wider administrative issues concerning the Tudor military C. S. L. Davies remains the leading authority on the victualling of Henry’s armies, see also ‘Supply Services’. 187 LP, I (1), 1662 (54). Hatteclyf was also made responsible, along with Miles Gerard “for setting over the Kinges Grace and his army ryall in Fraunce.” LP, I (2), 2326 (TNA: PRO E101/56/16). 188 TNA: PRO E 315/4. 189 LP, I (2), 2798 (TNA: PRO SP1/230, f.145), LP, I (2), 2677 (TNA: PRO SP1/230, f.104), LP, I (2), 2540 (TNA: PRO SP1/7, f.40). 190 LP, I (2), 2404 (TNA: PRO SP1/5, f.78) 191 LP, I (2), 2772 (27), LP, I (2), 2546 (TNA: PRO E101/56/7). 192 Although, “while they were absent from Court their regular work had to be done by deputies or subordinates, and the result was a chaotic breakdown of economical management and an increase in the waste and extravagance that made the court a scandal to the people.” A. P. Newton, ‘Tudor Reforms in the Royal Household’, R. W. Seton-Watson (ed.), Tudor Studies (London, 1924), p.246. 193 TNA: PRO E101/57/28, f.1. 194 Ibid., f.6v. 195 E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolk’s expedition to Montdidier, 1523’, p.40. 196 For example, during the Pilgrimage of Grace, despite commanding a relatively meagre force (of 10,000 men), it is interesting to note Norfolk’s annoyance and embarrassment 176

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at being unable to pay or indeed clothe and feed his force. LP, XI, 580, 727, 738, 775-6, 803; P. Williams, The Tudor Regime, p.115. 197 D. Grummitt, ‘Introduction’, in D. Grummitt (ed.) The English Experience in France, p.7. 198 C. S. L. Davies, ‘Provisions for Armies’, p.243. 199 LP, III (2), 2012. 200 LP, III (2), 2582. 201 Ibid. 202 Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia, p.299. 203 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.62. The major source of supply was the Netherlands, which staged the principal port through which European goods were exported into England. Davies described how gunpowder, pikes and guns manufactured and purchased in Italy and copper from the Fugger were exported through Antwerp. (p.63) 204 Ibid., p.63. 205 D. Loades, The Tudor Navy: An administrative, political and military history (Aldershot, 1992), Chapters 4 and 7. 206 N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, volume 1, 660-1649 (London, 1997), p.221. Rodger’s work is a lucid starting point for any interested student of the Tudor navy. See also: David Loades, The Tudor Navy: An administrative, political and military history (Aldershot, 1992); C. S. L. Davies, ‘The Administration of the Tudor Navy under Henry VIII: the Origins of the Navy Board’, English Historical Review, vol. 80 (1965), pp.268-88. 207 APC,vol. 1, p.167. See also pp.175, 176, 187, 188, 191, 192, 248, 264, 266, 300, 310, 324, 352, 394, 397, 410, 411, 414, 448, 497, 507, 513, 555. 208 CPR., Henry VII, vol. II, p.91. LP, I (2), 3608 (TNA: PRO E36/1, ff.23-46, BL Cotton Otho E IX, f.52 – an abstract of this book) p.1497 “Robert Brygandyne” received 50li. for “the charges of the Mary Rose and the Peter Garnarde.”; p.1497 (f.29) 50li. “towards the making, rigging and apparelling of two new barks.” Etc... 209 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.103 quoting LP, I (2), 1845, 1858-9 and A. Spont (ed.) Letters and Papers Relating to the War with France, 1512-3, Naval Records Society, vol.10, (1897), pp.109-21. 210 LP, XIV (2), 781, f.63. 211 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, pp.99-109. 212 For the patents see: LP, XXI (1), g.718, (1), (2), (5-10). For the memoranda of July 1545, LP, XX (2), Appendix 27. 213 N. A. M. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p.226. “The Lieutenant, the Controller, William Broke and the Surveyor Benjamin Gonson.” 214 Although they had little to do with the day-to-day administration of the navy, which was left to their junior officials. Moreover, in wartime, key strategic decisions would have been brought before the Privy Council and King, not left to the Lord Admiral. See: C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, pp.101-2. 215 D. Loades, The Tudor Navy, p.83.

274

216


N. A. M. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p.226, C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.116. Although Davies insists that Woodhouse’s office was “not an important one; in 1549 it was combined with that of the Surveyor, and it lapsed in 1589.” (p.116). For examples of the Ordnance office supplying the Navy see LP, I (2) 2834, LP, XVIII (1) 10. There is room for more research into these links between the Ordnance Office and the development and expansion of the fleet, admiralty and naval ordnance. 217 Ibid., pp.136-9. 218 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.136. 219 See for example, TNA: PRO E36/1, pp.50, 52. 220 C. Ffloukes, The Gun-founders of England, p.5. 221 Ibid., pp.53-4. 222 TNA: PRO E36/1, pp. 52, 53 223 See below p.90. On campaign at sea in 1522-25 see D. Loades, The Tudor Navy, pp.103-10. 224 TNA: PRO E101/62/14 (LP, I (2) 2052). 225 See, C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal, p.69, TNA: PRO E 36/2, pp.115-75, LP, I (2), 2051, 2052, 2053; LP, I (2), 2135 (BL Royal MS. 14 B.XII) 226 LP, I, g.218 (62), g.3582 (16). 227 Notably those at Calais, Berwick and Ireland, also at Tournai and Boulogne during the period of their occupation. The king and the officials at the Tower retained control over the appointment of these officials much of their supply of ordnance. The Masters of the Ordnance and Master Gunners also made regular trips of inspection to the garrisons, examining the artillery, overseeing maintenance and viewing the fortifications. The daytoday administration was necessarily out of the remit of London and the Tower. 228 R. W. Stewart commented that “although the Tower and Minories storehouses in London were undoubtedly the chief arsenals of the realm, the fact that the English state and its Irish counterpart were essentially decentralised made multiple stores of weapons inevitable.” The English Ordnance Office, p.140. 229 B. Trainor, ‘Extracts from Irish Ordnance Accounts, 1537-1539’, Irish Sword, vol. 1 (194953), p.324. 230 D. Grummitt, ‘The Defence of Calais and the Development of Gunpowder Weaponry in England in the late Fifteenth Century,’ War in History, vol. 7 (2000) p.265. For the best work on Tudor Calais see: D. Grummitt, ‘For the Surety of the Towne and Marches: Early Tudor Policy Towards Calais, 1485-1509,’ Nottingham Medieval Studies, vol. 44 (2000), pp.184-203 and ‘One of the mooste pryncipall treasours belongyng to his Realme of Englande’: Calais and the Crown, c.1450-1558’ in D. Grummitt (ed.) The English Experience in France. 231 Ibid., p.267. 232 e.g. LP, III (2), 2727. Grummitt presents a more in-depth study of the ordnance establishment at Calais in his forthcoming book, The Calais Garrison. 233 C. Ffoulkes, The Gun-founders of England, p.57. 234 LP, X, 867.

