The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization

The United States and Italy, 1940-1950 The United States and Italy, 1940-1950 The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabiliza...

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The United States and Italy, 1940-1950

The United States and Italy, 1940-1950 The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization

James Edward Miller

The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill and London

O 1986 The University of North Carolina Press

All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Miller, James Edward. The United States and Italy, 1940-1950. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Reconstruction, 1939-1951-Italy. 2. United States-Foreign

3. Italy-Foreign

relations-Italy.

relations-United

4. United States-Foreign

relations-20th

century.

5. Italy-Foreign

century.

I. Title

D829.18M55

1986

States.

relations-20th

327.73045

ISBN 0-8078-1673-6 Publication of this book has been aided by the generosity of the National Italian

American Foundation.

85-10035

Contents

Preface Abbreviations in Text Introduction: The Problem of Stabilization

Part I: Involvement 1. American Liberals and the Fascist Challenge, 1940-1943 The Fascist Challenge Liberals and Fascism The Anti-Fascist Coalition American Antifascism at War,1941-1943 2. The Politics of Surrender, January-October 1943 Roosevelt and Postwar Reconstruction The State Department and Italy's Future Mussolini's Fall and Its Impact Armistice Politics Sforza or Badoglio? Defining American War Aims

Part 11: Occupation 3. Allies at Odds, October 1943-June 1944 A Soviet Role in Italy? Deadlock in Italy Soviet Intervention Compromise

vi CONTENTS

4. A New Deal for Italy, June 1944-May 1945 Rome, at Last Toward a New Deal The Quebec Conference and a New Policy Elaborating the New Policy Part Ill: Reconstruction

5. Reconstruction: American Plans and Italian Realities, 1944 Building Italian Democracy Italy's Role in the International Order Economic Relief 6. Italy and American Hegemony, 1945 Containing the Left The Prospects for Peace Testing the Economics of Free Trade The Italy Lobby

7. The Reconstruction Stalls, 1946 Completing Italy's Political Reconstruction A Peace through Compromise Economic Stagnation

Part IV: Stabillzatlon 8. Crisis and Intervention: The Reorientation of American Policy, January 1947-April 1948 Elements of the Crisis The De Gasperi Visit The Ratification Fight A Military or Economic Response? The Fall Crisis Intervention

CONTENTS vii

9. Stabilization: The Triumph of the Conservatives The Marshall Plan-Italian Style Reorganizing Italian Labor Splintering the Italian Socialist Party NATO and the Polarization of Italian Politics Conclusion: Toward an "Historic Compromise"? Abbreviations in Notes Notes Selected Bibliography Index

On Monday, 4 April 1949, the foreign ministers of eleven nations met in the ornate Departmental Auditorium on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C., to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson made opening remarks that stressed the defensive nature of the new pact. Each of the European foreign ministers then rose to reply. Count Carlo Sforza, Italy's foreign minister, spoke midway through the program. For Sforza personally and for Italy, this was a moment of the greatest significance. Sforza was the living embodiment of Italy's newly forged ties with the United States. In July 1940, he arrived in the United States as a refugee from fascism, seeking an American commitment that Italy would have a free postwar choice of its government institutions and would retain its national sovereignty and boundaries. Two years later, in the same Departmental Auditorium, Sforza's efforts bore concrete fruit when Acheson publicly committed the United States to a significant role in Italy's postwar reconstruction. As the leader of the Italian exile movement in the United States and later as a spokesman for moderate antifascism in liberated Italy, Sforza was closely identified with the introduction of American power into Italy. After the war, as foreign minister, Sforza was a leading spokesman for Italian participation in the Marshall Plan, European Union, and Atlantic Alliance. With the signing of the treaty, Sforza had an American commitment to defend Italy against foreign attack. Meanwhile, Marshall Plan aid flowed into his nation to shore up its economy and defeat the threat of internal assaults on Italian democracy. Italy and the United States were linked in a partnership that has lasted ever since. Not all of Sforza's countrymen shared his enthusiasm for the new partnership. The Italian government's decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provoked one of the most heated debates of the postwar era. The major opposition parties of the left, Communist and Socialist, many members of the ruling Christian Democratic majority, together with thoughtful leaders

x PREFACE

of the Republican and Social Democratic parties organized demonstrations, strikes, and even a parliamentary filibuster to block passage of the treaty. Riots broke out in many Italian cities while fist fights erupted inside the Chamber of Deputies, as the final ratification vote took place on 17 March 1949. The government, however, easily prevailed on a vote of 342 to 170. Sforza made no reference to this turmoil in his brief remarks. Instead, he went to the heart of the treaty: the United States had voluntarily entered into a long-term commitment to European security.' The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty culminated a process through which the United States assumed leadership of a Western political and economic sphere that included Italy. The story of how Italian and American interests came to be defined as common and almost coterminous by the leaders of both nations is the subject of this book. It is written from the viewpoint of Washington, D.C., because for most of the decade 1940-1950 Italy was the object of the diplomacy of three great powers-Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Eventually, Germany was defeated and Britain was exhausted. The United States then assumed major responsibility for the economic and political reconstruction of Italy. The United States' involvement in Italy was a reluctant one: the result of military decisions that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff opposed. American leaders initially regarded Italy as a secondary problem and devoted little time to the massive social, political, and economic problems that an Italian campaign involved. The American attitude changed dramatically after Allied forces landed in Sicily on 10 July 1943. Italy became the theater in which American political and military strategy was tested before an increasingly critical domestic public opinion. For nearly a year Italy was the only area in Europe where American forces were fighting, and press coverage was intense. Public interest in Italy diminished after the successful Normandy invasion and the rapid advance of Allied armies through France. Nevertheless, Italy remained a major concern for United States policymakers until the surrender of German forces on 2 May 1945. Thereafter, other crises-the war with Japan and the subsequent postwar conversion problem-reduced Italy to the rank of a secondary concern for both American leaders and the American public. Then, in the spring of 1947, the Greek crisis and the Truman Doctrine refocused American attention on Europe. The specter of a Communist victory in Italian elections began to haunt policymakers and the American press, for it threatened to undercut the American position throughout Europe. The United States mobilized its political and economic power to defeat the Italian left and thwart the challenge of its Great

PREFACE xi

Power rival, the Soviet Union. After the Christian Democratic Party's stunning victory in the April 1948 elections ensured American hegemony in Italy, American leaders solidified that position by isolating the Italian left while simultaneouslyproviding the material resources for Italian reconstruction. The North Atlantic Treaty was the final element in the program for stabilizing Italy. This book traces the steps by which the United States first became involved in Italy and then proceeded to impose its vision of postwar stability. Chapters 1 and 2 examine the roots of American involvement in Italy, tracing the development of a theory of postwar order, stabilization politics, and its specific application to Italy. The evolution of an American policy toward Italy began in a tricornered dialogue between Italian-Americans, anti-Fascist exiles, and the American government. However, the Vatican and the British government quickly became powerful interlocutors in the debate and modified initial American willingness to support the plans of the anti-Fascists and the liberal supporters. At home, the power of the liberal-anti-Fascist coalition rapidly waned. Conservative Italian-Americans, Catholic church leaders, and moderate anti-Communists formed a larger and more powerful coalition. Under the influence of the British, the Vatican, and this coalition, United States policy toward Italy became more cautious and conservative. The responsibilities of occupation 2nd the demands of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's domestic constituencies soon stimulated a more innovative American policy than that favored by either the British or the Vatican. Taking a middle road between the backward looking politics favored by the British and the Vatican and the radical plans of the growing Italian resistance, the United States gradually emerged as the most influential of the Great Powers in Italian affairs. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the evolution of an American program for Italy in the midst of war and clashes with its two powerful allies: Great Britain and the Soviet Union. At the end of the war, British weakness and Soviet distance ensured American predominance. The United States was able to implement a program of political and economic reconstruction. Chapters 5 through 7 discuss the reconstruction and the diplomacy of the Paris peace conference, at which the United States sought to remove restraints on Italy and to negotiate a peace settlement that would not seriously damage the prospects for Italy's democratic reconstruction. The American reconstruction program was partially successful. The Italian economy failed to revive in spite of major infusions of American aid. Faced with the impending collapse of its reconstruction program, the United States intervened massively during 1947-49 to provide its Italian allies with the

xi1 PREFACE

material and psychological assistance they needed to defeat the challenge from the left. The historiography of Italian-Americanrelations in the 1940s is incomplete. Little has been written about the political aspects of the American decision to invade I t a l ~ The . ~ occupation period has received much more intense study and two works of great merit have appeared: David Ellwood's L'alleato nemico3 and Norman Kogan's Italy and the ~ l l i e sIn . ~addition, Italian scholars have used material available in Italy, Britain, and the United States to produce important works on the history of Italy's political parties and on the goals and achievements of the Italian resistance.' A number of first-rate monographs have appeared on certain aspects of Allied occupation p01icy.~ British policy has received in recent years some well deserved attenti~n.~ Ennio Di Nolfo has begun a thorough study of Italy and the origins of the Cold War; he has provided detailed documentation of American cooperation with the Vatican in the shaping of postwar ~ t a l y .A~ few American revisionist scholars have also shown an interest in wartime policy in Italy as part of a more general critique of American policy. Gabriel Kolko's comments remain among the most illuminating written on the period.9 Both American and Italian production drops off markedly after the war. A few general works on the diplomacy of the Paris peace conference have appeared.lo John Harper has contributed an important study of the economics of reconstruction." Antonio Gambino's Storia det dopoguerra is a thoughtful attempt at a synthesis. Antonio Varsori has contributed some important studies of postwar British policy. l 2 Little, however, has been written about American efforts at political reconstruction, or about the shaping of the Italian peace treaty. Likewise, with the exception of Harper's study, the economic aspects of the reconstruction have been largely ignored. Recent interest in the Marshall Plan in Italy is handicapped by a lack of studies of the earlier efforts at economic recon~truction.'~ Little work has been done on the dramatic and decisive period of American intervention in 1947-49. l4 Based on American, British, and available Italian documentation, this book attempts to provide a synthesis of a decade of American involvement in Italy. The decade 1940-50 was the most critical in the recent histories of both Italy and the United States. The war and the period of reconstruction that followed set both societies on paths from which they have not since diverged. The historiography of American involvement in the stabilization of Europe after two world wars is rich, and my debts to a large number of scholars who have worked on the problem is deep. Charles Maier's studies of postwar stabilization were fundamental to the creation of the framework of this book.

PREFACE xiii

Melvyn Leffler's work on post-World War I stabilization is a model of intellectual clarity. I have also drawn heavily on the theories of a number of revisionist scholars, such as Barton Bernstein, Gabriel Kolko, and Carl Parini, although I have ultimately rejected the schematic framework of economic causality. My interpretation of events in Italy, particularly in its stress on the modernizing role of the United States, owes a great deal to the work of David Ellwood. My own research has led me to the conclusion that the United States government's involvement in Italy was directed at the achievement of broad political goals. In Italy, economic policy, while of great importance, was the handmaiden of these political objectives. Primary among American goals was the creation of a stable world order based on the establishment of democratic nation states. American leaders assumed these states would adopt some form of mixed economy capitalism. The vast economic power of the United States was harnessed to the effort to create democratic states by an American foreign policy leadership, which repressed its preference for open-door economics to salvage a war ravaged world. The need for pragmatic action and the wide gap that separated the economic theorists at the State Department from American business leaders and from European economic elites assured that American economic reconstruction policy would be made in the interests of political stability. Ultimately, the United States achieved European stability by placing its economic resources in the hands of foreign leaders who shared the American commitment to democracy but not to the sort of economic and social reforms the United States favored. In researching and writing this study, I have accumulated a massive share of personal debts, which I would like to briefly and inadequately discharge. My primary intellectual and personal debts are to David Ellwood, a most loyal friend and critic; to Ennio Di Nolfo, both as a scholar and occasional deus ex machina, and to Fynnette Eaton, critic and editor. Others who have read parts or all of the manuscript and provided useful criticism are Robert McMahon, David Patterson, Antonio Varsori, Clayton Koppes, Jerry Haines, Barton Bernstein, John Harper, Giangiacomo Migone, Federigo Romero, and Eric Edelman. A Fulbright fellowship and academic year at the University of Florence enabled me to hunt down books, periodicals, and Italian archival sources and revise the manuscript. Among the archivists who have aided this research, William Cunliffe of the National Archives holds a special place for wise counsel and stimulating ideas. Ron Swerczek tirelessly answered my requests. I also must thank the staffs of the National Archives and the Roosevelt and Truman Presidential libraries; the

xlv PREFACE

Public Record Office; the Istituto Nazionale per la Storia della Resistenza of Milan; the Istituto storico della Resistenza in Toscana of Florence; the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome; the manuscript divisions of the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Hoover Institution; and the U.S. Catholic Conference. A generous publication subsidy from the National Italian American Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged. The book is dedicated to the remarkable group of females who have shared life with me over the past eight years: Fynnette, who saw the whole process through, Lucrezia, Poly, Elektra, Julie, and Circe the cat. The research and writing of this book was done on my own time and without any privileged access to the records of the State Department or other govemment agencies. The conclusions are my own and in no way reflect the views of the Department of State or the United States government.

AFL

American Federation of Labor

CFM

Council of Foreign Ministers

CGI L

Italian General Confederation of Labor

CIO

Congress of Industrial Organizations

CLN

Committee of National Liberation

CLNA1

Committee of National Liberation for North Italy

ECA

Economic Cooperation Administration

ERP

European Recovery Program

FEA

Foreign Economic Administration

LCGIL

Free Italian General Confederation of Labor

NAC

National Advisory Committee on International Monetary and Financial Policy

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PC1

Italian Communist Party

PSI

Italian Socialist Party

PSLI

Italian Socialist Labor Party (Social Democrats)

UNRRA

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

The United States and Italy, 1940-1950

Introduction The Problem of Stabilization

The American effort to build a peaceful and prosperous postwar world order began in Italy in the summer of 1943. Italy, the first Axis nation to surrender, the first occupied enemy nation, the first liberated nation, was the laboratory in which the United States experimented with a program of political and economic reconstruction. The ultimate objective of American policy was stabilization: the creation of a democratic and prosperous society, capable of self-reform and linked to the United States by mutually beneficial economic and political arrangements. The decision to stabilize the postwar world through intervention was a revolution in American foreign policy. After World War I, the American people rejected Woodrow Wilson's plans for building a democratic Europe through the use of United States economic and political power. Wilson's Republican successors tried to stabilize Europe by providing diplomatic backing for an economic stabilization program carried out by American bankers. Relying on economic expansion to promote peace, the bankers supported any regime, democratic or totalitarian, that assured domestic peace and promised an open door for American investment. American economic aid was a factor in Benito Mussolini's successful consolidation of power in Italy.' By the late 1930s, the Great Depression, the rise of nazism, and the imminent approach of a new European war convinced a growing number of Americans that democracy, economic prosperity, and peace were indivisible, and that the United States must assume a leading role in any postwar reconstruction of the international order. The consensus for a government-directed policy of stabilization expanded rapidly during World War 11, as many prewar isolation-

4 INTRODUCTION

ists joined internationalist Democrats and Republicans in demanding that the United States assume an active postwar role in world politics. Only a few old progressives from both parties, a minority of midwestern Republicans, and some elements of the far right resisted American intervention a b r ~ a d . ~ The new consensus favoring American involvement rested on a genera1 agreement about the basic elements of a stabilization program. Internationalists argued that the political objective of American policy must be the creation of democratic regimes throughout the world. They felt that democratic government could survive only when rooted in economic prosperity, and that a free trade system was the key to prosperity. Economic action would be the primary tool for achieving stabilization, and American corporate capitalism would have to take the lead in the postwar world economic reconstruction. Finally, this group saw the United States as the model for a stable society; nations engaged in the postwar reconstruction of their economic and political systems should emulate it.3 The conservative nature of this consensus was partially disguised during the war years by the rhetoric of American political leaders, especially Henry Wallace, but the extension of a social and economic system based on capitalism and parliamentary democracy remained the heart of American foreign policy. Agreement on general principles did not produce agreement on the means and agents for achieving stability. A major struggle over means and agents erupted after war broke out in Europe in 1939, and it continued through the 1940s, pitting liberals against conservatives. Conservatives, recalling the successful economic stabilization of the 1920s, looked to Europe's business and professional elites, reinforced by the middle classes, to recreate this "golden age." Agreeing with Benedetto Croce's dictum that fascism was a parenthesis in the onward march of freedom, American conservatives opposed efforts to examine the origins of fascism and the role that the established European elite played in the triumph and solidification of Fascist regimes. Liberals looked to the anti-Fascist coalitions of Marxists (Social Democrats, Socialists, and Communists) and middle-class reformers to stabilize the liberated nations. They were keenly aware of the role that the business and bureaucratic elites had played in the triumph and consolidationof fascism, as well as the links that existed between these elites and anti-New Deal forces in the United States. Liberals wanted to employ antifascism, particularly the purge, as a tool to destroy the political power of the right at home and abroad. The "Darlan Deal"--General Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision to entrust the government of liberated French North Africa to Fascist collaborators-came to symbolize the struggle over the use of foreign agents to direct the stabilization program,

INTRODUCTION 5

but it was only one of a number of such clashes that erupted during the war years. Fierce battles took place over the role of defascistization, American economic and psychological warfare programs, the direction and management of the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic alliance, and other wartime and postwar stabilization programs. Gradually, conservative internationalism prevailed through the use of the communism issue. The emphasis on anticommunism, in turn, deepened American intervention in the internal affairs of other states. On the pragmatic level, too, the choice of means and agents bedeviled American officials. The gap that existed between broad policy directives and their successful implementation usually revolved around the critical choices of which faction or individuals to back and what assistance to provide them. After the debate over the future role of anti-Fascist exiles was settled, the United States had to determine how far to cooperate with the monarchy while revitalizing Italy's government with their anti-Fascist opponents. Having chosen the Committee of National Liberation coalition as the vehicle for governing wartime Italy, United States officials were forced to choose sides when victory dissolved this fragile alliance. American efforts to entice the Italian Socialist party into more moderate politics failed at the same time that Italy's economic crisis became critical, and American leaders had to make the most crucial postwar choice, committing American prestige and economic resources to the only available bulwark against a Communist-dominated Italian government: the Christian Democratic party. With this final and reluctant but inevitable decision, the terms of Italy's reconstruction were settled. A conservative party would guide Italy, and reform would be limited to the minimum necessary to prevent a left-wing triumph. This was the dilemma of stabilization politics: stabilization would only occur if the democratic regimes that the United States supported achieved legitimacy in the eyes of the people they governed. Democratic regimes were being imposed on societies with limited or no previous experience with selfgovernment. Further, the democratic governments were being imposed by a foreign and often conquering power in cooperation with an elite closely linked to the victor. The United States had to intervene and reorganize the governments of liberated areas not only to achieve its long-term political objectives but to meet the most urgent and minimal needs of the peoples it was liberating: food, shelter, and public order. The real issue was how far to cany this intervention and when to end it. Obviously, these decisions called for a careful case-by-case scrutiny based on considerable understanding of the political history, eco-

6 INTRODUCTION

nomic infrastructure, and cultural heritage of the liberated nation. Reconstruction would also be easier if domestic political considerations did not weigh too heavily upon American policy. None of these conditions was present in the case of Italy. The demands of military operations, the objectives of the United States' major allies, the rise of an indigenous challenge to American stabilization programs, powerful domestic pressures, and a facile misreading of Italy's recent history all combined to make an already difficult problem nearly insuperable. Restraint was particularly difficult because policymakers had the ability to intervene and were subject to growing foreign and domestic pressures to act. The inherent difficulty of replacing the crude power of direct military rule with more subtle and indirect political and economic influence compounded the challenging task of selecting which programs and which factions to back in the reconstruction process. Situated uncomfortably between conflicting views and factions, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations tried to form coalitions combining elements of the old ruling elite with moderate forces of the left. Franklin D. Roosevelt's objective was a center-left coalition. Harry Truman, after repeatedly trying to cany through this program, settled for coalitions that were weighted to the moderate right. Throughout the 1940s, the United States government's efforts were directed at isolating the two totalitarian political extremes, Communist and Fascist, and denying them any role in postwar reconstruction. The presence in many liberated nations, including Italy, of indigenous resistance movements seriously complicated efforts to achieve stability. The resistance movements, which had played a significant role in the military struggle against Nazi Germany and claimed a predominant postwar political role, were leftist in orientation and dominated by their respective national Communist parties. These national Communist parties, in turn, were closely linked with the Soviet Union, the United States' emerging Great Power rival. A reconstruction carried out with the aid of the resistance might lead to Soviet domination of the liberated nations and Communist dictatorship. A reconstruction carried out without the resistance risked failure and civil war.4 American leaders realized that they had to channel a strong element of the resistance into the new state in order to reinforce its legitimacy. Italy was the paradigm of the United States' postwar stabilization problem. As the first European nation to be both defeated and liberated, the "enemy ally" was simultaneously subjected to a demanding and often harsh military occupation and to a frantic American effort to build the sinews of a democratic society. Italy then became the first Western nation to receive a peace settlement from the victorious Allies, and it was a test case for the successive economic programs, from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

INTRODUCTION 7

to the European Recovery Program, with which the United States sought to bolster the democratic regimes of Europe. When the effects of American aid materialized too slowly and the threat of a Communist takeover appeared imminent, the United States mounted its first covert military and political operations. Lessons drawn from the Italian experience had an enormous impact on subsequent American policymaking. American involvement in Italy was a natural outgrowth of that nation's strategic importance. Italy is one of a handful of economically and politically advanced states that have historic ties with the United States and that American leaders believed belonged naturally within the American sphere of influence. Notwithstanding the Fascist misadventure, Italy also possessed a tradition of liberal self-government and of democratic political parties. Economically, Italy had been an important prewar trading partner of the United States and throughout the 1920s and 1930s was an area of growing American private investment. Culturally, Italy was the seedbed of the civilization that gave birth to the United States. An important segment of the economic, political, and cultural elite in the United States shared pro-Italian feelings with 6 million Italian-Americans and the hierarchy of the American Roman Catholic church. Together they formed a potentially formidable lobby. Italy's military value became evident during World War I1 and grew when the war against nazism gave way to an intense geopolitical contest with the Soviet Union. Located in the center of the Mediterranean, Italy lies along the direct line of access to the oil of the Middle East and Britain's then vital Suez link with its Asian empire. Italian air fields enabled the Germans to shut off direct access to the Middle East for nearly four years, and Italian ports were the vital supply depot for Erwin Rommel's campaigns in North Africa. Allied aircraft based in Italy destroyed German warmaking capacity in Central and Southeast Europe, resupplied partisan bands, and covered the invasion of Southwest Europe. Added to these factors were intangible psychological considerations. Thousands of Americans died liberating Italy. If Italy again fell into the hands of a dictatorship, their sacrifices would.have been wasted. American leaders were also beginning to embrace the view, later enshrined as the domino theory, that a setback in the United States' position in one area of the world weakened its national security interests everywhere. In this view, the loss of so strategic a nation as Italy would be a catastrophe that would fatally undermine the United States' position in Europe.s These were the stakes during the ultimately successful American effort to stabilize Italy.

Part I Involvement

Chapter 1 American Liberals and the Fascist Challenge, 1940-1943

The New Deal, like the Roman god Janus, faced in two directions simultaneously. It was both a reform movement and an attempt to conserve the basic economic and political structure of the United States. As liberal reforms succeeded in treating the worst manifestations of the economic crisis, they lost the support of an ever-widening body of Americans who saw the New Deal as an emergency expedient for saving their vested interests. In 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to make limited but important modifications in the political structure in order to further reform. A variety of local and national interest groups coalesced and blocked this effort. By 1938, the New Deal and the reform movement were in dire straits. At the same time, Roosevelt's attention was absorbed by Europe where fascism, especially in its German form, posed a major threat to the United States, its foreign interests, and the general peace. At the end of 1937, Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's liberal Secretary of the Interior, noted in his diary: The whole international situation is desperately serious. . . . There are two irreconcilable systems of government in the world today and they are fighting for supremacy. On the one side is fascism and on the other is democracy. Pacifist though I am, I am becoming imbued with the idea that sooner or later the democracies of the world, if they are to survive, will have to join issue-armed issue-with the fascist nations.' Roosevelt needed to convince a majority of the New Deal coalition that American democracy was endangered by fascism and that this danger was

l 2 INVOLVEMENT

imminent enough to require immediate rearmament. Liberal congresspersons, particularly midwestern and western progressives, remembered that American armament in 1916 led to war in 1917 and the destruction of the reform movement at home.2 They argued that isolation from Europe's contagions and expansion of the New Deal at home would master the Fascist threat. Other elements of the New Deal coalition were equally resistant to rearmament and clung to isolationism. Large ethnic groups-Irish, Germans, Italians, and others-were strongly isolationist as were antiforeign nativists and the U.S. Catholic church's hierarchy. A broad consensus stretching from American businessmen to American socialists opposed rearmament. Roosevelt had to rally support for national defense at a time when defeats in Congress and the rejection of New Deal programs left him politically weak. On top of this, Roosevelt was a lame duck president, forbidden by hallowed tradition from running for a third term and unable to find a suitable and electable successor among his New Deal lieutenants.

The Fascist Challenge Italian fascism posed a challenge to American interests well out of proportion to the limited military and economic power of Italy. In Latin America, Italian activities threatened the stability of a number of pro-American regimes. The Fascist government had extended its influence both among the large Italian-American communities of the south and among Latin Americans generally through increased trade, the establishment of Italian corporate subsidies, military training missions, and arms sales. These activities troubled even isolationists. Administration leaders feared that in the event of an Axis victory in Europe, the Fascist states would dominate Latin America through their control of large Italian and German immigrant populations. In May 1939, Roosevelt privately remarked that if the Axis won a European war, Fascists would sweep into power throughout Latin America, isolating and encircling the United States and creating political and economic chaos. Latin American raw materials were essential for United States defense production. The combination of Axis military success and expanding Fascist influence in the south made Latin America an area of continuing concern for policymakers in the United States until late 1942.3 The Roosevelt administration countered Axis penetration in Latin America with Export-Import Bank loans to aid economic development and to strengthen popular support for the United States. American leaders made

L I B E R A L S A N D F A S C I S T C H A L L E N G E 13

numerous goodwill visits to the south in the late thirties while the U.S. Navy completed highly publicized maneuvers in the Caribbean. At the outbreak of the war in Europe, the State Department greatly increased its cultural affairs program in Latin America. Shortly thereafter, Roosevelt created a special agency for inter-American affaim4 A second major irritant in Italo-American relations was the autarkic policy that Benito Mussolini put into effect in the mid-1930s. In 1934, U.S. Ambassador to Italy Breckinridge Long, a friend of the Mussolini regime, reported that "Italian economic policy is operating against the interests of the United States," squeezing major American exports out of its domestic market. By imposing import controls and insisting on a stable balance of payments with the United States, the Italians cut American trade in half and then attempted to avoid American retaliation by dragging out negotiations. Rome's autarkic policies particularly annoyed Washington, because senior American officials like Secretary of State Cordell Hull tied the United States' recovery from the effects of the depression to the expansion of its exports through free trade

agreement^.^ The most irritating element in Italo-American relations was overt and covert political intervention in the internal affairs of the United States. The extent of Italy's control over the affairs of American citizens and resident aliens of Italian origin or descent was the core of the Fascist challenge. Extremely active and well-financed Italian agents, ignored by American authorities, had been at work in the United States since 1922, building an imposing structure of consular, educational, recreation, travel, and mutual assistance organizations through which Italy carried out espionage and propaganda operations. The Italian government had a number of objectives in erecting and maintaining this network. The Mussolini regime was eager to create a favorable image of fascism as a part of its political warfare with anti-Fascists and was particularly interested in establishing control over the Italian-American communities of the United States. Italian-Americans, organized with the aid of pro-Fascist local leaders, acted as an effective pressure group at the service of Italian fascism in its dealings with the United States government. These organizations were useful in collecting intelligence and encouraging isolationist sentiment among Americans. After Italy's entry into World War 11, strengtheningthe isolationist movement and increasing Italian-American identification with fascism became the primary objectives of Italian operations.6 Fascist propaganda and political covert operations in the United States were carried out by three types of organizations: the consular, tourist, and educational agencies of the Italian government; Italian-American recreational, fra-

14 I N V O L V E M E N T

ternal, educational, and mutual aid societies; and a handful of cultural organizations specifically directed at America's business, cultural, and intellectual elites. The consular, tourist, and educational agencies of the Italian government were the framework of the entire structure. In addition to providing visas, tourist information, and assistance to individuals and groups with interests in Italy, they pumped out reams of propaganda, funneled large sums of money into Fascist front organizations, gathered intelligence on anti-Fascists, arranged and sponsored tours by Fascist propagandists, and utilized a variety of pressures and rewards to ensure that local Italian-American communities responded to orders from Rome.7 By the mid-1920s, Italian-American ~ascistscontrolled all the important pre-Fascist recreational, fraternal, and mutual assistance organizations in the United States. Italian-Americans, with the financial aid of the Fascist government, created an impressive number of new organizations designed to further solidify the loyalties of particular interest groups within the Italian-American community. The two most important were the Casa Italiana at Columbia University and the Federation of Italian War Veterans.' The Fascists were eager to promote a favorable impression of the Mussolini regime among the United States populace as a whole. Aided by cooperative American citizens, Italian Fascists set up cultural organizations, sponsored tours by English-speaking Italian propagandists, and even recruited a few ~ m e r i c a sto spread the Fascist line. The Italy America Society, the Istituto Italiano di Cultura, and the Italian Historical Society were the three most prominent transmission belts for this Fascist culturaI pr~paganda.~ All of these activities were closely monitored in Rome by the Ministry of Popular Culture. In addition to its general direction of foreign propaganda, the ministry had specific responsibility for the communications media. Through EIAR, the state broadcasting network, it directed a growing volume of short wave propaganda while LUCE, another arm,produced and distributed propaganda films. The ministry also subsidized pro-Fascist foreign newspapers and published literature extolling the benefits and accomplishments of fascism for foreign audiences.lo Operating in cooperation with the Ministry of Popular Culture was the General Diiectorate for Italians Abroad of the Italian Foreign Ministry, which controlled the extensive chain of political, cultural, civic, recreational, and educational organizations supervised by Italian consulates. The Ministry of National Education handled cultural and academic exchange programs while the Dante Alighieri Society, a quasi-governmental body, exported fascism


through educational programs, which in 1938 enrolled thirty-seven thousand school children. l 1 Fascist propagandists operated quite openly and with great success throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. Then the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia marked the turning point in American attitudes about the Fascist regime. Italian aggression, first in Ethiopia and then in Spain, together with Mussolini's growing collaboration with Hitler turned most Americans against the Fascist regime. Tragically, the Ethiopian war consolidated the Fascist hold on the Italian-American community, which took great pride in Mussolini's conquests and was outraged when the League of Nations invoked sanctions against Italy. By 1940, a congressional study estimated that over one hundred thousand Italian-Americans were participating in two hundred Fascist goups. l2 Fascist success in mobilizing Italian-American support for the Ethiopian war was due in great measure to a monopoly of all their major social and cultural institutions. The Sons of Italy, the largest and most influential ItalianAmerican fraternal organization, fell into Fascist hands within months of Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy. In 1935 it mounted intense pressure on Congress and the Roosevelt administration to ensure that Ethiopia received no economic assistance, while simultaneously collecting large sums to aid the Italian invasion. l 3 The Fascists had an equally firm control over the Italian-language press and radio. Pro-Fascist businessmen sponsored Italian-language programming that laced music, drama, and news with generous doses of propaganda. In the late 1930s this radio propaganda took on strident racist and anti-American tones. Domestic broadcasts were supplemented by shortwave transmissions from Italy. l4 Fascist domination of the Italian-American press was not as complete. AntiFascist Italians managed to publish a number of excellent papers that courageously exposed Fascist operations in the United States and Mussolini's repression of freedom in Italy. None of these papers enjoyed a wide distribution. The large circulation Italian-language dailies were firmly in the hands of Fascist sympathizers. The central figure in Italian-American journalism and Fascist press propaganda was Generoso Pope, an Italian-born self-made millionaire. In 1928, Pope purchased New York's I1 Progresso Italo-Americana, the largest Italian-language daily in the United States, with the aid of the Italian government, and he put it at the service of fascism. Pope subsequently acquired another New York daily and eventually one in Philadelphia. Because he was also an active member of the New York State Democratic


party, Pope's chain was more restrained editorially than many other Italianlanguage newspapers. He criticized Italy's anti-Semitic legislation and began backing away from his previous unquestioning support of the Mussolini regime in 1940. The majority of the pro-Fascist Italian papers were neither so prudent nor so restrained. Racist and anti-Semitic propaganda poured out of Fascist papers such as II Grido della Stirpe. In general, the Italian-American press cheered Italy's entry into World War I1 and each subsequent act of aggression by Mussolini's "Roman ~egions."'~ During the Ethiopian war, Fascist organizational work paid big dividends. Italian-American pressure combined with administration fear of the general isolationist reaction and congressional objections ruled out American cooperation with the League of Nations' program of sanctions and defeated administration plans to revise neutrality legislation to undercut Italian aggression.16 The Italian government was highly pleased with the enthusiastic support that Italians throughout the world gave to its attack on Ethiopia. Nevertheless, in 1937, Fulvio Suvich, Mussolini's astute ambassador to the United States, observed that the Ethiopian adventure and Italy's ties with Hitler's Germany fatally undermined fascism's standing among Americans. Moreover, the Italian-Americans had isolated themselves as a result of their efforts to support Italy and their public identification with fascism.17 Antialien and antihyphenate feelings were rising in the United States during the late 1930s, fueled by the scarcity of jobs, fears of a new European war, and, in good measure, by the identification of foreign nationality groups with totalitarian ideologies. While congressional investigations and newspaper exposes of foreign intervention in the United States focused on the activities of American Communists and Nazis, Italian-American identification with the Mussolini regime was too close, Italian anti-Fascist efforts to awaken public interest too intense, and Fascist intervention too blatant for the state of affairs to endure.'' Mussolini's opportunistic entry into World War I1 on Hitler's side in June 1940 was the catalyst that focused public attention and hostility on Italian-Americans.

Liberals and Fascism For American liberals, as for Italian-Americans, the years after the Ethiopian war were marked by the pull of conflicting loyalties. After the failure of Wilsonian internationalismin 1919-20, strong currents of liberal thought became isolationist. However, Nazi aggression within Europe and Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia underlined the threat that fascism posed to


world peace. The Fascist challenge to democracy became even more imrnediate when the Italian and German governments began supporting the reactionary Spanish general Francisco Franco in his war on the Spanish republic. Most liberals hoped to preserve America's isolation while halting the onward march of totalitarianism. During the late 1930s and throughout the period of American neutrality, they attempted to define a liberal response to the Fascist threat that would somehow reconcile isolationism with the defeat of fascism and military preparedness with the extension of the New Deal. In the end, they abandoned isolationism in the effort to achieve their other goals. The war and the reconstruction program that American liberals developed was an amalgam of their Wilsonian heritage, the New Deal experience, and a strong dose of anti-Fascist rhetoric. Liberals embraced the Wilsonian heritage of free trade, national self-determination, and peace through international cooperation. Drawing on the diplomatic and social experiments of the New Deal, they demanded the extension of the Good Neighbor Policy, international economic cooperation, and full employment. Antifascism was the tool that a growing body of liberals hoped would defeat their conservative opponents at home and gain the cooperation of popular movements abroad to create a world New Deal. The liberal vision of a new world order was fully elaborated by early 1942. In spite of rhetorical flights such as Vice President Henry A. Wallace's call for a "people's revolution," liberal thinking favored the creation of an extended American sphere of influence based on a reformed capitalism supporting a stable democratic state system. The United States would serve as the political model for the new states and American economic expansion would be the motor that drove the new prosperity. The economic basis of the liberal plan for world order was a vast expansion of consumption. After living through the depression and subsequent rise of totalitarian movements, liberals were keenly aware that economic well-being was essential to the stability of political democracies. Thus, they were concerned with increasing world levels of production and employment. The tools that they hoped to employ to create increased production and consumption included international banks and funds, a general reduction of tariff barriers, technical assistance, stockpiling of critical materials, and massive American private investment abroad. The ultimate objective of liberal economics was the creation of a balanced world economy based on full employment, industrialization of underdeveloped nations, and speciaIization in production. A balanced world economy would put a floor of economic prosperity under democratic regimes. l9 The political basis of the new order was national self-determination and


democracy. To eliminate the excesses of nationalism and to destroy the opposition to democracy, liberals demanded a thorough purge of all Fascists and of the political and economic institutions created or appropriated by fascism. Thereafter, liberals envisioned a reconstructed system of democratic nation states, held together by mutual economic and political interest. These states would cooperate to preserve the peace and advance common human interests through a group of supernational agencies.'' This vision of a stabilized world order was a typical product of American reformist thought. Like the New Deal, it was essentially an effort to improve and thus preserve the existing order. Increased consumption and the creation of democratic institutions would diffuse popular discontent and gain time for gradual changes in the social structure and distribution of wealth. Thus, for all of its apparent radicalism, there was much in these proposals for postwar reconstruction to attract American policymakers. The evolution of American liberalism from isolationism toward internationalism accelerated in the late 1930s as Fascist totalitarianism mastered the depression and displayed its expansionism. Democracy and the liberal reform movement were on trial at home and abroad. While the Western democracies foundered about searching for a solution to the world economic crisis, the totalitarian states were providing their citizens with order, employment, and direction. If democracy was to survive, one liberal leader warned, it too must "be efficient and . . . have purpose." Democracy had to build its own national unity as a counterbalance to the appeal of Fascist regimentation." Roosevelt amplified this warning in his State of the Union message of 4 January 1939. The international situation, he stated, was perilous. A "new philosophy of force" threatened to take control of the other states of the Western Hemisphere and surround the United States. Isolation would doom democracy. If the United States wished to preserve its neutrality, the president concluded, it would have to ensure the safety of democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere with a major rearmament program, combat the subversive operations that always preceded military attacks, promote democratic unity among America's diverse ethnic groups, and further strengthen democracy at home through social reforms that would create full employment.22 The president's call for an armed and vigilant neutrality appealed to a broad spectrum of American public opinion, including the large body of liberals who wanted to contribute to the struggle against fascism without abandoning American neutrality. If, by a combination of military preparedness and social reform, the United States secured the Western Hemisphere from Fascist penetration, it might provide the Western European democracies with the example


and the encouragement needed to stop German and Italian expansion. In addition, rearmament paid major economic and political benefits by stimulating the economy, increasing employment, and thus improving ~oosevelt's political fortunes.= After the outbreak of war in Europe, a significant minority of the president's liberal supporters broke with his policy. They warned that the military inactivity of the Western democracies after the fall of Poland demonstrated that the British and French lacked the will to crush fascism. These liberals concluded that the United States must take an active role in combating fascism. The majority still hoped to avoid military intervention while taking the lead in the anti-Fascist struggle. A smaller group had no such illusions and allied with internationally minded conservatives to advocate immediate military intervention in Europe. These liberals warned that the New Deal could be revitalized only through intervention. By struggling for the freedom of mankind against a new barbarism, liberalism would gain the internal strength to carry forward the reform of American society.24 This viewpoint gained adherents rapidly during the spring of 1940 as Nazi armies crushed Norway, the Low Countries, and then France in rapid succession. Roosevelt realized that the United States would eventually intervene in the conflict in Europe. This realization and his determination to preserve the achievements of the New Deal from destruction by the Republicans and conservatives in his own party were major factors in Roosevelt's decision to break tradition and seek a third term. These same factors and shrewd political calculations influenced Roosevelt's decision to broaden his government by calling internationalist conservatives, including leading Republicans, into the management of national defense.25 Roosevelt did not endorse military intervention because he was determined not to run ahead of public opinion on an issue of life and death. The Democratic party's platform statement on foreign policy was carefully structured to placate both isolationist and internationalist sentiment. Roosevelt stressed the bipartisan nature of the national defense effort and his personal attempts to preserve the peace. He appealed to his liberal constituency by choosing Henry Wallace as a running mate and by continuing to insist that social reform was the basis of a strong national defense.26 Most liberals backed Roosevelt against his Republican opponent, utility executive Wendell Willkie, in spite of considerable discontent with his defense policies. The New Republic's "TRB" warned that New Dealers were losing their power and influence to businessmen and that the struggle to extend the


New Deal was being fought within the Roosevelt administration. Ickes complained that Roosevelt's concessions to big business were "abandoning advanced New Deal ground with a vengeance." Shortly after the election, Freda Kirchway, the editor and publisher of the Nation, questioned the concept of a government of national unity if its price was abandoning or watering down reform.27 Liberals searched instead for a spokesman and for a program that would allow them to consummate the marriage of national defense preparations and social reform.28 As Roosevelt transformed himself into the leader of a bipartisan national defense coalition, his vice presidential running mate, Henry A. Wallace, emerged as the spokesman of American liberalism. Wallace's American Choice, published during the 1940 campaign, represented a liberal effort to define the issues that could turn America's national defense effort into the instrument of social reform. Pointing to American businesses' long collaboration with the Third Reich, Wallace charged that they were led by appeasers who would sacrifice American liberty to preserve their German properties. To build United States defenses without any concessions to pro-Fascist businessmen, Wallace advocated that the United States reorient its foreign trade from occupied Europe to Latin America. This would assure the Western Hemisphere's independence from Nazi economic pressure and infiltration, while strengthening democracy throughout the Americas by increasing employment, production, and c o n ~ u m p t i o n . ~ ~ Wallace's attack on big businesses' collaboration with fascism initiated a liberal attempt to redefine the war as a struggle against fascism in both its domestic and international dimensions. By the spring of 1941, despite the presence of a few old progressives and Norman Thomas socialists in its ranks, the American right dominated the isolationist movement in the United States. The membership of American Fascists like Gerald K. Smith on the America First Committee tainted the entire isolationist movement and was an acute embarrassment for Republican congresspersons. The fervent backing that German-American and Italian-American Fascist organizations and, until 22 June 1941 the U.S. Communist party, gave isolationism was equally damaging3' Liberals began to see the deepening involvement of the United States in the war as a second chance to reverse Wilson's 1919 failure and to create a stable democratic world order. Freda Kirchway called for a total political, economic, and ideological struggle against fascism short of a declaration of war: breaking diplomatic ties with the Fascist states, aiding democratic anti-Fascist groups, and creating an anti-Fascist government in the United States. The question of American intervention was secondary, the liberals of Common Seizse argued.


Before the United States could decide whether to intervene, it had to determine its war aims. Intervention made sense only if its objective was the extension of economic and political democracy by offering a "world New Deal" as the alternative to Fascist imperialism.3i During the summer and fall of 1941, a majority of American liberals embraced intervention in the belief that the future of reform in the United States was linked to the defeat of fascism abroad. Only by stopping Adolf HitIer's "aimless revolution," the Italian-American liberal and anti-Fascist Max Ascoli wrote, could the United States unleash a "true democratic revolution" and lay "the foundations of a new international and world order." The United States could seize the initiative in the formulation of war goals for the anti-Fascist states by intervention. Freda Kirchway argued that intervention against European fascism would be an ideological commitment on the part of the United States. While war with Japan would be more popular since trade interests were at the root of tensions, fascism was a threat to American freedom and a declaration of war would strike a blow for human liberty.32 By the fall of 1941, mainstream liberalism had finally resolved its doubts about intervention and, under the leadership of Wallace, had defined its war aims. At the same time, liberals were attempting to drive a wedge between themselves and the conservative internationalists, who constituted the greatest threat to their plans for revitalizing the New Deal at home and launching an international version. Liberal plans for the postwar world faced serious challenges from the free trade ideology promoted by Cordell Hull and his State Department and from the complementary imperial dreams promoted by the publisher Henry Luce. During the 1930s, Secretary of State Hull made himself the high priest of the cult of free trade, offering it as a universal remedy for all the world's economic and political ills. American big business enthusiastically supported Hull's free trade policies, seeing in them an ideal tool for increasing its world market share.33 The specter of the conservative-dominated Department of State managing postwar economic reconstruction frightened liberals, who feared the State Department and American business would use free trade to promote American world economic domination. The United States' refusal to aid the Spanish republic in 1936-39 convinced many liberals that the career diplomats had Fascist sympathies. After the WorId War broke out, liberals protested against the State Department's selective enforcement of immigration policies. American failure to do more to assist anti-Fascists to escape from occupied Europe infuriated liberals, as did evidence of anti-Semitism in the department's handling of Jewish refugees.


Freda Kirchway summed up liberal objections: the State Department was not aiding refugees because it refused to accept the ideological meaning of the war. 34 Most liberals shared Hull's enthusiasm for free trade and agreed that closed economic systems such as those of Germany and Italy promoted imperialism and aggression. Nevertheless, they were also aware that the open-door policy by itself worked almost exclusively to the economic advantage of the industrial powers. Free trade alone would perpetuate the world economic caste system.35 Wallace was particularly sensitive to the weakness of free trade economics, which he proposed to overcome by promoting the industrialization of the underdeveloped nations, by stockpiling critical raw materials to ensure price stability, and through planning and intergovernmentalcooperation.36 The industrialization of underdeveloped nations, Wallace asserted, was the best assurance of world peace. Full employment within the industrializing nations would create the surpluses that encourage free trade and promote employment in the industrial states of Europe and America. Full employment and free trade would, in turn, create a "new order of democracy" in which "security, stability, efficiency, and widely distributed abundance would pre~ail."~' Wallace did more than simply outline the theoretical alternative to the open door. In late 1940, Roosevelt made him chairman of the Economic Defense Board. In this position Wallace moved with great skill and determination to secure the raw materials needed for American defense production and, through preclusive buying and other techniques, to wage economic warfare on the Fascist states. He brought a large number of similarly motivated liberals into the economic warfare program. By the fall of 1941, the vice president commanded a powerful agency dedicated to liberal economic and social views. He was ready to challenge the Department of State for control of the postwar economic reconstru~tion.~~ Conservative internationalism posed the major challenge to liberal formulation of American war aims. Interventionist activity owed its beginnings primarily to conservative internationalists, who later joined the Roosevelt administration in large numbers.39 Henry Luce, the publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines, was an important spokesman for conservative intemationalism. In February 1941, Luce published his famous call for the United States to claim the predominant role in world affairs and create an "American Century." Brushing aside isolationism, Luce boldly warned his countrymen that "we are, in fact, in the war," and that the only way out was to win it. America must


assume leadership and establish war aims for the Allied coalition. Once the United States claimed world leadership, it could create an American century based on free enterprise capitalism and the expansion and consolidation of American political influence through technical assistance and charity.40 Luce's vision of America's future horrified liberals. Freda Kirchway branded it "American imperialism." The New Republic observed that if a coalition of military and business interests gained control of the postwar reconstruction, right wing reaction would triumph as it had after 1918.~' Conservative internationalism was a powerful ideological challenge to liberal plans for a world New Deal precisely because they shared so many basic premises. In an article written for Luce's Fortune in late 1941, John Foster Dulles, a pillar of the Republican establishment, endorsed most of the principles that liberals favored. Dulles called for economic growth without imperialism, disarmament, a world organization for peace together with such Wilsonian ideals as freedom of the seas and national self-determinati~n.~~ By endorsing these goals and calling for national unity, conservative internationalists threatened to deprive the war of any ideological meaning. Furthermore, conservative internationalism enjoyed a second major source of strength in its anticommunism. Throughout the 1930s a large group of American liberals equivocated in judging Joseph Stalin's regime. By failing to condemn Soviet tyranny or to avoid association with the popular front organizations of the United States Communist Party, liberals exposed themselves to charges that they were pro-Communist dupes or traitors. The anticommunism of conservative internationalists more correctly matched the views and values of the majority of their countrymen. Conservative internationalists were wary of endorsing one key element in the liberal war program: antifascism. While the majority of conservative internationalists sincerely abhorred Hitler, Mussolini, and their henchmen and wished to destroy their regimes, they often had very close business and personal ties with businessmen, nobility, and military establishments within Italy and Germany-groups that had aided fascism's rise to power and profited from it. Moreover, American bankers and businessmen had also collaborated with these totalitarian regimes. After World War I, American bankers financed the economic stabilization of Mussolini's regime. Giant American corporations like General Motors cooperated fully in Hitler's rearmament programs. Mussolini completed his brutal conquest of Ethiopia with American oil and American trucks.43 American internationalist conservatives wanted to eliminate the Fascist regimes that waged the war while maintaining intact the classes and social structures that supported them. Liberals demanded more.


The Nation called for a "coordinated, uncompromising, democratic" struggle against fascism at home and abroad, led by men who had experienced firsthand the horrors of Fascist rule. By mid-1941 most liberals agreed with the radical George Seldes's analysis: "We are at war. We are fighting two foreign fascist nations, but not fascism abroad or at home."44 The liberal-dominated Office of Facts and Figures and its wartime successor, the Office of War Information, attempted to carry the war against fascism into the ethnic conkunities of the United States and to publicly commit the United States to a war without quarter for the eradication of fascism. At the State Department, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, the most influential liberal in the foreign policy establishment, seized the initiative in postwar planning. By late 1941, liberals were moving rapidly to control the formulation of American war aims.45

The AntbFascist Coalition In their efforts to commit the United States to an anti-Fascist policy, American liberals found natural allies in the small band of exiles and Italian-American anti-Fascists who were fighting Mussolini's efforts to organize and exploit the Italian-American community. For nearly twenty years, first within Italy and then in exile, Italians who opposed Mussolini and his regime carried on an education campaign designed to awaken their countrymen and other peoples to the true nature of fascism and to lay the basis for a post-Fascist government in Italy. Paris served as the center for exile politics until 1940. However, in the early 1920s a few exiles traveled to the United States seeking moral and financial support from the Italian population of North America and from American liberals. They found an Italian-American community already in the hands of the Fascists and a large body of liberal opinion that was solidly pro-Mu~solini.~~ This discouraging information, the distance from Italy that exile in America involved, and wide cultural gaps between the United States and Europe daunted all but a handful of hardy souls. One was the historian Gaetano Salvemini, a passionate and combative man whose wit and personal style captivated many American scholars, politicians, and journalists. In 1925, he visited the United States and experienced firsthand the extent of Mussolini's control. Determined to combat the Fascist propaganda apparatus, he returned in 1928, 1929, and 1932 before settling permanently at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1934.


Salvemini's companions in American exile were primarily academics and labor organizers. G. A. Borgese taught Italian literature at the University of Chicago, while Max Ascoli, who immigrated in 1932, was a professor at New York's New School for Social Research. Vanni Montana and Serafino Romualdi were two young socialists who drifted into the Italian-American labor movement. The exiles quickly established a working rapport with the small band of antiFascist Italian-Americans who were carrying on a sometimes violent and generally unsuccessful effort to root out fascism in the United States. ItalianAmerican antifascism was based in the American labor movement. Its most representative figures were journalists such as the anarchist Carlo Tresca and the socialist Carmelite Zito and labor leaders like Luigi Antonini of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and August Bellanca of the rival Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Union leaders provided financial backing, press coverage, and meeting halls for anti-Fascist activities. In the fall of 1939, Salvemini began organizing both exiles and ItalianAmerican anti-Fascists into a single national body with the dual objectives of influencing American policy toward Italy and of breaking the Fascists' hold on Italian-Americans. In December 1939, this new organization, the Mazzini Society, held its first meeting in New York City. To establish ties with the mainstream of American liberal opinion, the Mazzini Society elected Max Ascoli their president in June 1 9 4 0 . ~ ~ Ascoli and Fiorello La Guardia were the links between the Mazzini Society and those liberals trying to give the war an anti-Fascist character. La Guardia, the dynamic mayor of New York, provided numerous exiles with contacts within the United States government. Ascoli, a prot6g6 of Felix Frankfurter, Roosevelt's confidant and talent scout, introduced a variety of influential New Dealers to antifascism and its leaders.48 AscoIi's particular attractiveness to fellow liberals probably lay in the degree to which this Italian immigrant became more American than most Americans. He easily mastered the English language, developing a persuasive prose style and a corresponding command of slang that broke down the usual social and communications barriers. He also adopted the dress and tastes of his new homeland. The Americanization of Max Ascoli was so quick and complete that this recent arrival could bridge the deep social, intellectual, cultural, and personal gaps that separated liberals from exiles and both from Italian-Americans. As the leader of the Mazzini Society, Ascoli was the linchpin tying together these anti-Fascist c~nstituencies.~~ As their own anti-Fascist commitment grew, American liberals proved to be


the natural allies of the Mazzini Society. Many liberals appreciated the need to provide the American public with accurate information on fascism and raised funds for the Italian-language anti-Fascist press. Other liberals, like Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., were aware of the dangers that an Italian-American fifth column could pose both to the national defense and to the safety of the Italian-American communities and began to look for ways to assure Italian-American loyalty. Liberal journalists and government officials saw that the struggle over Italy's future was a significant part of the larger effort to build a postwar world order inspired by the New Deal. During 1940 and 1941 a coalition of exiles, Italian-American anti-Fascists, and liberals formed around the program of destroying domestic fascism and building a democratic postwar Italy. The process received a powerful stimulus in the late spring when the defeat of France drove a number of forceful personalities with fresh ideas into American exile." The two most important and influential members of this new wave of exiles were Italy's pre-Fascist foreign minister, Count Carlo Sforza, and the journalist Alberto Tarchiani, a former editor of Milan's Corriere della Sera. Tarchiani became secretary of the Mazzini Society. In partnership with Ascoli, he gave direction and vitality to the society and its programs. Sforza, a moderate conservative, immediately made contact with American leaders, starting with Roosevelt. Sforza's message was simple: America, like France, was menaced by the twin threats of the military power of the Axis and a potential (Italian-American) fifth column. To meet these perils, the United States should recognize an Italian government-in-exile composed of democratic anti-Fascists. Italian-Americans would then realize that America opposed Mussolini and fascism and not Italy. A government-in-exile would rally anti-Fascist forces within Italy and create a fifth column in Mussolini's state, correspondinglyweakening the Axis's military power. Sforza also claimed that a government-in-exile would rally support for Roosevelt's defense policies among Italian-Americans and win the Italian communities of Latin America to the cause of the United state^.^' Democratic anti-Fascists, led by the Mazzini Society and American liberals, rallied behind Sforza and his Free Italy program. All reports coming from Italy indicated massive popular discontent with Mussolini and his militarism. Moreover, the Sforza plan offered the United States a way to strike at fascism without military intervention, while giving American policy a more definite anti-Fascist tone. Finally, aid to the exiles would forward liberal objectives on the domestic and bureaucratic fronts. A blow at the pro-Fascist Italian-American leadership (the prominenti) attacked a potential fifth column and oppo-


nents of the philosophy and programs of the New Deal. Aiding the exiles was also a way to attack the cautious policies of the State Department, which liberals believed assisted fascism.52 The best news for the anti-Fascist coalition came from Washington where, during the winter of 1940-41, the Roosevelt administration abandoned its caution and cracked down on the Italian propaganda and espionage apparatus. The president's "Fireside Chat" of 29 December 1940 particularly encouraged anti-Fascist forces. Roosevelt condemned fascism and declared, "The people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis," implying that they deserved to be treated as other victims of Nazi aggre~sion.'~ When Italy retaliated against American actions by closing American consulates in southern Italy, the United States first closed selected Italian consulates and limited the movements of Italian personnel, then expelled the Italian naval attache and seized Italian ships in United States ports. On 14 June 1941, Roosevelt froze Italian, German, and Soviet assets and a few days later shut down all Italian consular, travel, and education offices. In July the United States blacklisted eighteen hundred Latin American firms for dealing with Italy and Germany.54 Buoyed by the actions of the Roosevelt administration, the anti-Fascists mounted campaigns against press and broadcast coverage of Italy. The Mazzini Society organized rallies to display Italian-American support for antifascism and for Roosevelt's defense policies. The society began publishing a weekly news bulletin, Mazzini News, and with British covert funding created the Italian News Service to provide factual information on conditions in Italy and on anti-Fascist plans and operations to both the English- and Italianlanguage press of the United States. The publication of Salvemini's pamphlet, "Italian Fascist Activities in the United States," neutralized the Casa Italiana as a Fascist propaganda weapon. In early February 1941, Assistant Secretary Berle began to push the Free Italy program within the government. Interior Secretary Ickes also befriended Sforza and his cause and brought the count's plan for an Italian-language mass circulation newspaper before a cabinet meeting in late March. The New York Times editorially supported the work of Sforza and Salvemini and called on Italian-Americans to back their efforts.55 The Italian-American community was badly confused by the sudden change in the administration's public attitude toward Italy. A few Italian newspapers and radio stations responded with vitriolic attacks on the president. Most became more discreet in their profascism. Assertive American nationalism gradually displaced aggressive Fascist propaganda in the Italian-language me-


dia. Judge Ferdinand Pecora, one of Pope's allies, announced the formation of a Legion for American Unity to rally the foreign born to the defense of the United States against the totalitarian states.56 Roosevelt encouraged this movement away from association with the Mussolini regime. A series of private warnings to Pope led the most influential of all Italian-Americans to gradually break his ties with fasci~m.~'Fearful of administration actions, disoriented by the loss of their consular ties to Italy, and confused by the sudden reversal of their own leaders and media, most Italian-Americans sullenly awaited the next blow. Roosevelt's moves, the mounting confusion and panic among pro-Fascist Italian-American leaders, and the growth of interventionist sentiment infused the anti-Fascists with confidence. The practical elements needed for the triumph of anti-Fascist politics were coming together in the fall of 1941. Liberals had a secure hold on the nascent national war information apparatus. In spite of considerable conservative influence within the Roosevelt administration, it was carrying out a fairly resolute anti-Fascist policy. Anti-Fascists were aggressively challenging Fascist control of the large American ethnic communities. Isolationism was still strong, but clearly on the defensive. In December 1941, after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declarations of war on the United States by Germany and Italy, the domestic crusade against fascism began in earnest.

American Antifascism at War, 1941-1943 With the United States at war, liberals intensified their support for the Free Italy program of Sforza and, in collaboration with the exiles and Italian-American anti-Fascists, intervened in Italian-American politics to root out Fascist influences. The anti-Fascist coalition focused its attention on three issues: committing the United States government to the political program of Free Italy, gaining control of the Italian-language media, and ensuring fair treatment for six hundred thousand Italian aliens in the United States. In the eighteen months between fall 1941 and spring 1943, American antifascism coalesced and collapsed. Free Italy collapsed first. The central elements in Sforza's programs were the establishment of an Italian Legion and United States recognition for an Italian National Council as a sort of government-in-exile. The legion was to be a volunteer force recruited in the Western Hemisphere and trained in the United States. The National Council would operate like the governing body of


the Free French movement. Sforza claimed that Free Italy would rally democratic Italians behind United States war objectives. However, he also intended to employ the leverage recognition provided to win an American guarantee of Italy's postwar territorial integrity together with a commitment that the Italian people would enjoy a free postwar choice of their form of government.58 Initially, United States officials showed interest in the Sforza program. In the spring of 1942, however, they separately rejected both Free Italy and the Italian Legion. The War Department and the British government raised strong objections to the legion proposal. The British and the Vatican strongly opposed a government-in-exile led by Sforza. Moreover, reports from Latin America indicated that the exiles enjoyed only a very limited support and that Sforza would not be able to recruit many volunteers for his proposed army.59 Shortly thereafter, on 4 April 1942, the Political Planning Committee of the State Department met for the first serious consideration by senior American officials of Italy's fate. State Department planners believed that Italy was on the edge of collapse and that both domestic and foreign policy considerations ruled out any attempt to deal with the Fascist regime to secure a separate peace. The House of Savoy was the most attractive alternative. Although weak, the monarchy remained the only "legitimate authority" capable of carrying out a separate peace. The subcommittee recommended dealing with the monarchy but insisted that any military agreement with King Victor Emmanuel 111"avoid political commitments that might restrict the free choice of the Italian people in the future." It did not consider how the United States could arrange a separate peace with Italy through a deal with the monarchy and the conservative social forces it represented while simultaneously guaranteeing that the Italian people had a free choice of their governmental institutions. Nevertheless, the meeting was a landmark in the evolution of American policy for Italy. For the first time, United States planners dealt with the central political issue of Italian reconstruction: the question of who would govern Italy in the interim between the defeat of fascism and the signing of a peace treaty. Whoever controlled the Italian government in that period would be able to determine the form of its postwar regime.60 In May 1942, Frederick Lyon of the State Department read a message to Prince Ascanio Colonna as the former Italian ambassador prepared to return home on the SS Drottingham during an exchange of interned diplomats. The American note began with assurances that the United States regarded Italy in a "totally different light" from Germany. If Italy acted to withdraw from the Axis alliance and the war, it could count on better and different treatment than a defeated Germany and Japan. Unstated but evident was a warning to the


monarchy: either oust Mussolini or face extinction. General William Donovan, director of the United States intelligence agency, Coordinator of Information, repeated this message to Vatican intermediaries in late May. Roosevelt's personal envoy to the Vatican, Myron Taylor, made the same points in his discussions with Pope Pius XI1 and senior church officials during a visit to Italy in ~eptember.~' American policy was firmly set on the road to a deal with the monarchy. Although Sforza and his allies were aware of growing resistance within the United States government to the Free Italy program, optimism pervaded the anti-Fascist coalition in the spring of 1942. Henry Wallace's widely publicized "Century of the Common Man" speech on 8 May 1942 reinforced the belief that the United States was ready to follow liberal leadership in creating a postwar world order. Wallace's call for American support for popular democratic movements, his rejection of any compromise with the Fascist states, and his insistence on crushing Fascist fifth columns in the Americas were what the anti-Fascists wanted to hear from administration spokesmen. Borgese wrote Tarchiani: "Wallace's discourse . . . seems epoch making." Ascoli noted, "Our war aim . . . is a new deal for the world, the adoption of the main principles and institutions of the American New Deal by the rest of the Moreover, liberals within the Roosevelt administration were orchestrating the first public United States commitments to the creation of a democratic postwar Italy: live radio and press coverage for a meeting on 2 June 1942 of the Mazzini Society and Italian-American Labor Council in Washington. Ascoli presided at this meeting and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave the principal address. Acheson's speech made a clear distinction between fascism and the Italian people and promised special treatment for defeated Italy. These statements, which pleased liberal opinion, were also designed to induce the king to withdraw from the German alliance and the war at the proper moment .63 Shortly after Acheson's speech, the State Department announced its sponsorship for an international congress of anti-Fascist Italians at Montevideo, Uruguay. The United States endorsed Sforza's leadership of the exiles and Free Italy. Welles, however, assured Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Minister in Washington, that American support did not imply any commitment to Free Italy. The Congress of Montevideo was a personal triumph for Sforza, but he won no further concessions from the United States government. Repeated efforts to gain recognition for Free Italy by Sfona and other Italian leaders were politely turned down by the State ~epartment.~"


Meanwhile, the liberals of the Foreign Language Division of the Office of War Information were coordinating the attack on domestic fascism. Under the leadership of Alan Cranston, the Foreign Language Division successfully broke Fascist control of the Italian-language media and protected the rights of Italian aliens, but was unable to turn these triumphs to its advantage. Roosevelt was anxious to rebuild support among Italian-Americans. Other agencies used the prominenti's influence to further their war programs among ItalianAmericans. As a result, the liberal anti-Fascists' campaign was limited to rooting out the most compromised supporters of Mussolini. The prominenti generally escaped punishment for their prewar activities. They won back their influence by cooperating enthusiastically with the war effort in the United States. By the summer of 1942, the administration's political strategy called for creating united front organizations in which the prominenti would join forces with the anti-Fascists. The prominenti, with Pope in the lead, adroitly jumped aboard while the anti-Fascists balked at the proposed alliance. Roosevelt's decision to remove the enemy alien stigma from Italians, which liberals like Cranston and Attorney General Francis Biddle fought through against fierce agency resistance, was announced at a Columbus Day rally organized by Pope. The prominenti were reaping the benefits of liberal efforts.65 The congressional elections of November 1942 signaled a turn to the right by the American electorate. Dozens of New Deal congresspersons were defeated. Within a week anti-Fascist politics received another devastating blow when the successful landings in North Africa were followed by the Darlan Deal. The decision of American civilian and military authorities to return responsibility for the administrationof liberated North Africa to French Admiral Jean Darlan and his collaborationist lieutenants made a mockery of America's proclaimed war aims and spurred an unsuccessful liberal effort to gain control of "civil affairs''-the political and military reconstruction operations in newly liberated areas-which were being carried out by the U.S. Army. Liberal interest in civil affairs grew in the summer of 1942 when both the Office of War Information and the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services prepared plans for influencing political activities in liberated areas. Simultaneously, the liberal-dominated Lend-Lease Administration was laying plans for economic reconstruction. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of the North African invasion force, with the backing of the War Department, insisted on full military control of all operations in the war zone. The Department of State was equally determined to take control of civil affairs management and cooperated with the liberals to break the Army's exclusive control of civil affairs matters.66

32 I N V O L V E M E N T The liberals seized an opening at the end of October 1942 when Roosevelt, upset by reports that the Army's military government school was run by antiadministrationofficers, told Secretary of War Henry Stimson that he would receive a memo that would "curl his hair." The president appointed Wallace, Hull, Agriculture Secretary Claude Wickard, and War Production Administrator Donald Nelson to study the question of who should control civil affairs operations. Jonathan Daniels, an influential liberal aide to the president, and former ambassador William Bullitt were separately commissioned to carry out their own investigation. After visiting the school, Daniels concluded that the military were well intentioned but their program was producing mediocrities. Reconstruction was too important to be left in their hands. Together with such New Deal stalwarts as Wallace, Welles, and David K. Lilienthal, Daniels formulated a proposal for a civilian civil affairs agency.67 In order to head off the creation of an independent, liberal-dominated civil affairs agency, Hull formed the Office of Foreign Territories and named Paul Appleby, a veteran New Deal administrator, to head the new organization. Eisenhower, meanwhile, found that he could not handle civil affairs alone and told Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, "The sooner I can get rid of all those questions that are outside the military in scope the happier I will be." Aided by the outmaneuvered liberals, the State Department established itself as the agency capable of handling civil affairs matters. Appleby was forced out in short order and with him liberal plans for the control of civil affairs.68 War Department and State Department collaboration in civil affairs struck most liberals as a prelude to a conservative postwar reconstruction. Elmer Davis, the Director of the Office of War Information, met with Hull to protest reports that the State Department planning committees favored handing the reconstruction over to reactionaries. Hull angrily replied that Davis, Wallace, and other liberals were only interested in winning the war to produce "worldwide social revolution even at the danger of producing revolution in the United States." This outburst confirmed liberal fears, and they began organizing to prevent a conservative restoration. The Free World Association and Freedom House became meeting grounds where concerned liberals and anti-Fascist exiles coordinated their strategy for countering presumed State Department plans.69 The liberal press continued its withering attack on the State Department and its policies. The Italian-American Labor Council joined the assault, demanding American pledges of the total destruction of the political and military power of Fascist totalitarianism through a complete purge together with a promise that the United States would not deal with either Fascists or Fascist


colIaborators. Roosevelt responded to these demands by promising to root out "quislings and lavals in power anywhere on the earth." When one of his liberal aides suggested that a complete break with Generoso Pope would be a good place to begin the rooting out, the president ignored him.70 As usual, Roosevelt displayed a finer political judgment than many of his liberal supporters. The anti-Fascist coalition was breaking apart. The political and personal quarrels that the anti-Fascists brought from Paris reappeared. The anticlericalism of prominent leaders like Salvemini and Borgese impeded cooperation with anti-Fascist Catholics. The relationship between the Italian-American representatives of the two major United States labor federations, the AFL and the CIO, always tenuous, broke down. The Mazzini Society became divided over its relationship with the Communists. The dissolution of the anti-Fascist coalition began in the summer of 1942 as liberals within the administration began to support a united front with ex-Fascists. In spite of continued efforts by these liberals to suppress suspect Italian-language papers and to revive Free Italy, Italian-American anti-Fascists and exiles saw their ideals and objectives being compromised by an American government in search of military victory and by liberals who put their loyalty to the administration's military objectives above their commitment to antifascism. The final break came when the Office of War Information proposed to establish cooperation not only between antiFascists and prominenti but between these groups and the Communists in an Italian-American Victory Council. Most anti-Fascists refused to join. On 11 January 1943, Carlo Tresca, a leading opponent of the victory councils, was gunned down in New York. The motive for the killing has never been clarified, but anti-Fascists immediately charged the killer was in the pay of either the Communists or Fascists. The Office of War Information became the primary target of their anger. On 14 January, the Mazzini Society condemned the Victory Council strategy. Luigi Antonini denounced both the Victory Council idea and the Office of War Information. The Nation insisted that "no unity with fascists" was possible.71 Cranston defended the strategy as a reaction to the weakness of the antiFascists' position. He claimed that the Victory Council plan would have allowed the anti-Fascists to exploit the prominenti's control of the ItalianAmerican community. He also noted, however, that an unbridgeable gap existed between the goals of the United States government and Italian antiFascists: They have their main interest and roots in Italy, rather than in the United Stztes. This fact enables them to take a non-compromising attitude. . . .


In the United States those judges, publishers, and other Italian-American leaders who were fascist sympathizers before Pearl Harbor are not military enemies, and we can assume that in a post-war United States they cannot be completely discounted in the Italo-American community. We will have to live and work with them.72 The Tresca case and the Victory Council imbroglio destroyed the coalition between anti-Fascists and government liberals at a crucial moment for both parties. The unity of purpose and action that had existed among anti-Fascists and among Italian-American labor leaders was shattered by the issue of cooperating with the Communists. Similarly, communism was the key issue dividing Italian anti-Fascists from liberal government officials. The Darlan Deal and charges that the Office of War Information's propaganda line to Italy lacked an anti-Fascist content created a fissure between the liberal anti-Fascist press and liberals within the Office of War Information and the State Department. In 1943, these splintered factions were easy prey for revived conservatism. Nevertheless, the anti-Fascists had achieved a number of their goals. Americans were publicly debating United States war aims. This debate solidified a national consensus for stabilization politics: intervention by the United States to build a peaceful postwar order based on democracy and free trade economics. In 1943, the Roosevelt administration slowly adjusted to the new national mood. The issue of what treatment to mete out to the Fascist regimes moved to the forefront of the war aims debate. The actions of anti-Fascists played a major role in destroying fascism's hold on the Italian-American community even before Pearl Harbor, and Italian-American leaders abandoned their ties with the Mussolini regime. Their lobbying effort led to public and governmental discussion of the future of Italy. Moreover, the Roosevelt administration had made a number of important if limited commitments regarding Italy's political reconstruction. These commitments were quickly put to the test. In the early months of 1943, the Anglo-American debate on European theater military strategy ended with an agreement to invade Italy.

Chapter 2 The Politics of Surrender, January-October 1943

The future of Italy became a primary concern for American policymakers in the spring of 1943. The slow advance of Allied armies across North Africa (September 1942-May 1943) eliminated the possibility of a cross-Channel attack on France in 1943 and made an invasion of Italy a more attractive prospect. Allied troops landed in Sicily on I0 July 1943 and after a six-week campaign drove German forces off the island. On 3 September 1943, the British Eighth Army crossed from Sicily to the Italian mainland and began its drive up the boot. The Italian government signed a secret armistice agreement with the Allies on the same day. The,Italian surrender was announced on 8 September, hours before the U.S. Fifth Army began landing operations at Salerno. German resistance was fierce and the outcome of the battle was in doubt for over a week. Finally, the arrival of the British Eighth Army permitted the Allied forces to drive off the Germans and advance on Naples, which was liberated on 30 September 1943. The Allies then continued their advance toward Rome until they ran into the Gustav line, a powerful series of German fortifications less than a hundred miles south of Rome. The offensive bogged down. Nevertheless, more than one-third of Italy was now under the control of Allied Military Government, and the political and economic reconstruction of Italy was underway. Meanwhile, the policy debate in the United States over postwar stabilization concluded with the defeat of the more advanced liberal programs. The State Department emerged as the agency that would carry out an American program of stabilization. American programs, which held a middle position between British plans for a conservative reconstruction carried out by the Italian right

36 I N V O L V E M E N T and the demands of the left for a radical restructuring of Italy's economy and constitution, won the support of an ever widening body of American and Italian moderates.

Roosevelt and Postwar Reconstruction In 1943, the ideological struggle between New Deal antiFascists and American conservatives entered its decisive phase. From the November 1942 congressional elections to the ouster of Henry A. Wallace and Surnner Welles in the late summer of 1943, liberalism sustained one severe defeat after another. A corresponding decline in liberal influence over policymaking opened the way for the conservative pragmatists of the Department of State to claim control over long-range American policymaking. During the same months, Italian-American antifascism crumbled and a new alignment of labor leaders and ex-Fascist prominenti emerged, based on a common fear of a Communist-dominated Italy. During the critical negotiations for Italian surrender and the initial phases of military government and defascistization, United States policy was heavily influenced by the objectives of four powerful conservative interests-the Army, the State Department, the Vatican, and the British-and lacked powerful counterpressure from the left. With their political fortunes at a nadir, liberals turned to Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish a just postwar order. In spite of major differences with other liberals on the conduct of the war, Roosevelt, too, aspired to a postwar order in which the United States would play the dual role of predominant power and model for social and political reconstruction.' The president, however, was more aware than his liberal critics of the limits of American power. He operated daily in a system of domestic and foreign alliances that greatly restricted his ability to achieve his political goals. Reconstructing the postwar world would require cooperation with existing political and social forces. A policy of confrontation would divide the Allies, reinforce the tendency toward spheres of influence, and quickly drive the United States back into isolation. Thus, Roosevelt sought to preserve the domestic and foreign coalitions the United States formed to wage the war and through them to create a stable postwar order. At home, too, Roosevelt sought the role of mediator. Social reform was temporarily suspended to accommodate conservatives in the war coalition government, but the president repeatedly warned his new partners that the end of the war would usher in a new era of domestic reform. While Roosevelt

P O L I T I C S O F S U R R E N D E R 37

rejected the advice of Wallace and others to wage the war on a narrow ideological base, he never abandoned the liberal vision of the postwar world.2 Instead, the wartime coalition became a school in which Roosevelt broadened the acceptance of reform liberalism's achievements and objectives. Isolationism remained the great threat to Roosevelt's plans for postwar domestic reform and world reconstruction. The dramatic conversion of a majority of Americans from isolationism to internationalismrepeated Wilson's 1917-18 experience, and Roosevelt, like most internationalists, doubted the depth or endurance of public support for American involvement abroad. He was convinced that there was only a limited time to achieve a reconstruction conducive to a stable peace before America's traditional isolationism reasserted itself. He realized that American ability to influence reconstruction would reach its height at the end of hostilities, when American armies occupied large areas of Europe and Asia and American war production supplied the needs of liberated areas and of Allies. American influence would quickly diminish as domestic pressures forced a rapid demobilization of the military and the dismantling of governmental control of the economy. With this in mind, Roosevelt opted for quick political surgery rather than the infinitely more complex, expensive, and time-consuming restructuring programs of Wallace and other liberals. He planned to liquidate Fascists, Nazis, and collaborationist leaders; introduce democratic governments; break up economic cartels; and offer interim economic aid to war ravaged nations. Roosevelt expected to leave the rest of the reconstruction process to the new democratic governments the United States would create. Governments dependent on American assistance to feed and employ their populations could be counted on to abandon restrictive trade practices.3 Roosevelt understandably overrated American isolationist sentiment. In common with most American officials, he also underrated the extent of damage the war would do to world economic structure. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's basic intuitions were sound. The countervailing pressures of British allies, the Vatican, and major American corporations and banks exerted definite limits to the degree of American intervention in the reconstruction process. Further, Roosevelt was certainly correct in believing that domestic pressures for demilitarization and decontrol would quickly remove major bargaining tools from the United States. Finally, Roosevelt's primary objective had to be military victory. Neither the domestic coalition government nor the Allies would hold together if he defined American objectives to suit his liberal supporters. Roosevelt responded to the liberals' pressure within limits that would not threaten the unity of his domestic and international coalitions.

38 INVOLVEMENT

Italy was the first major reconstruction problem in which Roosevelt could measure both his objectives and his technique of mediation. The British regarded Italy as a testing ground for their military strategy and postwar political plans. The Soviet Union and the Vatican, two key elements in Roosevelt's postwar domestic and foreign strategy, had important interests in Italy's future. At home, the Catholic church, the Italian-American community, and a number of banks and corporations closely followed events in Italy. Finally, American liberals developed a lively interest in Italian affairs precisely because Italy represented the first concrete test of American policy and intentions. From late 1942 to the last day of his life, Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly intervened to direct Italian policy and to mediate among varying interest groups. These interventions revealed a good deal about the validity of Roosevelt's plans for reconstruction and the American role in it. The United States quickly abandoned the role of mediator for that of advocate: a development that Roosevelt's domestic constituencies warmly applauded. In late 1942, in the wake of the first substantial Italian peace feelers, Roosevelt began considering Italy's immediate future. In November 1942, when it appeared that the American military advance would soon clear German and Italian troops out of North Africa, Roosevelt cabled Stalin that a quick victory would further undermine Mussolini, and that after the Italians had "a taste of some real bombing" the Fascist government would collapse and Italy would quit the war. Following an Italian collapse, further military operations in the Mediterranean would be unnecessary and Allied resources could be massed for a cross-Channel inva~ion.~ Roosevelt instructed Myron Taylor to build pressure for a separate peace on the Italian government through the Vatican. As part of this pressure campaign, Roosevelt responded to the entreaties of the Vatican and United States Catholics by authorizing negotiations to secure an open city status for Rome, exempting it from the threat of Allied bombing. On 11 December 1942, the Holy See informed the United States that it was proposing to the Italian government that it leave Rome. When the Fascist government formally agreed that Mussolini and the Italian army would leave the city, the Vatican sought a German commitment to remove its force^.^ Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, was surprised, delighted, and perplexed at the success of Roosevelt's initiative: "This [is] great fun! We know Germans are trying to stop it. If they succeed, they will have the responsibility and we can make oceans of bad blood." However, the British did not want to grant Rome open city status. Cadogan worked up a list of conditions designed to produce an Italian rejec-

POLITICS O F S U R R E N D E R 39

tion. When the United States objected to presenting these demands and the Germans agreed to withdraw, the British raised other technical objections to stall Roosevelt's initiative and prevent Rome from becoming an open city.6 .At the Casablanca Conference (14-24 January 1943), Roosevelt tried to create a liberal war policy by mediating between American and British strategic plans and by trading concessions on military matters for political ones. The major military issue was British insistence on continuing operations in the Mediterranean by attacking Sicily or Sardinia with the objective of knocking Italy out of the war. The United States gave way, abandoning its plans for a late 1943 cross-Channel attack on France. On political and diplomatic issues relating to Italy, Roosevelt got his way. Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed that the British would not bomb Rome without prior approval from the United States and accepted a policy of unconditional surrender designed in part to assuage the president's liberal critics. In the first case, Roosevelt conceded little. He was less attached to a 1943 crosskhannel offensive than his military chiefs, prefemng with Churchill plans that allowed for greater opportuni~m.~ Rome's status was another matter. The Pope had informed United States officials that if the Allies bombed the city, he would make a public protest designed to arouse Catholic displeasure. A papal protest was likely to have particularly bad effects in politically sensitive Catholic Latin America. Roosevelt's demand for the unconditional surrender of the Axis states would reestablish his anti-Fascist credentials after stinging liberal criticism of the Darlan Deal. In explaining the meaning of unconditional surrender to the press, Roosevelt also indicated that existing American commitments would be maintained. This statement was designed to reassure both American liberals and Italian monarchist^.^ These presidential gestures, although welcomed by liberals, were not particularly effective. Roosevelt's efforts to tie the Vatican to his postwar schemes troubled his liberal lieutenants, who feared that under Vatican influence the United States would install authoritarian, conservative regimes in liberated Europe. Wallace warned Roosevelt 'that Catholics were allying with other reactionaries to take over the Democratic party before the 1944 election^.^ Liberal press attacks on administration conduct of the war mounted after Casablanca. With a SiciIian invasion in the planning stages, the probability of invading the Italian mainland grew. The British, who claimed predominance in Italian affairs, decided to solidify their claim by taking control of the civil affairs administration of Sicily. In February 1943, Eisenhower proposed a joint and


equal partnership in the administration of the occupation. The British countered in early March with a proposal that would place Sicily under a British military administration. The U.S. War Department appealed to Roosevelt ta assert United States primacy. Roosevelt seized on the issue, which offered him a chance to ensure fair treatment for occupied Italy and to establish United States claims to parity in Italian policymaking. He cabled Churchill that an Allied military government should be as American in character as possible: and he rejected the notion of a "senior partner." At the same time, Roosevelt toughened a State Department proposal on purging Fascists and rejected the department's suggestion that the United States offer special treatment to the Italian monarchy. He also revised the portions of the draft dealing with antiFascist exiles to recognize their claims to participate in Italy's postsurrender administration.lo A month later, Churchill arrived in Washington with his retinue of advisors for the fourth major wartime conference of the Western Allies (12-15 May 1943). This time the British wanted an American commitment to knock Italy out of the war. Churchill and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, argued that a successful invasion of Italy would put such a terrific strain on German manpower that the Nazis would abandon the peninsula. Corresponding Allied military and economic investment would be small. The Allies needed to take control of a few key ports and air bases within Italy, the British argued, leaving administration of the rest to a post-Fascist Italian government under Allied supervision. American leaders were skeptical. The president doubted that an Italian campaign would drain German manpower. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall noted that estimates for military operations were always low and an invasion of Italy would consume the troops and supplies needed for a cross Channel assault. Berle and Welles worried that British plans for a postsurrender government called for fascism without Mussolini. Welles also feared that British plans for Italy were simply the first step in a program for British control of the whole Mediterranean. The American military's attitudes on the critical issue of post-Fascist government were equally disturbing to administration liberals. In April, the Office of Strategic Services had questioned the treatment that the War and Navy Department civil affairs manuals gave to defascistization and democracy. Both sets of instructions indicated that military government should attempt only minimal changes in institutions and personnel. The General Administrative Instructions issued by Allied Force Headquarters also left wide latitude for the retention of compromised individuals.l 2

''

POLITICS OF S U R R E N D E R 41

This conference repeated the Casablanca pattern: the British gained a reluctant American commitment to further military operations in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt, meanwhile, publicly reiterated his commitment to a clean sweep of Fascists; however, his statements failed to satisfy anti-Fascists. Roosevelt's sensitivity about this issue was evident when Eisenhower, who favored any deal with the Italians that would gain his military objectives, suggested that the Italians be promised "honorable terms." Roosevelt was "incensed," and Eisenhower beat an embarrassed retreat. l 3 Roosevelt was simultaneously trying to coax Italian conservatives to overthrow Mussolini, to arrive at policy agreement with the British, and to maintain his commitment to a purge. In June Allied forces seized the small Italian island of Pantelleria as a prelude to the invasion of Sicily. In a press conference comment on the island's surrender, Roosevelt tried to walk the tightrope between Italian, British, and domestic objectives. He began by separating Mussolini's regime and the Italian people, blaming the war on the former. His condemnation was so focused on Mussolini, however, that King Victor Emmanuel I11 and his clique could logically conclude that they were not included. To balance this, the president reiterated American commitment to a free postwar choice of political institutions by the Italians.14 Although these tactics failed to satisfy the president's domestic critics, Roosevelt was unwilling to commit the United States to the thorough purge anti-Fascists demanded because the political and military costs were too high: abandoning any hope of a conservative coup against Mussolini and accepting higher casualties as the price for achieving liberal ideological objectives without broad popular support. Furthermore, both the British and the Vatican opposed this course. The Western coalition might break down and with it hopes for military victory and postwar stabilization. Therefore, the best Roosevelt could offer anti-Fascists were promises that top Fascist leaders would be punished. Privately he pressed Churchill for the broadest possible purge of the Italian administration and their replacement by Allied Military Government officials. This policy might reduce domestic criticism of Allied policy and give both the Allies and the Italians a breathing space during which antiFascist forces in Italy could organize themselves and assume control of the government.l5 Even Roosevelt's limited anti-Fascist program was obstructed by the British as well as by his own bureaucracy. Churchill stoutly opposed Roosevelt's plans for a broad purge of the Italian administration, arguing that it would overburden Allied resources. He suggested that the extent of the purge be left to Eisenhower, who had already proposed a very limited purge to the Joint Chiefs


of Staff. Churchill and Marshall visited Eisenhower in Algiers at the end of May, and the British prime minister convinced both men to reconsider bombing Rome, just as the Vatican was again raising the issue of open city status. Further problems arose from the State Department where Breckinridge Long and other conservatives were agitating for ending the administration's foreign nationalities programs just when Sforza was exercising a moderating influence on already angry fellow exiles and liberals. In addition, leaks to the press indicated strong pockets of resistance within the State Department to Roosevelt's application of the unconditional surrender formula to Italy. l6 Roosevelt decided to crack down on the State Department professionals, a move sure to please liberals while relieving long accumulated presidential frustrations with the department's opposition to his policy of cooperation with the USSR. Under S e c r e h Welles efficiently carried out a purge of some of the most important career diplomats. l7

The State Department and Italy's Future In spite of Roosevelt's purge, the fortunes of the Department of State dramatically reversed during 1943, and it slowly recovered a predominant role in the creation of American foreign policy. The department's role in policymaking had declined after the outbreak of the war. Roosevelt never liked the department's top echelon of professional diplomats, viewing them as a closed circle that aped the political views 'and lifestyles of the reactionary European upper classes. He particularly resented their efforts to restrain his personal diplomacy. As long as the department controlled the flow of critical information from abroad, it retained its influence on policy. Moreover, Secretary of State Cordell Hull possessed vast political influence and was a skilled bureaucratic infighter. The spread of the war through Asia and Europe in 1940 and 1941 drastically reduced the number of operating United States embassies and consulates and, thus, the ability of the department to control and color the information the president received. Roosevelt, meanwhile, increased his independence by establishing a communications staff and an informal' foreign policy advisory group within the White House." Recognizing the importance of possessing a broad body of information and expertise, department officials acted in the early days of the war to control both. Under Secretary of State Welles recommended creating a group of postwar study committees. Members were drawn from the highest ranks


of the department and from influential private citizens. The Subcommittee on Political Problems, for example, was chaired by Welles and included Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins; Hamilton Fish, editor of the prestigious magazine Foreign Affairs; Anne O'Hare McCormick, the New York Times's resident expert on foreign policy; and Myron Taylor. From early 1942 to mid- 1943, these committees moved from broad discussions of the postwar world to detailed studies of specific problems of reconstruction. They created a body of coherent policy recommendations and detailed supporting studies, which would powerfully influence American decisions both during and after the war. The value of this kind of work was dramatically pointed out to the Americans at Casablanca, where they were humiliated by the better prepared British. l9 Thereafter, Roosevelt might freely ignore specific recommendations, but he did not overlook the existence of this body of information and policy recommendations in preparing for international conferences. After Roosevelt's death, the inexperienced Truman would be more dependent on this staff work. These advisory bodies paid immediate dividends for the State Department. The influential citizens who had a hand in shaping policy recommendations backed the department in its bureaucratic and political struggles while simultaneously building public support for its policies. In July 1943, Hull suspended the groups' operations as part of a power struggle with Welles. Once he ousted Welles, however, Hull formed new advisory bodies made up entirely of department professionals. The planning groups had proven their worth. Late in 1942, the department's planning committees began an intensive study of Italy, focusing on the makeup of a postsurrender interim government. Taylor had just returned from extensive talks with Vatican and British officials on a post-Fascist Italian government and on the best methods for forcing Italy out of the war. In addition to sounding out Vatican opinions on a postsurrender government, Taylor discouraged Papal efforts to play middleman in a negotiated peace. Vatican officials warned of the danger of a Communist revolution in the aftermath of Fascist colIapse. They underlined the consequent need for the monarchy to play a role in a post-Fascist government and for an Allied military presence in Italy. Vatican officials also urged the Allies not to bomb Rome. In subsequent discussions with Churchill and Roosevelt, Taylor stressed that by avoiding air attacks on Rome, the United States would improve its position with the Vatican, with the Italian people, and with those now large segments of the Italian government that wanted to oust Mussolini and end the alliance with Germany. In planning committee meetings and in private talks with department members, Taylor argued for a policy statement favoring a


regency in Italy during the interim between Fascist collapse and a new constitutional order.20 Discussions within the Territorial Subcommittee during December 1942 centered on the vital question of which Italian groups would receive United States support after fascism was overthrown. A new generation of anti-Fascists had grown up in Italy with few ties to the exiles. The subcommittee concluded that conservative interests would dominate the first stages of the post-Fascist era. They controlled the most powerful economic, social, and political institutions in Italy and through this control were in a position to carry out a coup.21 When the Political Subcommittee met on 2 January 1943, news of Italian peace feelers gave greater urgency to its discussions of a postwar peace settlement and the need for public support of an interim Italian government. Taylor and Ann O'Hare McCormick both argued strongly for dealing with King Victor Emmanuel I11 after Mussolini's removal. Assistant Secretary of State Berle agreed, adding that there was a big difference between dealing with the monarch and with fascism. Welles, however, remarked that a deal with the king might conflict with the previous commitment of a free postwar institutional choice by the Italian people. James T. Shotwell, a leading internationalist, endorsed Welles's viewpoint and warned of a major liberal backlash if a Darlan Deal took place in ~ t a l ~ . ~ ~ A compromise was reached in the Territorial Subcommittee, which recommended that the monarchy be allowed to form an interim government supported by the most powerful institutions in Italy: the industrialists, the military, and the Vatican. The subcommittee also recommended, however, that the House of Savoy be placed under Allied supervision and that representative government be reestablished. The Political Subcommitteebegan detailed studies of the workings of the Italian constitution to determine how a state structure responsive to the popular will could be created during the interim period of Allied ~upervision.~~ Roosevelt later introduced modifications, but the State Department had laid the basis for wartime American political reconstruction policy by midJanuary 1943. Six months later, the question of an interim government for Italy was preoccupying Allied leaders. Tied to the public and governmental debate over the future role of the House of Savoy was the politically charged issue of the extent to which the purge of fascism would be carried out in Italy. State Department planners were still concerned that having surrendered, the king would use his position to block the people's free choice of governmental institutions. This concern was heightened by Eisenhower and Churchill's repeated recommendations that the Allies collaborate with any authority offering


surrender. State Department policy recommendations stressed the need for the military to "avoid political commitments that might restrict the free choice of the Italian people in the future." At the same time, the committee reaffirmed its support for a deal with the monarchy and rejected the exiles as an alternative postsurrender g ~ v e r n r n e n t . ~ ~

Mussolini's Fall and I t s Impact In July 1943, events in Sicily and Italy built to a climax. Italian resistance on the island quickly crumbled, and German troops only delayed Allied victory for a few weeks. On 18 July, Eisenhower recommended that the Allied armies cross into Italy as soon as possible after the conquest of Sicily to knock Italy out of the war and draw German forces away from the Russian front. The following day five hundred Allied bombers struck at military targets in and around Rome while Hitler and Mussolini met at Feltre in northern Italy. The Italian general staff hoped Mussolini would convince Hitler that Italy had to withdraw from the war. The ill and weary Duce received a dressing down for Italian failures together with promises of additional German military aid. The twin shocks of the bombing and of Mussolini's failure to find a way out of the war finally drove King Victor Emmanuel I11 to take action against the dictator.25 On the night of 24-25 July 1943, the Fascist Grand Council voted to strip Mussolini of his control of military affairs and requested that the king assume responsibility for the conduct of the war. The Grand Council's resolution provided the king with the pretext he needed. On the afternoon of 25 July, he requested the dictator's resignation. A few minutes thereafter Mussolini was arrested and spirited out of Rome. Marshal Pietro Badoglio replaced Mussolini. Mussolini's fall produced immediate reaction in the United States. It acted as a catalyst solidifying a dominant new political grouping within the ItalianAmerican community. The most powerful element within the anti-Fascist coalition coalesced with the most important prominenti and reordered ItalianAmerican political priorities. Deepening mistrust between Italian-American AFL and CIO leaders had matured into open warfare by the first days of the spring of 1943 as Allied victories in North Africa brought the fall of fascism ever closer. Luigi Antonini and his anti-Communist lieutenant, Vanni Montana, feared that the United States would compromise with the old regime and that exiles associ-

48 INVOLVEMENT

ated with Communists would be given major roles in a post-Fascist government. Montana was the head of the Italian Socialist Federation of the United States, a small group of exiles who maintained ties to the anti-Communist faction of the Italian Socialist party (PSI). Montana and Antonini wanted to establish this wing as the dominant element within the party and to swing American support behind it. With American backing the PSI could then carry out a democratic and anti-Communist reconstr~ction.~~ Montana and Antonini next gained control of the Mazzini Society and made it a rallying point for their anti-Communist politics. In March 1943, Tarchiani and Cianca resigned their positions in the Mazzini Society. Ascoli tried to reorganize the society around new faces and thereby attract greater participation by American liberals. When this effort failed, he decided to step down. On 9 May 1943, with the acquiescence of the outgoing leadership, Antonini secured the election of a hand-picked slate of national leaders at a special meeting of the Mazzini Society and removed CIO chief August Bellanca from the leadership. Clashes between Italian-American labor leaders loyal to Bellanca and those who followed Antonini broke out in a number of other organizations. However, the poorly organized Italian-American left was unable to challenge effectively Antonini's growing power or his subsequent moves. " After consolidating his hold on the Mazzini Society, Antonini sought allies for his anti-Communist crusade on the right. Ignoring pressure from fellow anti-Fascists, Antonini never cut his ties with Generoso Pope. When communism replaced fascism as the immediate concern of Antonini and Montana, Pope began to figure prominently in their plans. While Antonini controlled important pressure groups, Pope's mass circulation Italian-language newspapers could rally the Italian-American rank and file. Moreover, Pope had for some time played the role of devoted anti-Fascist and saw eye to eye with Antonini on the Communist threat to Italy. Finally, both men were committed to Roosevelt and his policies.28 Efforts to create a united Italian-American organization capable of bringing strong pressure on the Italian policy decisions of the administration were already underway. The most active organizers were Dr. Frank B. Gigliotti* leader of the San Francisco Sons of Italy, and Judge Felix Forte, national head of the Sons of Italy. Both men were close to Pope and Antonini. News of the invasion of Sicily (10 July 1943) intensified these efforts. On 19 July 1943, Antonini issued a call for an autumn meeting in New York under ItalianAmerican Labor Council auspices of all Italian-American organizations for the purpose of unifying Italian-American support behind a democratic government for ItalyeZ9Pope immediately backed the effort in his papers.


