The Postmodern Significance of Max Weber's Legacy

T HE P OSTMODERN S IGNIFICANCE M AX W EBER ’ S L EGACY

OF

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T HE P OSTMODERN S IGNIFICANCE OF M AX W EBER ’ S L EGACY: D ISENCHANTING D ISENCHANTMENT

BY BASIT BILAL KOSHUL

THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY

© Basit Bilal Koshul, 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–6784–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: March 2005 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

To my parents: Dr. Muhammad Ikram Koshul and Mrs. Shagufta Ikram Koshul My Lord! Shower Your grace upon them both, just as they cherished and reared me while I was a child! (Qur’an, 17:25)

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Abbreviations of Weber’s Works

ix xi

Introduction The Chapters in Brief

1 2

1. The Disenchantment of the World and the Religion vs. Science Divide: An Enlightenment Reading of Weber 1.1 Disenchantment as the Fate of Our Times 1.2 The Effects of Disenchantment on Practical Rationalization 1.3 The Effects of Disenchantment on Theoretical Rationalization 1.4 Religion and Science in Disenchanted Times: An Interpretation of Weber

34

2. Beyond the Enlightenment: Weber on the Irreducible Relationship Between Faith and Science 2.1 The Faith Dimension of Science 2.2 The Empirical Dimension of Faith 2.3 Weber the Person on Religion and Science

41 43 49 56

3. The Value of Science in a Disenchanted Age: Bridging the Fact/Value Dichotomy 3.1 Science: A Uniquely Modern Way of Knowing 3.2 Practical Rationalization and the Value of Science 3.3 Theoretical Rationalization and the Value of Science 3.4 Meaning and Knowledge: Bridging the Fact/Value Dichotomy

65 67 72 76 80

4. The Constitutive Components of Scientific Inquiry: Bridging the Subject/Object Dichotomy 4.1 The Methodenstreit: The Issues and Parties 4.2 A Logical Flaw in the Methodenstreit 4.3 Imputation and Ideal Type: Bridging the Subject/Object Dichotomy

9 11 17 28

89 90 96 105

viii / CONTENTS 5. Disenchanting Disenchantment: Bridging the Science/Religion Dichotomy 5.1 The Relational Character of Weber’s Methodology: Some Recent Valuations 5.2 Two Possibilities of Progress: Disenchantment and Self-Awareness 5.3 The “Progress” of Weber Scholarship: From Disenchantment to Self-Awareness 5.4 Weber and the Disenchanting of Disenchantment Endnotes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

119 123 129 134 137 153 169 173 175

A CKNOWLEDGMENTS

First: All praise and glory is due to Allah, who has guided us to this destination, for we would not have been able to guide ourselves had it not been for the guidance of Allah. (Qur’an, 7:43)

Thereafter: The completion of this project is the result of support, patience, and encouragement from two other quarters, my family and my teachers. All that I have accomplished thus far, and anything that I accomplish in the future, could not have been possible without the prayers and sacrifices of my parents, Dr. Muhammad Ikram Koshul and Mrs. Shagufta Ikram Koshul. Besides the prayers and sacrifices of my parents, the patience and support of my wife, Samia Nazneen Tabassum, was a most indispensable element that gave me the space and the time to complete this project. After acknowledging the debt I owe to my family, I acknowledge the debt I owe to my teachers. With respect to this particular project, I am most indebted to Prof. Otto Maduro. Beginning with the process of gaining admission to the doctoral program at Drew University, continuing through the coursework and comprehensive exam stage of the studies and culminating in the work on the dissertation, Prof. Maduro has been the most helpful (and demanding) of mentors. I am also grateful to Prof. Jacques Berlinerblau and Prof. Bill Elkins for their assistance and support in the completion of this project. Even though he did not make any direct/formal contribution to the present project, the mentor-friendship of Prof. Peter Ochs made an invaluable, indirect contribution. Having a fairly good idea of what it is that I was trying to do in this project, the support of my teachers helped me to improve the “how” of it. I am also grateful to my colleagues in the Religion Department at Concordia College for their encouragement and support. The conversations with them, both impromptu and during the monthly department colloquia, helped me to refine some of my ideas and express them more coherently. I am also grateful to Mary Thornton, secretary for the Religion Department, for her assistance.

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A BBREVIATIONS OF W EBER ’ S W ORKS

● BTL (2002) “Between Two Laws.” In Weber: Political Writings. Ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ● LCS (1949) “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences: A Critique of Eduard Meyer’s Methodological Views.” In Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 113–188. ● MEN (1949) “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality.’ ” In Max Weber on The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 1–47. ● OSS (1949) “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” In Max Weber on The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 49–112. ● PESC (2002) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Stephen Kalberg. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Press. ● PV (1946) “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 77–128. ● RK (1975) Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics. New York: The Free Press.

RRW (1946) “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 323–359. ●

SPWR (1946) “The Social Psychology of World Religions.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 267–322. ●

xii / ABBREVIATIONS OF WEBER’S WORKS SR (1993) The Sociology of Religion. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. ●

● SV (1946) “Science as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber. Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 129–156.

I NTRODUCTION

Shortly after Max Weber died in 1920, Wittenberg characterized him as “a child of the Enlightenment born too late” and described his scholarship as “a vitriolic attack on religion.” With only a few notable exceptions, the subsequent evaluation of Weber’s legacy has been a variation of Wittenberg’s assessment. For example, Hekman (1994) has asserted that “the central dichotomies of Enlightenment thought” (i.e., fact vs. value and subject vs. object) serve as the foundation of Weber’s “philosophy of social science as well as his ethics.” Gane (2002) concurs with Hekman’s assessment. Casanova (1994) argues that Weber’s thesis about the “disenchantment of the world” has “its ideological origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion.” In making this assessment, Casanova is echoing Schluchter (1989). In sum, secondary literature on Weber has largely characterized Weber’s scholarship as (a) merely an expression of Enlightenment thought, and (b) inimically hostile to religion. If this is indeed the case, then Weber’s scholarship is largely irrelevant to contemporary discussions about formulating post-Enlightenment models of discourse and inquiry that hold the promise of transcending the limitations of disenchantment and investing contemporary culture with meaning and significance. But this is far from being the case. Only a gross misreading of Weber would label him a “child of the Enlightenment born too late”—one who remains committed to the Enlightenment dichotomies of fact vs. value, subject vs. object. A careful reading of his work reveals Weber to be a post-foundationalist thinker, far ahead of his time. Weber’s reflections on the methodology of scientific inquiry (often called Weber’s methodology of the social sciences) replace the dichotomous logic of Enlightenment thought with a relational logic that posits an intimate and irreducible relation between fact/value (Ciaffa, 1998) and subject/object (Ringer, 1997). In making the move toward relational logic, Weber anticipates the trend in late twentieth-century social science that seeks to replace disenchanting dualisms with relational dualities—a trend noted by Lawrence (1989), among others. Weber’s scholarship is also a far cry from being inimically hostile to religion. Weber’s critical analysis of scientific rationalism reveals that suprarational elements are always present in the very foundation of scientific rationalism and that “only a hair line separates faith from science” (OSS, 110). Weber offers this valuation in the concluding pages of an article titled “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” Weber’s rationalization of the methodology of scientific inquiry reveals that suprarational presuppositions and extra-scientific valueideas are at the very root of all scientific rationalism—there cannot be anything called “scientific inquiry” that is not rooted in this “un-scientific” ground. Weber’s

2 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY exposition of the presuppositions and value-ideas (Wertideen) underpinning scientific rationalism opens up novel possibilities of facilitating a mutually enriching dialog between religious rationality and scientific rationality. Once again Weber is far ahead of his time: this dialog is now well underway between the natural/physical sciences and religion—for instance, Polkinghorne (1998, 2001) and Barbour (1997, 2000)— but it is not even being seriously contemplated by the social sciences. The failure to appreciate the potential contemporary significance of Weber’s work is in large part due to a particular way of reading Weber. Much of the secondary literature in the field of Weber studies is divided between those who see Weber primarily as a sociologist of culture (i.e., Mitzman, 1970; Schluchter, 1979, 1989) and those who see him primarily as a methodologist of the social sciences (Kalberg, 1994). Arguments have been advanced that there is no relationship at all between these two aspects of Weber’s work (Bendix, 1962). This dichotomous reading of Weber’s corpus reinforces the reading of dichotomies into his work. A defining character of the present study is that Weber the methodologist of the social sciences and Weber the sociologist of culture will be in sustained conversation with each other with respect to a central theme—disenchantment of the world. In the vast body of secondary literature in Weber studies, it is rare to see these two aspects of Weber in sustained conversation with each other. This is a significant oversight in light of the fact that Weber the methodologist of the social sciences comments upon, clarifies, and sometimes completes critical observations made by Weber the practicing social scientist—especially with respect to the relationship between scientific rationalism and the disenchantment of culture. An integrated and relational reading of Weber invests his work with fresh meaning and significance that is not possible otherwise. This reading shows Weber’s corpus to be a veritable gold mine of insights that can make unique and significant contributions to the contemporary debates about the methodology of the social sciences and the existing cultural condition. The Chapters in Brief Chapter 1 begins with laying bare those aspects of Weber’s writings that seem to justify Wittenberg’s observation that Weber is nothing more than “a child of the Enlightenment born too late” whose work is “a vitriolic attack on religion.” Weber’s observations as a sociologist of culture can be interpreted as asserting that history has been a process of the progressive rationalization of human thought and action—a process that he called the “disenchantment of the world.” As a historical development, disenchantment is a product of the rupture between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism. While tension between the two rationalisms has been always present throughout human history and in all cultural milieus, it is only under modern cultural conditions that the tension reaches a breaking point. For Weber it is this rupture that has led to the complete disenchantment of culture. Disenchantment of the world brings with it meaninglessness as the penultimate value—meaninglessness as the value through which the universe is viewed and as the value that ultimately determines human existence in the universe. I integrate Weber’s observations from Science as a Vocation, Religious Rejection of the World and Its Directions, and The Social Psychology of World Religions to provide a detailed description of disenchantment.

