The Triune God: Systematics (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan)

COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN THE TRIUNE GOD: SYSTEMATICS trans lated from De Deo Trino: Pars systematica (1964) ...

Author: Bernard Lonergan

76 downloads 1103 Views 23MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD

LONERGAN THE TRIUNE GOD: SYSTEMATICS trans lated from De Deo Trino: Pars systematica (1964) by Michael G. Shields

Theologian Bernard Lonergan in the Mystery of the Hofy Trinity Icon © Father William Hart McNichols, 202

edited by Robert M. Doran and H Daniel Monsour

Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis Colleg~, Toronto by University of Toronto Press Toronto Buffalo London

·ernard Lonergan Estate 2007 "rinted in Canada

Contents

'BN 978-0-8020-9,68-0 (cloth) 978-0-8020-9433-9 (paper)

iBN

)rinted on

acid~free

paper

tequests for permission to quote from the Collected Works of Bernard L~nergan ;hould_be addressed to University of Toronto Press.

LI'brary and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

General Editors' Preface,

lergan, Bernard J-F. (Bernard Joseph Francis), 1904-1984. Collected works of Bernard Lonergan.

Translator's Foreword,

Contents; v. 12. The triune God; Systematics / edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour.

ROBERT M. DORAN /

xvii

MICHAEL G. SHIELDS /

xxiii

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8020-9168-0 (v. 12 : bound). ISBN 978-0-8020-9433-9 (v. 12 : pbk.)

Preface! 3

I. Theology - 20th century. Institute. II. Title

I

The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking! 7 I The Goal! 7 2 The Act Whereby the Goal Is Attained! II 3 The Question or Problem! 21 4 The Truth of Theological Understanding! 31 5 The Twofold Movement toward the Goal! 59 6 Comparison of the Dogmatic Way and the Systematic Way! 67 7 A Consideration of the Historical Movement / 77 8 A Further Consideration of the Historical Movement /87 9 The Object of Theology ! 101 10 The Purpose of This Work! 117

2

An Analogical Conception of the Divine Processions / 125 The Problem! 127 Opinions ! 131 Intellectual Emanation / 135

Bx89I.L595 1988

2.

Catholic Church.

I.

Lonergan Research

c88-093328-3 rev

The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of THE ,:,MALLINER CHARITABLE FOUNDATION,

which has made possible the production

of this entire series. The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the contribution of PHILIP toward publication of this volume. University of Toronto Press acknowledges

POCOCK

the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development

Program (BPIDP).

Contents

Vll

Assertion I: The divine processions, which are processions_ according to the mode of a processio operati, are understood in some measure on the basis of a likeness to intellectual emanation; and there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession. / 145 Assertion 2: Two and only two divine processions.can be conceived through the likeness of intellectual emanation, namely, the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love from both the Speaker and the Word. / 181 Assertion 3: Generation in the strict sense of the term is implied by the divine emanation of the Word, but not by the divine emanation of Love. / 18 9 Question I: Is our act of understanding different from our [inner] word? / 203 Question 2: Can the existence of a Word in God be demonstrated by the natural light of reason? / 207 Question 3: Does the Word proceed from the understanding of creatures? / 21 3 Question 4: Is the 'beloved in the lover' constituted by love or produced by love? / 219 I

The Real Divine Relations / 231 Opinions / 233 Theological Notes / 233 Assertion 4: Four real relations follow upon the divine processions: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. / 235 Assertion 5: These four relations are subsistent. / 239 Assertion 6: Three real relations in God are really distinct from one another, on the basis of mutual opposition. / 247 Assertion 7: The real divine relations are conceptually distinct from the divine essence but really identical with it. / 257 Four Notes / 261 Question 5: Can a relation be really identical with a substance? / 267 Question 6: Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from one another and really identical with one and the same divine substance? / 279 Question 7: What is the value of the distinction between ~being in' and 'being to'? / 289

The Robert Mollot Collection

Contents Question 8: Is it by a major or a minor conceptual distinction that the divine substance is distinguished from the divine relations and, conversely, that the divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance? / 295 'Question 9: Besides a real distinction and a conceptual distinction, is there a third intermediate distinction, calted a 'formal distinction on the side of the reality?' / 299

4

The Divine Persons Considered in Thexnselves / 307

307 Question 10: VVhat should be understood by the word 'person'? / 309 Assertion 8: The real, subsistent divine relations, really distinct from one another, are properly called and are persons. / 325 Question II: In what sense is God a person? / 329 Question 12: How many are there that subsiSt in God? / 331 Question 13: What does the w9rd 'person'. mean in regard to God? / 333 Question 14: What do numbers signify in God? / 335 Question 15: Is 'person' predicated analogously of God and of creatures?

SECTION I /

/337 _Question 16: What is the meaning of person as divine? / 339 Question 17: How is person related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication? / 345 SECTION 2 / 351 Assertion 9: The attributes of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are divided into common, proper, and appropriated. / 351 Assertion 10: The real divine relations constitute the divine persons and distinguish the persons constituted, and therefore are p~rsonal properties. / 363 Assertion I I: The notional acts are natural, conscious, intellectual, rational, necessary, autohomous, eternal, the foundation of order in God, but not voluntary except in a diminished sense. / 369 Question 1'8: Are the personal properties understood as prior to the notional acts? / 373 5

The Divine Persons in Relation to One Another / 377 Assertion 12: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through one real consciousness are three subjects conscious both of themselves and of each of the others, as well as of their own act both notional and essential. / 377 Question 19: Are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit more appropriately called modes of being (Seinsweisen) than persons? / 391

ColI!9cted Works of Bernard Lonergan

Vlll

IX

Contents

Question 20: Do the diVine persons say to ~ne another 'I' and 'You'? / 397

Contents

Question 32: Is it by way oflove that the divine persons are in the just and

dwell in them? / 501

Question 21: What is the analogy between the temporal' and the eternal subject? / 399 Assertion 13: The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit dwell within one, another both ontologically and psychologically. / 413 Assertion 14: Perfection has two formalities. The first is grounded upon act, while the second "is derived from the unity of order. The first perfection is infinite as found in the divine substance. The second is verified in the divine relations taken together as so great that no greater perfection can

be thought of. Although the two concepts of perfection are conceptually distinct, in God they refer to one undivided real perfection. / 421

Assertion 18: Although the indwelling of the divine persons exists more in acts and is better known in acts, still it is constituted through the .state

of grace. / 513

Epilogue / 523 Appendices / 527 Appendix I

6

The Divine Missions / 437 Assertion 15: What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constitUted by the divine perfection itself, but it has a consequent

condition in an appropriate external term. / 439 Assertion 16: Whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons as regards divine cognitive, volitional, and productive operation is constituted by the divine perfection common to the three persons as

both the principle-by-which and the principle-which, and therefore is attributed distinctly and equally to each divine person. / 443 Question 22: Did God the Father sent his Son to redeem the human race? /447 Question 23: Do the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit? I 449 Question 24: Is a divine person sent by the one or by' those from .whom he proceeds? / 451 Question 25: Is it by appropriation that the Father and the Son are said to send the Holy Spirit? / 453 Assertion 17: The mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine , relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent' condition. / 455 Question 26: In what way is an appropriate external term consequent upon a constituted .mission? / 467

Question 27= Is the Holy Spirit sent as notional love? / 473 Question 28:' Are the divine missions ordered to each other? / 479

Question 29: What is the formality of divine mission? / 483 Question 30: Is it appropriate that the divine persons be sent, the Son visibly and the Spirit invisibly? / 491 Question 31: Is the Son also sent invisibly and the Holy Spirit visibly? / 499

The Robert

Mollot Collection

I:

lnunanent Operation I 531

The Words .< Action' and 'Operation' / 535

2 The Two Proportions between Act and Potency / 535 3 Act of What Is Complete and Act of What Is Incomplete I 537 4 Nature / 539 5 Active and Passive Potency / 539 6 To Receive, Passion / 541 7 Action (poiisis,jactio) /543 8,Vital Act / 547 9 Application to the Act of Understanding / 553

Appendix 2' The Act of Understanding I 559 I The Notion of Object / 561 2 The Object of the Intellect as End and Term / 56 3 3 The Object That Moves the Intellect I 567 4 Passages in St Thomas on the Object as Mover / 56 9 5 Quiddity / 577 6 Various Meanings of 'Species' / 587 7 The Necessity for the Word / 597

Appendix 2A I 603 17 The Act of Understanding and the Uttering of an Inner Word I 60 3 18 Intellectual Emanation / 609 19 Spiration / 615 20

The Proc~ssion of Love / 62 I

Appendix 2B, FrolU the wage to the Ete;"'al ExeDlplar I 627 21 The Analogy ofIntellect / 627 22 Implications of the Analogy with Respect to God / 63 1

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Contents

XJ

23 Implications of the Analogy with Respect to Man / 637 24 Excursus: The Natural Desire of the Intellect / 645 25 The Analogy of the Word / 659 26 The Analogy of Proceeding Love / 671 27 The Trinitarian Analogy / 681

Contents

7 One of the Arguments in Assertion 7, That the Divine Essence and a Real Divine Relation Are Really the Same / 787 8 Response to the Scotist Position on Formal Distinction on the Side of the Reality / 789

Index / 793

\ppendix 3: Relations / 687 Question 33: Are there internal relations? / 687 Question 34: Does an external relation add another reality intrinsic to the subject besides the reality of the internal relation? / 699 Question 35: Do there exist in creation (a) a simply absolute reality, (2) a simply relative reality, (3) a reality that is absolute in a qualified sense, (4) a reality that is relative in a qualified sense? / 713 Question 36: Is the division of relations into predicamental and transce~ dental appropriate? / 719 Question 37: Are real created relations appropriately divided into internal and external as regards essence, and into beings-which and beings-by-which as regards existence? / 729 Question 38: Can several real relations be internal to one and the same absolute? Are they really distinct from the absolute? Are they really distinct from one another? / 733 A Brief Question: Is the relation of identity transitive? / 737

LA,TIN TEXT Prooenllwn. /

'2

Caput Prinl1u:n: De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi / 6 Sectio Prima: De Fine / 6 Sectio Secunda: De Actu Quo Finis Attingitur / 10 Sectio Tertia: De Quaestione seu Problemate / 20 Sectio Quarta: De Veritate Intelligentiae ! 30 Sectio Quinta: De Duplici Motu in Finem / 58 Sectio Sexta: Comparantur Via Dogmatica et Via Systematica / 66 Sectio Septima: Motus Historici Additur Consideratio / 76 Sectio Octava: Motus Historici Consideratio Ulterior / 86 Sectio Nona: De Obiecto Theologiae / 100 Sectio Decima: Opusculi'Intentio / 116

Appendix 3A: Letter to FrGerard Smith, s·l. / 739 Appendix 4: Passages froxn Divinarutn Personarutn / 743 1 Chapter I, Sections 3 and 4 / 743 Section 3:- Further Observations Concerning the Same Act / 743 Section 4: The Threefold Movement to the Goal / 755 2 Chapter 2, from the Definition of Emanatio Intelligibilis through Assertion

1

/761

3 4 5 6

Assertion I: The divine processions are to be conceived through their likeness to intellectual emanation / 765 Chapter 2, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Paragraphs of Question 1 / 781 Chapter 2, Question 4 / 783 Corresponding to the Section The Council if RIuims, AD. [[48, in Chapter 3/785 Assertion 6, Preliminary ObservatWns, § 2 / 787

The Robert Mollet Collection

Caput SecundUIIl: De Divinis Processionibus Analogice Concipiendis / 124 Problema / 126 Sententiae / 130 De Emanatione Intelligibili / 134 Assertum I: Processiones divinae) quae sunt per modum operati, aliquatenus intelliguntur secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis; neque alia esse videtur anaiogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam. / I44 Assertum II: Per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis duae et tan~ tummodo duae processiones divinae concipi possunt, nempe, verbi a dicente, et amons ab utroque. / 180 Assertum III: Divinam Verbi emanationem, non autem emanationem Amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae. / 188 Quaestio I: Utrum aliud in nobis sit intelllgere et aliud verbum / 202


:ii

Contents

Xlll

Quaestio II: Utrum naturali rationis lumine demonstrari possit in Deo esse verbum / 206 Quaestio III: Utrum Verbum procedat ex intelligentia creaturarum / 212 Quaestio IV: Utrum 'amatum in amante' constituatur an producatur per amOrem / 218 Oaput Tertium: De Relationibus Divinis Realibus / 230 Sententiael 232 N otae Theologicae I 232 Assertum IV: Ad processiones divinas sequuntur relationes reales quattuor, nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio passiva. / 234 Assertum V: Quae quattuor relationes sunt subsistentes. / '238 Assertum VI: Tres relationes reales in Deo secundum mutuam oppositionem realiter inter se distinguuntur. / 246 Assertum VII: Relationes divinae' reales ratione a divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum ea identificantur. / 256 Notae Quattuor I 260 Quaestio V: Utrum relatio possit esse idem realiter quod substantia / 266 Quaestio VI: Utrum fieri possit ut relationes divinae reales et realiter inter se distinguantur et realiter cum una eademque substantia divina identificentur I 278 Quaestio VII: Quid valeat distinctio inter 'esse in' et 'esse ad' / 288 Quaestio VIII: Utrum maior an minor sit rationis c;listinctio qua divimi substantia a divinis relationibus et vicissim divinae relationes a divina substantia distinguantur I 294 Quaestio IX: Utrum praeter distinctionem realem et distinctionem rati6nis admittenda sit tertia intermedia distinctio quae dicatur fonnalis a parte rei I 298

Caput QuartUDl. De Divinis Personis In Se Consideratis I 306 SECTIO PRIMA / 306 Quaestio X: Quid sub nomine personae intelligendum esse videatur /308 Assertum VIII: ReIationes divinae reales, subsistentes, et inter se realiter distinctae proprie dicuntur et sunt personae. / 324 Quaestio XI: Quo sensu Deus sit persona I 328 Quaestio XII: Quot sint in divinis quae subsistant I 330 Quaestio XIII: Qp.id nomen personae significet in divinis / 332 Quaestio XIV: Quid in divinis significent numeri /334 Quaestio XV: Quod analogice dicitur persona de divinis et de·creatis I 336

The R6bert Mollot Collection

Contents Quaestio XVI: Quaenam sit ratio personae qua divinae / 338 Quaestio XVIT: Quemadmodum persona se habeat ad incommunicabilitatem et ad communicationem interpersonalem / 344 SECTIO SECUNDA / 350 Assertum IX: Dividuntur attributa Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti in communia, propria, et appropriata. / 350 Assertum X: Relationes divinae reales personas divinas constituunt et constitutas distinguunt, et ideo sunt proprietates personales. / 362 ~sertum XI: Actus notionales sunt naturales, conscii, intellectuales, rationales, necessarii, autonomi, aeterni, fundamentum ordinis in divinis, sed non voluntarii nisi sensu diminuto. / 368 Quaestio XVIII: Utrum proprietates personales actibus notionalibus praeintelligantur I 372

Caput Quintwn. De Divinis Personis Inter Se COInparatis I 376 Assertum XII: Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus per unam conscientiam realem sunt tria subiecta conscia tum sui tum cuiusque alterius tum actus sui tam notionalis quam essentialis. / 376 Quaestio XIX: Utrum Pater, Filius, et Spiritus convementius modi essendi (Seinsweisen) quam personae nominarentur / 390 Quaestio XX: Utrum personae di~nae ad intra dicant, Ego, Tu / 396 Quaestio XXI: Quaenam sit analogia subiecti temporalis et subiecti aeterni 139 8 Assertum XIII: Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus tam psychologice quam ontologice circumincedunt. / 412 Assertum XIV: Duae sunt perfectionis rationes, quarum prima ex actu desumitur, altera autem ex unitate ordinis repetitur. Et prima quidem perfectio in divina substantia invenitur infinita; altera autem in divinis relationibus simul sumptis tanta verificatur quanta maior cogitari ne-quit. At quamvis duo perfectionis conceptus ratione i~ter se distinguantur, in' Deo tamen unam indivisamque perfectionem realem dicunt. / 420 Caput Sextwru De Divinis Missionibus I 436 Assertum XV: Quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicuntur ita per ipsam divinam perfectionem constituuntur ut conditio eorum consequens sit conveniens terminus ad extra. / 438 Assertum XVI: Quae contingenter de divinis personis secundum operationem divinam cognoscitivam, volitivam, productivam vere dic~mtur per communem divinam perfectionem tamquam per


XIV

Contents

xv

principium et quo et quod eonstituuntur, ,et ideo tribus pariter personis distincte attribuuntur. / 442 Quaestio XXII:. Utrum Deus Pater Filium suum ad genus humanum redimendum miserit / 44~ Quaestio XXIII: Utrum Pater et Filius Spiritum sanctum mittant /448 Quaestio XXN: Utrum mittatur persona divina ab eo a quo procedat /45 0 Quaestio XXV: Utrum per appropriationem Pater et Filius Spiritum sanctum mittere dicantur / 452 Assertum. XVII: Divinae petsonae missio ita per divinam relationem originis constituitur ut tamen per moclum conditionis consequentis eonvenientem ad extra terrninum exigat. / 454 Quaestio XXVI: Quemadmodum terminus ad extra conveniens missionem constitutam consequatur / 466 Quaestio XXVII: Utrum missio Spkitus sancti sit secundum dileetionem notionalem / 472 Quaestio XXVIII: Utrum divinae missiones inter Se ordinentur / 478 Quaestio XXIX: Quaenam sit ratio missionis divinae / 482 Quaestio XXX: Utrum eonvenienter divinae personae mittantur, et Filius quidem visibiliter) invisibiliter autem Spiritus sane'tus / 490 Quaestio XXXI: Utrum Filius etiam invisibiliter et Spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittanturJ 498 Quaestio XXXII: Utrwn secundum caritatem divinae personae iustis insint. atque inhabitent / 500 . Assertum XVIII: Divinarum personarum inhabitatio, q uamvis in actibus magis sit atque cognoseatur, per statum tamen gratiae constituitur. / 512

Appendix II: De Aetu Intelligendl / 558 I Obiectum / 560 2 De obiecto intellectus ut fine et termino / 562 3 De obiecto quod intellectum movet / 566 4 Testimonia S. Thomae circa obiectum movens / 568 5 De quidditate / 576 6 Quotuplex sit species / 586 7 De necessitate verbi / 596

Epilogus / 522 Appendix· I: De Operatione Irnmanente / 530 I De vocibus 'actio,' 'operatio' /534 2 De duplici proportione inter actum et potentiam / 534 3 Actus perfecti et actus irnperfecti / 536 4 Natura / 538 5 Potentia activa et 'passiva / 538 6 Pati, passio / 540 7 Actio (paresis, foctW) / 542 8 Actus vitalis / 546 9 Applicatio ad actum intelligendi / 552

Thp Rnh,::orf Mollnt r.nllF!dinn

Contents

Appendix II-A / 602 17 Intelligere et dicere / 602 18 Emanatio intelligibilis / 608 19 De spiratione /614 20 De processione amoris / 620 Appendix II-B: Ex bnagine Ad Exelllplar Aeternwn / 626 21 Analogia intellectus / 626 22 Analogiae consectaria quae Deum respiciant / 630 23 Analogiae consectaria quae hominem respiciant / 636 24 Appendix: De naturali desiderio intellectus / 644 25 Analogia verbi / 658 26 Analogia amoris procedentis / 670 27 De ipsa analogia trinitaria /' 680 Appendix m: De Relationibus / 686 QuaestiQ XXXIII: Utrum sint relationes internae / 686 Quaestio XXXIV: Utrum relatio externa aliam realitatem subiecto irttrinsecam addat super realitatem relationis intemae / 698 Quaestio XXXV: Utrum in rebus creatis existant (I) realitas simpliciter absoluta, (2) realitas simpliciter relativa, (3) realitas absoluta secundum quid, (4) realitas relativa secundum quid / 712 Quaestio XXXVI: Utrum relationes convenienter in praedicamentales et transcendentales dividantur / 718 Quaestio XXXVII: Utrum relationes reales creatae convenienter dividantur, secundum essentiam in internaS et extemas, et secundum esse in entium-quae et entium-quibus / 728


XVI

Contents Quaestio XXXVIII: Utrum plures relationes' reales uni eidemque absoluto internae esse possint; utrum realiter ab absoluto distinguantur; utrum realiter inter se distinguantur 1 732 Quaestiuncula: Utrum relatio iaentitatis sit transitiva 1 736

General Editors' Preface I,'

Appendix IV: Divinarum Personarum 1.742 1 Chapter I, Sections 3 and 4 / 742 Seetio Tertia: Ulteriora quaedam de eodem aetu / 742 Seetio Quarta:, De triplici motu quo ad finem proceditur / 754 2 Chapter 2, from the Definition of EmanatW Intelligibilis through Assertion

11760 Assertum I: Processiones divinae sunt concipiendae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis / 764 3 Chapter 2, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Paragraphs of Question 1 / 780 4 Chapter 2, Question 4 / 782 5 Corresponding to the Section 7he Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148, in Chapter

Y.

3/784 6 Assertion 6, Preliminary Observations, §2-/ 786 7 One of the Arguments in Assertion 7, Relationes divinae reales ratione a divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum ea identificatur 1 786 8 Response to the Scotist Position on Formal Distinction on the Side of the Reality / 788

Before he began teaching at the Gregorian University in Rome in 1953, Bernard Lonergan taught a course entitled 'De Deo Trino' in 1945-46 at College de l'Immaculee Conception in Montreal, and another course entitled 'De Trini w tate' at Regis College (then College of Christ the King) in Toronto in 1949-50. His first course in Rome on 'De Deo Trino' was offered in the spring semester of 1955 to second- and thirdwyear theology students. The texts used for the course were questions 27 to 43 of the first part of the Summa theologiae of Thon:as Aquinas and a text written by Charles Boyer, s.]., of the Gregorian faculty, 0Jnopsis praelectionum de SS. Trinitate. Lonergan produced his own notes for this course, a set of fifty pages issued to the students on 7 Marc;h (in those days the feast day of St Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic Church's litl.lrgical calendar). These notes consisted of three articles, of which the first and part of the second survived in the later texts that Lonergan composed on the Trinity and are published here as appendices 1 and 2. The first of Lonergan's own texts on the Trinity was Divinarum personarum con ceptWnem analogicam evolvi! Bernardus Lonergan, S.1., which was published ad usum auditorum (for the use of his students) by Gregorian University Press, Rome, in 1957. Lonergan taught the same course in the spring semester of that year and again in the fall semester of 1958, and we may presume that his own text supw plemented the other readings that he had used earlier. He- reissued the text with very slight modifications in 1959, and this version was used in his course 'De Deo Trino' in the fall semester of 1960. The three articles ofl955 and then the lengthy text ofl957 and 1959 were all part of that portion of trinitarian theology that was considered systematic, synthetic, w

,,

,

"



xviii General Editors' Preface

XIX

speculative, as contrasted with the analytic, dogmatic treatment of the development of the church's trinitarian doctrine. This portion of trinitarian theology was treated by Lonergan in a text published in 196I, De Deo Trino: Pars anafytica, and both this text and Divi:narum personarum were used in his course 'De Deo Trino' offered in the fall semester Of1962. The year 1964 saw the publication of the massive book De Deo Trino in two parts. The first part, now called pars dogmatica, was a revised version of the earlier pars anafytica, and the second part, pars systematica, a revised version of Diuinarnm personarum. The present text is based on the pars systematica of the 1964 De Deo Trino. That is to say, the preface, the six chapters, the epilogue, and appendices I, 2, and 3 of the present text consist of that work in its original Latin and in English translation on facing pages. What here are called appendices 2A and 2B consist of material from the 1955 notes' that Lonergan chose not to publish in Divinarum personarum and in De Deo T rino, Pars systematica, and appendix 4 of the present book consists of the material from Divinarum personarum that was either omitted from the 1964 text or revised for inclusion in the later text. Thus, we may reasonably claim that we have assembled here the total output of Bernard Lonergan in the systematics of the Trinity d~~ to 196+ Appendix 3A is the result of an editorial decision to include here a letter that Lonergan wrote to Rev. Gerard Smith, s.]., of Marquette University, who had written Lonergan vvith some questions on the theory of relations. In his later work Lonergan would suggest developments in the speculative portion of trinitarian theology, but these are only sketched in his work and left to others to complete. Those suggestions will be found in their appropriate places in other volumes of the Collected Works. Volume II of the Collected Works, 7he Triune God: Doctrines, will do for the pars anafytica or pars dogmatica of De Deo Trino what we have attempted to do here for the pars systematica. Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity stands in a tradition of theological reflection on this central mystery of the Christian faith, a tradition whose principal previous figures are St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. That is to say, Lonergan is firmly in the tradition that employs what has come to be called a psychological analogy for understanding the divine processions. This analogy was first worked out by Augustine in his De Trinitate and furthered by Aquinas in both the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae, prima pars, questions 27 to 43. Lonergan's work develops that analogy. It represents the third and fourth moments in the development of that analogy: the third moment in De Deo T rino: Pars .rystematica, offered here in English translation, and the fourth in the later suggestion already alluded to, where the analogy proceeds 'from above downwards' in consciousness.

There are two main differences in Aquinas's presentation as compared with Augustine. Augustine presents the analogy psychologically, by an appeal to word and love as they proceed in human consciousness. Aquinas presents it both psychologically and metaphysically, and in fact more metaphysically than psychologically, though the psychology is clearly second nature to him. Moreover, Augustine proceeds throughout in the via inventionis, the way of discovery, and reaches the' analogy in steps through the process of inquiry, whereas Aquinas follows a distinct ordering of questions that he calls the ordo discipHnae or the ordo doctnnae, the way of learning and teaching. By the time of the Summa theologiae Aquinas is doing theology in 'that order. It is the order proper to the systematic ordering of ideas. In the way of discovery, one begins with what is most clearly known to us and proceeds by way of analysis to the discovery of causes, reasons, explanation. In the way oflearning and teaching, one begins vvith the causes, reasons, explanation reached in the way of discovery and composes synthetically the realities thus explained. Lonergan not only stands in this particular tradition; he also advances it, and quite considerably. His psychological penetration especially of the procession of inner word from act of understanding is more detailed and more differentiated in terms of interiority than was that of either Augustine or Thomas. He brings to the work the vast riches of his explorations of human cognitional and deliberative process in the mammoth work Insight; and while many of the seeds of that work are potential, and a few of th.em actual, in the work ofAquinas, clearly Lonergan is standing on his own two feet as he works out the theory of intentional consciousness that he brings to bear on the psychological analogy. And his later suggestion 'from above' embarks on an entirely new line of thought that he has left to others to develop. The systematic part of De Deo T rino,·like every work in systematic theology, has as its principal objective an understanding of a doctrine or set of doctrines that are already proposed by the church and/ or accepted within a particular theological tradition. In the pars dogmatica of De Deo Trino, which will constitute volume II in the Collected Works, Lonergan presents five such affirmations. (I) God the Father neither made his own and only Son from some preexisting material nor created the Son from nothing, but from eternity out of his own substance generated the Son as consubstantial to the Father. (2) The Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, proceeding from the Father, who spoke through the prophets, is to be adored and glorified toget.her with the Father and the Son. (3) Therefore, one is the divinity, power, and substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but three are the persons or hypostases distinguished from one another by their proper characteristics, which are all in the order of relation; hence in God


General Editors' Preface


xx


'txi

everything is one except where the opposition of relation dictates otherwise. (4) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle and by OTIe spiration. (5) The dogma the Trinity, which is a mystery properly so called, cannot by principles natural to us either be understood in i.tself or be demonstrated from its effects; this remains true even after revelation, when, however, reason illumined by faith can proceed, with God's help, to an analogical and imperfect understanding of this mystery. That analogical and imperfect understanding is precisely the objective of the present volume. I asked my colleague and.fellow General Editor, Frederick E. Crowe, who is well known not only for his general expertise in Lonergan's work but also for the notes he wrote and the classes he taught in trinitarian theology and for his own contribution to an understanding of Aquinas's position on love, I jf he would contribute a few paragraphs to this General Editors' Preface. Here is what he wrote:

or

'Lonergan taught the Trinity for the first time in the fall semester of [the academic year] 1949-1950 at Regis College in Toronto. I attended those lectures in my fourth year of theology under his tutelage. They ended with a sweeping view of lire and thought, exploitiD:g the potentialities of the trinitarian categories of intelligence, word, and love. It was an exhilarating experience for me, and not only that: as well it became an anchor through several years of change in a changing world conceived in the categories of a changing theology. 'The potentialities of the psychological triad had one drawback: they kept me from attending sufficiently to the riches of interpersonal relations. These I found a few years later in chapters 5 and 6 of Divinarum personarum. I do not say those riches were only potential in the lectures of 1949-1950; we receive what we are ready to receive, and whether or not Lonergan presented the ideas that were to become chapters 5 and 6, I was not ready to receive them. Even after those chapters came out in print and I was teaching them, I was still for some years a particular fan of the emanatio intelligibilis. 'What have I to say now almost fifty years after Lonergan's Divinarum personarum? I think chiefly that I am grateful to have focused first on intelligible emanation and to have come later to an appreciation of interpersonal relations. Watching theological education now somewhat from a distance, I have the impression that intelligible emanation is being shortchanged: interpersonal relations have seized the theological imagination, and intelligible emanation, along with the study of consciousness in general, is relegated to an interesting footno·te. 1

See Frederick E. Crowe, 'Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,' now available in Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, ed. Michael Vertin (Boston: Lonergan Workshop, 2000) 71-203.



'May this Collected Works edition of the systematic volume of Lonergan's trinitarian theology do something to reverse the trend or at least to even the score. It will not be an easy task for theologians to assume. Consciousness itself must first gain a place of honor in philosophy and theology, and then intelligible emanation will be poised for the breakthrough now denied it. 'When the theologians of intelligible emanation compete on a levd playing field with those of interpersonal relations, I anticipate that what may start as competition will become collaboration, with the greatly increased riches that will accompany th;t development. This translation will, I believe, expedite the desired change and release a flood of studies authored by those for whom Latin is sadly a closed book.' We turn now to a few minutiae of editing. As with the earlier volume 7, The Ontological and PljIchological Constitution rif Christ, we follow the policy of confining to the Latin text the Gregorian University Press distribution into paragraphs of larger and smaller print, but with the reminder that this distribution was of some importance to Lonergan. As in other volumes, the Oyord American Dictionary and the Chicago Manual rif Sf:yle have been relied upon, not slavishly but with a predisposition in their favor. In addition to using DB and DS in reference to Denzinger's Enchiridion, we have added in the English text NO, referring to equivalent numbers, where available, in Joseph Neuner and Jacques Dupqis, TIe Christian Faith, 7th ed. (New York: Alba House, 2001). We continue to use the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible. We also continue our practice of putting brackets around editorial footnotes and comments. The General Editors wish to thank Michael Shields for his very careful and dedicated attention to the work of translation. It is probably no exaggeration to say that decades, and we hope centuries, of readers will be grateful to him. We wish also to thank Daniel Monsour, who brings to the work of editing a text like this not only a depth of philosophical and theological penetration but also a facility for painstaking research that seems second nature to him. Professors Neil Ormerod and Charles C. Hefling offered very helpful suggestions after reading the penultimate text. We cannot issue this text to the public without mentioning the tremendous assistance that an earlier translation has brought to Lonergan students. This earlier translation, available in typescript at many Lonergan Centers, was done by John Brezovec. It was consulted by the editors on numerOus occasions, as was the work on this volume done by Quentin Quesnell and the translation of the first chapter of Divinarum personarum done by Francis Greaney.


xxii General Editors' Preface We close with a note on the icon that we have chosen to use as a frontispiece, 'Holy Theologian Bernard Lonergan in the Mystery of the Eternal Processions of the Most Holy Trinity.' The noted iconographer William Hart McNichols wrote this icon in 2002, in commission from the Lonergan Research Institute. Fr McNichols quotes Frederick Crowe: ' ... in the mystery of the Trinitarian processions, and through his life to Method in Theology and beyond, in the welter of words that with other theologians it was his vocation to utter, Lonergan never lost what Thomas above all theologians could teach, that theology can be done, must be done, that when it is done, we are confronted with mystery and bow our heads in adoration.' It was from there, Fr McNichols writes, that he took his inspiration for the icon. He used a painting by Lawren Harris, Canadian landscape painter, for the background, since, as he writes, 'the vivid pine trees burning with light seemed perfect for the Theophany' that he was attempting to portray. He added the maple leaves, he says, 'as an affectionate touch thinking of my years of traveling to Canada to give retreats and the lovely friends made there.' Finally, Fr 'McNichols writes, 'In the icon Holy Theologian Bernard Lonergan receives insight and illumination from the Source he queried, the Most Holy Trinity.'

Translator's Foreword

Exegi monumentum aere perennius Horace, Odes III, 30

. ROBERT M. DORAN

(For the General Editors)

'Monumental' is a word that combines the meanings of massive, important, and lasting. It has been applied to Lonergan's great philosophical work Insight: A Stu4Y oj Human Understanding. I think it is very likely to be applied ,to his two-volume theological work De Deo Trino, 'The Triune God.' As related in the Editors' Preface, Lonergan's work on the Trinity took final form in 1964. If after more than forty years it has not yet received much recognition, the reason is obvious: it was written in Latin, an impenetrable barrier today to all but a very few. The Latin of this second volume combines the different layers of Lonergan's own Latinity. He first studied Latin as a schoolboy at Loyola High School in Montreal (1918-22), then as a youngJesuit at Guelph (1922-26) and at Heythrop, England (1926-30), where he did further studies in the Greek and Latin classics for the University of London degree, By this time he would have become completely at home in classical Latin (not to mention Greek), able to compose in the style of Cicero or Livy or even in the taut elliptical style of Tacitus. During the next stage of his studies, in Rome (1933-40), Lonergan would have listened to lectures all delivered in Latin, sometimes quite elegant Latin, for that was the custom at the Gregorian University in those days. He read extensively in the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, and the medieval Scholastics, as well as books and articles on scholastic philosophy and theology written in 'modern' Latin that



xxiv Translator's Foreword were common in Roman Catholic seminaries in the last century. Then, from 1940 on, when it became his turn to take the professorial chair, first in Canada and later in Rome (1953-65), he delivered his lectures mainly in Latin and composed also in Latin the various supplementa, as he called them, to accompany and augment his lectures. The style of these minor works, where clarity was the prime consideration, was neat and simple and straightforward - very good Latin, but not classical. The Latin in this book steers a middle course between these different styles, the classical and the scholastic textbook style. Needless to say, it is excellent Latin throughout, perhaps tending more towards the classical in such parts as the first chapter, and more scholastic"in style in the appendices, espt?cially I, 2, 2A, and 2B, which began life as a supplementum to the Roman lectures. There is a parallel variety in vocabulary, from strictly classical expressions to scholastic terminology, with occasional words like specializare and hiswricismus, coined by a kind of backformation from modern languages. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to the editors: to Daniel Monsour for his helpful comments and suggestions about the translation, especially with regard to Lonergan's English vocabulary; and to Robert Doran, whose invitation to me to undertake this translation has allowed me to have a part in making this monumental work available to a much wider readership. MICHAEL G. SHIELDS


THE TRIUNE GOD: SYSTEMATICS

Prooemium

Preface

Imperfectam illam mysteriorum intelligentiam, quam fructuosissimam affirmare non dubitavit concilium Vaticanum, dupliciter investigamus. Primo enim capitulo quaenam ipsa sit secundum se et quemadmodum se habeat ad reliquam theologiam inquiritur. Altero autem, tertia, et quarto capitulis enitimur, ut intelligentia

theoretice possibilis actu in mentibus nostris fiat circa divinas processiones, divinas relationes reales, divirias personas consubstantiales. I Non ergo de tractatu quodam rheologico componendo et conscribendo hie agitur, sed de ea tantummodo parte quae strictiori quodam sensu speculativa est. Non solum eniro·ipsa fidei dogmata iam cognita atque stabilita supponimus, sed etiam cmnes conclusiones quae ex fontibus revelationis deducuntur. 2 Alia enim est certitudo quae ita gignitur, alia autem est certorum intelligentia quam hic quaerimus unice. Quem in finem haud parum influunt sane tum metaphysica de operatione immanente, de relationibus, de subsistente, de persona, tum psychologica de conscientia, de intellectu, et de voluntate. At ·ne tota fere philosophia theologicum 0pusculum invadat atque obruat, ita processimus ut in ipsis argumentis minima et necessaria exponamus, in appendicibus autem paulo ampliora addamus, ad alia denique scripta eos remittamus qui profundius in quaestionem vel historicam vel speculativam inquirere velint. 3

We are going to investigate that imperfect understanding of mysteries that the First Vatican Council did not hesitate to acclaim as 'most fruitful.' We will proceed in two steps. Chapter I will cover the first step, asking what that understanding is in itself and how it relates to the rest of theology. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will try to bring to life for us such understanding as is theoretically possible .in· regard to processions in God, real relations in God, and consubstantial divine. Persons. I Our aim is to produce, not a complete treatise on the theology of the Trinity, but only that part of the treatise that is speculative in a stricter sense. The dogmas of faith are presupposed here as well enough known and established. Presupposed too are all the conclusions that can be deduced 2 from the sources of revelation. They provide certitude, but certitude is not what we are aiming at here. All we are aiming at is the understanding of those truths that we accept as certain. The prosecution of our aim will be influenced not little by metaphysics and psychology: metaphysics as regards immanent operations, relations, the subsistent, the person, and psychology in regard to consciousness, intellect, and will. But, lest our modest project be invaded and overwhelmed by practically the whole of philosophy, we have included in our arguments only what is indispensable. Further details have been relegated to appendices. Those who want to pursue the historical issues in further detail may turn to our 'The Concept of Verbum in

a

: ...

I

2


[For some reason, no mention is made here of chapters 5 and 6; chapter 5 continues the discussion of the divine Persons, and chapter 6 treats the divine missions.] [The presumption is that Lonergan means deduction in the strong logical sense of the term, and this presumption is supported by the way in which he will speak of 'conclusions' in theology at the various points at which that topic arises.]


4

Prooemium

5

Preface

the Writings o[St. Thomas Aquinas,' 77zeoiogicaiStudies 7 (1946) 349-92; 8 (1947) 35-]9, 404-44; IO (1949) 3-40, 359~3. Those who want to go more deeply into the speculative issues will have to consult our study Insight: A Study cif Human Understanding, and another work, De constitutione Christi ontologica et p~chologica. 3

,~:

if i

.{.

" f;

Jii k

The Robert Mollat Collection

3 [The historical work is now available as Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, "997). The speculative works to which Lonergan refers are Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study if Human Understanding, originally published London: Longman, Green and Co" 1957; 5th ed. published as vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); and Bernard Lonergan, De constitutione Christi ontologica et psycholog£ca (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1964); in English, The Ontological and Psyclwlogical Constitution if Christ, vol. 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, '2002). In the Latin text, these references to the 'Verbum' articles and to Insight and De constitutione Christi, are given only in footnotes. In the 1964 text, Lonergan added at this point the page numbers where the current edition differs from the earlier (1957, 1959) Divinarnm personarnm ... (see above, General Editors' Preface). The earlier material is given here in appendix 4.]


CAPUT PRIMUM

CHAPTER 1

De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi

The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking

Mirari neminem arbitramur quod, quaestionem speculativam aggredientes, notulas quasdam quae methodum respiciant praemittere decreverimus. Sicut eniro investigantes a recto tramite vagantur, cum finem scientificum minus exploratum perspectumque habeant, ita etiam addiscentes neque parum sollicitantur neque minaTes patiuntur difficultates, si q~idem non intelligunt quinam finis intendatur et quibusnam'mediis procedatur~ Quod sane eo facilius atque frequentius in thealogia addiscenda accidere solet, quod non univoce sed analogice tantum theologia sit sclentia, quod tot tamque diversa media in proprium finem adhibeat, quod pro mediorum diversitate diversimode procedat. Hoc ergo introductorio capitulo, communiores quasdam difficultates praecavendas intendimus. Brevius ~utem atque efficacius fore duximus, magis positivam rei intelligentiam' promovere quam errores subtilius narrare invicteque refutare. Qua de causa, ordinate disserendum censuimus de fine qui intenditur, de actu quo finis attingitur, de motu quo ad actum proceditur. Quod quam schematicum sit, cum nemo non videat, omnibus manifestam fore speramus nostram intentionem, non tractatus de methodo in brevi- absolvendi, sed notulas quasdam colligendi atque componendi.

It is hardly surprising that we introduce our speculative inquiry with a few notes on method. Investigators soon lose the right track if they do not carefully examine and accurately grasp the goal of their science. So too, students can have serious difficulties and worries when they do not understand what the goal of their studies is and what means they should use to get there. This happens more easily and more frequently in the study of theology: theology is a science only analogically, not univocally; it uses an extraordinary number of widely different means to its proper-end; and it has to proceed differently with each different set of means.

So in this introdu~tory chapter we will try to forestall a few of the more common difficulties. We have decided that it would be briefer and more effective to convey a more positive understanding of the issue than to present a nuanced account of the errors and then forcefully refute them. Therefore it seemed best to discuss in order th~ goal intended, the act by which the goal is attained, and the movement by which we advance toward that act. Since everyone can see how schematic this treatment is, we trust it will also be clear what our purpose is, to collect and put together a few notes, and not to att~mpt to present an entire treatise on method in such a brief space. The Goal

Sectio. Prima: De Fine

I

Cum scientia sit certa rerum per causas cognitio, qui scientiam tamquam finem prosequitur, duo intendat necesse est. Si enim causarum cognitionem ita appetit ut certitudinem nullatenus assequatur, exercet sane ingenium sed de ipsis rebus

Science is the certain knowledge of things through causes. Thus, if science is our goal, we have to intend two objectives. If we are so intent on coming to know causes that we pay no attention to certitude, then we may exercise our ingenuity



8

De Fine, Ordine, Modo Diccndi


9

nihil addiscit. Si autem certitudinem tam magni aestimat ut rerum rationes fet causas, quippe semper dubias, considerare nolit, crudam quandam atgue indigestam rerum notitiam ita accumulare potest, ut ad veri nominis scientiam numquam perveniat. Nam sicut essentia et esse ita inter se cohaerent ut alterum sine altera inveniri non possit, ita duae nostri intellectus operationes, quae quaestionibus quid sit et an sit respondent, tam arcte connectuntur ut altcra a9.hibita et altcra neglecta laboretur frustra.

At omnis duorum coniunctio, quantumvis necessaria, veram quandam atque rcalem distinction~m praesupponit; neque cuipiam obscurum arbitror quam diversis procedatur methodis, etiam in naturalibus- scientiis, nunc ad theorias inveniendas atque expoliendas, nunc autem ad certa proferenda iudicia. Quae sane methodorum differentia in theologica scientia adeo non minuitur ut maxime augeatur. Cum enim veritates supernaturales nisi per divinam revelationem nobis innotescere non possint, ex auctoritate atque fide certitudo theologica gignitur. Cum autem earundem veritatum intelligentia nisi pie, sedulo, sobrie inquirentibus concedi non soleat, ratio humana per fidem ·illustrata exerceatur necesse est. (DB 1796). Quae duo et quantum inter se distent et quam arcte cohaereant luculenter exposuit Aquinas.

and still learn nothing about the things themselves. On the other hand, if we make so much of certitude that we are not willing to consider the reasons and causes of things - an area of consideration. in which there is always some uncertainty - th.en we may gradually accumulate a half-baked and undigested knowledge of things, yet never attain anything worthy of the name of science. Just as essence and existence are so closely connected that one can never be found without the other, so our· minds perform two basic operations, corresponding to the two familiar questions What is it? and Is it so? and these are so closely connected that to use one and negleGt the other is to labor in vain. Now every bringing together of two things, however necessary it may be, presupposes that the two are somehow really distinct; and I do not think it is difficult for anyone to see how different are the methods, even in the natural sciences, for discovering and refining theories, on the one hand, and for proposing judgments that are certain, on't~e other. This difference of methods is found in the science of theology, only intensified. For supernatural truths can be knovvn by us only through divine revelation, and so certitude in theology is derived from authority and from faith. But an understanding of these same truths can be attained only by inquiring reverently, diligently, and judiciously, and so theology demands the exercise of human reason enlightened by faith (DB 1796, DS 30r6, ND 132). Aquinas brilliantly explained both how different these two procedures are and how intimately they are link~d with one another .

... quilibet actus exsequendus est secundum quod convenit ad suum finem. Disputatio autem ad duplicem finem potest ordinari. Quaedam enim disputatio ordinatur ad removendam dubitationem an ita sit; et in tali disputatione theologica maxime utendum est auctoritatibus, quas recipiunt illi cum quibus disputatur ... Quaedam vero disputatio est magistralis in scholis, non ad removendum errorem, sed ad instruendum auditores ut inducantur ad intellectum veritatis quam intendit: et tunc oportet rationibus inniti investigantibus veritatis radicem, et facientibus scire quomodo sit verum quod dicitur: alioquin, si nudis auctoritatibus magister quaestionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod ita est; sed nihil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret, sed vacuus abscedet.

. every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be directed to either of two ends. One kind of argument is directed to removing doubts as to whether something is so. In such arguments in theology, one relies especially on the auth~rities that are recognized by the persons with whom one is disputing ... But another kind of argument is that of the teacher in the schools. It seeks not to remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth that the teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is important to base one's argument on reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand how what is said ~s true. Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an appeal to authorities, the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed as stated; but they will acquire no knowledge or understanding, and they will go away empty.'

Quam finis atque methodi differentiam non solum explicita doctrina inculcavit Aquinas sed etiam c1arissimis illustravit exemplis. Nam ut caetera omittam, in

Not only did Aquinas explicitly teach that there are those two different ends and methods, but he also left brilliant examples of the two different ends and methods

I

I


Thomas Aquinas, Qyaesliones quodLihetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3.

Collected Works of Bernard Loner.gan


II

libro quarto Contra Gentiles diversis capitibus mutuo sibi succedunt tum disputa- . tiones quae de certitudine facti ex auctoritatibus pracedunt,2 tum disputationes magistrales in quibus adhibetur ratio ad intelligentiam assequendam. 3 His igitur dictis, quonam consilio brevissimum hoc opusculum compositum sit, facile aperitur. Cum enim lectoris fidem praesupponamus non solum certissimam sed etiam clare distincteque eruditam, in eo laboramus ut imperfecta illa et tamen fructuosissima fidei intelligentia (DB 1796) promoveatur atque communicetur. Qua de causa, quia fidem iam doctam praesupponimus, praesens nostra intentio non est ut, cumulatis auctoritatibus, amoveantur dubia et errores refellantur. Quia vera fides etiam doctissima parum vel nihil ipsa mysteria intelligere potest, rationibus utimur quae veritatis revelatae radicem investigent ~t scire faciant quemadmodum verum sit.


in his practice. One among many would be the way in which, in the fourth book of the C01J.tra Gentiles, he alternates between arguments from authority, making for factual certitude/ and arguments in which, as teacher, he uses reason to attain understanding. 3 It is easy, then, in the light of what has been said, to state the point and purpose of this little treatise. We presuppose that the reader is most firm in his -or her faith. We presuppose, too, that the reader is already well educated in the faith. Our aim will be merely to communicate and promote that imperfect yet most fruitful understanding affirmed by Vatican I (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). Since we presuppose an educated faith, we have no intention of trying to remove doubts and refute errors by piling up authorities. Because even the most learned faith can have_,)ittle or no understanding of the mysteries, we are employing those reasons that probe the root of revealed truth and enable us to understand how it is true. The Act Whereby the Goal Is Attained

Sectio SecWlda: De Actu Quo Finis Attingitur

2

Postquam de ipso fine dictum est, consequenter considerari oportet actum quo finis attingitur. Quae quidem consideratio omnino necessaria est. QuamVis enim in intelligentiam potius quam in certitudinem procedere intendamus, minime tamen intelligentiam potius incertam quam certam vel potius falsam quam veram volumus. Qua de causa, accurate perspiciendum est quinam sit intelligendi actus, quaenam sint eius proprietates, et quemadmodum hie actus ad verum et certum comparetur. 4 lam vero inde ab Aristotele distingui solent prima et secunda intellectus operatio. Prima enim dicitur operatio qua quaerimus quid sit vel cur ita sit, et rationem seu causam perspicimus, et definitionem vel hypothesin concipimus. Secunda autem dicitur operatio qua quaerirnus an sit vel utrnm ita sit, et evidentiam ponderamus, et propter evidentiam iudicium verum dicimus, et per verum tamquam per medium contemplamur ens. Quae quidem distinctio non temporis differentiam respicit, nam quamvis prima operatio sponte in secundam conducat (quod enim concipimus utrum e~istat statim quaerimus), edam secunda operatio ad ulteriorem et perfectiorem operationem primam nos invitat, cp.m melius intelligere studeamus quod esse iam

After speaking of the goal, we move to the act by which we attain it. That act requires our attention because, even though our aim is understanding and not certitude, still we hardly want an understanding that is uncertain rather than certain, or false rather than true. Therefore we must accurately grasp what. the act oflJ,nderstanding is,.what its properties are, and how this act is connected with what is true and what is certain. 4 Ever since Aristotle, a distinction has been recognized between a first and a second operation of the intellect. In the first operation we ask, 'What is it?' or 'Why is it so?' and we grasp some reason or cause, and we conceive a definition or a hypothesis; but in the second operation we ask, 'Is it?' or 'Is it so?' and we weigh the evidence, and because of the evidence we utter a true judgment, and through the true as through a medium we contemplate being. The distinction of first and second operations does not regard a difference in time. Although the first spontaneously gives rise to the second (for we immediately ask whether what we conceive really is so), still the second operation also invites us to a further and better exercise of the first, since we want to understand better 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 4, cc. 2-9, 15-18, 27-39, etc. 3 Ibid. ce. ro-i4, 19-26, 40-49, etc. 4 [The verb 'comparare' is variously translated - to connect, to relate, to compare depending on the context.]

. The Robert Mollot Collection


12

De Fine, Ordine, M9do Dice.ndi

13

sciamU5. Quare, ut duae hae operationes secernantur, ad obiecta attendendum est. 5 Obiectum vero aut est mavens, aut terminus immanenter productus, aut finis. In prima ergo operatione obiectum proprium seu mavens secundum statum prae· sends vitae est quidditas seu natura in materia corporali 6 existens, et obiectum ut terminus est definitio vel hypothesis concepta. In secunda autem operatione obiectum mavens est evidentia sufficiens, et obiectum ut terminus immanenter productus est verum. In utraque autem operatione obiectum ut finis est ens, quod per tatum intellectus processum intenditur, 7

Proinde, ex hac finis unitate et identitate sequitur non simpliciter distincta esse quae supra enumeravimus obiecta. Unum enim idemque est quod sensibus experimur) quod quid sit inquirimus, cuius quidditatem in sensibilibus perspicimus, cuius definitionem propter perspectam quidditatem concipimus, de cuius existentia quaerimus, ad quod affinnandum sufficere evidentiam intelligimus, quod esse propter perspectam evidentiam affirmamus, cuius realitatem per veritatem iudicii cognoscimus, quod denique tandem melius meliusque cognoscitur per tatum processum saepius iteratum, donee omnes rei aspectus tam perfecte quam vere intelligantur.

Praeterea, sicut unum est ens quod per multos actus cognoscimus, ita etiam unus quidam est actus quo de valore omnium actuum iudicatur. Verum enim, quod in solo iudicio formaliter cognoscitur, non solum ipsius iudicii veritatem respicit sed etiam caeterorum actuum. Ita si vere iudico hunc esse hominem, veritas iudicii dicit tum veritatem individui, quod sensibus innotescit, tum veritatem


what we already know is so. Thus, in order to distinguish these two operations, we have to pay attention to their objects,5 There are several meanings of the notion 'the object of an operation.' It can mean what moves us to the operation, or the tenn immanently produced by the operation, or the objective of the operation. In the first operation the proper object, the object that moves, is, in the conditions of this present life, an intelligibility or nature that exists as embodied in corporeal matter;6 and the object as term is the conceived definition or hypothesis. In the second operation the object that moves is sufficient evidence, and the object as the immanently produced term is the true. But with each operation the object as the objective is being, which is intended throughout the entire intellectual process. 7 The fact that both intellectual operations head to one and the same objective means, of course, that the objects we have just distinguished are not simply distinct. It is one and the same that we experience with the senses, about which we ask, 'What is it?' and whose intelligibility we grasp in the sensible data, and whose definition. we conCeive because of the intelligibility that we have grasped; it is still that one and the same about which we wonder, 'Is it?' 'Is it really so?' and about which we understand that there is sufficient evidence to answer yes, and that we affirm to be because of the evidence we have grasped, and whose reality we know by the truth of our judgment. And it remains this one and the same that is better and better known as we repeat this same process over and over again, until we come to understand every aspect of the thing as truly and perfectly as possible. Further,just as there is a unity in the being that we know through many acts, so also one single act judges the validity of all the acts. For the true, which is formally known only in judgment, regards the truth not only of the judgment itself but also of the other acts. Thus, if! truly judge, 'This is a man,' the truth of the judgment expresses the truth of the individual made manifest by the senses, the truth of the 5 [In all likelihood, this is not a statement that Lonergan would have made in his later work. In fact, it can be argued that, even prior to the publication' of this work as De Deo Trino in 1964, he had shifted the priority between objects and operations to operations. A balance is reached in A Third Collection, ed Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 141, in the paper 'Religious Knowledge': 'Gener-

alized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat·of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.'] 6 ['Corporeal' in the expression 'corporeal matter' sounds redundant today, but in view of Lonergan's discussion in Verbum of the different kinds of matter mentioned in Thomas's texts, it seemed best to translate the Latin phrase literally. See Verbwn 154-5 8 .]

7 [See the famous definition in Insight (372): 'Being ... is the objective of the pure desire to know.']


Collected

Works of Bernard Lonergan


'5

naturae, quae intelligendo perspicitur, tum veritatem existentiae, quae ipso iudicio ponitur. Quibus perspectis, dicendum est quonam actu intelligentia fidei attingatur. Et patet earn esse primam quandam intellectus operationem. Qui enim mysteriorum intelligentiam quaerit, non dubitat an sint mysteria vel utrum mysteria sint vera; qua dubitatione exclusa, excluditur secunda intellectus operatio. At hac operatione exclusa non manet nisi prima; quam sane operationetn vult qui quaerit quid sit quod esse certo credit, vel propter quid ita se habeat quod ita se habere minime dubitat. Prima ergo intellectus operatio est mysteriorum intelligentia.

Attamen ita prima est ut tamen tempore prima non sit. N am mysteriorum intelligentiam antecedit assensus fidei, qui, cum in verum sit, secunda quaedam operatio est. Et ipsum assensum fidei antecedit intelligentia quaedam catechetica, qua perspicitur quid dicere velint fidei articuli. Praeterea, ita mysteriorum intelligentia est prima intellectus opera,tio, ut tamen maxima intimitate cum aliis et secundis operationibus connectatur. Quamvis enim ipsa intelligentia secundum se non sit nisi prima operatio, tamen intelligentia est mysteriorum quae per antecedentem fidei assensum qua vera innotuerunt; et quam primum quaedam mysteria quodammodo intelliguntur, statim per secundam operationem quaeritur utrum id quod intelligendo perspectum sit etiam verum sit. Nihilominus, quamvis maxima quadam intimitate connectatur mysteriorum intelligentia tum cum vero revelato et antecedente tum cum vero consequente et theologico, remanet hanc intelligentiam secundum se esse actum quendam determinatum. Et ideo nunc proprietates eius sunt enumerandae ut postea de eius colligatione cum vera agatur. Primo, ergo, obiectum mavens ad intelligentiam theologicam est, non quidditas in materia corporali existens, sed quidditas Dei in quo sunt mysteria abscondita. Quae quidem quidditas nos movet, non immediate uti in visione beatifica, sed mediate per verum divinitus revelatum et fide susceptum. Deinde, ipsa intelligentia theologica est imperfec'ta. Est enim actus finitus per speciem finitam limitatus. 8 Sed actus finitus nullo modo proportionatur ad Deum


nature grasped by understanding, and the truth of the existence posited in the judgment itself. Once this is grasped, we go on to say which act it is in which the understanding of faith is attained. Clearly it is an instance of the first operation of the intellect. A person who is seeking an understanding of the mysteries is not asking whether there are mysteries or whether they are true. As long as that type of question is excluded, the second operation of the intellect is excluded as well. And if the second operation is excluded, there remains only the first. It is this operation that one intends when one asks, 'What is it?' about something that one firmly believes exists, or 'Why is it the way it is?' about something that one does not in the least doubt is the way it is. The und€rstanding of the mysteries is, then, an instance of the first operation of the intellect. Still, this operation is first, but not in the sense of being first in time. The assent of faith precedes the understanding of the mysteries, and the assent of faith is an assent to the true and so an instance afthe second operation. And it is preceded by a catechetical understanding in which one grasps what' the articles of faith mean. Notice too that -'the understanding of the mysteries is an instance of the first operation that is most intimately linked with other operations that- are instances of the second. For although the understanding in itself is merely a first operation, still it is an understanding of mysteries that became known as true in an antecedent assent of faith; and as soon as any understanding of the mysteries is attained, the second operation begins to function, as one asks whether what has been grasped by understanding is also true. Nevertheless, while the understanding of the mysteries is most intimately linked both with the antecedent revealed truth and with the consequent theological truth, the fact remains that this understanding in itself is a quite determinate act. And so we will now list the properties of that act, so that later we may examine its connection with the true. First, then, the object that moves us to theological understanding is not some intelligibility embodied in corporeal matter, but the intelligibility of God, in whom the mysteries are hidden. This intelligibility moves us, not immediately as in the beatific vision, but mediately through the truth that God has revealed and that we have accepted in faith. Second, theological understanding is imperfect. It is a finite act, limited by a finite species. 8 But a finite act is in no way proportionate to uriderstanding perfectly the 8 [On the various relations of 'species' to the act of understanding, see Lonergan, Verbum 133-38. Lonergan also discusses 'species' below, pp. 586-97.]




I)

infinite perfectum perfecte intelligendum. Et ideo, cum obiectum intelligentiae theologicae sit mysterium quoddam in Deo absconditum, fieri non potest ut hac in vita et citra visionem beatam perfecta sit intelligentia theologica. Terlio, haec imperfecta intelligentia est analogica. Nam finitus intelligendi actus directe respicit aliquid finitum; et quod directe finitum respicit, nisi per viam analogicam ad infinitum non extenditur. Qyarto, haec imperfecta et analogica intelligentia est obscura. Nam eatenus valet via analogica quatenus similitudo quaedam existit inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed 'inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda' (DB 432). Et ideo, skut ex similitudine oritur 'quciddam lumen, ita ex maiori dissimilitudine oriuntur tenebrae maiores.

Qyinto, haec imperfecta, analogica, et obs~ura intelligentia theologica decursu temporum augetur. Eiusmodi enim est intellectus humanus ut ad actus perfectiores per actus intermedios pedetentim proficiat. Et sicut in caeteris, ita etiam in theologids, gratia naturam non toHit sed perficit, uti ex ipsa historia theologiae patet. Qua de causa, dicendum est intelligentiam theologicam temporum decursu augeri. Sexto, haec imperfecta, analogica, obscura, atgue pedetentim sese evolvens intelligentia etiam est synthetica. Nam eiusmodi est intellectus humanus ut non solum singillatirn de rebus quaerat sed etiam, singulis intellectis, ulterius quaerat quemadrnodum inter se comparentur. Quare post singula mysteria seorsum considerata, ulteriores oriuntur quaestiones circa nexum mysteriorum inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo. Qui?us solutis~ ad intelligentiam syntheticam pervenitur. Septima, ipsa haec synthesis est imperfecta, analogica, obscura, et pedetentim sese evolvens. Synthesis enim nihil est aliud quam multorum simul intelligentia. Sed iisdem rationibus quibus probatur singulorum intelligentia esse imperfecta, analogica, obscura, et pedetentim sese evolvens, etiam probatur multorum simul intelligentia esse eiusmodi. Octavo, quamvis intelligentia theologica etiam synthetica sit imperfecta, analogica, obscura, atque pedetentim sese evolvens, nihilominus fructuosissima est. Semper enim est melior conditio intelligentis quam non intelligentis, tum in veris apprehendendis, tum in aliis verum docendis, tum in intima sua voluntate movenda, tum in aliis consiliandis atque dirigendis. Et ideo quo magis intelligentia theologica ad omnia revelata extenditur, eo plenius ipsa revelata apprehenduntur, eo efficacius docentur, et eo fidelius tota vita humana secundum omnes suos aspectus ad finem ultimum atque supernaturalem dirigitur.

The Robert MoUat Collection


infinitely perfect GoeL Therefore, since its object is some mystery hidden in God, theological understanding cannot possibly ever be perfect in this life, this side of the beatific vision.

Third, this imperfect understanding is analogical. For a finite act ofunderstand~ ing bears directly on something finite; but what bears directly on something finite can be extended only analogically to what is infinite. Fourth, this imperfect and analogical understanding is obscure. For analogy is valid to the extent that there is a similarity between Creator and creature, and (any similarity, however great, that is discovered between Creator and creature will always leave a still greater dissimilarity to be discovered' (DB 432, DS 806, ND 320). Thus, just as from the similarity comes some light, so from the dissimilarity comes a still greater darkness. Fifth, this imperfect, analogical, and obscure theological understanding develops over time. The human mind is such that it advances one step at a time through intermediate acts to acts that are more perfect. As in all else, so in theology, grace does not destroy nature,~ut perfects it. This is clear from the history of theology. So it must be said that theological understanding develops in the course of time. Sixth, this imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing theological understanding is also synthetic. For the human mind is such that it does not wonder about things just individually but, understanding .individual elements, goes on to ask how they are connected with one another. And so after the individual mysteries have been considered on their own, further questions arise about how they are connected with one another and with our last end. Answering these questions provides a synthetic understanding. Seventh, this synthesis is itself imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing. For a synthesis is no more than the understanding of many things together, The same reasons that prove that our understanding of individual matters is im~ perfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing also prove that the same will be true of understanding all those matters together. Eighth, although even synthetic theological understanding is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing, still it is highly fruitfuL The 'condition of one who understands is always better than the condition of one who does not, whether it be in apprehending truth or in teaching it to others or in moving one's inmost will or in counseling and directing others. The more theological understanding is extended to all that has been revealed, the more fully then are those revealed matters apprehended, the more effectively are they taught, and the more faithfully is the whole of human life in all its aspects directed to its final supernatural end.



'9

'Nono, neque parvus neque despiciendus percipitur fructus ab eo qui serio in theologicam intelligentiam ita tendit ut tamen eam parum assequatur. Qui enim intelligentiam theologicam quaerit, ad omnia attendat riecesse est quae in intelligentiam theologicam ducant. Haec autem sunt quae Deus nobis revelavit et Dei ecc1esia omnibus credenda proponit. Sed parvus non est fructus neque despiciendus qui inde percipitur quod revelata atque credenda serio, diu, accurate, exacte considerantur tum in se ipsis tum in iis quae ex ipsis consequuntur. Et ideo erronee concluditur quod, nisi ad intelligentiam mysteriorum de facto a singulis pervenitur, tempus teritur. Decimo, utrum vera existat intelligentia theologica, imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim sese evolvens, synthetica, atque fructuosissima, decernit summa sua auctoritate cone. Vaticanum I: Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissim'am assequitur, tum ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia tum e mysteriorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo; numquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprium eius obiectum constituunt (DB 1796).9


Ninth, the benefit derived by someone who seriously strives for theological understanding but attains it only in small measure is neither slight nor to be disparaged. Whoever searches for theological understanding has to attend to everything that can lead to such understanding, and that fl1.eans attending to what God has revealed to us and what the church of God proposes to be believed by all. But neither slight nor to be disparaged is the benefit that is derived from a serious, lengthy, careful, exact consideration of the truths that God has revealed and we are to believe, both in themselves and in all that follows from them. And so it is a mistake to conclude that, unless each one of us actually arrives at an understanding of the mysteries, time is being wasted. Tenth, do~s such theological understanding exist - imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, and highly fruitful? Vatican I has answered that question authoritatively. . Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judi. ciously, with God's help ,~ttains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end. Yet reason never becomes capable of understanding the mysteries in the same way as it does truths that are its own proper object (DB 1796, DS 30I6, ~,~9

'Crescat igitur ... et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius Ecclesiae, aetatum ac saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia .. .' (DB 1800).10

Quibus perpensis, nihil aliud nos dixisse videmur quam id ipsum quod concilium Vaticanum 'salutarem Christi doctrinam' (DB 17 81 ) reputavit. 1I

,

.'Therefore, let there be growth". and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time ... ' (DB 1800, DS 3020, ND 136).10 Reflecting on those words, one will see we have been speaking about what Vatican I already called 'Christ's saving doctrine' (DB 1781, DS 3000). II 9 [Translation based in part on Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 336, where, however, Lonergan uses 'diligently, piously, soberly' rather than 'diligently, reverently, and judiciously.'} IO [Relying somewhat on the translation found in The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English Translation (St Louis, B. Herder, 1955) § 80. The text is quoted from Vincent of Lerins.] 1 r The importance of understanding in theology has recently been explained by Johannes Beumer, Theologie als Glaubensverstiindnis fYVurzburg: Echtet-Verlag, 1953). (Lonergan's review article on this book, 'Theology and Understanding,' was published in Gregorianum 35 (1954) 630~48. It appears as chapter 8 in Collection, vol. 4 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 1I4-32.]



20



Sectio Tertia: De Q.uaestione sen Problemate 12

3 The Question or ProblelD '2

Postquam de fine egimus et de actu quo ad finem perveFlituf, non nulla dici oportet'de actu quo finis ante intenditur quam attingatur. Quae quidem anticipatio quaestio seu problema nominatur, et vel sponte fit, vel explicite, vel scienter. Sponte fit quaestio quatenus earn experimur admirationem quae arigo est non solum omnis scientiae et 'philosophiae sed etiam omnis theologiae. Explicite exprimitur quaestio ubi clare et distincte dicimus quid quaeramus. Scienter denique ponitur quaestio ubi adduntur rationes cur haec quaestio poni debeat.

Having treated the goal and the act in which the goal is attained, we must now consider the act in which we intend the goal before we attain it. This anticipation we call a question or a problem, and we can consider it either as it occurs spontaneously or as it is explicitly expressed or as it is put scientifically. A question occurs spontaneously in the experience of wonder that is the origin not only of all science and philosophy but also of all theology. A question is expressed explicitly when we say clearly and distinctly what it is that we want to know. A question is put scientifically when we add the reaSOns why this question ought to be put. What kind of reasons? They are not all of one kind. Some reasons reduce to a problem of coherence, some to a problem of understanding, and some to a problem of fact. Take, for instance, the question, Is the Holy Spirit a se, ffom himself? There are three "\:\rays of understanding this question. In a first way, the question can be understood to express a problem of coherence, and so, on hearing the question, one at onCe answers no- (Videtur quod non), because the 'Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, and what is from others is not from itself; but then one remembers (Sed contra est) that the Holy Spirit is God, and God is a se, and so the Holy Spirit is a se. Two arguments are used, to prove each side of a contradiction. That is a problem of coherence. In a second way, the question can be understood to express a problem for understanding. Granted that the Holy Spirit is both a se and not a se, how can both statements simultaneously be true? The matter would be quite simple if the Holy Spirit were composite; then the Holy Spirit could be a se in 'one' respect and not a se in another. But the Holy Spirit is utterly simple, and so there arises a very serious problem for understanding. In a third way, the question can be understood to express a problem of fact, such that the meaning of the question is, Does there really exist a third divine person? Is this really taught in the sources of revelation? Is it understood in the same sense in the sources of revelation as it was later in the councils and among theologians? Furthermore, although these three kinds of problems are very closely interconnected, still in any particular period more attention might be paid to one kind

Quod si has rationes quaesiveris quales sint, non orunes eiusdem generis esse invenies, sed alias ad problema cohaerentiae, alias ad problema intelligentiae, alias ad problema facti reduces. Ita tripliciter intelligi potest quaestio, Utrnm Spiritus sanctus sit a se. Primo modo, exprimitur problema cohaerentiae, et ideo ad propositam quaestionem statim dicitur: Videtur quod non, nam Spiritus sanctus est a Patre et Filio; qui ab aliis est, a se non est; ergo Spiritus sanctus non est a se. Sed contra est quod Spiritus sanctus est Deus; et Deus est a se; ergo Spiritus sanctus est a se. Quo duplici argumento probatur utraque pars contradictionis ut constet cxistere problema cohaerentiae. Altero modo, exprimitur problema intelligentiae. Constat quidem Spiritum sanctum tum a se tum non a se esse; sed quaeritur quemadmodum utrumque sim"ul verum esse possit. Et res quidem facillima esset, si Spiritus sanctus esset compositus, ut secundum aliud sit a se, secundum aliud autem non sit a se. Sed Spiritus sanctus est simplex prorsus, et ideo oritur gravissimum intelligendi problema. Tertio denique modo, exprimitur problema facti ut sensus sit utrum re vera existat tertia persona divina, utrum hoc in fontibus revelationis doceatur, utrum eodem sensu in fontibus intelligatur ac postea in conciliis et inter theologos.

Porro, quamvis haec tria problematum genera quam maxime inter se connectantur, alio tamen tempore magis ad aliud genus attenditur. Ita in ipsis Sci?Dtiae

12 [This and the next two sections comprise the first set of pages (13-36 in the Latin

text), and the only set in this chapter, that Lonergan mentioned at the end of the foreword as differing in a notable way from the text of Diuinarum personarum. See below, appendix 4, § I, pp. 742-61, for a translation of the material in Divmarum personarum that did not survive the changes that Lonergan made in these sections of De Deo Trino.]


Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicerrdi


initiis ubi hominibus persuadendum est ut rei scientificae vacent, utilissimum esse potest problemata cohaerentiae ponere; et ideo Abaelardus, canonistarum inhaerens vestigiis, opus composuit Sic et non (ML 178, .1339-1610) in quo circa propositiones theologicas centum quinquaginta octo tum partem affirmativam tum partern negativarn sustinuit. At parum est existentiarn quaestionum demonstrare quarum tamen praetermittitur solutio. Alii ergo libros sententiarum composuerunt ut materlam problematum e scripturis et e patribus colligerent atque ordinarent; alii autem ipsas solutiones evolverunt, sive per modum commentarii in libros sententiarum, sive independenter in brevioribus quaestionum collectionibus, sive etiam in maioribus' operibus quae totius theologiae sumrnam exposuerunt. Ubi autem quaeruntur solutiones, iam ex problemate cohaerentiae ad problema intelligentiae transitur, unde et brevi addiscitur quaestiones poni non posse quocumque ordine, cum aliae solvi non possint nisi aliae prius sint solu'tae, aliae autem quam primum solvantur in solutionem aliarum conducant. Quare, alium invenies quaestionum ordinem in Scripto super libros sententiarum, alium autem in Summa theologiaej quam differentiam notavit S. Thomas in prologo primae partis Summae suae, ubi distinxit inter ordinem disciplinae et ordinem quem requirit librorum expositio.

than to another. Thus, in the early stages of scientific inquiry when it is still necessary to persuade people to devote themselves to sci~nce, it might be extremely useful to focus on the problem of coherence; and so Abelard, continuing in the footsteps of some canonists, composed his Sic et non (ML 178, 1339-1610), in which he presented supporting reasons for both the affirmative and the negative side of IS8 theological propositions. But it would be of little value to prove the existence of questions yet never attempt to solve them. Hence some people composed books of Sentences to collect and organize, from scripture and the Fathers, material for problems. Others began working out answers, either in the form of commentary on those books of Sentences or independently in shorter collections of questions or in larger works that expounded a summa of the whole of theology. Seeking answers moved theologians beyond the problem of coherence to the problem of uricl.erstanding. Working on that problem, they soon discovered that questions carinot be put in any order whatsoever. Some questions simply can~ot be answered until others have been resolved. And sometimes the answers to one question immediately provide the answers to others. This discovery lies behind the differing order of the questions in St Thomas's commentary on the Sentences and his Summa theologiae. He indicated the difference in the prologue to the first part of the Summa, where he distinguished the order of learning from the order demanded by running commentaries.

Proinde, 13 sapientis est ordinare, et ideo sapientis est primum invenire problema quod eo sensu primum est quia (I) eius solutio solutionem aliorum problematum non praesupponit, (2) eo soluto expedite solvitur alterum, (3) primo alteroque soIutis statim solvitur tertium, et similiter deinceps per omnia problemata consequentia atque connexa.

Thus, 13.pu~ting things in their right order is the special talent of the wise person, and so the wise person will start with the problem that is first in the sense (I) that its solution does not presuppose the solution of other problems, (2) that solving it will expedite solving a second problem, (3) that solving the first and second problems will lead right away to solving a third, and so on through all consequent connected problems.

Deinde, intelligentia est de principiis; sed principium definitur primum in aliquo ordine; et ideo intelligentiae est perspicere solutionem eius problematis quod primum est in ordine sapientiae. At eiusmodi est hic ordo ut, primo soluto, expedite caetera solvantur; et ideo eiusmodi esse debet intelligentia ut virtualiter in se contineat reliquarum quaestionum solutiones.

Next, understanding is about principles. A principle is defined as what is first in some order. Therefore it belongs to understanding to grasp the solution of that problem that is first in the order proposed by wisdom. Since this order is such that solving the first means that the others' are expeditiously solved, the understanding should be such as virtually to contain in itself the answers to the rest of the questions. I3 [Lonergan begins here to present a particular 'take' on the three intellectual virtues of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge. Thomas treated these virtues in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q: 57, a. 2, and, as we have seen, Vatican I offered a prayer that 'there be growth, .. and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time ... ' (emphasis added, to stress a different order in the conciliar expression from that which Lonergan follows here).)



24



Tertio, scientia est de conclusionibus. Sed eo ordine prop9Duntur quaestiones

ut, prima soluta, nullo fere negotio ad caeteras solvendas procedatur. Quia ergo reliquae solutiones ad primam comparantur sicut conclusiones ad principium, Dmnes solutiones praeter primam ad scientiam pertinere videntur. Praeterea, ubi inter se connectuntur tum problemata tum solutiones, fieri non potest ut ipsi conceptus et etia~ termini quibus conceptus exprimuntur inter, se non connectantur. Quare, sicut cae'tera problemata, primo soluto, iam virtualiter solvuntur, ita etiam conceptus et termini, qui priinum problema primamque 501utionem definiunt atque exprimunt, nisi leviter non mutantur ut caeterarum definitioni atque expressioni inserviant. Unde et concludes non malevolum magistrorum arbitrium sed ipsas inter se connexas quaestiones et solutiones exigere tum conceptus systematice formatos tum terminologiam technicam quae non quibuscumque sed systematicis conceptibus correspondeat. Quae cum ita sint, problema intelligentiae solvitur, non quia singulis quaestionibus singula seorsum fiant responsa, sed quia tota quaestionum series per sapientiam ordinatur, quia prima quaedam quaestio foecundissimo intelligendi' actu resolvitur, quia caeterae quaestiones vi primae solutionis ordinate solvuntur, quia systema definitionum ad solutiones formulandas introducitur, quia terminologia quaedam technica evolvitur ad conceptus definitos exprimendos.

Inventi autem systematis duo sunt propria et,alia tria sunt accidentia. Et propria quidem sunt ut crescat et perficiatur; ei autem accidit tum ut male intelligatur, tum ut penitus reiciatur, tum ut facta, quorum intelligentia est, denegentur.

Crescit vero systema quatenus modo non solum vitali et organico sed etiam (quod superius est) intellectuali et rationali tum ad onines theologiae partes extenditur tum philosophiam aliasque disciplinas humanas in suos fines adsumit. Perficitur autem systema quatenus augetur principii intelligentia unde et conclusiones profundius rem penetrant et latius extenduntur. Male intelligitur systema secundum iUud: Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur. Principii ergo intelligentia adeo non augetur ut minuatur. Nisi imperfecte non solvuntur tum problema primum tum connexa et consequentia problemata. At solutiones imperfectae, sicut partim solutiones sunt, partim etiam


•

Third, knowledge has to do with conclusions. But the questions are put in such an order that, once the first is solved, the solutions to the others ~onow with almost no difficulty. Therefore, because the later solutions are connected to the first as conclusions are connected to some principle, all solutions after the first seem to be the prope~ province of knowledge. Besides, where both the problems and the solutions are interconnected, the concepts and even the terms that express the concepts must also be interconnected. Thus, if solving the first problem virtually solves all the others, the concepts and terms in which the first problem and the first solution are defined and expressed cannot be significantly changed if they are to serve to define and express the later problem,S and solutions. Clearly, then, it is not the arbitrary malice of professors but the interconnected questions and solutions themselves that demand both systematically formed concepts and a technical terminology that corresponds not to any concepts whatsoever but to systematic concepts, Thus, the problem of understanding is solved not because individual answers are provided to individual questions one at a time and separately, but because the whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by the efficacy of the first solution, because a system of definitions is introduced through which the solutions can be formulated, and because a technical terminology is developed for expressing the defined concepts. Moreover, once a syst~m has been discovered, it is susceptible to two proper and three accidental eventualities. It is proper to a system that it grow and that it keep improving itself. But it can also happen that the system is poorly understood, that it is completely rejected, and that the very facts that were understood in the system are now denied. A system grows to the extent that it is extended not only vitally and organically but also (and more important) in an intellectual and rational way to all parts of theology and draws upon philosophy and other human disciplines to serve its own ends, A system keeps improving itself insofar as the understanding of its principle increases so that the conclusions penetrate more deeply the matter under consideration and extend more widely. The poor understanding of a system is in accord with the dictum, Whatever, is received is received according to the capacity of the receiver. Thus, the understanding of the principle, far from increasing, decreases. The first problem and all the connected subsequent problems are solved imperfectly. But imperfect solutions are only partly solutions, and so they are also partly new problems. These


26


2)

sunt nova problemata. Neque oriuntur haec nova problemata nisi remote ex fontibus revelationis; proxime enim ex .systemate male intellecto procedunt. Nee satis. Ordinantur haec nova problemata per sapientiam non sapientium sed male intelligentium. Solvuntur haec nova problemata per eosdem quorum mala intelligentia novorum problematum fons erat atque origo. Novum ergo oritur systema, veri systematis simulacrum, cuius problemata non existunt, cuius ordo parum sapientibus placet, cuius principium" superfi,cialiter intelligentibus sufficit, cuius scientia palus quaedam est obscuritatis atque confusionis. At una non est insipientium insipientia, sed alia aliis placet. 14 Novo ergo systemati succedit recentius: ex inopinato multiplicantur summa ingenia; regit non ratio per fidem illustrata sed partium studium; neque scientiarum historico sed cognitionis sociologo praeparatur materia. IS

Penitus reicitur systema duplici de causa. Alii enim nisi systematis simulacra numquam cognov~runt; quae cum certo sciant non bona esse sed mala, omne systema necessario esse aberrationem iudicant. Alii autem profundiori quadam ignorantia laborant: nam 'intelligere' quid significet non capiunt; et ideo ubi de problemate intelligentiae agitur, nisi de problemate veri vel facti cogitare non valent. Quare, ubi rei divinae systematica quaedam intelligentia attingitur, hane non intelligentiarn esse reputant sed novam doctrinam dogmatibus philosophicis innixam. Ubi sententiae sanctorum systematice intelliguntur, easdem sententias non intelligi sed reici autumant. 16 At systemate penitus excluso, penitus etiam excluditur problema intelligentiae. Aut ergo ad problema cohaerentiae reditur, ut subtilitate logica de absolute necessariis et de absolute possibilibus disputetur; quod saeculo decimo quarto et deinceps factum est. Aut, his exercitiis fere 'logicis


new problems arise only remotely from the sources of revelation; proximately, they proceed from the poor understanding of the system. But there is more, The wisdom that puts the new problems into order is the wisdom not of the truly wise'but of those who have poorly understood. The solutions to these new problems come from the very persons whose poor understanding was the source and cause of the new problems in the first place. Thus, a new system arises, but it is just a semblance of a true system. Its problems do not really exist, its order will please those who have little wisdom, its principle will satisfy only those whose understanding is superficial, and its knowledge will be a morass of obscurity and confusion. Still, foolishness is manifold: different people are unwise in different ways. [4 And so the new system is followed by an even newer one. Extremely clever schemes and ideas suddenly proliferate. The rule of reason enlightened by faith gives way to partisan zeal. The story can no longer be told by a historian of science but only by a sociologist of knowledge. 15 System can be completely rejected for two reasons. Some people never were introduced to_anything more than semblances of system; since they can easily see that these are no good, they judge that every system must be an aberration. But others suffer from a more serious ignorance. They do not grasp what it means to understand. When they hear of the problem of understanding, they can think only of the problem of truth or offact. Thus, when some systematic understanding of divine reality is attained, they do not take it to be an understanding but some new teaching grounded in philosophical dogmas. When the ideas of the saints are being systematically understood, these same people claim that these ideas are not being understood but are being rejected. 16 But once system is utterly excluded, the problem for understanding is also utterly excluded. Then either one simply goes back to the problem of coherence and disputes with logical subtlety about absolute necessities and absolute possibilities, as theologians did in the fourteenth 14 [We may note here an anticipation of an aspect of the functional specialty 'Dialectic.'] 15 [Lonergan's footnote refers to Yves Congar's article 'Theologie' (Dictionnaire de theologie catJwlique, vol. 15 [29], Paris: Letouzey & Ane) column 410. This corresponds to material that can be found in Congar, A History of Thology, trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie (New York: Doubleday, 1968) 141-43, where there are discussed (1) the consequences of the 'useless subtlety' manifest after Aquinas, when the dialectical method of the quaestio was pursued, not for the sake of understanding but for its own sake, and (2) the consequent crystallization of theology into petrified systems and schools, where the schools were a function of identification with religious orders. The latter identification may be what Lonergan has in mind when he speaks here of partisan zeal and of the sociology of knowledge. Congar did not use these terms.} 16 See the letter ofJohn Peckham cited below, pp, 91, 93·



28


29

tandem denique omissis, ad problema facti proceditur. Systemati denique accidit ut denegentur facta quorum intelligentia est. Quod aliter ab aliis fit, neque hie repetendum esse videtur quid senserint sentiantve Protestantes, rationalistae; liberales, athei optimismo humanistico innixi, mad ernistae, existentialistae, historici 'critici,' et relativistae historici. N

Remanet ergo ut dicta colligamus et enu~eremus. Duos enim distinximus fines quorum alius certitudinem ex auctoritatibus percipit, alius autem fructum ex intelligentia certorum. Quam intelligentiam non solum imperfectam, analogicam, obscuram, et pedetentim sese evolventem diximus, sed etiam adeo foecundam ut problemate quodam primo soluto caetera problemata consequentia et connexa facile solverentur. At ipsa haec foecunditas suis haud caret incommodis: quod enim intelligi, crescere, perfici potest, idem vel male vel nullatenus intelligi potest, ut inter male intelligentes oriantur pseudo-systemata ad pseudo-problemata s01venda, dum non intelligentes ad problemata cohaerentiae redeant. Quod si in aliorum obscuritate et confusione, in aliorum claritate atque vacuitate, negantur ipsa facta quorum intelligentia vel cohaerentia quaerebatur, non sane desunt qui hanc 'negationem vel causam vel excusationem habuisse dicant in originali ilia praesumptione quae mysterioruin intelligentiam assequi ausa sit.