Mussolini's ouster shattered the last elements of the anti-Fascist coalition. On 26 July 1943, Antonini, Pope, and their allies formed the American Committee for Italian Democracy at a hastily called but well attended meeting in New York City. Judge Ferdinand Pecora, a Tammany Hall Democrat with a blemish-free personal record and close ties to Pope, was elected chairman. Gigliotti was the secretary. Antonini was vice chairman and Pope became treasurer. 30 The American Committee for Italian Democracy was an uneasy marriage of ex-Fascists and moderate anti-Fascists who shared the objectives of stopping communism in Italy and providing relief supplies for the Italian people. While bitter infighting and factionalism left Italian-American anti-Fascists politically weakened, the prominenti transformed themselves into anti-Mussolini Italian nationalists. They exerted pressure on the Roosevelt administration in favor of Italian territorial integrity and played significant roles in military government planning for I t a l ~ . ~ ' The American Committee for Italian Democracy immediately built a national base, establishing chapters in ten states by early August with the editorial support of the Hearst Press and the influential Catholic anti-Fascist weekly La Voce del Popolo. On 12 August 1943, Pecora Ied a delegation, including Antonini and Pope, to Washington for meetings with representatives of the Departments of State, War, and Treasury and with the President's War Relief Board. The American Committee requested exclusive control over the collection and shipment of relief to Italy. Government officials were generally friendly but avoided a ~ o m m i t r n e n t . ~ ~ Antonini's alliance with Pope destroyed the last shreds of unity among Italian-American anti-Fascists on the eve of Italy's surrender and weakened domestic opposition to a deal with King Victor Emmanuel 111. Moreover, on the same day that the Pope-Antonini alliance created the American Cornmittee, the liberal anti-Fascists of the Office of War Information suffered a crushing defeat. By the summer of 1943 the Office of War Information was a badly battered shadow of the agency that had set out eighteen months earlier to commit the nation to an anti-Fascist war. The Tresca incident was just the first of a series of onslaughts. During the spring, internal warfare convulsed the agency. Then conservative congresspersons, who saw the Office of War Information as a New Deal propaganda mill, tried to destroy the agency. The House cut out the entire appropriation for the agency's domestic budget. The Senate restored enough money to alIow the Domestic Branch continued existence, but severely limited its operations. Although they failed to destroy the agency, its congressional enemies were able to further diminish its influence. An investi-


gation of another liberal stronghold, the Federal Communications Commission, was chaired by Eugene Cox, a demagogic Georgia congressman. Cox's investigation gave the Italian- and German-American enemies of the Office of War Information a platform to attack the agency. Ex-Fascists charged that the Office of War Information used illegal and repressive means against them, while the conservative press roundly battered the agency.33 Then in midJuly Roosevelt ousted Wallace from his position in the economic warfare structure after his repeated clashes over reconstruction policy with Jesse Jones, the conservative Secretary of Commerce, became public. Roosevelt merged their economic warfare responsibilities with the Lend-Lease Administration into a new centralized agency, the Foreign Economic Administration, with Leo Crowley, a conservative Roosevelt loyalist, in charge. Wallace's lieutenants held prominent positions within the new agency, but liberals had lost their bid to control economic reconstruction. Despite these setbacks, the liberals in the Office of War Information's Overseas Branch continued their efforts to give United States war aims a definite anti-Fascist character. The beginning of civil affairs operations in Sicily heightened liberal concern about the direction reconstruction was taking. The first indications of the president's intentions came on 16 July 1943 in a Roosevelt-Churchill manifesto to the Italian people. The two leaders stressed Fascist responsibility for the war, demanded unconditional surrender, and urged Italians to overthrow Mussolini in order to save themselves. For liberals, the key passage in the manifesto was its statement on fascism: "We are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position." Percy Winner, a top Office of War Information policymaker, suggested that liberals seize this opportunity to force the United States to adopt a clearly anti-Fascist policy in its Italian civil affairs operations.34 Within a week the king removed Mussolini. Badoglio, the new prime minister, pledged to continue the war, but Allied leaders were convinced that the new regime would try to negotiate Italy's way out of the conflict. Hull told his colleagues at the State Department to avoid taking any action that might weaken the new government's shaky hold on power. Churchill took the same line.35 No one, however, informed the Office of War Information. Its special guidance on the Italian situation, issued 25 July 1943, stressed that the United States objective was the destruction of fascism whether headed by Badoglio or Mussolini, outlined Badoglio's past collaboration with fascism, and warned


that the end of Mussolini's rule did not mean the end of fascism. A shortwave broadcast by the Office of War Information that evening referred to Victor Emmanuel as the "moronic little king" and to Badoglio as a "high ranking fascist." This effort to undermine the new regime offered the agency's conservative opponents a chance to end liberal control of American propaganda. Roosevelt disowned the statement at a press conference the following day and agency enemies, led by Arthur Krock of the New York Times, had a field day attacking the agency. Coming while the Cox investigation was focusing on charges of agency misconduct, the "moronic little king" episode forced the Office of War Information to abandon its anti-Fascist objective^.^^

Armistice Politics The fall of Mussolini and the probability that Italy would seek an armistice found the Allies only partially prepared. Anglo-American officials needed to determine how to elicit a quick Italian surrender and precisely what terms they would offer the Italians. While these debates were secret, Italy's pIight was not. United States policy regarding Italy was being closely monitored by the press. American public opinion was increasingly restive for precise indications of United States war and postwar objectives. One reason for the lack of policy statements was the degree of disagreement between the United States and Britain over Italy. In midJune the British submitted a draft of surrender terms that not only failed to meet the unconditional surrender criterion but also required the Allied Commander in Chief to recognize the Italian government. The Americans countered with a tough draft that called for imposing an Allied Military Government over all Italy and suspending the powers of the Italian regime. This plan was rejected by the British and drawn-out negotiations over a comprehensivedoctrine began in the Combined Civil Affairs C ~ m m i t t e e . ~ ~ Eisenhower, meanwhile, was promoting his own plan to entice a quick surrender through the offer of generous terms. Eisenhower was convinced that attempting to govern Italy directly would place an unmanageable burden on Allied manpower and economic resources. He was also sure that after the Italian government surrendered, he could employ its existing administration, less a few top Fascists, to run the country. Because he was the individual most likely to receive an Italian offer to negotiate, Eisenhower urged a quick decision by the American and British governments on terms and requested authority to deal with any Italians able to guarantee a surrender. The Allied

SO I N V O L V E M E N T

Commander in Chief also proposed a broadcast to Italy praising the Italian people and the House of Savoy for ousting Mussolini, promising honorable terms, and designating the king as the man to speak for Italy.38 The broadcast idea was rejected by both Washington and London. Meanwhile, Churchill and Roosevelt and their top civilian and military advisors were hammering out a common policy. Churchill wanted to take advantage of any Italian offer and argued that the sole criterion should be the ability of the Italian government to "deliver the goods." He focused attention on the military advantages the Allies would gain from Italy's capitulation. The British argued that it was impossible for an Allied Military Government to administer Italy without {he cooperation of the Italian government and state bureaucracy. The Allies should maintain the Victor Emmanuel-Badoglio regime and limit any purge of the government or bureaucracy. This view enjoyed support in the U.S. War Department and among influential conservative newspapers and columnist^.^^ The State Department took a noncommittal public position on a possible deal with the monarchy and Badoglio regime. Secretary of State Hull referred specific questions about the situation in Rome to the War Department and the White House. The president, as usual, steered a course to the left of his military advisors without satisfying liberals. In his "Fireside Chat" of 28 July 1943, Roosevelt reiterated that Italy would have to accept unconditional surrender. He promised, "We will have no truck with Fascism in any way, in any shape or manner. We will permit no vestige of Fascism to remain." He again pledged that the Italian people would have a free choice of their government after liberation. Finally, Roosevelt warned that the war in Italy would continue until the Italians offered their surrender. Two days later, however, the president sharply narrowed his definition of fascism. He told reporters that he would accept Italy's surrender from anyone who was not "a definite member of the fascist government," adding that "a King or a present Prime Minister7'met his criterion of non-Fascists. The important thing was to end armed opposition and "avoid anarchy," and he would deal with any Italian government capable of achieving these goals.40 Roosevelt's performance produced a storm of liberal criticism. Gaetano Salvemini summed up their reaction: "One wonders what the President means by the word 'fascism.' If he means Mussolini, 'one man and one man only,' and 'the symbols of fascism,' it is plain that they will vanish. They are now vanishing. But they are not the whole of 'fascism.' 'Fascism' consists of those Fascist leaders who for twenty years have been accessories to all of Mussoh i ' s crimes. The King is one of them. Badoglio is one of them. Yet the King must remain taboo."41


I. E Stone, writing in the Nation, concluded that American policy was "heading straight for a situation which may some day make the four freedoms seem as much a mockery to the common people of the world as the Fourteen Points."42 Liberals were in no mood to accept Roosevelt's promises that after a period of military control reconstruction could proceed in the direction they favored. During three years of coalition government, liberals had seen their influence on policy eradicated, their leaders ousted from the government, and their hopes for a revival of the New Deal dashed. Meanwhile, conservative strength grew, especially in Congress. In 1943, reactionary congresspersons, allied with conservative journalists and the anti-New Deal leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Civil Service Commission, conducted a "witch hunt" within the federal bureaucracy to drive liberals out of their remaining important positions. The liberals' ability to influence significantly the choice of an interim Italian government reached its lowest point in August. While still reeling from the Wallace debacle, liberal influence on policymaking received another damaging blow when Hull ousted Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. British influence over American policy, meanwhile, reached its apogee.43 Churchill believed that the royal regime in Italy was highly suitable for achieving both British military strategy and its longer term diplomatic and political goals. He told RooseveIt, "My position is that once Mussolini and the Fascists are gone, I will deal with any Italian authority that can deliver the goods. I am not in the least afraid for this purpose of seeming to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio, provided they are the ones who can make the Italians do what we need for our war purposes. These purposes would certainly be hindered by chaos, Bolshevisation, or civil war. We have no right'to lay undue burdens on our troops."44 Roosevelt was receptive to Churchill's reasoning. The president was angry with liberal critics of his policy and ready to deal with the king and Badoglio to achieve Allied military objectives. Roosevelt insisted, however, that following an armistice the Allies make a statement reaffirming the Italian peoples' right of self-determinati~n.~~ Since Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that they would deal with the royal government, Anglo-American policymakers had three important and interrelated issues to resolve: the terms of surrender, the status of the city of Rome, and civilian participation in the occupation. In addition, Allied leaders were looking for ways to prod the slow moving Italians along the road to military capitulation. In Algiers, Eisenhower continued to assume he would receive the first


contacts and pressed for the widest possible authority to conduct talks with the Italians. He also wanted authorization to bomb Rome in order to hasten Italian surrender and to cut enemy lines of communication to the south where Allied landings would take place. Allied Force Headquarters strenuously opposed introducing civilian specialists in the early stages of occupation.46 The British concurred with Eisenhower's proposal to bomb Rome, but rejected his suggestion that he draft the final surrender terms for Italy. Six committees of the British Foreign Office had been hard at work since 25 July 1943 preparing a comprehensive document that would secure the most extensive control possible over a defeated Italian government for a Britishdominated Allied occupation authority. The British also opposed introducing American civilian experts into the military government structure either in Sicily or mainland Italy. On the practical level, the British had already placed their specialists in uniform and believed the United States should do the same. On the policy level, the British wanted to limit the American influence in the occupation. They were well aware that civilian agencies were both more aggressive and more responsive to domestic political pressures than was the United States ~ r m ~ . ~ ~ The American position was firm on two of the three major issues. The American government wished to provide Eisenhower with a set of military armistice terms that left the economic and political controls vague and would allow for the adjustment of the relationship between the Allies and Italian authorities as the political and military situation developed. Roosevelt was equally insistent that civilian specialists be brought into military government as soon as possible after the occupation period began. He continued to distrust the capacity and objectives of the army's civil affairs program.48 American policy on the status of Rome was less firm. Roosevelt wanted to avoid air raids, which would worsen relations with the Vatican at that critical moment. His military advisors, however, wanted to give Eisenhower a free hand with the bombing decision. The Department of State had serious misgivings, but endorsed bombing. At the beginning of August 1943, Roosevelt ordered a last minute cancellation of Eisenhower's plans for an attack on the city after the Vatican resurrected its plan to gain Italian and German withdrawal from the city.49 Churchill responded to this action with a flurry of cables, arguing that granting open city status to Rome would lessen pressure on Badoglio and complicate relations with the suspicious Russian ally, as well as endanger future Allied lines of communications and abandon the principle of unconditional surrender. However, he agreed to postpone further bombing until his scheduled conference with Roosevelt at Quebec in mid-August 1943.~'


Behind these specific concerns were two interallied problems of surpassing importance. British actions after the Casablanca Conference fed American fears that their overriding objective was committing the United States to an exhausting Mediterranean campaign, which would rule out a cross-Channel assault. The other problem was Soviet participation in the Italian surrender. On 30 July 1943, Russian journalist Ilya Ehrenburg told an American reporter that Roosevelt's disavowal of the Office of War Information seriously disturbed Moscow. Ehrenburg bitterly denounced Western failure to consult with the Soviets on Italian affairs and pointedly asked if the Badoglio deal was the prologue to an arrangement with Goering. Since Soviet cooperation was a pillar of Roosevelt's postwar plans, the administration immediately informed the Russian government of its plans and reaffirmed its desire for consultations with the Soviet Union." The rush of events in Italy forced the Allies to compose their differences. Caught between Allied forces to the south and a massing German army in the north, the king and Badoglio wanted either to neutralize their nation or to join the Allies after an invasion of Italy far to the north of Rome. Neither the Allies nor the Germans would consider neutralization. The Allies, moreover, lacked aircraft capable of covering an invasion north of Rome. They continued to insist that the Italians surrender unconditionally on the basis of a vague promise of fair treatment. The Italians, not unnaturally, were reluctant to turn themselves and their nation over to the Allies-especially when the left-wing press in both nations was demanding the punishment of Italian leaders with Fascist pasts. But the royal government realized that time was running out on them. German forces within Italy were being massively reinforced while the bulk of the Italian army was on the Balkan and Eastern fronts. It was only a matter of time before Hitler moved against his untrustworthy ally. To avert a German takeover, the Italians opened informal contacts with the British in Tangiers and Lisbon. They offered to cooperate with the Allies in exchange for military aid against the Germans and a guarantee of the crown's permanence. The Italians warned that the Communists would take over if the Allies failed to help them.52 Allied leaders rejected Italian offers of cooperation. Churchill remarked that until the royal government had "double crossed" the Germans, "the war should be carried forward against Italy in every way that the Americans will allow."53 In mid-August the Italian government unilaterally declared Rome an open city and secretly sent General Giuseppe Castellano to Lisbon with an offer to surrender in return for agreement that Italy would be allowed to fight alongside the Allies against the germ an^.'^ The Italian declaration of Rome's open city status was a bid for Vatican

W INVOLVEMENT

support as well as the effort of a frightened conservative cabal without popular support to stave off social unrest. It came too late to prevent a second AHied raid on Rome, but it brought the Vatican support the Badoglio government desired. Moreover, the intensity of Vatican protests,. which included a papal visit to the bombed areas, effectively ended Allied attacks and secured defacto open city status for ~ o m e . ~ ' News of Castellano's approach in Lisbon arrived just as Churchill and Roosevelt began meeting at Quebec. His offer put additional pressure on American and British leaders to reach agreement on the terms of surrender and on the degree of support they would give to an interim government led by Badoglio and the king. The Americans were more aware than ever of the dangers implicit in backing the royal government. A Department of State briefing paper warned that even temporary cooperation with the Badoglio regime would open a Pandora's box of difficulties for the United States, providing the Soviets with the opportunity to pose as the champion of democratic movements and creating a precedent for establishing or supporting antidemocratic governments in areas the USSR occupied. Moreover, Italian military cooperation would mean Italy's participation at the postwar peace conference, and it would strengthen Italy's claim to restoration of her colonies. To counter these undesirable prospects, Department planners suggested that the United States insert clauses within unconditional surrender terms that would guarantee free elections after the war to decide Italy's form of government and continued Allied supervision of Italy's interim government from the time of surrender until a permanent government was e ~ t a b t i s h e d . ~ ~ The United States proposed that the complete surrender terms include a requirement for supervision of the interim government by the Allies and also for the suspension of the powers of the Italian crown. The British opposed both of these ideas. The U.S. War Department wanted some sort of terms for Eisenhower's use and favored accepting British terms. The State Department, however, was adamant and the discussions stalemated. The Quebec Conference concluded without final Anglo-American agreement on any of the pressing political issues.''

Sforza or Badogllo? The State Department's growing concern with the implications of a policy line it had previously endorsed and its willingness to confront the British and the United States military over political issues led it suddenly to


reverse its policy on the exiles. In August 1943, Sforza had a very chilly interview with Hull. By the end of the month, however, the exile leader's analysis of the Italian situation was gaining acceptance within the department. Sforza warned that by supporting an interim government under the monarchy, the United States would polarize the internal political situation in Italy to the benefit of the Communist party. The pro-American and moderate currents would be unable to rally mass support for a democratic reconstruction if democracy meant the continuation of the discredited royal regime.58 State Department officials realized that the exiles would be a useful tool in the struggle to prevent the royal clique from collaborating with the British and the United States military to place Italy in a political straitjacket for the duration of the war. On 2 September 1943, Sforza met with Assistant Secretary of State Berle, who offered American aid in getting him back to Italy. Two days later Berle informed the British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, of American plans for Sforza's return and bluntly warned that the British could not deny permission to travel to North Africa to a man who enjoyed the backing of "several million Italians here." If the British wanted to stop Sforza, they would have to act publicly and alone. Campbell commented this would be a bad idea. Berle assured Campbell that Sforza's political activities would be subject to military considerations.59 The timing of Sforza's return immediately got caught up in the last stages of the surrender and first stage of occupation. An armistice agreement was finally signed in secret on 3 September 1943 in Sicily. Since the American and British governments still disagreed on economic and political terms for Italy, the armistice was a simple military agreement under which the Italian armed forces surrendered, and the Italian government placed itself and its forces under the full control of the Allied Commander in Chief. However, the text permitted the Allies to impose additional economic and political terms on Italy at a later date. Utilizing this "blank check," the British soon imposed a virtual straitjacket on their defeated enemy.60 Allied commanders, whose invasion forces were strictly limited, tensely awaited Italian actions. Murphy observed that "It is a nice balance in their minds whether we or their German allies will work the most damage and destruction in Italy. They are literally between the hammer and the anvil." The Allied army commander, General Sir Harold Alexander, felt that military success or failure hung on the knife's edge. The German army in Italy was so large, Alexander warned, that if the Italians failed to provide aid, the invaders would probably be defeated, with disastrous effects on English morale. At the


last moment, Badoglio tried to back out on the armistice. Eisenhower's firmness brought Italy back into line. After fierce German resistance to the 9 September 1943 landing at Salerno, Eisenhower and Churchill came to the same conclusions on Italy's future: the military situation in Italy was too perilous to permit any changes in Italy's government. Moreover, Badoglio would carry out his commitments and could be managed. Thus, both men favored strengthening the Italian government's po~ition.~' Sforza's presence in Italy threatened the consolidation of Badoglio's government. In early September 1943, Churchill was in Washington for discussions about the Italian situation and lost no time in bringing up Sforza's return to Italy with Roosevelt. Churchill easily persuaded him that in view of the confused military situation, Badoglio's had to be reinforced. Sforza, Churchill continued, could weaken Badoglio, and if he must be allowed to go abroad, "[He] should go to Eisenhower's Headquarters where he could be strictly controlled and not be loose in the area." Roosevelt agreed to postpone Sforza's trip three to four days to await developments in Italy. On 13 September 1943, Churchill got presidential approval for further delay.62 Meanwhile, on 12 September 1943, German commandos rescued Mussolini from captivity. The formation of a Fascist Republican regime under the aging Duce provided new arguments for reinforcing Badoglio. Eisenhower claimed that "the importance of the Badoglio administration is its unchallenged claim to legitimacy." He suggested that the Allied governments extend some form of recognition to it in return for a broadening of its base through coalition with anti-Fascist parties and a pledge to recognize the decisions of a postwar constituent assembly. The British Foreign Office agreed with this assessment and suggested bringing Sforza "into the fold" by allowing him to return in exchange for his pledge to cooperate with B a d ~ g l i o . ~ ~ At the request of the State Department, Sforza began making conciliatory public statements regarding ~ a d o g l i o Meanwhile, .~~ presidential aide Hany Hopkins intervened to support Sforza's return and the State Department's proposals for reorganizing the Italian government. Hopkins warned Roosevelt that the existing royal government could not "by any stretch of the imagination . . . be considered to represent a democratic regime." He opposed granting formal recognition to Badoglio's ministry, cautioning the president, "it is very easy to recognize these people, but it is awfully hard to throw them overboard later." If Eisenhower needed Italian manpower, he should simply appropriate it and not permit this issue to become the price of recognition, which was an "irretrievable" step. Former New York Lieutenant Governor Charles Poletti, a senior military government official in Italy, reported that the Italians "don't want Badoglio for too Iong" and had no use for King Victor Emman~el.~'


Domestic considerations also played a role in the decision to return Sforza to Italy. In the weeks following the announcement of Italy's surrender, fascism reemerged as an important domestic political issue. Initial reaction to news of the Italian capitulation was favorable, even in the liberal press. However, as soon as liberals realized the United States intended to maintain Badoglio and the king in power, their attacks on administration policy again mounted.66 After the liberation of Naples at the end of September 1943, an alternative to the royal government appeared in a coalition of six anti-Fascist parties under the leadership of the world-renowned philosopher Benedetto Croce. The erratic behavior of the two old men whom the Allies were backing also pointed to the need for action. Badoglio initially declined to sign the Long Armistice, the political and economic conditions that supplemented the terms signed on 3 September 1943. Eventually he signed the new terms on 29 September 1943, but only after the Allies agreed to eliminate the words "unconditional surrender" from the preamble of the document. This cosmetic change could not alter the fact that the Long Armistice represented a nearly total surrender of Italian sovereignty. The Italian government agreed to recognize the Allies' right to occupy its territory and utilize all its available resources to carry on the war against Germany. The entire Italian economy was placed under Allied control. Italy pledged to break diplomatic relations with all Axis states, to surrender Mussoh i , all Fascist leaders, and all war criminals to the Allies for punishment, to release all political prisoners and safely return all Allied prisoners of war, to disband the Fascist Party, to repeal the "racial laws," and to suppress Fascist ideology. Finally, the Italian government agreed to accept the supervision of an Allied Control Commission over its activities. The Long Armistice was a triumph for British policy and was only marginally offset by a letter that Eisenhower presented to Badoglio promising to lighten the armistice's terms as Italy's cooperation and military conditions permitted. Throughout the period of Italy's reconstruction, successive Italian governments would seek to weaken the impact of the treaty's terms on their freedom of action in both the internal political and foreign policy spheres. The ultimate objectives of Italian diplomacy became the freeing of Italy from the restraints imposed first by the 1943 armistices and then by the 1947 peace treaty, and gaining international recognition of Italy's equality in the intemational state system. The king balked at declaring war on Germany, hoping to extract initial concessions from the Allies. He then sent a message to Roosevelt and King George VI, as fellow heads of state, arguing that broadening his government and promising a free postwar institutional choice would be mistakes. He also


indicated his dissatisfaction with Badoglio and suggested that Mussolini's former lieutenant and foreign minister, Dino Grandi, would be an ideal candidate to lead an "anti-fascist A Grandi government was the last thing Roosevelt wanted. Moreover, ignoring widespread popular discontent, neither the king nor Badoglio planned to broaden the ministry through the inclusion of anti-Fascists or to carry out even the most minimal purge of Fascists. Taking their cue from British propaganda, the two old men simply pretended that with Mussolini gone, fascism was no longer a problem.68 The British, too, disliked the king's proposal; they mistrusted Grandi and feared British public reaction. The idea was politely buried. Meanwhile, Sforza finally left the United States for England in the fall of 1943 where he held discussions with British leaders. These talks soon became the subject of a heated controversy. During 1944, the British charged that Sforza reneged on promises he had made to them in October 1943, and twice they vetoed his nomination as Italian foreign minister. British documents show that Sforza made no effort to deceive his hosts and that he gave them good advice, which they failed to Concerned by the challenge that Sforza posed to the status quo and anxious to give the royal government more legitimacy, the British wanted to co-opt Sforza and the anti-Fascist parties into a coalition government under Badoglio. Churchill warned the anti-Fascists to join the king's ministry or face permanent exclusion from the interim g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~ When the British reluctantly agreed that Sforza could return to Italy, Churchill, citing "contradictory" statements, demanded that Sforza be routed through London so that he could test Sforza's loyalty to the Badoglio govemment. The British arranged a chilly reception for Sforza. When British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden suggested sending someone to the airport to meet Sforza, Cadogan demurred: "I don't see why we should make such a fuss of Sforza, who's a dud." After cooling his heels for a week, Sforza was summoned to a meeting with Eden on 8 October 1943. Sforza reaffirmed his readiness to cooperate with Badoglio in the war with Germany and reminded Eden that they shared the common objective of preventing an Italian revolution. The Count added that the British should cultivate non-Communist antiFascists. Sforza refused to participate in a Badoglio government, warning that neither Badoglio nor the king possessed the qualities to lead Italy out of its crisis. He made clear to Eden that he wanted the prime minister's job. Badoglio's government, Sforza concluded, was a "passing phenomenon" and he did not intend to destroy his own credibility by joining it.71


Three days later, Churchill called Sforza in for a stiff lecture. The British prime minister unsuccessfully tried to bully Sforza into agreeing to give his full support to the king and Badoglio. A few days thereafter, Sforza finally returned to ~taly.~* By the time Sforza arrived, Allied officials in Italy realized that the royal Italian government was a major liability. Only a handful of top aides clustered about King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio at their Brindisi refuge. These old, dazed, and discredited former collaborators with fascism were incapable of any decisive action that would rally the Italian people. The king promised to broaden his government but limited his efforts to discussions with a few elderly survivors of the pre-Fascist regime. He delayed declaring war on Germany until 13 October 1943, even though Allied officers warned him that this delay put Italian partisans fighting the Nazis outside the protection of the Geneva Convention on warfare. When Italy finally declared war, the king asked Badoglio to do it. Allied officers would not let King Victor Emmanuel tour occupied areas for fear that violent protests would further damage the shaky standing of his government. Harold Caccia, a British diplomat, visited the king on 17 October 1943 and was treated to a rambling discourse in which the 73-year-old monarch reminisced about events of the past half century and complained that the Allies were trying "to make a Charles I of me."73 Badoglio and his lieutenants were not a great deal more helpful. Badoglio, a skilled intriguer who enjoyed his new position, was incapable of rallying popular support for the war effort. Moreover, although a committed monarchist, he recognized the benefits to the institution of a change of kings. Thus, his relations with Victor Emmanuel were delicate. Generals Roatta and Ambrosio, Italy's top officers, were so tainted by their Fascist pasts and recent war crimes that even the British government found it impossible to ignore the public and parliamentary outcry. Badoglio's appointments were equally embarrassing: in September he nominated a well-known pro-German ex-Fascist general as governor of Sardinia. The Allied Military Government forced Badoglio to replace this officer.74 By mid-October the Duke of Acquarone, Minister of the Royal Household, realized that unless the anti-Fascist parties were brought into a new national government the monarchy's days were numbered. After talking with conservative anti-Fascist politicians in Naples, Acquarone offered a plan to replace Badoglio with a civilian prime minister who would form a government of antiFascists, which would be broadened after the liberation of ~ o m e . ~ ' Badoglio objected to this proposal. Allied military officers, too, repeatedly expressed fears that any change would cause unrest and endanger their lines of


communication. The British government was equally opposed.76 However, Sforza's arrival in Italy gave additional impetus for demands for a government reshuffle. Sforza met with Badoglio on 20 October 1943 and with Acquarone five days later. He told both men that only the abdication of both the king and his equally compromised son would induce anti-Fascists to join a new government, and that abdication was the only way to save the institution of monarchy. Hoping to further the discord between the king and Badoglio and open the way to his own prime ministership, Sforza suggested that Badoglio was the best candidate to head a regency.77 On 25 October 1943, Eisenhower dispatched his senior political advisors, Harold Macmillan and Robert Murphy, to survey the situation. They first visited the king and Badoglio at Brindisi. King Victor Emmanuel 111, MacmilIan reported, had no intention of abdicating or sharing power with the antiFascists: "Politically he stands for a governmental structure having a democratic and liberal facade concealing a highly centralized authority built around the person of the King." Badoglio realized the need for a broadened government. Croce and Sforza met the Allied diplomats separately on 29 October 1943. They adamantly refused to join any government until the king abdicated. Both men insisted that Badoglio had to be replaced.78 The declaration on Italy issued on 30 October 1943 by the Moscow Foreign Ministers' conference gave renewed impetus to the effort to form a new government. The document called for making the Italian government democratic by including representatives of the anti-Fascist parties, suppressing Fascist institutions, purging the bureaucracy, reintroducing basic political freedoms, and creating democratic local governments. In accord with this decision and with the evident need for a more energetic Italian government, Eisenhower instructed Allied Military Government to allow events to "follow their natural course."79 On 2 November 1943, Badoglio handed his resignation to the king and suggested Sforza as his logical successor. Victor Emmanuel headed for Naples to save his throne. Badoglio's resignation was bad news for the British government. While a government under the energetic Sforza would undoubtedly give greater aid to the war effort and would quiet domestic criticism, such a ministry would be very difficult to control. Furthermore, it was sure to displease Churchill: whose personal aversion to Sforza was deep-seated.'' The British were saved from a Sforza government by the tenacity of King Victor Emmanuel and an unexpected intervention from occupied Rome. Ar-


riving in Naples on 4 November 1943, the king delayed a resolution of the crisis through long talks with party leaders. Although he was unable to win any support, Victor Emmanuel held up matters long enough for Ivanoe Bonomi, the conservative and promonarchist head of the Rome Committee of National Liberation, to rescue him. A Bonomi message stated that the Rome Committee opposed any changes in the composition of the Italian government until the momentarily expected liberation of the capital. Fortified with this message, Victor Emmanuel appointed Badoglio to form a government of nonparty technocrats." The king's success was also a triumph for the British at the expense of the anti-Fascist parties and of the gradually evolving American position. The United States wanted the king's replacement for both immediate and long-term political reasons. However, it was unwilling to force him out. The British balked at any suggestion that the Allies remove the king. Churchill and some American officers claimed that Victor Emmanuel's authority guaranteed the loyalty of the Italian officer corps and respect for the provisions of the armistice and challenged the legitimacy of Mussolini's "republic" in the occupied north." American leaders were clearly unhappy with the status quo and continued to search for ways to encourage the evolution of a broad-based government centered on the anti-Fascist parties. In early November 1943, Roosevelt asked his senior officials for advice on handling the Italian political scene. Eisenhower's reply increased the president's uneasiness. Eisenhower believed that neither the king nor Sforza enjoyed strong public support. Though he favored a regency, Eisenhower believed that the royal regime would have to remain in power. Roosevelt decided to go along with his field commander until the liberation of Rome. However, both the president and Hopkins wanted to upset the status quo and lay the groundwork for ousting the monarch. Roosevelt also wanted to honor the commitment to a postwar popular choice of government and suspected that the British did not.83 The State Department, which shared these objectives, was unwilling to challenge directly the policy of retaining the monarch in power until Rome was liberated. The department wanted to reintroduce anti-Fascist exiles into Italy quickly, to promote political ferment and prevent the royal government from solidifying its control over the Italian state. Noting the Allied military's fear of the consequences of the immediate replacement of the king and Badoglio, State Department officials argued that this policy would promote a gradual change in the political structure. If they were permitted to opera&-without


British interference, Italian political forces could oust the king and move Italy toward a popularly based representative government. The State Department felt that the objectives of American policy should be defining limits within which the Italians could operate and ensuring that neither the Italians nor the British transgressed them. This policy would meet the military's requirement for the fullest possible Italian participation in the war effort and at the same time ensure a rapid democratization. A final decision on the fate of the monarchy would be postponed until a postwar vote. Representative exiles were to return home after making a simple pledge to support the war effort and to prevent any split among Italians that would hinder military operation^.^^

DefinlngAmerican War Alms By the fall of 1943, the administration was under heavy public pressure to define its war aims. In the spring of 1943, Wendell Willkie published One World, a report on his 1942 round-the-world trip and a call for a postwar international order based on cooperation with the Soviet Union. Wallace continued to speak out for a new world order. The Free World Association, together with the New Republic, Nation, Common Sense, and other liberal periodicals, conducted lively debates on the issues of reconstr~ction.~~ Moderate and conservative pressure for a better definition of United States war aims also rose. Walter Lippmann published the widely read book, American Foreign Policy, in mid-1943. Lippmann called for pragmatic internationalism based on great power cooperation. Mass circulation journals like the Saturday Evening Post and Life, together with influential groups like the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations, demanded that the administration clarify its objective^.'^ One major obstacle was Roosevelt. In December 1941, the president stated that World War I1 was a struggle for "survival," and a year and a half of growing pressure from right, left, and center failed to drive him to a more detailed or precise statement. Roosevelt left the public enunciation of foreign policy objectives to the State Department, which became the focus of public discontent running from the right to the left. Critics charged that the department was very effective in winning its petty bureaucratic wars but totally without a conception of the larger American interesL8' The State Department met this criticism with a series of public gestures designed to show that American officials were working for the creation of a peaceful world order based on Allied cooperation, and it began to define its own program of political and economic reconstruction.


State Department plans for political reconstruction centered on developing institutions within the liberated and former enemy states that would be democratic. The war, American leaders constantly repeated, was not directed against any peoples but against a false doctrine of government. Once fascism was eliminated, the liberated peoples (among whom were the former subjects of Fascist states) could establish democracy and the Allies would lift their occupation controls. At the level of specific choices to run an interim government, State Department leaders favored moderate democrats with antiCommunist views, such as Sforza. This program of democratization reflected traditional American belief in the superiority of free institutions. It did not deal with the broader problem of solidifying the postwar relationship between the Great Powers. State Department officials were wary of publicly embracing postwar international cooperation out of fear of a postwar domestic political reaction similar to that of 191920. Moreover, the department's dominant professionals, the "Europeanists," were viscerally anti-Communist and most reluctant to enter into long-term arrangements with the Soviet Union.'' By mid-1943, however, a growing internationalist consensus existed in the United States, and Roosevelt was impatient with anti-soviet attitudes inside the State Department. Secretary Hull realized that the department's future influence depended on its ability to move with the president and public opinion. He seized the opportunity offered by the Moscow Foreign Ministers' conference to put his agency at the head of those working for international postwar cooperation. At the end of ten days of intense debate, the American, - British, and Soviet foreign ministers issued a declaration on 1 November 1943 that seemed to ensure postwar cooperation among the Great Powers. During the following months Hull emerged as the spokesman for American-Soviet cooperation, as a doughty fighter against the resurgence of isolationism, and as the champion of the concept of a postwar international organization for peace. Hull brought Edward Stettinius, Jr., the Lend-Lease administrator and famed efficiency expert, into the State Department to fill Welles's position. These moves appeased the president and moderate and conservative public opinion.89 The economic portion of the State Department program was rooted in the ideology of free trade. By 1943, however, even as fervent an advocate of free trade as Hull was aware that simply lowering tariff barriers could not effectively deal with the chaos created by the war. The State Department cautiously adopted ideas and programs designed to aid in economic reconstruction and to give some economic stability to the postwar world. Department officials


supported the creation of an international development bank. They backed a special relief agency as a bridge between the chaos of war and a stable world order. They supported a vigorous attack on both international cartels and on the autarkic economic systems of European fascism. Most importantly, they recognized that the expansion of individual consumer power was one of the keys to postwar political stability.* Nevertheless, the State Department economic program was inadequate on both conceptual and technical planes. It seriously underestimated the extent of war destruction of the world's economy. The emergency relief agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), with its limited funding, international management, and emphasis on immediate relief over long-term reconstruction planning, proved to be a bandage applied to a massive gunshot wound. UNRRA could not deal with structural economic damage. In spite of its determination to end cartels and autarky, the State Department displayed scant interest in reforming the injustices and imbalances in the economies of nations like Italy and Germany that helped to give rise to both communism and fascism. Finally, the department's program hinged on the willingness of American corporations to invest in reconstructing nations. This cooperation was hard to secure so long as there were quick and massive profits to be made on a stable and commodities-short domestic market.91 Most of these weaknesses were not evident during the war, and, as a result, the State Department's economic program gained wide support. Businessmen liked its emphasis on free trade and the lack of any specific demands on them. The growing body of internationalists were pleased by departmental backing for UNRRA, the first of the agencies designed to promote postwar world cooperation. Plans for a world bank and for consumer-oriented economics indicated to generally skeptical liberals that, however slowly, the State Department was beginning to move in the right direction.92 In mid-November 1943, the State Department turned to the problems of Italy with a renewed strength. Its liberal rivals had been vanquished, the lines of policy direction were being collected into the department's hands, and a general program for reconstruction had been enunciated. State now moved against its last serious bureaucratic rival, the War Department, and asserted its view of American interests against the British and the Soviets.

Part II Occupation

Chapter 3 Allies at Odds, October 1943June 1944

By October 1943, British intransigence and royal stubbornness combined to create a stalemate, which lasted nearly seven months. The Americans demanded change, but the British resisted and they held the advantage. First, Roosevelt could not push his Italian demands too far for fear of public disclosure of Allied disunity and a possible rupture of the alliance. The United States and Great Britain had to conquer Hitler in unity or be destroyed in disunity. Second, the British contributed the greater proportion of manpower to the Italian campaign. In January 1944, British predominance became complete when an English general, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, replaced Eisenhower as Commander in Chief (shortly thereafter, Wilson was designated Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean). The United States continued to insist on a second front in France and systematically drained the Italian front of its best troops and commanders. It could not insist on political predominance in an area it was abandoning militarily to the British. Furthermore, American policymakers were divided-the State and War Departments disagreed on Italian policy and without a common policy, one agency constantly undercut and hamstrung the other. Finally, the United States was proposing innovation; the British were defending an existing state of affairs. Providing a rationale for change was more difficult than defending the status quo. Hanging over the stalemate in Italy was the question of what role the third Great Power, the Soviet Union, would play. Russian armies were moving westward. After stopping Germany at Stalingrad, the Soviets turned the tide of

68 OCCUPATION

the war in the East at the battle of Kursk in July 1943. Slowly, inexorably, Soviet forces were pushing the invader out of the USSR. By the spring of 1944, the Red Army was near Central Europe. Soviet military successes powerfully boosted the morale and prestige of Communist movements throughout Europe. Slowly at first, and then with growing confidence, the Soviet government demanded a role in the formulation of Western political and military strategy. Italy represented a test case for all three Great Powers. For the British, control over strategically located Italy was an essential part of a program for stabilizing its Mediterranean influence and its empire. For the Soviet Union, Western policy in Italy would indicate the limits of Western cooperation in occupation and the drawing power of Communist ideology in a war-ravaged Western Europe. For the United States, Italy represented the first opportunity to try out the politics of stabilization, and an opportunity for President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull to test their strategy of cooperation with the USSR.

A Soviet Role in Italy? Nowhere were Allied operations in Italy under closer scrutiny than in the Soviet Union. Admiral William Standley, the United States ambassador to the Soviet Union, repeatedly warned Washington that the Soviets would use the Italian occupation as a precedent for limiting British and American participation in the administration of areas liberated by the USSR. The Russians were militarily hard pressed and suspicious of the failure of the West to launch a second front. From the Soviet viewpoint, the Italian campaign was a less than satisfactory substitute for an Allied invasion in Northwest Europe. Predictions by the British Chiefs of Staff that an Italian campaign would preveht the Germans from reinforcing the Eastern front proved incorrect. Germany not only continued its buildup in the East, but was able to pull together enough troops to contest two-thirds of the Italian peninsula. By November 1943, the Italian campaign had become a wearing slugging match, with Eisenhower's armies bogged down far south of Rome. The only way to break the military deadlock quickly was to postpone the second front and massively reinforce the Allied armies in 1 t a l ~ . ~ Another postponement, however, might be a mortal blow not only to the prospect for postwar cooperation but also to the Allied coalition against Hitler. A separate peace between Hitler and Stalin was a possibility that haunted

'

' A L L I E S AT O D D S 69

American policymakers.3 Even if the wartime coalition held, another postponement of the major offensive in the West would probably poison postwar relations with the Soviets. Roosevelt realized the consequences of allowing the Soviets to complete the liberation of Europe with only minimal American involvement. in May 1943, he warned one top aide that the United States and Britain could not get in the position of "holding the leg" while the USSR "skinned the deer. It would be dangerous business for us at the end of the war. Stalin won't have much of an opinion of people who have done that and we will not be able to share much of the postwar world with him."4 Cooperation with the Soviet Union was the centerpiece of Roosevelt's postwar plans. The president believed that long-term peace was impossible unless the three major Allied states compromised their often conflicting objectives. In December 1942, Roosevelt told Wallace that three men would make the peace. This meant creating a relationship of trust among the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. To convince Stalin that the United States was ready to cooperate and to establish a personal relationship with Stalin, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull felt the Soviet dictator should be fully informed on events in Italy, especially on the secret and critical surrender negotiation^.^ Roosevelt was supremely confident that by meeting with Stalin and top Soviet officials he could resolve the outstanding issues between the two nations and mediate disputes between the Soviet Union and the United K i n g d ~ mThe . ~ president, in common with most liberals, saw the United States occupying a middle ground between aggressive Tory imperialism and revolutionary Soviet expansionism. The United States, which was politically progressive and without territorial objectives, would have to preserve the peace by moderating the territorial ambitions and reducing the mutual distrust of its two military partner^.^ Italy was a test case of American ability both to build a democratic society in liberated Europe and to promote Allied cooperation. Roosevelt, of course, was not operating with a free hand in his efforts to build Soviet trust. While most Americans admired the heroism of the Soviet peoples' struggle against Hitler, mistrust of the Soviet Union's objectives and of communism was never far from the surface in the United States. The Catholic church, large segments of the press, numerous liberals, and, of course, most conservatives were deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions. No group, however, outdid Italian-Americans in their anti-Soviet feelings.' Thus, a hostile domestic audience watched Roosevelt's efforts to cooperate with the USSR in Italian affairs. The British government was equally suspicious. Permanent Under Secretary

70 O C C U P A T I O N

Cadogan was relieved when Stalin ignored Roosevelt's invitation to attend the Quebec Conference: "If he can sulk, I suppose we can too, and I am rather in favour of leaving him alone . . . He may send someone there, whose arguments will reinforce the Americans, who are as keen as Joe on a cross-Channel spring ~peration."~ British reluctance to embark on a cross-Channel invasion had multiple causes, but undoubtedly hostility to the Soviet Union and fear of its objectives was a significant factor. While Hull and other American officials were anxious to meet the Soviets "more than half way," the British regarded the extension of Soviet influence in Italy as a major threat to their Mediterranean interests. In addition, the British bitterly resented Soviet efforts to use the cooperation of the United States as a bludgeon to force the British into the second front. Finally, the British had no faith in Roosevelt's personal diplomacy. British Foreign Secretary Eden felt the president's opinions were "alarming" and his diplomacy amateurish-a view that was widely shared within the British government. l o In spite of British and domestic opposition, Roosevelt made a determined effort to improve trust between the Allies. However, even this effort at cooperation took place within strict limits. As was the case in his handling of the development of atomic energy, Roosevelt was more concerned with friendly gestures than with concrete concessions to the Soviet Union. I ' Responding to Ambassador Standley's warning to keep the Soviets informed, the United States sent an aide memorandum to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on 3 August 1943, outlining its view of the role of the USSR in Italian affairs. The American note stated that responsibility for military operations, including an Italian surrender, rested with the American and British governments through their military commander in the Mediterranean. The surrender terms had already been drafted by the Western Allies. The United States would welcome Soviet comments and advice regarding Italian policy and would make sure the Soviet government was kept fully informed of all significant developments within Italy.'* Both American and British diplomats in Moscow responded enthusiastically to the American offer which the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald C. Kerr, and American ChargB d'Affaires Maxwell Hamilton agreed was a "major new step" in the improvement and crystalIizationof Soviet-Americanfriendship.l 3 There is considerable reason to doubt that Stalin iaw the American move in the same light. Gestures without concrete concessions were unlikely to move Stalin, who from 1943 through 1948 saw Italy as a bargaining chip in his relations with the West. The Soviet leader recognized Western predominance in Italy and accepted without question the right of the Western Allies to impose

A L L I E S AT ODDS 71

whatever regime they desired. The objective of Stalin's diplomacy throughout the war and early postwar years was to trade off Soviet concessions to the West over Italy for Western recognition of the emerging Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The other major Soviet wartime objective was preventing a separate peace between the Western Allies and Hitler. The Soviet leader had already signaled his concern over the implications of the deal with Badoglio for future Allied negotiations with Nazi turncoats. Stalin's interest in a role in the formation of policy for Italy reflected his concern that the Badoglio deal was simply the first step toward a deal with Goering. l4 Roosevelt's gesture satisfied neither Soviet objective. Nor could ex post facto communications from Churchill and Roosevelt allay Stalin's resentment at being excluded from negotiations with the Italians or his suspicions of Western motives. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's offer of a consulting role gave the Soviet dictator an opening, which he attempted to exploit to give himself greater influence in Italian affairs. On 23 August 1943, while Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec, the Soviet government presented a note from Stalin to the United States and British embassies. The Soviet leader protested that he was not being fully informed of the progress of surrender negotiations. The Soviet Union, Stalin continued, was no longer willing to accept the passive role assigned to it by its Allies. Instead of simply receiving information on the course of the negotiations, the Soviets demanded full participation: "I believe the time is ripe to organize the military-politicalcommission of representatives of the three countries . . . with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves from Germany. . . . I propose . . . to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commi~sion."'~ The demanding tone of Stalin's message annoyed both Churchill and Roosevelt.I6 Nevertheless, the Western Allies gradually accepted the notion of a three-power military-political commission. Simultaneously, however, the United States and the United Kingdom hedged their acceptance by insisting the commission be an advisory body. State Department officials believed that associating the Soviet Union with the surrender and administration of the occupation was a good means of deflecting criticism of United States cooperation with King Victor Emmanuel I11 and Badoglio.17 Sir Archibald C. Ken; admitting its obvious drawbacks, endorsed the Soviet proposal and Britain's War Cabinet concurred. The Foreign Office, meanwhile, offered the Soviets the chance to send a representative to an Italian surrender. l8 In early September, Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the idea of a mili-

72 OCCUPATION tary-political commission during their Washington meetings. Churchill wanted France represented on the commission. He insisted, however, that the role of the commission be limited to an advisory role. Roosevett's comments on the commission were contradictory, creating concern that he did not understand the issues. The Western Allies offered two different responses to Stalin's demand for the commission. Churchill's reply accepted an advisory commission, suggested broadening the body to include French membership, and indicated that Roosevelt was in general agreement. Roosevelt, however, simply offered to place a Soviet officer on Eisenhower's staff and indicated he opposed an advisory role for the French.19 Faced with these contradictory replies, Stalin rejected Roosevelt's as inadequate. The American effort to establish a special relationship with the Soviet Union received an unnecessary setback at the hands of its chief architect. The contrast between British cooperativeness and American evasiveness was reinforced two days later. Churchill sent a conciliatory message to Stalin accepting an advisory military-political commission and adding that Harold Macmillan, an influential and trusted advisor, would be the British representative on the new body. Roosevelt merely confirmed his agreement, adding that the advisory body should meet in Algiers rather than Sicily as Stalin had initially suggested. Stalin appointed two top Soviet diplomats, Andrei Vishinski and Alexsandr Y. Bogomolov, to serve on the commission. He proposed a late September date for the first meeting. Stalin suggested expanding the commission's functions in Italy and eventually extending its competence to other liberated nations.20 The Western Allies continued to offer largely symbolic concessions. The Soviet dictator accepted what was offered and pressed for more. When the Western Allies gave the Soviet Union equal status in the surrender terms, Stalin very agreeably accepted this, assented to both the long and short terms, and shortly thereafter assented to cobelligerent status for Italy. He used these largely symbolic but nevertheless important legal concessions to further probe Western intent. In accepting the West's proposed long terms, Stalin bluntly warned his Allies that any modifications would require Soviet approval. The United States had outlined its desire for substantial modifications of the terms, and Stalin established a bargaining position in which he could trade concessions to the Americans for other Soviet objectives." Stalin was relatively uninterested in Italy except as an area to establish precedent. When the Western Allies resisted an equal Soviet role in policymaking, Stalin accepted the military-political commission's advisory status and the greatly reduced Soviet involvement in Italian affairs, but he used the

A L L I E S AT O D D S 73

precedent to restrict Western involvement in the administration of territories occupied by the Soviet During the weeks immediately preceding the Moscow conference, the three Great Powers remained deadlocked over Italian policy, Churchill continued to favor small, mostly symbolic, concessions to the Russians in order to ensure reciprocal treatment for the Western Allies in the event the Soviets should be the first to enter a defeated Germany. The British, like the Americans, envisioned a strictly advisory body and opposed a Soviet suggestion for abolishing the Allied Control Commission. However, they wanted to couple rejection of Soviet proposals with a concession: making the military-political commission an advisory body to the Allied Control Commission and giving it a broad mandate to advise the three Great Powers on policy in all liberated areas. The British proposed setting up this advisory body in L~ndon.'~ The United States clung to a narrow definition of the military-political commission and its functions. In its first major test, Roosevelt's plans for mediation between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom collapsed. Roosevelt's military advisors opposed the creation of a body that would interfere with military management of Italy's occupation. The president agreed that the commission should function solely as an advisory body to the Allied Commander in Chief on general Mediterranean Instead of mediating, the American government coordinated its policies with the British on the role of the military-political commission and lightening the armistice terms. In mid-October 1943, the United States and British governments separately reiterated their intention to revise the Italian armistice. Meanwhile, Churchill cabled Roosevelt his views on the military-political commission: "Molotov's proposed amendment, making the . . . Commission . . . virtually an executive and governing body, goes far beyond what we had in mind. I am not prepared to agree to this extension of Russian and, as it would now be, De Gaullist powers of interference in a theatre where they have no troops and where all the burden is borne by us."25 In spite of serious policy differences, the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference on 20-30 October 1943 was marked by considerable Allied amity. Stalin set the tone. In a conversation with Eden on 21 October 1943, he told the British foreign secretary that Allied operations in Italy aided the Soviet Union. He also cabled Roosevelt the same day, agreeing with the president's proposal for a French role on the military-political commission. Eden took the role of the Western Allies' spokesman on Italian matters. At the third session of the conference, on 21 October 1943, the British foreign secretary reiterated that the commission would be a purely advisory body and that the Western


powers were creating it to ensure Soviet representation in Italy. The following day Eden proposed establishing the commission in London and introduced Eisenhower's plan for a three-stage expansion of the authority of the commission over Allied policy and over the operations of the Italian government. Molotov tacitly abandoned Soviet demands for a policymaking body, but reiterated Moscow's desire to be kept informed. He pointedly reminded his Western colleagues that their actions in Italy were establishing a precedent for the future administration of occupied and liberated areas. Molotov stressed that a thorough purge of Fascists was the essential first step in reestablishing democracy quickly in Italy. The Soviet foreign minister then introduced a seven-point draft statement of Allied policy. Finally, Molotov announced that the Soviet Union would claim postwar reparations from Italy. Appended to the Soviets' seven-point proposal was a request for the transfer of one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping from the Italians to the Soviet The Soviets had changed course. Accepting the defeat of their proposal for a military-political commission, they established their claims to military and economic reparations from Italy, gained the propaganda advantage by promoting democratization, and simultaneously asserted their right to predominance in administering territories liberated by the Red Army. Eden and Hull were taken off guard by the Soviet tactics, and on the following day they issued a joint statement that accepted the basic Soviet statement on Italian policy while defending Western collaboration with Badoglio and the embarrassing slowness and ineffectiveness of the purge. The Western statesmen ignored Soviet reparations claims. The matter of ships was referred to, Washington and London with a recommendation from both diplomats that favorable action be taken.27 On 26 October 1943, Roos'evelt responded that Italian shipping should be used in whatever way it benefited the war effort. He added the proviso that the question of title to the ships would be decided after the war.28 The British government was less cooperative. The War Cabinet favored leaving a decision on the ships to the three heads of state meeting in Tehran. Churchill hoped to use some Italian ships in the Pacific. Moreover, the Italian navy units were not equipped for cold weather, and the only area where they could be transferred to the Soviets was in the Arctic region. The British were also concerned with the effects a transfer would have on the cooperation of the Italian navy and on Badoglio's political longevity.29 The United States dutifully went along with the British, and the matter of the ships was deferred for consideration by the Big Three. Molotov protested. Both Eden and Hull told their governments that concessions on the ships


would greatly improve East-West trust. Roosevelt then authorized Hull to tell the Soviets that the United States favored the earliest possible transfer of onethird of the Italian fleet and merchant marines to the Soviets. The president repeated that a final and legal settlement of these prizes of war had to await the peace settlement. Hull wisely decided not to relay Roosevelt's offer because he feared its impact on Badoglio's po~ition.~' When Hull met with Eden on 30 October 1943, the British foreign secretary told the American secretary of state that his government was willing to announce its acceptance of Soviet requests "in principle." The British response was relayed to Molotov, and Hull met personally with the Soviet foreign minister to assure him that the United States, too, favored meeting the Soviets' request .31 The three Allies also reached a compromise on the form of the militarypolitical commission. A separate Advisory Commission for Italy was established in Algiers while a European Advisory Commission would be set up in London. The Advisory Commission for Italy was to be attached to the headquarters of the Allied Commander in Chief. Its members, representatives of the three major Allies plus the governments-in-exile of France, Greece, and Yugoslavia, were to report to their governments on Italian affairs and provide policy advice to the Commander in Chief. When the Allied Commander in Chief decided to end military control over the Italian government, the Advisory Commission would take over this responsibility for supervision of the armistice. In a delayed effort to give the commission prestige, Roosevelt appointed Robert Murphy, Eisenhower's political advisor, as the American member of the c o m m i ~ s i o n . ~ ~ The Moscow Conference left most outstanding Allied differences unsettled. American efforts to establish a better relationship with Moscow were stymied by the United States' unwillingness to go beyond purely symbolic concessions and share power with the USSR. Anglo-American diplomatic coordination reinforced Soviet suspicions. The Soviets, meanwhile, continued to reap the political advantages of their isolation from Italian affairs-publicly prodding the Western democrats to live up to their pledges of democratization and defascistization for Italy.33 These trends were dramatically reversed at the Tehran conference (27 November-2 December 1943), where Roosevelt finally got the chance to try his personal diplomacy on Stalin. In spite of their cooperation at Moscow, the United States and the United Kingdom had many serious policy differences, including those over Italy. At Tehran, Roosevelt found Stalin a natural ally against the British. The president went out of his way to emphasize his

76 OCCUPATION

separation from Churchill and from British objectives. This allowed Stalin to arbitrate periodically between the Americans and the British. He skillfully used these opportunities to advance Soviet objectives, usually in combination with the United States. The outstanding issue facing the Big Three was the timing of a crossChannel assault. At the Cairo meetings, which immediately preceded the Tehran conference, Churchill demanded reinforcements for the Italian carnpaign and postponement of the cross-Channel attack from the May 1944 date set at Quebec. The Americans were outraged, feeling Churchill was reneging on his commitments. Accepting the British proposal would probably destroy any hope of meaningful postwar cooperation with the USSR. Moreover, the Americans suspected that Churchill really wanted to carry them into more Mediterranean adventures designed to prop up Britain's declining imperial system.34 Continued Anglo-American differences over the broadening of Badoglio's government, the role of the French on the Advisory Commission for Italy, and the scope of military operations within Italy further complicated their relationship. The Western Allies arrived at Tehran in a deadlock, which Stalin successfully exploited. Stalin wasted little time in getting to the root of the matter: positive guarantees of a second front in the spring of 1944. Together with Roosevelt, he forced the reluctant British to reaffirm their commitment to the cross-Channel invasion. Then, at Stalin's insistence, Roosevelt and Churchill settled the question of who would command the invasion. Roosevelt selected Eisenhower, and as quid pro quo, a British general would command the Mediterranean theater. The Americans agreed that military operations in the Mediterranean would be an area of primary British responsibility. The United States did not abandon its claims to parity in the civil administration of Italy or in policymaking, however, laying the ground for further clashes with Great Britain.35 American control over Western strategic decisions was growing as the percentage of manpower and supplies the United States contributed to the common war effort increased massively. As a result, the United States was wresting control of Western strategy from its British ally. In granting the British primary responsibility for Mediterranean operations, the United States was giving up control of an area in which its plans called for a limited allocation of military resources, especially manpower. Roosevelt's efforts to come to an understanding with Stalin achieved a second major success: a Soviet promise to enter the war against Japan shortly after Hitler's final defeat. Roosevelt reciprocated, supporting Soviet claims to Italian ships. The Allies agreed to a January 1944 transfer to the soviet^.^^ The vexing issue appeared to be settled.


Deadlock in Italy While the meetings at Moscow and Tehran improved AmericanSoviet relations, they only increased American-British frictions. Italy was a particular irritant. Churchill wanted major reinforcements for Eisenhower's armies, while American strategists were intent on drawing off Allied forces to beef up the cross-Channel assault. The temporary equilibrium that Badoglio achieved by forming a government of technicians was rapidly dissolving. American and Italian anti-Fascists reluctantly accepted Badoglio's government on the assumption that Allied armies would liberate Rome within a few weeks, and a new government, representing the broadest possible political spectrum, would then be formed. However, shortly after Badoglio's government of technicians took power, the sluggish Allied offensive broke down in front of the Germans' Gustav line in south central Italy. Bad weather and insufficient manpower plagued the Allied armies. The liberation of Rome was months away. At the same time, the anti-Fascists were solidifying their unity and building party organizations. They improved their communications with the Rome Committee of National Liberation (CLN). Local CLN's patterned on those in German-occupied Italy sprang up in the south. A new organization in the industrial north, the Committee of National Liberation for North Italy (CLNAI), began to make its more radical impact felt on politics in the liberated s o ~ t h . ~The ' personal influence of Croce and Sforza was reinforced and eventually overshadowed by the growth of organized political parties: Communists, Socialists, Actionists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals. The royal government at Brindisi was an isolated and ineffective group of old men governing four provinces with the aid of the Allies. The United States and Great Britain were on a collision course over Italy. The British were confident that King Victor Emmanuel I11 and Badoglio could weather the challenge of the Naples anti-Fascists with their support. A. Rumbold, one of the Foreign Office's Italian specialists, discussed British plans: It will be remembered that Badoglio said that his government was only intended to last until Rome was captured. He is now saying in effect that the constitutional issue must not be raised until the whole of Italy is liberated. There is a contradiction between these two statements . . . because . . . it will be impossible to substitute a new government for the [Badoglio] government of experts without raising the constitutional issue. Our only chance of avoiding the most appalling political difficulties when Rome is reached lies in the hope that the politicians in Rome . . .


will agree to put off the constitutional question . . . and provisional g~vernment.~'

. . . serve in a

Adam Ross, another Foreign Office expert, agreed and added: ". . . a policy of non-interference is a positive policy which will lead us into diffic~lties."~~ Britain's determination to control Italian politics ran counter to one of the key elements of American policy. The United States was very reluctant to intervene in Italian affairs, especially in support of the king and Badoglio. In fact, the Roosevelt administrationwas under considerable domestic pressure to oust the Badoglio regime. Though the Americans accepted this regime, they were unwilling to make any effort to maintain it in power. Intervention, if forced upon the Allies, would have to involve removal of the king and creation of a government based on the anti-Fascist parties.'$' In handling the transfer of liberated temtory from Allied Military Government to royal administration, American policymakers avoided any move that would increase the prestige of the king. On 1 November 1943, Eisenhower established the Allied Control Commission for Italy but could not transfer administrative responsibility because of the continuing disarray of Badoglio's government. By the time Badoglio created a semblance of administrative order at Brindisi, American planners were having second thoughts aboul transferring responsibility. Turning more of liberated Italy over to King Victor Emmanuel I11 would only strengthen his determination to hold on to power in the face of massive popular discontent. The United States wanted to wash its hands of the king at the earliest possible minute, so the Combined Chiefs of Staff initially delayed territorial transfer and then worked out a January 1944 transfer agreement designed to prevent the royal regime from gaining any pre~tige.~' American concerns about Italy were heightened by reports that the Communists in the occupied north were successfully exploiting the king's unpopularity, thereby increasing their mass support. Moreover, senior Allied officials in Italy doubted that the royal government was the best suited to provide the rear area support for the Allied military campaign and in fact might hampe~ future operations. Eisenhower repeated these warnings in his final reports ta Washington. The Office of Strategic Services was openly alarmed at the political situation and, together with the Department of State, was pushing for the return of exiled Republican party leader Randolfo Pacciardi to Italy as a part of a program to undermine the royal government and replace it with a broadly based g ~ v e r n r n e n t . ~ ~ British and American policy differences came to a head in January 1944.

A L L I E S A T ODDS 79

The anti-Fascists announced plans for a meeting in Naples to force the king's abdication and establish a broad-based, anti-Fascist interim government. Theoretically, political activities were banned in all of Allied Military Govemment territory. The Allies tolerated all sorts of political activity, however, including the organizational work of the opposition parties, and favored some as part of their program for democratization. Suppressing the opposition, the course the British favored, would only increase Allied commitment to the royal government. A compromise was struck. The anti-Fascists could hold their congress, but in Bari, a city under royal admini~tration.~~ The political ferment in Italy encouraged American policymakers. On 24 January 1944, Assistant Secretary of State Berle submitted a policy memorandum advocating an Allied-enforced reorganization of the Italian government. Berle noted that the decision to retain the king and Badoglio was based on military considerations that were producing adverse political reactions. The royal government, although pledged to the eradication of fascism, was bringing ex-Fascists back into government under the guise of experts. As a result, pro-Allied Italians were growing disillusioned. Moreover, the royal government was utilizing the long delay in liberating Rome to entrench itself. A change in government was desirable, Berle concluded, to reverse these undesirable developments.44 On 22 January 1944, Frederick Reinhardt, a senior American official in Italy, reported that King Victor Emmanuel planned to appoint royalists as civil and military administrators for Rome, with orders to prevent opposition political activity during the liberation. The king then asked permission to visit Rome with Badoglio immediately after its liberation and try to form a government with the Rome CLN. The king's plan had British support, and Reinhardt also recommended accepting it. Berle pointed out the dangers of this approach: Sending the king and Badoglio to Rome in advance of the other political leaders would be a "clear sign" of Allied support for the two old men and would permit them to consolidate their position. Berle added pointedly that while aiding the king and Badoglio would achieve Great Britain's political objectives in Italy it would not further those of the United States. Allied authorities in Italy should not decide on a matter as important as a royal trip to Rome. 45 Berle's effort to upset the status quo in Italy met opposition within the department but its Iogic was powerful. On 25 January 1944, Hull recommended to the president the removal of King Victor ~ m m a n u e l .A~ ~ 28 January 1944 meeting of the department's political committee agreed that the removal proceed even at the cost of a public clash with the British.47


At the beginning of February 1944, Allied Force Headquarters, at the request of the royal government, blocked Pacciardi's return to Italy. Berle seized upon the incident, pointing out the dangers of allowing the military to determine policy: If all people coming into Italy are submitted for scrutiny, not to our authorities but to the group around Victor Emmanuel, every incoming Italian will be tested by whether he will or will not go along with this fascist remnant in building up its own position . . . it ought to be made very clear to our people at AFHQ that on this matter we exercise our own discretion. We certainly have not accepted the present regime in Italy for purposes of determining how, when and with whom the Italian state should be recon~tructed.~~ Meanwhile liberals were mounting an attack on Allied policy in Italy. Italian-Americans as a whole were either lukewarm or openly hostile to the Badoglio regime, which many believed was a British puppet. In spite of limited support in the conservative press, the Italian government was clearly a domestic political liability. The anti-Fascist Congress of Bari, held on 29-30 January 1944, triggered the next major clash with the British. British policymakers feared that the meeting would further undermine the authority and prestige of the Badoglio regime. The Foreign Office tried to argue that because military operations were in progress the meeting should be postponed. Meanwhile, Allied officials in Italy worked to ensure that the royal government maintained order. Mason MacFarlane, head of the Allied Control Commission, bluntly warned Badoglio that trouble at Bari would seriously damage Italy's relations with Allied governrnent~.~~ The royal government tried to drive a wedge between its opponents. The king offered a new program designed to appeal to conservative anti-Fascists, while Badoglio appealed to the Communists and Socialists to join his government. The opposition, however, remained united in its determination to oust the king. The arrival of three representatives of the Rome CLN and a resolution from the CLNAI calling on the Bari Congress to assume the government of liberated Italy strengthened their resolve.50 The Bari Congress was a continuous assault on the king. Nevertheless, the latent divisions within the opposition coalition emerged. The three parties of the left, Socialist, Communist, and Action, presented a resolution for the congress to assume the government of liberated Italy and suspend the monarchy. The conservative Christian Democrats and Liberals, aided by Croce,


Sforza, and the threat of Allied reaction, succeeded in substituting a resolution that demanded the formation of a government with emergency powers led by the six opposition parties, the abdication of the king, and a postwar constituent assembly. The congress elected an Executive Junta of six members to increase the pressure for Victor Emmanuel's abdi~ation.~' The actions of the Bari Congress pleased American policymakers and angered the British. The Foreign Office feared that the Executive Junta would establish itself as an alternative government. Badoglio's performance, especially his efforts to get Socialists and Communists into his government, pointed to an "extraordinary obtuseness," which if displayed in political negotiations after Rome's liberation could make "our intervention . . . necessary." Sforza's actions were even more galling. He was already acting to improve Italy's position at the postwar peace conference. Rumbold warned: "if Sforza becomes a prominent member of any future Italian government, we may look forward to finding him extremely intractable." Eden agreed: "I foresee much trouble with so-called Italian democrats. Sforza forecasts their attitudes. They will claim to escape from all penalties imposed upon king and Badoglio and there is no reason why they should. We should do nothing to facilitate Sforza's accession to power."52 Holding off the anti-Fascist opposition, propping up Badoglio through forceful intervention, and keeping Sforza out of power dominated British diplomatic strategy through the spring of 1944. The Bari Junta's activities constituted the most immediate threat to British interests. On 3 February 1944, Churchill cabled Roosevelt, emphasizing the need to continue supporting Badoglio's government. The prime minister warned that any new Italian government would be more difficult to control because it would press Italy's claims more strenuously to strengthen its base of support. The president was wavering. In late January, he approved instructions drafted by the Department of State authorizing the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, to support the six opposition parties' efforts to force Victor Emmanuel's abdication. At a press conference on 1 February 1944, however, he declined to call for the king's removal.53 The Department of State, meanwhile, was campaigning within United States policymaking bodies for the king's ouster. The initial success of the Allied military operation at Anzio (22 January 1944) led State Department officials to believe the liberation of Rome and formation of a new government were imminent. Encouraging reports from Italy underlined the moderation and cooperativeness of the six party opposition. On 4 February 1944, Secretary of

82 OCCUPATION

State Hull informed Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the State Department wanted to remove the king immediately in order to create a broad-based Italian government. Four days later, the department authorized Frederick Reinhardt, U.S. Acting Representative to the Advisory Commission for Italy, to relay American views to the French and to bring the issue of the king's abdication before the Advisory Commission. The department further instructed Reinhardt not to await British concurrence. Delaying action, Washington was learning, favored the British position.54 Within twenty-four hours, the State Department was forced to beat a hasty retreat. The Anzio campaign rapidly turned into a major military fiasco when the invading Allied army was pinned down on its beachhead. American and British diplomats in Italy were convinced that the king must soon abdicate but that only a minority of the opposition leaders wanted to assume immediate control of the government. The majority preferred to wait until the liberation of Rome allowed them to meet with the Rome CLN. Allied officials were wary of exposing Anglo-American differences in front of the Advisory Commission for Italy, and the .Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly supported their views.55 On 9 February 1944, Hull informed the president that the State Department no longer favored Victor Emmanuel's immediate abdication. Roosevelt agreed and instructed the department to avoid any action that might harm cooperation with the royal government. Replacement of the king would have to await military success.56 "Policy in Italy," Acting Secretary of State Stettinius telegraphed the American representatives abroad, "remains the same, but in abeyance." Roosevek delivered the same message to Churchill on 11 February 1944: "I think . . that you and I should regard this only as a temporary reprieve for the two old gentlemen."57 Churchill, victorious again, wrote a conciliatory reply. However, his plans to use the delay to strengthen both British control in Italy and the royal government against its opponents were short-circuited by Allied officials in the ~editerranean.58 The unified command and civil administration structure that Eisenhower began building in the spring of 1943 rapidly developed into a supranational bureaucracy, which increasingly formed and expressed policies and opinions different from those of Washington and London. Prolonged contact with the Italian political situation led American and British officials within the structure of the Allied Force Headquarters to adopt a cautiously independent stance in their dealings with their superiors in the United States and Britain. The deference that politicians in both Britain and America showed to arguments

.


based on military requirements gave Headquarters considerable leverage, as did its specialized knowledge of Italian affairs. Thus far, Headquarters' policy recommendationshad favored British interests. Eisenhower, a fervent believer in Allied cooperation, generally supported British views. Once Eisenhower was convinced, he could normally win the War Department's backing and thus stymie State Department policy initiatives. However, with an English general in charge after January 1944, American agencies were more likely to oppose policies they perceived as ~ r i t i s h . 'Moreover, ~ Wilson, Eisenhower's successor, inherited a more experienced staff, which had a better grasp of the relative strengths of the contending political factions together with a more sophisticated view of Allied interests in Italy. MacFarlane, Wilson's chief advisor, reviewed the situation in Italy on 13 February 1944. MacFarlane favored the king's abdication, but viewed his replacement by the crown prince as a bleak prospect: "He is thoroughly weak and wet and will probably agree to anything provided he is left as king." MacFarlane dismissed reported opposition by Italy's armed forces to the king's abdication as monarchist propaganda. MacFarlane's views infuriated Churchill, who fired off cables to both MacFarlane and Wilson warning against "wobbling" in executing the policies of His Majesty's g~vernment.~" Wilson, however, was receiving troubling information from Italy. MacFarlane met with King Victor Ernmanuel on 16 February 1944 and reported that the monarch was out of touch with political reality, at odds with Badoglio, and would not abdicate unless the Allies acted. Harold Caccia, MacFarlane's British political advisor, suggested immediate reexamination of Allied support for Badoglio, stating that on balance the Allies would be in a better position if they ousted Badoglio and replaced him with a moderate government of the sixparty opposition. The following day, the Executive Junta proposed creating an anti-Fascist government under a regency. The anti-Fascists, however, continued to rule out cooperation with either the king or his son. Allied nonintervention policy, the Junta noted, favored the crown. The Allies should now even the balance by supporting the Junta's proposal and forcing the abdication of the king and his son. Badoglio's simultaneous decision to continue governing with a ministry of technicians solidified the constitutional impasse.61 Wilson decided that only immediate action could head off an uncontrollabIe and probably violent political upheaval in liberated Italy. On 19 February 1944, he requested permission to put the program of the Executive Junta into operation, stressing that the political situation was developing too rapidly for further delay and that action must not await Allied military progress towards Rome. The program of the opposition was moderate, while their calls for civil

84 OCCUPATION disobedience to dislodge the king were more threatening to the success of Allied military operations than any repercussions likely to follow the departure of King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio. The alternative was cracking down on the opposition, supporting Badoglio, and taking the military and political consequences. Wilson, "from the local angle," strongly preferred ousting the king. In a second message to Churchill and Roosevelt, Wilson argued that intervening to support the opposition would actually increase Allied political leverage. The six parties knew from experience that they could not dislodge the king without the Allies and therefore would be ready to pay the Allies' price in the form of pledges to abide by all of Badoglio's armistice commitments and the choice of acceptable men as prime minister and regents. To prove his point, Wilson contacted the opposition leaders and secured a promise to avoid further inflaming the situation until the Allies could consider their program.62 Wilson's recommendations exploded like bombs in both Washington and London. Word of the Allied commander's plans also reached Salerno, the new seat of the royal government, and the king dramatically changed his position. In Washington, the recommendations were unexpected good news for the Department of State. The department's policy committee met, agreed to press again for immediate reorganization of the Italian government and abdication of the king, and sent Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn to get the agreement of United States military authorities. Dunn met with General John Hilldring, head of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, on 20 February 1944. Hilldring suggested that the United States support a proposal to establish a "Lieutenant Generalcy" under Crown Prince Umberto's son. Dunn replied that the United States should support the plan of the six parties and avoid further confusing matters with another The War Department dug in its heels. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy insisted that the president had to approve any United States proposal to oust the king. McCloy was incensed because the State Department's proposal meant that Badoglio would share political oblivion with his king. Badoglio had "played fairly" with the Allies, McCloy argued, and should be offered a role in any regency set up by the six parties. In spite of McCloy's objections, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee endorsed Wilson's program and recommended that the Allies authorize Wilson to intervene at his own d i ~ c r e t i o n . ~ ~ Wilson's initiative ran into a stone wall in London. The Foreign Office wanted its representatives at Allied Force Headquarters to snuff out the six parties' freedom to oppose ~adoglio.~' Wilson's assurance to the Americans that this action was a "military necessity" was the key to British plans.66 Wilson's messages of 19-20 February 1944 destroyed those plans. Churchill,


however, stubbornly held his ground. On 22 February 1944, the prime minister told the House of Commons that he could not foresee how another government could provide greater aid to the Allies than the regime of the king and Badoglio. Churchill dismissed the opposition parties as eager to govern but without legal authority or popular support. The United States and the United Kingdom agreed, the prime minister concluded, that formation of a new government would have to wait for the liberation of Rome. On 25 February 1944, the prime minister informed the president that he had spoken with cabinet approval and pleaded for support for his hard-line position. By climbing out on a limb, Churchill shrewdly forced Roosevelt to either support British policy or publicly break with his Ally.67 MacFarlane and Wilson backed off. The Commander in Chief remarked that Allied officials in Italy had offered the British government a recommended course of action and it had been rejected. They now had to wait for instructions. MacFarlane ordered Allied Force Headquarters' Psychological Warfare Branch to tighten its censorship of the Italian press and radio. The chief commissioner warned that the Allies must have a policy on the Italian institutional question before Rome was liberated and suggested he return to London to explain the Italian situation to Churchill. Wilson, meanwhile, ordered Allied officials to avoid any actions that would heighten the political tei~sion.~' However, neither Allied Force Headquarters nor the British government was in a position to control Italy's internal politics. The growing strength of the opposition was evident to both Badoglio and the king. On 19 February 1944, Badoglio offered MacFarlane his proposals for breaking the political impasse. Three days later, MacFarlane met with the king. Victor Emmanuel damned lax Allied censorship, which, he claimed, permitted the opposition to put him in an impossible position. The king proposed to "withdraw" from public life, appointing Umberto Lieutenant General of the Realm. Although he was ready to announce his plans immediately, Victor Emmanuel insisted he would withdraw only after he had visited a liberated Rome. MacFarlane commented of this meeting that the king finally was impressed by the power of the opposition's campaign, and he advised Wilson and Macmillan that in spite of Victor Emmanuel's claims, the king had not made his final offer. The chief commissioner doubted that the opposition would accept the king's proposal and pointed out that it would put the Allies in the "distasteful position" of supporting the king against the popular will. Furthermore, if the plan succeeded, it would probably produce a center-right government that would be as isolated as Badoglio's. "I still think that we ought to produce a more radical solution before we get to ~ o m e . " ~ ~ American representatives at Allied Force Headquarters agreed with Mac-


Farlane's assessment and urged American action to break the status quo. American diplomats believed both sides would agree to a compromise in which Umberto replaced the king and a final decision on the fate of the monarchy was placed in the hands of a postwar constituent assembly.70 Pressures for American intervention were building at home. The press in the United States was increasingly critical of Allied tolerance of an antidemocratic regime in Italy, especially when the six-party alternative was available. Assistant Secretary of State Berle suggested that the Department of State issue a statement disassociating itself and the United States from the royal regime. Dunn was instructed to sound out the pre~ident.~' The opposition, too, was creating new tensions. They believed Churchill's speech was the Allied reply to their proposals of 18 February 1944 and no longer felt bound by their agreements with MacFarlane. On 28 February 1944, the Executive Junta called for a ten-minute work stoppage throughout liberated Italy on 4 March I944 to protest Churchill's speech. MacFarlane banned the strike and the opposition parties obeyed. They had made their point.72 The British government was outraged by this provocation. British leaders were determined to get control not only of the insolent Italians but of the Allied command in the Mediterranean. Churchill wanted MacFarlane recalled immediately.73The prime minister minuted Eden: It is very embarrassing that General Wilson should continually be pouring out statements to the President and State Department which are contrary to or critical of the policy which he has been instructed to pursue. He could no doubt reply that he is an Allied Commander and must report the facts. At the same time, the United States have conceded us the right of being the channel of operational control, which I conceive would mean that we might have some sort of conversation with our man before he sends out his informational messages.74 Churchill's insistence on greater British control in Italy was one of the contradictions that plagued British policy in Italy. Like the Americans, the British wanted to establish a popularly based regime in Italy. The British, however, also intended to punish Italy for its part in the war, and to ensure that the Italians accepted a subordinate role in a postwar British sphere of influence. The royal government was the ideal vehicle for achieving these objectives. It was weak, cooperative, and implicated with Mussolini. It was also a legitimate government, though its legitimacy rested on its continuity and not upon popular support. The opposition was organizing the masses while the royal government tried to rebuild Italy's shattered administrative system. In


October 1943, Churchill was probably correct in claiming that the six parties represented only a few professors and other idealists; five months later this was not the case. The king's government, with Allied help, had reorganized an administration, but the six parties, with Allied tolerance, had organized popular support. A legitimate government required the participation of the six parties. This point, which both Allied officials in Italy and leaders in Washington understood, escaped Churchill. The British prime minister continued to believe that the authority of the king and Badoglio could be imposed on liberated Italy, if Allied officials through a combination of censorship and firmness silenced the opposition. MacFarlane and others repeatedly warned that repressing the opposition might cause outbreaks that could impede Allied military operations. Churchill and the Foreign Office refused to listen. Throughout 1944 they pursued the will-o'-the-wisp of control through a combination of support for conservative elements within the Italian government and intervention in Italy's political affairs. The British did manage to delay Italian antiFascist efforts to build a legitimate government, but they fatally undermined their own position.75 Britain's drive for greater control also led to new confrontations with the United States. The Americans believed that stability in liberated Italy required the early creation of a representative government. On 21 February 1944, Roosevelt warned Badoglio that the Italian government must broaden itself as soon as possible, and the liberation of Rome was the last chance for a change, not the starting point for a r e ~ r ~ a n i z a t i oChurchill's n.~~ attempts to block the formation of a broad-based government disturbed the president. He had no desire to engage in a public quarrel with the prime minister, but wanted to put the British on notice not to impede the evolution of Italian politics. State Department officials encouraged Roosevelt's stand. Reports from Italy indicated that moderates within the six-party opposition were having difficulty restraining the radicals. All the Italian factions were waiting for an indication of AHied policy before making further moves. If the British view predominated, violence would likely ensue, damaging both the military effort and Italy's political stability.77 On 2 March 1944, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius outlined this dismal picture for the president while reiterating State Department support for the solution proposed by the six parties. Roosevelt instructed Stettinius to draft a message for Churchill outlining these views, adding, "I too fear we are drifting into a more difficult ~ituation."~~ Roosevelt's message to Churchill noted the rapid deterioration of the situa-


tion in Italy and the need to break the political impasse. The president cautioned against a policy that would require the suppression of the anti-Fascist parties, adding: "I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply to his previous cables. As you know, we prefer the program put forth by the six opposition parties. . . . General Wilson and his advisors have recommended the acceptance of this proposal. . . . My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active cooperation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian g~vernment."~~ Once again Churchill held his ground. He assured Roosevelt that Allied forces could maintain order. He refused to cave in to the demands of one faction of the defeated Italians, saying that concessions would undercut Allied control in Italy. The prime minister claimed that "capitulation" to the opposition would be popular but would gain only "transitory" advantages. Churchill called in his political debts: "I gave loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair to you and the State Department. It was never more necessary . . . to have unity of action between our two governments." A solution to Italy's governmental crisis would have to wait until "Rome is taken."80 Roosevelt once again backed off from a confrontation. However, Churchill's bid to freeze Italian politics failed within a week.

Soviet lnterventlon For three months the Soviets quietly accepted a minor role in Italian affairs. After fruitlessly trying to turn the Adviso~yCommission for Italy into the executive organization for the Italian occupation, Andrei Vishinski quietly departed and Alexandr Bogomolov, a competent but less influential official, took control of Soviet affairs in Italy. The Soviets eventually placed a powerless representative on the Allied Control Commission. Meanwhile, clumsy Western handling of the transfer of Italian ships to the Soviets unnecessarily complicated Allied relations. Both Roosevelt and Churchill intended to fulfill their commitment to Stalin, but faced strong opposition from their military advisors. In addition, Roosevelt ignored the exact terms of the Tehran agreement and thoroughly confused the negotiations by repeatedly insisting that Stalin was entitled to one-third of the Italian fleet. While the Western Allies fumbled, the deadline for the ship transfer passed and Stalin's irritation increased." A primary cause for Western fumbling was fear of the Italian reaction to the announcement of the planned transfer of its warships and merchantmen to the


USSR. After considerable debate, Churchill and Roosevelt decided to substitute some of their ships for the heavier Italian units and half the merchant tonnage. Stalin, whose patience with Western delays had worn thin, agreed to the transfer in a disagreeable telegram. Churchill grumbled, "What can you expect from a bear but a Succeeding Western moves failed to improve Stalin's disposition. Churchill decided that transferring Italian destroyers and submarines would set off a mutiny in the Italian navy and topple Badoglio. The British prime minister suggested that the Allies substitute their destroyers and submarines for the Italian units. Roosevelt was agreeable, so long as the British provided the ships. Churchill reluctantly agreed and then offered Stalin eight overaged destroyers, which the United States had sold Britain in 1940. Stalin, understandably, was less than thrilled by the type of ships offered as substitutes for the more modem Italian units.83 While the Western leaders worked out the technicalities of the transfer, another month passed. Roosevelt tried to mollify the Soviet leader with friendly messages indicating his determination to meet Soviet requirements and to assure that the British did too.84 The desire to reassure Stalin probably explains Roosevelt's next action. During his press conference on 3 March 1944, the president told reporters that the Allies would assign approximately one-third of the Italian fleet to the Soviet Union.85 RooseveIt7sstatement stunned Churchill. "Can this be true?'he telegraphed to the president soon after receiving word of the press conference. The British prime minister's worst fears appeared to be on the verge of realization. On 4 March 1944, an angry Badoglio told MacFarlane that Roosevelt's statement made his position untenable. Badoglio claimed he had lost the confidence of the navy and the nation. He declared that he would resign and the king would probably abdicate as a result of Roosevelt's statements. MacFarlane soothed Badoglio and he agreed to stay on temporarily as prime minister. MacFarlane frantically requested a clarifying statement that would soften the impact of Roosevelt's comments.86 Allied bungling set the stage for an Italo-Soviet rapprochement. Four days after the Roosevelt statement, Bogomolov met Badoglio and offered to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Italian government. A delighted Badoglio immediately accepted. The USSR had forcefully reasserted itself in Italian affairs and Badoglio had greatly strengthened the position of his government. The Soviet initiative caught the Western Allies off guard. Already at odds


over the replacement of the royal government and the president's press conference statement, the American and British governments were unable to control Soviet penetration in Italy or to prevent Badoglio from exploiting the new situation. Although the Italian government immediately informed them of the Soviet offer, Allied officials had to pretend that they knew nothing until the Russians got around to notifying them. Meanwhile the Soviets requested permission to base aircraft in Italy in order to supply Tito's Communistdominated Yugoslav re~istance.~' Soviet actions deeply troubled Allied officials in Italy. Allied occupation authorities were strong anti-Communists. They had firsthand knowledge of the war's physical devastation and the accompanying psychological disorientation affecting most Italians. MacFarlane realized that these were the conditions that had brought communism to power in Russia in 1917, led to short-lived Communist governments in Bavaria and Hungary in 1919, and provoked unrest throughout Europe immediately after World War I. The Communist Party of Italy (PCI) was making significant progress in organization in liberated Italy and was very active in the resistance movement in the north. Allied officials feared that the Soviets would take advantage of their privileged positions within the Advisory Commission for Italy and the Allied Control Commission by assisting the growth of the PC1 and encouraging resistance to the policies of the Western powers. Secret Soviet contacts with Badoglio heightened the concern of senior Allied officials in Italy, who believed the Soviets would use their leverage to place PC1 representatives in key positions within the royal government. The PC1 would be in a position to control the weak government and at the proper moment establish a Communist state in Italy.88 London shared these fears. Churchill proposed to treat Soviet diplomatic offensives with precisely the same firmness with which he dealt with the Italian opposition. On 6 March 1944, the War Cabinet authorized Churchill to limit naval concessions to the USSR to the figures agreed upon at Tehran. Churchill then sent a stem message repeating Britain's position to Roosevelt. The prime minister won his point with Roosevelt and a British-drafted joint message was dispatched to Stalin, which politely but firmIy informed the Soviet leader that the offer of American and British ships was a "take it or leave it" proposition. Meanwhile, British officials privately informed Badoglio that he enjoyed British backing against the six parties, and that Churchill would reiterate this support in a statement to parliament. The British did not inform Roosevelt about this message.89 Finally, Great Britain's mission in Italy was reorganized to increase British control. Sir Noel Charles, a veteran diplomat, was dispatched to Italy as British High Commissioner and represen-

A L L I E S A T O D D S 91

tative on the Advisory Commission for Italy. Churchill took responsibility for political matters away from the unreliable MacFarlane, who, as Eden noted, "is the agent of the supreme commander, and as such is the servant of the United States government as much as of His Majesty's go~ernment."~ American response to Soviet moves was more measured. American representatives in Italy and the Supreme Allied Commander both argued that cooperation with the Soviets continued to be the best policy, if balanced by Western insistence that the Soviets live up to the terms of their past agreements. Reinhardt, U.S. Acting Representative on the commission, added that Soviet actions were probably an expression of impatience with Allied-created barriers to their activities in Italy. He also reported that while Badoglio was pleased by the Soviet diplomatic initiative, he had mixed feelings about allowing increased Communist influence in Italian politics. Badoglio urged the Western Allies to make counterbalancing diplomatic moves.91 This information was welcome in Washington. Both Roosevelt and Hull wanted improved cooperation with the USSR. The president tried to minimize tensions between the three Great Powers over Italy with prudent public silence. He twice refused to comment on the ships issue and after the news broke that the Soviets were exchanging diplomats with Italy, the president downplayed the issue. Questions were referred to a predictably bland Hull, and the president repeated the Secretary of State's comments when again quizzed by the press.92 Privately, American officials were more concerned about the continued British efforts to retain the status quo than by Soviet diplomatic initiatives. Hull told a meeting of the State Department's policy committee that aside from the confusion it would create and some bad publicity, Soviet recognition of Badoglio would have little effect.93 It was a measure of the limited importance that the United States initially attached to the Soviet action that Roosevelt reopened the issue of a broadened Italian government with Churchill. On 13 March 1944, the president bluntly warned the British prime minister that political activity could not be suspended until Rome was liberated. Roosevelt noted that both Wilson and his political advisors advised their governments to back the Executive Junta's program. Roosevelt suggested that the "Bari Group" and, if necessary, the king be informed that the Allies supported their proposed solution to the political impasse. In view of the advice of the Allied military and political advisors, Roosevelt could find no rationale for continued support of the king.94 Churchill, as usual, had an arsenal of arguments and ploys to counter the president's challenge: a more democratic and representative Italian govern-

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ment could be created after Rome's liberation; Soviet recognition of Badoglio complicated the Italian political situation; the Western Allies could not risk a public breach over Italy; and the opposition ("the ambitious windbags now agitating behind our front lines") lacked public support. Churchill called the War Cabinet into special session to strengthen his position and it dutifully complied. Churchill's public and private assurances had already encouraged Badoglio to hold on to his po~ition.~' Once again, Churchill's efforts were undercut. Soviet diplomatic action set the stage for a new round of political turmoil. The Americans rejected Badoglio's efforts to squeeze concessions out of the Western Allies. A combination of American and British firmness weakened the impact of the Soviet dkmarche. The Italian Communist party then broke the unity of the Italian anti~ascistcoalition and, aided by Allied diplomats, imposed a comprehensive solution on Italy's politics.

Compromise In spite of the limited importance Roosevelt and Hull initially attached to the Soviet recognition of Badoglio, the Americans were soon forced into alliance with the British to limit the damage to the prestige of the Allied occupation authority. Badoglio pressed for a seat on the Advisory Commission for Italy and Allied status for Italy. If the Allies granted either of these requests they would effectively abrogate the armistice agreements of September 1943 and undercut their military arrangements. Allied officials in Italy believed that the Soviet gesture would reduce the Allied Control Commission's ability to supervise the Italian government, and that the establishment of diplomatic ties between Italy and a growing number of its ex-enemies would follow, further weakening the Allied Control Commission's ability to monitor Italian activities. Allied officials realized that the Soviet action could not be challenged, but wanted "the status of this representative written . . as low as possible," together with Soviet reaffirmation of "their intention of supporting the terms of the armistice and the machinery of the Allied Control Commission." The British government shared these concerns and was angry because Soviet action took place without prior consultations. Averell Harriman, the new United States ambassador in Moscow, was equally troubled by this aspect of Soviet conduct. "In view of the carefully worked-out and comprehensive basis for mutual consultation on the Italian situation, I can not regard lightly the action of the Soviet Union," Harriman cabled. The ambassador urged that the

.