INTRODUCTION / 3 Weber’s analysis suggests that the rupture between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism—and the resultant disenchantment—cannot be redressed by any modern or premodern means. Schluchter (1989) and Casanova (1994) identify Weber’s disenchantment thesis with the process of secularization and posit that it is an expression of Weber’s judgment that the rift between religion and science is permanent. Consequently, disenchantment is the inevitable and irreversible “fate of our times” according to Weber’s sociological analysis of culture. Chapter 2 offers an alternative reading of Weber’s work. I argue that while Weber’s disenchantment thesis can be interpreted as the description of a historical process, it is neither a prescription for modern culture nor the product of some immutable evolutionary process. In making this argument, I turn to Weber’s analysis of the philosophical and epistemological underpinning of (social) scientific inquiry—often called Weber’s “methodology of the social sciences.” While other writings from Weber are included in the discussion, the article titled “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” is at the center of the discussion in chapter 2. In his methodological writings, Weber demonstrates acute awareness of the fact that religion and science have completely distinct identities. The tone and frequency with which he makes this observation make it appear that his methodological insights affirm his sociological insights that the divide between religion and science is natural and unbridgeable. But at the end of the discussion summarizing his position on the philosophical and epistemological underpinnings of (social) scientific inquiry, Weber states: We are now at the end of this discussion, the only purpose of which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith and to make explicit the meaning of the quest for social and economic [i.e., cultural] knowledge. (OSS, 110)

Löwith (1989) offers an insightful analysis of this particular observation by Weber and identifies it as a critical aspect of understanding “Weber’s Position on Science.” Löwith notes that Weber’s understanding of science is predicated on positing an intimate and irreducible link between faith and science. For Weber, while science is a rational inquiry of empirical reality, it is underpinned by a variety of supra-rational elements. Weber posits that the activity of scientific inquiry is not possible without a suprarational (i.e., faithful) affirmation of the nonrational presuppositions and extra-scientific value-ideas that lie at its roots. Conversely, belief in ultimate values shapes the way human beings behave in the world and rationally articulate their vision of the world and of their place in it. Weber posits that all such actions and rationally expressed ideas generated by belief in ultimate values (i.e., faith) provide the cultural science with material that they can investigate—and provide “objective knowledge” about. On all of these accounts, Weber’s understanding of science posits an intimate relation between faith and science. While Weber the sociologist of culture documents constant and progressively intensifying conflict between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism, Weber the methodologist of science sees an intimate and irreducible proximity between faith and science. While chapter 2 establishes the fact that Weber sees an intimate proximity between faith and science, my argument goes further—I see Weber establishing a bridge between faith and science. Chapters 3–5 will present evidence supporting this

4 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY hypothesis. Summarily stated these three chapters will explore the “what?” “how?” and “why?” of science according to Weber. Chapter 3 will address the question “What does science study?”—Weber’s answer to this question bridges the fact/value dichotomy. Chapter 4 will attend to the question “How does science arrive at an objectively valid description of reality?”—Weber’s answer to this question bridges the subject/object dichotomy. Chapter 5 will explore the question “Why does one undertake a scientific investigation of culture?”—Weber’s answer to this question bridges the religion/science dichotomy. Taken together, Weber’s bridging of these dichotomies bridges the “hair-line which separates science from faith.” I begin presenting the evidence of a Weberian bridge linking faith and science in chapter 3. In this chapter I address the question: What does (cultural) science study? In identifying meaning (Sinn) as the ultimate object of scientific investigation, Weber bridges the fact/value dichotomy because the very concept of “meaning” is possible only by bridging the fact/value dichotomy. For Weber, all human culture and all human activity that produces culture is made possible by the meaning (Sinn) that human beings confer upon a finite segment of empirical reality. At this level meaning is a value that produces human culture. But at the same time meaning is the most important (perhaps all important) fact that (cultural) scientists investigate and try to explicate in scientifically objective terms. In the final analysis it is the meaning that social actors invest in cultural institutions and acts that brings these institutions and acts into existence and creates the facts that (cultural) scientists deem worthy of study. At this level meaning (Sinn) is the penultimate fact that (cultural) scientists study. Weber goes on to address two other critical questions that shed greater light on the fact/value character of meaning (Sinn). He addresses the question “What contribution can the scientific study of facts make to the understanding of values?” Furthermore, “What is the value of science itself as a fact of human culture (i.e., as an activity that modern cultural beings find meaningful?).” These two questions take on special significance in light of Weber’s contention that science can neither produce value nor pass judgment on values. But, for Weber, it is nonetheless the most precise analytical tool that cultural beings have at their disposal to gain uniquely valuable knowledge about the values that human beings find meaningful. Chowers (1995) notes that irrespective of the angle from which one approaches Weber’s work, the investigation, understanding, and critical role of meaning (Sinn) in human culture is at the heart of Weber’s methodology of scientific inquiry. Consequently, Weber’s methodology of the social sciences establishes the categorical indispensability of that which Weber’s sociology of culture has documented to have become superfluous in modern culture—that is, meaning (Sinn). In identifying meaning (Sinn) as “what does cultural science study?”, Weber bridges the fact/value dichotomy. In explicating “how does cultural science arrive at an objectively valid description of reality?”, Weber’s methodology bridges the subject/object dichotomy. Chapter 4 presents evidence from Weber’s methodological writings to illustrate this point—a point that implicitly informed almost all of the discussion in chapter 3. When the cultural scientist studies any part of empirical reality, he/she is studying an “objective fact” that is a manifestation of a “subjective value” held by an actor. Furthermore, while the investigator is studying an “objective fact,” invariably, the orientation of his/her investigation has been determined by

INTRODUCTION / 5 a “subjective value” that he/she holds. Subjective and objective factors are intimately intertwined in both the empirical phenomena being investigated and in the processes of the investigation itself. Consequently, it would be a most illogical assumption that the scientific account given at the end of the investigation (i.e., the investigator’s “conclusion”) could be characterized as being purely “objective” or purely “subjective.” For Weber, the final account comes in the form of an “imputation” that is composed of objective elements (i.e., the ideal type and observed nomological regularities) and subjective elements (i.e., the investigator’s own imagination and cultural valueconcerns). In Weber’s methodology, an imputation is a “causal interpretation” that provides the scientific account for empirical phenomena. Weber’s notion of imputation integrates, while it simultaneously rejects, specific elements from the “objective causal explanation” offered by proponents of the historicist method and the “subjective interpretive understanding” offered by the proponents of the Verstehen school. It is not only Weber’s notion of imputation that bridges the subject/object dichotomy. Weber offers a detailed argument illustrating that all scientific inquiry ultimately produces knowledge not only about “objects” in empirical reality. For Weber, if scientific inquiry is done well, it ultimately lays bare the hidden presuppositions and value-ideas of the subject that has undertaken the inquiry. In other words, for Weber, scientific inquiry is no less a means of gaining self-knowledge by the inquiring subject as it is about gaining knowledge of objects. By the beginning of chapter 5, there would be sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Weber’s methodology of the social sciences bridges the faith vs. science, fact vs. value, and subject vs. object dichotomies. If even one (to say nothing of two, and even less of three) of these dichotomies pollutes Max Weber’s work, then a coherent account cannot be provided for a very important part of empirical reality, that is, Max Weber’s work on the sociology of religion, law, music, economic history, politics, methodology of the social sciences, and so on and so forth. The depth, breadth, and significance of Weber’s work are the product of a philosophical and epistemological understanding of scientific inquiry that is free of any of these dichotomies. Taking this as the starting point, chapter 5 focuses on the postmodern significance of Weber’s scholarly legacy. Chapter 5 begins with posing the question “Why does a scientist undertake a scientific investigation of culture?” This question is posed to not only deepen an understanding of Weber’s methodology of scientific inquiry, but also to understand Weber’s own motivations for dedicating his entire life to the pursuit of scientific knowledge about culture. I present evidence from Weber’s writing to demonstrate that it is not possible to adequately appreciate his answer to this question without bridging the religious/scientific dichotomy. The “why?” of scientific inquiry has an irreducible religious element in it in the form of a desire to transform the “what is” into the “what ought to be”—the very intellectual problem that Weber identified as being at the heart of all religious rationalism. Weber finds the “what is” of his cultural condition (i.e., disenchantment) to be deeply problematic because it is undermining passionately held values that he deems worthy of being held. He undertakes a scientific investigation of the origins, trajectory, and salient features of this “what is” with the hope of identifying the parameters and possibilities of challenging and modifying the disenchanted cultural condition. Weber himself notes that one of the major tasks of

6 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY religious intellectuals has been the construction of possibilities that make a challenge to the “fate of the times” plausible. Consequently I argue that, by his own definition, there is a religious dimension to Weber’s work insofar at it contains the resources that make it rationally plausible to challenge and undermine the “what is” of the disenchanted condition and offers a vision of post-disenchantment cultural possibilities. My argument that Weber’s work contains the resources that could be used to challenge disenchantment as the “fate of our times” is premised on the claim that the appreciation of this potential requires a recognition of the post-Enlightenment character of Weber’s work. Because of the importance of this point, the first part of chapter 5 concentrates on demonstrating how an Enlightenment reading of Weber makes his work largely irrelevant to contemporary intellectual and cultural debates. This point is illustrated by looking at the evaluations of Weber offered by Gane (2002) and Hekman (1994). They posit that Weber remains trapped inside the Enlightenment paradigm and then explicitly identify this as being the primary reason for his contemporary irrelevance. But this evaluation of Weber’s work and relevance is challenged by Ciaffa (1998), Ringer (1997), and Alexander (1983). All three of these thinkers posit that Weber’s methodology bridges a particular dichotomy—for Ciaffa the fact vs. value dichotomy, for Ringer the subject vs. object dichotomy, and for Alexander the real vs. ideal dichotomy. Furthermore, all three argue that the manner in which Weber bridges the particular dichotomy has a great deal to contribute to methodological and epistemological discussions taking place at the end of the twentieth century. I build upon the insights offered by Ciaffa, Ringer, and Alexander by first bringing the three disparate perspectives into conversation with each other and then taking their line of reasoning further. This synthesis is then complemented by Weber’s own reflections on “progress.” Weber notes that “progress” can lead to either differentiation (and subsequently disenchantment) or it can lead to heightened self-awareness and an increased capacity for self-expression. This discussion sets the groundwork to present the argument that Weber’s work contains uniquely valuable resources that rationally disenchant disenchantment—in a scientifically valid manner. Weber’s work disenchants disenchanting scientific rationalism on three accounts: (a) His analysis of the constituent parts of scientific rationalism lays bare the facts that it stands on nonrational foundations and that the practice of science is made possible only by suprarational affirmations of these foundations. (b) He demonstrates that while competing values (and value systems) of the worldly spheres cannot be rationally reconciled (the process of rationalization being itself responsible for the conflict), one can practically reconcile conflicting values in one’s vocational commitment. (c) He offers a theoretical image of the world that demonstrates that one can rationally and scientifically challenge disenchantment as the “fate of our times,” even though scientific rationalism posits that no such challenge is possible. Even though Weber does not provide a remedy to the malaise of disenchantment— Weber would say no scientist should even make a pretension of doing so—he does demonstrate that a rational and scientific stand against disenchantment is possible.

INTRODUCTION / 7 In sum, I demonstrate that Weber’s disenchanting of disenchantment is the further development of the historical process of intellectualization and rationalization—with Weber’s oeuvre representing a watershed in the process. Weber’s rational inquiry into the origins, character, and development of scientific rationality disenchants the scientific rationalism that had earlier disenchanted religious rationalism, which in its turn had initiated the process of disenchantment by shattering the enchanted symbiosis. Consequently, Weber’s work is a progression of the process of disenchantment. But Weber’s self-critical exploration and self-conscious explication of the contents and dynamics of scientific rationalism prove to be an exercise in which scientific rationalism is at the receiving end of the process of disenchantment rather than its perpetrator. The insights offered by Weber, taken together, reveal that disenchantment is the result of particular historical circumstances and particular valueideas embraced by particular cultural beings. Disenchantment is not the inevitable or irreversible fate of any epoch. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of Weber’s scientific, rationalized explication of the characteristics defining disenchanting scientific rationalism and the dynamics of its development. This reading of Weber shows him to be opening up new horizons of post-disenchantment possibilities at both the intellectual and cultural levels. Because I argue that Weber’s understanding of “science” makes a critical contribution to “disenchanting disenchantment,” it is no surprise that his article “Science as a Vocation” plays a central role in the following discussion. But when I reread Weber’s article titled “Politics as a Vocation” after completing the present work, I was struck by the similarities in Weber’s arguments in the two articles. One notices similarities in the flow and structure of the argument and sometimes even in the language that is used. The similarities are so striking that I have an intuitive feeling that an entirely different account of “disenchanting disenchantment” could be written from the perspective of Weber’s understanding of “politics.” This different account would parallel, enrich, and affirm the account from the perspective of “science.” While the former deals largely with epistemological concerns, the latter is concerned largely with ethics. Due to a number of constraints, I do not pursue this line of investigation in the main body of the text; however, at the same time I do not want to leave it completely unaddressed. As a compromise, I decided to confine to the endnotes the discussion of Weber’s exposition of politics and the contribution that this discussion can make to disenchanting disenchantment. In the main body of the text, the endnote cues that are highlighted and underlined indicate that this endnote specifically deals with Weber’s writings on politics, disenchantment, and disenchanting disenchantment. For obvious reasons, the discussion in the endnotes is not nearly as detailed as the discussion in the main body of the text; more often than not a quick observation is offered noting the parallel with his writing on science, and the relevant text from Weber’s writings on politics are cited. This perfunctory treatment of Weber’s writing on politics from this particular perspective does not in any way substitute for a more considered study exploring the similarities in the logical structure of Weber’s exposition of science and politics.