NOTES

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235

Ibid. Ibid. 237 C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai, Chapter 3. 238 LP, II (1), 2131. 239 LP, II (2), p.1513. 240 For Berwick see for example: TNA: PRO E101/57/13, E101/57/18, E101/57/20. 236

Chapter Seven The gunners 1

O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.466. C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.134. 3 M. Fissel, English Warfare, pp.44-5. 4 TNA: PRO E404/84. 5 LP, I (1), 311. Although calendared in the first volume of LP, the editors suggest that this document probably dates to 1508, owing to the absence of Thomas Hert from the list of gunners. 6 LP, I (1), g.289 (39), g.357 (25), 632 (67); IV (1), 1939. 7 O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.152. Hogg estimated that, after the expansive building programme of 1539-40, this figure stood somewhere in the region of 200 gunners nationally, inclusive of all those at the tower, in garrison and at sea (p.160). For the expansion of the wider ordnance establishment and recruitment of foreign and domestic gunners see, for example, TNA: PRO E101/57/18: “The muster book of the new fotemen of the fyfty gonners w(ith)in the towne and castell of berwick.” See also TNA: PRO E101/57/13, E101/57/20. 8 O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.473. 9 Moreover, it is clear that their position, as head of the ordnance establishment, was a highly sought after one. On the news of the death of Skeffington, Anthony Pykeyng wrote to Lord Lisle that “there are divers suitors to be master of the ordnance.” LP, X, 115. 10 The first master of the ordnance to serve Henry VIII, Sir Sampson Norton, had also served his father in this capacity and thus boasted experience in the role and was demonstrably loyal. Sir William Skeffington, had been Sheriff of Leicestershire and Warickshire before being knighted by Henry VIII; his appointment was possibly more in the tradition of fifteenth century masters. See O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The Gunner’. 11 Although this analysis will deviate from this where appropriate to illuminate key themes. 12 LP, I (2), g.2535 (7). His appointment is unusual in his receipt of wages totaling 12d. per day. This fee was normally reserved for the master gunner, with a basic gunner earning between 6d. and 8d. a day. Morris’ higher wage would suggest to me that he had already served as a gunner or even master gunner on campaign in France in 1513. However, there is no clear evidence for this supposition. 13 LP, I (2) g.3226 (23), DNB., p.988. 2

276

14


LP, II (1), 1210. His appointment to the post at Tournai is confirmed by the accounts of Sir Edward Bensted, Treasurer of Tournai of money paid ‘to footmen’, between 25 February and 10 March 1515, which includes a payment to ‘Morres and his servant’ of 18d. Presumably Morris continued to be paid at the rate of 12d. per day confirmed by the December 1513 patent appointing him as a gunner at the tower (LP, I (2) g.2525 (7)), and the remaining 6d. went to his servant. 15 C. G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai, p.54. 16 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, pp.258-9. 17 A ‘Falcon’ was a 2.5 pounder gun of 2.25 inch calibre. 18 Ibid., p.259. 19 Ibid., p.260. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p.259. 23 LP, IV (2), g.2927 (4). Morris was appointed Chief gunner at the Tower with a salary of 12d. per day in February 1527. 24 Hogg places Morris first at Calais and then at sea, with the vice-admiral Sir William Fitzwilliam, taking part in a raid on the French town of Treport, in August 1523, O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The ‘Gunner’ and Some Early Masters of the Ordnance’, Journal of the Royal Artillery, vol. 62 (1935/6), p.471. In the absence of any referencing, one can only assume, given its close similarity, that he bases this assumption on Pollard’s entry in the DNB. (p.988). However, the DNB account is clearly inaccurate about Morris’ early career, brushing over his appearance at Tournai. Given that his name appears on the muster lists for Suffolk’s army in August 1523 and the absence, as far as I can see, of any evidence to support his having been at sea in that month, I would suggest that the DNB is incorrect here. Rather, he was serving, in his capacity as a gunner, with the army in France. 25 LP, III (2) 3288. 26 Although, as we have seen, this document was most likely penned much later in Henry’s reign, it was nevertheless based on the experiences of these early campaigns. It is the best source from which to identify the functions and responsibilities of these men in the field. 27 CUL Ff 2.10, f.21. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., ff.21-21v. 31 Ibid., f.21v. 32 Hale commented that “the relationship between a master gunner and his weapon remained a personal one, for no two guns performed identically and, thanks to the slew of the carriage on recoil, no shot could be fired without realignment.” J. R. Hale, War and Society, p.50.