United States tell the Soviets that if continued, this sort of procedural error would seriously harm Allied relations, and he made this point at a meeting with Vishinski. The State Department approved Hamman's actions and adopted his suggestion that the United States publicly state that it had no prior information from the Soviet Union on r e ~ o g n i t i o n . ~ ~ The Soviets downplayed the significance of their move and assured the Allies of their continuing loyalty to the existing occupation arrangements. However, they reiterated their determination to establish closer contacts with the Italian government and implied that Western mismanagement of Italian political affairs required a greater Soviet pre~ence.~' The net effect of Badoglio's maneuvers was to undercut Churchill's argument that the royal government could be trusted to cany out Allied orders. American representatives in Italy renewed their calls for the removal of King Victor Emmanuel and for the immediate formation of a government based on the six-party coalition. They pointed out that the king's persistent refusal to abdicate was polarizing Italian politics to the advantage of the extreme left. A continued stalemate endangered the basic elements of American policy: a free postwar choice of government by Italians and the creation of a broad-based coalition government after Rome's liberati~n.~' Macmillan warned Churchill that Soviet actions not only strengthened the Italian Communist party and weakened Badoglio but were damaging the already fragile Anglo-American unity of policy in Italy. He wanted to solidify that unity by promoting a coalition government prior to Rome's liberation. The British resident minister thought both sides were willing to compromise and that the new government could be created on terms favorable to Great Britain's basic objectives in Italy: preservation of the monarchy, a wartime truce on the institutional issue, and acceptance of the armistice terms.99 As if to prove Macmillan's point, the increasingly powerful Committee of National Liberation for North Italy issued a declaration from the occupied north calling for a government of national unity based on the CLN parties and for deferral of the institutional issue to a postwar p l e b i s ~ i t e . ' ~ ~ The Soviets were willing to cooperate. On 20 March 1944, Bogomolov reportedly told a senior Italian diplomat that the Soviets intended to broaden their penetration of Italy, exploiting a situation in which they as cosigners of the armistice enjoyed special privileges without association with the rigors of military occupation to broaden their influence. Reports of this meeting, which Italians may have exaggerated for their own ends, aroused concern in Washington and London. Vishinski denied the stories. Bogomolov went further at a 27 March 1944 meeting with MacFarlane. The Soviet diplomat was "clearly anxious to be friendly. He gave the impression of a penitent cobra being

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matey." Bogomolov stated that the Soviet government wanted the Badoglio government broadened to include representation of the six parties. MacFarlane left the meeting "reasonably satisfied that the Russians intended to take a strong line with the parties of the left in Italy and that they intended to ensure that these parties would do nothing to upset the war effort."lO' Within days the Italian Communist party broke the political deadlock with a comprehensive proposal that satisfied British objectives. Palmiro Togliatti, the party's leader, returned to Italy from his Moscow exile on 26 March 1944. At a meeting of party leaders at Salerno on 1 April 1944, Togliatti stunned the Western Allies and most Italians, including many in the PCI, by offering to participate in a Badoglio government. Togliatti declared that military victory must be the primary concern of Italians. The institutional question could be settled after the war. Italy required a broadly based government of national unity to carry on the war effectively. Badoglio wasted no time in offering the PC1 posts in his cabinet. The Christian Democrats informally approached the prime minister about a broadened government. When the Executive Junta met on 6 April 1944 to discuss Togliatti's proposal, they could do little but ratify a fait accompli. Togliatti's proposal made sense. The military stalemate continued. The opposition could not allow the king and Badoglio more time to consolidate their positions, while waiting for Rome's liberation. Moreover, as Togliatti stressed, King Victor Emmanuel was not the real issue. The anti-Fascists' true objective was the crown's acceptance that a postwar constituent assembly would determine Italy's form of government. If the king retired in favor of a lieutenant general, and the monarchy accepted a postwar constituent assembly, the opposition had won its objectives. Togliatti's arguments easily prevailed. With only the Socialist Oreste Lizzadri dissenting, the Executive Junta voted to accept a lieutenant generalcy. '02 Victor Emmanuel was the last stumbling block to a coalition government. The king still hoped to save his throne. After Togliatti's svolta (reversal), Victor Emmanuel played for time, believing that the parties would drop their demand for his retirement in the rush to get into a new government. Robert Murphy, the American political advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, advised Washington that the Allies would have to intervene to force the king to live up to his pledges.lo3 Both the United States and the United Kingdom wanted a speedy conclusion to the negotiations between Badoglio and the opposition. Togliatti's svolta magnified Allied officials' fears of a dramatic growth of Soviet influence in Italy. Sforza warned Murphy that PC1 control of Italy would be the first step in the "diplomatic Sovietization of Europe." On 7 April 1944, Murphy met with


Macmillan, Noel Charles, and MacFarlane, three anti-Communist stalwarts, to discuss checking the growth of Soviet influence. All agreed that forcing King Victor Emmanuel out was the best way to regain the diplomatic initiative for the West. Murphy provided additional incentive. He had just returned from the United States and talks with Roosevelt. The president, Murphy reported, wanted the king out. Italian-Americans disliked the monarch, and Roosevelt needed their votes in the fall presidential elections. In addition, Roosevelt was convinced that Victor Emmanuel's continued political activities aided the growth of the Communist party. The four diplomats agreed to go to Victor Emmanuel's residence at Ravello and tell the aged monarch to "get off the stage."'04 The king balked. Nevertheless, Allied representatives went ahead with their plans to broaden the government. On 11 April 1944, a meeting of the Advisory Commission for Italy endorsed a coalition government. The following day, after meeting with his leading supporters, Victor Emmanuel announced that he would retire from public life as soon as Rome was liberated and that Umberto would become lieutenant general of the realm.'05 Consultations between Badoglio and the opposition moved into high gear so that on 24 April 1944 a six-party coalition government was formed. The political deadlock broke and Italy took its first major step toward representative democracy. Nevertheless, the prevailing mood of Washington, London, and at Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers was apprehension. The genie of democracy had been loosed, but by the Communists. The Soviet Union and not the Western powers greatly increased its prestige among Italians. The Italian Communist party, not the American-backed moderates or British-supported monarchy, provided Italy with a government of national unity. The PC1 was playing the leading role in laying the foundations of a new and, the Allies feared, totalitarian Italian state. Neither the United States nor Great Britain would allow strategic Italy to fall into Communist hands.'% Franklin D. Roosevelt was a man on the spot. American strategic interests in the Mediterranean were imperiled by a growing Communist movement and by Britain's imperial ambitions. At home, the powerful and well organized Italian-American voting bloc was increasingly restless over American policy in Italy. American liberals, too, were demanding a new policy for Italy. Within the policymaking bureaucracy, the State Department, Foreign Economic Administration, and Treasury Department were agitating for a more dynamic intervention in the Mediterranean. The military, meanwhile, was trying to unload many of its civil affairs burdens. Elections were approaching. Only dramatic action could stabilize Italy and help the president to win reelection.

Chapter 4 A New Deal for Italy, June 1944-May 1945

In the summer of 1944, domestic political pressures, foreign policy imperatives, and the chaotic social and economic situation in liberated Italy drove the United States into a deepening involvement in Italian affairs and into new clashes with the British. By the end of 1944, the United States was pursuing a substantially independent course in Italian affairs and an American stabilization program for Italy was taking form.

Rome, at last Throughout the winter and spring of 1944, the Roman Catholic church followed American, British, and Soviet diplomatic initiatives in Italy with growing alarm. Frustrated in their intense efforts to secure a negotiated general peace, church leaders watched helplessly as the Allies slugged their way up the Italian peninsula. While both sides assured the Vatican that they would respect its neutrality, churches and other religious sites were destroyed or heavily damaged in the fighting. Other Catholic property was occupied for use in military operations. The abbey of Monte Cassino was situated at the top of a strategic peak, dominating the surrounding countryside. The Germans initially respected the monastery's neutrality but soon began using it for observation purposes. Allied commanders, pinned down in the valley by German fire, refused to believe Vatican assurances that the thousand-

N E W D E A L FOR ITALY 97

year-old monastery was unoccupied. On 15 February 1944, a massive air raid leveled the ancient structure. The bombing of Monte Cassino sent shock waves throughout the Christian world. It intensified Vatican fears that the advancing Allies would destroy Rome, the administrative center of the Catholic church, and its unrivaled cultural, religious, and artistic treasures. The Allies still refused to guarantee open city status to Rome. Churchill, backed by most American and British commanders, opposed a declaration that the Allies would not attack the city or utilize it as a military base after its capture. Cultural and religious concerns were only part of the Rome issue. The Vatican was equally troubled by political factors. The Germans occupied the city in September 1943 in the wake of the flight of the king and Badoglio.' German authorities behaved with their customary arrogance and cruelty. Underground resistance groups were organized; some were monarchist, others represented the six-party coalition. The Vatican provided a refuge for many important leaders of the six parties and tried to restrain their military operations as well as those of the germ an^.^ In March 1944 Communist terrorists ambushed a German patrol in downtown Rome, killing thirty-three SS men with a powerful bomb. In retaliation, the Germans executed 335 Romans. Catholic leaders feared that the attack was a foretaste of a bloody Communist party insurrection and wanted Allied assurances that their troops would establish order as soon as possible after a German withdrawal. Church officials pleaded for major relief aid, especially food, to avert starvation and mass ~ n r e s t . ~ While the Vatican's fear of an insurrection proved groundless, its concerns about the Italian Communist party's objectives and Italy's economic conditions, transmitted to the American government through Myron Taylor, the president's representative to the Pope, and the Catholic hierarchy in the United States, weighed heavily with Roosevelt as the 1944 presidential elections approached. The president failed to deliver open city status because of British objections, and he had only a limited ability to influence the PCI's policies. Economic aid was his best tool for meeting Catholic demands. Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) shared Vatican concern that a "revolutionary" government would take control of Rome in the interim between German withdrawal and Allied entry into the city. The city's food supply was high priority for Allied planners. In May 1944, General Harold Alexander, the Allied ground forces commander, had built up enough forces to break through German defenses. Allied

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plans called for a rapid advance to the Po Valley, with expected massive destruction of factories, homes, and farms. Bound by the "disease and unrest" formula, Allied commanders begged Washington and London for more food, clothing, bedding, and durable goods for millions of northern Italiam4 The Allied offensive in Italy began on 12 May 1944. The U.S. Fifth Army advanced rapidly along the northwest side of Italy, linked up with the forces bottled up at Anzio, and entered Rome on 4 June 1944. The left peacefully awaited liberation. The advance continued, and on 22 August 1944, Allied troops liberated Florence with the aid of the local resistance. The Germans, however, created a new line of mountain fortresses just south of Bologna. The Anglo-American offensive ground to a halt. The liberated central third of Italy, a populous and socially and economically advanced area, included the political prize of the entire Italian campaign, Rome. However, Germany held the highly productive agricultural Po Valley and Italy's industrial triangle-Milan, Genoa, and Turin. The victorious Allies governed millions more Italians but were singularly without the means to feed and employ them. Even before the military advance began, Allied leaders recognized that if Italy was to survive the rigors of another winter at war, its government would have to take a more active and imaginative role. Administration of two-thirds of the nation was clearly beyond the ability of Allied Force Headquarters, and settling differences over the Italian government's reorganization was urgent. The British were satisfied with the Badoglio government. Badoglio responded to British encouragement and began planning to form a government after Rome's liberation. The Italian prime minister had established a good working relationship with Communist leader Togliatti and undoubtedly counted on Communist political support.' The Americans would accept any government the Italians formed but insisted that the choice be made without outside interference. Nonetheless, the Americans showed a clear preference for a government with no ties to the king or Badoglio and the ex-Fascists around them. The king, like Badoglio, wanted power and a continued role in Italy's political life. In the weeks just prior to Rome's liberation, King Victor Emmanuel and Crown Prince Umberto tried without success to revive the flagging fortunes of the monarchy. In April 1944, Umberto talked with a reporter for the London Times and tried to justify the monarchy's passivity when Italy entered the war by arguing that a coup against Mussolini in 1940 would have brought about a German invasion. He then added that the Italian people had at least passively supported Mussolini, implying that they had only turned


against fascism to escape the consequences of military defeat. The Badoglio cabinet approved a motion censuring the crown p r i n ~ e . ~ Meanwhile, Victor Emmanuel began to hedge on his pledge to retire. By late May the Allies thought they had arrangements worked out by which the king would retire as soon as Rome was liberated. Victor Emmanuel balked, insisting that he would only transfer his powers to Umberto at Rome. MacFarlane was determined to prevent the king from interfering in the delicate postliberation negotiations for a new g~vernment.~ MacFarlane, with the support of Allied Force Headquarters, the United States government, and Badoglio's ministry, forced the king to stick to his bargain. The transfer of royal authority to Umberto occurred at the royal villa near Naples on 5 June 1944, and the oId king passed into well-merited obscurity. A disheartened Croce remarked that Victor Emmanuel's long delay in retiring and Umberto's fumbling interview reduced the monarchy's already limited chances for survivaL8 While the monarchy's fortunes sagged, those of the six parties were rising. The leaders of the Rome Committee of National Liberation (CLN) offered to cooperate fully with the liberating Allies, removing the possibility they would establish a rival government in the city. On 29 May 1944, MacFarlane won Allied Force Headquarters' approval to fly the leaders of Badoglio's government and the new Lieutenant General of the Realm to Rome immediately after its liberation for consultation with CLN leaders. Alexander Kirk, United States representative on the Advisory Commission for Italy, objected that having the Italian government fly to Rome would boost the prestige of the CLN at the expense of the Badoglio ministry. MacFarlane, however, argued that an early meeting under Allied sponsorship was the best means of ensuring that the political evolution of Italy remained within acceptable bound^.^ The Rome CLN agreed to MacFarlane's plan for a preliminary meeting in Rome followed by detailed discussions among Italian politicians shortly thereafter in Salerno. Ivanoe Bonomi, the CLN's president, also indicated that the Rome committee was willing to serve in a new Badoglio government;1° MacFarlane's attempt at guided democracy was moving forward. On 5 June 1944, the Badoglio cabinet voted to go to Rome. In accord with the agreed scenario, Badoglio resigned and the Lieutenant General asked him to form a new government after talks with Roman leaders. On 6 June 1944, Umberto, MacFarlane, Badoglio, and senior representatives of the government flew to Rome. The first meeting took place the same morning. MacFarlane, in the best style of a British colonial governor, told party leaders to sink their political disputes in a war coalition and reminded the Italian leaders

100 OCCUPATION

that they were bound by both armistice agreements and the institutional truce. He then left the meeting. As soon as the Italian leaders began their discussions, MacFarlane's carefully laid plan for a new Badoglio government unraveled. Representatives of the Rome CLN ruled out another Badoglio ministry. All the party representatives agreed to serve under Bonomi. Badoglio bowed to the inevitable and advised Umberto to ask Bonomi to form a new government. MacFarlane gave his approval to this solution after Bonomi pledged that the new government would abide by the armistice and institutional agreement. The chief cornmissioner wisely decided that any effort to block the six parties would only damage the war effort. He consoled himself that he and Bonomi did all they could to keep Badoglio in the government. However, MacFarlane could not resist one act of interference in Bonomi's effort to form a cabinet. The chief commissioner was aware that Churchill loathed Sforza and on 9 June 1944 vetoed the Count's nomination as foreign minister." MacFarlane's handling of the situation pleased no one. Churchill had barely accommodated himself to the king's departure. Badoglio's dismissal by the "aged and hungry" leaders of the six parties was a virtual coup d'etat, and the British prime minister's reaction was volcanic. An apoplectic Churchill telephoned Cadogan to unleash his fury on "that old woman" MacFarlane. Cadogan did not think the options available to the British were appealing, but Churchill called Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to his country residence, Chequers, to discuss ways of toppling the new government.12 The prime minister sent MacFarlane a blistering cable demanding he justify his conduct. l 3 For the first time since the armistice, the British found themselves trying to overturn an established situation. Churchill cabled Roosevelt and Stalin for support in replacing Bonomi with Badoglio. He now argued that the formation of a democratic regime would have to await the liberation of Northern Italy and that in the meantime Badoglio was the only trustworthy leader available in Italy. l4 The Americans might have enjoyed the spectacle of Churchill's futile effort to reverse the Italians' political settlement if they had not been so angered by MacFarlane's veto of Sforza. U.S. political advisor Robert Murphy vigorously protested to MacFarlane and cabled Washington that "if he [Sforza] should not be appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs . . . the United States will be the loser." Acting Secretary of State Stettinius fired off a protest to London and reasserted American rights to be consulted before British officials on the Allied Control Commission acted. Both Murphy and Kirk urged Washington


to oppose any British effort to oust the Bonomi government. Murphy cautioned that Badoglio's forced return to power would undermine popular support for the war. Kirk challenged Churchill's contention that the new government was unrepresentative and argued that the Bonomi ministry was a major step along the road to the reconstruction of an independent and democratic Italy, precisely because it was formed without foreign intervention. He added that the infusion of new leaders would invigorate the government and reduce the Italian Communist party's influence over the cabinet. The State Department's political committee met urgently on 14 June 1944 to consider British objections to Bonomi and agreed that the new government must receive Allied recognition.l5 The president indicated his pleasure with the king's departure and impending government change at his 9 June 1944 press conference. Replying to Churchill's protest, Roosevelt warned that it would be a "grave mistake" to impede the formation of the new and anti-Fascist government. The president reminded Churchill of his prior commitment to a change of administration once Rome was liberated and added that any interference with Bonomi would violate pledges to the Italians of a free choice of their government.16 Stalin was ready to support Bonomi's ouster, but Allied officials in Italy insisted on the quickest possible confirmation of the new government. Macmillan warned, "I do not think . . . it is possible to put Humpty Dumpty in his place again after our own officers . . . have allowed him to tumble off." Bonomi meanwhile strengthened his position with a written pledge to abide by Badoglio's agreement. The War Cabinet, moreover, acted as a brake on Churchill's impetuosity. Churchill realized that the British would have to swallow Bonomi, and he took what vengeance he could by ordering MacFarlane's recall. l7 The clash over the Bonomi ministry was a critical point in the development of both American and British policy in Italy. Each government felt itself bested in the political maneuvering, and each was determined that the future political evolution of Italy should conform to its prescription. The British had been outmaneuvered by the despised political retreads of the six-party coalition. British resentment focused on "the would-be viper of Milan, Count Sforza," whom they blamed for Badoglio's ouster. If Britain was to reassert "the reality of control," a personnel shake-up was essential. Churchill had no faith in British High Commissioner Noel Charles and wanted Macmillan put in complete charge of Italian affairs. In addition, the British would have to find a new chief commissioner who was committed to British policy but acceptable to the United States.'*


The United States remained the basic obstacle to British plans. When the British tried to impose conditions on Bonomi, Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office complained that the Americans' attitude was "disconcerting." The Americans wanted no conditions at all. Worse, presidential elections were in the offing, and Roosevelt would be seeking further concessions for Italy to boost his standing among Italian-Americans. The British mistakenly believed Sforza had a wide public following in the United States and expected the "old trickster" would provoke a crisis just before the elections in order to gain American support for an even more independent government under his leadership. Thus, the British wanted to reach a modus vivendi with the Americans over Italy before election time in the United States.I9 While the British debated their approach toward the United States, they reassessed their attitude toward Bonomi. Churchill grudgingly accepted the new government. Senior Foreign Office policymakers began to realize that the new government provided a stronger bulwark against the advance of comrnunism. Since the influence of national Communists threatened British plans for postwar hegemony in Italy and Western Europe, a rapprochement with the conservative Bonomi became attra~tive.~'

Toward a New Deal The Americans had reason to be satisfied with how Italian politics evolved during the spring of 1944, but instead they felt deeply troubled by the course of affairs. Italy was becoming an issue in American politics. An unlikely trio of American liberals, Italian-American pressure groups, and the Roman Catholic church were united in demanding a more aggressive American intervention in Italy. This demand coincided with the State Department's insistence that furthering the United States' vital interests required diplomatic action. Roosevelt showed his extraordinary political skills by mixing machine politics and diplomacy to reassure liberals and Catholics and to mobilize and reunite his Italian-American supporters, while achieving the basic objective of an independent role for the United States in Italy without rupturing the Anglo-American alliance. Liberals complained that American policy in Italy promoted unrest by failing to supply adequate food or to mobilize Italian support for the war effort. They attributed American failure to a lack of political objectives. Military expediency, the New Republic commented, was no substitute for a consistent policy. America's British allies, the journal complained, were following their


prewar reactionary politics while the Soviets were pursuing their self-interest in blatant disregard of the needs of popular movements throughout Europe. Liberals demanded that Roosevelt intervene, give Allied policy unity and direction, and seize the leadership in planning postwar political reconstruction. Italy was the obvious place for the United States to take the initiati~e.~' In spite of their frequent complaints, liberals were firmly committed to Roosevelt's reelection. After a generation of his leadership, the president's personal future and that of liberal reform were inextricably linked. The president could not count on similar loyalty from Italian-Americans, whose dissatisfaction with American policy in Italy and with Roosevelt was rampant. Roosevelt's offer of one-third of the Italian fleet to the Soviets, reports of widespread destruction, the failure of the Allies to rearm Italy or to grant it Allied status, growing Communist influence, and, above all, the lack of an adequate supply program irritated talia an-~rnericans.~~ In spite of their political divisions, Italian-Americans had been actively organizing. During the winter of 1943-44, many local Italian-American relief committees formed, at times on the foundations laid by the now moribund American Committee for Italian Democracy. These committees could easily become the basis for antiadministrationpolitical action unless Roosevelt satisfied their demands for participation in an enlarged relief program for ~ t a l ~ . ~ ~ Roosevelt's political difficulties were compounded by infighting among his supporters. The anti-Fascists spent most of their time attacking each other and flaying the Roosevelt administration for its foreign policy failures. In May 1944, the anti-Fascist left scored a major publicity coup when Life magazine agreed to publish a "manifesto" signed by Gaetano Salvemini, G. A. Borgese, Randolfo Pacciardi, Lionello Venturi, Giorgio La Piana, and world renowned conductor Arturo Toscanini. The manifesto, a withering blast at Roosevelt's policies, appeared in the first runs of the 12 June 1944 edition of Life, but was deleted from most copies to make way for extended coverage of the 6 June 1944 invasion of France. Its impact was blunted.24 The other major target of the tali an-~merican Ieft was Luigi Antonini. In order to undercut his power bases, the left organized the Free Italian American Labor Committee and encouraged divisions within the Mazzini Society. Antonini charged that their attacks on him and on his organizations were part of a Communist conspiracy to seize control of Italy. News of the CommunistSocialist party unity-of-action pact, of Communist participation in the sixparty opposition, and later of inclusion of the Italian Communist party in the Badoglio government shocked and outraged Antonini, who wanted a massive American intervention in Italy to stop the growth of Communist infl~ence.~'

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Antonini's ally Generoso Pope and most of the right-wing Italian-American press also demanded greater American aid and involvement. Pope attributed most of Italy's problems to reactionary and vengeful British policies. The Italian-American center-right and right wanted the United States to oust the British from Italy.26 The Catholic church represented the third influential group that the president needed to accommodate. The Vatican and the American Catholic hierarchy both wanted the United States to play a larger role in Italy as a bulwark against communism. Neither Italian nor American church leaders were pleased with Roosevelt's performance during the first year of the occupation. The president had failed to secure open city status for Rome and had permitted bombing of Monte Cassino and Rome. Catholic officials were deeply concerned with economic relief, which they believed could blunt the growth of Italian communism.27 Civilian policymakers wanted to improve the American position in Italy through a showdown with Great Britain. They also wanted to take control of civil affairs policy for liberated Europe away from the War Department. Civilian policymakers argued that American economic relief and political modernization programs in Italy were failing because the British and military insisted on the "disease and unrest" policy, which gave a "disproportionate priority . . . to immediate military needs as compared with civilian necessities," and because of the embarrassing and unmanageable alliance with exFascists they had foisted upon Washington in September 1 9 4 3 . ~ ~ Even Roosevelt's military chiefs were pushing the United States government toward a major clash with the British over Italy. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed further diversions of men or material destined for the campaign in France to Italy. The British had agreed to mount an invasion of southern France from Italy to aid the main thrust onto the Normandy beaches, and the Americans were determined to hold them to their bargain. Roosevelt's firmness destroyed Churchill's Mediterranean strategy. The prime minister later wrote that the clash generated intense feelings that left the Western alliance on the verge of rupture.29 Confrontation over Italy grew in the second half of 1944. The president provided much of the stimulus, as he tried to meet the demands of keg elements of his domestic political coalition. Roosevelt wisely employed economic aid as the primary agent for reknitting this coalition; however, his efforts to aid Italy collided with British strategic objectives. The president had already made limited practical concessions and broader promises of action to hold the support of key electoral groups. During the winter of 1944, when further concessions to the right disheartened his liberal


supporters, Roosevelt had revitalized them with his January 1944 State of the Union message. The president's call for an economic bill of rights, his warning against any turn to the right at home, his attack on special interests and portrayal of inter-Allied harmony were what liberals wanted to hear.30 The president also offered special favors to Catholics. The United States authorized the Vatican to establish a special information service, passing messages between Allied- and German-held Italy. Presidential special representative Myron Taylor met frequently with church officials to discuss the situation in Italy, while Roosevelt was assuring the Catholic hierarchy in the United States of his determination to spare Rome from destruction. The United States insisted on its predominant interest in matters affecting the Catholic church in its dealings with the British and Allied Force Headquarters. The Education Subcommission of the Allied Control Commission, which had extensive dealings with church officials, was almost entirely staffed by American~.~' Italian-Americans were another object of continuing presidential interest. In October 1943, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Roosevelt's emissary, had promised an Italian-American Labor Council meeting that Italy would enjoy a free choice of government, would rejoin "the family of nations," and would rebuild a free trade union movement. During the winter the president personally announced the resumption of mail services to Italy and pledged that Italy's artistic heritage would be preserved.32 To further reassure Italian-American voters and Catholic leaders, Roosevelt launched American Relief for Italy in early 1944. The president designed the group to patch up differences among Roosevelt supporters, to give ItalianAmericans a greater role in relief efforts, and to silence criticism of American economic policies. Skillfully guided by Myron Taylor and Judge Juvenal Marchisio, American Relief for Italy went a long way toward meeting presidential objectives. Through careful compromise, AFL and CIO leaders, antiFascists, and ex-Fascists, including Generoso Pope, served with minimal friction on the various committees and advisory boards of American Relief for Italy. By designating his personal emissary to the pope as head of American Relief for Italy, Roosevelt assured the Vatican a major role in the relief effort.33 By June 1944, the president could broaden and increase the concessions he provided Italy. The British ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, reported growing public dissatisfaction in America with affairs in Italy, coupled with growing distrust and dislike of British policy, and a widespread desire for a bolder American intervention in European affairs.34 Roosevelt tried to satisfy demands for a greater role in Italy in his "Fireside


Chat" of 5 June 1944 on the fall of Rome. He stated that Rome's liberation by an army that included Italian troops was a greater spiritual than military victory. The great center of religion was now assured freedom of worship. Nevertheless, Italy still faced a long road to rehabilitation. Fascist misrule left its people in great danger. Italy was threatened by starvation, which only Allied relief aid could prevent. In addition, the society must be purged of Fascist influences. Salvaging the Italian people would be costly, but, Roosevelt emphasized, it was a policy that would pay large dividends. By aiding the Italians to self-sufficiency, the United States would eradicate fascism, root,out the causes of Italy's aggressive behavior, and build another peaceful society. Calling on all Allied states to assist Italy, he pledged immediate and increased American aid to Rome and to Italy. Roosevelt's talk was a model of political oratory: it appeased all the important interest groups. His pledges of greater economic aid, in particular, answered a specific demand of all three groups and gave the green light to civilian planners to develop programs to fulfill his pledges.35 Reports from Italy indicated that the military supply program was an embarrassing failure, and the War Department wanted to escape responsibility. Civilian agencies would be criticized no matter who administered it and thus had little to lose by accepting responsibility for the civilian supply program. Furthermore, both the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) wanted to strengthen their influence over Italian policy. Treasury Department officials also hoped to gain some leverage over United States 36

Initially the civilian agencies were seriously divided on the outline of a program for Italy. The FEA, which continued to represent the Wallace tradition of a world New Deal, offered proposals to promote the immediate economic reconstruction of Italy. FEA Deputy Administrator Lauchlin Cume, an intimate of both Roosevelt and Wallace, urged Lend-Lease aid for Italy. Currie's support gave the idea of Lend-Lease for Italy a force it normally would have lacked. In a meeting with Treasury officials, Cume told Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Under Secretary Daniel Bell: "I think it is in our interest . . . to get that economy self-sufficing and operating again as soon as possible, otherwise we will have to carry those people indefinitely." Other American officials were skeptical. Bell doubted that a program that allocated limited and badly needed American resources for foreign economic reconstruction could win public or congressional backing. Myron Taylor, one of the chief proponents of a major aid program for Italy, wrote Roosevelt: "I assume that rehabilitation means more the rehabilitation of men, women and children

N E W D E A L F O R ITALY 107

than it does the rebuilding of plants and other properties, which if undertaken would run into vast figures and an unpredictable length of time."37 The belief that the United States could limit its aid to Italy to short-term relief dominated policymaking until late 1946, with results that were nearly disastrous for American interests. In early August 1944, new policy recommendations emerged from interagency discussions. The interagency Liberated Areas Committee rejected the FEA's proposal for Lend-Lease in favor of a short-term aid package. Under the committee's plan, the Treasury Department would establish an account for the Italian government equal to the amount of money American forces in Italy were paid in lire. The Italian government could then use these dollars to purchase basic supplies. The troop pay offset credits provided the bankrupt Italians with critical foreign exchange while it recycled dollars into the American economy and thus promoted domestic prosperity. At the same time the State Department, with support from Morgenthau, proposed a special United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) grant for Italy. American officials realized that UNRRA aid would be limited, but they hoped it would establish a precedent for international aid to Italy and put pressure on the British to ante up troop pay credits for Italy. A UNRRA grant would signal Allied recognition of Italy's contribution to the common war effort. UNRRA administrator Herbert Lehman was willing to support a small grant for Italy, but the United States still had to win the agreement of the other UNRRA member states.38 On 1 August 1944, the Liberated Areas Committee approved "LAC 7 Revised," the basic statement of United States economic aid policy for Italy. LAC 7 proposed the quickest possible termination of military responsibility for civilian supply, together with increased economic aid in the form of troop pay credits, dollar credits for Italian exports, and remittances from ItalianAmericans to Italy. The United States would refrain from using these funds for the payment of claims against Italy and would request UNRRA and the British government to provide further aid to Italy. In an effort to encourage a favorable British response, American planners insisted that this aid would not be considered to constitute a change in the conditions of the armistice.39 The British held the keys to the success of LAC 7. Their support was essential for UNRRA approval of aid to Italy, their agreement to provide Italy with troop pay credits in sterling would greatly improve Italy's foreign exchange balance. The United States would be hard pressed to implement its plans without the cooperation of its British partner in occupation. The British were unimpressed with American plans. The Foreign Office


believed that troop pay credits constituted a major revision of the armistice, which the Americans proposed to make without "any quid pro quo whatever" from the Italians. Furthermore, the British concluded that American proposals would have no effect on Italy's galloping inflati~n.~' Nevertheless, the British recognized that something had to be done about Italy's critical foreign exchange shortage, that the Americans alone could provide the required aid, and that aid for Italy would help Roosevelt in his forthcoming election campaign. Assistant Secretary of State Acheson frankly admitted to Sir Richard Law, the head of a visiting British economic mission, that the proposals were "merely an improvisation" designed to get the Italians (and the Roosevelt administration) through the next "six to twelve months." The United States government was going to act, Law warned London, and Britain would have to go along.41 The British decided to exchange their agreement to increase economic aid for political concessions from the United States. In May 1944, the British government had proposed a "preliminary peace" treaty with Italy in the belief that only dramatic action would haIt the Italian Communist party's advance toward power. However, the British were determined to exact stiff penalties from Italy through the loss of its colonies and fleet and by denying Italy recognition as an ally.42 These demands would undercut any benefits that an Italian government made through signing a treaty. The illogical, contradictory, and self-defeating nature of the British proposal was evident to the Americans, as was the need for major improvements in the legal position of the Italian government. The United States favored lightening the armistice terms and making public gestures designed to improve the image and influence of the Italian government. As the British proposal continued to make its way through the complicated inter-Allied planning bureaucracy, the Americans, with the State Department in the lead, gutted its punitive content.43 The preliminary peace proposal reflected Britain's continuing effort to improve its control over Italy. Macmillan was pursuing this objective at Allied Force Headquarters, and in July he submitted a proposal for centralizing Allied control machinery in Italy. The Americans wanted to increase the independence and responsibility of the Italian government and favored a reduction of Allied control. They suggested that civilians replace,military personnel throughout the Allied Control Commission, beginning with the chief comrnissi~ner.~~ In August 1944, the British began reassessing their Italian policy and


dropped the preliminary beace proposal. Britain's objective remained control. A 12 August 1944 Foreign Office Research Department study suggested that democratic government in Italy would lead to chaos, and that "unless . . . Great Britain remains in control (i.e. virtual dictator) and largemindedly and firmly guides Italy along democratic lines, Democracy looks like having [sic] a very poor chance." Commenting on the study, a senior Foreign Office official recognized that this prescription was unrealizable but agreed that the British must retain "the right to advise and even to issue directives where necessary," together with the "right of super~ision."~~ During August, Churchill made a personal visit to Italy. The prime minister continued to nurture plans for a drive through Italy to Vienna and wanted to confer with his field commander, General Alexander. He hoped to reach an agreement with Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito on the future of that nation and to clear up other ~ a l k a nmatters. Churchill also wanted to meet with senior Allied officials and Italian politicians to determine how best to achieve British goals in that nation. After hearing British officials' apprehensions of Communist objectives in Italy, Churchill agreed that political concessions and increased economic aid were the best tools to reinforce Bonomi's government and weaken the left. However, the prime minister still wanted to punish Italy and insure Britain's postwar Mediterranean hegemony by means of a hard peace. Churchill recognized that a preliminary treaty was valueless because its harsh provisions would weaken rather than strengthen Bonomi. The 'prime minister opted for symbolic concessions: recognition of Bonomi's government and appointment of a diplomatic representative, together with a new title for the Allied Control Commission that would "suggest that its function was to help and guide the Italians." Churchill also approved the proposed UNRRA grant to Italy. To achieve control, Churchill decided to place Harold Macmillan at the head of the Allied Control C o m m i ~ s i o n . ~ ~ The British offered the United States a mixture of cosmetic policy concessions and agreement to a limited increase in economic aid in return for further centralization of power in British hands. The British counted on Roosevelt's need for Italian-American votes to drive the United States into a bargain. While the Americans would welcome British concessions, Churchill's determination to increase British control over Italy was bound to lead to clashes with an American government equally committed to reducing British intervention in Italy's affairs and softening the armistice regime.


The Quebec Conference and a New Policy In August 1944, Franklin Roosevelt was a candidate looking for help. The turbulent Democratic party coalition was deeply divided. The president's conduct of foreign policy was under attack from left, right, and center. Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, was running a smooth, well-organized campaign. In winning the New York governorship, Dewey had shown considerable talent for attracting the support of Democratic voters. After an August meeting with the president, Ambassador Halifax reported to London that Roosevelt was "pre-occupied with the election," which he felt would be "tough and close.'47 Roosevelt's strategy was to hold on to his liberal support and his southern political base while attracting the moderate and conservative voters of predominantly Catholic urban ethnic groups like the Poles, Irish, and Italians. As a concession to the urban machine politicians, the president unceremoniously dumped Henry Wallace as his running mate and replaced him with Senator Harry Truman, an affable Missouri party regular. Truman, a political moderate, had close ties to the party bosses and organized labor. In spite of its status as a secondary theater of war, Italy was a politically explosiye issue. Two influential columnists at the New York Times, Ann O'Hare McCormick and Herbert Matthews, repeatedly focused public attention on Italy's plight during the campaign. Liberals continued to regard Italy as an acid test of Roosevelt's determination to foster political democracy and check Tory imperialism. Finally, Dewey was making a strong bid for the Italian-American vote.48 A large degree of unanimity existed among all these groups on what United States policies in Italy should be. Drew Pearson, the liberal syndicated columnist, summarized them: the United States should speed up Italy's rearmament, grant Italy Allied status, and greatly increase the volume of economic aid to Italy through Lendbase. In addition, Italian-American labor insisted on playing a role in the revival of a free trade-union movement in Italy. If Roosevelt could satisfy these demands, he would carry a number of critical eastern urban areas.49 The president maneuvered with his usual tactical skill to meet the demands of his constituents. Rearming the Italians was the easiest demand to meet. The Supreme Allied Commander had already requested authority to increase the number of Italian combat troops to offset withdrawals for the August 1944 invasion of southern France." By the winter of 1944, six Italian combat groups were taking up positions opposite German lines.


Italian-American labor proved only a bit more difficult to satisfy. As usual, the nexus of the problem revolved around Luigi Antonini. In the spring of 1944, the British Trade Union Congress invited Antonini to join a delegation touring liberated Italy. When the State Department approved Antonini's request to visit Italy, his political rivals protested that he was receiving preferential treatment. Eventually, the administration worked out a compromise. George Baldanzi of the CIO and Free Italy America Labor Committee accompanied the Antonini-Trade Union Conference mission. Both major labor factions could take a hand in rebuilding the Italian trade union movement. Roosevelt reaped the political benefit: the united endorsement and support of Italian-American labor.51 The president could not meet the demands for Allied status for Italy or for Lend-Lease aid. The British had ruled out Allied status. A resolution introduced by Congressperson Vito Marcantonio granting Italy Allied status was discreetly pigeonholed by administration supporters in the House. After hearing interagency recommendations and the advice of aides like Myron Taylor, Roosevelt publicly ruled out end- ease.^^ The president had to satisfy calls for a new policy in Italy without granting the specific demands that accompanied them. The first step in forging a new policy was agreement with the British. A second Roosevelt-Churchill meeting in Quebec was set for September 1944. Italy was one of a number of complex problems demanding resolution; however, it was the only item on the agenda of pressing domestic political importance for Roosevelt. American preparations for discussions on Italy were extensive. The American prescription for Italy ran counter to that of Great Britain. Both governments agreed that Italy needed more economic aid, but the British wanted the Americans to pay the bill while they conserved their scarce resources. The British also insisted that increased United States aid to Italy was a concession on their part, for which the Americans must grant them a political quid pro quo. Yet, the United States and United Kingdom differed most deeply precisely over political matters. The Americans insisted that the Italian government's legitimacy rested on its autonomy. Elimination of the most burdensome armistice clauses and of many of the functions of the Allied Control Commission was the centerpiece of the American plan for Italy.53 In spite of these unresolved differences, Roosevelt carefully orchestrated public attention on his forthcoming discussions with Ck~urchillover Italy and managed to gamer considerable political advantage from the limited progress made at Quebec. Just the sight of their president tangling with the Tory

l l 2 OCCUPATION

reactionaries over Italy boosted his stock among his liberal and Italian-American labor constit~encies.~~ The centerpiece of Roosevelt's preconference media campaign was the dramatic return from Italy of Brigadier General William O'Dwyer, once and future Democratic candidate for mayor of New York and head of the Economic Section of the Allied Control Commission, to report to the president on conditions in liberated Italy. At his press conference on 8 September 1944, Roosevelt underlined the seriousness of Italy's economic situation and his commitment to aid the Italians. White ~ o u s officials e informed the press that Roosevelt was meeting with O'Dwyer and FEA chief Leo Crowley to map plans for assisting Italy.55 The next day, Crowley, a prominent Catholic layman, called in Monsignor Michael Ready, General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, for a discussion of Italy and other political matters. Crowley outlined the president's plans to increase aid to Italy and Roosevelt's determination to force a new Italian policy on the British. The FEA chief then made a clumsy effort to commit Catholic leaders to the reelection of the president. Ready responded by listing Catholic complaints about the policies of the Roosevelt administrati~n.'~ Meanwhile, the Roosevelt administration was transferring its broad objectives into a specific program to present to the British. Discussions continued in Washington under the direction of Harry Hopkins even as Roosevelt negotiated at Quebec. On 13 September 1944, Hopkins advised Roosevelt to secure a public statement committing the Allies to a new policy for Italy. The next day, Churchill proposed a reorganization of the Allied Control Comn~ission.~~ The prime minister politely sidetracked American suggestions about the fate of Italian colonies. The Quebec conference ended on 16 September 1944, and the negotiations moved to Hyde Park, where a draft declaration on Italy was drawn up prior to the prime minister's departure. Publication was delayed while both parties sought wording that would make the statement as acceptable as possible to both the Italian people and Roosevelt's domestic constituencies. The British, and Churchill in particular, were anxious to aid the president's reelection campaign and made public moves only after analyzing their effect on public opinion in the United States. When Roosevelt made a dramatic telephone call to the UNRRA conference at Montreal in order to mobilize support for a relief grant to Italy, Great Britain backed his initiative. Nevertheless, the British government continued to resist a number of the substantive concessions that the United States desired. Eden held up publication of the Roosevelt-Churchill statement in order to remove a clause in which the Allies proclaimed their willingness to revise the Italian a r m i ~ t i c e . ~ ~


Roosevelt wanted quick publication of the statement on Italy. Hull told British Ambassador Halifax that the president was handling all matters relating to Italy personally. When Churchill requested a further delay in the publication of the statement, the president called in reporters and told them that Italy received "paramount" consideration in his recently concluded discussions with Churchill and that the two leaders were now working on plans to put their decisions into effect. The president promised a policy statement soon. The following day, Italian-American publisher Generoso Pope published a personal letter from Roosevelt in which the president reiterated his concern for Italy and explained that he was coordinating his program with various United States and Allied agencies and with the British. Roosevelt stressed the need for a greater Italian role in its own reconstruction. As evidence of this determination, Roosevelt promised to send trucks to Italy to aid in the distribution of relief supplies.59 The Churchill-Roosevelt statement was released on 26 September 1944. Noting the role that Italians were playing in the struggle against the Nazis, the statement promised an increase in Italian administrative independence. The name of the Allied Control Commission was changed to Allied Commission as a symbol of Italy's new status. The Italian government was invited to send diplomatic representatives to the United States and Britain. The two nations pledged to work for the reconstruction of the Italian economy. In addition, they promised a UNRRA aid program. The Allies cautiously delayed announcement of Macmillan's appointment as acting president of the Allied Commission and that of U S . Admiral Ellery W. Stone as chief commissioner until after the November elections. The Roosevelt administration did not wish to announce that another British official was taking charge in Italy. The issue of British predominance in Italy was a highly charged one for Italian-Americans and liberals.60 Public reaction to what Roosevelt dubbed a "New Deal for Italy" was lukewarm. Most Italian-Americans adopted a wait and see attitude. A New York Times editorial expressed mixed feelings by approving the decision to increase economic aid to Italy, noting that the change of the commission's name was mostly symbolism, and questioning continued Allied cooperation with e x - ~ a s c i s t s . ~ ~ Roosevelt's initial effort to quiet the discontent about Italy was at best a partial success. The president's response to Italian economic and political problems was too tentative and too vague to overcome the effects of intense press coverage of Italy's plight.62 Only further economic and political concessions to Italy could offset the effects of this reporting on voters. However, the British had gone as far as they were willing in making

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concessions to Italy. Roosevelt would have to act independently in order to win Italian-American and Catholic backing for his reelection. Roosevelt's independent line gradually led the United States into a new and ultimately decisive clash with the British over Italy. The president's political advisors were plotting further moves even before the publication of the New Deal statement. On 23 September 1944, presidential lieutenant Oscar Ewing suggested that Roosevelt call Generoso Pope to the White House for a meeting: I think this tembly important. He can help us more on the Italian situation than any other single person in the Italian group. . . . I think it is very important that you send for Gene alone, and it should be an "on the record" conference. It is a play to his egotism and having anyone else with him will minimize its effect. The Italian-American publisher craved a meeting as a final and public absolution for his Fascist past.63 In another move, Myron Taylor and Judge Marchisio met with Pope Pius XI1 on 27 September I944 to discuss the plans of American Relief for Italy. The favorable response to the New Deal policy from the pope and other Catholic leaders was widely reported.64 On 30 September 1944, Generoso Pope, the grand marshal of New York City's Columbus Day parade, asked for a message from Roosevelt that he could read at the parade. This request set off another debate within Roosevelt's inner circle on the benefits of a close association with the controversial but powerful Italian-American publisher. Roosevelt again decided that Pope's ability to deliver Italian-American votes far outweighed his now distant past and on 5 October 1944 sent him a letter which reaffirmed the president's concern for both Italian-Americans and 1talye6' Roosevelt guarded his left flank by encouraging rumors that New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia would be sent to Italy to take charge of American interests. The president followed this up with further action: a special statement entitled "Present Problems in Italy" outlined past American contributions to Italy's recovery and plans for its reconstruction, while highlighting recent conce~sions.~~ The president got some help from Italy on 6 October 1944: a letter from Pope Pius XI1 to Myron Taylor praising the United States aid effort. This letter was especially welcome because it offset criticism from the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States. Don Luigi Sturzo, the exiled Italian Christian Democrat, had considerable influence on Catholic leaders' attitudes. Stuno


complained that Roosevelt's policies were "neither sufficient nor clever," and warned that Western blunders were aiding the growth of communism.67Catholic irritation with the Roosevelt administration increased in the fall when the State Department initially refused to permit the American bishops to send a special representative to Italy. An angry Monsignor Ready told Assistant Secretary of State Howland Shaw, "We were sick and tired of going around Washington with our hat in hand begging honest consideration for Catholic interests." Ready's attitude was ominous because he was generally proadministration. Another area of growing Catholic uneasiness was Italy's economic situation. New York's archbishop, Francis Spellman, returned from Italy in late September 1944 and warned Roosevelt and fellow bishops that only "immediate action" could meet the political and economic crisis. Ready's 5 October 1944 discussion with O'Dwyer reinforced Catholic concern about Italy. O'Dwyer described liberated Italy's situation as "horrible" and "as near chaos as possible." After outlining his own efforts to aid Italy, the politiciangeneral laid the blame for Italy's situation squarely on the British, telling Ready that "Great Britain intends to make Italy another Malta and it is seeing to it that Italy cannot live without England's help." O'Dwyer added that the British were anti-Catholic, and that American officials in the War Department were acquiescing in British policies that would result in a Communist take~ver.~' O'Dwyer's concluding assurances that Roosevelt himself was pro-Italian could hardly offset the impression created by his vivid picture of a chaotic Italy imperiled by British stupidity, American indifference, and Communist plotting. Roosevelt had to rely on new concessions, combined with the pope's favorable words, to choke off an incipient revolt among American Catholic 1eade1-s.~~ On 10 October 1944, the president announced that the troop pay credits program would be unilaterally implemented by the United States. The same day Crowley issued a statement that outlined United States plans for an increased civilian support program and reviewed previous American aid to Italy. Presidential aide Hopkins and FEA's Cume twisted arms in both the War Department and the War Shipping Administration to ensure that the bureaucracy delivered on the president's commitments for Italy.70 On 12 October 1944, Roosevelt accepted the Four Freedoms Award of the Italian American Labor Council in a national radio broadcast. The president's speech praised Italian-American contributions to the United States, reminded them of his administration's handling of the enemy alien issue, and promised that the United States would do everything possible to aid Italy.71

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Attorney General Biddle, who had represented the president at New York's Columbus Day parade, spoke to the same gathering: Mr. Biddle, with the large Italian-American vote of New York clearly in . . . mind, painted a dazzling picture of Mr. Roosevelt as the benefactor and savior of the Italian people. Beside the statues of Cavour and Garibaldi, and Mazzini, he said, there will one day stand the statue "of a man who loved Italian culture well enough to preserve Rome from destruction," that of Roosevelt, the liberator, whom he compared with "Columbus, the navigator," "I am proud to be the president's witness before history of his faith in the Italian soul."72 The following day at his regular press conference, Roosevelt repeated his promise that Italy would get more aid, including UNRRA funds.73 Roosevelt's effort was successful. Although available evidence suggests that the Republicans had made deep inroads into the Italian-American vote, the president held enough of it to win in New York and other industrial states. The Catholic church in the United States did not endorse Roosevelt, but kept its criticisms of American policy private. Pope Pius XII's letter probably reinforced the tendency of Catholics to vote for Roosevelt. The election campaign inarked a decisive step in the evolution of American policy towards Italy. It was the catalyst that drove the United States government to an increasingly independent policy. At first, these moves did not conflict with British objectives. By early November, however, the policy had a distinctively anti-British thrust. The British suffered in silence to assist Roosevelt's reelection effort. The independent policy line achieved a momentum of its own. The president's supporters found that Italian-Americans responded favorably to placing blame for Italy's problems on British imperialism. Years of prewar Fascist propaganda assaults on Britain had created a strong hostility among Italian-Americans, and harsh British treatment of defeated Italy resurrected these briefly submerged feelings. Another group that responded to and furthered anti-British feelings was the liberal press. Liberals found Britain a convenient target for their frustrations with American policy, blaming a cabal of British politicians and American diplomats and military officers for the policies they denounced rather than Roosevelt, on whom they rested their hopes for continued liberal reform.74 Ironically, another group that took pleasure in the anti-British turn of policy were the Department of State diplomats who had long argued for a more aggressive American role in Italy. The liberal bureaucrats of the Foreign


Economic Administration and the Office of War Information were equally pleased with the assertion of American rights, and they continued to nurture hopes for a postwar reconstruction guided by the United States according to liberal principles. Italy remained a test case and Britain the major stumbling block. Catholic leaders who feared the advance of communism in Italy as a result of British policies were bound to respond favorably to American initiatives, especially in the economic area. Two other significant results of Roosevelt's relief politics were the solidification of the fusion between moderate Italian-American labor and the prominenti and the creation of an informal but powerful Italy lobby consisting of Italian-Americans, liberals, and Catholic leaders. The Itaiian-American center coalition delivered enough votes to make it an important element in future presidential politics. It increased its leverage over both the domestic and foreign policy calculations of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. The strong anticommunism which cemented together the Italian-American center gave them a leading position among those groups demanding a hard-line policy against both the Soviet Union and Europe's national Communist parties. The Italy lobby would play an important role in reshaping American policy between 1944 and 1948.

Elaboratingthe New Policy With Roosevelt reelected, the British reasserted their claim to a dominant role in Italian affairs. Shortly after the election Churchill wrote the president: "I hope you will not mind my saying that you have jumped a good many fences in your directive . . . about the Italian ration of grain."75 Macmillan was about to take over the Allied Commission, and London anticipated achieving a degree of control that had eluded it since the armistice. "The prime minister," a Foreign Office official noted, "looks, as we do, to the final appointment of Mr. Macmillan to restore the ground lost in the past ten weeks ."76 The British government was trying to lock a barn long after the horse had escaped. The British thought the New Deal policy statement of 26 September 1944 was a political cosmetic. "After all, despite the change in its name, the Allied Commission really must continue to control to the extent it did before the Hyde Park De~laration."~~ The declaration's effect on the Allied command in Italy was quite different. Because the president and prime minister's joint statement was vague, Allied officials waited for further clarification in the

13.8 O C C U P A T I O N form of specific guidelines and directives. The already slow moving Allied occupation bureaucracy nearly ground to a halt. With the Allied Commission virtually paralyzed, the Italian government interpreted the statement to suit its aims and began to assert its independence of Allied control. Bonomi met with Kirk to stress that reduction of the Allied Commission's role was essential ta the smooth functioning of Italy's government and to the success of Italy's economic and political reconstruction. The Italians forwarded proposals for implementing the New Deal, which included Italian representation on the Allied Commission's subcommissions, reducing the Allied Commission's role to a strictly consultive one, and abolishing all Allied Commission activities outside of strictly military operations. The Italians then proceeded to test the intent of the new policy. On 20 October 1944, the Bonomi ministry published a legislative decree on labor rates without prior Allied Commission approval. The Supreme Allied Commander decided not to veto the Italian action, and he warned the Combined Chiefs of Staff that Italy would continue to exploit the commission's weakness until it received directives and guideline^.^' The British government was counting on Macmillan to provide a policy directive that would assure its continued dominance in Italy. Macmillan, however, had a more realistic view of the Italian situation. In September 1944, he warned that Italy needed economic aid immediately, or it "will go communist." He urged the British to support American proposals to increase aid and prophetically cautioned: "In any case, if our American ally is anxious to interpret her responsibilities generously, why should it hurt us? We shall soon be suppliants at the court of American bounty, is it not to our advantage that they should treat their ex-enemy, Italy, as well as possible? We shall then be able to plead that they must treat us with at least equal generosity. As potential beggars, we have a general interest in the distribution of alms."79 Britain, Macmillan realized, would have to accept the lead that the United States offered. However, by exploiting the special relationship between the two Anglo-Saxon powers created by the wartime alliance, he believed Britain could channel American policy in ways which supported its political

objective^.^^ Discussions at AFHQ on increasing Italy's share of Allied relief were underway at the time of the Hyde Park declaration. On 2.5 October 1944, Macmillan presented a paper designed to force action on the civilian supply situation. Macmillan proposed that the Supreme Allied Commander, although "uninstructed" by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, proceed on the basis of Macmillan's interpretation of Churchill's and Roosevelt's views to increase imports of civilian goods and provide enough grain to fulfill Roosevelt's


pledge of a 300-gram daily ration. The Allies would maintain this level of supply for six months after the termination of military operations in Italy. In addition, Macmillan wanted to immediately begin an "industrial first aid" program of 200-250 million dollars in liberated Italy. Wilson sent the substance of Macmillan's proposal to the Combined Chiefs. The Macmillan proposals were political dynamite, and the Combined Chiefs ordered Wilson to delay implementing them until the United States and United Kingdom reached agreement on a common policy. Neither Wilson nor Macmillan was willing to let the matter rest there. Wilson told the Combined Chiefs of Staff that it was time to redeem Roosevelt's 300-gram pledge and begin rehabilitating Italy's industrial plant through an increased allocation of money, supplies, and shipping. He warned that the disease and unrest formula was inadequate to meet Italian needs." Macmillan, meanwhile, convinced senior Allied officials to formulate their own general policy recommendations for Italy. On 20 November 1944, the Allied Commission's acting president assembled his staff to study the implementation of the Hyde Park declaration. The consensus favored a further reduction of the Allied Commission's role and a greatly increased civilian supply program. After this conference Macmillan prepared his own analysis, "Allied Policy Toward Italy," and flew to London for discussions with British officials. Macmillan's plans for further talks in Washington were cancelled when civil war broke out in Greece in ~ecember.'~ Although he advocated a far more radical program than London contemplated, the hard-pressed British government welcomed Macmillan's arrival. A program that represented the views of senior officials in Italy was a useful weapon in Britain's rapidly mushrooming political confrontation with the United States. "Allied Policy Toward Italy" was the "most influential and probably the most memorable" set of policy recommendations produced during the occupation period.83 Macmillan skillfully balanced his basic arguments for a reduction in Allied controls and increase in aid to Italy with an appeal to Britain's government to consider its larger strategic interests. The time had come, Macmillan stated, to limit Allied control to areas "where our military needs require it." The Allied Commission must take on a new role as advisor to the Italians, and "if our advice is not accepted, we must shrug our shoulders and allow affairs to take their course." While refusing to discuss "purely post-war problems," the Allies should hold their armistice rights in reserve and transfer authority to the Italian government. To achieve this, Macmillan proposed abolishing the Political Section of the Allied Commission and permitting the Italians to have direct

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diplomatic relations with foreign representatives, including the right to use their own ciphers. Moreover, Macmillan wanted the Allies to renounce their right to pass on the appointments of the Italian government except military ones and to terminate the local government operations of the Allied Commission. Changes in the Allied Commission's role would make the Italians more responsive to Allied objectives, Macmillan explained, and enable the AngloAmericans to play successfully the role of "elder brothers to our weak and errant juniors ." Modification of the Allied Commission did not imply staffing it with civilians to Macmillan. Instead, he recommended that, except at its Rome headquarters, the assignment of civilian personnel to the Allied Commission await the end of the war. Passing to economic reconstruction, Macmillan reiterated his earlier proposals for an increased Allied-financed import program and for industrial first aid. He appealed to the British government to make a proportionate contribution to this program. Macmillan concluded by admitting that his proposed economic program would be costly and hard to coordinate. However, the Allies were now committed to a new policy in Italy, and the Italians merited special treatment as a result of their cooperation with the war effort. Above all, aiding Italy forwarded American and British objectives: "It will need all the patience, courage and devotion that British and American administrators can give if we are to preserve Italy and her 45 millions of people from collapse into despair, anarchy and revolution. To fail to make the effort because of our grievances against Italy, however justified, may be to have won the war and lost the peace."84 The British government endorsed Macmillan's proposals and sent a copy to the U.K. Joint Staff Mission in Washington, with instructions to present them to the Combined Chiefs for approval. The two Allies, as usual, were marching in opposite directions over Italian policy, but the English, as usual, were marching in unison, the Americans in disharmony. American interagency conflict over Italy continued throughout the fall of 1944. The FEA championed immediate civilianization of the Allied Commission as an essential first step toward the reconstruction of Italy's economy. FEA officials doubted the War Department's commitment to Italy's rehabilitation. The FEA had a strong presence on staffs of the Allied Commission's economic subcommittees, and if the War Department's influence on economic affairs was eliminated, the disease and unrest formula could be reinterpreted or abandoned. FEA would be in a position to guide Italy's reconstruction along lines favored by New Deal liberal^.'^


The War Department, in fact, wanted to hand over responsibility for Italy to civilian agencies; however, the military insisted that all communications on economic matters must pass through military channels. In effect, the War Department wanted civilians to take public responsibility for Italy's reconstruction while it made The Department of State wanted to cut the Gordian knot of military control and at the same time reduce British meddling in Italy's internal affairs through a preliminary peace agreement between Italy and the Allies. Like FEA, the department favored a quick civilianization of the Allied Commission. Department officials viewed the Allied Commission as an increasingly unsupportable burden, delaying Italy's political and economic rehabilitation, and wanted to reduce it to a small advisory body. This would eradicate the influence of the British "colonial diehards" who dominated the Allied Commission, give the Italians a chance to work out their own solutions to the economic crisis, and foil the FEA's plans to guide Italy's recon~truction.~' Typically, Roosevelt chose to combine elements of agency programs. Shortly after the election, he told the cabinet that his economic policy for Europe was to "see that people do not starve but not be greatly concerned about shipments of materials, machinery, etc. particularly to Italy." This statement doubtless encouraged the War Department's hard-line stand against increased aid to Italy. Moreover, in a message to Churchill, Roosevelt reaffirmed that military necessity must determine the allocation of shipping. Roosevelt agreed that he had "jumped some fences" to please the Italian-Americansand warned that he would continue to do so in the future. Roosevelt was particularly dissatisfied with the administration of relief for Italy. He strongly endorsed an extensive civilianization of the Allied C o m m i s ~ i o n . ~ ~ Roosevelt's problem was providing the extra aid for Italy that his domestic clientele demanded after he had apparently ruled out increasing Italy's allotment of either ships or supplies. The British recognized this but had no intention of helping the president escape from his dilemma. Great Britain agreed to permit the Americans to increase independent economic aid to Italy if they could pay for it and ship it.89 While granting the Americans the right to a wider sphere of autonomy in economic affairs, the British continued to assert their own right to intervene in Italy's political affairs. This produced the first public clash over Italy between the Western Allies. By the fall of 1944, the Bonomi government was showing signs of internal stress. The right- and left-wing parties of the CLN maneuvered for leverage. In August the PC1 and PSI renewed their unity-of-action pact. While PSI

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leader Pietro Nenni repeatedly stated that the new agreement was not a preliminary move toward a fusion of the two Marxist parties, the parties of the right reacted hostilely. By mid-November left and right were itching for a test of strength. The Bonomi government deadlocked along ideological lines over a number of critical reconstruction issue^.^ Bonomi decided to act before he was driven from power. On 26 November 1944, the prime minister surprised his opponents by handing his resignation to the Lieutenant General of the Realm, rather than to the CLN which had nominated him. The left received a second unexpected blow when Bonomi informed the CLN that the British government had vetoed a Sforza candidacy as either prime minister or foreign minister in a new government. Sforza was the obvious alternative to Bonomi, and the left lacked another candidate who could claim support from the right-wing CLN parties. When a CLN delegation visited the British embassy to protest this action, High Commissioner Charles curtly told them that His Majesty's Government mistrusted Sforza and dismissed them.9' British actions startled and angered American policymakers. Ambassador Kirk commented, "These sporadic incursions from abroad . . . sap the little vitality. . . in the Italian body politic." The State Department agreed and, in a firmly worded message to London, protested the latest intervention in Italy's affairs and Britain's failure to consult with the United state^.^' The British, in reply, claimed a free hand in Italian affairs, leveled a barrage of charges against Sforza, and reminded the Americans of Britain's cooperation in granting Italy some preelection concessions. The arrogant tone of the British message nettled American officials. The British veto of Sforza ignited storms of protest from a wide spectrum of American public opinion makers.93 Resentment at British high-handedness and the clear advantages of playing to domestic public opinion produced a public condemnation of British policy in the United States. On 5 December 1944, the Department of State released a statement by the new Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Jr., calling for nonintervention in the internal affairs of liberated nations. Liberals and ItalianAmericans were elated. The Stettinius declaration "dropped on Rome like a V-2 missile." It had a similar effect in London. Eden dispatched a blistering protest to Washington, rebuked the United States in Parliament, and refused to back away from the Sforza veto. Privately, the Americans were apologetic, but the public rebuke stood.94 American public opinion was not content with the administration's rebuke. From the New York Times to the New Republic (and through the entire range of Italian-American press), the press demanded an independent American line.


The Sforza incident and British intervention in general unleashed an "orgy" of "twisting the lion's tail," which Lord Halifax judged the most sustained antiBritish outburst of the war.95 The violence of the press campaign reinforced agency and administration determination to achieve more generous treatment of Italy either with British cooperation or without it. Roosevelt's vague and contradictory statements on Italian relief necessitated agreement among the agencies. Both the War Department and FEA were drawing up plans for Italian relief when the Stettinius statement fueled the public outcry against Great Britain. The drive for interagency coordination was stimulated further by growing public awareness of the seriousness of Italy's economic plight. h b l i c outrage at Britain's political imperialism would wane, but demands for a more active American role in Italy's economic reconstruction mounted. Allied Force Headquarters, meanwhile, continued agitating for quick action to fulfill Roosevelt's pledge of a 300-gram daily bread ration.96 Two days after Stettinius's statement, representatives of the FEA and the State and War Departments met to hammer out a common program for Italian relief. The Army announced its willingness to liberalize the disease and unrest formula and to request a larger congressional appropriation for Italian relief. The meeting also approved a broadened role for the. FEA in the supply program. However, the conferees failed to make any progress on increasing the allotment of shipping for civilian relief. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy told a senior British diplomat that: "The War Department had decided that the claims of Europe for civilian supplies should be disregarded until . . . victory . . . in the west, when tonnage . . . would . . . be released . . . to make up for the sacrifices that had had to be made."97 Thus, the Americans went into critical negotiations with the British over the implementation of the New Deal program while still divided on economic policy. The British knew this, and having adopted Macmillan's proposals without serious modification, could count on the backing of the Allied Force Headquarters staff, including the American contingent, who had been summoned to Washington for the meeting. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee met to discuss the Italian situation on 14-15 December 1944. The British immediately introduced Macmillan's proposal. The American negotiators generally agreed with the direction of Macmillan's proposal, but argued that it did not go far enough. They suggested offering Italy a preliminary peace agreement. The Americans stated that British insistence on veto power over certain Italian ministerial nominations unnecessarily rubbed "the noses of the Italian ministers in the unpleasant

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armistice terms." The Americans agreed to leave civilianization of the Allied Commission to Macmillan and Admiral Stone. Turning to economic matters, the Americans introduced a new supply program proposal and insisted that the 300-gram ration be instituted immediately. Finally, the United States proposed returning as much control as possible over its own economy to the Italian government. The British strongly objected to this last proposal. They vetoed the preliminary peace idea and reaffirmed their position on controlling appointments to the Italian government. They also questioned the workability of the Americans' supply program proposal, especially since the U S . Army insisted that it would end its supply program as soon as Italy was liberated. These disagreements were referred to a special drafting committee with instructions to produce a modification of Macmillan's program that would please both sides.98 The American negotiating position was plagued by interagency differences. Both FEA and the State Department backed a more liberal policy than the War Department would support. Stettinius sought to outflank the War Department by appealing directly to Roosevelt to set up an arbitrator with authority to determine shipping allocations. The president declined and the War Department clung to its position. The British meanwhile remained firm, backing the Macmillan plan. The British Joint Staff Mission reported: "It looks as if as far as Italian affairs are concerned, we can secure the substance of what we want ."99 The Allied deadlock over Italian policy continued into late January 1945. Throughout this period the American press continued its attacks on the British and agitated for more vigorous American action. The Republicans tried to capitalize on Roosevelt's difficulties. In December 1944, Clare Boothe Luce, Republican congressperson from a strongly Italian-American district in Connecticut and wife of Henry Luce of Time-Life, visited Italy. Luce exploited heavy press coverage and her considerable polemical talent to the maximum. She leveled withering blasts at administrative fumbling in public statements in Rome and on her return to New York. Italy, she charged, was on the verge of starvation due to the Roosevelt administration's stupidity and blundering. Hard upon Luce's attacks, Drew Pearson published a leaked copy of a Lord Halifax memorandum that detailed the depth of Anglo-American disagreements on Italy. The Roosevelt administration was embarrassed. Both Stettinius and Roosevelt denied any major Anglo-American policy discord while reaffirming United States commitment to Italy's economic rec~very.'~' The bureaucratic tug-of-war within the administration over Italy continued. The FEA demanded a broader role in policymaking and a large-scale reconstruction program for Italy. At the urging of his subordinates, Treasury Sec-

'"


retary Morgenthau was staking out his claim to an expanded role in Italian policy. The State Department sought presidential action to override the War Department on shipping allocations. The State Department secretly approached the Foreign Office, hoping to undercut the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and arrive at a liberalized policy for Italy. Although pressures for a public intervention mounted, Roosevelt refused to be drawn into the fight. He limited himself to a public reiteration of his concern for Italy. lo2 The only effective way to choke off adverse publicity was to reach an agreement with the British. Because the economic portions of the Macmillan proposal represented the major area of Allied and interagency discord, they became the subject of a separate negotiation. On 22 January 1945, the American negotiators announced their willingness to accept Macmillan's proposals for political concessions to Italy and for the structural reorganization of the Allied Commission. The American statement, which outlined specific recommendations for immediate implementation in Italy, was a grudging concession and a thinly veiled warning of American intent to take unilateral action whenever possible. '03 Irritation with the British percolated through the policymaking bureaucracy. On 2 January 1945, the British ambassador again complained to the mildmannered secretary of state about the unilateral American actions of early December. Stettinius "replied in definite terms that I thought we were the ones who should be offended in view of their action. . . . I felt we had no other choice." Department of State officials blamed intentionally "dilatory" British tactics for the slowness of action by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on Italy's problems and the resulting public criticism of administration policies. '04 Although declining to join the attack on the British, Roosevelt realized that something had to be done about Italy. He decided to secure more concessions during his meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta and settle the Italy issue in a manner that would satisfy American public opinion and American strategic interests. While the president was sailing to Malta for a preliminary meeting with Churchill, Harry Hopkins and Stettinius flew to Rome for talks with Pope Pius XII, Italian foreign minister Alcide De Gasperi, Ambassador Kirk, and Admiral Stone. The message Hopkins brought to American officials was that the United States would no longer play a secondary role in Italy. At a 30 January 1945 press conference, Hopkins talked about the need for the United States to face up to the problems of postwar reconstruction at once. He admitted that public pressure had forced a major reassessment of American policy in Italy and hinted at another presidential initiative to aid the 1talians.'05 Hopkins's visit to Rome built up Italian-American expectations. Once


again, however, Roosevelt failed to deliver concessions. American officials were convinced that the Macmillan proposals would disappoint both Italians and Americans and had decided not to issue any public statement on the accords unless they were expanded during Roosevelt's talks.lo6 The British were willing to cooperate with the Americans as long as cooperation did not conflict with their long-term strategic interests. They were keenly aware that if the United States made more shipping available to Italy, the precedent would benefit Britain and the rest of Europe. The Foreign Office embraced Macmillan's view that Britain should encourage American interest in Italy. Nevertheless, the British were irritated by American attacks on their policy and by the failure of the United States to appoint an American official to the senior economic post on the Allied omm mission.'^^ American efforts to place Italy on the agenda at Yalta were parried by the British, who wanted to avoid serious negotiations on a preliminary peace "at all costs." Roosevelt was compelled to make a personal, written appeal to Churchill for broadening the political and economic concessions offered Italy. Cadogan killed this initiative, advising the prime minister that he should delay a reply and turn the whole matter over to the Foreign Office. Churchill did so and there the matter died. log American frustration was intense. A State Department summary of events glumly noted that both American prestige and Italy's economic and political situation were rapidly deteriorating as a result of Britain's refusal to cooperate. The Italian-American press erupted with criticism of Roosevelt's management of policy. Even the proadministration Progresso raked American policy. La Voce del Popolo, another consistent supporter of Roosevelt, was equally negative. However, the most remarkable expression of American outrage occurred on 22 February 1945. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau called a group of British officials to his office to deliver a severe dressing down about British policies in Italy. 'Og In spite of their frustration, the Americans went along with a public announcement of the new Allied policy for Italy. Public interest was too intense to bury the compromise in silence. Macmillan personally met the press in Rome on 24 February 1945 to explain the new policy. Simultaneous statements were released in Washington and London. As the Americans expected, ItalianAmerican reaction was negative. I1 Progresso editorialized that the New Deal was a "promise unfulfilled." However, the New Deal program won the backing of the New York Times's influential Ann O'Hare McCormick and other moderate and conservative opinion makers and thus reduced the public pressure on the Roosevelt admini~tration."~


The economic section of the New Deal program was finally completed in July 194.5. By that time, Germany's surrender and Britain's economic weakness forced the British to reappraise the Italian problem. On 12 July 1945, Eden told the cabinet that the United Kingdom could not continue to take the leading role in Italian affairs. The British economy was too devastated by the war. From July 1945 onward, Britain would follow the American lead. The New Deal policy was another setback for America's effort to speedily conclude its involvement in Italy by restoring Italy's independence and providing its economy with a transfusion of foreign exchange. Events of the next two years showed that this policy approach was unworkable: the Italian economy was too badly damaged and Italy's political independence too restricted to permit either a quick American withdrawal or a rapid Italian recovery. Nevertheless, the New Deal period was extraordinarily important in the long-term development of America's relationship with both Italy and with its Great Power allies. In the effort to conclude the occupation regime, the United States committed itself to a more extensive involvement in Italian affairs than anyone in Washington had desired or foreseen. As Harry Hopkins wryly noted, the administration found itself facing a political coalition representing the left, right, and center-all demanding an expanded American role in ltaly.' l2 America's primary role in Italy was established by the New Deal, while British power was in retreat even before Eden's concession. On 2 May 1945, German forces in Italy surrendered and the war-ravaged nation was reunified. The future of Italy now lay in American hands. Moreover, the reconstruction process was already underway. By late 1944, American officials had plans for both the political and economic order in postwar Italy and were attempting to put them into practice in spite of the constraints imposed by the war and their British ally and against the often conflicting plans of the Italian resistance movement. The alliance of the United States and the Italian center was in formation and would dominate Italian politics for decades.

''

Part Ill Reconstruction

Reconstruction American Plans and Italian Realities, 1944

Stabilization in Italy was a continuous process of accommodation between American objectives and Italian political and economic realities. The first stages of this reconciliation occurred in 1944 when the United States attempted to implement policy recommendations worked out in State Department planning committees. By the end of that,year, the United States was making progress toward its political objectives, but economic chaos made the future of Italian democracy problematic.

Building itallan Democracy Roosevelt set out the broad outlines of his Italian reconstruction policy in a "Fireside Chat" on 28 July 1943. The Allies would punish Mussolini and his collaborators and dismantle Fascist institutions. The Italian people would have a free hand in creating democratic political institutions as quickly as military conditions permitted. In the meanwhile, the Allies would provide Italy with the necessities of life and would maintain order. Defascistization, democratic reconstruction, interim economic aid, and political security were the basis of the presidential program. Roosevelt promised the Italians the widest possible participation in the reconstruction process from the beginning. This Italian share would grow as military necessity lessened. Italy, in the president's view, was more of a liberated nation than an enemy state.' Roosevelt's program obviously left a wide scope for implementation. It also included certain basic contradictions. The president promised the Italians a

132 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N

free choice of their governmental institutions but also insisted that they choose democracy. He called for the greatest Italian participation in the war effort but stressed that first they must surrender unconditionally. He demanded a thorough purge yet was ready to deal with Mussolini's closest collaborators. Italy's people were being liberated, but Italy was an enemy state whose postwar fate would be decided by the Big Three, not simply the United States. The task of translating policy statements into programs and of harmonizing the contradictions fell primarily to the Department of State. The political reconstruction of Italy required action by the United States on defascistization, constitutional reorganization, internal security, and the reintegration of partisans into Italian society. The planning committees had studied the reorganization of Italy's administrative and political structure since late 1942. By the time Italy surrendered, Department of State officials had some fairly precise notions about constitutional reforms. Initial responsibility for defascistization rested with the Allied Command in Italy and only became a problem when the military were unable to carry out a successful purge. Internal security and the future role of the resistance became intertwined by July 1944. The answers that the State Department gave to all of these issues were in turn bound up with its formulation of a political strategy for dealing with the most pressing issue: providing Italy with an interim government. A broad coalition government would unite the largest number of Italians behind the war effort and prevent any faction from prejudicing the Italian people's right to determine their postwar form of government.2 By early summer 1944, the elements of an American reconstruction program for Italy were in place. The Allied Military Government's purge of Italy's civil and military bureaucracy had failed, the northern resistance was mounting a challenge to the legitimacy of the Italian government, and a broadbased Bonomi coalition government had been created. Together these factors prompted a United States policy whose objective was enhancing the legitimacy of the Bonomi government by reducing the limitations that the armistice placed on its freedom of action. The United States would back the Bonomi ministry against the claims of the resistance movement to national leadership. It counted on Bonomi's government in turn to take charge of the purge and firmly establish its legitimacy. Although Italian politicians failed to deal effectively with the defascistization problem, the United States collaborated with the moderate and conservative elements within the Bonomi ministry to erect a set of barriers designed to contain the re~istance.~ The United States'. goal was to create a representative democracy on the Anglo-Saxon model. Neither British opposition, the ineffectiveness of the Bonomi government, nor the aggressive actions of the resistance diverted the

P L A N S A N D R E A L I T I E S 133

United States from political reconstruction. By insisting on the greatest possible Italian involvement in this process, the Americans hoped to overcome the effects of twenty years of Fascist authoritarianism. E P U R A Z I O N E MANCATA

All senior American officials favored a purge of the Italian political and business establishment and state bureaucracy. Nevertheless, in no area of American activity in Italy was the gap between promise and reality so glaring. Roosevelt's bold pledges were followed by a very restrictive and opportunistic presidential definition of who was a Fascist. Within a year of the invasion of Sicily, the United States willingly turned over responsibility for the purge to the Bonomi government. The British were even less inclined to prosecute former Fascists, since Italy's conservatives, the objective of the purge, were the most likely to accept postwar British hegemony in the ~editerranean.~ Observing American indecisiveness and British reluctance, Allied leaders in Italy followed their natural conservatism and carried out a slow purge, which never seriously threatened the position or influence of business, the Italian military, or the civil administration. A number of local Fascist politicians were removed from office, most prefects were replaced, and a few prominent Fascists were arrested. The Allies acted more vigorously in shutting down the offices and agencies of the Fascist party and in freezing the assets of Fascist organizations. These actions failed to satisfy the anti-Fascist parties, the resistance, or liberal opinion in the United state^.^ Eventually, public pressure from both the United States and United Kingdom forced Allied Military Government to act. Although military authorities feared that a vigorous purge would undermine the authority of the royal government, they instructed Badoglio to implement an active defascistization program. In December 1943, Badoglio's government issued a decree-law on the purge and appointed the aged anti-Fascist hero Tito Zaniboni to administer the new law, but failed to set up an independent agency to enforce it.6 Meanwhile, Badoglio was rebuilding the administrative structure of liberated Italy by calling out of retirement and hiding the same administrators who had faithfully served Mussolini. Prefects removed by Allied Military Government in one province soon reappeared as Badoglio's appointees in other areas. Senior bureaucrats were dismissed from one agency only to appear in the highest positions in a n ~ t h e r Allied .~ Military Government could not keep up with this bureaucratic musical chairs, which directly challenged its cherished armistice authority. By the time the svolta di SaEerno broke the deadlock between the anti-

134 RECONSTRUCTION Fascist parties and the royal government, the purge was stalled. The inclusion of the anti-Fascist parties in the government in April 1944 produced some action. Work began on a comprehensive decree-law designed to deal with all areas of Fascist criminality. Badoglio, however, intended to keep the purge under his personal control. He permitted the anti-Fascists to prepare cases against the military commanders responsible for the collapse of the defense of Naples and Rome in September 1943 but also warned that he opposed any "general crusade" against "all and sundry connected with fa~cism."~ Badoglio's efforts to keep a tight rein on the purge failed. Growing public pressure forced him to replace the ineffective Zaniboni with the dynamic and politically ambitious Sforza. As High Commissioner for the Purge, Sforza quickly built an independent agency, which he used to harass Badoglio and reinforce his own political position. The forced retirements of Badoglio and the king in June 1944 opened the way for a more vigorous purge. Both Allied governments favored such action. For the United States, an Italian-run defascistization program offered triple benefits. First, the Italian government would take a long step toward acquiring legitimacy through independent action on an important political matter. At the same time, the United States government would be relieved of the political embarrassment created by Allied Military Government's ineffective purge. Finally, a successful Italianrun purge would vindicate the United States policy of eliminating the armistice restrictions on ~ t a l yThe . ~ British government would gain relief from insistent domestic criticism of the failure of the purge. However, the primary factor in the British decision to encourage a wider purge was concern over Communist penetration in Italy. The Soviet Union was using both the Advisory Committee for Italy and the press as forums to needle the Western Allies over their failure to root out fascism. British leaders feared that the Italian Communists would exploit the purge issue to broaden their public support. The British calculated that a more aggressive purge directed by a coalition government would limit the propaganda benefits that the Italian Communist party was reaping and silence Soviet criticism by tying the PC1 to the government epurazione (purge) policy. lo Responding to the new mood in Washington and London, the Allied Control Commission stepped up its epurazione efforts and cajoled the Italian government into further action. The Financial Subcommission meanwhile grasped the nettle of purging Italy's banking system. New and detailed instructions were provided to military government officers. Allied epurazione procedure was brought into line with existing Italian legislation to simplify the task." Sforza and his lieutenants responded vigorously to these incentives: they

P L A N S A N D REALITIES 135

prepared show trials for major Fascists that were designed to set legal precedents for subsequent wider action, and they subjected the military high command to a serious purge, which removed over three hundred generals. Then the government issued a new decree-law (DLL 159) on the purge at the end of July 1944. Both the number of suspensions from office and the number of indictments increased. Sforza used the wider authority granted under DLL 159 to suspend 309 of Italy's 420 senators, including Badoglio, from office.I2 Notwithstanding these actions, evidence mounted that the purge was not achieving its objectives. Sforza privately expressed dissatisfaction with its progress.13 On the administrative side, a lack of trained personnel slowed up the settlement of individual cases and created a growing backlog. However, the basic problem was political. The purge was hamstrung by party maneuvers, the bitter rivalry of Bonomi and Sforza, and heavy-handed and erratic Allied intervention. Within the six-party coalition that governed Italy after June 1944, the purge was a simmering source of trouble. Only two of the six parties were committed to a thorough purge: the Socialists and the numerically small Action party. The Liberals, the traditional party of large business and large agricultural interests, and the Christian Democrats, a multiclass party hoping to gain the allegiance of Italian middle classes, both opposed a widespread purge. The other major component of the government, the PCI, was equally wary of Sforza's operations. In the first place, the Communists did not want Sforza to gamer credit for the purge. More importantly, however, the Communists realized that the issue of the purge could rupture the delicate unity of the CLN coalition, reducing Italy's limited contribution to the Allied war effort and weakening its tenuous position at the peace settlement. Moreover, a split within the CLN could bring an anti-Communist government to power. The PC1 was determined to remain within the government at whatever cost, including sacrificing the purge to the interests of the right and center.14 The lack of support within the CLN and the antagonism between Sfona and Bonomi fatally weakened the purge. Sforza was a veteran intriguer whose objective was the premiership. He employed his position as high commissioner for epurazione to build up his base of support on the left. Bonomi, a conservative with close ties to the court, the military and civil bureaucracies, and business, owed his prominence to his ability to mediate between these groups and the CLN during the clandestine period of 1942-44 and between the right and left within the CLN. In designating him as prime minister, the CLN parties recognized their fragile unity. Bonomi's Labor Democratic party consisted of a few pre-Fascist political notables without any popular base of

136 RECONSTRUCTION support. From the beginning of his prime ministership, Bonomi built his strength through collaboration with the parties and interests of the center and right. lS No issue made the groups supporting Bonomi more uneasy than epurazione. Most middle-class Italians had accepted and at times even supported the Fascist regime during its twenty years of power (as had sizable segments of the working classes). A purge directed by the left, especiallyone that went beyond the top levels of government, was a direct threat to them. As Sforza widened his objectives, these classes looked to Bonomi and the parties of the right to protect them.16 In July 1944, a power struggle erupted within the Bonomi government. Sforza continued to indict Bonomi's allies while Bonomi erected a series of road-blocks to the purge.I7 Contradictory Allied policy on epurazione aided Bonomi in undercutting the purge. Within the Allied Command a number of senior officials enthusiastically pursued their directives to implement a thorough purge. Colonel Charles Poletti, military governor of the Lazio region, and Colonel Charles Foley of the Allied Commission's Financial Subcornrnission were particularly active.18 This enthusiasm, however, was not widely shared either at Allied Force Headquarters or in London and Washington. In July 1944, Assistant Secretary for War McCloy told Poletti to reduce his involvement in the purge. Moreover, the personal relationships between a number of senior Allied officers and ex-Fascist nobles and businessmen became a serious scandal. The Allied Command in Rome admitted that these former Fascists were using these contacts to escape punishment. l9 The Allied Command repeatedly gave contradictory instructions on the purge to the Italian government. Allied Force Headquarters intervened to retain a number of important Fascists in key positions on the grounds that they possessed irreplaceable technical skills. While demanding Italian government action, the Allies insisted on time-consuming reviews of government decrees prior to their implementation. Finally, the occupation command limited its interest in epurazione to the top ~ascists.~' Thus Bonomi's efforts to,~containthe purge met with little opposition from military government. He received positive support from the British government. Churchill's anti-Sforza mania had long since infected the Foreign Office so that British officials regarded the epurazione program as a simple piece of self-aggrandizementby Sforza. Moreover, the British realized that Bonomi's anti-Fascist credentials enabled him to guarantee the survival of those conservative Italian groups they ~upported.~' When Bonomi precipitated a governmental crisis in November 1944, he


enjoyed British support. After the British vetoed Sforza's nomination as foreign minister, he resigned as high commissioner, and Bonomi took control of the epurazione machinery. The Communist Mauro Scoccimarro, Sforza's senior lieutenant, was given another ministry. Within weeks, Bonomi placed responsibility for the purge directly under the prime minister's office.22 By January 1945, Bonomi had successfully contained but not destroyed the purge. The northern resistance was determined to call both Bonomi and his supporters to account for their actions. T H E W I N D FROM T H E NORTH

As early as January 1944, American intelligence analysts identified the inadequacy of the purge as one of the important factors contributing to a growing radicalization of the northern r e ~ i s t a n c e In . ~ ~October 1944, encouraged by Sforza, the Committee of National Liberation for North Italy (CLNAI) voted to establish an independent epurazione machinery. This direct challenge to the authority of the central government was one of a number of threats that the resistance posed to the political settlements the United States and the United Kingdom were promoting. Although profoundly divided on Italy's future, the Allies united to meet this challenge with a combination of force and subtle Italian patriots created a powerful and highly successful political and military resistance north of Rome within a few months of the September 1943 armistice. By the winter of 1943-44, the Allied Command was actively looking for political accommodation with the CLNAI. The military power of the resistance gave Italy a correspondingly strong political voice. The Allies wanted the military aid the resistance furnished but were unwilling to pay as high a political price as the CLNAI demanded. Washington, London, and Allied Force Headquarters were in accord on one basic point: the resistance would not be allowed to challenge the political predominance and legitimacy of the national government in Rome. The CLNAI regarded itself as a provisional government for occupied Italy. It claimed wide powers to act in its own name, while recognizing the authority of the Rome CLN and the Bonomi government. Neither the Allies nor Bonomi accepted this claim. They insisted that the CLNAI accept the direction of the Bonomi government in political matters and of the Allied Command in military operations.25 The Allies and the resistance were at loggerheads on military policy. The Allied Command wanted the partisans to engage in numerous small unit

138 RECONSTRUCTION

actions of sabotage and harassment. They urged resistance leaders to keep their partisan bands small and scattered in order to force the Germans to employ the largest number of troops in rear area operations, correspondingly weakening their front-line defenses. The partisans insisted that their war had essentially political rather than military objectives. They built up large units, tried to liberate remote areas from German control, and laid plans for insurrections to seize control of and protect the cities and industrial plants in coordination with Allied advance^.'^ The resistance's insistence on the primacy of political objectives and the PCI's dominant role in its military formations created deep mistrust and apprehension among Allied leaders. The Americans and British feared that the Communists would use their commanding influence within the resistance to overthrow the interim government in the south and establish a Marxist dictatorship. While seeking every means to avoid a postliberation military confrontation with the resistance, Allied leaders were ready to use force, if ultimately necessary, to preserve the Italian Fortunately, an armed clash was avoided because of the good sense of both sides. Recognizing its military and political weaknesses, the resistance was ready to cooperate with the Allies and the Bonomi government. The Allies realized the destructive long-term effects of an armed clash with the partisans, while the Americans insisted that the resistance have a role in the postwar political settlement. Thus, Allied Force Headquarters made a concentrated effort at accommodation. Bonomi, too, sought to strike a bargain with the CLNAI. The key to the CLNAI's moderation lay in its dependence on the Allies and Bonomi government for money, arms, and recognition. The resistance needed supplies to carry on its military operations and cash to finance its military and political operations. Moreover, the CLNAI parties, because of their extralegal status, desperately wanted official recognition from the national government as its representative in the occupied north. In addition, the CLNAI, like the Rome CLN, was a broad coalition in which the parties of the right, especially the Liberals, acted as a brake on more radical innovation^.'^ The CLNAI's major objectives were a thorough purge of the state bureaucracy, military, and big business; the establishment of a national government based on the parties of the CLN; the administration of liberated northern Italy by local governments composed of CLNAI nominees; and the integration of the partisan units within the national army.29 The creation of the Bonomi government met one of these conditions, although the CLNAI was soon at odds with Bonomi. Handing greater responsibility for the purge over to


Bonomi was in fact an Allied effort to satisfy the CLNAI. The Allies and Italian government were also ready to give the CLNAI and its local cornmittees of national liberation a limited role in the postliberation administration of northern Italy and to integrate individual partisans into the regular Italian army. However, the Allies insisted that they would control the extent to which the partisans' demands were met.30 The radical statements of the Action and Socialist parties reinforced Allied suspicions about the CLNAI's objectives, as did its highly organized political machine, extensive plans for postliberation government in the north, and the growing size of military forces under at least nominal CLNAI control. The first serious experience that the Allies had with one of the major components of the resistance, the Tuscan Committee of National Liberation, reinforced their suspicions about the objectives of the Italian partisans.31 Nevertheless, in recognition of the military and political force that the resistance acquired between September 1943 and the end of the war, Allied leaders acted with considerable circumspection in their relations with the CLNAI. They valued the partisans' military assistance and realized that concessions alone could attain their three major postliberation objectives: subordination of the CLN to the authority of the Italian government, disarmament of the partisans, and CLN cooperation with Allied Military Government in restoring law and order following the liberation of the north. By early July 1944, Allied armies were advancing on Florence. For the first time they had entered areas where the armed resistance was strong. Thousands of local partisans began to pass into Allied hands as their homes were liberated. Local committees of national liberation took control of various aspects of the civil administration and generally did an efficient job. Allied leaders realized that their handling of these partisans was a test case, which would be closely scrutinized by the CLNAI. On 1 July 1944, the Allied Control Commission established a Partisan Branch to improve relations between Allied Military Government and the partisan forces behind German lines and to assist individual partisans' reintegration into civilian life. The Allies politely but firmly insisted that the partisans surrender their weapons. Partisans coming through Allied lines were transported to special camps, disarmed, fed, issued new clothing, and usually interrogated by Allied military intelligence. Allied officials tried to find employment for the partisans in their home areas.32 The system worked imperfectly from the start. Many partisans simply returned home without passing through the camps and kept their arms. Partisan units often hid their arms before entering the camps and later set up caches


in their home areas. Despite stiff laws against possession of arms and active enforcement by military government and Italian police, liberated Italy was an armed camp. Moreover, the Allies often failed to find employment for expartisans. Unemployed, politically radicalized, militarily experienced expartisans were a threat to the stability of postwar Italy for years. The Allies also refused to fully utilize the simplest employment expedient available to them: enlistment of the partisans in the regular Italian army. After considerable conflict with the Italian high command, the Allies were able to offer enlistment to partisans on an individual basis. Most partisans, however, wanted to see their units integrated into the m y . Both the Allies and the Italian government initially rejected this demand.33 The Allies later rejected Italian government proposals for incorporating complete partisan units into the regular army. The commander of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army argued that integrating whole partisan units would "politicize" the army, force the disbandment of regular army units, and undermine the prestige and authority of the Italian government. He dismissed the value of partisan units, arguing that they lacked proper military training. Lurking behind these motives was another: blocking the Communistdominated resistance from taking control of the Italian army and through it the state.34 The Allies' political relationships with the CLNs were troubled. Allied refusal to grant the CLNs anything beyond advisory status was one cause of friction. A greater problem was the military government's relationship with the interim CLN civil administrations set up after German withdrawal or sometimes, as in the case of Florence, created in the midst of the battle for the city. These administrations were very often efficient and eager to cooperate with Allied authorities; however, they insisted that their authority flowed from the CLNs and that they wanted to work in partnership with the military government rather than as its subordinates. Allied Military Government insisted that it was the sole authority in newly liberated areas. Because Allied policy was to reinforce the authority of the Bonomi government, military government officials instructed CLN appointees to key positions such as prefect and sindaco (mayor) to take their instructions from Rome rather than from the CLNs. The Rome government mistrusted the CLN appointees and relied on its own pool of career officials (many tainted by Fascist pasts) to take over key administrative positions in liberated areas. Although instructed to retain as many CLN appointees as possible, military government officials were often wary of the social and political objectives of the CLNs and eager to replace their nominees with more cooperative men from the south. These


removals met with heated protests from the CLNs, and in the case of Florence led to a serious encounter between Allied Military Government, Bonomi, and the Tuscan Committee for National ~ i b e r a t i o n . ~ ~ In sum, despite the American desire to have the CLNs and partisans play a useful role in liberated Italy, the military government was emasculating the political force of the resistance as it came into contact with it. Although desperately short of arms, money, and political recognition, the CLNAI was determined to maintain its independence and political power and to dominate the postwar reconstruction process. By September 1944, the CLNAI was locked in a struggle with the Allies and the Bonomi government over how much independence it would sacrifice to gain critically needed aid. In August 1944, Allied Force Headquarters informed the CLNAI that it wanted its military arm, the Corpo Volantari della Liberth, placed under the command of a regular officer of the Italian army. Bonomi nominated General Raffaele Cadorna, whose impeccable military and political credentials included a heroic role in the short-lived September 1943 defense of Rome. The Cadorna nomination had three objectives: establishing formal control over the military arm of the resistance, depoliticizing it, and subordinating the Corpo Volantari della Liberth to the orders of the Bonomi g ~ v e r n m e n tThe . ~ ~CLNAI parried this move by accepting Cadorna's nomination and placing its two senior military men, Fermccio Parri (Action Party) and Luigi Longo (PCI), alongside Cadorna as deputy commanders. Cadorna never exercised direct control over Corpo Volantari della Liberth operations. As the CLNAI's military power and political authority continued to grow, Allied intelligence recommended granting the CLNAI some form of recognition in order to establish firm Allied control. In late November 1944, Allied intelligence incorrectly forecast a German withdrawal from northern Italy during the winter, and a three-man senior CLNAI delegation arrived from Milan to represent the resistance in negotiations for an agreement finalizing the relationship between the CLNAI, the Allied Command, and the Bonomi government .37 The situation of the northern resistance was serious. The Allied offensive ground to a halt just south of Bologna. In an effort to spare lives, Allied commander General Alexander issued an ill-conceived proclamation on 13 November 1944, calling on the partisans to desist from further operations during the winter. The Alexander proclamation was an open invitation to the Germans and the Fascists to turn all their available forces against the armed resistance, which they did. Many partisan leaders interpreted Alexander's action as an effort to destroy the armed resistance. Bad winter weather hin-


dered Allied resupply to the hard-pressed partisans. The CLNAI was willing to pay a high price to gain the aid it needed to survive. Allied leaders were eager to provide military aid but were divided over the issue of recognition. Most military commanders favored recognition as a means of assisting the partisans' military efforts. British officials, however, were s/rongly opposed unless a high political price was extracted. The United States government took a different view. The Office of Strategic Services was reporting that the CLNAI represented a stabilizing element, which would be especially valuable in the maintenance of order during the liberation of the north. Strategic Services director William Donovan, a conservative Republican, pressed this view on Roosevelt and senior War Department officials, adding that the CLNAI urgently needed American support. Realizing that the CLNAI had to be brought into the reconstruction process, American officials in Italy also supported recognition.38 The situation was further complicated when the Bonomi government resigned just as negotiations began with the CLNAI representatives. Bonomi's resignation delayed negotiations between the central government and CLNAI delegation on the form of recognition. The Supreme Allied Commander, over the heated protests of British officials, decided to conclude a military agreement with the partisans' representatives. The CLNAI got the money it desperately needed, together with a pledge of other aid. The CLNAI was also delegated responsibility (and in a certain sense recognition) for assuring the maintenance of law and order during the period between German withdrawal and the arrival of Allied armies. In return, the CLNAI acknowledged that its military forces were under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. The partisans also pledged that once Allied armies had completed the liberation of northern Italy, they would accept the authority of Allied Military Government and obey its directives, including disarmament of the Corpo ~olantari.~~ Two weeks later, Gian Carlo Pajetta, the only member of the delegation to remain in Rome, signed a separate agreement with Bonomi's second government. The Italian government recognized the CLNAI as the anti-Fascist political organization in the north and its delegated representative in occupied Italy. In return, the CLNAI agreed to act as the Italian government's delegate and recognized its sole authority in all areas of liberated ~taly.~' Pajetta admitted that this agreement fell short of CLNAI objectives but cautioned the resistance leadership that it was the best the Bonomi ministry would offer. The relationship between Bonomi and the resistance deteriorated rapidly during December 1944. The CLNAI publicly attacked the prime min-


ister for the failure of the purge and accused him of setting off the governmental crisis in alliance with forces that had collaborated with fascism. At the same time, the CLNAI repeated its claim to uniquely represent the popular will and to be the basis upon which the postwar reconstruction would begin. These statements angered Bonomi and frightened his British backers, who were simultaneously blundering into a violent conflict with the Greek resist a n ~ e . Even ~ ' the Americans, who had a more positive view of the resistance, feared that the partisans would fail to live up to their commitments. As a result, the December 1944 accords, while strengthening the wartime position of the CLNAI, failed to establish the reciprocal trust or improve the political relationship between the resistance and the Allies and between the CLNAI and the Bonomi government. Both the Allies and the government placed increasing reliance on Italy's internal security forces to blunt the military threat of the left. I N T E R N A L SECURITY

The creation of military and police forces capable of providing for law and order within Italy was the responsibility of Allied Force Headquarters during the war. No policy issue was more fraught with danger for American interests. The problem was not simply one of equipment, recruitment, and training (although these were extremely pressing), but of a popular acceptance of the internal security forces. The legitimacy of the state's internal security forces had been undermined by their association with fascism, by military disaster, and by Allied utilization of them. Moreover, the partisans were an experienced and highly capable alternative. The components of Italy's internal security forces were the army and the militarized national police, the carabinieri. During war, the carabinieri was controlled by the Italian general staff. The British-dominated Military Mission to the Italian Army had primary responsibility for the reorganization and employment of Italian military forces. The Military Mission enjoyed an autonomous status within the Allied Commission and was in reality an independent agency. The relationship between the Allied Commission and the Military Mission was polite but tense. Original Allied plans for a major Italian contribution to the war effort were scrapped within hours of the announcement of the armistice. The Italian army, without firm direction from its military high command, was either overwhelmed by the Germans or dissolved. Scattered units in the south held together until the Allied advance reached them. The Allies controlled a few


hundred thousand poorly trained and badly equipped soldiers without an effective command structure. They decided to use these soldiers as rear-area support troops. The reconstruction of the Italian army as a fighting force would have to wait on events.42 The carabinieri faced a more hopeful future. Allied preinvasion plans called for employing these national police as the first line of public order. Organizations such as the secret police, the Fascist militia, and the public security (Questura) agents had taken the primary role in Fascist political repression. Public acceptance of the less politicized carabinieri was greater. However, the Badoglio government used the national police as agents to repress and intimidate its anti-Fascist opponents both before and after the armistice. The Allies feared the carabinieri would become a private army far the monarchy. In addition, the corps' strength was cut in half by the German capture of the north. Other carabinieri were in Allied prisoner-of-war camps. Equipment of all types was scarce.43 The growing power of the CLNAI considerably modified Allied policy. The legitimacy of the government and the army was closely linked, and the Allies tried to reinforce them by giving the army a greater role in combat against the Germans. Eisenhower recognized that the Badoglio government's shaky claim to legitimacy would be reinforced by military success. Shortly after the armistice, he began looking for a few intact units to use in the front lines. These efforts at cosmetic surgery failed to address the real problems of the Italian army Badoglio's hasty flight from Rome had destroyed the army command structure. Neither the prime minister nor the king inspired the confidence necessary to rally the conscripts of the rebuilding army to battle fascism. The Allies were short on most of the equipment needed by the Italian army. Moreover, they kept tens of thousands of experienced Italian officers and troops in prisoner-ofwar camps outside of Italy, because they could not agree on their status under the armistice or even how to transport them back to 1taly."" The Allies also paid a high price for failing to thoroughly purge the Italian high command. For months, Allied Force Headquarters feared that replacing the ineffective royal government would create disaffection within the Italian officer corps and further undermine the already feeble Italian military e f f ~ r t . ~ ' Faced with these problems, the Allied high command decided to raise an Italian army of five hundred thousand. Only fourteen thousand were given combat training, while one hundred eighty thousand (including the carabinieri) were equipped for internal se;urity activities. The Allies vetoed the plans of moderates like Sforza and Croce for forming an independent army in


the fall of 1943. By refusing to give the army a major combat role, the Allies undercut the king and Badoglio. Their personal fates and those of the conservative interests they represented were tied to the future of the military. The anti-Fascist opposition wanted to restructure the military as part of their effort to build a democratic Italy. Everyone realized that a major Italian contribution to the Allied military effort would improve Italy's bargaining position at a postwar peace ~ o n f e r e n c e . ~ ~ By July 1944, the Allies changed their plans for the army and the carabinieri. The resistance had an alternative Italian army, which was playing a major role in the liberation of Italy. The Allied high command hoped for resistance cooperation and prepared for civil war. The carabinieri was brought up to its full manpower allocation and the Allied Command fought to raise that ceiling. Plans were laid for screening and recruiting politically reliable partisans. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Wilson, recommended the immediate creation of six Italian combat groups (divisions) and increasing the overall size of the Italian army. Finally, the Allies initiated a propaganda campaign to improve Italian public perceptions of the national army and undercut the partisans' widespread popularity.47

Italy's Role in the lnternatlonal Order Franklin D. Roosevelt preferred to put off issues related to peace until the war was won.48 Nevertheless, the actions of the United States and other powers definitely altered the status quo long before the foreign ministers met in London in September 1945 to draft a peace treaty for Italy. This process began months before the United States officially entered the war. In October 1941, the British government publicly committed itself to the end of Italian colonial rule in the Cyrenaica portion of Italian Libya. Privately, the British also accepted in principle a division with the USSR of the German and Italian fleets.49 Once involved in the war, the United States began making public comrnitments and private decisions that guided both its wartime policy and postwar diplomacy. By early 1942, the president and Secretary of State Hull had pledged independence to Albania and Ethiopia, two victims of Italian aggression and annexation, and committed the United States to restore Greece and Yugoslavia to their national boundarie~.'~ Both states had outstanding temtorial claims against Italy, and Yugoslavia's were extensive.