At aequius iudicandum esse opinor. Abusus enim non tollit usurn; neque abusus ignorabatur vel a c. Vaticano I quod, cum contra semirationalistas doctrinam catholicam positive exponeret, fidei intelligentiam et possibilem et fructuosissimam esse praedicavit, vel a Summis Pontificibus qui communem omnium doctorem renuntiaverunt S. Thomam. Sed praeterea, ut ad finem praesentem argtimentum Card. Newman adaptem, scientiae pars omitti non potest quin triplex addiscentibus inferatur damnum. [7 Nam primo ipsa omissio facit ut ilia pars ignoretur. Deinde, quod gravius est, ipsa scientia mutilatur: quod enim scientiam qua scientiam constituit non in parte sed in toto invenitur; e~ ideo qui partem pro toto tradit, scientiae potius adversatur quam inservit. Tertia, quod gravissimum est, scientia mutilata citius tardius detorquetur: eiusmodi enim sunt exigentiae quae intellectualitatem atque rationalitatem constituunt, ut ipsa omissio


and following centuries, or one finally rejects such seemingly logi'cal exercises as well and concentrates only on the problem of fact. Xinally, it can happen to a system that the facts it understands are denied. This can occu.r in many different ways, and there is no point in rehearsing here all the different positions that are or have been represented by Protestants, Fationalists, liberals, atheists relying on humanistic optimism, modernists, existentialists, socalled 'critical' historians, and historical relativists. There remains the task of gathering together and summing up what we have said. We distinguished two goals, one that emphasizes certitude based on authorities, and another that emphasizes understanding what is already known as certain. We said that this understanding is not only imperfect, analogous, obscure, and gradually developing, but also fruitful, so that when some first problem is solved, the remaining connected problems will easily be brought to a solution. This very fruitfulness, however, has its disadvantages. The same system that can be udderstood, grow, and keep improving can also be poorly understood or not understood at all, with the result that those who understand p'oody will concoct pseudo-systems to solve pseudo~problems, while those who do not understand at all will give up the effort and return to problems of coherence. And ifin the obscurity and confusion of some and the clarity and emptiness of others the very facts that cried out for understanding and coherence are denied, some people surely will arise to claim that the cause of, or excuse for, this very denial lies in the original presumption of trying to understand the mysteries. I think a more equitable judgment should be made. The fact of abuse does not invalidate the right use. Vatican I was perfectly aware of abuses when, as part of a positive effort to expound Catholic teaching against the semirationalists, it pronounced the understanding of the faith to be both possible and highly fruitful. The later popes who named St Thomas 'the universal Doctor' also knew perfectly well the fact of abuse. But in addition, I should like to adapt to present purposes Cardinal Newman's argument that a part of knowledge cannot be omitted without inflicting a threefold harm on learners,17 First, omitting the part means that they will not learn that part. Second, and more seriously, knowledge itself will be mutilated. What constitutes knowledge as knowledge is found not in the part but in the whole, and so to hand on some parts as if they were the whole is to work against knowledge rather than to serve it. Third, and most seriously of all, mutilated knowledge will sooner or later be distorted. The demands that constitute our intelligence and reasonableness will make the omission felt; they will 17 [Lonergan is alluding to Newman's third discourse, 'Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge,' in The Idea ofa Universi~.J



30

31


sentiatur, ut compensatio seu supplementum quaeratur, ut caeterae quae traduntur partes ita a proprio officio et munere detorqueantur ut per se solae unum quoddam et tatum exhibere videantur. Quam ob causam, quo veheme~tius,. a~ omni speculatione theologica abstinetur, eo uberius in speculationibus hlstoflC1S indulgetur; quamvis enim ipsa methodus empirica pedetentim ad sententias communiter receptas 'conducat, sola tamen methodus sine mente nihil facit; mens autem philosophice et theologice inculta, teste experientia, recentissimis ventis theoreticis modo hue modo illue fertur,


require that a compensation or a supplement be sought and that the remaining parts of knowledge be wrenched from their proper role and task, until they appear by themselves alone to present some kind of unity and whole. For this reason, the more resolutely people abstain from theological speculation, the more abundantly they indulge in historical speculations. Empirical method will undoubtedly lead little by little to certain ideas being generally accepted, but method alone without a mind attains nothing; and experience teaches us how a mind innocent of philosophy and theology can be tossed back and forth by every new wind of

theory. Sectio Q.uarta: De Veritate Intelligentiae

4 The Truth of Theological Understanding

Quem quaeramus finem, quo actu attingatur, quemadmodum prius intendatur quam cognoscatur, diximus. Remanet tamen ut dicamus de intelligentia theologica atque systematica (I) utrum secundum se vera sit, (2) utrum verum sit quod intelligatur, et (3) utrum vera sit veri intelligentia.

We have spoken of the goal that we seek, of the act in which the goal is attained, and of 49w the goal is intended or anticipated before it is actually known. Now we have-rto reflect further on the precise nature bf systematic theological understanding and ask: (I) is it true in itself? (2) is what it understands true? and (3) is the understanding of the true itself true? (I) First, then, one must by aU means bear in mind that theological understanding is in itself neither true nor false. The reason is that theological understanding is, as we explained above, an instance of the first operation of the intellect, while truth and falsehood are found formally only in the second operation. Therefore, if we are considering only understanding, we can say that it is complete or incomplete, proportionate or analogical, clear or obscure, and so on. But as soon as we ask whether an understanding is true or false, we are no longer considering only understanding but have moved on to the next operation of the intellect, where we ask, 'Is this so?' and weigh the evidence and make a judgment. Second, whatever we intellectually grasp we also utter or express or manifest in an inner word. But it is one thing to grasp a cause or a reason, and something else to grasp the sufficiency of evidence. So there are two inner words. The first, by which something is defined in terms of its grasped cause or reason, is called the simple inner word. The second, by which what has been defined is affirmed or denied to exist, is called the compound inner word. And so, just as the understanding in the first operation is in itself neither true nor false, so also the simple inner word in which this understanding is expressed is in itself neither true nor false. Third, what we conceive in an inner word we also express in outer words; and since a sample inner word is true or false potentially, the outer words themselves also are often said to be true or false by metonymy. But this can be misleading even in this usage: one can pay more attention to the words themselves than to the intention of the speaker. If the compound inner word of affirmation or negation has not occurred, then outer words. express only a simple inner word, whereby a

(I) In primis ergo illud omnino retinendum est quod intelligentia theologica secundum se neque vera est neque falsa. Nam, uti dictum est, haec intelligentia ad primam intellectus operationem pertinet, sed veritas vel falsitas formaliter nisi in secunda operatione non invenitur. Qua de causa,-qui solam intelligentiarn considerat, earn dicere potest perfectam esse vel imperfectam, proportionatam vel analogicam, claram vel obscuram, aliaque eiusmodi; qui autem quaerit utrum vera an falsa sit intelligentia, non solam intelligentiam considerat sed etiam ad subsequentem intellectus operationem acceciit, qua quaeritur an sit, ponderaturque evidentia, atque profertur iudicium. Deinde, ornne quod intellectu conspicimus, etiam verba quodam interiori dicimus, exprimimus, manifestamus. At aliud est causam seu rationem conspicere, aliud vero evidentiae sufficientiam. Quare duplex est verbum interius. Aliud enim incomplexum dicitur quo res per conspectam causam seu rationem. definitur; aliud autem complexum dicitur quo id, quod definitum est, existe~e a:ffirmatur vel negatur. Et ideo sicut et ipsa intelligentia primae operationis de se neque vera neque falsa est, ita etiam verbum interius incomplexum, quo haec intelligentia exprimitur, de se neque verurn est neque falstim. Tertio, quod verbo interiori concipimus, etiam exterioribus vocibus exprimimus; et cum illud verum vel falsum esse possit, etiam per metonymiam ipsae voces dici solent verae vel falsae; qui tamen usus in abusum vergere potest, si magis ad voces ipsas quam ad intentionem loquentis attenditur. Si enim deest interius verbum complexum, quo vel affirmatur vel negatur, voces exteriores nihil manifestant nisi



3'


33

verbum incomplexum, quo consideratur vel definitio vel hypothesis, vel etiam recitatur alterius cuiusdam sententia; et tunc quamvis multae sint voces, quamvis simul sumantur, quamvis adsint 'est' et 'non est,' tamen neque verae neque [alsae sunt ipsae voces, cum non asseitionis sed considerationis vel recitationis intentionem manifestent. Quibus perspectis, concluditur voces exteriores, quae intelligentiam theologicam qua talem exprimant, ne per metonymiam quidem veras esse vel [alsas. Quarto, sicut ipsa intelligentia theologica est imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim sese evolvens, etc. J ita etiam consequens verbum interius et consequentes voces exteriores sunt imperfecte intellectae et analogice et obscure. Haec ergo de intelligentia theologica secundum se, et de eius expressione sive interiori et conceptuali sive exteriori et verbali. (2) Deinde dicendum erat quemadmodum intelligentia theologica ad verum antecedens compararetur. Et in primis notandum est theologicam scientiam a naturali vel humana eo c.lifferre quod non a datis sed a veris incipit. 18 In scientia enim naturali eorum quaeritur intelligentia quae sen'sibus dantur; -nisi per sensibilia intellecta ad verum non acceditur; neque plus speratur quam per successivas semperque meliores hypotheses et theorias maiorem quandam attingere verisimilitudinem atque probabilitatem. Similiter, in scientia humana, quamvis non a nudis sensibilibus incipiatur sed a sensibilibus sensu quodam significatoque humane indutis, hic tamen sensus non accipitur ut verus; et ideo sicut scientia naturalis, ita scientia humana per probabiliores semper theorias ad verum propius accedere intendit. Sed qui in verbo Dei invenitur sensus, a divina scientia eaque infallibili procedit; et ideo theologia quae a·veris revelatis incipit, scientia scientiae divinae subalternata esse dicitur. Quae cum ita sint, eo sensu intelligentia theologica est vera quod in vero divinitus revelato intelligendo consistit. Quod si aliud praeter verum a Deo revelatum intelligitur, adesse quidem potest intelligentia, sed adesse non potest intelligentia theologica. Quam enim intelligentiam laudavit c. Vatic anum I, illa eorum e'rat mysteriorum (DB 1796) quae in Deo abscondita, nisi divinitus revelata, nobis innotescere non poterant (DB 1795).

Deinde, guaeri potest utrum scripturas an magisterium ecclesiae adeat theologus ut mysteria addiscat quorum quaerat intelligentiam.


definition or a hypothesis is considered, or some other person's idea is repeated; then of course even if there are many outer words, even if all are taken together, even if they contain the words 'is' or 'is not,' still those outer words cannot be either true or false, since they do not carry an intention to assert something, but only to consider or repeat an idea. Thus, 'the outer words that express theological understanding as such are not true or false even by metonymy.

Fourth,"as theological understanding itselfis imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, and so on, so also the consequent inner word and the consequent outer words are imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely understood. So much for theological understanding in itself and for its expression, whether inner and conceptual or outer and verbal. (2) Next we have to state how theological understanding is connected to an antecedent truth. First, then, notice that theological science differs from natural or human science in that th~~logical science begins not from data but from truths. 18 The natural sciences seek an understanding of sensible data; they approximate to truth only by understanding sensible data; and they hope for no more than to attain greater plausibility and probability by means of successive and ever better hypotheses and theories. The human sciences, too, begin from sensible data: not from bare sensibIes, it is true, but from sensibles endowed with meaning and human significance. But they do not accept this meaning as true, and so like the natural sciences, they intend to approach ever nearer to truth by means of ever more probable theories. But the meaning that is found in the word of God proceeds from God's infallible knowledge, and so a theology that begins from revealed truths is called a knowledge subordinated to divine knowledge. Since this is so, theological understanding is true in the sense that it consists in understanding the truth that God has revealed. When anything is understood besides the truth that God has revealed, one may indeed have understanding, but not theological understanding, the understanding commended by Vatican 1 (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132), that is, the understanding of those mysteries hidden in God that could not be known by us unless they were revealed by God (DB 1795, DS 3015, ND 131). Second, one can ask whether the theologian should go to the scriptures or to the church's magisterium to learn of the mysteries that he or she seeks to understand. 18 [In the light of Method in Theology it is clear that Lonergan would later have qualified this statement. Systematics begins not from data but from truths, but systematics is but one of eight functional specialties in theology.]



34



35

Et primo dicimus, quantum ad verum verique sensum atunet, nihil referre utrum scripturas an magisterium adeat. Quod enim ab ecclesia omnibus credendum proponitur ut divinitus revelatum, idem in fontibus revelationis continetur (DB I792) et quidem eadem sensu ac ab ecclesia definitum est (DB 2314; d. 1800).

Attamen, stante dicta identitate veri et sensus, lange propius ad munus officiumque theologiae systematicae accedit declaratio ecclesiastica quam biblica. Categoriae enirn quae dicuntur biblicae ad immediatum vitae usum pertinent secundum particulares quosdam scriptores, lectores, tempora, loca, adiuncta, occasianes, fines. Categoriae autem quae did possunt catholicae in quaestionibus difficilioribus inventae sunt ad usum ecclesiae ubique dispersae, iure universalis, hisque in terris perpetuae. 19 Illae quidem clariores erant quoad primaevos christianos, a nobis autem non addiseuntur nisi longioribus et diffieilioribus studiis biblicis; hae autem interiorem quandam claritatem habent quae a quolibet perspici potest qui felieiter studia media peregerit. Illae ita Deum respiciunt ut simul homini dieant quid sentire, quid dicere, quid agere debeat; hae autem ipsam rem divinam secundum se ipsam exponunt. Magis commovemur 'ergo ubi Filius dicitur 'splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius';20 sed darius perspicimus problema theologicum ubi determinatur Filius Patri consubstantialis esse. . Quae cum ita sint, manifestum videtur theologiam systematicam potius a definitionibus eeclesiae quam a studiis biblicis incipere. Cum tamen doetrinae revelatae fontes tot tantasque eantineant thesauros veritatis ut numquam reapse exhauriantur (DB 2314), multa sane sunt in scripturis quae nondum ab ecclesia definita sunt; neve haec omnia dicas minoris esse momenti. Alia enim mysteria,

The first thing that we can say in response is that as far as the truth and the meaning of the truth are concerned, it does not make any difference whether one goes to the scriptures or to the magisterium. For whatever the church proposes to be believed by all as divinely revealed, that same truth is contained in the sources of revelation (DB 1792, DS 30Il, ND 219) and indeed with the same meaning as is defined by the church (DB 2314, DS 3886, ND 859, cf. DB 1800, DS 3020, ND'136). Still, ev"en granted this identity in truth and in meaning, a church declaration is likely to be much closer to the task and role of systematic theology than is a biblical statement.' So-called biblical categories pertain to the immediate uses of life for particular vvriters, readers, times, places, circumstances, occasions, and purposes, while what can be called 'catholic' categories have been discovered in working on very difficult questions, and they can be used by the universal church everywhere throughout the world, in every age. 19 Biblical categories were quite clear for early Christians, but we today can master them only after long and difficult biblical studies. But the catholic categories have a certain inner clarity that can be grasped by any~I1e with a decent middle-school education. Biblical categories speak of God while it the same time telling us what we should feel, what we should say, what we should do. The catholic categories speak of divine reality in itself. We may be more stirred when the Son is called 'reflection of God's glory and the exact imprint of his very being,'20 but we grasp the theological problem more clearly in the statement that the Son is consubstantial with the Father. Therefore it seems beyond doubt that systematic theology begins from the definitions of the church rather than from biblical studies. Nevertheless, the sources of revealed doctrine contain such great and abundant treasures of truth that they are never really exhausted (DB 2314, DS 3886, ND 859), and so there is much in scripture that has not yet been defined by the church, and some of it is of the greatest importance. Some great mysteries, such as the redemption, are so fully 19 [The expression 'catholic categories' can easily lend itself to misunderstanding.

20


Lonergan does not mean just any of the customary forms of expression of the Roman Catholic Church, many of which are as particular and as culturally specific as 'biblical categories.' He means what in the Epilogue of Insight is called 'the work of the speculative theologian seeking a universal formulation of the truths of faith' (Insight 76r). The issue will come up again. Note that this section was not in the earlier Divinarum personarum. There, the word catholica does not appear until later, and then most often in the sense of the Catholic Church. See below, p. 63, where 'catholice' is translated as 'universally.' But see also below, sections 7, 8, and 9, which were contained in the earlier version, and where the proper translation is 'Catholic.' The reference to 'catholic categories' may be seen as anticipating the question in Method in Thology regarding the transcultural base of the special and general categories.] [Hebrews 1.3.]


De Fine, Ordiric; Modo Dicendi


37

uti redemptio, adeo plene in fontibus exponuntur ut de iis vix umquam in ecclesia disputatum sit et ideo perpaucae atque breviores inveniantur magisterii declarationes. Alia autem mysteria, uti SS. Trinitas, in fontibus inveniuntur magis indirecte quam directe exposita, magis seorsum per partes quam simul per modum unius tractata; quae quidem ita admirationem, dubia, disputationes moverunt ut saepius et clarissime et exactissime ab ecclesia sint declarata. Quas ob causas, etsi facilius incipiat systematicus a deelarationibus ecclesiae, non semper tamen facere potest quod facHius est. Proinde, ubi systematicus ipsas scripturas adit ut mysterium addiscat cuius intelligentiam quaerat, ne munus suum cum munere theologiae biblicae confundat; nisi ad proprium suum finem eumque solum attenderit, numquam ad eum perveniet. Illud ergo e scripturis attingere vult quod quaerendum non habe,ret si ecelesiae magisterium rem definivisset. Vult ergo quod in se darum est, et ideo vult sensum significatumque categoriis quas superius dixi catholicls declaratum. Vult quod certo revelatum est, et ideo eas adhibet methodos technicas quae non ad probabilia vel probabiliora sed ad certa conducant: Vult quod ipsam rem divinam respkit, et ideo mentem Marci, Pauli, Joannis, alteriusve scriptoris ita scrutatur ut ibi non sistat sed ulterius ad clarum et certum de Deo rebusque divinis procedat.

Haec ergo de fine. De mediis autem adhibendis ad finem assequendum et longior et difficilior esset dissertatio, cum in studiis hodiernis factus sit dogmaticus tam quam lapis offensionis. Modernae enim investigationis scientiaeque modernae tota est indoles ut ad data positiva exactissime attendat, ut ad intelligentiam promovendam efficaciter procedat, ut ad veritatem et positive et certo determinandam sese imparem inveniat. Quod ergo moderna methodologia omittit, illud facere debet dogmaticus. Quemadmodum vero illud facere possit, neque brevis quaestio est neque facilis. Hanc ergo quaestionem satius duxi ad aliam remittere occasionem quam cclerius expedire.

Tertia, mysteria divinitus revelata non solum in fontibus revelationis et in infallibilibus ecclesiae declarationibus inveniuntur sed etiam in aliis quae dicuntur locis theologicis. 21 Quibus omnibus utitur systematicus ut mysterium addiscat

treated in the sources that there have hardly ever been disputes about them in the church. As a result, declarations of the magisterium regarding them are rare and brief. On the other hand, there are mysteries like the Trinity that the sources treat more indirectly and in scattered texts than directly and as a single whole. These have provoked surprise, doubts, arguments, which have led in turn to the church declaring them quite frequently and very clearly and exactly. Therefore, although. it may be easier for systematic theologians to begin from the declarations of the church, they are not always able to do what is easier. Accordingly, when systematic theologians go to the scriptures to learn about the mystery that they want to understand, they have to keep their own task distinct from that of biblical theology. Unless they concentrate exclusively on their own goal, they will not successfully arrive at it. What they want from the scriptures is something that they w6iilCl not even have to look for if the church had already defined it. They want what is clear in itself, and so they want the meaning .and the significance clearly expressed in the categories that earlier I called catholic. They want what has certainly been revealed, and so they use those technical methods that will lead, not to what is probable, not even to what is more probable, but to what is certain. They want what regards the divine reality itself, and so they examine the mind of Mark or Paul orJohn or any other writer, not to rest content with that, but to proceed further to something clear and .certain concerning God and divine r.ealities. This, then, is their aim. But what exactly are the means of attaining it?· The answer to that question would be long and difficult, since in contemporary studies the dogmatic theologian has become something of a stumbling block. The whole thrust of modern research and modern science is to pay the most exact attention to positive data, to move effectively toward understanding those data, and to find oneself unable to determine positively and certainly just what the truth is. What modern methodology omits is precisely what dogmatic theologians have to do. But to say how they can do it is not a brief or easy task. Therefore J judge it better to postpone this question to another occasion rather than attempt too quick an answer here. Third, divinely revealed mysteries are found not only in the sources of revelation and in the infallible declarations of the church but also in other theological sources, or loci. 21 Systematic theologians use all of these to learn about the mystery 21


[For Melchior Cano, theologic.al wei name .the 'places' where authority is to be found. Cano lists and discusses ten: scripture, apostolic traditions, the universal church, general councils, the papal magisterium, the Fathers, Scholastic theologians and canonists, natural human reason, widely shared opinions of philosophers and jurists, and history and human traditions. He also proposes on the basis of



39


cuius intelligentiam quaerat. Sed ad caeteras notasque regulas illud adiungere velim quod superius de systemate male intellecto dixi. Quatenus enim mala intelligentia in theologiam intrat, eatenus oriuntur pseudo-problemata et evolvuntur pseudo-systemata. Quas domos in arena exstructas et facile et secure evitat systematicus ubi problema suum fundamentale ex dogmatibus ecclesiae desumit, ubi problemata connexa et conseguentia e problemate fundamentali derivat, ubi ad quaestiones subordinatas vel ad appendices remittit problemata quae magis ex opinationibus hominum quam ex veris a Deo "revelatis oriri videantur. 22

that they want to understand. There are standard rules of procedure for this, but I wish to add what I said above about a system that is poorly understood. To the extent that poor understanding enters into theology"there arise pseudo-problems and there are developed pseudo-systems. Systematic theologians will easily and securely avoid such houses built on sand when they draw their fundamental problem from the dogmas of the church, when they derive connected consequent problems from their fundamental problem, and when they relegate to subordinate questions or to appendices those problems that seem to stem more from human opinions than from truths revealed by God. 22

(3) Denique quaerendum erat quemadmodum intelligentia theologica ad verum consequens compararetur. Quae enim secundum se ,neque vera est neque falsa, eadem veritatem participat non solum antecedenter quatenus veri revelati intelligentia est sed etiam consequenter quatenus iudicatur veri .mysterii veram esse intelligentiam. 23 Et . in primis, veritas consequens non ea est quae principiis communibus competit. 24 Haec enim principia respiciunt transcendentalia, nempe, ens, unum, verum, bonum; in omni inquisitione. et dubitatione humana adhibentur; ipsam hominis intellectualitatem atgue rationalitatem quasi constituunt; et ideo defenduntur tamquam conditiones possibilitatis cuiuslibet cognitionis humanae. Quamvis

(3) Finally, how is theological understanding connected to consequent truth? The act of theological understanding is in itself neither true nor false, but it participates in the truth not only antecedently insofar as it is the understanding of a truth that has been revealed but also in a consequent fashion to the extent that it is judged to be a try.~ understanding of a true mystery. 23 First, then, this' -Consequent truth is not the truth that belongs to common principles. 24 These principles regard the transcendentals, namely, being, the one, the true, the good, and are employed in every human inquiry, including every case of human doubt. They practically constitute human intelligence and reasonableness, and so they are defended as conditions of possibility of any human knowing.

these loci the positive and negative categorization of theological statements that became 'theological notes' and 'censures.' (See below, note 46.) Although Lonergan mentions here the tenn made current in Catholic theology by Cano, and refers cursorily to the first five of Cano's loci, it is unlikely that what he has in mind is limited just to the loci delineated by Cano or by the tradition of dogmatic theology that developed from Cano. The sources or loci that he has in mind probably extend to wherever the 'divinely revealed mysteries' are found or made manifest, and especially to such privileged expressions of Christian living as prayer and the liturgy, the sensusfidelium, the law of the cross operating in human history, and in the holy lives of the saints - all of which systematic theologians can use 'to learn about the mystery they want to understand.' Still, the fact that he will refer here to 'standard rules of procedure' may indicate that he was thinking of the tradition that grew out of Cano's De lads theologiaS.] 22 [Thus, Lonergan's o-wn treatise on the Trinity starts on p. 65 of the Latin text and runs for 195 pages. It is followed by 54 pages of appendices. It contains 18 asserta (lO5 pages) and 90 pages of questions that arise at various points in the exposition.] 23 [What follows is a heuristic sketch in twelve points of theological truth in generalthat is, what Lonergan is calling the consequent truth of theological understanding, or the truth consequent on theological understanding (1-7) - and how to judge it in any given case (8-12).] 24 [What is meant are such principles as the principle of identity, the principle of noncontradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, and so on. On these, see Verbum 69-7 0 and Insight 346-48, 356, 402, 543-44, 599.J




4'

ergo theologus haec communia principia necessario adhibeat, vel explicite et signate, vel implicite et exercite, quamvis praeterea haec principia et omnia et omnem singulorum aspectum includant, intelligentia tamen theologica interiorem quandam horum determinationem dicit, et ideo veritas consequens huius intelligentiae non eadem sit ac ipsorum communium principioru m . .

Deinde, veritas consequens non ea est quae ex perspecta rei essentia procedit sive per modum principii essentialis sive per modum demonstratae proprietatis. Hac enim in vita Deum cognoscimus non immediate per essentiam sed mediate per analogiam. Et ideo fieri nequit ut intelligentia divini mysterii sit vera ad modum perspectae essentiae.

Tertio, intelligentiae theologicae veritas consequens alia est ac in theologia naturali attingitur. Aliud enim est quod naturalis ratio analogice de Dea concipit et ex creaturis de Dea demonstrat. Aliud est quod nobis innotescere non potest nisi divinitus revelatur et fide suscipitur. Tertium denique est quod ratio per fidem illustrata invenit cum de mysteriis stricte dictis inquisierit (DB 1795, 1796, 1816).

Qyarto, intelligentiae theologicae veritas consequens alia est ac veritas antecedens. Nam antecedens veritas est ipsum divinum mysterium a Deo revelatum et fide susceptum cuius quaeritur intelligentia. Consequens autem veritas est ipsius intelligentiae. Illud verum est fide divina et forte etiam catholica; hoc autem saepe non aliam habet notam seu censuram quam 'probabile.·

Iteruffi, obiectum fidei divinae temporum decursu non mutatur; non enim mutatur ipsum fidei depositum (DB 1800), et ipsae declarationes dogmaticae non proponunt nisi idem verum eodem sensu intellectum (DB 1792, 1800, 2g14). E contra circa doctrinam fidei crescit et proficit, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, aetatum et saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia (DB 1800). Ouius augmenti quaenam sit veritas quaeritur ubi de veri tate consequente intelligentiae theologicae agitur.

Qyinto, intelligentiae theologicae veritas consequens per se est quae hypothesi competit; et per se intelligo quod ex ipsa rei natura oritur.



Now of course theologians have to use these common principles, whether explicitly and thematically or just implicitly and in practice. And without doubt these principles include all that is, as well as every aspect of every single being. Nevertheless, theological understanding adds a certain inner determination of these principles, and therefore the truth consequent on this understanding is not just the same as the truth of the common principles themselves. Second, the consequent truth is not the kind of truth that comes from grasping the essence of something, whether by grasping an essential principle or by grasping some demonstrated characteristic or 'property.' In this life we do not know God immediately by essence, but mediately by analogy. Therefore no human understanding of the divine mystery can be true with the kind of truth that comes from grasping an essence. Third, the truth consequent upon theological understanding is not the truth attained in natural theology. What natural reason conceives analogically about God and demonstrates about God from creatures is different from what can become known to us only if it is divinely revealed and accepted in faith. But different from each of these is what reason enlightened by faith finds when it inquires into the mysteries strictly sof"called (DB 1795, 1796, 1816; DS g015, gor6, g041; ND 131, 132, '37)· Fourth, the consequent truth of theological understanding is different from the antecedent truth. The antecedent truth is the divine mystery itself revealed by God and accepted in faith, a mystery whose understanding is being sought. The truth consequent upon theological understanding is the truth of that ul1derstanding itself. Thus, while the antecedent truth is 'of divine faith' and perhaps also 'of Catholic faith,' the consequent truth often deserves no other 'note' or qualification than 'probable.' Again, the object of divine faith does not change with time, for the 'deposit of faith' does not change (DB 1800, DS g020, l\'D 136), and the dogmatic declarations themselves propose only the same truth understood in exactly the same sense (DB 1792, r800, 2314; DS gOIl, 3020, g886; ND 219, 136,859). In stark contrast to that, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in regard to the doctrine offaith grow and advance, in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and time (DB 1800, 3020, ND 136). The question about the truth that is consequent upon theological understanding is a question about the truth of that continual growth and improvement. Fifth, the truth consequent upon theological understanding is per se the truth that belongs to a hypothesis. By per se I mean whatever comes to it from its own nature.



43

Hypothesis ergo est ea expressio conceptualis et etiam verbalis quae principium enuntiat, ex actu intelligendi procedit, et problema quoddam primum solvit. Quae hypothesis ita secundum se neque vera est neque falsa, ut tamen vera esse possit; et quidem eo probabilior est, quo plura problemata virtualiter solvit; eo autem magis ad certitudinem accedit quo magis omnis alia excluditur via ad eadem problemata vel aeque bene vel melius solvenda. Porro, quae hypothesi competunt, ea omnia per se oriuntur ubi attingitur illa intelligentia quam laudavit c. Vaticanum I (DB. 1796). Qui enim fructuosissimam assequitur intelligentiam, is non silet sed loquitur: procedit ergo ex ilIa intelligeFl.tia verbum interius et exterius, seu expressio conceptualis et verbalis. Praeterea, de eode'm loquitur, de quo antea 'sedulo, pie, sobrie' quaesivit; sed antequam intellexerit, de problemate solvendo loquebatur; et postquam intellexit, de problemate soluto 10quitur.;Praetere~, qui intelligentiam assequitur non qualemcumque sed fructuosissimam, non unicum quoddam jta solvit problema ut sterilis et sine fructu ulteriori sit solutio, sed ita unum directe solvit ut eo ipso multa et alia virtualiter solvat. Praeterea, qui mysteri~m divinitus revelatum aliquatenus intelligit) verum intelligit; quod verum nominavimus antecedens. Praeterea, ipsa mysterii intelligentia secundum se neque vera est neque falsa; nam, uti superius vidimus, haec intelligentia ad primam intellectus operationem pertinet, quae quaerit quid sit; quam operationem sequitur altera, quae quaerit an sit; neque veritas formaliter nisi in hac altera operatione attingitur. Praeterea, haec intelligentia, quae secundum se neque vera est neque falsa, tamen vera esse potest; fieri enim potest ut in subsequenti operatione affirmative respondeatur ad quaestionem an sit. Praeterea, eo probabilius affirmative respondetur quo plura solvuntur problemata connexa et consequentia. Denique tandem, eo magis ad certitudinem accedit haec affirmativa responsio quo magis excluditur omnis alia via ad earn assequendam intelligentiam quam laudavit c. Vaticanum I.

Sexto, secundum idem c. Vaticanum I crescit et proficit aetatum et saeculorum wadibus intelligentia, scientia, sapientia (DB 1800). Existit ergo series quaedam historica quae modo minimum exhibet quasi semen, modo nascentem virgulam, modo incipientem arborem, ut scilicet fructuosissima sit mysterii intelligentia, non solum quia cum creverit et profecerit multa solvat problemata, sed etiam quia ejusdem anteriora minusque perfecta stadia posteriorem perfectionem praepararint, promiserint, et quodammodo continuerint. Comparantur proinde priora et posteriora intelligentiae stadia tum ratione obiecti intellecti, tum ratione analogiae adhibitae, tum ratione perfectionis



. A hypothesis, then, is a conceptual and also verbal expression that states a prinCIple, that proceeds from an act of understanding, and that solves some primary problem. A hypothesis) of itself, is neither true nor false; nevertheless, it can be true. A hypothesis is more probable the more problems it has the potential of solving. And it moves closer to certitude as every other way of solving the same . problems equally well or better is excluded. Moreover, these characteristics of a hypothesis are all verified when there is attained the understanding that Vatican I referred to (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 13 2 ). One who reaches an understanding that is most fruitful is not silent but speaks, and so there proceeds from such understanding an inner and an outer word, a conceptual and verbal expression. Again, the theologian speaks about precisely what ~e or she earlier inquired into 'diligently, reverently, judiciously.' But before understanding, one would speak about the problem to be solved, while after understanding,'one speaks about the problem that has been solved. Again, one who reaches not just any understanding but one that is most fruitful does not solve just one single;:a1::oblem in a sterile fashion without bearing further fruit , but solves one c-' problem directly in such a way that one simultaneously reaches a virtual solution of many others. Again, one who gains any understanding of a divinely revealed mystery understands something true; we have called that the antecedent truth. Again, that understanding of the mystery is in itself neither true nor false. As we saw above, such understanding belongs to the first operation of the intellect, in which one asks, 'What is it?' A second operation follows, the one that asks, 'Is it so?' and truth is formally to be attained only in this second operation. Again, this understanding, which of itself is neither true nor false, nonetheless can be true: one's answer to the question, 'Is it 50?' in the subsequent operation can be 'yes.' Again, the probability accorded to the affirmative answer is always greater when the number of connected consequent problems solved by the same understanding is greater. And finally, this affirmative answer is given with greater certitude the more every other way of attaining the understanding mentioned by Vatican I has been tried and found wanting. Sixth, the same Vatican I taught that understanding, knowledge, and wisdom grow and advance as ages and centuries unfold (Dn 1800, DS 3020, ND 136). Thus, there exists a historical series that begins with the tiniest seed and becomes a growing shoot and then a budding tree. Accordingly, the understanding of mystery / is most fruitful not only because, with its growth and increase, it solves many' problems, but also because its earlier, less perfect stages were the preparation and promise of, and somehow already contained, the later perfection. Earlier and later stages of understanding can be compared with one another, first in terms of the object understood, then in terms of the analogy employed, and


44


45

adeptae. Et ratione obiecti intellecti in eadem sunt genere, eadem dogmate, eadem sensu, eademque sententia;25 nam idem semper est mysterium divinitus revelatum cuius intelligentia quaeritur. Ratione autem analogiae adhibitae ita ex multiplicitate ad uniformitatem proceditur ut, primo, multae et diversae tententur viae, deinde, ad unam quandam analogiam praeferendam augeatur consensus, tertio, in hac analogia profundius et exactius proponendo proficit intelligentia. Comparantur denique stadia ratione perfectionis ~deptae non solum secundum intelligentiam quae principium plenius et profundius penetrat sed etiam secundum scientiam quae ex principia concludit et secundum sapientiam quae totam materiam ordinat.

Cuius comparationis sit exemplum. S. Augustinus ergo et 8. Thomas de eod€m dogmate trinitario intelligenriam aliquam assecuri sunt; et eandem analogiam psychologicam uterque adhibuit. Quam analogiam psychologice exposuit 8. Augustinus, eandem autem 8. Thomas non solum psychologice sed etiam metaphysice, ut plenior apud cum sit principii intelligentia et larior esse possit sapientiae ordo et exactior conclusionum deductio.

Septima, crescenti et proficienti intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae non ponitur limes. Non ponitur ex parte obiecti intelligendi, nam mysterium divinum revelat infinitum, et infinitum non limitatur. Non ponitur ex parte analogiae: quamvis enim interdum demonstrari possit nullam aliam esse posse analogiam nobis hac in vita notam, attamen ipsa haec analogia petitur 'ex iis quae naturaliter cognoscit' ratio (DB 1796); sed ratio humana in rebus naturalibus intelligendis non ita perfecte intelligit ut perfectius intelligere non possit. Non ponitur limes ex parte .fontium revelationis qui tot tantosque veritatis thesauros contineant ut reapse numquam exhauriantur (DB 2314). Non ponitur limes ex parte sapientiae organizantis: quo


finally in terms of the perfection achieved. In terms of the object understood, the earlier and later are \"lithin the same genus, within the same dogma, within the same meaning and view, '25 because it is always the same divinely revealed mystery that theologians are trying to understand. In terms of the analogy employed, there is a gradual progress from multiplicity toward unity, so that while earlier efforts at understanding explore in many different directions, gradually consensus solidifies around the use of some one analogy, and finally understanding makes gradual progress in the profound and exact use of this analogy. In terms of the perfection achieved, the stages are compared not only on the basis of an understanding that more fully and deeply penetrates the principle of the analogy, but also on the basis of a knowledge that draws conclusions from the principle and on the basis of a wisdom that or-ders all the material. As an example of this comparison, consider 8t Augustine and 8t Thomas. Each of them attained some understanding of one and the same dogma of the Trinity. Each of them used the same psychological analogy. But 8t Augustine expounded the analogy psychologically, while 8t Thomas expounded it both psychologically and metaphysically. His understanding of the principle, then, was more complete; more elements and wider perspectives could be embraced within his sapiential ordering; and his deduction of conclusions could be more precise. Seventh, there is no limit to the growth and progress of understanding, know}M edge, and wisdom. The growth cannot be limited from the side of the object- to be understood, because the divine mystery reveals what is infinite, and the infinite has no limits. The progress cannot be limited from the side of the analogy employed, for while it may be demonstrable in some cases that the analogy used is the only one possible to us in this life, even then the analogy remains something drawn 'from what human reason knows naturally' (DB 1796, DS 30I6, ND 132), and no matter how thoroughly the human mind understands natural ob jects, there is always the possibility of understanding them better. Growth and progress cannot be limited on the side of the sources of revelation. The sources of revelation contain treasures of truth so many and so great that they can never really be exhausted (DB 2314, DS 3896, ND 419). No limit can be placed on the side M

25 [Vincent ofLerins, quoted by Vatican I (DB 800, DS 3020, ND 136); the translation is

one that Lonergan provided in some notes that he wrote while composing his paper 'Doctrinal Pluralism'; the notes are found in the archives ofthe Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. An English translation of the Roman Liturgy of the Hours, for the Second Reading in the Office of Readings for Friday of the twenty-seventh week in ordinary time, has, 'along its own line of development, with the same doctrine, the same meaning and the same import.']



47


magis enim ;atio naturalia et analogica penetrat, quo magis fontium studium thesauros pandit, eO plura ordinanda habet crescens proficiensque sapientia. Non ponitur limes ex parte intelligentiae et scientiae theologicae; ubi enim sapientia intelligentiae proponit problema, ibi ratio per fidem iIlustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, sperare sane potest aliquam s.e intelligentiam Deo dante esse assecuturam, tum propter ipsam Dei bonitatem, tum propter orationem c. Vaticani I ut 'Crescat igitur .. ' et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, aetatum et saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia ... ' (DB 1800). Ubi autem attingitur principii intelligentia, sponte sua sequitur conclusionum scientia.

Octavo, sicut praeter bonum semen seminari possunt zizania, ita etiam praeter crescentem et proficientem intelligentiam oriri potest mala intelligentia; cuius consectaria iam superius consideravimus ubi de pseudo-problematibus et pseudosystematibus. Nona, judicium ergo de veritate consequente inteIligentiae theologicae e tribus maxime procedere videtur. Primo enim examinatur haec intelligentia secundum ea quae per se ex intelligentia profiuunt, utrum. quoddam problema solvat, utrum hoc problema sit mysterium divinum prout mediate, imperfecte, analogice, obscure hac in vita a nobis intelligi possit, utrum fructuosa sit intelligentia quae alia et connexa problemata virtualiter' solvat, utrum alia sit analogia quae melius vel aeque bene eadem omnia resolvat problemata, an forte nulla alia sit analogia quae hac in vita a nobis cognosci possit. Deinde vero examinatur eadem intelligentia, non secundum se, sed secundum co~parationem historicam, utrum idem problema antea sit consideratum, utrum

directe an tantummodo indirecte, utrum in eadem an alia problematum complexione, utrum eadem an alia adhibeatur analogia) utrum analogia si eadem sit profundius penetretur, utrum novi addantur aspectus vel secundum profectum scientiarum naturalium et human arum vel secundum profectum in studiis scripturisticis, conciliariis, patristicis, ~ediaevalibus, etc., utrum principii intelligentia caeteras conclusiones per reliquum opus deductas re vera fundet, utrum plura et pleniora nunc quam antea deducantur, utrum melius attingatur to~i~s ma~e riae unus quidam quasi intuitus atque conspectus, utrum iam persplcl, possmt


. The Goal, the Order; and the Manner of Speaking

of the wisdom that orders things, since the more reason penetrates natl:1re and natural analogies, and the mOre research into the s~urces opens new treasures) the greater the number of objects there are to be ordered by growing and advancing vvisdom. Nor) finally, can any limit be placed on the side of theological understanding and theological knowledge themselves. Where wisdom proposes a problem for understanding, there reason illumined by faith and seeking diligently, reverently, and judiciously can hope that with God's help it will indeed attain some understanding. The expectation is grounded in God's goodness and in the prayer of Vatican I: 'Therefore, let there be growth ... and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in ..each person and in the entire church, according '-to the degree proper to each age and each !true .. .' (DB 1800, DS 3020, ND 136). Moreover, where an understanding of the principle is attained, knowledge of conclusions follows of its own accord. Eighth, besides good seed, tares may also be sown; so too, alongside growing, developing understanding, misunderstanding may also appear. The consequences of that were considered above in our discussion of pseudo-problems and pseudosystems. Nmth, a judgment as to the consequent truth of theological understanding appears to rest chiefly on three considerations. First, we can examine this understan.ding in tenus of what issues from it precisely as understanding. Does it solve some problem? Is the problem that it solves a divine mystery, something that can be understood by us in this life mediately, imperfectly, analogically, obscurely? Is the understanding fruitful in the sense that it provides a virtual solution to other connected problems? Is there another analogy that is better or at least as good in resolving all the same problems, or is there no other analogy that can be known by us in this life? Second, we can examine the same understanding not in itself but by way of historical comparison. Bas the same problem been considered before? Was it considered directly or only indirectly? Was it considered in the same complex of problems or in a different one? Was the same analogy used or a different one? If the ,same one, is the analogy now being grasped more profoundly? Are new aspects being added to it, whether because of progress in the natural and human sciences or because of progress in studies of scripture, the councils, the Fathers, the medievals, and so on? Does understanding the principle really ground all the other conclusions deduced later in the treatise? Are more and more complete conclusions being. deduced now than before? Is an overall view of the whole material now more easily reached? Can we now see further problems that call



49

problemata ulteriora quae ulteriorem intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae profectum invitent et quasi exigant. Tertia denique examinat~r eadem intelligentia secundpm comparationem ad pseudo-problemata et pseudo-systemata quae forte hac in materia orta, divulgata, neque penitus derelicta sint. Quaeritur ergo utrum omnes quaestiones quae umquam sint positae pari modo considerentur, an forte fiat selectio ut aliae principaliter tractentur; aliae per modum quaestionis annexae, et aliae denique sileanturj utrum haec selectio cornmunem usum sequatur an forte aliquo principia determinetur; utrum hoc principium sit qu~d mysterii divinitus revelati quaeratur intelligentia, quodque problemata ex mala intelligentia orta non tractentur nisi quatenus eorum omissio ea non amoveret quae mysterii intelligentiam apud multos impedirent.

Decimo, cum principalis quidam educationis fructus sit ut quis secundum diversa cr~teria in diversis materiis iudicet, non absque utilitate erit iudicium de intelli-

gentia theologica cum aliis et theologicis iudiciis comparare. Differt ergo iudicium de intelligentia theologica ab omnibus quibuscumque conclusionibus theologicis. Nihil enim facilius est quam recte concludere: positis enim praemissis, aut conclusio necessario sequitur, aut non; si non, nihil valetj si vera sequitur necessario, non minus vera est conclusio quam praerriissae. E contra, iudicium de intelligentia theologica non facillimum sed difficillimum est. Non ,enim agitur de conclusione sed de principio; quod principium modo possibile, modo minus modo plus probabile, modo saltern in ea linea' seu via esse potest quae sola ad intelligentiam a c. Vaticano laudatam conducat. Differt deinde ab omnibus quae naturali rationis lumine mediantibus creaturis de Deo cognoscantur, et quidem tum problemate tum solutione. Differt problemate, nam problema seu quaestio quam solvit intelligentia theologica nisi ex revelatis non oritur; sublata enim revelatione, nullum e·xistit problema nobis notum de Deo trino, de Verba incarnato, de gratia Christi, de sacramentis novae legis, etc. Differt deinde solutione, nam philosophica de Deo cognitio neque inducit neque systematice evolvit analogias hypotheticas atque interne obscuras; sed quae in Deo analogice esse affirmat, ea etiam demonstrat. Ita philosophus diceret et demonstraret Deum esse conscium; sed philosophus demonstrare non



for and practically demand further progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom? Third, we can examine the same understanding by comparing it with the pseudo-problems and pseudo-systems that may have arisen with regard to this subject matter, that may have spread abroad, and that may still to some extent prevail. Are all the questions that have ever been considered with regard to this subject matter being given equal treatment, or is a selection perhaps being made, so that certain questions are given priority, others are treated as secondary, and still others are left unmentioned? And if a selection is being made, is it made on the basis of custom, or on the basis of some principle? Is the principle found in the fact that what is being sought is some understanding of divinely revealed mystery, and tha't.'Proble.Fril' that have arisen from misunderstanding are not to be considered except where treating them is the only way to remove certain widely ~eld obstacles to understanding the mystery? Tenth, if it is true that one major fruit of education is that we learn to use different criteria of judgment for different materials, then it is useful to compare the judgment regarding a theological understanding with other judgments that are made in theology. The judgment about a theological understanding differs, then, from any and all theological conclusions. Nothing is easier than to conclude correctly: once the premises are posited, the conclusion either follows necessarily or it does not; if it does not, it is not valid; if it does, it is no less true than the premises. In contrast, a judgment about a theological understanding is not easy; it is extremely difficult. What is in question is not a conclusion but a principle. The principle may be merely possible. It may be more or less probable. Sometimes all we can say about it is that at least it may be on the line or along the way that alone leads to the understanding that Vatican I referred to. Next, a judgment about a theological understanding differs from all that is known about God by the natural light of reason through the mediation of creatures. Indeed, it differs both in its problem and in its solution. It differs in its problem, for the problem or question that theological understanding resolves arises ·only from revelation; take away revelation, and there would be no problem known to us about the Trinity, the incarnate Word, the grace of Christ, the sacraments of the new law, and so on. It differs in its solution, for philosophical knowledge of God neither proposes nor systematically develops hypothetical, internally obscure analogies. When philosophy affirms something analogously about God, it also proves what it affirms. Thus, a philosopher would say and prove that God is conscious; but a philosopher cannot demonstrate that God is dynamically


50

De Fi~e, Ordine, Modo Dicendi

51

potest Deum esse dynamice conscium; neque ulla ei est valida ratio cur supponeret Deum esse dynamice conscium. 26 E contra theologus supponit Deum esse dynamice conscium, non quia hoc demonstret, non quia clare hoc intelligat, sed quia in hoc uno et obscur~ radi~em invenit omnium obscurorum quae in Dea trina esse credit. cr. Sum. theol., I, q. 32, a. I, ad 2m.

Differt tertia ab omnibus determinationibus dogmaticis, non quidem problemate, sed solutione. Non differt problemate, cum utrinque ponantur quaestiones quae (I) sublata revelatione tollerentur et (2) ipsas res divinas respiciant. Differt autem solutione, nam determinatio dogrrtatica fit pef verum revelatum vel etiam quandoque per verum naturaliter natum, sed intelligentia theologica ulterius addit elementum hypotheticum quod neque fontes certo contineant neque ratio demonstret. Quae quidem particularius sunt dicenda.

Differt ergo -quaestio dogmatica vel theologica a quaestione biblica, quia illa ipsas res divinas respicit, haec autem mentem auctoris de re divina. 27 Cuius differentiae exemplo sit, quo sensu lesus Nazarenus sit Dei Filius. Biblicus enim inquirit quo sensu in singulis lods a Marco, a Paulo, a loanne, aliove, adhibita sit expressio 'Dei Filius'; et ideo diversimode respondet pro diverso auctore, diversis adiunctis, diverso contextu. Dogmaticus autem eandem quaestionem aliter intelligit; non eniro principaliter intendit de expressione investigare quid hie aliusve hagiographus certo vel probabiliter in mente habuerit cum hunc titulum, Dei Filium, usurparet; sed principaliter quaerit de ipsa re, de realitate lesu Nazareni, quemadmodum ab omnibus s,emper fideIibus concipi debeat.

Differt deinde solutio dogffiatica a solutione theologica. Ubi enim dogmaticus determinat Filium Dei non factum sed natum esse, nihil inducit hypotheticum sed ipsa revelata colligit, ponderat, intelligit. Nam sensu quodam singulari de

The Goal, the Order, and the Manner' of Speaking

conscious, and a philosopher has no valid reason for supposing that God is dynamically conscious. 26 As a theologian, however, one supposes that God is dynamically conscious, not because one demonstrates this, not because one clearly understands it, but only because in this one obscure element one finds the root of all the obscure things one holds in faith concerning the triune God. See Summa theologiae, I, q.,32, a.I, ad 2m. A judgment about theological understanding differs, thirdly, from aU dogmatic determinations. Here the difference has to do not with the problem but only with the solution. The difference does not have to do with the problem, because in both cases it is a matter of questions (J) that would not exist were it not for divine revelat,ion and (2) that regard the divine realities themselves. The difference does have t(f"d'o with the solution, because a dogmatic determination is made on the basis of revealed truth or, occasionally, also of some truth that is naturally known, but a theological understanding always adds some hypothetical element that is neither certainly contained in the sources nor demonstrated by reason, Let me try to explain. this in a more particular fashion. The dogmatic question Oike the theological) differs from the biblical question.. for it asks about God, while the biblical question ,is asking what a given author thinks about God. 27 Take, for example, the issue of what it means to say that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God. A biblical scholar asks how the expression 'Son of God' is used in text after text by Mark, by Paul, by John, by whomever. The answer will be different according to differences of author, circumstance, and context. But a dogmatic theologian understands the same question in a different way. The dogmatic theologian is not concerned primarily with finding out what this or that biblical author actually or probably had in mind in using the title 'Son of God.' What the dogmatic theologian is primarily after is the reality itself, the reality ofJesus of Nazareth, and how this reality should be conceived at all times by all believers. Next, the theological solution differs from the dogmatic. When as a dogmatic theologian one determines that the Son of God was not made but was begotten, one is not introducing anything hypothetical. One is drawing together, pondering, 26 [By 'dynamically conscious' Lonergan means 'with conscious intellectual emanation,' in the sense that a divine Word proceeds from a div!ne Dicere or that Amor proceeds from the divine Dicere and the divine Verbum. See the next chapter and Lonergan, Verbum 201-204'] 27 [Metlwd in Theology will speak of this difference as the difference between direct discourse (the dogmatic and systematic questions and responses) and indirect discourse (the exegetital questions and answers).]




53

Iesu adhibetur nomen, Filius; et idem, qui Iesus est, inter creaturas numerari non potest; et de eodem multa dicuntur quae Deo sunt propria; quae simul omnia sine ulla addita hypothesi important Filium non factum sed increatum, divinum divinitus natum.

Sed alterius generis est solutio proprie theologica. Ubi enim quaeritur qualis sit ilIa in divinis nativitas seu generatio, brevissime pennultae virtualiter ponuntur quaestiones; neque tamen orones statim menti oeeurrunt sed decursu temporum alia alteri aeeedit; quod si multae per revelata vel per vera naturaliter nota solvuntur, ipsae tamen solutiones alias et ulteriores movent quaestiones, donee manifestum fiat satis initiali problemati responderi non posse nisi clare distincteque excogitetur generatio quaedam prorsus singularis nobisque aliunde ignota prorsus. 28 lam vera quod ad solutionem problematis excogitatur, illud qua tale hypothesis est. Quod nobis aliunde ignotum exeogitatur, proprie dieitur hypothesis. Quod denique ita excogitatur ut ex eo tamquam ex principio sequantur tum quae fidei sunt tum quae ex fide conc1uduntur tum quae rationi contradicere non demonstrantur, non mera est hypothesis sed theoria multiplieiter verificata.

Undecimo, derelinquenda esse videtur sententia, quae 'conclusionis theologia' nominari solet, ut scilicet 0) theologia tum a ratione tum a fide distinguatur, (2) theologia nulla habeat principia praeter ea quae vel ex fide vel ex ratione accipit, (3) theologia ipsa non sit' nisi de conc1usionibus, et (4) hae conclusiones sint vel purae (utraque praemissa ex fide accipitur) vel mixtae (alia praemissa ex fide, alia ex ratione accipitur). Nam in primis haec sententia doctrinam c. Vaticani I praetermittere videtur. Non enim decrevit concilium: Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum praemissas ex fontibus revelationis desumpserit eisque forte aliam ex ratione ipsa adiunxerit, per observatas regulas logicas ad conclusionem certissimam pervenit. Sed concilium aliud exposuit idque non parum diversum:


and understanding what has been revealed. The name 'Son' is in fact used of Jesus in a singular way. The same one who is Jesus cannot be numbered among ,creatures. Many predications are made of him that are proper to God. Pull all of them together, and you do not have to add anything hypothetical in order to 'affirm that the Son was not made but that he is uncreated, divine, and born of God. But a properly theological solution is something of a different kind. When one asks what sort of thing that birth or generation in God is, one has in a very brief way virtually posed a large number of questions. But not all of these questions come to mind at once; rather, as time goes on different questions occur to different investigators. Many are solved through revelation or through naturally known truths; -but these very solutions prompt further questions, until eventually it becomes dear that a truly satisfactory answer to the initial problem demands that a generation that is unique and completely unknown to us from any other source has to be arrived at and clearly and distinctly conceived and formulated. 28 Now an idea that is arrived at and conceived and formulated in order to provide a solution to a specific, problem is, as such, a hypothesis. The 'something that is unknown to us from. any other source' that is arrived at and conceived and formulated is properly called a hypothesis. Finally, something is not just a hypothesis if it is ar- , rived at and conceiyed and formulated in such a way that there follow from it as from a principle items that are of faith as well as items that are concluded from faith, arid if no 'step in the process is demonstrably contrary to reason. It is then a theory that is verified in many different ways. Eleventh, the view that is usually called 'conclusions theology' should be abandoned. This view of theology maintains (I) that theology is distinct from reason and from faith, (2) that theology has no other principles besides those it receives either from faith or from reason, (3) that theology itself is only about conclusions, and (4) that these conclusions are either 'pure' (both premises come from faith) or 'mixed' (one premise is from faith and the other from reason). This view is untenable. To begin with, it seems to overlook entirely the teaching of the First Vatican Council. The Council did not decree; Reason enlightened by faith, having drawn its premises from the sources of revelation and having perhaps joined to them one or other premise from reason itself, arrives by carefully observing rules of logic at a most certain conclusion. The Council's teaching was quite different: 28 [arrived at and ... conceived and formulated'; the meaning is not one of deriving the

implications of something already known but of 'thinking in order to understand,' as this notion is pres~nted in Verbum 22-23 and 5I.]



54

55


Ac ratio quiciem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo ... (DB 1796). Aliud cuim est inquirere ut intelligas, et aliud est fern ita perspectam habere ut conclusiones demonstrare possis. Aliud est analogiam quaerere ut imperfecta quaedam intelligentia mysteriorum attingatur, et aliud est praemissas ex scripturis vel etiam ex ratione depromere. Aliuci est intelligentiam a Deo dante exspectare, et aliud est certitudinem ex regulis logicis accurate observatis percipere. Quae quam diversa sint, fugit neminem. Praeterea, minime obscura est concilii intentio. Nam ante quam semirationalismi damnaret errorem (DB 1816), positivam doctrinam catholicam exponere voluit, ideoque duos cognitionis ordines distinxit (DB 1795) et partem rationis in excolenda veritate supernaturali docuit (DB 1796). Praeterea, minime obscurum est quemadmodum haec mysteriorum intelligentia ad conclusiones puras et mixtas comparetur. Ubi enim ex revelatis mysteriis fiunt deductiones, ibi clare et distincte manifestantur problemata. Quo plures, quo magis exactae fiunt deductiones, eo plura et difficiliora manifestantur problemata. Et cum haec problemata ideo manifesteritur quia ipsae praemissae divina mysteria narrant, fieri non potest ut haec problemata solvantur nisi quaedam mysteriorum intelligentia attingatur. 29 Praeterea, ubi haec intelligentia 'ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia' attingitur, introducitur elementum hypotheticum. Etsi enim eadem analogia material iter in fontibus revelationis vel innuatur vel insinuetur vel suggeratur vel etiam clare indicetur, attamen eadem formaliter analogia cum omnibus suis implicationibus systematicis vix in fontibus adfuisse probatur. Quae cum ita sint, haud admitti potest sententia theologiam non esse mSl de conclusionibus puris et mixtis. Ex revelatis mysteriis enim logice sequuntur problemata, quorum solutiones nisi per'intelligentiam mysteriorum non attingun~ tur; et ubi hae solutiones elementum hypotheticum inducunt (quod saltern est ipsum systema in intelligentia fructuosissima virtualiter contentum), ibi ponitur


Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God's help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). It is one thing to inquire in order to understand, and it is something else. to grasp a reality so clearly that you can demonstrate conclusions from it. It is one thing to seek an analogy so that you can attain some imperfect understanding of ,mysteries, and it is something else to draw premises from scripture or also from reason. It is one thing to seek understanding with God's help, and it is ,something else to lay hold of certitude from having accurately followed the rules of logic. Anyone Gill see the difference. Aga!ip"~' the Council's intention is not in the least obscure. Before condemning the error of semirationalism (DB 1816, os 3041, ND 124), the Council wanted to make a positive statement of Catholic t.eaching, and so it distinguished two orders of knowledge (DB 1795, DS 3015, ND 131) and taught the role of reason in cultivating supernatural truth (DB 1]96, DS 3016, ND 132). Again, the way in which this understanding of mysteries is compared to conclusions, whether pure or mixed, is also not in the least obscure. What happens when deductions are made from revealed mysteries is that the problems clearly and distinctly emerge. The more numerous and the more exact the deductions, the more numerous and the more difficult are the problems that emerge; and since the problems stand forth the way they do because the premises of the de~ ductions tell of divine- mysteries, the problems can never be solved, unless some understanding of the mysteries is attained. 29 Again, when this understanding is attained 'from the analogy of what the mind knows naturally,' a certain hypothetical element is introduced. Materially speaking, it is possible that the same analogy is hinted at, insinuated, or suggested in the sources of revelation; it may even be clearly indicated. But one can never prove that the formally identical analogy along with all its systematic implications is present in the sources. It follows that the idea that theology deals only with pure and mixed conclu~ sions is simply mistaken. Logic applied to revealed mysteries leads to problems, the solutions of which can come only through some understanding of the mysteries. When these solutions introduce a hypothetical element (and at least the system virtually contained in a fruitful understanding is hypothetical), then there 29 [An instance of this process of deducing from revealed mysteries so as to state the problem clearly and distinctly occurs in the first assertion in the next chapter.]




5)


principium proprie theologicum, quod neque ex sola fide est, neque ex sola ratione, sed ex ratione per fidem illustrata et sedulo, pie, sobrie inquirente.

is posited a specifically theological principle that comes neither from faith ~lone nor from reason alone, but from reason enlightened by faith and inquiring diligently, reverently, and judiciously.

Quantum autem 'conelusionis theologia' scientiae theologicae noceat, breviter dici oportet. ~rimo, enim, fcivetur illa,tendentia quae systematica et posterius inventa auctoribus prioribus imponat. Ubi enim quis systematica amat et tamen nullam scit probationis methodum praeter deductionem ex fontibus, sua systematica in footibus scripturisticis, patristicis, mediaevalibus invenire solet. Deinde, cum systematici non omnes sint unius mentis et cordis, non unum tantummodo systema sed multa et diversa fontibus imponuntur. T ertio, cum verum criterion validi systematis in deductione ex fontibus non consistat, stante 'conclusionis theologia,' fieri haud potest ut ineptiora systemata refutentur et veriora serio probentur. Quarto, ubi florent studia exegetica, patristica, mediaevalia, impugnari solent theologi gui systemata deducant tamguam rei exegeticae, patristicae, mediaevalis prorsus imperiti. Quinto, cum ipsi exegetae, patristici, mediaevales non aliam sciant systematis probationem praeter deductionem ex fontibus, omne systema vanam quandam speculationem esse reputant, Quod si derelinqueretur ista opinatio - theologiam non esse nisi de conclusionibus puds et mixtis - adeo non inter se pugnarent systematici et positivi ut potius maximo mutuo adiutorio sibi essen!. Non enim multum inter se distant (I) intelligere doctrinam et (2) intelligere historiam doctrinae, Ubi autem eadem semper est doctrina, idem scilicet dogma, idem sensus, eadem sententia, ubi praeterea aetatum et saeculorum gradibus crescit et proficit eiusdem doctrinae intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, ibi sane nulla esse potest v~ida ratio cur positivi et systematici mutuo sibi opponantur. Quod enim nunc a systematico intelligitur, idem iam pridem praeparatur; et ideo ex intellecta historia systematicus ad munus suum plene et exacte intelligendum pervenit, sicut etiam ex intellectis solutionibus posterioribus positivus ipsas res anteriores guaenam fuerint et quo tetenderint elarius et exactius perspicere atgue iudicare potest.

We need, then, to indicate the exterit to which 'conclusions theology' does harm to theology as a science.

Duodecimo, ita de veri tate intelligentiae theologicae dilcimus ut duo et suprema criteria tacuerimus, quorum aliud naturam-humanam aliud autem divinum revelationis fontem respicit. Et circa naturam humanam praetereundum non est illud peccati originalis vulnus quo homo, sensibilibus immerslls, proprium quoddam sibi problematum


First, it fosters a tendency to impose on earlier authors the systematic discoveries of a later time. Those who love system and know no other method of verification but deduction from the sources generally find their system in the scriptural, patristic, or medieval Sources. Second, since not all systematic theologians are of one mind and heart, in the end not one but many different systems will be read into the sources. Third, since the real criterion of the validity of a system is not deduction from the SOl.~fc,es, then if 'conclusions theology' prevails, it wiil harPly be possible to refute inept systems and seriously argue the case for more adequate ones. Fourth, now that scriptural exegesis, patristics, and medieval historical studies abound, theologians who deduce systems generally earn criticism for their ignorance of the scriptures, the Fathers, and medieval history. Fifth, as long as scripture scholars, patristic scholars, and medievalists are aware of no kind of systematic verification other than deduction from the sources, they will regard every system as so much empty speculation. On the other hand, if we abandon the idea that theology is about pure or mixed conclusions, not only vvill there be no real conflict between positive theologians and systematic theologians, but they will actually be of enormous assistance to one another. Understanding a doctrine is really not that far removed from understanding the history of the doctrine. If the doctrine is always the same, that is, the same dogma, the same meaning, the same view, and if moreover understanding, knowledge, and wisdom about the same doctrine groW" and progress from age to age, then no valid reason remains why positive and systematic theologians should oppose one another. What is now understood by systematic theologians has been a long time in preparation, and so by understanding the history, systematic theologians will come to understand their task fully and exactly, just as by understanding later solution.s positive theologians will be able to grasp more clearly and judge more_accurately what really were the earlier states of affairs and in what direction they tended. Twelfth, we still have not mentioned the two supreme criteria by which the truth of a theological underst~nding has to be judged. One has to do with human nature, the other with the divine source ofrevelation. VYhen we speak of human nature, we must not overlook the wound of original sin. Because ofit human beings, immersed in sensible things, more or less create for


58


59 0

genus fere creat. Quae in scholis exponuntur quaestiones et soiutiones,3 ultra horizontem vulnerati hominis versantur; et ideo ei videntur a realitate, it vita seria, ab utilitate longius aberrare; quod vult, quo indiget, prorsus aliud esse autumat ac ea quae audit et redtare fere cogitur. Quius problema existentiale est Ht scilicet e sensibilibus emergat, ut 'reale' non solum dicat sed etiam consentiat et quasi sentiat non 'datis' sed 'veris' innotescere. Quod si hoc existentiale problema ad campum obiectivum transfertur, si supponitur non de subiecti conversione intellectuali agi sed de ipsa re theologica, incipitur gravissima quaedam deviatio quae facillime innumeros fere asseclas invenit.


Quod si theologus, uti ipsa rei natura postulat, prompte et libenter sapientiam suam ecclesiae magisterio postponit, remedium simul invenit contra ilium morbum, illud peccati vulnus, quod nuperrime indicavimus.

themselves their own special kind of problems. The questions and the solutions that theology presents30 are generally outside the horizon of wounded human beings, to whom such things seem to wander far from reality, from serious living, and from any kind of usefulness. What people want and need, they say, is completely different from what they are taught and almost feel compelled to parrot. The existential problem is this: people have to emerge from the sensible,'so as not only to say but also to agree and, as it were, to feel that the real becomes known not in the 'given' but in the 'true.' But if this existential problem is transferred to the objective level, if it is presupposed that the issue is not the intellectual conversion of the subject but theology itself, a very serious deviation, easily finding large numbers of adherents, has begun. As for the divine source of revelation, it is clear that the meaning of any truth has to be :q:leasured by the understanding of the one from whom the truth proceeds. A revealed truth proceeds from divine understanding and therefore it is measured only by divine understanding. Moreover, since here on earth God has entrusted divine revelation to none other than the church to guard it faithfully and declare it infallibly, it is clear that theologians cannot rely ultimately on their own wisdom but ought alway.$ to acknowledge that the church's teaching alone is determinative of the meaning of revealed truth and of sacred dogmas (DB 1788, 1800, 1818; DS 3007, 3020, 3043; NO 217, 136, 139)' Theologians who, as the very nature of the material demands, promptly and gladly submit their own wisdom to that of the church will find in so doing a remedy for the disease, the wound of sin discussed in the prece~:1ing point.

Sectio Quinta: De Duplici Motu in Fineln

5 The Twofold Movelnent toward the Goal

Finem diximus, attum quo finis attingitur, quaestionem quae finem anticipat, iudicium denique quo adeptio finis agnoscitur. Remanet ergo ut motum consideremus quo in finem procedatur; et cum duos distinxerimus fines, alium c~rtitudinis, alium intelIigentiae, duos pariter motus distinguamus necesse est; quorum alium nominamus dogmaticum, alium systematicum.

We have discussed the goal, the act in which the goal is reached, the question that anticipates the goal, and finally the judgment in which it is acknowledged that the goal has been attained. We still have to consider the movement toward the goal, and since we have distinguished two goals, namely, certitude and understanding, we have to distinguish as well two movements. We call one dogmatic, the other systematic. How these two movements are related to each other can be clarified from the very notion of science. Science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes; but before thirrgs are known through their causes, the causes have to be discovered; and as long as the causes have not yet been discovered we rely on

Circa veTO divinum revelationis fontem, constat sensum alicuius veri ab eius mensurari intelligentia ex quo verum illud procedat. Quare, cum verum revelatum ex ipsa divina intelligentia procedat, a sola divina intelligentia mensuratur. Praeterea, cum his in terris nulli alteri nisi ecclesiae tradiderit Deus suam revelationem fideliter custodiendam et infallibiliter declarandam, manifestum est theologum non suae sapientiae confidere posse sed semper agnoscere debere ex solo ecclesiae magisterio determinari sensum tum ipsius veri revelati tum sacrorum dogmatum (DB J788, J800, r8r8).

Quemadmodum vero hi duo motus inter se comparentur, ex ipsa notione scientiae elucet. Scientia enim est certa rerum per causas cognitio; sed antequam res per causas cognoscantur, ipsae causae sunt invenienda~; et quamdiu causae nondum sunt inventae, communi quadam atque praescientifica cognitione utimur,

30 [Literally, 'that are set forth in the schools.'J



60



qua res quidem apprehendimus et describimus quamvis causas earum adhuc ignoremus. Primus ergo motus quo ad scientiam acquirendam procedituf, ex communi. quadam et praescientifica rerum descriptione incipit et ad causas cognitas terminatitr: qui primus motus dicitur (I) analYsis, quia ex confuse apprehensis ad causas seu rationes bene definitas procedit, et (2) via resolutionis, quia ipsas res ad causas earum reducit, et (3) via inventionis, quia causae antea ignoratae inveniuntur, et (4) via certitudinis, quia nobis manifestissima est communis et praescientifica rerum cognitio, et ideo argumenta nobis maxime certa ex hac cognitione incipiunt ut remotiora nobisque obscuriora demonstrent, et (5) via temporalis, quia causae non statim inveniri solent neque a quolibet investigante neque tandem sine fortuna. 3 !

Alter autem motus ex inventis incipit causis et ad res in causis intellectas terminatur: qui quidem motus dicitur et (I) synthesis, quia rationes fundamentales 32 adhibentur tum ad res definiendas tum ad proprietates earum deducendas, et (2) via compositionis, quia causae adhibentur ad res producendas vel constituendas, et (3) via doctrinae seu disciplinae, quia ex conceptibus fundamentalibus et maxime simplicibus incipit, ut aliis pedetentim adiunctis ad intelligentiam totius scientiae- ordinate procedat, et (4) via probahilitatis, tum quia saepe haec via nisi probabilitatem ~on attingit, tum quia communi hominum aestimatione non certa discernitur ubinam ad certitudinem quandoque perventum sit, et (5) via simultaneitatis logicae, quia clare positis pdncipiis caetera omnia non longioribus temporum intervallis sed brevissimis deductionibus atgue applicationibus peraguntur. Quorum exempla qui quaerit, inter se comparet et historiam scientiae physicae vel chemicae et manuale quo~dam quo talis doceatur scientia. Ex historia enim constabit has scientias ex sensibilibus quam maxime manifestis probationes efficere. Et tamen ubi libros adiveris manual~s, aliud non invenies initium nisi tabulam elementorum periodicam unde ter centena millia compositorum derivantur vel, apud physicos, leges Newtonianas, geometriam guandam Riemannianam,

the ordinary prescientific knowledge by which we apprehend things and describe them even before knowing their causes. So the first movement toward acquiring science begins from an ordinary prescientific description of things and ends in the knowledge of their causes. This first movement has been called: (I) analYsis, because it starts from what is apprehended in a confused sort of way and moves to well-defined causes or reasons, (2) the wqy oj resolution, because it resolves things into their causes, (3) the wqy oj discovery, because previously unknown causes are discovered, (4) the wqy if certitude, because the ordinary prescientific knowledge of things is most obvious to us, and so the arguments we find most certain begin from such knowledge and go on to demonstrate matters that are more remote and more obscure to us, and (5) the temporal wqy, becau.se causes are not usually discovered instantaneously, any more than they are discovered by just anyone or without a certain amount of good luck. 3! The o'ther movement starts from the causes that have been discovered and ends by understanding things in their causes. This movement is called: (I) synthesis, because fundamental reasons 32 are employed both to define things and to deduce their properties, (2) the W®, if composition, because causes are employed to produce things or to constitute them, (3) the wqy ifteaching or iflearning, because it begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science, (4) the wqy if probability, partly because it often attains no more than probability, but also because people frequently have no clear discernment of just where or when they have reached certitude, and (5) the way if logical simultaneity, because, once the principles have been clearly laid down, all the rest takes comparatively little time; it can be accomplished in a few short deductions and applications. For examples of the two ways, compare the hi~tory of a science like physics or chemistry with- the textbooks from which these· sciences are taught. History reveals that these sciences worked out their various demonstrations starting from the most obvious sensible data. But when one goes to a textbook, one finds at the beginning of the book, in chemistry, only the periodic table of elements from which three hundred thousand compounds are derived, or, in physics, Newton's 31 ['Luck' was a theme for Lonergan, frequently mentioned both in passing remarks and in more serious comments. It sounds colloquial, but it is probably what he means here by 'fortuna.'] 31 (In (1) under the first movement, Lonergan had spoken of 'well-defined causes or reasons.' Here we have only 'reasons,' but that is not to exclude causes. With regard to God, of course, there are no causes, only reasons, but here 'reasons' can be taken to include anything that is arrived at when the analysis conducted in the first movement terminates successfully.]



62



mirosve 'quantorum' operatores. Qui enim "inquirit vel investigat vel probat, ex manifestis incipit; qui autem docet, ex iis incipit conceptibus quorum intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponit.

laws, Riemannian geometry, or those remarkable quantum operators. The reason for this difference is, of co~rse, that inquiring, investigating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, while teaching begins from those concepts that can be understood without understanding other elements.

Quibus perspectis, cum theologia analogice scientia quaedam sit, neque pars theologiae dogmatica a via analytica prorsus differt, neque pars theologiae systematica a via synthetica. Sicut enim in arcline naturali incipitur a communi quadam atque praescientifica cognitione, ita etiam in theologia incipitur ab iis quae Deus sub adiunctis particularibus et historicis revelavit. Sieut in arcline naturali ad causas inveniendas proceditur, ita in theologia idem verum eadem sensu catholice declaratur quod oHm biblice 33 revelatum est. Sicut inventis in ordine naturali causis ad rerum per causas cognitionem terminatur, ita in theologia mysteria divina, postquam catholice sunt declarata vel edam definita, imperfecte quidem et obscure sed tamen fructuosissime intelligi possunt. Quae cum ita sint, secundum similitudinem quandam ad viam analyticam concipi potest via dogmatica. Haec enim est via certitudinis quae idem verum eodem sensu declarat ac revelavit Deus. Haec etiam via inventionis est quae earn invenit declarationem quae exigentiis ecclesiae et universalis et his in terris perpetuae consulat. Haec tertio est via analytica quae ex particularitate historica atgue hebraica ad rationes communiter notas benegue definitas transit. Haec guarto est via resolutionis quae in multiplicitate revelatorum ipsa divina mysteria discernit atgue exprimit. Haec denique est via temporalis cum nisi temporum decursu non attingitur catholica mysteriorum declaratio.

. Now since theology is analogously a science, its dogmatic part is not completely different from the way of analysis, nor is its systematic part completely different ftom the way of synthesis. Just as in the natural order we begin from ordinary prescientific knowledge, so also in ·theology we begin from what God has revealed in particular historical circumstances. Just as in the natural order we proceed to the discovery of causes, so theology states universally in the same meaning the same truth that was once biblically33 revealed. Just as in the natural order the discovery of causes leads to the knowledge of things through the causes, so in theology once the divine mysteries have been declared or defined universally, they can be,.imperfectly and obscurely but still most fruitfully understood. It follows that the dogmatic way can be conCf~ived as similar to the analytic way. It is a way of certitude in that it expresses the same truth with the same meaning as what was revealed by God. Second, it is a way of discovery in that it finds an expression appropriate to the needs of a universal church that is to endure till the end of time. Third, it is.a way of analysis in that it moves from historical Hebraic particularity to generally known and well-defined reasons. Fourth, it is a way of resolution in that it discerns the divine mysteries in the multiplicity of what has been revealed, and gives expression to those mysteries. Finally, it is a temporal way because a universal expression of the mysteries is attained only in the course of time.