NOTES

33

277

LP, III (2) 3288. O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.147. 35 LP, I (2) 2135 (BL Royal MS. 14 B.XII). 36 Ibid.; LP, I (2) 2346 (TNA: PRO E101/56/22); LP, III (2) 3288. 37 Moreover, Hert had also spent time serving as the Master of the Ordnance at Tournai, and would later, as we shall see, serve as a fortifications engineer on the Scottish border. See: LP, II (2), p.1513. 38 CUL Ff.2.10, f.21v. 39 Ibid. 40 O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, pp.115-31, Citing F. Markam, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622), Epistle VII of the Fifth Decade and Nicolo Tartaglia, Nova Scotia (1537). 41 Tout argued that during the siege of Calais, 1346-7, the gunners were grouped with “masons, carpenters, armourers, &c., among ‘artificers and workmen’ in a different category from the various classes of fighting men.” The gunner was, he concluded, “a craftsman, an engineer, and not a soldier.” See T. F. Tout, ‘Firearms in England in the Fourteenth Century’, p.679. It is my contention however, that the gunner was both craftsman and soldier, the roles were not mutually exclusive. 42 DNB, pp.988-9, O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The Gunner’, p.471. At the end of the 1523 campaign, Suffolk had stored “away Henry’s artillery in the Hotel de Lalaing at Valenciennes,” in anticipation of a fresh campaign the following year. – S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.626. 43 LP, IV (2) 2828, 2830, 2864, 2871, 2914. 44 LP, IV (2), 3422. 45 Both Hogg and the DNB place Morris in Ireland in 1530, however, I can find no clear reference to this. One can only assume he was working in the Irish ordnance office or with the garrison troops in some capacity. 46 Calais, see: LP, V, p.324 (Treasurer of the Chambers Accounts); Carlisle, See, LP, V, 1629. See also, O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The Gunner’, p.471, DNB, p.989. 47 Francis Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622), Epistle VII of the Fifth Decade, cited and rendered in modern English in O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.118. 48 LP, III (2), App.37. See also: LP, III (2), 2665(i), 2796, 2876 and Chapter 8, pp.371-2. 49 LP, IV (III, I), 5420, 5603. 50 LP, XII (1) 85 (2), 918, 993, 961. 51 LP, XXI (1), 489. See also: 507, 529, 565, 577, 636, 686, 743, 1108, 1122, 1133, 1141, 115960. 52 LP, XVI, g.580 (27); XIX (2), g.337 (2). Although, as C. S. L. Davies rightly pointed out, it seems likely he would have been “much too busy acting as a fortifications engineer to do much as Clerk of the Ordnance.” (C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p123. For further discussions of Rogers, see: L. R. Shelby, John Rogers: Tudor Military Engineer (Oxford, 1967). See below, esp.pp.390-6. 34

278

53


LP, V, p.759. O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The Gunner’, p.471; DNB., p.988; LP, IV (1), g.297 (1) April 1524. 55 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.124. 56 Ibid.; LP, XIII (1) g.384 (26): Henry Johnson, Master Gunner had in 1534 “inspected the Ordnance at Calais, being highly commended for his efficiency by Lord Lisle.” (C.S.L. Davies, Supply Services, p.124). 57 Henry Johnson was another example of a foreign specialist recruited by Henry VIII to serve in his ordnance establishment. Originally from “the dominion of the Emperor,” he had married an English woman and received his letter of denization on 14 April 1541. See W. Page (ed.) Denizations and Naturalizations of Aliens in England, 1509-1603, Publications of the Hugenot Society of London, vol.8, (Lymington, 1893), p.135. 58 LP, I (1) g.632 (67). 59 Francis Markham Five Decades, in Hogg, English Artillery, p.122. 60 O. F. G. Hogg, English Artillery, p.57. See also: CPR., 1452-1461, p.342. 61 Across Europe “the ‘proving’ of guns became more methodical: charges were carefully weighed, ranges at different elevations measured.” – J. R. Hale, War and Society, p.50. 62 LP, I (2), 3222 (TNA: PRO E101/202/22). See also LP, I (2), 2834, 3222 for further examples of Hert ‘proving’ artillery. 63 BL Additional. MS. 32648, f.42 (LP, XVII, 928). 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The Gunner’, pp.471-2, DNB., p.989. 67 LP VIII, 948 (p.373). The date of this expedition is called into question by a subsequent letter, from Chapuys to his master, describing Morris as having been in Denmark “last year”. LP, IX, 287. Without more exhaustive research it deserves, in the context of my study, it is impossible to identify the date of this visit. However, the conflict in the sources over this issue does serve as a salutary reminder of the problems inherent in accepting source material at face value in this period. 68 Henry VIII to Charles V in C. S. L. Supply Services, pp.64-5. 69 Ibid., p.65. 70 LP, IX, 287. 71 Ibid. 72 LP, IX, 417. 73 LP, IX, 434; C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.66. 74 LP, IX, 417, 418. 75 LP, VIII, 948 (p.373). 76 LP, IX, 434. 77 D.N.B., p.989; O. F. G. Hogg, ‘The Gunner’, p.471. 78 LP, X, g.392 (17). 79 LP, XI, 600. For further details on preparations for the Pilgrimage of Grace see: LP, XI, 640, 803, 823. 54