146 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N O U T L I N I N G A PEACE TREATY

When the State Department's postwar planning committees began discussions of Italy's future in late 1942, planners quickly concluded that Italy should be stripped of its colonies. The Italian economy had been drained by building, expanding, and maintaining an African empire. The expected benefits of mass Italian migration to Africa had never materialized. While Italians in Africa contributed to the modernization of the territories under their government's control, they were never numerous enough to create economically viable colonies or to relieve the massive unemployment created by Italy's surplus population. The record of Italian colonial administration was checkered. While probably not more repressive than other colonial powers, it was no recommendation for continued Italian control of African territories. In Tripoli and Ethiopia, Fascist repression had been severe.52 The matter of Italy's borders also received serious consideration. American planners favored border rectifications with both Austria and Yugoslavia. The United States hoped to provide Italy with militarily secure and ethnically justifiable b o u n d a r i e ~ The . ~ ~ major problem was the Italian-Yugoslav border, where the Italians took control of large areas with ethnic Slovene majorities after World War I. Both the Yugoslav government-in-exile and Tito's provisional government inside Yugoslavia demanded the return of these areas and annexation of territories with ethnic Italian majorities. American planners also discussed the disarmament and demilitarization of Italy. Italy alone posed a minimal threat to world peace. In alliance with other aggressive states, however, Italy had become a considerable problem. First, Italy had the power to dominate and disrupt the western Balkans. Second, American military and civilian policymakers discovered Italy's strategic importance the hard way. Thrusting into the middle of the Mediterranean, Italy was in a position to block trade with the oil-rich Middle East. Finally, Fascist armaments policies had played a significant role in undermining the Italian economy.54 American planners wanted to demilitarize Italy's European borders and certain strategically located islands and reduce the Italian army to a size that would provide adequate self-defense and internal security for Italy. The British agreed with these plans. The Churchill government wanted a number of the modern units of the Italian fleet to replace its wartime losses. British officials were anxious to demilitarize Italy, which lay directly along the imperial lifeline to Suez and India. The Soviet Union, too, favored demilitarization and disar-


mament for Italy and, like Churchill, Stalin cast covetous eyes on the Italian fleet.55 The United States' plans for Italy did not involve economic penalties. American officials would aid United States banks, corporations, and private citizens to recover property seized by the Fascist government. Italian assets in the United States were frozen to compensate American citizens with claims against the Italian government. The United States assumed that other foreign governments would take similar action. The Property Control Subcommission of the Allied Commission was established to assist Allied nationals to recover property in Italy. The question of reparations was never seriously discussed by American officials. Economic chaos was so great that they did not believe reparations were a realistic prospect. Any reparations exacted from Italy would simply be recycled American or later United Nations aid. With the post-World War I German reparations precedent in mind, the United States opposed recycling.56 American planning reflected its broader objective of a stable postwar Italy. The United States had no reason or desire to impose a punitive peace. Thus, from mid-1942 onward, American policymakers freely promised the Italians a just and equitable peace and an honorable role in the postwar world. Public statements by American officials, including Roosevelt, clearly placed the Italians in a separate category, absolving the Italian people from responsibility for fascism or the war. Italians and Italian-Americans quite reasonably concluded that this meant Italy would receive special treatment at a postwar peace conference. Italy's cobelligerent status pointed in the same direction. Italian leaders were repeatedly assured that Italy's contribution to the Allied war effort would weigh heavily at the peace ~ o n f e r e n c e . ~ ~ Both Italians and Italian-Americans accepted these public and private pledges of special treatment gratefully. The failure of the Big Three at the Yalta Conference (4-1 1 February 1945) to make a public statement on Italy created resentment among both groups. The Italians' ability to influence the Allies was limited. Italian-Americans, however, quickly mobilized to extract further concessions from the administration. The long-delayed unveiling of the New Deal policy on 27 February 1945 failed to pacify Italian-American di~content.~~ Italian-American concerns were justified. Left to its own devices, the United States government would have produced a peace treaty for Italy that would meet most Italian expectations. The United States, however, was not operating in a vacuum. The British and Soviets lacked a large ethnic Italian population and had been attacked by the Fascists. The French and Yugoslavs,


also victims of Italian aggression, had large armies poised near the borders of a weak and occupied Italy. Both states were determined to use military force to secure their claims rather than to take their chances at a peace conference. As the war in Europe ended, the United States' plans for a nonpunitive peace for Italy faced challenges from these four powers and the claims of a number of smaller states. VENEZIA GIULIA

American and British officials became aware of the potential for trouble over Italy's border with Yugoslavia in late 1943. The expansion of Tito's military power and territorial control meant Italy would soon have to settle accounts with a revolutionary-nationalistmovement of considerable power. An October 1943 Department of State memorandum suggested that a special military government regime be imposed on the entire Istrian ~eninsula.~' By late 1944, Tito's partisan movement had evolved into a true national army, which was efficiently destroying not only German forces but opposition political elements and laying the basis for a Communist state. Ideological and balance of power considerations were now added to existing American foreign and domestic policy considerations. On 12-13 August 1944, Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander Wilson met with Tito and his advisors at Caserta, Italy, in an effort to negotiate a settlement of the border problem. The Allied leaders presented the Yugoslavs with a memorandum, which outlined their plans to establish military government over Italy's 1939 borders. The Allied plan was cloaked in the usual "military necessity" arguments. The British assured Tito that Yugoslav territorial claims would be carefully and sympathetically heard at the postwar peace conference, but insisted that the security of Allied Force Headquarters' planned lines of communication to Austria required occupation of all of the disputed territories. Tito rejected these proposals and told Allied leaders that he planned to establish a Yugoslav administration in any areas he liberated.* Churchill used Yugoslav intransigence to again propose his pet project of a thrust into Eastern Europe through the Julian Alps to Roosevelt. A successful advance into Eastern Europe from Italy would place all Istria in Allied hands and give the Western powers greater leverage in deals with the USSR. The American president and his military advisors had no use for this scheme and politely shelved it.6i American rejection of the admittedly risky British proposal left the Allies without a plan for holding Tito in check. Relations with the Yugoslavs were already bad, and the Western states had few incentives to


induce Tito to voluntarily accept Allied military government in the Istrian area. Allied discussions of the Italian-Yugoslav problem continued throughout the winter of 1944-45 without resolution. Pressures for a firm stand against Tito were mounting on the Roosevelt administration. Italy and Yugoslavia had been at odds over Venezia Giulia with its mixed Italian and Slavic population since the end of World War I. The Fascists repressed Slavic nationalism and later imposed a harsh occupation regime in a defeated and partitioned Yugoslavia. The Italian-American leadership was particularly sensitive to the issue of Venezia Giulia and reacted fiercely to Yugoslav territorial demands. Communist dominance of the Yugoslav resistance further fueled Italian fears. The antiCommunist Vatican urged the Allies to seize the Venezia Giulia area to prevent bloody Yugoslav reprisals against the Italians. The Italian government also warned about a Yugoslav slaughter of Italians and urged Allied control of the area pending ItaloYugoslav negotiations to settle its future. The CLNAI was prompting the Italian government to seek an agreement with the Yugoslavs. The Italian resistance had entered into agreement with Tito but evidently did not trust the militarily stronger Yugoslavs to carry out their end of the bargain. As Ann O'Hare McCormick noted, even the most sincere anti-Fascists opposed Yugoslav claims out of fear that accepting them would resuscitate the irredentism that had spawned fascism.62 These pressures and Tito's intransigence spurred Department of State studies of the Venezia Giulia problem. By December 1944, American leaders had a well-defined program for territorial adjustments in the Venezia Giulia region, including major territorial adjustments placing most Slovenes and other Slavs within Yugoslavia. The American plans called for Italian retention of the bulk of the region's economic resources, including large coal fields and the principal rail lines. The United States also supported Italian retention of the major port, Trieste. Control of Trieste was the most emotionally charged issue in the Venezia Giulia tangle. By backing Italian claims to Trieste, the United States was asserting the interests of its client against that of the Soviet Union. At the State Department's recommendation, Roosevelt approved the use of United States troops to occupy the disputed areas, practically ensuring a confrontation between the Allies and the ~ u ~ o s l a v s . ~ ~


Economic Relief While the United States was the strongest world economic power, the Roosevelt administration was never able to bring this power fully to bear in the pursuit of its reconstruction objectives. A strong body of conservative opinion, which found its spokesman in Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft, opposed any use of American money for foreign aid. American businessmen, including many with prewar investments abroad, were generally unenthusiastic about the possibility of using American money to create postwar markets. Congress responded to conservative opposition to foreign aid by tacking restrictions on Lend-Lease and military appropriations designed to prevent a "world WPA ."64 Roosevelt, recognizing the force of public sentiment, declined to make a serious effort to educate public opinion about the advantages that investment in foreign reconstruction would bring to the United States. After Roosevelt's death, his successor and the State Department tried unsuccessfully for nearly two years to explain the problem to an uninterested American public before the Communist issue came to their rescue. As a result, the war-tom nations of Europe and Asia received only erratic aid without any sense of American control. Italy was an example of the weaknesses of United States economic policy. In sharp contrast to its elaborate plans for the political reconstruction and international reorientation of Italy, United States economic planning was virtually nonexistent. The United States did possess a series of broad economic objectives: reestablishing a profitable reciprocal trade, integrating Italy into a reconstructed European economy, and ending prewar Italian protectionism. However, these objectives had to be achieved through an Allied military bureaucracy whose decisions were guided by very restrictive policies: economic aid to Italy had to assist in the prosecution of military operation^.^^ Allied economic policy was based on a series of bad assumptions. Preinvasion plans for managing the Italian economy had called for the Italian government to feed, clothe, and employ its people, aided by strictly enforced Allied controls on credit, which would prevent inflation. Due to a worldwide shortage of raw materials and shipping, Allied military commanders had very limited supplies with which to meet civilian needs. While the Allies expected the Italians to be self-sufficient, their industrial reconstruction plans only permitted rehabilitating plants that were essential for military operations or minimal civilian needs.66 The Allies soon were aware that they had seriously misjudged Italy's eco-

PLANS A N D REALITIES l S 1

nomic condition. In August 1943, Joint Chiefs of Staff planners estimated that Italy would need four hundred thousand tons per month of imported supplies, primarily coal. They planned to use Italian merchantmen to carry the majority of these imports. At the end of the same month, Allied Military Government warned that the Sicilians were incapable of feeding themselves. Within three months, Allied Force Headquarters admitted that 50 percent of the population of southern Italy would need imported grain to survive instead of the 10 percent it had originally estimated. Allied Force Headquarters needed to import one hundred thousand tons of grain per month just to supply a 200-gram daily bread ration in the liberated s o ~ t h . ~ ' These essential supplies had to arrive in Allied shipping, as the Italian merchant fleet no longer existed. Once the civilian supplies arrived, the Allies had to distribute them. Italy's internal transportation systems-coastal shipping, roads, railroads, canals, bridges-were casualties of the war. Rolling stock, trucks, boats, and cars were in extremely short supply.68 Without food, raw materials, and transportation, Italian industry and agriculture was unable to achieve self-sufficiency. Ironically, Italy's industrial plant, which the Allies assumed would be destroyed, survived relatively intact in the liberated south. However, industry could not operate without raw materials. Agriculture was severely damaged by the war and needed foreign assistance to recover.69 Finally, Italy could not pay for the imports it needed. Italy was in the grips of a severe inflationary spiral, which began in 1935 when Mussolini tried to put his economy on a war footing. Italy had no foreign currency reserves. During the first six months of its exclusive management of the Italian economy, Allied military administration massively increased Italy's inflation and failed to deal with the structural defects of the Italian economy. An arbitrary exchange rate overvalued dollars and pounds and encouraged Allied troops to use their plentiful lire to pursue Italy's scarce resources. The soldiers and Allied Command paid for their purchases with military government lire (Amlire). The bankrupt Italian government assumed responsibility for Amlire under the armistice terms. The combination of scarce resources and active printing presses fueled runaway inflation. The failure of military authorities to deal with Italy's economic chaos was widely reported and analyzed. The Stevenson mission submitted its report in February 1944, and a few weeks later Henry Grady, the president's personal appointee as head of the economic section of the Allied Control Commission, followed up with an equally bleak analysis." American officials were obsessed with inflation, which they feared would


undermine Italy's social structure, set off revolutionary unrest, and disrupt Allied military operations. The Allied Control Commission struggled without success to curb Italy's inflation, but Amlire, a widespread black market, continued scarcity of basic goods, and unauthorized wage increases undercut these efforts. In July 1944, one frustrated Allied official commented that Allied policy was bankrupting Italy, and unless the United States and Britain were ready to bear the costs of the occupation, Italy would never recover. "Liberated Italians have been living on faith, hope and charity; but the charity extended to them has been severely rationed."" The Roosevelt-Churchill announcement that Italy would enjoy a New Deal did little to assist the Italian economy. Washington and London took nearly a year to settle on a common economic policy. The Allied Command was left to implement its own program. In the late summer of 1944, Allied Force Headquarters concluded Italy must produce for export. Italian exports would provide foreign exchange with which to purchase fuel, raw materials, fertilizers, and machinery needed to resuscitate Italian industry and a g r i ~ u l t u r e . ~ ~ The plans of Allied Force Headquarters were based on the assumptions that the war would terminate quickly, freeing shipping to transport Italy's products abroad, and that the Italian government would be able to organize production in liberated areas. Neither of these assumptions proved correct.73 The Italian government had little enthusiasm for Allied plans. The government's economic policy was made by a group of advocates of economic liberalism. They believed that the creation of a government trade agency would undercut their plans for private business to control the postwar reconstruction. These laissez-faire advocates also wanted to build up Italy's foreign exchange reserves to stabilize the lire while relying on United States credits to pay for Italian imports.74 Encouraged by the vague promises of the Hyde Park declaration and subsequent announcements of further United States aid, the Italian government sent two influential bankers, Quinto Quintieri and Raffaele Mattioli, to Washington in November 1944. The Quintieri-Mattioli mission was designed to discover what the American and British intentions really were and to present ItaIian plans for reconstruction. The British kept their intentions secret by refusing to meet with the Italians. The Americans reluctantly agreed to accept the mission and quickly disabused the Italians of the idea that Italy could negotiate on an equal basis with the United States. Italian suggestions to create a balance sheet between Italy's contributions to the war effort and Allied assistance to the Italian economy were firmly rejected by United States officials. A senior U S . Treasury official bluntly told the Italians that American aid was not a settlement of an obligation but an American gift to ~ t a l ~ . ~ '


At the close of 1944, a pattern for American aid was set: erratic and from a variety of sources. This assistance did prevent the collapse of the Italian economy but was too uncoordinated to promote sustained economic growth. The weakness of Italy's economy repeatedly threatened to undercut the achievements of American political reconstruction programs.

Chapter 6 Italy and American Hegemony, 1945

The first year of the era of American hegemony in Western Europe was 1945. Allied victory over Germany in May was followed by American victory over Japan in August. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered in the atomic era and a brief period of exclusive possession by the United States of this terrifying new weapon of mass destruction. Of the major powers, the United States alone emerged from the war with its industrial plant and agriculture intact and was in a position to organize the reconstruction of a war-tom world. In Italy, American economic and political stabilizationprograms were given their first test with mixed results. The political programs were generally successful. The resistance came into the political process, reinforcing the legitimacy of the Italian state. Simultaneously, the Italians laid the groundwork for a representative democracy. Despite severe problems, the United States made progress in the international arena in its efforts to end the armistice regime in Italy. Negotiations on an Italian peace treaty began at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 and were the priority issue at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Aided by Great Britain, the United States frustrated French and Yugoslav efforts to carve out new boundaries at Italy's expense. Economic reconstruction, however, remained little more than a promise, in spite of massive infusions of aid. Aid from the United States and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) barely kept the Italian economy afloat. Divisions among American officials, UNRRA economists, and Italian economic experts over the solution to Italy's structural

ITALY A N D A M E R I C A N H E G E M O N Y 155

problems meant that the bigger questions of the economy were left unaddressed. As 1945 progressed, Italy's strategic importance receded, as did the attention the United States public and government paid to Italian matters.

Containing the Left Relations between Bonomi and the CLNAI further deteriorated during the winter of 1944-45. In liberated Italy the Socialist and Action parties refused to join a second Bonomi government. Their representatives in the CLNAI were equally intransigent and urged an open break with the government. The Communists played a restraining role. The British, however, were convinced that the Italian Communist party would lead an insurrection shortly after the liberation, ignoring massive evidence that the Communists, in fact, were anxious to cooperate with the Allies in ensuring a peaceful transition from CLNAI to Allied Military Government control in the north. U S . Arnbassador Kirk recognized the Communists' moderation but was concerned that the combination of armed and aroused partisans, economic chaos, and a weak Italian government would lead to a postliberation outbreak.' On 4 March 1945, General Mario Roatta, the former Italian chief of staff, escaped from a Rome military hospital with the complicity of some carabinieri officials. Roatta's trial had been the centerpiece of Sforza's purge program. Public indignation, fanned by the Socialists and Actionists, boiled over. A mob surrounded the Viminale Palace and threatened the lives of Bonomi and other ministers. Spurred by public response, the Communists took a strong line against the government. In addition to revealing public discontent with Bonomi and the ineffective purge, the Roatta incident further weakened the position of the government in its relations with the CLNAI.2 In an effort to defuse the situation, Bonomi, with the Allies' approval, sent Aldobrando Medici-Tomaquinci, the Liberal under secretary of the Ministry for Occupied Italy, to the north for talks with resistance leaders. MediciTornaquinci's message was simple: the partisans should cooperate with the Allies because they had no real alternative. The Communists again restrained the Socialists and Actionists, and the mission ended with a declaration affirming the desire of the CLNAI to cooperate with the government and the Allies. However, the CLNAI also reiterated its intention to carry out a thorough purge and its insistence that any postwar government must represent the parties and objectives of the CLNS.~ The new Allied Commander in Chief, General Mark Clark, launched the

lS6 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N

final offensive in Italy on 9 April 1945. German resistance speedily weakened and then crumbled. Partisan bands began moving down from the hills toward cities where the local CLNs were organizing insurrections against the German occupiers and their Fascist puppets. On 23 April 1945, Genoa rose. Milan followed suit on 25 April. CLN governments took power throughout the north. The CLNs carried out a speedy and violent purge of the leading Fascists. In the days following the liberation, the victorious liberators took a bloody accounting for twenty years of Fascist oppression, ignoring Allied demands that Mussolini and his senior aides be turned over alive for punishment. Nevertheless, the CLNAI loyally kept its basic commitments by providing northern Italy with competent administration during the chaotic days following insurrection and the arrival of Allied armies. Undoubtedly, the CLNAI prevented more serious outbreaks of ~ i o l e n c e . ~ The first crisis of postwar Italy was surmounted thanks to the realism of both the CLNs and the Allied Command. Nevertheless, the situation in the north remained tense. Sporadic violence continued in spite of CLNAI efforts to impose order. More importantly, the victorious CLNAI was pressing its political and economic demands, backed by the prestige acquired through its conduct of a successful epurazione program and its virtual control of the Italian civil administration in the north. With the liberation completed, the CLNAI outlined its specific demands. The first was replacing Bonomi with a prime minister who enjoyed the support of the CLNAI. In addition, the northern resistance wanted to carry out a thorough purge, end the monarchy, convoke a constitutional assembly with full powers to reconstruct Italian politics and society, integrate partisan formations into the Italian army, and restructure Italy's economy under the control of factory production councils, which the workers established during the liberati~n.~ The United States' objective was to thwart the most radical objectives of the resistance while encouraging the CLNs to play a central role in the construction of a democratic Italian state. Chances for success of these plans appeared slim in the first weeks after liberation. Italian leftists, intoxicated with the completeness of the military triumph, believed they had the momentum to create a new Italian state. Pietro Nenni, the volcanic chief of the Socialist party, was among the most strident and confident in calling for a workers' state. In spite of the caution of their chiefs, many Italian Communists shared Nenni's belief that they had the power to sweep away the bourgeois state.6 Certain factors, however, favored American efforts. The rapid diminution of British power and Britain's acceptance of American primacy in Italy cut the


floor out from under the monarchy and other elements of the old right and reduced the chances of a civil war.7 At the same time, the unity of the CLNAI was unraveling. American leaders had counted on internal divisions to blunt the force of more radical elements within the resistance. Tension between right and left was always close to the surface although kept in check by the need to defeat the German army. After the German surrender of 2 May 1945, the unity of CLNAI and of the local CLNs was fractured by disputes over the purge, particularly in the industrial sector, and over the role of factory council^.^ The United States could count on center and right anti-Fascist parties to assist in restraining the left. The replacement of Bonomi as prime minister by Fermccio Pani on 19 June 1945 similarly favored American objectives. Pani, one of the outstanding leaders of the resistance, was a committed democrat who attempted to implement the CLNAI's program of democratic renewal within the constraints established by a coalition government and by Allied controls. Pani's government committed the resistance to work within bounds and contributed to the peaceful disarmament of a majority of partisans. He gave legitimacy to Allied and conservative calls for law and order, but ultimately failed to enact the reforms that his American supporters believed would stabilize Italian s ~ c i e t y . ~ Nevertheless, the Pani government was a critical element in the success of American plans for a moderate reconstruction. The United States' goal remained the construction of a democratic parliamentary regime by increasing the autonomy of Italy's government and refraining from public intervention in Italian affairs. American leaders believed that the left, and particularly the Communists, represented a threat to the survival of a democracy in Italy and sought means to guide Italy toward a regime that ensured American interests. Rather than indicating their objectives through a series of highly publicized and counterproductive interventions, American policymakers tried to create parameters---de jure and de facto precedentswithin which Italy's constituent assembly would operate. These precedents would undercut the left's claims that the costituente (constituent assembly) possessed an unfettered right to reconstitute Italian society in any manner it saw fit. By insisting on the creation of popularly elected local governments, on a referendum on the fate of the monarchy, and on the legislative independence of the interim Italian government from the costituente, the United States championed democratic solutions to Italy's problems while simultaneously reining in Italian radicalism. I0 The Italian institutional question was the center of American concerns. If a decision on the fate of the monarchy was taken out of the hands of the

158 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N costituente, the assembly's theoretical omnicompetence would be dealt a crippling blow. Similarly, if local elections preceded elections for the costituente, the left would be unable to challenge the legitimacy or independence of local government, or to create that degree of centralization so favored by dictatorial regimes of the left and right. In a surprising show of unanimity, the United Kingdom and the Allied Commission also favored a referendum on the institutional question. The institutional issue, formally shelved for the duration of the war in April 1944, had reemerged less than four months later when Bonomi's government enacted legislation for a postwar constituent assembly (DLL I51), which placed a decision on the institutional question in the hands of the costituente. The wording of the decree-law, which probably resulted from the inattention to detail so characteristic of Bonomi's government, represented a victory for the parties of the left. Stone realized the significance of the wording and called on Bonomi to urge revision of the document. Bonomi assured the skeptical chief commissioner that the document did not exclude a referendum on the monarchy. Stone's skepticism was well founded. The Allied Commission's Legal Subcommission reviewed the document and concluded that the costituente's right to decide the monarchy's fate was ironclad. In November 1944, the loquacious Lieutenant-General of the Realm, Umberto, told New York Times journalist Herbert Matthews that he preferred a referendum on the monarchy. Capitalizing on Umberto's statements, the left pushed a resolution through the government that affirmed that the costituente would decide the fate of the monarchy. Bonomi urged the Allies to make a public statement endorsing a referendum to head off a choice by the costituente. The United States declined and began casting about for other means to limit the costituente's powers." The State Department quickly reversed itself. Alexander Kirk, the United States ambassador in Italy, insisted that a referendum, by undercutting the powers of the costituente, would powerfully restrain the radical and antidemocratic projects of the left. In addition, the United States found a resolute ally within the Italian government. AIcide De Gasperi, the foreign minister in the Bonomi and Parri governments, feared that a vote in the constituent assembly would rupture the unity of the Christian Democrats. He shared the American belief that limiting the powers of the assembly would contain the left. De Gasperi wanted a permanent alliance with the United States and shrewdly chose the institutional issue as the cornerstone of a new relationship." After consultations with the British, the United States adopted a four-point program for implementing Italy's political reconstruction. First, local elections would precede a national election to choose a costituente. Second,


Italians would decide the monarchy's fate in a separate vote, probably held at the same time as elections for the costituente. Third, the Italian government would modify DLL 151 with another decree-law and simultaneouslyestablish a fourth important precedent for limiting the costituente: the independent authority of an interim government to legislate while the costituente wrote a constitution. Once these restraints were in place, the costituente would be permitted to write a constitution without interference.13 The United States, however, had to convey these views to the Italian government without making a heavy-handed intervention, which would undermine the Italian government's legitimacy at precisely the moment its prestige had to be at its height.14 Parri, moreover, endorsed the idea that the constitutional assembly enjoyed unlimited powers to restructure Italy's political and economic system. He intended to offer the resignation of his government to the assembly at its first meeting. Nenni, the vice premier for the costituente, wanted to hold elections for the constituent assembly prior to local elections, and openly campaigned against the monarchy despite his wartime pledge to the Allies to refrain from commenting on the i ~ s u e . ' ~ The Allies relied on the conservative anti-Fascist parties to carry out their program. De Gasperi was determined to revise DLL 151 through governmental action and to affirm the independence of the interim government from the co~tituente.'~ The Liberals wanted to restrain the growing power of the left within the Parri government. In spite of Parri's hard work and good intentions, his government was quickly immobilized by a left-right split. The most pressing issues facing the government were completing the purge, initiating an economic reconstruction program, and setting up the constituent assembly. On all issues the right successfully blocked the programs of Pani and the left. The Liberals and the Christian Democrats wanted to limit the purge and prevent any radical redistribution of economic power. They eagerly joined in the effort to establish parameters of law and existing institutions around the co~tituente.'~ Parri's first efforts at renewal were in the area of the purge and economic reconstruction. In July 1945, Nenni was appointed High Commissioner for the Purge and quickly infused that moribund agency with renewed life. At the same time, Parri offered a draft-law for a currency conversion designed to stimulate Italy's stagnant economy and sop up the profits that pro-Fascist businessmen had made through collaboration with Mussolini.'* Conservatives weakened the defascistization program by transferring responsibility for the purge of economic profiteering from Nenni to the conser-

160 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N vative Ministry of the Treasury. They demanded a depoliticizationof the purge by placing it in the hands of the conservative Italian judiciary. Meanwhile, a growing body of public opinion demanded an end to this apparently endless process. In August 1945, the conservatives won approval for a decree terminating defascistization in the south. By consenting, a weary left hoped to quiet public discontent and concentrate purge personnel in the north where public opinion strongly backed epurazione. l9 Conservatives employed delay to frustrate Parri's proposed currency conversion.20 The left, meanwhile, agreed to schedule local elections prior to a vote on the constituent assembly in order to test the voting system and their local party organizations. By early November 1945, the conservatives had stalemated Pani's government and with it the hopes of the northern resistance. They sapped the ministry's legitimacy through a ceaseless attack on its inability to maintain law and order, especially among ex-partisans. In November, the right felt strong enough to go over to the attack. Croce, the president of the Liberal party, let loose a major salvo in an 8 November letter in which he attacked the government's epurazione program. At the end of the month, Croce's party withdrew from the government. De Gasperi vetoed Parri's plan to govern without the Liberals, and Parri resigned on 24 November 1945. Flushed with success, the Liberals played a disproportionate role in the negotiations that led to the formation of De Gasperi's first government on 10 December 1945. As a price for their participation in the new government, the Liberals demanded that a willing De Gasperi promise a speedy termination of the purge and end the special privileges and status enjoyed by the CLNs. De Gasperi, meanwhile, checked Nenni's bid for the prime ministership and successfully asserted his own claim. The Allies observed this crisis from the political sidelines-a major victory for American insistence on nonintervention in Italy's internal political affairs." Once De Gasperi was prime minister, the State Department was able to present its views directly. On 5 January 1946, De Gasperi and Chief Cornrnissioner Stone met. De Gasperi sought an Allied declaration favoring a referendum. He also asked for a letter from Stone requesting De Gasperi's views on the institutional question. Utilizing this letter, De Gasperi forced the issue within his government. On 22 January 1946, U S . Ambassador Alexander Kirk informed De Gasperi that the United States believed that the Italian government had the power to legislate limits within which the costituente would act. Kirk reiterated the American view that the assembly should simply write a con~titution.~~

I T A L Y A N D A M E R I C A N H E G E M O N Y 161

De Gasperi reopened the entire question of political reconstruction in an 11 February 1946 speech before the Consulta, the advisory body established by the Pani government to function as a substitute parliament until the constituent assembly met. The prime minister announced that the government would use its legislative powers to revise existing decree-laws on the election of a constituent assembly. The Liberals proposed a series of changes, which included a compulsory vote and a separate election to determine the fate of the monarchy. When the left balked at both proposals, De Gasperi assumed the role of mediator. After protracted intragovernmental negotiations, the parties agreed to a compromise introduced by the Socialists: they abandoned the compulsory vote in favor of an admonition on the obligatory duty of voting. The parties also agreed to hold a separate referendum on the institutional question at the same time as the election of the constituent assembly.23 The United States achieved its basic objectives before a vote was cast: creating parameters around the costituente through the action of the Italian parties. A legitimate local government system was coming into place to restrain the centralism of the Italian state. The parties also affirmed the legislative independence of the interim government. Freed from responsibility for administrationor policy decisions, the costituente proceeded to write an Italian constitution that conformed to the Anglo-American design. The party struggle over the future of Italy began with the local election campaign. All of the parties believed that this test of strength would influence voters' choices for representatives to the costituente. The local elections were held in March and April 1946 in all the small and medium-size cities of Italy and in Milan. Venezia Giulia and the Alto-Adige areas were excluded from the voting as disputed territories. These elections gave parties a chance to test their political organization. The results confirmed that Italy's future rested with three mass parties: the Christian Democrats, the Communists, and the Socialists. The Liberals took 6.8 percent of the vote, while the Action party gained only 1.5 percent. The Republicans, whose wartime refusal to accept any compromise with the monarchy excluded them from both the interim government and the CLNAI, received 4.4 percent. The elections indicated that multiparty democracy would flourish in Italy and established the Socialists as the potential balancing element in Italian politics. American policymakers would watch the PSI'S evolution with growing concern. Throughout 1946, they nurtured hopes that the PSI would either join the Christian Democrats in a center-left coalition or alternate in power with them. In either case, the imperative for American policy was that the Socialists firmly establish their independence from the Communist party.24


The Prospectsfor Peace In the spring of 1945, American plans for the postwar internkional order crashed into the reality of the national objectives of its European Allies. In the case of Italy, territorial skirmishes with France and Yugoslavia were the prelude to a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. While the Soviets were ready to accept American hegemony in Italy, they resisted United States efforts to play a role in the political settlement in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union utilized Italy to break American intrusion into their sphere of influence. The Americans viewed the Soviet Union's treatment of Italy as evidence of its expansionist designs, believing that Soviet demands were designed to weaken Italy and set the stage for a Communist takeover. Thus, negotiations for an Italian peace treaty fueled the Cold War. The conflict of the two powers over Italy emerged at the end of the war in the clash between Yugoslavia and the Western Allies over Venezia Giulia. BORDER PROBLEMS

The future of Venezia Giulia was discussed at the Yalta conference but the Allies took no decisions. A British paper on the issue suggested the division of Venezia Giulia into Allied and Yugoslav occupation zones and warned that if no action was taken prior to the arrival of liberating armies, the "powder magazine" might explode. When neither the United States nor the Soviet Union responded favorably to British suggestions, British Foreign Secretary Eden instructed the new Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Alexander, to find a compromise solution through direct negotiations with Tito. Alexander visited Belgrade on 21 February 1945 and reached a provisional settlement with Tito. Yugoslav civil administrators would govern areas liberated by Tito's troops, but most of the disputed territory would be placed under the control of an Allied Military Government. Alexander referred the settlement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noting that Tito already was in position to occupy large portions of the disputed territory. He recommended that the Allies invite Yugoslavia to share in military government respon~ibilities.~~ The Alexander-Tito accord died inside the labyrinth of Combined Chiefs of Staff committees. The U.S. War Department opposed the deal, insisting that the Allies could not share responsibility for administration of Venezia Giulia with one of the claimants. The British, whose major objective was ensuring United States participation in a postwar occupation of Venezia Giulia, ac-


cepted War Department objections and offered three alternative plans for dealing with the Yugoslavs. The British agreed to follow whichever one the Americans selected, in exchange for an American commitment to provide personnel for military government in Venezia Giulia. American officials, after discussions with the State Department, settled on a British plan that ruled out any Yugoslav military presence in the Venezia Giulia. area and permitted a Yugoslav civil administrationonly on a temporary basis. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved this plan and drafted a cable ordering Alexander to establish an Anglo-American military government over the entire area.26 British eagerness to commit American personnel to the military government in Venezia Giulia was in part a nervous reaction to the sudden change in leadership in Washington. President Roosevelt died in Warm Springs, Georgia, on 12 April 1945. Harry Truman, his successor, was a virtually unknown politician without previous foreign policy experience. Despite assurances of the continuity of policy, the British government was apprehensive about the new president. Churchill fretted that his inability to attend Roosevelt's funeral was a lost opportunity to establish personal contact with Truman and take the measure of the new pre~ident.~' Britain had good reason for its concern. In the weeks immediately following Roosevelt's death, the United States government managed to lead the Western Allies into a comer over Venezia Giulia. While Truman struggled to master the complexities of his office, his senior civilian policy advisors maneuvered the Western Allies into a confrontation with Tito. The American military was anxious to withdraw from Europe and increasinglyabdicated its policy responsibilities to the Department of State, which had incorrectly measured Tito's power and the degree of Soviet support he enjoyed. Rejecting Alexander's counsel, the State Department chose to settle the Venezia Giulia issue through a race to occupy the disputed territory. The United States decision to reject the Alexander-Tito agreement was based on two unproved assumptions: first, that Tito was a loyal frontman for Stalin; and second, that the Soviet leader recognized that reining in Tito was in Soviet interest^.^' Tito, moreover, had a military head start, and his forces had seized most of Istria and large areas of Venezia Giulia by 1 May 1945. Yugoslav troops entered Trieste that same day, and only German resistance averted total Yugoslav control of the city. On 2 May 1945, Allied troops entered Trieste, took control of the port, and accepted German surrender. The race for Trieste ended with neither side holding a secure advantage. Yugoslav forces were well within the area that Alexander wanted to secure his line of communications with Allied forces that would occupy Austria.


Yugoslav and New Zealand troops faced each other over barricades in Trieste. Elsewhere the Yugoslav advance halted only when it met Allied armies. The nationalistic and revolutionary passions of the victorious Yugoslavs were inflamed, and Alexander's soldiers tended to sympathize with their demand^.^' Moreover, Tito's well-equipped veterans outnumbered the Allies. The new, inexperienced American president was caught between the contrasting policy advice of his senior military and civilian aides and was under growing pressure from the British ally and a highly vocal Italian-American population for strong action against the Yugoslavs. Although anxious to halt what he believed was an unjustified land grab, Truman was determined to avoid the use of force. The U.S. War Department, especially General George C. Marshall, and the Supreme Allied Commander strongly supported this viewpoint. The military men had a better sense of the hazards of resorting to force. Marshall's calm authority was critical in bolstering Truman's determination to prevent a tense situation from spilling over into an armed conflict. Department of State officials miscalculated the speed with which the crisis came to a head and were willing to risk the use of force against Tito to gain American objectives. Marshall appealed to Truman to head off a military clash. The Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed General Alexander to avoid the use of force if Tito attempted to seize Venezia Giulia. Secretary of War Henry Stimson tried to impress upon Secretary of State Stettinius the perils of relying on military force. By 3 May 1945, the military reined in the aggressive State ~epartment .30 After adopting a cautious policy, the United States brought Churchill to heel. The pugnacious prime minister was ready for a confrontation with Tito and Stalin in order to establish firm Western control of areas it liberated. However, Churchill could not move without agreement from his more powerful War Department efforts gave Alexander the opportunity to seek a compromise with Tito. An exchange of cables between 3 May and 5 May 1945 indicated that Tito was still willing to come to an accommodation with the West based on the never-completed Belgrade accords. Alexander sent his chief of staff to Belgrade to seek a peaceful ~ e t t l e m e n t . ~ ~ The talks took place on 8-9 May 1945 but failed to produce agreement. Once again, hard-liners tried to force the issue. On I0 May 1945, Truman told his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, that he was seriously contemplating the use of force. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew reported the president's reversal to Stimson and added that State was preparing a policy directive reflecting Truman's "new frame of mind." Stimson delayed action by insisting


the draft be sent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. The next day, General Marshall once again headed off a resort to force in a White House meeting with the president, Leahy, and senior State Department officials. The general insisted that the diplomats continue their efforts to negotiate a peaceful ~ettlement.~~ Tito's rejection of Allied demands gave new life to Churchill's aggressive plans. After a strongly worded message from Truman suggesting an ultimatum to Tito, Churchill believed he had the green light for military action. The next day he cabled Alexander that he could count on the support of eighteen divisions if an Allied ultimatum was rejected. The prime minister later told Truman that he did not think the Yugoslavs would start a war and would allow the Allies to nudge them back in a series of border incidents. His optimism was undoubtedly buoyed by reports from Alexander that Allied troops were now siding with the Italians against the aggressive and overbearing ~ u g o s l a v s . ~ ~ Truman, however, had regained his briefly lost composure. The United States could not risk another war in Europe while the Japanese still clung tenaciously to the last remnants of their Pacific empire. The War Department insisted on the quickest possible withdrawal of American forces from the European theater to provide the needed manpower and equipment for the invasion of Japan. Although Italian-Americans vociferously demanded action against Tito, few responsible leaders supported military action. Most Americans, whatever their feelings about Tito's Communist regime or the Venezia Giulia question, opposed involvement in a new European conflict. On 16 May 1945, Truman once again ruled out action against the Yugoslavs. The president told Churchill that the United States would use force only if attacked by the ~ u ~ o s l a v35s . Although force was ruled out, a show of force would usefully affirm Allied firmness and provide General Alexander with the reinforcements he needed to counter an attack by the numerically superior Yugoslavs. Marshall ordered General Eisenhower to assemble his armored divisions and prepare them for a rapid movement through Austria in support of ~ l e x a n d e r . ~ ~ While these preparations were underway, Truman sent a firm but conciliatory message to Stalin. The Soviet leader's reply of 22 May 1945 suggested the elements of a solution. The United States, Stalin stressed, would have to accept a Yugoslav military presence in areas west of Alexander's line of communications with Austria and continued Yugoslav occupation of large portions of the Istrian peninsula. If the Allies permitted Yugoslav civil administration to remain in place in territories Tito already occupied, the Yugoslavs would allow Allied Military Government into the area. Stalin's answer indi-

166 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N cated that the Soviet Union strongly supported Yugoslavia but also sought a peaceful solution to the crisis. After three more weeks of negotiations, the Western powers and Yugoslavs reached an agreement that defused the Venezia Giulia crisis. Tito agreed to withdraw the bulk of his forces to a line to the east of Alexander's line of communications from Trieste to Austria. The Yugoslavs evacuated Trieste, which was placed directly under Allied Military Government. Yugoslav civil administrations were left in those areas with predominantly Slavic populations. The Allies continued to garrison areas along the southern Istrian coast, including the heavily Italian city of Pola. The Allies promised to suppIy the token force which Tito left within the Allied Military Government's area. Tito agreed that the fate of all of Venezia Giulia would be decided at the peace ~ o n f e r e n c e . ~ ~ Meanwhile, the United States enforced its will on the French, who had seized parts of northwestern Italy. French claims were considerably less ambitious than those of the Yugoslavs and lacked the support of any of the Big Three. Nevertheless, Charles De Gaulle was as forceful and determined a leader as Tito, and the issue combined nationalism with French amourpropre. France consistently took a hard line with the Italian government after the surrender, obstructing its efforts to improve its international status. The French wanted to punish Italy for its alliance with Hitler, in part as revenge for their national humiliation in 1940 and in part to liquidate the two nations' long-standing Mediterranean political rivalry. De Gaulle hoped to reinforce France's claims to Great Power status by forcing the Allies to accept a Frenchimposed settlement of its border with Italy. This annexation was also designed to give Paris a military stranglehold over Italy. De Gaulle's provisional government had attempted to stir up annexationist sentiment among the Frenchspeaking population along the Italian side of the Franco-Italian border beginning in mid-1944. These efforts were only modestly successful and alerted the Italian government to French designs. The Italians protested to the Allied Commission and the French government, while the United States sought French assurances that it would not seize disputed territories in advance of the peace conference. The French denied they had any expansionist aims.38 In early May 1945, however, while American and British attention was focused on other problems and Allied troops in northern Italy were heavily occupied defending Venezia Giulia and entering Austria, French generals disobeyed the instructions of Eisenhower, the Allied commander in northern Europe. They crossed into northwestern Italy and established French control in Aosta, Cuneo, Tenda, Briga, and Val di Susa. The French halted only when they met advancing units of the U.S. Fifth Army. When French officers refused to withdraw, a military standoff reminiscent of that in Venezia Giulia ensued.


Throughout May 1945, France and the United States diplomatically sparred over the presence of French troops within Italy. The French government insisted the occupation was a symbol of French victory over the nation that had attacked it in 1940. France assured its Western Allies that its occupation was not the first step in an effort to annex Italian territory. Within the French zone of occupation, however, annexationist sentiments were simulated through the creation of a proannexation press, demonstrationsby French troops dressed as Italian civilians, formation of proannexation committees of national liberation, and the arrest and harassment of leading Italians. The Italian government, already hard-pressed in the east by the Yugoslavs, complained loudly to the Allied high command and to the United States and British governments about these tactics.39 Initially, Allied officials in Italy offered a compromise that would absorb French troops in northern Italy into the Allied Military Government structure. The French government turned down this proposal, and its generals subsequently rejected Allied Military Government's requests to move their troops back to their own side of the border. Eventually, the French overstepped themselves. On 30 May 1945, General Paul Doyen, the French commander in Italy, rejected another Allied request to withdraw and informed the Allied Command that an effort to dislodge the French would have "grave consequences." Two days later, he added: "General De Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of Allied Military Government in territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessq means without exception .'""' The tone of the French replies confirmed Eisenhower's warning that the French would not withdraw voluntarily from Italy. On 4 June 1945, an exasperated Churchill recommended swift action against the French, using any available punitive measures, except military force. A more prudent Truman, realizing French support would be needed in forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union, cautioned against publicly humiliating France. Instead, he dispatched a stem personal letter to De Gaulle, cutting off arms shipments and telling him to pull French troops out of ~taly.~' Implicit in Truman's letter was the threat of further supply cutoffs, including food, if the French failed to comply. After Truman called De Gaulle's bluff, the French government was able to beat a hasty retreat without a great deal of public embarrassment. France capitulated to Truman's demands on 10 June and agreed to remove its troops from Italy on 10 July 1945.42 The twin crises of May 1945 were a warning of trouble ahead for United

168 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N States efforts to secure a nonpunitive peace settlement for Italy. Both Britain and France had outstanding claims against Italy. However, both states depended on American economic aid for their reconstruction and would moderate their demands in Italy to assure American goodwill. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were a different matter. While they, too, relied on American aid (the Soviet Union through Lend-Lease and a promised large Export-Import Bank loan, Yugoslavia through UNRRA), the United States could not employ this aid to gain leverage in the Italian peace talks. UNRRA aid to Yugoslavia was too unwieldy to be an effective tool. The Soviets wanted American aid, but could do without it. The USSR was plundering its neighbors and former enemies to provide the requirements for economic recovery. The Soviets pointed out that Italian troops had supported Hitler's Russian operations and thus Italy owed them reparations. Since the Soviets accepted Italy's location in the American sphere of influence, they had no stake in Italy's reconstruction problems. They would back YugosIavia's territorial claims and the reparations demands of Yugoslavia and other Bakan states. Once the United States accepted the principle of Italian reparations, the Soviets would be in a position to grab the largest share. The confrontation with Yugoslavia over Venezia Giulia was a preview of the difficulties of negotiating a peace settlement for Italy. The Department of State consistently treated revolutionary and nationalistic Yugoslavia as a proxy for the Soviet Union and did not shrink from the use of military force to attain its objectives. A growing pro-Italian sentiment, nurtured in almost two years OF conflict with the United Kingdom over Italy's reconstruction, reinforced a strong anticommunism. Added to this was the obvious but less frequently stated view that Italy in geopolitical, economic, and cultural terms was one of those states that belonged in the United States' immediate sphere of infl~ence.~~ T H E POTSDAM C O N F E R E N C E

The United States emerged as Italy's champion in the first stage of the peacemaking process. The Americans believed that a generous peace settlement with the Italians was an essential element in the stabilization of a democratic Italy. This objective challenged the Soviet Union's objectives of expanding its defensive perimeter and extracting territories and economic production from its defeated enemies. From May 1945 onward, the United States was on the defensive. In order to preserve Italy's political settlement, the Truman administration was forced to make greater concessions to the Soviets than it had


initially envisioned. These concessions weakened the American position in Italy and cost the Truman administration domestic political backing. Truman's difficulties did not come solely from the USSR. As usual, the Western Allies were not in accord on Italy. The British initially insisted on stem punishment of the Italians for their cooperation in Nazi aggression. Fortunately, the Churchill government was more interested in preventing Soviet penetration of Western Europe and Africa than in punishing the Italians, and the British eventually lined up with the United States to frustrate Stalin's claims. Churchill had lost a good deal of his personal enmity towards Italy after Sforza disappeared from the center of Italian politics. However, the Foreign Office, and especially Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, remained passionately anti-Italian. At the end of June 1945, General Alexander visited London for talks with British leaders over Italy's future. He returned to Caserta in a highly pessimistic mood. Eden, Alexander told his staff, harbored almost "psychopathic views" on Italy and insisted on acting as if Mussolini was still in power.44 The Churchill government was determined to dominate Western Europe. Keeping Italy in a politically weakened and dependent position remained part of this plan. Churchill, the Foreign Office, and the War Office clung to this objective while sharing American appreciation for the need for a stable democratic state. The British fear of a Communist takeover in Italy was intense. Under steadily increasing American pressure for immediate action to end Italy's cobelligerent status, the British reluctantly began to draw up a draft peace treaty for Italy in June 1945. Both the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff drafted versions that included punitive measures designed to weaken ~ t a l While ~ . ~the ~ British plans for disarmament and decolonization did not differ radically from the American plans, they were not linked to reforming the Italian economy and were presented as punishment for Italy's war guilt. Reparations, too, were to be extracted. The British recognized Italy's economic difficulties, but decided these were the United States' problems. After their setback in northwest Italy, the French reduced their territorial claims against Italy. They remained determined to limit future Italian influence in the Mediterranean, but they adopted a new diplomatic tactic. They sought to play the role of mediator between the two Great Powers, with the twin objectives of raising France's international status while simultaneously subjecting Italy to a harsh peace. Fortunately for the Italians, France could not follow this strategy consistently. The French government sided with Italy's desire for colonial mandates in order to prevent Soviet penetration into North Africa and to prevent the further enlargement of British influence in that area. Further-


more, France was too weak economically to openly challenge the United States on the Italian treaty and softened its initial support for Yugoslav and Austrian territorial claims and its reparations claims. Negotiations for an Italian treaty quickly evolved into an American-Soviet confrontation. Suspectinglhat reaching agreement on an Italian peace would be time consuming, American officials were anxious to make both substantive and symbolic gestures to Italy to bolster the forces working for democratic reconstruction. American economic aid programs were a part of this process, but American officials regarded the lifting of m i s t i c e restrictions on the Italian government as the best means of reinforcing nascent Italian democracy. As a symbolic form of recognition of Italy's participation in the Allied war effort, and over heated British objections, the United States used Italy's militarily meaningless declaration of war against Japan as a pretext to publicly support Italian membership in the new United Nations Organization. This gesture was highly pleasing to ~ t a l i a n - ~ m e r i c a n s . ~ ~ The United States, like Britain, was preparing its version of an Italian treaty, The postwar planning committees of the Department of State supplied much of the text. The department maneuvered to limit and in some cases eliminate military influence on the peacemaking process.47 State Department control of peacemaking was assured when James Byrnes became Secretary of State on 1 July 1945. During his eighteen-month tenure as Secretary of State, Byrnes dominated the foreign policy process and particularly the peace treaty negotiations. A moderate conservative with great political skills, including a superb negotiating technique, and an undisguised desire for the presidency, Byrnes was both a logical and risky choice for Secretary of State. Truman lacked Byrnes's leverage with Congress and broad areas of the business community. Byrnes also possessed the confidence and the wide-ranging managerial experience required to take hold of the increasingly complex foreign policy. His negotiating skills served the nation well during the wearing and complex negotiations over the "satellite" peace treaties. Nevertheless, the new Secretary of State was as much a neophyte in international diplomacy as the president he served. He was also Truman's most immediate political rival. Byrnes's self-confidence and his tendency to formulate American policy after consultations with a few trusted subordinates irritated Truman, whose political future rested on those decisions. The president found allies within Byrnes's own department. The professionals of the State Department had won the bureaucratic battle for policy control, only to see the new Secretary of State cut them out of policy formulation. Led by the politi-


cally sensitive Under Secretary Dean Acheson, the professionals established strong claims to the president's respect and loyalty.48 Byrnes and Truman arrived in Potsdam, Germany, on 15 July 1945 for a face-to-face encounter with Churchill and Stalin to lay the groundwork for the postwar peace settlement. An apprehensive Churchill had his long-awaited first meeting with Truman and came away favorably impressed with the new president.49 Nevertheless, the old Tory statesman was no more inclined to follow Truman's lead than he had Roosevelt's. At the first plenary session, Truman introduced the question of Italian membership in the United Nations Organization and requested British and Soviet support. Churchill gave a lengthy recitation of the injuries Italy had done to Britain during the war and established his nation's claim to a share of the Italian fleet. Churchill's performance removed any lingering doubts that the United States faced stiff opposition to its peace plans for Italy. Truman nonetheless introduced a document outlining American objectives: the removal of the armistice regime through an interim peace agreement and the quick negotiation of a final Italian treaty by the Allied foreign rninistrie~.~~ The Soviets and the British soon outlined their respective positions on an Italian treaty. At the foreign ministers' meeting on 20 July 1945, Molotov tied an agreement on Italy to Soviet reparation demands. The same day, at the fourth meeting of the heads of government, Stalin linked the conclusion of an Italian treaty to successful negotiation of treaties with three ex-enemy states, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, which were under Soviet occupation. The loquacious Churchill aided Stalin's case by insisting that the Parri government was unrepresentative and that Italy must be punished for its role as Germany's ally. The United States rejected Soviet claims to reparations for Italy and the tying of an Italian treaty to those for the states under Soviet o c c u p a t i ~ n . ~ ~ When the Big Three again discussed Italy on 24 July 1945, the British moved closer to the United States. Eden, attempting to undo the damage caused by Churchill's rashness, indicated that the British government, too, believed the Italian government deserved different treatment from the regimes governing the other ex-satellites. Churchill made a plea for special treatment for Italy based on its contribution to the Allied war effort. He also praised the growth of democracy in Italy and complained that the Soviets were erecting an "iron fence," which cut off Allied access to Eastern ~ u r o p e . ' ~ The meeting at Potsdam broke up with the issues of an Italian peace well defined. Churchill was replaced suddenly as prime minister by Clement Attlee on 26 July 1945, which accelerated the pace at which the British government aligned itself with the United States on the major issues of an Italian peace


treaty, American plans for a democratic reconstruction were hostage to Soviet demands. The final Potsdam protocol represented a compromise between the Soviet and American positions and left all the substantive issues for negotiations between East and West in the newly created Council of Foreign Ministers. The United States agreed that negotiations for treaties with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria would be conducted simultaneously with those for Italy, and shelved its suggestion for immediate Italian membership in the United Nations Organization. The Soviets, in turn, permitted a specific mention in the protocol of Italy's contribution to the war effort and indirectly committed themselves to support Italian membership in the United Nations once the peace treaty had been signed.53 PEACE TALKS IN LONDON

The Potsdam Declaration's treatment of Italy won widespread praise for the Truman administration. Italian-Americans hailed it as the first step toward a just peace with Italy, while the Italian government expressed its thanks. Hopes rose for a quick and favorable solution. The United States and the United Kingdom were in accord on the need for a rapid and equitable settlement. The French government, too, informed Washington of its desire to see Italy receive a favorable peace, adding that it wanted only a few minor border rn~difications.~~ The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened in London on 11 September 1945. The United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR, and Republic of China were represented. They immediately began laying out the ground rules for negotiation of a peace treaty with Italy. Procedural questions dominated and ultimately stalemated the London meeting. The Soviets intended to Iimit the number of American and British allies and clients who would have a say on the shaping of the treaties with Italy and the East European states. The Council of Foreign Ministers meeting deadlocked after three weeks of negotiations. Nevertheless, the foreign ministers made considerable progress in writing an Italian treaty and in defining the issues that separated them. The Americans introduced a series of proposals designed to provide Italy with a favorable peace settlement. The British introduced a more comprehensive document, the so-called draft headings, which specifically outlined their terms of peace for Italy. The Soviets clarified the price they would demand for agreement to an Italian treaty. American proposals recognized the right of France, Austria, and Yugoslavia


to seek border rectifications with Italy. Final adjudication of these demands was to be the responsibility of a multination peace conference, which would take place after the Council of Foreign Ministers had completed a draft treaty. The conference would, of course, be presented with recommendations prepared by the council, and the unstated but obvious implication was that the conference, after debate, would ratify these recommendations with minor revisions. The United States proposed to demilitarize Italy's small southern islands and place a ceiling on the armaments Italy could have in Sicily and Sardinia. Italy would have armed forces sufficient for internal security and frontier defense, would scrap or turn over to the victorious nations most of its fleet, and would surrender all of its colonies to a United Nations international trusteeship. The American proposals also recognized the principle of reparations payments by Italy to states that its former government had attacked. However, these payments would be limited in recognition of Italy's cobelligerent role and of its restricted ability to pay. Reparations would come from the forfeiture of Italian assets in other states and from surplus Italian war production capacity which could not be reconverted to civilian economic uses.55 The USSR demanded a colonial trusteeship in the Tripolitania for itself and suggested that the administration of the other colonies be divided among the major powers. Molotov claimed, with some justification, that former Secretary of State Stettinius had promised the Soviet Union a trusteeship at the San Francisco ~onference.'~ The United States opposed Soviet penetration of Africa and the southern Mediterranean. Secretary of State Byrnes told Molotov that the United States had never envisioned single nations acting as trustees, but rather the nomination of a neutral government that would administer the colonial area for the United Natiom5' The second major Soviet demand was a share of the Italian fleet. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom objected to this demand in prin~iple.'~ The third Soviet demand was for large-scale Italian reparations. The Soviets strengthened their case by associating their demands with those of other states seeking compensation. Initially, Molotov proposed that the amount of reparations be left open and that the peace conference set a figure. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, refused to permit the Soviets to bid up the reparations bill at a meeting of Italy's ex-enemies. They suggested that a final sum be fixed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The sum, they felt, should reflect Italy's limited ability to pay and the amounts the Italians already owed for American and British relief assistance. Molotov cut the Soviets' Potsdam suggestion of $600 million to $300 million, on the understanding that the

174 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N Western states had no reparations demands. Ernest Bevin, Britain's new Foreign Secretary, rejected this figure, noting that the United States and United Kingdom had first claim on any excess Italian wealth. Bymes added that the United States would not permit its relief aid to be recycled into reparations payments; that would defeat the whole purpose of the aid program. Italian assets abroad and excess war industries would have to satisfy the demands of the Soviets and other states.59 Hovering over the first Council of Foreign Ministers session was. the question of Venezia Giulia. The conference heard statements by De Gasperi and by Yugoslav representatives and established a special study group to deal with the complicated border issue. Both the United States and the Soviet Union refrained from pushing their client states' positions too strongly. The United States was dealing from relative weakness: the Yugoslavs had strong legal and moral claims to much of the disputed temtory and occupied a good portion of what they wanted. The causes of Soviet moderation can only be guessed. The Yugoslavs, meanwhile, were cementing their control over occupied areas and trying to undercut Allied Military Government's authority in the portions of Venezia Giulia they occupied, especially in Trie~te.~' At the end of September 1945, Molotov suddenly announced that the Soviets wanted to limit participation in the foreign ministers' discussions to the states that actually were at war with the individual ex-enemy states. This would eliminate China, an American ally, from the conference. The Soviets rejected a counterproposal from Byrnes and discussions were suspended. Byrnes bitterly resented Soviet action but publicly downplayed the suspension. Few knowledgeable observers were fooled. Ann O'Hare McCormick commented that the council's breakdown was not procedural but over matters of ~ubstance.~' On 5 October 1945, Bymes reported to a national radio audience on the results of the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Secretary's speech was optimistic, stressing the considerable progress that the foreign ministers had made in defining the Italian treaty and substantial areas of agreement among them. The Secretary reminded his listeners that negotiations meant compromise, and that the council was not expected to produce a final treaty.62 Bymes's speech was an effort to calm rapidly rising public discontent with the peacemaking process. Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace, no friend of the Secretary of State, privately praised Bymes's patient diplomacy as "judicious," but it was coming under heated attack from anti-Communist press and congressmen who wanted a showdown with the Soviets on every issue in dispute between the two states.63


The growth of antiCommunist sentiment in the United States was particularly welcome to many elements within the Italian-American community. The Council of Foreign Ministers' session was a domestic political disaster for the Truman administration. The administration inherited all of Roosevelt's vague pledges of a special treatment for Italy, and the Potsdarn protocol raised hopes that Truman and Byrnes would transform them into reality. Byrnes arrived at London with a set of proposals that were bound to disappoint pro-Italian elements: temtorial concessions, the loss of Italy's colonies, reparations, demilitarization, and the surrender of much of the Italian navy. His problem was complicated by leaks and by the intensive press coverage that surrounded the American delegates' activities at the council meetings. The American press portrayed the United States delegation as ill-prepared and weak in the face of the Soviets. The United States' real weakness was an eagerness to rapidly conclude a treaty, which the Soviets exploited. The other weakness of the American position was that it championed Italian interests, which forced the United States to make concessions to win Soviet agreement.64 Neither the Italian nor the American press understood or conveyed these facts to their readers. The Interim United States Information Agency reported that news of the American position on the colonies issue had caused a serious deterioration of pro-American feeling in Italy. By late September 1945, the peace treaty was being effectively employed by the Italian right to undermine Parri's already shaky government, a development that worried senior United States officials. The Italian moderate left was central to American plans for Italy's reconstruction and the United States government was loath to damage its relations and prestige with this Equally troublesome was the state of public opinion at home. The left attacked the administration for being ill-prepared. Liberals generally favored American peace proposals and objectives and were critical of Soviet actions, but they womed about the execution of American policy. Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, a leading spokesman for disgruntled liberals, heaped abuse on Byrnes and Truman for their diplomatic performance. The right, meanwhile, thundered at the Soviets and urged the administration to stand up to Stalin. The moderate and conservative press tended to support specific proposals and objectives of American diplomacy while criticizing Bymes's performance. Diplomacy toward the Soviet Union was subject to even more severe criticism. Calls for firmness in dealing with the Soviets were mixed with statements of concern that a further deterioration of relations among the Allies might lead to a new war or at the least to a division of Europe into hostile The Italian-American press did a rapid turnabout. No longer blaming Brit-


ain for Italy's problems, they attacked the Soviets and communism instead. They criticized the administration roundly for failing to live up to its pledges and for retreating in the face of Soviet demands.67

Testlng the Economics of Free Trade While the peace process captured the American public's attention in the fall of 1945, Europe's economic situation remained desperate. Germany, divided and occupied, was a virtual wasteland. Britain was bankrupt. Eastern Europe was being stripped of food and factories by a wardevastated Soviet Union. Italy and France were somewhat better off, but depended on American food, raw materials, and grants to avoid economic collapse. With the war's end, the legislative authority for most direct United States assistance lapsed. The United States entered the postwar era without effective control of its primary reconstruction tool, economic aid. Economic policy was hamstrung by the wartime assumption that neither Congress nor the American people would willingly continue to finance the economies of the liberated nations. Strong popular support did exist for international organizations, though, and the Roosevelt administration had capitalized on this to win congressional authority to establish and fund the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). An American, Herbert Lehman, became its first director, in recognition of the size of the United States contribution to the agency and of the ultimate reliance of much of the world on some form of American reconstruction aid. The UNRRA concept had strong liberal support, so it paid an additional political dividend for Roosevelt. The agency soon ran into serious troubIe, however: Lehman proved a maladroit international administrator but was irreplaceable because of his political credentials. Moreover, the United States discovered that it was difficult to ensure that its monetary contributions to UNRRA were used to further American political and economic objectives. Finally, most Western European governments voluntarily renounced UNRRA aid. A large part of the aid went to nations that were under Communist control and sometimes bit the hand that was feeding them. The Yugoslavs were particularly truculent UNRRA aid recipients. Congressional opposition to the program ballooned after the end of hostilities in Europe. Launched with great hopes in 1943, UNRRA was floundering by late 1945. The agency's difficulties underlined the poverty of American postwar economic planning. When the economics of free trade, so favored in American public statements, proved

I T A L Y A N D A M E R I C A N H E G E M O N Y 177

unable to overcome postwar chaos, American officials scrambled to find new sources of aid for Europe. Between 1943 and 1945, the American economic program for Italy was based on two major sources: troop pay credits and the War Department's civilian supply program. These programs provided Italy with approximately $450 million in credits, finished goods, and raw materials. A small UNRRA aid program supplemented these grants, together with two private sources of aid: remittances sent by Italian-Americans and Italian aliens in the United States to their families in Italy, and the supplies provided through American Relief for Italy.68 While the private aid would continue indefinitely, the military aid programs and the UNRRA grant ended on 1 January 1946, and troop pay credits shortly thereafter. The Italians were desperately seeking other sources of funding. In November 1944, a special mission headed by Quinto Quintieri and Raffaele Mattioli arrived in Washington as suppliants. Although the United States was anxious to avoid humiliating and undermining the Italian government, officials politely rejected the ItaIians' proposals for increasing aid, offering only to regularize trade between the two states. After five months of discussions, the Italians left Washington with little to show for their efforts. A week later, the Treasury undercut the Italian government by announcing that the United States would not cover its share of the cost of Amlire, the military government-issued currency in Italy.69 The unwillingness to grant Italy further aid reflected American domestic and foreign difficulties. As usual, the United States was subjected to counterbalancing pressures from London and the Mediterranean. The British initially opposed any concessions to Italy. In addition to residual anti-Italian sentiment, the bankrupt United Kingdom was simply unable to match United States contributions and sought to avoid further serious damage to its prestige and position in Italy by canceling out American influence. While the British fought American proposals, Allied Force Headquarters clamored for further aid for the rapidly deteriorating Italian economy.70 At the end of the war, the British realized that they would have to come to terms with American programs for postwar reconstruction as a precondition for a large American loan, which the British economy desperately needed. In May 1945, the British finally agreed to implement the technical economic reform that the United States had proposed in late 1944 as a part of the New Deal program.7' The New Deal economic programs were welcome to senior Allied representatives in Italy, but were clearly inadequate. The two top Americans in Italy,


Admiral Stone and Ambassador Kirk, prepared detailed policy recommendations, which stressed the need for immediate, large-scale aid to prevent a revolutionary outbreak. AC President Macmillan touched on the same points in talks at the Foreign Office, as did General Alexander during his postsurrender visit to London.72 Italy was part of a wider economic crisis, which American officials were struggling to comprehend. Public opinion polls indicated that the vast majority of Americans were willing to endure continued scarcity of food and other items to provide aid to Europe. However, Americans still believed they faced a problem of immediate short-term relief as after World War I. No American official had explained the extent of the devastation of Europe's economic infrastructure or the length of time required to repair it. American officials, in fact, were still unaware of how serious the situation was. Dean Acheson, who had been intimately connected with wartime economic affairs, recalled: "The enormity of the task . . . only slowly revealed itself. As it did so, it began to appear as just a bit less formidable than that described in . . . Genesis . . . to create a world out of chaos."73 In the spring of 1945, the State Department hoped for a reconstruction conducted by American businessmen and international relief and reconstruction organizations like UNRRA and the newly created International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Departmental spokesmen were crisscrossing America enlisting public support and encouraging American businessmen, large and small, to invest in foreign markets, especially in Europe. The message that men like Under Secretary Acheson, Assistant Secretary William Clayton, and others carried was that American prosperity was directly linked to the recovery of foreign markets. The alternative to ~mericaninvolvement in economic reconstruction was revolutionary upheaval, which would bring the loss of foreign markets and of domestic p r ~ s p e r i t y . ~ ~ While these arguments contained a considerable amount of truth, they failed to move most Americans. A few aggressive corporations, such as International Telephone and Telegraph and Trans Western Airways, did move into the European and Italian markets as soon as the fighting ceased. They quicMy met serious obstacles to their plans for rapid market exploitation. The host govemments generally welcomed the capital they brought and offered monopoly concessions. The Department of State's commitment to free-trade principles, however, made it a staunch opponent of any deals smacking of market domination, even by American corporations. Probably the most active business organization was the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Association, a group whose only interest was ensuring that prewar bondholders were repaid by bankrupt European and Asian governments. The bondholders in question were pri-


marily large banks. The bankers were trying to get their money out of Europe, and there was little chance they would provide loans to businessmen interested in foreign i n ~ e s t m e n t . ~ ~ Sustained American investment in Europe required political stability. Political stability, in turn, required economic stability based on massive American investment. The lack of private capital drove the United States government to deeper involvement in economic reconstruction. A series of ill-coordinated attempts at stopgap relief eventually gave birth to a coordinated, government-financed program of anti-Communist reconstruction. However, American policy floundered for two years before the Marshall Plan took form. The free-trade policies-which former State Secretary Hull and his successor as high priest of economic liberalism, Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton, so vigorously supported-were triumphant in Washington but could not be exported to an economically shattered postwar world. In a June 1945 summary of American events, the British Embassy noted both the "crystallization of American foreign economic policy and its immediate inapplicability to the existing conditions." It cautioned, however, that the ideology of free trade was so strong that American statesmen would press on relentlessly until they created a free trading system.76American relations with Italy were a case in point. The American government was pursuing a double-tracked policy in Italy. On the one hand, American officials were frantically searching for means to keep Italy's economy afloat. Simultaneously, the Department of State was pressing the Italians to abolish all legal barriers to free trade and to enact laws and regulations that would favor a multilateral international economic system. On 10 July 1945, Clayton forwarded an eight-page statement of American economic aims in Italy to Ambassador Kirk. The Italian economy, Clayton noted, was in no condition to enter into a multilateral trading system and would not be for some time. Nevertheless, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs outlined the areas in which the United States wished Italian action to create conditions for free trade.77 Even as Clayton wrote his lofty prescription, his subordinates were struggling to find the cash and commodities that would keep Italy's economy going until the end of the year. In June 1945, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy informed the Liberated Areas Committee that no military necessity existed for continuing the Army's supply program for Italy and that he would terminate it immediately. Quick and forceful action by the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration gained Italy a reprieve until the end of 1945; however, the outlook for 1946 was grim. While combined government and private contributions to Italy for 1945 amounted to $1 billion, an Allied


Commission senior official reported that less than $350 million was committed for 1946 from all sources. Italy had no substantial foreign exchange reserves. Without dollars and pounds, the Italians could not purchase the raw materials, especially coal, needed to get their industries and transportation system working and to heat their homes during the coming winter. The United States was the only nation capable of supplying enough currency to enable the Italians to make purchases abroad. In many cases, the United States was also the only nation possessing an exportable surplus of commodities, including food, which the Italians desperately needed.78 In spite of its cobelligerent status, many Americans still viewed Italy as an ex-enemy state. No specific congressional appropriation for Italy was likely. The simplest way to ensure that the Italians received sufficient aid for 1946 was to include them in the UNRRA's regular relief program.79 An appropriation for Italy could then be included in a larger request to Congress. As in 1944, the United States government had to win the agreement of the often hostile member states of UNRRA for a grant to Italy and then gain approval from Congress, which was increasingly hostile to both UNRRA and the concept of foreign aid. Fortunately, the Truman administration had powerful support: the British government and the Italian-American community. Great Britain strongly endorsed the American proposal for a $450 million grant within the UNRRA Council. The British had reversed their policy because of their concern with the extent of American domination in Italy. Sir Noel Charles, the British representative in Italy, was alarmed at the growth of American economic penetration and warned London that without action to counterbalance this development, the British would lose their access to Italian markets. The Foreign Office took a more sanguine view of trade possibilities, but was concerned about the political impact of allowing the United States to be the sole source of economic aid for Italy. While accepting American predominance in Italy, the British government still nurtured plans for a strong British influence in that country's affairs. Britain lacked money to directly aid Italy, but if the major source of foreign aid was international and resulted from combined American and British action, the United Kingdom could justly claim a leading role in Italian affairs. American and British partnership won approval for an Italian aid program at the August 1945 UNRRA council meetingg0 Next, the administration turned to Congress for a UNRRA appropriation, with the united support of the Italian-American community. Franklin Roosevelt's death was a serious blow to the ascendent Italian-American leadership. Truman had little experience with ethnic groups, and Italian-American leaders watched his initial moves with concern. They were quite pleased with Tru-


man's handling of the Venezia Giulia crisis. His subsequent ability to foil French efforts to seize Italian territory further enhanced Truman's stature among Italian-Americans. The new president also took an early interest in the Italian economic crisis." Truman's interest in Italy was widely shared within the government. Conservatives like Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Secretary of War Henry Stimson saw Italy as a key element in general European stability. Throughout June and July 1945, the administration sent an impressive array of senior officials to Capitol Hill to convince Congress that Italy needed aid quickly.82 Italian-American leaders lobbied intensively to win congressional approval for the UNRRA appropriation. The Truman administration badly needed this assistance. Mass circulation publications like Life and the Saturday Evening Post editorialized against UNRRA, charging it was mismanaged and that its actions damaged United States national interests. The administration had its own doubts about UNRRA but realized that it lacked alternatives to deal effectively with the world economic crisis. It stoutly defended the agency in public and, with the aid of a coalition that included liberals and ItalianAmericans, won passage of the 1946 UNRRA appropriation.83 A number of smaller loans and grants supplemented the UNRRA aid program for Italy. Troop pay credits continued into the early part of 1946. Shortly before the end of 1945, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton pried a $25 million loan to Italy for the purchase of cotton from the Export-Import Bank. Clayton had three objectives for the grant: increasing the production of badly needed clothing, creating employment in a key industrial sector, and establishing the precedent for further bank ioans to Italy. Meanwhile, the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission provided the Italians with large quantities of war surplus items, which they could employ in reconstruction-trucks, clothing, spare parts, temporary shelters. In order to preserve Italy's limited foreign exchange supply, the United States accepted lire for the relatively small sums that United States law required be charged for surplus items. In addition, the State Department acted to assure that Italy got a sizable share of the coal the United States was shipping to Europe, and it put strong pressure on the Department of Agriculture to increase the Italian grain allotment. The State Department even encouraged Italian efforts to reopen commercial relations with East Europe at a time when the United States refused to recognize the Soviet political settlement in that area.84 The State Department also backed efforts to get private American investment into Italy. A May 1945 Italian Trade Day in New York City received the department's blessing. Passport regulations for business travel to Italy were

l82 R E C O N S T R U C T I O N

eased during the summer. Simultaneously, the United States government ended restrictions on private trade with 1taly and urged the Italians to establish an agency to promote private investment. Nevertheless, the future of private trade with Italy was clouded. The Trans Western Airways and International Telephone and Telegraph cases suggested that American corporations would seek monopoly control as their price for entry into the Italian market, a practice the State Department strenuously opposed.85 Even more than direct corporate investment, the Italian government and industries required capital in the form of loans from American banks. The bankers, however, wanted security. Italian assets in the United States had been frozen at the beginning of the war. Private credit would remain tight until these assets were available to settle claims and serve as security and until the status . of American property in Italy was ~larified.'~ The major exception to this rule was the Bank of America. A. I? Giannini, the Italian-American founder of this massive financial organization, was anxious to invest in his homeland but on terms likely to upset the nation's fragile political equilibrium. In November 1945, Giannini visited Italy and told Italian politicians and industrialists the price of his loans was reining in the Italian left. Giannini's visit gave a psychological lift to the right. Startled American officials in Italy watched helplessly as Giannini's heavy-handed intervention undercut the reformist Parri government. Giamini departed without making any major loans. By the end of 1945, only Fiat had secured large credits from another American bank, New York's Morgan Guaranty Trust. The Fiat loan was the result of a long-standing tie between the Italian corporation and the American automotive giant General Motors, and it involved a division of international markets that contravened American free trade objective^.'^ Giannini's intervention in Italian politics was only a minor incident in the maneuvering to overthrow the Parri ministry, but it underlined the other problem that the United States faced in trying to revitalize the Italian economy: the unwillingness of most Italian factions to play the roles American planners assigned to them. Sizable and influential elements of the Italian business community opposed both free trade and American encouragement of political and social reform. Italian textile manufacturers gladly took American loans while rejecting American economic and political reconstruction objectives. The dominant school of Italian middle-class economists, the liberalists, so far outdid the Americans in their devotion to laissez-faire economics that they repeatedly threatened to undermine the stabilizing effects of American relief aid." The plans of the left-wing parties of the resistance were equally at variance with those of the United States. At the end of the war, the workers of the north

ITALY A N D A M E R I C A N H E G E M O N Y l83

formed consigli di gestione (councils of administration) in their factories and claimed a controlling voice in production decisions. The councils, which had the backing of all the parties of the left, were the first steps toward a socialization of Italian industry. The councils created practical problems for Italy's industrial recovery. Thanks in great part to the efforts of the CLNs, most of Italy's industrial plant and power stations had escaped destruction at the hands of the retreating Nazis and Fascists. However, due to shortages of critical raw materials, the plants could provide neither high production nor meaningful employment. Italian workers who had endured Fascist oppression and had played a major role in their own liberation were unwilling to sacrifice their jobs in order to improve industrial productivity. In the first days after liberation neither the Bonomi government, nor the Italian industrialists, nor Allied Military Government felt strong enough to oppose the workers. Thus, they agreed to a ban on firings, which insured that tens of thousands of Italian workers would be paid full salaries for work they could not perform. The Parri government endorsed the ban on firings. By the end of 1945, the massive costs of supporting an involuntarily underemployed work force were a major roadblock to economic reconstructi~n.~~ After the fall of the Parri government, the mass parties of the left abandoned the northern workers. De Gasperi's new government accepted the Liberals' ten-point program, which included lifting the ban on firings and ending the epurazione program that threatened Italian industrialists. The parties of the left realized that without layoffs, Italy's struggling industry could not begin its recovery. The industrialists seized the opportunity to increase profits and at the same time destroy or emasculate the production councils.g0 Fortunately, the layoffs of the winter of 1945-46 were not as severe as they would have been six months earlier. Aided by American capital and coal, Italian industry had moved from 10 percent of its production capacity in June 1945 to 50 percent by December 1945. The reconstruction of the nation's transportation system moved ahead. The rhythm of industrial life was resuming, and Italians were proving to have great endurance and improvisational ability. Nevertheless, Italy's economic situation remained delicate. The agricultural sector was only slowly recovering, and in December 1945, in spite of American food shipments, the average daily ration was a mere 1,300calories. In France the ration was 2,000 calories. Even in Germany the Allies maintained a 1,500 calorie daily ration. General Lucius Clay, the chief of American Military Government in Germany, warned Washington: "There is no choice between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000."91 Hunger, widespread unemployment, lack of housing, and massive physical

184 RECONSTRUCTION

destruction were all present in Italy, together with two Marxist parties whose membership within the De Gasperi coalition did not prevent them from directing discontent against that government or rousing utopian hopes among the masses. All of these factors contributed to repeated outbreaks of small-scale violence. Bandits appeared in the countryside; food riots broke out in the cities. The violence remained sporadic, but American officials realized that it could quickly mount into revolution if the line of money and supplies from the United States to Italy were broken or interrupted. Such a break almost occurred in January 1946 because Congress only grudgingly passed the UNRRA supplemental appropriation in late December. A quick shuffling of funds by UNRRA administrator Lehman allowed the program to go into operation on 1 January 1946.92 Fortunately for the United States, during 1946 the political energies of the left were directed toward the twin objectives of destroying the monarchy and creating democratic political forms that would protect their freedom to organize and operate. Neither the Socialists nor the Communistsoffered a coherent program for economic recovery. The Action party disintegrated early in 1946. Within the government, Socialist and Communist ministers cooperated in the effort to find the food and raw materials needed to keep Italy's economy afloat. Italy would recover if the critical foreign supply line was kept open. The Italian government, however, was almost powerless to do anything to ensure supplies. Shortages of food and raw materials were worldwide and Italy was only one of dozens of war-devastated nations trying to get a share of the scarce supplies. Italy's ambassador, Alberto Tarchiani, tirelessly lobbied American politicians, businessmen, and religious and labor leaders and lined up grass-roots support for Italy among Italian-Americans. He hammered away at the twin theses of anticommunism and American strategic interests in Italy. Neither tactic was immediately successful for, in spite of a growing anti-Soviet sentiment among the press, public, and government, the United States government was not yet ready to tie economic recovery programs for Europe to an anticommunism crusade. Senior State Department officials were aware of Italy's strategic importance and of the disastrous international and domestic political consequences that would follow from a collapse of the Italian economy. However, the broadened concept of "national security," which this outlook reflected, was not widely accepted within the United States government. Furthermore, the State Department lacked a realistic plan for dealing with either the Italian or the European economic crises. These failures created political problems for Truman.


The Italy Lobby A new factor in United States policy calculations emerged during 1945. Policy toward Italy was under intense domestic scrutiny. The growth of a broad-based, loosely organized pro-Italy lobby was an important development. It was a frequent critic of both the State Department and the Tmman administration over the lack of economic aid for Italy and the slow pace and unfavorable results of treaty negotiations. The core of this lobby was the network of personal alliances and mass organizations that grew out of the Antonini-Pope rapprochement. By the end of the war, Pope and his fellow prominenti had overcome their prewar ties to fascism through their highly publicized involvement in a variety of patriotic organizationsand causes. They became the champions of a postwar democracy for Italy. Their anti-Fascist opponents continued to be riven by factional disputes. Many followed Antonini's lead and joined organizationsdominated by the prominenti. Moreover, the anti-Fascists' major issue had lost relevance: the totalitarian threat to an Italian democracy appeared on the left now. Anti-Communist Italian-Americans, and especially the prominenti, had an issue that allowed them to widen the distance between themselves and their Fascist pasts while further isolating their opponents.93 Anticommunism was also a major factor motivating another important component of the Italy lobby, the United States Roman Catholic church. The American church hierarchy feared a Communist takeover of the nation that hosted the administrative and spiritual center of Catholicism and was concerned for the physical well-being of 45 million Italian Catholics. These concerns remained equally alive after the war. Catholic charities collected and donated millions in cash and supplies for Italian relief. The hierarchy's apprehensions mounted as Italy's left-wing parties revealed their popular strength. Anticommunism together with deeply rooted ties to Italy and to a common faith were natural links between a predominantly Irish- and German-American Catholic hierarchy and a predominantly Catholic Italian-American population. The third element of the Italy lobby, a small but active and influential group of internationally minded liberals together with a few conservatives, gave the Italy lobby a visibility and legitimacy it would have otherwise lacked. Their reasons for involvement with Italian affairs varied. Anticommunism motivated many in this group. Others like Alan Cranston and Oscar Cox carried their concern for Italy's future from their government positions into private life. A strong cultural attachment to Italy motivated most. Many liberals, moreover, used the Italian issue as a weapon against the Truman administration, which was far too conservative for their liking.

lS6 RECONSTRUCTION

The Italy lobby was a political problem for Truman from the first days of his administration, in part due to a lack of personal rapport with powerful ItalianAmericans like publisher Generoso Pope and AFL leader Luigi Antonini. The president, to his credit, was uneasy with the pro-Fascist pasts of men like Pope, which Roosevelt had simply overlooked. He kept the Italian-American publisher at arm's length until the 1948 election campaign. The president's distant relationship with Italian-American leaders meant that, unlike Roosevelt, he was unable to deflect or tone down their criticism of United States policy. His relations with liberal leaders deteriorated rapidly in 1945 as he purged most Roosevelt liberal appointees and replaced them with conservative Truman loyalists lacking impressive administrative ability. Many liberals believed the new president was betraying Roosevelt's legacy. They sniped relentlessly at Truman while laying plans to hand the 1948 Democratic presidential nomination to Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace. The Italian-Americans and liberals were joined by others who were concerned about the geopolitical and strategic as well as the human consequences of the economic collapse of Italy. The Council for Italian American Affairs was organized in 1945 to inform Americans about Italy's plight and lobby for action to meet the crisis. Alan Cranston was Executive Director. The board included Washington attorney Lauchlin Cume, a former Roosevelt lieutenant and Foreign Economic Administration official; Allen W. Dulles, who had headed the Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland and aided the Italian resistance during the war; and the influential journalist Max Ascoli. The national council included prominenti such as journalist Frank Gervasi and Judge Felix Forte, together with New York's new mayor William O'Dwyer, Charles Poletti, arid Sumner Welles. The Italy lobby worked closely with Ambassador Tarchiani and generally supported the political and economic objectives of the Italian government, particularly large loans and the conclusion of a nonpunitive peace. These demands went far beyond what the United States was prepared or able to provide, creating friction between Truman's administration and the lobby." Because of the wide divergence of views that separated its constituents, the Italy lobby was always a very informal coalition. Its components tended to mount parallel campaigns on the same issues and the degree of coordination that the Council for Italian American Affairs and later, Common Cause, achieved was limited. In addition, demands for consideration of Italy's problems competed with the claims of other interest groups for government action and for a share of available foreign aid funds. Like Italy, the Italy lobby had a hard time holding public attention in the early years of the postwar era. Nevertheless, the lobby succeeded in mobilizing private and public aid for


Italy. It was less successful in its efforts to influence the peace treaty. However, during the 1947-48 crisis the lobby played a vital role in building public support for an anti-Communist intervention by the United States. In the process, it became an ally of the Truman administration, and its elements played a role in the president's stunning reelection triumph.

Chapter 7 The Reconstruction Stalls, 1946

At home and abroad, the Truman administration staggered through 1946 beset by seemingly endless problems. Faced with mounting domestic pressures for quick reconversion, Truman hastily abandoned price and wage controls in June 1946 and immediately reaped runaway inflation. Labor unrest grew as wages fell behind prices and farmers' profits evaporated. The president's response to these problems created an image of a weak, vacillating man. Abroad, the United States and the Soviet Union clashed over control of atomic weapons; occupation policies in Germany, Austria, and Japan; peace treaties; and Iran. International economic recovery from the effects of the war was slow and a heavy burden on United States taxpayers. Americans were growing apprehensive about a new war and had little confidence in Truman's ability to insure peace, to promote economic reconstruction, or to deal successfully with the USSR.' The administration's foreign policy was uncoordinated. Truman, Bymes, and Wallace promoted three different Soviet policies. Foreign economic policy was a bureaucratic battleground in which the secretary of state and the president rarely intervened. Italy was part of the pattern of confusion. The United States achieved its major political objectives while Italy's economy staggered forward, but a series of economic crises threatened to destroy American plans for Italian stabilization. By the end of 1946, United States public and governmental interest in Italy reached its lowest point just as that country's fortunes reached the nadir. United States policy initiatives in Italy were disjointed. Secretary James Byrnes concentrated on completing a peace treaty and only occasionally inter-

R E C O N S T R U C T I O N S T A L L S 189

vened to deal with other political and economic issues. Assistant Secretary Clayton, almost alone, found sources of aid for the hard-pressed Italians. The United States mission in Italy lacked an ambassador for most of the year, a sure sign that the focus of American interests was elsewhere. ChargC David McKay Key spent the first half of the year entangled with the fate of the monarchy and the rest of 1946 in a frantic effort to focus his government's attention on the mushrooming economic crisis.