Pariter, proinde, secundum similitudinem quandam ad viam syntheticam concipi potest pars theologiae systematica. Haec enim est via qua docent magistri discipulique addiscunt, si quidem illud vere addiscitur quod intelligitur, neque aliter ad intelligentiam pervenitur nisi ~b eo incipitur cuius intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponat. Haec praeterea est via synthetica quae ex uno alterove principio caetera ordinate exponit. Haec tertia est via compositionis quae totum quoddam divinum mysterium e~ successione aspectuum rationumque multiplicitate componit. Haec quarto est via probabilitatis cum non certa ex revelatis deducat sed ipsa revelata ex priori quodam supposito atque hypothetico derivet. Haec denique est via simultaneitatis logicae, nam cum sapiens quaestionum ordinem invenerit et intelligens principium perspexerit, sequuntur sponte quadam

In like manner and for like reasons the systematic part of theology can be conceived as similar to the way of synthesis. For it is the way in which teachers teach and students learn, at least if it is true that for something truly to be learned it must be-understood and that the only way to reach understanding is to start with that whose understanding does not require the understanding of anything else. It is, moreover, a way of synthesis in that, starting from one principle or another, it lays out all the rest in an orderly fashion. Third, it is a way of composition in that it composes the whole of a divine mystery from a series of aspects and a multiplicity of reasons. Fourth, it is a way of probability because, rather than deducing certainties from what has been revealed, it derives what has been revealed from some prior hypothetical supposition. Finally, it is a way oflogical simultaneity in that, once in one's wisdom one discovers the order of the questions, and once in one's understanding one grasps a principle, then the conclusions and the 33 [' ... catholice ... biblice': see above, p. 35, note 19.J


•


65


sua conclusiones atque applicationes; etsi enim haec consecutio a rigore logico deficiat, cum ex principio nisi imperfecte et obscure intellecto non procedat, non ideo tamen pedetentim et temporum decursu et fortuna favente ex principio systematico ad conclusiones pervenitur.

Quod si in via dogmatica processum agnovj.mus analyticum, resolutionis, inventionis, certitudinis, temporalem, si in via systematica pariter agnovimus processum syntheticum, compositionis, doctrinae et disciplinae, probabilitatis, et simultaneitatis logicae, minime tamen praetennittendum est haec nomina analogice adhiberi. Aliter enim in physica, aliter in chemica scientia intelliguntur analysis et synthesis. Aliter in scientiis naturalibus, aliter in scientiis humanis, aliter denigue in theologicis disciplinis. Non enim eodem modo rerum materialium intelligitur natura ac verba Platonis; et Platonem ita intelligimus ut ipsi deinde iudicemus utrum Plato verum senserit; sed' verbum Dei prius verum esse credimus guam guid doceatur investigemus. Suo ergo modo via dogrnatica est analytica, resolutionis, inventionis, certitudinis, et temporal is; et suo pariter modo via systematica est synthetica, compositionis, doctrinae seu disciplinae, probabilitatis, atgue simultaneitatis logicae.

Quam arcte vera duae hae viae inter se connectantur, eo magis attendendum est cum numquam deesse videantur quorum dimidiata sapientia partem pro toto sum ere sibi aliisque tradere velit. Unum e'rgo et totum faCiunt analysis et synthesis, resoluti~ et compositio, inventio et doctrina, certitudo et certorum intelligentia, diuturna investigatio et breve fructuum compendium. Quod si altera pars ita eligitur ut altera negligatur, non solum amittitur totum sed et ipsa pars electa corrumpitur. Qui enim partern dogrnaticam negligit ut systematicam profundius colat, id ipsum negligit cuius intelligentiam quaerit; unde et mox oriuntur pseudo-problemata et pullulant pseudo-systemata quae subtilissime de omnibus ita disputent ut tamen mysterioru m intelligentiam praetermittant. Qui autem partem systematicam negligit ut fidelius et exactius dogmaticam retineat, unam eamque divinam revelationem ita in multa et distincta mysteria resolvit ut tamen in unitatem ex hac multiplicitate regredi non possit; quae pro omnittln captu revelavit Deus, earum tec~ nicam expressionem decursu temporum ita invenit ut tamen non capiat quemadmodum haec technica docenda sint atgue addiscenda; multa et technica certissime cognoscit, sed certorum intelligentiam praetermittere mavult; tempora praeterita