NOTES

80

279

LP, XII (1), 85 (2), 918, 993, 961. LP, XII (2), g.617 (10). 82 G. Goold Walker, The Honourable Artillery Company, 1537-1926 (London, 1926), p.2. This is the most recent treatment of the history of the HAC and I must thank Gervase Phillips for providing me with this reference. 83 See below, p.??? 84 LP, XIV (1), 400. 85 LP, XIV (1), 691. A further letter to the king complained of a lack gunners for his ‘great pieces’ (LP, XIV (1), 728). As we have seen, such concerns would ultimately lead to the deployment of Spanish mercenaries at Dover and in Essex, (LP, XX(1), 1144). 86 E.g. LP, XIV (1), 732: Sir Richard Bulkeley, writing to Cromwell, wrote, “I beg I may have a couple of gunners and some good ordnance and powder sent me, for the defence of the king’s house of Bewmares which stands in most jeopardy.” 87 LP, XIV (1), 839. 88 LP, XIV (1), 711, 490. 89 BL Royal App.89, f.23. 90 Ibid., f.25v. 91 G. Goold Walker, The Honourable Artillery Company, p.15. (Ultimately competition for the site between the Gunners of the Tower and the Guild of St. George would see the Guild removed to Finsbury). 92 LP, XVI, 958. 93 LP, XII (1), g.311 (23). Gold would retain this position until 1566. 94 F. Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre, in O. F. G. Hogg, English Arillery, p.121. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 A. B. Caruana, Tudor Artillery, 1485-1603 (Historical Arms Series, No.30), pp.4-5. He bases this conclusion on the existence of six sets of notes, ‘the gunners notes’, taken at various dates during the ‘Tudor century’ by student gunners, but all following the same format. This is persuasive, but, considering the paucity of this material, half a dozen manuscripts across the century, mostly from the reign of Elizabeth I, cannot be considered conclusive. 98 The establishment of figures for this ‘labour movement’ is the work of another study. Although it is interesting to note Page’s argument that “most of the skilled labour during the sixteenth century was executed by foreigners, and nearly all the tradesmen attached to the Royal household came from abroad.” W. Page, ‘Denizations and Naturalizartions of Aliens in England’, p.vii. 99 For example see: B. G. Awty, ‘The Arcana Family of Cesena as Gunfounders and Military Engineers’, esp. pp.61-2; B. G. Awty, ‘Parson Levett and English Cannon Founding’, Sussex Archaeological Collections, vol. 127 (1989), p.134. C. Ffoulkes, The Gun-founders of England, pp.4-5; M. C. Fissel, English Warfare, p.206. 100 W. Page, ‘Denizations and Naturalizations of Aliens in England’, p.xlii. 81

280

101


TNA: PRO C1/222 m.12.; CPR, 1476-85, p.405; See also: H. Schubert, ‘The First CastIron Cannon’, pp.132-3; J. R. Hooker, ‘Notes on the Organisation and Supply of the Tudor Military Under Henry VII’, p.27. One might similarly note the example of Peter Bawde (Bawood) “maker of out bombards,” who had originated in France and received his denization on 10 October 1542. W. Page, ‘Denizations and Naturalizations of Aliens in England’, p.17. See also p.196 for Francis Poyes, an armourer from Normandy, who having arrived in England in 1525 received his letter of denization on 1 July 1544. 102 H. Schubert, ‘First Cast-Iron Cannon’, p.133; Guicciardini famously described how, during the 1494 campaign, “so violent was their battering that in a few hours they could accomplish what previously in Italy used to require many days.” – cited in B. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, p.159. 103 See for example: TNA: PRO E101/57/13, E101/57/18, E101/57/20 listing the gunners at Berwick or E101/58/4 for an indenture for the recruitment of Spanish gunners at the Tower of London in 15 Henry VIII by Sir William Skeffington, Master of the Ordnance. 104 B. G. Awty, ‘The Arcana Family of Cesena as Gunfounders and Military Engineers’, pp.61-80, esp.pp.61-2 for paragraph. Francesco Arcano served as Master of the Mines. 105 LP, I (2) 2346 (TNA: PRO E101/56/22). 106 LP, XVI 380 f.114b, 153 b, 156, (BL Arundel MS. 97) See also LP, XVI, 1489, f.171b, 172 (BL Arundel MS. 97). Similarly in 1545 requests were sent out for 150 Spaniards, (presumably arquebusiers) to be sent into Essex and another 150 to be added to the garrison at Dover. LP, XX(1), 1144. 107 LP, VII, 1131. 108 A letter dated 15 April 1539 from Marillac, the French ambassador to London, to Montmorency, Constable of France, would seem to suggest that there was a policy of compelling foreigners to take part in English defensive preparations against the feared invasion. Marillac reported that “no one who can bear arms is excepted; even strangers here engaged in commerce are compelled to provide themselves harness and wear the livery of the city.” (LP, XIV (1), 770). However, during the London Musters of 1539, it was reported that “after long deliberation,” it had been “decided that no alien even though he were a denizen, should muster.”(LP, XIV (1), 940, 8 May 1539). One can only speculate as to the reasoning behind this, however with Henry himself planning to inspect the mustered troops of London, perhaps the council feared a foreigner, disaffected at being compelled to English service, might, given armed access to the king, have been a security risk. One can only assume no such threat was feared from Henry’s foreign gunners. 109 LP, XVI, g.1391 (36); W. Page, ‘Denizations and Naturalizations of Aliens in England’, p.78. 110 LP, I (2), 3226 (23), 3499 (1). 111 LP, XVII, 258, f.54; LP, XVII, 646, 652. 112 LP, XVII, 730 (BL Additional .MS. 32647, f.83), 928 (BL Additional .MS. 32648, f.42), 933 (BL Additional MS. 32648, f.41).