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C HAPTER 1 T HE D ISENCHANTMENT OF THE W ORLD AND THE R ELIGION VS . S CIENCE D IVIDE : A N E NLIGHTENMENT R EADING OF W EBER

Weber’s sociology of culture distinguishes between two different cultural conditions: enchanted and disenchanted. In the enchanted cultural condition, charisma or “extraordinary powers” (SR, 2) are thought to be inherently present in all empirical phenomena. Charisma is “either a gift that inheres in an object or person simply by virtue of natural endowment” or it may be “artificially produced in an object or person” that already contains a dormant germ of it through some ascetic or preternatural regimen (SR, 2). It is of little consequence whether this extraordinary power is “actual, alleged, or presumed” (SPWR, 295)—these are all modernist value judgments. The fact is that, for the individuals living in the enchanted cultural condition, this supernatural power permeates the natural world and it is very real. This is so much the case that, for the individuals concerned, the attainment of their material and ideal needs depends on the direct manipulation of and interaction with charismatic persons, objects, entities, and so on. In the enchanted cultural condition, the relationship between “supernatural” charisma and the “natural” empirical world can be described as one of complete symbiosis. In stark contrast, the disenchanted cultural condition views all empirical phenomena to be completely devoid of charisma or supernatural powers. In the disenchanted cultural conditions, all empirical phenomena are seen as the result of natural processes that can be rationally understood and technically controlled. Two important principles underpinning the disenchanted cultural condition are that “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play” in empirical reality and that “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (SV, 139). The claim that the world is free of all incalculable, mysterious, supernatural forces “means that the world is disenchanted” (SV, 139). In the disenchanted cultural condition, human beings do not need to interact with charismatic (i.e., “supernatural”) powers to meet their material and ideal needs; they seek to fulfill the needs through rational and technical means. Weber also describes disenchantment as the process of “increasing intellectualization and rationalization” (SV, 139). The following observation by

10 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY Weber contrasts the enchanted and disenchanted cultural conditions: One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization means. (SV, 139)

Between the enchanted and disenchanted cultural conditions, Weber identifies a third cultural possibility—that of historical religion. Religious culture seeks to establish a middle position between enchantment and disenchantment. In contrast to disenchanted cultural claims, historical religion recognizes supernatural charisma as a “fact” that is no less real (actually more real) than any fact in natural, empirical reality. But in contrast to enchanted cultural claims, historical religion rejects the claim that charisma is inextricably a part of empirical reality. From the religious perspective, the empirical and the charismatic are different but related domains. With respect to the relationship between supernatural charisma and natural empirical reality, the position of the three cultural conditions can be described as enchantment as the symbiosis of charisma and empirical reality, historical religion as the differentiation but intimate relation of charisma and empirical reality, and disenchantment as complete absence (or autonomy) of charisma from empirical reality. Weber’s research on the history of Western culture arrived at the conclusion, among others, that historical development led from an enchanted to a religious, and ultimately to a disenchanted, a-religious worldview. He used the phrase “disenchantment of the world” (SV, 155), to describe the modern1 condition that is the culmination of this historical process. Weber argues that while there is a movement toward disenchantment in every single culture known to historians, the complete disenchantment of culture is the unique achievement of modern, Western culture.2 In other words, disenchantment is a universally latent potential in all human cultures but this universal potential is actualized in only one particular, unique cultural condition— that of the modern West. For Weber, a fundamental task of social (or cultural) science is to understand the defining characteristics and developmental processes and discover the “causes” that have led to disenchantment. He notes: Any child of modern European culture will, unavoidably and justifiably, address universal-historical themes with a particular question in mind: What combination of circumstances called forth the broad range of ideas and cultural forces that on the one hand arose in the West, and only in the West, and on the other hand stood—at least as we like to imagine—in a line of historical development endowed in all civilizations with significance and validity? (PESC, 149)

Weber’s disenchantment thesis has often been interpreted to be both assuming and advancing the idea that there is an unbridgeable divide between religion and science. This interpretation finds its justification in the historical and cultural analysis offered by Weber in a number of his writings. Even though the purpose of the present project is to challenge this interpretation, an exposition of the thesis and the interpretation with reference to Weber’s work is necessary, as it sets the ground for challenging the interpretation, again with reference to Weber’s work.

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 11 Weber posits that disenchantment has shaped not only the institutional structures and procedures in modern society but also the psychological attitudes of modern human beings. Given the fact that disenchantment manifests itself at both the external institutional level and the inner psychological level, an adequate treatment of the subject requires that it be analyzed on both levels. Weber argues that even though the impact of rationalization and intellectualization at the two levels is intimately related, its effects are not the same and therefore should be considered separately. After noting that “rationalism” may have a variety of meanings, Weber further notes: It means one thing if we think of the kind of rationalization the systematic thinker performs on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts. Rationalism means another thing if we think of the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means. These types of rationalisms are very different, in spite of the fact that ultimately they belong inseparably together. (SPWR, 293)

To the extent that the following discussion is an exposition of Weber’s position, it adopts the definitional structure proposed by Weber. To the degree that it is a particular reading of Weber that is interested in a particular issue, it adopts its own flow of argument. The discussion in this chapter focuses on (a) disenchantment as the irreversible and inescapable fate of modern times; (b) the effects of disenchantment on practical rationalization (i.e., “methodical attainment of . . . ends by means of precise calculation”) and the fragmentation/ autonomization of value spheres; (c) the effects of disenchantment on theoretical rationalization (i.e., “theoretical mastery of reality by means of . . . concepts”) and the loss of meaning and significance in the world.3 The discussion of the disenchantment thesis in these terms seeks to establish grounds on which this thesis has been interpreted as being an expression of Enlightenment thought. The phrase “Enlightenment thought” is explained in greater detail in the latter part of the present chapter. For the time being, it can be understood to be an expression of the modernist claim regarding the universal validity and objectivity of rationality and reason. Enlightenment thought utilizes this understanding to formulate the position that an unbridgeable divide separates religion from science because of the differing relations the two have with respect to this universally objective and valid reason/rationality: one (science) is an expression of rational thought par excellence, while the other (religion) is an expression of irrational thought par excellence. While the goal of this book as a whole is to challenge this interpretation of Weber’s disenchantment thesis, the goal of this chapter is to present (partially, but adequately) the grounds on which this interpretation is built. 1.1 Disenchantment as the Fate of Our Times Weber begins the concluding part of his last public lecture with the words: “The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all,

12 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY by the ‘disenchantment of the world’ ” (SV, 155). He defines the terms intellectualization and rationalization, and links them to the disenchantment of the world, earlier in the lecture, in these words: The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not . . . indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. (SV, 139)

Even though there are a variety of factors contributing to the process of intellectualization, rationalization, and the resultant disenchantment of the world, Weber argues that the progress of science is the most crucial of these. Weber notes: “Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of intellectualization which we have been undergoing for thousands of years” (SV, 138). The fact that scientific rationalization and intellectualization and the resultant disenchantment of the world define the fate of our times has far-reaching implications for the place of religion in modern culture. While the processes of intellectualization and rationalization have come to be almost exclusively identified with scientific progress in modern times, Weber notes that they cannot be viewed in such exclusive terms from a historical perspective. This is due to the fact that, in its origin, intellectual and rational thought is intimately connected with religious thought. If one traces the genealogy of scientific rationalism back far enough, one finds that its ancestral roots are to be found in the religious domain. The fact that the genealogy of scientific rationalism can be traced back to religious roots means that the subsequent development and progress of scientific rationalism would directly impact the standing of religious rationalism in human society. In identifying disenchantment as the fate of the times, Weber begins with describing the commonality and the differences between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism. Weber posits that theology can be considered a type of science as it represents a particular sort of rationalization and intellectualization—it “represents an intellectual rationalization of the possession of sacred value” (SV, 153). Theology is illustrative of the exercise of rationality or the “imperative of consistency” (RRW, 324) in the domain of religious thought. Insofar as theology is a “science” in the most general sense of the word, it shares a fundamental characteristic with all science: “No science is absolutely free of presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions” (SV, 153). The acceptance of the validity and value of the presuppositions on which all and every science is built cannot be proven by appealing to “rational” or “scientific” grounds. Consequently, for Weber, the presence of such rationally/scientifically unjustifiable presuppositions in science evidence the presence of a suprarational element in the scientific domain. The presence of the rational in the religious domain and that of the suprarational in the scientific domain evidence the existence of common ground between the two. But, for Weber, a fundamental difference remains between religion and science, in spite of some common characteristics. This is due to the fact that theology (i.e., rationalized religious thought) “adds a few specific presuppositions for its work

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 13 and thus for the justification of its existence” (SV, 153). The “few specific presuppositions” that theology adds for the justification of its existence come in the form of the claim that certain “revelations” are facts relevant for salvation and as such make possible a meaningful conduct of life. Hence, these revelations must be believed in. Moreover, theologies presuppose that certain subjective states and acts possess the quality of holiness, that is, they constitute a way of life, or at least elements of one, that is religiously meaningful. (SV, 154)

Besides the presuppositions of revelation, holy acts, and holy states, theology contains an additional element that sets it apart from science. This additional element is the requirement of an “intellectual sacrifice” (SV, 154) on the part of the believer as a necessary prerequisite for the possession of the quality of holiness—the most valuable of religious goods. In the absence of this intellectual sacrifice, the individual does not have recourse to any other means in the attempt to attain faith or any other state of holiness. Weber notes: Whoever does not “possess” faith, or the other holy states, cannot have theology as a substitute for them, least of all any other science. On the contrary, in every “positive” theology, the devout reaches a point where the Augustinian sentence holds: credo non quod, sed quia absurdum est. (SV, 154)

Weber identifies “faith” as a holy state that can be attained only by a sacrifice of the intellect. No system of intellectual rationalization, not even theology, can vouchsafe faith to an individual who is not willing to make the intellectual sacrifice. Weber goes on to emphasize that if one cannot hope to obtain faith from a system of rationalization, such as theology, he/she is even more at a loss in this regard if he/she turns to some other science besides theology. In sum, faith is a holy state that cannot be justified on intellectual, rational, or scientific grounds; it can only be justified in terms of a sacrifice of the intellect. The fact that religion requires an intellectual sacrifice on the part of the believer to (among other things) a prophet or a church as a prerequisite for attaining faith, means that religious rationalism is fundamentally at odds with the spirit of an age that is shaped by scientific progress and scientific rationalization. This is due to the fact that science demands an unflinching exercise and defense of intellectual integrity in the face of any and all claims to the contrary. In return, science offers itself as a means to a type of knowledge that cannot be had from any other source: Science today is a “vocation” organized in special disciplines in the service of selfclarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe. This to be sure, is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so long as we remain true to ourselves. (SV, 152)