'The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking

applications follow of their own accord. This derivation ~f conclusions may be deficient in tenus oflogical rigor, since it proceeds from a principle that is only imperfecdy and obscurely understood; but that do~s not mean that the process of arriving at conclusions from a systematic principle is the kind of thing that proceeds one step at a time over a long stretch of years, with a certain amount of luck. While we have acknowledged in the dogmatic way something of the process of analysis, of resolutiori, of discovery, of certitude, and of a temporal way, and in the systematic way something of the process of synthesis, of composition, of teaching and learning, ofpr6bability, and oflogical simultaneity, we cannot ignore the fact that these terms are used analogously. Analysis and synthesis are understood in one way in physics and in another way in chemistry; they are understood in one way in the natural sciences, in another way in the human sciences, and in another way in theological disciplines. The way we understand the nature of material things is.differe~t from the way we understand the words of Plato; and when we understand Plato, we next judge whether what Plato held is true. But we believe that the word of God is true even before we investigate what it teaches. Therefore the dogmatic way has its own mode of being a way of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and a temporal way, and the systematic way has likewise its own mode of being a way of synthesis, of composition, of tea,ching or learning, ofprobability, and of logical simultaneity. How intimately these two ways are linked must be particularly stressed because there never seem to be lacking those whose diminished wisdom is ready and eager to take a part for the whole and to pass it on as such to others. Analysis and synthesis, resolution and composition, discovery and teaching, certitude and the understanding of what is certain, lengthy investigation and a brief compendium of results - these constitute a single whole. Those who choose but one part and ne-

~~~-~-~~~~~=~~-~

chosen. Those who neglect the dogmatic part in order to cultivate the systematic more profoundly are in fact neglecting what they are seeking to understand. Soon pseudo--problems emerge and pseudo-systems start to sprout, systems that dispute ever so subtly about everything while overlooking the understanding of the mys~eries. But those who neglect the systematic part in order to hold faithfully and exacdy to the dogmatic so resolve the one divine revelation into many dif~ ferent mysteries that no move can be made back from this multiplicity to unity; from what God has revealed for all to understand, they devise in the course of time a technical expression of that revelation, but they do not grasp how these technical matters are to be taught and learned. They know with certainty many technical matters, but choose to overlook the understanding of what they are


66



scrutatur ut de conciliis, de documentis pontificiis, de patribus, de theologis colligat atque cumulet et technica et certissima, quorum tamen omnium sapienter ordinatum atgue intellectum compendium excludit. Quibus peractis, stupens miratur homines pios theologiam dogmaticam spemere et ad biblicismum quendam, eumque parum tutum, confugere.

certain of. They rummage through the past collecting and iccumulating technically established infonnation concerning the councils, papal documents, the Fathers' the theologians, but they avoid the task of assembling a wisely ordered, intelligible compendium of all these matters. And after all this, they stand amazed that devout people reject dogmatic theology and take refuge in some fonn of biblicism that is itself hardly secure.

Sectio Sexta: Comparantur Via Dogtnatica et Via Systematica

6 COlnparison of the Dogm.atic Way and the Systelnatic Way

Et distinctas et inter se connexas diximus viam dogmaticam viamque systematicam. Quemadmodum vero altera ad alteram comparetur, magis particulariter dicendum est; neve desint exempla concreta, a summis et brevissimis lineamentis theologiae trinitariae incipimus. In via ergo dogmatica (quam analyticam, resolutionis, inventionis, certitudinis, temporalem diximus), primae sunt missiones Filii atque sancti Spiritus quas narrat Novum Testamentum, secundum est dogma trinitarium ut simul affirmentur tum contra Sabellianos tres realiter distincti tum contra Subordinationistas unus solus Deus (DB 48-51), tertia est triurn consubstantialitas (DB 54, 86), quartae sunt proprietates personales reales (Cappadoces), quinto perspicitur has proprietates esse relativas et has relationes esse origin is, sexto harurn originurn intelligentia quaeritur et rnaxirne invocatur analogia psychologica.

We have stated that the dogmatic way and the systematic way are distinct yet connected. Now we will state in greater detail how they are compared to each othei'. And for concrete examples, we will draw on the brief basic outlines of trinitarian _theology.

In via autem systematica (quam etiam syntheticarn, composltlOnis, doctrinae, disciplinae, probabilitatis, et simultaneitatis logicae diximus), primo consideratur unus Deus,34 secundo, in Deo uno intelligente, sciente, diligente ponuntur emanationes intelligibiles,35 tertio, in emanationibus fundantur relationes,36 quarto, praecognitis emanationibus et relationibus,37 considerantur personae in

Thus, i~;the dogmatic way (which we have said is a way of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and a temporal way), there are first the missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit narrated in the New Testament. Second, there is the trinitarian dogma, which affirms, simultaneously, against the Sabellians three who are really distinct and against the subordinationists one sole God (DB 48-5 I, DS IE~-I5, ND 3°1--;-303). Third, there is the consubstantiality of the three (DB 54, 86; DS 125, 150; ND 7, 305). Fourth, there are the real personal properties, which were worked out by the Cappadocians. Fifth, there is the recognition that these properties are relative and that the relations are relations of origin. Sixth, an understanding of these relations of origin is sought, and in particular an appeal is made to a psychological analogy. In the systematic way (which we have said is a way of synthesis, of composition, of teaching, oflearning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity), the first consideration is of the one God. 3f Second, in the one God, who understands, knows, and loves, there are posited intellectual emanations. 35 Third, on the emanations are based the relations. 36 Fourth, supposing the emanations and the relations,37 the per34 Tho~as Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, qq. 2-26. 35 Ibid. q. ';). [Lonergan, following St Thomas here, writes emanationes intelligibiles, where the adjective means 'intellectual,' 'pertaining to the intellect' as opposed to the senses, a meaning that 'intelligible' does not have in English. On p. 137 below, he no~es th~ amb!guity and in three places writes. intellectualis seu intellig£bilis, 'intellectual or mt:lllgtble. See also p. 185 below. Unless the context suggests otherwise, as it occasIonally does (see, for example, appendix 2B, §25, p. 763), we have translated emanatio intelligihilis as 'intellectual emanation.'J 36 Ibid. q. 28. 37 Ibid. q. 29, Introduction.



68

69


communi,38 quinro, considerantur personae singillatim,39 sexto, comparantur per0 sonae ad ea quae ante personas considerata sunt, nempe, ad divinam essentiam,4 . . . p . ad relationes seu propnetates,.41 ad actus notIonales seu emanatlones, septzmo, comparantur personae et inter se43 et ad nos.44 His ergo positis, ad comparationem proceditur. Et in primis elucet eadem realiter considerari tum in via dogmatic~ tum in via systematica. Non enim aliae sunt missiones' Filii et Spiritus quae III Novo Testamento narrantur et aliae quas exponit S. Thomas in q. 43 primae partis. Neque alia est generatio divina de qua egit S. Athanasius et alia realiter est illa generatio de qua tum ante personas systematice conceptas (g. 27) tum iterum post (q. 41) egit S. Thomas. Et idem omnino de caeteris dicendum :st, .cum mo~us syntheticus nihil sit aliud quam ordinata expositio eorum quae m Via analyuca sunt inventa atque demonstrata. Deinde, quamvis de iisdem in utroque ,motu agatur, tamen alia et alia ordine ponuntur. Quod enim in alio motu'prius invenitur, in alia p9sterius consideratur. Ita ad missiones terminat Aquinas, et ex missionibus incipit Novum Testamentum. Iterum, ad analogiarn psychologicam terminat inquisitio patristica, ex qua tamen incipit Aquinas. Cuius inversionis ratio omnino universalis est. Qui .enim inquirit vel dubitationes amovet, ex maxime manifestis incipit ut ad remotIora et obscuriora concludat. Qui autem docet, ex iis notionibus incipit quarum' int~lligentia intelligentiam aliarurn non praesupponat ut, paulatim crescente complexitate, ad concretum intelligendum perveniat. Tertio, quamvis de iisdem in utroque motu agatur, ipsa tamen realiter eadem non eadem modo concipiuntur. Qui enim conceptus missionis in Summa 'de theologia exponitur, nempe, habitudo missi tum ad mittentem tum ~d ~erminum, haud explicite in mentem venit primaevis christianis cum S. Paull epistolas legerent. Neque Symbolum 'Quicumque' cum tres esse personas doceat, tres, rel~ tiones subsistentes dicit. Neque huius differentiae deest ratio universalis, cum In via synthetica includitur totum e1ementum explicativum ad' quod via analytica


s~ns are considered all together. 38 Fifth, the persons are considered individually.39

Szxth, t~e persons are related to each of 'the items considered before the persons were dIscussed.: namely, to the divine essence,40 to the relations or properties,41 and to the notIonal acts or emanations. 42 Seventh, the persons are related to one another 43 and to us. 44 That said, let us proceed to the comparison. In the firs~ place, it is clear that the dogmatic and the systematic ways are concerne~ WIth the same realities. The missions of the Son and of the Spirit narrated.m the ~ew Testament are identical with the missions discussed by St Thomas m questIOn 43 of the Ptima pars of the Summa. The divine generation that St Atha~asiu:s wrote about is the same generation that St Thomas spoke of both in ~uestio~ 27, before he had presented his systematic conception of the persons, and m questIOn 4 1 , after he had completed that presentation. This kind of identity will be fo~~d all across the board, since the synthetic movement is simply an orderly exposItIon of what was discovered and demonstrated in the analytic process. S:~on.d, al~ough e~ch movement treats the same realities, still each posits the realItIes m a dIfferent order. What is prior in one is subsequent in the other. Thus Aquina~ e~d.s wit~ the missions, while the New Testament starts with them. Again: ~he patnstIc mqUlry ends with the psychological analogy, while Aquinas starts with It. The reason for th~s inversion is completely universal: anyone who inquires .or removes doubts starts from what is most obvious in order to conclude to what is more remote and more obscure; but anyone who is teaching starts' with those no~ons that can be understood without presupposing the understanding of other notIOns, so that, by gradually increasing the complexity, one might arrive at an understanding of the concrete. Third, although the, same realities are treated in each movement, they are :onceived differently in each. The concept of a divine mission that is put forward In a Summa of theology, namely, the rClation of the one sent both to the sender and to the term, is' hardly what came explicitly to the mind of the first Christians as they read the letters of St Paul. Again, the Creed Qyicumque teaches that there are three persens, bl,lt it does not mention three subsisting relations. There is also a universal reaso? for this difference: included in the way of synthesis is th'e entire 38 39 40 41 42 43 44


Ib;d. qq. '9-3'. Ib;d. qq. 33-38. !b;d. q. 39. Ibid. q. 40. Ibid. q. 4r; see q. 27. Ib;d. q. 4'. Ib;d. q. 43.


7'


pedetentim procedit; qua de causa, solent libri manuales distinguere inter' ipsum factum, quod ex auctoritatibus demonstrant, et intelligentiam facti, de qua saepius theologos disputantes exhibent. Quarto, haec formalis conceptuum differentia eo magis augetur quo priora in via dogmatica et posteriora in via systematica comparantur. N am quo posterius in via systematica unumquodgue ponitur, eo magis totam praeviam atgue accumulatam intelligentiam praesupponit atgue includit. Quo autem prius in via dogmatica unumquodque ponitur, eo magis simplicem facti narrationem exponit et omnem disputabilem intelligentiam evitat. Quinto, eadem formalis conceptuum differentia eo magis minuitur quo posteriora in via dogmatica et priora in via systematica comparantur. Nam ipsa via dogmatica in intelligentiam assequendam pergit et assecutam retinet atque cumulat; neque totam hanc intelligentiam statim in ipsis initiis exponit via systematica. Qua de cailsa, non tam magna est distinctio inter analogiam psychologicam ad quam concludit via dogmatica et eandem analogiam ex qua indpit via systematica.

Sexto, utriusque viae differunt probationes, tum quia diversi sunt conceptu: formales, tum quia diversi intenduntur fines. Ita via dogrnatica demonstrat relatlOnes certa in Deo existere, tum ex nominibus Patris et Filii, tum ex necessitate distinctionis per sola relativa, tum ex actibus notionalibus; sed eadem via ignorat relationes prout personis quodammodo praecognoscuntur;45 et nisi post factum stab~itum quod sunt relationes, de earum fundamento cogitare non incipit. E contra, VIa systematica ex fundamento processionum ad relationes ponendas procedit; et cum personas nondum systematice conceperit, nisi per quandam a~ti~ipationem. satis inconvenientem argumenta sumere potest ex personarum nommIbus, propnetatibu s, et actibus notionalibus. Q~ae differentia prorsus universalis est: omnis enim argumentatio ex prioribus procedit et ad posteriora praeparat; sed quae viae systematicae sunt priora, viae dogmaticae sunt posteriora; quae autem viae systematicae posteriora sunt, eadem viae dogmaticae sunt priora. Qua de causa, gui motu quodam commixto procedit ut simul via dogmatica et via systematica utatur, tatum fere tractatum in singulis thesibus percurrere debet.


e.xplanat~~ elem.ent toward which the way of analysis proceeds one step at a tIme. ThIs IS behmd the common distinction in the manuals between 'the fact' which. they pr~ve from authorities, and 'the understanding of the fact,' in regar~ to whIch more often than not they show theologians arguing with one another. Fourth, this formal difference of concepts increases as we compare the elements that are prior in the dogmatic way with the elements that are subsequent in the systematic. The later an element is posited in the systematic movement the more it presupposes and includes the whole previous cumulative understa~ding.· But the earlier an element is posited in the dogmatic movement, the more it expresses a simple narration of fact and the more it avoids any controversial understanding. Fif~h, the ~ap1e formal difference of concepts diminishes as we compare the elements that are subsequent in the dogmatic way with the elements that are prior in the systematic. For the dogmatic way moves toward the attainment of understanding, and once it has attained understanding it holds onto it and adds it to previous achievements; and the systematic way does not immediately express all of this understanding at the very beginning. Thus, there is no great difference between the psychological analogy at which the dogmatic way concludes and the same psychological analogy from which the systematic way begins. Sixth, the proofs of the two ways differ, partly because of the formally different concepts, but, also because of the different goals intended. The dogmatic way proves that relations certainly exist in God, arguing from the names of 'Father' and 'Son,' from the necessity that any distinctions in God be purely relative, and from the notional acts. But the dogmatic way is not aware of the relations insofar as they are somehow known prior to the persons;45 nor does it begin to think about the basis of the relations until it has established the fact that relations do exist. The systematic way, in contrast, proceeds from the foundation of the processions to posit the relations, and since it has not yet formed a systematic conception of the persons, it is only by an inappropriate anticipation that it would argue from the names, properties, and notional acts of the persons. The differen~e is completely universal: every argument proceeds from something prior and moves to something SUbsequent; but what are prior in the systematic way are subsequent in the dogmatici ang what are subsequent in the systematic way are prior in the dogmatic. Thus, anyone who tries to use a blend of the two at the same time will be compelled to run through practically the entire treatise in every individual thesIs. 45 Ibid. q. 29, Introduction; see q. 27, Introduction; also Bernard Lonergan, 'Theo!ogy and Understanding,' Gregorianum 35 (1954) 637 [now in Collection at 121-22].


Collected. Works of Bernard Lonergan

73

Dc Fine, Ordine, Modo J?icendi

Septima, notae seu censurae theologicae ad viam dogmaticam proprie pertinent.46 Via enim dogmatica eadem est ac via certitudinis, quae ex maxime manifestis incipit et ad remotiora obscurioraque demonstranda procedit. Notae autem seu' censurae theologicae nihil aliud dicunt quam gradum certitudinis vel probabilitatis qui singulis assertis competit. Quapropter, quasi in propria domo, in via dogmatica ponuntur notae theologicae. Quod si quis illud quaereret quod ad viam systematic.am ita se haberet, sicut ad viam dogmaticam se habent notae seu censurae theologicae, forte ad conditiones intelligendi inveniendas duceretur. Non enim omnia in via systematica pari necessitate sunt intelligenda; sed alia eiusmodi sunt ut, nisi intelligantur, nihil in toto tractatu intelligi possit; aliarum au'tem negligentia nisi 'partem intelligentiae non aufert; alia denique ponuntur quo facilius alia intelligantur, vel darius cum aliis quaestionibus connectantur, vel promptius ad applicationes producantur.

Quae tamen distinctiones, cum ad artem paedagogicam pertineant, iam pridem a bonis magistris adhibentur. At earum mentio forte illud illustrat, nempe, quam inconvenienter in via systematica ad ootas theologicas multum attenditur. Viae eoim systematicae finis proprius non certitudo sed certorum intelligentia est; .neque tantum apud orones est intelligendi desiderium ut proprius hic finis facile hominum mentes ab aliis considerationibus revocet. Viae autem systematicae valor eiusmodi est ut initio non perspiciatur, neque in ipso fine adepto plene aestimari possit, nisi accedant comparationes concretae, ut eluceat quantum inter ,se distent mens quidem certissima sed scientiae vacua et mens _.cuius certitudines informat, ordinat, dirigit synthetica quaedam omnium apprehensio. Viae denique systematicae securitas atque soliditas non criteriis ordinariis mensurantur; qui certitudinem quaerit, quam plurimos afferre solet testes communis fidei communisque doctrinae; qui autem intelligentiam quaerit, multitudinem tutius negligat et quam sapientissimum audiat; qua de causa, sancta mater'ecdesia nobis studiorum ducem proponit non omnes panter theologos, neque magis communes sententias, sed unicum S. Thomam. Octavo, aliter in via dogmatica, aliter autem in via systematica ad adversariorum sententias attendendurn est. Qui enim adversarios refutat, ad ipsam eorum


Seventh, theological notes or censures belong properly to the dogmatic way.46 The dogmatic way is the same as the way of certitude, beginning from what is most obvious and moving to a demonstration of what is more remote and obscure. Theological hotes or censures are intended to characterize the degree of certitude or probability proper to individual propositions. Such characterizations belong in dogmatic theology as in their proper home. Is there anything in the systematic way that corresponds to the role of theological notes or censures in the dogmatic? Let me suggest that an answer lies in discovering the conditions of understanding. In the systematic way the understanding {jf some points is more necessary than the understanding of others: some points are such that, unless they are understood, nothing else in the entire treatise can be understood; neglecting to understand other points may deprive us only of part of the understanding of the entire treatise; and finally, some points are included just so that others may be more' easily understood or that the connections with other questions may be clearer or that we may proceed more promptly to the applications., These distinctions belong to the general art of pedagogy and have long been employed by"good teachers. But mentioning them here perhaps illustrates how inappropriate it is to pay much attention in systematic theology to theological notes. The proper goal of the systematic way is not certitude but understanding those things that are certain. And not in everyone is the desire to understand so strong that this proper goal draws their minds away from other considerations. The value of the systematic way is not perceived at the beginning, nor can it be fully appreciated even when the goal is attained u~less concrete comparisons are made to show the vast gulf that separates a mind full of certitudes but empty of anything scientific from a mind in which the synthetic grasp of all the issues gives form, order, and direction to its certitudes. Finally, the security and solidity of the systematic way cannot be measured by ordinary criteria. One who aims at certitude will appeal to as many witnesses of the common faith and the common teaching as possible, but one who aims at understanding can safely ignore the multitude and-'-attend to the most wise. Thus, holy mother church proposes as guide for our studi~s neither all theologians equally nor even the majority opinion of theologians, but only St Thomas. Eighth, the opinions of one's opponents playa different role in the dogmatic way from their role in the systematic. To refute adversaries, obviously one must 46 [On theological notes, see the entry 'Theological Notes' by William Henn, in 7he New Dictionary if 7heology, ed.Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 19~7) 100g-I1.]



74


75

doctrinam secundum proprium eorum sensum attendat necesse est; secus fictos hastes facilius vincere reputaretur. Et ideo in via dogmatica, ubi amoventur dubitationes cmnes et plena quaeritur certitudo, adversariorum sententiae ampli-

tudine quadam historica sunt exponendae. Qui autcm ipsos errores exstirpare intendit ne alii decipiantur, radicem quaerat unde error speciem veritatis sibi assumat, ibique securim app1iceti neque quicquam refert utrum hie illeve adversar. ius umquam ad illam radicem explicite vel animadverterit, cum de intima huius illiusve mente minime agatur sed de mentibus vel nunc existentibus velJuturis. Et ideo in via systematica non tam ad adversarios quam_ ad radices eITorum attendere debemus. 47 Duas ergo distinximus vias, aliam dogmaticam, aliam systematicam. Quae quidem, quamvis de iisdem rebus tractent, tamen ordinibus contrariis et oppositis procedunt, conceptibus formaliter'distinctis utuntur, diversas probationes adhibent, aliter et aliter ad notas seu censuras theologicas se habent, et diversimode adversarios erroresque considerant. Cur? Quia 'quilibet actus exsequendus est secundum quod convenit -ad suum finem; Disputatio autem ad duplicem finem potest ordinari. '48 Quamvis enim idem sit ens quod et essentiam et esse habeat, quamvis eadem sit propositio qua exprimatur sive intelligibile (quod est verum) sive verum (quod est intelligibile), quamvis sine reduplicatione non distinguatur inter verum intelligibile qua verum et verum intelligibile qua intelligibile, tamen alia est intellectus ope ratio qua attingitur verum intelligibile qua verum, et alia realiter est operatio qua attingitur verum intelligibile qua intelligibile. Quod si alia et alia sint operationes, etiam alia et alia sunt methodi quibus ad operationes proceditur. Si enim certitudinem quaeris, ex maxime manifestis incipis et pedetentim ad obscuriora demonstranda peIVenis; si intelligentiam quaeris, ex iis incipis quorum intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponit; si autem confusionem mavis, exige intelligentiam ubi de certitudine agitur, et certitudinem quando intelligentia quaeritur.

The.Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking

attend to their teaching in the sense in which they intend it; othenvise one earns the reputation of easily defeating straw men. And so in the dogmatic way, where all doubts are to be removed and where perfect certitude is sought, the opinions of one's opponents have to be set forth in their full historical background. But to eradicate those errors and keep others from being deceived by them, one must seek the root whence the error is able to assume the semblance of truth, and there lay the axe. It makes no difference whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention.to any of those roots, since here one is concerned not with the inmost mind of one or other historical figure but with the minds of people in the present' and in the future. Consequently in the systematic way we should pay attention not so much to adversaries as to the roots of errors. 47 We have distinguished two ways, the dogmatic and the systematic. While they investigate the same realities, they proceed in contrary and opposed orders, they use formally distinct concepts, they employ different methods of proof, they have different relations to theological notes and censures, and they consider opponents and errors in differe~t w"ays. Why all this? Because 'every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be directed to either of two ends.'48 Although it is the one same being that has essence and the act of existence, although it is the same proposition by which there is expressed the intelligible (which is true) and the true (which is intelligible), and although we cannot without reduplication distinguish between intelligible truth as true and intelligible truth as intelligible, nevertheless there is one operation of the mind that attains intelligible truth as true, and a really distinct operation that attains intelligible truth as intelligible. But if the operations are different, so are the methods by which one proceeds to the operations. It follows that if you seek certitude, you begin from those items that are most manifest and gradually arrive at a demonstration of those that are more obscure; but if you seek understanding, you start from those itcms which you can understand without presupposing the understanding of others; if, howeve~, what you prefer is confusion, then you demand understanding where certitude is the issue, and certitude where what matters most is understanding.

47 [In the introduction to the dogmatic part of this treatise on the Trinity, written later than this systematic part, Lonergan distinguishes 'dogmatic' from 'positive,' and assigns to the positive theologian this concern for the accurate representation of the minds of individual figures of history. In the dogmatic part, then, Lonergan treats historical figures and movements in the way he here describes as 'systematic.' He uses a review of history to perform the 'dialectic' function of going to the roots of error, without a profound concern 'whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention to any of those roots.'] 48 Thomas Aquinas, Qyaestiorus quodlibetales, 4, q. g, a. 3. See above, p. g.




77


Neminem sane arbitror confusionem velIe. At haud semper clare distincteque perspicitur quanta sit confusio, ubi insufficienter inter viam dogmaticam viamque systematicam distinguatur. Ubi enim diversi sunt fines, diversa obiecta formalia, diversae operationes quibus fines diversi attinguntur, diversi ordines quibus in fines proceditur, diversi conceptus formales qui adhibentur, diversae probationes, diversae errorum considerationes, haud convenit ita opera theologica iudi.care ac si unicus sit finis, unum formale obiectum, una operationum species, unus ordo quaestionum, una conceptuum fonnalium classis, unus probandi modus, una errorum consideratio. Quod si parum convenire videtur etiam si de solis viis dogmatica et systematica agatur, multo minus convenit ubi rei historicae consideratio accedit. Ad quam statim transeundum est.

I trust no one really wants confusion. But it is not always grasped how much confusion results from not keeping the dogmatic and systematic ways sufficiently distinct. Where the goals are different, where the formal objects are different, where the operations by which the different goals are attained arc different, where the orders by which one moves toward the goals are different, where different formal concepts are employed, and different proofs and different ways of considering errors, it makes little sense to judge theological works. as if they all had but one goal, one formal object, one kind of operation, one ordering of questions, one type of formal concept, one way of proving, and one way of considering errors. And if it makes little S'ense when the issue regards simply the dogmatic and systematic ways, it.makes even less sense when the consideration of history is added. To that we now turn.

Sectio Sept:inJ.a: Motus Historici Additur Consideratio

7 A Consideration of the Historical Movelnent

Post vias dogmaticam atque systematicam inter se comparatas, iam addi oportet prioris et historici motus considerationem. 49 Non enim unico quodam intuitu, angelorum more, ad earn fidei intelligentiam perventum est quae nunc inter catholicos communiter possidetur, sed saeculorum decursu ratio per fidem illustrata sedulo, pie, sobrie ita inquisivit, ut pedetentirn seu modo humane vetera novis augeret et perficeret. Quod si ipsum hunc motum qualis fuerit perspicere volumus, duo consideranda videntur. Primo, enim, ii conceptus sunt formandi quibus clare et distincte apprehendi potest ipsius rei historicae ratio tum in genere tum in iis quae fidem catholicam propius respiciant. Deinde, post conceptus hac in sectione septima propositos, in sectione octava,intelligentiam quandam quaeremus huius motus theologici, quocum intime connectitur dogmatum quae dici~r evolutio.

After comparing the,dogmatic and systematic ways with each other, we must now turn to a consideration of a prior, historical movement. 49 The understanding of faith that today prevails among Catholics was not arrived at by some single intuition, in the manner of the angels. Rather, over the course of the ages reason illumined by faith has searched diligently, reverently, and judiciously, so as gradually, in a human way, ever to augment and improve the old with the new. If we want to see wnat this historical movement really was like, two considerations are necessary. First, we need to fonn those concepts that will help us grasp clearly and distinctly the intelligibility of historical reality both in general and in those matters that touch the Catholic faith more intimately. Second, after proposing those concepts in this seventh section, we will seek in the next section some understanding of this theological movement, a movement which is intimately connected with what has been called the development of dogma. Again, to begin from general notions, the difference between nature and spirit, between the natural sciences and the properly human sciences, is that, for all practical p'urposes, "t~ose realities that are prior for us, better known to us, more obvious to us seem in t~e natural sciences to remain stable, whereas in the human sciences they undergo slight but continual changes. Colors and sounds, the heavy and the light, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, the smooth and the rough, the hard and the soft, and everything else that becomes known to the

Porro, ut a notionibus generalibus ordiamur, eiusmodi fere est distinctio inter naturam et spiritum, il!ter scientias naturales et scientias proprie humanas, ut ea ipsa quae quoad nos sunt priora, notiora, manifestiora, in naturalibus quidem immota manere videantur, in humanis autem levi quodam at perpetuo ftuxu commutari. Colores enim et soni, gravia et levia" calida et frigida, sicca et humida, lenia- et aspera, dura et mollia, et alia quaecumque sensibus innotescunt, ex

49 [In Divinarum personarum (28) this reads 'of a third, historical movement' (tertii et historici motus). See below, appendix 4, §r, esp. pp. 755-61, for the background that explains this difference.]



Dc Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi

79

immutata corporis nostri specie immutabilitatem quandam participant; et ideo in naturalibus scientiis univoca invenitur categoria quae priora quoad nos annuntiat. At alia e'st lex naturae, alia spiritus. Linguae enim et mores, structurae domesticae, oeconomicae, politicae, artes mechanicae et liberales, religiones et scientiae, non solum maxima quadam diversitate multiplicantur sed etiam mira quadam vel fecunditate vel inquietudine perpetuo augentur, fiorescunt, dilabuntur. lam vero, illud singulis hominibus est prius, notius, manifestius, quod parvuli, pueri, adolescentes, iuvenes videbant, audiebant, faciebant. Quapropter, ex ipsa rerum humanarum varietate atque inconstantia maxime redditur aeguivoca categoria quae priora quoad nos designat. Non enim unum quoddam fixum atgue immutatum est 'Illud nos, sed quot sunt epochae, quot aetates, quat culturae, quat nationes, quat classes sociales, quot fere homines, tot in rebus humanis mirae atgue profundae inveniuntur -differentiae in iis quae sponte priora, notiora, manifestiora' reputantur.

lam vera ex ipsis his differentiis quae brevi vocabulo culturales nominari possunt, statim oritur problema quoddam .fundamentale, nempe, ut principium inveniatur transculturale, quo systematice ex lis quae huic sunt priora ad ilia quae alteri priora sunt transiri possit. Et primum quoddam solutionis elementum ex psychologia profunda repetitur. Non enim solis sensibus conveniunt homines sed etiam symbolis illis spontaneis quibus sensibilitas et suam finalitatem spiritui manifestat et vicissim dictamina spiritus ipsa sibi aperit et quodammodo interpretatur. Quae quidem symbola qualia sint, quemadmodum adhiberi possint et debeant, et guonam fructu ad historiam praesertim religionum applicentur, multis et vanis scriptis disserunt recenuores. Alterum autem solutionis elementum est lentior atgue difficilior ill~ processus quo eruditi culturam et quasi mentalitatem alterius loci et temporis pedetentim induunt. Sicut enim in aliena natione degere, alienam linguam addiscere, alienas consuetudines secpli, aliena instituta quasi imbibere possumus, ita etiam eruditissimus quisque ex infinitis .fere jndiciis quae in monumentis atque documentis lateant non solum alienam sed etiam antiquam culturam quasi usu cotidiano suam quodammodo facere potest. Tertium proinde solutionis elementum in eo est ut non solum rerum gestarum narra~ tiones legantur, comparentur, et in unam cohaerentemque recitationem redigantur, sed ctiam ea omnia adhibeantur quae aliis scientiis novimus, ut totam alterius temporis vitam sub aspectu mechanico, artistico, o~conomico, politico, sociali, scientifico, philosophico, religioso, quantum fieri possit, intelligamus.



senses seem to share a kind of immutabilitY with the unchanged character of the human body. As a result, in the natural sciences the categories that express what is prior for US are univocal. But the law of the spirit is different from the law of nature. Languages and customs, domestic, economic, and political structures, the mechanical and liberal arts, religions and sciences not only are multiplied with great diversity, but they also go through recurrent patterns of increase, flourishing, and decay with an astounding fertility and restlessness. For individual human beings, w.laat is prior, better known, and more obvious is whatever they were seeing, hearing, and doing when they were infants or children or adolescents or young adults. And so, as a result of the very variety and inconstancy of human aifairs".-the categories that indicate what is prior for us become equivocal in the extreme. The us in question is not something fixed and changeless. There are as ·many remarkable and deep differences in what are spontaneously counted as prior, better known, and more obvious in human affairs as there are periods, ages, cultures, nations, social classes - in fact, almost as many as there are individual human beings. These differences, which we may for brevity's sake designate as 'cultural,' give rise at once to a fundamental problem: the problem of finding a transcultural principle that would enable us to pass systematically from what is prior for one person to what is prior for another. A first element in the solution is appropriated from depth psychology. Human beings are alike not just in their senses but also in those spon~aneous symbols in which sensibility both manifests its own finality to spirit and conversely discloses to itself and, as it were, interprets the spirit's own demands; As to what those symbols are, how they can and ought to be put to use, how fruitfully they can be applied especially to the history of religions - all that can be found in a numher of different writings of recent authors. A second element in the solution is the slower and more difficult process by which scholars manage gradually to acquire the culture and almost the mentality of another place al1d time. Just as we can live in a foreign country, learn a foreign language, follow foreign customs, and as it were imbibe foreign practices, so too diligent scholars, working from the almost infinite number of clues that lie hidden in artifacts and documents, can make their own not only a foreign culture but also a culture of antiquity in its day-by-day living. A third element in the solution is that not only can narratives of past events be read, compared, and woven together into a single coherent account, but also everything we know from other sciences can be used to help us reach as full an understanding as possible of the whole life of another age in all its aspects: mechanical, artistic, economic, political, social, scientific, philosophical, religious.


80



Quae tamen tria, etiam simul sumpta, ad plenam problematis solutionem vix conducere passunt. Faciunt sane ut singuli investigatores ex propria in alienam transeant culturam. Faciunt ut singuli investigatores orone forte quod ad alienam culturam pertineat in propriam quodammodo transferre passint. Iroo faciunt ut multi investigatores, dummodo ipsi eiusdem culturae, eiusdem aetatis, eiusdem scholae sint, de obiectiva rerum gestarum serie atgue sensu consentiant. _Sed minime gravissimum illud maximeque inconveniens tollunt

quod, quot sunt culturae, quot scholae, quot tendentiae, tot etiam fieri solent' tum rerum gestarum narrationes tum dictorum scriptorumque interpretationes. Solvitur quidem prob-

lema transculturale quasi ex parte obiecti. Sed adeo insolutum manet ex parte subiecti ut saepius doceatur quaestiones ita esse dividendas ut cae quae materialia potius respiciant scientifice determinari possint, sed eae quae magis' hominum principia, iudicia, consilia tangant quasi inevitabili cuidam relativismo derelinquantur.

Cuius divisionis ratio, partim ex iis quae superius diximus, partim ex principiis philo~ sophicis vel methodicis explicatur. Ideo cnim circa ea quae magis materialia sunt admitti~ tur certitudo, quia in naturalibus fere univocum est' quod quoad nos dicitur prius, notius, manifestius; ideo autem de culturalibus et spiritualibus praevalet scepticismus, quia in iis quae homini sunt propria, valde aequivocum invenitur quod quoad alios aliosque prius, notius, manifestius reputatur. 50 Attamen, si quis quaesiverit quam ob causam rei histori~ cae periti in relativis permaneant, cur tanto studio tantoque labore ex relativis·ad-alios ad relativa~ad-se-ipsos transeant, cur tandem ad illud non recurrant quod quoad se sit prius, notius, manifestius, saepius respondetur vel tutius evitari omnes philosophorum sententias vel philosophiam quandam relativisticam esse veram.

Quem 'historicismum' tum in se ipso, tum in praesuppositis suis philosophicis, tum in horum consequentiis theologicis, iterum atgue iterum in litt. encyc!. 'Humani generis' damnavit R.P. Pius xnY Quemadmodum vera ipsa relativismi radix impugnetur, et

Still,- these three elements, even when taken together, hardly provide a full solution to the problem. They help individual researchers cross over from their own culture to a foreign culture. They allow individual scholars somehow to make their own whatever belongs to the foreign culture. They even make it possible that many investigators, provided they belong to the same culture, age, and school of thought, might agree on the oqjective sequence and significance of historical events. But that hardly overcomes the very serious and most inconvenient fact that there are as many accounts of what was done and as many interpretations of what was said and written as there are cultures, schools, and tendencies of thought. The transcultural problem may indeed be solved, so to speak, on the side of the object, but on the ,side of the subject it remains unsolved. And that is why we are often told that there are two types of questions: those that deal with material reality can be settled scientifically, while those that touch rather on human principles, judgments, and decisions are left exposed to an inevitable relativism. This di~sio'n of questions can be accounted for partly from what we have said already, and partly from certain philosophical or methodological principles. Certitude is allowed regarding what is more material, because what is prior for us, better known to us, more obvious to us in the realm of nature is for all practical purpo'ses univocal. But skepticism prevails in regard to whatever is cultural and spiritual, because in the prop~rly human realm there is considerable equivocity regarding what is prior for, some and prior for others, better known to some and better known to others, more obvious to some and more obvious to others. 50 Still, suppose one asks, 'Why do historical scholars settle for the merely relative? Why do they put so much study 'and so much labor into passing simply from what is relative-to:-others to what is relative-to-themselves? Why do they not put their effort into uncovering what is prior, more knowable, more obvious in itself?' The frequent response is either that it is safer to avoid all the opinions of philosophers or that some relativistic philosophy is true. This kind of~historicism,' whether in itself or in its philosophical presuppositions or in the ~eological consequences of these presuppositions, was condemned again and again by Pius XII in his encyclical Humani generis. 51 In another work I have 50 [In Insight Lonergan remarks (p. 385) that the distinction between the univocal and the analogous properly regards concepts. The same holds true for the equivocal. So, properly speaking, the conceptual category 'prior for us,' in its application in the human realm, is what is equivocal. It is only by a less proper and extended use that one can speak of what is prior, better known, and more obvious as being equivocal, and indeed, as equivocal in the extreme. Note that later (p. 87) Lonergan speaks of the 'eguivocity of the category that announces what is prior. 'J 51 Acta Apostolicae Sedis XLII (1950) 563-68, 573.

The Robert MoUot Collection

Collected




scientifice ad veram documentorum interpretationem procedi possit, alibi egiY

Quibus pcrspectis, haec in genere de re historica condudenda videntur, nempe, et (I) existere problema quoddam transculturale, quod eo gravius fit quo magis ab externis et materialibus receditur et intimius ad differentias culturales attenditur, et (2) adaequate non resolvi hoc problema, etiamsi summa arte summaque sollertia transeatur ex iis quae quoad illas ad ea quae quoad hos priora, notiora, manifestiara sunt, seu (3) adaequatam problematis transculturalis solutionem haberi non posse nisi ea invocentur quae in ipsa interiori hominis vita inveniuntur absoluta, et (4) ideo tantum praevalere extra ecclesiam relativismum quendam historicum atque aprioristicum, vel quia methodice omnia philosophica excludantur, vel quia relativismus quidam philosophicus acceptetur atque propugnetur.

lam vero ut ad quaestionem theologicam perveniamus, fieri non potuit ut problema transculturale inter christianos non oriretur. Ex alia enim parte, revelatio divina particulari populo, certis temporibus, certis sub adiunc'tis facta est, et ideo tum sacrae scriptu,!,ae eloquia tum apostolica evangelii praedicatio ita homines particulares respiciebant ut conditionibus eorum culturalibus quodammodo implicata atque ligata manerent. At ex alia parte, ecclesia Dei omnium hominum est, omnis loci, omnis culturae. Qua de causa, eo ipso quod sub adiunctis particularibus universalis atgue catholica53 fundata est ecclesia, iam constitutum est problema transculturale nostrum. lmo, intra ipsius novi testamenti ambitum, in ipsis ecclesiae exordiis cum contra iudaizantium consilium non solum gentibus ptaedicetur sed etiam eis ritualia mosaica non imponantur, problema transculturale et clare distincteque manifestatur et eiusdem problematis solutio quaedam praeclarissimo exemplo praebetur. Attamen, ut magis systematice procedamus, ampliari oportet distinctionem iam pridem factam inter priora quoad se et priora quoad nos. Et idem quidem maneat prius quoad se, quod etiam prius systematicum,54 prius theologicum, prius dogmaticum nominari licet. Quod vero ante dicebatur prius quoad nos, nunc subdividendum est in prius scripturisticum, patristicum, et contemporaneum, ut respective significetur id quod erat prius, notius, manifestius aut antiquae mentalitati

discussed the way to attack the real root of relativism and sketched the method by which one can proceed scientifically to the true interpretation of documents. 52 With regard to history, then, we can draw the following general conclusions: (J) there exists a transcultural problem, and this problem grows more' serious the more one's attention is withdrawn from external material things and the more intimately it is directed to cultural differences; (2) this problem is not adequately solved even when one uses the greatest skill and care in moving from what is prior, better known, more obvious to one group to what is prior, better known, mOR obvious to another; (3) there can be no adequate solution of the transcultural problem without appealing to those absolute features that can be discovered in the interior life of human beings; (4) thus, the reason that there is so much a priori historical relativism outside the church is either that all philosophical pursuits are methodically excluded or that some kind of philosophic relativism is accepted and defended. Now l~t us come to the theological question. It was inevitable that a transcultural problem arise among Christians. On the one hand, divine revelation was given to a particular people at definite times and under definite circumstances; thus, the words of scripture and the apostolic preaching of the gospel were directed to particular human beings and so were necessarily implicated in and bound up vvith their cultural cohditions. Yet, on the other hand, the church of God is for all people, at every place, in every culture. Therefore our transcultural problem is already constituted by the fact that a universal and Catholic 53 church was founded under particular historical circumstances. Indeed, in the New Testament period itself, at the very origins of the church, when it was decided against the advice of the Judaizers not only to preach to the Gentiles but also to exempt them from Mosaic rituals, the transcultural problem was clearly and distinctly displayed, and, moreover, a magnificent example was given of a solution to the same problem. Still, if we are to proceed more systematically, we have to develop further the distinction already made between what is prior in itself and what is prior for us. What is prior in itself remains the same, but it may be called a 'systematic prior, '54 a 'theologIcal prior,' or a 'dogmatic prior.' And what we called 'prior for us' should be subdivided into a 'scriptural prior,' a 'patristic prior,' and ~ 'contemporary prior,' to signifY respectively what was prior, better known, more obvious to an

52 Lonergan, Insight 366-71, 517-18, 585-617. 53 [See above, p. 35, note 19·] 54 [The choice has been made here to translate the various kinds of 'prius' in a fairly literal sense. Freer translations may make for easier reading, but the precise point is easily lost unless the translation remains close to the original.)





semiticae vel palaestinensi, aut fidelibus patrum coaevis, aut fidelibus huius illiusve alterius loci, temporis, culturae. Ulterius, distinguantur motus transculturalis, motus theologicus, et motus dogmaticus, ut transculturalis dicatur motus ex priori scripturistico in prius patristicum, vel ex horum alterutro in prius contemporaneum, theologicus autem dicatur motus ex priori scripturistico vel patristico in prius systematicum, dogmaticus denique dicitur motus ubi prius systematicum magisterio ecclesiae confirmatur, docetur, definitur. Ita motus transculturalis fuit ut gentes intrarent in haereditatem populi Dei. Motus pariter transculturalis fuit ut formarentur mediaevales catenae, glossae, et sententiarum patristicarum collectiones. Motus transculturale~ sunt quos investigat sive missioiogia sive profundior theologia pastoralis. At motus theologitus fuit ut conciperentur personae divinae ut consubstantiales, ut conciperetur Verbi divini incarnatio tamquam duarum naturarum in una persona coniunctio, ut concip~rentur gratiae divinae tamquam habitus motusque absolute supernaturales, ut conciperetur sacramentum tamquam signum efficax gratiae. Denique tandem motus dogniaticus illustratur per Nicaenum concilium quod Filium Patri consubstantialem definivit, per concilium Chalcedonense quod Christum unam personam in duabus naturis definivit, per concilia TFidentinum et Vaticanum I in quibus permulta theologica quodammodo adhibita sunt tum ad fidem declarandam tum etiam ad eandem definiendam. Quae cum ita sint, non aliud in scripturis ponitur et aliud a theologis rite excogitatur, sed in utrisque idem dicitur secundum tamen aliud et aliud prius. Iterum, non aliud in scripturis ponitur et aliud in ecclesiae definitionibus, sed in utrisque idem quamvis secundum aliud et aliud prius. Denique, non alia est fides primaeva et palaestinensis, alia hellenistica, alia mediaevalis, alia contemporanea, sed idem in omnibus creditur quamvis secundum aliud et aliud prius exponatur.

Proinde, ut motus inter se comparentur, motus utique transculturalis ad quoddam hellenisticum terminatur, vel ad quoddam mediaevale, vel ad quoddam aliud contemporaneum. Sed motus proprie theologicus, cum ad prius quoad se terminetur, minime ad hellenisticum v'd mediaevale vel aliud particularibus adiunctis culturalibus alligatum terminatur. Pari ergo ratione, motus dogmaticus calumniatur si homoousion mere hellenisticum reputatur vel transubstantiatio mere mediaevalis. Denique tandem toto caelo differunt motus theologicus et motus


ancient Semitic or Palestinian mentality, or to the faithful ofthe patristic period, or to· the faithful of this or that place, time, or culture. Furthermore, we can distinguish a transcultural movement, a theological movem:nt, and a 'dogmatic movement. A transcultural movement is a movement from a 'scriptural prior' to a 'patristic prior,' or from either of these to a 'contemporary prior.' A theological movement is a movement from a 'scriptural or patristic prior' to 'a systematic prior.' And a dogmatic movement occurs when a 'systematic prior' is confirmed, taught, and defined by the church's magisterium. So the entry of the Gentiles into the inheritance of the people of God was a transcultural movement. Likewise, the medieval creation of catenae, of glossae, and of collections of patristic opinions was transcultural. Transcultural movements are investigated both by missiology and by the more profound type of pastoral theology. But conceiving the divine persons as consubstantial, conceiving the incarnation of the divine Word as a union of two natures in a single pe~on, conceiving divine graces as absolutely supernatural habits and motions, and conceiving sacraments as efficacious signs of grace were all theological movements. Finally, the dogmatic movement is illustrated by the Council of Nicea, which defined that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, by the Council ofChalcedon, which defined that Christ is a single person in two natures, and by the Council of Trent and the First Vatican Council, each of which employed a large number of theological elements both to state and to define the faith. On this basis we can say that what is set down in the scriptures is not different from the correct conclusions that theologians arrive at. Rather, the same thing is stated in each, in accord with one or another type of priority. Again, what is set down in the scriptures is not different from what is set down in ecclesial definitions. Rather, the same thing is stated in each, though in accord with one or other type of priority. Finally, the primitive Palestinian faith and Hellenistic faith and medieval faith and contemporary faith are not different faiths. Rather, the same thing is -believed in all of them, even though expositions differ in accord with one or other priority. Accordingly, comparing these movements with one another yields the conclusion that a transcultural movement terminates, say, at a Hellenistic phase or at a medieval phase or at some other contemporary phase, whereas a properly theological movement, since it terminates at what is prior in itself, does not terminate at a Hellenistic phase or at a medieval phase or at some other phase bound to par,ticular cultural circumstances. By the same token, then, to regard the homoousion as merely Hellenistic or transubstantiation as merely medieval is to disparage the dogmatic movement. And finally, there is an enormous difference between a theological movement and a dogmatic movement, for while they may coincide


! ;

86



dogmaticus: quamvis enim quoad conceptus coincidere possint, aliud tamen est iudicium proferre privata theologi auctoritate, et longe aliud est ipsam fidem infallibiliter declarare sub ductu Spiritus Dei. Remanet ut et illud perspiciatur, nempe, quantum inter se differant problema transculturale et generale et idem problema prout in re catholica invenitur. Histaricas enim vidimus summa quadam arte atgue soUertia ex uno relativo in aliud relativum transire, neque ad prius quoad se et absolutum ascendere auciere, cum tot tamque diversa a philosophis doceantur. Sed ecclesia Dei non solum ipsos motus transculturales pedidt sed etiam una eademque voce ad cmnes c~lturas omniaque tempora loqui potest, cum ad prius quoad se non solum ascendat sed etiam infallibiliter de ipso suo 'ascensu iudicet. Denique neque illud praetereundum ducimus, quod haec historiae analysis quam arctissirne cohaeret cum iis quae iam sint dicta de fine theologico, de actu quo finis attingitur, et de motu quo ad actum proceditur. Nihil enim hic additu"r nisi illud unumque, nempe, quam ambigua quamque aequivoca sit ilia categoria quae prius, notius, manifestius qU'oad nos annuntiat. Quo tamen addito, summis lineamentis statim elucent (r) differentiarum culturalium series quaedam historica, (2) problema transculturale et catholicum, (3) momentum viae dogmaticae quae:: ex prioribus quoad alios et alios ad priora quoad se procedat, (4) momentum viae systematicae quae ipsum prius quoad se ordinate explorat, et (5) quantum inter se differant motus transculturalis, motus theologicus, et motus dogmaticus. Quibus perspectis, via dogmatica viaque systematica non solum in proprium contextum concretum atque historicum ingredi videntur sed etiam speciale quoddam munus intra ipsum processum historicum exercere conspiciuntur.

conceptually, still it is one thing to offer a judgment on the private authority of a theologian and quite another to state the faith itself infallibly, under the guidance of the Spirit of God. 'I\'e still have to determine the great difference that exists between the general transcultural problem and that same problem as it is found in Catholicism. We have seen how historians pass with consummate skill and astuteness from one relative ~iew to another relative view, without daring to. ascend to what is prior in itselfand absolute, because philosophers propose so many and such diverse teachings. Yet the church of God not only accomplishes such transcultural movements, but also in one and the same voice it can speak to all cultures 9-nd all times. For it does ascend to what is prior in itself and, moreover, passes an infallible judgment on its own ascent. Finally, we must not overlook how intimately this analysis of history squares with what has already been said about the goal of theology, about the act whereby the goal is attained, and about the movement whereby we proceed to that act. For in this section we have added only one element to those considerations, namely, the ambiguity and equivocity of the category that announces what is prior, better known, more obvious with respect to us. Still, once this element is added, there immediately come to light in their main lines (I) a historical series of cultural differences, (2) the Catholic transcultural problem, (3) the importance of the dogmatic way that proceeds from what is prior for so and so to what is prior in it:self, (4) the importance of the systematic way that explores in an ordered fashion what is prior in itself, and (5) how great a difference there is between transcultural movements, theological movements, and dogmatic movements. And once all this is grasped, the dogmatic way and the systematic way will be seen not only to enter·.~nto their proper concrete historical context, but also are perceived to exercise a special t.ask within the historical process itself.

Sectio Octava: Motus Historici Consideratio Ulterior

8 A Further Consideration of the Historical Move:rnent

Postquam diversos motus secunduI? diversos terminos distinximus, iam ipse motus, prout inter terminos procedit, considerari debet. Cumque de motu intellectuali agatur, illud in primis perspici oportet quod fieri non potest ut ipsi viri, quantumvis acuti, qui intellectualiter moveantur,. clare et distincte proprium motum intelligant. Omnis eniro motus ex fine intelligitur; et ideo qui finem non intelligit in quem movetur, motum in hune finem intelligere non potest. lam vera qui motu intellectuali movetur, in scientiam tamquam in finem movetur; quam sane

We have distinguished different movements on the basis of their different starting points and goals. Now we have to consider movement itself as it proceeds from the starting point to the goal. Since the issue concerns intellectual movement, we have first to grasp that, no matter how intelligent the people involved in such a movement may be, they cannot understand their own movement clearly and distinctly. Every movement is understood from its goal, and so those who do not understand the goal to which they are moved cannot understand the movement to this goal. Now those who are involved in an intellectual movement are being moved to knowledge as goal, and as long as they are in movement, they do not



88


89

scientiam nondum habet, quamdiu movetur; quam ob caus~ clare et distincte apprehendere non potest quemnam in finem moveatur; et ideo, fine parum intellecto, ipsum mdtum in finem parum intelligere potest. Quapropter haud mirandum est quod Romani Pontifices et ecc1esiae Patres maximique theologi, quamvis per ipsos theologiae et dogmatum evolutio effecta sit, parum emnino de ipsa hac evolutione loquuntur. Inter opera eoim humana, alia sunt quae prius intelliguntur quam fiant, alia autem quae prius fieri debent quam intelligi passint; et huiusmodi sane est omnis motus intellectualis. Attamen, quae praeter humanam intentionem fiunt, intentionem divinam minime excedunt. Qui eoim per revelationem, particulari cuidam culturae accommodatam, fundavit ecclesiam universalisticam, non solum transculturale perspexit problema sed etiam eiusdem probler.natis solutionem praeparavit, inspiravit, gubernavit. Quod si quis ad hane divinam intentionem attenderit, ei arduum nimis non erit evolutionem theologicam atque dogmaticam ex ipsa hac evolutione intelligere. Quodcumque enim factum est, Deo gubernante factum est. Quod si bonum factum est, Deo positive volente factum est; sin autem malum factum est, Deo permittente factum est. Sed definitiones infallibiles certo sunt bonae; haereses certo sunt malae; quae tamen duae non solum opponuntur sed etiam eatenus in,.. ter se connectuntur quatenus secundum intentionem humanam ahera est alterius occasio et remedium, et quatenus secundum divinam intentionem ideo malum permittitur ut ex ipso malo bonum maius educatur. Quam ob causam, si singulae definitiones infallibiles sunt bonae, maius sane bonum est tota definitionum series,_ quae est ipsa dogmatum evolutio. Si singulae haereses sunt malae, maius malum est tota haeresium series. Quod si malum non permittitur nisi propter bonum maillS, ma,ius malum non permittitur nisi propter bonum maximum. Maximum ergo bonum est dogmatum evolutio, quam Deus operatus est priusquam de ea cogitaverint homines.

Quae cum generaliora sint, magis particulariter sunt declaranda. Quattuor ergo seligimus exempla, quorum primum est homoousion in quo solemniter relinquitur prius scripturisticum, alterum est dyphysismus chalcedonensis in quo tacite relinquitur prius patristicum, tertium est conflictus mediaevalis inter augustinismum et aristotelismum ex quo de facto systematice ad prius quoad se proceditur, quartum denique est subsequens incertitudo methodologica per quam suadetur ut accuratius perpendantur habitudines inter prius scripturisticum et prius systematicum.



yet have the knowledge. Therefore they cannot clearly and distinctly grasp what goal they are moving toward; and if they do not so understand the goal, they do not so understand the movement toward the goal. Thus, there is nothing surprising about the fact that popes and Fathers of the church and the greatest theologians have had practically nothing to say about the dl;velopment of theology and of dogma, even though they were the ones who. effected the development. Some human achievements are understo.od before they h~ppen; while others have first to happen before they can be understood. Every intellectual movement is of the latter kind. Still,. what happens beyond the range of every human intention is hardly beY0nd God's intention. The God who founded a universal church through a revelation accommodated to a particular. culture has not only grasped the transcultural proqlem but also has prepared, inspired, and guided its solution. It will not be particularly difficult for one who attends to this divine intention to understand theological and dogmatic deVelopment from that development itself For whatever has happened has happened under God's governance. If something good has happened, it has happened in virtue of God positively willing it; but if something evil has happened, it has happened with God simply allowing it to happen. But i·nfallible definitions are certainly good, and heresies are certainly evil; and yet definitions and heresies are not just opposed to each other but also connected with each other. For in the realm of human intention ·heresy is the occasion of definitions, and definitions are the remedy for heresy, and in the realm of God's intention evil is allowed so that from the very evil there may be drawn a greater good. Thus, if individual infallible definitions are good, the whole series of definitions, that is, the very development of dogma itself, is a still greater good. If individual heresies are evil, the whole series of heresies is a still greater evil. But if evil is allowed only for the sake of a greater good, then a greater evil is allowed onlY' for the sake of a very great good. The very great good in this case, then, is the development of dogma that proceeded under God's guiding action even before human beings gave it any thought. That is all very general. To move to particulars, we select four examples. The first is homoousion, in which in a solemn definition the 'scriptural prior' is left behind. The second is Chalcedon's two-natures doctrine, in which in a more tacit manner the 'patristic prior' is left behind. The third is the medieval conflict between Augustinianism and Aristotelianism, from which de facto there developed the systematic shift to what is prior in itself. The fourth, finally, is the subsequent methodological uncertainty, which urges us to examine more accurately the relations between the 'scriptural prior' and the 'systeqJatic prior.'


90



91

Primo igitur in controversia ariana, quae per maximam partern saeculi quarti exaestuabat, alia erat quaestio aperte posita atque primaria, utrum Filius Dei fuerit creatura, et alia erat quaestio secundaria et quodammodo lateus, utrum positiva et obligatoria fidei confes-

tury, there was one question that was primary and was posed openly, namely, 'Is

sio 'aliis vocibus uti possit praeter eas quae in sacris scripturis legantur. lam vero, circa hane

and somehow remained hidden, namely, 'Can an explicit and obligatory profes-

quaestionem secundariam, de facto concilium Nicaenum voce, homoousion, usum est; et de

sion of faith employ wo;rds other than those that we read in the sacred scriptures?'

First, then, in the Arian controversy that raged through most of the fourth centhe Son of God a creature?' And there was_another question that was secondary

facto, post concilium Nicaenum acceptum" numquam dubitatum est alias voces praeter

Now in fact, as regards this secondary question, the Council of Nicea did use the

scripturisticas in symbolis fidei adhiberi. De facto ergo stabilitum est licite transiri ex priori

word homoousion. And in fact, after the Council was accepted, there was never any

quoad nos scripturistico ad aliud quod quoad se sit prius. Qua tamen in.re quantum divinae

doubt about using nonscriptural language in the symbols of faith. That means

providentiae intentio intentiones humanas excedat, ex eo perspicitur quod ne S. Athanasius quidem tale principium generale affirmaverit; cum enim decreta Nicaenae synodi defend-

that in fact there was firmly established the legitimacy of a shift from the scrip-

eret, non methodum quandam dogma6cam vel theologicam defendebat sed exceptionem.

. of diVine providence exceeds human intentions is evident from the fact that even

turaf 'prior to us' to something that is prior in itself. Yet how greatly the intention

Satius esse ducebat omnem fidei confessionem vocibus scripturisticis fieri, sed quo efficacius

Athanasius would not have affirmed such a general principle. When he defended

exstirparetur haeresis ariana, homoousion necessarium contendebat.

the decrees of Nice a, he was not defending any dogmatic or theological method, but an exception. He thought it was quite satisfactory that every confession of faith be made in scriptural language, but he contended that homoousion was necessary to root out more effectively the Arian heresy.

Qua de causa, etiam post concilium Nicaenum fieri potuit ut ille salus transitus credatur licitus qui a priori quoad nos scripturistico ad prius quoad nos patristicum pro~edat. Et

Thus, even after Nicea it remained possible to believe that the only licit transition is one that proceeds from a scriptural 'prior for us' to a patristic 'prior for us.'

ita opinabatur Severus Antiochenus qui, cum apud patres viderit vocem, natura, nihil aliud

That is what Severus of Antioch thought. Since he found that the Fathers used

significare quam ens concretum atque completum, ut omnis natura etiam suppositum sit,

the word 'nature' to mean a complete, concrete being, so that every nature is also

unam tantum naturam in Christo Deo et homine agnovit, et ipsum concilium Chalcedo-

a supposit, he acknowledged only one nature in Christ God and man, and so he

nense tamquam nestorianum impugnavit. Qua de causa, non ob errorem christologicum

rejected the Council of Chalcedon as Nestorian. It would seem, then, that what

a fide defecisse hi monophysitae videnturS5 sed potius quia propter errorem methodolog-

happened in the case of these Monophysites is not that they defected from the

icum ecclesiae concilioque oecumenico obtemperare noluerunt. At haec monophysitarum

faith because of a christological error,55 but that they refused to comply with the

causa adeo obscura erat, ut haud prohibere potuerit quominus alii crederent numquam

church and the ecumenical council because of a methodological error. Yet the

prius scripturisticum esse relinquendum nisi ad prius patristicum transiretur.

case -of the Monophysites was so unclear that it could not keep others from believing that a 'scriptural prior' should never be abandoned except for a transition to

Tertium ergo sit exemplum mediaevalis conflictus inter augustinianos et ari~totelicos. Quem, Romam scribeos, sic descripsit Ioannes Peckham,

O.F.M.,

archiep. Cantuar.:

a 'patristic prior.' And so we have the third example: the medieval conflict between the Augus-

tinians and the Aristotelians. John Peckham, O.F.M., Archbishop of Canterbury, described the dispute in a letter to Rome:

.. et ut sacrosancta Romana ecclesia attendere dignaretur, quod cum doctrina

... and that the Holy Roman Church might please notice how the teaching of the

duorum ordinum in omnibus dubitabilibus sibi pene penitus hodie adversetur;

two orders [Franciscans and Dominicans] is almost completely opposed today on

cumque doctrina alterius eorundem, abiectis et ex parte vilipensis sanctorum

every debatable question. The teaching of one of these orders rejects and often 55 See]. Lebon, 'La christologic du monophysisme syrien,' in Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichfi: und Gegenwart, ed. Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht, vol. I (Wurzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951) 576-80.



De Fine, ardine, Modo Dicendi

93

sententiis, philosophicis dogrnatibus quasi totaliter innitatur, ut plena sit idolis domus Dei et ianguore, quem praedixit Apostolus, pugnantium quaestionum; quantum inde futuris: temporibus poterit ecclesiae periculum imminere. Quid enim magis necessarium, quam fractis columnis aedificium cadere; quam vilipensis authenticis doctoribus Augustino et caeteris, foedum venire principem et veritatem succumbere falsitati?5 6

Qua in descriptione inter duas intellectus operationes satis distinxisse non videtur auctor. Aliud enim est quaerere quid sit, aliud autem est quaerere an sit. Quod si in hac secunda operatione sanctorum sententias abicis et philosophicis dogrnatibus quasi totaliter inniteris, a fide sane deficis. Sin autem de fide nulla iam est quaestio, si ad sola dubitabilia restringitur totus confiictus, quemaclmodum fieri potest ut domus Dei impleatur idolis, ut vilipendeantur doctores authentici ut Augustinus, ut alterius ordinis doctrina philosophicis dogrnatibus quasi totaliter innitatur? Ea sola lege haec omnia conciliantur ut testem habeamus parum acutum quamvis, uti videtur, non minus acutum forte quam alii eiusdem aetatis. Non enlln reapse agebatur de veris sed de intelligentia, neque de intelligentia philosophica sed de theologica, cum illud perfecerit saeculum XIII ut, edam inter augustinianos, ex priori quoad fideles scripturisti~o et patristico, ad prius quoad se theologicum et systematicum transiretur.

Quod enim factum est in concilio Nicaeno cum homoousion sit definitum, .quod factum est in concilio Cha1cedonensi cum duae Christi naturae sint affirmatae, circa omnia fere vera revelata factum est per theologos mediaevales inquirentes, disputantes, distinguentes, determinantes. Praeterea, sicut homoousion fidem non destruit sed salvat, sicut duae Christi naturae fidem non destruunt sed statuunt, ita etiam (quamvis uti patet, sine auctoritate conciliari) priora quoad se in medio aevo quaesita et inventa fidem ordinant, protegunt, defendunt. Praeterea, sicut vel rationalismo vel relativismo historico indt:llget qui homoousion mere philosophicum vel dyphysismum mere hellenisticum iudicat, ita proprie theologica erat problematica mediaevalis seu integer ille quaestionum solutionumque complexus qui tantum tamque profunde in subsequentia concilia interdum inftuxisse perspicitur.

The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking contemns the positions of saintly authors. It rests almost entirely on philosophical dogmas. Thus, the house of God becomes filled with idols and With the futility of disP1ited questions foretold by the apostle. Great danger lies ahead on that route for the church of future generations. Smash the pillars and the house will fall. Nothing is more inevitable: Despise the teachings of Augustine and other authentic doctors, and in will come the prince of evil as truth collapses before falsehood. 56

The author seems to have failed to distinguish adequately the two different operations of the mind. Asking 'What is it?' is different from asking 'Is it so?' If, in answering this second question, you do indeed cast aside the teachings of the saints and for all practical purposes depend entirely on philosophical presuppositions, no doubt you do stray from the faith. But if faith is not the issue, if the argument is entirely about questions that really are debatable, how is it possible that the house of God is being filled with idols, or that authentic teachers like Augustine are being :contemned, or that the teaching of one of the orders rests almost exclusively on philosophical dogmas? The only ground for such comments seems to be that the commentator was not a sagacious witness, although he was probably no less sagacious than others of the same period. The issue in these debatable questions was not truth but understanding, and not philosophical but theological understanding. The achievement of the thirteenth century, even among the Au-gustinians, was the transition from what was prior for the scriptural and patristic peopl~ of faith to the theological and systematic 'prior in itself.' What Nicea did in defining homoousion, what Chalcedon did in affirming two natures in Christ, this the thirteenth-century theologians, inquiring, disputing, distinguishing, settling their questions, did for almost all revealed truths. Moreover, as homoo?;sion does not destroy the faith but preserves it, as the doctrine of two natures does not destroy the faith but stabilizes it, so in the same way (though, of course without the authority of church councils) the prior in itself, sought and found in the Middle Ages" orders the faith, protects it, defends it. Again, just as homoousion was more than something merely philosbphical and the doctrine of the two natures more than merely Hellenistic - to claim otherwise would be in the first insta~ce rationalism and in the second historical relati:vism - so the medieval problematic, that integrated complex of questions and answers that at times has manifestly had so great and so profound an influence on later councils, was properly theological.

56 F. Ehrle, John Peckham aber den Kampf des Augustinismus und Aristotelis~us in der zweiten HaIfte des 13.Jhs.,' Zeitschriftfor katholische Theologie 13 (1889) 181.



94


95

At aliud erat scripturistica et patristica priora et notiora ad theologicum et systematicum prius et notius reducere, aliud longe erat accurate atgue exacte perspicere quemadrnodum

inter se comparentur hoc et ilia. Etsi eoim omnes theologi, sive Augustinum propius sequi dictitarent sive Aristotele uterentur, aliquam reductionem ad priora quoad se peragerent,

ipse tamen interminatus inter eos confiictus satis demonstrat quam obscure quamque

con~

fuse intimam quaestionis rationem et veram disputationis causam perspexerint. Quam ob rem, nerno mirari potest posteriores theologos circa methodologicum problema non parum

vel vacillari vel aberrare potuisse.

Quartum ergo nobis exemplum sit ipsa haec incertitudo. Quam eni~ arcte priora quoad se et priora quoad nos inter se connectantur, satis superius diximus: quorum scilicet via analytica est inventio atque probatio, eorundem prorsus via synthetica est sapienter ordi~ nata expositio. At si intima haec coruunctio et interdependentia vel praetermittuntur vel minus clare perspiciuntur, sequitur tum speculationem in systemata tendere quae, quasi anima a corpore separata, fontes positivos negligant, tum ipsas inquisitiones positivas, di~ rectione atque integratione privatas, vel huc illuc vagari vel per modum ingentis cuiusdam acervi iacere inertes. lam vera tripliciter abitur in systematicum quin synthesis attingatur. Primo enim, adeo dominari potest ancilla philosophica ut theologi prolixius in quaestionibus occupentur quae ex radice philosophica dependeant. Deinde, quamvis tum ad speculativa tum ad pos!tiva attendatur, fieri potest ut magis iuxtapositio vel mixtio attingatur quam coniunctio atque synthesis. Tertio denique, adeo exaggerari potest ipsum systema ut positiva superfluant cum demonstrari possint. Quarum prima tendentia in decadentia saec. XIV et xv maxime conspicitur, quarnvis deinceps theologiam vexare haud desiverit. Altera autem tendentia oritur inquantum ad ancillae dominationem ai::lditur necessitas apologetica. Tertia denique in semirationalismo saec. XIX apparuit, cuius vita brevis concilio Vaticano I interempta est.

Tripliciter pariter, cum synthesis defuerit, in re positiva aberratur. Primo enim, suadet archaismus ut, recentiori saltern synthesi reiecta, ad stadium quoddam christianismi an~ tiguius, simplicius, purius redeatur. Deinde autem, suadet futurismus ut, tam antiguiori quam recentiori synthesi spreta, novus quidam atgue inauditus omnium conspectus ac~ ceptetur. Tertio denique, accedunt qui, tot tantisque theoriis mente defatigati, ita certi~ tudinem quaerant ut omnem intelligentiam excludant. lam vero novatores saec. XVI et posteriores pietistae archaismum scripturisticum extolle~ bant; baianistae et iansenistae archaismum patristicum et augustinianum valebant; neque



Nevertheless, to resolve what is prior and better knovm for scriptural and patristic writers into the theological and systematic 'prior and better known' is not at all the same as grasping accurately and exactly how the two are related to each other. For even if all theologians, both those who insisted they were more closely folIow~ ing Augustine and those who used Aristotle, were engaged in a certain amount of resolution into what is prior in itself, still the endless conflict between them is evidence enough of how obscurely and confusedly they grasped the inner intelligibility of the question and the true cause of the dispute. For that reason we should not be s\ltprised that later theologians could be either quite uncertain or even in error regarding the methodological problem. And so our fourth example lies in this very uncertainty. We said enough above about the c~ose connection between what is prior in itself and what is prior for us: what the way of analysis discovers and demonstrates is entirely the same as what the way of synthesis wisely orders. But if this intimate link and interdependence are overlooked or not clearly grasped, the consequence is both that speculation will tend to issue in systems that, like souls without bodies, neglect the positive sources, and that positive investigations, deprived of direction and integration, will wander aimlessly hither and thither or like some huge mass lie there in complete inertia. There are three ways of making the transition to the systematic without achieving a synthesis. First, the philosophical handmaid can be so dominant that theologians are occupied at great length with questions that at root are philosophical. Second, theulogians can attend to both speculative and positive issues but achieve, not a joining and a synthesis, but just a juxtaposition and an aggregate. Third, system itSdf can be so exaggerated that positive elements become superfluous, since they ca~ be demonstrated. The first tendency can be seen quite clearly in the decadenc~ of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but it also troubled later theology. The second tendency occurs when apologetic exigencies combine with philosophical domination. The third tendency appeared in nineteenth-century semirationalism, whose short life was ended by the Fir~t Vatican Council. In parallel fashion, when synthesis is lacking there are three ways of going astray on the positive side. The first is an archaism that tempts people to reject at least the later syntheses and return to a more ancient, simple, pure stage of Christianity. The second is·a futurism that tempts people to bypass earlier and later syntheses alike and to accept some new and as yet unheard-of overview of everything. The third is the tendency of those whose minds are so exhausted by a plethora of weighty theories that they settle for certitude and exclude all understanding. Now the sixteenth-century Reformers and the later Pietists extolled a scriptural archaism; the followers ofBaius andJansenius wanted a patristic and Augustinian


96


97

The Goat, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking

Quibus positis, stabilitur fundamentum unde dominationi ancillae philosophicae resisti possit. Excluditur pariter ea notio quae theologiam meram mixtionem velit, quasi scilicet theologia, propriis principiis privata, in solis conclusionibus consisteret, quae sive ex revelatis solis sive ex revelatis et philosophicis simul deducerentur. Excluditur denique illa tendentia positivistica quae omnem intelligentiam praetermittendam ducat.

archaism; nor are theologians of our own age immune from the same tendency, who so praise bibncal or patristic theology that they almost seem to prefer to omit all later theology. Next, futurism is seen in liberals and modernists) who suggest that not only Catholics and Protestants but also the Fathers of the church and the New Testament authors themselves were mistaken regarding the true nature of the C~ristian religion. Finally, the third error consists, not in the division of labor within positive studies, which is quite proper, nor in insisting on a solid analytic foundation for the way of synthesis, which is also quite proper, but in so highly esteeming the necessity and solidity of the positive path as to end up with a positivistic exclusion of speculation. The understanding of mysteries taught by the First Vatican Council is opposed to all of these aberrations. Because there is an understanding of mysteries, there is a strictly theological understanding. Because there is a strictly theological understanding, ther.e· are also concepts that express this understanding and principles that will be ut,tered in these concepts. Because there are concepts and principles that originate from a strictly theological understanding, the proper object of theology, its, proper method, and its proper field of activity are vindicated. Once these points are grasped, a stable foundation is provided for resisting the domination of philosophy. On the same basis, the notion that theology is a mere aggregate, as if theology had no principles of its own and consisted only in conclusions drawn from revelation alone or from revelation and philosophy"is ruled out. And the positivistic tendency to neglect all understanding is also ruled

Proinde, quia haec intelligentia theologica decursu saeculorum augetur, excluduntur tum archaismus qui posteriorem intelligentiam illegitimam arbitretur, tum etiam anachronismus qui posteriorem intelligentiam extitisse fingat priusquam de facto extiterit.

out. Again, since this theological understanding increases age after age, there are ruled out both the archaism that regards later understanding as illegitimate and the anachronism that imagines that later understanding existed much earlier than

. ab hac tendentia immunes sunt recentissimi, qui ita theologiam vel biblicam vel patristicam praediccnt ut omnem posteriorem theologiam fere omissam velint. Futurismus deinde conspicitur in liberalibus et modernistis, qui de vera indole religionis christianae errasse arbitrentur non solum catholicos et protestantes sed etiam patres ecclesiae et ipsos novi testamenti auctores. Tertius denique error consistit, non in eo quod vel rite dividitur positivae inquisitionis labor vel rite ponitur viae syntheticae fundamentum analyticum atgue certum, sed in eo quod tanti aestimatur viae positivae necessitas atgue soliditas, ut ad positivisticam quandam speculationis exclusionem perveniatur.

Quibus aberrationibus omnibus opponitur illa mysteriorum intelligentia quam docuit concilium Vaticanum. Quia enim datur mysteriorum intelligentia, datur intelligentia stricte theologica. Quia datur intelligentia stricte theologica, dantur etiam conceptus qui hanc in~ telligentiam exprirnant et principia quae his in conceptibus fundentur. Quia dantur tum conceptus tum principia quae ex intelligentia stricte theologica oriuntur, vindicantur theologiae proprium obiectum, propria methodus, proprius campus.

Praeterea, quia ecclesiae declarationes et definitiones per Spiritus sancti assistentiam infallibiles sunt, intelligentia theologica, inquantum in has declarationes et definitiones intrat, mutationem non admittit. 57 Quare inventiones quas futuristicas nominavimus exc;luduntur. Denique tandem, quia intelligentia theologica imperfecta est, exduditur rationalismus et semirationalismus. Motus ergo historici quattuor consideravimus exempla: (I) homoousion Nicaenum in quo prius scripturisticum derelinquitur; (2) dyphysismum Chalcedonensem in

in fact it did. Moreover, because declarations and definitions of the church are protected from error tfirough the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the theological understanding that truly enters into these declarations and definitions will not change. 57 And so the figments that we have named 'futurism' are ruled out. Finally, since theological understanding is imperfect) rationalism and semirationalism are also ruled out. We have examined four examples of historical movement: (I) the homoousion of Nicea, in which the 'scriptural prior' was left behind; (2) the 'wo natures) doctrine 57 [' ... mutationem non admittit.' While writing 'Doctrinal Pluralism' several years later, Lonergan changed his terminology; from speaking of 'immutability' he moved to speaking of 'permanence of meaning.'J



98


99

quo prius patristicum derelinquitur; (3) mediaevalem conflictum inter augustini~ anas et aristotelicos in quo ad prius quoad se et systematicum proceditur; et (4) subsequentem incertitudinem methodologicam in qua aureum medium inter aberrationes varias et oppositas cernitur. In quibus omnibus illud maxime perspicitur quod aliud est dogmatum evalutionem efficere et aliud est candem evolutionem intendere. Non erat intentio concilii Nicaeni ut communiter a priori scripturistico ad prius systematicum rccedi possit. Neque erat intentio concilii Chalcedonensis, ut communiter a priori patristico ad prius systematicum recedi passit. Neque t,heologi mediaevales tam augustiniani quam aristotelici disputaverunt utrum ad prius systematicum procedendum sit. Negue communi quodam consilio coniuncti ita egerunt theologi saec XIV et XV, novatores et apologetae catholici, baianistae et iansenistae, semirationalistae et traditionalistae, liberales et modernistae, ut per varias et oppositas tendentias medium eatholicum in elariori luee eonstituerent. Ipsum denique concilium Vaticanum I, non tam ulteriores eonclusiones methodologieas fundare quam' particulares errores eondemnare et salutarem Christi doetrinam affirmare volebat.

At maxime in eoneiliis oecumenicis, a Nicaeno ad Vaticanum, dogmatum evolutio effeeta est. Aliud tamen est singulas definitiones seorsum intendere, quod sane in singulis conciliis peraetum est. Aliud autem est totam illam definitionum atque decIarationum seriem intendere iri qua dogmatum evolutio perspicitur; haec enim ipsius seriei intentio vires humanas ita excedit ut tamen Deo intendente, volente, gubernante, imo infallibiliter assistente, effecta sit. Neque cur efficiatur obscurum est, cum necessarium fuerit ut ecclesia Dei eatholiea atgue uni~ersalis divinam revelationem catholice et universaliter exprimere possit. Quam dogmatum evolutionem concomitatur augmentum intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae. Aliguid enim intelligit, qui imperfecte vel hornoousion vel transsubstantiationem intelligit. Quae qui intelligit, aliguid plus intelligit quam illi qui de consubstantialitate vel transsubstantiatione numquam clare et distincte cogitaverint. Sed ubi plus intelligitur, augetur sane intelligentia. Ubi ex aucta intelligentia deducuntur conclusiones, augetur scientia. Quo plura intelliguntur et sciuntur, eo magis ad earn sapientiam acceditur quae omnia ordinat atque iudicat. Denique tandem, cum rerum divinarum sapientia Deo propria sit, ne sapien tissimi quidem theologi est de divinis judicare absolute, sed suum iudicium submittat necesse ~st ad eum cui Deus his in terris infallibilitatem promisit.



ofChalcedon, in which the 'patristic prior' was left behind; (3) the medieval conflict between AUgU:stinians and Aristotelians, in which a move was made to a systematic 'prior in itself; and (4) the subseque~t methodological uncertainty, in which we discerned a golden mean between various opposed aberrations. What stands out in all of this is that it is one thing to effect a development of dogma ap.d something else to intend the same development. It was not the intention of the Council of Nicea to affirm a general possibility of passing from the 'scriptural prior' to the 'systematic prior.' Nor was it the intention of the Cotin'c'il of Chalcedon to affirm a general possibility of passing from the 'patristic prior' to the 'systematic prior.' The medieval theologians, whether Augustinian or Aristotelian, did not'argue whether a shift should be made to the 'systematic prior.' Nor was it a common decision of the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth·century, the Reformers and the Catholic apologists, the Baianists and the Jansenists, the semirationalists and the traditionalists, the liberals and the modernists, that by their different opposed tendencies they would place the Catholic mean in a clearer light. Even the First Vatican Council wished not so much to ground further methodological conclusions as to condemn specific errors and to affirm Christ's saving doctrine. Still, a development of dogma was brought about, especially in the ecumenical councils from Nitea to Vatican 1. But it is one thing to intend the individual de~nitions, one llt a time, as each of the councils undoubtedly did, and it is quite another thing to intend the entire series of definitions and declarations in which the development of dogma can be seen. To intend that entire series surpasses human powers; nevertheless, it was brought about by God's intention, will, governance, and infallible assistance. And the reason why it was brought about is not obscure: it was necessary if the Catholic and universal church of God is to be able to express God's revelation in a Catholic and universal way. An increase in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom accompanies the development of dogma, One who understands imperfectly hornoousion or transubstantiation does understand something - something more than those who may never have reflected seriously on either consubstantiality or transubstantiation. But where more is understood, obviously understanding increases. Then if conclusions are drawn from this increased understanding, knowledge increases as well. The more things there are that are understood and known, the more is progress made toward that wisdom that orders and judges all things. Indeed, since ultimate wisdom about divine matters belongs to God alone, it is not given even to the wisest theologian to pass judgment on divine matters in any absolute fashion; rather, it is necessary for theologians to submit their judgments to the one to whom God has promised infallibility on this earth.

Collected

Works of Bernard

Lonergan

100


101

Dogmatum denique evolutionem et intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae augmentum ita Deus per instrumenta ministerialia efficit ut a suo fine attingendo deficere non possit Si enim abundant qui verum intelligibile diligant, tunc sane crescit et multum vehementerque proficit tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia. Si autem veri intelligibilis refrigescit dilectio, in falsam intelIigibilitatis speciem aberrant homines; multiplicantur problemata; suadentur solutiones falsae; oriuntur haereses; ut denique tandem, qui dilectione bani non rnoveantur, saltern per mala ingravescentia compellantur. Quam ob causam, sive verum intelligibile volumus, sive nolurnus, minime impediri potest ilIud augrnentum quod Deus intendit et viis suis inscrutabilibus efficaciter producit. Quae cum ita sint, ex quo incepimus, ad Aquinatern redeamus. Nostris enim temporibus non desunt quos ad disputationes rnagistrales theologiamque speculativam parum moveat ilIud argumentum quod, eiusmodi disputationibus omissis, auditor 'nihil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret, sed vacuus abscedet.' Quos tamen abstractum scientiae nomen hon convincit, concreta forte scientiae realitas allicere potest. De ilia enim mysteriorum intelligentia agitur quam non solum pedetentim in ecclesiae historia sese evolventem vidimus sed etiam ab ipsa divina intentione esse adhibitam ut revelatio, particulari mentalitati accommodata, expositionem universalem catholicamque accipiat.


Finally, God through ministerial instruments brings about the development of dogma and the increase of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in such a way that the goal God intends cannot fail to be attained. If there are many love:s of intelligible truth, then clearly the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of one and all, of individuals as well as of the whole church, grows and makes great and vigorous progress. But if the love of intelligible truth grows cold, people are led astray by the false appearance of intelligibility; problems are multiplied; false solutions are urged; heresies arise; and the final result is that those who are not mov~'a by love of the good .'~u dicitur quidquam de termino immanenter producto sive 'per amorem sive per levitatem ignis.

c. Gent., IV, 19 §7: Cum autem ostensum sit quod amatum necesse est aliqualiter esse in voluntate amantis; ipse autem Deus seipsum amat: necesse est quod ipse Deus sit in sua voluntate ut amatum in amante. Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur; amare autem quoddam velIe est; velle autem Dei est eius esse ... Unde oportet quod Deus, secundum quod consideratur ~t in sua voluntate existens, sit vere et substantialiter Deus.

Ubi notabis: amatum esse in arnante secundum quod amatur, non secundum quod aliquid per amorem intra voluntatem producitur; neque valeret argumen~ tum si aliud esset velIe et aliud ex actu volendi productum esset 'amatqm in amante.' De Malo, q. 6, a. I ad 13m: ." amordicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam. Quare 'amatum in amante' per amorem constituitur inquanturn movetur amans in amatum" et non inquantum aliquid producitur intra voluntatem per

amorem. Compo theal., c. 49: ... id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu ametur, pracedit et ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili

The

Robert Mallat Collection

An Analogical Conception of the Divine Processions

We answer by citing texts in which (I) 'the beloved' is present 'in the lover' because love is present and not because something is produced by the act oflove, (2) the analogy is explicitly posited in the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word just as love proceeds in us from our mental word, (3) the Holy Spirit is called proceeding Love, and (4) a procession after the manner ofa thing operated. is excluded from the will. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, ,-r4, §3560: ' ... what is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in the lover's will, yet not in the same way in the two instances. What is loved is in the intellect by reason ofa likeness of its species; but what is loved is in the will of the lover as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle through the suitability and proportion that the principle has to the term. Just so, a higher level is, in a way, in a flame by reason of the lightness according to which it possesses the proportion and suitability to such a level; but the generated flame is in the generating flame through the likeness of its form.' From this, one will conclude: just as the higher level is in a flame by reason of lightness, which is the principle of motion toward the higher level, so the beloved is in the lover by reason oflove, which is the principle of motion toward the beloved. Nowhere in the text is anything said concerning a term immanently produced, either by love or by the lightness of the flame. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, '7, §3563: ' ... it has been shown that i't is necessary that the beloved be in some way in the will of the lover. But God loves himself. It is necessary, then, that God himself be in God's own will as the beloved in the lover. But what is loved is in the lover inasmuch as it is loved; an act of love is a kind of act of will; God's act of willing is God's own act of existence ... Hence, it must be that God, inasmuch as he is considered as existing within his own will, is truly and substantially God.' In this passage one will note: the beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is loved, not inasmuch as something is produced in the will by love; the argument would not be valid if the act of willing were orie thing and 'the beloved in the lover' produced from the act of willing were another. De malo, q. 6, a. I, ad 13m: ' ... love is said to transform the lover into the beloved inasmuch as the lover is moved by love toward the very object that is loved.' Therefore, 'the beloved in the lover' is constituted by love inasmuch as the lover is moved toward the beloved, and not inasmuch as something is produced within the will by love. Compendium theologiae, c. 49: ' ... what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved. The fact that an object is actUally loved proceeds from the lover's capacity to love, and also from the lovable good actually understood.


224

225

De Divinis Processionibus Analogice Concipiendis

actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est amatum esse in amante, ex duobus procedit: scilicet ex principio amativo et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili. Qui locus determinat tum id quo constituitur 'amatum in amante' tum ea ex quibus procedit 'amatum in amante'i neque adeo detorqueri potest ut asseratur 'amatum in amante' produci per amorem, non produci per verbum, esse aliud. ac ipse amor. Saepius autem alibi docetur Spiritum procedere a Verba, skut amor ex verba mentali:

In I Sent., d.

II,

q.

I,

a.

I

ad 4ffi: ... a Verbo procedit Spiritus sanctus, sicut a verbo

mentali arnor. Ibid. d. 27, q. 2, a. I sol.: ... quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet ... aut non placet. Cf. In

III de Anima, lect. 4 §634 s. C. Gent.,

IV,

24, § 12: Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi

verba cordis illud coneipiamus. Ibid. IV, 19, §8: Quod autem aliquid sit in'voluhtate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quendam habet ad eoneeptioneJ!l qua ab intellectu eo~eipitur, et ad ipsam rem cuius intellectualis conceptio dicitur verbum: non eniro amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo eognoseeretur ." Neeesse est igitur quod amor quo Deus est in voluntate divina ut amatum in amante, et a Verba Dei, et a Deo cuius est Verbum procedat.

De Pot., q. 9, a. 9 ad 3m (2ae ser.): nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconcipiatur; et sic oportet quod ille qui proeedit per modum voluntatis sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens distinguatl.!-r ab eo, Cf. ibid. q. 10,

a. 2 c.; ad 2m; ad '7m; a. 4 e. Ibid. q. 10, a. 5: Non enim potest esse nee intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est intellectu praeconceptum; unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura. Sum. theal., I, q. 36, a. 2 c: Neeesse est autern quod arnor a verbo procedat: non enirn aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus sanctus procedat a Filio. C( ibid. q. 27, a. 3 ad 3m , Camp. theal., e. 49.



Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is in the one loving proceeds' from two principles: from the loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible, which is the word that has beeh conceived concerning the lovable.' This 'passage determines both what constitutes 'the beloved in the lover' and that from which 'the beloved in the lover' proceeds; and, indeed, it c'annot be so twisted as to assert that 'the beloved in the lover' is produced by love; not by the word, and is different from love itself. Rather, in other passages St Thomas quite frequently teaches that the Spi;it proceeds from the Word as love proceeds from a mental word. Super I Sententiarnm, d. II, q. I, a. I, ad 4m: ' ... the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word.' Ibid. d. '27, q. '2, a. I soL: ' ... since there can be two apprehensions, either of truth by itself or of truth as expanded to take in th~ good and the fitting - and this latter is a complete apprehension - hence there are two words, namely, of something pleasing that is set forth, a word that spirates love - and this is a complete word and the word of something also that displeases ... or does not please.' See In III de Anima, leet. 4, §§634-35. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 24, ~I2, §36I7: :For love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart.' Ibid. c. 19, ~8, §3564: 'But that something is in the will as what' is loved is in the lover (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it and to the thing itself whose conception by the intellect is called the word: for nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known ... It is necessary, therefore, that the love by which God is in the divine will as ti}e beloved in the lover proceed both from the Word of God and from God whose Word he is.' De potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2nd series): ' ... nothing can be loved whose word is not first conceived in the intellect; hence, the one who proceeds by way of the will must be from the one who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently is distinguished from that one.' See ibid. q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 2m; ad 7m; a. 4 c. Ibid. q. 10, a. 5: 'It cannot be, nor can it be understood, that there is a love for something that has not first been conceived by the intellect; therefore, every love is from some word, when one is speaking of love in an intellectual nature.' Summa theologiae, I, q. 36, a. 2 c.: 'It is necessary that love proceed from the word: for we do not love anything except inasmuch as we apprehend it iri a mental conception. Accordingly, from this taO it is clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.' See ibid. q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m; Compendium theologiae, c. 49.


226

De Divinis Processionibus Analogice Concipiertdis

227


De Rat. Fidei ad Cantorem A~tiach., c. 4: Manifestum est autem quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus. Conceptio autem intellectus est verbum, unde oportet quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filium, ex quo patet Spiritum sanctum esse a Filio.

De rationibusfidei cantra Saracenas, Graecos et Annenos ad Cantorem Antiochiae, c. 4: 'It is clear that we are able to love nothing with an intellectual and holy love that we do not actually conceive by means of the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is the word; hence, it is necessary that love come forth from the word. Now, we say that the Word of God is the Son; it is clear, then, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.'

Sicut ergo amor e verbo procedit, ita Spiritus sanctus e Verbo divino procedit; unde mirum non est S. Thomam docuisse Spiritum sanctum esse ipsum Amorem procedentem et non aliquid aliud quod per Amorem procedentem producitur.

Therefore, just as love proceeds from the word, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word. It is no wonder, then, that St Thomas taught that the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love itself and not something different that is produced by proceeding Love.

Sum. thea!., I, q. g7, a. I Sed contra: Ipse Spiritus sanctus est Amor. Ibid. c.: Inquantum vera his vocabulis (amore, dilectione) utimur ad exprimendam habi~ tudinern eius rei quae procedit per modum arnoris ad suum principium et e converso; ita quod per amorem intelligatur arnor procedens ... sic Amor est nomen personae. Cf. ibid. ad gm; ad 4ffi. Ibid. ~. 2 C.: Pater et Filius dicuntur diligentes Spiritu sancto vel Amore procedente. Cf.

Summa theologiae, I, q. 37, a. I, Sed contra: 'The Holy Spirit himself is· Love.' Ibid. c.: 'Insofar as we use these words (amore, dilectione) to express the relationship to its own principle of that reality which proceeds after the manner of love, and vice versa, so that by "love" proceeding love is understood ... , and so Love is the name of a person.' See ibid., ad 3m; ad 4m. Ibid. a. 2 c.: 'The Father and the Son are said to be loving through the Holy Spirit or through proceeding Love.' See ibid. ad gm; ad 4m. Ibid. q. 38, a. I C.: ' ... partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love.' Ibid. a. 2 C.: ' ... since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love.' Ibid. ad 1m.: 'The Holy Spirit because he proceeds as Love from the Father.' Moreover, as regards this comparison between the procession of the word and the procession oflove, Aquinas taught the following and never retracted it. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m: 'There is this difference between intellect and will: ' the operation of the will tenninates at things, in which there is good and evil; but the operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which there is the true and the false, as is said in Metaphysics VI Qect. 4, § 1240]. Consequently, the will does not have anything going forth from itself, except what is in it after the manner of an operation; but the intellect has in itself something tha~ goes forth from itself, not only after the manner of an operation, but also after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation.'

ibid. ad gm; ad 4111. Ibid. q. 38, a. I C.: particeps divini Verbi et procedentis Amaris. Ibid. a. 2C: ... cum Spiritus sanctus procedit ut Amor. Ibid. ad 1m: Spiritus sanctus, quia procedit a Patre ut Arnor. Quantum autem ad comparationem inter processionem verbi et processionem amaris, haec docuit neque retractavit Aquinas: De Ver., q. 4, a. 2 ad 7m: Haec alitem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus' terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum, ut dicitur in VI Metaph. [lect. 4, §I240]. Et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus .habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis sed etiam per modum rei operatae.

Unde concludes: Si nihil procedit intra voluntatem per modum operati, 'amatum in amante' constituitur et non producitur per amorem. Obicitur tamen amorem non posse a verbo procedere. Nam arnor est actus vitalis. Omnis actus vitalis ab ea potentia producitur in qua recipitur. Ergo amor producitur, non ab intellectu vel a verbo sed ab ipsa voluntate in qua recipitur. Respondetur istam sententiam de actu vitali non esse S. Thomae, uti postea in Appendice I stabilietur. Sed ultro concedimus eandem de actu vitali sententiam


Thus, one may conclude: if nothing proceeds within the will after the manner of a term of an operation, then 'the beloved in the lover' is constituted by love and not produced by love. However, it may be objected that love cannot proceed from the word. For love is a vital act. Every vital act is produced by that faculty in 'ry'hich it is received. Love, therefore, is produced, not by the intellect or by the word, but by the will itself in which it is received. Our response is that this opinion concerning the vital act is not that of St Thomas, as we will establish later in appendix I. But we concede without hesitation


228

229

De Divinis Processionibus Analogice Concipiendis

optime explicare" cur Thomistae velint et probare nitantur 'amatum in amante' non constitui sed produci per amorem. Instatur tamen nostram interpretationem non satis attendere ad evolutionem 2 doctrinae S. Thomae circa processionem secundam. Cf. Bull. tlwm., X , p. 534,