NOTES

113

281

LP, XVIII (1), 10, 698. LP, XVIII (2), 231, p.127-8; XVIII (2), 233. 115 M. Merriman, The Rough Wooings (East Linton, 2000), esp. pp.110-36 and 137-63; G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, see esp.pp.148-61 116 LP, XIX (1), 182. 117 LP, XIX (1), 265. 118 Ibid. 119 LP, XIX (1), 368, f.55, 56. For appropriation of shipping see: LP, XIX (1), 377. 120 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 2, p.347. 121 LP, XIX (1), 483 (BL Additional. MS. 32654, f.179). 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 LP, XIX (1), g.278 (10), g. 442 (23), g.444 (7). 127 C. S. L. Davies, Supply Services, p.127. 128 Ibid.pp.125-6. 129 DNB., p.330; LP, XIX (1), g.443 (1) “Sir Thomas Seymer. To be, in the event of disease or death of Sir John Wallop, chief captain and leader of the forces of which the king, in accordance with his treaty with Charles Emperor of Romans, sends to the Emperors dominions in Lower Germany and of which…he has appointed Wallop to be chief captain.” This document has been placed in 1544 by the editors of LP, under the title of ‘undated grants’ – it surely relates to operations in 1543. 130 LP, XIX (1), 990. For examples of Seymour ostensibly acting as Master of the Ordnance see; XIX (1), 970; XIX (2), 418, 599; XXI (1), 3, 90, 113. 131 LP, XXI (1), 738. 132 LP, XX(1) 584, 986, 1071, 1144, 1313; XX (2), 346, 369, 501, 599. 133 It is widely accepted that the siege of Montreuil was laid, not with any real prospect of success, but as a covering measure for the king and his army at Boulogne. Hammer has recently suggested that Henry may have had no other intention then extending the Calais Pale out to Boulogne, having learnt from his manipulation at Imperial hands in 1513 and 1523. He points out that before the campaign the king had commented to the Imperial ambassador, “it would be better to take two or three frontier places than to have burnt Paris.” P. E. J. Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, p.18. 134 Ibid.,p.18. See also, LP, XIX (1), 272 (18). 135 E. Gruffudd, ‘The ‘Enterprises’ of Paris and Boulogne’, (ed.) M. B. Davies, p.55. 136 Ibid., p.58. 137 Ibid., p.72 138 W. A. J. Archbold (ed.), ‘A Diary of the Expedition of 1544’, English Historical Review, vol. 16 (1901), pp.503-07. For original manuscript see: CUL Dd.14.30 {3} –adds nothing new. 114

282


139

Ibid., p.505. Ibid. The Scots suffered from a similar problem at Flodden, finding their shot flew over the heads of the English. 141 Ibid., p.507. 142 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.108. 143 Ibid., p.109. 144 J. H. Leslie, ‘Diary of the Siege and Capture of Boulogne’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 1 (1922), p.194. For original see: BL Cotton Caligula E IV, f.63v – manuscript adds nothing new). 145 Ibid. 140

Conclusion 1

CSP Ven, vol. 6, pt.II, 1555-1557, p.1047. D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.99. 3 C. Oman, Art of War, p.368. 4 J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.247. 5 B. M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, p.163. 6 Oman claimed that ‘the first half of the sixteenth century was neither very notable nor a very glorious epoch in English military history.’ (C. Oman, ‘The Art of War’, in H. D. Trail (ed.) Social England, p.70) He described an English army still based on fifteenth century models, identifying ‘masses of billmen and spears, flanked by large wings of archery...with hardly any provision of cavalry, and was a force raised for a short campaign.’ C. Oman, Art of War, p.285. 7 See Chapter 4, pp.180-7. 8 See J. J. Goring, ‘The General Proscription of 1522’, pp.681-705. 9 LP, XIV (I), 652-654; TNA: PRO SP1/180 f.1-37v, (LP, XVII, 882); LP, XVIII (I), 832; TNA: PRO SP1/184 ff.29 - 220v. 10 TRP, vol. 1, no.121, p.178. 11 See esp: BL Additional MS., 23791. 12 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p.1. 13 CUL F.f.2.10. 14 D. Eltis, English Military Theory, p.186. 15 BL Cotton Julius F.V., f.57v; J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.264. 16 Robert Hare had been admitted to the Inner Temple, on 2 February 1547-8, directly after leaving school and had no military training. DNB, p.373. 17 The ‘piracy’ or ‘sharing’ of ideas was a common feature of early modern and late medieval literature. Contamine described how Robert de Balsac’s La Nef de Princes et des Batailles formed the basis of manuscripts by at least two other authors. P. Contamine, ‘The War Literature of the Late Middle Ages’, p.115. 18 For example, Text B emphasized the importance of ‘scilence’, ‘obedience’ and ‘treuthe’ on 2

NOTES

283

the battlefield. CUL.Ff.2.10, f.12. These virtues are similarly described in Barrett’s ‘Captain’s Handbook (1562) which described the “six principall poyntes,” that defined a good soldiers as: “scilence, obedience, secrett, sober, hardie, treuth.” See J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Pararde Ground’, RWS, pp.280-1. Similar concerns echo through much of the literature of the Elizabethan and early Stuart eras. 19 C. G. Cruickshank, ‘Military Developments of the Renaissance’, pp.74-5. 20 TNA: PRO SP1/172 f.109v (LP, XVII, 632). 21 D. Eltis, English Military Theory, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe. 22 It is entirely probable that a good many more military treatise were penned in the early years of Henry’s reign that are now lost to the historical record. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the expansion of the printing press would later ensure the greater survivability (not least through higher production) of manuscripts of all varieties. 23 P. E. J. Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, p.14. 24 G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p.257. However, this relative tactical sophistication did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. The commander of Italian auxiliaries supporting English operations around Boulogne, between 1544 and 1546, ordered the production of diagrams demonstrating how the English were arrayed. On observing how the shot were located behind the defensive line of pikemen, Giovacchino inquired of his English counterpart why he had formed his men in such a fashion. It was explained to him “that the pikemen stoop while the shot fired over their heads.” J. R. Hale, ‘On a Tudor Parade Ground’, RWS, p.267. Here then England was clearly engaged in wider European ‘military conversations’ exchanging ideas with their continental counterparts. By the 1540s the English were not only aware of and employing new ‘pike and shot’ formations, but were innovating in their own right, with enough success that foreign commanders thought their ideas worthy of diagrammatic notation. 25 BL Additional MS., 23971, f.17v. 26 For Henry VII see: TNA: PRO E36/124, pp.172, 174, 186. For Henry VIII see TNA: PRO E101/55/29, E101/61/228, E101/56/9, E36/285, E36/1, E351/9 etc. 27 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour’, p.228. 28 TNA: PRO E36/1, p.50, 52. 29 TNA: PRO E101/62/11 (LP, I (2), 2053 (2). 30 T. Esper, ‘The Replacement of the Longbow’, p.390. 31 E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.62. 32 Ibid., p.319. 33 As we have seen, even Oman accepted that “though Henry VIII was a believer in the bow in his early days…by the middle of his reign he was, probably with reluctance, yielding to the tendency of the age, and subsidizing the purchase of hackbutts and calivers.” C. Oman, Art of War, p.286. 34 TNA: PRO E101/62/16, (LP, I (1), 1725). 35 One might note Gruffudd’s description of English cavalry tactics in 1544, which would see the light horse draw the enemy within range of the English “bows and hand-guns.” M.