Since the modern historical condition has been, and is being, shaped by scientific progress, we as moderns cannot evade the consequences, implications, and requirements

14 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of scientific rationalism if we are to remain true to ourselves and our historical condition. Plain intellectual honesty and integrity require that we, as moderns, reject all claims of special gifts and grace claiming to provide access to, and possession of, sacred values and revelations because such claims cannot be justified on rational, scientific grounds. In sum, scientific rationalism and religious rationalism are fundamentally at odds with each other in the modern historical condition because of the differing attitudes that the two have toward the intellect. Whereas religious rationalism promises the gifts of sacred values and revelation in return for a sacrifice of the intellect, scientific rationalism promises self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts in return for the maintenance of integrity and autonomy of the intellect. This account of the relationship between the intellect and faith and the intellect and science puts religion and science at the ends of a mutually exclusive dichotomy. This dichotomy is reinforced by Weber’s more detailed description of the role that the rational intellect plays in modern culture. Scientific progress has disenchanted the world to such a degree that it is no longer possible to offer an adequate rational defense of sacred values and revelations in the modern historical setting. The modern intellect, if it remains true to itself, has to reject any such defense in the name of intellectual honesty and integrity. This means that religion is nothing more than an antique in modern times that cannot play a constructive or positive role in the life of moderns. Weber notes that many modern intellectuals maintain a deep longing for religion in spite of this fact. In order to fulfill this longing, such intellectuals attempt to fashion a type of religion that is suitable for the modern disenchanted milieu. Weber goes on to argue that all such attempts are nothing more than examples of intellectual chicanery that are devoid of both religious and scientific value: Never yet has a new prophecy emerged . . . by way of the need of some modern intellectuals to furnish their souls with, so to speak, guaranteed genuine antiques. In doing so, they happen to remember that religion has belonged to such antiques, and of all things religion is what they do not possess. By way of substitute, however, they play at decorating a sort of domestic chapel with small sacred images from all over the world, or they produce surrogates through all sorts of psychic experiences to which they ascribe the dignity of mystic holiness, which they peddle in the book market. This is plain humbug and self-deception. (SV, 154 ff.)

In a disenchanted era devoid of genuine prophecy, “the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations” (SV, 155). Consequently, modern culture is devoid of something corresponding to the “prophetic pneuma, which in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together” (SV, 155). In spite of the best attempts and most ardent wishes of some modern intellectuals, the vacuum created by the absence of the binding force of religion in the public sphere cannot be filled by the artificial construction of new religions by means of academic prophecy. Consciously making the intellectual sacrifice and returning to traditional religion is another response to the fate of the times. For Weber, this response, if done properly, is intellectually more honest and ethically more praiseworthy than the attempt

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 15 of modern academic prophets: To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him. After all, they do not make it hard for him. One way or another he has to bring his “intellectual sacrifice”—that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall not rebuke him. (SV, 155)

The individual making this choice turns his/her back to a fundamental characteristic of the historical epoch of which he/she is a part—the progress of scientific rationalization and intellectualization. Whether it is the modern intellectual trying to construe new religions in the absence of genuine prophecy, or someone bringing his/her intellectual sacrifice to the old church (or masjid, synagogue, temple), both are sidestepping the fundamental issue facing the moderns. This issue is the fact that while there has always been a tension between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism during the course of history, it is only in the modern disenchanted era that this tension has developed into a full-blown rupture. The locus of the tension between the two centers on the issue of meaning (Sinn). Weber notes that religious rationalism (in all its variety of historical and cultural expressions) posits that all the events in the world and the event of the world itself are inherently infused with meaning: At all times and in all places, the need for salvation—consciously cultivated as the substance of religiosity—has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practical rationalization of life’s realities. To be sure, this connection has been maintained with varying degrees of transparency: on this level, all religions have demanded as a specific presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men. (RRW, 353)

Religious rationalism infuses meaning into the world by positing that the empirical world does not exhaust all of reality, that is, a part of reality exists above and beyond the empirical world. From the perspective of religious rationalism, the supra-empirical domain of reality is intimately related to the empirical domain and to all of the events taking place in the empirical domain. Religious thought posits a relationship of the empirical world that is encountered by the senses and analyzed by the intellect, with a heavenly realm that lies beyond the senses and the intellect that can only be accessed through charismatic means. While the events in the world may not be fully clear and comprehensible (i.e., rationalized) in their own terms, they can be understood and made sense of (i.e., rationalized) when linked to the heavenly realm. From the perspective of religious rationalism, it is the positing of a relationship between the worldly and heavenly realms that makes the events of the worldly realm and the world meaningful and significant. Even though there is a clear distinction (or differentiation) between the two, religious thought posits a rational link between the empirical worldly and the supra-empirical heavenly sphere. But even in this religious postulate, a possibility exists that the empirical world be affirmed on its own terms rather than in relation to the heavenly

16 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY sphere. In other words, the potential exists that the two spheres, beyond being differentiated distinctly into “the worldly” and “the heavenly,” become autonomous in their own right. The tension that this potentiality engenders for rational thought is manifest in the event–meaning (or cognition–interpretation) rupture that is implicit in the dualistic world image that sees reality as being composed of a supra-empirical heavenly realm that is above and beyond the realm of the empirical world. Schluchter notes that the [n]ear-identity between cognition and interpretation [in the enchanted world view] becomes problematical with the transition to the dualist theocentric world view. Now cognition and interpretation can separate in the name of autonomy of the value spheres, and thus the relations between scientific rationalism and ethico-religious rationalism can become tense. (Schluchter, 1979, 45)

Religious rationalism posits a discontinuity between cognition and interpretation but at the same time attempts to maintain a relationship between the two in spite of the discontinuity. It is only by maintaining a relationship despite the discontinuity that meaning can be deciphered and attached to the event that is observed. Scientific rationalism, on the other hand, rejects any and all religious, philosophical, or metaphysical attempts to attach meaning to any particular event that is observed in the empirical domain, just as it rejects the attachment of meaning to the empirical world itself. For scientific rationalism, all of the events in the world and the world itself can be understood and explained in terms of laws of natural causality that are imminently present in the empirical domain. Weber posits that the tension between the religious claims of a meaningful cosmos and the scientific claims of a cosmos of natural causality represents the “greatest and most principled” clash between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism (RRW, 350). According to Weber, this clash finds its sharpest and most acute expression in modern disenchanted culture: The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then science encounters the claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way asks for a “meaning” of inner-worldly occurrences. (RRW, 350 ff.)

In the cognition–interpretation dialectic, religious rationalism identifies otherworldly meaning as the conclusive interpretation, whereas scientific rationalism identifies inner-worldly, natural causality as the conclusive interpretation. As long as the understanding of the world and worldly events remained tied to otherworldly meaning (in premodern culture), an autonomous development of scientific rationalism was not possible. But once scientific rationalism posited inner-worldly, natural causality to explain the events in the world and the event of the world, then it became possible for the (originally religious) differentiation of the two spheres to

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 17 develop into full-blown disenchanted/disenchanting autonomy of each sphere. This marks the divorce of scientific rationalism from religious rationalism. It is in the aftermath of this secession that scientific rationalism completely and consistently “worked through to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism” (RRW, 350). It is the fate of the moderns to live in a disenchanted age in which scientific rationalism has not only become autonomous from religion, but has also challenged the fundamental presupposition on which religious rationalism is based (i.e., that the cosmos is inherently meaningful). If the moderns are to remain true to themselves, they must remain true to their particular historical situation and not turn to the old churches (or masjids, synagogues, temples, etc.) of a bygone era in order to respond to the disenchanted fate of the times. To continue to affirm premodern religious claims about the cosmos and behave according to premodern religious teachings in modern times is akin to living in a permanent state of cognitive dissonance, that is, living in a world irrevocably shaped by scientific progress as if such progress has not taken place. The synthesis of religious rationalism and scientific rationalism is a part of the historical narrative which has been replaced by the empirical disenchanted reality of the differentiated autonomy of the two spheres—this autonomy is not something that can be either ignored or wished out of existence. This account of the relationship between science and religion in a disenchanted age suggests that it is the fate of the times that the two will remain mutually antagonistic because they are, and will remain autonomous. Before discussing whether this antagonistic relationship between religion and science is Weber’s final word on the issue, a more detailed account of Weber’s understanding of the effects of disenchantment on practical rationalization and theoretical rationalization is required.

1.2 The Effects of Disenchantment on Practical Rationalization Let us keep in mind that the expression “practical rationalization” refers to the “imperative of consistency” being applied to the practical–ethical attitude, and focus this discussion on the effects of disenchantment on practical rationalization. Weber notes that religious rationalism seeks to shape all aspects of human behavior in the world in line with an “exclusive orientation” that aims at attaining “the ‘one thing that is needful’ ” (SV, 149). This means shaping the entirety of an individual’s and collectivity’s worldly behavior with reference to a supreme, supra-empirical value: [T]he substance of prophecy or of the savior’s commandment is to direct a way of life to the pursuit of a sacred value. Thus understood, . . . prophecy or commandment means, at least relatively, to systematize and rationalize the way of life, either in particular points or totally. (RRW, 327)

In practical terms, the “pursuit of a sacred value” means that all worldly activity, be it political, economic, esthetic, or intellectual, is systematically and rationally oriented in a particular direction. Weber posits that such exclusive orientation of

18 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY human behavior in the world goes against the most fundamental character of empirical reality. Weber notes: “Scientific” pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other. The elder Mill . . . was on this point right when he said: If one proceeds from pure experience, one arrives at polytheism . . . . (SV, 147)

Weber posits that the economic, political, religious, and esthetic value spheres are examples of worldly spheres that have different values, differing in their demands on the individual. Both the values and demands of the different orders are irreconcilable in the end—just as they are irreconcilable with religious values and demands (RRW, 330 ff.). Weber argues that it is impossible to resolve the perpetual conflict among the different value spheres through any ‘scientific’ means. He uses theological imagery to further detail the impossibility of scientifically reconciling not only the differences between the value spheres, but also trying to determine the value of any given value sphere with reference to the value of another value sphere. He uses the term “god” to refer to the supreme value of a particular value sphere: I do not know how one might wish to decide “scientifically” the value of French and German cultures; for here, too, different gods struggle with one another, now and for all times to come. (SV, 148)

The inability of scientific rationalism to decide upon the worth of a particular value of a particular value sphere or to choose among differing values of different value spheres (thereby leading to a polytheism of values) is the direct opposite of the goal of religious rationalism. In addition to being in a perpetual conflict with each other that cannot be resolved by scientific rationality, the inner logic of the worldly values rejects the very notion of being judged from the perspective of a single, supra-mundane, otherworldly value. If anything, the “god” (or supreme value) from one perspective looks like the “devil” (or nadir) when viewed from another perspective. Weber notes: What man will take upon himself the attempt to “refute scientifically” the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount? For instance, the sentence, “resist no evil,” or the image of turning the cheek? And yet it is clear, in mundane perspective, that this is an ethic of undignified conduct; one has to choose between the religious dignity which this ethic confers and the dignity of manly conduct which preaches something quite different; “resist evil—lest you be co-responsible for overpowering evil.” According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is the devil and the other God, and the individual has to decide which is God for him and which is the devil. And so it goes throughout all the orders of life. (SV, 148)

While the gods of the different worldly value spheres are engaged in an irreconcilable conflict that cannot be decided rationally, they are simultaneously in conflict with the supreme value of religious rationalism that seeks to integrate all worldly values/behavior with reference to a supra-mundane ideal.