§ 121 7· Respondetur superfluere hypothesin de evolutione ubi attendatur ad explicitam doctrinam S. Thomae. Explicite docuit S. Thomas: (I) secundam processionem esse amoru ex verb(J, (2) Spirit urn sanctum esse tum 'amatum in amante' tum amorem procedentem; (3) non esse processionem in voluntate nisi per modum operationis; et (4) amatum esse in amante secundum quod amatur. Quam maxime evoluta esset haec sibi cohaerens doctrina si in stadia quodam posteriori certo constaret (I) secundam processionem esse, non amoris ex verbo: sed 'amati in amante' ex amore, (2) Spiritum sanctum esse 'amatum in amante' sed non esse amorem procedentem, (3) esse in voluntate processionem per modum rei operatae, (4) amatum esse in amante, non quia ametur, sed quia ex hoc amore procedit aliquid realiter distinctum quod nominetur 'amatum in amante.'

Attamen de hac maxima evolutione adeo non certo constat ut in probationem non afferantur nisi loca in quibus forte implicite inveniri potest non tota sententia Ioannis a S. Thoma sed hoc illudve elementum.



that that opinion concerning the vital act explains very well why Thomists hold and endeavor to prove that 'the beloved in the lover' is not constituted by love but is produced by love. Nevertheless, it may be urged that our interpretation does not attend sufficiently to the development ofSt Thomas's doctrine concerning the second procession. See A. Patfoort, Review notice of B. Lonergan, Divinarum personarnm conceptio analogica in Bulletin thomiste 10:2 (1958) 534, § 1217. ' Our response is that a hypothesis concerning development is superfluous when one attends to St Thomas's explicit doctrine. St Thomas taught explicitly (I) that the. ~e~ond pr~cession is th: processio~ qf love from the word; (2) that the Holy Spmt I~ bo~ the ~el~ved In the lover and proceeding Love; (3) that the only proceSSIOn In the willIS the procession after the manner of an operation; and (4) that ~e. beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is being loved. ThIS mternally consistent doctrine would have evolved to the extreme ifin some later stage it could be proved beyond doubt (I) that the second procession is not the procession oflove from the word, but 'of the beloved in the lover' from love (2) that the Holy Spirit is 'the beloved in the lover' but is not proceeding Love, (3) that there is a procession in the will after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation, (4) that the beloved is in the lover, not because the beloved is being loved, but because something really distinct proceeds from this love which is named l the beloved in the lover.' ' However, such extreme development is so far from having been proved beyond doubt that the only texts adduced in its favor are those in which perhaps implicitly there can be f~und, not the fullness ofJohn ofSt Thomas's thought on the point, but only certam elements of it.


CAPUT TERTIUM

CHAPTER THREE

De Relationibus Divinis Realibus

The Real Divine Relations

Post quam duae divinae processiones specifice distinctae sunt conceptae, quaeritur quamnam realitatem iis attribui oporteat. Et primo concluditur quattuor esse in Deo relationes reaks, quae quidem quoad· rem cum processionibus identificantur. Deinde statuitur has relationes esse subsistentes. Tertio probatur tres subsistentes relationes realiter inter se distingui. Et quarto explicatur relationes reales divinas realiter cum divina substantia identificari sed ratione ab eadem substantia distingui. Quibus classicis assertis accedunt notae quattuor et quaestiones quinque. Notae respiciunt tum conciliaria tum explicativa, nempe, in Deo esse Trinitatem non quaternitatem, in Deo omnia esse unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio, in Deo essentialia et notionalia ratione distingui et realiter identificari, et de Deo illegitimum esse syllogismum qui per medium essentiale ex notionali ad notionale concludat. Proinde quaeritur quemadmodum rclatio possit identificari cum substantia, quemadmodum salvetur principium identitatis comparatae, quid valeat distinctio inter esse in et esse ad, utrum maior an minor sit rationis distinctio inter divinam substantiam divinasque relationes reales, utrum admittenda sit distinctio quae dicitur formalis a parte rei.


Now that we have -conceived the two specifically distinct divine processions, we must ask what reality is to be attributed to them. First, we conclude that there are in God four real relations and that these are really identical with the processions. Next, we .establish that these relations are subsistent. Third, we ShClW that three of these subsistent relations are really distinct from one another. And fourth, we explain that the real divine relations are really identical vvith the divine substance but conceptually distinct from that same substance. To these classical assertions we add four notes and five questions. The notes have to do with matters both conciliar and explanatory, namely, that in God there is a trinity and not a quaternity, that in God everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition, that in God what is essential and what is notional are conceptually distinct but really identical, and that concerning God it is illegitimate in a syllogism to argue from what is notional to what is notional using what is essential as the middle term. Accordingly, we ask how a relation can be identified with the substance, how the principle of compared identity 'can be safeguarded, what is the value of the distinction between 'being in' and 'being to,' whether the conceptual distinction between the divine substance and the real divine relations is a major or minor one, and whether the so-called 'formal distinction on the side of the realitY' is admissible.


232


233


Sententiae

Opinions

Quam antiqua sit Patrum de relationibus divinis doctrina, in parte dogmatica exponitur. 1 Mediaevales entitatem relationis divinae inquirentes, post tentamina parum felicia tum Gilberti Porretae (DB 389; cf. DS 745) tum Abbatis Ioachim de Flora (DB 431 s,), in eas pervenerunt conclusiones quae deinceps, si nominales quosdam excipias Scotique distinctionem fonnalem, factae sunt inter omnes theologos sententiae communes: videlicet, quattuor esse in Deo relationes reales et quidem subsistentes; quarum tres realiter inter se distingui; ratione denique sed non realiter inter divinam substantiam divinasque relationes reales distingui.

Just how early is the teaching of the Fathers on the divine relations is set forth in the dogmatic part of this work. I The medieval theologians inquired about the entity of a divine relati~m, and after the infelicitous attempts of Gilbert de la Porree (DB 389; see DS 745) and AbbotJoachim of Flora (DB 431-33, DS 803-808, NO 3 17- 20), they.arrived at those conclusions which, apart from the views of some nominalists and Scotus's formal distinction, subsequently became the common opinions of all theologians: namely, there are in God four real and indeed subsistent relations; three of these are really distinct from one another; and finally, there is a co~ceptual but not a real distinction between the divine substance and the real divine relations.

Notae theologicae

Theological Notes

Quattuor quae sequuntur asserta sunt theologice certa. Certo enim concluditur esse relationes reales in Deo ex ipsis nominibus, Pater, Filius; certo pariter concluditur quattuor esse relationes reales divinas ex dl.!-abus processionibus (DB 54, 6gl); certo pariter concluditur tres reales esse relatione.s divinas realiter inter se distinctas ex trinitate personarum, sive cum Patribus .arguis personas consubstantiales non posse realiter inter se distingui nisi per relationes originis (cf. DB 280), sive brevius ex conc. Florentino axioma adsumis '9mn~a unum esse ubi non obviat relationis oppositio' (DB 703); certo etiam concluditur relationes reales et divinam substantiam non realiter inter se distingui quia 'in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas' (DB 432); quare pariter certum est relationes reales esse subsistentes (cf. DB 389, DS 745), certo denique concluditUr saltern ratione distingui inter relationes reales et divinam substantiam, cum haec nec generet nec gignatur nec procedat, et tamen Pater generet, Filius gignatur, Spiritus sanctus procedat (DB 432),

TheJour assertions presented in this chapter at:e theologically certain, From the very names 'Father' and 'Son' we conclude vvith certainty that there are real relations in God. With equal certainty we conclude from the two processions that there are four real divine relations (DB 54, ns I25~26, NO 7~8; DB 6gl, DS 1300, ND 322). It is likewise a certain conclusion from the Trinity of persons that three real divine relations are really distinct from one another, whether with the Fathers we argue that consubstantial persons cannot be really distinct from one another except by relations of origin (DB 280, DS 530, ND 314) or, more succinctly, we adopt the axiom of the Council of Florence that in God 'everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition' (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325). We can also conclude with certainty that there is no real distinction between the rear relations and the divine subst.ance, since 'in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity' (DB 43 2 , DS 804, NO 318); and therefore it is equally certain that the real relations are subsistent (DB 389, DS 745). Finally, it is a certain conclusion that there is at least a conceptual distinction between the real relations and the divine substance, because the substance neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, and yet the Father generates, the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeds (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318 ).

I


[That is, in what will be volume II, The Triune God: Doctrines. See there thesis 3. Since Lonergan had not written the pars dogmatica when he published Divinarum personarum, the text there refers rather to R. Arnou, De.Deo Trino (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1933) 129-40.]


234


235


ASSERTUM IV

ASSERTION 4

Ad processiones divinas sequuntur relationes reales quattuor, netnpe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio passiva.

Four real relations follow upon the divine processions: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration.

Ad terminos

Terminology

process-io: origo unius ab alio. sequuntur: scilicet, secundum nostrum modum concipiendi in via synthetica; in via autem analytica ex personis distinctis ad proprietates relativaS concluditur, et ex proprietatibus relativis ad processionesj denique, si ipsam realitatem divinam respicis, processiones sunt idem realiter quod relationes. relaw: ordo unius ad aliud. . reale: id quod vere est; opponitur enti rationis quod concipitur quidem sed in rebus non est. patemitas: relatio generantis ad generatum. filiatio: relatio generati ad generantem. spiratio: processio amoris ex dicente et verbo. spiratio activa: relatio spirantis ad spiratum. spiratio passiva: relatio spirati ad spirantem.

procession: the origin of one from another. flllo'w upon: that is, according to our manner of conceiving in the way of synthesis; contrariwise, in the way of analysis we conclude from distinct persons to relative properties and from relative properties to processions; and with respect to the divine reality itself, the processions are really the same as the relations. relation: the order of one to another. real: that which truly is; it stands in opposition to conceptual being, to what is conceived but does not exist in reality. paterni!y: the relation of the one who generates to the one generated. filiation: the relation of the one generated to the one who generates. spiration: the procession oflove from the speaker and the word. active spiration: the relation of the spirator to the spirated. passive spiration: the relation of the spirated to the spirator.

I Ex reali processione Verbi sequitur realis relatio verbi ad principium quod verbum dicit; et cum haec processio sit generatio proprie dicta, haec rcalis relatio verbi ad suum principium est filiatio. 2 Ex reaJi processione amoris sequitur realis relatio amoris ad principium quod amorem spirat; et cum haec processio non sit generatio proprie dicta, haec realis relatio non est filiatio et convenienter nominari potest spiratio passiva.

3 Processio verbi intelle~tualiter conscia est ex perspecta intelligibilitate rei dicendaej praeterea, ex hac intelligibilitate perspecta oritur in intellectu perspiciente necessitas quaedam intellectualis ad verbum dicendumj quae necessitas ad verbum dicendum, cum re vera in intellectu existat, est relatio realis ad verbum dicendum et, orto iam verbo, est relatio realis ad verbum dictum; denique tan~ dem cum in divinis verbum dicere sit Filium generare, relatio realis ad verbum aeternaliter dictum, Filium aeternaliter generatum, est relatio realis paternitatis.


I From the real procession of the Word, there follows a real relation of the word to the principle that speaks the word; and since this procession is generation in the proper sense, this real relation of the word to its principle is filiation. 2 From the real procession of love, there follows a real relation of love to the principle that spirates love; and since this procession is not generation in the proper sense, this real relation is not filiation, and can fittingly be termed passive spiration. 3 The intellectually conscious procession of the word is from the grasp of the intelligibility ofwhatever is to be uttered; moreover, from this grasp of intelligibility there emerges in the intellect that grasps it an intellectual 'necessity to speak the word. Since this necessity to speak the word really exists in the intellect, it is a real relation to the word to be spoken, and, once this word is uttered, a real relation to the word spoken. Finally, since in God to speak the word is to generate the Son, the real relation to the eternally spoken Word, the eternally generated Son, is the real relation of paternity.


236


237

4 Processio amoris intdlectualiter conscia est ex perspecta atque affirmata bonitate rei amandae; praeterea, ex hac perspecta atque affirrnata bonitate oritur in perspiciente atque affirm ante necessitas quaedam intellectualis seu rrioralis ad amorem spirandum; quae quidem necessitas, cum re vera in perspiciente atque affirmante existat, est relatio realis ad amorem spirandum et, orto iam amore, ad amorem spiratum; denique tandem haec realis relatio spirantis ad spiratum convenienter nominatur _spiratio activa.


Porro, Deus creator est omnium tum principium tum finis (DB 1785), et ideo creatio activa est relatio ration"is tantum. Sed Deus Pater non comparatur ad Deum Filium sicut creator ad creaturam, vel sicut finis ad id quod est propter . finem; et ideo deest paritas.

4 The intellectually conscious procession oflove is from the grasp and affirmation of the goodness of whatever is to be loved; moreover, from this grasp and affirmation of goodness there emerges in the one who grasps and affirms it an intellectual or moral necessity to spirate love; since this necessity really exists in the one who has grasped and affirmed goodness, it is a real relation to the love that is to be spirated and, once this love has arisen, a real relation to the love spirated; finally, this real relation of the spirator to what is spirated is fittingly termed active'spiration. 5' Once these matters are grasped, we conclude from the real divine processions that there are four real relations in God, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. It might be objected2 that the relations of paternity and active spiration seem to be not real but only conceptual. For what holds for the principle that is God the Creator holds equally for the principle that is God the Father or God the Spirator. But active creatio.n is only a conceptual relation. Therefore paternity and active spiration are likewise only conceptual relations. In reply we say that these two cases are not the same, since a principle and what originates from it are related in various ways. There is a principle that is inferior to the originated, such· as an instrument that has an effect beyond ~ts own proper perfection. There is another principle that is equal to the originated, as when the principle is really ordered to the originated and the originated in turn is really ordered to its principle; father and son are an example of this. Finally, there is a third case in which the principle is superior to the originated, as when the principle is the end of the originated. This sort of principle is not really ordered to what it originates, for an end does not exist because of that whose end it is. Now God the creator is both principle and end of all things (DB 1785, DS 3004, ND II3), and therefore active creation is a conceptual relation only. But God the Father is not related to God the Son as creator to creature or as the end "to that whose end it is. And so the two cases are ~ot .the same.

Scholion

Excursus

Processiones ratione distinguuntur a relationibus et realiter cum relationibus identificantur.

The processions are conceptually distinct from, but really identical with, the relations. The processions and relations are conceptually distinct, for to conceive the origin of one from another is not the same as to conceive the order of one to

5 Quibus perspectis, concluditur ex realibus processionibus divinis quattuor esse in Deo relationes reales, nempe, paternitatem, filiationem, spirationem activam, et spirationem passivam. Obicitur.2 Videntur relationes paternitatis et spirationis activae esse non reales sed rationis tantum. Quod enim valet de principio quod est Deus Creator pariter valet de principio quod est Deus Pater vel- Deus Spirator. Sed creatio activa est relatio rationis tantum. Ergo pariter paternitas et spiratio activa sunt relationes rationis tantum. Respondetur. Deest paritas, cum diversimode comparetur principium ad principiatum. Aliud enim principium est principiato inferius, et eiusmodi est instrumentum quod effectum exserit ultra propriam perfectionem. Aliud deinde principium est principiato aequale, quatenus principium realiter ordinatur in pnncipiatum et vicissim principiatum realiter ordinatur in principium; et eiusmodi sunt pater et filius. Tertium denique principium est principiato superius, et eiusmodi principium est finis principiati; et tale principium non realiter ordinatur in principiatum, nam finis non est propter id quod est ad finem.

Ratione distinguuntur, nam non est idem concipere originem unius ab alio ac concipere

2

The Robert Mallat- Collection

[The material from this point to the Excursus did not appear in Diuinarnm personmum.]


238


239


ordinem unius ad aliud; v.g., pater non habet originem a filio sed habet ordinem ad filium.

another; a father, for example, does not originate from his son, but he does have an order to his son.

Re~iter identificantur, nam ubi processio est sine ulIo motu, ipsa processio nihil est in rebus praeter relationem; uti manifestum est etiain in creatione quae sine motu fit; cf, Sum, theol., I, q. 45, a. 2 ad 2m, et a. 3.

The processions and relations are really identical, for when there is a procession without any motion, the. processio:n itself is nothing in reality except a relation; this is manifest also in creation, in which there is no motion; see Summa theologiae, I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m, and a. 3. Nonetheless, since two relations follow upon each procession, one may further ask with which relation the procession is really identic~l. The answer demands a distinction. If a procession is conceived as an originatiQn, it clearly follows that the origination, and therefore the procession, is really in that which is originated; and in. this case the procession is really identical with filiation and with passive spiration. But if a procession is conceived as an action, we must make a further distinction: if the action is conceived as being in or from the agent, the procession is really identical with the real relation of the agent; but if the action is conceived as being in the recipient, the procession is really identical with that which is originated, that is, with filiation and passive spiration. The importance of this question can be seen if one asks whether in God the procession of word and the procession of love are really distinct. For if the procession is understood as an origin or an action in the recipient, the answer must be yes, since ffiiation and passive spiration are really distinct. But if the procession is understood as an action in or from the agent, the answer must be no, since, as we will show later, paternity and active spiration are not really distinct. For this reason, we cannot accept without some distinction the thesis and argumentation of]. Brinktrine that 'within God there is only a virtual, not a real, distinction between g.eneration and ~piration.'3

Cum tamen ad singulas processiones sequantur binae relationes, u!terius quaeritur cum quanam relatione realiter identificetur pro cessio. Cui quaestioni per distinctionem respondendum est. Si eniro processio concipitur tamquam origo, constat originem, et ideo processloncm, realiter esse in eo quod originem habet; et sic processio realiter identificatur cum filiatione et cum spiratione passiva. Si autem processio concipitur tamquam actio, subdistinguendum est: nam uno modo concipitur actio tamquam in agente vel ab agente, et sic processio realiter identificatur cum relatione reali agentis; sed alia modo concipitur actio tamquam in passo, et sic iterum processio realiter identificatur cum eo quod originem habet seu cum filiatione et spirati.one passiva. Cuius quaestionis momentum perspicitur cum quaeratur utrum in divinis processio verbi et proccssio amoris realiter inter se distinguantur. Si enim sumitur processio tamquam origo vel tamquam actio in passo, affirmative respondendum est cum filiatio et spiratio passiva realiter inter se distinguantur. Si autem sumitur pro cessio tamquam actio in agente vel ab agente, negative respondendum est cum paternitas et spiratio activa, ut postea demonstrabitur, non realiter inter se distinguantur. Quibus perspectis, sine distinctione non videtur admittenda sive thesis sive argumentatio quam ponit]. Brinktrine. 3

ASSERTUMV

ASSERTION 5

Quae quattuor relationes SWlt subsistentes.

These four relations are subs.istent.

Asserti intentio

Meaning qf the Assertion

Cum ex duabus processionibus ad quattuor relationes reales nuperrime concluserimus, iam via synthetica procedentes ex relationibus ad subiecta subsistentia

From the two processions we have just concluded to four real relations, and we now continue along the way of synthesis to argue from the relations to sub3 J. Brinktrine, Die Lehre 'lion Gott. II. Von dtT' gottlichtn Trinitiit (Paderborn: Verlag F. Sch6ningh, 1954) 72: 'Zwischen der innerg6ttlichen Zeugung und der Hauchung besteht nur ein virtueller, kein realer Unterschied.' [Lonergan's review of this book in Gregorianum 37 (1956) 665 will appear in CWL 20, Shorter Papers.]



240


241


Quae' omnia ut ordinate dicantur, primo de ratione subsistentiae, deinde de huius rationis applicatione i.n divinis, tertio de decretis concilii Remensis, quarto de ipso argumento tractabimus. Ipsum vero assertumj quoad rem, est theo!.cgice cerium, sed quoad modum dicendi est communis certaque seri.tentia.

sistent subjects ~ that is to say, from paternity to the Father, from filiation to the Son, from active ,spiratioD. to the Spirator, and from passive'spiration to the Spirit. This conclusion is ine'-;itable, at least in some sense. For if there exists real paternity, there exists that by which someone is really a father, and similarly for the other relations. But since God is utterly simple, there cannot be in God a real distinction between that which IS and that by which it is. Hence from the fact that there is real paternity there is not only that by which there is a· father but also that which is a father, and similarly for the other relations. Thus also St Thomas -with his characteristic acumen wrote, 'Therefore just as divinity is God, so divine paternity is God the Father.'4 To set forth these matters in orderly fashion, we will first treat what is meant by subsistence, then see what application this has to God, third, deal with the decrees of the Council of Rheims, and fourth, present our argument. As far as its content is concerned, this assertion is theologically certain. But in its mode of expression it is a common and certain opinion.

Qyid sit subsistens'

The Subsistent 5

Multa quae esse dicantur, non omnia eodem modo sunt. Sunt eoim chimerae, at tantummodo in mente, et ideo entia rationis sunt. Sunt possibilia, at tantummodo in potentia agentis vel etiam ·materiae, et ideo potius esse possunt quam sunt. Sunt accidentia, at in alio esse iis competit, et ideo magis insunt quam sunt. Sunt principia entis constitutiva, ut essentia et esse, materia et forma, substantia et accidens, potentia et actus, q~ae tamen non ipsa sunt sed ii~ aliquid est. At praeter haec omnia quae sunt secundum quid, nempe, in mente, in potentia alterius, in alio, quibus aliud, etiam et principalius esse dicuntur mineralia, plantae, animalia, homines, angeli, Deus, Pater, Filius, Spiritus. Quae cum sint simpliciter, cum sint ea quae revera sunt, nomen speciale sibi vindicant et dicuntur subsistentia.

Many things are said to be, but they do not all exist in the same way. There are chimeras, but these are only in the mind, and thus are conceptual beings. There are possible beings, but they are only in the potency of an agent or even of matter, and are therefore what can be rather than what are. :rhere are accidents, but their mode of being is to be in something else, and therefore they 'are in' rather than simply are. There are the constitutive principles of being, such as essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accident, potency and act; none of these themselves are, but by them something is. But besides all of the above, which are in a qualified way, namely, in the mind, or in the potency of something else, or in another,. or as that by which another is, there are those things that are first and foremost said to be - minerals, plants, animals, humans, angels, God, the.Father, the Son, the Spirit. Since all of these simply are and truly are,' they are rightly given the special designation 'subsistent.' A subsistent, then, is whatever simply is that which is. It is distinguished from conceptual beings, possibles, accidents, and the constitutive principles of being.

arguimus, videlicet, ex paternitate ad Patrem, ex filiatione ad Filium, ex spiratione activa ad Spiratorem, ex spiratione passiva ad Spiritum. Quae quidem conclusio, aliquo saltern sensu, necessaria est. Si enim existit realis paternitas, existit id quo aliquis realiter sit paterj et similiter de aliis. Cum tamen Deus sit omnino simplex, nulla haberi potest realis distinctio inter id quod et id quo. Qua de causa, eo quod habetur realis paternitas, non solum habetur id quo ,est pater sed etiam id quod est pater; et similiter in aliis. Quo perspecto, conscripsit.acutissimus noster: 'Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater. '4

Subsistens est ergo quodcumque est id quod est;·et dividitur contra ens rationis, possibile', accidens, et principium entis constitutivum.

4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae,

I,

q. 2·9, a. 4.

5 See Lone.rgan, The OntoLogical and Psychological Constitution if Christ 32-35.



242


243


Qy.id in divinis suhsistat

W'hat Is It in God That Subsists?

Ex antecessis patet in divinis subsistere quodcumque est id quod est. At Deus est omnino simplex; nam omne compositum ipsius suae compositionis causam habeat necesse est; et ideo, cum Deus sit primum omnium principium, nullam prorsus compositionem realem admittit. lam vero in ente omnino simplici nihil esse potest quod non sit ipsum ens simplicissimum. Et ideo quodcumque in Deo realiter est, idem est ac Deus, idem est ac id quad est, idem est ac id quod subsistit, et ideo ipsum subsistat necesse est. Qua de causa, cum nomina quae de Deo dicantur eum significandi mQdum habeant qui creaturis COIlfpositis nominandis conveniat, d~stingui solet in -nominibus divinis inter id quod significatur et modum significandi. Nam id quod significatur semper est illud summum ens absolute simplex; modus autem significandi, praesertim in abstractis, magis creaturis compositis quam Deo simplici aptatur. Sive enim dicimus Deum, sive dicimus divinitatem, id quod significatur est idem summum ens omnino simplex; et tamen secundum modum significandi per nomen, Deus, dicere videmur id quod est et per nomen, divinitas, dicere videmur id quo est.

From the foregoing it is clear that whatever in God is that which is, is subsistent. But God is utterly simple; for every composite being necessarily has a cause of its own composition, and so, since God is the first principle of all things, there can be no real composition whatever in God. Now, in an utterly simple being there can be nothing that is not that simple being itself. In God, therefore, whatever really is, is the same as God, is the same as that which is, is the same as that which subsists, and hence necessarily subsists. Consequently, nouns, that are used of God have the way of signifying that is suitable for speaking of composite creatures. Regarding the divine names, therefore, we must distinguish between what they signify and their way of signifying. What they signify is always that supreme and absolutely simple being; but the way they signify, especially in the case of abstract terms, is better suited to composite creatures than to the simple God. Whether we say 'God' or 'divinity,' we mean the same utterly simple supreme being; but in saying 'God' we seem to be emphasizing that which is, while in using the term 'divinity' we stem to be emphasizing that by which God is.

Concilium Remense~ A.D. [[406

TiuJ Council 'If Rheims, A.D. Il48'

Quae olim huk condlio attribuebatur Prqfessiofidei de .Trinitate (DB 38g-392), ab ipso concilio emissa esse non videtur (ns 745). Quatenus ergo dogmatice proceditur, 7 illud tantum afferendum est quod, teste· Duone Frisingensi, in causa Gilberti Porretae definivit Romanus Pontifex', nempe, ' ... ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et per.sonam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi' (DS 745; DB in nota ad 389).8

The document Prqfessio fidei de Trinitate (DB 389--92), once attributed to the Council of Rheuns; was apparently not issued by it (os 745). Hence the only dogmatic statement that needs to be mentioned here is the pronouncement which, according to Otto, Bishop of Freising, was defined by the pope [Eugene III] regarding the case of Gilbert de la Porree: 7 ' ..• no theological formality is to divide nature and person, nor in the phrase Deus divina essentia are the last two words to be understood in the ablative case only but also in the nominative' (os 745, DB 389 note). 8 If no formality divides a divine, person and the divine nature, then surely there is no real distinction between the Father and divinity.

Quod si nulla ratio inter diVinam personam naturamque divinam dividit, nulla sane est realis distinctio inter Patrern et deitatem.

6 [See below, section 5 of appendix 4, pp. 784-87, for the version of this section that . appeared in Divinarum personarum.] 7 Two recent works on the thought of Gilbert de la Porree are M.E. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porrela on the T riniry, Analecta Gregoriana 56 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1951) and M.A. Schmidt, Gottheit und Trinitiit nach dan Kommentar des Gilbert POrTela ZU Boethius, De Trinitale (Basel: Verlag fur Recht und Gessellschaft, 1956).

8 [When the words divina essentia are taken in the ablative case, Deus divina essentia means 'God (is) by the divine essence,' whereas when they are taken in the nominative case .the expression means 'God (is) the divine essence.']

The Robert MoUot CoJlectio.n


244

De Relationihus Divinis Realibus

245

Praeterea, quia Deus divina essentia esse dicitur non solum sensu ablativi sed etiam nominativi, non solum Deus est deitate (sicut et horno est humanitate) sed etiam Deus est deitas (etsi hic homo non sit humanitas). Quae quide~ ad iam, dicta redeunt. Etsi enim quoad moduro significandi 'deitas,' 'paterriitas,' 'filiatio,' dicant id quo, tamen quoad rem significatam non alia et alia sunt res quas dicunt 'Deus' et 'deitas,' vel 'Pater' et 'paternitas,' et ideo sicut 'Deus' et 'Pater' dicunt id quod, ita pariter 'deitas' et 'paternitas' pariter dicunt realitatem, non qua aliud est, sed quae ipsa est seu subsistit.

The Re'al Divine Relations

Besides, since the words Deus divina essentia are theologically correct whether divina essentia be taken in the ablative or in the nominative case, not' only does God exist by divinity, just as a man is human by his humanity, but also God is divinity, even though a man is not humanity. These points bring us back to what has already been said. With regard to the way of signifying, 'divinity,' 'paternity,' 'filiation' mean that by which, but with regard to the reality that is signified there are not two different realities meant by 'God' and 'divinity,' or by 'Father' and 'paternity'j and so just as 'God' and 'Father' mean that which is, so also 'divinity' and 'paternity' mean, not the reality by which something else is, but the reality which itself is or subsists. .

Argumentum

Argument

In Deo idem est quod est et quo est.

In God, that which is and that by which it is are identical. But the real divine relations are at least that by which. Therefore the real divine relations are that which is. Further, that which is subsists. Therefore the real divine relations subsist. The meaning of the mqjor premise is that, although there is a distinction in their way of signifying between those words that name that which is (God, Father) and those that name that by which it is (divinity, paternity), still what they signify is in each case the very same reality, so that divinity really is God and paternity really is the Father. This major premise is proved from the divine simplicity itself, from the fact that there cannot be composition in the first principle of all things, and from the decree of Pope Eugene III as reported by Otto ofFreising. Regarding the minor p~emise, it is obvious· that if in God there is real paternity, by that very fact there is that by which God is Father; and similarly for the other divine relations. Thus the conclusion: divine paternity is God the Father, divine filiation is God the Son, divine active spiration is God the Spirator, and divine passive spiration is God the Spirit. The second mqjor premise is simply the definition of 'subsistent.'

Atqui relationes divinae reales saltem sunt quo est. Ergo relationes divinae reales, sunt quod est. Proinde, id quod est subsistit. Ergo relationes divinae reales subsistunt. Maior: sensus est quod, quamvis quoad modum significandi distinguatur inter ea quae nominant quod est (Deus, Pater) et ea quae nominant quo est (divinitas, paternitas), tamen quoad id quod significatur idem oronino dicitur, ut divinitas realiter sit Deus et paternitas realiter sit Pater. Quae maior probatur sive ex ipsa divina simplicitate, sive ex eo quod repugnat prirnum omnium principium esse compositum, sive ex eo quod ab Eugenio III , decretum esse testatur Otto Frisingensis. Minor: evidens est quod si in Deo habetur realis paternitas, eo ipso habetur id quo Deus est Pater; et similiter in aliis.

Conclusio: ergo divina paternitas est Deus Pater, divina filiatio est Deus Filius, divina spiratio activa est Deus Spirator, et divina spiratio passiva est Deus Spiritus.

Addita maior: declarat ipsam rationem subsistentis. SCMlion

Excursus

In creatis differunt tum quoad modum significandi tum quoad id quod significatur homo et humanitas, pater et paternitas, filius et filiatio. Aliud enim in creatis est suhsistens quod est; ~iud autem est essentia, vel forma, vel relatio qua est.

In the case of creatures, man and humanity, father and paternity, son and filiation differ both in the way they signify and in what they signify. For in creatures, the subsistent which is differs from the essence or form or relation by which it is.


, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

246

247


In divinis autem differunt quoad modum significandi sed non differunt quoad id quod significatur Deus et divinitas, Pater et patemitas, Filius et filiatio, Spirator et spiratio activa, Spiritus et spiratio passiva. Praeterea, in creatis distinguitur inter subiectum quod relatione refertur et ipsam relationem qua refertur; in· divinis autem idem. est subiectum quod refertur et relatio qua refertur; et ideo cum in divinis realis relatio ponatur, non solum ponitur id quo aliquid refertur sed etiam ijonitur id ipsum quod refertur; posita eniro patemitate, eo ipso ponitur et Pater; et similiter in aliis. 9 Praeterca, elucet quid sibi velit distinctio inter relationem ut relationem et relationem ut subsistentmz. Relationes enim ut relationes sunt paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa et passiva.

Relationes autem ut subsistentes sunt Pater, Filius, Spirator, Spiritus. 10. Quae respective inter se diffcrunt quoad modum significandi sed coincidunt quoad realitatem quae significatur.

In regard to God, however, 'God' and 'divinity,' 'Father' and 'paternity,' 'Son' and 'filiation,' 'Spirator' and 'active spiration,' 'Spirit' and 'passive spiration' differ in the way they signify but not in what tl}ey signify. Besides, in creatures the subject that is related by a relation is not the same as the relation by which it is related; but in God the subject that is related and the relation by which it is related are the same; since, therefore, real relation is posited in God, there is posited not only that by which something is related but also that itself which is related; when paternity is posited, by the same token the Father is posited, and likewise in the case of the other divine relations. 9 Moreover, the meaning of the distinction between relation as relation and relation as subsistent is made clear. The relations as relations are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration, whereas the relations as subsistent are Father, Son, Spirator, ~d Spirit. 10 The respective pairs differ in the way they signify but are the same in what they signify.

ASSERTION 6

ASSERTUMVI Tres relationes reales in Deo secundUttl realiter inter se distinguuntur.


~utu~ oppositione~

Three real relations in God are really distinct from one another, on the basis of mutual opposition.

Ad tenninos

Terminology

nempe, patemitas, filiatio J spiratio passiva. relatio: ordo unius ad aliud. reale: quod non tantum concipitur sed etiam vere est. distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. realiter distincta sunt quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. mutuo opponuntur relationes quarum altera est alterius terminus; ita pater est terminus ad quem refertur filius, et vicissim filius est terminus ad quem refertur pater.

three: that is, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. relation: the order of one to another. real: that which is not only conceived but also truly is. distinct: one is not the other. reallY distinct: one as real is not the other as real. mutuallY opposed relations: each is the term.of the other; thus father is the term to which son is relateq, and conversely son is the term to which father is related.

Praemittenda

Preliminary Observations

tres:

I

A relation of the same to the same is only a conceptual being.

Relatio eiusdem ad idem est ens rationis tantum. 9 Cf. Sum. theol., I, q. 40, a. 3: 'Non enim proprietates personales sic mtelliguntur advenire hypostasibus divinis, sicut fonna subiecto praeexistenti: sed ferunt secum sua supposita, inquantum sunt ipsae personae subsistentes, sicut paternitas est ipse Pater.' Quod proprietates idem dieunt ac relationes, vide ibid. q. 40, introd.


9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 40, a. 3: 'For the properties of the persons are not to be understood as coming to .the divine hypostases as form comes to a preexisting subject; rather, their own supposits come with them, since they are the subsistent persons themselves, as, for example, paternity is the Father himself.' That 'properties' means the same as 'relations,' see ibid. q. 40, introduction. 10 ['Spirator,' of course, is not a distinct subsistent, but is identical with the Father and the Son as one principle. See below, pp. 252-55.]


248


249

Nam idem realiter ad se ipsum non refertur nisi bis idem concipitur; et relationes inter duos conceptus eiusdem realitatis manifeste sunt entia rationis tantum.

2 Si relationes mutuo oppositae non realiter distinguuntur, non sunt rdationes reales: 11 Nam rdatio eiusdem ad idem est ens rationis tantum. Et relationes mutuo oppositae non realiter inter se distinctae sunt relationes eiusdem ad idem. Ergo relationes mutuo oppositae non realiter inter se distinctae sunt entia radonis tantum.

Maior constat ex prima conclusione. Minor constat ex definitione relationum mutuo oppositarum. Nam relationes mutuo oppositae sunt quarum' altera ad alteram terminatur; quod si altera ab altera non realiter distinguitur, idem realiter bis ad se ipsum refertur. Unde concludes: Si relationes mutuo oppositae sunt reales, realiter inter se distinguuntur. Quod sequitur ex praecedente per conversionem propositionis hypotheticae. Nam secundum logicarri minorem ubi valet lSi A, tunc B,' ibi necessario valet 'Si non B, tunc non A,' et vice versa.


For the same is not really related to itself, unless the same. is conceived twice; and the relations between two concepts of the same reality are obviously only conceptual beings. 2

If mutually opposed relations are not really distinct, they are not real relations. 11

For the relation of the same to the same is only a conceptual being. And mutually opposed relations that are not really distinct from one another are relations of the same to the same; Therefore, mutually opposed relations that are not really distinct from one another are only conceptual beings. The major premise is clear from the first conclusion. The minor premise is clear from the definition of mutually opposed relations. For mutually opposed relations are those in which' each -has the other as its term; but if each is not really distinct from the other, then the same is actually related twice to itself. Hence the conclusion: if mutually opposed relations are real, they are really distinct from one another. This conclusion follows from the antecedent by the conversion ofa hypothetical proposition. For according to minor logic, when the proposition 'If A, then B,' obtains, the proposition 'If not B, then n~t A' necessarily also obtains, and vice versa.

3 Relationes reales multiplicantur per se inquantum multiplicantur ordinationes reales, et roultiplicantur per accidens inq~antum multiplicantur subiecta realia quae realiter ordinantur. Relatio enim definitur ordo unius ad aliud. Quare cum relatio in se spectata sit quidam ordo, per se relationes reales multiplicantur, quia a parte rei sunt ordinationes reales· inter se realiter distinctae. Praeterea, cum subiecta realiter inter se distincta per unam numero relationem realero realiter referri non possunt, per accidens multiplicantur relationes reales quia multiplicantur subiecta realia.

3 Real relations are multiplied per se insofar as real orderings are multiplied, and . they are multiplied per accidens insofar as the real subjects that are really ordered are multiplied. For relation is defined as the order of one to another. Therefore, since relation considered in itself is an order, real relations are multiplied per se because in reality they are real orderings really distinct from one another. Moreover, because subjects really distinct from one another cannot be really related by a relation that is numerically t!J.e same, real relations are multiplied per accidens because real subjects are multiplied.

4 Per solam terminorum multiplicationem multiplicantur Telationes rationis, sed non multiplicantur relationes reales. Cuius ratio est quod terminus est aliud praeter subiectum et subiecti r.elationem, et ipsa relationis terminatio ad aliud nihil est a parte rei nisi ipsa huius alterius existentia obiectiva.

4 By the multiplication of terms alone, conceptual relations are multiplied, but not real relations. The reason is that the term is something other than the subject and the subject's relation, and this termination of a relation at another is nothing in reality except the objective existence of this other. II


[See below, appendix 4, section 6, p. 787, for the earlier version (Diuinarum personarum) of this short section 2.]


250



251

Qua de causa, si A, B, et C sunt realiter aequalia, aequalitas A ad B ab aequalitate A ad C distinguitur ratione sed non realiter.

Therefore, if A, B, and C are really equal, the equality of A to B is distinguished conceptually but not really from the equality of A to C.

5 Si reIationes unius subiecti sunt unum ardine, ratione distinguuntur sed realiter sunt una relatio. Nam relatio in se spectata est ordo quidam; et quae sunt unum ordine nisi unum ordinem non faciunt. Quare, una relatione reali realiter refertur natura substanhalis tum ad potentias accidentales, tum ad formas in his potentiis· recipiendas, tum ad actus per fonnas eliciendos, tum ad effectus qui actibus producuntur. Nam omnes hae relationes sunt unum ordine et, si seorsum concipiuntur, haec separatio vel est mera mentis praecisio vel est error; non- enim ordinatur natura' substantialis ad potentias accidentales quin eo ipso ordinetur ad formas in potentiis recipiendas, etc., neque ordinatur ad formas accidentales quin ad potentias ordinetur, etc. Praeterea, sicut natura substantialis una relatione ad potentias, formas, actus, et effectus ordinatur, ita etiam singulae potentiae, formae, actus, et effectus singulis relationibus realibus J2 ad caetera ordinantur quae uno eodemque systemate inter se connectuntur.

5 If the 'relations of a single subject stand in a single order, they are conceptually distinct but are really a single relation. For considered in itself, a relation is an orderj and when things are made one by ordering, the order itself is one. Therefore, it is through a single real relation that a substantial nature is really related to accidental potencies, to forms to be received in these potencies, to acts to be elicited by these -forms, and· to the effects produced by these acts. For all these relations stand in a single order, and if they are conceived separately, this separation is either merely a mental prescinding or it is an errorj for a substantial nature is not ordered to accidental potencies without by that very fact being ordered to forms to be received ,in the potencies, and so on, nor is it ordered to accidental forms without being ordered to those potencies, and so on. Besides, just as a substantial nature is ordered by a single relation to potencies, forms, acts, and effects, so also single potencies, forms, acts, -and effects are related by single real relations l2 to all the other things that are interconnected in one and the same system.

6 Inquantum dicens, verbum, et amor unum obiectum respiciunt, singuli singulis relationibus realibus ad binos alios referuntur realiter. Tamquam unum obiectum dicentis, verbi, et amoris sit quoddam bonum. Tunc dicens perspicit sufficientiam evidentiae ut bonitas obiecti verbo vero affirmetur et ideo amore honesto ametur. Deinde, propter perspectam evidentiam verbo vero dicitur bonitas propter quam obiectum amandum est. TertIo, spiratur amor propter evidentem bonitatem a dicente perspectam et verbo vero affirmatam.

6 Inasmuch as speaker, word, and love regard the same object, each one is really related to the other two by a single real relation. Let us say that the one object of speaker, word, and love is some good. In that case the speaker grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming in a true word the goodness of that object and therefore loving it with a right and proper love. Next, because of the evidence grasped, the goodness because of which the object is to be loved is expressed in a true word. Third, because of the evident goodness grasped by the speaker and affirmed in the true word, love is spirated. From this it is clear that speaker, word, and love, inasmuch as they regard one object, are related to one another in a single system of relations; and therefore speaker is related to both word and love by a single real relation, word is related to both speaker and love by a single real relation, and love is related to both speaker

Unde elucet dicentem, verbum, et amorem, inquantum unum obiectum respiciunt, uno quodam relationum systemate inter se referrij et ideo una relatione reali refertur dicens tum ad verbum tum ad amorem; una relatione reali refertur verbum tum ad dicentem tum ad amoremj et una relatione reali refertur amor

12


[The meaning is that it is by one relation that one potency is related to everything else in the system, by one relation that another potency is related to everything else in the system, by one relation that a form is related to everything else in the system, and so on. So too, the next sentence means that it is by one relation that the speaker is related to the word and to love; it is by one relation that the word is related to the speaker and to love; it is by one relation that love is related to the speaker and to the word - as the following paragraph confirms.]


252


253

tum ad dicentem tum ad verbum. Dicit enim dicens non verum abstractum ut verbum dicere possit quin simul amorem spiret, sed verum concretum atque bonum unde fieri nequit ut verbum dicat quin eo ipso spiret amorem. Neque verbo dicitur verum abstractu~ ut a dicente dependeat et tamen amorem non spiret, sed verbo dicitur veritas qua affinnatur bonitas, et ideo eiusmodi est dependentia :verbi a dicente ut' a spiratione amoris separari non possit. Arnor denique rationalis atque bonus est, non solum propter bonitatem affinnatam, non solum prC!pter perspectam evidentiae sufficientiam ad affinnandam bonitatem, sed propter utramque simul, nempe, propter bonitatem quae ratione sufficienti perspecta affirmatur.

I


and word by a single real relation. For the speaker does not utter an abstract truth as if able to speak the .word without at the same time spirating love, but utters a truth that is concrete and good, so that it is impossible to speak the word without by the same token spirating love. Nor is the word spoken an abstract truth that would depend upon the speaker and yet not spirate love; rather, in the word the truth is uttered by which goodness is affirmed, and therefore the dependence of the word upon the' speaker is such that it cannot be separated from the spiration of love. Fin,ally,.love is rational and good, not only because of the ,affil'med goodness, and not only because of the grasped sufficiency of evidence for affirming goodness, but because of both together, that is, on account of goodness that is affirmed because sufficient reason for doing so has been grasped.

Argumentum

Argument

Cum quattuor in Deo sunt relationes reales, non detenninatur quaenam realiter inter se distinguantur'nisi per sex ~omparationes, nempe, (I) paternitatis et filiationis, (2) spirationis activae et passivae, (3) paternitatis et spirationis activae, (4) paternitatis et spirationis passivae, (5) filiationis et spirationis activae, (6) filiationis et spirationis passivae. Iamvero paternitas et filiatio realiter inter se distinguuntur, nam sunt relationes et reales et mutuo oppositae quae supra demonstratae sunt realiter inter se distingui. Pariter spiratio activa et spiratio passiva sunt relationes reales et mutuo oppositae et ideo pariter inter se realiter distinguuntur. Paternitas autem et spiratio activa Patris sunt relationes reales dicentis ad verbum et ad amorem; quae relationes ratione sed non realiter inter se distinguuntur. Nam supra demonstratum est relationes eiusdem, si unum ordine sunt, nisi unum ordinem unamque relationem realem non constituere; atqui relationes dicentis ad verbum et ad amorem sunt unum ordine, cum ille qui uno verbo verum bonum dicat simul et verbum dicat et, mediante verbo, amorem spiret.

Since in God there are four real relatio'ns, we can determine which ones are really distinct from one another only by making six comparisons, namely (I) of paternity with filiation, -(2) of active spiration with passive spiration, (3) of paternity with active spiration, (4) of paternity with passive spiration, (5) of filiation with active spiration, and (6) of filiation with passive spiration. Now paternity and filiation are really distinct from each other, since they are real and mutually opposed relations, and we have shown above that such relations are really distinct from each other. Similarly, active spiration and passive spiration are real and mutually opposed relations, and so they too are really distinct from each other. But paternity and the active spiration of the Father are real relations of speaker to word and to love; these relations are distinct from each other conceptually but not really. For we demonstrated above that relat'lons of the same, if they are made one by ordering, constitute but a single order and a single real relation; but the relations of speaker to word and to love are made one by ordering, since the one who in one word utters a true good speaks the word and at the same time, through the mediation of the word, spirates love. Similarly, filiation and the active spiration of the Son are real relations of word to speaker and to love; these relations are distinct from each other conceptually but not really. For relations that are made one by ordering constitute only one order and one real relation; but the relations of word to speaker and to love are made one by ordering, since in the one word there is spoken a true good, which as true arises from the speaker and as good is ordered to the spiration oflove; and therefore, they are distinct from each other conceptually, but in reality constitute a ,single intelligible order.

Pariter, filiatio et spinitio activa Filii,sunt relationes reales Verbi ad dicentem et ad 'amorem; quae relationes ratione sed non realiter inter se distinguuntur. Nam relationes quae ordine unum sunt nisi unum ordinem unamque relationem realem non constituunt; atqui relationes Verbi ad dicentem et ad amorem sunt unum ordine, cum uno Verbo dicatur verum bonum quod qua verum a dicente oritur et qua bonum ad amorem spirandum ordinatur; et ideo ratione inter se distinguuntur sed realiter unum ordinem intelligibilem constituunt.



254

255


Denique tandem spiratio passiva realiter distinguitur tum a patemitate tum a filiatione. Nam spiratio passiva est relatio realis amoris ad dicentem et ad verbum; cui vicissim opponitur realis spiratio activa dicentis et verbi ad amorem; quae realis spiratio activa non realiter distinguitur a patemitate vel a filiatione.


Quibus perspectis, concluditur tres relationes reales in Deo realiter inter se distingui, nempe, patemitatem, fiIiationem, et spirationem passivam. Spiratio autem activa, quamvis a spiratione passiva realiter distinguatur, realiter tamen non distinguitur a paternitate vel a filiatione.

Finally, passive spiration is- really distinct from both paternity and filiation. For passive spiration is the real relation of love to speaker and to word, to which conversely there is opposed the real active spiration of speaker and word to love; this real active spiration is not really distinct from paternity or from filiation. From all this we conclude that there are in God three real relations really distinct from one another j namely, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. Although active spiration is really distinct from passive spiration, still it is not really distinct from paternity or from filiation.

ScMlion

Excursus

Quaesierit tamen quispiam utrum spiratio activa Patris realiter distinguatur a spiratione activa Filii. Et videtur quidem realis distinctio admittenda, quia Pater et Filius sunt duo subiecta reaIiter inter se distincta, et uterque reaIiter spirat amorem, et duo subiecta realiter distincta per unam numero relationem realem non realiter referuntur.

One may ask whether the active spiration of the Father is really distinct from that of the Son. It might seem that they are really distinct, since the Father and the Son are two subjects really distinct from each other, each of whom really spirates love, and two really distinct subjects are not really related by a relation numerically the same. Against this, however, is the fact that in God all things are one where there is no relational opposition (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325); and there is no mutual opposition between the active spiration of the Father and the active spiration of the Son. Our response is that speaker and word are found differendy in us and in God. We understand in one act and conceive or judge in another act. But in God there is but one infinite a~t by which God understands and speaks and conceives· and judges. Hence in us the two real active spirations are really distinct, since spiration proceeds from two really distinct acts. But in God, where there is but one act that is both speaker and word, there is but one principle of spirationj and since only one love is spirated from this one principle, there can be only one active spiration. Regarding the objection that the Father and the Son are two subjects really distinct from each other, we grant that the two are really distinct as Father and Son, but deny that the two are really distinct in spirating love. Just as the Father and the Son are really one God, so also are they really one principle of spiration, one spirator; and similarly, the Father and the Son and the Spirit, although they are three persons, are nevertheless one God and one principle of creation, one creator (DB 704, DS 1331, ND 326).13

Sed contra est quod in Deo omnia unum sunt ubi non obviat relationis oppositio

(DB

703); neque mutua opponuntur spiratio activa Patris et spiratio activa Filii.

Respondetur quod aliter in nobis et aliter in Deo habentur dicens et verbum. In nobis enim alia actu intelligitur et alia actu concipitur seu iudicatur. At in Deo unus tantum est actus infinitus quo et intelligit et dicit et concipit et iudicat. Qua de causa, in nobis duae spirationes activae reales realiter distinguuntur, quia a duobus actibus realiter distinctis proeedit spiratio. Sed in Deo ubi unus tantum habetur actus qui et dieens et verbum est, unum tantum spirandi principium habetur; et cum ex hoc uno principia non spiratur nisi unus amor, nisi una realis spiratio activa haberi non potest. Ad illud autem quod in contrarium affertur quod Pater et Filius sunt du,o subiecta real iter inter se distincta, distinguendum est: sunt duo realiter distincta inquantum sunt Pater et Filius, cQnceditur; sunt duo realiter distincta inquantum amorem spirant, negaiur. Sicut enim Pater et Filius sunt realiter unus Deus, ita etiam realiter sunt unum spirandi principium seu unus spirator; et similiter Pater et Filius et Spiritus, quamvis treS sint personae, tamen sunt unus Deus et unum creandi principium seu unus creator. DB 70 4.'3

13 See below, pp. 356-63.


Collected

Works

of Bernard Lonergan

256

257



ASSERTUM VII

ASSERTION 7

Relationes divinae reales ratione a divina essex»:tia distinguuntur et realiter cum. ea identificantur.

Th"e real divine relations are conceptually distinct from the divine essence but really identical with it.

Ad terminos

Tmninowgy

"relationes divinae reales: nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio pas-. siva, essentia diuina: deitas; cum tamen in Deo nulla sit compositio realis, deitas est Deus; et ideo quoad id quod significatur, essentia divina dicit ipsum Deum prout est tribus personis communis, seu prout Deus est et Pater et Filius et Spiritus: distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. ratione distincta sunt quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. realiter distincta sunt quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua ·reale. realiter identica sunt quae realite~ non distinguuntur.

real divine relations: namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. divine essence: divinity; but since in God there is no real composition, divinity is God; therefore, the reality signified by 'divine essence' is God as common to the three persons, that is, God as Father, Son, and Spirit. distinct: one is not the other. conceptually distinct: the concept of one is not the concept of the other. really distinct: one as real is not the other as real, really identical: they are not really distinct.

Argumentum Triplici proceditur gressu ut primo probetur divinam essentiam divinamque relationem realem non esse eadem "tum re tum ratione, deinde ea esse eadem re, unde tertio relinquatur ea non esse eadem ratione.

We shall proceed in three steps: to.prove, first, that the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and il1 concept; second, that they are the same in reality; third, that therefore it remains that they are not the same in concept.

Primo, ergo, divina essentia

First, then, the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in realig; and in concept.

ei

divina relatio realis non sunt eadem tum re tum ratione.

Nam de eodem secundum rem et ratione~ non praedicantur contradictoria" Atqui de divina essentia et de divina relatione reali praedicantur contradictoria. Ergo divina essentia et divina relatio realis non sunt eadem tum re tum ratione"

Maior est contradictionis principium quod valet de eadem (re) secundum idem (ratione).

Minor exemplis constat, v.g., Pater non est Filius, et Deus est Filius; sed 'Filius' et 'non Filius' sunt contradictoria; ergo Pater et Deus non sunt idem et re et ratione. Et similiter fit argumentum comparando alias relationes reales cum divina essentia.


Contradictory terms cannot be predicated of the same thing both in reality and in concept. But contradictory terms are predicated ofthe"divine essence and a real divine relation. Therefore, the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and in concept. The major premise of this syllogism is the principle of contradiction, which applies to the same thing (reality) in the same respect (concept). The minor premise is clear from examples, such as 'The Father is not the Son' and 'God is the Son'; but 'Son' and 'not Son' are contradictory terms; therefore, the Father and God are not the same both in reality and in concept. "The same argument holds in comparing the other real relations with the divine essence.


258

259


Obici tamen potest quod, quamvis verissime Filius sit Deus, tamen admittenda non vide~ tur propositionis affirmativae conversio simplex; et ideo dubitari potest de ilIa praemissa, nempe, Deus est Filius. Respondetur. Primo, si Socrates est hie homo, hie homo est Socrates; sed 'Deus' et 'Fil~ ius' sunt tennini singulares, sicut 'Socrates' et 'hic homo'; et ideo ubi termini sunt utrique singulares, propositio etiam affirmativa convertitur simpliciter. Deinde, quod Deus est Fil~ ius est expressa doctrina conc. Lateranensis IV (im 432): ' ... una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus sanc~ tus; tres simul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem.'


One might object here that although it is most true that the Son is God, yet a simple conversion of an affirmative proposition seems inadmissible; hence it may be doubted that the premise, 'God is the Son,' is correct. In reply to this objection we note, first, that if Socrates is this man, this man is Socrates; but 'God' and 'Son' are singular terms, just as are 'Socrates' and 'thi~ man'; thus, in the case where each term is singular, even an affirmative proposition is simply convertible. Second, that God is the Son is the explicit doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318): ' ... one supreme reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, which is truly the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: three persons taken together, and each of them taken individually.'

Deinde, dimna essentia et divina re/alia realis sunt eadem realiter.

Second, the divine essence and a real divine relation are realfy the same.

Pn'mo, arguitur ex divina simplicitate. Nam deitas et paternitas sunt aut (I) realiter diversa et incomposita, aut (2) realiter diversa et composita, aut (3) realiter identica.

First, this is argued from the simplicity ofO-od. For divinity and paternity are either (I) really different and not a composite, or (2) really different and a composite, or

Sed si eligitur primum, Pater non est Deus, quod est haereticum. Si eligitur secundum, Deus non est simplex, habet causam suae compositionis, et ideo non est primum principium; quod etiam est haereticum. Ergo relinquitur tertium, nempe, deitas et paternitas sunt realiter idem. Et similiter probatur identitas realis inter divinam essentiam et alias relationes ~ivinas reales. lterum,14 arguitur ex principio Anselmiano quod in conc. Borentino (DB 703) docetur, nempe, quod in divinis omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Nam paternitas et divina essenti,,!- non sunt relationes mutua oppositae, cum divina essentia non sit relatio et multo minus relatio paternitati opposita. Ergo paternitas et divina essentia sunt .unum. Et similiter probatur quod divina essentia et quaelibet alia relatio divin'a realis sunt unum. Iterum, arguitur ex principio quod in conc. Lateranensi IV contra Abbatem loachim definitur: 'in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas' (DB 432 ). Nam, uti.s'upra probatum est, sunt tres relationes divinae reales quae realiter inter se distinguuntur. lam vero si tres relationes realiter a divina essentia distinguerentur, haberetur quaternitas. Et ideo cum quaternitas non sit admittenda,

(3) really the same. But if we choose the first alternative, then the Father is not God, which is heretical. lfwe choose the second, God is not simple, there is cause of God's composition, and therefore God is not the first principle, which is likewise heretical. Therefore, we are left with the third alternative, that divinity and paternity are really the same. And the real identity between the:; div.ine essence and the other real divine relations is proven in the same way. Again,14 this is argued from Anselm's principle as taught in the Council of Florence (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325), namely, that in God all things are one where there is no relational opPC?sition. For paternity and the divine essence are not mutually opposed relations, since the divine essence is not a relation and much less is it a relation opposed to paternity. Therefore, paternity and the divine essence are one. And it is similarly proved that the divine essence and any other divine real relation are one. Again, this assertion is argued from the principle defined in the Fourth Lateran Council against the position of AbbotJoachim: 'In God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity' (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318). For, as was proven above, there are three real divine relations really distin~t from one another. But if the three relations were really distinct from the divine essence, there would be a quaternity. And since a quaternity cannot be admitted,

a

14 [In Diuinarum personarum Lonergan here presents ,another argument from what had been thought to be the position of the Council of Rheims. See below, appendix 4, section 7, pp. 786-89.]



260


261


distinctio realis inter essentiam et telationem divinam realem est reicienda.

a real distinction between the divine essence and a real divine relation must be rejected.

T ertio~ divina essentia a divinis relatwnibus realibus ratione distinguitur.

Third~ the divine essence is conceptuallY distinct from the real divine relations.

Quod primo concluditur ex iis quae iam sunt probata. Si enim essentia divina et relatio divina realis sunt eadem ~e~iter et, praeterea, non sunt eadem re et ratione, relinquitur ut eadem non sint ratione. Deinde, eadem est conclusio ex definitione distinctionis rationis. Nam ratione distincta sunt quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. Sed conceptus paternitatis non est conceptus deitatis. Ergo paternitas et deitas ratione distinguuntur. Et similis habetur conclusio comparando divinam essentiam cum aliis relationibus divinis realibus.

This conclusion follows first from what has already been proven. For if the divine essence and a real divine relation are the same in reality and, as wclJ, not the same both in reality and in concept, it remains that they are not the same in concept. Furthermore, the same conclusion follows from the definition of a conceptual distinction. For things are conceptually distinct if the concept of one is not the concept of the other. But the concept of paternity is not the concept of divinity. Therefore, paternity and divinity are conceptually distinct. And a similar conclusion is had by comparing the divine essence with the other real divine relations.

Notae Q.uattuor

Four Notes

Quare in Deo 50lummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas.

J.1Ihy there is onlY a trini!y~ not a quatemi!y~ in God.

Quod assertum in conc. Lateranensi IV (DB 432) contra Abbatem Ioachim definitur.

This assertion was defined in the Fourth Lateran Council (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318) against AbbotJoachim. The reason for it is that, although there are in God three real relations really distinct from one another, yet because these relations are really identical with the divine essence, there is in God no really fourth something that could be added to the three relations. Note that if this principle of the council is assumed, it is very easy to prove that the three real divine relations really distinct from one another cannot be really distinct either from the divine essence or, by extension, from the fourth real relation, active spiration. 15

Cuius ratio est quod, quamvis in Deo sint tres relationes reales realiter inter se distinclae, tamen quia hae relationes realiter cum divina essentia identificantur, in Deo non invenitur quidquam realiter quartum quod tribus relationibus addi possit. Notate autem hoc concilii principia assumpto, facillime probari quod tres relationes divinae reales et realiter inter se distinctae non possunt realiter distingui sive a divina essentia sive (per extensionem quandam) a quarta relatione reali quae est spiratio activa. 15

15 [There is something of a slip here, it would seem. In Assertion 6 on p. 253,

Lonergan writes: '[A]ctive spiration and passive spiration are real and mutually opposed relations, and so they ... are realty distinct from each other.' But in the present context he says that if one assUl1)es the principle enunciated by the Fourth L.at~ran Council, 'it is very easy to prove that the three real divine relations really dlstmc~ from one another cannot be realty distinct from the divine essence or, by extenSIOn, from the fourth real relation, active spiration' (italics added). Now 'the three real divine relations' include passive spiration. Part of what Lonergan is saying in this second reference, then, is that passive spiration is not really distinct from active spiration - which contradicts what he said in the statement in Assertion 6. Accordingly, if we are not to assume that Lonergan is guilty of actually contradicting himself, we must assume that he made a slip here.]



262

263


!he Real Divine Relations

Etiam in divinis omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.

In God all is one where there is no relational opposition.

Quod ab Anselmo enuntiatum principium in cone. Florentino (DB 703) inter ea recensetur quae sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia firmiter credit, profitetu~, et praedicat. Et inquantum implicite l6 dicit omnia non esse unum ubi obviat relationis oppositio, ex eo constat quod per relationes reales et mutuo oppositas realiter 'inter se distinguuntur Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Inquantum autem explicite l7 dicit omnia esse unum ubi non obviat rdationis oppositio, ex eo constat quod relationes reales realiter cum di.vina essentia identificantur et, praeterea, in Deo simplicissimo omnia attributa realia realiter cum divina essentia identificantur. Notate autem, hoc concilii principio assumpto, facilIime probari tum personas divinas realiter inter se distinctas nisi per mutuas relationes reales et oppositas non distingui, tum etiam, cum diyina essentia non sit relatio et multo minus rdatia relationi opposita, divinam essentiam realiter identificari tum cum relationibus divinis realibus tum cum omnibus attributis essentialibus.

The Council of Florence (DB 703, DS 1330, NO 325) listed this principle, enunciated by Anselm, among 'those propositions which the holy Roman Church firmly believes; professes, and proclaims. J6

In implying that all are not one where there is relational opposition, this principle makes it clear that by reason of real mutually opposed relations, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are really distinct from one another. 17 But in stating that all is one where there is no relational opposition, this principle makes it clear that the real relations are really identical with the divine essence and also that in God, who is most simple, all real attributes are really identical with the divine essence. Note also that if this principle of the council is assumed it is very easy to prove both that the really distinct divine persons are distinct only by reason of their mutually opposed real relations, and that, since the divine essence is not a relation and much less a relation opposed to a relation, the divine essence is really identica; both with the real divine relations and with all the essential attributes.

Ulterius in divinis essentialia et notionalia ratione distinguuntur et realiter identificantur.

Furthermore, in God the essential and the notional are conceptuallY distinct but reallY identical.

Essentialia· dicuntur attributa quae in ipsa ratione divinae essentiae fundantur et ideo tum de singulis personis tum de omnibus parher praedicantur, v.g., quod sunt, vivunt, intelligunt, amant, creant, gubernant, etc.

Essential attributes are those that are founded in the very formality of the' divine essence and therefore equally predicated of each person and of all - for example, that they are, they live, they understand, they love, they create, they govern, and so on.

Notionalia vero dicuntur quae unam alteramve relationem realem important et ideo non de omnibus personis praedicari possunt sed solummodo de ilia cuius

The notional are those that imply' one or other real relation and therefore cannot be predicated of all the persons bu t only of that person whose relation

J

What it seems Lonergan intends to say is that neither the divine essence nor active spiration is a fourth something in addition to the three real and really distinct divine relations of paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. But active spiration, the relation of the spirator to the spirated, that is, the relation of speaker and word to love, while really identical with paternity and filiation, is really distinct from passive spiration. Or again, it may be said that active spiration, although it is a real relation and different in concept from paternity and filiation, is not really distinct from them but is really identical with them, just as the divine essence is identical with the divine relations.] 16 [In a handwritten marginal note in Divinamm personamm, Lonergan wrote at this point implicite, that is, 'implicitly.'] r7 [On the same page in Diuinarum personarum, Lonergan wrote in the margin explicite, that is, 'explicitly.' Thus, the words impticite and explicite were added in the present edition.]



264

265



e.st illa relatio; v.g.', Pater generat sed non gignitur, spirat sed non spiratur; Filius gignitur sed non generat, spirat sed non spiratur; Spiritus neque generat neque gignitur neque spirat sed spiratur; etc. lam vero, cum relationes et essentia ratione distinguantur et realiter identificentur, patet essentialia et notionalia etiam ratione distingui et realiter identificari.

it is; the Father, for example, generates but is not generated, spirates but is not spirated; the Son is generated but does not generate, spirates but is not spirated; the Spirit neither generates nor is generated nor spirates but is spirated. Since the relations and the essence are conceptually distinct and really identical, clearly what is essential and what is notional are also conceptually distinct and really identical.

(]yare inter extrema notionalia illegitime adhibetur essentiale tamquam terminus medius fYllogisticus.

1herifore it is illegitimate in a fYllogism to argue fiom what is notional to what is notional using what is essential as the middle term.

Cuius ratio est quod syllogismus in principiis ide~titatis et non-contradictionis fundatur; quae principia respiciunt idem secundum idem, seu id quod est idem et re et ratione. Sed notionalia et essentialia, quamvis sint eadem re, non sunt eadem ratione. Et ideo inter extrema notionalia terminus medius essentialis facillime fallacias introducit.

The reason for this is that syll ogisms are based upon the principles of identity and noncontradiction; these principles regard the same in every respect, that is to say, what is the same both really and conceptually. But the notional and the essential, although really the same, are not the same conceptually. Hence to use what is essential as a middle term between notional extremes very easily leads to fallacious conclusions.

Exemplo sit illud: Filius est Deus; Deus generat; qui generat est Pater; qui est Pater, non est Fili~s; ergo Filius non est Filius. Ubi contradictio sequitur ex eo quod inter extrema notionalia~ quae utrinque sunt Filius, ita introducitur terminus medius essentialis, nempe, Deus, ut in" diversis praemissis significet, non idem secundum idem, sed idem secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Nam idem realiter est Deus qui est Pater et qui est Filius; sed secundum aliam rationem habetur praemissa quod Filius est Deus, et secundum aliam habetur alia praemissa quod Deus generat seu est Pater. At aliud sit exemplum et maioris momenti. Nam in cone. Lateranensi IV, DB

Here is an example. The Son is God; God generates; the one who generates is the Father; the one who is the Father is not the Son; therefore the Son is not the Son. The contradiction arises from the fact that between the notional extremes , both of which are 'Son,' an essential middle term, 'God,' is introduced, so that in different premises there is signified not what is the same in every respect, but the same in different respects. For it is the same God in reality who is both the Father and the Son; but it is in one respect that one premise states that the Son is God and in another respect that the other premise states that God generates or is the Father. But there is another and more important example of this. In the Fourth Lateran Council it was decreed (DB 432, DS 804-805, ND 318-19):

432, decretum est: .. quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus; tres siroul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem: et ideo in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas; quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia seu natura divina: quae sola est universorum principium, praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest: et ilia res non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus qui procedit: ut distinctiones .sint in personis, et unitas in natura. Licet igitur 'alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus, non tamen aliud': sed id quod est Pater, est Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus idem omnino; ut secundum orthodoxam et catholicam fidem consubstantiales esse credantur.

The Robert Mollot

Collection

... there is one supreme reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, which truly is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; three persons together, and each ofthem individually; and therefore in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity, because . each of the three persons is that reality, namely, the divine substance, essence, or nature; it a,lone is the principle of all things, besides which there is no other; and that reality is not generating nor generated nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates and the Son who is generated and the Holy Spirit who proceeds: so that the distinctions pertain to the persons, and unity to the o·ature. Therefore, although "the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit still another, yet there is no other reality'; but that reality which is the Father, is the Son, and is the Holy Spirit entirely the same; so that according to orthodox and catholic faith they are believed to be consubstantial.


266

'167 . .' The Real Divine Relations

De ReIationibus Divinis Realibus

Quod difficile videri potest. Nam affirrnatur quod ilia summa res est Pater, quod Pater est generans, et quod illa summa res non est generans; item, affinnatur quod ilia summa res est Filius, quod Filius gignitur, et quod ilia summa res non est genita; item, affirmatur quod ilia summa res est Spiritus, quod Spiritus procedit, et quod ilia summa res non procedit. Unde concludendum videtur quod ilia summa res est et generans et non generans, genita et non genita, procedens et non procedens, ut triplex habeatur contradictio. Sed contra est quod superius explicavimus, nempe, valent syliogismus et prin~ cipium contradictionis ubi agitur de eodem secundum idem, seu de eodem tum re tum ratione. lam vero ubi dicitur quod ilIa summa res veraciter est Pater et FilM ius et Spiritus sanctus, manifeste non agitur de essentia divina prout a personis praescindit et in se ipsa consideratur. Sed ubi dicitur quod illa summa res non est generans neque genita neque procedens, agitur de essentia divina prout a personis praescindit et secundum rationem essentiae consideratur, cum statim addatur 'ut distinctiones sint in personis, et unitas in natura.' Q.ua de causa, in diversis assertis, quamvis agatur de eodem secundum rem, non tamen agitur de eodem secundum idem, seu de eodem tum re tum ratione; et ideo contra intentionem concilii non est fallaciter syllogizandum ut ad contradictionem perveniatur.

Quibus intellectis, elegantissima habeturprobatio quod relationes divinae reales et divina substantia seu essentia tum realiter identificantur tum ratione distinguuntur. N am sine reali identitate non habetur quod illa summa res veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus. Et sine distinctione rationis non habetur quod ilIa summa res non est generans neque genita neque procedens, sed Pater est qui generat, Filius est qui gignitur, et Spiritus est qui procedit.

This may be difficult to grasp. For it affirms that that supreme reality is the Father, that the Father generates, and that that supreme reality does not generate; again, it affirms that that supreme reality is the Son, that the Son is generated) and that that supreme reality is not generated; and still again, it affirms that that supreme reality is the Spirit, that the Spirit proceeds, and that that su'preme reality does not proceed. The conclusion would seem to be that that supreme reality gene~ates and does not generate, is generated and is not generated, proceeds and does not p~oceed - a threefold contradiction. Against this, however, is what we have explained above, that the principle of contradiction is legitimately applied, and a syllogism valid, when the reasoning is about the same thing in every respect - in other words, about what is the same both re~y and conceptually. But when it is said that the supreme reality truly is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, obviously the reference is not to the divine essence as prescinding from the persons and considered in itself On the other hand, when it is said that the supreme reality does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed, the reference is to the divine essence as prescinding from the persons and as considered according to the formality of the essence, since immediately are added the words, 'so that the distinctions pertain to the persons, and unity to the nature.' Therefore although the different statements are about the same reality, they are not about the same reality in every respect, that is, about what is the same both really and conceptually; and so one must not in 'opposition to the council construct fallacious syllogisms with the result that one arrives at contradictions. When one has understood this, one has an exquisite demonstration of the fact that the real divine relations and the divine substance or essence are both really identical and conceptually distinct. For without real identity, we should not be able to say that in truth that supreme reality is the Father and the Son and the Spirit. And without a conceptual distinction we should not be able to say that that supreme reality neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, but that it is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Spirit who proceeds.

QUAESTIO V

QUESTION 5

Utrwn relatio possit esse idem. realiter quod substantia

Can a relation be really identical with a substance?

Et videtur quod non, nam decem genera entis realiter inter se distinguuntur; sed relatio et'substantia sunt genera diversa, nempe, quid et ad quid; ergo relatio non potest esse idem realiter quod substantia.

It may seem that a relation cannot be the same as a substance, for the ten categories of being are really distinct from one another; but relation and substance are different categories, namely, 'something' and 'to something'; therefore, a relation cannot be really identical with a substance.


•


268

De Relatianibus Divinis Realibus

269


Praeterea, relatio est accidens; sed accidens realiter a substantia distinguitur; et ideo relatio non potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Praeterea, relatio est essentia secundum quid, et substantia est essentia simpliciter; sed essentia secundum quid non est essentia simpliciter; ergo relatio non potest esse idem realiter quod substantia.

Besides, a relation is an accident; but accident and substance are really distinct, and therefore a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. Again, .a relation is essence in a qualified sense, whereas substance is simply essence WIthout qualification; but_essence in a qualified sense and essence without qualification are not the same, and so a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. .

Sed contra est quod relationes divinae reales non realiter sed ratione a divina substantia distinguuntur; ergo saltern in divinis relatio potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Praeterea, omne subsistens est in genere substantiae; sed relationes divinae reales sunt subsistentes; ergo saltern in divinis relatio potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Respondeo dicendum quod ad huiti~ quaestionis solutionem duplex requiritur consideratio; primo enim ipsae notiones relationis, accidentis, et substantiae sunt exacte intelligendae; deinde, clare atque distincte perspiciendus est modus quo hae notiones in rebus verificentur. Circa primum, animadvertendum est notiones relationis, accidentis, et substantiae esse genericas et ex diversis definiendi modis derivari. Alia enim definiuntur per ea quae ipsa sunt; alia autem definiuntur per ea quae ipsa non sunt, et quidem dupliciter, cum alia definiantur per aliud in quo sunt et alia definiantur per aliud ad quod sunt.

Against these arguments, however, is the fact that the real divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance not in reality but only in concept; therefore, at least in God a relation can be really the same as the substance. Moreover, every subsistent is in the category of subst~mce; but the real divine relations are subsistent, and therefore at least in God a relation can be.really the same as the substance.

I respond. that ~o considerations are required to resolve this question: first, the very notIons of relation, accident, and substance must be understood exactly; second, the way in which these notions are verified in things must be clearly and distinctly grasped. Regarding the first consideration, note that relation, accident, and substance are generic notions and are derived through different ways of defining. Some things are defined by what they themselves are; others are defined by what they themselves are not, and this is so in two ways, since some are defined in terms of another in which they are, and others are defined in terms of another to which they are.

v.g., homo definitur per ea quae ipse homo est: definitur enim homo animal rationale, ubi homo tum animal est tum rationalis est. Definiuntur autem simitas, eclipsis, circulus, per ea quae ipsa non sunt: in definitione enim simitatis ponitur nasus, in definitione ec1ipsis ponitur quoddam corpus caeleste ut sol veliuna, in definitione circuli ponitur superficies plana; sed simitas non est nasus sed in nasa; eclipsis non est sol vel luna sed obscuratio facta in sale vel in luna; circulus non est superficies plana sed in superficie plana; et ideo his in exemplis "fit definitio per aliud in quo definitum invenitur. Definiuntur denique relativa omnia per aliud: relativa enim sunt quorum esse est ad aliud se habere; ubi tamen notandum est relativa definiri non per aliud in quo sunt sed per aliud ad quod sunt.

For example, a human being is defined by what a human being is: for a human being is defined as a rational animal, where a human being is both animal and rational. But snubness, eclipse, and circle are defined by what they themselves are not. 'Snubness' is defined in terms of 'nose,' 'eclipse' in terms of a heavenly body such as the sun or the moon, and 'circle' in terms of a plane surface. Snubness is not a nose but in a nose, an eclipse is not the sun or the moon but a darkening in the sun or in the moon, and a circle is not a plane surface but in a plane surface. Thus, in these examples the definition is stated in terms of another in which is found what is defined. Finally, all relatives are defined in terms of another; for relatives are those whose existence is to be to another, and so one must take note that relatives are defined not in terms of another in which they are but in terms of another to which they are.

lam vero per definitiones innotescunt essentiae rerum, et ideo quot sunt genera definitionum, tot sunt genera essentiarum. Quorum ergo sunt definitiones per ea quae ipsa sunt, seu per se, eorum sunt essentiae simpliciter. Quorum autem sunt definitiones per aliud, eorum sunt essentiae secundum quid, et quidem dupliciter;

Now, the essences cif things are known through definitions, and so there are as many kinds of essences as there are kinds of definitions. The essences of what are defined by what they themselves are, or through themselves, are essences without qualification. The essences of what are defined through another are essences in a qualified sense, and this in two ways: the essences of what are defined through



270

De Relationibus DiVinis Realibus

27'

nam quorum sunt definitiones'per aliud in quo sunt, eorum sunt essentiae secun~ dum quod in alio sunt; et quorum sunt definitiones per aliud ad quod sunt, eorum sunt essentiae secundum quod ad aliud sunt. Praeterea, unicuique competit esse secundum suam essentiam. Quorum ergo sunt essentiae simpliciter, sicut per se definiuntur, ita iis competit esse per se. Quorum autem sunt essentiae se~undum quid, sicut per aliud definiuntur, ita iis quodammodo competit esse per aliud, et quidem dupliciter. Nam quae definiuntur per aliud in quo sunt, iis competit esse in alio; et quae definiuntur per aliud ad quod sunt, iis competit esse ad aliud. Quibus perspectis, elutet (I) quid sit substantia, (2) quotupliciter dicatur acci~ dens, (3) quo sensu relatio sit accidens, et (4) quam genericae sint hae definitiones. Primo, enim, elucet. substantiam esse id cui competit esse per se. Deinde elucet accidens dici dupliciter: sensu enim latiori, accidens est quodcumque habet essentiam secundum quid; sed sensu strictiori, accidens est cui competit esse in alio. Tertia elucet relationem et sensu latiori esse accidens, quia per aliud defin~tur, et non esse accidens sensu strictiori, quia non definitur per aliud in quo est, et ideo ei non competit ex ipsa sua ratione esse in alio. Quarto denique elucet has defini~ tiones substantiae, accidentis, et relationis non proxime desumi ex concreta rerum realitate, sed valde remote ex genericis modis quibus definiuntur, nempe, per se, per aliud, per aliud in quo definitum invenitur, et per aliud ad quod definitum est.

At notionibus exacte intellectis, ad alteram solutionis partem procedendum est, cum ex solis notionibus ad distihctiones rationis concludi possit sed, nisi notiones ad res comparentur, ad distinctiones reales numquam perveniatur. Ratione enim sunt distincta quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius; et ideo facillime ex dictis concluditur ratione inter se distingui tum substantiam et accidens tum accidens stricte dictum et relationem. Sed realiter sunt distincta quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale; et ideo ad realem. distinctionem probandam omnino considerari oportet ipsam realitatem ad quam notiones applicantur. Quod, quamvis universaliter verum sit, maxime est observandum ubi notiones sunt genericae atque remotissimae, cum nihil in rerum natura sit mere genericum. Ita nihil legitime concluditur nisi distinctio rationis inter relationem et accidens stricte dictum, ex eo quod relationi competit esse ad aliud et accidenti stricte dicta competit esse in alio. Quod manifeste confirmatur ex rebus materialibus in



another in which they are are essences that are in another, and the essences of what are defined in terms of another to which they are are essences that are to another. Further, it is proper to each thing to be in accord with its essence. Those whose essences are without qualification are defined through themselves, and so it is proper to them to be through .themselves. Those whose essences are, qualified in some respect are defined through another, and so it is proper to them to be through another. This is so in two ways: it is proper to those that are defined through another in which they are, to be in another, and it is proper to those that are defined through another to which they are, to be to another. From this, then, it is clear (I) what substance is, (2) the various meanings of 'accident,' (3) in what sense a relation is an accident, and (4) how generic these definitions are. First, then, it is clear that a substance is that to which it is proper to be through itself Second, it is clear that 'accident' is used in two ways: in a broader sense, an accident is whatever has a qualified essence, but in a stricter sense an accident is that to which it is proper to be in another. Third, it is clear that a relation is both an accident in a broader sense, since it is defined through another, and not an accident in the strict sense, since it is not defined through another in which it is, and therefore 'to be in another' is not what is proper to a relation by definition. Fourth, it is clear that these definitions of substance, accident, and relation are not derived proximately from the concrete -reality of things, but quite remotely from generic ways of defining, namely, through self, through another, through another in which the defined is, and through another to which the defined is. Once these notions are understood exactly, we may proceed to the second part of the solution to this question. From notions alone we can conclude to conceptual distinctions, but unless notions are related to things, we shall never arrive at real distinctions. For those things are distinct conceptually when the concept of one is not the concept of the other, and therefore from what we have said it is quite easy to conclude that substance and accident, and also accident in the strict sense and relation, are conceptually distinct. But there is a real distinction when one as real is not the other as real, and so to prove a real distinction we must definitely consider the reality itself to which the notions apply. Although this is universally true, it must especially be observed when the notions are generic and quite remote, since nothing real is merely generic. Thus, from the fact that it is proper to a relation to be to another, and to an accident in the strict sense to be in another, it is not legitimate to conclude to anything other than a conceptual distinction between relation and accident in the strict sense. This is clearly demonstrated in the 'case of material things, in which

all


272


273

quibus multae inveniuntur relationes quae de facto in alio sunt quamvis hoc iis non competat ex ipsa relationis ratione. Iterum nihil legitime concluditur nisi distinctio rationis inter substantiam et relationem. ex eo quod substantia est essentia simpliciter et relatio est essentia secundum quid. Genericus enim aspectus secundum quem realitas quaedam est substantia minime excludit possibilitatem alterius aspectus secundum quem eadem realitas sit relativa. Ita omnis substantia finita. secundum quod substantia est, per se definitur, essentiam simpliciter habet, eique competit esse per se. At omnis substantia finita etiam est natura quaedam; omnis natura finita est principium intrinsecum operationis; et omne reale principium operationis ad operationem suam realiter distinctam refertur realiter. Et ideo. perspecta concreta rerum realitate. elucet idem realiter secundum alium aspectum esse substantiam et secundum aspectum alium esse relationem realem. Quibus simul consideratis, elucet relationem posse esse vel accidens stricte dictum vel substantiam. Cuius ratio est quod oppositio contradictoria non viget neque inter esse ad aliud et esse in alio neque inter essentiam simpliciter et essentiam secundum quid. Quod enim ad aliud est. etiam in alio esse potest; et quod secundum unum aspectum suae realitatis habet essentiam simpliciter. secundum alium aspectum eiusdem realitatis habere potest essentiam secundum quid. E contra, cum oppositio contradictoria vigeat inter esse per se et esse in alio (nam per se idem valet quod non in alio), fieri non potest ut eadem realitas sit et substantia et accidens stricte dictum; qua de causa, accidentia eucharistica, quamvis de facto in alio non sint, nihilominus accidentia manent quia ex ipsa eorum ratione atque natura eiusmodi sunt ut iis competat esse in alia. Quae si in rebus creatis inveniri possunt, multo magis in divinis sunt agnoscenda. Deus enim in nullo genere est,18 et ideo quamvis per deficie~tem nostrum concipiendi modum de divina substantia et de divinis relationibus loquamur, tamen ex conceptibus eiusmodi ad ipsam divinam realitatem par~m accedimus. et ideo temerarie ex iis argueret qui certo concluderet divinam substantiam non posse esse realiter idem ac divina relatio. Praetcrea, cum hac in vita sciamus non quid Deus sie 9 sed quid Deus non sit, aspectus tantummodo divinae perfectionis eosque ex magna parte negativos 19 Ita S. Thomas passim, v.g., Sum. theol., 1, q. 3, jntrod.; q. I, a. 7, ad 1m; q. 2, a. 2 ad 2m; q. 12, a. 12 ad 1m; a. 13 ad 1m; q. 13, a. 8 ad 2m. Huius sententiae fundamenta vide in appendice II, §5. Neque aliter sentit P. Lennerz, De Deo Uno, n. 1I2; quod



there are many relations that in fact are in another even though this is not what is proper to relations by definition. Again, from the fact that substance is essence without qualification and relation is a qualified essence, it is not legitimate to conclude to anything other than a conceptual distinction between substance and relation. For the generic aspect according to which a given reality is a substance does not at all exclude the possibility of another aspect according to which the same reality may be relative. Thus every finite substance, as substance, is defined through itself and has an essence without qualification, and it is proper for it to be through itself. But every finite substance is also a nature; every finite nature is an intrinsic principle of operation; and every real principle of operation is really related to its really distinct operation. Therefore. once the concrete reality of things is understood, it is clear how the same thing according to one aspect is a substance and according to another aspect is a real relation. When all these matters are considered together. it is evident that a relation can be either an accident in the strict sense or a substance. The reason for this is that the op'position between being to another and being in another, or between essence without qualification and qualified essence, is not a contradictory opposition. For what is to another can also be in another; and what according to one aspect of its reality has essence without qualification, according to another aspect of the same reality can have qualified essence. On the other hand, since there is a' contradictory opposition between being through itself and being in ano,ther - for 'through itself is the same as 'not in another' - it is impossible for the same reality to be both a substance and an accident in the strict sense. It is because ofthis that the eucharistic . accidents, although in fact they are not in another, nevertheless remain accidents, because. by their formality and nature it is proper to them to be in another. If this is the case in creation, all the more must it be acknowledged in God. For God is not in any genus. 18 and therefore, although we talk about the divine substance and the divine relations according to our limited way of conceiving things, yet through such concepts we attain little understanding of divine reality itself, and so it would be presumptuous to conclude with certitude from these concepts that the divine substance cannot be really the same as a divine relation. Besides, in this life we know, not what God is,19 but rather what God is not. Hence we know merely aspects of divine perfection, and those are for the most 18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theoiogiae, I, q. 3, a. 5. 19 Passim in Aquinas. See, for example, Summa theologiae, I, q. 3, Introduction; q. I, a. 7, ad rm; q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m; q. 12, a. 12, ad 1m; a. 13, ad 1m; q. 13, a. 8, ad 2m. For the basis for this opinion, see appendix 2, §5. H. Lennerz, De Deo Uno (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1948) § I 12, is of the same opinion; for what St Thomas

Collected


274


275

cognoscimus, neque ea positiva Dei intelligentia gaudemus ut adaequate perspicere possimus. quemadmodum hi multi et diversi aspectus inter se in unum conflentur. Qua de causa, nullum serium confici pote'st argumentum ex eo quod non intelligitur quemadmodum in unum reale et ratio substantiae et ratio relatio.nis coincidere possint. Nam etiam in naturaliter notis melius ex eo arguitur quod intelligitur quam ex eo quod non intelligitur; et in mysteriis divinis quaerenda est intelligentia non perfecta sed imperfecta ilia quam parit ratio per fidem iliustrata dummodo sedulo, pie, sobrie quaerat. Praeterea, dici non potest ita inter se pugnare substantiam et relationem ut in uno eodemque reali inveniri non possint, cum sufficiat vel unum exemplum positivum ad assertum universale et negativum refellendum. Sed ex multis exemplis constat realitatem substantiae relationes reales non excludere. Nam omnis substantia finita componitur ex potentia et actu qui realiter inter se referuntur; omnis substantia materialis realiter componitur ex materia et fonna et esse quae realher inter se referuntur; omnis substantia finita sive materialis sive immaterialis est natura quaedam specifica, quae est principium intrinsecum operationuffi, ubi operationes realiter a principio distinguuntur, et ipsum principium realiter ad operationes realiter distinctas refertur. Praeterea, quo magis genericas substantiae et re1ationis rationes cum ipsa divina realitate comparamus, eo minus esse per se et esse ad aliud sibi opponi videtur. Non enim divina realitas per se esse desinit quia a Patte ad Filium et a Patre Filioque ad Spiritum communicatur; communicatio enim substantiae rationem substantiae non destruit; et tamen ipsa haec communicatio relationes reales fundat. Praeterea, relationes reales in communicatione fundatae non referunt Deum ad aliud quod Deus non est, sed altera rela:tio subsistens ad alteram et oppositam refertur et, cum omnes hae relationes cum realitate divinae substantiae realiter identificentur, quam maxime minuitur tum relationis esse ad aliud tum etiam relationis oppositio ad esse per se. Ad primum ergo quod obiciebatur,~O dicendum est quod sicut in aliis scientiis ita etiam in metaphysica duplicem cognitionem distingui oportet: alia enim est praescientifica rerum cognitio, in qua.rerum causae adhuc ignorantur; alia autem est scientifica rerum cognitio,

enim a S. Thoma nominatur 'scire quid sit,' ab eo nominatur 'quidditativa quidditatis cognitio.'



part negative ones. We do not enjoy a positive understanding of God so as to be able to understand how these many diverse aspects come together into one. As a result, no serious argument can be made on the basis of the fact that we do not understand how the formality of substance and the formality of relation can come together into one reality. Even in what we know naturally it is better to argue from what we understand than from what we do not understandj and in the case of the divine mysteries we have to seek, not a perfect understanding, but that imperfect understanding that reason enlightened by faith generates when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously. Moreover, one cannot say that substance and relation are so incompatible that they cannot exist in one and the same reality, since even one positive example suffices to refute a universal negative assertion. But it is clear from many examples that the reality of substance does not exclude real relations. For every finite substance is composed of potency and act, which are really related to each other; every material substance is really composed of matter and form and existence, which are really related to one another; every finite substance, whether material or immaterial, is a specific nature, which is an intrinsic principle of operations, where the operations are really distinct from the principle and the principle itself is really related to the really distinct operations. Again, the more we compare the generic notions of substance and relation with the divine reality itself, the less do being through itself and being to another seem to be opposites. The divine reality does not cease to be through itself because it is communicated by the Father to the Son and by the Father and the Son to the Spirit; for the communication of the substance does not destroy the formality of substance; and yet this very communication is the foundation of the real relations. Again, the real relations founded on communication do not relate God to another that is not God; rather, one subsistent relation is related to the other opposite subsistent relation, and since all these relations are really identical with the reality of the divine substance, the being wanother of relation as well as the opposition of relation to being through itself are diminished as much as possible. In reply to the first contrary argument,20 we say that in metaphysics as in all other sciences, one must distinguish betvveen tvvo kinds of knowledge. The first is a prescientific knowledge of things, in which the causes of things are not yet known.

terms 'to know what (a thing) is' Lennerz calls 'quidditative knowledge ofa quiddity' [Lennerz, §1I2, p. 91: 'Non autem quidditative quidditatem Dei cognoscimus']. 20 [See the beginning of this question 5, p. 267. The argument, again, is that rela.tion cannot be the same as substance because the ten categories, among which are substance and relation, are really distinct from one another.J


276

De Rclationibus Divinis Realibus

277

in qua res per causas suas cognoscuntur. lam vero'metaphysica est scientia rerum per causas ultimas; causae autem ultirnae et constitutivae sunt potentia et actus, materia et forma, essentia et esse, et essentiarum divisiones supra expositae; ultima autem causa efficiens et finalis est Deus; et inquantum res per tales causas cognoscuntur, habetur cognitio metaphysica scientifica. E contra, decem praedicamenta sunt, non ultimae rerum causae, sed ultima rerum genera; quae quidem genera ultima pertinent ad cognitionem metaphysicam qua praescientificam, videlicet, in ordine ad causas investigandas atque inveniendas; et ideo de praedicamentis tractatur, non in ipsa metaphysica, sed in logica. ~I