284


B. Davies, ‘The Enterprises’ of Paris and Boulogne,’ p.68. BL Additional MS., 23971, f.4. 37 This was most especially evident in the 1540s, in the defence of earthworks at Boulogne. 38 CUL F.f.2.10, f.10, BL Additional MS., 23971, f.3. 39 TNA: PRO SP1/230, f.329 (LP, I (2) Appendix 22). 40 B. L. Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2v, (LP, I (2), 2053). 41 For example one might note the combination of native English pike and mercenary pike on campaign with the English in France in 1513. See: BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.2-2v, (LP, I (2), 2053); TNA: PRO E101/62/14, (LP, I (2), 2052); TNA: PRO SP1/3, f.160, ‘The Order how the kings battle shall proceed’; E. Hall, Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.67. 42 For evidence of native production, one might note a payment of 20li on 2 December 1511 to Cornelius Johnson for making “two newe gonnes,” of ten inches “compass,” for the king’s use, see: TNA: PRO E36/1, p.60 and PRO E36/1, p.33 (see pp.29-41 for further examples). For foreign imports see William Damsell’s account for payments for “handgunnes”, ‘Ordn(a)nce of brasse’, ‘Saltpeter’ and other munitions between 1 December 1543 and 29 September 1547 in the Netherlands. TNA: PRO E351/9. 43 Given England’s vastly inferior financial resources Henry’s armies were “lucky not to meet the full force of the French.” C. S. L. Davies, ‘Henry VIII and Henry V’, p.248. 44 One commentator noted that England did not even produce horses capable of bearing a man-at-arms: “the island does not produce any, except a few in Wales, and an equally small amount from the Crown studs.” CSP Ven, vol..6 pt.2, 1556-7, 884, cited in C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, p.204. 45 For example a thousand “horsemen strangers”, accompanied the rearward in 1513, See: BL Lansdowne. MS. 818, f.5v. During the Spring Sir Edward Poynings had been busy in the Netherlands contracting noblemen to supply cavalry for Henry’s coming invasion of France – LP, I (1), 1918, 1934 46 D.Potter, War and Government, p.177. “There were usually formations of foreign troops in Picardy during the Habsburg-Valois Wars, Swiss and Italian in earlier phases. German Lansquentes and pitoliers later on.” 47 G. Phillips, ‘'Of Nimble Service': Technology, Equestrainism and the Cavalry Arm of Early Modern Western European Armies’, pp.12-3. 48 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.71 (LP, III (1), 670). Gallowglass, were Irish Mercenaries of Scottish descent. They were renowned for their strong discipline and hardiness and were usually armed with a two-handed sword or battle-axe. Kerne, were Irish infantry usually armed with bows, swords and javelins and were extensively employed by the English. 49 Ibid. 50 “For in the winter season Inglishmen ca(n)not take payne like kerne as ye may be adu(er)tised by thois which haue had thexperience of the warre ther.” TNA: PRO SP60/2, f.134 (LP, VIII, 1124). 51 TNA: PRO SP60/1, f.48, f.71. K. Durham and A. McBride, noted that the English border horse held their “own against the light Irish cavalry, whose main disadvantage it would 36

NOTES

285

seem was their practice of riding without stirrups.” Indeed “This, combined with a shallow quilted saddle invariably resulted in their being unhorsed when they clashed with their English counterparts.” The Border Reivers (London, 1995) pp.33-4. 52 LP, VII, 1291, 1368 53 M. Fissel, English Warfare, p.282. Luis Ribot Garcia reached a sympathetic conclusion, noting that “England’s greatest defensive strength lay in her geographical isolation, which, together with the use of militias…goes some way towards explaining the late appearance of the standing army.” ‘Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain’, in P. Contamine (ed.) War and Competition between States, p.58. 54 4 & 5 Philip and Mary, c.3; D. Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe, p.103. 55 Sir John Smythe, Instructions Obseruations and Orders Mylitarie, STC (2nd ed.)/22885, Early English Books, 1475-1640/1298:08. 56 See especially: C. Storrs and H. Scott, ‘Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c.1600-1800’, War in History, vol. 3 (1996), pp.1-41. 57 CUL F.f.2.10, f.11. 58 Ibid., ff.13-14. 59 BL Additional MS., 23971, ff.7-7v. 60 J. A. Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army’, p.187. 61 E. Hall. Henry VIII, vol. 1, p.67. 62 G. Phillips, ‘To Cry “Home! Home!”: Mutiny, Morale and Indiscipline in Tudor Armies’, p.315. 63 For example, Parker has demonstrated that mutiny, and what to modern eyes appears ‘illdiscipline’, heavily afflicted the Spanish Army of Flanders, often held up as the ‘model’ of sixteenth century soldiery. G. Parker, ‘Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders’, pp.38-52. 64 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, p.43. 65 S. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.630. 66 L. MacMahon, ‘Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army’, p.210. 67 D. Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces, Picardy, 1470-1560 (Cambridge, 1993), p.159. 68 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.617. Before the arrival of the large relief force under the Dauphin, the French, during the English sieges of Montdidier and Boulogne, employed much the same policy in 1544. 69 E. Gruffudd, ‘Suffolks Expedition to Montdidier’, p.38. 70 E. Gruffudd, ‘The ‘Enterprise’ of Paris and Boulogne’, p.55. 71 G. J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, Chapter. 1. 72 R. W. Stewart, The English Ordnance Office, p.144. 73 C. G. Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France, p.172. 74 D. J. B. Trim, ‘The Context of War and Violence in Sixteenth Century English Society’, p.251 (note 79). 75 Ibid., p.250. Although he does, of course, acknowledge a period of 20 years between