Completlng Italy's Polltical Reconstruction The Truman administration's lack of firm direction tended to obscure an important political success in Italy: the settlement of the institutional question through free elections. Even with this issue resolved, however, the threat of insurrection remained, and the United States increased its involvement in training and supplying Italy's internal security forces. THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

In 1946 the United States' plans for political reconstruction reached a successful conclusion when the referendum on the institutional question produced a narrow but solid victory for a republic, and King Umberto 11 grudgingly accepted his countrymen's decision. The constituent assembly's powers were firmly limited by the existence of a functioning local and national government and by a popular decision on the fate of the monarchy. The United States and United Kingdom's roles in the events surrounding the 2 June 1946 referendum were very limited. Once De Gasperi won the left's acceptance of a referendum, the two Allied powers had simply to resist pressure from the right to intervene. The British had long since abandoned their support of the House of Savoy. In June 1945, Churchill stated, "the essential question . . . is whether Italy is to become a parliamentary democracy. . . or . . . a totalitarian state . . . it is a matter of indifference whether Italy chooses to be a . . . Monarchy or a Republic." The Americans never had much sympathy for either the institution of monarchy or for its occupants. The major concern for both Allies was to prevent the referendum from becoming a pretext for a coup d'etat byeither the right or the left. Italian monarchists were actively building paramilitary forces and simultaneously seeking Allied action to postpone the vote. The left was more circumspect, but the Allies' ingrained suspicions led them to fear a possible coup from the Communists. Togliatti,


the Minister of Justice, indicated that the Italian Communist party would not accept a monarchist victory in the referendum. De Gasperi and some Allied officials believed that the PC1 would resort to force if the voters rejected a re~ublic.~ David Key, the United States charge in Italy, took a more realistic view. He reminded Washington that Allied intelligence had no evidence of Communist preparations for a coup, and that the PC1 recognized that the Allies would oppose any recourse to force. Key's reporting reinforced Washington's preference for nonintervention. The United States wanted a decision on the monarchy and instructed Key to "deplore" any Italian government suggestions for a postponement. The Italian government never considered a delay. The monarchy had only a limited base of support within the De Gasperi ministry. The Liberals favored retaining a king, but without Christian Democratic backing, they had little weight within the cabinet. As a result, the monarchy tried unsuccessfully to gain the assistance of the Allied Command, United States intelligence, and the Vatican for a po~tponement.~ To the surprise of both the left and the monarchists, the referendum indicated that the crown, although defeated, enjoyed considerable support. The vote for a republic was 12,717,923 and came heavily from the north. The monarchy collected 10,719,284 votes and had its base of support in the south. In the simultaneous vote for a constituent assembly, the Christian Democrats won 207 seats, the Socialists 115, and the Communists 104. The right-wing movement, Uomo Qualunque, received 1.2 million votes and 30 seats. The king briefly considered a resort to force before going quietly into exile. More importantly, from the American point of view, the referendum and simultaneous vote on the membership of the constituent assembly were severe psychological blows to the left. Italian voters showed that they opposed a radical recon~truction.~ If the left wanted to impose a radical solution, it would have to employ force. American officials took this possibility seriously and continued their efforts to improve Italy's internal security. The constitutional arrangements, which began to emerge with the referendum, were well within the parameters set by American policymakers. The Italian government and Allies had met and disarmed the resistance's challenge to the legitimacy of the Italian state. The committees of national liberation were withering away. However, their more radical and committed members were increasingly active within the two mass parties of the left. The potential for a violent challenge to the state now lay with these two parties, which were helping create Italy's new constitution while governing the state in the De


Gasperi ministry. The Americans watched with growing concern as the Socialists and Communists played what appeared to be a double game of taking leading roles in the government and costituente while simultaneouslyarousing the masses against the state. Meanwhile, a massive economic crisis was fueling popular unrest and undermining the legitimacy of the Italian political reconstruction. Italy had to rely on its internal security forces to discourage an insurrection until economic recovery began. These forces, however, were woefully unprepared for the task. INTERNAL SECURITY

The end of the war temporarily reduced the internal security problem. The Committee of National Liberation for North Italy and its partisans provided interim police who assisted in a generally successful maintenance of law and order. Disarmament, though by no means complete, was widespread. Nevertheless, Italy's internal security remained a serious concern for Allied officials. The Italian army began to disintegrate as thousands of draftees deserted and headed for home.6 The opportunity for mass violence increased as the Americans began transferring troops to the Pacific theater and generally loosening wartime controls. Italian internal security forces were incapable of dealing with a revolutionary outbreak. Their morale was low, their training and equipment insufficient, and popular respect almost nonexistent. An Allied Force Headquarters study in July 1945 concluded that the carabinieri were unpopular and unable to cope with a serious situation. The army's combat units had fought well throughout the war and had made a small but significant contribution to the final Allied victory. Nevertheless, they could not compete with the partisans in public appeal. The Allied Commission's Chief Commissioner Stone suggested that the army assume a major role in the physical reconstruction of Italy as a means of winning popular r e ~ p e c t .The ~ Allied Commission continued to lobby for an increase in the size of the carabinieri and finally won the approval of both the Supreme Allied Commander and the Combined Chiefs of Staff for expanding the corps by ten thousand in September 1945. The British government suggested that a special training group be dispatched to reorganize the other Italian police agencies. The idea appealed briefly to both the Americans and Parri. However, Parri was reluctant to permit further Allied involvement in Italy's reconstruction and realized that the obvious anti-Communist overtones of the proposal could undermine the unity of his g~vernment.~ Plans for building an adequate internal security force were hampered by the


expectation that the final peace with Italy would strictly limit the size of its armed forces. United States policy was to keep Italy in a state of "partial di~armament."~ The Americans hoped that by keeping the Italian internal security forces small, they could build up a first-class army and police. However, Italy lacked the administrative support and the economic base to maintain even a drastically reduced internal security establishment. Limited foreign currency reserves had to be used for economic recovery. Diverting Italian foreign exchange to purchase American or British military supplies would endanger the political stability that Italian internal security forces were designed to protect. The withdrawal of Allied forces from Italy increased the burdens of the hard-pressed De Gasperi ministry by saddling it with responsibility for defending its frontiers. The Military Mission to the Italian Army was simultaneouslydemanding that the Italian government bring its military forces to a high state of readiness no matter what the costs.I0 Washington was becoming aware that the Italians could not build an efficient internal security force without United States aid and that military assistance would increase American leverage in Italy. The United States military insisted, however, that weapons standardization required that the British continue to handle rearmament. Allied concern over Italy's internal security rose after the June 1946 elections. The De Gasperi government was stalemated over reconstruction programs along left-right lines. The Italian economy was stagnating. Sporadic violence continued unabated. The parties of the left encouraged crippling strikes and mass demonstrations to protest governmental inaction. In July 1946, a gas workers' strike threatened to halt the UNRRA relief program. In August, armed bands of ex-partisans took to the hills and demanded changes in government policy. On 9 October 1946, a crowd of between twenty and thirty thousand tried to storm the Interior Ministry in Rome to protest job layoffs. Police fired on the mob, killing 2 and wounding 119." The British dusted off their plan for a United Kingdom police mission to Italy. De Gasperi, like Parri, rejected the idea as politically unfeasible. United States officials shared this view. Additionally, the United Kingdom proposal was designed to strengthen British influence in Italy. The U.S. State Department remained determined to reduce this influence, especially in military and police affairs. Under intense pressure from the State Department, the U.S. War Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed their previous policies and sought to provide Italy with supplies and training for its internal security and defense forces. l 3 At the end of 1946, the British reluctantly abandoned their plan for a police

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mission. They scaled down their costly involvement in training and equipping the Italian army. As American officials assumed an increasing burden for internal security, the Italian police were seriously embarrassed by the Troika incident. In September 1946, Italian police uncovered information pointing to the existence of a paramilitary Communist terrorist organization funded by the Soviet Union. The information was from dubious sources and the police report fell into the hands of the Italian Communist party, which published it in the party daily, Unitd, with the twin objectives of demolishing the report and embarrassing the government. They succeeded brilliantly. The Soviet Union and PC1 angrily and indignantly demanded apologies from De Gasperi. The prime minister disavowed the report and formally apologized to the USSR. The police were humiliated while the government stood revealed as unable to keep its secrets or stand up to internal or external Communist pressure. U.S. Chargt Key warned that the PC1 had shown its ability and intention to undermine public order by destroying the p ~ l i c e . ' ~ As 1947 began, American officials were nervously measuring the growing power of the PC1 in the government and in the streets against the material and morale weaknesses of Italian internal security.

A Peace through Compromise The Italian peace treaty was the major achievement of James Byrnes's 18-month tenure as Secretary of State. Byrnes won Soviet agreement for a treaty that was essentially nonpunitive through an exhaustive and seemingly interminable series of negotiations, which spanned four separate international meetings, two continents, and all of 1946. By the time Bymes's patient negotiations achieved their objective, American public opinion had lost interest in Italy's fate but was convinced of Soviet malevolence. Byrnes and his negotiations were discredited, and the treaty created serious domestic political trouble for the Truman administration. Compromise was out of fashion in international relations. The breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers' (CFM) talks in London and the resounding beating that Bymes's policies took from the American press created unrest within the State Department and accelerated the release of Italy from its armistice obligations. In mid-November 1945, Ambassador Kirk flew back to Washington for consultations. Kirk was highly critical of Byrnes's general conduct of United States foreign policy and particularly hostile to the secretary's handling of the Italian peace negotiations. He presented officials in


the Office of Western European Affairs with a most undiplomatic and impractical proposal for a unilateral declaration of peace with Italy. Amazingly, the Kirk proposal won the support of frustrated State Department officials and Byrnes had to intervene to squelch the idea.15 Heavy criticism of the administration's handling of CFM negotiations and discontent within the State Department also revived a proposal that the Supreme Allied Commander lift most of the armistice provisions unilaterally. The precedents for this action were Eisenhower's September 1943 modifications of the armistice and the Cunningham-DeCourten naval agreement. The British had repeatedly suggested this course of action as an alternative ta American proposals for an interim peace treaty. In the late summer of 1945, the United States came around to the British viewpoint that negotiations for a preliminary peace required unacceptable concessions to the Soviets over Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. As the CFM ground to a halt and pressure for action grew, the United States initiated talks with the British and with Allied Force Headquarters designed to identify all the armistice clauses which could be nullified.16 The official publication of the Italian armistice terms in November 1945 provided a further impetus to action. Due to their harshness, the terms remained secret throughout the war. After the war the Italian government repeatedly requested their publication, shrewdly calculating that this would build sympathy among groups inclined to support a favorable peace for Italy. The Western Allies unsuccessfully attempted to soften the impact of publication by simultaneously releasing the related documents that mitigated the armistice terms. "Hitler treated France better," commented one Italian-American paper. Italian Foreign Minister De Gasperi took advantage of the Allies' embarrassment to call for the abolishment of the armistice.17 Abolishing the armistice clauses took on a life of its own and, to the horror of the British, quickly developed into a new version of the interim peace treaty idea at the hands of Chief Commissioner Stone and the new Supreme Allied Commander, the British General William D. Morgan. Proposals drafted by Allied Force Headquarters stimulated the State Department to work out its own draft. After a conference with Stone (and much to the Chief Commissioner's surprise), Italy's new Prime Minister De Gasperi endorsed the idea of a new armistice in a 12 December 1945 nationwide radio broadcast. By January 1946, the State Department had a draft that abolished the Allied Commission and the old armistice and substituted an agreement in which the Italian government pledged to cooperate with the Allies, to allow the continued maintenance of token military forces in Italy, and to respect Allied interests in Italy until a

RECONSTRUCTION STALLS 195

final peace was signed. The Americans then approached the Soviet Union and United Kingdom, seeking their approval for a new armistice agreement. The Soviets indicated that they had no objections in principle to rewriting the armistice and would'study the American draft when presented. The British, who were better informed of what was afoot in the State Department, had serious doubts about the idea, but had no wish to arouse American or Italian enmity by vetoing it. They grudgingly agreed to back the new armistice, hoping the Soviets would bear the onus for killing the plan. The British disliked a number of provisions, especially Article 3, which provided for fourpower supervision of Italy's military affairs. The British did not want to offer the Soviets the opportunity for continued legal penetration in Italy. They also suspected that the French would utilize a four-power organization to cripple the Italian army. Rather than suggest modifications, the British speedily put together their own draft, which was sent to Washington on 3 April 1946. Completing a joint draft that was mutually agreeable took months, much to the Foreign Office's pleasure. While the armistice revision was moving ahead, State Secretary Byrnes resuscitated the peace conference, arranging a special meeting of the Soviet, British, and American foreign ministers at Moscow in December 1945. Since neither side modified its London conference positions, the outlook for resumption of the CFM talks was very bleak. British Foreign Secretary Bevin was ready to propose that the United States and the United Kingdom sign a separate agreement with Italy that would abolish the armistice regime, grant Italy full diplomatic relations, conclude the state of war, support Italian membership in the United Nations Organization, and accept the consequences in Eastern Europe2' Byrnes and Truman, however, were not as pessimistic. The president wrote Stalin urging the Soviets to compromise, and the Soviet dictator obligingly indicated that his views were not as inflexible as those of Comrade Molotov. He intervened in the Moscow discussions at the appropriate point and the three powers reached a solution: China was excluded from discussions on the satellite treaties, but France would participate. The three foreign ministers also agreed that work on the four treaties involved would proceed in unison, with the Italian treaty receiving priority treatment. They agreed to hold a second meeting of the CFM before 1 May 1946. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers' deputies were instructed to begin discussions on parts of the Italian treaty." Byrnes put the peace talks on track at a high price for both the administration and the secretary of state personally. Once again, Bymes's concessions to

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the Soviets angered large segments of American public opinion. The Moscow meeting's final communiquk associated Italy with the Eastern European satellite states, which was particularly distressing to the Italian government, public opinion, and the Italy lobby because the Potsdam declaration appeared to give Italy a special status and priority. The Truman administration's standing with Italian-American voters again plunged. On top of this, Bymes's performance angered Truman, who felt his secretary of state had not kept him informed and was "babying the ~oviets."*~ The administration set about rectifying its public image. In a radio address following his return from Moscow, Byrnes stressed his achievement in getting the stalled negotiations moving and promised that the United States would refuse to sign any treaty that did not meet with international approval. Bymes's public statements regarding the Soviet Union began to take on a firmer tone. The United States strengthened the position of De Gasperi's govemment with gestures of public support. Truman promised De Gasperi that Italy's wartime contribution would be remembered when the peace treaty was written. The administration informed the Italian-American and Italian press of its efforts to negotiate a new armistice agreement. Truman pledged that Italy would have a voice in the peacemaking process in his State of the Union message. 23 While American gestures were appreciated, they did little to raise the administration's standing with either the Italy lobby or Italians. Commenting on Truman's message to De Gasperi, Generoso Pope remarked that a promise of American help was good, but the situation required action to preserve American prestige and common American and Italian interests. Italians realized that they would have to defend their own interests while relying on ItalianAmericans to keep up pressure for aid to Italy. The Italian-American leadership agreed. Pope and Antonini organized committees for a just peace for Italy, which had strong antiSoviet overtones.24 Meanwhile, the peace talks dragged on. The foreign ministers' deputies met in Paris throughout the late winter and spring of 1946 without achieving much progress. Neither side showed any flexibility on the major outstanding issues: the colonies, reparations, or Venezia Giulia. By April, the military subcommittee studying the division of the Italian fleet did reach tentative agreement on assigning Italian ships to six Allied states. Ideological and strategic differences did not impede negotiations for war booty.25 Byrnes's patience was running low. On 4 April 1946, he publicly asked that a new CFM session begin on 26 April. The other governments agreed. Notwithstanding this unusual show of unanimity, Byrnes was deeply pessimistic


about the chances of a negotiated solution, and at a cabinet meeting on 19 April 1946, he outlined contingency plans for the signature of a unilateral peace agreement with Italy if negotiations broke down again.26 Byrnes refined his negotiating strategy. His temperament and his experience at London led him to limit the number of advisors he consulted and the size of the delegation he took to the meetings at the Majestic Hotel in Paris. He believed that the best way to make progress with the Soviets was by holding small, informal discussions. Byrnes also kept his delegation small to cut down on news leaks, which had plagued the London meeting.27 Byrnes purposely played a low-key role at the formal discussions. He met frequently with Molotov for personal talks and, in a variant of this strategy, encouraged a French proposal for small informal meetings of the four foreign

minister^.^' Another factor driving the secretary of state toward informal diplomacy was the presence on his delegation of the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg. Byrnes needed these men in Paris as a sign of the broad support his policies enjoyed at home, but he paid a high price in both personal and policy terms for their presence. While Connally was an amiable politician who loyally backed Byrnes and immersed himself in the work of various study groups, Vandenberg was a major weight on his time and patience. A recent convert from isolationism to internationalism, Vandenberg was viscerally antiCommunist and had little sense of the realities of international negotiations. Vandenberg's presence constantly reminded Byrnes of the growing anti-Soviet feeling at home and the national impatience with the slow pace of negotiations. Byrnes and his deputies had to continually stroke Vandenberg's immense vanity and calm his raging anti-Soviet feelings.29 The first session of the CFM meeting in Paris lasted from 26 April to 16 May without reaching substantive agreements on the three major questions of the Italian treaty. By the end of the twenty-day negotiating marathon, tempers were frayed, patience exhausted, and peace no closer at hand. Nevertheless, the negotiators made some progress on all three issues. The United States agreed to support French proposals for an Italian trusteeship in its pre-Fascist colonies under the United Nations, offering a way out of the deadlock over the colonies. The British still opposed Italian mandates, but an Italian trusteeship arrangement allowed both the Americans and Soviets to back away from their previous positions.30 The Soviet Union showed flexibility on reparations. While insisting that the Italians would have to pay $300 million to compensate the USSR and smaller


victims of Fascist aggression, the Soviets proposed that a portion be taken out of current production rather than through dismantling Italy's industrial plant. The Soviets were willing to accept seized Italian assets abroad and Italian war plants as the basic elements of a repa&tions settlement. Byrnes continued to insist that the whole bill must come from these sources. Nevertheless, the elements of a reparations settlement were in place.3' Venezia Giulia was the hardest problem the negotiators faced. Each of the four powers proposed a different line along which a division of the disputed territories should be made. The Americans' line was most favorable to Italy, the Soviets' line most favorable to Yugoslavia. At Soviet insistence, the Yugoslavs and Italians were again summoned to set out their cases. De Gasperi spoke for Italy and made a favorable impression on the Western foreign ministers. In private discussions with Byrnes, the Italian prime minister accepted fairly extensive territorial losses, but insisted that Trieste must remain Italian. Byrnes agreed, and in an effort to break the deadlock, offered to accept the French line (the Western proposal most favorable to Yugoslavia) in return for an Italian Trieste. Both the British and the French supported this proposal. The Soviets, however, continued to demand Trieste for Yugoslavia. In informal talks, Molotov offered to drop Soviet demands for reparations and colonies in exchange for Trieste. Byrnes demurred. He realized, however, that even a partial solution of the Venezia Giulia problem would open the way for a general solution.32 By 14 May 1946, Byrnes felt that negotiations had reached a point where a pause would favor the formation of new negotiating positions. He proposed that the CFM suspend the talks until 15 June. The other foreign ministers agreed, and the Soviet Union also approved the Americans' request for a new armistice agreement. The document was a revised United States draft, which dropped the offending Article 3A-providing four-power supervision of Italy's military affairs-and met other British objections. The Allies instructed the Supreme Allied Commander to present the document to the Italian government.33 Byrnes's patient negotiation was making progress; however, the strategy was out of step with American public opinion. During the spring of 1946, an extremely broad spectrum of the American press was attacking the Soviet Union's behavior at Paris. Racing ahead of United States officials, American public opinion was becoming fiercely anti-Soviet and anti-~ommunist.~~ This anti-Soviet feeling was exploited and encouraged by the elements of the Italy lobby. The activities of pro-Italy groups were, in turn, stimulated and, to some degree, guided by Alberto Tarchiani, Italy's antiCommunist arnbassador to the United States.

RECONSTRUCTION STALLS 199

Byrnes was acutely aware of the power of anti-Communist sentiment and tried to neutralize it by taking hard-line positions in his public statements and by associating powerful conservative congressmen with his policies. These tactics limited his freedom to maneuver but bought time. Byrnes's 20 May 1946 radio address on the first Paris session of the CFM, a marked contrast to previous optimistic reports, somberly detailed the United States and Soviet positions and put the blame for the deadlock squarely on the USSR. He reiterated the need for patience and firmness while stressing the bipartisan nature of American Bymes's fence mending was a partial success. Though the Italy lobby continued to criticize the Truman administration for failing to live up to wartime pledges, a number of influential publications endorsed Byrnes's negotiating strategy. Liberal journals like the Nation and New Republic, which continued to regard accommodation with the Soviet Union as the best hope for peace, applauded Byrnes's patient negotiations. Influential anti-Communist periodicals praised his refusal to back down before Soviet demands.36 Byrnes returned to Paris for the second CFM session, determined to break the East-West deadlock and convene a peace conference. If the negotiations failed again, American public support would certainly evaporate and the chances of a United States-Soviet war would greatly increase. Byrnes secured presidential approval for a fall-back position on Trieste. The United States would initially insist that Italy retain control of the port city, but if the Soviet Union continued to resist, it would agree to the creation of an independent administration under United Nations supervision. American officials realized that a cooling off of nationalistic passions on both sides would have to precede the final settlement of the Trieste question. Moreover, delay favored the efforts of the Italian majority within the city to regain their dominant position from well-organized Yugoslav nationalists. The United States was also willing to make limited concessions on the reparations issue.37 The second session of the CFM (15 June-12 July 1946) initially seemed doomed to repeat the deadlock of the first. Noting the tense situation in Italy following the referendum and subsequent departure of King Umberto into exile, Molotov proposed that the CFM investigate the Italian political situation. The Americans and British wanted no Soviet-sponsored intervention in Italy's internal affairs, a time-consuming and dangerous precedent, and placed the Molotov suggestion at the end of the agenda, where it quietly died. After almost a week of fruitless negotiations, Byrnes again proposed informal and restricted meetings. At the first informal meeting, the four foreign ministers agreed to a United States proposal for a one-year moratorium on the colonial issue and a special study by a group representing the four powers. A second

200 RECONSTRUCTION

informal meeting on Trieste deadlocked. The negotiations over the distribution of the Italian navy also stalled when the Soviets demanded the best Italian fleet unik3* On 22 June 1946, a series of developments opened the way for resolution of the outstanding differences among the Allies and for convening the peace conference. Count Niccold Carandini, the Italian representative in Britain, informed Byrnes that Italy was willing to make reparations deliveries from its current production if the Soviet Union provided the raw materials. The same day the French reported that the Soviets were willing to accept an international regime in Trieste as a last resort3' On 24 June, Byrnes suggested compromise on the French plan for Trieste. Molotov proposed an international trusteeship for Trieste, with a Yugoslav government responsible to the four powers. Byrnes rejected this idea and again suggested the French plan. Molotov then offered a new variant: a joint Yugoslav-Italian government. Byrnes turned this plan down. At the formal session that same day, the foreign ministers came to an agreement in principle on a French plan for the allotment of Italian ships.40 At the informal session two days later, Molotov again presented the Soviet plan for placing Trieste under a Yugoslav governor with four-power supervision. The United States and Britain immediately rejected the plan. The folloviing day Molotov ended months of procrastination by agreeing to return the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. A startled Byrnes realized the Soviet foreign minister was signaling his government's intention to resolve the larger issues of the Italian peace treaty.41 On 30 June 1946, the Soviet foreign minister announced that the USSR would accept a French plan as the basis of an internationalized settlement of the future of Trieste. The Soviets also offered a slightly modified proposal on reparations, which the Americans reje~ted.~' At the formal CFM meeting on 1 July, the foreign ministers inched closer to settling the Italian-Yugoslav border and the status of Trieste. They reached a compromise on 4 July that established a Free Temtory of Trieste under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and set the Italian-Yugoslav border along the French line.43 The foreign ministers reached a basic agreement on reparations the same day. The Italians would pay $100 million in reparations to the USSR over a seven-year period commencing when the peace treaty came into force. The Italians would turn over their war plants, together with their Balkan assets, and would cover the rest of their reparations bill through current production, with the Soviets supplying the raw materials. The claims of the smaller states


against Italy would be settled at the peace conference. At the end of an informal meeting that evening, Molotov agreed to summon the peace conference for 29 July 1946."" Byrnes had the outline of an Italian peace treaty. The conference turned to discussions of the other satellite treaties and concluded its work on 12 July. Byrnes flew home to defend his settlement. News of the settlement left Byrnes and the administration with few supporters. The Italian government protested every compromise. The Italy lobby joined in each protest. Added to the vehemence of their protests were the conservative press attacks on the secretary of state's diplomacy as a "sellout" to the Soviet Union. Ironically, the liberal press, which usually supported Byrnes's cabinet rival, Henry Wallace, gave Byrnes limited backing.45 Byrnes's report of the deals struck at Paris was pessimistic and defensive. The United States, he admitted, had an imperfect peace, but, he argued, it was the best that could be n e g ~ t i a t e d . ~ ~ Byrnes's treaty, as well as his negotiating tactics, did win the grudging endorsement of the moderate and conservative press. A Life editorial praised his "patience" and "firmness" with the Soviets. The New York Times agreed with Byrnes that the treaty was probably the best anyone could get and urged its ratifi~ation.~~ Mass demonstrations and press denunciations of an unjust diktat (dictated peace) expressed popular reaction to the treaty in Italy. In the United States, the Italy lobby geared up in an attempt to defeat the treaty. Influential proItalian columnists like Ann O'Hare McCormick and former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles damned the treaty as an improvised grab bag of injustices. Pope Pius XI1 urged a just peace for Italy, implying that the CFM's compromise did not meet that criterion. The Italian-American press ceaselessly attacked the draft treaty. The Italian-American leadership organized a committee of prominent spokesmen chaired by Charles Poletti, to go to Paris and plead Italy's case at the peace conference. Italian-American leaders hoped to line up the Latin American and northern European small states against the treaty and eventually to force the United States to renounce its handiwork.48 The inability of American diplomacy to win a mild peace settlement was a serious blow to De Gasperi, who had committed his government, his party, and himself to a pro-American foreign policy. The peace conference provided the Italians with a last opportunity to reverse the decisions of the Great Powers. They organized an intensive lobbying campaign in Paris led by De Gasperi and the Socialist party leader Pietro Nenni. At the end of August 1946, Nenni, the Italian foreign minister-designate, appealed to northern Europe to support


Italy's modifications of the treaty. Although a number of European leaders expressed sympathy for Italy's plight, few went beyond general expressions of pro-Italian feeling.49The Italian delegation in Paris continued intense private discussions with all the delegations to the peace conference. On 10 August 1946, De Gasperi delivered a moving and reasoned plea for a more equitable settlement to a silent and hostile peace conference. Bymes retrieved the day for the United States and the Italian prime minister by rising and warmly shaking De Gasperi's hand as he left the silent hall. American strategy consisted of psychological gestures and defense of the existing settlement. In meetings with De Gasperi and other Italian officials, the secretary of state agreed to support most of the specific Italian modifications but warned them that the suggestions had little chance for adoption. The best Byrnes could achieve was limiting the size of the reparations claims made by the small states. While the Italians, with American backing, secured some minor modifications of the draft treaty, the Soviet Union vetoed any major changes.50 The Italians had a role in some of their defeats. When they sought modifications of the treaty's preamble, Italian representatives stressed their contributions to the war effort and implied that two Allied states, Holland and Belgium, had done much less for the common cause. Both states voted against Italian proposals. The Italy lobby mission to Paris was ineffective. Poletti got sidetracked on private business. Antonini's tactics antagonized Bymes. The Italian-American representatives made little impression on other delegations. Bymes fumed privately over the efforts of Italian-Americans to secure justice for their ancestral land by upsetting his delicately balanced peace ~ettlement.~' In spite of these setbacks, the Italian government scored a few successes. The most notable was the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement of 9 September 1946, which was included as an annex to the treaty. Under this agreement Italy retained the Alto-Adige, with its important hydroelectric power stations and strztegic frontier, by agreeing to grant the region local autonomy and accord equality in cultural, economic, and political rights to its German-speaking majority. Italy also reached a bilateral settlement of Egypt's reparations claims. The treaty's preamble was rewritten in response to Italian pressures. Most importantly, the treaty put off but did not foreclose the eventual retention of Trieste, or an Italian mandate in its pre-Fascist colonies.52 Still, Italy suffered fairly extensive losses of wealth, territories, and prestige. Moreover, the losses were strung out over the summer and intermixed with small victories. The effect was to raise and then dash Italian hopes repeatedly.53

RECONSTRUCTION STALLS 203 The peace conference's formal meetings were a series of clashes between East and West. Because the CFM draft treaty met their needs, the Soviets were intransigent on almost every point of substance. The Yugoslavs were even more troublesome. They bitterly attacked the Free Territory of Trieste provision. During the conference, Yugoslav fighter planes twice attacked unarmed United States transport aircraft that strayed into Yugoslavia's airspace. Five Americans were killed in the second incident. Eventually the Soviets had to restrain their comrades.54 The peace conference finally concluded on 15 October 1946, endorsing the CFM draft and leaving final negotiations on the treaty to a CFM meeting in New York. While the Italian bid for a more equitable peace failed, the major casuaIty of the conference was Byrnes's strategy of negotiation. The New Republic, which strongly favored American-Soviet cooperation, noted that confrontations between East and West broke out all over the world while Byrnes and Molotov haggled over the small print of the Italian treaty. A widening press consensus challenged Byrnes's negotiating approach by pointing to the inability of the Paris meetings and the CFM to achieve a just peace. Inside the Tmman administration, the peace negotiations became proof of aggressive Soviet intentions. In a September 1946 memorandum to Truman, Clark Clifford, the president's special assistant, warned that the Soviets were delaying negotiations while cementing their control over Eastern Europe. Clifford believed that Soviet demands for Italian and German ships were part of a program to build up the USSR's offensive ~apabilities.~~ When Wallace publicly criticized Byrnes's policies, in a September 1946 speech, questioning the "get tough" approach to the Soviets' foreign policy, he forced a showdown within the cabinet, which the secretary of state won. Truman demanded Wallace's resignation as commerce secretary. However, Byrnes's victory was Pyrrhic. Wallace was one of the few members of Tmman's administration who could be counted on to support continued negotiations with the Soviets. Surrounded by hardliners within his own department and the administration, increasingly isolated and bewildered by the inability of the Soviets to make even the most minimal concessions to promote international cooperation, Byrnes turned to the final stages of negotiations with his political capital nearly exhausted. The CFM met for one last grueling negotiating session in New York (4 November-12 December 1946). The final session commenced with an articleby-article review of the treaty. Early in December, the Soviets demanded revisions in the Yugoslav-Italian settlement. Bymes stood firm. He called Molotov to a private meeting and told him that unless the Soviets abided by


their earlier deal, there would be no treaty. Molotov, who was certainly aware of the anti-Soviet and antitreaty sentiment in the United States, fell into line and work on the treaty was completed. At American insistence, the final draft included a codicil that excluded any nation that refused to sign it from the benefits of the treaty, a pointed warning to the Yugoslavs to abide by international law. Bymes, who had become an expert in Soviet negotiating styles, thereafter avoided any private meetings with ~ o i o t o v . ~ ~ The Italian peace treaty, as finally completed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, limited Italy's armed forces to three hundred thousand men and set a total reparations bill of $360 million. The independence of Albania and Ethiopia were reaffirmed, and Italy renounced its rights to all its colonies and surrendered Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. The Italians ceded a small amount of temtory to France and accepted serious frontier modifications in favor of Yugoslavia. Trieste became a Free Territory, divided between Anglo-American and Yugoslav military administrations pending a final settlement. The Italians also surrendered most of their fleet to the victorious Allied powers. The CFM finished work on the satellite treaties on 12 December 1946. Bymes, psychologically and physically exhausted, resigned in January 1947. He had carried the negotiations over an Italian treaty to completion with a combination of patience, finesse, and realism. Unfortunately for Byrnes, the prevailing domestic and foreign policy currents changed direction during the negotiations and his achievement was not appreciated. Byrnes had gained basic American policy objectives. Italy was freed from the impediments of the armistice and from the possibility of legal Soviet intervention. The bill for reparations was well within the Italian ability to pay and was so structured that the exactions had no appreciable effect on Italy's economy. Italy lost its economically draining colonial empire and imperial pretensions. Later American support for Italian mandates in the pre-Fascist colonies allowed the Italians to save their wounded national pride while improving relations between the two states. Treaty limits on the size of Italian defense forces and equipment kept the costs of armaments from straining Italy's economy during the critical first years of reconstruction and at the same time provided Italy with sufficient internal security. Even the postponement of a final decision on Trieste proved a blessing in disguise for the Italians. Handing Trieste over to a weakened Italy in 1947 was an invitation to a Yugoslav invasion and a potential confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within two years, however, the Yugoslavs and Soviets were enemies. In 1954, a negotiated settlement returned Trieste to Italy with the approval of Yugoslavia. Finally, Italy's


territorial losses, although painful, did not seriously impair Italian territorial integrity or defensive capabilities.

Economic Stagnation The continuing failure of Italy's economy to recover threatened to neutralize the successes of American political reconstruction programs and the conclusion of a nonpunitive peace treaty. Italy was a prime example of the ineffectiveness of United States economic plans. The campaign to provide Italy with continuing aid was fought on two major fronts by State Department officials. Within the government, they contended with the Department of Agriculture and the powerful interagency National Advisory Committee on International Monetary and Financial Policy (NAC). Simultaneously, department planners sought to convince a skeptical Congress that Italy's needs were immediate. These efforts received support from Italian-Americans and from the Italy lobby. The British government, however, continued to view Washington's economic intervention in Italy with hostility and suspicion. British officials in Italy sought to divert scarce civilian supplies to the rebuilding of Italian internal security forces, a policy more likely to provoke social revolution than to reinforce the ability of the Italian state to defend itself.57 The State Department's immediate problem was prying appropriate funds out of the National Advisory Committee and giving the Italian government greater control over its own economic affairs together with a role in the reorganized economic system. The United States supported Italian membership in the new United Nations Economic and Social Committee, in the International Coal Organization, as well as in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Allies turned over control of all currency within Italy to the Italian government and restored all the property seized by German occupation forces. An agreement between the United States and Italian government over the lire/dollar exchange rate was followed by the resumption of private trade to Italy. The United States also sought to coordinate their advisory programs for Italy's economy and recovery with the United Kingdom, while taking a strong stand against the extraction of large reparations from Italy at the CFM peace talks. These actions provided Italy only limited material aid, but gave it useful moral support.58 Such actions were no substitute for large grants and loans. Throughout the spring and summer of 1946, the State Department struggled to win the release of appropriated funds from NAC. This interagency committee of government

206 RECONSTRUCTION

bankers was wary of granting Italian loans. Italy's political instability made it a bad credit risk. NAC members initially opposed United States support for Italy's membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. On 3 March 1946, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton requested clearance for a $150 million Export-Import Bank loan to Italy from NAC. Clayton also requested the immediate release of $120 million held in a Treasury suspense account to recompense the Italian government for support services it provided to Allied military operations. Representatives af the Export-Import Bank and the Treasury objected to loans for an unstable Italy. Clayton responded that Italy required a "political loan" and assured NAC members that more such loans would follow in the pursuit of United States objectives abroad. NAC's bankers overcame their scruples far enough to approve the release of the Treasury suspense account. Within a month the Export-Import Bank finally released the $25 million loan for cotton purchases that Clayton had requested in November 1 9 4 5 . ~ ~ While the Italian government was grateful, it insisted that the sum was inadequate to meet its needs. On 7 March 1946, Tarchiani officially requested an Export-Import Bank loan of $950 million. H. Freeman Matthews, the Director of the Division of European Affairs, tactfully told Tarchiani that while the State Department sympathized with Italian needs it could not control the decision on aid to Italy. Tarchiani then met with Truman to urge presidential intervention in support of the $300 million in grants and loans pending before the NAC. The president was sympathetic, but made no commitment^.^^ Without presidential action, the Italian loan remained stalled within NAC. On 20 March 1946, the Committee postponed consideration of the loan and required a study by the State, War, and Treasury departments to determine if the Treasury suspense fund could be turned over to Italy. The State Department responded forcefully to these delaying tactics. At the 5-6 April meeting of NAC's staff, Clayton's Special Assistant Emilio Collado informed the Committee's economists that the secretary of state wanted their approval for release of the suspense funds within ten days. At its next meeting on 11-12 April, NAC staff approved a recommendation on Italy, which stressed that release of the suspense fund was not an alternative to an Export-Import Bank loan. NAC approved the transfer of the suspense fund at its 19 April meeting. It deferred action on the Export-Import Bank loan again after the bank reported its existing funds were already ~ommitted.~' Italy's economic and political situation remained highly unstable. Despite growing industrial production, critical food shortages remained. Clashes erupted between the UNRRA's Italian mission and the conservative econo-


mists and industrialists who were masterminding Italian reconstruction planning over the mechanics of rehabilitating Italy. The UNRRA mission to Italy was a refuge for a forlorn band of American liberals who hoped to implement the social philosophy of the New Deal in the reconstruction of Italy. Opposed not only by powerful Italian conservatives but by their own superiors, the liberals were unable to enact any serious reform. The actions of Italy's UNRRA mission were a political liability for the international relief program.62 The Truman administration was looking without success for another approach to the economic reconstruction problem. The government was committed to using the newly created international banking system to meet the world economic crisis. Due to shortages of money and personnel, the banks did not begin operations until 1947, and, once they began to function, they were unable to cope with the magnitude of the crisis. In addition, they quickly developed many of the same political liabilities that plagued UNRRA. In spite of a preponderance of American money and American personnel within these institutions, their lending policies required the agreement of a number of foreign nations that were in open conflict with the United States. The conservative majority in Congress tended to regard the banks as an extension of American diplomatic machine~yand was correspondingly angered whenever the banks failed to promote national objective^.^^ The Truman administration quickly discovered that trying to utilize either UNRRA or the international banks to deal with pressing problems was a frustrating and ultimately unrewarding effort. First, the administration had to squeeze funds for international reconstruction out of a reluctant Congress. Next, it had to go through an equally time-consuming process of negotiations to get the banks to appropriate these funds for the reconstruction projects it was supporting. The limited political gains of international cooperation were more than offset by domestic political losses. Italy was an example of the limits of international reconstruction efforts. Even if Italy became a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, it would have to wait its turn for a limited share of the bank's funds. The experience of UNRRA's Italian mission indicated the likelihood of serious clashes over utilization of money between the Italian government and the lending agency. The United States, however, lacked an alternative program. The American government had tied itself in knots over a relatively small Export-Import Bank loan. The National Advisory Committee was not responsive to the repeatedly pressed political objectives of the Department of State. Neither the department


nor any other agency with responsibilities for foreign economic policy had a clear program for dealing with the large foreign economic crisis. In mid-1946, the State Department began putting together a 1947 Italian aid package, which-like its predecessors for 1945 and 1946-was a jerry-built structure of grants and loans without any promise of dealing with the root causes of the economic crisis. The first element in the 1947 program was the long-delayed Export-Import Bank loan to Italy. On 2 May 1946, Secretary of State Bymes, in Paris, ordered the department to secure NAC approval of the loan as quickly as possible. Clayton offered a new proposal to NAC. The department asked the committee to approve a $100 million loan to the Italians, with the understanding that a further $50 million would be made available when the ExportImport Bank had sufficient funds to cover it. NAC members immediately objected. The Soviet Union was demanding large reparations from Italy for itself and a number of smaller victims of Fascist aggression. NAC members raised the post-World War I precedent of American aid to Germany and insisted on guarantees that American economic assistance to Italy would not be recycled to pay off reparations to the USSR. They also wanted the Depattment of State to secure French and British renunciation of their claims against Italy. Economic aid for Italy was once again stalled.64 The department had no greater success with Congress. On 10 May 1946, Clayton and Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson met with members of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives to secure their approval for the transfer of nontroop pay credits to ItaIy and to sound out the congresspersons on further grants. Committee members were hostile, pointing to Italy's role in the war. They believed in aiding Italy through loans rather than grants. Italian reconstruction reached another dead end.65 Rebuffed by Congress, Clayton returned to NAC to win approval for the Export-Import Bank loan. After recounting his troubles with Congress, he informed the committee that Bymes was setting a $100 million maximum on reparations payments from Italy, and that this money would be taken from overseas Italian assets, factories producing military equipment, and Italian shipping. When Marriner Eccles of the Federal Reserve noted Italy's desperate need for shipping, Clayton replied that the United States could meet this from its surplus merchant fleet. The assistant secretary of state insisted the committee act without awaiting final word on the British and French position on Italian reparations. Three days later, Clayton reported that the British and French would probably renounce their reparations claims. This still failed to satisfy NAC members, who withheld approval for the loan until they had a definite French and British ~ o m m i t m e n t . ~ ~


NAC's continued inaction was driving Italian representatives in the United States into a near panic. Tarchiani and Ercoli Scozzi, the Italian president of the American Chamber of Commerce for Trade with Italy, warned of disastrous political consequences unless aid was immediately forthcoming. Tarchiani predicted the left wing would win victory in the constituent assembly vote on 2 June 1946 and suggested that the United States issue a statement hinting at large-scale aid. Clayton de~lined.~' Italian warnings were more than scare tactics designed to aid centrist politicians. Italy's economy continued to live on the edge of disaster. Chief Commissioner Stone reported on 24 May 1946 that the Italian government would have to cut the daily grain ration within days of the elections because UNRRA was unable to deliver its food commitments. Without prompt action, Italy would exhaust its grain reserve by midJune. The Italians were also using up their troop-pay and UNRRA credits at a faster-than-expected rate and stood to lose about $70 million in UNRRA aid due to procedural errors. Without the nontroop pay credits and Export-Import Bank loan, the Italian economy would run out of foreign exchange before the end of 1946. Even with this additional aid, Italy would require an estimated $400 million in aid just to maintain its slow economic growth in 1947.68 While quick attention by United States and UNRRA officials insured that limited funds and food supplies would be available to Italy until 31 December 1946, Italy's weakened economy would plunge into chaos without additional aid. Harry Truman indirectly aided the effort to keep Italy afloat. The Truman administration, and especially the president, kept the troubling world economic situation constantly in front of the American public. Truman insisted that the United States assist war-ravaged nations, backed the politically unpopular loan to Britain, called upon Americans to cut back on their food consumption, and, through initiatives like the Hoover Food Mission, publicized Europe's economic situation.69 By the summer of 1946, the administration's repeated emphasis on the economic and political interdependenceof the United States and Europe began to bear fruit. A broad segment of the press took up Truman's call for largescale immediate aid while castigating the president for his inability to meet the crisis. Italy, with one of the most critical economic situations, received considerable editorial attention. The Italy lobby picked up some important congressional converts. Efforts to find businessmen willing to invest in Italy were less successful, but a few adventurous firms showed interest. Automatic Electric of Chicago joined International Telephone and Telegraph in the race for a share of Italy's telephone industry. American tobacco growers wanted part of the Italian market. Aided by these domestic pressures, a growing congressional respon-


siveness to geopolitical arguments about the value of Italy to the United States, and the State Department's efforts to line up support within other agencies, Clayton finally won House approval for the Italian loan on 25 July 1946.70 A few days later NAC approved the sale of United States surplus merchant ships to Italy on terms that minimized the impact on Italy's limited foreign exchange reserves. Within a month, NAC agreed, with a few reservations, to support Italy's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In October 1946, the department was able to announce that $50 million in nontroop pay credits were being turned over immediately to Italy. Following Roosevelt's precedent, the administration waited until Columbus Day to announce this grant in order to influence the Italian-American vote in the November 1946 congressional elections. In keeping with its wellestablished role of stumbling block to aid for Italy, the War Department then held up implementation of payment until after the ele~tion.~' Italian-American voters showed the same disdain for this clumsy political tactic as they had in 1942 and 1944 and joined the national majority, which returned a Republican Congress for the first time since 1928. The last act of the 1946 struggle to secure aid for Italy was played out on 7 November 1946, when NAC staff reluctantly recommended approval of a $100 million Export-Import Bank loan to the corn~nittee.~~ A full $150 million loan was by now the keystone of the 1947 aid plans far Italy. Additional bank loans were unlikely, and the Department of State hoped to supplement these funds with the remaining nontroop pay funds and a postUNRRA grant from Congress. The State Department wanted the Italian government to play a more active role in securing further aid and warned Tarchiani that Italy must improve its factual presentations. Meanwhile, American officials tried to expand Italian trade with the United States occupation zone in Germany and to assure increased food assistance for ~taly.'~ At the end of 1946, Italy was on the verge of economic and political collapse, The growing strength of the well organized Italian Communist party and its ally, the militant Italian Socialist party, raised the specter of a radical pro-Soviet government taking power in Italy with disastrous effects on the stability of Europe. In 1947, the Truman administration again tried to meet the Italian crisis with a series of improvisations. This time, however, the improvisations worked.

Part IV Stabilization

Crisis and Intervention The Reorientation of American Policy, January 19474pril1948

In January 1947, the American settlement in Italy was unraveling. The political reconstruction was being undercut because Italy's economy was unable to provide employment and essential goods and services. The peace treaty was purchased at a high cost in American prestige and Italian amourpropre. At home, the Italy lobby was disenchanted with Truman and his policies and threatened to bolt to the Republicans, while liberal opposition to Truman was crystallizing around Henry A. Wallace. Within sixteen months, the Italian situation was reversed and Italy's proAmerican orientation was triumphantly asserted. The United States met the economic crisis with a dramatic program of European reconstruction. The Italian Communist party's (PCI) bid for power failed. The Italy lobby joined forces with the administration, and the Italian-American vote was within Truman's grasp. This dramatic reversal of American fortunes followed the adoption of new programs and new tactics. The stated goals of American policy remained constant: stability through democracy, free trade, and peace. However, United States tactics radically altered the meaning of these concepts. Democratic state building gave way to an anti-Communist crusade throughout the American sphere of influence. The United States committed itself fully to an alliance with De Gasperi, the Christian Democratic party, and the Roman Catholic church. In spite of American efforts to steer De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats toward a reform coalition with the moderate left, the new alliance carried the United States into deeper commitments with the Italian right, which opposed American reformist objectives. Italian society was polar-

214 STABILIZATION

ized along class lines. American policymakers fanned anticommunism at home and abroad, which undercut effective reforms in Italy.

Elements of the Crisis The most pressing and severe threat to American interests in Italy was economic. By January 1947, most of the aid programs-UNRRA, troop pay, nontroop pay-that kept the Italian economy afloat were nearing their termination, but Italy had not reached an adequate level of production and employment. The United States had no plans for a successor program and indeed only the vaguest notions of how the post-UNRRA needs of Italy and other states could be met. Fiorello La Guardia, the new director general of UNRRA, warned that the termination of UNRRA aid could mean the end of democratic government in Italy and other war-ravaged areas.' De Gasperi agreed. In an interview with the New York Times, he put an $880 million price tag on Italy's 1947 aid package. American estimates were considerably lower, but officials agreed that even with $100 million loans from the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank, Italy required nearly $250 million in additional aid to cover its 1947 balance of paymenk2 Aid could only partially meet Italian needs. Grants and loans enabled the Italians to bid on equal terms for a share of finished commodities and raw materials. However, even with American aid, the Italians were hard-pressed to acquire coal, and money in itself could not cope with the political and economic disorganization that plagued Italy. In November 1946, De Gasperi telephoned La Guardia and pleaded for the shipment of an additional fifty thousand tons of wheat to stave off hunger and a potentially revolutionary situation. United States studies estimated that Italy required between 1.5 and 1.9 million tons of grain to carry it through to the June 1947 summer harvest. The U.S. Department of Agriculture opposed the Department of State's efforts to channel more of the small United States grain surplus to Italy. Myron Taylor, Truman's personal representative to the Vatican, had planned to close out American Relief for Italy's operations in 1947, but announced instead that the relief effort for Italy would be increa~ed.~ United States observers agreed that if the economic situation was mastered, the political threat from the left could be surmounted. Meanwhile, the political power of both the far left and the far right continued to grow. On the right, a mass movement, the Uomo Qualunque, was drawing together the discontented middle classes and sapping the political strength of the Christian Democrats

C R I S I S AND INTERVENTION 215

and Liberals. Although this movement was antiCommunist, it was also nostalgically philo-Fascist, and American officials watched its development with growing apprehension. Further to the right, 1946 witnessed the birth of the neo-Fascist 1talian Social Movement and of the right-wing terrorism, which have intermittently plagued I t a l ~ . ~ American concern with the threat from the left was much greater. In October 1946, the Socialists and Communists renewed their wartime unity-of-action pact. American officials concluded that Italian socialism was a front organization for the Communists and that a democratic concentration to the left of De Gasperi was impossible. A united PC1 and PSI ticket won the Rome city elections. The Christian Democrats were caught between the aggressive extremists of left and right and shouldering the major share of responsibility for both the Italian economic crisis and the unhappy peace negotiations. The beating that they absorbed in Rome appeared to foreshadow serious defeats in the parliamentary elections expected in the late spring of 1947.~ Reports that the USSR was providing the PC1 with covert arms shipments and funding underlined the threat to Italian democracy. A Joint Chiefs of Staff study concluded that, aided by a Communist-Socialist fifth column, invading Yugoslavian or Soviet troops would easily conquer Italy. Meanwhile, public opinion in the United States, aroused by the press and political opposition, demanded a firm stand against the Soviet ~ n i o n In .~ November 1946, public discontent with Truman's foreign policy played a role in a Republican election triumph that gave them control of both houses of Congress for the first time since 1930. A group of hard-line anti-Comrnunists-Richard Nixon, Harold Velde, William Jenner, William Knowland, John Bricker, and Joseph McCarthy-would give American domestic politics and foreign policy a new coloration. The Republican victory was a stunning challenge to the Truman administration. The president had to seize the initiative in both domestic and foreign affairs if he was to avoid defeat in the 1948 elections. Italy was one of the areas in which innovative action by the administration would bring large political benefits. The conservative and antiCommunist Italian-American vote was at stake.7

The De Gasperi Visit Shortly after the election, Walter Dowling, the State Department's Italian desk officer, assessed Italy's problems and prospects. Dowling

216 STABILIZATION warned that the economic situation and the shock of the peace treaty had created a backlash that the Communists might successfully exploit to win the national elections tentatively set for the spring of 1947. Dowling was confident, however, that the trends favoring the left could be reversed. The mass of Italians, he confidently (and correctly) asserted, were pro-American. Admitting that "the wops do feel we have let them down," especially on the peace treaty, Dowling predicted that wavering Italians could be won back by a judicious and sustained mixture of flattery, moral encouragement, and considerable material aid, "with an occasional word from the sponsors advertising the virtues of democracy, American style." Without being anti-Communist, this approach would be "so damned pro-Italian that even the dumbest wop would sense the drift," and by avoiding a direct confrontation between a foreign power and Italian Communists, would deprive the PC1 of a useful propaganda weapon. Dowling's specific recommendations included quick approval of the still pending Export-Import Bank loan, abolishing the Allied Commission, speedily withdrawing occupation troops, presenting Congress with a specific relief program for Italy (with accompanying publicity), and inviting De Gasperi and Nenni to Washington to show American interest in Italy and hopefully to knock off Nenni's ideological blinders.' The Truman administration took up the suggestion of a De Gasperi visit to bolster Italian democracy and to demonstrate its concern for Italy to ItalianAmerican voters. The De Gasperi visit was from its inception something of a gamble for both the United States and the Italian prime minister. Arranging moral support was an easy task, but providing concrete aid was difficult. State Department efforts to increase Italy's grain allotment were resisted by Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson, who argued that limited American surpluses could not be sent abroad. At one Cabinet meeting, he stated that the Italians were eating too much and should be forced to restrain their consumption. The Export-Import Bank loan, the centerpiece of material American support for De Gasperi, remained frozen in the National Advisory Committee with little prospect of an early release. The bankers continued to resist the department's program of "political loans." Another important Italian request, authority to purchase fifty more surplus Liberty ships at favorable terms, had to pass through the same gauntlet. Significant political concessions, such as changes in the terms of the peace treaty or Italian admission to the United Nations' international organizations, were unlikely since they required Soviet a p p r ~ v a l . ~ De Gasperi, on the other hand, had to return to Italy with some material aid. The prime minister was under mounting attack from left and right for his

CRISIS A N D INTERVENTION 217

government's inability to deal with the economic crisis. The Communists also claimed that De Gasperi had needlessly antagonized the Soviets at Paris and had lost any chance for a more equitable peace settlement by aligning Italy so firmly with the United States. The results of the peace negotiations, the left charged, proved that the United States was unable and unwilling to deliver on its commitments. A nonaligned policy would better serve Italy's interests and also prevent East-West tensions from spilling over and polarizing Italy's internal politics. lo Nevertheless, both parties were eager to take the political risks that a visit entailed. De Gasperi was searching for a firmer American commitment to his personal political fortunes and those of the Christian Democrat party. He also wanted recognition of Italian status as a full member of the reconstructed international community. Finally, an American trip would bolster his personal prestige. The Americans were anxious to back moderate political currents within Italy. They hoped to counteract the bad effects created by the peace settlement on Italian and Italian-Americanpublic opinion by a show of concern for Italy. De Gasperi left Rome for Washington on 3 January 1947 in a hail of publicity. Provisional President Enrico De Nicola, Supreme Allied Commander U.S. General William Lee, Allied Commission Chief Commissioner Ellery Stone, and U.S. ChargC David Key bid the prime minister farewell. After a harrowing, storm-buffeted air voyage, the exhausted Italian prime minister and his party finally arrived in Washington on 5 January 1947. Italy's requests fell into three general categories: immediate material aid (especially coal and grain), financial assistance (above all the Export-Import Bank loan), and political concessions (primarily United States backing for Italian membership in international organizations). The State Department hoped to provide quick assistance on the first and some progress on the second. In return for this aid, the Italians had little to offer save pledges of support for American international trade policies, which, as one Italian noted, favored Italy's immediate interests anyway. The Italians utilized the Communist peril as a tool to hasten concessions. State Department officials were unresponsive, but the Italian prime minister discovered that antiCommunist rhetoric struck a responsive chord among Republican congressional leaders, who surprisingly favored further aid for Italy.12 After wearying discussions, De Gasperi flew to Cleveland for a scheduled speech to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs, with very little to show for his visit. The National Advisory Committee still refused to release the $150 million loan. Truman had promised extra grain and coal, but the United States

2U) STABILIZATION

was short of shipping. Without immediate action this aid would not arrive in time to avert food shortages and possible starvation. United States and Italian negotiators were close to an agreement on an Italian request to purchase fifty Liberty ships at favorable terms, and the United States released an additional $50 million in nontroop pay credits to De Gasperi at a press conference on 8 January 1947. Negotiations to unlock the Export-Import Bank loan continued on the technical level between M i a n and American representatives. A discouraged De Gasperi told Tarchiani that he could not go back to Italy with these concessions. The Italian prime minister decided to return to Washington after visiting Cleveland and New York. l3 Italian and American officials designed the Cleveland and New York trips for maximum press exposure and impact on Italians and Italian-Americans. De Gasperi's Cleveland speech was the centerpiece of the conference and the type of public recognition of Italy's renewed role in world affairs that informed Italian public opinion craved. New York treated De Gasperi as a conquering hero. The city's political establishment, the Catholic church's hierarchy, and the entire range of Italian-American leadership turned out to toast democratic Italy and its prime minister. De Gasperi made a transatlantic broadcast to Italy and another special broadcast to Italian-Americans.14 De Gasperi's New York visit was a model of ethnic politics. Guided by the knowledgeable Tarchiani, De Gasperi had talked with Sons of Italy representatives in Washington and now met individually with all major Italian-American factional leaders. Tarchiani handed the arrangements for the prime minister's New York public appearances to Generoso Pope, whose communications empire, including an Italian-language radio station, gave the prime minister extensive and highly favorable coverage. Pope lost no opportunity to associate himself with De Gasperi and Italian democracy.15 On 14 January 1947, De Gasperi returned to Washington to assess the progress of Italo-American negotiations. The National Advisory Committee finally approved the elusive Export-Import Bank loan in principle, and State Department officials were confident that it would quickly accept the final wording for the loan agreement. Moreover, the Truman administration was ready to take dramatic action to improve the prime minister's domestic image. On 14 January 1947, the War Department announced that five grain supply ships en route to Germany were being diverted to Italy. The government also announced that two Italian transport ships seized in 1941 were being returned to Italy. l6 De Gasperi flew home on 15 January 1947, accompanied by more favorable news: public announcement of approval for the loan and for Italian purchase of fifty Liberty ships. Truman released a letter to President De Nicola promising

C R I S I S A N D I N T E R V E N T I O N 219

more American aid and stressing the United States' continuing interest and concern for Italy." The De Gasperi visit was a public relations triumph achieved without any major new American commitments. Antonio Pesanti, a leading Communist economist, commented that while the prime minister received little in the way of substantive concessions, the outpouring of Americans' pro-Italian sentiments was a reassurance that Italy badly needed. Particularly impressive were the favorable comments of a wide segment of the American press, which normally showed only a limited interest in Italy. Walter Lippmann devoted his column of 7 January I947 to the Italian prime minister's visit and endorsed providing "our friend" Italy with all the material aid it required. Significantly, Lippmann stressed the need for a European reconstruction program within which Italy would participate. The conservative Saturday Evening Post featured an article on Italy's plight, arguing forcefully for a major commitment of American aid.''

The Ratification Fight In spite of the success of De Gasperi's visit, the Truman administration was unable to rebuild its Italian-American support. The fight over United States ratification of the peace treaty embittered Italian-Americans, who argued that the treaty's territorial provisions and economic sanctions were unjust. De Gasperi, in contrast, was able to shift part of the burden of public resentment over the treaty to the parties of the left, avoiding any serious political damage to the Christian Democrats. The prime minister flew home to a mounting governmental crisis caused by a schism within the Italian Socialist party. After emerging as the largest mass party of the left in the June 1946 elections, the Socialists had fragmented. The party comprised two distinct currents: a social democratic minority and a more radical and intellectually incoherent majority. Pietro Nenni, who incarnated the intellectual confusion and radicalism of the left, presided over the party as its secretary. Although a skillful political tactician, Nenni was unable to conciliate the various currents of the majority with the social democrats. Moreover, Nenni was an orator of power who could never resist a bit of demagoguery. As a government minister, Nenni was prudent and restrained, but he was unwilling to commit the PSI to play within the bounds of the new democratic system. Nenni believed that the PSI must exploit any opportunity for a revolutionary transition to socialism and maintain the wartime unity-of-action pact with the PCI.'~

220 STABILIZATION The social democrats reacted to the October 1946 renewal of the unity-ofaction pact by breaking with the PSI at its national congress in Florence (January 1947) and forming the Socialist Labor party (PSLI), led by Giuseppe Saragat. In the United States, Luigi Antonini encouraged the split and poured AFL union money into the new party. No evidence exists of United States government involvement in the socialist schism. However, the appearance of the new party revived the flagging American vision of a democratic center-left coalition winning the working class to democracy through reform while isolating the Communists. American policy makers hoped for more defections from the PSI to the PSLI and an alliance of reformist Socialists and Republicans that would become the basis for an eventual governmental coalition with the Christian ~emocrats.'~ De Gasperi exploited the Socialist split to reorganize the government. When Nenni resigned as foreign minister, De Gasperi resigned as prime minister (20 January 1947). After a relatively brief governmental crisis, De Gasperi formed his third ministry on 2 February 1947. The new government was a coalition of Christian Democrats, Communists, and Socialists. Two influential independents, Luigi Einaudi and carlo Sfona, became ministers of the Treasury and Foreign Affairs respectively. In his first speech as foreign minister, Sfona told the constituent assembly that Italy must sign the treaty and liquidate its anomalous international status, The government stated that it would submit the signed treaty to the constituent assembly for final approval. De Gasperi argued persuasively that, in a democracy like Italy, responsibility for so momentous an action must be shared by the executive and the parliament. The Italian prime minister was determined to share responsibility for signing with his Communist and Socialist coalition partners and prevent the left from employing the treaty issue against the parties of the center and right." The Italian peace treaty was signed in Paris on 10 February 1947. De Gasperi informed the United States that he would submit the treaty to the costituente for approval after United States ratification. The Italian prime minister argued that Italy could not approve so punitive a document before the Great Powers who were imposing it had approved it. De Gasperi also calculated that moving slowly would allow the emotional reactions against the treaty to cool and the public relations efforts of pro-treaty forces to take effect." The Italian prime minister was aware of the storm of protest against the treaty in the United States and of the remote possibility of American rejection of the peace agreement. The American Senate's 1919 rejection of the Versailles treaty encouraged caution.


The Italy lobby in the United States was coordinating an impressive public relations campaign to defeat the treaty. The Italian-language press published almost daily denunciations of the treaty. Generoso Pope mounted an antitreaty campaign of an intensity unmatched since he supported Mussolini's Ethiopian adventures. Luigi Antonini rallied large segments of the union movement against the peace settlement. Common Cause, a new element in the Italy lobby, united the Italian-American leadership with a variety of internationalist liberals and conservatives in a public education campaign against the treaty. Influential Catholic publications also attacked the treaty, and the church's hierarchy appeared poised to join in the assault. On 10 February 1947, Common Cause issued a report by former Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, Jr., which charged that the treaty was harmful to both Italian and United States interests and urged the Senate to delay ratification. Berle suggested that, in place of the treaty, the Senate enact a law ending the state of war with Italy and putting into effect those articles of the treaty that would restore normal economic and commercial relations between the United States and Italy. A number of influential columnists, including Dorothy Thompson and Sumner Welles, endorsed Berle's proposal. Other groups rallied to the antitreaty position, including the American Socialist party, elements of organized labor, and Italian-American and Catholic fraternal organizations such as the Knights of Columbus and the Sons of Italy. Admiral Stone, now retired, joined the critics of the treaty.23 Even more threatening from the Truman administration's viewpoint was the alliance of these antitreaty groups with a number of prominent Republican politicians. New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, a Republican presidential aspirant, was an early and active opponent of Byrnes's negotiations and of the treaty. Senator Robert A. Taft, the other major Republican presidential prospect, announced in April 1947 that he supported delaying ratification. The battle over the Italian treaty threatened to further erode the president's already shrinking public support.24 The Truman administration responded that the Italian treaty was the best deal the United States could get and should be ratified immediately to remove the weight of the armistice from the Italians. Afterwards, the United States and Italy could cooperate to revise it. Administration spokesmen reminded opponents that renegotiating the pact with the Soviets would subject Italy to another drawn-out period of armistice control. In March 1947, Byrnes and the new secretary of state, George C. Marshall, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to reiterate the futility of reneg~tiation.~' The administration counted on Senators Vandenberg and Connally to guide

222 S T A B I L I Z A T I O N

the treaty rapidly through committee hearings and obtain quick Senate approval. However, the Italy lobby's activity forced Vandenberg to revise his plan for a one-day hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee. In view of the large number of opponents requesting to be heard and their massive press and letter-writing campaigns, Vandenberg postponed the hearing until Marshall returned from the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in late April. The administration planned to counter antitreaty arguments with its most influential spokesman.26 Hearings on the Italian treaty began on 30 April 1947. Byrnes testified first. He reviewed the major features of the agreement and assured the committee that the United States would not gain any further concessions from the

soviet^.'^ The treaty's opponents took up almost the entire hearing. Berle's presentation was listened to respectfully. Thereafter, however, questioning became rougher as an impatient Connally bored in on the weaknesses of the opponents' arguments. Although each opposition speaker was careful to praise the efforts of Byrnes, Connally, and Vandenberg, their attacks on the treaty were, in fact, attacks on the competence of the senators to protect America's national security interests. Connally was visibly irritated. Vandenberg masked his feelings but pushed the hearings along at a brisk pace. Byrnes's decision to associate the congressional leadership in the peace negotiations was paying major dividends.28 On 9 May 1947, the Foreign Relations Committee voted for ratification. The treaty, with Vandenberg as its floor manager, came before the Senate for debate and a vote in early June. With the administration urging immediate action, it won quick passage, despite the efforts of the Italy lobby. On 14 June 1947, the president hailed the treaty vote as a painful but necessary step. The administration had won the battle over the treaty with surprising ease. The key to its success was Vandenberg's and Connally's influence both in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Senate as a whole. Moreover, one of the major components of the Italy lobby sat out the treaty debate. The hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church decided to avoid a public clash with the Truman administration on this heavily charged issue. In spite of their reservations about the treaty, the church's leaders confined their lobbying efforts to economic aid for Italy, which they believed was the essential weapon for blunting the threat of a Communist takeover. Finally, the Italy lobby's alternative to ratification of the treaty was not convincing. Delay or rejection of the treaty simply meant putting off a settlement in Italy to an indefinite future. American-Soviet relations were deteriorating at a frightening speed, and few senators couId foresee when a better solution would be possible. Most senators


agreed with the administration: better a bad treaty that could be amended than no treaty.29 De Gasperi.also agreed that it was time to end the treaty problem. Shortly after ratification by the United States, he submitted the treaty to the constituent assembly for approval. After a heated debate, the costituente approved the treaty on 31 July 1947. Meanwhile, events in Italy were building to a direct confrontation between the United States and the Italian left. Each step that the Truman administration took toward deepening its intervention in Italy's affairs won the enthusiastic support of the key elements of the Italy lobby, Italian-Americans, and Roman Catholic leaders.

A Military or Economk Response? Italy was only one of a number of unstable states that Washington was trying to hold within the Western orbit through a combination of economic aid and political concessions. Each case was treated as a separate problem. Thus, no general approach to the European situation existed when Britain handed responsibility for the nascent civil war in Greece over to the United States in February 1947. The Greek crisis acted as a catalyst that unified American programs for European stabilization. Beginning in Greece the democratic state building characteristics of United States stabilization policies took second place to anti-Communism. Initially, the focus of American policies would be economic. However, the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 foreshadowed a switch in American priorities to mutual defense. Most of Truman's subsequent foreign policy initiatives were fathered or given workable form within the Department of State. There is no parallel in American history for so remarkable an outpouring of ideas and initiatives: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Point Four. Certainly the cautious and conservative Department of State was an unlikely agent for bold and innovative responses to a major domestic and foreign crisis. Yet for nearly two years the department's professionals provided both leadership and workable programs for a vast expansion of American influence throughout the world. Roosevelt's programs for democratic reconstruction were given a final form that would have startled their author. Stabilization became a program for conservative political reconstruction. Bymes's replacement in January 1947 by General George C. Marshall

224 STABILIZATION brought to the State Department both a heightened sense of mission and the tight, efficient organization that gave career diplomats a predominant voice in policymaking. The memoirs of senior officials of that era testify to the passionate loyalty that they felt toward the taciturn, austere, and remote general. The opportunity to find career and personal fulfillment through creating a new framework for American world predominance played an even greater role in creating this sense of mission.30 Late in 1946, historian Gaetano Salvemini acutely summed up the American dilemma. The United States, he wrote, had to find a way to provide economic aid to a large number of desperate nations in the face of growing domestic unrest over the costs of such aid and the unwillingness of American business to invest in states that lacked politically stable regimes. Salvemini might have added that conservatives generally opposed the use of govemmental grants to promote reconstruction, while many liberals were suspicious of "political" loans designed to prop up conservative regimes. The dominant right demanded exclusive American control of its aid programs and a quick and final conclusion of the entire foreign-aid effort.31 The president and his senior foreign policy advisors agreed with their conservative critics that the United States must have exclusive control over future aid. They recognized, however, that United States aid would have to continue for some time if European economic recovery was to take place. In his 6 January 1947 State of the Union speech and subsequent economic messages, Truman tried to educate the new Republican majority in Congress to international economic realities. The president noted that American prosperity was now tied to international commerce and the maintenance of existing levels of exports. If foreign markets collapsed, the nation would face the threat of another world depression.32 To meet the crisis, the president wanted to continue funding the international banks. He also requested a special and unspecified sum for post-UNRRA aid to a number of states including Italy. The administration promised to reorient the lending policies of the Export-Import Bank in order to aid American investment abroad.33 The vagueness of Truman's prescription confused Europeans. De Gasperi, who was in Washington when the president addressed Congress, tried without success to get more detailed information on the post-UNRRA grants. American officials had no information to give because they had no programs.34 The Greek crisis changed the Truman administration's approach to foreign aid. On 25 February 1947, Truman asked the Republican-dominated congress for a sizable post-UNRRA grant for a number of specific economic programs,


including aid to Italy. While adopting the politically popular line that the United States would have sole control over the allotment of aid, Truman and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clayton stressed the humanitarian considerations that motivated their request. The same day the president, Secretary Marshall, and Under Secretary of State Acheson met with the congressional leadership to discuss the situation in Greece. Acheson made an impassioned presentation of the dangers of the Greek crisis for United States national security. After eighteen months of pressure in Greece, Iran, and at the Turkish Straits, the USSR was in a position to break through into three continents. From Greece, Acheson warned, communism would push south into Africa, east into oil rich Iran, and west through Italy and France to the conquest of northern Europe. Only the United States could stop this penetration, the under secretary concluded, and Greece was the place to take a stand. Vandenberg told Truman, "Mr. President, if you will say that to the Congress and the country, I will support you and I believe most of its members will do the same." The administration held the key to achieving its foreign policy objectives. In the months that followed, the administration utilized anticommunism with dazzling success to improve America's world position and its own domestic political fortunes.35 On I2 March 1947, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress on the situation in Greece and Turkey. The president pointed to the economic roots of the Greek problem but laid his primary stress on the need to restore internal security against the threat of armed Communist terrorists. The United States would henceforth support "free peoples" resisting subjugation by "armed minorities" aided by "outside pressure."36 Truman's address succeeded brilliantly in its primary objective of rallying public and congressional support for aid for Greece. However, the economic content of Truman's proposal was overlooked. The media's concentration on the political and potential military aspects of the Truman Doctrine was natural. Truman was trying to sell the key notion behind American foreign policy-the use of economic aid to stabilize the American sphere-without a blueprint for employing the economic weapon. While planners in Washington were working to create a comprehensive program, Truman, Acheson, and finally Marshall tried to mobilize public support for the general concept of a major new economic aid program. Both the president and Acheson stressed the physical side of the European problem-"the hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos7'-that the war had created, which would have to be dealt with successfully if the United States was to ensure a peaceful world order. The American public, as Acheson later admitted, was indifferent to the administration's

228 STABILIZATION

logic, while the American right noisily demanded political action against c~mmunism.~' In Italy the Truman speech blew apart the uneasy truce between De Gasperi and the left. In February 1947, Ann O'Hare McCormick noted that the truce held because Italian moderates were unsure of the degree of American interest and wanted to avoid arousing the Soviets. The Truman Doctrine ended these doubts. Italy's Communists recognized that the Truman Doctrine was a declaration of war against both the Soviet Union and national Communist parties that would divide Europe into conflicting American and Soviet spheres of influence. De Gasperi, too, recognized that a new situation existed and on 7 April 1947 called Tarchiani back to Rome for consultations. The domestic political atmosphere rapidly deteriorated. While the Communists continued to cooperate with the Christian Democrats within the costituente on such potentially explosive issues as the inclusion of the Lateran Pact in the constitution, violence and disorder increased throughout the nation. After Communist and Socialist party leaders threatened to use force to gain their objectives, the moderate left and the industrialists of northern Italy prepared to counter a Communist-Socialist coup. Moderates believed that the PC1 was playing a "double game": lulling its opponents by its moderate behavior in the cabinet and costituente while arousing and disciplining the masses for a revolutionary seizure of power.38 Tarchiani arrived in Rome on 12 April 1947 in the midst of this tense political situation to report that the United States government was ready to aid Italy but that aid was conditioned on the creation of an efficient and "homogeneous" government in Rome. The Communists had to go if De Gasperi wished Washington's unconditional support.39 Tarchiani's analysis was correct. The Italian ambassador was, however, a few days ahead of his American interlocutors in arriving at these conclusions. As a result, the Italians and Americans acted more or less independently of each other, a situation that has contributed to a confused historiographical debate over which side initiated the ouster of the PC1 from Italy's government. Washington was studying the Italian situation as p& of a general review of American foreign economic policy. On 4 April 1947, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's ad hoc committee on Italy presented its conclusions. A draft report noted the continued political instability of Italy and recommended a "radical" revision of foreign economic policy to achieve political stabilization. The United States should shift the emphasis of its aid program from production for export to production for (and expansion of) the Italian internal market, greatly increase its aid by an additional $1 10 million in

CRISIS A N D I N T E R V E N T I O N 227 1947, and commit approximately $935 million to Italy by the end of 1949. Italy would have to alter its export program, adopt a consistent antiinflation program, and come up with a comprehensive reconstruction program in the face of strong opposition from Italian business. The ultimate objective of American and Italian programs should be flooding the Italian domestic market with cheap consumer goods. 'Ihming Italy into a consumer society would blunt the Communist threat and allow a stable democratic system to emerge. As Italy transformed itself into a consumer society, the United States would utilize economic aid, military assistance programs, and "timely" support for democratic forces to prevent a Communist putsch or victory at the polls.40 The committee's proposals reaffirmed the strategy that Dowling, State's Italian desk officer, outlined in November 1946 and added two important new ideas: use American economic aid to stimulate Italian consumerism, and prepare to intervene in Italy's domestic politics. The first proposal represented a striking departure from American tactics. The second proposal was a reversal of the entire Roosevelt strategy of stabilization: Since 1943, the United States had consistently resisted deepening its involvement in Italy's internal politics. The fundamental assumption of American leaders was that intervention defeated the objective of an independent, self-supporting Italy. By 1947, however, a growing consensus in Washington believed that a temporary intervention was necessary for Italy to survive the critical months until American economic aid programs took effect. Paradoxically, the decision to pursue a consumerist strategy in Europe represented a partial triumph for the ideas championed by Henry Wallace and other liberals since the early 1940s, and it allowed liberals to rally around the Truman foreign economic policy while opposing its blatant anti-Communism. It also brought into the foreign economic policy bureaucracy a group of skilled and experienced liberal economist^.^^ Anti-Communist intervention appealed strongly to conservatives who went along with reconstruction aid as part of an overall strategy for stopping Soviet expansion. The whole program appealed to Italian-Americans, whose national leaders endorsed both its anti-Communism and its emphasis on economic recon~truction.~~ The conclusions of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee were approved by the Department of State and forwarded to the embassy in Italy on 25 April 1947. In a comment on 7 May, the embassy detailed the major legal, economic, financial, and political impediments standing in the way of the program's implementation. The embassy concluded its analysis by warning that the program's success lay in the hands of an Italian ruling class that did not

228 STABILIZATION

have the necessary motivation or capacity to enact the far-ranging reforms that were a precondition for ~tabilization.~~ By the time the embassy's detailed response arrived, the United States was committing itself irrevocably to the Christian Democrats. The Department of State concluded that the time had arrived to form an anti-Communist government. Economic considerations took second place to pressing political realities. On 28 April 1947, Marshall reported to the American people that negotiations for a German peace treaty were stalemated. The secretary of state blamed the Soviets for the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow and charged that the USSR was deliberately obstructing peace talks in order to accelerate the destabilization of Europe. Time was running out, Marshall warned, and the United States would have to act alone.44 On 1 May 1947, the State Department asked Ambassador James C . Dunn whether De Gasperi could form a government without Communist participation to guide Italy through the national elections, which were tentatively set for the fall of 1947. De Gasperi, meanwhile, sent Truman a personal message on 28 April, requesting greater American aid and stating his willingness to broaden his coalition. De Gasperi did not suggest ousting the left but proposed to dilute its influence within his coalition. On 2 May 1947, Tarchiani visited the Department of State to ascertain American response to De Gasperi's proposal and to determine the extent of United States political and economic aid to a government with a more anti-Communist tone. The Americans were nonc~mmittal.~~ On 3 May 1947, Dunn reported that the Communists were carrying out a coordinated plan aimed at paralyzing the Italian government and blocking essential economic and financial reforms. The confidence of the Italian middle class was rapidly evaporating as a result of this stalemate and the lack of a firm anti-Communist stand by the United States. Time was running out, Dunn warned, but with quick and determined action, De Gasperi and the United States could reverse these unfavorable trends. As a first step, Dunn suggested that Marshall make a strong statement of American interest in Italy. Implicit in Dunn's analysis was the assumption that after De Gasperi forced the Communists out of his government, the United States would make a major commitment of additional aid to a new government.46 On 5 May 1947, Dunn met with De Gasperi. The prime minister explained his proposal for broadening the Italian government by including the small center-left parties (Republicans and Social Democrats). De Gasperi told Dunn that he had held exploratory talks with both Togliatti and Nenni on this idea. He ruled out forming a new government without the PCI. Dunn replied that


future aid depended on the Italians putting "their homes in order" and reiterated the United States' confidence in De Gasperi, a broad hint that the United States would provide new assistance to the prime minister if he drove the Communists out of his g~vernment.~' Two days later, Dunn analyzed the political crisis for the State Department. The ambassador insisted that Italy needed a new government that would act against the "special interests" represented by the Communists, and he suggested that the PC1 would voluntarily withdraw from a government that was prepared to impose a program of economic austerity.48 The next day, Marshall approved a policy statement on Italy that committed the United States to support a non-Communist government. Accepting Dunn's view that the stabilization of Italy was impossible as long as the PC1 remained in the government, the memorandum stated that the objective of the United States was the immediate formation of a non-Communist government capable of implementing reform while carrying Italy through national elections. To achieve this objective, the United States would assure De Gasperi of all possible support after he expelled the PC1 from his government: lining up British and French backing for the new government, concluding favorable trade and commerce agreements, increasing economic assistance, and making repeated public endorsements of De Gasperi's non-Communist government and Italy's national objective^.^^ De Gasperi resigned on 12 May 1947, apparently without knowing of the developments in Washington. The prime minister's move, combined with the simultaneous expulsion of the French Communist party from the Ramadier government, stunned the PCI. De Gasperi's coalition was working well, the Communists claimed, with both parties of the left supporting moderate and sensible reform while offering the Christian Democrats a government coalition that enjoyed the backing of most Italians. De Gasperi had brought the political situation to a crossroads. The prime minister, the PC1 journal Rinascitu warned, must now choose between a government based on the masses or a ministry that represented Italy's privileged minority.50 De Gasperi formed his fourth ministry, a minority government, on 30 May 1947, after the Republicans and Social Democrats refused to join the new government. The government had to rely on the votes of the neo-Fascists in parliament, a source of acute embarrassment to the United States and the Christian Democrats. American diplomats urged De Gasperi and the members of the Little Entente (Republicans and Social Democrats) to compromise their differences and form a center-left ministry with a social reform program. Meanwhile, the United States faithfully fulfilled its commitments to De Gas-

230 STABILIZATION

peri. On 2 June 1947, the Department of State released a special statement by Secretary of State Marshall, which welcomed the formation of the new govemment. This unusual act was a clear sign of the deep American commitment to an anti-Cornmunist political solution in Italy." On 5 June 1947, Marshall made a speech at Harvard, offering Europeans the opportunity to regain control of their national destinies through a cooperative program of economic reconstruction. The secretary of state stressed the humanitarian motivations behjnd American policy and carefully avoided connecting American aid to political alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, the immediate effect of this speech was to further strengthen De Gasperi's personal authority and reinforce his new government. The Italian government announced its support for the Marshall initiative and its eagerness to parti~ipate.'~ The Marshall speech was a political masterstroke. The decision to offer the European states the leading role in formulating the Marshall Plan rallied support for United States policies throughout Europe and enabled the administration to put part of the responsibility for fleshing out its policy on others. Marshall's insistence that pa$icipation in a European recovery program be open to all states and his stress on the humanitarian aspects of American aid won enthusiastic endorsement from American liberals. The Marshall Plan appeared to offer an alternative to the Truman Doctrine's policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Conservatives, too, were attracted to the Marshall Plan, which would rebuild Europe on the capitalist rather than the socialist Public support for the Marshall Plan, however, was not deep. Two months after Marshall's speech, the majority of Americans were unaware of his proposal. Opposition to the program grew as a dollar-and-cents proposal emerged. The strong midwestern isolationist current of the Republican party, led by Senator Taft, became increasingly vocal. The Truman administration faced a major task in building popular support for the Marshall Plan in a very short time. In a memorandum dated 27 May 1947, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Will Clayton warned that Europe's economies were careening toward disaster, with Italy leading the race toward bankruptcy. Without further infusions of aid, the Italians would run out of foreign exchange currency before the end of 1947. Ambassador Dunn cautioned that De Gasperi's minority government was extremely unstable and dependent on American support. If it collapsed, the Communists and Socialists would be in position to take control of 1taly:The United States was propping up the new government with a stream of small economic and political concessions that could not cope


with the magnitude of Italy's crisis. Both Dunn and the newly created Policy Planning Staff urged that the administration present a special program of economic aid for Italy to Congress immediately. The Policy Planning Staff suggested that the program be a sort of trial run for the Marshall Plan, with the United States offering Italy aid and the Italians responding with an overall reconstruction program.54 Clayton rejected this suggestion, warning that Congress would not fund a special relief program for Italy. The United States must rely upon the European leaders to sense the severity of their own plight and speedily draw up a workable program for reconstr~ction.~~ The first sessions of the Paris conference on the Marshall Plan gave the Truman administration and the De Gasperi regime a welcome propaganda victory. .The Soviets walked out and then forced the Czech govemment to follow their lead. The USSR's action was pure folly, putting the onus of the growing East-West division on them, while increasing support for the Marshall Plan within the United The Soviet walkout seriously embarrassed the PCI. They initially took a cautiously positive stand on the plan. They did not dare reject a program that offered large amounts of economic aid to Italy. On the other hand, they opposed efforts to tie Italy to America as the price of such aid. Soviet action put the PC1 in an extremely precarious position. The PC1 could not ignore or challenge the Soviet walkout because its psychological and financial dependence on Moscow was too great. On the other hand, the Communists wished to avoid a direct attack on the Marshall Plan.57 While the Communists wrestled with their problem, De Gasperi exploited the opportunities that progress in creating the Marshall Plan and Soviet errors had created. In coordination with Sforza, he attempted to establish an "atmosphere" that would encourage a "large American loan." Responding to American interest in free trade and European integration, the Italians initiated negotiations with France for a customs union. They lined up their American supporters in Congress and the Italy lobby to demand immediate action to aid Italy. The Italian prime minister renewed his efforts to broaden his government through an alliance with the Little Entente. In response to De Gasperi's requests, Under Secretary of State Clayton visited Rome for talks with Italian leaders and came away convinced that De Gasperi's govemment would cooperate loyally and efficiently with American economic and political reconstruction programs. Aligning himself publicly with the United States, the Italian prime minister charged that the Communists were undercutting the national economy through strikes and ~iolence.~'

232 STABILIZATION

In spite of De Gasperi's skillful opportunism, his personal popularity and that of his government were flagging by the end of the summer. In Paris, the Marshall Plan conference bogged down. The delegates, although eager to come up with a bold program, were economic technicians who lacked the independence to strike a deal. They constantly referred major issues to their governments, slowing the negotiations to a crawl and shifting press attention away from the Paris talks. By early September, American officials were discussing intervening to accelerate the talks.59 While hope faded for speedy relief through the Marshall Plan, Italy's economic crisis worsened. In September, Fortune,certainly no opponent of free enterprise, published a lengthy article on Italy, which pinpointed the cause of the nation's continued economic crisis: the laissez-faire economic policies of Finance Minister Luigi Einaudi. Planning and a controlled market ensured Britain's stability. The free market in Italy brought "rapacity and inequality," together with political instability. Inflation, a "flourishing" black market, and "rampant" corruption, combined with Communist subversion, left Italy's future in serious doubt. The United States, Fortune concluded, had to provide Italy with massive and immediate economic aid or surrender this strategic nation to c o m m u n i ~ r n . ~ ~ Tarchiani carried the same message to the State Department. On 28 August 1947, the Italian ambassador informed the department that Britain's decision to suspend the convertibility of its currency left the Italians without a major source of foreign exchange. As a result, the Italian government estimated that its balance of payments deficit for the last six months of 1947 would be $236 million. Italy would run out of coal at the end of September. Without coal, Italy's limited economic recovery would stop, and widespread unemployment would bring with it increased political instability. Tarchiani pleaded for irnrnediate American action.61 The Communists successfully exploited the chaos created by Einaudi economics to build opposition to the De Gasperi government. The PC1 was taking a more militant stand than at any time since the 1930s. In September 1947, Italian Communist leaders were summoned to a Soviet-sponsored conference of major Communist parties in Bialystok, Poland. The Yugoslavs and the Soviets dressed down the Italians and ordered them to take a more revolutionary line, unleashing an all-out battle against the Marshall Plan. Togliatti had to obey. The Soviets probably bankrolled his party, and they certainly had the unquestioning loyalty of large elements of the PCI's leadership and rank and file. Suspecting what would happen at Bialystok, Togliatti had already begun to attack the Marshall Plan concept. Strikes, small-scale violence, and

C R I S I S A N D INTERVENTION 233

inflammatory rhetoric increased. On 7 September, Togliatti reviewed a parade of thirty thousand Communist ex-partisans in Parma and threatened to employ them against the Italian government if the PCI's demands were not mete6' Togliatti's speech played into the hands of De Gasperi and those officials in the Tmman administration who wanted a clear anti-Communist orientation for American foreign policy. In June 1947, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, a hard-line anti-Communist, had discussed the possibility of a Communist coup in Italy with his senior military advisors. In August, the Central Intelligence Agency warned that the PC1 would use every available tactic to undermine the Marshall Plan. Togliatti's speech confirmed these prognostications.63 "The Alarm bell is ringing in Italy," Ann O'Hare McCormick warned in the New York Times.Togliatti, she added, was no firebrand. Any move he made to use force or even threaten its use was well thought out and approved by the Soviet Union. On 16 September 1947, Tarchiani met with Dowling and Acheson's successor, Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, to discuss Italy's economic and political situation. The PCI, Tarchiani warned, was committed to driving De Gasperi from power, and because it lacked the votes in parliament, it would probably resort to violence. The Italian ambassador raised the specter of a Communist insurrection in the north, supported and supplied by Yugoslavia and the USSR. All the powers had deposited the Italian peace treaty ratification on 15 September 1947, and the last Allied troops would withdraw from Italy by 14 December 1947. Tarchiani pointedly asked what sort of aid De Gasperi could count on in the event of an armed insurrection after that date.64 Tarchiani's message hit home with Lovett. On 18 September, he instructed the Policy Planning Staff to outline a response to a Communist takeover of north Italy. Four days later Lovett brought up the possibility of a Communist coup in a discussion with Defense Secretary Forrestal. The two men agreed to bring the issue before the newly created National Security C~uncil.~' On 24 September 1947, the Policy Planning Staff completed work on its contingency paper for Italy. The paper warned that the evidence that the PC1 was planning an insurrection was unconvincing, but sketched a highly believable scenario based on the assumption that insurrection would follow final Allied withdrawals from Italy.66 Armed with this scenario, Forrestal and Lovett brought up the Italian situation at the National Security Council meeting of 27 September 1947. The council approved their recommendation that it determine United States policy options in ~ t a l y Planning .~~ and intelligence groups throughout the United States government began studying an American response to a Communist-led

234 STABILIZATION

insurrection. The atmosphere of crisis grew as the date for final Allied withdrawal approached. Ironically, this crisis atmosphere existed initially only in Washington and was then transferred to Italy. De Gasperi insisted that he could face any political crisis as long as he could count on sufficient economic aid. Ambassador Dunn, who never underestimated either the power or the determination of the PCI, also believed that economic aid could master the Italian situation. On 19 September 1947, he informed the Department of State that Italy's internal security forces were capable of dealing with any attempted insurrection and expressed doubt that the PC1 contemplated a resort to armed force. This view was widely shared by Italians of all political viewpoints, as well as by senior American military personnel in ~ t a l y . ~ ~ American planners did not lose sight of the economic side of the Italian crisis. In fact, the threat of a Communist insurrection was a critical factor in the American decision to request congressional passage of an emergency interim aid package for Italy. Notwithstanding mounting evidence that Italy's economy was in a critical condition, the Truman administration had delayed acting because it wanted to present Congress with a single and "final" aid program for Europe based on recommendations of the Paris meeting on the Marshall proposals. In midSeptember, the gravity of Italy's economic crisis forced action, however. On 23 September 1947, Clayton recommended that Truman call a special session of Congress in November to deal with the rapid deterioration of the economies of France and Italy. Lovett brought the matter up at a cabinet meeting the next day. The president called a meeting for 29 September with the congressional leadership to deal with both the future of the Marshall Plan and to study "emergency action" to meet the crisis in Italy and France. Truman and Marshall told congressional leaders that unless $580 million in additional aid became available before the end of the year, Italy and France would fall to the Communists. Both indicated the need for a special session of Congress. The congressional leadership was not convinced, and Truman hesitated to call a special session.69 By September 1947, the theme of defeating communism through the Marshall Plan dominated administration rhetoric. The administration relied upon this hard line to prod a reluctant, conservative majority in Congress into quick action, but risked losing liberal support for the Marshall Plan. Liberals feared the Marshall Plan would be used to defeat democratic socialism and set East against West. Even the cautious Council on Foreign Relations doubted the utility of anticommunism in selling the Marshall Plan.70


After building up concern on both left and right about the crisis in Europe, the administration temporized for almost a month before calling a special session of Congress to deal with an interim aid program and inflation at home. In announcing his decision on 23 October 1947, Truman noted that the Italian situation was particularly perilous. During the previous four weeks evidence had mounted of the severity of the economic crisis in Italy and of the weakness of democratic forces. The Italians were short of food and black marketeering was rampant. The De Gasperi government could not pay for industrial and agricultural equipment or for food. The Italian balance of payments gap grew daily. On the other hand, the Italian electorate was not yet streaming into the hands of the Communists. The Marshall Plan and obvious American concern for Italy continued to have beneficial effects. In mid-October, the Christian Democrats gained ground in Rome municipal elections. The Truman administration believed that time favored American interests. If Italy's economy could be kept afloat until mid-1948, the Marshall Plan would begin operating and Communist influence would d e ~ l i n e . ~ ' On 24 October 1947, Truman went on national radio to explain his reasons for calling a special session of Congress. In this address and in a subsequent speech opening the special session, the president mixed humanitarian, strategic, and self-interest arguments to build congressional and public support for another grant of aid to Europe. Italy and France, Truman explained, were involved in an economic crisis that was not of their own making. Without immediate aid, both nations faced the prospect of starvation and political chaos. The United States must relieve the human suffering and check the spread of totalitariani~m.~~ Truman's statement was widely praised and set the stage for quick congressional action. The administration's sophisticated lobbying campaign for the Marshall Plan, which began in the spring of 1947, paid its first dividends. A series of fact-finding visits by congressional delegations convinced many conservatives of the need for the Marshall Plan and of the reliability of Western Europe's leaders. De Gasperi, who was very adept at courting congresspersons, made an especially favorable impact on the delegation that visited him. Aid to Italy could also count on the support of the two rival Republican leaders in the Senate, Vandenberg and Taft. Vandenberg's anticommunism and his personal involvement with the Italian peace treaty turned him into an advocate of both the Marshall Plan and interim aid. Taft was cautiously opposed to the Marshall Plan and searching for an alternative. Nevertheless, he redeemed earlier pledges of support for Italy by voting for the interim aid program.73

236 STABILIZATION

The Fall Crisis Interim aid cleared the Congress in four weeks. Its final passage on 14 December 1947 reinforced the administration's political campaign against communism abroad by providing concrete evidence of American concern for Italy. Italy's political situation had heated up after Rome's city elections in October. Communist-incited violence grew throughout October and November, reaching a peak in early December. While ostensibly defeating a Fascist revival abetted by De Gasperi, a Communist leader privately admitted the campaign's aim was to force De Gasperi to take them back into a coalition.74 The Communist strategy was badly conceived. It drove the Vatican and the United States into closer collaboration with De Gasperi and pushed the Little Entente into a government coalition that gave De Gasperi a parliamentary majority of the center-left. The strategy also encouraged further schisms within the Socialist party on the eve of national elections. This strategy was effectively dictated by the Cominform. Stalin had decreed total war against the Marshall Plan. Togliatti, however, realized that without American aid, Italy's economy would collapse, no matter who was in power. He wanted to re-enter the government on terms that would give the PC1 a say in the allocation of American aid. He tried to signal to the United States his party's willingness to play a cooperative role in the reconstruction process. However, the Americans were watching PC1 actions rather than listening to Togliatti's overture^.'^ These actions caused major disruptions within the already atomized Italian socialist movement. Shortly after the October 1947 city elections in Rome, U.S. Labor Attach6 John C. Adams counted nine separate socialist groupings. Elections and Communist violence further fragmented Italian socialism. Saragat's Social Democrats (PSLI) suffered defeat in the Rome vote and were interested in joining the De Gasperi coalition to recoup their loss through increased patronage. Like other socialist groups on the right, the PSLI was angered by leftist violence, which included attacks on its leaders and organizations, and was fearful of a coup attempt. The Social Democrats' decision was encouraged by the American government and the United States labor movement, the PSLI's major source of financing. Nenni's Socialists were strengthened by the Rome vote. This encouraged Nenni to pull the party to the left to claim a larger share of the working-class vote. However, every shift to the left brought with it the threat of further defections. Nenni, one leading socialist observed, was too ambitious ever to


allow the PSI to become a simple appendage of the PCI. The embassy agreed and advised Washington not to write off the PSI as a stabilizing factor, and to avoid moves that would drive the impetuous Nenni into closer collaboration with the ~ o m m u n i s t s . ~ ~ While solidifying De Gasperi's support on the moderate left, Communist tactics spurred the Vatican into deeper political commitments. In 1946, Vatican lay organizations, especially Catholic Action, had provided the Christian Democrats with the manpower and money needed to win the largest share of delegates to the constituent assembly. The Christian Democrats had remained weaker organizationallythan the two competing mass parties. The Vatican was cool both to democracy and to De Gasperi. However, Pope Pius XII's anticommunism far overrode his suspicions of democratic government and the Christian Democratic prime minister. As Communist violence increased, so did Catholic anti-Communist political action. In September 1947, Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster, acting as the Vatican's spokesman, warned Italian Catholics that it would be impossible to belong to the PC1 and remain within the church. This statement directly contradicted Togliatti's claims that the PC1 and the church could coexist. As the crisis atmosphere heightened, Catholic Action responded to the Pope's instructions and prepared to defend public order against left-wing violence. The Vatican encouraged the De Gasperi government to repress political ~iolence.'~ While encouraging these developments, the United States was preparing a strategy for dealing with a Communist revolt. Although the Policy Planning Staff advised against direct United States military intervention, the use of American forces was never completely ruled out, and American plans consistently included extensive military assistance to the Italian government. American planners realized that a number of situations would compel American military intervention. The conviction was growing that the critical point in the struggle between East and West had shifted from Germany to Italy.78 Policy Planning Staff recommendations were intently studied within the United States military and foreign policy bureaucracy. On 30 September 1947, an ad hoc committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee recommended a direct confrontation with Moscow over the PCI's activities. The committee cautioned, however, that the United States should act only if it was prepared to back its words with force. A War Department study more prudently suggested sending military advisors to Italy and increasing military aid together with intensive economic support.79 The United States had strengthened Italy's internal security forces by providing the Italian army with equipment in the custody of Allied Force Head-


quarters. By 1947 these supplies were nearly exhausted, however, and Italy's military forces needed a coordinated program of supply and training to maintain a credible deterrent to a leftist insurrection. In late September, the War Department secretly sent a small survey team to study the Italian internal security situation and to recommend a coordinated program of supply and training. The team, led by Colonel Charles Bathurst, recommended a major buildup of light arms and ammunition. Bathurst noted that some equipment could only be provided through congressional action. Ambassador Dunn opposed this suggestion, fearing the political and economic consequences of remilitarization programs.80 Although Dunn repeatedly insisted that a Communist insurrection was not imminent, Washington was taking no chances. On 13 November 1947, the Policy Planning Staff issued a gloomy forecast of future Soviet behavior. It ruled out Soviet military action but correctly forecast a Soviet crackdown in Eastern Europe and the destruction of democracy in Czechoslovakia. State Department planners also predicted that Stalin would soon order the Communist parties of Italy and France to turn to insurrection to defeat the Marshall Plan. Even though armed revolt would probably destroy both parties, Washington believed that Stalin had sufficient control and was reckless enough to initiate an insurrection in order to cripple Western Europe's economic recovery. The vision of a class war in Western Europe dominated the thinking in Washington throughout November and December. The likely Italian scenario was more troubling since it involved probable Yugoslav military intervention in support of the PC1 and an armed clash between Anglo-American and Yugoslav forces in Trieste. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was gathering information on Yugoslav support for PC1 paramilitary organizations. Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower recommended that the United States prepare lists of Italian agents who would assist American forces in the event of military interventi~n.~' Henry A. Wallace walked into this tense situation at the end of October. Truman's chief political rival was sidling toward outright opposition to the Marshall Plan, which he saw as dividing Europe and keeping corrupt and conservative European elites in power. In October 1947, the former vice president went to Europe to study the situation. The trip was one of a series of fiascos that effectively d&stroyedWallace's political base. Most Americans recoiled at Wallace's use of foreign platforms to attack Truman and American foreign policy. However, the domestic political benefits to Truman were balanced by the damage Wallace's statements could do to the image of American support for regimes like the De Gasperi