Quae cum ita sint, valde ruditer procedit qui ex praedicamentis qua talibus arguit. Quamvis enim sint genera et ultima et inter se distincta, quantum attinet eognitionem metaphysicam praescientifieam, tamen ipsa cognitio praescientifica non est nisi stadium praeparatorium ad cognitionem proprie scientificam. Praeterea, postquam ad cognitionem scientificam perventum est, manifeste standum est in iis quae clare et distinete per causas demonstrantur, neque ullo modo arguendum est ex ipsis praedicamentis nisi ad eos convincendos qui scientiam metaphysicam vel non capiant vel adhuc forte non intellexerint. Quam ob rem, in responsione supra posita, substantiam, accidens, et relationem in ultima constitutiva realia reduxirnus, nempe in essentias quibus competit esse per se vel in alia vel ad aliud; et secundum haec iudicavimus utrum substantia possit esse idem quod relatio. Praeterea, notandum est eandem fere esse rationem circa distinctionem quae fieri solet inter relationes praedicamentales et relationes transcendentales. Aliae enirn sunt rela~ tiones quae cognitione metaphysiea praescientifica innotescunt; et huiusmodi sunt quas enumerat Aristoteles,22 nempe, secundum quantitatem, secundum actionem et passionem, et secundum mensurabile et mensuram. Aliae autem sunt relationes quae per ipsam investigationem metaphysicam innotescunt; et huiusmodi sunt tum ea quae in sex ultimis praedicamentis inveniuntur tum ea quae inter principia rerum constitutiva intercedunt.23 Porro, ad hane differentiam sequitur alia. Priores relationes a prirnis et maxirnis doctoribus investigatae sunt; posteriores autem relationes qua tales investigari non potuerunt nisi postquam primi et maximi doctores ipsam scientiam metaphysicam invenerunt et


The second is a scientific knowledge of things, in which things are known through their causes. Now, metaphysics is the knowledge of things through ultimate causes. The ultimate constitutive causes are potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, and the divisions of essences stated above. The ultimate efficient cause and final cause is God. Insofar as things are known through these causes, there is scientific metaphysical knowledge. On the other hand, the ten categories are not the ultimate causes of things but the ultimate kinds of things. These ultimate kinds belong to metaphysical knowledge as pre scientific, that is, as directed to investigating and discovering causes, and therefore the categories are treated in logic, not in metaphysics itself. 21 Since this is so, to argue from categories as such is to proceed without due rigor. For although the kinds of things are ultimate and distinct from one another as far as prescientific metaphysical 'knowledge is concerned, still this prescientific knowledge is itself but a preparatory stage for properly scientific knowledge. Besides, once one has arrived at scientific knowledge, one must obviously stay with what has been clearly and distinctly demonstrated through causes and should not in any way argue from the categories unless to convince those who either do not grasp metaphysical knowledge or perhaps have as yet not understood it. Therefore, in the foregoing reply we reduced substance, accident, and relation to their ultimate real constitutive elements, that is, to essences to which it is proper to be through itself, or in another, or to another; and in accordance with this we have judged whether a substance can be the same as a relation. Moreover, practically the same argument applies to the distinction that is made between categorial relations and transcendental relations. The first are those relations that are known by prescientific metaphysical knowledge; these are the ones listed by Aristotle,22 namely, relations according to quantity, according to action and passion, and according to the measurable and the measure. The second are those relations that are known through metaphysical investigation; such relations are both those that are found in the last six categories and those that obtain among !pe constitutive principles of things. 23 Again, another diffe:r:ence follows from this distinction between prescientific and scientific knowledge. Categorial relations were investigated by the earliest group of great thinkers; but transcendental relations as such could not have been investigated until after those first great minds had founded and developed

21 [See Lonergan, Insight 420.] 22 See Thomas Aquinas, In V MetapfDis., lect '7, §§rOQI-roo3. 23 [For further data on a Scholastic discussion regarding relations in 'the last six categories' and relations 'among the constitutive principles of things,' see below, appendix 3, PP' 718-29.]



278


279

perfecerunt; ex ipsa enim rei natura tardior oriiur metaphysica relationis metaphysicae. At neque prima neque secunda differentia facit aliam distinctionem quam historicam. Et ipsa quae fit distinctio inter relationes praedicamentales (seu priores) et transcenden-

tales (seu posteriores) additam habet inconvenientiam quod rudes conducit in pestiferam notionem quod metaphysica est rerum cognitio non per ultimas causas sed per ultima genera. Quibus perspectis, scientificam credimus relationum esse distinctionem in subsistentes, subsistentium, et eorum quibus constituuntur subsistentia. Sic enim relationum divisio gradus rerum ontologicos consequeretur.~4

Ad secundum 2 ;' dicendum quod accidens dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, ut significet id cui competit esse in alio; alio modo, ut significet omne quod per aliud definitur sive per aliud in quo est sive per aliud ad quod est. lam vera si primo modo sumitur accidens, concedendum est substantiam non posse esse idem realiter quod accidens, sed negandum est relationem ex ipsa sua ratione esse accidens in hoc sensu. Si autem secundo modo sumitur accidens, concedendum est relationem esse accidens, sed negandum est accidens hoc sensu latiori cum realitate substantiae pugnare.

Ad tertium 26 denique conceditur substantiam esse vel habere essentiam simpliciter et relationem habere essentiam secundum quid; at negandum est fieri nori posse ut una eademque realitas sit et secundum se essentia simpliciter et secundum quod communicatUr essentia secundum quid. 27


metaphysical knowledge. For the metaphysics of metaphysical relation naturally emerges rather slowly. But neither the first nor the second difference makes for more than a historical distinction. And the distinction between the former relations, the categorial, and the latter, the transcendental, has this added inconvenience, that it gives the uninformed the pernicious notion that metaphysics is knowledge of things not through ultimate causes but through ultimate categories. Accordingly, we hold that the distinction ·of relations into subsistent relations, the relations of subsis tents, and the relations of the constituents of subsis tents, is scientific. For this division ofrelations corresponds to the ontological degrees ofreality. 24 In reply to the second contrary argument,25 we say that accident can be understood in tvvo ways. First, it signifies that to which it is proper to be in another. Second, it signifies anything that is defined either through another in which it is or through another to which it is. If we take accident in the first sense, we must concede that a substance cannot be really the same as an accident, but we must deny that a relation by definition is an accident in this sense. But if accident is taken in the second sense, we must concede that relation is an accident, but deny that an accident in this broader sense is incompatible with the reality of substance. In reply to the third contrary argument,26 we concede that a substance is or has essence in an unqualifiea sense, while a relation has essence with· qualification. But we must deny that it is impossible for one and the same reality to be both an unqualified essence with respect to itself and a qualified essence with respect to its communication. '.1.7

QUAESTIO VI

QUESTION 6

Utrwn fieri possit ut relationes divinae reales et realiter inter se distinguantur et realiter cwn una eademque substantia divina identificentur

Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from. one another and really identical with one and the same divine substance?

Et videtur quod non, quia ea quae sunt eadem uni tertia sunt eadem inter se. Qua de causa, si relationes reales realiter inter se distinguuntur, identificari non possunt

It seems impossible, since tvvo things that are the same as a third thing are identical with one another. Hence, if real relations are really distinct from one another, they 24 See appendix 3. 25 [See above, p. 269. The argument is that relation is an accident, and accident is really distinct from substance, so that relation cannot really be identical with substance.) 26 [See above, p. 269' The argument is that relation is essence in a qualified sense and substance is simply essence without qualification, and that the two are not the same, so that relation cannot be identical with substance.] 27 [See p. 273 above.]



280


28r

realiter cum una eademque substantia divina. Si autem realiter identificantur cum una eademque substantia divina, realiter inter se distingui non possunt. Sed contra est quod Pater non est Filius, et nihilominus unus idemque Deus et Pater est et Filius. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est huius quaestionis aspectus. Alius enim est aspectus logicus, inquantum invocatur principium identitatis comparatae, nempe, quae sunt eadem uni tertia sunt eadem inter se. Alius autem est aspectus realis, cum absoluta et relativa neque eodem modo realia sint neque eodem modo realiter inter se distinguantur. Et quantum ad aspectum logicum attinet, dicendum est eandem esse rationem de principio identitatis ac de principio contradictionis: principium enim identitatis nihil est aliud ac positiva eiu~ assertio cuius oppositum per principium contradic~ tionis excluditur. lam vera inter omnes constat illegitime applicari principium contradictionis ubicumque agitur vel de diversis vel de eodem secundum diversos aspectusj et ideo illud solum per principium contradictionis excluditur quod idem secundum idem (seu idem re et ratione) et est et, non est. Pariter ergo dicendum est ilIegitime applicari principium identitatis ubicumque agitur vel de diversis vel de eodem secundum diversos aspectus: et ideo illud solum sub principio identi~ tatis cadit quod idem secundum idem (seu idem re et ratione) respiciat.

Quibus perspectis, facilis omnino est responsio ad obiectionem supra positam, cum perperam ibi invocetur principium identitatis comparatae. Nam reales relationes divinae re sed non ratione cum divina substantia identificanturj et ideo nihil efficere potest principium identitatis, quod ea sola respicit quae eadem sunt non solum re sed etiam ratione. Cum tamen solutio stricte logica merum effugium videri possit si nulla addatur explicatio de ipsis rebus, etiam considerandum est quemadmodum se habeat allata distinctio ad casus diversos. Primo, ergo, si absolutum, A, est realiter idem cum absoluto, C, et pariter absolutum, B, est realiter idem cum absoluto, C, tunc dari non potest nisi distinctio mere nominalis tum inter A et C tum inter B et C, ut, v.c., A sit hoc vestimentum, et B sit hoc indumentum, et C sit haec tunica, ubi vestimentum, indumentum et tunica non sint nisi diversa nomina eiusdem prorsus rei. Cuius ratio est quod, si duo absoluta sunt realiter idem, nulla est intelligibilitas unius quae non sit per identitatem intelligibilitas alteriusi et quae tum re tum intelligibilitate sunt eadem, nisi nominibus inter se distingui non possunt. Qua de causa, aHata distinctio inter



cannot be really identical with one and the same divine substance. If, however, they are really identical with one and the same divine substance, they cannot be really distinct from one another. But against this is the fact that the Father is not the Son, and nevertheless one and the same God is the Father and is the Son. In replying to this question, we must point out that it has two aspects. The first aspect is logical, in that an appeal is made to the principle of compared identity, namely, that two that are identical with a third are identical with each other. The other aspect is real, since absolutes and relatives are not real in the same way and are not really distinct from each other in the same way. As far as the logical aspect is concerned, the formality of the principle of iden~ tity is the same as that of the principle of contradiction; for the principle of identity is simply the positive statement of that whose opposite is negated by the princi~ pIe of contradiction. Now all agree that it is illegitimate to apply the principle of contradiction whenever the question is about either different things or about the same thing under different aspects; therefore, the only thing denied by the princi~ pIe of contradiction is that the same thing in the same way - the same both really and conceptually - both is and is not. It is similarly illegitimate to apply the prin~ ciple of identity whenever the question is about different things or about the same thing under different aspects; therefore, the only thing that falls under the prin~ ciple of identity is the same thing under the same aspect - the same thing both really and conceptually. In view of this it is quite easy to reply to the above objection, since it incorrectly appeals to the principle of compared identity. The real divine relations are identical with the divine substance in reality but not conceptually. Therefore the principle of identity does not apply, since it regards only those things that are the same not only really but also conceptually, Since, however, a strictly logical solution can seem to be merely an evasion if there is no added explanation about the things them,selves, we must also consider how the distinction we have made applies in different cases. To begin, then, if an absolute, A, is really the same as an absolute, C, and an absolute, B, is likewise really the same as an absolute, C, then the distinction between A and C and between Band C can be only verbal: for example, A is . this vestment, B is this garment, and C is this tunic, where 'vestment,' 'garment,' and 'tunic' are but different nouns for a thing that is entirely the same. This is so because, if two absolutes are really the same, there is no intelligibility in one that is not identical with the intelligibility of the other. And when they are the same both in reality and in intelligibility, they can be distinct only verbally. For this reason, if only absolutes are being considered, the distinction we have


282

De RelatiQnibus Divinis "Realibus

283

re et ratione et re sed non ratione, si de solis absolutis cogitatur, omni vero sensu caret. Deinde, si relativum, A, sit realiter idem cum absoluto, C, et relativum, B, sit realiter idem cum eodem absoluto, C, fieri non potest ut mere nominalis sit disM tinctio sive inter A et C sive inter B et C. Eiusmodi enim est absolutum ut suam rationem intra suam realitatem contineat atque claudatj eiusmodi autem est rela M tivum ut per suam rationem ultra propriam realitatem ad aliam respiciatj et ideo absolutum et relativum non solum nomine sed etiam intelligibilitate necessario inM ter se distinguuntur, cum fieri nequeat ut eadem ratio et intra suam realitatem tota contineatur et ultra suam realitatem ad aliam realitatem respiciat. Qua de causa, allata distinctio inter re et ratione et re sed non ratione, ubi duo relativa cum e~dem absoluto comparantur, non tantum diversa nomina sed etiam diversas eiusdem rei intelligibilitates dicat necesse est. Cuius rei exemplum classicum est realis identitas ab Aristotele affirmata tum inter motum et actionem tum inter motum et passionem. Apud Aristotelem eniro actio definitur actus

huius ut ab /we, scilicet, actus qui agentis est inquantum ab agente procedit, et passio definitur actus huius ul in hoc, scilicet, actus qui patientis est inquantum in patiente recipitur; et cum" idem sit actus qui et ab agente procedit et in patiente recipitur, scilicet, ipse motus ab agente productus et in patiente receptus, sequitur tum actionem tum passionem esse realiter idem cum motu. Quibus perspectis, etiam elucet cur tam difficile hoc theorema multis videatur. Nam et actio et passio super ipsum motum relationes, ut ab hoc, ut in hoc, addunt; sed longe alia est haec addita intelligibilitas ab intelligibilitate motus absoluti; et ideo multis perdifficile videtur quod tam diversae relativorum et absoluti intelligibilitates in uno eodemque reali inveniuntur.

Denique, ubi duo relativa cum eodem absoluto realiter identificanrur, non solum intelligibilitate ab absoluto distinguantur necesse est sed etiam realiter inter se distingui possunt. Nam, uti supra demonstratum est, relationes et reales et mutuo oppositae necessario realiter inter se distinguuntur. Sed relationes quae cum eodem absoluto realiter identificantur sunt relationes reales. Et ideo si eiusmodi sunt earum rationes intelligibiles ut mutuo opponantur, etiam realiter inter se distinguuntur. Quod sane totius nostri problematis clavis est atque solutio. Absolutorum enim est ut realiter non distinguantur"nisi eadem ratio et ab u~o ponatur et ab alio non ponatur. Sed relativorum ulterius est ut realiter inter se distinguantur, non solum



made between 'really and conceptually' and 'really but not conceptually' is quite meaningless. Next, if a relative, A, is really identical with an absolute, C, and a relative, B, is really identical with the same absolute, C, the distinction between A and C or between Band C cannot be merely verbal. For an absolute is such that it contains and encloses its essential meaning within its own reality, whereas a relative is such that by reason ofits essential meaning it goes beyond its own reality to look towards another. Therefore, an absolute and a relative are not only verbally distinct but are also necessarily distinct in intelligibility, since it is impossible that the same meaning be both totally contained within its own reality and at the same time look towards another reality beyond its own. This is why when two relatives are related to the same absolute, our distinction between 'really and conceptually' and 'really but not "Conceptually' necessarily signifies not only different words for the same reality but also different intelligibilities of the same reality. The classic example of this is the real identity that Aristotle affirmed between motion and action and between motion and passion. He defines action as 'the act of a thing considered as being from this thing,' that is, an act of an agent considered as proceeding from the agent, and passion he defines as 'the act of a thing considered as being in this thing,' that is, the act of a recipient considered as being received in the recipient. And since the act that proceeds from the agent is the same as that which is received in the recipient, namely, the motion "produced by the agent and received in the recipient, it follows that both action and passion are really identical with motion. One can see from this example why this theorem is apparently so difficult for so many. For 'action' and 'passion' add to motion the relations 'as from this' and 'as in this'; but this added intelligibility is far different from the intelligibility of the motion of an absolute, and therefore to many it seems extremely difficult to see that such diverse intelligibilities of the absolute and of relatives are present in one and the same reality. Finally, when two relatives are really identical with the same absolute, not only must they be distinct in intelligibility from the absolute but also they can be really distinct from each other. For, as we demonstrated above, relations that are both real and mutually opposecl are necessarily really distinct from one another" But relations that are really identical with the same absolute are real relations. Therefore, if their intelligible conceptions are opposed to one another, such rcla M tions are really distinct from one another. This surely is the key to the solution of our whole problem. Absolutes are such that there is no real distinction betw"een them unless the same conception can be posited of one and not of the other. In the case of relatives, on the other hand, there is the further fact that they are really distinct from one another not only by the


284


285

per positionem et non-positionem eiusdem rationis, sed etiam per mutuam oppositionem diversarum rationum. Quae quidem oppositio, inquantum realis est, ex realitate relationum dependet; et haec realitas ex uno eodemque absoluto haberi potest. Sed eadem oppositio, inquantum oppositio est, ex solis rationibus dependet; nam oppositae sunt relationes inquantum altera ad alteram terminatur; et altera ad alteram terminatur, non quia relationes sint reales, sed quia earum rationes mutua se respiciunt. Qua de causa, quae sunt eadem uni tertio, non necessario sunt eadem inter se. Nam duo relativa cum eodem tertio-realiter identificari passunt; quod "Si realiter identmcantur, saltern ratione intelligibili ab absoluto distinguuntur; et si eiusmodi sunt rationes ut mutuo opponantur, etiam realiter inter se distinguantur necesse est. 28 Cuius tamen exemplum in rebus creatis non inveniri fatendum est. Actio enim et passio, sensu Aristotelico, quae realiter cum motu identificantur, non mutuo opponuntur, cum actio agentem respiciat et passio patientem. Imo, cum ab agente et in patiente ad unam atque indivisam intelligibilitatem pertineant, ordine unum sunt et nisi unum ordinem seu unam relationem realem non constituunt. Si vero actio intelligitur ut relatio agentis ad patiens, et passio intelligitur ut relatio patientis ad agens, sane habentur re1ationes et reales et mutuo oppositae. Attamen actio et passio sic intellectae cum uno eodemque tertio realiter identificari non possunt, cum actio actum, passin potentiam supponat, et idem secundum idem non possit esse et actu et potentia. Qua de causa, solummodo in divinis inveniuntur re1ationes et reales et mutua oppositae et cum eodem absoluto realiter identicae, inquantum per unum actum infinitum habentur et principium verbi, et verbum, et amor procedens. Obiectio vera quae primo loco posita est, sic cum responsionibus et instantiis exponi potest. Quae sunt eadem uni tertia sunt eadem inter se; atqui Pater et Filius sunt eadem uni Deo; ergo sunt eadem inter se. Respondetur. Quae uni tertia sunt eadem tum re tum ratione, sunt eadem inter se, con~editur. Quae uni tertia sunt eadem re sed non ra,tione, sunt eadem inter se, negatur. Et minor contradistinguitur: Pater et Filius sunt eadem uni Deo, tum re tum ratione, negatur, re sed non ratione, coru;editur.


positing and non-positing of the same conception but also by the mutual opposition of diverse conceptions. This opposition, as real, depends upon the reality of the relations, and'this reality can be had from one and the same absolute. But this same opposition, as opposition, depends solely upon the conceptions. For relations are opposite inasmuch as each is the term of the other, and each is the term of the other not because the relations are real but because their conceptions regard one another. Hence, what are. identical with the same third are not necessarily identical with one another. For two relatives can be really identical with the same third; but if they are really identical, they are distinguished from the absolute at least by an intelligible conception. And if their conceptions are such that they are mutually opposed, the relatives must also necessarily be really distinct from one another. 2B Still, we must admit that there is no example of this to be found in creation. Action and passion in the Aristotelian sense, which are really identical with motion, are not mutually opposed, since action regards the agent and passion the recipient. In fact, since 'from the agent' and 'in the recipient' pertain to one undivided intelligibility, they stand in a single order and constitute but one order or one real relation. If, however, action is understood as a relation of the agent to the recipient and passion as a relation of the recipient to the agent, then indeed we have relations that are real and mutually opposed. Nevertheless, action and passion understood in this way cannot be really identical with the same third, since action supposes act, passion supposes potency, and the same reality in the same respect Cannot be both in act and in potency. Only in God, then, are to be found relations that are real, mutually opposed, and really identical with the same absolute, inasmuch as through one infinite act there are in God the principle of the word, the word, and proceeding love. The olijection that was put at the beginning of this question can be stated as follows, together with the replies and the further objections. What are identical with one third thing are identical with one another; but the Father and the Son are identical with the one God, and therefore are identical with one another. In response, we grant that what are identical with one third thing both really and conceptually are identical with one another; but what are identical with one third thing in reality but not conceptually are not identical with one another. And we deny that the Father and the Son are identical with the one God both in reality and conceptually; we do concede that they are identical with the one God in reality but not conceptually. 28 See 'A Brief Question,' p. 737.



286

287


Instatur. Distinctio rationis nihil facere potest ut adsit distinctio realis.


It might be urged that a conceptual distinction can contribute nothing to making a real distinction.

&spondetur. Nihil efficitur ad distinctionem realem per distinctionem mere nominalem, conce;duur. Nihil efficitur ad distinctionem realem ubi in eadem realitate verificantur diversae rationes intelligibiles, nempe, absoluti et relativi, negatur.

Instatur. In eadem realitate verificari non possunt rationes intelligibiles adeo diversae ut ad distinctionem realem fundandam sufficiant. &spontutur. In eadem realitate verificari non possunt rationes intelligibiles adeo diversae ut fundari possit distinctio realis absolutorum, conceditur, relativorum, subdistinguitur, non mutuO oppositorum, conceditur, mutuo oppositorum, negatur. Et ratio est quod tum absoluta tum etiam relativa non mutuo opposita non realiter inter se distinguuntur nisi per positionem et non-positionem eiusdem rationis, et patet unam rationem non posse simul poni et non poni per eandem realitatem. E contra, relativa realia et mutuo opposita per ipsam mutuam oppositionem realiter distingui demonstrantur; neque ulla invenitur contradictio in eo quod in eadem realitate verificantur relativa mutuo opposita.

Instatur. Saltern nulla existit possibilitas concreta ut relativa mutuo opposita in eadem reaIitate verificentur. Nam in rebus creatis nullum prorsus invenitur exemplum; et in divinis res non concipitur nisi pbnendo processionem realem in qua idem reaIiter actus ex se ipso quodammodo oriatur. Respondetur. Ut relativa mutuo opposita in eadem reaIitate verificentur, nulla invenitur possibilitas concreta, distinguitur, nulla quae ex rebus creatis demonstretur vel a nobis perfecte intelligatur, conceditur, nulla quae ex divina revelatione certo credatur et a nobis aliqualiter intelligatur, negatur. Nam fide constat eundem Deum esse Patrern et Filium, Patrem autem non esse Filium. Quod quidem aIiquatenus a nobis intelligitur per analogiam psychologicam. Praesens enim problema nihil est aIiud quam transpositio quaedam illius problematis ex quo incepimus, nempe, quemadmodum Filius sit et a se et non a se, vel quemadmodum habeantur et realitas emanationis et consuhstantialitas emanantis. Si eniro haec habentur, etiam habentur duae relationes reales mutuo oppositae, realtter inter se distinctae, et tamen cum eadem substantia divina identicac. Ad illud autem quod additur de actu ex eodem actu, notanda est differentia inter conc. Nicaenum ct Lateranense IV. Ubi enim in Nicaeno dicitur 'Deum ex Deo,' intelIigi oportet


In response, we grant that through a merely verbal distinction, n·othing is pro~ duced pertaining to a real distinction. We deny that nothing is produced pertaining to a real distinction when diverse intelligible conceptions, namely, that of the absolute and that of the relative, are verified in the same reality. It might be urgedfurther that there cannot be verified in the same reality intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction. In resNnse, we grant that in the same reality there cannot be verified intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction between absolutes, or a real distinction between relatives that are not mutually opposed; but we deny that diverse intelligible conceptions verified in the same reality cannot ground a real distinction between relatives that are mutually opposed. The reason is that both absolutes and relatives not mutually opposed are really distinguished only through affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same conception, and obviously a single conception cannot be simultaneously affirmed and not affirmed by reason of the same reality. On the other hand, we have shown that real and mutually opposed relatives are really distinct by reason of their mutual opposition; and there is no contradiction in the fact that mutually opposed relatives are verified in the same reality. Still, one might object, at least there is no concrete possibility for mutually opposed relatives to be verified in the same reality. For there is no instance of this whatever in creation; and in God this can be conceived only by positing a real procession in which the really same act somehow or other originates from itself. To this we answer that, although there is in the created world no instance that has been proven or is perfectly understood by us of mutually opposed relations being verified in the same reality, nevertheless such an instance is to be believed with certitude from divine revelation, and is to some extent understood by us. For from faith we are certain that the same God is Father and Son, and that the Father is not the Son. We understand this to a certain extent through the psychological analogy. For the present problem is but a transposition of the problem with which we began, namely, how the Son is both from himself and not from himself, or how there is present both the reality of the emanation and the consubstantiality of that which emanates. For if these two are present, there are also two real) mutually opposed relations, really distinct from each other and yet identical with the same divine substance. As to what the objector adds about an act emerging from the same act) one must note the difference between the statement of the Council of Nicea and that


288

Dc Relationibus Divinis Realibus

289

Deum Filium esse ex Deo Patre, ut nomen essentiae divinae concrete sumatur et a relationibus personaiibus non praescindat. Ubi autem in Lateranensi IV dicitur quod 'ilia res non est generans neque genita neque procedens,' intelligi opartet illam rem esse divinam substantiam, essentiam, seu naturam prout ratione distinguatur a relatianibus personalibus.

Instatur. Nihilominus non salvatur principium identi~atis camparatae; et statim probatur. Quamvis eniro principium directe respiciat ea quae sunt eadem tum re tum ratione, tamen contradictoria de eadem praedicari non possunt nisi praeter distinctionem rationis etiam invenitur distinctio realis. Verbi causa, idem homo non patest esse et martalis et immortalis nisi realiter distinguuntur anima qua est immortalis et materia qua est mortalis. Pariter idem Deus non potest esse et Pater et Filius nisi secundum aliud realher est Pater et secundum aliud realiter est Filius.

Respondetur. Contradictoria de eadem praedicari non possunt nisi praeter distinctianem rationis etiam invenitur distinctio rcalis, dirtinguitur, cantradictoria et absoluta, corueditur, relativa mutua opposita, subdistinguitur, requiritur aliqua realis distinctio, nempe, ipsorum relativorum, conceditur, requiritur realis ilia compositio quae absolutis competit, negatur.

Et explieo. 'Immortale' et 'mortale' stricte sunt eontradictoria, quia eadem potentia respective tollitur et ponitur; et ideo ad realem campositionem intra hominem rite concluditur. Sed 'Pater' et 'Filius' realiter distinguuntur quia sunt relativa mutuo opposita; et mutua oppositio relativa realem compositionem in absoluto non demonstrat.


of the Fourth Lateran. The phrase in Nicea, 'God from God,' inust be understood to mean that God the Son is from God the Father, in which the name of the divine essence is expressed concretely, without prescinding from the personal relations. But in the statement of the Fourth Lateran Council, ' ... that reality does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed,' the expression 'that reality' is the divine substance, essence, or nature as conceptually distinct from the personal relations. Still, one might object forther, the principle of compared identity is violated; here is the proof Although this principle direcdy regards what are the same both really and conceptually, still contradictories cannot be predicated of the same thing unless, besides a conceptual distinction, a real distinction is also present. For example, the same man cannot be both rilOrtal and immortal unless there is a real distinction betvveen the soul by which he is immortal and the matter by which he is mortal. Similarly, the same God cannot be both Father and Son unless by reason of one thing he is really the Father and by reason of another thing he is really the Son. We answer this objection as follows. That contradictories cannot be predicated of the same thing unless, besides a conceptual distinction, a real distinction is also present, is true in the case of contradictory absol~tes. For it to be true in the case of mutually opposed relatives, a real distinction is required between the relatives themselves; but there is not required that real composition that is proper to absolutes. Let us explain. 'Immortal' and 'mortal' are strictIycontradictory, since the same potency is respectively denied and affirmed, and therefore one correctly concludes to a real composition in a human being. But ·'Father' and 'Son' are really distinct since they are mutually opposite relatives; and mutual relational opposition does not prove real composition in an absolute.

QUAESTIO VII

QUESTION 7

Quid valeat distinctio inter 'esse in' et 'esse ad'

What is the value of the distinction between 'being in' and 'being to'?

Differt categoria relationis ab aliis inquantum distinguuntur relationes.(non autem substantiae vel qualitates vel alia praedicamenta) in relationes reales et relationes rationis. Porro, conceptus compositus dupliciter reduplicatur: considerari enim potest relatio realis vel qua relatio est vel- qua realis est. Quae duae reduplicationes nominari consueverunt 'esse ad' et 'esse in.' Sicut enim substantiae competit esse per se, sicut accidenti stricte sumpto competit esse in alio, ita etiam relationi,

The category of relation differs from the oth.er categories in that relations are distinguished into real relations and conceptual relations. There is no similar distinction for substances or qualities or other predicaments. Moreover, a composite concept is reduplicated in two ways: for a real relation can be considered either as it is a relation or as it is real. These two reduplications are usmilly termed ~being to' and 'being in.' For just as it is proper to a substance to be through itself, and just as it is proper to an accident in the strict sense to be


Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

290

De Re1ationibus Divinis Realibus

291

eo ipso quod relatio est, competit esse ad aliud; qua de causa relatio realis qua relatio dicitur lesse ad.' Praeterea, cum comrnuniter relationes sunt accidentia, eam habent realitatem quae accidentibus competit, nempe, lesse in'; et ideo relatio realis qua realis dicitur 'esse in.' Quibus perspectis, concludes 'esse ad' et 'esse in' non esse concipienda per moduro essentiae et esse ut ex eorum compositione quoddam totum efformaretur, sed ea esse concipienda tamquam duas notas unius relationis realis. Cuius distinctionis, in reduplicatione fundatae, duplex est valor' et periculum unum. Valor primus ex eo est quod reales personarum divinarum distinctiones oriuntur, non ex positione et non-positione eiusdem rationis, sed. in unica reali'positione relationum mutuo oppositarum. Aliis verbis, distinctio realis personarum ex oppositis 'esse ad' proxime oritur. Valar secundus ex eo est quod Filius habet omne quod Pater, excepta paternitate. Filius enim non realiter distinguitur a Deo; Deus non realiter distinguitur a Patre; et tamen Filius realiter distinguitur a Patre, quia distinctio personarum est secundum opposita 'esse ad.' Et idem valor iterum apparet ex eo quod ' ... Deitas ... nee minoratur in singulis, nee augetur in tribus; quia nee minus aliquid habet, cum unaquaeque persona Deus singulariter dicitur, nec amplius, cum totae tres personae unus Deus enuntiantur' (DB 279); quia scilicet fundantur personarum distinctiones non in positionibus contradictoriis et realibus sed in oppositis 'esse ad.'

Periculum autem unum est ne ex mente decidat quod 'esse ad' nihil est nisi aspectus reduplicatus relationis realis; quod eo facilius fit cum de mysterio disputetur. Age vero, nullum prorsus esset mysterium SS. Trinitatis si uni actui puro et infinito accederent tantummodo tria entia rationis. Quod tamen interdum supponi videtur cum elegantius et efficacius solvantur difficultates atque problemata. Quare omnino animadvertendum est eandem divinam realitatem et vere unam et vere trinam secundum duos aspectus ratione disiinctos a nobis ita apprehendi ut secundum aspectum absolutum unus sit Deus et secundum aspectum relativum tres sint relationes subsistentes realiter inter se distinctae. Quapropter non minus reales sunt re1ationes tres quam essentia una, cum pariter in suprema realit~te divina tam relationes quam essentia inveniantur. Et tamen non realiter inter se distinguuntur essentia et realis relatio quaelibet, cum ratione tantummodo distinguantur aspectus Dei absolutus et aspectus Dei relativus.


The Real DiVine Relations

in another, so it is proper to a relation as a relation to be to another. Hence, a real relation as a relation is said 'to be to.' Furthermore, since in general all relations are accidents, they have that reality that is proper to accidents, namely, 'to be in,' and therefore a real relation as real is said 'to be in.' From this we conclude that 'being to' and 'being in' are not to be conceived after the manner of essence and existence so as to form a whole out of parts, but are to be conceived as two aspects of one real relation. This distinction, based on reduplication, is valuable in two ways, and has one danger. It is valuable, first, because the real distinctions among the divine persons arise, not from the affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same formality, but in the single real affirmation of mutually opposed relations. In other words, the real distinction of the persons arises proximately from one 'being·to' opposing another 'being-to.' Second, it is valuable because of the fact that the Son has all that the Father has, except paternity. The Son is not really distinct from God; God is not really distinct from the Father; yet the Son is really distinct from the Father, because the distinction of persons is by reason of the mutual opposition of one 'being-to' and another 'being-to.' The same value is clear from the fact that' ... God ... is not less in each one [of the persons] nor greater in all three [together]; for there is no less reality when anyone of the persons is individually called God, nor is there more when all three persons are declared to be one God' (DB 279, DS 529, ND 312). That is to say, the distinction of the persons is grounded not on real contradictory affirmations but on the mutual opposition of one 'being-to' and another 'being-to.' The one danger is that one may lose sight of the fact that 'being to' is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation, and this occurs more easily when the discussion concerns a mystery. In fact, there would be no mystery of the Trinity at all if three merely conceptual beings were attributed to one pure infinite act. This seems sometimes to be supposed, when difficulties 'and problems are solved too neatly and efficiently. Hence, it is most important to note that we apprehend the same divine reality that is both truly one and truly threefold according to two conceptually distinct aspects, so that according to the absolute aspect there is one God and according to the relative aspect there are three subsistent relations really distinct from one another. The three relations, therefore, are no less real than the one essence, since the relations as well as the essence are equally present in the supreme divine reality. And yet there is no real distinction between eSsence and each real relation, since there is only a conceptual distinction between the absolute and the relative aspects of God.


292


293

Proinde, cum reduplicetur relatio realis ut considerentur relatio realis qua relatio (esse ad) et relatio realis qua realis (esse in), verum omnino est realem relationum distinetionem proxime oriri ex 'esse ad'; sed pariter verum est eandem relationum distinctionem futuram fuisse non realem sed rationis si haberentur tantummodo 'esse ad' sine reali 'esse in'; nam relationes mutuo oppositae, ilisi sunt reales, non realiter inter se distinguuntur. Praeterea, verum omnino est Filium habere omnia quae habet Pater, paternitate excepta, quia realiter identificantur tum filiatio cum deitate tum deitas cum paternitate. At minus verum non est tam paternitatem quam filiationem esse realem, et realiter inter se distingui realem paternitatem et realem filiationem. Praeterea, verum omnino est quod Deus non minoratur in singulis nee augetur in tribus, quia tota divina realitas a singulis habetur, neque aliquid maius quam tota divina realitas a tribus sUnul sumptis habetur. At pariter verum est ratione distingui a divina essentia tres relationes reales, quae omnes realiter inter se distinguuntur. His igitur perspectis, allatae distinctionis simul et valorem et rericulum agnosce. Cum enim aliud sit verum et aliud tatum verum, aliud est in clariori quadam luce divinam unitatem exponere, aliud autem est in clarion quadam luce tum divinam unitatem tum divinam tnnitatem simul manifestare. Illud facit aHata distinctio, et ideo maximum quendam valorem habet. Hoc autem facerepotest nulla brevis distinctio, cum de mysterio in Deo abscondito agatur. Quam ob causam, cum tam trinitatem in unitate quam unitatem in trinitate confitemur, nullo modo ex allata distinctione inter 'esse ad' et 'esse in' ratiocinari licet, quasi tota doctrina trinitaria in hac sola distinctione contineatur. Quamvis enim vera sit distinctio, quamvis utilissima sit, quamvis nullum afferat periculum dummodo evitetur abusus, attamen incipit abusus quam primum vel implicite supponitur quoddam verum partiale esse totum verum. 29


Accordingly, when a real relation is reduplicated to consider a real relation as relation (being to) and a real relation as real (being in), it is entirely true that the real distinction between the relations arises proximately from 'being to.' But it is equally true that the same distinction between the relations would not be real but only conceptual if there were only the 'being to' without a real 'being in'; for if they are not real, then mutually opposed relations are not really distinct from one another. Further, it is entirely true that the Son has all that the Father has, except paternity, since filiation is really identical with deity and deity with paternity. But it is no less true that both paternity and filiation are real, and that the distinction between real paternity and real filiation is a real distinction. Again, it is entirely true that God is not diminished in each or increased in the Three, because the whole divine reality is possessed by each, and nothing more than the whole divine reility is possessed by the Three tog~ther. But it is equally true that the three real relations, which are all really distinct from one another, are conceptually distinct from the divine essence. Having understood this, one can easily see ,the value and at the same time the danger of this distinction. Since truth is one thing and the whole truth is another, it is one thing to throw more light on the divine unity and quite another to throw more light simultaneously on both the divine unity and the divine trinity. The former is what this distinction does, and therefore it has a very great value. But no short and simple distinction can achieve the latter, since we are dealing with a mystery hidden in God. Therefore, since we confess both trinity in unity and unity in trinity, we may by no means argue on the basis of this distinction between 'being to' and 'being in' a~ if the whole doctrine of the Trinity were contained in this distinction alone. Although this distinction is true, although it is most useful, and although there is no danger in it as long as abuse is avoided, still abuse creeps in as ,soon as one supposes, even implicitly, that any partial truth is the whole truth. 29 29 [Lonergan's remark in this question that difficulties and problems concerning the

unity and the threefoldness of God are solved 'too neatly and efficiently' through the use of the distinction between 'being in' and 'being to' is an obvious reference to some of the trinitarian literature with which he was familiar. In that literature, it seems, the distinction occasioned a perhaps unwitting semirationalist distortion of trinitarian theology, of the kind condemned by Vatican I. Accordingly, Lonergan has a twofold concern in this question. First, he is concerned to emphasize that, while the distinction based on the reduplication of the composite concept 'real relation' does not capture the whole truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is a legitimate, valuable, and fruitful instrument of understanding when judiciously employed. For with the context of the preceding discussion, the distinction



294


295


QUAESTIO VIII Utrum :maior an nllnor sit rationis distinctio. qua divina substantia a divinis relationibus et vicissim divinae relationes a divina substantia distinguantur

QUESTION 8 Is it by a :major or a :minor conceptual distinction that the divine substance is distinguished fro:m the divine relations and, ~on versely, that the divine relations are distinguished fro:m the divine substance?

Ad tenninos

Terminology

distincta sunt quorum unum non est- aliud. ratione sunt distincta quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. maior seu adaequata est rationis distinctio ubi conceptus unius conceptum alterius non actu dicit ne implicite quidem. minar seu inadaequata est rationis distinctio ubi conceptus unius conceptum alterius actu dicit saltern implicite. substantia: id cui competit esse per se. divina substantia: actus purus. relatio: ordo unius ad alilJ.d; id cui competit esse ad aliud. relationes divinae: paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa et passiva.

distinct: one is not the other. conceptual distinction: the concept of one is not the concept of the other. major or adequate conceptual distinction: the concept of one does not actually express the concept of the other, even implicitly. minor or inadequate conceptual distinction: at least implicitly the concept of one actually expresses the concept of the other. substance: that to which it is proper to be through itself. divine substance: pure act. relation: the order of one to another; that to which it is proper to be to another. divine relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration. ,

Sententiae

"

Alii distinctionem utrinque maiorem defendunt, uti Ferrariensis, Toletus, Molina, Vasquez, Billot, Buonpensiere, et Boyer.30 Alii distinctionem utrinque minorem docent; uti forte Caietanus, certo Ioannes a S. Thoma, et Galtier. 31 Alii maiori distinctione substantiam a relationibus, minori autem relationes a substantia secernunt, uti Suarez, Ruiz.

Nota: Sine censura theologica libere disputatur quaestio.

;

Opinions Among those who defend a major distinction in both cases are Ferrariensis, ToIetus, Molina, Vasquez, Billot, Buonpensiere, and Boyer. 30 Others hold for a minor distinction in both cases: perhaps Cajetan, certainly John ofSt Thomas, and Galtier.3 1 Still others, such as Suarez and Ruiz, hold that the divine substance is distinct from the relations by a major distinction, but the relations are distinct from the substance by a minor distinction. Note- that this is an open question, lacking any theological note. facilitates one in holding together in imperfect understanding and affirming that in God there is both real trinity in unity and real unity in trinity. At the same time, however, he is at pains to warn against the semirationalist distortion of the distinction that overlooks or forgets that 'being to' is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation.] 30 Carolus Boyer, Synopsis praelectionum de Sanctissima Trinitate (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949) 133-39. 31 PaHI Galtier, De S{1flctissima Tnnitate: in se el in nobis (Paris: Beauchesne, !933) §§ 285-8),



296

297



Solutio

Solution

Cum omnis conceptus ex aetu intelligendi proeedat iIludque exprimat quod inte1~ ligendo perspieitur, remote quidem ex obieeto intelligentiae, proxime autem ex ipso intelligendi aetu detenninandum est quid per eonceptum dicatur.

Since every concept proceeds from an act of understanding and expresses what is grasped by understanding, the determination' of what is expressed in a concept proceeds remotely from the object of understanding and proximately from the act of understanding itself. Moreover, when different authors affirm that concepts are different, their acts of understanding are no doubt different, as well as the formal objects of these acts. The present question) therefore, seems to require only that we explain from which acts of understanding concerning which formal objects the different COncepts of different authors proceed. Fir~t of all, then, there is the case in which the formal object is the divine reality itself as apprehended by faith and by reason enlightened by faith. This .object is) indeed, a rationally conscious infinite act that is conceived by us according to the two formalities of substance and relation. In speaking of an infinite act of existence, of understanding, of conceiving, ofjudging, and of loving, we are referring to the divine substance. But in speaking of two rationally conscious emanations, namely, ofword from speaker and of~ove from both, we are referring to the divine relations. From this if is clear that the relations are distinct from the substance by a minor distinction, since the rationally conscious relations cannot be had without an act of understanding, of speaking, and of loving. The substance is similarly distinct from the relations by a minor distinction; for although the natural light of human reason is not capable of grasping that an infinite act of understanding is necessarily such that it utter a word and through the uttered word spirate love, nevertheless reason enlightened by faith understands this to some extent, and in 'accordance with this limited understanding it does not conceive the divine substance without also at least implicitly affirming the intellectual emanations and the consequent relations .. In contrast) there is the case where the formal object is the divine reality not as understood and conceiyed in theology, but as understood and conceived under the wholly generic concepts of substance and relation. Now, the generic concept' of substance is the concept of that to which it is proper to be, through itself, and the generic concept of relation is the concept of that to which it is proper to be to another. Since the concept of substance does not actually indicate 'other,' even implicitly, it is set off from the concept of relation by a major conceptual distinction; and this major distinction is not denied by the fact that this concept taken precisely is applied to the divine reality. Similarly, the generic concept of relation explicitly indicates only that to which it is proper to be to another; and although from this concept alone one can conclude to a subject, another premise is certainly

Praeterea, ubi alii auctores alios esse conceptus affinnant, procul dubio alii aliorum sunt actus intelligendi et alia etiam sunt horuin actuum obieeta formalia. Qua de causa, quaestio praesens nihil aliud postulare videtur nisi ut explicetur secundum quosnam intelligendi actus circa quaenam obiecta formalia procedant aliorum auetorum conceptus alii. Inprimis igitur sit obiectum fonnale ipsa divina realitas prout fide atque ratione per fidem illustrata apprehenditur. Quod sane o~ieetum est actus infinitus ratio~ naliter conscius qui secundum duas rationes substantiae et relationis a nobis concipitur. Inquantum eniro ponitur infinitus actus essendi, intelligendi, eoncipiendi, iudicandi, et amandi, ponitur divina substantia. Inquantum autem ponuntur duae emanationes rationaliter consciae, nempe, verbi a dicente et amoris ab utroque, ponuntur divinae relationes. Et sic manifeste habetur distinctio minor relationum a substantia, cum emanationes rationaliter consciae sine actu intelligendi, dicendi, amandi haberi non possint. Et similiter etiam habetur distinctio minor substantiae a relationibus; quamvis enim naturale lumen rationis humanae eiusmodi non sit ut perspicere valeat talem necessario esse aeturn intelligendi infinitum ut verbum dicat et per dictum verbum amorem spiret, nihilominus ratio per fidem illustrata aliquatenus hoc intelligit, et secundum-hane intelligentiam imperfectam non con~ cipit divinam substantiam quin etiam emanationes intellectuales et consequentes relationes saltern implicite dicat.

E contra, sit obiectum fonnale ipsa divina realitas, non prout theologice intelligitur atque concipitur sed prout genericis prorsus conceptibus substantiae atque relationis subest. lam vero genericus substantiae conceptus est eius cui competit esse per se, et genericus relationis conceptus est dus cui competit esse ad aliud. Qui substantiae conceptus, cum aliud actu non dicat ne implicite quidem, distinc~ rione rationis maiori a conceptu relationis secernitur; neque tollitur haec maior distinctio eo quod hic praecise conceptus divinae realitati applicatur. Et similiter genericus relationis conceptus explicite non dicit nisi id cui competit esse ad aliud; et quamvis ex hoc conceptu solo ad subiectum concludi possit, alia sane requiritur



-

."

298

Dc Relationibus Divinis Realibus

299

praemissa ut demonstretur subiectum esse substantia; nam in rebus creatis id quod per relationem ad aliud refertur non sola est substantia sed etiam est accidens (ut verbum ad intelligere, vel arnor ad utrumque), et principiurn entis intrinsecum (ut potentia ad actum, etc.), et ens rationis (ut differentia ad genus); in divinis.autem subiectum quod per relationem ad aliud refertur non est divina substantia, cum divina substantia non generet et ideo non referatur ad Filium, neque gignatur et ideo non referatur ad Patrern, neque spiret et ideo non referatur ad Spiritum, neque spiretur et ideo non referatur ad Patrern sirnul et Filiurn.


Quibus perspectis, elucet quernadrnodum omnes theologorurn sententiae fundamentum quoddam habeant. Nam qui defendunt rationis distinctionem utrinque minorem, ex theologic'a intelligentia ipsius divinae realitatis procedunt. Qui autem defendunt radonis distinctionem utrinque maiorem, ex genericis conceptibus systematice definitis arguunt. Denique tandem qui mediam incedunt viam iudicare videntur secundum fortiora aliorum argumenta.

required to demonstrate that the subject is a substance. For among creatures, that which is referred to another by a relation may be not only a substance but also an accident (such as a word related to the act of understanding, or love to both), or an intrinsic principle of being (such as potency related to act, and so on), or a conceptual being (such as difference related to genus); but in God, the subject that is referred to another by a relation is not the divine substance, since the divine substance does not generate and therefore is not related to the Son, is not generated and therefore is not related to the Father, does not spirate and therefore is not related to the Spirit, and is not spirated and therefore is not related to the Father and the Son together. It is clear from this how all the opinions of the theologians have some foundation. Those who hold for a minor conceptual distinction from both sides argue from a thyological understanding of the divine reality itself. But those who defend a major conceptual distinction from both sides argue from systematically defined generic concepts. Finally, those who follow a middle course seem to base their judgments on the stronger arguments of other theologians.

QUAESTIO IX UtrUIn praeter distinctione:m. reale:m. et distinctione:m. rationis admittenda sit tertia intermedia' distinctio quae dicatur form.alis a parte rei 32

QUESTION 9 Besides a real distinction and a conceptual distinction, is there a third interm.ediate distinction, called a 'fornial distinction on the side of the reality'? 32

Et admittenda videtur. Nam Deus Pater perfecta obiectivitate ipse se cognoscit. lam vero ante omnem operationem mentis et solummodo ex parte obiecti visi, Dea Patri exhibentur et deitas et paternitas aut ut una atque prorsus indivisa realitas aid ut duae realitates aut ut una realitas cum duplici formalitate obiectiva. Atqui neque primum membrum admitti potest neque secundum. Ergo admittendum est tertium quod est distinctio seu non-identitas formalis ex parte rei.

The argument in favor of such a distinction is as follows. God the Father knows himself with perfect objectivity. But prior to any operation of the mind and solely on the part of the object seen, divinity and paternity are manifested to. God the Father either as a single and absolutely indivisible reality or as two realities or as one reality with two objective formalities. But neither the first nor the second member can be admitted, and therefore one must admit the third, which is the formal distinction or nonidentity on the side of the reality. The major premise lays down a complete disjunction based on an evident foundation. The minor premise will be proven part by part. The first member cannot be admitted. For ifon the part of the object seen, and prior to any operation of the mind, no distinction whatever between divinity and paternity is displayed, it necessarily follows that, wherever divinity is seen, paternity is also seen as being the very same reality. Hence there arises this dilemma, tha't

Maior ex fundamento evidenti ponit disiunctionem completam. Minor autem per partes probatur. Primum membrum admitti non potest. Si enim ex parte obiecti visi ante omnem opera-' tionem mentis nulla prorsus exhibetur distinctio inter deitatem et paternitatem, necessario sequitur quod, ubicumque videtur deitas, etiam videtur paternitas ut res omnino eadem.

32

John Duns Scotus, In I Sen!., d. 2, q. 7; d. 8, q. 4. Rep. Par., In I Sent., d. 45, q. 2. The prior history of the question is treated by B. Jansen, 'Beitrage zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio Formalis,' ·Zei.tschrift}iir katholirche 7heologie 53 (1929) 317-44,5 17-44.



300


301

Unde exsurgit dilemma: aut Filius est Pater aut Filius non est Deus. Si enirn Filium dicis Deum, cum deitas sit eadem realitas ac paternitas, etiam Filium dicis Patrem; quod haeresis Sabelliana est. Si autem Filium negas Patrem esse, cum paternitas sit eadem realitas ac deitas, etiam negas Filium esse Deum; quod haeresis Ariana est. Neque secundum membrum admitti potest. Si enim alia realitas est deitas et alia realitas est paternitas, tunc Deus est Deus et Pater est Pater, sed Pater non est Deus; quod est haereticum. Neque utiliter ad quamlibet compositionem confugies, cum compositi alia pars de alia numquam praedicetur.. Remanet ergo tertium quod distinctionem fonnalem importat. Primum enim membrum dicit distinctionem rationis; secundum dicit distinctionem realem; tertium denique inter~ mediam ponit distinctionem secundum quam in una realitate agnoscuntur fonnal.itates quae ex parte rei non sunt identicae; quae sane distinctio differt tum a distinctione reali quae duas realitates ponit tum a distinctione rationis quae formalitatum diversitatem non in re sed in sola mente ponit. Praeterea, per distinctionem realem et distinctionem ration is non habetur disiunctio completa, et ideo tertia est admittenda distinctio intermedia. Nam per distinctionem realem ponuntur realitates duae. Per distinctionem rationis ita ponitur una realitas ut omnis distinctio vel soli menti attribuatur vel, si fundamentum in re agnoscatur, saltern hoc fundamentum reale non sit distinctio ex parte ipsius rei. Et ideo manifeste remanet ulterior distinctio agnoscenda secundum quam mentalis rationum distinctio in obiectiva non~identitate formalitatum ex parte rei fundatur.

Respondeo argumentum Scoti ex' duobus dependere, quorum aliud est generale et aliud particulare. Generale est systema quoddam gnoseologicum in mytho perceptionistic0 33 fundatum ut, scilicet, veritas seu obiectivitas necessario consistat in ccinfonnitate, similitudine, adaequatione inter percipientem et perceptum. Particulare autem est quod in divinis saltern ratione distinguuntur paternitas et divinitas. Quae sane distinctio rationis est casus omnino specialis, cum intirne connectatur cum distinctione reali inter personas divinas. Quibus suppositis, quaeritur de veritate seu obiectivitate huius distinctionis saltern rationis in mente divina.

,;

.

,


either the Son is the Father. or the Son is not God. For if you say that the Son is God, then since divinity is the same reality as paternity, you also say that the Son is the Father, which is the Sabellian heresy. But if you say that the Son is not the Father, then since paternity is the same reality as divinity, you also say that the Son is not God, and this is the Arian heresy. Nor can the second member be admitted. For if divinity is one reality and paternity another, then God is God, and the Father is the Father, but the Father is not God, which is heretical. Nor will it help to appeal to any sort of composition, since one part of a composite is never predicated of another. There remains, then, the third member, which argues for a formal distinction. For the first member affirms a conceptual distinction, and the second a real distinction; the third affirms an intermediate distinction according to which there are acknowledged in one reality formalities that are not identical on the side of the. reality. This distinction surely differs both from a real distinction, which posits two realities, and from a conceptual distinction, which posits formalities that are diverse not in reality but only in the mind. Besides, real distinction and conceptual distinction do not form a complete disjunction, and therefore a third, intermediate distinction must be admitted. For through a real distinction there are posited two realities, and through a conceptual distinction there is posited one reality in such a way that every distinc~ tion is attributable to the mind alone or, if there is acknowledged a foundation in reality, at least this real foundation is not a distinction on the side of the reality itself. Obviously, therefore, a further distinction must be acknowledged according to which the mental distinction of concepts is founded upon the objective nonidentity of formalities on the side of the reality. This argument from Scotus depends on two premises, one general, the other particular. The general premise is a particular gnoseological system based on a perceptionist myth,33 namely, that truth or objectivity necessarily consists in a conformity, a similitude, a correspondence between the perceiver and the perceived. The particular premise is that in God paternity and divinity are at least conceptually distinct. This conceptual distinction is, of course, an entirely special case, since it is intimately connected with the real distinction between the divine persons. With these points presupposed, the question has to do with the truth or ob~ jectivity of this distinction, which is at least a conceptual distinction in the divine mind. 33 See above, p. 211.



302


303

lam vero, secundum suppositum systema gnoseologicum, haec'distinctio non potest esse vera nisi correspondeat alicui non-identitati a parte rei. Atque haec non-identitas poni non potest in aliquo remota, e.g., in non-identitate Patris et Filii, nam quaeritur de iis quae immediate a Deo Patre pelfecta obiectivitate videntur. Existit ergo in re non-identitas aliqua deitatis et paternitatis, secus vera et obiectiva non esset distinctio saltern rationis quae est in mente Dei Patris immediate deitatem et paternitatem clarissime et perfectissime perspicientis. Attamen, quod necessario sequitur ex suppositis Scoti minime sequitur ubi systema suum gnoseologicurn reicitur. Quare, circa divinam cognitionem dicendum est quod in Deo idem prorsus est intelligere quod est esse; unde ipsa veritas seu obiectivitas cognitionis divinae de Deo non est similitudo inter cognoscere et cognitum sed dissimilitudinis absentia. 34 Quibus positis, tollitur totum fundamentum ab argumento Stoti suppositum. Circa vero nostram cognitionem dicendum est earn non perfici donee proferatur judicium, ut cognitio distinctionis necessaria sit iudicium comparativum negativum. Unde ea definiuntur distincta quorum unum non est aliud. Realiter ergo distinguuntur quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. Ratione autem distinguuntur quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. Quae rationis distinctio subdivid~ potest secundum- causas c~r alius et alius sit conceptus; et ubi causa diversi conceptus est in re, habetur distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re; ubi autem causa diversi conceptus est in sola mente, habetur distinctio rationis tantum. Quibus addi non potest distinctio formalis a parte rei ut, scilicet, formaliter a . parte rei distinguantur quorum aliud qua formale non sit aliud qua formale. Quid enim significet illud quaformale? Aut enim dicit reale aut non. Si dicit reale, tunc unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale, et habetur distinctio realis. Sin autem dicit non-reale, tunc unum qua non reale non est aliud qua non reale, et habetur distinctio quae non est a parte rei. Ad primum ergo quod in contrarium obicitur dicendum est quod maior falsum supponit. Nulla enim cognitio in dualitate radicatur, .cum sensus in actu sit-sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu sit intelligibile in actu. Et multo minus divina ipsius divin-itatis cognitio dualitatem importat, cum in his quae sunt sine materia idem sit intelligens et intellectum, et ipsa veritatis ratio in divina Dei cognitione non in similitudine sed in absentia dissimilitudinis consistat.

,(

-

,


On the presupposed gnoseological system, this distinction cannot be true unless it corresponds to some noniden~ty on the side of the reality. But this nonidentity cannot be located in anything remote, such as the nonidentity of the Father and the Son, for we are inquiring about those things that are immediately seen with perfect objectivity by God" the Father. Therefore there exists in the reality some nonidentity of divinity and paternity, for otherwise the at least conceptu'al distinction in the mind of God the Father immediately perceiving divinity and paternity with utmost clarity and perfection would not be true and objective. However, what follows necessarily from Scotus's presuppositions by no means follows when his gnoseological system is rejected. Thus, as regards divine knowledge, it must be said that in God understanding and being are absolutely the same. Hence the very truth or objectivity of divine knowledge of God is not a similarity between knowing and the known but the absence of dissimilarity.34 On this basis the entire foundation presupposed by Scotus's argument is removed. And in our knowledge, which is not complete until a judgment is made, knowledge of a distinction is necessarily a negative comparative judgment. Hence, those are defined as distinct of which one is not the other. Those are really distinct of which one real is not the other as real. Those are conceptually distinct of which 'the concept of one is not the concept of the other. This conceptual distinction can be subdivided according to the causes of the difference in concepts: when the cause of a different concept is in the reality, the distinction is a conceptual distinction with a foundation in reality; but when the cause of the different concept is in the mind alone, there is a conceptual distinction only. To these there cannot be added any formal distinction on the side of the reality that would on the side of reality formally distinguish one as fonnal from another as formal. For what would 'as formal' mean? Either it means the real or it does not. If it means the real, then one as real is not the other as real, and so there is a real distinction. But ifit does not mean the real, then one as not real is not the other as not real, and so there is a distinction that is not on the side of the reality. With regard to the first .argument advanced in favor of this intennediate distinction, we m~st point out that its major premise rests on a false supposition. No knowledge is rooted in duality, since sense in act is the sensible in act and intellect in act is the intelligible in act. Much less does God's knowledge of divinity entail duality, since in what is without matter the one who understands and what is understood are identical, and the very essence of the truth in divine knowledge of God 'consists not in similarity but in the absence of dissimilarity.

as

34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae,

The Robert

Mollot Collection


I,

q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m.

304

De Relationibus Divinis ReaIibus

305

Supposita ergo dualitate reiecta, sequitur nullum esse obiecturn quod divinam quandarn inspectionem vel realiter vel sana ratione antecedat; sequitur etiam divinum esse et divinum intelligere esse prorsus idem, ut eodem actu et sint Pater et Filius et Spiritus, et intelligant se esse Deum, et intelligant Patrern esse neque Filium neque Spiritum, Filium autem non esse Spiriturn. Quae omnia uno simplicissimoque actu ita cognoscunt ut nulla sit conceptuum multiplicatio, nulla sit iudiciorum multitudo, nulla sit intelligentiae imperfectio, et nulla problemata mysteriosa infirmis nostris ratiociniis solvenda.

Quibus perspectis, absurdum fere videtur trilemrna propositum. lam enim sufficit error quo noster concipiendi modus in res materiales ita transfertur ut ipsae res non solum suis realitatibus sed etiam nostris formalitatibus constituantur atque distinguantur. At longius progreditur qui nostrum concipiendi modum a divina perfectione alienissimum in ipsam divmam realitatem quodammodo inferat. Ad secundum autem quod obiciebatur dicendum est disiunctionem inter distinctiones reales et rationis esse completam, dummodo in ipsis rebus valeat contradictionis principium, 8i enim unumquodque aut est aut non est, in ipsis rebus necessaria habetur aut ens aut nihil. Quare si formalitates sunt entia quorum unum non est aliud, distinctio est rcalis; et si formalitates non sunt entia quorum unum non est aliud, distinctio est Tationis,



. Once the supposed duality is rejected, it follows that there'is no object that either reilly or in sound reason is antecedent to some divine inspecti'on. It also follows that the divine act of existence and the divine act of understanding are absolutely identical, so that by the very same act the Father and the Son and the Spirit are, understand that they are God, and understand that the Father is neither the Son nor the Spirit and that the Son is not the Spirit. All this they know in one most perfectly simple act, so that there is no proliferation of concepts, no multiplicity of judgments, no imperfection in understanding, and no mysterious problems for our feeble human reasoning to try to solve. Accordingly, the proposed trilemma is rather absurd, It is error enough when our manner of conceiving is transferred to material things in such a way that those things themselves are constituted and distinguished not by their own realities alone but also by our conceived formalities. But it is a much worse error when our way of conceiving things, so far removed from divine perfection" is brought to bear in some way upon the very reality of God. With regard to the second argument in favor of this distinction, we must point out that the disjunction of real distinctions and conceptual distinctions is complete, as long as the principle of contradiction is valid with regard to things themselves. For if every thing either is or is not, then in things themselves there necessarily is either being or nothing, Therefore, if the formalities are beings, one of which is not the other, the distinction is real; and if the formalities are not beings, one of which is not the other, the distinction is coriceptual.


CAPUT QUAR TUM

CHAPTER FOUR

De Divinis Personis In Se Consideratis

The Divine Persons Considered in Themselves

Post consideratas processiones et relationes, iam de ipsis personis divinis agendum est; et primo quidem de iis in se consideratis, deinde de iis inter se comparatis, r tertia de iis secundum habitudinem ad nos.:2 Circa ipsas personas duo maxime sunt consideranda. Quare, prima quadam sectione, ratio seu definitio personae investigatur atgue divinis personis applicatur; sectione autem secunda, quaeritur de attributis personarum divinarum, de proprietatibus carum actibusque notionalibus. ,

}

Having considered the processions and the relations', we must now turn our attention to the divine persons themselves. First, we will consider the persons as they are in themselves, next, the persons with respect to one another, I and third, the persons in their relation to us. 2 Concerning the persons themselves, there are two considerations that are most important. Accordingly, in the first section of this chapter we will investigate the essential meaning or definition of person' and apply it to the divine persons; in the second section we will examine the attributes of the divine persons, their properties, and the notional acts.

SECTIO PRIMA

SECTION 1

Circa rationem personae, primo, multa et diversa quae de persona sunt proposita in unitatem quandam rediguntur (Quaestio X), deinde, Patrem, Filiurn, Spiritum proprie dici et esse personas probatur (Assertum VII!), tertia, ad pleniorem rei intelligentiam adduntur varia. Ita quaeritur an Deus sit persona (Qyaestio X!), quat in divinis subsistant (Q,uaestio XII), quid in divinis significetur et per nomen personae (Qyaestio XII!) et per numeros (Qyaestw XlV). Quibus perspectis, ulterius investi~ntur analogia personae divinae et personae creatae (Qyaestw XV), ratio personae divinae qua divinae (Qyaestio XV!), et habitudo personae tam

We first bring together into some unity the several diverse proposals that have been offered regarding the meaning of person (question IO); next, we prove that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are properly called and are persons (assertion 8); and third, we add a few observations for a fuller understanding of this matter. Thus, the questions arise whether God is a person (question II), how many subsistents there are in God (question I2), what there is in God that is signified by the word 'person' (question 13) and by numbers (question I4). From this we go on to investigate the analogy between a divine person and a created person (question IS), the meaning of divine person as divine (question I6), and the I

2


[See chapter 5.J (See chapter 6.]


308


309


ad incommunicabilitatem quam ad communicationem interpersonalem (Qy.aestio XVII).

relation of person to incommunicability as well as to interpersonal communication (question 17).

QUAESTIO X Quid sub noIDine personae "mt"elligendwn esse videatur

QUESTION 10 What should be understood by the word 'person'?

Ex antecessis constat tres esse in divinis relationes reales, subsistentes, realiter inter se distinctas, nempe, Patrern, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum. Nunc autem quaeritur utrum hae relationes re vera sint personae proprie dictae. Quare in primis determinari oportet quid sub nomine personae intelligi debeat.

From what we have said, it is clear that there are in God three real relations that are subsistent and really distinct from one another, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Now we ask whether these relations are truly persons in the proper sense. The first thing to detennine, therefore, is what is "to be understood by the word 'person.'

Cui tamen quaestioni modis quinque respondetur. Primo enim dictum est requiri quoddam nomen commune, ut quos singillatim dicamus Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, communiter dicamus personas. Ita S. Augustinus: 'Cum ergo quaeritur quid tria, vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod speciale vel generale nomen quo compIectamur haec tria, nee occurrit animo .. .'3 'Quaesivit quid tri~ diceret: et dixit substantias slve personas, quibus nominibus non diversitatem inteIligi voluit sed singularitatem noluit; ut non solum ibi unitas intelligatur ex eo quod dicitur una essentia, sed et trinitas ex eo quod dicuntur tres substantiae vel personae. '4

There are five ways in which this question is answered. First, it was observed that some common word was needed, so that those whom we singly call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we may speak of in common as persons. As St Augustine put it, <When we ask, Three what? or Three who? we are led to find some special or general word under which we may include all three, and none has occurred to us .. .'3 '[Human limitation] asked what it should "call the Three. And it replied, "substances" or "persons." By these names it did not wish to convey any idea of diversity, but it Vlfished to avoid any idea of singleness, so that not only would unity be understood by speaking of one essence, but also trinity would be understood" by speaking of three substances or three persons.'4 Second, after this" answer, definitions were formulated, most notably that of Boethius, 'individual substance of a rational nature,' that of Richard ofSt Victor, 'incommunicable existence of the divine nature,' and that ofSt Thomas, 'distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.'

Sed post hoc responsum fiebant definitiones quarum praecipue memorantur et Boethii, 'rationalis na~rae substantia individua/ et Richardi de S. Victore 'divinae naturae existentia incommunicabilis,' et S. Thomae 'subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali.' Tertia, propositae sunt theoriae plus minus metaphysicae, ut Scoti, Capreoli, Caietani, Suarezii, Tiphani, et forte aliorum. OJ!.arto, persona dicenda esse videbatur vel conscientia, vel individualitas conscia, vel distinctum centrum conscientiae, vel aliud psychologicum.

Quinto, denique, ita explicatur persona ut concrete apprehendi debeat; et ita persona est quacum ineuntur relationes personales, vel cui dici potest 'tu,' vel quae simpliciter a genere 'rerum' distinguitur, vel quae naturaliter ad comrrtunicationem Cum personis aliis ordinatur, et similia; quae tamen omnia non per

Third, theories that were more or less metaphysical were proposed by Scotus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Suarez, Tiphanus, and possibly others. Fourth, it seemed that the person should be said to be consciousness, or conscious individuality, or a distinct center of consciousness, or some other psychological reality. Fifth, and finally, the person is explained in such a way that it has to be apprehended concretely. Thus, a person is one with whom personal relationships are entered into, or one to whom one can say 'you,' or whatever is simply distinguished from the category of 'things,' or one who is by nature ordered to commu. nication with other persons, and so on. These, however, are not to be understood 3 Augustine, De Trinitaie, VII, iv, 7; 4 Ibid. VII, iv, 9; ML 42, 942.



ML

42, 939"

3IO


3Il

modum definitionis sunt intelligenda, sed potius per modum descriptionis eorum quae unusquisque ex propria experientia vitali atque personali recolere debeat. Cuius multitudinis non alia invenitur unitas nisi ea quae ex ipsa quaestione repetitur. Ut enim exemplo utar, secundum Aristotelem ignis erat unum de quattuor elementis, sed secundum recentiores ignis est activitas quaedam chemica. At quamvis responsa maxime inter se disterit,"idem sane ab Aristotele intellectum est et a recentioribus intelligitur cum quaeratur quid sit ignis. Hac enim quaestione ab utrisque significatur eadem quodammodo natura in iisdem specifice sensibilibus intelligenda. Quare, ipsa quaestio seu ipsa dynamica orientatio animi admirantis atgue inquirentis, cum determinatis sensibilibus vel veris determinatis- applicetur, structuram quandam heuristicam5 constituit quae quodammodo una in diversis responsis permaneat. Quod si conceditur, perspici potest quet;nadmodum inter se habeant quinque modi supra enumerati. Nam apud S. Augustinum notio personae divina:e est ipsa quaestio, quid tres. lam habetur structura heuristica, at nondum haberi videtur circa responsum nisi perplexitas. Apud Boethium, Richardum, ~. Thomam definientes, illud est novum quod interdum quaeritur non particuiariter, quid tres, seu quid sit persona divina, sed generaliter, quid sit persona. 6 Proinde, cum hae definitiones clare et distincte inter se comparari non possint nisi quaestionibus metaphysicis determinetur quid sit natura intellectualis, quid substantia, quid individuum, quid existentia, quid incommunicabile, quid subsistens, quid distinctum, mirari non possumus gressum ulteriorem quo Scotus, Capreolus, Caietanus, Suarezius, Tiphanus rationem personae per theorias metaphysicas exposuerunt. At multae erant hae theoriae metaphysicae, neque tantummodo circa personam disputabatur; quare ad quaestiones gnoseologicas, quippe quoad nos magis notas, confugerunt philosophi; et cum caetera omnia psychologice declarari ,solerent, valde inconveniens habebatur ipsam personam aliter quam psychologice exponi. Cum denique non minus multiplicarentur theoriae gnoseologicae quam metaphysicae, recentissimi censuerunt ab omni speculatione abstinendum esse et ad

The Divine Persohs Considered in Themselves

as definitions b~t rather as descriptions of what everyone should find by consulting his or her own personal life experience. The only unity in all these proposals lies in the question itself. An example of this sort of unity is that, while for Aristotle fire is one of the four elements now it is understood as a chemical reaction. Yet, however divergent these a~swers are, both Aristotle and modern scientists have the same thing in mind when they ask what fire is. In asking this question, both in some way have in mind the same nature that is to be understood in specifically the same sensible data. When this question, therefore, this dynamic orientation of the wondering and inquiring mind, is brought to bear upon determinate sensjble data or upon determinate truths, it constitutes a heuristic structure,5 which remains somehow one whatever answers are given. Now if this is granted, then one can understand how the five ways mentioned above are related. With St Augustine the notion of divine person was the question itself, Three what? Here we have already a heuristic structure, but there was apparently no answer yet, only perplexity. What was new in the definitions of Boethius, Richard, and St Thomas is that sometimes they asked not the particular question, Three what? or, What is a divine person? but the general question, What is a person?6 Further, since these definitions cannot be clearly and distinctly compared to one another unless by raising metaphysical questions one determines what an intellectual nature is, what a substance is, what an individual is, what existence is, what is meant by 'incommunicable,' by 'subsistent,' arid by 'distinct,' it is not surprising that Scotus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Suarez, and Tiphanus took the further step of expounding the meaning of person in terms of metaphysical theories. But there were many such metaphysical theories, and person was not the only disputed notion. So philosophers turned to gnoseological questions as being better known quoad nos; and since it was the custom to explain everything else in psychological terms, it was considered quite inappropriate to explain the person in any way other than psychologically. Since th'ere was as great a proliferation of gnoseological as of metaphysical theories, in recent times thinkers have decided to cease all speculation and return 5 For an illustration of heuristic structure, see Lonergan, Insight, chapter 2. (See ibid. 759 for a discussion of the identity of the heuristic concept of 'fire' over the centuries.] 6 [The statement is not quite accurate regarding Richard. As Lonergan says in Phenomenology and Logic 332, 'In Richard of St Victor yOll get another definition, this time not of a person in general but of a divine person ... 'J



312


3I3

ipsam vitam concretam redeundum. Qui quo magis ut homines atque veri nominis personae extiterint7 eo darius perspiciunt quantum intercedat inter ea quae diversis pronominibus significentur. Qui enim 'ego' dicere potest et cui dicitur 'tu' sane persona est; de quo autem dic~tur 'id,' non persona est sed res tantum. Quod cum experientiam concretam, vitalem, personalem describere velit, multipliciter exponi potest. His igitur perspectis, praeter multitudinem opinionum circa personam elucet unam quandam extitisse structuram heuristicam se tempo rum decursu evolventern. Ipsa eoim S. Augustini particularis quaestio non omittitur cum generaliter de persona quaeratur. Neque personae definitiones praetermittuntur cum altius in fundamenta metaphysica inquiratur. N eque rerum cognitio secundum ultimas entis causas excludit entis conscii considerationem. Neque generalis consideratio entis conscii impedit quominus etiam ens sui conscium in relationibus suis concretis investigetur. Qua de causa, Patrern, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum personas esse dicemus, tum secundum nomen, tum secundum definitionem, tum secun'dum constitutionem metaphysicam, tum secundum conscientiam, tum secundum relationes et inter se et ad nos. Quod tamen magis particulariter declarari oportet, cum ita evolvi soleat structura heuristica ut non solum ad verum plenius cognoscendum procedat sed etiam hominis lapsi obtenebratam mentem prodat atgue manifest'et. Et ideo circa singula stadia aliquid dicendum videtur.

In primis e'rgo definitio Boethii, quamvis recte exponi possit, 8 tamen non sine difficultate exponitur. Si enim persona est individua substantia :rationalis naturae, tres personae, tres substantiae esse videntur; at in Deo nisi unam substantiam non admittimus; et ideo Boethii definitio secundum sonum verborum difficultates magis fadt quam solvit. Definitio autem Richardi nisi momentum historicum . habere non videtur; et ideo satis fore duximus in quaestione quadam annexa de ratione incommunicabilitatis disserere. 9 Unde non relinquitur nisi definitio S. Thomae, quam fusius alibi iam exposuimus. JO


to concrete life. The more people 'exist'7 as huma~ beings and as persons in the true sense, the more clearly they will perceive how great is the difference in the meanings of different pronouns. For one who is able to say 'I' and one who can be addressed as 'you' are certainly persons; but whatever is referred to as 'it' is not a person but only a thing. This is open to explanation in many different ways, sinc~ it means describing the concrete personal experience oflife that people have. This being the case, it is clear that besides the multitude of opinions about what a person is, there exists a single heuristic structure that has been developing over the course of time. St Augustine's particular question is not left aside when we ask about the person in a general sense. Nor do we overlook the various definitions of person when we inquire more deeply into the metaphysical foundations. Nor does the knowledge of things through the ultimate causes of being exclude a study of conscious being. Nor does a general consideration of conscious being prevent us from investigating being that is conscious of itself in its concrete relationships. Accordingly, we will call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit persons: persons in name, persons by definition, persons by reason of metaphysical constitution, persons by reason of consciousness, and persons by reason of relations both among themselves and to us. However, a more detailed clarification is needed here, since a heuristic structure generally develops in such a way that it not only leads to a fuller knowledge of the truth but also betrays and manifests the darkened mind of fallen humanity. For this reason it seems worth while to say something about individual stages in the process. First, then, although Boethius's definition can be correctly explained, 8 still this is not easy to do. For if a person is an individual substance ofa rational nature, the three persons would seem to be three substances. But we admit only one substance in God, and therefore this definition as it is worded creates more difficulties than it solves. The definition of Richard of St Victor seems to have only a certain historical importal:1ce, and so we have felt it sufficient to discuss it in a related question about the meaning ofincommunicability,9 Therefore we are left with St Thomas's definition, which we have expounded at greater length elsewhere. 10 7 [See the section 'Existenz' in Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution Chrnl 18-3L] 8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologifle, I, q. 29, a.I.

of

9 [Lonergan is referring to question 17. See below, pp. 345-51. However, Richard is not mentioned there by name.] IO Lonergan, The Ontalogical and PsycholiJgical Constitution if Christ 8-43. [[he actual definition appears at least twice in St Thomas's works: in Super I Sententiarum, d. 23, q. I, a. 4 c., and De potentia, q. 9, a. 4 c.]

The Robert Mollot CoJtection

Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

314

Dc Divinis Personis In Se Consideratis

315

Deinde, quamvis auctores maxime de constitutione personae finitae disputent,11 de constitutione personae ihfinitae vix disputare possunt, cum tanta sit divinae personae simplicitas ut unum idemque realiter sint eiusdem personae essentia, esse, relatio, subsistentia, proprietas, actusque notionalis. Quare, cum d~ realibus non sit disputandi locus, nisi ae ratione personae divinae non fiunt disceptationes; quas convenientius in quaestionibus annexis absolvendas esse d~ximus.


Next, although there has been a great deal of disagreement about the constitution of a finite person, II it is scarcely possible to dispute the constitution of an infinite person, since the simplicity of a divine person is so great that the essence, the act of existence, the relation, the subsistence, the property, and the notional act of the same divine person are one and the same. Therefore, since the realities are beyond dispute, the only disagreements are about the formality of divine person, and we have judged it more convenient to settle these in related questions. Third, the question about consciousness is more profound, more subtle, and more serious. Its seriousness is .obvious: if there are as many persons as there are consciousnesses, then either three' persons would mean that there are three gods or else God would be one person because of divine unity. 12 There is a similar case in Christolo'gy, where either the oneness of the person leads to monophysitism or the duality of na~res leads to Nestorianism; nor does kenoticism provide a valid third way. The subtlety of the question arises from the very nature of consciousness. It is one thing to be conscious, but it is quite another to know, through knowledge in the proper sense, that one is conscious. To be conscious belongs to everyone, for consciousness is simply the presence of the mind to itself. This self-presence is effected by the very fact that our sensitive and intellectual nature is actuated by both apprehending and desiring. It does not matter what object is apprehended or desired, since we as conscious subjects consciously apprehend and desire different things. Nordo we become conscious by adverting to ourselves, since consciousness is on the side of the adverting subject and not on the side of the object adverted to. But when this adverting to ourselves is done, we begin the second step, namely, knowing that we are conscious. For one who is conscious places oneself on the side of the object inasmuch as one understands and conceives consciousness and truly affirms that one is conscious. Therefore, a conscious subject and the consciousness of the subject precede and accompany all understanding and conception and affirmation of oneself as conscious, and remain when thes~ operations regarding oneself are omitted. But unless we de.fine what consciousness is, and unless we

Tertio, circa conscientiam et profundior et subtilior et gravior est quaestio. Et gravitas sane manifesta est: si enim tot sunt personae quat sunt conscientiae, aut tritheismus ex tribus personis concluditur, aut Deus unipersonalis propter divinam unitatem affirmaturj12 et similiter in Christologia, aut personae unitas in monophysismum aut duarum naturarum distinctio in nestorianismum conducit; neque kenoticismus re vera tertiam aperit viam. Quaestionis autem subtilitas ex ipsa conscientiae ratione oritur. Aliud enim est esse conscium aliud autem est scire (scientia propne dicta) se esse conscium. Illud omnium est, cum nihil aliud sit quam ipsa mentis praesentia sibi; quae quiclem praesentia eo ipso efficitur quod natura nostra sensitiva vel intellectualis sive apprehendendo sive appetendo ~ctuatur; neque quidquam refert quodnam obiectum vel apprehendatur vel appetatur cum conscii et conscie alia apprehendamus et appetamus, neque ideo conscii efficiamur quod in nos ipsos convertamur, cum conscientia ex parte ipsius subietti convertentis inveruatur et non ex parte obiecti ad quod convertatur. Qua tamen conversione peracta, incipit aliud quod scire se esse conscium dicitur. Conscius enim se ipsum ex parte obiecti sistit quatenus conscientiam intelligit atque concipit et se conscium esse vere affirmat. Qua de causa, ipsum subiectum conscium ipsaque subiecti conscientia omnem sui conscii intelligentiam et conceptionem et affinnationem et antecedit et concomitatur et, his omissis, superest; sed nisi definimus quid sit conscientia et nisi vere affirmamus

II

12

Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 44-75. [That is, if there are as many persons as there are consciousnesses, and vice versa, then three persons would mean three consciousnesses and three separate consciousnesses would mean three gods; or, from divine unity it follows there is one conscjousness, and if the number of persons is the same as the number of consciousnesses in God, there is only one person in God.]

-~



316

3f7


nos secundum definitionem esse conscios, ad scientiam proprie dictam circa propriam nostram conscientiam non pertingimus. 13 Cui subtilitati accedit quaestionis profunditas. Cognitio enim proprie humana triplici perficitur gressu, videlicet, ut primo sive exteme sive interne experiamur, et deinde inquirendo circa sensibilia vel conscia intelligamus et concipiamus, et tertio reftectentes et evidentiam ponderantes verum affinnemus et per verum tamquatr).' per medium ens cognoscamus. At aliud est triplici hoc gressu processum cognoscendi perficere, aliud autem est triplici eodem gressu cognitionem nostram triplici gressu perfectam cognoscere. Qua de causa, qui ita triplicem perficiunt gressum ut ad solum primum coghoscendum perveniant, in empiristarum abeunt partes qui aliud nobis cognoscibile non,agnoscant nisi externa sensibilia et internum 'ego' empiricum; quod etsi manifeste pugnet cum ipsa eorum intelligentia, multis tamen et diversis modis una e
Sententiamm differentiae

Vdrious opinions

Circa ea quae contingenter de una alterave divina persona qua divina vere dicuntur, inter omnes de duobus constat, nempe, (I) nihil reale et intrinsecum addi divinae personae qua divinae propter tale verum, et (2) tale verum adaequationem cum re non habere sine termino ad extra convenienti. De primo constat quia per~ sona divina qua divina est immutabilis; de altero constat quia verum contingens sine re contingenti haberi non potest. Attamen circa constitutionem horum verorum contingentium, in tres praecipue partes abeunt auctores. Prima enim est classis eorum qui dicant tale verum contingens constitui, non per immutatam realitatem divinam sed per terminum ad extra convenientem, videlicet, inquantum hic terminus speciali quodam modo respicit ipsam divinam personam de qua fit vera praedicatio contingens. Ita circa Incarnationem a se~ quacibus Scoti et Tiphani ponitur relatio specialis in natura assumpta ad solum Verbum assumens; et similiter circa increatum .spiritus sancti donum, a multis tenetur hoc donHm qua datum constitui eo quod in gra·tia sanctificante habetur relatio specialis ad donum divinum, quod quidem donum vel est ipse Spiritus sanctus vel per appropriationem Spiritus sanctus dicitur.

Regarding what is truly predicated contingently of one or other divine person as divine, two points are clear, namely, (r) that nothing real and intrinsic is added to a divine person as divine on account of such a truth, and (2) that such a truth has no correspondence with reality without an appropriate external term. The first is clear, because a divine person as divine is immutable; the second is also clear, because there can be no contingent truth without a contingent reality. However, regarding the constitution of these contingent truths, there are three principal divisions among theologians. To the first group belong those who hold that such a contingent truth is con~ stituted not by the unchanged divine reality but by the appropriate external term - that is to say, inasmuch as this term regards in a special way the divine person about whom a true contingent predication is made. Thus, concerning the incarnation, the followers of Scotus and Tiphanus posit a special relation in the assumed nature to the assuming Word alone. Similarly, concerning the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, many authors hold that this gift is constituted as given by the fact that there is in sanctifYing grace a special relation to the divine gift, which gift is in fact either the Holy Spirit himself or is said to be the Holy Spirit by appropriation. Others, however, are of the opinion that each and every thing is constituted by its own proper reality and that ·therefore the relation alone of the term does not suffice. Hence, to this second group belong those who say that these contingent

Quaerimus ergo quid requiratur atque sufficiat ut verum sit tum Filium a Patre esse missum, tum Spiritum sanctum a Patre Filioque esse'missum. Cui quaestioni respondemus duplici asserto: primo, divinae personae missionem cl?nstitui per ipsam divinam originis rel~tionem; deinde, quamvis eiusmodi missio per solam relationem originis constituatur, tamen teITIlinum ad extra conveniente11'l: exigi. Quare, nihil aliud dicimus quam id quod iam ante diximus, tum generaliter in asserto xv de omnibus quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicantur, tum in simili de iis quae contingentem operationem cognoscitivam, volitivam,. vel productivam divinae personae qua divinae attribuunt, tum in particulari cum alibi de constitutione Christi ontologica egerimus. 13

Ali~s tamen videtur unumquodque per propr~am suam realitatem constitui et ideo solam termini relationem non sufficere. Quare secunda classis eorum

Ig Ibid. Ig0-55.



458

De Divinis Missionibus

459

est qui dicant haec vera contingentia constitui per quandam unionem infiniti et finiti; sicut enim uniuntur materia et forma, vel essentia et esse, vel potentia et actus, ita etiam infinitum et finitum modo quodam eminentiori unh:i docent. Ita circa Incarnationem sentiunt qui eminentem quandam actuationem essentiae humanae assumptae per esse'Verbi diVinum astruunt; et similiter post Petavium non pauci increatum Spiritus sancti donum qua datum quodammodo per modum cuiusdam fo~mae nostrae sanctificationis vel saltern adoptionis concipere volunt. 14 AJiis denique videtur ideo finit~m causis intrinsecis componi quia finitum est ut nulla sit vera similitudo inter constitutionem infiniti et compositionem finiti. Et cum hi etiam teneant unumquodque per propriam realitatem constitui, ad infinitam divinam realitatem qua infinitam recurrunt. Tertia ergo sententia, quam defendimus, inprimis distinguit inter id quod additur infinito, nempe, nihil, et id quod per infinitum constituitur, nempe, quod non finitur. Deinde analogiam invenitj non in creatis, sed in ipsis divinis. Sicut enim Deus contingentia esse scit per scientiam suam et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen requiritur, sicut Deus contingentia esse vult per suam volitionem et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen requiritur, sicut Deus contingentia esse facit per suam omnipotentiam et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen requiritur, ita etiam Filius est omne quod est per proprium suum esse divinum et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen omnino requiritur,15 et Spiritus sanctus mittitur per id quod ipse Spiritus sanctus est et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen omnino requiritur.

Secundum tertiam ergo sententiam de divinis personis qua divinis vere praedicantur tum communiaet propria, tum necessaria et contingentia. Quae quidem omnia constituuntur per ipsam divinae personae realitatem, communia quidem per realitatem communem, propria autem per realitatem 'propriam, necessaria sine ulla conditione, contingentia deniqu~ cum ,conditione consequenti. Quod si nerno negare potest communia et contingentia constitui per divinam realitatem cum conditione consequenti (Deus enim contingentia esse scit per suam scientiam,16 etc.), vix assignari potest ratio cur propria et conti~gentia non pariter

truths are constituted by some sort of union of the infinite and the finite. They hold that just as matter and form are united, or essence and existence, or potency and act, so also the infinite and the finite are united in some preeminent manner. Concerning the incarnation, this is the opinion of those who suppose some eminent actuation ofthe assumed human essence through the divine existence of the Word; and, in a similar way, a number of theologians since Petavius want to conceive the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit as given somehow by way of some form of our sanctification or at least of adoption. 14 Still others consider that the finite is composed of intrinsic ca~ses because it is finite, so that there is no true similitude between the constitution of the infinite and the composition of a finite being. And since these also hold that each thing is constituted by its proper reality, they have recourse to the infinite divine reality as infinite. The opinion of the third group, which we are defending, distinguishes first of all between that which is added to the infinite, namely, nothing, and that which is constituted by the infinite, namely, what is not finite. Next, it finds an analogy, not in created things, but in divinity itself. For just as God knows that contingent things exist through his own knowledge, and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required) and just as God wills that contingent things exist through his own volition, and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, and just as God makes contingent things exist through his own omnipotence and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, so also the [incarnate] Son is all that he is through his own proper divine act of existence and not through an external term, which is nevertheless absolutely required,15 and the Holy Spirit is sent through that which the Holy Spirit is and not through an external term, which is nevertheless absolutely required. According to this third opinion, then, both what is common and what is proper) and what is necessary and what is contingent, are truly predicated of divine persons as divine. All of these are constituted by the very reality of the divine person, the common by their common reality, the proper by their proper reality, the necessary without any condition, and finally the contingent with a consequent condition. But if no one can deny that common contingent truths are constituted by the divine reality, with a consequent condition - that God knows that contingent things exist by his own knowledge,16 and so on - one can hardly assign a reason 14 For the argument against the root of these opinions, ibid. II8--21.

14 Contra radicem huius sententiarum classis arguitur, ibid. u8--2I.

The Robert

The Divine Missions

15 Ibid. 134-55. 16 [and not through an external termj see above, pp. 443) 445.J

Mollot Collection


460

46J


constituantur per ipsam- divinae personae realitatem cum conditione consequente. Postquam tres hae sententiarum classes singillatim sunt consideratae, nonnihil claritatis additur si inter se comparantur. Maxime ergo inter se differunt prima et tertia. In prima enim, praesupponitur processio divina, sed missio formaliter in termino quodam ad extra invenitur. In tertia, autem, requiritur quidem terminus ad extra tamquarp conditio consequens, sed ipsa divinae personae missio per divinam originis relationem constituitur. Medium denique locum inter haec extrema tenet secunda sententiarum classis, quae missionem constitui ducit secundum remotam quandam analogiam ex rebus compositis exquisitam. lam vero ex prima sententia sequitur cohaerens ilia doctrina quam propugnat P. Galtier: processionem esse de formali ratione missionis, sed teiminum esse eiusdem determinativum et constitutivum;17 missionem praesupponere et includere aeternam processionem sed formaliter esse ex productione eft'ectus novi; 18 operationes ad extra esse communes, relationes creaturae ad Deum consequi has operationes, et cum nihil proprium Spiritui sancto sit in operatione, nihil proprium Spiritui sancto esse posse in relatione; quare, per appropriationem dici Spiritum sanctum invisibiliter mitti; 19 neque ipsos Patres graecos affinnare talem pro priam operationem, vel consequentem relationem. 2o Tertia autem sententia modo opposito procedit. Si enim vere et realiter mitti".. tur Spiritus sanctus a Patre Filioque, habetur in ipso Spiritu sancto realis relatio, qui ab aliis; quae quidem realis relatio cum spiratione passiva realiter identificatur sed ratione ab ea distinguitur; realiter identificatur, quia nihil reale et intrinsecum infinitae perfectioni personae divinae addi potest; ratione distinguitur, quia passiva spiratio est aeterna et necessaria neque terminum creatum exigit, sed missio est temporalis et contingens et terminum creatum et consequentem tamquam conditionem exigit. Neve hoc mirum nimis dicas, cum idem prorsus ipse se~tias circa Deum vere et realiter contingentia scientem, volentem, facientem, nempe, tale scire, velle, facere super actum purum non addere nisi relationem rationis.

The Divine Missions

why proper contingent truths are not-likewise constituted by the very reality ofa divine person, with a consequent condition. We have considered the opinions of these three groups separately. Considerable clarity will be added if we compare them with one another. The greatest difference is between the first and the third. In the first, a divine procession is presupposed, but a mission is found formally in an external term. In the third, however, an external term is indeed required as a consequent condition, but the mission of a divine person itself is constituted by a divine relation of origin. The second group occupies the middle ground between these two extremes, maintaining that a mission is constituted according to some remote analogy taken from composite things. Now, from the first opinion there follows the corresponding doctrine put forth by Galtier: that while a procession belongs to the formality of a mission, still a term is what determines and constitutes it;17 that a mission presupposes and includes an eternal procession, but exists formally from the production of a new effect; 18 that external operations are common, that relations of a creature to God are consequent upon these operations, and since there is nothing proper to the Holy Spirit in an operation, there can be nothing proper to the Holy Spirit in such a relation; that therefore it is by appropriation that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent invisibly;'9 and that the qreek Fathers themselves do not assert such a proper operation or a consequent relation. 20 " The third opinion proceeds i~ the opposite way. For if the Holy Spirit is really and truly sent by the Father and the Son, there is present in the Holy Spirit himself a real- relation, 'who from others.' This real relation is really identical with passive spiration but conceptually distinguished from it. It is really identical, because nothing real and intrinsic can be added to the infinite perfection of a divine person; it is conceptually distinct, because passive spiration is eternal "and necessary and needs no created term, whereas a mission is temporal and contingent and requires a created consequent term as a condition. You can hardly say thit this - is most strange, since it is exactly what you hold with regard to God as really and truly knowing, willing, and creating contingent things, namely, that such knowing, willing, and creating adds nothing to pure act except a conceptual relation. '7 ,8 '9 20