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 19 Weber uses the imagery of the “struggle of the gods” to describe the intractable tension that exists between the different value spheres (or orders) (SV, 152). Not only does this tension exist amongst the different worldly value spheres, but the worldly value spheres as a collectivity also stand in intractable opposition to the religious sphere. Weber notes: “[P]rophetic and redemptory religions have lived not only in an acute but in a permanent state of tension in relation to the world and its orders” (RRW, 328). The one point that illustrates this permanent state of tension better than any other is the stark contrast between the religious ideal of universal brotherhood4 and the impersonal, un-brotherly ways of the worldly spheres. The religious ethic is based upon an ordered and systematic code of daily life in which the command to love one’s neighbor is of supreme importance. Beginning with this command, the end of the religious ethic is a call for universal love of all human beings: The more imperatives that issued from the ethic of reciprocity among neighbors were raised, the more rational the conception of salvation became, and the more it was sublimated into an ethic of absolute ends. Externally, such commands rose to a communism of loving brethren; internally they rose to the attitude of caritas, love for the sufferer per se, for one’s neighbor, for man, and finally for the enemy. (RRW, 330)

For Weber, the progressive rationalization of the religious command to “love thy neighbor” culminates in the claims of a universal brotherhood as being the supreme religious value in this world. But this penultimate religious value is challenged by the progressive rationalization of the particular values in the different worldly spheres. Weber notes: The religion of brotherliness has always clashed with the orders and values of this world, and the more consistently its demands have been carried through, the sharper the clash has been. The split has usually become wider the more the values of the world have been rationalized and sublimated in terms of their own laws. (RRW, 330)

As the values of the world come to be rationalized and sublimated in their own terms, they become more and more impersonal, and the clash with the religious ethic of universal brotherhood intensifies. Weber notes: “The religious ethic of brotherliness stands in dynamic tension with any purposive-rational conduct that follows its own laws” (RRW, 340). This can be illustrated by contrasting the religious ideal of universal brotherhood with the supreme values of the economic, political, esthetic, and erotic spheres. But in order to adequately appreciate the modern clash between the supreme religious value and the various disenchanted/disenchanting values of the worldly spheres, it must be kept in mind that there was an original enchanted/ enchanting synthesis of the supreme religious value and the various worldly values. Weber locates the origin of the modern rationalized economy in pre-modern religious communities. He notes that the religious communities, centered around temples and monasteries, have always depended “upon economic means” for their own maintenance, propaganda/propagation, and other forms of “accommodation to cultural needs and the everyday interests of the masses” (RRW, 332). These religious communities represent the earliest example of collective rationalized economic activity because this activity was not directly dependent on the natural world

20 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY (i.e., procuring material needs by means of hunting/gathering or subsistence farming). Consequently, “[t]emples and monasteries have everywhere become the very foci of rational economies” (RRW, 332). In such a cultural condition, “religion” and “economy” stand in such close proximity to each other that it is difficult to separate the two. But with progressive rationalization, the economic market attains an identity of its own, distinct and separate from the temple, and economic values come to be distinguished from religious values. The emergence of a particular type of religious actor is a crucial factor in catalyzing the process of differentiation: The ascetic monk has fled from the world by denying himself individual property; his existence has rested entirely upon his own work; and, above all, his needs have been correspondingly restricted to what was absolutely indispensable. The paradox of all rational asceticism . . . is that rational asceticism itself has created the very wealth it rejected. (RRW, 332)

Rational asceticism makes it possible to conceptualize a “worldly” realm, characterized by economic possession (and by extension attachment to the world), that is set apart from a “heavenly” realm characterized by eternal salvation (and by extension disregard for everything the world has to offer). The differentiation of market and economic values from the temple and religious values, catalyzed by the emergence and spread of rational asceticism, attains fullblown autonomy in the modern disenchanted milieu when the values of each of the sphere come to be interpreted in its own imminent terms. Weber notes that a modern, rational economy as a functional organization “originates in the intereststruggle of men in the market” (RRW, 331). The impersonal, abstract notions of calculation, estimation, and above all money shape the interaction and behavior of human beings in the market. The market and everything connected with it is devoid of brotherly love among individuals: The routinized economic cosmos, and thus the rationally highest form of the provision of material goods which is indispensable for all worldly culture, has been a structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root. (RRW, 355)

The worldly economic order is not only based on a “structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root,” but it is also based upon the most impersonal and abstract of all worldly concepts, money. The more an individual shapes his/her practical life according to the inner demands of a rational economy, the further he/she will be removed from religious values: Money is the most abstract and “impersonal” element that exists in human life. The more the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness. The more rational, and thus impersonal, capitalism becomes, the more . . . this [is] the case. (RRW, 331)

The absence of love and the absence of brotherly relations are the defining characteristics of the disenchanted economic order, with competition in/of the marketplace replacing love and money replacing brotherly relations.

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 21 The origin and fate of the religious ethic vis-à-vis the political sphere is similar to what has been noted about its relation to the economic sphere. In the enchanted world, there is no “political” that is distinct from the “religious.” Weber notes: The ancient god of war as well as the god who guaranteed the legal order were functional deities who protected the undoubted values of everyday routine. The gods of locality, tribe, and polity were only concerned with interests of their respective associations. They had to fight other gods like themselves, just as their communities fought, and they had to prove their divine powers in this very struggle. (RRW, 333)

This enchanted/enchanting symbiosis is shattered by the revolutionary claim of historical religion. This claim posits that human affairs are not governed by a multitude of “gods of locality, tribe, and polity . . . only concerned with interests of their respective associations” but rather by the One God of the universe who is concerned about everything and everyone in it. This One God requires the believers to use all means at their disposal to spread His name and domain throughout His world so that all may come to know His love and the possibility of salvation through His love. This mission requires the use of “political” means to achieve “religious” goals. Weber notes that the tension between the religious and political spheres arises only in the case of the universalist claims of historical religion: The problem only arose when these barriers of locality, tribe, and polity were shattered by universalist religions, by a religion with a unified God of the entire world. And the problem arose in full strength only when this God was a God of “love.” The problem of tensions with the political order emerged for redemption religions out of the basic demand for brotherliness. (RRW, 333)

The tension that results from the differentiation of the political and religious spheres in the aftermath of the revolutionary claim of monotheism is as obvious as it is acute. The God of love demands that the believers use coercive violence to spread His message of love and salvation throughout the entire world. From this perspective, the only legitimate use of violence is in the cause of the God of love. The just war is engaged in for the sake of executing God’s commandment, or for the sake of faith, which in some sense always means a war of religion. Therefore, salvation aristocracies reject the compulsion to participate in those wars of political authority which are not clearly established as holy wars corresponding to God’s will, that is, wars not affirmed by one’s own conscience. The victorious army of Cromwell’s saints acted in this way when it took a stand against compulsory military service. (RRW, 337)

With the increased rationalization of the political sphere, the political authority comes to claim a monopoly on “legitimate coercive violence.” In this cultural condition, the political authority claims that it and only it can legitimately use violence, and it does so in the interests of maintaining worldly political order, and categorically rules out the possibility of using the same for the sake of some otherworldly value. Weber notes that the political state “is an association that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and cannot be defined in any other manner” (RRW, 334). Violence and the threat of violence are the defining characteristics of

22 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY the political state: It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the naked violence of coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of internal enemies. It is only this very appeal to violence that constitutes a political association in our terminology. (RRW, 334)

Rationalized in purely political terms, in the final analysis, it is power relations that determine the legitimacy of the state to employ coercive violence and not any notion of ethical right: “Reasons of state” thus follow their own external and internal laws. The very success of force, or the threat of force, depends ultimately upon power relations and not on ethical “right,” even were one to believe it possible to discover objective criteria for such “right.” (RRW, 334)

The competing claims of different state actors to legitimately use coercive violence give rise to conditions that further challenge the penultimate religious value of universal love and brotherhood. The political order directly competes with religion when “[a]s the consummated threat of violence among modern polities, war creates a pathos and a sentiment of community” (RRW, 335). This sentiment of community during times of war cuts across all social, ethnic, economic divides and welds the modern polity into a unity that is comparable to the religious achievement of constructing a social body based on the ethic of brotherliness. Additionally, “war does something to the warrior which, in its concrete meaning, is unique: it makes him experience a consecrated meaning of death which is characteristic only of death in war” (RRW, 335). For the moderns, death is an immanently meaningless event because the “why?” of it cannot be explained in any logical or rational terms. It is only the warrior on the battlefield who can give him/herself a coherent answer to the “why?” of his/her death and thereby infuse it with meaning. Consequently, the modern polity comes into direct tension with religious practical–ethical attitude on two decisive points: The very extraordinary quality of brotherliness of war, and of death in war, is shared with sacred charisma and the experience of the communion with God, and this fact raises the competition between the brotherliness of religion and of the warrior community to its extreme height. (RRW, 336)

Weber sees an intimate link between the claim of the modern political state to have a monopoly on the use of violence with the “meaningful” death on the battlefield: This location of death within a series of meaningful and consecrated events ultimately lies at the base of all endeavors to support the autonomous dignity of the polity resting on force. (RRW, 335)

In addition to the pathos of war generated by the modern policy, the bureaucracy of the modern nation-state further undermines the religious ethic. Just as the worldly

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 23 economic order is based on the abstract, impersonal notion of money, the worldly political order is based on impersonal bureaucratic management of society. This management refers to the application of rational rules determined by an impersonal authority, “the state,” in a “matter-of-fact manner, ‘without regard to the person’ . . . without hate and therefore without love” (RRW, 334). In contrast to the intereststruggle in the marketplace that directly pits one individual against another, political bureaucracy attempts to facilitate relationships between individuals, groups, and society. But this facilitation is not done for the sake of the persons concerned, or in terms that concern persons as such, it is done for the sake of maintaining an impersonal entity, “the state,” and in terms of impersonal rules and regulations: The more matter-of-fact and calculating politics is, the freer of passionate feelings, of wrath, and of love it becomes, the more it must appear to be an ethic of brotherliness to be estranged from brotherliness. (RRW, 334 ff.)