Wallace arrived in Rome on 31 October 1947 and received red-carpet treatment from the American embassy and the Italian government. In addition to a meeting with Dunn, he had a long interview with De Gasperi and an audience with Pope Pius XII. In his major public statement, Wallace assured Italians that the American people were solidly behind economic aid to Italy and world peace. He condemned the use of aid for political purposes and called on Italy to play a role in reknitting East-West cooperation. Wallace's statement received front-page coverage in the Communist press. On returning to the United States on 4 November, Wallace told newsmen he had seen no signs of United States embassy interference in Italy's affairs.84 Meanwhile, in Washington, the National Security Council approved NSC 111: "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy" (14 November 1947). The document outlined a series of measures designed to bolster the De Gasperi government against its domestic opponents and committed the United States to aid the Italian government in the case of an armed insurrection in the north. The National Security Council also authorized United States military officials to proceed with an arms aid program for Italy and "took note" of U.S. Air Force requirements for the preparation of airfields in southern ~ t a l y . ~ ~ Three days later, as Communist violence spread, De Gasperi addressed the second national congress of the Christian Democratic party. The prime minis: ter told his fellow Christian Democrats that the PC1 campaign of violence was a "declaration of war" on his government and on democracy. He pledged to meet this assault and promised to continue to cooperate with the United States in rebuilding Italy's economy and preserving its democracy. Sounding the keynote of his political campaign, De Gasperi lumped the Communists with the Fascists as enemies of democracy. The election issues, he told the cheering delegates, were democracy against totalitarianism and Catholicism against atheism. A reorganization of the Christian Democrats' leadership gave reformist elements a larger voice in party affairs. American officials were pleased. Dunn, however, cautioned that the left was using mass demonstrations, violence, and parliamentary maneuver to oust the De Gasperi government before the elections. By replacing De Gasperi with a caretaker government, the PC1 would score a massive psychological victory and set the stage for a De Gasperi strengthened his position by bringing the Republicans and Social Democrats into his government at the beginning of December. By creating a center-left majority, De Gasperi undercut Communist claims that his ministry was a tool of the neo-Fascists. A center-left ministry fitted into the American scheme for internal reforms, which, when combined with American aid, could finally stabilize I t a l ~ . ~ '

240 STABILIZATIQN The threat of revolution hung heavily over Italy in late November 1947. Italian government officials and churchmen expressed their fears to United States representatives and to the press. On 28 November, De Gasperi requested that the withdrawal of the last of the United States occupation forces, scheduled for 4 December, be postponed until 14 December, the last day allowed under the peace treaty. Truman agreed. That same day, Samuel Reber, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, reviewed the Italian situation for Lovett, and at his recommendation, the State Department informed the Department of Defense that the military actions outlined in NSC 1/1 were imminent. The following day the State Department sent a copy of NSC 111 with its scenario for United States involvement in an Italian civil war to the embassy in Rome with instructions to inform De Gasperi of its contents in order to bolster his resolve to face an insurrection. On 5 December, Ambassador Dunn offered to provide an American military mission to train Italian internal security forces. De Gasperi declined, pointing out that PC1 propagandists would charge that the United States controlled his government. The Italian prime minister suggested a United States policy statement timed to coincide with the withdrawal of its last troops, which would "remind" Italians that United States rights and duties included the responsibility to intervene to protect the democratic institutions and settlement established by the Paris peace treaty.88 By the first week of December 1947, the prime minister's analysis of Communist intentions changed. Violence rapidly trailed off following the establishment of a center-left government with its solid parliamentary majority. De Gasperi now felt that insurrection would come in the winter, prior to the national elections. The prime minister presented Dunn with a secret list of arms requirements for his internal security forces. De Gasperi warned that the Communists were waiting for a worsening of economic conditions before making any moves. His concerns about the economic situation were heightened by word from Washington that the Italian bread ration would be cut. The Department of State even suggested an approach to the Soviets for food aid. De Gasperi rejected this idea out of hand. Asking for Soviet aid, he warned, would reopen the way for PC1 entry into the g o ~ e r n r n e n t . ~ ~ In addition to a looming grain shortage, the Truman administration's program for military aid to Italy was in serious trouble. The U.S. Department of Defense lacked much of the equipment the Italians wanted and would have to seek congressional authority and funding to meet De Gasperi's request. Public disclosure of American military aid was the last thing that either the United States government or De Gasperi wanted. The ability of American forces to


provide immediate aid to the Italian government in the event of a revolt was equally in doubt. The State Department's Office of Near Eastern Affairs vetoed Dunn's suggestion that the United States station a task force in Libya. Other political considerations ruled out placing such a force in Austria or Germany. American officials had to settle for New York City as the primary staging area, which meant a four-week delay in getting troops to Italy. Emergency shipments of military equipment would take as long. Thus, immediate American aid was limited to naval and air upp port.^ The prevailing view in Washington was that the United States had to take a tough public stance. In spite of De Gasperi's assurances that the immediate crisis had passed, Dunn continued to stress the revolutionary objectives of the Communists. Domestic press coverage of events in Italy increased tension as the 14 December 1947 deadline for troop withdrawals approached. The State Department drew up an extremely tough statement for White House release, warning that the United States would not permit minority factions in Italy to overthrow the democratic system. Marshall toned it down, pointing out the evident contradiction between De Gasperi's insistence that the United States avoid publicizing its military aid and his request for a threatening statement at the moment of withdrawal from Italy. The United States, Marshall cautioned, should have the force to back up its warnings. Even with a more diplomatic tone, however, the Truman statement was a clear warning to the PC1 that force would be met with force. Backing Truman's words, the U.S. Air Force and Navy put on a show of force as the last troops left Italy. That same day Congress passed the interim aid package. The Truman statement jolted the PCI. A shaken Eugenio Reale, the PC17sforeign policy spokesman, appeared at the Italian foreign office to protest. Italian officials blandly replied that Truman was within his rights under the treaty. A perplexed Reale wondered aloud if the Americans meant war. The effect of the Truman statement impressed both American and Italian officials. Henceforth, the United States would openly confront the PCI.~' The United States had other reasons to celebrate the success of its policy. The British, who were highly skeptical of American support for both De Gasperi and the anti-Nenni socialists, began to join Washington's hard line against communism. Successive British ambassadors in Italy reached essentially the same conclusions as the Americans on the need to back De Gasperi's government unconditionally. After Nenni failed to break with the PC1 over its role in the Corninform and the battle against the Marshall Plan, the British Labour party reluctantly decided to withhold further support from the PSI. Although the British government lacked the financial power to intervene

242 STABILIZATION

decisively in Italian affairs, it was more receptive to American diplomatic initiatives, especially after De Gasperi broadened his government to the left.92 The American hard line reflected an increased interest in Italy and had a tonic effect on Truman's relations with the Italian-Americans. The prominenti had been itching for a showdown with Italy's Communist party since late 1945. Italian-American discontent with the Italian peace treaty, the size of American aid to Italy, the administration's apparent inability to halt the spread of communism, and Truman's lack of rapport with Italian-American leaders had undercut the administration's political standing. As a result, ItalianAmerican leaders had taken independent initiatives, which often conflicted with their government's. State Department officials were deeply concerned that the anti-Communistactivities of Frank Gigliotti and other ex-operatives of the Office of Strategic Services who had ties to the far right would impede a center-left coalition. Gigliotti and other Protestant Italian-Americans publicly and privately attacked the Christian Democrats for their ties with the Vatican at a time when that party represented the bulwark of American anti-Communist policy. Even traditional Democratic party loyalists like Generoso Pope created serious political problems for Tmman with the antitreaty campaign and demands for a hard-line stand against the Corn~nunists.~~ In their desire to do something for Italy, Italian-Americans enthusiastically contributed to the "friendship train," a private initiative to aid the people of Italy and France and fight communism. Pope and his labor allies sponsored tours of the United States by leading democratic Italian politicians, such as Saragat, together with frequent broadcasts from Italy by De Gasperi, Sforza, and other members of the government. Other Italian-American labor groups funded small cooperative factories in Italy." Pope never felt very comfortable opposing Truman, and whenever possible he enthusiastically supported the president's initiatives. Truman's statement of 14 December 1947 was the opening for a rapprochement, which both sides seized. On 15 December, Pope applauded the president's action in an editorial. Four days later, the Sixth Annual Conference of the Italian-American Labor Council passed a resolution commending the president's action. Pope privately approached the White House, offering aid in the president's reelection drive. The White House gratefully received this offer, and the process of rebuilding the president's Italian-American base of support began. During the spring and summer of 1948, the United States developed policies which met ItalianAmerican demands for a forceful presence in Italy and encouraged ItalianAmericans to play an active role in defeating communism.95


lnterventlon After the tension of early December, the Christmas season of 1947 brought the welcome respite of diminishing violence. While the left reassessed its strategy in the face of growing American intervention, American policymakers wrestled with the immediate problem of reinforcing Italy's internal security forces. A new factor dominated planning: Italy's rapidly approaching first national parliamentary elections, scheduled for 18 April 1948.% Throughout January and early February 1948, Italy's political parties held national congresses and meetings of their executive committees to plan their election strategies. The left easily defined the issues on which the early stages of its campaign would be fought. The PC1 and PSI charged that De Gasperi and Sforza were turning Italy into an American satellite, sacrificing national independence in exchange for American backing for their persona1 political futures. The left expected to get good political mileage out of economic conditions. Ambassador Dunn predicted that "good old-fashioned mud slinging," including anticlericalism, anti-Americanism, and personal innuendo, would all have prominent roles in the Communist attack. He doubted that De Gasperi and his fellow ministers had the taste or the ability to reply in kind. The government, he concluded, had lost its best issue-law and orderbecause of the diminution of Communist-inspired vi~lence.~' The United States received a worthwhile lesson in Italian sensitivity to American intervention in January 1948. In an effort to strengthen American forces in the Mediterranean, the Defense Department sent a reinforcement of one thousand marines to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Department of State claims that the move was purely administrative fooled no one. The left immediately charged that these troops were part of an American intervention force. The American press ridiculed official explanations, and the Italian government complained privately about Washington's actions.98 The economic situation remained critical. "Daily life in Italy," an American journalist wrote, was "one vast wearying orgy of lawbreaking," as the Italian people struggled to survive and the wealthy few exploited their privileged position to pile up new profits and luxuries. De Gasperi's Minister of the Treasury, Luigi Einaudi, was in good measure responsible for these glaring injustices. He tenaciously clung to economic austerity programs that penalized the majority of Italians while benefiting Italy's large industrialists. In spite of the well-publicized infusion of interim aid money and other supplemental grants, the pace of Italy's economic recovery remained painfully slow. The

244 STABILIZATION State Department estimated that the European Recovery Program would begin operations in Italy in June 1948. Interim aid would run out in April and the possibility loomed that American assistance would be cut off just a few weeks before the national election^.'^ The United States had to find ways to bolster the democratic parties while limiting its public involvement in Italy's affairs. One immediate American concern was strengthening the anti-Communist Italian socialists. Dunn was searching for a way to funnel American aid into projects that would reinforce Saragat's shaky political base. American officials hoped that anti-unity-ofaction pact forces within the PSI would coalesce and prevent that party from entering into an electoral alliance with the PCI."' The United States also sought greater Vatican involvement in the election campaign. At American instigation, the Vatican placed a gag on the minority of priests who supported the left-wing parties. United States officials encouraged Pope Pius XII's anti-Communist public statements and sought Vatican support for anti-Communist political alliances. Although reluctant to involve itself in American domestic affairs, the Vatican "suggested" in early February that the United States Catholic hierarchy strongly support private American initiatives aimed at combating the PCI.lO' The other elements of the Italy lobby were already active in the battle against the PCI. American officials were struggling to find the best means to simultaneously employ and restrain their enthusiasm. Pope continued to support the friendship train as an effective counter to communism. Organized labor wanted to play a more active role in curbing the left. In late December 1947, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union sent the veteran socialist Angelica Balabanoff to Italy to rally anti-Stalinist Italian socialists. Balabanoff, a veteran of the pre-Fascist PSI, attacked Nenni and the PC1 with great vigor and assisted the PSLI's organizing efforts. However, her heavy-handed actions appeared to bear out Communist and Socialist party claims that the Social Democrats were a tool of foreign interests. Moreover, American labor was short of funds, and without American money the organizationally weak and numerically small PSLI was unable to mount an effective challenge to the PSI. Dunn found that he could not legally divert American funds to aid the PSLI. The Social Democrats sent a senior official to the United States to seek financial aid, while Dunn urged Washington to find backing for them.lo2 At the end of January, the Italy lobby began testing a new method of intervention in Italian politics, which partially compensated for its lack of funds while involving tens of thousands of Americans in the fight against communism. Generoso Pope launched a national letter-writing campaign to

C R I S I S AND INTERVENTION 245

Italians. Italian-Americans, labor unions, and the Catholic church all joined in the letters to Italy campaign. United States officials tried to curb the excesses of this spontaneous private initiative without damaging its impact, especially in the south. lo3 While struggling to obtain the right type of cooperation from its domestic constituency and the Vatican, the United States found a firm partner in De Gasperi. The Italian government was prepared for an election and possibly a civil war. In late December 1947, De Gasperi's intelligence services obtained an essentially accurate account of the Bialystok meeting of Communist leaders and passed it on to Washington. Italian and American military officers met to coordinate arms shipments for Italy's internal security forces. The time in service of twenty thousand Italian troops was extended to back up the government's warnings against violence during the election campaign and to deter any Communist plans for an insurrection. In a display of firmness and interparty cooperation, De Gasperi named Republican chief Randolfo Pacciardi coordinator of all internal security measures. I" The support that De Gasperi received from his Little Entente partners strengthened the government's image. Strong currents within both parties favored campaigning against the unpopular economic policies of the government. Saragat and Pacciardi, however, were convinced that communism was the real issue of the elections and held their parties inside the government coalition. Saragat received the dubious reward of heading the interministerial committee that explained government economic programs to Italy's millions of unemployed. lo5 In early February 1948, De Gasperi utilized press reports of military training activities by organizations with PC1 connections to justify a ban on all paramilitary activities. He also warned the leftist Italian National Partisan Association that he would dissolve it if it engaged in any further military activities. Pacciardi and Mario Scelba, the hard-line Christian Democrat Minister of the Interior, effectively employed the police to neutralize paramilitary organizations for the remainder of the election campaign.Iffi In spite of these actions, the left appeared to be gaining ground. Ambassador Dunn reported in late January that the PC1 and PSI were simply better organized than their opponents. The Communists were getting good mileage out of charges of American interference in Italy's affairs. The PC1 demanded that Italy take a neutral position in the emerging East-West power struggle. lo7 Throughout February 1948, Dunn's reports to Washington were pessimistic. The Communists, he warned, possessed the ability to seize control of north Italy. The PC1 was refraining from revolutionary action because it was certain

248 STABILIZATION of a major political triumph. Public opinion polls showed the left running ahead of the Christian Democrats. Even if the left failed to gain a majority in the voting, Dunn prophesied, it would be able to re-enter the government and dictate its policies. Thereafter, Italy would swiftly pass to totalitarian rule.'08 Dunn's pessimism was widely shared by American reporters in Italy, by Italian conservatives, and by official Washington. On 20 February 1948, the National Security Council met to consider a policy paper outlining American strategy for the Italian election campaign.lW NSC 112, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy," envisioned a Hobson's choice: either a Communist victory at the polls or a Communist insurrection. Judging that a defeat for liberal democratic forces in the free elections was the worst possible outcome, the National Security Council approved an intensification of American aid to the De Gasperi government and simultaneous preparation for a military intervention in the event that a De Gasperi victory touched off a Communist insurrection. NSC 112 recognized that the promise of Marshall Plan aid was the most effective weapon available to the United States in its campaign against communism. The United States government mounted an intensive public relations campaign designed to reinforce the Italian perception that without American aid Italy's economy would collapse, and that with American help Italy was assured of future prosperity. The National Security Council realized that deeds had to reinforce words, and it authorized an increase in the American aid program, especially in the food supply. At the same time, NSC 112 instructed United States officials to continue to provide Italy with the arms and equipment needed to deter or defeat a Communist insurrection. Additionally, the United States sought the cooperation of the British and French governments to provide De Gasperi with foreign policy successes, which would increase Italy's prestige and identify Italy with the West in the minds of Italian voters. If this combination of psychological and material aid succeeded and the Communists resorted to force in the face of a political defeat, the United States would provide the Italian government with massive military aid and, as a last resort, intervene to prevent a complete Communist triumph. Acting in response to NSC 112's directives, the United States mounted a major campaign designed to identify Italy and the United States with common traditions and objectives. This program grew in scope and intensity throughout the remaining eight weeks of the election campaign.'1° Time was running out and De Gasperi's prospects were deteriorating. On 17 February 1948, the left won a local government election in Pescara. The victory, insignificant in itself, was magnified by the press and by Dunn into a


major defeat for the Christian Democrats. The failure of the Social Democrats to draw voters (and members) away from the PSI was more troubling. At the end of January, the PSI agreed to form an election bloc with the PCI, an arrangement that would siphon votes off to the organizationally stronger Communists. Aviable anti-Communist Socialist party might have won over a large share of the left wing. The Social Democrats, however, were bankrupt, their leadership was unexciting, and they were saddled with responsibility for the schism within Italian socialism. While Dunn hoped to revive the PSLI's flagging prospects with a large infusion of money, repeated American efforts to find private sources of aid failed. With De Gasperi's political campaign floundering, a large-scale flight of private capital from Italy to foreign banks began. The Christian Democrats, too, needed financial support and secretly sent an emissary to talk with American bankers."' A dramatic reversal in the government's fortunes began when the Czech Communist party seized power in Prague on 24 February 1948. The Czech coup sent shock waves throughout the West, galvanized anti-Communist forces in Italy, and made communism the central issue of the campaign. The coup in Prague convinced United States leaders that intervention was justified to defeat the PC1 and sparked the Congress to quick action on the pending Marshall Plan legislation. On 8 March 1948, the National Security Council met again and approved NSC 113, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means," which authorized covert funding of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats.'I2 The council instructed the State Department to bolster the De Gasperi regime with diplomatic initiatives and to coordinate a public relations campaign involving government officials and Italian-American leaders. The United States government acted on NSC 1/33 recommendations with decisiveness and rapidity. American diplomacy secured a three-power statement on Trieste, which pledged the eventual return of the city to Italy. The administration presented a second interim aid bill to Congress and urged swift passage. On 15 March 1948, a Department of State spokesman announced that the United States would cut off Marshall Plan aid to Italy in the event the left won the elections. When Dunn reported the left was successfullydownplaying this announcement, Marshall personally repeated the warning.l13 The propaganda campaign launched under NSC 112 hit full stride in midMarch. Special ceremonies emphasized American concern for Italy's welfare, American support for De Gasperi, and Italy's dependence on American aid.


The United States brought an Italian film crew to Washington to record a White House ceremony in which Truman handed over ownership of twentynine ships to Ambassador Tarchiani and flooded Italy with films on themes like democracy and the Marshall Plan. Special radio shows featuring Bing Crosby and Dinah Shore supplemented more blatant broadcasts by ItalianAmericans and major American political figures. The United States increased the letters to Italy campaign in response to the request of the Italian government, and the U.S. Post Office system provided special handling to expedite this mail. 'I4 Meanwhile, American covert funding poured millions of dollars into the coffers of Italy's center and center-left political parties. When courier delivery proved too slow and too easily detected, the United States established a system of banking transfers that got the money to Italy more quickly and made detection more difficult. Private donations, which the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency funneled to the center and center-left parties, supplemented United States aid.''' American action, Dunn reported in early April 1948, was turning the tide. De Gasperi's anticommunism campaign, which was so listless in February, caught fire after the Czech coup. The prime minister put the Communists on the defensive. The Christian Democrat party machine, infused with American dollars and Vatican-supplied political workers, was soon matching the Popular Front in grass-roots organization.'I6 The Catholic church, which had waged a determined but highly pessimistic campaign against the left, was galvanized by American action. The pope personally waded into the campaign with a series of public attacks on communism. Catholic Action vigorously supported De Gasperi, while priests, bishops, and members of religious orders used their pulpits and schoolrooms to tell Italians that the choice on 18 April 1948 was between Christianity and atheism. 'I7 With the aid of the United States and the Vatican, De Gasperi turned the 1948 election into a referendum on communism. Economic issues almost disappeared from the public debate in spite of the left's strenuous efforts to make them the central issue of the campaign. De Gasperi hammered away at the fundamental choices that he claimed Italy faced: democracy or totalitarianism, Christianity or atheism, and alignment with the West or the East. The Soviets, meanwhile, balanced the demands of a Yugoslav Communist party already in power against the political and military risks of a PC1 victory and kept a certain distance from Italian affairs. ' I 8 By mid-April 1948, De Gasperi was confident of victory. The Americans,


however, were still worried. While reining in overzealous private attempts to influence the elections as well as a few dangerous schemes hatched by senior American officials, the State Department's high command was simultaneously considering a last-minute show of force by the U.S. Navy. De Gasperi had to stop his allies. He also halted plans for shipping United States arms to Italy. Washington did not share Rome's confidence about the ability of Italian security forces to defeat a Communist-led insurrection. At the last minute, De Gasperi shelved American plans for a massive and secret reinforcement of Italy's police and military forces. The Italian prime minister calculated that the damage that discovery of such aid would do to his campaign more than offset its value in the face of increasingly problematic Communist insurre~tion."~ On 18-19 April 1948, the Italian people responded to De Gasperi's campaign of fear and gave the Christian Democrats an election triumph of completely unexpected proportions: 48.5 percent of the popular vote and an absolute majority in parliament. The combined vote of the Popular Front was 31 percent. Due to Italy's preferential voting system, the PC1 increased its representation from 104 to 141 deputies, while the Socialists dropped from 115 seats to 42. The Social Democrats fell from 52 to 33 seats in the new parliament. De Gasperi could govern without the moderate left, a development that undercut American plans for a center left reform government. The PCI, although humbled, emerged as the largest party on the left. Nenni's Socialists were increasingly reduced to the role of client to the Communist party. As a result, American hopes for reform and long-term political stabilization rested exclusively with De Gasperi. Within eighteen months these hopes were to be shattered.120 Nevertheless, the Italian elections were a major foreign policy triumph for the Truman administration. Intervention in Italy won the acclaim of the two most powerful elements of the Italy lobby: Italian-Americans and the U.S. Catholic church. Leaders of both groups, seeing the election as an apocalyptic struggle, urged that the United States take whatever measures necessary to stop communism and warmly responded to government efforts to give them a role in the fight against the PCI. Liberals were divided. Even those who favored anti-Communist policies expressed misgivings about the depth of United States intervention in Italy's internal affairs. These doubts were far outweighed by the depth and breadth of public support for Truman's antiCommunist policies. The administration had a foreign policy that helped erase its negative public image and improved the president's chances for reelection in November 1948.12'

Chapter 9 Stabilization The Triumph of the Conservatives

During the spring and summer of 1948, the growing Cold War between the Great Powers entered a period of intense political, economic, and military confrontation as well as growing domestic repression in both the United States and the Soviet Union. The coup in Czechoslovakia, the Italian election, the Berlin blockade and airlift, and discussions for the formation of a Western defensive pact divided Europe into two blocs, which have endured to the present. The intensification of the Soviet-American confrontation over Europe had important effects on domestic politics in the United States. American liberalism split over policy toward the Soviet Union. Led by anti-Communistorganizations like Americans for Democratic Action, the vast majority of liberals somewhat reluctantly rallied behind the policies of the Truman administration. They abandoned Henry Wallace, his vision of postwar cooperation with the USSR, and his Progressive political party. Truman solidified this liberal support through an aggressive championship of domestic reforms. The president already enjoyed the support of key Italian-American leaders because of his handling of the Italian election crisis. In the fall of 1948, these leaders rallied a large part of the Italian-American vote for Truman. The president rebuilt much of the Roosevelt coalition and stunned the nation by winning reelection over heavily favored New York Republican Governor Thomas Dewey. With liberals joining Catholic leaders and Italian-Americans in the Cold War consensus, the Truman administration enjoyed strong domestic backing for a hard-line anti-Communist policy in ItaIy. Meanwhile, American plans for

T R I U M P H O F T H E C O N S E R V A T I V E S 2S1

serious reform in Italy collapsed shorlly after the April 1948 elections. The Americans hoped that De Gasperi would implement a consumer-oriented economic program while discreet United States intervention would build up the power of the democratic parties. Both consumerist economics and United States intervention were designed to win the working classes away from their allegiance to the parties of the far left and to the General Confederation of Labor (CGIL). The Marshall Plan mission to Italy promoted programs designed to expand employment, redistribute land, and modernize Italy's industrial plant. The Italian government initially delayed and then watered down American reform proposals. De Gasperi and his Christian Democrat lieutenants utilized European Recovery Program (ERP) aid to build up their clientele, reward party loyalty, and reinforce the existing social structure. In spite of the importance that United States officials attached to reform and the strong support that their proposals enjoyed among the parties of the reformist left, American leaders did not force them upon De Gasperi. Reform politics were rapidly losing their constituency in the United States. While Truman represented a more moderate and rational anticommunism than many Republican leaders, he undercut the domestic and foreign reforms by permitting an antiCommunist witch hunt at home. The swelling American antiCommunist hysteria favored increased intervention in Italian affairs. The spirit of ideological holy war that infected the United States in 1948-49 was quickly transferred abroad.' Without the implementation of the basic economic and political reforms of the politics of consumption, however, American efforts to undermine the PCI, PSI, and CGIL were counterproductive. Intervention shattered the unity of the PSI and CGIL and left both firmly under Communist hegemony, together with the vast majority of the Italian working classes. Italy became a polarized society, while the United States became identified with the forces backing the status quo. Italy's conservatives, after surviving the debacle of fascism and the upheaval of the war, reimposed their control over their society with American aid. Stabilization politics became a tool in their triumph.

The Marshall Plan-ltallan Style The Christian Democrats' stunning triumph in the elections on 18 April 1948 produced heady optimism among the victors. Fears of a Communist coup quickly evaporated, giving way to euphoria, which infected Italy's center-left and the American embassy in Rome. The new parliament

252 STABILIZATION

elected Luigi Einaudi, a leader of the Liberal party, president of the republic. By engineering the departure of his strong-willed minister of the treasury, Premier De Gasperi appeared to signal his readiness to promote the economics of consumption, which the Americans favored and Einaudi abhorred. The Italian prime minister reorganized his government, giving the Social Democrats and Republicans major posts. Pacciardi became minister of defense, Saragat took the Ministry of the Merchant Marine, Ivan Matteo Lombardo headed the Industry and Commerce Ministry, while Roberto Tremelloni became vice president and led an interministerial committee to coordinate the Italian side of the Marshal1 Plan. U.S. Ambassador Dunn was ecstatic. In May 1948, he sent two glowing telegrams to Washington reporting on De Gasperi's moves. The next (sixth) De Gasperi government, the ambassador predicted, would be a ministry of reform, which would stabilize Italy by fulfilling election pledges of economic development within a free state. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency filed an equally optimistic assessment, but added a cautionary note: the left and right wings of the De Gasperi coalition were at odds on the fundamental issues of reconstruction p01icy.~ In fact, the political split within the De Gasperi government was even deeper. The right wing of the Christian Democrats, which represented Italy's large industrialists and landowners as well as a significant segment of the professional and bureaucratic classes, continued to favor the monetarist policies of Einaudi and resisted the full employment programs of the Social Democrats. The Christian Democrat right was confident that the Americans could be managed and that they could ignore the United States' insistence on political reform and production for consumer sectors. The reformist left was divided. The Christian Democrat left wing, closely allied with the Christian labor movement, wanted a program of full employment and consumerism. However, these Christian Democrats were locked in a struggle with the Social Democrats for control of non-Communist labor and opposed programs that would boost the prestige and popularity of their rivals. Saragat's Socialists were in a desperate position. Large portions of the PSI were disenchanted with Nenni's leadership and seemed ready to fuse with the Social Democrats to create a new majority anti-Communist Socialist party. To win these waverers over, the PSLI had to carry through its economic programs, and the ERP had to provide tangible benefits. The PSLI had to achieve its objectives within the government, but De Gasperi, with an absolute Christian Democrat majority, could ignore them whenever he chose.3 The Socialists' dilemma was worsened by the strength of the Communist

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challenge for control of the working classes. Defeat at the polls temporarily ruled out the strategy of cooperation and united the PC1 around a program of total opposition to De Gasperi and to the ERP Togliatti visited Moscow in June to smooth over his relations with Stalin; on his return he announced that the PC1 would use all the means at its command to thwart the Marshall Plan. The Communist-dominated CGIL immediately swung into action, using strikes to close down ports, interrupt internal communications, and cut industrial production. In parliament, the left utilized every means available to the minority to hamstring the implementation of ERP program^.^ Polarization worked in favor of De Gasperi and the PC1 while reducing support for both the Saragat and Nenni Socialists. Communist tactics further weakened Italy's already shaky economy. Italian agriculture was in perilous straits, and in April 1948 De Gasperi requested additional grain from the United States. Industrial recovery was equally slow. In mid-1948, Italy's industry was producing at 78 percent of its prewar (1939) level. These figures were even more troubling because of the erratic nature of Italian industrial performance between 1926 and 1939. Einaudi's tight credit policies were stabilizing the lira while creating a deflationary trend that discouraged private investment, increased both total unemployment and underemployment, and created vast national unrest. In many cases, factories had to pour their limited profits into the pockets of idle workers rather than into capital investment. Finally, Italian business was oriented toward production of goods for export and in direct conflict with stronger industrial nations like Germany and France, which were eager to utilize exports to promote recovery. The U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the agency responsible for managing ERE joined with the embassy in Rome in pressing for major economic and social reforms. ECA administrators in Italy were a mixture of liberal economists and businessmen administrators who believed that Italy's economic recovery must be based on the production of goods for domestic consumption. ECA's other major objective was the rapid expansion of employment, since full employment was a prerequisite for both expanded domestic consumption and social stabilization. ECA proposed to use Marshall Plan aid to invest in industries capable of rapidly expanding their production. In order to maximize the effects of ERP aid, ECA negotiated a counterpart fund agreement with the Italian government. The Italians placed a sum of lire equal to the amount of dollars provided by ECA in a fund under the control of the ECA mission in Italy. The Italians were to use their dollars to purchase raw materials and equipment abroad (primarily from the United States). Counter-

254 STABILIZATION

part funds were to be used to finance recovery projects in Italy and to stimulate employment. The effective utilization of counterpart funds immediately became a major source of disagreement between the United States and Italian governments. The chief of ECA in Italy, James Zellerbach, demanded detailed plans from the Italians for the use of counterpart funds before releasing the money. The Italians wanted a freer hand. De Gasperi suggested using part of the lire fund for political patronage and propaganda. The Italians also wanted the counterpart to pay for interest on their national debt. Zellerbach balked. He insisted that ECA money had to be used to stimulate production and employment. The embassy and ECA did agree, however, to use some counterpart for pro-ERP propaganda. The battle over the lire counterpart continued throughout 1948 and 1949, as the Italians tried to maximize their control of ERP aid. They made equally strenuous attempts to increase the size of their total allotment. The Italian government, one ECA report noted, had a "shopping list psychology," which led to a series of unrealistic proposals based on Italian fears that other nations would receive a larger share of limited ERP funds. At the same time, the Italians refused to use counterpart funds to combat the recession created by Einaudi's monetarism. By September 1948, Zellerbach, frustrated by Italian inaction, publicly took the De Gasperi government to task in two speeches. Zellerbach's criticisms had no effect on the Italian government. De Gasperi's parliamentary majority was so strong that he could ignore the domestic impact of criticisms by the Americans and the moderate Socialists. De Gasperi, moreover, was convinced that the economic reconstruction of Italy was impossible without the support of the nation's business and banking communities. He spoke of the need to meet the demands of this "Fourth Party" to avoid a flight of capital and expertise. The Americans, after repeatedly accusing the Italians of failing to make necessary but politically difficult decisions, lacked the courage to enforce their will. The United States had committed itself so deeply to the De Gasperi government that it stifled official criticism of the Italian prime minister and ultimately surrendered a growing amount of control over ERP money to the Italians. In January 1949, the ECA gave up trying to control Italian use of counterpart and instructed Zellerbach to release the money in exchange for Italian agreement to begin negotiations on the needed monetary and fiscal reforms. The American surrender was followed in short order by the reduction of the Socialists' limited influence within the ~e Gasperi government. In late March 1949, De Gasperi reshuffled the management of the government's ERP program, demoting Tremelloni and increasing the power of the Christian Democrat right-wing faction led by Giuseppe Pella.8


This dominant faction allowed the remainder of 1949 to pass without effectively utilizing $601 million in ECA aid to promote increased production or employment. A February 1950 survey of the Italian economy noted that throughout 1949 theDe Gasperi government's economic policy was characterized by infighting and inaction. In spite of American pleas and De Gasperi's pledges, the government failed to enact a land reform law. The continuation of Einaudi's tight credit policies restricted investment in plant and equipment. Production costs remained high and made Italian exports noncompetitive. As a result, Italian exports to the United States declined by 50 percent from 1948 levels. United States direct aid and counterpart releases did keep unemployment down through public works projects. However, not enough American money was being spent to build up Italy's industrial plant.9 Italian delay in effecting structural reforms was undercutting American hopes for political stabilization in Italy. Italian failure to reform their economy and to utilize effectively Marshall Plan aid was widely reported in the American press and diminished public support for ERP. In spite of a stunning reelection victory, Truman recognized the conservative political temper of his electorate and cut the size of his request for foreign aid.'' The lagging pace of economic growth in Italy, combined with American determination to achieve a quick political stabilization, led the United States to adopt short cuts to its goal: encouraging the breakup of the national labor confederation, the CGIL; promoting schisms within the PSI; and insisting on Italian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) despite the limitations that the Paris peace treaty imposed on its armed forces. All of these initiatives were part of a strategy of isolating the Communist-dominated left and forcing wavering elements of the center and moderate left to break their psychological and political ties with the PSI and the ideal of a unified left.

In May 1948, the Department of State instructed the embassy in Rome that the United States was to exert all possible efforts to strengthen non-Communist labor. The success of ERE the State Department cautioned, depended on the ability of the non-Communists to capture and hold control of the major labor federations. In the event that non-Communists could not control CGIL, the United States would covertly support an effort to split the national labor federation. The State Department's instructions were a final reversal of the policy of encouraging the development of an independent and unified labor movement,

256 STABILIZATION which the United States had fostered during the war. As in other instances during the Cold War's evolution, the United States policy changed more slowly than did the attitudes of its domestic constituency. As late as December 1946, Admiral Stone was successfully arguing that the U.S. Army should recognize CGIL's right to organize Army civilian employees and to call a strike. Meanwhile, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was taking an increasingly hard line against Communist-dominated unions, and Antonini and his Italian-American Labor Council were intervening in the internal politics of the Socialist party and of organized labor to destroy Communist influence. Anti-Communist politics simultaneously gained dominance in the other major American union federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), cutting away a traditional source of support for a unified labor movement in Italy. By mid-1947, the CIO was actively curbing its own leftists and breaking its ties with the CGIL.'~ Apprehension about Communist control of labor was not confined to Italy or to the American labor movement. In April 1947, the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs published two articles stressing that Communist domination of labor in Europe and South America threatened the United States' national interests. Anti-Communist Italian labor leaders were actively feeding American concerns. Catholic, Republican, and Social Democratic unionists repeatedly warned American officials that the Communists were steadily expanding their hold on the labor movement. In spite of a common fear of communism, old enmities and current mistrust prevented common action against the PC13 advance. While the reformist Socialists and Republicans were cooperating, they disliked and mistrusted the numerically larger Catholics. The Catholics, in turn, held long-standing grudges against the anticlerical reformist Socialists and Republicans. In June 1947, the disunity of the three non-Communist unions and what Dunn termed the "weak-kneed" and "mediocre" leadership of Social Democrat and Republican unionists handed the left almost complete control of the CGIL.'~ The solidification of Communist control over the CGIL, the announcement of the Marshall Plan, and the rapid approach of national elections stimulated discussions within the American government and labor movement over the future of Italy's unions. The United States and British labor attach& cautioned that an attempt to break up the CGIL would only weaken the non-Communist unions within it, and that the minority's strength was greater in a unified than in a divided labor movement.14 However, the prevailing opinion within the U.S. government moved rapidly toward a decision to intervene and break up the CGIL. American union leaders followed suit, a bit more reluctantly, but

TRIUMPH OF THE CONSERVATIVES 257 inexorably, in response to Washington's arguments and a series of clashes with the CGIL over the Marshall Plan. Once agreed on splitting the CGIL, the United States government and American labor mounted pressure on Italy's reluctant unionists to take action. Ironically an act of political violence against the Communists triggered the first split in the CGIL. The catalyst driving American government and labor into action against the CGIL was the 1948 Italian parliamentary election campaign. The AFCs national leaders fully shared their government's view of the apocalyptic nature of the struggle and became involved in covert funding of the PSLI. The CIO did not participate in these activities but ardently supported the ERE? It helped organize the London conference of Socialists and union leaders to rally the left behind the program. The CGIL voted against sending a delegation to the meeting. PSI unionists, however, were ambivalent about ERP aid. They realized that Italian recovery depended on United States aid, but they feared American political objectives and wanted to maintain the solidarity of the working classes through unity of action with the Communists. At the instigation of the Socialists, the CGIL sent a message to the CIO representative at the London conference, James B. Carey, suggesting a meeting between CIO and CGIL leaders. Carey readily agreed, and Fernando Santi (PSI) and Giuseppe Di Vittorio (PCI), the leading figures in the CGIL, set off for London. They were not the only Italian unionists traveling north. The minority of Christian Democrats, Republicans, and Social Democrats decided to challenge the will of the left majority and sent a delegation to the London conference. Dunn was pleased, commenting that this action constituted the first open break within the CGIL, while cautioning that neither side wanted schism at this point.I5 American officials feared that a Di Vittoridarey meeting wouId create a propaganda bonanza for the Communistsjust five weeks before the April 1948 national elections. Marshall urged Carey to make a public statement on Italy's need for ERP aid before he met Di Vittorio. Carey did more. He publicly backed the CGIL minority and told Di Vittorio that the ERP represented Italy's best hope for national recovery. Di Vittorio's efforts to smooth over his disagreementsprovided the CIO chief with the opportunity to further publicize them by rebutting the CGIL's leader in the press during the two weeks before the elections. l 6 Carey's action encouraged State Department officials to enlist both national unions into a campaign to split the CGIL. On 23 March 1948, senior AFL and CIO leaders met at the State Department for discussions on what role they could play in defending the democratic regime in Italy. Department officials argued that the CGIL had to be broken up, because otherwise the Communists

258 STABILIZATION

would utilize it to destroy the ERR The AFL representative agreed with State Department reasoning and promised to cooperate fully with the effort to split the CGIL. Philip Murray and Carey of the CIO balked at active involvement in a covert campaign but offered to fund a pro-ERP speaking tour by Italianspeaking American unionists, under the auspices of the CGIL minority." Operations designed to split the CGIL were temporarily shelved pending the conclusion of the Italian election. Once the election was over, American leaders planned to take quick action.I8 A number of factors favored the effort to break up the CGIL. In late March 1948, the Socialist International expelled the PSI, damaging the credibility of both the party and its trade union organizations. Just a week before the election, the Christian Democrat member of the editorial staff of I1 Lavoro, the CGIL newspaper, quit in protest against its attacks on the ERR The CIO was providing moral support to the minority in order to strengthen its will to break with the CGIL. The AFCs Irving Brown privately urged the minority leaders to take quick action against the CGIL.'~ Nevertheless, the Italians did not act. They cautiously awaited developments. The minority wanted to see whether the CIO and the British Trade Union Congress would break away from the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions when it met in Rome at the end of April. In spite of numerous Communist provocations, neither the CIO nor the Congress was ready to make a complete break with the World Federation. The reluctance of the reformist Socialists to make a break was reinforced by an unsuccessful attempt by the moderate Socialist Giuseppe Romita to remove Nenni and reunify the PSI and PSLI under centrist leadership. Catholic unionists, too, resisted an immediate break, offering an implausible scheme for utilizing Catholic Action to pack the CGIL with Catholic workers and gain majority control. Giovanni Gronchi, a trade unionist and the leader of the Christian Democrat left, flatly opposed leaving the CGIL.20 During May and June 1948, the two factions within the CGIL conducted a war of charges and countercharges. Neither side, however, was ready to assume responsibility for a split. The catalyst for the split was the assassination attempt on 14 July 1948 that left Communist party chief Palmiro Togliatti severely wounded. While Togliatti struggled for his life, the accumulated tensions within the rigidly disciplined PC1 briefly broke loose. The CGIL declared a general strike. Local Communist militants seized police stations, communication facilities, factories, and other public and private facilities. Mass demonstrations and individual acts of violence mounted. In spite of the chaos, however, the Communists' reaction was too fragmented to pose a


serious threat to the Italian government. By I7 July, the violence subsided, aided by news of Togliatti's sur~ival.~' The CGIL's decision to call a general strike was the final straw for Catholic trade union leaders. De Gasperi charged that the left's actions proved that they had a plan for revolutionary action. Catholic unionists agreed. On 15 July 1948, the Christian Democrat trade unionists sent an ultimatum to the CGIL's executive committee demanding the immediate cessation of the general strike. The executive committee ignored the ultimatum, and the Catholic trade unionists failed to carry through with their threat. Di Vittorio realized that a split in the aftermath of the Togliatti shooting would drastically limit the number of workers who followed the Christian Democrat unionists out of the CGIL. He decided to force a break and on 26 July 1948 the CGIL's executive committee expelled the Catholics. Neither the Republicans nor the Social Democrats followed the Christian .Democrat trade unionists. United States officials realized that without united action by the minority, withdrawal would do little damage to the CGIL.22 Di Vittorio's move put the Catholic trade unionists off balance. When the Social Democrats and Republicans failed to provide any support, the Christian Democrat unionists floundered. Initially, they refused to accept their expulsion from the CGIL and laid plans to challenge it at the national federations. Then, they were exceedingly slow in organizing their own independent union organization. When they finally did begin organizing, they were embarrassingly reliant on Catholic Action for manpower, money, and ideas, raising the specter of Vatican control of their movement. The Communists exploited these weaknesses with great skill. PC1 and CGIL propagandists attacked the Catholic unionists for breaking the unity of Italian labor and for subservience to the Vatican and the Americans. Communist tactics succeeded in isolating the Catholics and limiting the loss of CGIL members. Fear of Vatican influence also prevented the traditionally anticlerical Social Democrats and Republicans from serious collaboration with the new union organi~ation.~~ Both the United States government and American labor tried without success to encourage the Republican and Social Democratic parties' labor organizations to break with the CGIL. In July 1948, a high-powered AFL delegation arrived in Rome for talks with both American embassy officials and Republican and Social Democratic labor leaders. Ignoring American pledges of largescale aid and a concentrated dose of anti-Communist rhetoric, the reformist Socialists and Republicans refused to leave the CGIL. Frustrated in this attempt, the AFL contented itself with providing a small amount of aid to the new Catholic labor organization. The aid, however, was too limited to con-

260 STABILIZATION

vince Christian Democrat unionists that they enjoyed AFL confidence and support.24 By September 1948, the continued inability of the United States to further fragment the CGIL or achieve its overall objective of stabilization through ERP aid tempted the State Department to try another covert funding operation. Marshall sent an "eyes only" message to Ambassador Dunn with a plan for funding a "non-partisan, non-clerical labor federation" with a weekly newspaper. American funds would be "laundered" by sending them to Italy through American unions. The whole plan rested on the belief that the promise of large American aid would lure the Social Democratic and Republican parties into coalition with the Christian ~ e m o c r a t s . ~ ~ Dunn advised Washington that even a major increase in American financial aid would not tempt these parties to break with the CGIL. He warned that the United States could not allow the Christian Democrats' independent union to flounder and urged the United States government to provide it with financial aid. In late September 1948, the Christian Democrat labor leaders reinforced their claim on United States aid by forming a Free Italian General Confederation of Labor (LCGIL) comprising the secessionist Catholics from the CGIL and three independent, nonsectarian labor unions. The new union's leaders made determined efforts to separate themselves from the Catholic church but were unsuccessful. One Social Democrat labor leader remarked that the new labor federation "smells of the sacristy" and scoffed at a coalition with the LCGIL. The British labor attach6 agreed and added that the Christian Democrats' break with the CGIL simply enabled the PC1 to tighten its control over major independent unions. Meanwhile, Luigi Gedda, the conservative leader of Catholic Action, was impatiently requesting American financial aid to create a Catholic free trade union movement independent of the Christian ~emocrats. 26 Fortunately for the Americans, the CGIL was also in disarray. The Republican and Social Democratic minority strongly opposed the strikes that the labor federation was mounting against the ERR Relations between the PSI and PSLI were especially strained as PSLI unionists desperately tried to break the PSI leaders' hold on their union rank and file. While the PSLI's tactics and antiCommunist propaganda were driving some individuals out of the CGIL, few were joining the reformist^.^^ The struggle between the left and right wings of the CGIL over the ERP became increasingly bitter in late 1948. American policymakers attempted to widen this growing schism and lay the groundwork for cooperation between the LCGIL and the Republican and Social Democrat unionists. In collabora-


tion with the AFL and CIO, the State Department organized a visit to the United States by the leaders of both anti-Communist factions. The United States encouraged the formation of an ECA Trade Union Advisory Council as a vehicle for the Christian Democrat, Republican, and Social Democratic parties to control the distribution of ERP patronage to the labor movement. By early December 1948, United States efforts were apparently on the verge of success. At a secret meeting on 5 December 1948, the PSLI's leadership voted to split with the CGIL at the earliest possible moment. They were confident that they could carry the Republicans with them into an independent trade union federation. After accomplishing this, they planned to negotiate some form of alliance with the LCGIL. Timing the break with the CGIL was critical for reformist union leaders who wanted to carry the largest possible body of workers with them; therefore, they delayed action." The United States again intervened to speed up the process of division and unification. The long-delayed visit of Italian anti-Communist unionists to the United States finally took place in March and April 1949, under the formal auspices of the two United States labor federations and of the ECA. Two separate groups visited the United States, each composed of representatives of the three anti-Communist political factions. By bringing leaders of the three union federations together in a situation free from normal political pressures and press coverage, the United States furthered the process of unification. A personal meeting between Truman and the labor leaders provided the Italians with special public re~ognition.'~ In spite of this progress, the unification effort still faced serious obstacles. The PSLI was divided by pro- and anti-CGIL factions. The financial resources required to foster and maintain a unified anti-Communist labor federation were not available. Moreover, the increasing size and success of LCGIL discouraged both Republican and Social Democrat unions and independent labor federations from joining for fear of losing their freedom of action to a Catholic-dominated union movement. The potential merger was under heavy attack by the left-wing press in Italy, by some left-wing labor leaders in the United States, and by the passionately anti-Communist Italian-American AFL unionist Vanni Montana, who feared unification would destroy democratic so~ialism.~' Other factors favored the unification effort. The CGIL was weakened by the failure of its strike campaign against the ERP and by challenges to the unity of some of its constituent member unions mounted by the LCGIL and covertly aided by the AFL3' In early May 1949, the leadership of the three anti-Communist unions

262 STABILIZATION

agreed upon a common program for unification, which received the blessing of Luigi Antonini of the AFL and George Baldanzi of the CIO. Timing of the initial break with the CGIL and ultimate unification, as usual, was left to events.32 This time, however, a pretext for a final split occurred within days of the initial event, and anti-Communist labor seized on it. On 11 May 1949, a group of Communist militants seized control of the Molinella Chamber of Labor and prevented the democratically elected PSLI majority leaders from entering the chamber building. The PSLI press played up the issue. By the end of the month, both the Socialist Labor and Republican parties had broken with the CGIL and formed the Italian Labor Federation. American pleasure with the further splintering of the unity of the CGIL was quickly tempered. The new labor federation drew only one hundred fifty thousand members away from the CGIL. The LCGIL now numbered five hundred thousand and these numbers alone were enough to cause the new federation's leaders to hesitate to join with it. In addition, there was considerable opposition to a merger from Republican leaders and from the Italian Labor Federation's rank and file. The new federation signed a unity-of-action agreement with the LCGIL, but declined to merge with its far larger ally.33 Moreover, the timing of the split ignited a violent quarrel within the American labor movement and attacks on United States policy. Vanni Montana was highly critical of the AFL's role as midwife in the reorganization of Italian labor. He opposed further efforts to unify anti-Communist labor by either American labor or the United States government, arguing that it would play into the hands of both Catholics and Communists. Montana enlisted the influential American socialist leader Norman Thomas in his campaign to block any further American pressure for labor ~ n i f i c a t i o n .By ~ ~ late September 1949, Thomas was publicly attacking American involvement, much to the delight of the Communists. Faced with unfavorable publicity and serious infighting among both American and Italian labor groups, the AFL decided to give up its efforts to promote the unification of Italian anti-Communist labor. Jay Lovestone, the chairman of the AFL's Free Trade Union Committee, bitterly told a State Department official that the AFT, had wasted its money on Italy, and the Italians would have to use their own resources hereafter. August Bellanca, a CIO.leader who accompanied Lovestone to Washington, suggested that the United States reduce the pressures for ~ n i f i c a t i o n . ~ ~ The United States was not ready to dampen its anti-Communist crusade. Truman's September 1949 announcement that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic weapon ignited a fresh outburst of anti-Communist hysteria in the


United States and intensified the arms race. Any tendency to relax anticommunist activity was further reduced by the solidification of PC1 control over the CGIL and the Communists' continued use of strikes to block American military and economic programs for Italy. The United States government urged Italian labor to unify and American labor to take a larger part in the struggle against communism by cooperating with government programs.36 The effort finally paid off on 30 April 1950, when the Italian Labor Federation and LCGIL officially united to form the Italian Confederation of Free Unions. The new organization, with a membership of 1.6 million workers, was a tool of limited use in the anti-Communist struggle. Its unity was fragile and it proved unable to draw further significant bodies of workers from the CGIL. At the end of 1950, the CGIL was still the dominant force within Italian labor and, due to the withdrawal of the anti-Communists, the PC1 held predominance.

Splintedng the Italian Socialist Party At the same time American officials were attempting to reorganize Italian labor they were encouraging dissident elements within the Italian Socialist party to break with its leftist leadership. The final results of these efforts were discouraging: the democratic forces were splintered, Communist dominance of the left grew, and American actions deepened the social schism in Italy between middle class and workers. The Italian Socialist party was a political organism with two conflicting souls: one reformist and evolutionary, the other maximalist, an Italian term that implied revolutionary rhetoric and confused political objectives. The party's dominant leader, the charismatic Pietro Nenni, personified the maximalist tradition. Nenni's political strategy was defensive. The PSI'S leader saw his party caught between two powerful forces. On the right stood reformist "neo-socialism," favored by a sizable minority of his own party, by Italian-American leaders like Antonini, and, Nenni correctly surmised, by the American government. On the left was the PCI, with its superior political organization and consistent political ideology. Nenni wanted to cooperate with the PC1 to avoid a struggle within the Italian left reminiscent of the one that had opened the way for the Fascist seizure of power. He was sure the PSI would lose such a struggle and hoped that through collaboration with the PCI, Socialists could win over the majority of the Italian left.37

264 STABILIZATION

Nenni's strategy was to keep in step with the PC1 by staking out a series of extreme public positions. As soon as the war ended, he had gone into high gear. All parties were bound to observe the truce on discussion of the institutional question. In his first postvictory statement in May 1945, however, Nenni demanded the establishment of a republic. Shortly afterwards he was arrested for defying an Allied Military Government ban on holding mass meetings in the newly liberated north. Even more disturbing to both Allied officials and Italian moderates was the continued maintenance of PSI partisan formations months after the war's end.38 Nenni's aggressive behavior reflected personal optimism as well as political calculation. The formation of the Parri government in June 1945 and the Labour party's victory in England indicated a strong trend to the left, which buoyed the perpetually optimistic Nenni. Moreover, his strategy had its successes. In his dual positions as Minister for the Constituent and High Commissioner for the Purge in 1945, Nenni had harassed the right and created conditions for a victory for the republic in a future constituent assembly. Nenni and other Socialist leaders believed that the creation of a republic was the essentid first step toward a revolution in ~ t a l In~ addition, . ~ ~ Nenni's preoccupation with the republic had strengthened his alliance with the PCI, whose leaders shared his conviction that the destruction of the monarchy was an essential precondition for achieving their objectives. The Communists pressed for a fusion of the two parties. Nenni avoided both fusion and a public break with his powerful Communist ally. The threat of a fusion ignited the barely suppressed fears of the right-wing Socialists and af Nenni's Labour party allies in Britain. In April 1946, Nenni's internal opponents, aided by the Labour party, ousted the Socialist leader as party secretary. A new party secretariat, carefully balanced between left and right wings, shelved the fusion issue.40 This compromise failed to stabilize the PSI. In spite of successfully ousting Nenni, his right-wing opponents were in the minority. Moreover, Nenni never admitted defeat and immediately rallied the various factions of the left. With the fusion issue safely buried, the debate within the Socialist party centered on the extent of its cooperation with the PCI. Nenni easily rallied a strong majority to his view that the two Marxist parties needed a very close alliance. In January 1947, this viewpoint was triumphantly endorsed at the Socialist congress of The minority did not accept its defeat. Giuseppe Saragat, their leader, regarded the Communist issue as one of principles, not tactics, and broke with the PSI for betraying its democratic character.42 The schism reinforced leftist currents within the party. Nevertheless,

TRIUMPH OF T H E CONSERVATIVES 265

throughout 1947 American leaders nursed the hope that the PSI's rank and file could be won away from a few bad leaders. The United States supported and aided Saragat while simultaneously encouraging moderate and anti-Communist elements within the Socialist party. This policy failed. Nenni and his more radical ally, Lelio Basso, successfully weathered the American-backed challenges to their leadership, while the Saragat Socialists failed to gain broad support. In October 1947, the remnants of the Action party joined the PSI, strengthening the left while dealing a damaging psychological blow to Saragat's Social Democratic party. Moreover, the Americans were committed to a confrontation with the Communists and their allies. They ignored the warnings from anti-Communist Italian Socialists that hard-line tactics undercut their chances to build an independent PSI. The Americans and Italian Socialists engaged in a running political battle, which in its intensity equaled that between the United States and Italy's ~ o m m u n i s t s . ~ ~ The bitter 1948 electoral struggle revived American hopes that moderate elements within the PSI could recapture the party. Important PSI leaders were clearly restive with the electoral pact that Nenni negotiated with the PCI, and available evidence suggested that the rank and file shared this discontent. In addition, various European Socialist parties led by the British Labour party were attacking Nenni while providing aid to the Social Democrats they formerly shunned.44 The PSI's crushing defeat in the April 1948 elections brought the simmering rebellion of the moderates to the surface. Led by Giuseppe Romita, angry Socialists demanded an emergency party congress to pass judgment on the Nenni-Basso leadership and their policy of collaboration with the PCI. After defeating the left, the moderates planned to seek reunification with the PSLI. Romita's effort enjoyed the sympathy and support of both the PSLI and the Americans, although U.S. Ambassador Dunn doubted that he could oust the charismatic Nenni.45 Dunn's skepticism was justified. The July 1948 Socialist party congress elected a new centrist party leadership and adopted a platform that modified the alliance strategy of Nenni and Basso. The major factions created independent power bases. Nenni became president of the Socialist parliamentary group and utilized this position to continue collaboration with the PCI. Romita and his allies set about building their own political apparatus, including a newspaper, and strengthened their ties with the PSLI. Both wings ignored the directives of the central committee as it suited their objectives. A powerless center quickly lost its prestige, and the potential for further schisms within the PSI increased.46 This state of affairs tempted United States leaders to intervene. Senior

268 STABILIZATION

American officials were convinced that the Marshall Plan's success hinged on the presence within the De Gasperi government of a strong, reformist Socialist party. The PSLI was obviously too small to create the necessary pressure for reform. The Americans, therefore, wanted to create a broadly based Socialist party by unifying the PSLI, a number of Socialist splinter groups, and the center and right wings of the PSI.47 The British Labour Party was the agent for this effort to promote Socialist reunification. In January 1949, the International Department of the Labour Party, with American backing, held a conference at Claxton, England, on reunification and sent Dennis Healey, its Director, to Italy to confer with the Socialist factions and encourage unification. Hopes for a major change of leadership by the PSI were again high.48 These hopes evaporated as the PSLI fell into factional infighting over a variety of issues, including Italian participation in NATO and the management of ERP aid. The Social Democrats' left faction wanted the PSLI to withdraw from the government, arguing that this maneuver would improve the prospects for Socialist ~ n i f i c a t i o n .The ~ ~ crisis within the Social Democratic party deepened throughout the winter of 1949. In early March, the party directorate called an emergency national congress for June to settle internal difficulties. While his disorganized opponents fought each other, Nenni reestablished control over the PSI, or more correctly, over the largest fragment of the Italian Socialist movement. The schisms that the United States had encouraged left a weakened PSI totally in the control of forces favoring cooperation with the PCI. The anti-Communist Socialists were too divided to play the role that the United States felt was essential to the success of its stabilization program.

With American stabilization programs facing serious difficulties, Italian membership in the new North Atlantic alliance system took on great importance. Although Italy lacked significant military power, political and military grand strategy dictated some form of Italian participation in an American-led defense organization. Italy's strategic position made its membership in a Western alliance highly desirable from both the miIitary and political point of view. American and British military men had lasting memories of Italian ability to block passage through the Mediterranean as well as of Italy's natural defenses. Western European leaders feared the loss of their political southern flank. The events of 1947-48 heightened awareness of Italy's importance. Moreover, internal political developments increased the

TRIUMPH OF THE CONSERVATIVES 267 value of Italian participation for American policymakers. The inability of ERP aid and covert political operations to isolate the Communists and their PSI allies was due in great part to the reluctance of moderate Socialists to break their ties with the left. PSLI leaders continued to insist that participation in ERP did not mean that Italy had made a commitment to the West and that Italy could pursue a third course of European integration that would prevent the solidification of political blocs. The Americans were searching for a vehicle that would force the moderate left to abandon neutralist illusions of Europe moderating between the Soviet Union and the United States and would finalize their break with the left, isolating the PC1 and PSI. The decision to invite Italy to join the North Atlantic alliance was a difficult one. The United States briefly considered and then rejected plans to include Italy in a European defense pact in the tense days prior to the April 1948 elections as a means of psychological reinforcement of De Gasperi. As soon as the elections were over, American leaders began to question the concept of Italian participation in the emerging Atlantic pact. Geographically, Italy was not an Atlantic nation. Another worry was what effects a major modernization of Italy's military forces would have on its weak economy. Atlantic pact membership might negate the effects of ERP aid. Furthermore, De Gasperi's electoral victory reduced Italy's internal security requirements, while the peace treaty strictly limited Italian rearmament and, thus, greatly limited the contribution that Italy could make to a defensive military alliance. In addition, the Truman administration had to face objections to Italian membership from other European allies, from within the Department of State, and most importantly, from influential United States senators. The last factor was especially critical from spring through fall of 1948 when Truman's reelection seemed improbable and bipartisanship was essential for the president's domestic political strategy and for the effective operation of United States foreign policy. The United States, however, avoided a definitive decision on Italy by placing the issue before its European allies.50 The Italian government also had doubts about its participation in the Atlantic alliance. Large portions of its populace were reluctant to join the Western bloc. Even pro-American Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza initially balked at the concept of a Western defense pact. Sforza preferred an economic alliance among the Western states; he warned that any effort to build a military and political alliance on top of the Marshall Plan would only heighten East-West tensions. Prior to the April 1948 elections, Sforza and De Gasperi shied away from policies that smacked of Italian subservience to Washington. Another consideration that weighed upon Italian leaders was the possibility that Yugoslavia would utilize Italian membership in a military pact as a pretext for


occupying the rest of Venezia Giulia. The Italians feared that the Western states would not risk war to defend Italy from Yugoslav aggression. Even proWestern Italians demanded that any military alliance include specific American guarantees to defend Italy's border^.^' Only one major Italian politician was fully committed to Italy's participation in an Atlantic alliance: Italy's ambassador to Washington, Alberto Tarchiani. Beginning in April 1948, he campaigned for an immediate Italian commitment to participate in the still formless defense pact. In late April and early May, Tarchiani outlined for Secretary Marshall and John D. Hickerson, the chief of State's Office of European Affairs, Italy's request for military aid and political commitments that would assure its participation in an Atlantic bloc. He then returned to Rome to convince his superiors that only membership in the nascent alliance would secure Italy's borders and its economic and military needs.52 Officials at Rome were considerably less enthusiastic about an early Italian commitment to a Western alliance. Powerful opposition to Italian membership existed in De Gasperi's own party and among Italian industrialists as well as in the parties of the moderate left. The Italian prime minister decided to seek specific concessions on the still unsettled question of the final disposal of Italy's colonies, together with relaxation of some of the military restrictions of the peace treaty as the price for Italian membership. The shrewd De Gasperi probably calculated that the delay involved in diplomatic discussions would provide him with a better reading of the extent to which the traditionally isolationist Americans were committed to participating in a pact for the defense of Western ~ u r o p e . ~ ~ De Gasperi's maneuvers failed to satisfy domestic political critics and created major foreign policy problems. Tarchiani warned that American leaders were impatient with Italy's ambivalence toward the Atlantic alliance: "The ministry asks for continued American intervention but offers only neutrality. certainly not a good money of exchange." De Gasperi's demands aroused British resistance and strengthened the hand of those European governments that already opposed Italian participation in the alliance. De Gasperi was caught between two fires. The Catholic right, spearheaded by Catholic Action, demanded an immediate commitment to the Western bloc. The Christian Democrats' left wing, under the leadership of Giovanni Gronchi, strongly opposed this course, fearing that the Communists would exploit the issue to strengthen their hold on the labor movement. Even Christian Democrat centrists doubted the benefits of membership in the alliance.54 During the fall and winter of 1948, the American position began slowly to modify in favor of Italian participation. In October, Marshall visited Rome to


discuss economic and defense issues. Sforza reassured the secretary of state that Italy shared the United States' commitment to Western defense, but added that because the peace treaty left Italy defenseless, his government needed ironclad guarantees for its territorial defense and time to convince its people of the benefits of a Western alliance. Ambassador Dunn endorsed Sforza's line of reasoning. He urged that the United States undertake a public relations campaign to build Italian support for a European defense agreement. Dunn recommended modernizing Italy's defense forces to strengthen its case for membership in the Atlantic alliance with both domestic and foreign opinion. As a part of the effort to enhance Italy's military image, the United States invited Italian Army Chief of Staff Efisio Murras to Washington for talks. The Italian general even met Truman. This heavy emphasis on public relations contrasted starkly with American unwillingness to meet Murras's requests for vastly expanded military aid. The United States insisted that the Italians must observe the peace treaty limits.55 Meanwhile, reasons for including Italy in the North Atlantic pact grew. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that Italy was too important strategically to be left out of a European defense alliance and that, notwithstanding the treaty, Italy's armed forces must be modernized to face the threat of internal subversion. American leaders were also convinced that the best way to destroy the threat of Communist subversion was through the isolation of the PC1 and its allies. However, neither the Marshall Plan nor the efforts to create a massbased, anti-Communist Socialist party or trade union movement were succeeding. Meanwhile, important elements of the moderate left continued to look for a third way and to maintain their contacts with the Nenni Socialists. The Communists, moreover, launched a highly effective campaign against the Atlantic pact, charging that it would commit Italy to a new war. Public revelation that a number of Western European states opposed Italian membership in the pact reinforced antialliance forces. This blow to Italian amour propre renewed concern over the willingness of Italy's allies to defend its national boundaries in the event of war.56 The breadth of the coalition of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists, and Communists, which attacked the treaty in parliament and in the press, was impressive. Influential reformists like Piero Calarnandrei and Ugo Guido Mondolfojoined Nenni in the front ranks of the opponents of the treaty. The struggle over NATO threatened to fracture further the tenuous unity of the PSLI. The usually understated Mondolfo, a PSLI leader, warned that the treaty would tie Italy to one of the two states contesting world hegemony. Nenni claimed that the treaty turned Italy into "an aircraft carrier of imperiali~m."~~ In January 1949, American backing for Italian membership in NATO crys-

270 STABILIZATION tallized. Hickerson had championed Italian inclusion in NATO throughout 1948. He convinced the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that Italy belonged in the alliance. Acheson then presented the Italian case to Truman, who agreed to support Italian membership in discussions with the European allies. Meanwhile, the Italian government also decided that participation in NATO was vital to its interests. De Gasperi feared that failure to join the alliance would Ieave his nation in diplomatic isolation. Furthermore, the pact clearly achieved a key Italian foreign policy objective: an American commitment to the defense of Europe. Finally, De Gasperi had reached the same judgment as the Americans about the need to isolate the PC1 from the moderate left. The Italians, however, wanted an invitation to join the Atlantic pact.j8 Within the multinational North Atlantic pact planning committee, opposition to Italian participation dissolved. In addition to the United States, France strongly championed Italian membership in an effort to include its Mediterranean colony, Algeria, in the pact and thus achieve formal recognition of its claim that Algeria was part of "Metropolitan" France. However, the Western states were unwilling to invite Italy to join. When the Italian government realized that no invitation would be forthcoming, they formally applied for membership on 1 March 1949.'~ Aided by Tarchiani's astute cultivation of key members of Congress, the Truman administration won congressional approval of Italian membership and formally assented at the 7 March 1949 meeting of the NATO planning ~ommittee.~' NATO quickly achieved American objectives by driving a wedge between the moderate left and the PSI. In spite of serious protests within his party, Saragat supported NATO membership within the government and carried the PSLI with him. The PSI and PC1 launched violent attacks on NATO. Nenni warned that NATO would divide Europe and polarize Italian society; he insisted that only the collective security machinery of the United Nations offered the hope of lasting peace. De Gasperi countered that the Italian people had to choose between security and war. The polarization that NATO created within Italy was a necessary segregation of antidemocraticforces from the rest of society. De Gasperi proudly affirmed that his alliance with the United States provided Italy economic assistance and political and military security through NATO? The United States provided discreet support for De Gasperi's efforts to win the backing of the left wing of his coalition for NATO membership. American policymakers were concerned with the psychological impact of the North Atlantic treaty and sought to avoid any implication that Italy was a second-rate


power. The United States took steps to see that debate in the United Nations on the potentially embarrassing issue of the fate of Italy's colonial empire was postponed. Minor Italian infractions of the peace.treaty were ignored.62 Count Sforza signed the North Atlantic pact at a ceremony in Washington on 4 April 1949. Domestic criticism of the pact continued unabated, but Italian membership in NATO served the purposes of both the United States and De Gasperi governments. The parties of the moderate left had chosen to support the prime minister and endorse a military and political alliance with the United States. The United States had solidified its commitment to the Christian Democrat party and through this to a conservative reconstruction in Italy. Supported by the reform-oriented United States and the Italian moderate left, De Gasperi and his fellow conservatives stabilized Italy.

Conclusion Toward an 'Historic CompromiseR?

By 1950, the heroic era of the American stabilization program in Italy was ending. A democratic government held power. The PC1 was isolated and no longer represented a legitimate governing alternative to the Christian Democrats. Unfortunately for American plans, the PC1 shared its isolation with the Socialist party and most of the organized labor movement. The fox was trapped inside the chicken house. The anti-Communist Socialists and the antiCommunist trade unions failed to win the working classes away from the CGIL and other Communist-dominated labor organizations. During the NATO debate the Communists and Socialists successfullyexploited Italian fears of a new war to champion peace and Italy's independence from foreign domination. In backing the treaty, reformist Socialists widened the gap between themselves and the working class. Italy was polarizing into two societies: a middle class-dominated state that was ruled by the Christian Deme crats and a state within this state, dominated by the Italian Communist party. Between 1948 and 1953, De Gasperi's successive governments failed to institute effective social reform laws. Faced with serious decline in its popular support, the Christian Democrat leadership ramrodded a new election law through parliament early in 1953 that would provide a bonus of additional seats to any party or bloc that won 50 percent of the vote. The proposal was designed to retain an absolute Christian Democrat majority and keep the left in permanent isolation.' It was also strongly reminiscent of the 1923 Acerbo Law, which had solidified fascism's control over Italy. The left seized the opportunity to defend democratic practice and themselves from the "swindle law." The June 1953 elections were a triumph for the far right and left at the

C O N C L U S I O N 273

expense of the parties of the center. The democratic parties (Liberals, Christian Democrats, Republicans, and Social Democrats) held a wafer-thin majority. De Gasperi was finished politically. At the same time, however, the Italian economy began to show dramatic signs of improvement. Einaudi's antiinflation policies had stabilized the lira. By the early 1950s, the Italian government began seriously investing its reserves of ERP aid in economic expansion projects. The war in Korea prompted new United States military aid programs and offered the Italians the chance simultaneously to break down the restrictions imposed by the Paris Peace Conference and to expand their production and employment through the creation of a new armaments industry. Initially, Italy produced for the defense of an arms-scarce Western Europe, but soon expanded its sales to the Third World. Finally, the stabilization of the Italian economy enticed American banks and corporations into major inve~tment.~ All of these factors stood at the base of the so-called economic miracle of the 1950s and early 1960s, which saw a rapid and massive expansion of Italian production and domestic consumption. Economic well-being created, in turn, the basis for political stabilization and Christian Democrat political predominance, without, however, destroying the power base of the PCI. Reform-minded leaders of the Socialist Labor and Republican parties and the left wing of the Christian Democrats searched for a formula that would end the dangerous polarization of Italian society by bringing the Socialist party and the Italian working classes into the governing coalition while keeping the PC1 isolated. Amintore Fanfani, a leader of the Christian Democrat center-left, sponsored a variety of laws designed to win working-class allegiance to parliamentary democracy, to entice the PSI from its alliance with the PCI, and to build working-class support for his party. As Christian Democratic party secretary from 1954 to 1958, Fanfani set about building a strong political organization that would reduce party dependence on the Vatican and make it a more attractive partner to the secular parties of the left. Soviet Communist party leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation in February 1956 of Stalin and the Soviet repression of revolutionary Hungary later that year gave a restive Pietro Nenni the opening he needed to break his party's decade-long subordination to the PCI. A slow rapprochement began between the Socialist and Christian Democrat parties. It culminated in December 1963 when Nenni and five of his colleagues became ministers in a Christian Democrat-led coalition government, widening the governing majority. The PCI, meanwhile, gradually broke out of its isolation and claimed the role of a democratic opposition party. In spite of their continuing doubts about the

274 C O N C L U S I O N

Communists' commitment to democracy, Italian leaders encouraged this development, while refusing to include PC1 ministers in a governing ~ o a l i t i o n . ~ The resilient Italian political system absorbed first the PSI and then the PCI, successfully withstood a decade-long assault by terrorists, and instituted enough reforms to retain the loyalty if not the deep affection of its citizens. A strong majority of Italians preferred change within a democratic system. In retrospect, American involvement in the stabilization of Italy was a significant, if troubling, achievement. American power assured Italians the right to choose their future form of government and also was employed to ensure that they chose democracy. In the defense of that democracy against real but probably overestimated foreign and domestic threats, the United States used undemocratic tactics that tended to undermine the legitimacy of the Italian state. Fortunately, the democratic consensus in Italy was broad enough to survive the damage inflicted on it by overeager foreign protectors. Ultimately, the Italian willingness to include the Communists within the democratic consensus provided the stability that anti-Communist American policies threatened. Although the Italians had to rescue the stabilization program from the excesses of its creators, the American achievement in Italy was impressive. In partnership with a broad coalition of Italian moderates, the United States played a leading role in creating a democratic state; resuscitating a warprostrated economy; feeding, sheltering, and employing millions; securing a reasonable peace; and defending this settlement from the threats of British imperial aspirations, Soviet economic exploitation, and the miIlenarian expectations that dominated the thinking of portions of the rank and file and even some of the leaders of Italy's two leftist mass parties. The United States did not avoid serious mistakes and could not provide cures for all the difficulties that plagued Italy. The armistice regime was a harsh and unnecessary anomaly by 1944. The peace treaty was too severe, especially in its psychological impact on a nation seeking to build a democracy. American intervention, especially after 1950, was often a needless meddling in the internal affairs of a nation whose commitment to democratic values was as deep as that of the United States. Nevertheless, the American stabilization of Italy between 1940 and 1950 was a positive achievement, because the Italians were free to build a better society within the framework of a democratic state. This ultimateIy was the goal of stabilization politics, and in Italy, at least, stabilization succeeded.

Abbreviations in Notes

In citing works in the notes, short titles have generally been used. Works or organizations frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations: ACC: Allied Control Commission. ACI: Allied Advisory Commission for Italy. AC/S: Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome, Italy. Actes et Documents: Pierre Blet et al., eds. Actes et Documents du Saint Si&e relatifs d la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 7 vols. Vatican City, 1965AFHQ: Allied Force Headquarters. AGL: Archivio Giustizia e Liberti. Berle, Navigating: B. Berle and T. Jacobs, eds. Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971. New York, 1973. Cadogan Diary: David Dilks, ed. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. New York, 1972. CCAC: Combined Civil Affairs Committee. CCS: Combined Chiefs of Staff. CIA: Central Intelligence Agency. Civil Affairs: Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, eds. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. Washington, 1964. CLNAI, Atti: Gaetano Grassi, ed. Verso il govern0 del popolo: Atti e documenti del C W , 1943-1946. Milan, 1977. COS: British Chiefs of Staff. Decade: U.S. Department of State. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949. Washington, 1950. De Gasperi Scrive: Maria-Romana De Gasperi, ed. De Gasperi Scrive. 2 vols. Brescia, 1974. DSB: Department of State Bulletin. Eisenhower Papers: Alfred Chandler et al., eds. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. 9 vols. Baltimore, 1970-1978. FNB: Foreign Nationalities Branch. FO 371: General Correspondence of the British Foreign Office. FDRL: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

276 A B B R E V I A T I O N S I N N O T E S FDR, PPA: Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Edited by S. Rosenman. Vols. 8-13. New York, 1941-1950. FDR, PPC: Roosevelt, Franklin D. Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 24 vols. in 12. New York, 1972. FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States. Annual volumes, 1940-1950. Washington, 1959-1977. G-5: Civil Affairs Division. HQ: Headquarters. HSTL: Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. HST, PP: Truman, Harry S. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S. Truman. 6 vols. Washington, 1961-1965. ISRT: Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana, Florence, Italy. Italian Desk Files: Records of the Office of Western European Affairs Relating to Italy, 1943-1949. JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff. LC: Library of Congress. NA: National Archives, Washington, D.C. NAC: National Advisory Committee on International Monetary and Financial Policy. NNMM: Modem Military Branch, National Archives. OASW: Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. OF: Official Files. ORE: Office of Research and Estimates (Central Intelligence Agency). OSS: Office of Strategic Services. PPF: President's Personal Files. Prem: Prime Minister's Correspondence. PRO: Public Record Office. PSF: President's Secretary's Files. PWB: Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Force Headquarters. RG 56: Record Group 56, National Archives: Records of the Secretary of the Treasury. RG 59: Record Group 59, National Archives: General Records of the Department of State. RG 84: Record Group 84, National Archives: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. RG 107: Record Group 107, National Archives: Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. RG 165: Record Group 165, National Archives: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs. RG 169: Record Group 169, National Archives: Records of the Foreign Economic Administration. RG 208: Record Group 208, National Archives: Records of the Office of War Information. RG 218: Record Group 218, National Archives: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. RG 226: Record Group 226, National Archives: Records of the Office of Strategic Services.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S I N N O T E S 277 RG 260: Record Group 260, National Archives: Records of United States Occupation Headquarters, World War 11. RG 286: Record Group 286, National Archives: Records of the Agency for International Development. RG 319: Record Group 3 19, National Archives: Records of the (U.S.) Army Staff. RG 331: Record Group 331, National Archives: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War 11. RG 353: Record Group 353, National Archives: Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees, Department of State. RG 407: Record Group 407, National Archives: Records of the Adjutant General. Roosevelt-ChurchillCorrespondence: Francis Loewenheim et al., eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. New York, 1975. Roosevelt, Letters: Elliot Roosevelt, ed. FDR: His Personal Letters. 2 vols. New York, 1947-1950. SAC: Supreme Allied Commander. SWNCC: State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. U.S. and Italy: United States and Italy, 19364946: Documentary Record. Washington, 1946. Wartime Correspondence: USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondencebetween the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. 2 V O ~ MOSCOW, . 1957.

PREFACE 1. The text of Sforza's statement and a description of the treaty ceremony are in New York Times, 5 April 1949. 2. The best works are in the series, The United States Army in World War 11: Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, and Garland and Smyth, Sicily. Also, Reitzel, Mediterranean. 3. Cf. Edelman's dissertation, "Incremental Involvement." 4. Hanis, Allied Military Administration of Italy, also remains a fundamental work. 5. For example, Baget-Bozzo, I1 partito cristiano a1 potere. Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana. Catalano, Storia dei Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia. Piscitelli, Da Parri a De Gasperi. Gallerano, "L'influenza dell'amministrazione militare alleata sulla riorganizzazione dello stato italiano," pp. 4-22. Above all, the excellent Quazza, Resistenza e storia d'ltalia. Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi. See also Delzell, Mussoiini's Enemies. 6. For example, the essays in Quazza et al., L'ltalia dalla liberazione alla repubblica . 7. Above all in Ellwood's L'alleato nemico. Cf. Howard, Mediterranean Strategy; Varsori, "Italy, Britain and Separate Peace." 8. Di Nolfo, "Stati Uniti e Italia tra la seconda guerra mondiale e il sorgere della guerra fredda"; Di Nolfo, "Problemi della politica estera Italiana, 1943-50"; and Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti. 9. Kolko, Politics of War, pp. 43-63. 10. Ward, Threat of Peace; Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, Semblance of Peace. 11. Harper's dissertation, "The United States and the Italian Economy." Cf. Southard, Finances of European Liberation. 12. Varsori, I1 diverso declino di due potenze coloniali; Varsori, "La Gran Bretagna." 13. This gap is partially remedied in Aga Rossi, Ilpiano Marshall e 1'Europa. A number of younger scholars are working on aspects of the Marshall Plan. A useful addition to the debate on stabilization is La Palma, "Italy." 14. In addition to Varsori, "La Gran Bretagna," see Miller, "Taking Off the

280 NOTES T O PAGES 3-14 Gloves"; Edelman, "Incremental InvoIvement" (dissertation); Smith, "United States, Italy and NATO (dissertation); and Smith, "Fear of Subversion."

INTRODUCTION

1. On post-World War I stabilization, see Leffler, Elusive Quest; Mayer, Wilson versus Lenin, and Politics; Levin, Woodrow Wilson; Parini, Heir to Empire; Hogan, Informal Entente; Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, and 'Two Postwar Eras." Migone, Gli Stati Uniti e if Fascismo, pp. 173-74, 180-82. 2. On the triumph of internationalism, see Divine, Second Chance. Patterson, Mr. Republican. Griffith, "Old Progressives." 3. Cf. Calleo and Rowland, World Political Economy. Aron, Imperial Republic. Iatrides, "American Attitudes." Maier, "Politics of Productivity." 4. Cf. Ellwood, "A1 tramonto dell'impero britannico." 5. Miller, "Search for Stability"; Leffler, "American Conception of National Security."

CHAPTER 1

1. Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, 2:43-44. Ickes, Diary, 2:286; 276. 2. Cf. Jonas, Isolationism in America, and Adler, Isolationist Impulse. 3. Department of State, "Memorandum on Italian Fascist Operations in Latin America" (1939), "3850 Italy," G-2 Regional Files, RG 165, NA. Roosevelt, Letters, 2779-80. Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, 250. Steele, First Offensive, p. 25. Adams, Economic Diplomacy, p. 207. Ickes, Diary, 2:473-74. Mangione, Ethnic at Large, p. 247. FDR, PPA, 9:158-62, 184-87. 4. Adams, Economic Diplomacy, vii-viii. New York Herald Tribune, 1 November 1941. Ninkovich, "Currents of Cultural Diplomacy." The Italian Ambassador (Colonna) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 5 April and 30 July 1941, PWB Special Report No. 78, RG 59, NA. 5. Nixon, Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 2:232-35, 5 10-13. Cf. Gardner, Economic Aspects. 6. Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities, p. 52. Parini to Alfieri, Rome, 29 May 1937, PWB Special Report No. 128, RG 59, NA. Rocco to Mussolini, Rome, 3 April 1941, PWB Special Report No. 76, RG 59, NA. Walters, Silent Missions, p. 350, states that the Italians even managed to infiltrate the ultra secret U.S. atomic energy program. He rates their intelligence work in the United States highly. Report of the Bergamasci Mission, 18 October 1935, PWB Special Report No. 101, RG 59, NA. Villari to the Director General of the Ministry of Popular Culture, Rome, 8 July 1940: PWB Special Report No. 109, ibid. Rocco to Mussolini, RG 59, NA. 7. "Propaganda negli Stati Uniti," 5 June 1937, PWB Special Report No. 109A, RG 59, NA. Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities, p. 37. See also "Within the Gates," Nation, 19 October 1940. 8. Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities, pp. 124-3 1.

NOTES TO PAGES 14-22

281

9. Myron Taylor to William Phillips, New York, 1 March 1937, "842 Italy America Society," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA; and Ugo Cecini to Phillips, New York, 25 August 1937, "842 Italian Institute of Culture," ibid. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, is an excellent survey of Fascist propaganda. 10. Samuel Reber, "Italian Cultural Propaganda Abroad," n.d., ca. January 1938, "842 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 11. Ibid. 12. "Propaganda negli Stati Uniti," RG 59, NA. Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities, pp. 135-43, 194. Reber, RG 84, NA. I1 Controcorrente, December 1939. Ugo Carusi to Charles Poletti, Washington, 24 July 1940, "Vincenzo Rossi," Charles Poletti Papers, Columbia University, New York. 13. I1 Controcorrente, January 1940. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 94-95. 14. Miller, "Question of Loyalty." Bruner and Sayre, "Short Wave Listening." 15. La Sentinella, 1 November 1940. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 84-86. 16. Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 111-1 13, 119. Nixon, Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 3:95. 17. Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 232. Nixon, Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 3:34. The Italian Ambassador (Suvich) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 4 February 1937, PWB Special Report No. 78, RG 59, NA. 18. The Italian Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 26 September 1938, RG 59, NA. 19. Hachey, Conjdential Dispatches, p. 109. 20. Divine, Second Chance, pp. 38,41, 62-66. Iatrides, "American Attitudes." 21. Wallace, Democracy Reborn, pp. 142-43. 22. FDR, PPA, 8:l-12. 23. Errico, "New Deal." 24. Commonweal, 8 December 1939. Nation, 10 February 1940. Berle, Navigating, p. 268. Louis Mumford, "Corruption of Liberalism," New Republic, 29 April 1940. Nation, 20 April 1940. Sniegoski, "Unified Democracy." 25. FDR, PPA, 9:198-204,230-40. FDR, PPC, 26. Ickes, Diary, 3:254. FDR, PPA, 9:293-303,407-16,499-510. 16~25 1-52. 27. New Republic, 17 June 1940. Ickes, Diary, 3:295. Nation, 16 November 1940. 28. Nation, 18 May and 13 July 1940. 29. Wallace, American Choice, pp. 9-10, 14, 29-31, 33-34, 134, 136. 30. Adler, Isolationist Impulse, pp. 270-72, 274. New Republic, 2 June 1941. Herbert Apgar, "Who Are the Isolationists," Nation, 22 March 1941. Cf. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists. 31. Wallace, Democracy Reborn, pp. 176-79. Nation, 24 May 1941. "What Kind of Victory?" Common Sense (June 1941):176-77. 32. Ascoli, "War Aims and America's Aims." Cf. New York Times, 31 August 1941. Nation, 30 August 1941. See also New Republic, 25 August 1941. 33. Hull, Memoirs, pp. 365,747. Kolko, Politics of War, pp. 243-54. 34. Memorandum: "The Campaign to Undermine the State Department," n.d. but 1942, "US. Department of State, Attacks on," Cordell Hull Papers, LC. Nation, 25 December 1940 and 19 J U ~ ) 1941. New Republic, 23 June 1941.

282 NOTES T O PAGES 22-29 35. Wallace, Democracy Reborn, p. 18 1. 36. Ibid., pp. 183-87. 37. Ibid., pp. 183-87, 189. 38. See the comments in the New York Herald Tribune, 18 September 1941. 39. Chadwin, Hawks. Cf. Sniegoski, "Unified Democracy," and T ~ t t l e , ~ Ato i dthe Allies." 40. Henry Luce, "American Century," Life, 17 February 1941. For the background to Luce's article, see Swanberg, Luce and His Empire, pp. 172-83. 41. Nation, 1 March 1941. New Republic, 17 February 1941. 42. John Foster Dulles, "Peace Without Platitudes," Fortune, January 1942. 43. Snell, American Ground Transportation, pp. A 16-23. Migone, Gli Stati Unili e Fascismo, pp. 327-37. 44. Nation, 26 July 1941. In Fact, 9 June 1941. Cf. Call, 4 January 1941. 45. Freeman, "Delivering the Goods." Winkler, Politics of Propaganda. Berle, Navigating, p. 374. New York Times, 8 October 1941. Gardner, Economic Aspects, pp. 173-74. 46. Salvemini, Memorie, p. 109. 47. Tirabassi, "La Mazzini Society." Secretary's report on the first meeting of the Mazzini Society, 29 December 1939, fasc. 2, Fondo Mazzini Society, AGL, ISRT. 48. Frankfurter to Stacy May, Harvard, 15 July 1933; and Frankfurter to Ascoli, 1 June 1935, "Ascoli," Frankfurter Papers, LC. 49. Interview with Max Ascoli, 28 March 1974. Frankfurter to Ascoli, 22 March 1937, "Ascoli," Frankfurter Papers, LC. 50. New York Times, 28 December 1938. A. A. Berle to La Guardia, 19 April 1939, "La Guardia," Berle Papers, FDRL. A fruit of this cooperation was Keene, Neither Liberty nor Bread. 51. Miller, "Carlo Sforza." See also Varsori, Gli alleati. 52. Nation, 27 April 1940. "Political War," Free World, October 1941. New Republic, 13 January and 24 March 1941. 53. Miller, "Carlo Sforza," and "Question of Loyalty." Morgenthau diary, 328: 135-37, Morgenthau Papers, FDRL. Memorandum of a conversation between the Italian Ambassador (Colonna) and Assistant Secretary of State Long, 19 November 1940, Long Papers, LC. FDR, PPA, 9:638-39. 54. Ickes, Diary, 3:394-95,433. FRUS 1941,2:793-94. Memorandum of a conversation between Colonna and Hull, 2 May 1941, Long Papers, LC. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, p. 147. The order is in FDR, PPA 9:217-24. 55. Salvemini to Tarchiani, 24 January 1941, fasc. 55, Carteggio Tarchiani, Fondo Tarchiani, AGL, ISRT. Tarchiani to Salvemini, 26 March 1941, ibid. Corriere del Popolo, 30 January 1941. Miller, "Carlo Sforza." New York Times, 17 and 18 Febmary 1941. Biococchi, "Propaganda fascista e cornunit2 italiane in USA." Varsori, Gli alleati, pp. 115-16. Letter from Varsori to the author, 14 JuIy 1982. Berle, Navigating, p. 358. Ickes to Sforza, 5 April 1941, "War File No. 1 1 ," Secretary of Interior Files, Ickes Papers, LC. 56. Miller, "Question of Loyalty." Chadwin, Hawks, p. 22. 57. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 347-48. 58. Miller, "Carlo Sforza," and "Question of Loyalty."

N O T E S T O PAGES 2 9 - 3 9

283

59. Ibid. 60. Minutes of the 4 April 1942 meeting of the Political Subcommittee, MacLeish Papers, LC. 61. Di Nolfo, "Dite a1 re Vittorio," reprints the text of the note with a commentary. Donovan to Roosevelt, 30 May 1942, "OSS vol. 12," PSF, FDW. Actes et Documents, 5:707-9. On U.S. exile policy, see Davis, Cold War Begins, pp. 37,74-75. 62. Sforza to Roosevelt, 7 April 1942, PPF 6741, FDRL. Nazione Unite, 9 April 1942. Borgese to Tarchiani, 13 May 1942, fasc. 7, Carteggio Tarchiani, Fondo Tarchiani, AGL, ISRT. Ascoli, "Notes for the Congress," n.d., "Mazzini Society," Ascoli Papers, New York City. 63. Miller, "Carlo Sforza," New York Times, 3 June 1942. Hull, Memoirs, p. 1548. 64. Miller, "Carlo Sforza." Memorandum of a conversation between Welles and Campbell, 1 1 August 1942, 865.10/87, RG 59, NA. 65. Miller, "Question of Loyalty." 66. "Notes on the Functions of the FNB," 23 July 1942, "Miscellaneous Papers," Foreign Nationalities Branch Correspondence, RG 226, NA. Eisenhower Papers, 1:447-49. Blair, "Amateurs in Diplomacy." Weil, Pretty Good Club, pp. 114, 119. 67. Blum, Price of Vision, pp. 126-27, 135-36. Civil AfSairs, pp. 14-29. Daniels, White House Witness, pp. 77-78, 83-86, 88-91. 68. Civil AfSairs, p. 45. Weil, Pretty Good Club, pp. 1 17-21. 69. Civil AfSairs, pp. 26-27. Blum, Price of Vision, pp. 184, 191. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, "Foreign National Groups in the U S . , Report No. 107: Freedom House," 17 February 1943, "Miscellaneous Correspondence," Foreign Nationalities Branch Correspondence, RG 226, NA. 70. FDR, PPA, 11:71-81. Miller, "Politics of Relief." Hassett, memorandum for files, 15 March 1943, PPF 4617, FDRL. 71. Miller, "Question of Loyalty." Nation, 9 January and 16 January 1943. 72. Cranston to Davis, 26 January 1943, "Propaganda," Records of the Director, RG 208, NA.

CHAPTER 2 1. Range, Roosevelt's World Order, pp. 2, 137. 2. Bums, Roosevelt, pp. 421-29. 3. Miller, "Search for Stability." Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, p. 46. 4. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 659. 5. Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Unit;, pp. 221-22. Actes et Documents, 7:123-24, 134-35. FRUS 1942,3:795-96. 6. Cadogan Diary, p. 499. FRUS 1942,3:797-800, FRUS 1943,2:913. 7. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, pp. 581-88,597-98,63132, 685,713-14,716. FDR, PPC, 21:87-89. 8. FRUS 1943, 291 1. La Guardia to Roosevelt, 27 December 1942 and Roosevelt to La Guardia, 30 December 1942, PSFLa Guardia, FDRL. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, pp. 363-64. Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 365.

284 NOTES T O PAGES 4 0 - 4 5 For a discussion of other factors influencing Roosevelt, see O'Connor, Diplomacy for Victory, pp. 19-22, 35-43, 51, 53. 9. Blum, Price of Vision, pp. 15 1-52, 156, 164-65. 10. Civil A#airs, pp. 165-67. FRUS 1943, 2:327. For a detailed analysis of this episode, see Varsori, " 'Senior' o 'Equal' Partner?" Sherwood, Rooseveit and Hopkins, pp. 721-24, 838. Documentation on this episode is in "OPD 381 Security (Casc 56):' Records of the Operations Division, RG 165, NA. 11. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 25, 30,44. Berle, Navigating, pp. 435-36. 12. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and ~ u e b e cpp. , 121, 150. Civil Affairs, pp. 145-46,382-83. 13. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 1 19-23. FDR, PPC, 22:22-28. New York Times, 30 May 1943. Luigi Sturzo, "After Mussolini What?" Voce del Popolo, 4 June 1943. Cadogan Diary, p. 534. Civil Affairs, p. 222. 14. FDR, PPC, 21:372-74. 15. CivilAffairs, pp. 173, 175. 16. CivilAflairs, p. 173. Eisenhower Papers, 2:1179-80. Butcher, My Three Ears with Eisenhower, pp. 322-23. Long to Hull, Washington, May 1943, "Division of European Affairs," Long Papers, LC. Poole to Donovan, 16 April 1943, "Miscellaneous Correspondence," Records of the Foreign Nationalities Branch, RG 226, NA. New York Times, 22 May 1943. 17. Weil, Pretty Good Club, pp. 129-39. 18. Ibid., pp. 82-83, 119. 19. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 191. 20. Taylor's report on his 1942 trip to Europe is in "Vatican: Taylor Report," Taylor Papers, FDRL. Large portions are reprinted in Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, pp. 175-188. Some portions were also reprinted in Aga Rossi, "La politica del Vatican~ durante la seconda guerra mondiale." FRUS 1942, 3:792-94. Di Nolfo, Vatican0 e Stati Uniti, pp. 23 1-32. 21. Minutes of the 11 December 1942 meeting of the Territorial Subcommittee, "T Minutes 1-35," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. E. Rothwell, "A Note on Opposition," T192, 12 December 1942, "T Docs," ibid. Rothwell, 'X Note on Italian Institutions," T-195, 17 December 1942, "T Docs," ibid. Minutes of the 18 December 1942 meeting of the Territorial Subcommittee, "T Minutes 1-35," ibid. Memorandum from Jones to Dunn, 31 December 1942,865.0012026, RG 59, NA. 22. Minutes of the 6 January 1943 meeting of the Political Subcommittee, "PSC Minutes 32-49," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1943, 2:317. 23. P-170: "Problems Relating to a Government of Italy Based on the House of Savoy," 7 January 1943, "P Docs 170-200," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 24. P-236: "Summary of Views March 1942-July 1943," P236, "P Docs 201250," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 803-8. Hickerson to Forte, 6 June 1943,865.011207,RG 59, NA. Taylor to Hull, 12 June 1943, "May 17-June 14, 1943," Hull Papers, LC. Washington Post, 20 June 1943. 25. Eisenhower Papers, 21261-63. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, p. 266. Cf. Deakin, Brutal Friendship, pp. 398-419.