286


“Suffolk’s invasion of France in 1523 and Wallop’s expedition to Flanders in 1543”, p.251 (note 82). 76 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Eng. hist. e.187., ff.105-199. 77 Ibid., f.128v. 78 CSP Ven, vol. 5, 1534-54, no.703 in C. H. Dillon, ‘The English Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, pp.201-2. 79 Ibid. 80 S. Gunn, ‘Suffolk’s March on Paris’, p.598. 81 They would be followed, and superseded, by Thomas Seymour, Earl of Hertford and later Protector Somerset, and John Dudley, Lord Lisle and Duke of Northumberland, as England’s premier soldiers. 82 L. MacMahon, ‘Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army in Renaissance Europe: A Reassessment’, in D. J. B. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos, p.192. 83 H. A. Dillon, ‘Arms and Armour at Westminster, the Tower and Greenwich, 1547’, p.228. 84 See esp. J. M. Currin, ‘The King’s Army in the Parties of Bretaigne’, pp.319-412. 85 D. Grummitt (ed.), ‘Introduction’, The English Experience in France, p.4. 86 G. Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 9-40. 87 Ibid., p. 11. 88 Ibid.. 89 Ibid., p. 16. 90 J. Black, European Warfare, 1494-1660, (London, 2002), p.96. 91 For the older view see esp. C. Oman, The Art of War; F. L. Taylor, The Art of War. For recent re-considerations see esp. D. Abulafia (ed.), The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494-5: Antecedents and Effects (Aldershot, 1995). 92 J. Black, European Warfare, p.70. 93 M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, p.345. D. E. Showalter commented that “The image made familiar by Ferdinand Lot and Sir Charles Oman, of medieval warfare as featuring limited discipline, simple tactics, and no strategy at all, has given way to a growing appreciation of the complexity of military operations between the eighth and the sixteenth centuries.” – ‘Caste, Skill, and Training: The Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies from the Middle Ages to the Sixteenth Century’, p.407. 94 Ibid. 95 R. I. Frost, The Northern Wars, p.311. 96 Ibid. 97 The relationship between ‘revolution’ and ‘evolution’ is explored in a stimulating article by G.Raudzens, discussing European colonialism before 1788. See: G.Raudzens, ‘Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? Military Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Causes of European Colonial Conquests to 1788’, The Journal of Military History, vol.63 (1999), pp.631-41.

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Index Administration (military), 151-4 Agincourt, battle of, (1415), 14, 47, 90 Amicable Grant, 24 Arquebus (hackbutt), 29, 30, 34, 42-54, 81, 101, 103-4, 110, 161 Artillery, 12, 19, 25, 26-30, 33-4, 36, 38-42, 77, 88, 92, 99, 102, 110-1, 117, 168, 183 Artillery Fort, 88 Audley, Sir Thomas, 9, 10-12, 26, 36, 43, 56, 58, 80, 90, 123, 137, 181-2; Audley Manuscript, 9-14, 26, 43, 59, 62-3, 70, 80, 90, 160, 181-3 Barrett, Henry, 12 Berwick-upon-Tweed, 145, 146, 147, 161, 162, 168, 170 Bicocca, battle of (1522), 53, 185 Bill (billmen), 3, 9, 43, 46, 80-8, 110,111, 121, 183, 185-6, 191-2 Biringuccio, 27 Bombards, 25,6, 34, 45 Boulogne, 3, 9, 12, 26, 43, 44, 48, 162, 178-9 Bosworth, battle of (1485), 82, 111 Brandon, Charles, Duke of Suffolk (Lord Lisle), 20-2, 40, 46, 48, 66, 73, 85, 104, 116, 121, 131, 137, 139-40 143, 162, 165 Cannon, 27 Calais, 7, 18, 23, 39, 48, 72, 77, 83, 112, 141-2 144, 145-50, 160-1, 164, 167-8, 170, 175, 178, 185, 189 Cavalry, 1, 3, 12, 33, 43-5, 63-4, 77, 83, 86, 88-94, 101, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 16, 117, 129, 145, 186 Cerignola, battle of (1503), 39

Charles, duc de Bourbon, 21, 22, 23 Charles the Bold, 80, 150 Charles V, 21-4, 26, 39, 63, 82, 95, 96, 104, 112, 157, 169, 178, 189-90 Command and control, 59-64 Contamine, P, 8, 11, 59 Crecy, battle of (1346), 14, 47 Cromwell, 96, 103-9, 171, 174 Cruickshank, C, 2, 10, 11, 46, 88, 118 Culverin, 27, 36, 37, 39, 161 Cutte, Sir John, 154 Daunce, Sir John, 144, 154 Davies, C.S.L, 5, 33, 95, 115, 141, 158, 163, 168, 177 Demi-cannon, 27, 175 Demi-culverin, 27 Desertion, 73-4 Disease, 72-3 Discipline, 4, 65-79, 101, 188-9 Dorset, Marquis of, 1512 campaign, 16-7, 76, 82, 111, 120 186 Double-cannon, 27 Dudley, Sir Robert (Earl of Leicester), 134 Education, 57 Edward III, 50, 152 Eltis, David, 1,3-4, 7-8, 10, 12, 46, 55, 62, 67 Falcon, 27, 34, 45, 161, 175; Falconet, 27, 39, 103 Firearms, 3, 4, 12, 116 Fissel, Mark, 2, 12, 94 Flodden, battle of (1513), 4, 18-9, 26, 36-9, 45, 48, 67, 73, 76, 85-8, 110, 122-5, 145, 154, 180, 184, 186