GaItier, De SS. Trinitate in se et nobis 276, § 394. Ibid. 277, §397. Ibid. 30r-302, §430. Ibid. 292-g7, §§42~5. Galtier, L'habitation en nous des troll personnes (see above, note I) 27-34. Paul Galtier, I.e Saint Esprit en nous d'apres us peres grees (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946).


ColJected Works of Bernard Lonergan

46.2


The Divine Missions

463

Differentia autem theologica inter primam et tertiam sententiam maxima est. Secundum tertiam enim sententiam terminus missionem conseq~itur, et ideo si datur missio necessario datur terminusj neque a scriptura et patribus exigitur ut talem ponant terminum qualem theologus convenientem opineturj sed sufficit prorsus quod fontes revelationis affinnant aliam divinam personam mittentem et aliam esse missam. 21 Sed secundum primam sententiam missio terminum consequitur et, nisi conveniens terminus qua talis in documentis clare et distincte affirmatur, dubitare potest theologus utrum re vera de missione proprie dicta agatur. 22 Differunt denique secunda ~t tertia sententiae secundum aI,1alogias quas adhibent. Secunda enim analogiam quaerit in rebus creatis et compositis, ut unio iusti ad Spiritum datum concipiatur quodammodo ad modum unionis materiae ad formam vel potentiae ad actum. 23 Tertia autem analogiam quaerit ill ipsis divinis: sicut enim contingentia et propria de quibusdam divinis personis dicuntur, ita contingentia et communia de tribus divinis personis dicuntur; et sicut haec per actum infinitum, addita relatione rationis, constituuntur, ita etiam ilIa per infinitam originis relationem, addita relatione rationis, similiter constituuntur.

But the greatest theological difference is between the first and the third opinion. For according to the third· opinion, a term follows a mission, and therefore if there is a mission there is necessarily a term. Nor is there any requirement that scripture or the Fathers posit a term that theologians consider appropriate;" it is quite sufficient that the sources of revelation affirm that one divine person is the one sending and another the one sent. 21 But according to the first" opinion, a mission follows a term, and unless an appropriate term as such is clearly and distinctly affirmed in the documents, a theologian can doubt whether the question here is really about a mission in the proper sense. 22 The second and third opinions differ in the analogies they use. The second opinion seeks an analogy in composite created things, so that the union of the just and the Spirit that is given is conceived as somehow like the union of matter and form or of potency and act. 23 The third opinion, however, seeks its analogy in the divinity itself: just as proper contingents are predicated of one or other of the divine persons, so common contingents are predicated of the three divine personsj and just as the latter are constituted by infinite act with the addition of a conceptual relation, so also the former are similarly constituted by an infinite relation of origin with the addition of a conceptual relation.

Argumentum

Argument

Primo, arguitur non constitui mlSSlonem divinae personae sine divina originis relatione; deinde, arguitur nihil aliud requiri praeter originis relationem ut ipsa missio constituaturj tertio, arguitur missionem qua contingentem atque temporalem exigere terminum ad extra convenientem, non quidem per modum constitutivi, sed tantummodo per modum conditionis consequentis.

It is argued, first, that the mission of a divine person is not constituted without a divine relation of origin; second, that nothing more is required for a mission to be constituted than a relation of originj ~hird, that a mission as contingent and temporal requires an appropriate external tctm, not as a constitutive but only as a consequent condition.

21 Si enim missio per reali~atem divinam constituitur, tota quaestio est utrum secundum missionem sint in divinis relationes reales, a quo alius qui ab alio; utrum vero sint eiusmodi re1ationes reales, ex fontibus sat facile determinatur.

If a mission is constituted by the divine reality, the whole question is whether on the basis ofa mission there are in God the real relations 'from whom another' and 'who .from another.' Whether there are such real relations is quite easily determined from the sources of revelation. 22 Ifa mission is constituted by a term, the existence of the mission isjudged according to the term; and since not even the patristic authorities seem to know this rule of constitution, it is extremely difficult to prove the existence of a mission. 23 It is commonly objected to this opinion, first, that the sole formal cause of our justification is finite grace received in us (DB 799, DS 1529, ND 647), second, that there is a danger that the uncreated gift granted to the just may be conceived as something like a hypostatic union (DB 2290, DS 3814, ND 1996), Of third, that there is a danger that the hypostatic union itself may be conceived in a manner similar to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. See the series of objections and answers in H. Schauf, Die Einwohnung des hei.ligen Gei.stes [see p. 4"37, note r] 225-47. More recently, De Letter, 'Created Actuation by the Uncreated Act' [see the same note].

J

22 Si enim missio per terminum constituitur, secundum tenninum de existentia ipsius missionis iudicatur; et cum auctoritates ne patristicae quidem hanc constitutionis regulam noyisse videantur, perdifficile est existentiam missionis probare. 23 Contra hanc sententiam communiter obicitur, primo, unicam formalem causam nostrae iustificationis esse gratiam finitam in nobis receptam (DB 799), deinde, periculum adesse ne donum increatum iustis concessum ad modum unionis hypostaticae concipiatur (DB 2290) vel, tertio, ·periculum adesse ne ipsa unio hypostatica ad modum "inhabitationis Spiritus sancti concipiatur. Vide seriem obicctionum ct solutionum apud H. Schauf, Die Einwohnung des heiligen Geistes, Freiburg im Breisgau 1941, pp: 225-4]. Recentius De Letter, 'Jh§ological Studies 18 (1957) 60-9 2.


21


464


465

The Divine Missions

Ad primum sic proceditur. Inquantum verum est quod Pater mittit Filium, verum est Patrem esse -mittentern, Patrern non esse rnissum, Filium non esse mittentem, Filium esse missum. lam vera opposita de personis divinis vere et realiter non praedicantur nisi secundum relationes originis; atqui esse mittentem et esse missum sunt opposita quae vere et realiter de divinis personis praedicanturj ergo secundum relationes originis praedicantur. Mawr constat ex, principio quod omnia unum sunt ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. DB 703.Minor clare constat ex sacra scriptura, uti supra stabilitum est. Similiter, inquantum verum est quod Pater et Filius mittunt Spiritum sanctum, verum est Patrem et Filiurn esse mittentes et non missos, Spiritum sanctum esse missum et non mittentem. Unde repetitur idem argumentum ac supra.

Argument for the first part Inasmuch as it is true that the Father sends the Son, it is true that the Father is the one sending, that the Father is not the one sent, that the Son is not the one sending, and that the Son is the one sent. Now, opposites are not really and truly predicated of the divine persons except according to relations of origin; but 'to be sending' and 'to be sent' are opposites that are really and truly predicated of divine persons; therefore they are predicated according to relations of origin. The mqjor premise is clear and certain from the principle that everything is one w1"!ere there is no distinction by relational opposition (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325)' The minor is clear from 'sacred scripture, as has been already established. Similarly, inasmuch as it is true that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit, it is true that the Father and the Son are the ones who send and not the ones sent, and that the Holy Spirit is the one sent and not the one sending. Thus, the argument here is the same as above.

Ad secundum autem Sic proceditur. Ubi adest causa seu ratio constitutiva quae perfectionis infinitae est, superfluit omnis alia causa seu ratio constitutiva. Atqui ad divinas missiones constituendas adest causa seu ratio quae perfectionis infinitae est, nempe, ipsa. realis. relatio originis quae cum divina essentia realiter identificatur. Ergo ad divinas missiones cortstituendas praeter relationem originis superfluit omnis alia causa seu ratio constitutiva. Maior constat ex ipsa ratione infiniti. Quod enim infinitum est, non limitatur ad hoc vel' illud;· et quod nullo modo limitatur, saltern ad omnia certo cognita sufficit.24 Minor constat ex addita ratione. Quare, sicut divina persona per divinam essentiam et est et scit et vult et operatur et per divinam originis relationem distinguitur ut generet vel gignatur, spiret vel spiretur, ita etiam per divinam originis relationem constituitur ut mittens vel ut missa.

Argument for the second part Where there is present a cause or constitutive reason that is infinite in perfection, every other cause or. constitutive reason is superfluous. But for the divine missions to be constituted there is a cause or reason that is infinite in perfection, namely, a real relation of origin, which is really identical vvith the divine essence. Therefore, for the divine missions to be constituted, any other cause or constitutive reason besides a relation of origin is superfluous. The major premise is clear from the very notion of the infinite. For what is infinite is not limited to this or that; and what is in no way limited is at least sufficient for all that is known with certainty.24 The minor is dear from the reason given for it. Therefore, just as a divine person is and knows and wills and operates by the divine essence, and is distinguished as generating or generated, or as spi-rating or spirated, by a divine relation of origin, so also a divine person is constituted as sending or as sent by a divine relation of origin.

Ad tertium autqn sic proceditur. Quaecumque contingenter sunt v~ra, adaequationem veritatis per realitatem simplicem et necessariam eamque solam habere non possunt.

,

,

Argument jor the third part Whatever is contingently true cannot have the correspondence of truth through a reality that is simple and necessary and this alone. 24 This point is more fully explained in The Ontological and Psychological Constitution if Chris(roo- ro5·



466


467

The Divine Missions

Porro, quod divina persona mittit v.el mittitur, contingenter verum est; liberrimo enim consilio divino omne illud est quod vel esse vel non esse pot~st; et absolute potuit non esse creatio, incarnatio, sanctificatio. Ergo, quod divina persona rriittit vel mittitur adaequationem veritatis habere non potest per solam perfectionem divinam; et ideo terminum ad extra convenientem exigit. Praeterea, exigitur hie terminus ut conditio consequens ipsam missionem. Nam persona mittens et etiam missa nullo modo a creatura dependet et ideo, quamvis terminus sit conditio, quia necessarius est, tamen conditio vel praevia vel simultanea esse non potest.

But the fact that a divine person sends or is sent is contingently true; for all that can be or not be exists by a sovereignly free divine decision; and absolutely speaking, creation, incarnation, and sanctification could have not been. Therefore, the fact that a divine person sends or is sent cannot have the correspondence of truth through the divine perfection alone, and therefore requires an appropriate external term. Besides, this term is required as a condition consequent upon the mission itself. For the person sending and also the person sent in no way depend upon a creature and the~efore, although the term is ~ cO'ndition because it is necessary, still it cannot be either a prior or a simultaneous condition.

QUAESTIO XXVI Q.ue:m.achn.odwn tenninus ad extra conveniens missioneIn consti.. tuta:m. consequatur

QUESTION 26 In what ways is an appropriate external term consequent upon a constituted mission?

Ad intelligentiam praecedentis asserti notate quod Deus et est ens per intellectum et est agens per intellectum: est ens per intellectum quatenus eius esse est eius intelligere et velIe; est agens per intellectum quia eius producere est iterum eius intelligere et velle. Quam ab causam, eo ipso quod Pater et Filiu~ et Spiritus concipiunf25 et volunt divinam quandain personam mitti, iam habentur et ipsa missio constituta et terminus ad extra conveniens productus. 26 Habetur constitutio quia'Deus est ens per intellectum et ideo, quod de se intelligit Deus, est Deus. Habetur productio quia Deus est agens per intellectum et ideo quod extra se esse intelligit Deus, extra Deum est.

To understand the previous assertion, note that God is both being by intellect and agent by intellect. God is being by intellect since God's being is God's understanding and willing; God is agent by intellect since God's creating is again God's understanding and willing. For this reason, by the very fact that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit conceives and will the sending of a divine person, the constituted mission itself and the appropriate created external term are already present.26 The constitution is present because God is being by intellect and therefore what God understands about God is God. There is the creation because God is agent by intellect and therefor-e what God understands to be outside God is outside God. Therefore, if the following are distinguished, (r) constitution in the active sense, (2) constitution in the passive sense, (3) creation in the active sense, and (4) creation in the passive sense, then (1) constitution in the active sense is common to the three persons, since the Three conceive and will both that the Father send the Son and that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit;

Quare si distinguuntur (I) constitutio active significata, (2) constitutio passive significata, (3) productio active significata, et (4) productio passive significata, tunc:

(I) constitutio active significata est communis tribus personis, cum tres concipiant et velint tum Patrem mittere Filium tum Patrem.Ftliumque mittere Spiritum sanctum;

25 [Lonergan's word is 'concipiunt,' 'conceive.' But he quickly moves to variations on 'intelligere,' 'to understand.'] 26 [' ... are already present,' that is, sub specie aetemitatis. See Lonergan, Grace an.d Freedom 345-46: 'All other predication (predication other than substantial predications) with respect to God involves extrinsic denomination and presupposes its term as actually existing sub specie aetemitatis ... Since any predication with respect to God ad extra presupposes the actual existence (sub specie aetemitatis) of the term ... 1 :; 1



468


469

The Divine Missions

(2) constitutio passive significata est propria mittenti et missae, cum tres concipi~ ant et velint, non tres mittere et tres mitti, sed Patrem mittere Filium, et Patrern Filiumque mittere Spiritum sanctum; (3) productio active significata est communis tribus personis, cum tres concipi~ ant et velint terminurn ad extra convenientem produci, cumque ipsum concipere adiecta voluntate sit ipsum producere omnipotens; (4) quamvis constitutio active significata et productio active significata sint tribus personis communes, tamen communes sunt tribus non confusis sed distinctis: quod enirn Filius intelligit et vult se mitti a Patre, hoc a Patre habet sicut et a Patre habet suam substantiam; quod Spiritus sanctus intelligit et vult se mitti a Patre et Filio , hoc ipsum habet a Patre et Filio sicut et ab eis habet suam substantiam; et simile de productione active significata dicendum est;

(2) constitution in the passive sense is proper to the,one sending and to the One sent, since the Three conceive and will, not that three send and that three be sent but that the Father send the Son and the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit; (3) c~eation in the active sense is common to the three persons, since the Three conceive and will that the appropriate external tenn be created, and since the very conceiving, together with the will, is the omnipotent act of creating; (4) although constitution in the active sense and creation in the active sense are common to the three person~, still they are common to the Three not confusedly but distinctly; for the fact itself that the Son understands and wills that he be Sent by the Father he has from the Father,just as he has his substance from the Father; and the fact itself that the Holy Spirit understands and wills that he be sent by the Father and the Son he has from the Father and the Son, just as he has his substance from them; and the same must be said concerning creation in the active sense;

(s) productio passive signi:ficata est ipse terminus ad extra conveniens qua dependens a prima sua causa efficiente; (6) personis divinis intrinsece immutabilibus nihil reale et intrinsecum additur sive _per constitutionem active significatam, sive per constitutionem passive significatam, sive per productionem active significatam; (7) et tamen per' infinitam neque limitatam divinam perfectionem sive communem sive propriam prout res exigit, vere et realiter tres constituunt, vere et realiter mittentes et ~issae respective constituuntur, 27 vere et realiter tres pariter personae terminos convenientes producunt; (8) sicut enim divina immutabilitas realem et intrinsecam additionem facit impossibilem ita etiarn divina infinitas eandem reddit superfluam. Praeterea, incarnatio Filii et donatio Spiritus sancti similes quidem sunt quantum ad modum constitutionis et productionis, sed differunt quantum ad id quod constituitur et producitur. Quantum ad modum similes sunt quia in utraque habentur octo superius e_numerata. Quantum vero ad id quod constituitur et producitur, in rnultis differunt omnino. In incarnatione enim, terminus ad extra materialis est natura humana non subsistens, cum unio sit in persona; sed in donatione tenninus ad extra materialis est natura humana subsistens, cum unio gratiae sit inter personas. Quare, sicut

(5) creation in the passive sense is the appropriate external term itself as dependent upon its first efficient cause; (6) nothing real and intrinsic is added to the intrinsically immutable divine persons, whether by constitution in the active sense or by constitution in the passive sense or by creation in the active sense; (7) and yet through their infinite and unlimited divine perfection, either common or proper according to the case, the Three really and truly constitute, .are really and truly constituted as sending and sent, respectively, 27 and' the three persons really and truly equally create the appropriate tenns; (8) for just as divine immutability makes impossible a real, intrinsic addition, so also divine infinity renders such an addition superfluous. Furthermore, the incarnation of the Son and the giving of the Holy Spirit are similar as to the manner of their constitution and creation but differ as to what is constituted and created. They are similar as to the manner, because the above eight statements are verified in each; but as to what is constituted and created, they are in many respects entirely different. In the incarnation the material external term is the nonsubsistent human nature, since th,e union is in the person; but in the giving of the Holy Spirit the material external tenn is a subsistent human nature, since the union of grace is 27 [fhat is, when 'constitution' is taken in the passive sense, there is a sending and a sent among or with respect to the Three, who are really constituted as the Father sending and theSon sent, and as the Father and the Son sending and the Holy Spirit sent. The sentence as it stands could be understood as at least not excluding that the Father, like the Son and the Spirit, is sent, but clearly that is not what Lonergan means.]



470


471

haec riatura subsistit per esse proprium et proportionatum, ita ilIa natura non subsistit quia esse proprio et proportionato caret. Praeterea, in incarnatione per proprium esse divinum. Filius est et Deus et homo; quod quidem verum contingens qua contingens adaequationem habet per esse quoddam secundarium quo assumitur natura non subsistens; et cum haec assumptio proportionem naturae excedat, pariter hoc esse secundarium proportionem naturae assumptae excedit. 28 Sed in donatione per propriam suam perfectionem Spiritus sanctus est et donum et iustis datum; quod quidem verum contin. gens qua contingens adaequationem habet per gratiam sanctificantem qua grata Deoque sancta redditur natura subsistensj et cum donum increatum et creata sanctitas proportionem huius naturae excedant, etiam gratia sanctificans proportionem naturae excedit.

The Divine Missions

between persons. Therefore, just as the latter nature subsists through its proper proportionate act of existence, so the former nature does not subsist, since it lacks a proper proportionate act of existence. Besides, in the incarnation the Son is both God and man through his own divine act of existence. This contingent truth as contingent has its correspondence of truth through a secondary act of existence by which the nonsubsistent nature is assumed; and since this assumption exceeds the proportion of nature, this secondary act of existence likewise exceeds the proportion of the assumed nature. 28 But in the giving of the Holy Spirit, it is through his own proper perfection that the Holy Spirit is gift and is given to the just. This contingent truth as contingent has its correspondence of truth through sanctifying grace whereby a subsistent nature is rendered holy and pleasing to God; and since both the uncreated gift and the created holiness exceed the proportion of this' nature, sanctifying grace also exceeds the proportion of nature.

In incarnatione ergo terminus ad extra formalis est esse quoddam secundarium quod'ad genus s'ubstantiae reduciturj sed in donatione terminus ad extra formalis est gratia sanctificans quae in' genere qualitatis invenitur.

In the incarnation; therefore, the formal external term is a secondary act of existence that is reduced to the category of substance; but in the giving of the Spirit the formal external term is sanctifying grace, which is in the category of quality.

Praeterea, quamvis in incarnatione Filius qua Deus non sit sol us, tamen salus Filius incarnatur. Sed in donatione, quamvis solus Spiritus secundum propriam perfectionem sit donum, tamen cum idem sit totam ~uam dllectionem dare et se dare, quia Pater et Filius dant totam suam dilectionem procedentem, etiam ipsi se dant et ideo venire et iustis inhabitare dicuntur.

Moreover, although in the incarnation the Son as God is' nor alone, it is the Son alone who .becomes incarnate. But in giving the Spirit, although the Spirit alone according to his proper perfection is gift, still, since to give one's entire love is the same as to give oneself, and since the Father and the Son give their entire proceeding Love, they also give themselves and therefore are said to come and dwell in the just. From this.we conclude that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit understand, will, constitut~, and accomplish different things in the incarnation and in the giving of the Spirit. But if one .asks about the supernatural character of the formal terms, it is pertinent to note the following. First, there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed,2 9 namely, the

Quibus perspectis, alia in incarnatione et alia in donatione intelligunt, volunt, constituunt, faciu~t Pater, Filius, Spiritus. Quod si quis de ipsa entitate supernaturali terminorum formalium quaesiverit, convenienter notantur sequentia. Primo, quattuor sunt divinae relationes reales realiter identicae cum divina substantia, et ideo quattuor modi specialissimi qui divinae substantiae imitationem ad extra fundant. Deinde, quattuor sunt entia absolute supernaturalia quae numquam informia 29 inveniuntur, nempe, esse

28 [For a fuller discussion of the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, see Lonergan, The Onwlogical and Psychological Constitution of Christ '42-51. The issue is also discussed, and objections answered, in Lonergan, De Verho mcamato (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), assertion 9, pp. 259-66.] 29 'Only love is meritorious per se; the other virtues or their acts can be informed or

uninfonned. They are informed by sanctifying grace and love, and when grace departs they become uninformed and cease to be meritorious. For this reason it


Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

472


473

secundarium incarnationis, gratia sanctificans, habitus caritatis, et lumen gloriae. Quare, sine inconvenientia diceretur esse secundarium inearnationis esse participationem creatam paternitatis et ideo specialem relationem ad Filium habere; gratiam sanctificantem esse partieipationem spirationis activae et ideo specialem relationem ad Spiritum sanctum habere; habitum caritatis esse participationern spirationis passivae et ideo specialern relationeri1 ad Patrern et Filium habere; lumen gloriae esse participationem filiarlonis et ideo filios adoptionis perfecte ad Patrem reducere. Quod si quis dixerit Deum operari ad extra non secundum relationes sed secundum communem naturam et i!1eo relationes divinas reales sic participari non posse, respondendum est per distinctionem. Vera enim esset obiectio S1 Deus esset agens naturale quod producere non posset nisi simile in natura, sicut ignis semper calefacit et aqua semper humectat. Sed natura divina tribus communis est intellectualis, et sicut Deus per suum intellectum cognoscit quattuor relationes reales, ita per suum intellectum, adiecta voluntate, entia finita sed similia et absolute supernaturalia producere potest.

The Divine Missions

secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifYing grace, the habit ofcharity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father. But if one says that God operates externally not according to the relations but according to the common nature, and therefore the real diyine relations cannot be participated in in this way, we must answer with a distinction. The objection would be true if God were a natural agent that could produce only something similar in nature, as fire always produces heat and water always causes moisture. But the divine nature common to the Three is intellectual, and just as God by the divine intellect knows the four real relations, so also by the divine intellect, together with the divine will, God can produce beings that are finite yet similar [t6 the four real relations] and absolutely supernatural.

QUESTION 27 QUAESTIO XXVII

Is the Holy Spirit sent as notional love?

Utrwn missio Spiritus sancti sit secundum dilectionem. notionalem

Cum Spiritus sanctus procedat ut Arnor, cumque vera et realis divinae personae missio nihil aliud sit quam ipsa eiusdem p~rsonae processio cui consequenter aecedat conveniens terminus ad extra, fieri nequit ut ipse Spiritus sanetus sit missus nisi secundum dilectionem procedentem, seu notionalem. Ad cuius tamen intelligentjam haec notate. Dist1nguuntur in divinis dilectio essentialis et dilectio notionalis non realiter sed ratione tantum, cum dilectio essentialis sit ipsa divina essentia, dilectio autem notionalis sit eadem essentia cum relatione originis cointellecta. Quare,; essentialis est divina dilectio tribus personis communis, et secundum eam Pater et Filius et

Since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, and since the true and real mission of a divine person is nothing other than the very procession of that person with the addition of an appropriate, consequent external tenn, the Holy Spirit can only be sent as proceeding, or notional, love. For a fuller understanding of this, it will help to note the following. In God the distinction between essential love and notional love is a conceptual, not a real, distinction, since essential love is the divine essence itself, while notional love is that same essence understood with a relation of origin. Essential divine love, therefore, is common to the three persons, and it is according to this love that

seems worth while to distinguish between acts that are formally supernatural and acts that are virtually supernatural. The former attain God as God is in Sf, while the latter do not attain God as God is in Sf but only in some respect, as in the case offaith and hope.' Lonergan, 'De ente supernaturali' (to be published in CWL 19), thesis 3, §55. The point of Lonergan's temark in the present text is that the four absolutely supernatural realities are formally supernatural, and necessarily so. For the created correlate of divine communication or divine self~giving is that the creature should attain God as God is in se, and these are the created realities whereby we attain God as God is in Sf.]



474


475

Spiritus cliligunt amne quod diligunt. Notionalis autem dilectio est ipse Spiritus sanctus pro cedens cuius principium est Spirator, seu Pater et Filius dilectionem spirantes, et secundum hanc spirationem Pater et Filius Spiritu sancto et se et nos diligunt. 30 Neque mira est reputanda haec dilectio notionalis, si quidem omnis creatura diligit non per ipsam suam essentiam sed per actum in propria voluntate receptum, cuius actus ipsa creatura quoddam principium existit. Praeterea, si obiecta divinae dilectionis respicimus, primum quidem est ipsa divina bonitas tribus personis communis, alterum autem est bonitas finita singulis creaturis propria, tertium autem est speciale quoddam obiectum inquantum Deus quasdam creaturas diligit in ordine ad ipsum bonum infinitum iis communicandum. 31 Et secundum hanc tertiam atque specialem dilectionem divinam attenditur missio ipsius Spiritus sancti ad quam consequitur donum gratiae sanctificantis. Uti enim supra habitum est; constitutio divinae missianis est per divinam conceptionem atque voIitionem; et inquantum active significatur constitutio, tribus personis est communis; inquantum autem passive significatur, aliquibus est propria. Quare, cum ipse Spiritus sanctus mittatur, secundum huius missionis constitutionem active significatam habetur specialis divina dilectio tribus communis atque essentialis. Et cum haec dile,ctio sit in ordine ad ipsum bonum infinitum communicandum, existit tamquam divina sui donatio secundum quam tres divinae personae se iusto dant. 32 Si autem eadem constitutio passive significatur, Pater et Filius sunt diligentes et mittentes et dantes, ipse autem Spiritus sanctus est dilectio procedens et persona missa et donum datum. Et cum haec dilectio omnino specialis sit, per eam Pater et Filius Spiritu sando iustos' diligunt atque donant. 33 Cum denique ad hanc specialem dilectionem tam essentialem quam notionalem necessaria sequatur terminus ad extra conveniens, praeter gratiam, quae est ipse favor divinus erga aliquem, etiam est gratia gratum faciens 34 quae est qualitas et accidens in anima iusti receptum. 35 Obicitur tamen quod missio Spiritus sancti magis secundum operationem intellectus sit

The Divine Missions

the Father and the Son and the Spirit love all that they love. Notional love) however, is the Holy Spirit proceeding, whose principle is the Spirator, that is, the Father and the Son breathing love, and it is according to this spiration that the Father and the Son love themselves and us by the Holy Spirit. 30 This notional love should not be considered strange, since every creature loves, not by its own essence, but by an act received in its will, the creature itself being a principle of this act. Moreover, if we consider the objects of divine love, the first is the divine goodness itself common to the three persons, the second is the finite goodness proper to each creature, and the third is a special object inasmuch as God loves certain creatures in order to communicate the infinite good itself to them. 31 It is with this third, special divine love that the mission of the Holy Spirit is concerned, with the gift of sanctifying grace as its consequence. As mentioned above, the constitution of a divine mission is by divine conception and volition. The constitution in the active sense is common to the three. persons, whereas in the passive sense it is proper to certain ones. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit himself is sent, in accord with the constitution of this mission in the active sense there is a special divine love that is common to the Three and essential. And since this love is ordered to communicating the infinite good, it exists as a divine self-giving, by way of which the three divine persons give themselves to the just person. 32 But if the same constitution is taken in the passive sense, the Father and the Son are loving and sending and giving, while the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love and the person sent and the gift given. And since this Love is altogether special, by it the Father and the Son love the just and give to them by the Holy Spirit. 33 Finally, since an appropriate external term necessarily follows this special love both essential and notional, in addition to the grace that is God's favor towards someone, there is also gratia gratumfaciens, grace that renders one pleasing to God,34 which is a quality and an accident received in the soul of the just person. 35 It is objected, however, that the mission of the Holy Spirit is more by way of the operation of the intellect than of the will. For the Spirit has spoken through the 30 31 32 ·33 34 35


Thomas Aquinas, Swnma theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 2. Ibid. I~2, q. HO, a. I. Ibid. I, q. 43, a. 4, ad 1m; q. 38, a. I, ad Jm. Ibid. q. 37, a. 2; q. 38, a. I, ad 4ffi; a. 2, ad 3m. Ibid. I~2, q. 110, ~ersons are in the just and $' dwell in theIIl?

Respondeo circa hanc quaestionem duo esse consideranda, nempe ipsum factum et facti intelligentiam. Et circa ipsum factum, clara videtur Novi Testamenti doctrina,

With regard to this question, two points must be considered; namely, the fact itself and the .understanding of the fact. As to the fact itself, the teaching. of the New Testament seems quite clear.

I

104.16: Deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo.

Ibid. 13: In hoc cognoseimus quoniam in eo manemus et ipse in nobis, quoniam de Spiritu suo dedit nobis. Cf. Gal 4.6; Rom 8,14-17. Ibid. 8: Qui non diligit, non novit Deum, quoniam Deus earitas est. 10 15-4: Manete in me, et ego in vobis ... 5: Ego sum vitis, vos palmites; qui manet in me et ego in eo, hie fert fruetum multum ... 9: Sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos. Manete in dilectione mea. Si praecepta mea servaveritis, manebitis in dilectione' mea, sicut et ego Patris mei praeeepta servavi et maneo in eius dilectione. 10 14.15: Si diligitis me, mandata mea servate. 16: Et ego rogabo Patrem, et alium parac1itum dabit vobis ut maneat vobis cum in aeternum, Spiritus veritatis, quem mundus non potest aecipere quia non videt eum nee seit eum. 17= Vas autem cognoscetis eum quia apud vos manebit et -in vobis erit. 20: In lio die vas cognoseetis quia ego sum in Patre meo, et vos in me, et ego in vobis. 21; Qui habet mandata mea et servat ea, lie est qui diligit me. Qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo; et ego diligam eum et manifestabo ei me ipsum. 23: Si quis diligit me, sennonem meum servabit, et Pater. meus diliget eum, et ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus.

1017.21 :... ut omnes unum sint sicut ttl, Pater, in me et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint; ut credat mundus quia tu me misisti. 22: Et ego c1aritatem quam de~isti mihi dedi eis, ut sint unum sicut et nos unum ·sumus. 23: Ego in eis et tu in me, ut sint consummati in unum, et cognoscat mundus quia tu me misisti et dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti ... 26: Et notum feci eis nomen tuum, et notum faciam ut dilectio qua dilexisti me in ipsis sit et ego in ipsis.

Rom 7.17-18, 20: circa peccatum .inhabitans atque operans. Rom 8.8: Qui autem in carne sunt Deo placere non p·ossunt. 91 9: Vos autem in carne non estis sed in spiritu, si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis. Siquis autem Spiritum Chr.isti

1John 4.16: 'God is love, and those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them.' Ibid. v. 13: 'By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit.' See Galatians 4.6; Romans.s.I4-17. Ibid. v. 8: 'Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.' John 15-4: ·'Abide in me as I abide in you .. .'; v. 5: 'I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much· fruit .. .'; v. 9: 'As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, as I have kept my Father's commandments and abide in his love.' John 14.15.: 'If you love me, you will keep my commandments'; v. 16: 'I will ask the Father; and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you for ever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him'; v. 17: 'You know -him, because he abides with you,. and he will be in you'; v. 20: 'On that day you will know that I am in my Father, and yO\) in me, and I in you'; v. 2I: 'They who have my commandments and keep them are those who love me; and those who love me will be loved by my Father, and I will love them and reveal myself to them'; v. 23: 'Those who love me will' keep my word, and my Father will love them, and we will come to them and make our home with them.' John 17.21: ' ... that they all may be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be one in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me'; v. 22: 'The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one as we are one, [v. 23] 1 in' them and you in me, that they may become completely one, so that the ~orld may know that you have sent me and have loved them as you have loved me'; v. 26: '1 made your name known to them, and I will make it known, so that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them.' Romans 7.17-18, 20: concerning sin as inhabiting and working [in us]. Romans' 8.8-II: ' ... those who are in the flesh cannot please God. 9 ! But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. 91 See Romans 8.1.



502

503


non habet, hie non est eius. ro: Si autem Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus vero vivit propter iustificationem. II: Quod si Spiritus eius qui suseitavit lesum a mortuis habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit lesum Christum a mortufs, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra propter inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis. Cf. I Cor 2.16 s.; 6.15-20;'13; 2 Cor 5.14-21; 2 Tim l.I3 s. lam vero ex his et aliis fere innumeris92 constat de mutuo quodam inesse, quod -importat non solum donum Dei increatum sed etiam actus nostros quibus habitualiter mandata Christi servamus secundum caritatem. Quod quidem inhabitare, dari, habere, frui interpretatur S. Thomas secundum quod per gratiam gratum facientem Deus iustis inest sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante. 93 Quod quidsignificet, ex sensibilibus incipientes et paullatim ad altiora procedentes determinare debemus. Primo ergo aspectu praesentia videtur esse propinquitas localis. At lapis lapidi propinqua esse potest quin tamen lapidem lapidi praesentem vel absentem concipiamus. Deinde, praesentia videtur esse adaptatio quaedam psychica quae propinquitatem localem sequitur. Ita cum animal animali obviam fit, ex signis exterioribus ad totam quandam adaptationem sensitivam et internam concludere possumus. Quod si praesentia in tali adaptatione ponitur, ipsa propinquitas localis non est nisi conditio praesentiae. T ertio, quam:,is alia animalia nulla phantasmata formare videantur nisi ea quae in sensibilibus immediatis fundentur, homo, cum per intellectum in tatum ens cognoscendum procedat, maxima quadam imaginationis libertate utitur.94 Quare praeter rei propinquitatem, propter solam memoriam praeteriti vel imaginationem futuri haud parum commoveri potest atque solet. Quapropter, si praesentia in adaptatione quadam psychica consistit, in homine duplicem praesentiam distinguere debemus, aliam nempe quae propinquitatem localem consequitur et aliam quae in ipsa libertate partis sensitivae et humanae fundatur.

The Divine Missions

Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.' See also I Corinthians 2.16-17, 6.15-20; IS; 2 Corinthians 5.14-21; 2 Timothy I.I3-14. From these and almost countless other texts,9 2 there is clearly a mutual 'being in' that implies not only the uncreated gift of God but also our acts, by which we habitually keep Christ's commandments through love. St Thomas interprets this indwelling, gift, possessing, and enjoying in accord with the fact that through the grace that renders us pleasing God is in the just as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover.93 We must determine what this means by beginning from objects of sense and gradually proceeding to higher realities. Atfirst glance, then, presence would seem to be spatial proximity. But one stone can be close to another, and yet we do not think of stones being present to or absent from one another. Second, presence would seem to be a certain psychic adaptation resl:llting from spatial proximity. Thus, when one animal meets another we can conclude from external signs that a total internal sensitive adaptation has occurred. But if presence is seen as this sort of adaptation, then spatial proximity is only a condition for presence. Third, although other animals apparently form only those phantasms that are grounded in immediate sense experience, humans, since they proceed by intellect to the whole of being as the to-be-known, employ the utmost freedom of imagination. 94 Therefore, even apart from the proximity of an object, they can be and generally are greatly moved merely by remembering the past or by imagining some future possibility. Hence, if presence consists in a certain psychic adap~a tion, we must distinguish two kinds of presence in humans, one' that results from spatial proximity and another that is based upon the very freedom of human sensibility. 92 See the encyclical 'Mystici corporis,' 29 June 194$ Sebastian Tromp, Corpus Christi, quod est ecciesia, 3 vol. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946--60; English translation by Ann Condit, The Boqy if Christ, Which Is the Church, New York: Vantage Press, 1960); Emile Mersch, Ie Corps mystique du Christ, 2 vol. (2nd ed., Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1936; grd ed. rev. and augm., Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1951; English translation of 2nd ed. by John R. Kelly, The Whole Christ, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938, 1956); and so on. 93 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 43, a. 3. 94 [See above, p. 407, note 24·J



504

505


Qyarto, homo persona est, non quia animal sit et parte sensitiva utatur, sed quia naturam intellectualem habet et secundum eam operatur. Quare, si de praesentia personae ad personam sermo fiet, sane non excludendae sunt operationes personis propriae. Praeterea, id quod cognoscitur, secundum esse quoddam intentionale in cognoscente est; et id quod amatur, amanti coniungitur atque unitur, secundum quod poeta amicum affirmavit dimidium animae- suae. Quapropter, id ipsum quod est cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante etiam praesentia quaedam est; et cum hae operationes, quatenus in parte intellectiva perficiantur, personis sint ~ propriae, haec praesentia personalis dici potest. Ulterius, nisi per multos actus non pervenimus ad personam quandam vere cognoscendam; neque per multos actus acquiritur cognitio quin eo ipso habitus cognoscendi acquiratur; et ideo in habitu fundatur illa cognitio secundum quam persona vere cognita cognoscenti inest. Praeterea, quamvis unus alterve actus voluntatis impulsionem quandam ad unionem constituere possit, tamen sine habitu amoris non habentur illi actus amoris quibus manifestatur amantium unio; et ideo in habitu fundatur ille arnor sec:undum quem persona amata amanti inest tamquam alter ipse. Praesentia ergo personalis ita secundum actus consideratur ut tamen actus in habitibus fundentur. Quod si praesentiam personalem ab obsessione distinguimus, etiam dicendum est hanc praesentiam non actus continuos exigere sed earn frequentiam quae ex habitibus oriri solet. Sicut enim qui domum quandam habitat semper in domo inclusus non manet, ita qui alium sibi praese~tem habet nihilominus de multis et diversis cogitat, vult, operatur. Quod quidem melius intel1igitur si ad rationem bani ordinis reditur. Uti enim supra habitum est,95 quasi organice inter se connectuntur (I) personae, (2) relationes interpersonales, (3) habitus apprehensivi et appetitivi, (4) multae multorum operationes inter se ordinatae, et (5) series successioque bonorum particularium. Quae quidem omnia simul sumpta bonum ordinis intelligibile constituunt. At cum eadem sint quae praesentiam personalem constituant; dicendum est, qua perfectione habeatur bonum ordinis, eadem haberi prae~entiam personalem, et similiter qua perfectione habeatur praesentia personalis, eadem perfectione haberi bonum ordinis. Praesentiam ergo multiplici sensu distinximus: alia enim consideratur secundum propinquitatem localem) secundum quam lapis lapidi esset praesens vel

The Divine Missions

Fourth, human beings a~e persons not because they are animals and use their senses, but because they have an intellectual nature and operate in accordance with it. If, ~erefore, we are speaking about the presence of one. person to another, surely we must not leave out of the discussion 'the operations that are proper to persons. Besides, that which is known is in the knower with an intentional existence, and what is loved is joined and united to the lover, as _the poet says about his friend being 'half of.my soul.' Therefore the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover are also instances of presence; and since these operations of knowing and loving, insofar as they are performed in the intellectual part of our being, are proper to persons, this presence can 'be called personal presence. Further, only through many acts do we arrive a~ true knowledge of a person; and we do not acquire knowledge through many acts without thereby acquiring also a habit of knowing; and so it is a habit that provides the foundation of that knowledge by which a person who is truly known is in the knower. Again, although one or other act of the will can constitute an impulse towards union, still without a habit oflove there will not be those acts oflove that manifest the union of the lovers; and so it is a habit that provides the foundation of that love by which a person who is loved is in the lover as another self. We understand personal presence, therefore, on the basis of acts, but in such a way that the acts have their foundation in habits. But if we distinguish personal presence from obsession, we must also say that this presence requires not continuous acts but only that frequency that generally results from habits.just as someone who lives in a house does not stay in the house all the time, so someone who has another person present to himself or herself still thinks about and wills and does many different things. For a better understanding of this) we return to the idea of the good of order. For as we said above,95 (I) persons, (2) interpersonal relationships, (3) cognitive and appetitive habits, (4) many coordinated operations among many persons, and (5) a succession and series of particular goods, are) as it were, organically interconnected. All these elements taken together constitute an intelligible good of order. But since these are the same element~ that constitute personal presence, it must be said that the degree of perfection by which the good of order is achieved is the same as that by which personal presence is achieved, and similarly, that the degree of perfection by which personal presence is achieved is the same as that by which the good of order is achieved. We have, then, distinguished several meanings of 'presence.' One sort of presence is a matter of spatial proximity, and on this basis one stone would be present 95 Question go. [Note that the order in which the five elements are mentioned here is not the same as the order in which they were mentioned in question go.]


Collected Works

of Bernard

Lonergan

506


507

absens; alia, secundum adaptationem sensitivam quae propinquitatem localem consequitur; alia animalibus rationalibus propria quae solummodo memoriam praeteriti vel imaginationem futuri supponit; alia denique personalis, secundum quam personae, commune ordinis bonum prosequentes, mutuo insunt ad modum cogniti in cognoscente et amati in amante. Quibus perspectis, ad Deum trinum ascendamus ut deinceps oeconomiam salutis aliqualiter intelliger.e nitamur. Primo, ergo, ipse Deus sibi inest ad modum cogniti in cognoscente et amatum in amante. Omne enim verbum mentis est, secundum esse intelligibile, id ipsum quod per verbum cognoscitur. lam vero Deus se per verbum dicit, et ideo illud verbum est Deus secundum esse intelligibile. Sed in Deo idem est esse quod intelligere; et ideo esse Dei naturale est idem quod esse Dei intelligibile. Quod ergo in Deo est per modum cogniti Dei in Deo cognoscente, non solum secundum esse intelligibile sed etiam secundum esse naturale Deus est. Verbum ergo Dei Deus est. Praeterea, eo ipso quod amicus amatur efficitur quaedam quasi identificatio amici cum amante; unde et amicus dicitur alter ipse, et a paeta nominatur dimidium animae suae. Amici enim bonum ordinis commune prosequentes et ordinate cooperantes et successione bonorum particularium fruentes, adeo non singuli seo~sum sibi vivunt ut potius unam pluribus communem vitam habeant. lam vero Deus se diligit; quae quidem divina Dei dilectio non solum quandam quasi identificationem importat sed etiam omnimodam identitatem; divinum enim velle est ipse Deus; et ideo Spiritus sanctus, qui in Deo procedit ut dilectio, Deus est. Praeterea, Deus Pater est in Filio, et Filius est in Patre, tam ut cogniti in cognoscentibus quam ut amad in amantibus. 'Et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare.'96 ' •.. quia dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi.'97' ... sicut et ego ... maneo in eius dilectione. '9 8 Quorum enim unum est esse et intelligere et scire et diligere, quod quidem ipsi sunt, ii perfectissime mutuo insunt.

Praeterea, omnia alia quae praeter Deum sunt a Deo et cognoscuntur et amantur. Quae etiam Deo insunt ut cognita in cognoscente et amata in amante, non quidem ad consubstantialitatem divinae naturae, sed secundum esse intentionale et secundum illam quandam quasi identificationem amoris. Attamen alios quidem

The Divine Missions

to or absent from another. Another sort of presence has to do with the adaptation of sensibility resulting from spatial proximity. A third sort of presence, proper to rational animals, supposes only a remembrance of the past or the imagining of some future possibility. ~inally, there is personal presence whereby persons, pursuing a common good of order~ are mutually.in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. From these considerations let us ascend to consider the triune God in order from there to strive for some understanding of the economy of salvation. FIrst, then, God is in himself as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. For every m~ntal word is, in the order of intelligible existence, the very thing that is known through that word. Now, God expresses himself through a wqrd, and therefore that word is God in the order of intelligible existence. But in God to be is the same as to understand, and therefore God's natural existence is the same as God's intelligible existence. Hence, what is in God, in the way God the known is in God the knower, is God, not only in the order of intelligible existence but also in the order of natural existence. Thus, the Word of God is God. Further, by the very fact that a friend is loved there results a quasi-identification of the friend with the lover. Thus, a friend is said to be a second self, or as the poet says, 'half of my soul.' For friends who pursue a common good of order, work together in an orderly way, and enjoy a succession of particular goods, are so far from living ,each one for himself or herself that they may rather be said to have one life in common. Now, God loves himself. This divine love of God implies not only a quasi-identification, but even a total identity. For divine willing is God himself, and therefore the Holy Spirit, who proceeds in God as Love, is God. Moreover, God the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father, both as the known in those who know them and the beloved in those who love them. ' ... and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows -the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him. '96 ' ..• because you loved-me before the foundation of the world.'97 ' ... just as I ... abide in his 10ve.'gS Those whose being and understanding and knowing and loving are one and the same and are indeed that which they themselves are, are in one another in the most perfect way. Besides; all other things apart from God are known and loved by God. These also are in God as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover, not, 9f course, in the consubstantiality of the divine nature, but according to intentional existence and the quasi-identification of those in love. Still, God knows and loves 96 Matthew 11.27; see John 97 John 17. 2 4. 98 John 15·ro.


lO.I5.


508

509


cognoscit et diligit Deus secundum quod convenit perfectioni eorum naturae; alios autem 'praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. '99 Et qui sic specialiter cognoscuntur et diliguntur specialiter etiam Deo inesse perspiciuntur tamquam cogniti in cognoscente et amati in amante. Specialiter ergo insunt Verbo divino quo Deus Pater et se et omnia alia dicit; 100 et specialiter insunt Dilectioni divinae procedenti qua Deus Pater et Deus Filius et se et omnia alia diligunt. 101

Dei-nde, ad Dominum et Mediatorem, Verbum divinum hominem factum, convertamur. Qui quidem non omnes cognoscit qui clamant, 'Domine, Domine",102 sed 'ego sum pastor bonus et cognosco meas et cognoscunt me meae,'103 Neque suos cognoscit quin eos diligatj imo 'sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos';I04 et 'maiorem hac q,ilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. 0I05 Neque aves pastorem cognoscunt quin eum diligant. Sicut enim ipse pastor scivit, 'Et ego, si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum. H06 Sicut et exclamavit apostolus, 'Ego enim per legem legi mortuus sum ut Deo vivam. Christo confixus sum cruci. Vivo autem iam non ego, vivit vera in me Christus .. Quod autem nunc vivo in carne, in fide vivo Filii Dei, qui dilexit me et traclidit semet ipsum pro me,' 107 Sicut et pro aliis orat apostolus, Cut det vobis secundum divitias gloriae suae virtute corroborari per Spiritum eius in interiorem hominem, Christum habitari per fidem in cordibus vestris, in caritate radicati et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis quae sit latitudo et longitudo, et sublimitas et profundumj scire etiam supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi, ut impleamini in omnel)1 plenituclinem Dei.' 108 Sicut et pro aliis conclusit apostoIus, 'Caritas enim Christi urget (continet) nos; aestimantes hoc, quoniam si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est Christus, ut et qui vivunt iam non sibi vivant, sed ei qui pro ipsis mortuus est

The Divine Missions

others in accordance with what suits the perfection of their nature; but there are still others whom 'he foreknew [and] predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers and sisters. '99 And those who are known and loved in this special way are also seen to be present in God in a special way as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. Therefore in a special way they are in the divine Word in which God the Father utters himself and all other things;IOO and in a special way they are in the divine proceeding Love in which God the Father and God the Son love both themselves and all other things as well. 101 Next, let us turn to the Lord and Mediator, the divine Word incarnate. He does not know 'all of those who cry, 'Lord, Lord,'!02 but, 'I am the good shepherd. 1 know my own and my own know me. >103 Nor does he know his own without loving them; indeed, 'As the Father has loved me, so 1 have loved you,;104 and, 'No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends.' 105 And the sheep do not know their shepherd without loving him. For, as the shepherd himself knew, ~And I, when 1 am lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself.'106 As also the apostle Paul exclaimed, 'For through the law 1 died to the law, so that 1 might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life 1 now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself up for me. ' 107 And as the apostle prays for others, 'that, according to' the· riches of his glory, he may grant that you may be strengthened in your inner being with power through his Spirit, and that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith, as you are being rooted and grounded in love. I pray that you may have the power to comprehend, with all the' saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be filled with all the fullness of God.'108 And as the.apostle concludes for others, 'For the love of Christ urges us on, because we are convinced that one has died for allj therefore all have died. And he died for all, so that those who live might live no longer for themselves, but for him who died and was raised for them. From 99 Romans 8.29· 100 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologUu, I, q. 34, a. 3. (See above, question 3, pp. 212- 17.] 101 Ibid. q. 37. a. 2. 102 Matthew 7.23. 103 John 10.14· 104 John 15·9. 105 John 15.13. 106 John 12.32. ['All things,' Vuig., omnia, Gk. panta, a variant reading.) 107 Galatians 2.19-20. 108 Ephesians 3.16-19.


•


5ID


SIr

et resurrexit. Itaque nos ex hoc neminem novimus securidum carnem. Et si cognovimus secundum camem Christum, sed riimc iam non novimus. Si qua ergo in Christo, nova creatura; vetera transierunt: ecce facta sunt omnia nova.",og Quos ergo cognoscit et diligit Christus homo, et qui Christo homini credunt eumque diligunt, neque sibi sed ei vivunt, mutua sane insunt atque inhabitant ut cogniti in cognoscentibus et amati in amantibus. T ertio, sicut mediatoris erat non suam doctrinam docere neque suam voluntatem quaerere sed eius qui misit eum, ita etiam Christus membra sui corporis non sibi unit quin ea Deo Patri uniat. Ipse enim Pater prior dilexit nosj110 et ipse erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi;U1 et 'qui videt me, videt et Patrem';112 et 'qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo';113 et 'dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti';I14et 'si diligitis me, ... alium paraclitum dabit vobis ... apud vas mane bit et in vobis erit.'"5 Quae omnia, simul sumpta, dicunt: 'sicut tu, Pater, in me et ego in te, ut et.ipsi in nobis unum sint.'"6 Quem sane unita~s finem non assequimur nisi, mandatum Christi servantes, invicem diligimus sicut et ipse Christus dilexit nos; imo qui proximum diligit, eo ipso Christum diligit; et qui proximum esurientem vel sitientem vel hospitem vel nudl,lm vel infirmum vel in carcere non diligit, Christum non diligit, skut et testatus est ipse iudex venturus. 1!7

Quibus perspectis, concluditur et ipsas divinas personas et beatos in cado et iustos his in terris mutuo inesse sicut cogniti in cognoscentibus et amati in amantibus. Quod quidem cognoscere et amare attenditur tum circa finem ultimum, quod est ipsum bonum per essentiam, tum circa finem proximum, quod est commune ordinis bonum et regnum Dei et corpus Christi et ecclesia. Consequens autem mutuum inesse differt pro uniuscuiusque natura atque statu: divinae eniro personae mutua insunt secundum consubstantialitatem; iusti autem Deo et invicem insunt secundum esse intentionale et secundum illam quandam quasi identifica~

The Divine Missions

now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view; even though we once knew Christ from a human point ofviJ::w, we know him no longer in that way. So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!,!Og Those, therefore, whom Christ the man knows and loves and who believe in Christ the man and love him, live not for themselves but for him, and Christ and they surely live and dwell in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. Third, as it was the function of the Mediator not to teach a doctrine of his own but that of the one who sent him, nor to seek his own will but that of the one who.sent him, so also Christ does not unite the members of his body with himself without uniting them with God the Father. For the Father first loved us, 110 and he was in Christ reconciling the world to himself III 'Whoever has seen me has seen the Father';'12 'those who love me will be loved by my Father';113 'you ." have loved them even as you have loved me.'114 'If you love me, ... he will give you another Advocate ... he abides with you, and he will be in you.'115 All of these are summed up in the words, ' ... as you, Father, are in me, and I am in you, may they also be one in us.'116 We surely do not arrive at this ultimate unity unless, by keeping Christ's commandments, we love one another as Christ has loved us. Indeed, one who loves one's neighbor, by that very fact loves Christ; and one who does not love one~s neighbor who is hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison does not love Christ, as the future Judge himself has testified. 117 From all of this we conclude that the divine persons themselves and the blessed in heaven and the just on this earth are in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. This knowing·and loving is directed both to the ultimate end, which is the good itself by essence, and to the proximate end, which is the general good of order, the kingdom of God, the body of Christ, the church. This consequent mutual 'being in,' however, differs according to each one's nature and status: the divine persons are in one another through consubstantiality; the just are in God and in one another by ·way of intentional existence and the quasi-identification of love. 109 2 Corinthians 5.14-17. IIO Ijohn 4.ID, Ig. 111 2 Corinthians 5.19. 112 John 14· 9. 113 John 14.21; see 16.27· II4 John 17.2$ see 17.26. II5 John 14.15-17. II6 John 17.21. 1I7 Matthew 25.31-46.


ColleCted Works of Bernard Lonergan

I SI2

.1


tionem amoris; in Verbo autem sumus ut cogniti et amati tum secundum natu~ ram eius divinam tum secundum naturam eius humanam; et Verbum nobis inest ut, hominem sensibilem cognoscentes et diligentes, in Deum, qui lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem, 118 cognoscendum atque diligendum pervenia.mus; et quia prior cognitio et dilectio nobis facilior est cum sensitivam nostram praeteriti memoriam-et imaginationem futuri includat, per earn in aitiorem manuducimur in qua nunc iam non secundum camem Christum novimus, sed intus in nobis intelligibiliter secundum emanationem veritatis dicitur verbum- nostrum Verbi divini, et secundum emanationem sanctitatis spiratur dilectio nostra divinae Dilectionis. Mittuntur enim divinae personae secundum ipsas earum processiones aetemas ut nobis obviam fiant atque inhabitent secundum similes processiones in nobis per gratiam productas. Qui autem a Patre procedunt et mittU'ntur, sine Patre non veniunt, cui per Filium in Spiritu sit omnis gloria.

'I

SI3

The Divine Missions

l'

I

!

We are in the Word, however, as known and loved through bo~ his divine and his human nature; and the Word is in us in order that in knowing and loving a visible human being we may arrive at knowing and loving God, who dwells in unapproachable light. 118 And because this prior knowledge and love is easier for us, since it includes our sense memory of the past and our imagination of the future, we are led through it to that higher knowledge and love in' which we nO longer know Christ from a human point of view, but our inner word of the divine Word is spoken in us intelligently according to the emanation of truth, and our love of divine Love is spirated according to the emanation of holiness. For the divine persons are sent in accordance with their eternal processions, to encounter us and dwell in us in accordance with similar processions produced in us through grace. Those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father, to whom be all glory through the Son in the Spirit.

ASSERTUM XVIII

ASSERTION 18

Divinarum personarwn inhabitatio, quatnvis in actibus :magis sit atque cognoscatur, per statuIn. tatnen gratiae constituitur. 119

Although the indwelling of the divine persons exists :more in acts and is better knoWn in acts, still it is constituted through the state of grace.l!9

Primo, est haec inhabitatio quod personae divinae et iusti mutuo insunt tamquam

First, this indwelling

cogniti in cognoscentibus et dilecti in diligentibus. De praesentia enim agitur non

is

the fact that the divine persons and the just are in one another as the known are in those who know them and the beloved are in those IIS I Timothy 6.16. II9 [Two points are worth mentioning here. First, Lonergan has a meaning for the phrase 'the state of grace' that is different from common usage. Except in one instance (see p. 5IS), he does not speak here of individual persons, as individuals, being in a state of grace. Rather, the 'state' or 'situation' of grace refers to many different subjects together. See below, under Sixth, where a distinction is made betvveen a habit of grace and the state of grace. Second, Lonergan is not saying that the state. of grace is somehow the cause of the divine indwelling; to translate 'per statum ... gratiae' as 'by the state of grace' might imply such a misunderstanding more than does the translation 'through the state of grace.' What is constituted through this state is a divine-human interpersonal situation; and here Lonergan is using 'constitution' in a less precise sense than earlier. He had said that 'constituted' is used by analogy to the constitution of a finite being: just as a finite being is composed of and constituted by intrinsic principles, so infinite being is constituted by the infinite and absolutely simple perfection. The state of grace, in Lonergan's sense, is neither a finite being nor infinite being, but a divine-human interpersonal situation, the divine indwelling. He does not say that it is constituted by infinite and absolutely simple divine perfection. Rather, if there is the Father's love because of the Son, if there is the Spirit as sent, if there are the consequent terms sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and the other virtues and gifts that flow from sanctifying grace, then there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation.]


Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

514


515

lapidis lapidibus sed personae personis.

Deinde, haec inhabitatio in actibus magis est et magis cognoscitur. Magis est, nam :ratio cognitionis et dilectionis magis verificatur in actu quam in potentia vel in habitu. Magis cognoscitur, nam unumguodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. T ertio, per intermissionem actuum non eo ipso tollitur vel interrumpitur in· habitatio. Hoc enim satis superque suadent voces sacrae scripturae, ut 'manere,' 'vivere,' 'inhabitare,' 'esse in Christo,' 'esse in Spiritu'; neque dubitant theologi.

Qy.arto, sicut potentia vel habitus per actum cognoscitur, ita per actum optimum maximum optime maxime' cognoscitur. Quamvis eoim parvuli et dormientes et morbo laboraotes et insanientes et moribundi vere et realiter sint homines, 'tamen eos neque unice neque praecipue adimus ut naturam humanam qualis sit deter· minemus. Pariter, quamvis in statu gratiae esse possint vel parvuli vel dormientes vel venialiter peccantes vel max mortaliter peccaturi, neque unice neque principaliter eos considerare debemus ut rationem inhabitationis perspiciamus. Quare, in unoquoque eo magis inhabitationis ratio perspici potest quo magis non sibi sed Christo vivit, in Christo manet, in spiritu est; neque tamen factum inhabitationis ideo est negandum quia ab oculis humanis non videtur, tum quia introspectiva analysis valde difficilis est, tum quia de supernaturalibus internis non datur scien· tia stricte dicta, tum quia iudicium est non penes subiectum neque alios homines sed penes Dominum. Qy.into, distinguenda sunt tria quae sub nomine gratiae veniunt, nempe, (I) favor alicuius erga aliquem, (2) donum ab ilio huic collatum, (3) huius gratitudo animi. 120 Et ideo circa gratiam divinam parher distinguuntur quod (I) Pater propter Filium suuro hominem iustos Spiritu sancto diligit atque donat, (2) hanc dilectionem atgue donationem consequitur gratia sanctificans, quae est habitus entitativus absolute supernaturalis in essentia animae receptus,121 et (3) ex hoc habitu quasi naturaliter profluunt virtutes et dona unde inferior pars animae subditur rationi et ratio subditur Deo, et ideo habetur illa interna rectitudo atque iustitia qua iusti prompte a Deo moventur in ordine ad vitam aeternam. 122

The Divine Missions

who love them. We are not speaking here about the presence of a stone to stones but of a person to persons. Second, this indwelling exists more in acts and is better known in acts. The reason it exists more in acts is that the formality of knowledge and oflove is verified more in act than in potency or habit. The indwelling is _b~tter known in acts, for each thing is known insofar as it is in act. Third, the discontinuity of acts does not automatically terminate or interrupt the indwelling. There is more than enough emphasis on this point from such words in scripture as 'abide,' 'live,' 'dwell in,' 'being in Christ,' 'being in the Spirit.' And there has never been any doubt about this on the part of theologians. Fourth, as a potency or a habit is known through act, so it is known in the very best way through the very best act. For although children and the sleeping and the sick and the insane and the moribund are really and truly human persons, still we do not go only or mainly to them in order to determine what human nature is. Similarly, although children or the sleeping or those who sin venially or those who are about to sin mortally can be in the state of grace, we must not consider only or mainly such persons in order to understand the nature of the indwelling. Hence, the nature of the indwelling can better be understood in each person the more he or she lives not for himself or herself but for Christ, abides in Christ, and is in the Spirit. Still, the fact of indwelling is not to be denied on the grounds that it is not seen by human eyes, because iritrospective analysis is very difficult, because there is no science in the strict sense about the interior supernatural life, and because it is not for its subject or for other persons to judge it, but for the Lord. Fifth, there is a distinction to be made among three things that are called 'grace.' They are (I) one person's favor toward another, (2) a gift given by the former to the latter, and (3) the gratitude felt by the latter. 12o Therefore, with regard to divine grace we similarly distinguish (I) that the Father loves and gives to the just by the Holy Spirit because of his incarnate Son, (2) that there follows upon this love and giving sanctifying grace, which is an absolutely supernatural entitative habit received in the essence of "the soul,12l and (3) that from this habit there flow, naturally as it were, virtues and gifts whereby the lower part of the soul is subordinated to reason and reason is subordinated to God, whereupon there results that inner rectitude and justice by which the just are readily moved by God towards eternal life, to which they are oriented. I22 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theowgiae, 1·2, q. fIO, a. J. [This distinction may work for the Latin gratia, but it does not hold for th.e English 'grace.'] 121 Ibid. a. 3. I22 Ibid. a. 2; q. llg, a. r.

120

The Robert MoHot Collection


516

Dc Divinis Missionibus

517

Quae tamen tria non ideo distinguuntur ut quasi separentur. Quamvis enim tria sunt dilectio donumque increatum, et habitus gratiae sanctificantis, et orientatio animae iustificatae, uno intelligibili ordine inter se alligantur. Quia enim contingens est dilectio atque donatio, requiritur terminus ad extra conveniens tamquam conditio consequens; et ideo ad primum sequitur alterum. Quia vero virtutes et dona ex gratia sanctificante profluunt sicut potentiae ex essentia animae, eo quod ponitur gratia sanctificans etiam ponuntur et orientatio animae iustificatae et promptitudo ad agendum sub motu divino; uncle non solum ad secundum sequitur tertium, sed etiam ex primo sequitur divina moria ad actus secundum virtutes donaque exserendos.

Sexto, distinguendum est ulterius inter habitum gratiae et statum seu situationem gratiae. Habitus gratiae est accidens quoddam physicum in anima iusti receptum. Status vero seu situatio gratiae simul multa et distincta subiecta respicit. Ita ad statum gratiae constituendum requiruntur (I) Pater qui diligit, (2) Filius propter que~ Pater diligit, (3) Spiritus sanctus quo Pater diligit atque donat, et (4) ipsi iusti qui a Patre propter Filium Spiritu sancto diliguntur atque dbnantur, qui consequenter gratia sanctificante ornantur unde fluunt virtutes et dona, unde sunt iusti et recti et prompti ad actus in ordine ad vitam aeternam recipiendos eliciendosque. 123 Septimo, per hunc statum ergo constituitur situatia quaedam interpersonalis divinoRhumana. Secundum hunc statum divinae personae atque iusti mutua insunt tamquam cogniti in cognoscentibus et dilecti in dili~entibus. 124 Qui sane status in actibus magis est magisque cognoscitur, quin tamen per solam actuum interR missionem tollatut. Qualis autem sit hie status seu situatio, eo darius ducet quo perfectiores considerantur habitus actusque.

The Divine Missions

• separated. Still, these three are not to be so sharply distinguished as to be For although love and uncreated gift, the habit of sanctifying grace, and the orientation of the justified soul are three realities, they are linked to one another in a single intelligible order. Since the love and giving are contingent, they require an approp~ate external term as a consequent condition, and so the second follows the first. But since the virtues and the gifts flow from sanctifying grace as potencies flow from the essence of the soul, from the very fact that there is sanctifying grace there is also both the orientation of the justified soul and its readiness to act under divine influence. Thus, not only does the third follow the second, but also divine influence follows from the first in order to elicit actions that flow from the virtues and gifts. Sixth, a further distinction is to be made between the habit of grace and the state or situation of grace. The habit of grace is a physical accident received in the soul of the just. But the state or situation of grace refers to many distinct subjects together. Thus to constitute the state of grace there are required (I) the Father who loves, (2) the Son because ,of whom the Father loves, (3) the Holy Spirit by whom the Father loves and gives, and (4) the just, whom, because of the SOon, the Father loves by the Holy Spirit, and to whom the Father gives by the Holy Spirit, and who consequently are. endowed with sanctifying grace, whence flow the virtues and gifts, and who are thereby just and upright and ready to receive and elicit acts ordered towards eternal life. 12 3 Seventh, through this state, therefore, there is constituted a divineRhuman interR personal situation. In accordance with this state the divine persons and the just are in one another as those who are known are in those who ,know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. 124 This state, of course, exists more in acts and is better known in acts, yet it does not cease to exist solely because of a ·temporary cessation of the acts. Moreover, what the nature of this state or situation is will emerge ever more dearly the more perfect the habits and acts are that are examined. 123 Romans 8.32. 124 [In the previous paragraph, Lonergan said that the state or situation of grace is

constituted by the interconnected realities (I) to (4). Then here he says that through this state there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation. This 'divineRhuman interpersonal situation' is simply the interconnected fact of (I) to (4). So too, the indwelling spoken of here is another way of stating what is more exhaustively specified by the interconnected (1) to (4), and affirming that the interconnected (r) to (4) obtain. The state or situation of grace, the divineRhuman interpersonal situation, the mutual indwelling, are nothing over and above the interconnected (I) to (4)']


Collected


5r8


519

The Divine Missions

Hoc enim statu non sumus nostri, quia sumus templum Spiritus sancti. 125 Hoc etiam statu ipse Spiritus sanctu~ pariter suus non est, cum nobis datus sit. 126 Hoc statu pariter Christiani non sibi vivunt sed ei qui pro ipsis mortuus est et resurrexit;[2 7 quare vita eorum abscondita est cum Christo in Deojl28'quis enim eos a caritate Christi separabit?'29 Neque caecus quidam animi impulsus est caritas si quidem in fide vivunt Filii Dei'30 et Christus per fidem habitat in cordibus eorum; 131quare ab iltis differunt qui aemulationem Dei habent sed non secundum scientiam. 132 Manentes ergo in caritate,- in Deo manent et Deus in eis; 133 quod quidem mutuum manere non ex sua caritate sed ex dono Spiritus cognoscunt;1 34 non enim ipsi priores Deum Patrern dilexerunt, sed ille prior eos dilexit et rnisit Filium suum propitiationem pro peccatis eorum. 135

In this state we are not our own, for we are temples of the Holy Spirit. [25 In this state the Holy Spirit also is not his own, since he has been given to US. 126 Similarly, in this state Christians live not for themselves but for him who died and was raised for them;[27 therefore their lives are hidden with Christ in God. 128 And who will separate them from the love of Christ? 129 Their charity is not some blind psychic impulse, since they live by faith in the Son of God, 130 and Christ dwells in their hearts through faith.lgl Because of this they are not like those who have zeal for God but without sound knowledge. 132 So, abiding in love, they abide in God and God in them, '33 and they know this mutual abiding not because of their own charity but by the gift of the Spirit. 134 For they did not first love God the Father, but he loved them first, and sent his Son as the atonement for their sins. [35

Secundum hunc statum, ergo, divinae personae in iustis et iusti in divinis personis sunt tamquam cogniti in cognoscentibus et dilecti in diligentibus. Qui quidem status ex parte personarum divinarum semper actu secunda est, sed ex parte iustorum ita semper actu primo est ut in actum secundum sub motione divina pro perfectione iusti prompte exeat. 136 Quare, qui iustus est, iustificetur adhuc,137 quo abundantius vitam habeat in'Spiritu per Filium in gloriam Dei Patris. Gloria enim. Patris est quod, sicut ipse aeternalitei secundum veritatem dicit Verbum et per Verbum secundum sanctitatem spirat amorem, ita etiam in plen~tudine temporis secundum veritatem misit Verbum suum carnem factum ut Verbo credentes vera

In this state, therefore, the divine persons are in .the just and the just are in the divine persons as the known are in those who know them and the beloved are in those who love them. On the part of the divine persons this state is always in second act, but on the part of the just it is always in first act so that under divine influence it may readily issue into second act, according to the degree of perfection of the just person. Ig6 Hence, 'let one who is just be justified still,'137 according to the abundance of the life which that person lives in the Spirit through the Son to the glory of God the Father. For the glory of the Father is this, that just as he eternally speaks the Word in truth and through the Word breathes forth Love in holiness, so also in the fullness of time he sent his incarnate Son in truth so 1 Corinthians 6.19. Romans 5.5. 2 Corinthians 5.15. Colossians 3.3. Romans 8.35. ISO Galatians 2.20. 131 Ephesians 3.17. 132 Romans 10.2.

125 126 127 128 129

133 I John 4.15. 134 1John 4.1$ see Romans 8.15. [They know this mutual abiding not by any elicited

love independent of the gift ofthe Spirit; none can claim charity as 'their own,' fOT it is an absolutely supernatural virtue beyond the natural proportion of any human being; it is the gift of the Spirit.] 135 I John 4·10. 136 [On first and and second act, in the sense of form and operation, see Lonergan, Insight 459, note I. See also below, appendix I, §2, p. 537.J 137 DB 803, DS 1535, NO 1937. [!be reference is to Revelation 22.11, translated in NRSV as 'Let ... the righteous still do right.']


Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

520


52l

verba intus dicamus atque intelligamus, et per Verbum secundum sanctitatem misit Spiritum Verbi ut SpiritiIi dilectione coniuncti et corporis Christi membra viva facti clamemus: Abba, Pater.

The Divine Missions

that by believing the Word we might speak and understand true inner words; and through the Word he sent the Spirit of the Word in holiness so that joined to the Spirit in love and made living members of the body of Christ we might cry out, 'Abba, Father!'

•



APPENDIX I

APPENDIX 1

De Operatione Immanente 1

Immanent Operation L

Neque unus neque constans .TIominum verborumque usus in scriptis S. Thomae reperitur. Suo enim tempo~e alius erat loquendi modus ex Avicenna, uti videtuf, deductus; alius ex navis studiis Aristotelicis recenter invectus; neque deerant COffiplicationes ulteriores, cum diversae voces graecae per eandem latin am, eademque

You will find that in his writings St Thomas was not consistent in his use of words. At one time he used terminology derived, apparentlYt from Avicenna, but later he used a terminology that came into use through the recent study of the works of Aristotle. And this was further complicated when different Greek words were I

I

[Quae oHm de verba mentis ex operibus S. Thomae collegimus et apud Theological

Studies (Woodstock MD, USA, VII (1946) 349"""92; VIII (1947) 35-79, 404-44; x (1949) 3-40, 35!hJ3; cf. L.-B. Geiger, a.p., Bu&tin thomisre VIII (1952) 477-79, paragr. 740) publici iuris fecirnus, hac fere ,lege nunc auditorum usui acconunodamus ut qui pleniorem rei expositionem desiderent articulis supra citatis adeant, qui vera conclusiones materiam theologicam propius respicientes breviter indicatas velint hisce foliis contenti esse possint. Finem vero nostrum, si exquisieris, quodammodo esse multiplicem fatemur. Principaliter sane habitum scientiae promovere intendimus. At cum in aliis quisque scientiam consecutus videatur qui iam per se operari possit, in re Trinitaria ilIum aestimarim scientia ornatum qui scripta Aquinatis et exacte legere et cum gaudio intelligere quaeat. Qua de causa, cum scholae ipsa sua natura ad intelligentiam communicandam magis quam ad rerum historicarum notitiam augendam ordinentur, cumque inter lectiones qui muitum scribat ad nomina et verba potius quam ad sensum intellectumque attendere soleat, visum est his foliis auditorum mentes liberare quo facilius quantulum eis afferemus fructum et percipiant et conservent.]


[In the earlier supplement most of what appears in this appendix is contained in article I, 'De Quibusdam Notionibus Communibus' ('Some Common Notions'). The three articles of the supplement are' preceded by two paragraphs tha~ do not appear in De Deo Trino, and which are translated here as follows. 'Some time ago we collected various passages on the inner word in the works ofSt Thomas, which we published in a series of articles in 1healogical Studies. [Reference is made to the verbum articles, now available as volume- 2 in Collected Works of Bernard"Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.] We are adapting this material here for the use of students, so that while those who want a fuller explanation of this matter can go and read those articles, students who prefer to have a brief exposition of those conclusions that are more relevant to theology may find this little treatise sufficient for their needs .. 'If you ask what our objective is in this, we must confess that we have, i~ a way, several objectives. The primary one, of course, is to foster the habit of scientific knowledge. In other disciplines, anyone who is able to operate on his own is regarded as having acquired scientific knowledge, but when it comes to the Trinity, I should consider as having such knowledge one who is able to read with accuracy what Aquinas wrote and delight in understanding it. Accordingly, since lectures by their very nature are designed to communicate understanding rather than increase one's knowledge of historical matters, and since those who take copious notes during lectures generally pay more attention to the words themselves than to understanding what they mean, we felt that this brief treatment might free the minds of the students to gather and store up more easily the modest fruit we are providing to them.']


532

Appendix I: Dc Operatione Immanente

533

Appendix

I:

ImmaQ-ent Operation

graeca vox per diversas latinas, redderentiIr. 2

translated by the same Latin word, and the same Greek word by different Latin words. 2

Quod si praetermittitur, ipsa littera Aquinatis caligine quadam obtecta atque obvoluta maneat necesse est, cum eadem diversis vocibus dici, diversa autem iis~ dem, non perspiciatur. At ex hac obscuritate vespertina in atram noctem proceditur si omiss~ investigatione linguistica per speculationem metaphysicam exquiruntur notionum clarificatio et sententiarum specie tenus oppositarum reconciliatio.

If this fact is ignored or overlooked, the writings of Aquinas inevitably remain veiled and shrouded in obscurity, since one does not notice that the same things are being referred to by different 'expressions and, on the other hand, diverse things are 'being referred to by the same expression. Moreover, this twilight obscurity gives way to the darkness of night if, while neglecting linguistic investigation, one earnestly seeks by means of metaphysical speculation the clarifi,cation of notions and the reconciliation of opinions which at least appear to be in opposition. For this reason we reduce now to the briefest space certain issues which we explained at greater length in earlier treatments, namely, what in the writings of Aquinas is meant by 'action' as well as 'operation,' by 'act' and 'potency,' by 'act of what is complete' and 'act of what is incomplete,' by 'nature' and by 'active potency' and 'passive potency,' by 'to receive' and 'to act,' and finally what one

Quam ob causam, ad brevissima quaedam capita nunc reducimus quae olim longiori dissertatione exposuimus, videlicet, quid apud Aquinatem significent tam actio quam operatio, actus et potentia, actus perfecti et imperfecti, natura et po~ tentia tum activa tum passiva, pati et agere, quid denique sentiendum sit de actu

2

2

[Quod si praetermittitur, duplex sequitur inconveniens. Primo, enim, ipsa littera Aquinatis caligine quadam obteeta atque obvoluta maneat necesse est: qui enim nescit quo sensu voces sint adhibitae, veram auctoris sententiam apprehendere nequit. Secundo, in mentem discipuli vel acutissirni transit nebu~a quae dam con~ ceptuum atque terminorum unde opiniones oriuntur confusae et disputationes sine fruetu vel fine. Quid enim in aliis fieri soleat, inde coniecturare licet quod Caietanus, vir max~ imi ingenii et inter commentatores optimus, haec scribere potuit: 'Intelligere ergo non est formaliter patij quamvis, proprie loquendo, non sit etiam formaliter agere, sed potius active passiveque vitaHter operari. Et idem iudicium est de sensatione.' In, Sum .. theol., l, q, 79, a, 2, par. xx; ed, Leon., v, 263' Quid sit active non agere? Quid passive non pati? Quid denique passive et non agendo operari vitaliter? Sane haec omnia clare atque cohaerenter explicari posse non infitior. mud solum dico: veram vereque utilem esse explicationem quae viam aperiat ad textum S. Thomae intelli· gendum; ideoque non speculatio~e metaphysica sed linguistica investigatione opus esse. Qua de causa, primo hoc articulo quid actio operatioque significent (2), quaenam sint actus ad potentiam proportiones diversae (3), quid actus perfecti et actus imperfec,ti dicant (4), quonam differant natura (s), et potentia sive activa sive passiva (6), quid sit pati (7), quid agere (8), quid denique de actu vitali senserit Aquinas (9), paucis adhibitis documentis declaramus ne parvus error in principia in fine fiat magnus.]


[The first article in the supplement begins with a section entitled 'Articuli necessitas' ('Why This Article Is Needed'). Its first paragraph corresponds to the first paragraph in the appendix in De Deo T mo, but the next three are unique to the supplement. They are translated here as follows, 'If this fact is ignored or overlooked, the writings of Aquinas inevitably remain veiled and shrouded in obscurity, since one who does not know the sense in which words are used will not be able to know their author's true meaning . Next, this nebulous apprehension ofhi8 concepts and terminology will enter into the minds of even the most intelligent students, resulting in a welter of opinions and controversies that are both fruitless and endless. 'A good illustration of this may'be found in the example ofCajetan, a most intelligent man and the very best of commentators, who wrote the following: "The act of understanding, therefore, is not formally a passion, a reception, a being~changed (pau); although, properly speaking, it is not an action (agere) either, but rather an active and passive vital operation. And the same is true of sensation" (In Sum. tired, T, q. 79, a. 2, par. xx; ed. Leon., v, 263.) What is this active non~action? What is passive non-reception? Again, what is meant by a passive non·acting vital operation? Certainly, I am not denying that all this can be clearly and coherently explained. All I am saying is that there is a true and truly useful explanation that opens the way to understanding St Thomas's text, and therefore that what is needed is not metaphysical speculation but linguistic investigation. 'For this reason, then, lest a minor error at the beginning end in a major one, in this first article we intend, by appealing to a few texts, to clarify the following points: the meaning of "action" and "operation" , .. , the various proportions of act to potency ... , the meaning, of "act of what is complete" and "act of what is incomplete" , .. , the difference between nature .. , and potency, both active and passive., " the meaning of "to be affected" or "to receive" ... , and "to act" .. " and finally, Aquinas's opinion about vital act.' The following two paragraphs in the appendix replace these paragraphs from the supplement.]


534

Appendix I: De Operatione Immanente

535

vitali, et quemadmodum haec omnia ad immanentem intelligendi operationem applicentur.

De vocibus 'actio,' 'operatio'

I

Multa et cliversa exempla invenies apud Theological Studies 8 (1947) 416 s., 434 s.

I:

Immanent Operation

ought to think concerning vital act and how all this can be applied to the immanent operation of understanding. . I

Tam voxgraeca energeia('actus')·quam voxpoieru ('factio')pervoces latinas 'actio,' 'operatio,' reddebantur. Qua de causa in legendis S. Thomae operibus semper ex contextu detenninari oportet utrum vox 'actio,' vel vox 'operatio,' actum significet an exercitium causalitatis efficientis.

Appendix

The Words 'Action' and 'Operation'

The Greek words energeia, 'act,' and poresis, 'making,' were both rendered into Latin by the words actio and operatio. Hence in reading St Thomas one must always determine from the context whether the word actio or the word operatio refers to act or to an exercise of efficient causality. You will find a number of examples of this flexibi'lity in usage in 17zeologl:cal Studies 8:3 (1947) 416-17, 434-37 [Verbum IIg-21, 136-43].

v.g., operatio est actus: 'Omnis enim animae operatio vel est actus potentiae activae vel passivae.' In II de Anima, lect. 6, §305. Operatio est causalitatem exeicere: 'ope.ratio enim alicuius effectus attribuitur non mobili sed moventi.' Sum. Meol., I-n, q. III, a. 2 c.

For example, 'operation' in this text means act: 'Every operation of the soul is the act of either an active or a passive potency' (In 1/ De anima, lect. 6, §3 0 5). But, here 'operation' means to exercise efficient causality: 'The operation of some effect is attributed not to the movable thing but to the mover' (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. III, a. 2 c.).

Actio est actus: 'Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae .... Ad actum autem potentiae activae ... ' Sum.

'Action' in this case means act: 'Every action belongs either to an active potency or to a passive potency. But an object is to the act of a passive potency .. ' But (an object is) to the act of an active potency .. .' (Summa theologiae, I, q. 77, a. 3 c.). But 'action' means'here to exercise efficient causality: 'In action there is implied a reference "as that from which there is movement in the movable thing ... '" (Summa theolog£ae, I, q. 28, a 3, ad Im.)3

theol.,

1,

q. 77, a. 3 c.

Actio est causalitatem efficientem exercere: 'in actione importatur respectus ut a quo est motus in mobili.' Sum. theol., I, q. 28, a. 3, ad rm. 3 2

De duplici proportione inter actwn et potentiam. 4

2

The Two Proportions between Act and Potency 4

Duplex maxime attenditur proportio secundum quam cognosci possunt actus et potentia.

There lare two proportions according to which act a~d potency can especially be known.

'Potest enim sic accipi proportio, ut dicamus, quod sicut hoc est'in hoc, ita hoc in hoc. Utputa visus sicut est in oculo, ita auditus in aure.' In IX Metapfv!s., lect. 5, § 1828.

is

'One kind of proportion is that whereby we say that just as this is in this, so that

in that; as, for example, just as seeing is in the eye, so hearing is in the ear' (In

IX Metapl!J>s., leet. 5, § 1828). 'Alius modus proportionis est, ut dicamus quod sicut se habet hoc ad hoc, ita hoc ad hoc; puta sicut se habet visus ad videndum, it~ auditus ad audiendum.' Ibid. § 1829.

'Another kind of proportion is that whereby we say that just as this is for this, so that is for that; as, for example, just as eyesight is for seeing, so the faculty of hearing is for hearing' (In IX Metaphys., leet. 5, §1829).

3 [Lonergan cites this text not in the pages of Verbum mentioned above, but in Grace and Freedom 268.] 4 [See Lonergan, Verbum 56-57 and 125-26.]



536

Appendix I: De Operatione Immanente

537

Qua de causa duplex distinguitur actus et duplex pariter potentia. Actus primus est forma, e.g., visus qui recipitur in ocule, vel auditus qui recipitur in aure. Actus secundus est operatio, actio, energeia, puta actum videndi qui visum perficit vel actum audiendi qui auditum perficit. Potentia vero prima est sicut oculus qui perfici debet tum per formam (visum) tum ulterius per actum secundum (videre). Potentia vero secunda coincidit cum forma seu actu primo. Cf. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. Quae duae proportiones fundamentales non solum pro accidentalibus sed etiam pro substantialibus valent. e ••• sicut oculus est aliquid compositum ex pupilla sicut materia et visu sicut fonna, ita animal est compositum ex anima sicut fonna et ex corpore sicut materia.' In II de Anima, lect. 2, §241. 260 ..]



692

Appendix III:- De Relationibus

693

Ad mawrem primam: praedicatum principii analytici potest esse vel absolutum vel relativum at in omni casu tale est ut tolli non possit quin tollatur subiectum, cum analyticum sit principium in quo praedicatum est de ratione subiecti; quare si sunt principia analytica cum praedicato relativo, sunt subiecta relationum internarum. Ad alteram mawrem: si sunt subiecta realia relationum internarum, sunt relationes internae reales; nam non tollitur relatio interna quin tollatur subiectum eius; et ideo si datur subiectum realiter, datur relatio realiter. Ad minorem: principia causalitatis efficientis et finalis (I) sunt analytica, (2) referunt causatum ad causam, et (3) vere applicantur entibus contingentibus.

Appendix 3: Relations

As to thefirst major premise: the predicate of an analytic principle can b~ either absolute or relative, but in either case it is such that it cannot be negated Without negating the subject, since an analytic principle is that in which the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject; therefore, if there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, there are subjects of internal relations. As to the second mqjor premise: if there are real subjects of internal relations, there are real ~nternal relations; for an internal relation cannot be negated without negating its subject, and therefore if there is really a subject, there is really a relation as well. As to the minor premise: the principles of efficient causality and of final causality (I) are analytic, (2) relate the caused to the cause, and (3) are truly applied to contingent beings.

6 Si sunt quantitates reales, sunt relationes reales internae. Atqui sunt quantitates reales. Ergo sunt relationes reales internae. Ad maiorem: qui dicit 'quantum' ponit quaestionem cui non respondetur nisi -per relationem proportionisj quare omnia quanta ex ipsa sua ratione stant in aliqua proportione cum omnibus aliis quantis; et cum haec proportio sit de ipsa ratione quantitatis, reales esse non possunt quantitates quin pariter reales sint hae proportiones. ' Minor patet. 3

6 If there are real quantities, there are real internal relations; but there are real quantities. Therefore there are real internal relations. As to the mqjorpremise: to say 'how much' is to ask a question to which no answer can be given except in tenns of a relation of proportion. Therefore, all quantified things by their very nature stand in some proportion to all other quantified things; and since this proportion pertains to the very fonnality of quantity, quantities cannot be real without there likewise being real proportions. ~ The minor is evident.3

7 Si sunt leges naturales quae (I) ex ipsa rerum natura secundum necessitatem quandam physicam profluunt et (2) entia realia et realiter distincta inter se religant, sunt relationes internae reales. Atqui sunt tales leges. Ergo sunt relationes internae reales.

7 If there are natural laws that (I) from the very nature of things result according

Maior evidens videtur cum primum membrum relationis interioritatem manifestet et alterurn eiusdem realitatem. Minor constat ex chimia et physica, saltern si hae scientiae ad _mentem philosophiae perenhis intelliguntur.

to some physical necessity and (2) link things that are real and really distinct from each other, then there are real internal relations. But there are such laws. Therefore, there are real internal relations. The major premise seems evident, since the first point above indicates the internality of the relation and the second point its reality. The minor premise is clear from physics and chemistry, a.t least if these sciences are understood according to the mind of philosophia perennis.

8 Si in viventibus inveniuntur partes organicae, etiam inveniuntur relationes iI}ternae reales. Atqui verum est ante cedens. Ergo verurn etiam est consequens.

8 If organic parts are found in living things, real internal relations are also found in them. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the conclusion is also true. 3 [In Insight (at p. SIS) the notion of quantity is shifted out of descriptive knowledge, which is what it is in Aristotle's list of categories, and defined as 'anything that can serve as a tenn in a numerical ratio,' and, inversely, a proportion in this context is defined as 'a numertcally definable ratio between quantities.']



694

Appendix III: De Relationibus

695

'Maior ex eo constat quod omnis pars organica ideo est talis quia determinata opera atque munera perficit relate tum ad caeteras partes tum ad totum vivens. Unde Aristoteles recte aiebat pedem ab animali seiunctum non esse pedem nisi aequivoce; et idem valet de caeteris partibus. lam vero subiectum quod cessat esse univoce tale quia ab aliis seiungitur, relationibus intemis cum aliis coniungitur; et . ideo si vere sunt partes organicae, vere etiam et realiter sunt relationes internae 'reales. Minor est evidens.


The mqjor premise is clear from the fact that every organic part is the way it is because it performs detennined works and functions with regard both to the other parts and to the organic whole. Hence, Aristotle rightly held that the severed foot of an animal is no longer a foot except in an equivocal sense; and the same holds for all the other parts. Now a subject that ceases to be univocally what it is as a result of being separated from other things is conjoined with those others by internal relations; and therefore, if there truly are organic parts, there really and truly are real -internal relations as well. The minor premise is evident.

9 Abundant denique relationes internae reales in psychologia rationali, uti patet ex definitionibus potentiarum et habituum, ex specificatione actuum ab obiectis, ex compositione sensuum cum organis, ex dependentia nostri intellectus a sensibus, ex dependentia partis appetitivae ab apprehensiva, ex ordinatione quaestionum ad actus intelligendi, actuum intelligencli ad verba dicenda, verborum dictorum ad actus voluntatis, et vice versa ex dependentia actuum intelligendi a quaestionibus, verborum ab actibus intelligendi, volitionum a verbis interius dictis. Quae relationes omnes ideo sunt internae quia vel a~ ipsas definitiones pertinent vel ex definitionibus profluunt vel a'natura humana in praesenti statu detenninantur.

9 Fmally, there is an abundance of real internal relations in rational psychology, as is clear from the definitions, of faculties and habits, fro~ the specification of acts by their objects, from the close connection between the senses and their organs, from the dependence of our intellects upon the senses, from the dependence of appetition upon apprehension, from the ordering of questions to acts o( understanding, of acts of understanding to inner words to be uttered, of inner words uttered to acts of will, and vice versa from the dependence of acts of understanding upon questions, of inner words upon acts of understanding, and of acts of the will upon inner words. All these relations are internal because they either belong to the very definitions, or flow from the definitions, or are determined by human nature in its present state.

Obiectiones

Objections

I Videntur relationes internae esse entia rationis tantum, nam inveniuntur non in ipsis rebus sed tantummodo in theoriis forte falsis quae a philosophis et scientiaru.m cultoribus proponantur. Respondetur. Si reale ducitur id quod cognoscitur ante omnem operationem intellectus, relationes internae sunt entia rationis tantum, conceditur. Si reale est ens, id quod est, id quod intelligendo et diiudicando innotescit, subdistinguitur: relationes internae sunt entia rationis tantum, si intelliguntur et concipiuntur quin esse vere affirmentur, conceditur, si non solum intelliguntur atgue concipiuntur sed etiam esse vere affirmantur, negatur.

Internal relations seem to be merely conceptual beings, for they are found not in things themselves but only in the possibly false theories proposed by philosophers and scientists. To this we rePlY that if by 'real' you mean that which is known prior to all intellectual operation, we grant that in that case internal relations are merely conceptual beings. But if the real is being, that which is, that which is known by understanding and judging, then internal relations that are understood and conceived without being affirmed would be merely conceptual beings, but not those that are not only understood and conceived but also truly affirmed to exist. Internal relations are not only understood and conceived but are also truly affirmed. For above all it is heretical to deny that the intellectual soul is per ~e and essentially the form of the human body. But the soul is not the form of a body without a relationship to that body; it is not essentially the form of a body u"nless related to that body by an internal relation; and this internal relation is

lam vera non solum intelliguntur atque concipiuntur relationes internae sed etiam vere affirmantur. Nam in primis haereticum est negare anirnam intellectivam esse per se et essentialiter formam corporisj sed anima non est forma corporis qum referatur ad corpus; neque est essentialiter forma corporis nisi ad corpus referatur per relationem internam;

The Robert Moilot Collection

I


696


697

ncque haec relatio interna est merum ens rationis, cum temer, cliceretur concilia Viennense et Lateranense V (DB 480, 738) non de rebus sed tantummodo de: conceptibus decrevisse.

2 Instatur. Nullum ens reale est indeterminatum. Atqui omnis relatio interna est indeterminata. Ergo nulla relatio interna est realis. Maior est evidens et minor exemplis constat. Nam re1atio interna proportionis inter quaelibet quanta non est specifica et arithmetica, sicut duplum ad dimidium, sed est generica et algebraica, sicut a ad x.


not a mere conceptual being, for it would be rash to say that the decrees of the Council of Vienne [I3Il-I2] and the Fifth Lateran Council (DB 480, 738; DS gOo--gOI, 1440-41, ND 410) were dealing only.with concepts and not with realities. No real being is indeterminate. But every internal relation is indeterminate, and therefore no internal relation is real. The major premise is evident, and the minor premise is clear from examples. For the internal relation of proportion between any quantified beings is not specific and arithmetical, such as the double to the half, but is generic and algebraic, such

.2

asatox. Responcktur. Illud intercedit inter absolutum et relativum quod realitas absoluta totam suam rationem in se contineat, sed realitas relativa suam rationem non complet nisi per comparationem ad aliud. Et id~o maior est distinguenda: nullum ens reale et absolutum est indetermiJiatwn, concediturj nullum ens reale et relativum est indeterminatum, suhdistinguitur, inquantum determinationem a subiecto accipit, conceditur, inquantum determinationem a termino accipit, negatur.

Unde et contradistinguitur minor: omnis relatio intema est indeterminata, distinguitur, indeterminata ex parte subiecti, negatw-, indeterminata ex parte termini, suhdi.sti.nguitur, in multis, conceditur, in omnibus, negatur. v.g., relatio rei finitae ad primam causam et ultimurn finem est interna sed omnino determinata. Et ideo ad conciusionem, conceditur relationes internas non habere eam determinationem quae absolutis competit, et negatur hanc indeterminationem ex parte termini tollere . illam realitatem quae competit re1ationibus. R?atio eniro, ut communiter dicitur, est ens quoddam minimum atque debilissimum. 3 Instatur iterum: Nullum ens reale est universale. Sed ornnis relatio interna est universalis. Ergo nulla relatio interna est realis. Maior constat inter aristotelicos et minor probatur ex eo quod relatio interoa concluditur ex ratione universali qua definitur subiectum. Respondetur. Maior conceditur et minor distinguitur. Relatio interna est universalis quoad id quod intenditur, negatur; quoad modum quo intenditur, conceditur. Sicut enirn universaliter absoluta cognoscimus quin absoluta universalia in rebus ponamus, ita panter universaliter relativa cognoscimus quin relativa universalia in rebus' ponamus.