N O T E S T O PAGES 46-52

285

26. Montana, Amarostico, pp. 201-3. Miller, "Politics of Relief." Call, 2 April 1943. 27. Montana, Amarostico, pp. 210-13. Ascoli to Salvemini, 18 March 1943, "Salvemini," Ascoli Papers, New York City. Documentation on Antonini's actions'is in Miller, "Politica dei 'prominenti.' " 28. Montana, Amarostico, pp. 232-33. Miller, "Politics of Relief." Justice, 1 July 1943. 29. Memoranda of conversation between Gigliotti, Wellington, and Jones, both 26 June 1943, 865.01/237, RG 59, NA. New York Times, 19 July 1943. 30. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, is the best study of the Office of War Information and its problems. See also Weinberg, "What to Tell America." Koppes and Black, "What to Tell the World." Miller, "Question of Loyalty." 34. The manifesto's text is in U.S. and Italy, pp. 42-44. Winner to Sherwood, 19 July 1943, "Area I-Italy," Records of the Overseas Branch, RG 208, NA. See also Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, pp. 90-91. 35. Berle, Navigating, pp. 439-41. Eden, Memoirs, 2:465. 36. "Special Guidance on Badoglio and Mussolini," 25 July 1943, "Italy," Records of the Overseas Branch, RG 208, NA. Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, pp. 95-96, 112. 37. For detailed treatment of the Italian surrender negotiations see Quinlan, "Italian Armistice," pp. 203-3 10. Toscano, Dal25 luglio a11'8 settembre. Hilldring to the JCS Secretariat, 20 June 1943, CCS 397.27, RG 218, NA. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, pp. 22-26. 38. Eisenhower Papers, 2:1095-96, 1075, 1215, 1287, 1289-90. 39. FRUS 1943,2:332-35. Campbell, "Notes Submitted," 27 July 1943, CCAC 387 Italy, RG 218, NA. Civil Affairs, p. 224. New York Times, 26,27,28 July 1943. 40. DSB 9 (31 July 1943):64. I.E Stone, "How Washington Reacted," Nation, 7 August 1943. FDR, PPA, 12:326-36. FDR, PPC, 22:50-51. 41. Salvemini, "Words and Deeds," New Republic, 9 August 1943. 42. Nation, 7 August 1943. 43. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches, p. 122. On the evolution of British thinking about an Italian government, see Varsori, "Italy, Britain and Separate Peace." "The Downfall of Mussolini and Future Policy Towards Italy," 26 July 1943, FO 3711 37307iR6774, PRO. "Political Forces in Italy," 31 July 1943, FO 371137376lR7033, PRO. 44. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 64. FRUS 1943, 2336-37. 45. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, p. 521. 46. Eisenhower Papers, 2:1298, 1300-1301, 1310. Eisenhower to the Office of War Information, 31 July 1943, "800 Italy Pre-Armistice," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Civil Aflairs, p. 214. 47. Cadogan Diary, pp. 547-48. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 522,537. Ellwood, L'afleato nemico, pp. 35-38, 5 1-62. Minutes of the third meeting of the CCAC, 29 July 1943, "CCAC 387 Italy," RG 218, NA. Ricketts to

288 NOTES TO PAGES 52-58 British Civil Affairs, 19 August 1943, FO 371137308lR8027, PRO. 48. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, p. 527. Civii Affairs, p. 215. 49. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 537-52, 558-59. Berle, Navigating, p. 441. 50. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 532-54. FRUS 1943, 2:939-40. 51. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 455,451. Standley to the Department of State, 30 July 1943, 865.0012108, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1943,234445. Berle, Navigating, p. 441. 52. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 555,583-84,535-48. 53. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 88. 54. Cadogan Diary, p. 552. 55. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 594,914, 1057-58. 56. Ibid., pp. 600-601. 57. Ibid., p. 1088. 58. Memorandum of a conversation between Hull and Sfona, 16 August 1943, 865.011538, RG 59, NA. Poole to Grey, 26 August 1943, 865.01/377, ibid. 59. FRUS 1943,2:402-3. Cf. Ickes diary, 5 September 1943, Ickes Papers, LC. FRUS 1943, 2:403-4. Department of State to Murphy, 8 September 1943, 865.011 367A, RG 59, NA. 60. Eisenhower assured his superiors: "Nothing I am doing now or will do in the future implies any promises to any particular government or heads of government with respect to their status after occupation by Allied forces" (Eisenhower Papers, 2: 1375-76). 61. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 1276, 1278. Eisenhower Papers, 2:1405. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, p. 1217. 62. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 1225-26, 1339. Churchill to Eden, 9 September 1943, Prem 3124315, PRO. 63. Civil AfJhirs, pp. 231-32. Foreign Office to United Kingdom Delegation at Washington, 17 September 1943, Prem 3124315, PRO. 64. J. W. Jones to Berle and Matthews, 11 September 1943, 865.011616, RG 59, NA. Hickerson to Berle, 25 September 1943, 865.011606, ibid. 65. Hopkins, "Memorandum on Italy," 22 September 1943, "Italy," Special Assistant Files, Hopkins Papers, FDRL. Poletti to McSheny, 23 September 1943, 100001 100175, RG 331, NA. 66. Blum, Price of Vision, pp. 236-60. New Republic, 20 September 1943. Nation, 25 September 1943. "Military Occupation and Then What?" Harpers, October 1943. 67. FRUS 1943, 2:374-75. MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 September 1943, 100001100/74,RG 331, NA. Acquarone to Taylor, 28 September 1943, ibid. Harrison to Hull, 28 September 1943, 865.011458, RG 59, NA. Murphy to Roosevelt, 30 September 1943,865.011457%, ibid. Eisenhower to CCS, 20 September 1943, "800 Italy War," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Sforza interview with the International News Service, 28 November 1948, "Patto Atlantic0 1949," busta 7, Carte Sfona, ACIS.

NOTES TO PAGES 5 8 - 6 4

287

68. Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 October 1943, "800 Italy A-Z," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 69. Rumbold minute, 1 October 1943, FO 371137290lR9457, PRO. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 48-63. 70. FRUS 1943, 2:372. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 139. 71. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 171. Cadogan Diary, p. 564. Memorandum of a conversation between Eden and Sforza, 8 October 1943, Prem 3124315, PRO. 72. Prime Minister's minute, 11 October 1943, filed as an enclosure to a dispatch from Murphy to the Department of State, 1 November 1943, "800 Italy-Sforza," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Cadogan Diary, p. 566. 73. Memorandum of a conversation between Caccia and Victor Emmanuel, 17 October 1943, FO 371137294lR1157, PRO. 74. Murphy to the Department of State, 11 October 1943, "800 Italy, ACC," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Taylor to Eisenhower, 7 October 1943, "800 Italy King," ibid. FRUS 1943, 2:386. 75. MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 15 October 1943, 100001100/74, RG 331, NA. FRUS 1943,2409-10. 76. Taylor to Macmillan and Murphy, 18 October 1943, "800 Italy King," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Eisenhower to Taylor, 19 October 1943, ibid. Draft cable from the Foreign Office to the British Resident Minister, 20 October 1943, FO 3711 37292lR10434, PRO. Churchill minute, 21 October 1943, ibid. 77. FRUS 1943,2:411-12. Sfoaa to Churchill, 26 October 1943, 100001100174, RG 331, NA. 78. Macmillan, "Notes on a Visit to Italy," ca. 31 October 1943, "800 Italy Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 79. Civil Affairs, p. 430. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 1 November 1943, "800 Italy Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 80. Sargent and Pink, minutes, 2 November 1943, FO 371/37293/R11048, PRO. 81. Pink minute, 10 November 1943, FO 371/37294/R11410, PRO. Dixon minute, 8 November 1943, FO 371137295lR11755, ibid. Draft Foreign Office circular telegram, ca. 10 November 1943, FO 371/37295/R11971, ibid. 82. FRUS 1943,2:420,422-23. War Cabinet minutes 151 (43), 8 November 1943, Cab 65, PRO. 83. Roosevelt to Churchill, 9 November 1943, Prem 3124318, PRO. Eisenhower Papers, 3:1552-58. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 196-97. 84. FRUS 1943,2:423-27. DSB 9 (16 October 1943):256-58. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 244-45. 85. Divine, Second Chance, pp. 98-1 18. 86. Ibid., pp. 81-115, 124-27. 87. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches, pp. 75-76, 128-29. FDR, PPA, 11:32-42. FDR,PPA, 11:3. 88. Divine, Second Chance, pp. 113-15. Weil, Pretty Good Club, pp. 126-27. 89. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches, p. 75. Divine, Second Chance, pp. 149-55. Weil, Pretty Good Club, pp. 153-56. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches, p. 149. 90. Feis, "Restoring Trade." Welles, Four Freedoms, pp. 18-23. Baldwin, Eco-

288 NOTES T O PAGES 64-73 nomic Development, pp. 1, 14. 91. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 922. Kuklick, American Policy, pp. 3839. Baldwin, Economic Development, pp. 17,23. 92. Baldwin, Economic Development, pp. 53-54; Divine, Second Chance, pp. 117-19, 154-56.

CHAPTER 3 1. FRUS 1943, 3553-54. 2. Mastny, "Soviet War Aims." FRUS 1943, 3562. Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 32-33. 3. Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1165-69. "If Russia Makes Peace,'' Common Sense, March 1943. Mastny, "Stalin." 4. Stimson and Bundy, Active Service, p. 527. 5. Blum, Price of Vision, p. 144. Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1548-49. FRUS 1943, 2:346. 6. Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 127-30, 172-77, 189-91. 7. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 160-61, 176-77. Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 186-87. Davis, Cold War Begins, p. 37. 8. Hachey, ConjidentialDispatches, p. 71. Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, pp. 226-27. Miller, "Politica dei 'prominenti.' " 9. Cadogan Diary, pp. 545-46. 10. Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1460-61. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 39, 53, 61-62. Eden, Memoirs, p. 433. Cadogan Diary, pp. 477-78,512,577-82. 11. Bemstein, "Quest for Security." Cf. comments of Kennan, "United States and the Soviet Union." 12. FRUS 1943, 2~344-45. 13. Ibid., pp. 347-48. 14. Standley to the Department of State, 30 July 1943, 865.0012108, RG 59, NA. 15. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 1086-87. 16. Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 415. FRUS 1943, 2:357. 17. Matthews to Dunn, 24 August 1943,740.0019 EW 193911657, RG 59, NA. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 600-601. 18. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, p. 1173. Attlee to Churchill, 25 August 1943, Prem 3124113, PRO. 19. FRUS 1943,2:355-56. Churchill to the War Cabinet, 3 September 1943, Prem 3/241/3, PRO. Cadogan Diary, pp. 558-59. Wartime Correspondence, 1:153-54. FRUS 1943, 1:784. 20. FRUS 1943, 1:784-85. Wartime Correspondence, 1:159-61. FRUS 1943, 1:785; 2:375-76, 380. 21. FRUS 1943,2377-78. 22. Mastny, "Soviet War Aims." 23. Wiley to the Department of State, 3 October 1943, "800 Italy King," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Dixon and Strang minutes, 3 October 1943, FO 171137309JR


289

9541, PRO. FRUS 1943,2:384-86; 1554-56. 24. Leahy to Roosevelt, 2 October 1943, "Memos to and from President, 1 July 1943-November 1945," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. Roosevelt to Churchill, 4 October 1943, "Prime to President 1943," ibid. 25. FRUS 1943, 1552-54; 2:388-89. Churchill to Roosevelt, 16 October 1943, Prem 3124113, PRO. Wartime Correspondence, 2: 100-101. 26. Eden, Memoirs: Reckoning, p. 479. Wartime Correspondence, 2102. FRUS 1943, 1:596-97,605-13,714-15. Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1283-84. 27. FRUS 1943, l:7 15-18, 624. On the fleet question, see Bernardi, La Marina. 28. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 120. 29. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 2586-87. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 217-52. 30. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 251. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 127-28. Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1301-02. 31. FRUS 1943, 1:673-74. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 149-50. 32. "Secret Protocol, Advisory Council for Italy," "Moscow Conference, October 1943 General," Hull Papers, LC. U.S. and Italy, pp. 71-74. FRUS 1943, 2:412-13. 33. Hamilton to the Department of State, 23 November 1943, "800 Italy A-Z," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 34. Cadogan Diary, pp. 570-71. Wilson to King, 29 October 1943, tab 37911, CCS 3 18 Italy, RG 218, NA. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 331. 35. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 490-92. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 323. Cadogan Diary, p. 133. 36. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 597. 37. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 108-10. 38. Rumbold, minute, 9 December 1943, FO 37 1137296lR12803, PRO. 39. Ross, minute, 9 December 1943, ibid. The emphasis is Ross's. 40. See, for example, New York Times, 16 November 1943. FRUS 1943,2:42627. 41. Eisenhower to CCS, 28 November 1943, CCS 387 Italy, RG 218, NA. Civil Affairs, p. 294. Poletti, "Report on Popular Attitudes in Sicily," 10 December 1943, "AMG-General December 1943," Poletti Papers, Columbia University. Miller, "Search for Stability," for details. 42. OSS R&A report 1681: "The Radical Trend in German Occupied Italy," 10 January 1944, OSS Files, RG 59, NA. OSS R and A report 53758, "Politics and Sfoaa," ibid. MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 3 November 1943, "800 Italy-Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Bedell Smith to Murphy, 2 December 1943, "800 Italy-Territory," ibid. Jones to Berle, 23 November 1943, 865.011748, RG 59, NA. Miller, "Randoifo Pacciardi aux Etats-unis." 43. Hume to Eisenhower, 20 December 1943, 1000011321309, RG 331, NA. Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 22 December 1943, "800 Italy-Parties," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 44. Berle: "Reorganization of the Government of Liberated Italy," 21 January 1944, "Policy Committee-Documents-Europe,"Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 45. FRUS 1944, 3:1002-3. Macmillan to the Foreign Office, ca. 20 January 1944,

290 NOTES TO PAGES 79-84 ''801-Govemment, Jan. 11 to Feb. 29," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA, for the British rationale for supporting the king's request. Berle to Dunn and Stettinius, 24 January 1944,865.011965, RG 59, NA. 46. Minutes of the Political Committee Meeting, 24 January 1944, "PC Minutes," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1944, 2:1004-5. FRUS 1943, 1:1007. 47. Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Political Committee, 28 January 1944, "PC Minutes," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 48. Berle to Matthews and Fullerton, 3 February 1944,865.0111006, RG 59, NA. 49. Schieffelin to Hull, 22 January 1944, 865.011968, RG 59, NA. Miller, "Politics dei 'prominenti.' " Foreign Office to Macmillan, 24 January 1944, FO 3711 438141R1192, PRO. MacFarlane to the SAC, 24 January 1944, 1000011321309, RG 331, NA. Stone to MacFarlane, 26 January 1944, ibid. 50. MacFarlane to AFHQ, 24 January 1944, 1000011361114, RG 331, NA. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 112-13. 51. FRUS 1944,2:1012-13. AFHQ to CCS, 30 January 1944, 100001136i144,RG 331, NA. 52. Minutes by Rumbold, 2 February 1944 and Eden, 4 February 1944, FO 37 11 43814lR1646, PRO. 53. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 425-26. Minutes of a meeting of the Political Committee, 23 January 1944, "PC Minutes," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. FDR, PPC, 23: 14. 54. Reber to AFHQ, 2 February 1944, 1000011321309, RG 331, NA. Hull to Leahy, 4 February 1944, "CCS 387 Italy," RG 218, NA. FRUS 1944, 3:1018. 55. Memorandum of a conversation between Hull and Halifax, 4 February 1944, 865.001V8312-944, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1944,3:1016-18. Wilson to CCS, 9 February 1944, and Leahy to Hull, 10 February 1944, both "CCS 387 Italy," RG 218, NA. 56. Hull-Halifax memorandum of conversation, 4 February 1944, 865.00lV83/2944, RG 59, NA. Roosevelt to Stettinius, 10 February 1944, "State Dept.," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. 57. FRUS 1944,2:1019-21. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 426. 58. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 426-27. 59. Macmillan, Blast of War, pp. 399-400. 60.MacFarlane to Wilson, 13 February 1944, 10000/101/405, RG 331, NA. Churchill to MacFarlane and Wilson, 16 February 1944, Prem 3124318, PRO. 61. MacFarlane to Wilson, 17 February 1944, 1000011011405, RG 331, NA. Caccia to MacFarlane, 17 February 1944, ibid. FRUS 1944,3:1024-27, 1030. Wilson to CCS, 18 February 1944, "CCS 387 Italy," RG 218, NA. Partially reprinted in Civil Affairs, pp. 442-43. 62. Wilson to CCS, 19 February 1944, "CCAC 000.1 Italy," RG 218, NA. Wilson to CCS, 20 February 1944, 1000011321310, RG 331, NA. 63. Monthly report of business of the Political Committee, 22 February 1944, "Docs-PC," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. Civil Affairs, p. 443. 64. McCloy to Stettinius, 21 February 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. "CCAC 68: The Political Situation in Italy," 23 February 1944, "CCS 387 Italy,"RG 218, NA. 65. Ross minute, 18 February 1944, FO 3711439091R2568, PRO.


291

66. Sargent minute, 19 February 1944, ibid. 67. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 427. The complete text is in the New York Times, 23 February 1944. Churchill to Roosevelt, 25 February 1944, "CCAC 000.1 Italy," RG 218, NA. 68. MacFarlane to Wilson, 24 February 1944, 1000011011406, RG 331, NA. Wilson to CCS, 25 February 1944, "CCS 387 Italy," RG 218, NA. 69. Badoglio to MacFarlane, 19 February 1944, 1000011011405, RG 331, NA. MacFarlane to Wilson and Macmillan, 21 February 1944, 100001136188, ibid. The substance of MacFarIane's report is in FRUS 1944,3:1031-32. MacFarlane to Alexander, 22 February 1944, 1000011011405, RG 331, NA and MacFarlane to Wilson, 25 February 1944, 1000011011406, ibid. 70. FRUS 1944,3:1035. 7 1. See, for example, "Suppression-Why?" St. Louis Post Dispatch, 27 February 1944. Minutes of the eighteenth meeting of the Political Committee, 28 February 1944, "PC Minutes," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 72. MacFarlane to Churchill, 29 February 1944, Prem 3124318, PRO. 73. Cadogan to Churchill, 29 February 1944, ibid. 74. Churchill to Eden, 1 March 1944, ibid. 75. Ross minute, 3 March 1944, FO 37 1143910lR3501, PRO. 76. FRUS 1944,3: 1031. 77. Minutes of the Bari Junta meeting of 28 February 1944, in "La Giunta Esecutiva." Holborn to McCloy, 29 February 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. Wilson to CCS, 29 Febmary 1944, "CCS 387 Italy," RG 218, ibid. Stettinius to Roosevelt, 2 March 1944, 865.01/2157A, RG 59, ibid. 78. Roosevelt to Stettinius, 4 March 1944, 865.0112157A, RG 59, NA. 79. Civil Affairs, p. 444. 80. bid., p. 445. 81. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 856-57. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 389-90. Cadogan Diary, p. 595. 82. Wartime Correspondence, 1:186-87. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 873-74. 83. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, pp. 426-28,448. Wartime Correspondence, 1:206. 84. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, pp. 438-39,448. 85. FDR, PPC, 23~75-77. 86. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 875-76. MacFarlane to Wilson, 4 March 1944, 1000011011406, RG 331, NA. MacFarlane to Wilson, 5 March 1944, ibid. 87. MacFarlane to Wilson, 8 March 1944, 1000011361299, RG 331, NA. Wilson to the.BritishChiefs of Staff, 9 March 1944, "CCS 686 Italy," RG 218, NA. 88. MacFarlane to Alexander, 28 February 1944, 10000/1011406,RG 331, NA. MacFarlane to Alexander, 8 March 1944, ibid. ACC Monthly Report, March 1944, 1000011421391, RG 331, NA. British representative in Italy to the Foreign Office, 10 March 1944, "707 Russia," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1944, 3: 1041-42. 89. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 430-31. War Minutes (44) 28th Conclusions, 6 March 1944, Prem 3124015, PRO. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, pp. 462-

292 N O T E S T O P A G E S 91-98 63. Wartime Correspondence, 1:208-9. Wilson to MacFarlane, 8 March 1944, 1000011011466, RG 331, NA. 90. Eden to Macmillan, 7 March 1944, Prem 3124318, PRO. 91. Wilson to the COS, 9 March 1944, "CCS 686 Italy," RG 218, NA. FRUS 1944,3:1039-40. 92. FDR, PPC, 23:80,88-89,96, 103. 93. Minutes of the twenty-fifth meeting of the Political Committee, 15 March 1944, "Minutes-PC," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 94. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 431. 95. Ibid., pp. 430-32. MacFarlane to Wilson, 11 March 1944, 100001136J115, RG 33 1, NA. 96. Macmillan to the Foreign Office, 15 March 1944, Prem 3124318, PRO. FRUS 1944,3:1046, 1050-51, 1061-62. 97. FRUS 1944, 3~1044-48, 1062. 98. Ibid., p. 1066. 99. Macmillan, "Note on the Italian Situation," 22 March 1944, Prem 3124318, PRO. 100. CLNAI, Atti, p. 123. 101. Wilson to CCS, 21 March 1944, "CCAC 000.1 Italy:' RG 218, NA. MacFarlane to Wilson, 28 March 1944, 1000011361299, ibid. FRUS 1944, 3:1079-80. 102. MacFarlane to Wilson, 2 April 1944, 1000011321288, RG 331, NA. MacFarlane to Wilson, 3 April 1944, 10000/136/115, ibid. Avanti, 3 April 1944. Baldwin, 'Xmerica at War." Minutes of the Bari Junta meeting of 6 April 1944, in "La Giunta Esecutiva." FRUS 1944, 3:1089-90. 103. Murphy to the Department of State, 10 April 1944, "801 Government Mar. 1April 29," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 104. FRUS 1944, 3:1090. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 202-3,22830. 105. FRUS 1944, 3~1092-93. 106. Ross minute, 26 April 1944, FO 3711439111R6443, PRO. FRUS 1944,3: 1112-14.

CHAPTER 4 1. On the defense of Rome, see Zangrandi, L'italia tradita. 2. Cicognani to Hull, 21 May 1944, 865.461154, RG 59, NA. "The Question of the Recognition of Rome as an Open City," n.d. "71 1.6 Rome--Open City:' Taylor Files, ibid. COS to Wilson, 1 June 1944, "71 1 Rome:' Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 3. Cicognani to Hull, 2 May 1944,865.481133, RG 59, NA. Ready to Crowley, 26 May 1944, ''International Affairs: Relief: Italy 1944-52," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C. 4. Civil Affairs, pp. 501-2, 554-60. On the military planning for the Italian campaign, see Fisher, Cassino. Civilian affairs planning is detailed in Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy.


293

5. Charles to the Foreign Office, 22 April 1944, FO 371143792lR6575, PRO. MacFarlane, notes of meeting with Badoglio, 5 May 1944, 100001132/288, RG 331, NA. MacFarlane to W~lson,2 April 1944, 1000011361115, ibid. Murphy to the Department of State, 23 April 1944, "801 Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 6. Details in ACC Weekly Bulletin, 13 May 1944. Kirk to Department of State, 14 May 1944,865.0112423, RG 59, NA. 7. FRUS 1944,3:1118-19. 8. Interview with Croce, 31 May 1944, OSS Intelligence Reports, RG 226, NA. 9. Kirk to Department of State, 28 May 1944, "801 Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1944, 3:ll20-21. 10. MacFarlane to Wilson, 5 June 1944, 1000011321228, RG 331, NA. 11. MacFarlane to Wilson, 10 June 1944, "801 Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 12. Cadogan Diary, pp. 637-38. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, p. 526. Wartime Correspondence, 1:227. 13. Churchill to MacFarlane, 11 June 1944, Prem 31243112, PRO. Cf. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 88-90. 14. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, p. 526. Wartime Correspondence, 1: 227. 15. FRUS 1944, 3: 1125-27. Murphy to the Department of State, 13 June 1944, "801 Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Kirk to the Department of State, 14 June 1944, ibid. Minutes of the sixtieth meeting of the Political Committee, 14 June 1944, "PC Minutes," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 16. FDR, PPC, 23:236-37. FRUS 1944,3:133-34. 17. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, pp. 529-30. MacFarlane to Wilson, 12 June 1944, 1000011361116, RG 331, NA. Macmillan to Foreign Office, 13 June 1944, Prem 31243112, PRO. Minutes of a meeting of the War Cabinet, 13 June 1944, 76(44)4, Cab 65, ibid. Churchill to Eden, 16 June 1944, FO 3711437941R9962, PRO. 18. Makins to Sargent, 18 June 1944, FO 37lI43794lRl0071, PRO. This document is summarized in Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 3:440. Churchill to Eden, 14 June 1944, FO 371143794lR9764, PRO. Cf. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, p. 86. 19. Sargent minute, 17 June 1944, FO 3711437931R9524, PRO. Minutes of McDermott, Ross, Sargent, and Cadogan, letter from Makins to Sargent, and Eden marginalia, all in FO 371143794lR10071, ibid. The expression "old trickster" is Churchill's in a minute to Eden, 7 April 1944, FO 371143910lR5574. In March 1944 Sforza offered to return to the United States to aid Roosevelt's reelection effort. Roosevelt was not interested. Ickes, diary, 31 March 1944, frame 8735, Ickes Papers, LC. 20. Churchill to Eden, 20 June 1944, Prem 31243112, PRO. McDermott minute, 27 June 1944, FO 37 1143794lR9914, PRO. Ross minute, 25 June 1944, FO 37 11437941 R9975, PRO. 21. New Republic, 7 February, 27 March, 3 April 1944. Nation, 18 March 1944. PM, 31 March 1944. See also comments of Sumner Welles, New York Herald Tribune, 19 April 1944. 22. Blum, Price of Vision, p. 300. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, "Revival of Italian Nationalism in the Once Pro-fascist press," 11 April 1944, "820.1 OSS,"

294 NOTES TO PAGES 103-7 Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. "Notes on the Italian Press and Radio in the U.S.," ibid. OSS Report B 201, "Italy as viewed by Italian Americans on the Eve of the Fall of Rome," 31 May 1944, "OSS FNB Reports B 191-210," Intelligence Library Files, RG 165, NA. Adamic et al. to Roosevelt, 27 March 1944,865.0112304, RG 59, NA. 23. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 24. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report B-129, "Schism in the Mazzini Society and a New Free Italian Movement," 21 December 1943, "800 Italy General," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. "An Italian Manifesto," Life, 12 June 1944. LaPiana to Salvemini, 13 May 1944, box 2, Salvemini Papers, Archivio Salvemini, Rome. 25. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report MR 87, 16 October 1943, 865.011 673, RG 59, NA. "Schism in the Mazzini Society," 21 December 1943, "800 Italy General," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Raymond Murphy to Jones and Matthews, 26 October 1943,865.01/651, RG 59, NA. Call, 3 December 1943. New York Times, 15 April and 26 April 1944. 26. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report 183, "The Foreign Language Press in the United States," 18 April 1944, no folder, Intelligence Library File, RG 165, NA. 27. Actes et Documents, 7562-63. Civiltd Cattolica 95 (8 January 1944):71-82. FRUS 1944,41277-78, 1282-83. Mooney to Roosevelt, 23 February 1944, PPF 4727, FDRL. 28. Hunt to Cume, 13 April 1944, "Italy," Historical File on the Foreign Economic Administration, RG 169, NA. BerIe, Navigating, p. 453. 29. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, pp. 545-46. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 49-61,71-87. 30. FDR, PPA, 12:32-42. Bums, Roosevelt, pp. 422-28. The importance of economic factors is stressed in Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 97-101. 31. Breckinridge Long, "Vatican Information Service," 14 October 1943, "Vatican 1942-43," Long Papers, LC. Actes et Documents, 7:722-23. Roosevelt to Mooney, 9 March 1944, PPF4727, FDRL. Stettinius to Leahy, 17 February 1944, "Leahy," Stettinius Papers, University of Virginia. MacFarlane to Griggs, 5 May 1944, 100001 136163, RG 331, NA. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 195-96. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 84-85. 32. DSB 9 (16 October 1943):256-58. Cf. New York Times, 13 October 1943. FDR, PPC, 23:47-50. New York Herald Tribune, 17 January 1944. La Voce del Popolo, 18 February 1944. 33. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 34. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches, pp. 168, 172-73. 35. FDR, PPA, 12:147-52. For reaction and analysis, see the comments of Sumnet Welles, New York Herald Tribune, 14 June 1944, New Republic, 19 June 1944; Progresso, 25 June 1944;Justice, 1 July 1944. 36. Civil Affairs, p. 367. New York Times, 16 July 1944. Davis to Cleveland, 18 July 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 37. Danlien to Cunie, 5 July 1944, "Italy-Industry-General," Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Morgenthau, Bell, and Currie, 20 June 1944, Morgenthau diaries, 746:170-78, Morgenthau

NOTES T O PAGES 107-12

295

Papers, FDRL. Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, pp. 3 12-14. 38. McConnel and Glasser to Morgenthau, 21 June 1944, Morgenthau diaries, 746:47-48, Morgenthau Papers, FDRL. Minutes of the sixty-eighth meeting of the Political Committee, 7 July 1944, "PC Minutes," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 39. Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Liberated Areas Committee, 1 August 1944, "LAC Minutes 2-36," Country Committees, RG 353, NA. LAC 7 Revised: "The Financing of Italy's Essential Civilian Requirements and Other Expenditures," 2 August 1944, "LAC Docs. 1-50," ibid. 40. Minutes by M. L. Williams, 27 July 1944, FO 371143863lR11583, PRO. 41. Law to the Foreign Office, 5 August 1944, FO 371/43863/R12211, PRO. Ibid., FO 371/43863/R12183, PRO. 42. British Foreign Office to the Embassy in Washington, n.d. but ca. 15 May 1944, "500 United Nations," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Sargent minute, 11 May 1944, FO 37114391llR4308, PRO. Cf. comments of Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 82-83. 43. Department of State to Murphy, 17 May 1944, "500 United Nations," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Hackworth to Matthews, 7 June 1944, 865.0115-2544, RG 59, ibid. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 82-83, notes that Churchill had no intention of concluding such a treaty, but utilized it to reinforce Badoglio. Memorandum for record, 7 July 1944, "Italy Case 20," Records of the Operations Division, RG 165, NA. JCS 88512: "Proposed Preliminary Peace Treaty with Italy," 12 July 1944, CCS 387 Italy, RG 218, NA. Ross minute, 8 August 1944, FO 371143912lR12223, PRO. 44. Murphy to the Department of State, 20 July 1944, "7 11.9 ACC Reorganization," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Kirk to the Department of State, 24 July 1944, 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-2444, RG 59, NA. Department of State to the American Delegation in Rome, 8 August 1944, ibid. 45. FORD, "Future of Italy," 12 August 1944, FO 371143899lR12735, PRO. Williams minute, 12 August 1944, ibid. Cf. comments of Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 98-100, which reproduces large portions of the FORD report. 46. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 85-88, 100-101, 105-6. Miller, "Politics of Relief ." 47. Halifax to Churchill, 20 August 1944, Prem 417512, PRO. 48. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 49. Progresso, 25 June 1944. 50. Fisher, Cassino, pp. 227-30, 255-59. 51. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 52. Memorandum by Long, 10 June 1944,865.0116-544, RG 59, NA. FDR, PPC, 24~71-72. 53. FRUS, Conference at Quebec, pp. 207-10. CAC 248 Preliminary: "The Treatment of Italy," 31 August 1944, "CAC Documents," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 54. "Plea for Italy," Corriere del Popolo, 17 August 1944. 55. New York Herald Tribune, 30 August and 9 September 1944, New York Times, 5 September 1944. Aiken to Eggleston, 5 September 1944, "Italy-Policy," Area Policy Files, Records of the Director of Overseas Operations, RG 208, NA. FDR, PPC, 24100-102. Charles to the Foreign Office, 8 September 1944, FO 3711438641 R14248.

298 NOTES TO PAGES 112-16 56. Memorandum of a conversation between Ready and Crowley, 9 September 1944, "International Affairs: Relief: Italy, 1944-52," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference. 57. FRUS, Conference at Quebec, pp. 412-15,417-18. 58. Churchill to Roosevelt, 11 September 1944, PSF Quebec, FDRL. Joint Military Mission to Churchill, 14 September 1944, Prem 411513. "RJC" to Martin, 15 September 1944, ibid. New York Times, 21 September 1944. FRUS, Conference at Quebec, pp. 494-97. 59. Memorandum of a conversation between Hull and Halifax, 22 September 1944,865.01/9-2244, RG 59, NA. Minutes of a meeting of the British cabinet, 22 September 1944, Minutes 125(44) 21, Cab 65, PRO. New York Times, 23 and 24 September 1944. Progresso, 23 September 1944. 60. U.S. and Italy, pp. 88-89. 61. OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report B 263: "Italian Americans Consider the Roosevelt-Churchill Statement and UNRRA Aid," 17 October 1944, "OSS FNB Reports 256-270," Intelligence Library Files, RG 165, NA. New York Times, 28 September 1944. 62. See, for example, Allen Raymond, "Bankrupt Italy is Capable of Anything," Saturday Evening Post, 23 September 1944; Ann O'Hare McCormick column, New York Times, 23 September 1944. 63. Ewing to Roosevelt, 23 September 1944, PPF 4617, FDRL. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 64. New York Times, 28 September 1944. 65. A synopsis of this correspondence is in PPF 4617, FDRL. 66. New York ~erald.Dibune,30 September 1944. Telephone conference between Morgenthau and Cume, 3 October 1944, Morgenthau diaries, 778:114-16, Morgenthau Papers, FDRL. The text is in U.S. and Italy, pp. 89-90. 67. New York Times, 6 October 1944. Sturzo to Ready, 25 September 1944, "International Affairs: Italy: 1944-47," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Commonweal, 8 September 1944. 68. Ready to Mooney, 5 September 1944, "International Affairs: Relief: Italy, 1944-52," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Memorandum of a conversation between Ready and Crowley, ibid. Spellman memorandum, n.d., but October 1944, "International Affairs: Italy, 1944-47," ibid. Memorandum of a conversation between Ready and O'Dwyer, 5 October 1944, "International Affairs: Relief: Italy, 1944-52 ," ibid. Cf. Spellman's memorandum for Roosevelt, n.d., but October 1944, in Di Nolfo, "Eine Analyse Kardinal Spellmans zur Italienischen Situation im Herbst 1944." 69. .Ready to Mooney, 6 October 1944, "International Affairs: Relief: Italy, 194447," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 11 October 1944. 70. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 71. FDR, PPA, 12:331-32. 72. Gore-Booth to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1944, FO 371/43914/R17571, PRO. British officials reviewed the Biddle performance as "repulsive" and "pretty nauseating." 73. FDR, PPC, 24~157-58.


297

74. Miller, "Politica dei 'prominenti.' " Bums, Roosevelt, pp. 497-531. 75. Churchill to Roosevelt, 12 November 1944, "CCS 433 Italy," RG 218, NA. 76. Minute by Ross, 31 October 1944, FO 3711437991R17422, PRO. 77. Minute by Ross, 8 November 1944, FO 371143926lR17853, PRO. Cf. comments of Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 106-12. 78. Stone to G-5, AFHQ, 28 September 1944, 1000011361256, RG 331, NA. FRUS 1944, 3:1154-55. Civil Affairs, p. 506. SAC to the CCAC, 23 October 1944, "CCAC 004.06 Italy," RG 218, ibid. 79. Macmillan to Law, 10 September 1944, FO 3711439121R14893, PRO. Cited also in Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, p. 101. 80. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 187. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, p. 125. 81. Macmillan, "New Deal for Italy: Civilian Supplies," 25 October 1944, 100001 136168, RG 331, NA.'Minutes of the twenty-sixth meeting of the SAC Political Committee (SAC PC (44)26), 27 September 1944, 1000011361245, ibid. SAC to the CCS, 1 November 1944, "CCAC 091.3 Italy," RG 2 18, NA. CCS 728: "Economic Policy for Italy," 8 November 1944, "CCAC 091.3 Italy," RG 218, NA. CCS to SAC, 13 November 1944, ibid. SAC to CCS, 17 November 1944, ibid. 82. Minutes of the twenty-fifth meeting of the Allied Advisory Commission for Italy, 17 November 1944, 1000011361228, RG 331, NA. Minutes of the Acting President's Conference, 20 November 1944, 1000011361153, RG 33 1, ibid. Macmillan, "Allied Policy Toward Italy," ca. 20 November 1944, but dated 5 January 1945, 1000011321463, RG 331, NA. Extensive portions of this document are published in Civil Affairs, pp. 508 ff. Minutes of the Vice Presidents' (ACC) Conference, 23 November 1944, 1000011361152, RG 33 1, NA. 83. Civil Affairs, p. 494. 84. Civil Affairs, p. 509. 85. Perkins to Cume, 22 September 1944, "Italy Relief and Reconstruction No. 5," Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. Paul to Cume, 21 October 1944, ibid. Memorandum for Currie, 9 October 1944, "Book 9: Relief for Italy No. 10," Harry Hopkins Papers, FDRL. 86. Patterson to McCloy, 30 September 1944, "370.8 Italy," Decimal Files of the Assistant Secretary of War, RG 107, NA. Somerville to Hilldring, 17 November 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. Hilldring memorandum to the CCS, ca. 21 November 1944, CCS 433 Italy, RG 218, NA. McCloy to Matthews, 2 November 1944,740.0019 Controll11-2544, RG 59, NA. 87. Stettinius to Kirk, 23 October 1944, "710 Peace Treaty," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Kirk to J. W. Jones, 18 November 1944, "71 1.9 ACC Reorganization," ibid. Jones to Cannon and Matthews, 16 November 1944, 740.0019 Control (Italy)/ 11-1644, RG 59, ibid. Matthews to McCloy, 22 November 1944, ibid. 88. Millis, Forrestai Diaries, p. 16. Roosevelt to Churchill, 21 November 1944, Prem 412918, PRO. 89. Minute by Ross, 23 November 1944, FO 371143867lR19065, PRO. Griggs to Churchill, 3 and 9 November 1944, Prem 412918, ibid. Minutes of a meeting relating to the Financing of Italian Civilian Imports, 29 November 1944, FO 371/43867/ R19751, PRO. 90. PWB Weekly Bulletin, 30 July, 13 August, and 19 November 1944. Di Nolfo,

298 NOTES TO PAGES 122-25 Vaticano e Stati Uniti, p. 397. 91. Draft telegram from Headquarters Allied Commission to AFHQ, n.d., 100001 136/108, RG 331, NA. 92. FRUS 1944,3:1558-61. 93. FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 267-69. New York Times, 29 November 1944. Progresso, 3 December 1944. Ickes, diary, 2 December 1944, frame 9370, Ickes Papers, LC. Halifax to the Foreign Office, 30 November 1944, Prem 31243/5, PRO. 94. For the text, see U.S. and Italy, p. 98. Bastonini to Roosevelt, 6 December 1944,865.01112-644, RG 59, NA. Loeb to Stettinius, 7 ~ecember1944, 865.011 12-744, ibid. New York Times, 6 December 1944. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 3:461. New York Times, 7 December 1944. FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 269-72. Cf. comments of Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, pp. 107-24. 95. Hachey, Confidential Dispatches, pp. 237-38. 96. FEA Italian Division: "The Situation in Italy and the Response of the NonMilitary Agencies," 5 December 1944, "Basic Policy Documents on Italy: ItalyIndustrial-General," Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. Hilldring to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, 2 December 1944, "014 Italy," CAD Records, RG 165, ibid. New York Times, 3 December 1944. Gualtieri to Stettinius, 5 December 1944,740.0019 Control (Italy)/12-544, RG 59, NA. SAC to the CCAC, 7 December 1944, "CCS 433 Italy," RG 218, NA. Cf. Macmillan to the Foreign Office, 7 December 1944, FO 371/43868/R20212, PRO. 97. Manis to the Foreign Office, 8 December 1944, FO 371/49810/ZM 257, PRO. Hilldring to Davis, 7 December 1944, "014 Italy," CAD Records, RG 165, NA. Davis memorandum for record, 11 December 1944, ibid. 98. Civil Affairs, pp. 513-14. Emerson to Cume, 16 December 1944, "Italy-Allied Control Commission," Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. 99. Department of State to Kirk, 20 December 1944, "71 1.9 ACC Reorganization,'' Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Stettinius to Roosevelt, 15 December 1944, "Memos-To and from President," Leahy Files, RG 218, ibid. Land to Leahy, 15 December 1944, "Italy," Hopkins Papers, FDRL. Feis to McCloy, 18 December 1944, "370.8 Italy," OASW Decimal Files, RG 107, NA. Chiefs of Staff to SAC, 19 December 1944, "71 1..9 ACC Reorganization," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 100. Cf. for example, New York Times, 11 December 1944 (Ann O'Hare McCormick), 14 December 1944 (Herbert Matthews), 29 December 1944 and 4 January 1945; New Republic, 11 December 1944; Call, 15 December 1944, Progresso, 17 December 1944; WashingtonPost, 18 December 1944; Corriere del Popolo, 2 1 December 1944; LSfe, 15 January 1945 (editorial). 101. New York Times, 5 January 1945. DSB, 12 (7 January 1945):29. FDR, PPC, 25:13-14. 102. Bums to Cume, 27 December 1944, "Italy-Relief and Rehabilitation-No. 5:' Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. FRUS 1945,4:1221-22. Glasser to Morgenthau, 18 December 1944, Morgenthau diaries, 803:234-44, Morgenthau Papers, FDRL. Stettinius to Roosevelt, 28 December 1944, 865SOl8/ 12-2844, RG 59, NA. The Department of State to the Embassy in Great Britain, 29 December 1944, "71 1.9 ACC Reorganization," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Emerson to

NOTES TO PAGES 125-33 299 Currie, 2 January 1945, "Italy Allied Commission," Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. La Sentinella, 12 January 1945. New York Times, 18 and 21 January 1945. FDR, PPC, 25:27,43. 103. Civil Affairs, pp. 514-15. 104. Memorandum of a conversation between Stettinius and Halifax, 2 January 1945, 865.0111-245, RG 59, NA. Problem sheet for the week ending 13 January 1945, "Statements of Policy," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, ibid. 105. Di Nolfo, "Stati Uniti e Italia tra la seconda guerra mondiale e il sorgere della guerra fredda." New York Times, 31 January 1945. 106. FRUS, Conferencesat Malta and Yalta, p. 958. Progresso, 4 February 1945. 107. Minutes by Ross, Hoyar Millar, and Rumbold, 6 and 7 February 1945, FO 37114975UZM 826, PRO. Minutes by Ross, 6 February 1945, ibid. Harvey Report, 20 January 1945 with Eden comment, FO 371149751lZM628, PRO. Halifax to Eden, 4 February 1945, FO 371149752lZM726, ibid. 108. Minute by Dixon, 6 February 1945, FO 371149752lZM762, PRO. FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 963-64. Cadogan to Churchill, 13 February 1945, Prem 3125013, ibid. 109. Problem sheet for the week ending 17 February 1945, "Statements of Policy," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report B-328, "Italian Americans on Yalta," 12 March 1945, "326 thru 335," Intelligence Library Files, RG 165, NA. Progresso, 15 and 18 February 1945. La Voce del Popolo, 23 February 1945. Memorandum of a conversation between Morgenthau and British representatives, 22 February 1945, Morgenthau diaries, 821:167-79, Morgenthau Papers, FDRL. Memorandum of a conversation among Jones, Hickerson, and Makins, 24 February 1945,740.0019 Control (Italy)12-2245, RG 59, NA. Bland to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 24 February 1945, FO 371/48753/ZM1227, PRO. 110. Texts in U.S. and Italy, pp. 107-17. Progresso, 28 February 1945. New York Times, 28 February 1945. 111. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 3:486. 112. New York Times, 31 January 1945.

CHAPTER 5 1. FDR, PPA, 12:326-36. 2. FRUS 1943,2423-25. 3. "Survey of Principal Problems in Europe," 15 July 1944, "Office of European Affairs," Stettinius Papers, University of Virginia. FRUS 1944, 3:1144. 4. Ellwood, "A1 tramonto dell'impero britannico." 5. Sforza to Berle, 17 December 1943, 865.0111053, RG 59, NA. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 108-10. Corriere del Popolo, 18 November 1943. In Fact, 22 November 1943. 6. Badoglio to MacFarlane, 6 January 1944, 1000011361114, RG 331, NA. Chapin to the Department of State, 28 February 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. 7. New York Times, 15 April 1944. Spofford to HQ, Allied Military Government, 1 January 1944, 1000011361108, RG 331, NA.

300 NOTES TO PAGES 134-38 8. MacFarlane to SAC, 6 May 1944, 10000/136/327, RG 331, NA. MacFarlane to SAC, 12 May 1944, ibid. 9. Miller, "Epurazione Mancata." 10. Minute by Ross, 18 May 1944, FO 371143792lR7390, PRO. Cf. New York Times, 20 January 1944. 11. HQ, ACC, Monthly Report, July 1944, 10000114Y391, RG 331, NA. ACC Executive Memorandum No. 67,s July 1944, 10000/136/327, ibid. MacFarlane to Badoglio, 16 June 1944, ibid. 12. Civil Affairs, p. 473. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 22 July and 13 August 1944. 13. Memorandum of a conversation between Sforza and White, 8 September 1944, 10000113U293,RG 331, NA. 14. Setta, Uomo Qualunque, p. 20. OSS Report JR 889, 1 August 1944, RG 226, NA. 15. Aga Rossi, "La situazione politica ed economica nell' Italia nel period0 194445 ." 16. Setta, Uomo Qualunque, p. 23. Minutes of the twenty-sixth meeting of the ACI, 1 December 1944, 10000I1361228, RG 331, NA. 17. Stone to SAC, 6 September 1944, 1000011361109, RG 331, NA. Kirk to the Department of State, 7 October 1944, "800 Italy General," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 18. Rome Area Command to War Department, 1 July 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. Foley to the Legal Subcommission, ACC, 6 July 1944, 10000/142/548, RG 331, NA. 19. McCloy to General Jacob Devers, 6 July 1944, "370.8 Italy," Assistant Secretary of War Decimal Files, RG 107, NA. Rome Area Command to War Department, 10 July 1944, "014 Italy," Records of the Civil Affairs Division, RG 165, NA. 20. Civil Affairs, pp. 474-75. Stone to Bonomi, 5 September 1944, 10000/136/ 327, RG 331, NA. Notes of a meeting at HQ, ACC, 8 August 1944, ibid. 21. Minutes by McDermott, 2 July 1944, and Sargent, 4 July 1944, FO 3711 43794IR10050, PRO. Minute by McDermott, 4 JuIy 1944, FO 371143794fR10361, PRO. 22. Minute by Williams, 6 December 1944, FO 37 1143800IR19994, PRO. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 10 December 1944. Schott to the vice president, Civil Affairs Section, ACC, 30 December 1944, 10000/132/293, RG 331, NA. 23. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Report 1681: "The Radical Trend in German Occupied Italy," 10 January 1944, RG 59, NA. 24. Stone to Sforza, 16 September 1944, 10000/136/327, RG 331, NA. ltalia Libera (Lombard edition), 20 October 1944. CLNAI, Atti, p. 199. HQ, ACC, Monthly Report, January 1945, 1000011421391, RG 331, NA. 25. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 112-13. Civil Affairs, p. 540. 26. Walter B. Smith to Fifteenth Army Group, 30 September 1943, 100001100157, RG 331, NA. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 135-36. 27. Civil AfSairs, pp. 538, 544. Cf. Delzell, Nemici, pp. 409-12. 28. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 112, 138. HQ, Allied Armies in Italy to AFHQ, 11 Novem-

NOTES T O PAGES 1 3 8 - 4 5

301

ber 1944, 1000011361338,RG 331, NA. Secchia and Frassati, Resistenza e alleati, pp. 129-30. Cf. "Atti del Congresso delle federazioni del PLI in Alta Italia: Gennaio 1945." 29. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 111, 123, 197-98. 30. Memorandum by Upjohn: "Treatment of the CLNs," 21 October 1944, 100001 1321314, RG 331, NA. 31. Hopkinson to Stone, 18 December 1944, 1000011361338,RG 331, NA. Cf. Delzell, Nernici, pp. 397-400. 32. Minutes of a meeting at HQ, ACC, 3 July 1944, 1000011361338,RG 33 1, NA. Regional Control and Military Government Section, ACC, "General Instmctions on Administration of Patriots in Military Government Territory," 18 July 1944, ibid. 33. Secchia and Frassati, Resistenza e alleati, pp. 122-23. Cf. Delzell, Nemici, pp. 530-33. 34. Browning to Berardi, January 1945, 1000011321445,RG 331, NA. Kirk to the Department of State, 3 January 1945, "800.131820," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 35. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 15 October, 11 and 21 November 1944. 36. SAC Political Committee, memorandum: PC 44 (137): "Relations with Italian Partisans," 20 November 1944, 1000011361261, RG 33 1, NA. 37. Notes on a meeting of Stone and General Staewell, 18 November 1944, 100001 1091641, RG 331, NA. SAC Political Committee, memorandum: PC (44) 144 annex: "Relations with Italian Partisans," 5 December 1944, 1000011361261, ibid. 38. SAC Political Committee, memorandum: PC (44) 141: "Relations with Italian Partisans," 23 November 1944, 1000011361261, RG 331, NA. Donovan to McCloy, 29 November 1944, "336 Italy, case 33," Records of the Operations Division, RG 165, NA. Di Nolfo, "L'operazione 'Sunrise.' " Abbot and Marat to HQ, OSS, 20 November 1944, "823.3 Partisans," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 39. Kirk to the Department of State, 17 December 1944, "820.02 Italian Resistance," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. SAC Political Committee, minutes: PC (44) 36, 19 December 1944, 1000011361257,RG 331, NA. Civil Affairs, pp. 541-42. Secchia and Frassati, Resistenza e alleati, p. 215. 40. For the text, see SAC P (44) 161, 27 December 1944, 1000011361261,RG 331, NA. Cf. Delzell, Nemici, pp. 441-55. 41. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 220-21, 205-6. Italia Libera (Piedmont edition), January 1945. Sargent to Eden, 29 December 1944, FO 3711497961ZM 318, PRO. On the Greek situation, see Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, chapters 2-3. 42. Eisenhower Papers, 3:1472. 43. OSS Report VJ-68, 3 February 1944, "801 Government," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. MacFarlane to G-5, AFHQ, 23 May 1944, 1000011361351,RG 331, NA. Browning to HQ, ACC, 27 June 1944, ibid. 44. Eisenhower Papers, 3: 1451 , 1534-35. MacFarlane to SAC, 31 January 1944, 10000/136/62,RG 331, NA. 45. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 244. 46. Allied Armies in Italy to AFHQ, 3 April 1944, 1000011361476,RG 331, NA. Croce to Sforza, 20 October 1943, "800 Italy A to Z," Caserta Post Fi.les, RG 84,

302 NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 5 - 5 0 NA. MacFarlane to Murphy, 2 November 1943, "800 Italy1822 Italian Army," ibid. Cerquetti, Le Fone Armate Italiane, pp. 11-17. 47. Stone to HQ, 1 August 1944, 10000/136/351, RG 331, NA. Stone to the Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, 6 September 1944, ibid. Browning to AAI, 23 July 1944, 1000011361338, RG 331, NA. Murphy to Dunn, 12 August 1944, "820.02 Italian Resistance," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Psychological Warfare Branch to Office of War Information, 14 October 1944, ibid. 48. Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, pp. 149-51. 49. FRUS 1942,3:33-34. Wartime Correspondence, 1:26. 50. P 160: "Official Statements Pertaining to the Postwar Position of Italy," 30 December 1942, "P Docs. 141-169," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 51. P 168: "The Italian Colonies," 2 January 1943, ibid. 52. On Italian administration of Ethiopia, see del Bocca, Ethiopian War. On colonial issues, Louis, Imperialism at Bay. 53. T 198: "The Italian-Yugoslav Frontier: Alternate Boundaries," 12 December 1942, "T Docs.," Notter Files, RG 59, NA. 54. CAC 204 Preliminary: "General Objectives of American Policy Towards Italy," 27 May 1944, "CAC Docs," Notter Files, RG 59. 55. CAC 204 Preliminary, ibid. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 173. 56. FRUS 1943, 1:740-41. Despres to Rosenson, 19 August 1944,740.00119 EWl8-1944, RG 59, NA. Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 151. 57. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 1287-88. U.S. and Italy, p. 64. 58. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report B-328, "Italian Americans on Yalta," 12 March 1945, "326 thru 335," Intelligence Library File, RG 165, NA. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Report 345, "Italian Americans Organize to Demand Allied Status for Italy," 6 April 1945, ibid. 59. Laukhuff to Jones, Fullerton, and Matthews, 12 October 1943, 865.011522, RG 59, NA. 60. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 76-77. Murphy to Department of State, 16 August 1944, "715 Boundaries," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 61. FRL7S,Conference at Quebec, pp. 221-23. 62. OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch Report B-160, 'A Fascist Forgery Reappears in the U.S. ,'' 17 February 1944, "820.01 OSS," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. OSS, FNB, Intelligence Report, "Kosanovich Press Conference Excites ItalianCriticism," 18 July 1944, "715 Boundaries," ibid. Papal Secretariat to the United States mission at the Vatican, 4 August 1944, "Misc. Confidential Files, 1943-44:' Myron Taylor Files, RG 59, NA. Wilson to Stone, 15 August 1944, "715 Boundaries," ibid. Bonomi to Stone, 16 September 1944, ibid. CLNAI, Atti, p. 179. New York Times, 18 September 1944. 63. Interdivisional Committee on Italy, "The Italian-Yugoslav Frontier," (CAC 215) 2 September 1944, "715 Boundaries," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Interdivisional Committee on Italy, "The Port of Trieste," (CAC 244) 2 September 1944, ibid. Hohenthall to Jones, 13 February 1945, 740.001 19 Control (1taly)lll-2744, RG 59, NA. Di Nolfo, "L'operazione 'Sunrise.' " 64. Patterson, "Alternatives to Globalism." 65. Civil Affairs, pp. 214-15.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 150-57

303

66. Harper, "U.S. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), pp. 67-69. Civil Affairs, pp. 150-51. 67. Civil Affairs, pp. 203-4, 314. 68. Harper, "U.S. and Italian Economy," p. 70. 69. Piazza, "Dibattito teoretico e indirizzi di governo nella politica agraria della Democrazia Cristiana." Bertolo et al., "Aspetti della questione agraria e delle lotte contadini nel second0 dopoguerra in Italia." 70. Aga Rossi, I1 Rapporto Stevenson. Grady's report is in ACC files 100001 15412140, RG 331, NA. 71. Bruno Foa, "Currency and Related Problems in Italy," March 1944, 865.5151 61, RG 59, NA. SAC to MacFarlane, 1 April 1944, 1000011361421, RG 331, ibid. ACC Monthly Report, June 1944, 10000/142/391, ibid. "Some Reflections on Allied Economic Policy in Italy," July 1944, 1000011511263, RG 33 1, NA. 72. Spofford to Hilldring, 23 August 1944, "631 Private Trade," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 73. Memorandum: "Principles by which the Allied Control Commission Should Be Guided in Exercising Supervision and Control over Resuscitation of Italian Foreign Trade," n.d., but ca. 29 August 1944, 1000011361365, RG 331, NA. 74. Dietrich to Coe, 31 October 1944, "Italy," Geographic File of the Administrator, RG 169, NA. Wall Street Journal, 17 November 1944. 75. Lawler to Stone, 21 November 1944, 1000011361249, RG 331, NA. Lawler to Stone, 24 November 1944, ibid. On the Quintieri-Mattioli mission, see Harper's dissertation, "U.S. and Italian Economy," pp. 78-88. An Italian version of the mission is in Ortona, Anni d'Arnerica, pp. 14-47,49-50,60-71,73-85.

CHAPTER 6 1. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 223-27, 229-34, 252-57. HQ, Allied Commission, "Patriot Situation in North Italy," 31 January 1945, 1000011361339, RG 33 1, NA. Minutes of Acting President's Conference, 8-9 March 1945, 1000011421167, ibid. Kirk to the Department of State, 19 April 1945, 865.0014-1945, RG 59, NA. 2. Minutes of the thirty-second meeting of the ACI, 16 March 1945, 1000011361 288, RG 331, NA. 3. "Resistenza e governo italiano nella missione Medici-Tornaquinci." CLNAI, Atti, pp. 292-93. 4. Duff, "Italy." Delzell, Nemici, pp. 525-27. 5. Kirk to the Department of State, 23 April 1945,865.0014-2345, RG 59, NA. Italia Libera (Lombard edition), 27 April 1945. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 353-54. 6. Nemi, Vento del Nord, pp. 355-66. Sassoon, Togfiatti,pp. 43-44. Ellwood, 7. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 3:475-76,478-80,483-84. L'alleato nernico, pp. 125-75. 8. CLNAI, Atti, pp. 321-23, 337-44. 9. Edelman, "Incremental Involvement," (dissertation), pp. 276, 330, 334, 38083. OSS Research and Analysis Report 3171, "An Analysis of the Pani Cabinet," 21 June 1945, RG 59, NA. 10. Miller, "Search for Stability."

304 NOTES T O PAGES 1 5 8 - 6 4 11. Stone to SAC, 3 July 1944, 100001136188, RG 331, NA. Wilmer to the Deputy Chief of Staff, ACC, 6 December 1944, ibid. Stone to SAC, 17 November 1944, ibid. Stone to G-5 AFHQ, 31 March 1945, ibid. Kirk to Stone, 20 November 1944, ibid. "Italy: Future Government: Methods of Securing a Free Expression of the Wishes of the Italian People," (CAC 315),27 November 1944, "800 Italy Institutional Question," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1945,4:963. 12. Kirk to the Department of State, 26 June 1945, 865.0016-2645, RG 59, NA. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:22-23, 26-33. 13. Memorandum by H. M. Smyth, 22 June 1945, "Italy Policy," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1945,4972-75. Grew to Kirk, 10 July 1945, "801 Government 1945," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 14. J. W. Jones, memorandum for files, 30 August 1945, "800 Italy Institutional Question," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1945,4:976-80. 15. Parri to Stone, 20 September 1945, "800 Italy Institutional Question," Rome Embassy Files, RG 59, NA. Miller, "Search for Stability." Kirk to the Department of State, 26 July 1945,865.0017-2645, RG 59, NA. 16. Memorandum by Hopkinson, 5 September 1945, 10000/136188,RG 331, NA. De Gasperi Scrive , 2: 121. 17. Cattani, "Dalla caduta del fascismo." 18. Piscitelli, Da Parri a De Gasperi, pp. 99-106, 133. 19. Flores, "Epurazione." Setta, Uomo Qualunque, pp. 16-18, 20. Miller, "Epurazione Mancata." 20. Harper, "U.S. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), pp. 145-60. Piscitelli, Da Parri a De Gasperi, pp. 99-106. 21. Cattani, "Dalla caduta del fascismo." Cf. Ellwood, L'alleato nemico, p. 188. 22. Minutes of the forty-ninth meeting of the ACI, 15 Febmary 1946, 10000/ 1361229, RG 331, NA. FRUS 1946,5874-76,879-87. 23. (ACC) Public Relations Branch Weekly Bulletin, 2 March 1946. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:41-43. 24. Faenza and Fini, Gli americani in Italia, pp. 86-92, 129-31, 158-63, 17479. 25. FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 888-89. FRUS 1945,4:1103-6, 1108-10. 26. CCAC 14812: "Administration of Disputed Areas Formerly Under Italian Rule," 14 March 1945, CCS 383.21 Italy, RG 218, NA. Minutes of the fifty-third meeting of the CCAC, 12 April 1945, ibid. CCAC 148/4: "Administration of Disputed Areas Formerly Under Italian Rule," 16 April 1945, ibid. 27. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 410. 28. Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy), 21 April 1945, "ABC 387.4 Italy," Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA. 29. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 472-73. Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, p. 12. On the military aspects, see Cox, Race for Trieste. 30. Cutter, memorandum for files, 27 April 1945, "ABC 387.4 Italy," Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA. "LHS" memorandum for record, 30 April 1945, ibid. Stimson to Stettinius, 30 April 1945, ibid. Marshall to McNarney, 3 May 1945, CCS 383.21 Italy, RG 218, NA.


305

31. Churchill to Truman, 30 April 1945, "Prime-President Truman, April-June 1945," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. 32. SAC to CCS, 5 May 1945, "CCS 338.21 Italy," RG 218, NA. Civil Affairs, pp. 597-98. 33. Leahy, diary 1945, p. 81 (10 May 1945), Leahy Papers, LC. Grew memorandum of a telephone conversation with Stimson, 10 May 1945, 740.0019 Control (1taly)IS-1045, RG 59, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Grew and TNman, 11 May 1945,740.0019 Control (1taly)lS-1145, ibid. Cox, Race for Trieste, pp. 230-34, offers a different version of these events based on Truman's memoirs. 34. Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 276-77. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 475,477. Civil Affairs, p. 600. 35. Antonini to Truman, 11 May 1945,865.01415-1145, RG 59, NA. Truman to Churchill, 16 May 1945, "Prime-President Truman, April-July 1945," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. 36. Marshall to Truman, 17 May 1945, "Memos-to and from President, 1945," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. 37. Wartime Correspondence, 2:236-37. The text of the agreement is in U.S. and Italy, pp. 155-56. 38. De Gasperi to Stone, 9 February 1945, 10000/136/270, RG 331, NA. Stone to G-5 AFHQ, 15 February 1945, ibid. FRUS 1945,4:725-27. De Porte, De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, pp. 69-70, 170-7 1. Guillen, "I rapporti franco-italiano dall'armistizio alla firma del Patto Atlantico." 39. FRUS 1945,4:730-32, 735-36. 40. Ibid., pp. 730-31,734-35. 41. Ibid., pp. 728-29. Churchill to Truman, 4 June 1945, "Prime-President Truman, April-July 1945," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. 42. SAC P(45)-15, 18 June 1945, 1000011361270, RG 331, NA. 43. Cf. Cannon to Jones et al., 6 May 1945, 74010019 Control (1taly)IS-645, RG 59, NA. Miller, "Search for Stability." 44. Kirk to Department of State, 15 July 1945, "71 1.9 Italy Armistice," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 45. Cabinet Conclusions 14(45), 12 July 1945, FO 371149760lZM 3840, PRO. Cf. comments in FO 371/49759/ZM 3830, ibid. COS, "Peace Treaty with Italy," n.d., 10000I1361236, RG 33 1, NA. 46. FRUS 1945,4:1009-10. Cannon to Matthews, 11 June 1945, "Treaty-Military," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS, Conference at Potsdam, 1:681-85; 2:62 1-22. Progresso, 18 April, 8 September 1945. 47. Dowling to Huston, 28 June 1945, "Treaty-Military," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. 48. Weil, Pretty Good Club, pp. 220-66. 49. Memorandum for Bevin, 17 July 1945, Prem 417912, PRO. 50. FRUS, Conference at Potsdam, 2:53-54, 1080-8 1. 51. Ibid., pp. 148-50, 168-75,624-25. 52. Ibid., pp. 357-64. 53. For the text, see Mee, Meeting at Potsdam, pp. 268-85. 54. Progresso, 5 August 1945. La Voce del Popolo, 10 August 1945. FRUS 1945,

306 NOTES TO PAGES 173-80 4:1019; 2:109. SAC (45)-4,24 August 1945, 10000/136/259, RG 331, NA. Cannon memorandum, 7 August 1945, "Treaty Proposals-British," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Bevin to Balfour, 21 August 1945, ibid. 55. FRUS 1945,2:134-35, 151, 179-81,475. 56. Ibid., pp. 163-66. 57. Ibid., pp. 200-201. 58. Dowling to Gates, 11 September 1945, "Treaty-Military," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. 59. Hull memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of War, 17 September 1945, "Treaty-Military," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1945, 2:187-95, 210-16. 60. Hollingshead to Mosley, 13 September 1945, "Treaty-Istria," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1945, 2:248-54. Cf. Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, Semblance of Peace, pp. 420-23. 61. FRUS 1945, 2:490. Bymes statement is in U.S. and Italy, p. 179. Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 103. New York Times, 2 October 1945. 62. For the text, see U.S. and Italy, pp. 180-87. 63. Blum, Price of Vision, p. 497. Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, Semblance of Peace, p. 424. 64. Cf. New York Times, 17 and 18 September 1945. Saturday Evening Post, 3 November 1945. FRUS 1945,2:159-63,381-83. 65. Memorandum of Dowling to Hickerson, 17 September 1945, "Treaty Proposals-U.S.," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Dowling to Acheson, 29 September 1945, "Statements on Policy," ibid. OSS 2677 Regiment Report JRAR 96: "The Difficult Position of the Pani Government in Italy," 26 September 1945, "800 Italy August-Oct.," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 66. New Republic, 1 October 1945. Commonweal, 12 October 1945. New York Herald Tribune, 3 October 1945. Sumner Welles article is in the Washington Post, 26 September 1945. New York Times, 18 September 1945. Baltimore Sun, 23 September 1945. America, 13 October 1945. Life, 15 October 1945. 67. Progresso, 16 September and 7 October 1945. La Sentinella, 14 and 28 Septeniber 1945. Dowling to Reber, 27 September 1945, 865.0019-2745, RG 59, NA. 68. FRUS 1945,4: 1225-27. 69. Ibid., pp. 1222-25, 1250-52. Baltimore Sun, 13 March 1945. 70. FRUS, 4:1232-40. Minute by Ross, 8 February 1945, FO 371149811lZM 842, PRO. Stone to G-5 AFHQ, 5 February 1945, 10000/136/91, RG 331, NA. 71. Jones to Matthews, 9 May 1945,865.51/5-945, RG 59, NA. 72. FRUS 1945, 1:688-94. Sargent to Churchill, 6 June 1945, Prem 31243113, PRO. 73. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. xix. 74. Cf. Acheson and Clayton statements in DSB (22 April 1945):738-42,760-62. Other speeches reprinted in DSB (18 March 1945):439-40,441-48; (25 March 1945):507-12,469-78; (8 April 1945):616-20. 75. Harper, "U.S. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), pp. 245-71. 76. Hachey, Conjidential Dispatches, pp. 270-7 1 . 77. Clayton to Kirk, 10 July 1945, 865.5017-1045, RG 59, NA. 78. Civil AfSairs, p. 627. Harlan Cleveland, "Report on mission to Washington, April-June, 1945," 23 June 1945, 10000/136/362, RG 331, NA.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 8 0 - 9 0

307

79. Jones, memorandum, 24 May 1945, "Statements on Policy," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. 80. Charles to the Foreign Office, 16 May 1945, FO 3711499721ZM 2854, PRO. Leckie to Ross, 10 July 1945 with Foreign Office comments, FO 3711499721ZM 3809, ibid. Hoyar Millar memorandum, 10 July 1945, FO 37 1149818lZM 3731, ibid. 81. FRUS 1945,4:1265-66. 82. FRUS, Conference at Potsdam, 1:686-88. Truman, Memoirs, 1:264. Civil Affairs, pp. 627-28. Progresso, 27 June 1945. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Problems of World War II and its Aftermath, 1: 103-1 13. 83. Progresso, 22 August 1945. New York Times, 12 December 1945. Commonweal, 21 September 1945. Life, 5 November 1945. HST, PP 1945, pp. 463-67. New Republic, 10 December 1945. 84. Tasca to Stone, 31 December 1945, 1000011361440, RG 331, NA. Harper, "US. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), pp. 199-202. FRUS 1945,4:1253-54, 1261-63. Progresso, 18 August 1945. New York Herald Tribune, 17 September 1945. Cox to Hunt, 21 June 1945, "Italy Commodities, General," RG 169, NA. Minutes of the thirtieth m&ting of the Liberated Areas Committee, 20 August 1945, "LAC Minutes 2-36," RG 353, ibid. Byrnes to Anderson, 20 November 1945, 865.5018111-2045, RG 59, NA. Kirk to Stone, 23 August 1945, 10000/136/365, RG 331, NA. 85. Progresso, 23 May 1945. New York Times, 28 September 1945. Harper, "US. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), pp. 245-71. Sampson, Sovereign State, p. 59. 86. ngendhat, Multinationals, pp. 27-28. 87. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, pp. 424-27,506-34. 88. Ellwood, "Ricostruzione, classe operaia e occupazione alleata in Piemonte." Harper, "U.S. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), pp. 1-51, 245-72,287-327. 89. Kirk to Department of State, 7 January 1946, 865.5111-746, RG 59, NA. 90. Piscitelli, Da Parri a De Gasperi, pp. 141-50. 91. Smith, General Lucius D. Clay, 1:184. 92. Sulzberger, Long Row, p. 289. Progresso, 12 January 1946. FRUS 1945, 2: 1049-50. 93. Miller, "Politics of Relief." 94. Fenoaltea, "Italy at Work." Progresso, 17 March 1946. Cume to Niles, 25 April 1946, OF 233 Misc., HSTL. Currie to Truman, 10 May 1946, OF 233, HSTL. New York Times, 22 May 1946. Justice, 1 April 1946. Report of the Council for Italian American Affairs, 13 July 1946, "Italian American Affairs," Nash Papers, FDRL. Ortona, Anni &America, pp. 38, 66-67, 69-70, 85, 88, 115-16, 121, 138, 141, 260.

CHAPTER 7

1. Cf. Life, 29 April 1946. America, 4 May 1946. Nation, 11 May 1946. New York Times, 10 April 1946. 2. Churchill to Halifax, 13 June 1945, FO 371t49757lZM3140, PRO. Kirk to Department of State, 4 October 1945,865.00110-445, RG 59, NA. Eisenhower Papers, 6:458. Cf. Togliatti comments at 10 May 1946 meeting of the Council of Ministers,

308 NOTES TO PAGES 1 9 0 - 9 5 verbali del consiglio dei ministri, busta 7, fasc. 29, ACIS. "I comunisti e la costituente," Rinascita, April 1946. Key to Department of State, 13 May 1946, 865.00151346, RG 59, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Stone and De Gasperi, 16 April 1946, "800.1 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 3. Key to Department of State, 13 May 1946, 865.0015-1346, RG 59, NA. Department of State to the Embassy in Italy, 19 April 1946, 865.0014-1346, ibid. 4. Key to Department of State, 17 May 1946,865.0015-1746, ibid. Tittman to Department of State, 1 May 1946, 865.0015-146, ibid. 5. Setta, Uomo Qualunque, p. 157. New York Times, 9 June 1946. 6. Stone to AFHQ, 24 May 1945, 1000011361429, RG 33 1, NA. Robertson to HQ, Allied Commission, 10 May 1945, 1000011361479, ibid. 7. Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff (MJPA) PI304 "Interim Policy for the Future of the Italian Armed Forces," 31 July 1945, 100001136/263,RG 331, NA. Stone to SAC, 15 June 1945, 10000/1361479,ibid. 8. SAC to CCS, 3 August 1945, 1000011361479, RG 331, NA. CCS to SAC, 29 September 1945, "CCS 400 Italy," RG 218, NA. SAC to CCS, 6 October 1945, ibid. Memorandum by Ross, 11 January 1946, FO 371160622lZM187, PRO. 9. CAC 336 Preliminary: "Internal Security: Italy: Armaments," 19 December 1944, CAC Documents, Notter Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1945,4:1008-9. 10. SAC to CCS, 23 August 1945, 1000011361479, RG 331, NA. SAC to CCS, 14 November 1945, 1000011361480, ibid. Browning, "Reorganization of the Italian Army," ca. January 1946, 10000/109/1143,ibid. Minute by Ross, 7 January 1946, FO 371/60602/2M89, PRO. 11. FRUS 1945,4: 1050-5 1. War Department to Commanding General, Mediterranean, 17 May 1946, "CCS 400 Italy," RG 218, NA. Commanding General, Mediterranean, to War Department, 27 May 1946, ibid. 12. New York Times, 18 July, 28 August, 10 October 1946. 13. See the comments of British officials in FO 371160622lZM1729, PRO. FRUS 1946, 5917-18, 940-41, 950. SWNCC 32015: "Modernization of the Italian Air Force," 12 December 1946, "CCS 452 Italy," RG 218, NA. 14. FRUS 1946,5:948-50,952-53. Stone to G-5 AFHQ, 20 December 1946, 865.00112-3146, RG 59, NA. 15. Progresso, 28 October and 15 November 1945. Reinstein to MosIey, 21 November 1945, "71 1.9 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Sulzberger, Long Row, p. 293. 16. Reinstein to Mosley, 21 November 1945, "711.9 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Foreign Office to Halifax, 17 September 1945,740.0019 Control (Italy)/ 9-1745, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1945,4: 1054-55, 1057, 1062-64. Kirk to the Department of State, 25 September 1945, "71 1.9 Italian Armistice," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Acheson to Forrestal, 27 September 1945, "CCS 387 Italy," RG 218, NA. 17. FRUS 1945,4:1075, 1088-89. De Gasperi to the British and American Ambassadors, 6 November 1945, 100001136/91, RG 331, NA. La Sentinella, 23 November 1945. 18. FRUS 1945,4: 1089-90, 1096. Stone to G-5, AFHQ, 8 December 1945, 100001136191, RG 331, NA. Minutes of Ross, 25 January 1946, and Hoyar Millar, 27 January 1946, FO 371160522lZM308, PRO. FRUS 1946,5826-29,832. Minute


309

of Ross, 9 March 1946, FO 371/60525/ZM277, PRO. Minute by Ross, 20 February 1946, FO 371160524lZM593, PRO. 19. Discussions within the British government are outlined in a minute by Ross, 13 March 1946, FO 371/60526/ZM857, PRO. FRUS 1946,52334-39. 20. Cabinet Papers (45) 351: Italy, Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary, 28 December 1945, Cab 129/5, PRO. 21. FRUS 1945,2562, 718-19. U.S. and Italy, pp. 194-95. Cf. Dawson, Threat of Peace, pp. 50-77. 22. New York Times, 31 December 1945. Progresso, 13 January 1946. FRUS 1945,4:1100-1101. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 7 January 1946. Hillman, Mr.President, pp. 26-28. There is considerable doubt that Truman sent his "babying" letter to Byrnes, but whether sent or not, it reflected his state of mind. 23. U.S. and Italy, pp. 196-98. New Republic, 7 January 1946. Barron's, 11 March 1946. Dowling to Dunn and Cohen, 3 January 1946, "Treaty ProposalsU.S. ,'' Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Progresso, 14 January and 7 February 1946. HST, PP 1946, p. 42. 24. Progresso, 15 January 1946. Politica Estera, 20 January 1946. Dowling to Matthews, 21 January 1946, "Italian Policy," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Justice, 1 February 1946. 25. FRUS 1946,2:58-60. Reber to Dowling, 12 February 1946, "Treaty General," Italian Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Dowling to Reber, 21 February 1946, ibid. 26. U.S. and Italy, pp. 201-2. Minutes of 19 April Cabinet meeting, "Cabinet Meetings-Notes," Connelly Papers, HSTL. 27. Lincoln to Hull, 29 April 1946, ABC 092.3 Paris, Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 3 19, NA. 28. FRUS 1946,2:203-6. Vandenberg, Papers, pp. 269-70. 29. Vandenberg, Papers, pp. 265-66,264,269, 278-79. 30. Ibid., pp. 279-80. FRUS 1946, 2:155-56, 194, 333-41, 360-68. 31. FRUS 1946,2:114-20, 126-27,341-46. 32. Ibid., pp. 249-58, 360-68. Cf. De Gasperi's report to the Italian cabinet, verbali del consiglio dei ministri, 16 May 1946, busta 7, fasc. 31, AC/S. Sulzberger, Long Row, p. 313. Decade, pp. 72-79. 33. FRUS 1946,2:408-10,416-17. 34. America, 16 March 1946. New York Times, 10 April 1946. Life, 29 April 1946. Barron's, 29 April and 20 May 1946. Nation, 11 May 1946. 35. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:122-26. Leahy diary, 7 May 1946, Leahy Papers, LC. Decade, pp. 72-79. Vandenberg, Papers, p. 286. 36. New Republic, 3 June 1946. Nation, 25 May 1946. Commonweal, 3 1 May 1946. Life, 27 May and 17 June 1946. Journal of Commerce (New York), 5 June 1946. America, 25 May 1946. Blum, Price of Vision, p. 572. 37. Vandenberg, Papers, pp. 289-90. Leahy diary, 22 June 1946, Leahy Papers, LC. Novak, Trieste, p. 252. FRUS 1946, 2:478-79. 38. FRUS 1946,2:496-505,557-63,570-74,584-86. 39. Ibid., pp. 576-78,562-83. 40. Ibid., pp. 598-606,614-46.

310 NOTES TO PAGES 200-205 41. Ibid., pp. 641-46, 661. Bymes, SpeakingFrankly, pp. 131-32. 42. FRUS 1946,2675-79, 686-91,697-98. 43. Ibid., pp. 703-12,715-21,722-26,731-42. 44. Ibid., pp. 729-30,755-69, 771-74,854-55. Bymes, Speaking Frankly, p. 135. 45. FRUS 1946, 2:628-29, 700-701, 728-29,777-80, 856-59,904-7. America, 13 July 1946. Nation, 13 July 1946. New Republic, 15 July 1946. 46. Decade, pp. 79-82. 47. Life, 22 July 1946. New York Times, 27 July 1946. Cf. Commonweal, 27 July 1946. 48. SAC to CCS, 17 July 1946, "CCAC 00.1 Italy," RG 218, NA. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 3 August 1946. New York Times, 22 and 24 July 1946; 2 and 9 August 1946. Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading, pp. 74, 125, 369. New York Times, 1 August 1946. Montana, Amurostico, pp. 320 ff. 49. (ACC) Public Relations Branch Weekly Bulletin, 10 August 1946. Verbali del consiglio dei ministri, 6 August 1946, busta 8, fasc. 12, AC/S. 50. FRUS 1946, 3:15-16, 172-74,267-69. Bymes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 148, 154-55. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 14 September 1946. Minutes of the fifty-sixth meeting of ACI, 30 August 1946, 10000/136/230, RG 331, NA. The Italians found Bymes antipathetic. They thought Truman was a man they could trust and win over-if they could get to him. Egidio Ortona, Anni &America, pp. 152-53. 51. Minutes of the fifty-sixth meeting of the ACI, 30 August 1946, 10000/136/ 230, RG 331, NA. Montana, Amarostico, p. 324. New York Times, 24 August 1946. Justice, 1 September 1946. Sulzberger, Long Row, p. 3 16. 52. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 31 August 1946. Tarchiani, America-italia, pp. 11-12. FRUS 1946, 3:550-51. On the Alto-Adige, see Toscano, Alto Adige Question. 53. Minutes of the fifty-sixth meeting of the ACI, 30 August 1946, 10000/1361 230, RG 331, NA. (ACC) Public Relations Branch, Weekly Bulletin, 14 September 1946. 54. FRUS 1946, 3:390-92,413-36,508-12. Bymes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 14446. For details, Dawson, Threat of Peace, pp. 127-51. 55. New Republic, 19 and 26 August 1946. Nation, 17 August 1946. America, 24 August 1946. New York Times, 2 and 10 October 1946. The Clifford memo is in Krock, Memoirs, pp. 431-32,469. Commonweal, 27 September 1946. Blurn, Price of Vision, pp. 588-89. Decade, pp. 86-92. 56. FRUS 1946, 2969-88. Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 233. 57. Cf. Harden to Leckie, 14 July 1945 with Foreign Office comments in FO 371/49972fZM3809, PRO. 58. FRUS 1946, 1:1271; 5:827-28, 891-92. Stone to De Gasperi, 8 February 1946, 10000/136/166, RG 331, NA. De Gasperi to Stone, 24 January 1946, 10000/ 1361423, RG 331, NA. SWNCC 20415: "Restitution from Germany and Austria to Italy," 19 February 1946, "SWNCC Papers," Records of the Historical Division, Records of the Office of Military Government (Germany), RG 260, NA. New York Times, 2 February 1946. U.S. and Italy, pp. 198-99.

NOTES T O PAGES 206-10

311

59. Minutes of the fourteenth meeting of NAC, 27 February 1946, "Meetings 124," NAC Minutes, RG 56, NA. FRUS 1946,5:894-97, 899; 2901-2. 60. Progresso, 8 March 1946. Memorandum of a conversation between Matthews and Tarchiani, 7 March 1946,865.0013-746, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1946,5:901. For the Italian internal government debate on economic aid plans, cf. Ortona, Anni &America, pp. 220-22. 61. NAC Action 45, 20 March 1946, "NAC Actions 1-102," RG 56, NA. Minutes of the seventeenth and eighteenth meetings of the NAC staff, 5-6 and 11-12 April 1946, "Minutes 1-24," ibid. NAC Action 51, 19 April 1946, "Actions 1-102," ibid. FRUS 1946, 1:1427-28. 62. Harper, "U.S. and Italian Economy," (dissertation), chapter 6. Woodbridge, UNRRA, 2:268. 63. John Perry, "Why UNRRA Has Failed," Harper's (January 1946):77-86. 64. FRUS 1946,5:907-10. Acheson to Bymes, 10 May 1946,865.5115-1046, RG 59, NA. 65. FRUS 1946,5:910-12. 66. Ibid., pp. 912-14. Minutes of the twenty-eighth meeting of NAC, 17 May 1946, "Minutes 25-49," RG 56, NA. 67. FRUS 1946, 5:914-15. Scozzi to Bymes, 22 May 1946, 865.5115-2246, RG 59, NA. 68. Stone to SAC, 24 May 1946, 100001136192, RG 331, NA. 69. FRUS 1946, 5:922-25. UNRRA Italian Mission, "Post UNRRA Program in Italy," 23 July 1946, 1000011361254, RG 331, NA. Cleveland memorandum of telephone conversation, 31 May 1946, 10000115411456, ibid. Minutes of a meeting of UNRRA and Italian government representatives, 4 June 1946, 1000011361363, RG 331, NA. HST, PP 1946, pp. 189,213,239-40,313,316-17, 320. 70. "The Food Scandal," Fortune, May 1946. Call, 16 September 1946. Saturday Evening Post, 11 May 1946 (editorial). McCormick to Vinson, 1 June 1946, 865.511 6-146, RG 59, NA. Key to Department of State, 26 April 1946, 865.5 1/4-2646, ibid. George to Clayton, 17 July 1946, 865.5 1/7-1746, ibid. Connelly to Snyder, 18 July 1946, "Italy 1946-49," Snyder Papers, HSTL. New York Times, 7 June 1946. FRUS 1946,5:921-22,926-27. 71. NAC Action 81,31 August 1946, "Actions 1-102," RG 56, NA. Minutes of the thirty-seventh meeting of the NAC, 3 September 1946, "Minutes 25-49," ibid. FRUS 1946,5:937, 941-42. New York Times, 12 October 1946. 72. Minutes of the forty-eighth NAC staff meeting, 8 November 1946, "Minutes 25-49," RG 56, NA. 73. FRUS 1946, 5:928-29,933-34,942-46. U.S. Embassy to the Italian Foreign Office, 5 September 1946, "631 Trade-Italy 1946," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Clayton and Tarchiani, 11 December 1946, 865.00112-1 146, RG 59, NA.

312 NOTES T O PAGES 213-19 CHAPTER 8

1. Nation, 10 August 1946. Minutes of the 24 June 1946 meeting of Italy Committee of the State Department, "CIT Minutes 1-9," RG 353, NA. New York Times, 25 July 1946. New Republic, I2 August 1946. 2. New York Times, 30 August 1946. FRUS 1947, 1:1029-31. 3. White to Ness, 28 October 1946, 865.50110-2846, RG 59, NA. New York Times, 15 November 1946. State Department to the U.S. Embassy in Italy, 2 January 1947,865.50110-2846, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1947,3:841. New York Herald Tribune, 3 January 1947. 4. Statements of Poletti and Spofford, minutes of the fourth meeting of the Western European Study Group, Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Policy in Italy," 3 March 1946, Records of Groups, vol. 18, Council of Foreign Relations Records, New York. Weinberg, Afer Mussolini. New York Times, 7 November 1946. 5. New York Times, 28 October and 11 November 1946. 6. Gallman to Department of State, 22 August 1946, 865.0018-2246, RG 59, NA. Joint Intelligence Survey 26311: Invasion of Italy by the USSR, 19 November 1946, "ABC 336 Russia," Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA. New York Times, 6,7, and 21 December 1946. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:221-22. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities, 1:105. 7. Ross, Loneliest Campaign, pp. 21-27. 8. Dowling to Matthews, 21 November 1946,865.00111-2146, RG 59, NA. Portions published with a commentary in Di Nolfo, "Quando 1'America passa la guida dell'anticomunismo dal Re a De Gasperi." 9. Minutes of cabinet meeting, 13 December 1946, "Cabinet Meetings-Notes," Connelly Papers, HSTL. FRUS 1947,3:836-38. 10. Critica Sociale, 1 January 1947. New York Times, 4 January 1947. 11. Charles to Foreign Office, 3 January 1947, FO 37116776312186, PRO. New York Times, 4 January 1947. De Gasperi Scrive, 2127-29. Woodward to Connelly, 19 December 1946, OF 233, HSTL. 12. New York Times, 4 and 6 January 1947. FRUS 1947, 3:838-41,852-54. Memorandum of a conversation between Clayton and Tarchiani, 11 December 1946, 865.00112-1 146, RG 59, NA. Tarchiani, America-ltalia, pp. 46,67-68, 86-87. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." 13. FRUS 1947,3:841-42,845-51, 854-59. Progresso, 9 January 1947. Tarchiani, America-ltalia, p. 61. 14. New York Times, 11 January 1947. Progresso, 9, 13, and 14 January 1947. 15. Tarchiani, America-ltalia, pp. 84, 98, 103. Progresso, 11, 12, and 16 January 1947. 16. FRUS 1947, 3:859-60. War Department Press Release, 14 January 1947, "400.38," OASW Classified Decimal File, RG 107, NA. DSB (14 January 1947): 136. 17. HST, PP 1947, pp. 105-6. 18. Critica Economics (February 1947), pp. 3-8. Washington Post, 7 January 1947. "Is Italy Worth Saving?" Saturday Evening Post, 8 February 1947. Commonweal, 17 January 1947. America, 18 January 1947. 19. Cf. the comments of Nemi, as reported in Nichols, "Italian Crisis."

N O T E S T O P A G E S 220-27

313

20. Faenza and Fini, Gli americani in Italia, pp. 158-63, 196-221. 21. Gambino, Intervista sul De Gasperi, pp. 37, 65-66, 77-79. Sforza, Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi, p. 14. FRUS 1947, 3521-22, 527-28. New York Times, 10 February 1947. 22. "Italy Looks at her Peace Terms," Commonweal, 27 December 1946. Rinascita 4 (January-February 1947):3-14. 23. Progresso, 10 February, 23 and 28 March, 2 April, 5 May 1947. New York Times, 10 February 1947. America, 22 February 1947. Commonweal, 31 January 1947. The text of Berle's report is in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Treaties of Peace with Italy, pp. 34-39. On Italian efforts to organize opposition to the treaty, cf. Ortona, Anni &America, pp. 227-29. Progresso, 28 April and 19 May 1947. Call, 26 March 1947. New York Times, 19 April and 25 May 1947. Leahy diary, 1 May 1947, Leahy Papers, LC. 24. Progresso, 6 April 1947. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 169-86. New York Times, 8 and 12 May 1947. 25. Decade, pp. 92-97. HST, PP 1947, pp. 9-10. FRUS 1947,3:525-30. DSB 16 (16 March 1947):486-87. 26. FRUS 1947, 3541-43. 27. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Treaties of Peace with Italy, pp. 11-12. 28. Ibid., pp. 53-58, 74-75. 29. Carroll to Mooney and Stritch, 5 May 1947, "International Affairs: Italy 194447," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Stritch to CarrolI, 7 May 1947, ibid. 30. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 196-97, 287-90. Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 363-66. 31. Salvemini, Lettere dall'America, 1:327-28. H . Feis, "Diplomacy of the Dollar,"Atlantic (January 1947), pp. 25-28. Nation, 25 January 1947. New Republic, 27 January 1947. DSB (15 December 1946):1107-8. Life, 30 December 1946. Saturday Evening Post, 25 January 1947. 32. HST, PP 1947, pp. 10,26, 37-38. 33. Ibid., pp. 10, 38. 34. FRUS 1947, 3:845-50. HST, PP 1947, pp. 49-50. 35. HST, PP 1947, pp. 128, 149-50. Dobney, Will Clayton, pp. 181-84. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 293. 36. HST, PP 1947, pp. 176-80. 37. New York Times, 22 March 1947. Reprinted in Krock, Nation, p. 173. Call, 19 March 1947. HST, PP 1947, pp. 159-60, 167-72. Decade, pp. 1-3. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 311-12. Saturday Evening Post, 5 April 1947. 38. New York Times, 5 February 1947. Rinascita (March 1947):43-44. Dunn to Department of State, 28 March 1947, 865.0013-2447, RG 59, NA. Bay to Department of State, 17 April 1947, 865.00/4-1747, ibid. FRUS 1947, 3:877-78. Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra, pp. 268-69. 39. Tarchiani, Dieci anni, p. 136. Gambino, Intervista sul De Gasperi, pp. 81-82. 40. SWNCC, Special Ad Hoc Committee, "Draft Working Report on Italy," 4 April 1947, ABC 400f336 Italy (Rearmament), Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA. 41. Baldwin, Economic Development, pp. 21-22. Arkes, Bureaucracy, pp. 3-4.