The increasing, and finally autonomous, rationalization of the political sphere replaces the religious value of love with that of legitimate use of coercive violence and the religious value of brotherhood with impersonal bureaucracy. The increasing rationality of the economic and political spheres makes the religious practical–ethical attitude appear to be that much more nonrational and irrational. But even at the level of nonrationality and irrationality, the religious ethic stands in profound tension with the worldly spheres. If anything, the religious tension with esthetic and erotic spheres, “whose character is essentially non-rational or basically anti-rational” (RRW, 341) is even more profound and intractable than its tension with the rational economic and political spheres. Weber notes that in certain cultural/ historical setting, there is a synthesis of the “esthetic” and “religious” spheres—a synthesis so intimate that every specific aspect of the esthetic sphere (i.e., visual art, music, dance, architecture, etc.) can be traced back to religious roots. Weber notes that religion has been an inexhaustible fountain of opportunities for artistic creation, on the one hand, and of stylizing through traditionalization, on the other. This is shown in a variety of objects and processes: in idols, icons, and other religious artifacts; in the stereotyping of magically proved forms, which is a first step in the overcoming of naturalism by a fixation of “style”; in music as a means of ecstasy, exorcism or apotropaic magic; in sorcerers as holy singers and dancers; in magically proved and therefore magically stereotyped tone relations—the earliest preparatory stages in the development of tonal systems; in the magically proved dance-step as one of the sources of rhythm and as an ecstasy technique; in temples and churches as the largest of all buildings, with the architectural task becoming stereotyped (and thus style-forming) as a consequence of purposes which are established once for all, and with the structural forms becoming stereotyped through magical efficacy; in paraments and church implements of all kinds which have served as object of applied art. (RRW, 341)

The synthesis is replaced with a tension-ridden differentiation of the artistic and religious spheres when salvation religion makes a conceptual distinction between “form” and “meaning”: The sublimation of the religious ethic and the quest for salvation, on the one hand, and the evolution of the inherent logic of art, on the other, have tended to form an increasingly

24 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY tense relation. All sublimated religions of salvation have focused upon the meaning alone, not upon the form, of the things and actions relevant for salvation. Salvation religions have devalued form as contingent, as something creaturely and distracting from meaning. (RRW, 341)

Even though there is tension between the two spheres, the synthesis is maintained between the two spheres “for so long as the creative artist experiences his work as resulting from the charisma of ‘ability’ (originally magic) or from spontaneous play” (RRW, 341). But this differentiation-harmony is replaced with disenchanted/ disenchanting autonomy with the increasing intellectualization and rationalization of the artistic values because “under these conditions, art becomes a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their own right” (RRW, 3422). Not only is an entire inner-worldly cosmos created by art (completely independent of the cosmos posited by religious rationalism), but this creation also seeks to provide “salvation from the routines of everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressure of theoretical and practical rationalism” (RRW, 342). Art comes to take on a redemptory function in a highly intellectualized and rationalized world and thereby starts to directly compete with religion on the all-important (actually only-important) issue of salvation. Speaking of art’s irrational origin and irrational claim of providing an escape from routinized modern existence, Weber notes: Every rational religious ethic must turn against this inner-worldly, irrational salvation. For in religion’s eyes, such salvation is a realm of irresponsible indulgence and secret lovelessness. (RRW, 342)

The inner-worldly salvation offered by art is directly related to the form of the artistic expression, whereas the otherworldly salvation offered by religion is divorced from all notions of “form.” Consequently, “[a]rt becomes an ‘idolatry,’ a competing power, and a deceptive bedazzlement; and the images and allegory of religious subjects appear as blasphemy” (RRW, 343). In a most principled way, the inner-worldly salvation offered by the esthetic sphere clashes with the claims of (otherworldly) salvation religion. Beside being in profound tension with the irrational esthetic sphere, the rationalized ethic of “salvation religion is in profound tension with the greatest irrational force of life: sexual love” (RRW, 343). This tension is the product of certain historical and cultural developments in light of the fact that there are historical and cultural examples that demonstrate that a synthesis between “religion” and the “erotic” is a part of the human experience. Weber notes: Originally the relation of sex and religion was very intimate. Sexual intercourse was very frequently part of magic orgiasticism or was an unintended result of orgiastic excitement . . . Sacred harlotry has had nothing whatsoever to do with an alleged “primitive promiscuity”; it has usually been a survival of magical orgiaticism in which every ecstasy was considered “holy.” (RRW, 343)

But this synthesis between the religious and the erotic is shattered due to certain cultural and historical developments that lead to the emergence of differentiated

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 25 spheres of the religious and the erotic. Weber describes the developments contributing to the emergence of the differentiated spheres in these words: A certain tension between religion and sex came to the fore only with the temporary cultic chastity of priests. This rather ancient chastity may well have been determined by the fact that from the point of view of the strictly stereotyped ritual of the regulated community cult, sexuality was readily considered to be specifically dominated by demons. Furthermore, it was no accident that subsequently the prophetic religions, as well as the priest-controlled life orders, have, almost without significant exception, regulated sexual intercourse in favor of marriage. The contrast of all rational regulation of life with magical orgiasticism and all sorts of irrational frenzies is expressed in this fact. (RRW, 344)

The rational regulation of sexual relations by salvation religion gives rise to the differentiated spheres of the religious and the erotic. This regulation is the middle point between enchanted orgiastic frenzy and disenchanted eroticism where sexual love is raised to the “sphere of conscious enjoyment (in the most sublime sense of the term)” (RRW, 345). Weber describes the religious rationale regulating marriage and its attitude toward eroticism in these words: [M]arriage is accepted as one of the divine ordinations given to man as a creature who is hopelessly wretched by virtue of his “concupiscence.” Within this divine order it is given to man to live according to the rational purposes laid down by it and only according to them: to procreate and to rear children, and mutually to further one another in the state of grace. This inner-worldly asceticism must reject every sophistication of the sexual into eroticism as idolatry of the worst kind. (RRW, 349)

The “idolatry” of the erotic sphere that has become autonomous from the religious sphere expresses itself in a variety of ways. Most obviously it is the conscious enjoyment of the sexual union for what the union itself has to offer—without any reference to a transcendent value. This enjoyment appears as “a gate into the most irrational, and thereby real kernel of life, as compared with the mechanisms of rationalization” (RRW, 345). Weber further notes: This boundless giving of oneself is as radical as possible in its opposition to all functionality, rationality, and generality. It is displayed here as the unique meaning which one creature in his irrationality has for the other, and only for this specific other. (RRW, 347)

When the meaning underlying this “boundless giving of oneself ” to a “specific other” is subject to close rational scrutiny, it presents itself as a type of “sacrament.” Weber notes: From the point of view of eroticism, this meaning, and with the value-content of the relation itself, rests upon the possibility of a communion which is felt as a complete unification, as a fading of the “thou.” It is so overpowering that it is interpreted “symbolically”: as a sacrament. The lover realizes himself to be rooted in the kernel of the truly living, which is eternally inaccessible to any rational endeavor. (RRW, 347)

26 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY Similar to the reprieve that art offers from the intellectualized and rationalized existence of everyday life, the irrationality of the erotic experience frees the individual “from the cold skeleton hands of rational orders, just as completely as from the banality of everyday routine” (RRW, 347). On another level, the irrational experience engendered by erotic love gives the individual a false sense of elation that clouds his/her view of the world at large. The sense of euphoria that is experienced by the lover in the aftermath of a romantic encounter leaves one in a state that sees nothing but goodness and beauty in the whole world: The euphoria of the happy lover is felt to be “goodness”; it has a friendly urge to poeticize all the world with happy features or to bewitch all the world in a naïve enthusiasm for the diffusion of happiness. (RRW, 348)

This sense of euphoria can be interpreted as being the manifestation of a corrupted psyche because, in one sense or another, religion sees the presence of human beings in this world and the conscious enjoyment of pleasures in this world to be “residues of the Fall” (RRW, 349). In addition to being the locus of surrogate (and thereby false) notions of salvation, the erotic sphere directly challenges the penultimate worldly religious value, brotherhood: From the point of view of any religious ethic of brotherhood, the erotic relation must remain attached, in a certain sophisticated measure, to brutality. The more sublimated it is, the more brutal. Unavoidably, it is considered to be a relation of conflict. This conflict is not only, or even predominantly, jealousy and the will to possession, excluding third ones. It is far more the most intimate coercion of the soul of the less brutal partner. This coercion exists because it is never noticed by the partners themselves. Pretending to be the most humane devotion, it is a sophisticated enjoyment of oneself in the other. (RRW, 348)

Not only does eroticism set the couple involved in the sexual union apart from the rest of humanity, but it is also fundamentally a coercive relationship that sets one partner in the relationship in a domineering position above the other. In sum: A principled ethic of religious brotherhood is radically and antagonistically opposed to all [the values of eroticism.] from the point of view of such an ethic, this inner, earthly sensation of salvation by mature love competes in the sharpest possible way with the devotion of a supra-mundane God, with the devotion of an ethically rational order of God, or with the devotion of a mystical bursting of individuation, which alone appear “genuine” to the ethic of brotherhood. (RRW, 347 ff.)

At the level of practical rationalization, the religious ethic of universal brotherhood stands in sharp tension with the rational worldly spheres of economics and politics and the irrational worldly spheres of estheticism and eroticism. The rational worldly orders challenge the religious ideal of universal brotherhood in this world and seek to replace it with institutions, procedures, and attitudes based on impersonal, bureaucratic, functional relations. The irrational worldly spheres challenge the religious

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 27 ideal of salvation being only an otherworldly experience by positing values that appear to offer inner-worldly salvation from the mundane, rationalized routines of life. Besides this tension with the religious ethic, the values of the different worldly spheres are also mutually antagonistic. The rationalized behavior shaped by commitment to “reasons of the state” will often conflict with, and remain antagonistic to, rationalized behavior that takes “interest-struggles of men in the market” as its ultimate value. The cosmos that is created by esthetic endeavors to escape the routines of rational life is meant to be enjoyed by all. The experience of “salvation” in an erotic relationship is meant only for the individuals involved. Furthermore, the rational and irrational worldly order remain mutually antagonistic. As the overarching and unifying impetus of a universal religious ethic has been shattered by modern practical rationalization, the mutual antagonism of the disenchanted worldly orders makes itself felt in an especially acute manner. The inability of scientific rationalism to choose among different values, and its principled rejection of any attempt to integrate the different worldly values, with reference to a supra-mundane ideal, creates a disenchanted form of polytheism that is similar to, but not the same as, the polytheism of a bygone era. The unifying impetus of the religious ethic had the effect of partially suppressing the tensions and struggles between the different worldly spheres. But in the disenchanted modern period, these struggles break out into the open in much more stark terms: Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years—blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclusive orientation towards the grandiose moral fervor of Christian ethics. (SV, 149)

While the polytheism of a bygone era has returned, it has returned with a significant difference. Weber describes the manner in which the disenchanted age is similar to but also different from the ancient world: We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. (SV, 148)

Each of the worldly spheres has its own supreme value that is in perpetual tension with the supreme value of other value spheres. The human being lives in the midst of this conflict of value spheres and his/her life is shaped by the manner and time in which he/she decides to sacrifice to one god at one time, and to another god at another time. As noted above, religious prophecy sought to eliminate the tension between the different value spheres by orienting them all in the direction of “one thing that is needful.” But in the aftermath of the progressive rationalization of the worldly spheres the unifying ethos of the religious ethic has been shattered and the ancient battle of the gods resumes. Since the psychological bearing of moderns is devoid of a mystical (or religious) component, the ancient battle of the gods takes

28 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY place under novel conditions: Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another. (SV, 149)