To this we reply as follows. The difference between an absolute and a relative consists in this, that an absolute reality possesses its entire meaning within itself, whereas a relative reality has its complete meaning only by comparison to something else. We would therefore make the following distinction regarding the major: we grant that no real absolute being is indeterminate; but that no real relative being is indeterminate is true insofar as it receives its determination from the subject, but not insofar as it receives its determination from the term. We contradistinguish the minor premise accordingly. That every internal relation is indeterminate on the part of its subject, we deny; that it is indeterrriinate on the part of its term we concede to be true in many cases, but not in alL For example, the relation of a finite being to its first,cause and ultimate end is internal and wholly determinate. As to the conclusion, then, we grant that internal relations do not, have the determination that is proper to absolutes, while denying that this indetermination on the part of the term negates the reality that is proper to relations. For a relation, as is commonly observed, is the smallest and weakest of beings. 3 No real being is universal. But every internal relation is universal; therefore no internal relation is reaL The major premise is common doctrine among Aristotelians, and the minor is proved from the fact that an internal relation is concluded to from the universal idea by which a subject is defined. We replY by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. We deny that an internal relation is universal as to what it intends, while conceding that it is universal as to the manner in which it is intended. For just as we know absolute beings universally without positing absolute universals in things, so in the same way we know relatives universally without positing relative universals in things.


698

Appendix ITI: De Relationib'us

699


QUAESTIO XXXIV

QUESTION 34

Utnun. relatio externa aliatn realitatem. subiecto intrinsecatn addat super -realitateIn relationis internae

Does an external relation add another reality intrinsic to the subject besides the reality of the internal relation?

Qy-aestionis intentio

Meaning of the Q,uestion

Generatim fit ut relatio externa magis sit determinata quam relatio interna. Relatio enim interna ex ipsa subiecti ratione et intelligibilitate habetur, sed relatio externa non ex solo subiecto sed ex subiecto et termino inter se comp'aratis oritur. Ita de ratione accidentis est ut alicui substantiae insit, et de ratione quanti est ut secundum aliquam proportionem ad omne aliud quantum referatur; sed de ratione accidentis non est ut huic substantiae insit, et de ratione quanti non est ut tali proportione specifica et arithmetica ad hoc quantum referatur.

Generally speaking, an external relation is more determinate th~n an internal relation. For an internal relation results from the very notion and intelligibility of the subject. But an external relation arises not from the subject alone but from the comparison between subject and term. Thus, it is of the very nature of an accident that it inhere in some substance, and it is of the very nature of a quantified object that it relate to every other quantified object in some proportion. But it is not of the nature of an accident that it inhere in this substance, nor is it of the nature of a quantified object that it relate to this quantified object in such or such a specific arithmetical proportion. Accordingly, since the truth-correspondence between the intellect and the thing must be adamantly maintained, wherever some greater determination in truths is noticed, an equal determination must be acknowledged in things. Hence, since' an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation, then, by reason of the truth of the external relation another reality must surely be acknowledged in addition to that which is acknowledged by reason of the truth of the internal relation. Nevertheless, there immediately arises a doubt whether that other reality that is proper to an external relation is intrinsic to the subject of an internal relation, or perhaps extrinsic to .the subject and to be found rather in the term. Hence the present question of whether an external relation adds another reality intrinsic to the subject over and above the reality of the internal relation.

Quibus perspectis, cum omnino salvanda sit adaequatio veritatis inter intellectum et rem, ubicumque maior quaedarn determina,.tio in veris detegitur, etiam in entibus aequalis determinatio est agnoscenda, Et ideo cum magis determinata sit extema quam interna relario, alia sane est agnoscenda realitas per veritatem relationis externae praeter earn quae iam agnoscitur per veritatem relationis internae.

Attarnen illud statim exsurgit dubium utrum alia illa realitas relationi externae propria sit intrinseca subiecto relationis internae an forte subiecto extrinseca et in termino inven~enda. Et sic ponitur praesens quaestio utrum relatio externa aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam add at super realitatem relationis internae.

Elucidationes praeuiae

Prdiminary clarfliCatiOTlS

lam vera cum quaestiones eiusmodi inde a medio aevo disputentur neque solvi videantur, omnino praemittendae sunt eae elucidationes quae ambiguitatem atque confusionem ab hac quaestione nostra amoveant.

Since questions of this kind have been discussed since the Middle Ages and apparently never settled, it is quite necessary to present first some clarifications in order to obviate any ambiguity or confusion in our treatment of this matter.

I In primis, ergo, illa non ponitur quaestio quae communiter agitari solet utrum relativum realiter addat super absolutum. Nam realitas relationis internae sane relativa est. Et ideo illud nunc uniee quaeritur utrum relatio externa et realis super relationem internam realem ulteriorem quandam realitatem addat.

I First of all, then, the question is not the one that is usually discussed, namely, whether a relative really adds something to an absolute. For the reality of an internal relation is certainly something relative. Therefore, the only question now is whether a· real external relation adds some further reality onto a real internal

relation.



700


70r


2 Neque de qualibet ulteriori realitate quaeritur sed unice de ea quae subiecto est intrinseca. Patet enirn maiorem determinationem ideo in relatione externa inveniri quod praeter subiectum reale etiam realis terminus consideretur. Neque de eo quod patet ponitur quaestio sed de eo quod dubitatur) nempe, utrum alia realitas subiecto intrinseca praeter realitatem termini agnoscenda sit.

2 The question is not about just any additional reality but solely about that which is intrinsic to the subject. For it is clear that a greater determination is present in an external relation because in addition to a real subject, a real term is also taken into consideration. The present question is not about what is clear but about what is in doubt, namely, whether in addition to the reality of the term another reality intrinsic to the subject is to be acknowledged.

3 Proinde, clare et distincte intelligi oportet in quo conveniant et in quo differant praedicata absoluta et relativa. Conveniunt enim in hoc quod utrumque praedicatum) absolutum nempe et relativum, vere subiecto attribuitur. Ita vere Petrus est homo, et vere Petrus est Pauli amicus.

3 Further, it must be clearly and distinctly understood in what respects absolute predicates and relative predicates agree and in what respects they differ. They agree in this, that both predicates, absolute and relative, are truly attributed to the subject. Thus, Peter is truly a man, and Peter is truly. a friend of PauL They differ, however, in this, that an absolute predicate expresses the reality of the subject and that alone, whereas an external relative predicate expresses the reality of the subject and at the same time points to another reality. Thus, 'to be a man' expresses only' Peter's reality, but 'to be a friend of Paul' considers not only the reality of Peter but also the reality of Paul.

Differunt autem in hoc quod praedicatum absolutum ipsam subiecti realitatem eamque solam dicit, sed praedicatum relativum et externum ita subiecti realitatem dicit ut aliam . realitatem simul intendat. Ita 'esse hominem' solam Petri realitatem dicit, sed 'esse amicum Pauli' non solam Petri realitatem sed etiam realitatem Pauli considerat.

4- Sequitur aliam in absolutis et aliam in relativis externis esse adaequationem veritatis. In absolutis enim veritas subiectum per se solum respicit) et ideo in absolutis non habetur adaequatio veritatis nisi in realitate subiecto intrinseca. Y.g., nulla res vere est homo per aliam realitatem quam suam. In relativis autein externis veritas non subiectum solum sed etiam terminum respicit, et ideo in relativis externis non habetur adaeguatio veritatis nisi in duplici realitate quarum alia est subiecto intrinseca et alia est subiecto extrinseca. v.g., sicut nulla res per se sola vere est duplum, ita etiam hoc verum, A esse duplum B, adaequationem veritatis habere non potest in sola realitatc A.

5 At ulterius minirne sunt confundendae comparatio et compositio. Utraque sane est quaerl"am synthesis. Sed comparatio relativa subiecti ad terminum relinquit subiectum et terminum inter se distincta ef realiter duo. Compositio autem duorum ex duobus facit unum simpliciter. V.g., comparantur potentia et actus, et etiam componuntur potentia et actus; sed comparantur per relationem, componuntur autem inquantum duo in unum reale coalescunt. Et ideo non est censendum novam quandam realitatem ex comparatione exsurgere quia nova quaedam realitas ex compositione exsurgat.


4- From this it follows that there is one truth-correspondence in the case of absolutes and another in the case of external relatives. In absolutes) truth regards only the subject by itself, and therefore ·in absolutes there is no truth-correspondence except in the reality intrinsic to the subject. For example, no being is truly a man by any other reality than his own. In external relatives) however, truth regards not only the subject but also the term, and therefore in external relatives there is no truth-correspondence except in the two realities, one of which is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to the subject. For example,just as no thing by itself alone is truly twice, so also this truth, IA is twice B,' cannot have its truth-correspondence in the reality of A alone. 5 But further, comparison and composition must by no means be confused:Both, it is true, consist in a certain synthesis. But the relative comparison of a subject to a term leaves the subject and the term distinct from each other and really two. A composition of two things, however, makes thos~ two to be simply one being. For example, potency and act can be compared and potency and act can be compounded; but they are compared through a relation, whereas they are compounded inasmuch as these two coalesce into one real being. One must hot think that a new reality results from a comparison simply because a new reality does result from composition.

Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

702

703


6 Praeterea, cum comparatio proprie sit actus intellectus et tamen communiter subiectum

re1ationis modo quodam obiectivo ad terminum comparari dicatur, ne entia realia et entia rationis inter se confundantur, distinguendum est inter COrrtparationem formalem, quae in solo intellectu fit, et comparationem obiectivam, quae nihil est aliud quam ipsa subiecti habitudo seu respectus ad terminum.

7 Sequitur similem distinctionem esse agnoscendam inter deterrninationem forrnalem et determinationem obiectivam. Formalis eniro determinatio est in intellectu qui subiectum et terminum apprehendit, comparat, et ad relationem determinatam affirmandam pervenit. Obiectiva autem determinatio non in mente fit sed iam in rebus adest: nam et obiective adest determinabile, nempe, subiectum quod ex ipsa sua ratione per relationem internam realiter respicit totalitatem quandam terminorum saltern possibilium; adest pariter objective determinans, nempe, terminus q~i inquantum inter ea invenitur quae a subiecto necessario respiciuntur, fupdamentum reale praebet quo objective determinabile fiat obiective determinatum.

8 Denique tandem quamvis relatio dicatur respectus, quamvis subiectum dicatur terminum respicere, minime tamen haec metaphora ita ad litteram sumenda est ut subiectum credatur terminum aspicere et perspicere. Et ideo quamvis determinatio abiecti perspecti necessaria in subiecto perspicienti etiam sit, minime condudi potest determinationem quam relatio ex termino habet parem quandam determiriationem necessario inducere in subiecto quod per relationem terminum resp~ciat.


6 Again, since comparison properly speaking is an act of the intellect, and yet the subject of a relation is commonly said to be compared to its term in an objective way, in order that real beings not be confused with conceptual beings one must distinguish between a formal comparison, which is made only in the mind, and an objective comparison, which is nothing other than the order or respect of the subject to its term. 7 F~om this it follows that a similar distinction must be acknowledged between a formal detennination and an objective determination. A formal determination is in the intellect which apprehends the subject and the term, compares them, and arrives at an affirmation of their determinate relation. Objective dete-rmination, on the other hand, does not take place in the mind but is already in things; for a determinable is objectively present, namely, a subject which by its very nature really through an internal relation 'r~gards' the totality of at least possible terms; similarly, a determinant is objectively present, namely, the term which, inasmuch as it is found among those things that are necessarily 'regarded' by the subject, provides a real foundation by which the objectively determinable becomes objectiVely determined. 8 Finally, although a relation is called a 'respect' or 'regard,' and although a subject is said to have respect or regard to its term, this metaphor should not be taken literally as if the subject looks at or perceives its term. And therefore although a determination of the object perceived is necessarily also in the perceiving subject, one can by no means conclude that the determination that a relation has from its term necessarily produces an equivalent determination in the subject that ,has a respect or regard to its term by way of a relation.

O!faestionis solutio

Solution to the question

Quibus perspectis, ad quaestionem respondetur relationem externam non addere aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam super realitatem relationis internae. 4

In light ofwhat we have said, our answer to the question is that an external relation does not add to the reality of an internal relation another reality intrinsic to the subject. 4 To put it in concrete terms, if A is really and truly twice what B is, then that 'twice' has its truth-correspondence through the reality of an internal relation by which A really regards all quantified beings and, at the same time, through the reality. of B which objectively determines that indeterminate internal relation.

Et ut etiam concrete loquamur, si vere et realiter A est duplum relate ad B, tunc illud 'duplum' habet adaequationem veritatis et per realitatem relationis internae qua A omnia quanta realiter respicit, et simui per realitatem B quae obiective determinat indeterminatam relationem internam.

4 [Lonergan treats the same issue in Insight 518-19.]



704

705



Iterum, si vere et realiter A est duplum relate ad B, tunc illud 'duplum' non habet adaequationem veritatis per realitatem quandam quae in ipso A recipitur et super realitatem relationis internae additur.

Again, if A is really and truly twice B, then that 'tWice' does not have truthcorrespondence through a reality that is received in A itself and is added to the reality of its internal relation.

Argumenta

Arguments

In entibus realibus multiplicandis, salvanda est adaequatio veritatis. Atqui sententia negans superadditam realitatem salvat adaequationem veritatis, sententia autem affinnans superadditam realitatem toliit adaequationem veritatis. Ergo sententia negans est amplectenda et sententia affirmans est reicienda. Maior: Nam nisi per verum non innoteseit ens. Minor: Nam uti constat ex quarta elucidatione praevia, in relativis externis non habetur adaequatio veritatis nisi in duplici realitate quarum alia est subiecto intrinseca et alia est subiecto extrinseca. Atqui sententia negans non habet adaequationem veritatis nisi per duplicem realitatem, aliam subiecto intrinsecam, nempe relationem internam, et aliam subiecto extrinsecam, nempe ipsum terminum. Sed sententia affirmans superadditam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, per hane solam superadditam realitatem veritatis adaequationem habet. Et confirmatur minor: In veritate, A non est duplum relate ad B nisi per realitatem A et realitatem B. In sententia negante, A non est duplum relate ad B nisi per realitatem A et realitatem B. Sed in sententia affirmante, A est duplum relate ad B per superadditam realitatem A intrinsecam.

In multiplying real beings, truth-correspondence must be preserved. But the opinion denying an additional reality preserves the truth-cor~espondence, whereas the opinion affirming an additional reality denies it. Therefore, the negative opinion is to be accepted and the affirmative rejected. As to the mq,jor premise: being is known only through what is true. As to the minor premise: as is clear from the fourth preliminary clarification, there is no truth-correspondence in external relatives apart from two realities, of which one is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to the subject. Now the negative opinion has no truth-correspondence apart from these two realities, one that is intrinsic to the subject, namely, an internal relation, and the other extrinsic to the subject, namely, the term. Bur. the opinion affirming an ad~itional reality intrinsic to the subject has its truth-correspondence through this additional reality alone. We substantiate the minor as follows. In truth, A is not twice B except through the reality of A and the reality of B. In the negative opinion, A is twice B solely through the reality of A and the reality of B; whereas in the affirmative opinion, A is twice B through an additional reality intrinsic to A.

I

Praeterea, ilIa sententia non est admittenda quae absoluta et relativa adeo non distinguit ut potius ea confundat. Atqui sententia affirmans est eiusmodi. Ergo. Ad minorem: Uti ex praevia elucidatione tertia constat, absoluta dicunt realitatem subiecti intrinsecam, sed relativa externa non solam realitatem subiecti intrinsecam sed edam aliam subiecto extrinsecam.

:2

lam vero qui propter relationem externam qua externarn vult novam realitaterh subiecto intrinsecam, sane ille adeo non distinguit absoluta et relativa externa ut ea potius confundat. Atqui sententia affirmans propter relationem externam qua externam vult novam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam. Ergo.

3 -Praeterea, sententia affirmans superadditam realitatem in gravissima inconvenientia conducit.


I

Again, no opinion is admissible that so fails to distinguish clearly between an absolute and a relative that it tends rather to confuse the two. But such is the affirmative opinion. Therefore it is not admiss~ble. As to the minor premise: as has been explained in the third preliminary clarification, absolutes express a reality intrinsic to a subject, but external relatives express not only a reality intrinsic to a subject but also another reality extrinsic to it. Now, one who because of an external relation as external opts for a new reality intrinsic to a subject surely so fails to distinguish between absolutes and external relatives as rather to confuse them; but the affirmative opinion opts for a new reality intrinsic to a subject because of an external relation as external. Therefore, the affirmative opinion cannot be admitted.

2

3 Furthermore, the opinion affirming an additional reality leads to very serious diffic~lties.

Collected Works of Bernard Lon~rgan

']06

707



Nam unumquodque quantum ad omnia alia quanta per totum universum dis· persa realiter refertur relationibus realibus, externis, specificis~ Similiter ad unumquodque quantum omnia et singula alia quanta relationibus realibus, externis, specificis referuntur. Qua de causa, in sententia affirmante superadditam realitatem subiecto intrin· secam, mutato quolibet quanto, necessario realiter mutantur omnia alia quanta per universum dispersa. Neque ulla assignatur causa naturalis omnium harum mutationum quae secundum leges arithmeticas et exactissimas necessario atque instantanee perficiuntur. Quod est inconveniens.

Each and every quantified being is really related to all other quantified beings in the entire universe by relations that are real, external, and specific. Likewise, all other quantified beings are related to each and every quantified being by relations that are real, external, and specific. For this reason, according to the opinion affirming an additional reality intrinsic to the subject, when any quantified being changes, all other quantified beings in the entire universe would also necessarily change. But no natural cause can be found for all these changes, which necessarily and instantaneously would occur in accordance "With extremely exact numerical laws. Therefore, this opinion is inadmissible.

S. Thomae doctrina

St Thomas's Doctrine

Quid hac in re S. Thomas docuerit, ex locis infra citatis patet. De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8, ad 5m: ' ... non oportet, ad hoc quod de aliquo relatio aliqua de novo dicatur, quod aliqua mutatio in ipso fiat, sed sufficit quod fiat mutatio in aliquo extremorum: causa enirn habitudinis inter duos est aliquid inhaerens utrique. Unde ex quacumque parte fiat mutatio illius quod habitudinem causabat, tollitur habitudo quae est inter utrumque.' De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c.: 'Dicendum quod relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate: quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia iri subiecto remanentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit, ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud ... Quod autem dicitur de al~quo ut ah eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nee actio cum agente. Et propter hoc etiam prohat Philosophus v Phys. quod in ad a1iquid non potest esse motus: quia, sine aliqua mutatione eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius, sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie, sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus; quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens.'

What St Thomas taught on this matter is clear from the following quotations. De potentia, q. 7, a. 8, adsm: ' ... it is not necessary, in order that any new relation be predicated of something, that there be any change in that thing; it suffices that there be a change in any of the terms, for the cause of an order between two things is something inherent in each of them, Hence, any change on the part of that which caused the order nullifies the order between the two.' De potentia, q. 7, a, 8 c.: 'It must be said that in this respect a relation differs from quantity and quality in this, that quantity and quality are accidents of some kind that remain in the subject; but, as Boethius says, "relation" does not mean "as remaining in the subject," but "as in a certain transit to another" ... But what is attributed to something "as proceeding from it to something else" does not enter into composition with it, as neither does action enter into composition "With the agent. And on this account the Philosopher too proves in the Physics, Book v, that there cannot be motion in "(the being related) to something"; because without any change in that which is related to another, a relation can cease to be only through the change of the other; as also is clear ab~ut action, that there is no movement as regards action except metaphorically and improperly; as we say that one passing from leisure to act is changed; which would not be the case if relation or action signified something remaining in the subject. ) De potentia, q. 7, a. 9, ad 7m: ' ... there is !l0thing to prevent an accident of this kind [relation, action] from ceasing to be "Without causing any change in its subject; for it does not have the perfection of its being in that subject, but through transition into another; and with the cessation of that transition, the being of this accident ceases "With respect to its act but remains with respect to its cause - as

De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9, ad 7m: ' ... nihil prohibet quod esse desinat huiusmodi accidens [relatio, actio] sine mutatione eius in quo est, quia sua ratio non perficitur prout est in ipso subiecto, sed prout transit in aliud; quo sublato, ratio huius accidentis tollitur qui· dem quantum ad actum, sed manet quantum ad causam; sicut et subtracta materia


Collected Works

of Bernard Lonergan

708


709

tollitur calefactio, licet maneat calefactionis causa.'

In V Phys., lect.

3(ed. Leon., II, 237; sect. 8): 'In illis igitur relationibus quae non ponunt

rem aliquam nisi in uno extremorum, non 'videtur difficile quod mutato ilia extrema, in quo relatio realiter existit, de novo dicatur aIiquid relative de altero absque sui mutatione, cum nihil ei realiter adveniat. Sed in illis in quibus relatio invenitur realiter in utroql1e extremorum, videtur difficile quod aliquid dicatur de uno per mutationem alterius absque mutatione sui: cum nihil de novo adveniat alicui absque mutatione eius cui advenit. Unde dicendum est quod si aliquis per suam mutationem efficiatur mihi aequalis, me non. mutato, ista aequalitas primo erat in me. quodammodo, skut [caddo scilicet] in sua radice, ex qua habet esse reale: ex hoc enim quod habeo talem quantitatem, competit mihi quod sim aequalis omnibus illis qui eandem quantitatem habent. Cum ergo aliquis de novo accipit illarn quantitatem, ista communis radix aequalitatis determinatur ad istum: et ideo nihil advenit mihi de novo per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius mutationem.'

Etiarn'vide: In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a

theol.,

III,

I,

ad 3m. In Vll Phys., lect. 6; ed. Leon., n, 344. Sum.

q. 16, a. 6, ad 2m.

Quibus in lods, sequentia notari possunt: (a) Adest distinctio inter praedicata absoluta et relativa: absolutum enim est Out in subiecto man ens'; relativum et externum est Cut in aliud tr~msiens vel procedens.' (b) Ad mutationem relationis realis non necessario requiritur mutatio in ipso relationis subiecto, sed sufficit mutatio in tennino. Neque valet quodlibet effugium quod inter mutationem impropriam et mutationem proprie dictam excogitetur, cum expresse dictum sit, 'et ideo nihil advenit mihi de novo per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius mutationem.'

(c) Exemplo innuitur distinctio inter absolutum, relationem internam, et relationem externam. Ubi enim didtur, 'ex hoc enim quod habeo talem quantitatem,' ponitur absolutum. Ubi deinde additur, 'competit mihi quod siro aequalis omnibus ~is qui eandem quantitatem habent,' innuitur relatio interna. Quando postea concludirnr, 'cum ergo aliquis de novo accipit illam quantitatem:, ista,communis radix aequalitatis determinatur ad istum,' additur determinata relatio externa quin ulla nova realitas subiecto intrinseca ponatur.


,,


when the material [being heated] is removed, the heating also ceases, although the cause of the heating remains.' In v Phys., lect. 3 (Leonine edition, vol. II, 237, §8): 'In the case of those relations, therefore, whose reality is found in only one of the extremes [subject or ter~], there is no difficulty in saying that when that extreme changes some new relationship is predicated of the other extreme without its being changed, since nothing real is added to it. But in the case of those relations whose reality is found in both extremes, there seems to be this difficulty, that something is predicated of one of them by reason of a change in the other without any change in the former, since nothing new is added to anything without that thing being changed. Hence, we must conclude that if someone becomes equal to'-me through a change in him and without any change in me, that equality was first in me in some way, as in the basis upon which it possesses real existence; for from the fact that I have such or such a quantity, I am in a position to be equal to all those who have the same quantity. When, therefore, someone acquires this quantity, that common basis of equality applies to him, and so nothing new comes to me from the fact that I begin to be equal to him as a result of the change in him: See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 26, q. 2, a. I, ad 3m; In VII Phys., lect. 6, Leonine edition, vol. II, 344; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2m. In the above passages, note the following points: a) There is a distinction between absolute and relative predicates: an absolute predicate is 'remaining in the subject'; a relative and external predicate is 'directed or proceeding towards another.' b) For a change in a real relation a change in the subject of the relation is not a necessary requirement; change in the term is sufficient. It is not a valid escape to invent a distinction between improper change and change properly so called, since St Thomas expressly says, 'and so nothing new comes to me from the fact that I begin to be equal to him [someone else] as a result of a change in him.' c) St Thomas's example suggests a distinction between an absolute, an internal relation, and an external relation. Where he says, 'from the fact that I have such or such a quantity,' he states an absolute. When he adds, 'I am in a POR sition to be equal to all those who have the same quantity,' he indicates' an internal relation. When he concludes, 'when, therefore, someone acquires this quantity, that common basis of equality applies to him,' there is added a determinate external relation without there being any new reality intrinsic to the subject.

a


710

Appendix III: De Re1ationibus

7"


Objections

Obicitur relation~s

I Unless an additional reality intrinsic to the subject is admitted, there are no such things as real relations; but the consequence is false, and therefore the antecedent is false.

Distinguitur maior: tolluntur omnes relationes reales, si negantur relationes reales et internae, conceditfU, si affirmantur relationes reales et internae, negatur.

To this we ~eply that this objection would hold only if one denies that there are real internal relations.

2 Instatur. Atqui non sufficit relatio interna realis. Nam magis determinata est relatio externa quam interna. Quae maior determinatio exigit maiorem quandam realitatem, secus tollitur

2 But a real internal relation is not enough. For an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation, and this greater determination demands some greater reality, or otherwise there is no truth-correspondence. Our reply is that it demands a greater reality extrinsic to the subject but not a greater reality intrinsic to the subjeCt.

I Nisi conceditur superaddita illa realitas subiecto intrinseca, tolluntur omnes reales. Sed falsum est consequens. Ergo falsum est antecedens.

adaequatio veritatis. Distinguitur haec praemissa: exigit maiorem realitatem subiecto extrinsecam, .conceditur, subiecto intrinsecam, negatur.

3 Instatur. Atqui exigitur maior realitas subiecto intrinseca. Quod vere praedicatur de aliquo est ei intrinsecum. Atqui relatio externa vere de subiecto praedicatur. Ergo realitas relationis externae est subiecto intrinseca.

Distinguitur mawr: Pracdicatum absolutum dicit realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, conceditur, praedicatum relativum et extcrnum dicit realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, subdistinguitur, quac realitas est relationis internae, conceditur, quae realitas superadditur rcalitati relationis

3 But it does deman:d a greater reality intrinsic to the subject. For what is truly predicated of anything is intrinsic to that thing. But an external relation is truly predicated of the subject; therefore, the reality of an external relation is intrinsic to the subject. We admit that an absolute predicate indicates a reality intrinsic to the subject. An external relative predicate, however, indicates a reality that" is simply the reality of an internal relation, not a reality added to an internal relation.

mtemac, riegatur. 4 Instatur. Atqui non sufficit realitas relationis internae. Nam relatio interna respicit quoslibet terminos secundum rationem quandam genericam; relatio autem externa respicit hune

terminum secundum rationem specificam; et ideo sunt duo respectus qui, qua respectus, inter se vere et.realiter distinguuntur. Respondetur. Sunt duo ~espectus inter se distincti inquantum respectus sunt, distinguitur, quatenus sunt in mente, conceditur, quatenus sunt in rebus, subdistinguitur, sunt duo per realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, negatur, per realitatem subiecto intrinsecam et extrinsecam,

4 But the reality of an internal relation does not suffice. For an internal relation has a respect to any of its terms according to some general reason, whereas an external relation ~as a respect to this term according to it specific n~ason; therefore, there are two respects which, as respects, are really and truly distinct from each other. We agree that these two respects are distinct conceptually as respects, and we also agree that they are two in extramental reality by reason of the reality that is

conceditur.

intrinsic to the subject and the reality that "is extrinsic to the subject; but we derry that they are two through the realitY intrinsic to the subject.

5 Instatur. Atqui realitas extrinseca non potest facere duos respectus reales ex ·uno. Respondetur. Per realitatem extrinsecam constitui non potest obiectiva deterrninatio alicuius respectus, negatur; per realitatem extrinsecain constitui non potest super 75, 757 Chalcedon: and dogmatic movement, 85, 8g, 91, 93, 99 Charity, habit of: absolutely and formally. supernatural, 471-73 and n. 29; _and passive spiration, 471 Chemistry: and two ways, 61-63, 757 Chevalier, Irenee, 625 Chollet,Jean~Arthur, 413 n. 28 Christ: being in C., 509-13; Co's natural knowledge through agent intellect and phantasm, 571; and divine indwelling,

50 9- 13

Cappadocians, 67, 395

Church: and proximate end of divine

Capreolus, 309, 3I1

missions, 495---g7 Circumincession: 377, 413-21; and being

Catechetical understanding, 15 Categories: biblical, 35 and o. 19; catholic,

35 and n. 19,37,63 and n. 3$ and causes, 275-77, 723-25, 740; as predicaments, 267, 275--79. 721; and prescientific knowledge, 277; and prior for us, 77-79; special and general, 35 n. 19; treated in logic not metaphysics,

277 Catholic Evidence Guild, 113 Cause of the matter, 581, 593 Causes: and categories, 275--77; and first operation, II; and inner word, 31; and

in, 507; and equality of persons, 43335; explained in terms of divine essence,

415-17; explained in terms of origins, 419-21; explained in tenns ofrdation, 4J7; taught in scripture, 413-15 City of God: and proximate end of divine missions, 495 Clement of Alexandria, 635

of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Conceiving: c. and understan~g as different kinds of act or_operation, 607 Concept(s)/Conception(s): and cognitive process, IS; and expressed species, 58991; and object as term of first act, 13; heuristic and proper meanings of c., 151; interconnection of in theology, 25; need for systematically formed c. in theology, 25; proceed from understanding) 183. 297,657,765,771; systematic c., 151 Conceptual being(s): 235, 241, 68g; not subsistent, 327, 347 Conclusions: and improvement of system,

25, 45; and judgment about theological understanding, 47-49, 55; and knowledge (science), -25,99, 153; and principles, see Principles; proper sense of drawing c. vs. conclusions theology, 153 n. 19; pure and mixed c., 53, 55, 57; and technical formulation of problem, 153; in theology, 3 and n. 2,55-57, II7, 153; and theories) 53

Cogitative power, 587 Coherence: and early stages of science,

Conclusions theology, 53-57, 97, 153 Concrete universal, lO3 u. 58 Condition: defined, 441. See 000 Appropri~

2J; questions for, 21; and rejection of

ate external term, Consequent condition Congar, Yves, 27

system, 27


U. IS


Consciousness: and being, 14J, 371, 381; circle of, 201 and n. 52; c. of divine person known through true, 321; c. studied under formality of true and being, 323; c. viewed as perception, 211 and n. 6J; and conscious origination ('by virtue of consciousne~s,' 'by virtue of intellectual consciousness'), 143, 163,

175--77; defined, 381; divine c. on basis of essential act, 381-85; divine c. on basis of notional acts, 385-87; divine c. and infinite act, I6S; divine c. as intellectual,

389; divine c. through notional acts is one) 387; and divine person, 309, 3II, 313, 315-23, 37'191; duality of, 139; in God (intellectual, dynamic, see also Dynamic consciousness), 163; intellectual c., 141-43; knowledge of c., 315-17; and knowledge, 315-17, 379; notion of c., 379-81; one divine c. had distinctly by distinct persons, '387; 431; predicated of subject, act, and action, 379; and reflection or introspection, 141, 315-17, 379; and self~knowledge, 31517,379; as self-presence, 141, 315-17; sensitive and intellectual c. contrasted, 139, 175; and side of object, 315-17, 379; and side of subject. 315-17; 379; unity of divine c. on basis of essential act and of notional acts, 389-'91 Consequent condition: and appropriate external term, 441, 455-67; defined, 441 Constitution: in active sense, 467, 469, 475; of a being by intrinsic principles, 325-27; of contingent truths, 455-67; of divine mission by divine conception

and will, 455-67, 475; of God by infinite perfection, 439, 455-67; ontological c.) 455 and n. 12; in passive sense, 469,

798

799

Index

475; of state of grace, 513-21 and n. ng.

Creatures: understanding of and proces-

See also Appropriate external term,

sion of Word, 21g-17, 399 Cultural dilferences, 79; and transcultural

Consequent condition; Contingent predication, Mission Constitutive: meaning of word 'c.', 36$ meaning of ,c.' in God, 365, 439

Consubstantial: 35; and dogmatic and theological movements, 85; and real distinction in Trinity, J59. 337. 367. See

also Homoousion Consubstantiality: and dogmatic way, 67; and emanation, 213, 433; and procession/relation, 169 Contemporary prior, 83, i15

Contingent predication: 439-47.457; adds nothing real and intrinsic to a

problem, 79-81, 87

ing,5 1 DOgInatic movement, 85; and theological

139,143 Deduction, in theology, 3 and n. 2, 55. See also Conclusions

Discovery: way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Distinct/distinction: absolutes and relatives d. in different ways, 281; adequate~y) d.,

movement, 85-87 Dogmatic prior, 83. See also Prior in itself, Prior for us

401 and n. 20; conceptually d., 257, 261,

Dogmatic question: and biblical question, 51; and theological question, 51

Definition, II; and cognitive process, IS; and common matter, 205; d. of circle, 567-69; d. by what something is and d. through another, 269-71;

58g-g1; and object as term, 13,203-207,

and distinct common attribution, 445;

605; and quiddity, 585, 605, 781-83; and

and divine cognitive, volitional, and

simple inner word, 31, 205, 567, 569; and solution of problems, 25 De Letter, P., 437 n. I, 463 n. 23 De natura verhi intelkctus, 565 Deneffe, August, 413 n. 28 Depth psychology: and transcultural principle, 79 Description: prescientific d. and way of

relations, 701, 703 Creating: God's c. is God's understanding

discovery, 5g-6I, 73, 77 Desire: d. for beatitude, 647; d. to know, 645-59; .natural d., to know God by

and willing, 467 Creation: active c. a conceptual relation,

essence, 4II and n. 27, 639-41, 645-59 Determination(s): formal and objective d.,

and external

271,295-99, 301, 367; conceptually d. with foundation in reality, 303, 735; d. defined, 247, 257, 295; d. and perfection, 431; major and minor conceptual distinctions, 295-g9; and negative comparative judgment, 303; really d., 247,257,271,303,327,367; really d. in created persons by substance, existence, operation, 349-51; really d. in God by relations, 263, 349, 351, 367; really d. in God in relation to common contingent predication, 44S; and Trinity, 331; verbally, conceptually, and really d., 281-83, 287, 289 Distinct subsistent in -an intellectual nature, 309, 3 Il , 313, 323, 327, 33 1 , 337 Divided from everything else: and constitutive principles of a being, accidents,

systematic, 65-67; and prior in itself, 85-87; task of within historical process, 87 Dominicans: and Franciscans, 91-g3

Dondaine, H., 219 Doucet, V, 645 Duality, and knowledge, 2Il, 303, 631 Durandus, 421 Dynamic consciousness: and God, 49-5 I and n. 26, 163, 169, 213: and infinite act, 167; and pure perfection, 213; means 'has a conscious exigence for an emanation,' 163 Economy of salvation: and proximate end of divine missions, 497 Efficient causality: as one meaning of actio,

metaphysical, natural, analogical), 145-

Divinity: is God, 241, 24$ is Father, etc.,

47

243 Doclo.:, I., 219


Dogmatic way, 61, 63, 65; compared with systematic way, 67-77; d.w. without

n. 36

c., 28S; no motion in c., 239, 545; in

Deus divina essentia, 243 and n. 8

Dogmatic theology: a stumbling block, 37; and systematic theology, 119

possibles, and conceptual beings, 347;

237; in active sense, 469, 545; and active spiration and paternity, 237; no example of identity of substance and relation in

modes of procession (external, internal,

mental problems of systematiCS, 39; and judgment about theological understand~

and principle of contradiction, 347 and

70S; of general intellectual light, 139; of

passive sense, 469, 545

funda~

Differences: cultural d., 79 Diligently, reverently, judiciously, see Reverently

67 (see also Appropriate external term); common and proper c.p., 45g-6r;

truth~c.

d. not hypothetical, 51-53; and

and theology, 33, 65; sensible d. determine as m~tter, 139 Decision: and intellectual emanation, 137,

intellectual emanation, 137, 139, 143, 14.9; and meaning that a noun signifies,

13, :w3-207 Correspondence:

heresies, 89; and intellectual movements,

own, 447-49, 451; understanding d. and understanding history of d., 57 Dogma: development of, see Development;

Dialectical theology, 395

and expressed species, 589-91; and

notional acts, 385-87 Corporeal matter: and object of intellect,

and God's intention, 89, 99-101; and

Doctrine: d. of Son and Spirit not their

Data: in natural sciences, human sciences,

appropriate external term, 441, 455-

265,267,2'81,347 and n. 36 Co~presence: of divine persons through

Development: of dogma, 77, 89, 759; effecting d. and intending d., 99-101;

87-89; of theology, 89, 759

divine person, 457. 461-63, 469; and

productive operation; 443-47, 457 Contradiction: principle of, 145 n. II, 257,

Index

Divine ideas: 635-37; as secondary objects of divine act of understanding, 635

Collected Works of Bernai'd Lonergan

operatio, 535, 543-47; principle of, 693 Ehrle, F., 93 n. 56 EIter, E., 645, 655 Emanation: by way of truth and by way

800

801

Index

of holiness, 361; and consubstantiality,

to second phase by understanding,

213, 433, 60g-15; defined, 181. See abo

belief, and love, 41S; as distinct subsistent

Intellectual emanations, Processions Empiricism/eI?piricist(s), 317, 319 End: and appropriateness, 491; of divine missions, 487, 491-99; and multitude,

in: an intellectual nature, 401; have only

Index

Fact(s): rejection of facts understood in system, 25-29 Faith: articles of, 109; assent of, and

Florence, Council of, 159, 233, 259, 263, 337,4'5 Folly: as multiple as wisdom is one, 27

an intellectual nature fully actuated,

systematics, 11, 15~ Catholic f., 41;

Fonn: and active potency, 539-41; and

4II; intrinsically immutable, 401; the

arid certitude in theology, 9, 107; and

'now' of e.s., 401; and Word and Love,

conclusions theology, see Conclusions

species, 579, 593 Formal distinction on the side of the

411- 13 Eugene III, Pope, 243,245

theology; differs from theology, 105, 107;

reality, 231, 233, 299-305, 633, 667-69,

and proximate ends of missions, 495--99;

divine f., 41; f. illumines reason, 9, 19,

789-9'

and unity of order, 425-27; and value,

Evidence: and affirmation/judgment!

27, 41, 47, 55, 57, 77; and object that moves to theological un~erstanding, 15

425-27; and perfection, 423-2$ ultimate

second operation,

675

Energeia, 535, 537

II,

105-107, 135-

Equality: and divine perfection, 433-35

37. 139, 143, 149, 203-207, 567; and cognitive process, 19; and critical vs

Equivocal: and prior for us in human

naive realism, 321; distinct from true, 203, 605; and intellectual emanation,

sciences, 81, 87 Essence: divine e. and contingent

pred~

ication, 443-47; divine e. and divine

135-37, 139, 143, 149; as object that moves to second operation, 13, 203-

attributes, 263; divine e. as nature and as

207, 567, 603, 605; and resolution to

intellectual, 193-99; divine e. as power

principles, 603 and n. 2; in theology and

by which Begetter begets, 353 n. 48,

other sciences, 105-107

359-61 n. 54; e. in another and to an~

Examples: and understanding, 137

other, 271, 277; e. in the manner of

Excluded middle: principle of, 145 n. II

a hypostasis includes relation, 36S; e.

Exegesis: systematic and historical e., 751-

without qualification and qualified e., 269--'71,279; and first intellectual opera~ tion,731 Essence and existence: correspond to

53 Exigency!Exigen~ies:

detenninate and

indeterminate e., 639', and natural

(see abo Object); understanding of f. and theological understanding, 29 Father: and divine indwelling, 5II-13; and divinity, 243; and paternity, 239-47; as proper name, 353; really distinct from Son as person but not in spirating love, 255; sends Son, 447-49, 455, 465; with Son sends Holy Spirit, 449-51, 455, 46163, 465. See also Paternity Father, Son, and Spirit: are distinct, 3272g; are in an intellectual nature, 32]2g; are persons, 327-29; are subsistent relations, 329; in one act are, understand they are God, and understand that one

Fourth Lateran Council, 259, 261, 265, 289, 329-3', 395 Franciscans: and Dominicans, 91-93 Franzelin,j.B.,423 Free: and voluntary, 355 Friendship: and mission of Son, 487 Fulgentius, St, 415 and n. 30 Futurism, 95, 97 Galtier, Paul, 295 and n. 31, 343 n. 33, 423 and n. 38, 437 n. 1,453 n. 11,461 and nn. 17-20 Generation: defined, Igl, 201-203,.66S; divine g. and dogmatic way, 69; divine g. and systematic way, 69, IIg, 121; and divine procession, 151, 235; as emanation by way of truth, 355; and

is not the other, 305

desire for vision of God, 651-59; and

Ferrariensis, 295, 621

emanation of word, 125, 189-203, 235,

understanding and judgment, 9, 7$ and

obediential potency, 639-41, 651-59;

663-65; and filiation, 235; formality of,

internal and external relations, 729-33.

transcendental e., 143

Fifth Lateran Council, 697 Filiation: compared with paternity as

See also One Essential act: cannot be basis of distinct consciousness that divine persons have of one another, 381-8g; and divine

191--93; internal g. only in God, 159;

really distinct, 253; defined, 235; and

and likeness 'of nature, 193, 199-203;

32S; natural act and intentional act of

generation 235; is the Son, 239-47;

and origination of Son, 127, 185, 235,

e. in infinite are one, 197; and second

and light of glory, 473; not really

397, 663-65; procession of love not g.,

intellectual operation, 731

distinct from active spiration, 253; and

235, 679; and speaking/being spoken,

Existence: divine act of e. is conscious,

consciousness, 381-85; e.a. anq notional

Existential problem, 59

procession of Word, 235; really distinct

acts are one in reality but conceptually

Existenz, 317 n. 7, 319

from passive spiration, 255

397-99 Gift: as proper name of Holy Spirit, 357

distinct, 389--9'1

Experience: and cognitive process, 13, 3I]~

Final causality: principle of, 693

Gilbert de la Porn!:e, 233, 243 and n. 7,

FIrst Vatican Council, 3,

785,787 Giving of Holy Spirit: formal external

Essential and notional: really identical and conceptually distinct in God, 231, 26567 Eternal subject(s): analogy to our transitiori

and trinitarian analogy, 221 External term. see Appropriate external tenn

Ex vi intellectiva pr~ueniens, 133 n. 3


II,

Ig, 2g, 33, 43,

45 n. 25, 47, 49, 53-55, 85, 97, 99, II7, 131,153,167,169,319,321,395,681,761,

tenn of, 471; and incarnation, 469-

76 7,773

71; and indwelling of Father and Son,


802

Index

471; material external term of, 469; and sanctifying grace, 471 Goal(s): in theology: 7-31 passim, 37; of two ways, 71, 75 God: as agent by intellect, 467; analogical knowledge of God, 195; as being ,by intellect, 467; conceived as person, 331; distinctions in God known by faith, 130; God emanates from God, 76S; God has generated God, 36g; God in himself as known in knower and beloved in lover, 507; God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three persons, 331,363; God's act of understanding is God's substance/being, 171, 195. 215, 21 7, 303, 30 5, 37 1, 467, 557, 633, 635, 665, 677; God's knowledge of other things, 633-37 (see also Object: primary and secondary); God's und,erstanding is first in the manner of essence, 195; God's willing is God's act of existence, 677; infinity of, 195-g7; nature of, and generation, 193--99; nature of God is intellectual, 193--99, 327--29, 637; not a fourth person, 331; not in any genus, 27g; as object o(theology, lOS; as 'the One who is,' 195 and n. 36; simplicity of, 129, 189, 193; and systematic way, 67-69; and two processions on likeness of intellect\lal emanation, 181-89; as ultimate efficient and final cause, 277; understands all beings by understanding ,being itself, knows all truths by knowing truth itself, wills all good by willing good itself, 329; what God is is unknown, 193. 195, 273. See also Divinity God from God: 129, 131, 151, 159, 163 Godfrey ofFontaines, 547, 617 Gonet,J.wB.,421

803 Gonsalvus Hispanus, S47 Good: and appropriateness of divine missions, 491-99; g. by essence, 4919g; g. by participation, 49I-gg; g. is concrete, 671; g. of order, 493--99, S05-I3, 673; g. of order and personal presence, S07; human g. of order, 49399; known analogically, 671-7S; as object of love, 671; particular g., 49399, SOS, 673; universal g., 671-73 Goodness: divine g. as universal principle of all good, 671-73 Grabmann, Martin, 56S Grace: perfects nature, 17; and theological movement, 8S; and unity of sciences, 103; various meanings of word 'go', 51517. See also Operative grace, Sanctifying grace, State of grace 'Grace perfects nature,' 655

Gratia gratumfaciens, 475 Gregory Nazienzen, 361 n. 55 GUnther, Anton, 2II, 633 Habit(s): and good of order, 493"""99, 50513) h. of grace and state of grace, 513

Index

Holy: as common term, 355; as employed for each divine person, 355 Holy Spirit: and bond of Father and Son,

Hypothetical proposition: conversion of,

249

421; constitution of gift of H.S., 45763; is beloved in lover, 229, 507; is God, S07; is the Holy Spirit a se? 21, 127--29; is proceeding Love itself, 227, 473, 625; mission ofH.S., 44g-SI, 45S--SS, 47g-83, 485--91; not begotten but proceeding,

I and Thou: and divine persons, 397--g9; and meaning of person, 30g-13. See also 'You'

127; and notional love, 473-79'; and

Idealism, 317, 323 Ideas, divine, See Divine ideas

passive spiration, 239-47, 455; proceeds from Father, 127; proceeds from Father and Son together, 127; proceeds from Son, 225; proceeds from Word as love from mental word, 225, 227, 229; as proper name, 355; sent by Father and

Son, 449-51, 455, 461-63, 465, 473-77; as speaking through the prophets and in disciples, 475-77; as teaching all truth, 475-77 Homoousion: and dogmatic movement, 85, 89,91,93,97, 99· See also Consubstantial Horace, 419 n. 34 Human disciplines/sciences: and theology, 25, 103

Idea: in practical matters, 593 Idea of being: primary and secondary components in, 215 n. 65

Identical: really i., 257 Identity: and divine knowledge, 633; knowledge rooted in i., 631, 637; principle of, 14S n. II, 265, 281, 347 and n. 36. See also Compared identity, principle of Image: free i., 407 and n. 24, 503 and n. 94; as proper name of Son, 355. See also Phantasm Image of God: deficient in human. consciousness, 169, 389; ill intellectual creatures, 195 and n. 39, 389, 609-15; in intellectual emanations, 765 Imagination: and definition of circle, 567; object of, 577. See also Phantasm Imitation of Cod: and four divine relations,

n. II9, 517; and personal presence, 505 Henn, William, 73 n. 46 Henry of Ghent, 629 Heresy: and God's intentioI)" 89; and infallible definitions, 89 Heuristic structure: manifests fallenness, 313; and question, 3Il, 3-13 Historical movement, 77-lOr; conditions for understanding, 77; and goal of theology, 87; as prior, 77; as third

Humani.generis, 81 and-no 51,

movement, 77 and n. 49, 757-59 Historical reality: intelligibility of, 77

43; and quiddity, 781-83; and simple inner word, 31; and technically formulated

of, 471; and giving of Spirit, 469-71; material external term of, 469; and

Historicism, 81-83 Holiness: and emanation of love, 355

problem, 161; and theological solutions, 53,

mission, 483-85, 487-89; and secondary act of existence, 471 and n. 28


III

and n. 64,

115 and n. 72, Il9 HusserI, Edmund, 321 n. 19 Hylomorphism: in Aristode, 58g; gnoseological foundation of, 207 Hypothesis, I I; and analogy, 55; and

471-73; and participation, 471-73, 497 Immanent operation, 531-57 Immanentism, 317, 319, 321, 323 Immortality: of soul, 649-51

consequent truth, 41-43, 51-5g; defined, 43, 53; and intrinsic possibility, 747; in natural science, 3$ and object as term, 13, 203-207; and probability/certitude,

Immutability, 97 n. 57 Incarnation: and divine act of existence, 471; and dogmatic and theological, movements, 85; fonnal external term

55-57,63,155 and n. 17; and theory, 53, 749


804

Index

805

Incommunicability: 313, 345-51; and com-

as uniting and as different from intel-

munication, 349; in created persons,

ligent grasp,-20$ distinct from act of

349-51; defined, 349; and real distinc-

understanding, 66r; divine and human

tion, 349; and real relations, 349 Incommunicable existence of the divine

i.w. compared, 659-7'; enables clarity and distinctness in us, 20g-1 I; enables cultivation of sciences, 20g; enables transition beyond visible universe by analogy, 20g; enables transition from

nature, 309, 3IX, 31S Individual substance of a rational nature: sog, SII, 313; difficulty with this definition of person, 313

Individuum vagum, 33S Indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio: and principles of identity and contradiction, 347 and n. 36 Indwelling: consists in and is known in acts, but constituted through state of

definition and evidence to things as existing, 20g; enables transition from understanding of cause to conception of thing, 207--209; existence of i.w. proven from outer w., 563) and expressed species, 589; and generation,

grace, 5IS-21; and known ~n knower and beloved in loved, 51S-15 (see also Presence); and love, 501-13

see Generation; and grasp of evidence, 203--205; and image of triune God, 765; as intelligible, 143-45 n. II; i.w. many in us, one in God, 65g-6Ij i.w.

Infallibility (ecclesial), 87, 99; of intellect,

twofold, 31, 105 and n. 60, 181 n. 23,

Index

Inquiry: in systematics, 9, 19,41,43,55 'In the same,' 147 and n. 13 Instrumentalism, 317 Intellect: analogy of i., 627-45; angelic i., 337; angelic i. and being, 627, 63S; and being, 627-45; comparison of divine and human i., 627-45; created i. as passive potency, 195,337,637-45; divine i. and being, 627, 631-37; human i. and being, 627, 639-41; infinity of, 195; i. in act with respect to total object infinite and a

se, 195, 337-39; natural desire of created i., 645-59 (see also Desire); and tending to God, 195; and unity/multiplicity, 101 Intellect in act is intelligible in act, 197, 303 Intellectual: as what regards all being, all truth, all good, 327 Intellectual consciousness: structure of, Igg Intellectual emanation(s): 67 and n. 35,

563, 74$ necessary in us, 207--209, 597601; necessity of i.w. in us grounded in

135-43, 60g-15; and active intellectual consciousness, ISg; of affirmation from

distinction of moving object from terminal object, similar necessity not in God,

grasp of evidence, 203-20$ and aseity, 76$ and causal emanation, 165, 6Il13, 77g; and consubstantiality, 213,

reh,ltive not absolute distinction within

209-13, 597-60I, 665-71; not noesis, fa pensee pensan~, intending intention, in-

i.a., 16$ and three acts in us, 76$ true

tention of the one understanding but

quoad se, 197; un~erstood negatively, not

noima, fa pensee pensee, intended intention, intention understood, 565; and outer word, 56g; proceeds from grasp of intelligibility, 235; procession of and paternity/filiation, 235; relation of consequent i.w. to truth, 31, II7; signifies and is si.gnified, 563; simple i.w., SI, 205, 563, 745; and theological hypothesis, 43. 745; theological i.w. imperfectly, analogically, obscurely understood, 33, 745; and understanding, 3I, 125,

i.e., 161, 181-89; earlier definition of,

183, r8g, 203-207, 559-61, 603-609, 661-63

161-69; and pure perfection, 763; as real and natural, 761, 77$ and relations,

595 Infallible definitions: and heresies, 89 Infinite act: comprehends itself perfectly, 197; and dynamic -consciousness, 167; as originated, I63; as originating, I6S;

positively, 169 Infinity: excludes potency, 198; of God, 195-97; of intellect in act with respect to its total object, 195; of what emanates in God, 763 Influence: of first agent (vehementius impri-

mat), 1I3 and n. 67 InTUJScibilitas: and fundamental notions, 353 n·3 8 Inner word: analogy of, 659-7r; caused in us but not in God, 661-63; compound i.w., 31, 563, 745; and definition


433, 60g-15; created and uncreated i.e., 777; defined, 141, 151. 181; divine 761, 767; and intelligible emanations,

see Relations; subject as principle of i.e., 215; and systematic way, 67-

6g. IIg, 125; as tertium comparatWnis in psychological analogy, 769; and two divine processions, 181-89, Ig9-203; of word and of love, 199-203. &e also Generation, Love, Spiration, Word Intellectual light, 155 n. 18 Intellectual nature: 195~7, 219, 225, sag, SII, 315, 323, 327-29, 331, 335, 3S7; actuated per accidens and spontaneously before per se and deliberately, 403405; actuation of is form and act, 40g; and communication, 351; differences in i.n., 337:-39; in eternal and temporal subjects, 399-413 passim (see also Eternal subject, Temporal subject); finite i.n., 339; i.n. regards totality of being, truth, goodness, 351; and subsistence, 339 Intellectual or intelligible, 67 n. 35, 143-45 n. II, 663 n. 7 Intelligible: in nature and in intellect, 14345 n, II; in potency and in act, 569, 577; i. truth and object as tenn, 105, 107, II7; and spiritual, 185; and true, 75; two meanings of, 60g-11 Intelligible in act is the intelligent in act, 2Il and n. 62

137 and n. 8, 143-45 and n. II, 18385, 60g and n. 5, 611; and material or

Intelligible in act and understood in act,

sensible emanation, 60g-15; necessity of i.e. arises from subject, 21$ negated if word is unconsciously fanned, 561; not clearly grasped by us in its formality,

Intelligible species, 537, 549-51, 553, 555 Intelligibilis, 143-45 n. 11, r85 Intending: i. individual definitions and i.

777; not demonstrable in God, 763; and procession, 125, 135, 145, 151, 185,76581; and procession per modum operati,


577

series, 99 Intentional: and natural, 141, '97, 203, 565 Intention understood: and expressed species, 589-9I Interconnection: of mysteries with one another and with our last end, 19, 55

806

807

Index

Index

Interpretation: of Thomas Aquinas, 739-

317; knowledge ofk., 317; k. ofreal in the

41 Intersubjectivity: and disposition to

true, 59; omitting a part of (Newman),

207 ll. 58, 209 n. 60, 215 n. 65, 239 n. 3, 241 n. 5, 263 nn. 16 and 17, 277

29; prephilosophic k., 321; prescientific

n. 21, 3Il nn. 5 and 6, 313 nn. 7, 9, and

interpersonal relationships, 495 Introspection: and Aquinas, 769 n. 16

and scientific k., 275-79; rooted in identity, 631; and subject-object duality,

10,315 n. 11,317 n. 13,321 n. 18,331

Mandonnet, Pierre, 565

Is it? II; and cognitive process, 13 Is it so? II; and cognitive process, 13; and

211,303; viewed as looking, 211; wisdom, understanding, and k. grow, 23-25 and

n. 23, 347 n·36, 357 n. 48, 359 n. 49, 365 n. 64,373 n. 75,379 nn. I and 2, 399 n. 18,401 nn. 19 and 20, 405 n. 23,

Marriage: of Christ and church, 495 Materialism, 317 Matter: common m. and definition, 205; common m. differs from individual m.,

understanding of mysteries, 43, 93 Jansen, B., 299 n. 32, 633 Jansenius/Jansenists, 95, 99 Joachim of Flora, 233, 259, 261 John Damascene, 8t, 195 n. 36 John of Naples, 617 John of 8t Thomas, 221 and n. 67, 229,

295, 619, 621-25, 785 and n. 23 Judgment(s): and cognitive process, 13, 317; as compound word, 567; and evidence, II, 105-107, 135--37, 139, 143, 149, 203207, 567; and intellectual emanation, 135--37, 139, 14$ j. determines us as second act, 139; j. about theological understanding, 49-51; and person, 319; as second act/operation, II, 567; and validity of all cognitive acts, 13-15; various kinds oftheologicalj., 49-51 Just; justified: are in God as known in knower and beloved in lover, 507-21; and divine indwelling, 5°7-13 Justification, 427 Kant,!., 583 Kenoticism, 315 Kingdom of God: and divine missions, 495 Kittel, G., 451 n. 5 Knowledge: and conclusions, 25; degrees of, -657; and distinction of critical and naive realism, 321; immediate k., 17g; is experience, undex:standing, and judging,

n. 13,43,45-47,49, 57, 99, 101, 395, 749-55,761 Known in knower: and beloved in lover,

675--"J7; and indwelling, 505-21 Krempel, A., 727--'29, 740 Learning, way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Lebon,]., 91 n. 55 Lennerz, H., 273 n. 19 Liberalism, 97, 99, 323 Light: further determinations of, 139; general fundamental!. of intellect, 139; participation in eternal 1., 139 Light of glory: absolutely and formally supernatural, 471--'73 and n. 29; and filiation (sonship), 473 Likeness: and absence of unlikeness in divine knowing, 197, 30g; and truth, 199-201; in God, 201-203; in nature, and generation, 191--93, 199--'203 Loci: theologlcal, 37-39 and n. 21 Logical simultaneity: way of, 61, 63-65, 65,67 Lombard, Pet~r, 753 Lonergan, Bernard, 5 and nn. 3-5, 15 n. 8,

19 n. II, 21 n. 12, 23 n. 13, 33 n. 18, 35 n. 19. 39 n. 22, 45 n. 25, 51 n. 26, 71 n. 45. 81 n. 50, 83 n. 52, 103 n. 58, '105 n. 60, II3 and n. 67, II9 n. 73, 135 n. 5. 135 and nn. 6 and 7, 143-45 n. II, 147 nn. 12 and 14, 149 n. 15, 175 n. 22, 185 n. 27, 191 n. 34, 203 n. 55, 205 n. 45,


407 n. 24,409 n. 26, 447 n. 4, 455 n. 12, 5 13 n. Il9, 535 nn. 3 and 4, 545 n. 7, 547 n. 8, 569 n. 6, 577, 637 n. 3, 641 n. 4, 643 n. 5, 667 n. 8, 687 n. I, 691 n. 2, 693 n. 3, 703 n. 4, 717 n. 5, 745 and n. 3, 759 n. 7, 773--'75 n. 17, 775 n.18 Looking: knowledge viewed as, 21 I Love: analogy of 1.,

671~81;

and beloved

in· lover, 125, 135 n. 4, 21g-29, 675-77

(see also Beloved in lover); as complacentia, 67S; and divine indwelling, 501-1S; divine 1. and supernatural order, 483 and n. 48; emanation of, and word, 199203; essential and notional 1., 355-57, 473-77; as essential term, 355-57; and goal of theology, III-13; and mtellectual emanation, 181-89, 199-203, 671-81; 1. in God understood essentially and notionally, 679-81; 1. unitive, 675-77; notional and proceeding 1., 473-77; objects of divine I., 475; proceeds from grasp and affirmation of goodness, 237; proceeds from intellect, 137, 183, 679; proceeds from judgment of value, 355; proceeds from mental word, 225, 2'27, 615--21, 679; and processW operati, 619; as proper term, 355-57; as rational and good, 253; as related to speaker and word, 251 and n. 12; and will, 181, 675; and willing the good, 493--95 Luck, 61 and n. 31


Magisterium: and understanding of mysteries, 33-35, 59, 121; and unity of sciences, 103

205; m. of cause, 579, 593; m. of cause and cause ofm., 607; and senses, 205 Mean: Catholic m., 99 Meaning: in data of human sciences, 33; and definition, 591; in word of God, 33 Measure: m. of revealed truth is divine understanding, 59 Mechanism,

3~I

Mersch, E., 503 n. 92 Metaphysics (immanent operations, relations, the subsistent, person): m. is scientific knowledge, of things through ultimate causes, 277; and notion. of person, 309, 3Il; and trinitarian theology,

3 Method: in sciences, 9; in theology, 7-1 r Methodological uncertainty: after Middle Ages, 89, 95, 99 Metonymy, 31, 745 Missiology, 85, 115 Mission(s), divine: analogy with human m., 483-91; and appropriate external term, see Appropriate external term; constitution of, 455-67; divine m. ordered to each other, 479-83; and dogmatic way, 67; formality (ratio) of divine m., 483-91; and incarnation,

483---85, 487-89; and local movement, 483-8S; m. of Holy Spirit, 449-51, 453-55, 479-83,485-91; m. of Son, 447-49, 479-83, 485-91; and new

·808

Index

80g

personal relations, 487; and new series of operations, 485; and notional love,

661,665; and supernatural, 645-59 Naturallaw(s): and real internal relations,

473-77; and processions, 45I-5g; and relation of origin, 451-53, 455-67, 477 and n. 36; single total end to both m.,

693 Natural sciences: and human sciences, 77 Natural theology: and consequent truth, 41; and problem for theological understanding, 49-51, 747; and understanding of mysteries, 41 Nature: and active and passive potency, 539-41, 55S; in Aquinas, 53g; for Aristotle, 193; divine procession in manner of a n. that is spiritual, intellectual, volitional, 779; and doctrine of vital act, 55g; as essence, 193-97, 539; as .corm more than as .matter, 539; and grace, 655; natural desire to know is a 'nature,' 647; as principle of movement and rest in that in which it is primarily and per se and not by accident, 327, 369, 539; as principle of operation, 193, 197-99, 273; and real internal relations, 689-gl; and spirit, 77; term 'nature' applied to God, 193-95; as used at Chalcedon, 91 Necessity: autonomous intellectual n., 31.9; and divine consciousness, 16g Nestorianism, 91, 315 Newman,John Henry, 29 Nicea, Council of, 85, 91, 93, 97, 99, 157. 287,779 Noesis noCseOs, '631 Nominalism/nominalists, 233 Noncontradiction, principle of, see Contradiction, principle 'of Nonscripturallanguage: and symbols of faith, gl Notes: theological, 39 n. 21, 73 and n. 46,

487; stages in fulfilling m., 487-89; and systematic way, 69; visible and invisible m., 491-99; word 'm.' understood in two ways (procession and effects), 451-53 Misunderstanding, 47 (see also Understanding: poor, Problem: and poor, System: poor) Modernism, 97, 99, 323 Modes of being: and divine 'persons, 377, '391-97; and relations, 395; and the subsistent, 395 Molina, L., 295, 421 Monarchy: divine m., 353 n. 38 Monophysitism, 91 and n. 55, 91, 315 Motion: and action-passion, 283, 285, 543-

47 Movement: and act of what is complete, 369; fundamental m. and further m., IOg---II; intellectual m. not understood by people involved, 87; threefold m. to theological goal, 755-61; twofold m. to theological goal, 59-67, 109. See also Dogmatic way, Object, Systematic way Multiplicity: and intellect, 101 Multitude: and perfection, 425-27 Mystery: hidden in God, 151, 6~1; and problem, 153. See also Understanding of mysteries Mystical body: and end of divine missions,

495 'Mystici corporis,' 503 n. 92 Names: divine, 243 Natural: and intentional, 141, 197, 203,

73, 75 Notional: n. and essential attributes, 265-

I i l

Index

Notional acts: 353, 361, 369-73; and divine consciousness, 385-87; and elements of trinitarian theology, g85; and essential act, 389-g1; four·principal n.a., 385;

standing differs from o. of definition

n.a. autonomous, 371;.n.a. conscious,

objective/end/goal, 13, 101, 105, 107, 203-2 07, 561 , 563-65, 597, 603-605;

371; n.a. order in 371; n,a. 371; n.a.

eternal, 371; n.a. foundation of God, 371-'73; n.a. intellectual, natural, 369; n.a. necessary, rational, 371; n.a. voluntary,

37$ and personal properties, 353, 369, 373-'75; and persons, 369; and systematic way, 69

Notional!ove, 355-57, 473-'79 Notionally loving, 355-57 Notions: five fundamental n., 353 and n. 38; and making known the divine persons, 353 Now: 'now' of eternal and temporal subjects contrasted, 401 and n. 19; n. is to subject as time is to its motion, 401 Numbers: in God, S35; two ways of defining n., 335. See also Three Obediential potency, 539, 639-41, 645-49 Object(s); and active potency, 561; conceptual and preconceptual 0., 559-61; defined in terms of causal relation to potency and act, 561; and developing understanding, 43-45; distinction. of, 605; and distinction of understanding and inner word, 559 n. I, 60g-609; and faith, 109, 3I9; God as o. of theology in sense of goal, 105; indirect 0., 569; as moving, 13, 101, 109, II7. 20g-207, 561, 563-77, 60S; o. of imagination, of understanding, and of inner word, 577; o. that moves mediately (through revealed truth) to theological understanding is intelligib~ity

67


of God, ·IS; o. of under-


or inner word, 205, 597-6ol, 603-609; o. of understanding is that because of which o. of uttering emerges, 605; as

and operation, 13 and n. 5. 75, 203-207, S67-69, 60g---609, 755; and passive po~ tency, 561; primary and secondary o. of divine understanding, 215-17, 633-37, 661, 665; primary and secondary o. of theology, 105; process (movement) from o. as moving to o. as term, 101, 109-III; process from o. as term to o. as goal, 101, III-17; proper o. in present life, 569, 575, 577; reducible to potency, act, mover, and end or term, 56r; and specification of act, 203-207; subject and 0., 2II; supernatural o. of theology, 107; as term immanently. produced by operation, 13, rot, ro5-107, 203-207, 561, 563-65,569, 60S-60S; and theory ofvital act, 547-53; three meanings of word 'object,' 561; two meanings of word 'object,' 321 and n. 18; two objects that move us intellectually, 603; two terms produced immanently, 605; as what is known through the true, 319-21 Objective: o. of first and second operations the same, 13 Objectivity,319-321 Ocular analogy for intelligence, Igl-33, 629. See also Perceptionist myth Olivi, Peter John, 547 One: ",:dds only negations to being, 347, 349; essence, existence, relation, subsistence, property, notional act of same divine person are one and the same, 315; in God everything is one

'8IO

Index

except ... , 231, 233, 255, 259, 263,

Originating and originated act, 16g; and

337~39, 349, 367, 465; interchangeable

real emanation, 163 Other: o. person and o. thing (alius and

with being, 347; one creator but three creating, 36g; one essence, one

aliutf) in God, 361 .

substance, one nature, 351; one spirator

Otto, Bishop ofFreising, 243, 245, 787, 789

but two spirating, 36g;, three meanings of 'one' (material, formal, actual), 347

Outer word: 31-33, 745; and existence of inner word, 563; relation of consequent

and n. 36 Operation(s): in Aquinas, 533, 535; distinction of o. not based on time, II,

o.w. to truth, 31-33, II7, 74$ si~ifies rather than is signified, 563; and

IS; and good of order, 493-99, 505-

theological hypothesis, 43; theological o.w. imperfectly, analogically, obscurely

i3; and methods, 75; object of 0., 19;

understood, 33, 745; and things, 563

and objects, 13 and n. 5, 75, 567-69, 603-609, 755; and presence of one person to another, 505; two operations of mind/intellect, g, 11-13, 31, 43, 75, 93, 105,203,403,563,~67,583;unde~tand

ing and conceiving as different kinds of 0., 607; and

unde~tanding

of mysteries,

Panneriides, 643-45 and n. 5 Participation: in divine life, 471-73, 497 Passion: and act of unde~tanding, 533 n. 2; as pati, reception, 533 n. 2 Passive potency: 533, 535, 539-41; according to Aristotle and Avicenna, 539-41, 555,607 and n. 4; and object, 561, 607; and possible intellect, 555

15 Operative grace, 551 Opposition: and distinct relations, 159, 165,231,233,247-55,259,263,285-89, 2gl,3 67 Orban, L., 633 Order: of discovery, 2g; excellence of 673; as fundamental notion in book, 523-25; in God, 'and notional

0.,

Passive spiration: compared with active

103

Patristic prior, 83, 89, 91, 1Ig; as related to

i

I

systematic prior, 95, 97-99, 113 Paul, St, 69 Peckham,john, 27 n. 16,

9I~3

and n. 56

Pelster, Franz, 565

505; and interpersonal relations, 309II,

31I-13, 313, 319, 32g; and judgment,

319i.meaning of for Augustine,_309; meaning of p. as properly divine can

Penido, Maurilio, 219, 625

be either subsistent relation or essence

Per accidens: and actuation of intellectual

distinct by relation, 339-45; meaning of

nature, 403-40S; meaning of, 403 Perceptionist myth, 301 and n. 33. See alw Ocular analogy

in regard to God, 333-35; ?1etaphysics of, 309, 3Il, 3Ig; 'person' predicated

Perfection: and act, 421-35; distinction and p., 431; divine p. and contingent

33?-39; Trinity needed for definition of pe~on as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 331; unity offive ways in question, 3Il. See alro Persons, divine

predication, 439-47; divine p. and dogma of Trinity, 377, 421-35; and divine relations, 421-35; and end, 42327; infinite p., 427; and multitude, 4'25-27; three de~ees of p., 429; two formalities of p. (act and relation or unity of order) but one divine p., 421-

analogously of God and creatures,

Personalism: 32$ exaggerated p., 323 'Persons, divine: are conscious distinct subjects, conscious of themselves as subjects and as distinct from one another, 323,

235; and habit of charity, 47$ is the Holy Spirit, 239-47; and mission, 455; and procession of love, 235, 675; really

43,45 Permanence of meaning, 97 n. 57 Per se: and actuation of intellectual nature,

367; are subsistent relations, 323, 325-

distinct from paternity and filiation, 255; and relation 'who from others,' 461; and

403-405; meaning of, 403 Person(s): and autonomous intellectual

29, 341-42, 365; for Barth, 391-97; and communication/incommunicability,

distinct from passive spiration, 255;

Aquinas), 309, 3I1, 313; essential meaning or definition of as applied

345-51; and consciousness, 315-23, 325 (see alro Person); and created persons, 349-51; distinct by relational opposition, 367 (see also Distinct, One); cl.p. know one another on side of object but are conscious of one another on side of subject, 385-87; d.p. subsist as properly as God subsists, 393; as essence distinct by a relation, 341-42, 365; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are persons in name, by definition, by metaphysical constitution, by conscious,ness, by relations to

and secondary act of existence of

to divine persons, 307-51 passim; five

one another and to us, 313; formality of

p. theology, 85, lI5 Paternity: compared with filiation as really

ing, 57-59; and unity of sciences,

ways' of determining what 'person' means, 309-11, 323-2$ and intellectual emanations, 321; and intellectual nature,

323-25,377--91; are distinguished not on basis of substance but of relations, 337,

421-35, 491-9g; and processions, 679; of questions, 2g; two meanings of 0.,

655, 673, 687 n. 1 Origin: conscious 0., 143 Original sin: and theological understand-

incarnation, 473 Patfoort, A, 219, 229

35, 491-93; and unity of order, 421-35 Perfection of understanding in theology,

will,675 Pastoral: p. situation and theology, 109-0;

wisdom, 23-25, 47, 63-65, 67, 99, 103,

Index

spiration as really distinct, 25$ defined,

acts, 371-73; good of 0., see Good; of learning, teaching, 2g; and perfection,

423; of two ways, 69; unity of o. and perfection, 423-27; of universe, 425; and

I

81I

distinct, 253; defined, 235; is the Father, 239-47; not a conceptual relation, 237; not really distinct from active spiration, 239, 25g; and procession of Word/generation of Son, 235; really


necessity, 319; and consciousness, 309, 3u, 313, 315---2g; constitution of finite p., 315; constituti?n of infinite p., 315; created p. distinguished on basis of substance, 337; created p. subsists through causes that are not subsistent, 351; defined, 327; definitions of (Boethius, -Richard of St Victor,


812

813

Index

Index

d.p., 315, 36$ in relation to us, 307 (see

215-17; not subsistent, 327, 347; under.

conditions of possibility of knowledge,

alro Missions); interpersonal relations of,

formality of being, 215, 241; under

39; and consequent truth, 39-41; and

formality of possible, 215-17

evidence, 603·and n. 2; and general

32$ in themselves, 307; and relations,

theological understanding, 49; Proceeding love: analogy of, 671-8r; as proper term, 357

.]1, II9, 125, 129, 309, 32$ and system-

Potency: accidental p., 639; and act, 535-

atic way, 67-69, JI9; what is constitutive

37; active and passive p., see Active

of, 367; with respect to one another,

potency, Passive potency; in Aquinas,

not subsistent, 325, 347; and notional acts, 361; as predicated properly or

307. See also Person(s) Pesch, c., 423

53$ essential p., 639, 655; first p., 537,

commonly, 357-59; p. of act related

157, (but internal) 157, (but not p.

639; kinds of p., 637-45; and limitation,

to act in several ways (productive,

of operation or p. operatz) 157, (but

Petavius, 459 Phantasm: reflection on, 569, 573, 595-

423, 427; and notional acts, 361; obediential p., 539, 639-4 1', 645-59; and

receptive either proximately as form or

according to the mode of p. operatz)

remotely as mere potency), 647-49; p.

159, 161; divine p. are conscious, 323;

97; relation between properly disposed

perfection, 423; as predicated in active

external p., 147 and n. 14, 157, 159,

p. and intelligible species, 593--95; and

and passive senses, 359; as predicated of

by which Begetter begets, 357 n. 48; p. of what we have conceived (sense, self-

understanding, ISS n. 18, 205, 567--69,

God, 359-61; as predicated internally,

evident p., and light of intellect), 603

181-89; internal p., 147 and n. 14, 149,

359; as referring to divine essence: 359

and n. 2; and real internal relations,

157,159,163; of love from speaker and

and n. 54; as referring to something

691; relations ofp. and what originates

word, 125, 181-89,221; and missions,

proper, 359 and n. 54; remote essential

from it, 237; specifically theological p.,

451-5S; mode(s) ofp., 145-47, 169; p.

p., 655; second p., 537, 639; second p. is .

57, 161 and theological understanding,"

without motion is relation, 239; and

38-4I, 45, 49; and transcendentals, 39;

relations, 125, 129, 159,231,237-39; and systematic way, 71, 119, 125; unconscious

57 1,573,575,595,6°3 Phenomenalism, 317 Phenomenology: transcendental p. an inversion of naive realism, 321 Philosophical knowledge of God, see Natural theology Philosophy: and system in theology, 25,

form or first act, 537 Power of begetting: signified divine nature

what is first in some order, 23, r61, 357 Prior for us:

Pragmatism, 317

Plato/Platonists, 2lI, 547, 581, 629, 667

Predication: personal and essential p. in

65 Positive theology: and dogmatic theology, 75 n. 47; and systematic theology, 57, 75 n. 47, 95, 121, 125-27 Positivism, 97, 317 Possible intellect: and inner word, ~205; as passive potency, 55$ and phantasm, 205i in terminology from Avicenna and Aristotle, 555 Possibles: and divine active power, 21517; and divine essence/understanding,

and understanding, 23-25, 45, 63-65; as

directly, 357 n. 48

93-g7 Physical premotion, 547 Physics: and two ways, 61-63, 757 Pius XII, 81 and n. 51 Plotinus, 635 . Poieru, 535 Posited: if relations p. persons are p., 363-

intellectual light, 139; intrinsic p. of being

109-I II,

1I3-15; equivocal

Procession(s): defined, 145, 169, 235, 765; divine and human p., 5II-rS; divine p., 151, (not a making) 157, (not external)

163; and intellectual emanation, 125,

p. from habit, 177, 179; two and only two, 125, 131, 181-89; within intellect

Precepts: and questions, 177

in human affairs and human sciences,

and from intellect to will, 221; of word

Predicaments: 267, 275-79; p. not causes,

77-81, 87; and transcultural principle,

from speaker, 125, 181-89,221

723-25, 740. See also Categories

79-87; univocal in natural sciences, 79, 81. See also Contemporary prior, Patristic prior, Scriptural prior

reference to God, 681 Presence: o~ divine persons to one another,

Prior in itself: 83, 85, 115; confused with

385-87; and free images, 503, 507; and

prior for us, lI5j strengthens faith, 93.

indwelling, 505-1$ and intersubjectivity,

See also Dogmatic prior,. Systematic prior, Theological prior

495; and known in knower and beloved in lover, 505-13i of object to subject, 141; personal p., 505; personal

p.

of order, 507; and psychic adaptation, 503, 507; and spatial proximity, 503, 505-507; of subject to self, 141 Prestige, G.L. 415 n. 28 Principle(s): analytic p. and real internal

lSI, ISS-6g, 171, 369, 659 n. 6; defined, 159; does not imply contradiction, 159; and intellectual emanation, 161-69, 171;

Probability: and theological understanding, 43, 61; '!"'ay of, 61, 63, 65, 67 Problem: conclusions and clear statement

149 and n. 15, 157,369,541,555,619 Properties: and notional acts, see Notional

of p., 55; fundamental trinitarian p.,

actsj personal p., 67, 351-53, 367; and

127-29, 135; and mystery, 153; and poor

1.

processW operati (per modum operatz), 149,

only in God, 167 Processio operati, 145, 149 n. 17, 157, 369, 541, 555, 619, 625, 659 and n. 6 Procession of operation, ProcessW operaticnis:

Prior and subsequent: and two ways, 71

and good

Procession according to the mode of a

relations, 247 n. 9

understanding of system, 25-29, 39

Proportion: between act and potency, 535-

relations, 691--9S; and conclusions, 25,

(see also Misunderstanding); technical

45,47-49,53, 63, 165, 167-69, In; as

formulation of p., 151, 153, 161; for

37 Proposition: and expressed species, 591; as



814

Index

inner word, 605; and positing synthesis, 6'05 and n. 3 Pseudo: p. problems and systems, 29, 39,

47,49,65 Psychological analogy, 45, 67, 69, 71, 125, 287; and different conceptual systems, 2U; different understandings of, 'and procession of Word from understanding of creatures, 213-17; drawn from experience, 221; and existential autonomy, 177-79; and order of notional acts and personal properties, 373-75: and poorly propounded, opinions, 131-33, r85-87; shortcomings of, 777; and understanding of divine processions, 145, 153, 169-81 Psychology (consciousness, intellect, will): and metaphysics, 141; and trinitarian theology, 3 Quantity/quantities: and real internal relations, 693 and n. 3, 719 Quaternity: not in God, 231, 233, 259, 261, 33 l

Question(s): and act from potency, 14S; as act in which goal is intended,.21; existential q., 177; as explicitly expressed, 21; and heuristic structure, 3Il and n. 5, 31S; order of, 23-25; practical q., 177; provides unity to a history of concepts, 3Il, 3Ig; as scientific, 21; speculative q., 177; as spontaneous, 21, 177; two

815

Quod quid erat esse, 569 n. 7, 577, 581 Qyod quid est, 577

Index

generic terms, 297-99; distinction of r. into subsistent r., r. of subsistents, and r. of constituents of subsistents, 279;

Rational psychology: and real internal relations, 695 Rationalism, 93, 97 Real: and absolutes and relatives, 281; and already out there now, 321; and conceptual being, 235: defined, 235, 247, 325; knowledge of r. in true, 59, 321; two meanings of word 'real,' 321 Realism, 317; naive and critical r. distinguished, 321 Reason: and faith, see Faith; in theology, 9,53-55,57,77; and understanding, 62 9 and n. 2 Reasons: and causes, 61 and n. 32; and coherence, 21; and fact, 21; and first operation,

I I;

and inner word,

31; and precepts, 177; and scientific question, 21; in theology, g--II, 63; and

distinctions regarding identity of r. and processions, 239; divine r. are conscious, 323; divine r. identical with processions, 2~P; divine r. intellectual, 329; divine r. not only an order to another but someone ordered to another, 365; divine r. really distinct are persons, 323, 325-29; divine r. really identical with divine substance/essence, conceptually

subjects), 249; mutually opposed r. defined, 247; mutually opposed r. as real and really distinct, 249, 27CJ89, 327-29, 735; and natural laws, 69$ and order, 421-35; and organic parts, 693-95; of origin, 67; and other categories, 289; and perfection, 42135; as personal properties in God, 367; and persons, 71, 1I9, 125, 129-31, 325-29, 365; predicamental r. defined, 721; predicamental (categorial) and transcendental r., 277, 719-29, 731, 740;

distinct from it, 231, 233, 257-61, 263,

and processions, 125, 129, 159, 231, 237-

267,281,291, 295-g9, 789; and dogmatic way, 67, 71; and emanations, 67-69, 349; and essence and existence, 729-

39; and processio per modum operati, 159; and properties, 67, 247 n. 9; and rational psychology, 695; real and conceptual

3S; and essence in the manner of a hypostasis, 36S; external r., 689, 699~ 713; external r. does not add to reality of internal r. another reality intrinsic to

r., 289; and real distinction in Trinity, 159; and real finite natures, 689-91; and real quantities, 69$ really distinct from

691; four real r. in God, 231, 233, 235-

one another, 279-89, 327-29, 735; r., accident, and substance, 269:-79; r. in Aristotle,.740; r. of created persons do

39; how~. can be really identical with substance, 267-79; and human good

and as subsistent constitute them, 353,

of order, 493-99, 505-IS; of identity,

363-67; r. in,God not added to supposits

737; as intellectual, 327-29; internal r.,

but bring supposits with them, 365; r. of

Relation(s): and absolute, 733-37; accidents and real internal r., 689; and analytic

687-97; .internal r. and essence, 729-33; internal r. and primary relativity, 739-

God to creatures conceptual, 717-19; r.

principles, 691-gS; and 'being to,' 28991 (see also Being in and being to); and beings-which and beings-by-which,

41; internal r. not mutually opposed are distinct conceptually but distinction

r. and r. as subsistent, 247; r. of same to same is conceptual being, 249, 719; r. of single subject in single order are single

understanding, 21 Redemption: nl?t defined dogma, 35-37 Reduplication: and being in and being to, 29 l

Reformers:

~nd

archaism, 95

729-33; categorial (predicamental) and

(Aristotle: four) kinds of q., 57-9, 583 Qyicumque, 69, 151, 157,363 Quiddity: as agent object, 203-207; and definition, 205, 781-83; general treatment of q., 577-87; and thing, 781-

transcendental, 277, 719-29, 731, 740; conceptually distinct from processions,

83 Quietism: intellectual q., 113

subject, 703-707; and finite substance,

has foundation in reality, 735; internal r. and scientific knowledge, 713; and metaphysical principles of things, 691;

not subsist, 351; as r. distinguish persons

in Lonergan and Aquinas, 739-41; r. as

r., 251 and n. 12; and souls, 691; speaker, word, and love each related to the others by a single r., 251 and n. 12; and subject, in creatures and in God, 237; subject of

687; distinct from substance by minor

and missions, 451-53, 455-67, 477; and modes of being, 39$ multiplying conceptual relations (by ,multiplying terms alone), 249; multiplying real r.

conceptual distinction in theology but by major conceptual distinction in

per se (by multiplying real orderings) and per accidens (by multiplying real

71, II9; term of r., 68g, 697, 699-713; three real r. really distinct in God,

237-39; defined (the order of one to another), 235, 247, 249, 295, 325,



r., 689, 697; subsistent r., 231, 233, 239-

47, 325-29; and systematic way, 67-69,

8r6

Index

817

231, 233, 247-55; transcendental and predicamental (categorial) r., 277, 71929,731,740; transcendental r. defined, 721; transcendental r. and ultimate causes, 721; transitive

L,

737. See also

Opposition; and unity of order, 421-35 Relative(s): and absolute, 697, 713-19; defined, 269, 697; relative simply and in a qualified sense, 713-19 Relativism: and the human, 83 and n. 52, 87,9$ and problem of knowledge, 317, 32$ and question of 'prior,' II5 Rengstorf; K.H., 451 n. 5 Resolution: r. to principles (sense,

self~

evident principles, light of intellect), 603 and n. 2; way of, 6r, 63, 65, 67, 757 Revelation: and knowledge of supernatural truth, 9; and problem for theological understanding, 49, II7; sources of, see Sources of revelation; and starting point of dogmatic way, 6S; and transcultural problem 83, 89 Reverently, diligently, and judiciously, 9, 19, 43, 47, 55, 57, 77, 275 Rheims, Council of, 241, 243, 785-87 Rhetorical understanding, 153 Richard of St Victor, 309, 3II and n. 6,

mystery (Vincent of Lerins), 45 and n. 25, 57, 63 Sanctifying grace: absolutely and fonnally supernatural, 471-73 and n. 29, 515; as created participation of active spiration, 473; exceeds proportion of nature, 471; follows upon God's love, 515; and special divine love, 475; and virtues and gifts, 497,5 15-17 Sartre,Jean~Paul, 2Il, 633 Schauf, H., 437 n.

I,

461 n. 23

Second Vatican Council, 123 n. 74

Sources: as loci, 37-39 and n. 21

Semirationalism, 29, 55, 95, 97, 99, 131,

Source(s) of revelation: 21, 27, 35, 37, 747;

153, 207 Sending and sent: and relations of origin, 455-67 Sense in act is sensible in act, 303 Senses; and corporeal and individual matter, 205 Sensism, 317 Sensitivity: as consciousness, 139 Sentences: and Aquinas, 2$ books of, 23 Severus of Antioch, 91 Sic et non (Abelard), 23

Schmidt, M.A., 243 D. 7 Scholarly differentiation, 79 Scholars: today's s. and medieval

Index

compil~

ers,753 Scholastic theology: and Humani generis, 121-'23 and n. 74; and prior in itself, I IS Science(s): as certain knowledge of things through causes, 5, 59, 105, 107, 731; collaboration of s., 103; common features of s., 10I-1OS; final stage of,

SignifY: what words s. and their way of signifying, 243, 245, 247, 333 Similarity: and absence of dissimilarity in' God, 197, 303 and n. 34 Simplicity of God, 185, 241, 243, 245, 259,

719~29, 731; as goal, 7-9; human s. and

37' Smith, G., 739-4' Sociology of knowledge, 27 and n. IS Solutions: imperfect s., 25-'27; in theology,

data, 33; natural s. and data, 3$ one s. uses another, 101-1OS; and ptescientific

25-2 7 Son: and filiation, 23g-47; has all that

knowledge, 107; stages of s., 719-29, 731; theology as, 7-9; two meanings of s. (Aristotle), 75$ unity of s., 101-103

the Father has except paternity, 291; is both a se and not a se, 127-29; is only~

and analogy, 55; divine s. of r. and truth of theological understanding, 59; and magisterium, 33-35; never exhausted, 35, 45; and redemption, 35-37;' and Trinity,37 Speaker: and intellectual emanation, r8I89; only Father is s. in God, 397; as related to word and to love, 251 and n.I2 Speaking: and generating, 397-99; s. word and spirating love, 253 Species: expressed S., 589-93; impressed s., 416-17; and knowing God by essence, 639; s. shining in phantasm, 593, 603 (see also Phantasm); and understanding, 15 n. 8, 531-57 passim, 577, 579; various meanings of, 416-22 Speculative theology: 3; and dogmas, 3 Spirating/Spiration: II3 and n. 66, II9, 127, 129, 139, 615-'21, 675; defined, 235; and intellectual emanation, 18189; and judgment of value, 181; and notionally loving, 181 n. 24, See also Active spiration, Passive spiration

begotten, 127; is Word, 191, 397; as

Spitator: and active spiration, 239-47; not

3'3 Robilliard,j.A., 219, 625

Scotus,John Duns, 133, 2II, 233, 299 n. 32, 301,303, 309, 31I , 457, 547, 617, 62 9,

mediator, 481; mission of, 447-49, 47983,485-91; really distinct from Father

distinct, 247 n. 10, 331 Spirit: as common and as proper name,

Rosmini, Antonio, 211, 633, 635, 64S-45

633,657-59,667-69,7 8grg' Scriptural prior, 83, 89, 91, 97, IrS; as

as person but not in spirating love, 255;

Ruiz, 295

355; law of, 77; and nature, 77 Spiritual: and intelligible, and moral

481; as redeemer, 481; sent by Father,

procession, 137; nature/procession and

Sabellianism, 67, 162 Sacraments: and theological movement,

related to systematic prior, 95, 97, 1I3 Scripture: contains much that has not been defined, 35-37; and understanding

447-49, 455, 465; the Son is God/God is the Son, 259; with Father sends Holy

of mysteries, 33-35, 37 Secondary act of existence: absolutely and

Spirit, 449-51, 455, 461-63, 465. See also Filiation

Trinitarian analogy, 173--77, 179-81; and relation to matter, 173i types of s. procession, 173--75. See also Decision; Will

85 Same: and principle of contradiction, 257, 265,281; relation ofs. to s., 249; s. both really and conceptually, 257, 281; s. genus, dogma, meaning, view, import,

formally supernatural, 471-73 and n. 29; as created participation of paternity, 473; exceeds proportion of nature, 471


as reason for special love in Holy Spirit,

Sonship: see Filiation Soul: Aristode's definitions of, 6gl; and real internal relations, 691


Spontaneity: intellectual s., 177, 179, 181; and sensitive consciousness, 143, 175 State of grace: 513 and n. IJg; constitutes a divine-human interpersonal situation,

818

Index

81 9

n.

517; and first and second act, 61g;

Sufficient reason: principle of, 145

and habit of grace, 513 n. I1g, 517; and known in knower and beloved in

Summa: and'Aquinas, 2$ and questions, 23 Supernatural: absolutely s., 471-73 and

lover, 517, '61g; refers to many subjects together, 517 Suarez, F~ancisco, 295, 309, 3u, 423 Subject(s): as a being in the strict sense, 401; as conscious person, 401; as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature,

II

n. 29, 639, 641; and divine love, 483 and n. 48; exceeds proportion of a nature, 539, 645-59; formally s., 471-73 and n. 29; and natural desire, 645--S9; s. character offonnal terms of incarnation s., 471,3 n. 29 Supposit: as distinct subsistent; 331, 345,

subject); as object, 141; and object, 2IIj as principle-which, 14$ as proper principle of intellectual emanation, 215;

Sutton, Thomas, 547 Syllogism: epistemonic or explanatory s.,

247; as subject, 141; 's.' a relative term, 399; three s. of one consciousness, 391 (see also Consciousness, Persons, divine) Subordinate knowledge, 33 Subordinationism, 67 Subsist: divine persons s. as properly as does God, 39$ minerals, plants, animals, humans, angels, God, Father, Son, Holy Spirit s., 347 Subsistent: and being and unity in strict

359; and relations, 365

119 and n. 73; and essential and notional, . 265-67,363; force ofs. is extensive not intensive, 747 Symbols: and internal communication, 79; and transcultural principle, 79 Sympathy: and intersubjectivity, 495 Synthesis: theological s. is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing, 17; way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 109, II7, 18 3, 235, 327, 757 System: growing and developing, 25; poor

sense, 347~49; defined, 241, .245, 325-27, 331; in God, 243, 337-39; and modes of being, 395; and relations, see Subsistent

understanding of s., 25-29, 39 (see also Misunderstanding); rejection of facts

relations; in us, 339

25~29j

Subsistent relations: 231, 233, 23g-47, 279, 337-39, 349, 39$ and constitution of divine persons, 35g; as persons, 325-29;

understood by s., 25-29; rejection of s., s. without synthesis with positive,

9$ truth of s., 749 Systematic analogy, 171, 173, 179 Systematic conception: and virtual solution of all problems, 23, 43, 47,171,173

as subjects, 239-47 Sub specie aetemitatis, 467 n. 26 Substance: and accident, 26g-71; ambigu-

Systematic prior: 83, 8g, 95, 99, 1I3, II5; as related to scriptural and patristic prior,

ity of word's.,' 401; defined, 271, .295; divine s. and relations, see Relation(s)j as

95-97,99, 113· See also Prior for us, Prior in itself

nature and so as related, 27$ and real internal relations, 691

biblical theology, 37; and:dogmatic theology, 121; and positive theology, 57 Systematic way, 61, 63, 65, 77, II7, 127; and dogmatic way, 67-72; and prior in itself 87, 119; task of within historical process~ 87; and that whose understanding does not require the understanding of anything else, 63, 6g, 77, JI9, 125

and gift of Holy Spirit, 471-73; virtually

401; eternal and temporal s., 377, 39g41 ~ (see also Eternal subject, Temporal

and relation, in creatures and in God,

Index

Systematic theology: begins from definitions of church, 35; contrasted vvith

Teaching: way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Technical terminology: need for, 25 Temporal subject(s): as distinct subsistent

in an intellectual nature, 401; but intellectual nature is potential, 40 3, and actuated per accidens before per

se, 463-405; is a s.of another nature besides the intellectual, 403; mutable and material, 401; needs other t.s. to move to second phase, 405; the 'now' of t.s., 401; obstacles to transition to second phase of t.s., 407-409; remains the same through substantial and accidental change, 401; self-revelation and selfacceptance of t.s., 405; three ways of transition from first to second phase of t.s. (understanding, belief, love), 405407; two phases of t.s., 403-409 Temporal way, 61, 6g, 65, Teresa (of Avila), St, II3

&J

Term, and object, see Object(s) That which and that by which: in c~eatures 339; in God, 241, 243, 245, 337-39, 34 1 ' Theological movement: 85, 87; and dogmatic movement, 85, 87 Theological prior, 83. See also Prior fdr us Prior in itself ' Theological question: and biblical question, 51; and dogmatic question, 51; and hypothesis, 51":"53

TheolOgical scienGe: begins not from data but from truths, 33 Theologica} understanding: II-19, 97; and analytic principles, 74$ as connected to antecedent truth, 33-39, 743, 7495$ as connected to consequent truth, 39-59, 743; deductions from, 749; and demonstrations, 747; as first operation of intellect, 15, 43, 743, 745, but linked with instances of second operation, 15, 745-47; as hypothesis, 43, 51-53, 747; increases, 97; in itself and in its expression, 31-33; in itself neither true nor false, 3r, 43, 117, 743; is understanding truth that God has revealed, 33; judgment about, 49-5 1; and natural knowledge of God, 747; properties of, 15-19; questions for, 21, 2g; reduces to uni'!y, 167, 749-55; and sources of revelation, 747; and truth, 93, 747-49; truth of, 31-59 passim. See also Understanding of mysteries Theology: and faith, 103-105, r07; as knowledge subordinated to divine knowledge, 33; and natural science, 749-5 1; parts of, 121; in relation to other sciences, 103 and n. 59, 107; as science, 5, 63, 10 7- 10 9, II9; spirates charity, 1I3; and subordinate science, 109; twofold aspect of, IOJ-105; and two operations ofintdlect, 105-107; as Wisdom, 103 and n. 59, II3 Theory: and hypothesis, 53, 749 'This': 581 Thomas Aquinas, 9-0 and nn. 1-3, 23 and n. 13, 27 n. 15, 29, 45, 67 nn. 3435, 71 n. 45, 73, 75 and n. 48 101 1I3 13 1, 133 and nn. 1-3, 135 and nn.' 4-5~ 139 and n. 9, 155 n. 18, 157, 161, r65, 181



820

821

Index

Ipdex

nn. 24 and 25, 183, 185, 187, 189 n. 31,

To be conceived: and to conceive; as

7S; as medium of being (and knowledge

191 n. 32, 191 n. 34, 195 and nn. 36-45, 197 nn. 46-49, 199 nn. 50 and 51, 201 n. 53, 2Il and n. 63, 213, 219, 22 1-29,

implying relation, 353 To be spoken: 'can be taken in two ways (predicated of Word and of everything

of real), II, 13, 59, 20g; and object as term of second operation, 13, 20g-207;

239, 241, 247 n. 9, 273 nn. 18 and 19, 277 ·n. 22, 303 n. 34, 309, 3Il, 313 and n. 8, 317 n. 13,329 n. 22, 333 n. 24,'335 n. 26, 337 n. 27, 339 n. 28, 341 and nn. 29 and 30, 344 nn. 34 and 35, 353 nn. 37 and 38, 355 nn. 39-41, 357 nn. 43-47, 359 nn. 50-54, 361 and nn. 55-57, 363 and nn. 58-62, 365 n. 65, 367 n. 66, 369 nn. 67 and 68, 371 nn. 70-7 2, 373 nn. 73-'74, 375 ~. 76, 399 n. 17, 40J n. 19, 403 n. 22, 4II n. 27, 415 and n. 31, 417, 419 nn. 33 and 35, 421 n. 36, 425 I)n. 3944, 427 n. 45, 433 n. 47, 445 nn. 2 and 3,447 n. 4, 451 n. 6, 453 and n. 10, .4?5 nn. 30-35, 479 nn. 39-41, 481 nn. 43.l.. 45,483 n. 47, 485 n. 51, 493 nn. 76:-78 , 499 nn. 84-86 and 89-90, 503 n. 93, 509 nn. IOo-101, 515 nn. 120-22, 531 • and n. 1, 533 and n. 2, 535, 537, 539,

541,543,545,547,549,551, 553, 557, 559 n. 1,561,563,565 and n. 4, 569-"]7, 579, 581, 58 3, 585, 587, 589, 591, 593, 595,597,.599, 601, 607 and n. 4, 609, 6I1 and n. 6, 615-25, 627, 629, 631, 633,

635, 637, 639, 641, 643, 645-59, 661, 663, 667, 671, 673, 675, 677, 679, 681, 683,685,707-709,723,737,739-41,755, 765, 769 and n. 16, 783-85, 789 n. 29 Thomists, 221, 229 'Thou': see 'You' Three: subsist in God, 331-33; ~ transcendent~number,335

Tiphanus, 309, 3II , .457 To act, 533 To affirm: designates essenti~ act, 353

understood by God and spoken through Word), 369; and to speak, as implying relation, 353 Toledo, Eleventh Council of, 433 n. 47,

453 and n. 9 T oletus, 295 To receive (pall), 533, 54 1-43 'To something,' 269-'79 To ti en emai, 577 To ti esti, 57.7 . To understand: either infinite or finite, 553; a perfection, second act, act ofw~at is complete', motion, action or operatIOn as act, 553 Traditionalism, 99 Transcendental: t. exigencies, I4S; t. laws,

as proper term for Son, 355; and reveal-

ing of human subject, 321; t. and being convertible, 203-207 Truth: antecedent t., 33-39, 41, 43, II7, 743; consequent t., 39-59, It7, 74S; consequent t. probable, 41; criteria for t. of theological undestanding, 5759; as essential term, 355; and faith, 319; formally only in judgment, 563; as proper term for Son, 35$ revealed t. measured by God's understanding, 749; and second operation, 43; and starting point of theology, 33, 107; and understanding, 93, 749-55 Truth-correspondence: and external relations, 7or, 703 Unbegotten; and five fundamental notions,

175, 177 Tr~nscultur~ movement, 85 Transcultur~ problem: 79-87; and ab-

solute features of interiority, 83; and Christians/Catholics, 83, 85-87, 99101; and God ,s so1· utIon, 89, 99- IOI', in New Testame~t, 83 Transference: and intersubjectivity, 495 Transubstantiation, 99 Trent, Council of, 85 Trinitarian dogma: and dogmatic way, 67 Trinity: and divine knowledge/being, 30$ understanding of in Augustine and Aquinas, 45 Trivet, Nicholas, 547 Tromp, Sebastian, 437 n. 1,503 n. 92 True: defined, 250; distinct from evidence, 203; as essential term, 355; and intellectual emanation, 355; and intelligible,


353; as proper attribute, 353 Understanding of mysteries: 3, 9, 33; as act, 11-19 (see also Theological understanding); analogical, 17, 29, 47, 107, lJ7, 15 1, 161, 165-67, 171, 745, 747;. and antecedent revealed truth, IS, II7, 743; and certitude, 3, 7-II, 2g--31, 43, 55, 59, 747; and consequent theological truth, 15,47, II7, 743 (see also Truth); developing, 17, 29, 41, 43-45, 45-47, II7, 433, 745, 747, 749; finite, 15-17; as first operation of intellect, 15, 745, 755, but linked with instances of second operation, 15,745-47,755; fruitful, 3,II, 17, 19, 29, 43, 47, II7, 151; as goal, 7-II; as hypothesis, 41-43, 747; imperfect, 3, 7, 17, 29, 47, 107, II7, 151, 161, 165~67, 167-69, 17 1, 273-74, 745, 747; mediate,


47, 15 1, 161, 165-67; 169-71; obscure, 17, 29, 47, 76, 1I7, 161, 745, 747; and problems, 53-55; properties of, 15-19; stages of, 43-45; synthetic, 17, II7; and the true, IS, II7. See also Theological understanding, Understanding Understanding; always better thiln not u., 17; and conception/concepts, 183, 657, 765, 77I (see also Concept(s), Conception); conditions of u. and systematic way, 73; created u. distinct from substance, from act of existence, and from operative potency, 195; divine understanding, objects of, 215-17. 66r, 665; and first principle in order of wisdom, 23; from another, 555; ~s grasping intelligibility in sensible data, IS; as immanent operation, 535; and inner word, 31, 125,.. 203-207,559-61; and intellectual emanation, 137; is a pati, 555; and knowledge, 317; as passion,pati, reception, 533 n. 2; poor u. of system, 25-29, 39 (see also Misunderstanding); as principal intellectual act, 629; and principles, 23-25, 45, 63; as proper act of intellect (Thomas), 133; and reason, 62 9; relation to truth, 31; resolved into category of quality, 553-55; strictly spiritual, 151; u. a doctrine and u. history of that doctrine, 57; u. and conceiving are different kinds of act or operation, 607; u. ofu., 631; and uttering of inner word, 603-609; and virtual solution of a body of questions, 25; wisdom, u., and knowledge grow, 23-25 and n. 13, 43,

45-47,49,57,99, 101,395,749-55,761. See also To understand Undivided in itself: and constitutive principles of a being, accidents, possibles,

822

Index

and conceptual beings, 347; and

princi~

Will: does not have anything going forth from itselfper modum operati, 227, but only _

pIe of identity, 347 and n. 36 Unity: actual u. and person, 347; actual u. predicated by analogy, 347 (see also Analogy);, actual u. and subsistence, 347-49; numerical, natural, actual, 347; of order,.423; of science, IOI-I03 Universal: of sense, 587; and understanding, 587; and (why,' 587

processio operationis, 227; and intellect,

III,

181-82 n. 25, 227, 673-75; and intellectual emanation, 137, 181 and n. 25, 199-203, 675; and love, 181, 675; moves

189-20g; proceeds from understanding of creatures, 213-17; as Son, 19 1 Word of God (spoken in history): and data in theology, 33, 65j is God, 50 7; as object that moves to theological understanding, ra7

itself regarding the means, but is moved by God regarding the end, 551-53; operation ofw. terminates at things, 227; and

Univocal: and prior for us in natural

vital act, 551-53; and wisdom, 673-75 Williams, M.E., 243 n. 7

science, 79, 81 and n. 50 Us, 79 Uttering inner word: and understanding,

603-609

Wisdom: and being, 629; folly as multiple as w. is one, 18; infinite w., 655; method as w., 103 n. 59; and order, 2g--25,

47, 63-65, 67, 99, 103, 655, 673, 687 n. Ij philosophy as W., I03 n. 59; and

Value: and end, 675 Vasquez, 295

poor understanding, 25-27; theology

Vienne: Council of, 697

as w., 103 and n. 59, JI3; and unity of

Vincent of Lerins, 19 n. 10,45 n. 25, 395

sciences, IOl-I03; and will, 673-'75; w.,

Virtually unconditioned, 319, 321

understanding, and knowledge grow,

Virtual solution: and system, see Systematic conception Vital act, 131, 227-29. 535, 547-53, 621,

23-25 and n. 13, 43, 45-47, 49, 57, 99, 395, 74g-55, 761 Witte, Johannes, 393 and n. IO Wonder: and light of intellect, 139; as

649 Volk, Hermann, 383 and. n. 9

origin of all scic;:nce and philosophy and

Voluntary: and free, 355, 373

theology, 21, 583 Word: analogy ofw., 659-71; compound

Way of signllying: see Signify

and simple w., 567-69; and intellectual

Ways: linkage of two w., 65-67, 95; two w.

emanation, 181-89, 199"'203. 353; inner W., see Inner word; and likeness, 199-

of inquiry, 59-67 Welch, Claude, 393 and n. 8, 393 n.

II

Whatever is received is received according to the capacity of the receiver, 25 What is it? II; and cognitive process, 13; and understanding of mysteries, 15, 43,

93 What? and Why? 579-81 Why is it so? II; and understanding of mysteries, 15

203; outer w., see Outer weird; as proper name of Son, 353, 397; as related to speaker and love, 251 and n. 12; w. that spirates love, 225, 253 Word of God (as immanent divine Word): as definition and as affirmation, 767; and demonstrability, 125; and emanation of love; 199"'20g; existence of cannot be demonstrated, 207-13; and generation,


COllected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Yes: and cognitive process, 13; and judgment, 13 'You': 'I' and 'You' and divine persons, 397~9; three in God who can 'be addressed as 'you,' 395-97

The Triune God: Systematics (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan)

The Triune God: Doctrines (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan)

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Insight

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Collection

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Understanding and being

Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3)

Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964: Volume 6 (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan) (v. 6)

Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2)

Collected Works of Poe

Collected Works

Collected Works

Collected Works of Poe

Collected Works

Collected Works)

Collected Works)

Wittgenstein: The Collected Works

Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God

Systematic Theology. Volume 1. The Triune God

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

The Triune God: Systematics (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan)

The Triune God: Doctrines (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan)

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Insight

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Collection

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Understanding and being

Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3)

Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964: Volume 6 (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan) (v. 6)

Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2)

Collected Works of Poe

Collected Works

Collected Works

Collected Works of Poe

Collected Works

Collected Works)

Collected Works)

Wittgenstein: The Collected Works

Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God

Systematic Theology. Volume 1. The Triune God

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected Works of Rudyard Kippling

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Collected works of C.G. Jung

Recommend Documents