INDEX France, 4, invasion of, 1513 campaign, 17-8, 34-6, 45, 47, 59, 71, 72, 75-8 82, 91, 94, 116-7, 119-22, 127, 137-8, 143, 146, 1556, 182-3, 189; 1522 campaign, 19-22, 31, 39-42, 45-6, 48, 73, 84 , 116-7, 129, 1567, 184-5, 189; 1523 campaign, 60, 63, 73, 75, 84, 111, 116, 131, 137, 140, 150, 157, 165-7, 174, 184-5, 189; 1544 campaign, 69, 73, 116, 117, 140, 157, 178-9 Fortifications, 3, 25, 42 Francis I, 52 Gage, Sir John, 144 Garrisons, 115, 145-51 General Proscription, 64, 84, 1257 Gentleman Pensioners, 115, 135, 145, 162, 190, 193 Geraldine Rebellion, 96, 102, 110, 148 Gruffudd, Ellis, 22,41, 44, 143, 147-8, 178 Gunners, 135,148-9 Gunpowder, 3 Guisnes, 9, 48, 141, 167-8, 173 Hale, J.R, 12 Halidon Hill, 50 Hare, Robert, 10 Hawkwood, John, 63 Henry V, 14, 16 Henry VII, 6, 14-5, 28-31, 82, 956,142, 145, 161, 163, 183, 193-4 Heron, John, 155 Hert, Thomas, 140, 162, 166, 168, 169 Hertford, Earl of, 175-6 Honourable Artillery Company, 170-1 Hundred Years War, 15 Infantry, 1,4, 9, 12, 35, 83, 93, 97, 192 Ireland, 4, 48, 95-110, 160, 161, 186, 192

320 James IV, 18, 19, 26, 36-7, 38, 39, 45, 85-7, 95, 124 Johnson, Cornelius, 29, 31, 32, 168-9 Kildare, Earl of, 96, 97, 101, 102, 107, 108, 109, 110 Landsknechts (Almayns), 3, 17-8, 39, 45, 47, 53, 74-5, 80, 82-4, 87,8, 93, 117-8, 129-31, 186, Lee, Richard, 26 Le Havre (1562), 72 Lieutenancy, 119 Longbow, 2-4, 9, 12, 28, 30, 4254, 81-2, 97, 110, 170, 183-4, 1912 Louis XII, 59 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 10, 63, 80 Mary I, 55, 119 Maynooth, 107 Merbury, Nicholas, 152 Mercenary (mercenaries), 3, 5, 116-8, 190 Military Literature, 7, 14 Militia, 113, 118-35 Montdidier, 21-2, 41-2 Morris, Sir Christopher, 5, 140, 164-79 Morrison, Richard, 58 Munitions, 152 Navy Board, 4, 158-62, 192 Norton, Sir Sampson, 160-1, 164 Offaly, Lord (‘Silken Thomas’), 102, 103, 106 Oman, Sir Charles, 2, 19, 35, 40, 52-3, 77, 88, 91, 116 Ordnance Office, 4, 152-3, 190 Order of the Garter, 136 Pavia, battle of (1525), 23, 25, 42 Phillips, Gervase, 2-3, 12, 50, 53, 93, 95, 194, 195 Pike, 1-4, 12, 39, 43, 44, 48, 58, 62, 80, 81, 82, 83, 80-6, 94, 111, 116 117, 155, 183, 185-6 Pilgrimage of Grace (1536), 120, 131-2, 140-1, 170

INDEX Pinkie, Battle of (1547), 3, 67, 141 Popenruyter, Hans, 30, 31, 161 Poynings, Sir Edward, 15 Ravenna, battle of (1512), 34, 39, 42, 53 Richard III, 28 Roberts, Michael, 1, 4, 195 Rogers, John, 26 Rough Wooing, 175-7 Russel, John, 140-2, 144, 148 Sadler, Sir Ralph, 134 Saltpetre, 33, 172 Saker, 27, 37, 175 Sandes, William, 17, 21, 40, 120, 139, 141, 144 Serpentine Powder, 33, 161 Sesia, battle of (1524), 53 Seymour, Sir Thomas, 177 Shot, 1-2, 12 Simnel, Lambert, 82 Skeffington, William, 102-4, 1068, 140, 148, 164, 165 168 Spears, 115, 135, 145, 151, 162 190,193 Spurs, battle of (1513), 18, 35 47, 92-3 Standing Army, 4, 63, 77, 113-5, 144 Stoke, Battle of (1487), 82 Swiss, 18, 39, 53, 80, 83, 87, 1178 Talbot, George, 4th Earl of Shrewsbury, 140 Therouanne, 18, 35-6, 41 47, 77, 92, 141, 184 Thirty Years War, 115 Trace Italienne, 25, 26 Training, 4, 55, 56, 111, 187-8 Trained Bands, 119 Treaty of the More, 22, 24 Tournai, 18, 35-6, 66, 77-8, 141, 142, 146-9, 164, 184, 189 Tower of London, 5, 102 Vegetius, 8, 10, 57, 59 Vergil, Polydore, 17, 18, 82-3, 121

321 Victualling, 99, 156-7 Vintenar, 60 Wallop, Sir John, 5, 9, 26, 142-3, 177, 182 Warwick, Earl of, 72 William, Lord Grey of Wilton, 142 Winchester, Statute of, 119, 125, 136 Wingfield, Sir Richard, 141-2, 165 Wolsey, Thomas, 15, 20, 22-4, 34, 49, 58, 83-4, 123-4, 125, 127, 191 Wyndham, Sir Thomas, 156 Yeomanry, 145

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