At one point in the historical development/rationalization of culture salvation religion replaced the enchanted symbiosis of the “religious” and “worldly” spheres with the religious differentiation of the worldly from the religious. But at the same time, it used the universal ethic of brotherhood to synthesize the differentiated spheres. The further development/rationalization of culture has shattered the synthesizing impetus of salvation religion. This shattering has resulted in a modern disenchanted milieu, where scientific rationalization has done to religious rationalism what religious rationalism had done to the enchanted symbiosis—it has asserted the independent identity of that which had been originally integrated. The synthesizing ethos of the universal ethic of brotherhood has been negated by a disenchanted rationalism that not only negates this ethos, but also produces an “eternal” and irreconcilable struggle between the ultimate values of the worldly spheres. In short, disenchanting rationalism has negated the ethos of brotherly love and has replaced it with an eternal and irreconcilable struggle among the values of: (a) impersonal money, (b) impersonal bureaucracy, (c) irrational escape into an artistically created cosmos, and (d) irrational escape in erotic love. 1.3 The Effects of Disenchantment on Theoretical Rationalization While disenchantment makes itself felt in the form of perpetual and irreconcilable conflict between the different worldly spheres in terms of the practical–ethical rationalization, it makes itself felt differently in terms of theoretical rationalization (i.e., the application of the “imperative for consistency” to the intellectual–theoretical attitude). The nature and scope of the challenge at the theoretical level can be better appreciated when viewed in light of the historical relationship between rationalism and religious thought. The direct challenge that disenchanted rationalism poses to religious rationalism is a historical anomaly in light of the fact that religion and rationalism have been mutually supportive of each other during much of history. Weber notes that prophetic and priestly religion have stood in “intimate relation with rational intellectualism” because the “more ‘doctrine’ a religion contains, the greater is its need for rational apologetics” (RRW, 351). The need for doctrine in prophetic and priestly religion is based on the fact that there is a basic contradiction between the fundamental postulate of religion and the observed empirical reality. It is a fundamental postulate of religion that the cosmos and human existence are infused with meaning. The proponents of religion, especially the prophets, present a unified view of the world derived from a consciously integrated and meaningful attitude towards life. To the prophet, both the life of man and the world, both social and cosmic events, have a certain systematic and coherent meaning. (SR, 59)

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 29 In order for the religious postulate of a meaningful cosmos to make rational sense, religious thought has had to provide a rational explanation for the vicissitudes of fate and fortune that human beings encounter in the world. But the postulate of meaningful human existence has stood in sharp tension with the inexplicable and apparently unwarranted and unfair distribution of fortunes among human beings in the world. Weber describes this contrast in these words: The need for an ethical interpretation of “meaning” of the distribution of fortunes among men increased with the growing rationality of the conceptions of the world. As the religious and ethical reflections upon the world were increasingly rationalized, and primitive, magical notions were eliminated, the theodicy of suffering encountered increasing difficulties. Individually, “undeserved” woe was all too frequent; not “good” but “bad” men succeeded. (SPWR, 275)

A postulate of human existence that could be both meaningful and rational requires that the “good” succeed and the “bad” fail, but lived human experience in the world provided ample evidence to the contrary. Theodicy has attempted to bridge the gap between “what is” and “what ought to be” by providing a variety of rationalized explanations. These explanations attempt to justify not only the woes of those who are the victims of bad fortune, but also the felicity of those who are beneficiaries of good fortune. Weber notes that, at a psychological level, those benefiting from good fortune need as much assurance that their good fortune is legitimate fortune, as those suffering from bad fortune need assurance that they will be eventually compensated for their misery (SPWR, 271). Theodicy represents that aspect of religious thought that attempts to reconcile the apparently inexplicable and arbitrary (i.e., meaningless) human condition that is often observed in the human world, with the postulate of a fundamentally and inherently meaningful cosmos. This reconciliation is done by positing the existence of a heavenly realm above and beyond the earthly realm, and an afterlife in the heavenly realm. It is asserted that all unjust suffering and undeserved fortune in the worldly realm will be justly compensated in the afterlife of the heavenly realm. The irrationality of human fate in the world is rendered rational by appealing to the notion of “compensatory causality” (RRW, 355) in the heavenly realm. In light of the psychological human need to rationally comprehend the apparent irrational vicissitudes of human fate, it is easy to see why salvation religion has stood in “intimate relation with rational intellectualism” (RRW, 351). But with progressive differentiation of culture, rational intellectualism begins to follow its own inner logic and eventually comes to challenge the most fundamental claim of religious rationalism regarding the nature of the cosmos in which human beings find themselves. Weber describes the original relationality, subsequent differentiation, and eventual autonomy of religious rationalism and “scientific” rationalism in these words: Ethical religiosity has appealed to rational knowledge, which has followed its own autonomous and inner-worldly norms. It has fashioned a cosmos of truths which no longer had anything to do with the systematic postulates of a rational religious ethic; with the result that the world as a cosmos must satisfy the demands of a religious ethic or evince some “meaning.” On the contrary rational knowledge has had to reject this

30 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY claim in principle. The cosmos of natural causality and the postulated cosmos of ethical, compensatory causality have stood in irreconcilable opposition. (RRW, 355)

Weber notes that the postulate of natural causality, which lies at the root of scientific rationalism, means that the modern has the ability to know everything about the cosmos and the human condition in the cosmos with reference to natural factors/laws that can be understood and explained in worldly terms. In principle, the modern can come to know all things that affect his/her life by means of calculation, so much so that he/she does not need to have any recourse to references to unknown/ unknowable mysterious factors in order to explain/master his/her life-condition. Consequently, there is no need to explain and understand the vicissitudes of human fate and fortune in this world with reference to otherworldly factors. The scientific postulate of natural causality negates the religious postulate of compensatory causality as a means of understanding and explaining (i.e., rationalizing) the cosmos and the human condition in the cosmos. In replacing the postulate of compensatory causality with natural causality, the ground is prepared for scientific rationalism to challenge religious rationalism on the most crucial of issues. As cited above, Weber notes: At all times and in all places, the need for salvation—consciously cultivated as the substance of religiosity—has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practical rationalization of life’s realities . . . on this level, all religions have demanded as a specific presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men. (RRW, 353)

The fundamental presupposition of religious rationalism is that “the world be somehow meaningful.” In the absence of this presupposition, there is no historical “religious” thought to speak of—and it is this very presupposition that modern scientific rationalism rejects as a matter of principle. Weber notes: Who—aside from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences— still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the world? If there is any such “meaning,” along what road could one come upon its track? If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the belief that there is any such a thing as the “meaning” of the universe die out at its very roots. (SV, 142)

Complementary to the manner in which modern rationalized economic activity is based on “a structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root” (RRW, 355), scientific rationalism causes the very concept of meaning to “die out at its very roots.” Consequently, the challenge posed by modern scientific rationalism to religious rationalism is no less acute at the level of theoretical rationalization than it is at the level of practical rationalization. On both accounts, scientific rationalism makes claims that strike at the very roots of religious rationalism—in one case it negates the postulate of the ethic of universal brotherhood, and in the other case it negates the postulate of a meaningful cosmos. Given the fact that, historically speaking, religious rationalism had intimate relations with intellectual rationalism, the modern antagonism between the two

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 31 described by Weber requires further exploration. Rationality in all its forms, whether religious or scientific, is faced with the same empirical, social reality in the world. There is a great deal of unjust suffering and grossly unequal distribution of material and ideal goods. As long as rational thought remained tied to religious apologetics, a generally agreed upon religio-rational explanation and a religio-ethical system of social organization was formulated that ideally posited an ultimately just compensation and retribution both in this world and in the hereafter. But [t]he more intensely rational thought has seized upon the problem of a just and retributive compensation, the less an entirely inner-worldly solution could seem possible, and the less an other-worldly solution could appear probable or even meaningful. (RRW, 353)

From the perspective of religious rationalism, the intense rational reflection on worldly suffering pointed to an otherworldly solution. But there is a principled clash between this rational explanation for an ethical dilemma offered by religious rationalism and the explanation offered by scientific rationalism to a conceptual dilemma. When modern scientific thought is confronted by the “claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented, cosmos” (RRW, 351), it has to reject this claim as a matter of principle. As far as scientific thought is concerned, the world is not “God-ordained,” it exists and functions according to immanent laws of natural causality and nothing more. Even though there has always been tension between the two, religious thought and rational thought have been able to establish a working relationship during the past millennia. But the modern antagonism between religion and science is a unique phenomenon in human history: Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the irrational or anti-rational supra-human power. (RRW, 351)

It is understandable and logical that science cannot accommodate the most fundamental of all religious presuppositions—that the world is a meaningful cosmos. This is not the only case where a particular sphere cannot accommodate the fundamental presupposition of another sphere. It is more often the case rather than the exception. But when judged in light of its own standards, scientific rationalism is faced with intractable dilemmas of its own. Weber notes: Science has created this cosmos of natural causality and has seemed unable to answer with certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions. Nevertheless science, in the name of “intellectual integrity” has come forward with the claim of representing the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world. (RRW, 355)

A view of the cosmos that cannot deal with a “question of its own ultimate presuppositions” all the while that it rejects the religious presuppositions, and then states that its own view of the cosmos is the most “reasoned view of the world” makes the problematic of meaning even more acute. The value of human culture when viewed

32 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY from the perspective of a rational scientific cosmos makes human culture and human existence positively senseless. On the one hand, the development of rational thought has emancipated human beings “from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life” (RRW, 356). On the other hand, it has rejected the notion of a religiously meaningful cosmos. In having broken free of the cycle of nature and of the religious understanding of meaning, it has not filled the vacuum created thereby with anything; “[c]ulture’s every step forward seems condemned to lead to an ever more devastating senselessness” (RRW, 357). Not only does scientific rationalism negate the religious claims of a “meaningful cosmos,” but it also rejects all such claims coming from any quarter. The increasing sense of senselessness is directly tied to the defining character of science and culture—progress. A life led in the pursuit of cultural values, all of them ultimately created artificially, is bound to be an exercise in futility because one cannot but fleetingly grasp a minor portion of what progressive culture, cumulative knowledge, evolving science and developing rationality have to offer. Talking of the death of a modern from the perspective of a life lived in the pursuit of cultural ideals defined by the idea of progress, Weber notes: He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very “progressiveness” it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness. (SV, 140)

Those individuals who lived and died within the organic cycle of life could die “satiated with life” because they had “fulfilled a cycle of their existence beyond which they did not reach” (RRW, 356). But the moderns do not have the option of completing a cycle of existence because their worldview rejects the notion of cyclical time altogether and replaces it with the notion of linear progress. One can become tired of pursuing progress but he/she cannot become satiated, since there is always more to be had. Because the perfectibility of the modern is tied to the acquisition of ever-progressing cultural goods, perfectibility will always remain out of reach as cultural values continue to progress into the indefinite future. Furthermore, the segment which the individual and passive recipient or the active co-builder can comprise in the course of a finite life becomes the more trifling the more differentiated and multiplied the cultural values and the goals for self-perfection become. (SV, 140)

The pursuit of cultural values is senseless not only for the above-mentioned reasons but also because it is a “senseless hustle in the service of worthless, moreover selfcontradictory, and mutually antagonistic ends” (RRW, 357). Judged from the perspective of their own inner logic, the values of the worldly economic, political, esthetic, erotic, and intellectual spheres are, at best, mutually antagonistic and often even mutually contradictory. It is against this background that for the moderns “senseless death has seemed only to put the decisive stamp upon the senselessness of life itself ” (RRW, 356).