314 NOTES TO PAGES 227-33 Cf. Wallace comments, New Republic, 24 and 31 March 1947. 42. New York Times, 1 May 1947. Marchisio letter to editor, ibid., 14 May 1947. Progresso, 13 and 16 April 1947. 43. FRUS 1947,3:886-87. Dunn to the Department of State, 7 May 1947, 865.5115-747, RG 59, NA. 44. Text of Marshall's address is in DSB (11 May 1947):919-24. 45. FRUS 1947, 32380, 889. De GasperiScrive, 2:93-94. Dowling to Matthews, 2 May 1947, 865.01/5-847, RG 59, NA. 46. FRUS 1947,3:889-92. 47. Ibid., pp. 893-94. 48. Ibid., p. 895. 19. Matthews to Marshall, 8 May 1947, 865.0115-847, RG 59, NA. 50. "Dov'k la crisi?" Rinascita (May 1947). No conclusive evidence identifies when the Americans informed the Italian government of their new policy. A number of circumstantial factors point to a mid-May meeting of Truman and Tarchiani (for which no record exists) as the point at which the new policy was unveiled. De Gasperi was aware of the American attitude by late May and was eager for public support for his new government. Cf. FRUS 1947,3:904-8. 51. FRUS I947,3:914-16. Text inDSB (15 June 1947):1160. 52. Text in DSB (15 June 1947):1159-60. FRUS 1947, 3:254,920. 53. New Republic, 16 June 1947. Nation, 2 1 June 1947. Fortune, July 1947. 54. Gallup, Gallup Poll, 1:661. FRUS 1947, 3:230-32,922-23. Marshall to Leahy, 27 May 1947, "Italian Ships," Leahy Files, RG 218, NA. U.S. Embassy Rome to the Department of State, 16 May 1947, "631 Italy--Civilian Supplies," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Department of State to Dunn, 26 May 1947, ibid. Attachment to the minutes of the seventeenth meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 12 June 1947, "Minutes 1947," PPS Records, RG 59, NA. 55. FRUS 1947,3:269-70,295-96. 56. Saturday Evening Post, 5 July 1947. Life, 14 and 21 July 1947. Harnby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 185-86, 188, 191. 57. Dunn to the Department of State, 27 June 1947, 865.00/6-2547, RG 59, NA. Sassoon, Togliatti, pp. 111-17. FRUS 1947, 3:933-35. 58. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:103-6, 131. FRUS 1947,3:945-47. De Gasperi, Discorsi, pp. 131ff. 59. FRUS 1947, 3:343-44, 397-405. 60. "Italy: East or West," Fortune, August 1947. 61. FRUS 1947, 3:959-60. 62. Reale, Nascita, pp. 52-53. "I1 'Piano' Marshall," Rinascita (June 1947):13739. New York Times, 8 September 1947. 63. Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 280-81. CIA, ORE 2111: "Probable Soviet Reaction to a U.S. Aid Program for Italy:' 5 August 1947, "CIA-ORE:' PSF, HSTL. FRUS 1947,3:327. 64. New York Times, 10 and 15 September 1947. Progresso, 14 September 1947. De Gasperi Scrive, 2: 136-37. FRUS 1947,3:969-70. 65. Minutes of an informal meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 18 September 1947, "Minutes 1947," PPS Records, RG 59, NA. . . Millis, -.- Forrestal Diaries, p. 318. 66. ~ ~ ~ 5 1 9 4 7 , 3 : 9 7 6 - 8 1 . - ~-


315

67. Minutes of the sixty-sixth meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, "1947 Minutes," PPS Records, RG 59, NA. 68. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:136-37. FRUS 1947, 3:973-75. Dunn to Department of State, 18 September 1947, "800 Italy Communist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Bonner to Dunn, ibid. Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations to the War Department, 22 September 1947, "800 Italy," ibid. Dunn to Department of State, "800 ItalyIRepublican Party," ibid. 69. Minutes of the 24 September 1947 cabinet meeting, "Cabinet MeetingsNotes," Connelly Papers, HSTL. Mario Rossi, "Letter from Rome," Nation, 13 September 1947. Stone, Truman Era, pp. 70-71. Barron's, 15 September,l947.Hogan, "Search for a 'Creative Peace.' " HST, PP 1947, pp. 331-32. FRUS 1947,3:362, 369-72. Barron's, 22 September 1947. FRUS 1947,3:446. Leahy diary, 29 September 1947, Leahy Papers, LC. HST, PP 1947, pp. 439-41,445-46. 70. FRUS 1947,3:472-77. HST, PP 1947, pp. 449-57. Stbne, Truman Era, pp. 36-39. New Republic, 19 September and 6 October 1947. Nation, 4 October 1947. Bidwell and Diebold, "New Aid for New Europe." 71. HST, PP 1947, pp. 475-76. Dunn to Department of State, 8 October 1947, "800 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1947,3:478-81,986-87,99194. Dunn to Department of State, 17 October 1947, "850 Marshall Plan," ibid. 72. HST, PP 1947, pp. 476-79,492-98. 73. Cf. comments of H. Alexander Smith, 10 November 1947, in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Relief Aid 1947, p. 138. House Subcommittee on Italy, Greece, and Trieste, Italian Crisis and Interim Aid, 25 November 1947. Vandenberg, Papers, pp. 378-79. Barron's, 3 November 1947. Miller, 'Taking Off the Gloves." 74. Ward to Foreign Office, 9 December 1947, FO 371167769lZ10599, PRO. Cf. C. Neikind, "The Communist Show of Strength," New Republic, 1 December 1947. 75. Reale, Nascita, pp. 3 1-32, 62-64. M. Straight, "Italy," New Republic, 24 November 1947. M. Ascoli, "Communism in Italy," Commonweal, 27 December 1947. 76. Dunn to Department of State, 20 November 1947, "800 ItalylSocialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Nation, 8 November 1947. Critica Politica (November-December 1947), pp. 356-61. Dunn to Department of State, 17 November 1947, "800 Italy/Socialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 28 November 1947, ibid. Memorandum of a conversation between Adams and Lombardi, 3 1 October 1947, "800 Italy/Socialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Adams, "The Socialist Party and Labor Movement in Italy," 19 November 1947, ibid. 77. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, pp. 27-29,44-49. Parsons to the Department of State, 27 October 1947, "800 Political Affairs," Myron Taylor Files, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1948, 3:745-46. 78. Hillenkotter to Truman, 10 October 1947, "Memos to and from President," Leahy Papers, RG 218, NA. Sulzberger, Long Row, pp. 362-66. American Federarionist, October 1947. New York Times, 8 October 1947. 79. SWNCC 383: "Proposed Emergency Assistance to Italy and Other Countries," 30 September 1947, ABC 400.336 Italy (Rearmament), Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA. "Italy," 3 October 1947, ABC 371.2 Italy, ibid. 80: FRUS 1947,3:967-69,983,989-91.

316 NOTES T O PAGES 238-43 81. Ibid., pp. 989-91. Dunn to Department of State, 16 November 1947, "800 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Caffery to Department of State, 21 November 1947, "800 ItalylCommunist Party," ibid. PPSl3: Resume of the World Situation, 6 November 1947, "Policy Staff Papers," vol. 1, PPS Records, RG 59, NA. 82. CIA: Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, 26 September 1947, NNMM Reference Collection, NA. CIA, ORE 47: "Current Situation in Italy," 10 October 1947, CIA ORE 1947, PSF, HSTL. Department of State to Dunn, 9 October 1947, 865.00Bl10-647, RG 59, NA. Eisenhower Papers, 9:2022. The British analysis was similar, cf. Ward to Warner, 23 December 1947, FO 37117315512970, PRO. 83. Markowitz, People's Century, pp. 23744,250-60. 84.New York Times, 1, 3, and 5 November 1947. 85. FRUS 1948, 3:724-46. National Security Council Action 9, 14 November 1947, NNMM Reference Collection, NA. 86. De Gasperi, Discorsi, pp. 145-76. Byington to Department of State, 4 December 1947,865.00112-447, RG 59, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 20 November 1947, "800 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 87. Dunn to Department of State, 28 November 1947, "800 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 88. Memorandum of conversation between McFadden and McGuren, 27 November 1947, "800 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Memorandum of conversation between Parsons and Tardini, 25 November 1947, ibid. FRUS 1948,3:727-30, 736-37. Lovett to Forrestal, 1 December 1947, JCS 1808, RG 218, NA. 89. FRUS 1948, 3:737-42. 90. Ibid., pp. 734-35,740,743-44. Eisenhower Papers, 9:2124-26. Memorandum to Wedemeyer, 9 December 1947, "ABC 400.336 Italy (Rearmament)," Records of the Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA. 91. "Significant Decisions at the meeting of the four secretaries," 9 December 1947, Spaatz diary 1947, Spaatz Papers, LC. FRUS 1948, 3:746-49, 752. America, 13 December 1947. Progresso, 14 December 1947. Life, 24 November 1947. 92. Charles to Foreign Office, 11 September 1947 with minutes, FO 3711677671 28302, PRO. Ward to Foreign Office, 9 December 1947, ibid. Piggott minute, 28 October 1947, FO 371167768129331, PRO. Piggott minute, 5 December 1947, FO 371/67768/210459, PRO. Brown minute, 17 December 1947, FO 37 11677691 Z10836, PRO. 93. Reber to Dowling, 7 July 1947, 865.00/7-747, RG 59, NA. Gigliotti to Vaughan, 22 July 1947, OF 233 Misc, HSTL. 94. Progresso, 8 April 1947, 11, 12, 16 June 1947,9 September 1947,26 October 1947,9 and 19 December 1947. New York Times, 21 December 1947. Dunn to the Department of State, 25 August 1947, 811.50316518-2547, RG 59, NA. 95. Progresso, 18 August 1947,23 November 1947, 15 December 1947. Justice, 1 January 1948. Scoresi to Connelly, 30 December 1947, OF 233 Misc, HSTL. Alice W. to Baron, 30 December 1947, ibid. 96. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." 97. FRUS 1948,3:816-19. 98. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves."


317

99. Nina Standen, "Italian Backdrop," Harper's (February 1948):150-59. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:244. LXB (11 January 1948):51, and (1 February 1948):138. NAC Action 218, 18 February 1948, "Actions 103-251," RG 56, NA. FRUS 1948,3:37677. 100. Dunn to Department of State, 16 January 1948, 865.0011-1648. RG 59, NA. Department of State to the Embassy in Italy, 30 December 1947, "800 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1948, 3:819-22. 101. New York Times, 18 December 1947. Parsons to Department of State, 19 December 1947, "800 Political Affairs," Taylor Papers, RG 59, NA. Parsons to Department of State, 2 January 1948, 865.0011-248, ibid. Parsons to Department of State, 28 January 1948, ibid. Department of State to Parsons, 6 February 1948, ibid. Cicognani to Carroll, 7 February 1948, "Communism: Italy: 1944-54," Records of U.S. Catholic Conference. "Interview with Pope Pius XII," 10 September 1947, "Personal Correspondence, 1944-46," Bohlen Papers, RG 59, NA. 102. Progresso, 27 December 1947. Call, 26 December 1947,3 January 1948. Dunn to Department of State, 30 January 1948,865.0011-3048, RG 59, NA. 103. Progresso, 25 January 1948. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." 104. De Gasperi to Taylor, 24 December 1947, "M. Taylor 1948," Hassett Papers, FDRL. Dunn to the Department of State, 28 December 1948, 865.20112-2747, RG 59, NA. Overt United States intervention in Italy is massively detailed in Rossi, "Italian Elections," (dissertation). 105. New Republic, 5 January 1948. Dunn to Department of State, 22 January 1948, 865.0011-2148, RG 59, NA. Fedele, Fronte popolare, chapters 2, 3. De Gasperi Scrive, 2:229-30. 106. New York Times, 2,5, and 6 February 1948. 107. FRUS 1948,32319-22. New York Times, 17 and 18 January 1948. DSB (15 February 1948):218-29. 108. FRUS 1948,32324,827-30,832-35. Dunn to Department of State, 25 FebruXY 1948,865.0012-2548, RG 59, NA. 109. FRUS 1948, 3:765-69. Cf. the parallel British analysis in British Embassy Rome to Foreign Office, 25 February 1948, FO 371173516lZ1674,PRO. 110. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." 111. New York Times, 18 February 1948. Dunn to Department of State, 18 February 1948, "800 Italy Elections," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1948, 3:836-37. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." 112. FRUS 1948, 3:775-79. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves," for details. i 13. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves ." 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid. 116. Dunn to Department of State, 12 March 1948, 865.0013-1248, RG 59, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 3 March 1948, "800 Italy Parties," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1948, 3:868-70. 117. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves." 118. De Gasperi, Discorsi, pp. 179-202. New York Times, 12 April 1948. DSB (25 April 1948):549-52. 119. Miller, " T ' n g Off the Gloves." Mallet to the Foreign Office, n.d., FO

318 NOTES TO PAGES 249-55 371173158122788, PRO. Scelba was encouraging the British to be ready to intervene to face a postelectipn insurrection. Mallet to Foreign Office, 10 April 1948, FO 371/73158/23019,ibid. 120. Cf. comments of M. Rossi, "Italy Between Blocs:' Nation, 3 April 1948, and C. M. Sulzberger, New York ~i'mes, 24 April 1948. Also, Fedele, Fronte popohre, chapter 4. 121. Progresso, 1 February 1948. McNicholas to Carroll, 16 February 1948, "Communism: Italy: 1944-54," Records of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Carroll to Cicognani, 2 April 1948, ibid. Volpe to Goodwin, 3 March 1948, 865.0013-848, RG 59, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 5 March 1948, 865.5113-448, ibid. New York Times, 2 April 1948. New Republic, 15 March 1948. Nation, 13 March 1948. Divine, "Cold War."

CHAPTER 9

1. Freeland, Tnrrnan Doctrine, pp. 292-360. 2. Dunn to Department of State, 24 May 1948, "800.2 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 59, NA. CIA, "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States," 17 June 1948, NNMM Reference Collection, NA. 3. White to Cleveland, 20 July 1948, "S-30 Policy," FRC accession 53A441, RG 286, NA. Pella comments, 6 July 1948, verbali del consiglio dei ministri, busta 3, fasc. 7, AC/S. Memorandum of a conversation between Lombardo and Fraleigh, 23 November 1948, "Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Galli, Storia della DC, pp. 110-17. Dunn to Department of State, 30 Septeinber 1948, "S-30 Policy," FRC accession 53A441, RG 286, NA. 4. New York Times, 27 June 1948. Dunn to Department of State, 30 November 1948, 865.504111-3048, RG 59, NA. 5. Memorandum of a conversation between Thorp and Ronchi, 7 April 1948, 865.501814-748, RG 59, NA. FRUS 1948, 3:873-75. Byington to Department of State, 11 August 1948, "S-16 Private Loans Under ECA Guarantee," FRC accession 53A441, RG 286, NA. Zellerbach to Hoffman, 23 September 1948, "Policy I," ibid. 6. Dunn to Department of State, 15 September 1948, "Policy I," FRC accession 53A441, RG 286, NA. "Italy: ERP Program for April-June 1948," 30 April 1948, "Slob Country Submissions," FRC accession 53A441, RG 286, NA. 7. Memorandum of a conversation between De Gasperi and Zellerbach, 4 November 1948, "S-2 Local Currency," ibid. Byington to Department of State, 12 August 1948, 865.0018-1248, RG 59, NA. Department of State to the Embassy in Italy, 30 August 1948, ibid. 8. ECA Mission in Italy to ECA, 19 August 1948, "Policy I," FRC accession 53A441, RG 286, NA. Hoffman to ECA Mission in Italy, 4 January 1949,"s-2 Local Currency," ibid. Dunn to Department of State, 2 April 1949, "Parliamentary Events:' ibid., Washington Star, 16 September 1948. "Review of ERP 1948-49 Program for Italy," "ECA," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Poggiolini, "Europeismo degasperiano e politica estera dell'Italia." 9. Annual Economic Review: Italy 1949, 15 February 1950, "Economy General," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA.


319

lo. HST, PP 1949, pp. 52-55. 11. Department of State to the Embassy in Italy, 7 May 1948, "850.4 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 12. Stone to G-5 AFHQ, 3 December 1946, with attachments, 1000011361438, RG 331, NA. International Free Trade Union News, December 1946. Italian-American Labor Council to Italy's Socialists, ca. 14 December 1946, "Italian Groups in US," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Antonini, "Reply to Lizzadri," n.d., 1000011361 438, RG 331, NA. "Garment Workers," Fortune, November 1946. New Republic, 24 March 1947. Department of State to Embassy in Italy, 23 June 1947, 865.504316247, RG 59, NA. 13. Ehrman, "French Labor Goes Left." Romualdi, "Labor and Democracy." Dunn to Department of State, 24 March 1947,865.504313-2447, RG 59, NA. Durn to Department of State, 26 May 1947, 865.504315-2647, ibid. Dunn to Department of State, 12 June 1947, 865.0016-1247, RG 59, NA. 14. Adams, "The Socialist Parties and Labor Movement in Italy," 19 November 1947, "800 Italian Socialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 3 April 1948, 865.504314-348, RG 59, NA. 15. Irving Brown, "Trouble in Italy," American Federationist, October 1947. New York Times, 4 October 1947. Murphy to Dowling, 27 February 1948,865.0012-2448, RG 59, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Adams and Oreste Lizzadri, 7 November 1947, 865.504111-747, ibid. FRUS 1948,3:841-42, 845-47. 16. Department of State to Embassy in Great Britain, 10 March 1948, "850.4 CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Lane and Enrico Pani, 16 March 1948,865.50413-1648, RG 59, NA. CIO News, 29 March 1948. 17. FRUS 1948,3:867. Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 23 March 1948, "Policy Memos," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. 18. Dunn to Department of State, 2 April 1948, "850.4 CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 19. Dunn to Department of State, 31 March 1948, 865.0013-3148, RG 59, NA. Department of State to Embassy in Italy, 15 April 1948, 865.504314-948, ibid. Dunn to Department of State, 8 April 1948, "850.4 CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 22 April 1948, ibid. 20. Dunn to Department of State, 22 April 1948, "850.4 CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 2 May 1948,865.504315-248, RG 59, NA. "Schoolboy Diplomacy at Rome," WFTU News, July 1948. Dunn to Department of State, 4 May 1948, "800 Italiaq Socialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Parsons and Angiolini, 25 May 1948, "124 Amvat," ibid. DUMto Department of State, 26 J.une 1948, 865.5043162548, RG 59, NA. 21. Dunn to Department of State, 25 May 1948, 865.0015-2548, RG 59, NA. Critica Sociale, 16 June 1948. 22. Verbali del consiglio dei ministri, 17 July 1948, busta 3, fasc. 12, ACtS. CGIL Notiziario, 20 July 1948. Byington to Department of State, 17 July 1948, 865.00171748, RG 59, NA. Byington to Department of State, 27 July 1948, 865.50417-2748, ibid. 23. Dunn to Department of State, 15 September 1948,865.504319-1548, RG 59,

320 N O T E S T O P A G E S 260-63 NA; Dunn to Department of State, 3 September 1948,865.5043/9-348, ibid. Nation, 11 September 1948.CGIL Notiziario, 30 August 1948. 24.Byington to Department of State, 23 July 1948,"850.4CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84,NA. Byington to Department of State, 25 July 1948,865.00172548,RG 59,NA. Department of State to Embassy in Italy, 13 September 1948, 865.5043/9-1348, ibid. Justice, 15 September 1948.Dunn to Department of State, 13 September 1948,"N-6 CGIL," FRC accession 53A441,RG 286,NA. 25.Marshall to Dunn, I September 1948,865.504319448,RG 59,NA. 26.Dunn to Department of State, 6 September 1948,865.5043/9-648, RG 59, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Knight and Simonini, 20 October 1948,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59,NA. Dunn to Department of State, 19 October 1948,"850.4CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84,NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Bonner and Gedda, 6October 1948,"800Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84,NA. 27.Dunn to Department of State, 8 October 1948,"850.4CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84,NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Knight and Pam, 19 September 1948,865.5043/9-1948, RG 59,NA. 28.Department of State to Embassy in France, 4 October 1948,865.504319-1748, RG 59,NA. Memorandum of a conversation among Knight, Parri, Canini, and Cozzaniti, 20 October 1948,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59,NA. Dunn to Department of State, 9 December 1948,"850.4CGIL," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84,NA. Dunn to Department of State, 21 December 1948,ibid. 29.Fraleigh, memo for files, 3March 1949,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Fraleigh to Dowling, 31 March 1949,ibid. 30.Dunn to Department of State, 19January 1949,"N-6 CGIL," FRC accession 53A441,RG 286,NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Knight and Staffanetti, 25 March 1949,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59,NA. Montana, Amarostico, pp. 345-51. 31.Dunn to Department of State, 18 March 1949,865.0013-1849,RG 59,NA. ibid. Dunn to DepartHudson to Department of State, 4 April 1949,865.50414-449, ment of State, 6 May 1949,"N-5Labor Unions," FRC accession 53A441,RG 286, NA. 32.FRUS 1949,4:704-5. 33.Memorandum of a conversation between Knight and Simonini, 21 October 1949,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59,NA. Dunn to Department of State, 25 October 1949,865.00/10-2549, RG 59,NA. 34.Montana to Dunn, 28 June 1949,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59,NA. Thomas to Acheson, 14September 1949,865.5043/9-1449, ibid. 35.Memorandum of a conversation between Fraleigh and Lovestone, 25 October 1949,"Labor," Italy Desk Files, RG 59,NA. 36.Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy." Byington to Department of State, 19 October 1949,865.504/10-1949,RG 59,NA. Lane to ECA, 17February 1950, "Italy-Defense," FRC accession 53A177,RG 286,NA. Minutes, agenda, and summary of ECA Labor Conference, 5 May 1950,"Washington Labor Conference--Case File," ibid. Jewel1 to Shishkin, 14April 1950,"Unions-Italy," ibid. 37.Nenni, Vent'anni di fascismo, p. 454."Conversation with Pietro Nenni," (30 September 1944), OSS Intelligence Report JR 1094,10October 1944,RG 226,NA.


321

38. GSI District Two to AFHQ, 15 November 1945, "800 Italy Dec." Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 39. (ACC) Public Relations Branch Weekly Bulletin, 27 July and 4 August 1945. Colarizi, "I1 partito socialista italiano in esilio." 40. Nenni, "I taccuini di Nemi." Call, 7 January 1946. Orebaugh to Department of State, 17 April 1946,865.0019-1746, RG 59, NA. Haniman to Department of State, 24 May 1946, "800 General," Caserta Post Files, RG 84, NA. 41. Key to Department of State, 9 January 1947, 865.0011-947, RG 59, NA. 42. Memorandum of a conversation between Key and Saragat, 22 November 1946, 865.00111-2546, ibid. Key to Department of State, 9 January 1947, 865.0011-947, RG 59, NA. 43. Dunn to Department of State, 9 October 1947,865.00110-947, RG 59, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 17 November 1947, "800 ItalylSocialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 29 October 1947, 865.001 10-2947, RG 59, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Adarns and Lombardo, 31 October 1947, "800 ItalyISocialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 44. FRUS 1948,39319-22,854-56. 45. Dunn to Department of State, 28 April 1948, "800 ItalylSocialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 4 May 1948, ibid. 46. Byington to Department of State, 27 October 1948, 865.00110-1548, RG 59, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 23 December 1948, "800 ItalylSocialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. 47. Department of State to Embassy in Italy, 26 May 1948, "800 ItalylSocialist Party," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. FRUS 1949,4704. 48. FRUS 1949,4:704. Holmes to Department of State, 21 January 1949, 865.001 1-2149, RG 59, NA. "Auspici d'anno nuovo," Critica sociale, 1 January 1949. 49. Dunn to Department of State, 9 January 1949,865.0011-849, RG 59, NA. 50. FRUS 1948,3:59-61,70-71, ll4-15,200-201, 339-42; 1:262. Sale to Mosely, 19 August 1948, "400.3 18 Equipment to Foreign Governments," SWNCC Files, RG 353, NA. 5 1. Memorandum of a conversation between Ainsworth and Colonna, 28 January 1948, "710 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Dunn to Department of State, 2 February 1948, "710 European Federation," ibid. FRUS 1948,353-54. 52. Dunn to Department of State, 11 March 1948, "710 European Federation," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Salvemini, Lettere dall'dmerica, 2:223-24. 53. Memorandum of a conversation between Tarchiani and Sale, 27 April 1948, 865.0014-2748, RG 59, NA. Matthews to Marshall, 4 May 1948, "Treaty-Military," Italy Desk Files, ibid. Tarchiani, Dieci anni, pp. 147-48, 169-70. 54. Tarchiani, Dieci anni, p. 153. FRUS 1948, 3:203-4, 218, 227-28. Douglas to Department of State, 12 September 1948, "710 European Federation," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Sforza to Italian Embassy in Washington, 27 September 1948, ibid. Dunn to Department of State, 26 October 1948, "710 Italy," Rome Embassy Files, RG 84, NA. Memorandum of a conversation between Greene and Marazzo, 28 October 1948, ibid. Dunn to Department of State, 17 November 1948, 865.00111-1648, RG 59, NA. 55. FRUS 1948, 32311. Verbali del consiglio dei ministri, 22 October 1948, busta

322 N O T E S T O P A G E S 269-73 4, fasc. 13, ACIS. FRUS 1948,3:808-11, 814-15. DSB 19 (28 November 1948): 680. Woodward to Connelly, 26 November 1948, OF 233, HSTL. Cf. Franks to Foreign Office, 31 December 1948, FO 371/79328/248, PRO. 56. FRUS 1948, 3:339-42, 104-7, 227. Critica Politica 10 (December 1948): 409-16; (February-March 1949):67-73. Critica Sociale, 1 December 1948, 1 February 1949. Dunn to Department of State, 5 March 1949, 865.0013-549, RG 59, NA. V. Mallet, Rome, to Ivo Mallet, Foreign Office, 19 February 1949, FO 3711794381 218636, PRO. Dowling to Acheson, 1 1 February 1949, "Western Group," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Memorandum by Sayre, 2 1 February 1949, "Atlantic Pact," ibid. 57. Critica Sociale, 16 March 1949, 1 April 1949. I1 Ponte, April 1949. Nenni, Patto atlantico, pp. 1-2, 6. Rinascita, April 1949. CIA, ORE 2-49, "Major Problems of Italian Government Policy," 5 April 1949, "CIA ORE 1949,"PSF, HSTL. Dunn to Department of State, 10 March 1949,865.0013-1049, RG 59, NA. 58. Smith, "Fear of Subversion." FRUS 1949,4:7-8,23-24, 141-45. 59. FRUS 1949,4:126-28. Italian Embassy at Brussels to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 January 1949, "Patto Atlantic0 1949," Carte Sforza, AC/S. Undated memorandum prepared in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ibid. Toscano, Pagine di Storia Diplomatica Contemporanea 2:445-517. 60. Dowling to Acheson, 11 February 1949, "Western Group," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Verbali del consiglio dei ministri, 8 March 1949, busta 6, fasc. 7, ACIS. Verbali del consiglio dei ministri, busta 6, fasc. 8, ibid. Tarchiani, Dieci anni, p. 168. Memorandum of telephone conversation with Connelly, 9 March 1949, "Europe 1949," Policy Planning Staff Records, RG 59, NA. 61. Nenni, Patto atlantico, pp. 8-9,25. De Gasperi, Discorsi, p. 213. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, pp. 480-82. FRUS 1949,4:253-54,328-29. 62. Unger, memorandum, 2 April 1949, "MAP General," Italy Desk Files, RG 59, NA. Unger to Surrey, 17 June 1949, "Military," ibid. Minutes of the sixty-eighth meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 25 April 1949, "Minutes 1949," policy Planning Staff Records, RG 59, NA.

CONCLUSION

1. Gambino, Intervista sul De Gasperi, pp. 1 17-26. 2. The major point at issue in the debate on Italy's postwar recovery is the extent to which Luigi Einaudi's currency policy hindered recovery or whether it was the essential basis for recovery. The question cannot be resolved without extensive research on the economic aspects of the ERP in Italy between 1948 and 1952. Einaudi's policy enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the Italian business and banking cornmunity. However, the largest private corporation in Italy, FIAT, strongly supported the ECA's contention that Italy needed a rapid expansion of production and employment. (See Bairati, Vittorio Valletta, pp. 162-63, 187-88.) What is clear is that the Italian government's refusal to follow a policy of economic expansion greatly impeded American efforts to achieve its larger political goal of stabilization. For views critical of the Einaudi policy, see the essays in Aga Rossi, II Piano Marshall e l'Europa, and Salvati, Stato e industria nella ricostruzione. The classic defense of Einaudi is Hildebrand, Economy of Modern Italy.

N O T E T O P A G E 2 7 4 323 3. On the PC1 and its evolution, see Leonard, Eurocommunism, and Blackrner and Tarrow, Communism in Italy and France. During the period 1975-78, a spate of interpretive articles on the PC1 appeared in Foreign AjJairs, Foreign Policy, and Problems of Communism.

Selected Bibliogmphy

Archives and Manuscript Collections I. U N I T E D STATES

Archives of the United States Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C. Columbia University, School of International Affairs, New York. Herbert H. Lehman Papers Charles Poletti Papers Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers Adolph A. Berle Papers Oscar Cox Papers Stephen Early Papers William Hassett Papers Harry Hopkins Papers Henry Morgenthau Papers Philleo Nash Papers Samuel Rosenman Papers Myron C. Taylor Papers Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Harry S. Truman Papers Dean Acheson Papers William L. Clayton Papers Clark Clifford Papers Matthew J. Connelly Papers George M. Elsey Papers Paul C. Hoffman Papers J. Howard McGrath Papers Philleo Nash Papers Charles G. Ross Papers Harold D. Smith Papers John W. Snyder Papers Stephen Spingam Papers John R. Steelman Papers

326 S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. Delzell Collection Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. Tom Connally Papers Felix Frankfurter Papers Cordell Hull Papers Harold Ickes Papers and Diaries William D. Leahy Diaries Breckinridge Long Papers and Diaries Archibald MacLeish Papers Carl A. Spaatz Papers Robert A. Taft Papers Max Ascoli Papers, New York. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Modem Military Branch Reference Collection Record Group 44: Records of the Office of Government Reports Record Group 56: Records of the Secretary of the Treasury Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State Record Group 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State Record Group 107: Records of the Office of the Secretary of War Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs Record Group 169: Records of the Foreign Economic Administration Record Group 208: Records of the Office of War Information Record Group 218: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Record Group 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services Record Group 286: Records of the Agency for International Development Record Group 319: Records of the (U.S.) Army Staff Record Group 331: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War I1 Record Group 353: Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees, State Department Record Group 407: Records of the Adjutant General New York Public Library, Manuscript Division. Fiorello La Guardia Papers Vito Marcantonio Papers Tresca Memorial Committee Papers United Nations Archives, New York. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration's Italy Mission University of Virginia, Alderman Library, Chariottesville, Virginia. Edward Stettinius, Jr., Papers Edwin M. Watson Papers 11. GREAT B R I T A I N

Public Record Office, Kew Gardens. Foreign Office General Correspondence, 1943-1949

S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 327 Prime Minister's Correspondence Cabinet Papers, 1940-1947 Imperial War Museum, London. Papers of Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane 111. I T A L Y

Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome. Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri Gabinetto del Presidente del Consiglio Ministero del Interno Delegazione Tecnica agli Stati Uniti Carte Carlo Sfoaa Archivio Gaetano Salvemini, Rome. Istituto Storico del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, Milan. Fondo CLNAI Fondo Merzagora Fondo a Prato Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana, Florence. Archivio Giustizia e Libert2 Fondo Mazzini Society Fondo Tarchiani Fondo Medici-Tornaquinci

Congressional Documents U S . Congress. House. Providing for Returns of Italian Property in the United States. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 26 June 1947. H. Rept. 390. . Providing Return of Italian Property in the United States and for Other Purposes. 80th Cong., 1st ses~.,1947. H. Rept. 1009. . Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings Pursuant to H.J. Res. 99,A Joint Resolution Requesting the President to Recognize Italy as an Ally and to Extend Lend Lease Aid. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 11 April 1945. . Committee on International Relations. Selected Executive Session Hearings, 19434950. Vol. 1, Problems of World War I1 and Its Aftermath. Washington, 1976. . Subcommitteeon Italy, Greece, and Trieste. The Italian Crisis and Interim Aid. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 25 November 1947. H. Rept. 1145. U S . Congress. Senate. Carrying into ESfect Certain Parts Relating to Patents of the Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, RatiJied by the Senate on June 5 , 1947. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 24 July 1947. S. Rept. 728. . The European Recovery Program. Basic documents and background information prepared by staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. . Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Relief Aid 1947: Hearings Held in ExecutiveSession on H.J. Res. 154 andS. 1774. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. . Hearings on Executives E G, H, I: Treaties of Peace with Italy, Rumania,

328 S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y

. . . . .

Bulgaria, and Hungary. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. Hearings on Interim Aid for Europe. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. Hearings on United States Assistance to European Recovery Program. 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948. 3 parts. Hearings on a Proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Behveen the United States and Italian Republic Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. Final Report with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 23 April 1976. 6 vols. Hearings on Intelligence Activities. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975. 7 vols.

Published Documentary Collections Aga Rossi, Elena, ed. "La politica del Vaticano durante la seconda guerra mondiale. Indicazioni di ricerca e documenti inediti sulla missione di Myron Taylor." Storia Contemporanea 6 (December l975):88 1-928. . IL rapport0 Stevenson. Rome, 1979. Blet, Pierre, et al., eds. Actes et Documents du Saint Si&e Relatifs a la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 7 vols. Vatican City, 1965. Campbell, Thomas, and Herring, George, eds. The Diaries of Edward Stettinius, Jr. 1943-1946. New York, 1975. Chandler, Alfred; Galambos, Louis; et al., eds. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. 9 vols. Baltimore, 1970-1978. Coles, Harry, and Weinberg, Albert, eds. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. The United States Army in World War 11: Special Studies. Washington, 1964. Collotti, Enzo, ed. Archivio Pietro Secchia, 1945-1973. Milan, 1979. De Gasperi, Maria-Romana, ed. De Gasperi Scrive. 2 vols. Brescia, 1974. Di Nolfo, Ennio, ed. Vaticanoe Stati Uniti, 1939-1952. Milan, 1978. . "Eine Analyse Kardinal Spellmans zur Italienischen Situation im Herbst 1944." In Beitrage zur Zeitgeschichte: Festschrift Ludwig Jedlicka zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by R. Neck and A. Wandruszka, pp. 321-334. Vienna, 1976. . "L'Operazione 'Sunrise': Spunti e documenti." Storia e politica 14 (1975): 345-76 and 501-22. Dobney, Frederick, ed. The Selected Papers of Will Clayton. Baltimore, 1971. Grassi, Gaetano, ed. Verso il govern0 del popolo: Atti e documenti del CLNAI, 19431946. Milan, 1977. Hachey, Thomas, ed. ConjidentialDispatches. Evanston, Ill., 1974. Hillman, William, ed. Mr. President. London, 1952. "La Giunta Esecutiva dei partiti antifascisti nel Sud (gennai-aprile 1944)." Movimento di Liberazione in Italia 28-29 (March 1954):41-121. Loewenheim, Francis; Langley, HaroId; and Jones, Manfred, eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. New York, 1975. Miller, James E. "La politica dei 'prominenti' italo-americani nei rapporti dell'OSS." Italia contemporanea 139 (June 1980):51-70. , ed. "Randolfo Pacciardi aux Etats-Unis (1941-1944): Elements d'une politique Amtricaine B l'tgard de 1'Italie post-Fasciste." Notes &Informations (Institut

S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 329 Universitaire d'Etudes Eurogennes de Turin) 4 (December 1974):23-54. Nixon, Edgar, ed. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 1934-1937. 3 vols. Cambridge, Mass., 1969. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S. Truman. 6 vols. Washington, 1961-1965. Roosevelt, Elliot, ed. FDR: His Personal Letters. 2 vols. New York, 1947-1950. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 24 vols. in 12. New York, 1972. . Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Edited by S. Rosenman. Vols. 8-13. New York, 1941-1950. Roosevelt, Kermit, ed. War Report of the OSS. 2 vols. New York, 1947. Salvemini, Gaetano. Lettere dall'America. Edited by A. Merola. 2 vols. Bari, 19671968. Secchia, Pietro, and Frassati, Filippo, eds. La Resistenza e gli alleati. Milan, 1962. Schewe, Donald, ed. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 1937-1941. New York, 1979. Smith, Jean Edward, ed. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 2 vols. Bloomington, Ind., 1974. Taylor, Myron C., ed. CorrespondenceBetween President Truman and Pope Pius XII. New York, 1952. . Wartime CorrespondenceBetween President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII. New York, 1947. U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. 2 vols. Moscow, 1957. U.S. Department of State. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 19414949. Washington, 1950. . The Development of the Foreign Economic Reconstruction Policy of the United States, March-July, 1947. Washington, 1947. . Foreign Relations of the United States. Annual volumes, 1940-1950. Washington, 1959-1977. . Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference of Berlin. 2 vols. Washington, 1960. . Foreign Retations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. Washington, 1961. . Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Washington, 1955. . Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conference at Quebec, 1944. Washington, 1972. . Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942 and Casablanca, 1943. Washington, 1968. . Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943. Washington, 1970. . United States and Italy, 1943-1946: Documentary Record. Washington, 1946.


Memolrs, Speeches, and Published Diaries Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York, 1969. Adamic, Louis. Dinner at the White House. New York, 1946. Amendola, Giorgio. Lettere a Milano. Rome, 1973. Badoglio, Pietro. Italy in the Second World War. Translated by M. Currey. London, 1948. Berle, Beatrice, and Jacobs, Travis, eds. Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971. New York, 1973. Biddle, Francis. In Brief Authority. New York, 1962. Blum, John Morton, ed. The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 19421946. Boston, 1973. Bohlen, Charles. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York, 1973. Bonomi, Ivanoe. Diario di un anno. Milan, 1947. Butcher, Harry C. My Three Years with Eisenhower. New York, 1946. Byrnes, James E All in One Lifetime. New York, 1958. . Speaking Frankly. New York, 1947. Caracciolo, Filippo. '43-'44 Diario di Napoli. Florence, 1964. Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. 6 vols. New York, 1948-53. Colby, William, and Forbath, Peter. Honorable Men. New York, 1978. Daniels, Jonathan. White House Witness, 1942-1945. New York, 1975. Deane, John. The Strange Alliance. New York, 1947. De Gasperi, Alcide. Discorsi politici. Rome, 1969. De Gaulle, Charles. Mkmoires de Guerre. Vols. 2 and 3. Paris, 1956-1959. Dilks, David, ed. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. New York, 1972. Dixson, Piers. Double Diploma. London, 1968. Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. Translated by M. B. Petrovich. London, 1963. Dulles, Allen. The Secret Surrender. New York, 1966. Eden, Anthony. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: The Reckoning. Boston, 1965. Eisenhower, Dwight. Crusade in Europe. New York, 1948. Ferrell, Robert, ed. 0 8 t h Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. New York, 1980. Guariglia, Raffaele. Ricordi, 1922-1946. Naples, 1949. Hassett, William. Off the Record with FDR. New York, 1958. Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York, 1948. Ickes, Harold. The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes. 3 vols. New York, 1954. Israel, Fred, ed. The War Diary of Breckinridge Long. Lincoln, Nebr., 1966. Kennan, George. Memoirs. 2 vols. Boston, 1967-72. Krock, Arthur. Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line. New York, 1968. Leahy, William D. I Was There. New York, 1950. Lewis, Norman. Naples '44. London, 1978. Lizzadri, Oreste. I1 socialismo italiano dal frontismo a1 centro sinistra. Rome, 1969. Lussu, Emilio. Diplomazia clandestina. Florence, 1956. Macmillan, Harold. The Blast of War. New York, 1968.

S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 331

.

The Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955. New York, 1969. Millis, Walter, ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York, 1951. Montana, Vanni. Amorostico. Livomo, 1975. Moran, Lord. Winston Churchill: The Strugglefor Survival, 1940-1965. London, 1966. Murphy, Robert. Diplomat Among Warriors. New York, 1964. Nenni, Pietro. Una battaglia vinta. Rome, 1946. . I1 cappio delle alleanze. Milan, 1949. . Daf patto atlantico alla politica di distensione. Bologna, 1953. . "I taccuini di Nenni." Europeo 22 (13 January 1966):lO-19. . Tempo di guerrafredda. Diari 19434956. Edited by G. Nenni and D. Zincaro. Milan, 1981. . Vent'anni di fascismo. Milan, 1964. . Vento del Nord. Turin, 1978. Ortona, Egidio. Anni &America. Bologna, 1984. Puntoni, Paolo. Parla Vittorio Emanuele. Milan, 1958. Reale, Eugenio. Nascita del Cominform. Milan, 1958. Romita, Giuseppe. Dalla monarchia alla repubblica. Pisa, 1959. . Taccuinipolitici (1947-1958). Milan, 1980. Rosenrnan, Samuel I. Working With Roosevelt. New York, 1952. Salvemini, Gaetano. Memorie di un fuoruscito. Milan, 1960. Sforza, Carlo. Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi. Rome, 1952. . L'ltalia dull914 a1 1944. Rome, 1945. Sprigge, Sylvia. Croce, the King and the Allies. New York, 1950. Stimson, Henry, and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York, 1947. Sturzo, Luigi. Lamia battaglia da New York. Milan, 1949. Sulzberger, C. L. A Long Row of Candles. New York, 1969. Tarchiani, AIberto. America-Italia: Le dieci giornate di De Gasperi negli Stati Uniti. Milan, 1947. . Dieci anni rra Roma e Washington. Milan, 1955. Truman, Harry. Memoirs: Year of Decisions, 1945. New York, 1955. . Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 19464952. New York, 1956. Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr., ed. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston, 1952. Wallace, Henry. Democracy Reborn. Edited by R. Lord. New York, 1944. Walters, Vernon. Silent Missions. New York, 1978. Welles, Surnner. World of the Four Freedoms. New York, 1943.

Max Ascoli, New York City, 28 March 1974. Randolfo Pacciardi, Rome, 12 October 1973.


Secondary Materials BOOKS

Adam, Frederick. Economic Diplomacy. Columbia, Mo., 1976. Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse. New York, 1957. Aga Rossi, Elena, ed. I1 piano Marshall e l'Europe. Rome, 1983. Aga Rossi Sitzia, Elena, et al. Italia e Stati Uniti durante E'amministrazione Truman. Milan, 1976. Andreotti, Giulio. Concerto a sei voci. Rome, 1945. . De Gasperi e il suo tempo. Milan, 1964. . Intervista sul De Gasperi. Bari, 1977. Ardia, Danilo. I1 partito socialista e il Patto Atlantico. Milan, 1976. Arkes, Hadley. Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest. Princeton, N.J., 1972. Aron, Raymond. The Imperial Republic. New York, 1974. Baer, George. The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War. Cambridge, Mass., 1967. Baget-Bozzo, Gianni. I1 partito cristiano a1 potere. 2 vols. Florence, 1974. Bairati, Piero. Vittorio Valletta. Torino, 1983. Baldwin, David. Economic Development and American Foreign Policy. Chicago, 1966. Battaglia, Roberto. Storia della Resistenza italiana. 'hrin, 1953. Bauer, Raymond; Pool, Ithiel; and Dexter, Lewis. American Business and Public Policy. New York, 1963. Bemardi, Giovanni. La marina, gli armistizi e it trattato dipace. Rome, 1979. Bemstein, Barton, ed. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration. Chicago, 1970. Bertolo, Gianfranco, et al. I1 dopoguerra italiano, 1945-1948. Guida bibliografica. Milan, 1975. Blackmer, D., and Tarrow, S., eds. Communism in Italy and France. Princeton, N.J., 1975. Blum, John M. From the Morgenthau Diaries. Vols. 2 and 3. Boston, 1965-1967. Blumenson, Martin. Salerno to Cassino. Washington, 1969. Bocca, Giorgio. Palmiro Togliatti. 2 vols. Bari, 1977. . Storia dell'Italia partigiana. Bari, 1971. Bryant, Arthur. The Turn of the Tide, 1939-43. London, 1957. Bums, James McGregor. Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. New York, 1970. Calleo, David, and Rowland, Benjamin. America and the World Political Economy. Bloomington, Ind., 1973. Candeloro, Giorgio. 11 movimento cattolico in Italia. Rome, 1972. Castronovo, Valerio. Giovanni Agnelli. 'hrin, 1977. Catalano, Franco. Storia del Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia. Milan, 1956. Cerquetti, E. Le Forze Armate Italiane dal I945 a1 1975. Milan, 1975. Chadwin, Mark. The Hawks ofworld War II. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1968. Child, Irvin. Italian or American? New Haven, Conn., 1943. Cline, Ray. Secrets, Spies and Scholars. Washington, 1976.

S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 333 Coakley, Robert, and Leighton, Richard. Global Logistics and Strategy, 19434945. The United States Army in World War 11: Special Studies. Washington, 1968. Cole, Wayne C. Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945. Lincoln, Nebr., 1983. Condet, Kenneth. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Nationat Policy, 1947-1949. Washington, 1976. Cox, Geoffrey. The Race for Trieste. London, 1979. Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York, 1979. Davis, Lynn. The Cold War Begins. Princeton, N.J., 1974. Deakin, E W. The Brutal Friendship. New York, 1966. Degli Espinosa, Agostino. I1 regno del Sud. Rome, 1946. del Boca, Angelo. The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941. Chicago, 1969. De Luna, Giovanni. Badoglio. Milan, 1974. . Storia del Partito d'Azione. Milan, 1982. Delzell, Charles. I nemici di Mussolini. Thin, 1966. . Mussolini's Enemies. Princeton, N.J., 1961. De Porte, A. W. De GaulleS Foreign Policy, 1944-1946. Cambridge, Mass., 1968. de Robertis, Antonio. Lu jiontiera orientale italiana nella diplomazia della seconda guerra mondiale. Bari, 1981. Diggins, John. Mussolini and Fascism. Princeton, N.J., 1972. Divine, Robert. Second Chance. New York, 1967. Ellwood, David. L'alleato nemico. Milan, 1977. Faenza, Roberto, and Fini, Marco. Gli americani in Italia. Milan, 1976. Fedele, Sante. Frontepopolare. Milan, 1978. Feis, Herbert. Churchill Roosevelt Stalin. Princeton, N.J., 1967. FerreH, Robert. George C. Marshall. New York, 1966. Fisher, Ernest E Cassino to the Alps. Washington, 1977. Flym, George. Roosevelt and Romanism. Westport, Conn., 1976. Foa, Bruno. Monetary Reconstruction in Italy. New York, 1949. Freeland, Richard. The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism. New York, 1972. Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. New York, 1972. Galante, Severino. LA politica del PC1 e it patto atlantico. Padua, 1973. Galli, Giorgio. Storia della DC. Bari, 1978. Gallup, George H. The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971. 3 vols. New York, 1972. Gambino, Antonio, ed. Andreotti: Intervista su De Gasperi. Bari, 1977. . Storia del dopoguerra. 2 vols. Bari, 1978. Gardner, Lloyd. Architects of Illusion. Chicago, 1970. . Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy. Madison, Wis., 1964. Garland, Albert, and Smyth, Howard M. Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. The United States Army in World War 11. Washington, 1965. Garosci, Aldo. Storia dei fuorusciti. Bari, 1953. Gerson, Louis. The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy. Lawrence, Kans., 1964.

334 S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y Gimbel, John. The Origins of the Marshall Plan. Stanford, Calif., 1976. Godson, Roy. American Labor and European Politics. New York, 1976. Graziano, L. La politica estera italiana nel dopoguerra. Padua, 1968. Greenfield, Kent R. American Strategy in World War 11. Baltimore, Md., 1963. Haines, Gerald, and Walker, Samuel, eds. American Foreign Relations. Westport, Conn., 1981. Hamby, Alonzo. Beyond the New Deal. New York, 1973. Harris, Brice. The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis. Stanford, Calif., 1964. Harris, C. R. S. Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1 945. London, 1957. Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York, 1954. Hildebrand, George. Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy. Cambridge, Mass., 1965. Hogan, Michael. Informal Entente. Columbia, Mo., 1977. Howard, Michael. The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. New York, 1969. Hughes, H. Stuart. The United States and Italy. Cambridge, Mass., 1979. Iatrides, John. Revolt in Athens. Princeton, N.J., 1972. Jonas, Manfred. Isolationism in America, 1935-1941. Ithaca, N.Y., 1966. Keene, Frances, ed. Neither Liberty nor Bread. New York, 1940. Kogan, Norman. Italy and the Allies. Cambridge, Mass., 1956. . A Political History of Postwar Italy. New York, 1981. Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War. New York, 1968. , and Kolko, Joyce. The Limits of Power. New York, 1972. Knox, MacGregor. Mussolini Unleashed. New York, 1982. Krock, Arthur. In the Nation, 19324966. New York, 1966. Kuklick, Bruce. American Policy and the Division of Germany. Ithaca, N.Y., 1972. Leffler, Melvyn !F The Elusive Quest. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979. Legnani, Massimo, ed. Regioni e Stato dalla resistenza alla costituzione. Bologna, 1975. Leonard, W. Eurocommunism: Challengefor East and West. New York, 1979. Levin, N. Gordon. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics. New York, 1968. Lippmann, Walter. The Cold War. New York, 1947. Louis, wlliam Roger. Imperialism at Bay. New York, 1978. Lussu, Emilio. Sulpartito d'azione e gli altri. Milan, 1968. McNeill, William. America, Britain, and Russia. London, 1953. Magister, Sandro. La politica vaticana e I'ltalia, 1943-1978. Rome, 1979. Maier, Charles S. Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Princeton, N.J., 1975. Mammarella, Giuseppe. Italy Afer Fascism, 1943-1965. Notre Dame, Ind., 1966. Mangione, Jerry. An Ethnic at Large. New York, 1978. Markowitz, Norman. The Rise and Fall of the People's Century. New York, 1973. Mastny, Vojtech. Russia's Road to the Cold War. New York, 1979. Matloff, Maurice. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-44. Washington, ' 1959. , and Snell, Edwin. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42. Washington, 1953. Mayer, Arno. Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. New York, 1967.

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. Wilson vs. Lenin. New York, 1959. Mee, Charles. The Meeting at Potsdam. New York, 1975. Mercuri, Lamberto. Gli Alleati e I'ltalia: 19434945. Naples, 1976. Migone, Giangiacomo. Gli Stati Uniti e il fascismo. Milan, 1980. . Problemi di storia nei rapporti tra I'ltalia e gli Stati Uniti. Turin, 1971. Novak, Bogdan. Trieste, 1941-1954. Chicago, 1970. O'Connor, Raymond. Diplomacy for Victory. New York, 1971. Panini, Carl. Heir to Empire. Pittsburgh, Pa., 1969. Patterson, James. Mr. Republican. Boston, 1972. Piscitelli, Enzo. Da Parri a De Gasperi. Milan, 1975. Pogue, Forrest. George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945. New York, 1973. Price, Harry. The Marshall Plan and its Meaning. Ithaca, N.Y., 1955. Quazza, Guido. Resistenza e storia d'ltalia. Milan, 1976. , et al. L'ltalia daNa liberazione alla repubblica. Milan, 1977. Radosh, Ronald. American Labor and United States Foreign Policy. New York, 1969. Range, Willard. Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order. Athens, Ga., 1959. Reitzel, William. The Mediterranean. New York, 1948. Rhodes, Anthony. The Vatican in the Age of Dictators. New York, 1973. Roosevelt, Elliot. As He Saw It. New York, 1946. Ross, Irwin. The Loneliest Campaign. New York, 1968. Salvadori, Massimo. Breve storia della Resistenza italiana. Florence, 1974. . Resistenza ed azione. Bari, 1951. Salvati, M. Stato e industria nella ricostruzione. Milan, 1982. Salvemini, Gaetano. Italian Fascist Activities in the United States. Edited by l? Cannistraro. New York, 1977. -. L'ltalia vista dall'America. Edited by E. Tagliacozzo. Milan, 1969. Sampson, Anthony. The Sovereign State of lW. New York, 1973. Sassoon, Donald. Togliatti e la via italiana a1 socialismo. ' k i n , 1980. Schaffer, Alan. Vito Marcantonio. Syracuse, N.Y., 1966. Schapsmeier, Edward, and Schapsmeier, Frederick. Prophet in Politics. Ames, Iowa, 1970. Schlesinger, Arthur. The Vital Center. Boston, 1949. Scoppola, Pietro. La proposta politica di De Gasperi. Bologna, 1977. Setta, Sandro. Uomo Qualunque. Bari, 1975. Sherry, Michael. Preparing for the Next War. New Haven, Conn., 1977. Sherwood, Robert. Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York, 1950. Smith, Bradley, and Aga Rossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise. New York, 1979. Smith, J. E., ed. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 2 vols. Bloomington, Ind., 1974. Smith, R. Harris. OSS. Berkeley, Calif., 1972. Snell, Bradford C. American Ground Transportation. Washington, 1974. Southard, Frank. The Finances of European Liberation with Special Reference to Italy. New York, 1946. Spini, Giorgio; Migone, G.; and Teodori, M., eds. Italia e America dalla grande guerra a oggi. Venice, 1976. Spriano, Paolo. Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano. 5 vols. %in, 1967-75.

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S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 343 UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Black, Gregory. "The United States and Italy, 1934-1946: the Drift toward Containment.'' Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1973. Buzzell, Rolfe. "The Eagle and the Fasces: the United States and Italy, 1935-1939." Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1977. DeNino, Mary. "Ethnic and Political Consciousness in the New York Italian Cornmunity, 1940-1944." Master's thesis, San Diego State University, 1980. Edelman, Eric. "Incremental Involvement: Italy and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1948." Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1981. Harper, John. "The United States and the Italian Economy, 19454948.'' Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1981. Laccetti, Silvio. "The Dissolution of the Italian Empire After World War 11." Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1967. Landa, Ronald. "The United States and the Italian National Elections of 1948." Unpublished article (1972). Leffler, Melvyn. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948." Wilson Center Working Papers No. 48. May 1983. (Now in American Historical Review 89 [April 1984]:346-81.) Miller, James E. "Epurazione Mancata: the Failure of Defascistization in Italy, 19431946." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 1980. Poggiolini, Ilaria. "Europeismo degasperiano e politica estera dell'Italia: un ipotesi interpretiva, 1947-1949." Unpublished manuscript, 1984. Rossi, Ernest. "The United States and the 1948 Italian Elections." Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1964. Smith, E. Timothy. "The United States, Italy and NATO: American Policy Toward Italy, 1948-1952." Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, 1981. NEWSPAPERS

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344 S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y Common Cause Common Ground Common Sense Commonweal Critica Econornica Critica Politica Critica Sociale Department of State Bulletin Forbes Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Reports Fortune Free World Harper's Magazine In Fact

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Acheson, Dean, ix, 30, 108, 171, 178, 225, 233,270 Acquarone, Duke of, 59 Action party (PdA), 77, 80, 139, 141, 155, 161, 184 Adam, John C., 236 Advisory Commission for Italy, 75, 82, 88, 90,91,92,95,99, 134 Africa: Italian colonial empire, 146 Albania, 145,204 Alexander, Harold, 55.97, 109, 141, 16266, 169, 178; meeting with Tito (February 1945), 162-64 Alexander proclamation, 141 Algeria, 270 Algiers, 42, 51,72, 95 Allied Commission, 113, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 126, 143, 158, 179, 180, 191, 194, 216 Allied Control Commission, 73, 78, 80, 88, 90,92, 100, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 134; Education Subcommission, 105; Economic Section, 112; Political Section, 119; Financial Subcommission, 134, 136; Partisan Branch, 139; Property Control Subcommission, 147; Legal Subcommission, 158 Allied Force Headquarters, 40, 52, 80, 82, 83,84,85,95,97,98,99, 108, 118, 123, 136, 137, 138, 151, 152, 177, 191, 194, 237, 238; role in policy making, 82-83, 105, 136, 143; recommendations on policy, 83-86; Psychological Warfare Branch, 85; and the purge, 136; influence on Italian policy, 136 Allied Military Government, 35, 41,49,59, 78,79, 132, 133, 134, 139-42, 151, 162, 165, 166, 167, 174, 183,264

Allied Military Lire (Amlire), 1.51, 152, 177 Alto-Adige, 161,202 Ambrosio, Vittorio, 59 America Fist Committee, 20 American Century, 22,23 American Chamber of Commerce for Trade with Italy, 209 American Committee for Italian Democracy, 47, 103 American Federation of Labor (AFL), 25, 33, 45, 105,220,256-59,261,262 American Foreign Policy,62 American Relief for Italy, 105, 177, 214 Americans for Democratic Action, 252 American Socialist party, 221 Anderson, Clinton, 216 Anti-Fascist coalition: achievements of, 34 Anti-Fascist exiles, Italian, 5, 24, 25, 26, 28; British attitudes toward, 29 Anti-Semitism, 21 Antonini, Luigi, 25, 33,45,46,47, 103, 104, 111, 185, 186, 196,220,221,256, 262,263 Anzio, 81, 82,98 Aosta, 166 Appleby, Paul, 32 Armistice, Italian, 35, 112, 194; revision of, 73, 112 Army-Navy Liquidation Commission, 181 Ascoii, Max, 21,25, 30,46, 186 Attlee, Clement, 171 Austria, 163, 165, 166, 188, 241; claims against Italy, 146, 170, 172, 173 Automatic Electric Co., 209 Badoglio, Pietro, 45,48-53, 56-61,71, 7485,87,89-94,97,98, 144, 145; character

346 I N D E X of government, 59, 144, replacement of (1944), 59-60, 98-100, 134; resignation of (1943), 60-61; reaction to agreement on Italian fleet, 89; six-party government (1944), 95; policy toward purge, 133-34 Balabanoff, Angelica, 244 Baldanzi, George, 111, 262 Bank of America, 182 Bari, 79,80 Bari Congress, 80-81; reaction to. 81 Basso, Lelio, 265 Bathurst, Charles, 238 Bavaria, 90 Belgium, 202 Belgrade, 162, 164 Bell, Daniel, 106 Bellanca, August, 25,46, 262, Berle, Adolf A., 26,27,40,44,55,79, 80, 86, 105,221,222 Berlin blockade, 250 Bevin, Ernest, 174, I95 Bialystok (Poland), 232, 245 Biddle, Francis, 31, 115 Bogomolov, Alexsandr, 72,88,93 Bologna, 98 Bonomi, Ivanoe, 61,99, 100, 102, 118, 121, 122, 135, 136, 137, 155, 157, 188; govemment formed (1944), 98-101; and British policy, 100-102; resignation of (1944), 121-22, 136-37; and purge, 131, 135-36, 155; and resistance, 140, 155-56; second ministry of, 155, 158, 183 Borgese, G. A., 25,30,33, 103 Bowman, Isaiah, 43 Bricker, John, 215 Briga, 166 Brindisi, 59,60,78 Brook, Alan, 40 Brown, Irving, 258 Bulgaria, 171, 172, 194 Bullitt, William, 32 Business, American: and the Thud Reich, 20 Byrnes, James, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 188, 193, 195-204,208,221,222,223; character of, 170 Caccia, Harold, 59, 83 Cadogan, Alexander, 38,70, 100, 126 Cadorna, Raffaele, 141 Calamandrei, Piero, 269

Campbell, Ronald, 30.55 Carabinieri, 144, 145, 191 Carandini, Niccolb, 200 Carey, James, 257,258 Casablanca Conference, 39,40,41,43,53 Casa Italiana, 14, 27 Caserta, 148, 169 Castellano, Giuseppe, 53 Catholic Action, 237,248,258, 260,268 Cavour, Camillo, 116 Central Intelligence Agency, 233,238, 248, 252 Chamber of Deputies, x Charles, Noel, 90,95, 101, 122, 180 Chequers, 100 Chiefs of Staff (British), 68, 169 China, 172, 174, 195 Christian Democratic party, ix, xi, 5, 77, 80, 94, 114, 158, 159, 161, 190,213, 214, 215,217,219,220,235,237,239, 242, 245,246,247,251,252,254,257-61, 268-73; U.S. commitment to, x, xi, 228, 229,247,248 Churchill, Winston, 39-42,44, 50-54, 58, 59,60,71-74,76,77,82-93,97, 100, 101, 102, 109, 111, 112, 113, 118, 121, 125, 126, 146, 148, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 171; enmity toward Sfoaa, 59, 100, 136, 169; defense of monarchy, 84-88,9192, 189; views of treatment of USSR, 90, visits Italy (1944). 109; and Venezia Giulia, 164,165 Cianca, Alberto, 46 Civil affairs, 31,32, 39.52; liberal plans, 3132 Civil Service Commission, 51 Clark, Mark, 155 Claxton (England), 266 Clay, Lucius, 183 Clayton, William (Will), 178, 179, 181, 189, 206,208,210,225,230,231,234 Clifford, Clark, 203 Cold War, 162,250,256 Collado, Emilio, 206 Colonna, Ascanio, 29 Columbus, Christopher, 116 Columbus Day, 31, 116,210 Combined Chiefs of Staff, 78, 118, 119, 162, 163, 164, 191 Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 49, 84,

I N D E X 347 123, 125 Cominfonn, 235,241 Committee of National Liberation (CLN), 5, 77,93, 121, 122, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 160, 183, 190 Committee of National Liberation for North Italy (CLNAI), 77,80,93, 137-44, 155, 156, 161, 191; negotiations with Allied command and Badoglio government, 98; Allied policy toward, 137-39, 141, 142, 144; objectives of, 138, 140-41, 156; relations with Bonomi government, 155-57; postwar cooperation with Allies, 156; dissolution of, 157 Common Cause, 186,221 Common Sense, 20, 62 Communism: as issue in U.S. politics, 5, 23, 34,45,46, 115, 117, 175, 184, 185, 197, 198, 199,214,215,225,250 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 25,33,45,46, 105,256,257,258,261, 262 Connally, Tom, 197,221,222 Conservatives, U.S.: views on postwar order, 21-23; views on fascism, 23 Consigli di gestione, 183 Consulta, 161 Coordinator of Information, 30 Corpo volantari della iibert2, 141 Corriere della Sera, 26 Council for Italian-American Affairs, 186 Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), 172, 193, 194,205; London meeting (1945), 145, 154, 172-74, 193; Paris meetings (1946), 196-201, 203; New York meeting (1946), 203-5; Moscow meeting (1947). 222,228 Council of World Affairs, 217 Council on Foreign Relations, 62, 234 Counterpart fund, 253-54 Cox, Eugene, 48,49 Cox, Oscar, 185 Cranston, Alan, 31,33, 185, 186 Croce, Benedetto, 57,60, 77,99, 144, 160 Crosby, Bing, 248 Cross-Channel attack. See Second front Crowley, Leo, 48, 112, 115 Cunningham-DeCourten agreement, 194 Cume, Lauchlin, 106, 115, 186 Cyrenica, 145

Czechoslovakia, 231,238,247,248,250; coup (1948) and reaction, 247-48.250 Daniels, Jonathan, 32 Dante Alighieri Society, 14 Darlan, Jean, 31 Darlan Deal, 4,31,34,39,44, 88 Davis, Elmer, 32 Decree law: DLL No. 151, 158, 159; DLL No. 159, 135 De Gasperi, Alcide, 125, 158, 159, 160, 161, 174, 192, 193, 194, 196, 198,201,202, 213,214,216,217,218,226,228,229, 230,232,234,235,236,237,239-43, 245-49,251-55,265,267,268.270-73; political objectives, 158; make-up of first government, 160; and peace treaty, 198, 219,220, 223; visit to United States (1947), 216-19; make-up of third government, 220; forms fourth government (May 1947), 229; and 1948 election, 239,240, 245-49 De Gasperi-Gmber agreement, 202 De Gaulle, Charles, 166, 167 Democratic party (U.S.), 4, 15-16, 19, 39, 110, 197,242 De Nicola, Enrico, 217, 218 Department of Agriculture (US.), 205, 214 Department of Defense (U.S.), 240,243 Department of State (U.S.), xiii, 13, 21, 22, 24,27,29,30-36,40,42,43,44,47,48, 52,54,55,56,61-64,67,71,78, 81-84, 88,91,93,95, 102, 106, 108, 111, 12226, 132, 146, 148, 149, 150, 158, 160, 163, 164, 165, 168, 170, 178, 179, 181, 184, 185, 192-95,205,206,207,210, 214-18,223,227,228,230,232,234, 240-44,247,248,249,255,257,260, 261, 262, 267; Political Subcommittee, 29, 43,44, 101; and civil affairs, 32; effort to control policy making, 36,42,64, 170, 223; postwar planning committees, 42,43; development of policy toward Italy, 43-44, 86,87, 131, 184; Territorial Subcommittee, 44, policy toward exiles, 55; objectives in Italy, 61-62; public criticism of, 62-63, 185; reconstruction program, 63-64, role in Venezia Giulia crisis, 148-49, 162-65; economic reconstxuction policy, 178, 179, 205,206,207,208; Office of Western Eu-

348 I N D E X ropean Affairs, 194; Policy Planning Staff, 231,233,237; Office of European Affairs, 240, 268; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, 24 1 Dewey, Thomas, 110,221,250 Disease and unrest formula, 98, 104, 119 Di Vittorio, Giuseppe, 257,259 Dodecanese Islands, 200,204 Domino theory, 7 Donovan, William, 30, 142 Dowling, Walter, 215,216,227,233 Doyen, Paul, 167 Droffingham,29 Dulles, Allen, 186 Dulles, John Foster 23 Dunn, James 84,228,229,231,234,238, 239,240,241,243-48,252,256,257, 260,265,269 Eccles, Marriner, 208 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 253,254,255 Economic Defense Board (US.), 22 Eden, Anthony, 58,70,73,74,75,81,86, 91, 100, 112, 122, 127, 169, 171 Egypt, 202 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 53 EIAR (broadcasting network), 14 Eighth Army (British), 35 Einaudi, Luigi, 220,232,243,252,253, 255,273 Eisenhower, Dwight, 31, 41,42,44,45,49, 51,52,56,61,67,72,74,75,76,78,82, 83, 144, 165, 166, 167, 194,238; and Italian surrender, 49; views on purge, 49 Elections (Italian): April 1948, xi, 243, 24549; June 1946, 190, June 1953,272-73 Enemy alien status, 31 Ethiopia, 145; Italian invasion, 15, 16, 23 European Advisory Commission, 75 European Recovery Program. See Marshall Plan European Union, ix Ewing, Oscar, 114 Executive Junta (Bari), 81, 83,86,91, 94 Export-Import Bank, 13, 168, 181,206, 207, 208,209,210,214,216,217,218,224 Fanfani, Amintore, 273 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 51

Federal CommunicationsCommission, 48 Federal Reserve Bank, 208 Fiat loan, 182 Fifth Army (US.), 35,98, 166 Fish, Hamilton, 43 Florence, 98, 139, 141 Foreign Aflairs, 43, 256 Foreign Bondholders' Protective Association, 178 Foreign Economic Administration, 48, 95, 106, 107, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123, 124, 179, 186 Foreign Office (U.K.), 38, 52, 56,71,77, 78,80,81,84, 87, 102, 107, 109, 117, 125, 126, 136, 169, 178, 180, 195 Foreign Office Research Department, 109 Foreign Policy Association, 62 Forrestal, James, 233 Forte, Felix, 46, 186 Fortune, 22,23, 232 Four Freedoms, 5 1 Four Freedoms Award, 115 Fourteen Points, 5 1 France, 19,26,75, 162, 172, 176, 194, 195, 204,225,234,235,238,253,270; attempt to seize temtoly in Italy, 166-67; customs union with Italy, 231 Franco, Francisco, 10 Frankfurter, Felix, 28 Freedom House, 32 Free Italian-American Labor Committee, 103, 111 Free Italian General Confederation of Labor (LCGIL), 260,261,262,263 Free Italy, 26,27,28,29,30,33 Free Tenitory of Trieste, 200, 203, 204 Free Trade Union Committee (AFL), 262 Free World Association, 32, 62 French Communist paxty, 229 French Line, 198,200 Friendship Train, 242,244 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 116 Gedda, Luigi, 26 General Motors, 23, 182 Genoa, 98, 156 George VI, 57 Gervasi, Frank, 186 Giannini, Amadeo E? , 182 Gigliotti, Frank, 46, 47, 242

I N D E X 349 Goering, Hermann, 53, 171 Good Neighbor Policy, 17 Grady, Henry, 151 Grand Council of Fascism, 45 Grandi, Dino, 58 Great Britain: covert funding of Mazzini Society, 27; wartime policy in Italy, 40,41, 42,51,77,78,81, 86.87, 100, 101, 108, 109, 112, 114-20; and Italian surrender, 50, 52; and institutional question, 50, 59, 61,77-78,80, 83,85,87,95; policy toward the Soviet Union, 69,70,72,73, 90, 91, 169; views on Italian communism, 90, 92,93,94,95, 155; policy toward Bonomi government, 99, 100, 101, 102, 109, 117, 118; economic policy for Italy, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 121, 127, 177, 180,205; accepts reduced role in Italy, 127, 156-57, 180, 192; policy toward purge, 133, 134, 136; and peace treaty, 145, 146, 194, 195; policy toward Venezia Giulia, 148, 149, 162, 163, 168; internal security policy, 192, 193, 195; suspends convertibility, 232 Great Depression, 3 Greece, 75, 119, 145,200,223,225; resistance, 143; civil war, 223, 224,225 Grew, Joseph, 164, 181 Grido della Stirpe, 16 Gronchi, Giovanni, 258,268 Gustav Line, 35, 77 Halifax, Lord, 105, 110, 113, 123, 124 Hamilton, Maxwell, 70 Haniman, Averell, 92, 93 Healy, Dennis, 266 Hearst press, 47 Hickerson, John, 268,270 Hilldring, John, 84 Hiroshima: bombing of, 154 Hitler, Adolf, 15, 16, 21, 23,45,67,68,69, 76, 166, 168, 194 Holland, 202 Hoover Food Mission, 209 Hopkins, Hany, 56,61, 112, 115, 125, 127 House of Commons, 85 House of Representatives, 47; and Allied status for Italy, 111,208, 210; Appropriations Committee, 208 House of Savoy, 29,44,51, 189 Hull, Cordell, 21,22,32,42,43,48,50,51,

55,63,69,70,74,75,82,91,92, 113, 145, 179 Hungary, 90, 171, 172, 194 Hyde Park declaration. See Roosevelt-Churchill statement

Ickes, Harold, 11,20,27 Lnterim aid, 234,235,236,241,244,247 Interim U.S. Information Agency, 175 International Coal Organization, 205 International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), 244 International Monetary Fund, 178,205,206, 207,210 International Telephone and Telegraph, 178, 182,209 Invasion of France. See Second front Iran, 188,225 Isolationism, 12, 17, 18.22, 37 Istituto Italiano di Cultura, 14 Istrian Peninsula, 148 Italian-American Labor Council, 32, 105, 115,242,256 Italian-American press, 15, 16 Italian-American radio, 15 Italian-Americans: prewar ties with fascism, 13, 14; antifascism, 36, 103; realignment of political forces, 45,46,47, 103; attitudes regarding monarchy, 95; and economic assistance for Italy, 102, 105, 111, 113, 114, 116, 180, 181, 184,205; and Italian labor, 110, 111,261,262; reaction to New Deal for Italy policy, 113; attitudes toward Great Britain, 116, 122, 123, 175, 176; reaction to Yalta conference, 125, 126; and Italian peace treaty, 147, 148, 179, 242; Venezia Giulia issue, 149, 164, 165; reaction to Potsdam conference, 172; attitudes regarding the Soviet Union, 175, 176, 196, 198; reaction to publication of Italian armistice, 194; reaction to Moscow Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 196; involvement in 1948 election, 244,245,248 Italian-American Victory Council, 33, 34 Italian-American vote, 111, 116,210,215 Italian armed forces: enlistment of partisans, 140, 143, 156; Allied policy regarding, 140, 143-45, 191, 192; reduction in size, 173, 191, 192; postwar reorganization, 191, 192, 193

350 I N D E X Italian Communist party (PCI), ix, 77, 80, 81,90,92,93,94,95,97,98, 101, 102, 103, 121, 134, 141, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 184, 189, 190, 193,210,215,216, 219,220,226,228,230-34,236,237-49, 251-53,256-60,262-67,269,270,272, 273,274; relationship with Soviet Union, 90,94, 193,215,231,232,233,237,248; role in resistance, 138, 141; reacts to Tmman Doctrine, 226; "double game," 226, 228; ousted from Italian government, 226, 228,229, 230, 236; and Marshall Plan, 231,232-33; reacts to Truman's December 1947 statement, 241 Italian economic miracle, 273 Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL), 251,253,255-63 Italian Historical Society, 14 Italian Labor Federation, 262, 263 Italian Legion, 28, 29 Italian National Council, 28 Italian National Partisan Association, 245 Italian News Service, 27 Italian Republican party (PRI), 161,220,221, 228,229,25 1,252,256,257,259,260, 261,262 Italian Socialist Federation in the United States, 46 Italian Socialist Labor party (Social Democrats), 220, 228,229, 236,239, 244, 247, 249,252,254,257-62,265,266,267, 269,270,273 Italian Socialist party (PSI), ix, 46,77,80, 81, 121, 139, 155, 156, 161, 184, 190, 201,210,215,219,220,226,230,236, 237,241,243,244,245,247,249,25158,260,263-67,269,270,272,273,274; analyzed, 219,263-64 Italian Social Movement (neo-Fascists), 215, 229,239 Italian trade day, 181 Italy: strategic importance of, 6,7, 146; Fascist activities in Latin America, 12; intervention in U.S. affairs, 12-16; prewar relations with the United States, 13; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Directorate of Italians Abroad, 14; Ministry of National Education, 14; Ministry of Popular Culture, 14; surrender of, 35,44,45,52,53,54,55; institutional question, 40, 44,45,85, 86, 95,

98,99, 156, 158, 159, 161, 189-91; Anglo-American disagreements over policy toward, 49.77-88,91,92,93, 100-102, 113-27; civilian agency role in occupation of, 51, 108, 120, 121, 123, 124; diplomatic objectives, 57; declaration of war on Germany, 57, 59; ;constituent assembly, 94, 156-61, 191,223,226; relief aid, 102, 105-8; Lend Lease aid for, 106, 107, 110, 111; Allied status claimed, 111; colonies of, 112, 268; internal security, 143-45, 191-93,237,238,240,245,249; KOnomic situation analyzed, 151, 152, 182, 183, 184,205-7,214,215,243,253; local government, 158, 160, 161; Ministry of the Treasury, 159; Ministry of the Interior, 192; diplomacy at peace conference, 201-2; economic policy, 217; withdrawal of U.S. forces, 233, 240,241; Ministry of the Merchant Marine, 252; Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 252 Italy America Society, 14 1taly lobby, 185, 186, 187, 196, 198, 199, 201,202,205,209,213,221,222,223, 231,244,249; components of, 102-4; defined, 117 Japan, x, 28,29,76, 165, 170, 188 Jenner, William, 215 Johns Hopkins University, 43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, x, 41,42, 82, 104, 151! 165, 192,215,269 Joint Staff Mission, 120, 124 Jones, Jesse, 48 Julian Alps, 148 Kerr, Archibald Clark, 70, 71 Key, David, 189, 190, 193,217 Khrushchev, N i t a , 273 Kirchway, Freda, 20,21,22, 23 Kirk, Alexander, 99, 100, 101, 118, 122, 155,160, 178, 179, 193, 194 Knights of Columbus. 221 Knowland, William, 215 Korean War, 273 Krock, Arthur, 49 Kursk, 68 Labor Democratic party, 135 Labour party, 241,264,265,266; Interna-

I N D E X 3!51 tional Department, 266 La Guardia, Fiorello, 25, 114, 214 La Piana, Giorgio, 103 Lateran Pact, 226 Lavoro, 11,258 Law, Richard, 108 LCGIL. See Free Italian General Confederation of Labor League of Nations, 15, 16 Leahy, William, 82, 164, 165 Lee, William, 217 Lehman, Herbert, 107, 176, 184 Lend-Lease Administration, 31,48 Lend-Lease aid, 150, 168 Liberal party (Italy), 77,80, 138, 155, 159, 160, 183, 190,215,252 Liberals, American: and isolationism, 12, 18; and fascism, 16-24; and postwar order, 17, 18; and intervention, 18-24; and Roosevelt, 19,20,50,51, 102, 103, 104, 105, 116; and U.S. war aims, 20-21; and antifascism, 25, 26, 27; declining political fortunes, 47,48; reaction to Italian surrender, 57; and Italian policy, 102, 103, 175; and peace treaty, 175; and Truman, 186, 249,250; and the Marshall Plan, 234 Liberated Areas Committee, 107, 179 Liberty ships, 216,218 Libya, 145,241 Lieutenant General of Realm, 84,85,94, 122 Life, 22, 103, 181,201 Lilienthal, David, 32 Lippmann, Walter, 62,219 Lisbon, 53,54 Little Entente, 229, 231,236, 245 Lizzadri, Oreste, 94 Lombardo, Ivan Matteo, 252 London, 73,75, 82,84,93,95,98, 100, 108, 119, 126, 134, 136, 137, 152, 169, 177, 178,257 London Conference on the Marshall Plan, 257 Long, Breckinridge, 13,42 Long Armistice, 57 Longo, Luigi, 141 Lovestone, Jay, 262 Lovett, Robert, 233,234, 240 Luce, Clare Booth, 124 Luce, Henry, 21,22,23, 124 LUCE, 14 Lyon, Frederick, 29

McCarthy, Joseph, 215 McCloy, John, 84, 123, 136, 179 McCormick, Ann O'Hare, 43,44, 110, 126, 149, 174,201,226,233 Macmillan, Harold, 60,72,85,93, 101, 108, 109, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 178; and new policy for Italy, 118-20, 123-26 Majestic Hotel, 179 Malta conference, 125 Marcantonio, Vito, 111 Marchisio, Juvenal, 105, 114 Marshall, George C., 32,40,42, 164, 165, 221,223-24,225,228,229,230,241. 247,260,268,269; Harvard speech, 23031 Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program-ERP), ix, 7, 179,223,230-32, 241,244,246,247,251-58,260,261, 267,269 Mason MacFarlane, Noel, 80,83,85,86,87, 89,91,93,94,95,99, 100, 101 Matthews, H. Freeman, 206 Matthews, Herbert, 110, 158 Mattioli, Raffaele, 153, 177 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 116 Mazzini News, 27 Mazzini Society, 25,26, 27,33,46, 103 Medici-Tornaquinci, Aldobrando, 155 Milan, 98, 156, 161 Military campaign in Italy, 35-36, 39, 68, 77, 97-98, 141-42, 155-56 Military mission to the Italian army, 143, 193 Military political commission, 71-75: role of France, 72, 73,75 Molinella, 262 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 70,73, 74, 171, 173, 174, 195, 197, 199,200,201,203,204 Mondolfo, Ugo Guido, 269 Montana, Vanni, 25,45,46, 262 Monte Cassino, 96,97, 104 Montevideo: international congress in, 30 Montreal, 112 Morgan, W~lliamD., 194 Morgan Guaranty Trust, 182 Morgenthau, Henry, 125, 126 Moscow, 53,92,237 Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference (1943), 60,63,73-75.77; declaration summarized, 60

352

INDEX

Pacciardi, Randolfo, 78, 80, 103,245,252 Pajetta, Gian Carlo, 142 Pantelleria, 41 Paris, 24, 33, 197,201,217 Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan, 231, 232,234 31,34,38,40,43,44,45,47,48,49,50, Paris Peace Conference (1946). xi, xii, 203, 51,56,58,86,98, 131, 132, 133, 156, 273; discussed, 203 Parma, 233 159, 169,221; overthrown, 29,30; U.S. Pani, Fenuccio, 141, 157, 160, 191, 192 reaction to overthrow, 45-49; rescue of, 56; death, 156 Pam government, 157, 158, 159, 182, 183; significance of, 157; paralysis of, 159-60, program of, 159, 183 Naples, 35,57,59,61,79,99, 134 Peace Treaty with Italy: reparations, 74, 147, Nation, 20,24,33,51,62, 199 170, 171, 173, 175, 196, 197, 198, 200, National Advisory Committee on Interna201,204,208; U.S. policy, 145-49, 161, tional Monetary and Financial Policy 162, 168, 169, 171, 172-73, 174, 196-97, (NAC), 205-10,216,217,218 199; allocation of Italian navy, 146, 169, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 112 National Security Council, 233, 239, 246, 173,200,204; Soviet policy, 146-47, 162, 168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 197-98, 200, 247 Nelson, Donald, 32 201; Venezia Giulia question, 148-49, 162, 166, 174, 196, 198, 199,200,203, Nenni, Pietro, 122, 156, 159, 160,201,216, 219,228,236,237,241,244,249,252, 204, French policy, 168, 169-70, 197; Yugoslav policy, 168, 198; colonial issues, 253,26346,269,273 173, 196, 197, 199,202,204; military New Deal, 11, 12,17, 18, 19,20,21,23,27, clauses, 173, 204, 255; provisions, 201-4; 31,32,36,47, 120,207 effects, 213; ratification, 219-23; signed, New Deal for Italy, 102, 111-27, 147, 177 220; U.S. Senate hearings, 221-22. See New Deal statement. See Roosevelt-Churchill also Preliminary peace treaty statement NewRepublic, 19,23,62, 102, 122, 199,203 Pearl Harbor, 28, 34 Pearson, Drew, 110, 124 New York Times, 27,43,49, 110, 122, 126, Pecora, Ferdinand, 228 158,201,214,233 Pella, Giuseppe, 254 Nixon, Richard, 215 North Atlantic Treaty, xi; signing of, ix; ratifi- Pesanti, Antonio, 219 Pescara, 246 cation of, ix, x Pius XII, 30,39,97, 114, 116, 125,201, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 237,239,244 ix, 223, 255, 266-71 Point Four, 223 Norway, 19 Poland, 19, 232 Poletti, Charles, 56, 136, 186, 201, 202 O'Dwyer, W~lliam,112, 115, 186 Pope, Generoso, 15, 16,28,31,33,47,56, Office of Facts and Figures, 24 104, 105, 113, 114, 185, 196,218,221, Office of Strategic Services, 40,78, 142, 242,244 186, 242; Foreign Nationalities Branch, 31 Popular Front, 247, 248 Office of War Information, 24,31,32, 33, Post Office (US.),248 34,47,48,53, 117; Foreign Language DiPotsdam Conference, 154, 168-72; protocol vision, 31; Domestic Branch, 47; Overseas at, 172, 196 Branch, 48; "Moronic little king episode," Prague, 247 48-49 Preliminary peace treaty, 108-9, 123, 171, One World, 62 194, 198 Moscow Foreign Ministers' Meeting (1945), 195, 196 Murphy, Robert, 55,60,75,94,95, 100 Murras, Efisio, 269 Murray, Philip, 258 Mussolini, Benito, 3, 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 30,

I N D E X 353 President's War Relief Board, 47 Progressive party, 250 Progress0 Italo-Arnericano, 15, 126 Prominenti, 26,31,33,36,45,47,242 Purge (defascistization and epurazione), 36, 39,41,48,49,50,74,75, 131-37, 144, 155, 157, 159, 160 Quebec Conference: in 1943,52,54,70,71; in 1944, 110, 111, 112, 113 Quintieri, Quinto, 152, 177 Quintieri-Mattioli mission, 152, 177 Ramadier, Paul, 229 Ravello, 95 Ready, Michael, 112; 115 Reale, Eugenio, 241 Reber, Samuel, 240 Red Army, 68,74 Reinhardt, Frederick, 79, 82,91 Republican party (U.S.), 4, 19,20, 23, 110, 116, 142, 197,210,215,217,221,224, 230,235,250,251 Resistance (Italian), xi, xii, 137-43, 149, 154, 160, 182; Allied policy toward, 13843 Rhodes, 204 Rinascita, 229 Roatta, Mario, 59, 155 Romania, 171, 194 Rome, 60,83,99, 104, 120, 122, 125, 126, 134, 192,215,217,226,235,236,239, 249,251, 255, 258, 268; as open city, 38, 39,42,51,52,53,54,97, 104; air attacks on, 45,54; liberation of, 59, 61,77, 79, 81,82,85,87,88,91,93,94,95,96-100, 106; Committee of National Liberation, 61, 77,80,82,99, German occupation of, 9697, 141 Romita, Giuseppe, 258,265 Rommel, Erwin, 7 Romualdi, Serafino, 25 Roosevelt, Franklin, xi, 6, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20,22,26,27,28,32,33,41,43,44,46, 50-57,69,70-76,84,85,87-92,95, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108-18, 121, 123-26, 148, 171, 175, 176,210; attitude toward isolationism, 12, 37; and the Roman Catholic church, 29,38,43,52,69, 105, 112, 115; war and postwar aims, 36,37,62; me-

diator role in foreign and domestic politics, 36-37,38,68,69,70,72,88,89; and Italian reconstruction, 38, 103, 104, 121, 13132, 147; and unconditional surrender, 39; and the purge, 40,41,49,50,51, 106, 132, 133; and Italian surrender, 41,42; and the State Department, 42; Fireside Chat (July 28, 1943), 50, 131; and the Soviet Union, 53,68,69,70, 88,89,90,91,92; and the ships transfer issue, 74,75,88,89, 90,91, 103; views on institutional question, 81, 82, 95-96, 101; reelection strategy (1944), 95,97, 102-6, 109, 11016; and Italian-Americans, 95, 102, 103, 113, 114, 115, 116, 121, 180, 186; Fieside Chat (June 5, 1944), 105, 106; and Italian peace treaty, 145; and U.S. foreign economic policy, 150; reaction to death of, 163, 180, 181 Roosevelt-Churchill manifesto (1943), 48 Roosevelt-Churchill statement (1944), 112, 113, 118, 152 Ross, Adam, 78 Rumbold, A., 77, 81 Salemo, 35,56,84,99 Salvemini, Gaetano, 24,25,27,33, 103,224 San Francisco Conference (l945), 173 Santi, Fernando, 257 Saragat, Giuseppe, 220,236,242,245,252, 253,264,265,270 Sardinia, 39,59 Sargent, Orme, 102 Saturday Evening Posr, 62, 181,219 Scelba, Mario, 245 Schuster, Ildefonso, 237 Scoccimarro, Mauro, 136 Scozzi, Ercoli, 209 Second front, 35,39,53,67,70,76, 104 Seldes, George, 24 Senate (US.), 47; Foreign Relations Committee, 221,222 "Senior partner," 39-40 Separate peace, 68-69 Sforza, Carlo, ix, x, 26-30,42, 54-61,63, 77,81, 100, 101, 122, 123, 136, 137, 144, 169,231,242,243,267,268,269,271; and NATO, ix, x, 267-71; return to Italy, 54-60; meetings with British leaders, 5860,and Communist issue, 94; appointment

3bi4 I N D E X as foreign minister vetoed (June 1944), 100, 101; appointment as foreign minister or prime minister vetoed (November 1944), 122; and the purge, 134-37, 155; and the peace treaty, 220 Shaw, Howland, 115 Shore, Dinah, 248 Shotwell, James, 44 Sicily, 55,71,72, 133; invasion of, 35, 39, 40,45; civil affairs in, 48 Sixth Fleet, 243 Smith, Gerald K., 20 Socialist International, 258 Sons of Italy, 15,46,218,221 Spanish republic, 17, 21 Spellman, Francis, 115 Stabilization: studies of, xii, xiii; objective of U.S. policy, 3-7, 131,223, 229; elements of U.S. policy, 4-5; liberal and conservative views, 4-5; dilemma, 5-7; Roosevelt policy reversed, 226-28 Stalin, Joseph, 23,28,68-73,75,76,88,89, 90,100, 125, 147, 164, 165, 169, 171, 175,236,238,253; views on Italy, 70,71, 101

Stalingrad, 67 Standby, William, 68,70 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 226,227,237

Stettinius, Edward, Jr., 63, 82, 87, 100, 122, 123, 124, 125, 164, 173

Stevenson mission, 151 Stimson, Henry, 32, 164,181 Stone, Ellery, 113, 124, 125, 158, 160, 178, 191, 194,209,217,221,256

Stone, I. E, 51 Stuao, Luigi, 114 Suez Canal, 7 Suvich, Fulvio, 16 Svolra di Salerno, 94, 133 Switzerland, 186 Taft, Robert, 151,221,230,235 Tammany Hall, 47 Tangier. 53 Tarchiani, Alberto, 20,26,46, 184, 198, 206,209,210,218,226,228,248,268, 270; cooperation with the Italian lobby, 186 Taylor, Myron, 30,38,43,44,97, 105, 106, 111, 114,214

Tehran Conference, 74,75, 76.77, 88, 90 Tenda, 166 Thomas, Norman, 20,262 Thompson, Dorothy, 221 Time,22 Times (London), 98 Tito, Josef, 90, 109, 146, 148, 149, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166

Togliatti, Palmiro, 94,98, 189,228,232, 233,236, 253, 258,259; assassination attempt on, 258-59 Toscanini, Arturo, 103 Trade Union Advisory Council, 261 Trade Union Congress, 111,258 Trans Western Airlines, 178, 182 ''TRB," 19 Treasury Department (U.S.), 47, 95, 106, 107, 152,206

Treasury suspense account, ("non-troop pay"), 206, 209, 214 Treaty of Versailles, 220 Tremelloni, Roberto, 252, 254 Tresca, Carlo, 25, 33.47 Trieste, 149, 163, 166, 174, 198, 199,200, 202,238,247

Tripoli, 146 Troika incident, 193 Troop pay off-set credits, 107, 115, 177, 181, 209,214; defined, 107 Truman, Hany, ix, 6,43, 110, 163, 164, 165? 167-71, 175, 181, 188, 195, 196,203, 206,209,218,225,226,227,234,235, 238,240,241,242,248,251,255,262, 269,270; Truman Doctrine, x, 223,224, 225,226,230; and Venezia Giulia, 163, 164, 165; and Italian-Americans, 180, 181, 186, 196,213,219,242,249,250 Turin, 98 Turkish Straits, 225

Tuscan Committee of National Liberation, 139, 141

Umberto of Savoy, 84,85,95,98,99,

158,

189, 199

Unconditional surrender, 39,53,54 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, xi, 38, 42,54,63, 117, 134, 149, 162, 172, 173, 175, 176, 193,.202,215,225; role in Italian surrender, 53; policy in Italy, 67,68, 72.73.74.88-95, 162; view on western

I N D E X 355 military strategy, 68; role in Italy, 68-76, 88-92, 93,94; U.S. public opinion regarding, 69; status under Italian armistice, 72; ships transfer issue, 74, 75,88, 89,90; intervention in Italian internal affairs, 88-92; establishes diplomatic relations with Italy, 89,90,91,92; policy toward Venezia Giulia, 165-66 Unitd, 193 United Nations, 170, 171, 172, 195, 199, 216; and the preliminary peace treaty, 195; and the Marshall Plan, 230,231,233,236; and the 1948 election, 248 United Nations Economic and Social Committee, 205 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 6, 64, 107, 109, 112, 113, 154, 168, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 184, 192,206,207,209,214; and aid programs for Italy, 107, 108, 112, 113, 116, 176, 177, 180, 181, 184,206,207, 209, 214; and Italian mission, 207 United Nations Security Council, 200 United States: foreign policy objectives, ixxi, xiii, 3-10, 106, policy regarding Italian reconstruction, x, xi, 43,44, 131-33, 157, 158, 160, 161, 188, 190, 191; U.S. Catholic church, xi, 7, 12,38,97, 102, 104, 114, 115, 185,218,223,244,249; war aims, 4-5,62-64; U.S. Communist party, 16,20,23; views on institutional question, 29,61,78,85, 86, 157-58, 189-91; commitments to postwar Italy, 30; military strategy in Italy, 40; views of British policy, 40, 91, 192; relations with the Vatican, 43; position on Italian surrender, 52, 54; policy on interim government, 54,55,78,80,91, 95; interagency disputes on policy, 67, 104, 106, 120, 121, 164, 165, 179,214,215, 216; weight in Western alliance, 76; policy regarding reorganization of Italy's government, 79, 81, 87, 88,92, 93; reaction to Soviet intervention, 90,91,92; policy on Italy, 111, 114, 115, 188,213,237,238, 239,243,244,246,251; policy regarding purge, 131-34; policy regarding resistance, 132, 141, 142, 156; policy regarding Venezia Giulia, 149, 162-63; economic policy in Italy, 150-53, 176-84, 205-10; attitudes and policy toward Italian commu-

nism, 161,215,220,264,268; economic aid to Italy, 179, 180-84; conflicts with the Soviet Union, 181, 199,203,215,230, 238; policy regarding Italian armed forces, 191, 192,237,238,245,247; policy revised, 215, 216, 223-30; confronts the Italian communists, 232,233,235,237,238, 241, 242,243; United States Air Force, 239; covert operations in Italy, 244, 247, 248; policy regarding Italian labor, 255, 256,260,261; policy regarding Italy's participation in NATO, 266-71 Unity of action pact, 103, 121 Uomo Qualunque, 214 Val di Susa, 166 Vandenberg, Arthur, 197,221,222,225,235 Vatican, xi, 15,29,30,36,37,38,41,42, 43,44,52,53,54,96,97, 105,214,242, 273; concern with communism, 97,237, 244,245 Velde, Harold, 215 Venezia Giulia, 148-49, 162-65, 174, 196, 198, 200, 268; Allied plans for, 148, 149, 174; Italian policy regarding, 149 Venturi, Lionello, 103 Victor Emmanuel III,41,44,45,47,49,50, 56,57,59,60,61,71,77,78,79,80,81, 82,83,84,85,93,94,95,98,99; question of abdication, 81-86,93,94,95,99 Vienna, 109 Viminale Palace, 155 Vinson, Fred, 208 Vishinski, Andrei, 72, 88,93 Voce del Popolo, 47, 126 Wallace, Henry, 19, 20,21,22, 30,32, 36, 37,39,51,62,69, 106, 110, 174, 186, 201,203,227,250; role in economic warfare, 22; views on postwar order, 22; loses economic warfare function, 48; visit to Italy (1947), 238-39 War Cabinet, 71,74,90,92, 101 War Department (U.S.), 29,31,32,40,47, 50,54,64,67,83, 104, 115, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 142, 163, 164, 165, 177, 192, 206, 218, 237; Civil Affairs Division, 84; support for Badoglio, 84 Warm Springs, Georgia, 163 War Office, 169

356 I N D E X War Shipping Administration, 115 Washington, D.C., ix, 27,56,72,78, 82, 84, 87,93,95,97, 104, 119, 120, 126, 134, 136, 137, 152, 183,216,217,218,223, 226,237,241,244,245,257,267 Washington Conference (1943), 40-41 Welles, Sumner, 24, 32, 36,40,43,44, 51, 63, 175, 186,201,221 White House, 50,241,242 Wickard, Claude, 32 Willkie, Wendell, 19, 62 W~lson,Henry Maitland, 67, 81.83, 84, 85, 86,88,91, 119, 148 Wilson, Woodrow, 3,20; internationalism of, 17,23

Winner, Percy, 48 World Bank, 178,205,207,210,214 World Federation of Trade Unions, 258 World New Deal, 17-18,30-31 Yalta Conference, 125, 126, 162 Yugoslavia, 75, 145-49, 162, 164, 165, 166. 168,203,204,232,238; resistance movement, 90,claims against Italy, 145, 146, 162, 170, 172, 173 Zaniboni, Tito, 133 Zellerbach, James, 254 Zito, Cannelb, 25

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