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 33 The modern disenchanted view of the cosmos, and of the disenchanted human condition in the cosmos, is a product of the rationalization process that was initially catalyzed by historical, salvation religion itself. Historical religion posited that the natural world was a creation of God and was devoid of all extraordinary powers, that is, charisma. In doing so it challenged the enchanted symbiosis that saw the entire cosmos and everything in it being permeated by charisma. For historical religion, charisma was to be encountered on the stage of history in the person of prophets who had been chosen by God and/or in the events of history that marked God’s intervention into history to protect His people against their enemies. While the world of nature was devoid of mysterious incalculable forces for historical religion, the stage of history certainly was not. Scientific rationalism rejects all claims of mysterious incalculable forces on the stage of history, just as historical religion rejects all claims of enchantment in the world of nature. Disenchanted rationalism explains/ understands the unfolding of the historical process in terms of laws of causality, in contrast to the religious explanation/understanding that links this process to a Divine Will. From the perspective of scientific rationalism, while the laws of historical causality may be more difficult to decipher than the laws of natural causality, they are nonetheless knowable in principle. In furthering the process of disenchantment, modern rational thought does to historical religion what religion had done to primitive enchanted thought—it reveals to be profane what had been considered sacred. Weber argues that, in revealing that which had been considered sacred to be profane, rational thought creates the conditions for the actualization of latent possibilities already present in historical religious thought. In the context of the present discussion, the most relevant of these possibilities is the antireligious skepticism that leads to a disenchanted view of the cosmos and of the human condition in the cosmos. For Weber, this “anti-religious” possibility is already present in historical religion: Anti-religious skepticism, per se, was represented in China, in Egypt, in the Vedas, in post-exilic Jewish literature. In principle, it was just as it is today; almost no new arguments have been added. (RRW, 351)

While antireligious skepticism has always been a possibility in historical religious thought, and even an actuality in minor, isolated instances in the past, it did not become a social phenomenon until the modern period. The basic reason for this is the fact that rational thought has remained tied to religious apologetics for most of history. But as the historical process unfolded and rational thought matured, it has come to define itself in terms of its own autonomous, inner-worldly logic. In the modern historical situation, rational thought has proven to be a natural ally of the latent skepticism already present in historical religious thought. Even though in principle “almost no new arguments have been added” to the antireligious positions already contained in the sacred literature of historical religion, the disenchanted modern world image that understands the world in terms of natural causality greatly enhances the plausibility of such skepticism. In short, the modern disenchanted condition creates the cultural milieu in which a latent potential in historical, salvation religion can be actualized—a potential that could not be actualized in other cultural milieus.5

34 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY At the level of theoretical rationalization, scientific rationalism rejects all philosophical, religious, and metaphysical claims that attempt to infuse meaning into the world. At the same time, its own view of the cosmos sees the universe functioning according to immanent laws of natural causality that are devoid of meaning. When combined with modern practical rationalization, the modern pursuit of material and ideal interests takes on a character unknown in human history. The cosmos of the capitalist economic order is Tied to the technical and economic condition at the foundation of mechanical and machine production, this cosmos today determines the style of life of all individuals born into it, not only those directly engaged in earning a living. (PESC, 124)

Economic pursuit becomes a compulsion that one is forced to pursue whether one wants to do so or not. The implications of this modern necessity for leading a religious life are as far reaching as they are problematic. Weber notes: “Under the technical and social conditions of [modern] rational culture, an imitation of the life of Buddha, Jesus or Francis seems condemned to failure for purely external reasons” (RRW, 357). The world image offered by modern science culminates in making senselessness the supreme value—the meaninglessness of a modern’s death is an exclamation mark on a meaningless worldly existence. The pursuit of economic interests is the supreme pragmatic value offered by modern rationalism, so much so that even those who are not directly engaged in the most loveless of worldly pursuits are engaged in it indirectly. Weber’s analysis reveals that on both accounts, the disenchanted fate of the time destines the moderns to live in a world in which religious values and ideals have been irrevocably undermined by scientific rationalism. After having undermined other values and ideals, scientific rationalism offers nothing meaningful and significant in their place, in the name of rational, intellectual integrity. Wolin summarizes the results of Weber’s analysis about the disenchanted fate of the times in these words: Meaninglessness was no longer an aesthetic experience of the few, but a contagion. Having undermined religious, moral, and political beliefs, the forces of rationalization had finally exposed the meaning of meaninglessness to be power without right. (Wolin, 1981, 422)

1.4

Religion and Science in Disenchanted Times: An Interpretation of Weber

The account of disenchantment given by Weber can be interpreted as positing an unbridgeable divide between religion and science, and this interpretation in turn can be viewed as being a reflection of Weber’s own value judgments. Wittenberg offered such an evaluation of Weber’s work in the 1930s. Commenting specifically on Weber’s “Science as a Vocation” lecture, but within the larger context of Weber’s work on the sociology of religion, Wittenberg argues: Weber may be seen to be mounting the most vitriolic of attacks upon religion. And all this in the name of science! . . . It is perhaps in his adoption of this purely value-laden

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 35 stance, in his passionate and implacable critique of religion, that Weber’s attachment to his own world-view stands most clearly revealed. (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 118)

Wittenberg sees Weber’s passionate and implacable critique of religion to be the complementary side of his passionate and “unconditional acceptance of the value of science” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 114). Weber’s “resolute affirmation of the secular” and the “uncompromising rationalism of his world-view” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 117), seems entirely out of place to Wittenberg in the aftermath of the tragic events of World War I. While such an attitude could be justified at an earlier period of European history, it was both historically and intellectually untenable by the time Weber delivered his “Science as a Vocation” lecture. The combination of an implacable critique of religion and an unconditional acceptance of the value of science on Weber’s part, in his particular historical setting, makes him “the last great representative of a European rationalism that is grounded on radical skepticism” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 114). This commitment to European rationalism has the effect of “boldly tearing asunder science and politics, persons and things, science and religion” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 118)—tendencies that most clearly characterize Weber’s scholarship as a whole. Wittenberg describes the European, Enlightenment rationalism that Weber was so passionately committed to, and its relation to his work, in these words: Max Weber was a child of the technological age; the quantitative, formal–logical, rational–conceptual methodology he adopted was moulded, down to the very last detail, to the features of that age. It is entirely in keeping with the technological spirit of that age that Max Weber should feel able to apportion the task of governing that world by “rational calculation”—and of “disenchanting” that world—to science. (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 119)

The tearing asunder of science and politics, persons and things, religion and science by scientific rationalism overlooks the fundamental fact that there is “an intimate relationship between politics and science, science and world-view” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 119). The intimacy of this relationship can be best illustrated by the fact that when Weber’s work is critically analyzed, this relationship presents itself to be “both deep-seated and indissoluble” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 118), even though Weber himself would have us think otherwise. Wittenberg is arguing that while a plain-sense reading of Weber suggests that there is an unbridgeable divide between religion and science, the manner in which Weber frames the entire discussion implies that there is an intimate relationship between the two. For Wittenberg, Weber’s lifework is riddled with the basic contradiction that that which he states explicitly in the form of scientific analysis is at odds with the implicit methodology on which Weber constructs his scientific analysis. This characteristic of Weber’s work, in turn, is a reflection of the Age of Rationalism as a whole. Wittenberg draws the link between the two when offering a summary statement of Weber’s work: [I]t is in Max Weber that the decline of the Age of Rationalism finds its embodiment; as Weber descends to his grave, so too does rationalism. For it is he who, for one last grandiose moment, embodies that age in all its splendor and its weaknesses. (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 120)

36 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY For Wittenberg, Weber is “a child of the Enlightenment, born too late” (Wittenberg, 1989 [1938], 119). Wittenberg sees Weber’s disenchantment thesis as being a forceful and final articulation of a tradition of the Enlightenment that wanted to replace religion by science, either by asserting that religious statements could be turned into scientific ones or by claiming that religion was a prescientific stage of knowledge destined to be succeeded by it. (Schluchter, 1989, 251)

Enlightenment thought sought to give science a privileged position over religion based on the claim that scientific rationalism is the expression of disciplined, objective rationality while religious ideas are the expressions of subjective irrationality. Enlightenment thought posits an unbridgeable divide between religion and science in which the origins, defining characteristics, and practical effects of one are the direct opposite of the other. Religion is considered to be rooted in immature, emotional impulses that inevitably hinder the refinement and progress of the individual/ society. Science is considered to be the product of mature rationality that naturally promotes the progress and development of the individual/society. Hume6 gives voice to this divide between religion and science when he notes that whereas “the pure love of truth” is at the root of mature reason and rational inquiry, the origin of the religious idea is to be located in the human being’s [a]nxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst for revenge, the appetite for food and other necessities. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity. (Hume, 1998, 28)

Whereas Hume’s observation sees the origin of religion in the subjective, immature, and irrational impulses of primitive people, Freud contrasts the mode of inquiry engendered by mature, objective rational reflection of science with the immature subjectivism of religion: The riddles of the universe only reveal themselves slowly to our inquiry, to many questions science can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is our only way to the knowledge of external reality. Again, it is merely illusion to expect anything from intuition or trance; they can give us nothing but particulars, which are difficult to interpret, about our own mental life, never information about the questions that are so lightly answered by the doctrines of religion. (Freud, 1975, 40)

For Freud, religion is concerned with particular, subjective phenomena that do not yield any positive, reliable knowledge about external reality—such knowledge can only be had from an objective, rational scientific inquiry. The views of Hume and Freud are illustrative of a tradition of Enlightenment thought that posits an unbridgeable divide between religion and science. Wittenberg’s evaluation of Weber’s disenchantment thesis sees it as being an expression of this Enlightenment tradition.

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 37 Writing almost sixty years after Wittenberg offered his assessment of Weber’s disenchantment thesis, Casanova reaches a similar conclusion. If one discounts the hyperbolic and rhetorical tone of Wittenberg’s assessment of Weber, it is clear that his evaluation of Weber’s relationship to Enlightenment thought is an earlier expression of Casanova’s more deliberate, scholarly analysis. Casanova notes that the theory of secularization has “often served as the unstated premise” of the theories of many of the founding fathers of sociology and the sociology of religion (Casanova, 1994, 17). He goes on to note that “foundations of the more systematic formulations of the theory of secularization are to be found in the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber” (Casanova, 1994, 17). The relationship between the theory of secularization and Weber’s disenchantment thesis is implicit in the definition that Casanova offers for the theory of secularization as [t]he conceptualization of the process of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres—primarily the state, the economy, and science—from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere. (Casanova, 1994, 19)

In light of the discussion about the “struggle of the gods” in section 1.2 on practical rationalization, Casanova’s definition of secularization equates secularization with the process of disenchantment. In doing so, Casanova concurs with Schluchter who sees Weber’s description of the process of disenchantment as being a description of the process of secularization (Schluchter, 1989, 253). Just as Wittenberg saw Weber’s disenchantment thesis as being an expression of Enlightenment thought,7 Casanova sees Weber’s account of secularization as being an expression of Enlightenment thought. The theory of secularization, as it was formulated by the founding fathers, had “its ideological origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion” (Casanova, 1994, 19) and it “may be the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences” (Casanova, 1994, 17). Its status, especially in the aftermath of its systematic formulation by Durkheim and Weber, is such that [I]ndeed, the theory of secularization is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theories of the modern world and with the self-understanding of modernity that one cannot simply discard the theory of secularization without putting into question the entire web, including much of the self-understanding of the social sciences. (Casanova, 1994, 18)

The self-understanding of modernity, as expressed in the theory of secularization, is based on the “myth that sees history as the progressive evolution of humanity from superstition to reason, from belief to unbelief, from religion to science” (Casanova, 1994, 17). In other words, according to Casanova, the theory of secularization is both based upon and reinforces the claim of an unbridgeable divide between religion and science. The outcome of this polarization is that religion is gradually pushed out of the public (and rational) domain into the private (and irrational) domain with the continued development of modernity. According to Schluchter, this is a defining

38 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY characteristic of modern societal development: [s]ecular humanism, with the support of some sectors of theology, helps to make religion subjective through its idea of a world that can in principle be controlled through calculation and is thus without surprises. Religion is translated from an external fact into a component of individual consciousness. (Schluchter, 1989, 256 ff.)

But developments in recent times have begun to present a pointed challenge to the received wisdom of the Enlightenment tradition. Casanova notes that the dichotomous view of the religious vs. secular split, in contemporary times, is advocated by “cognitive minorities” in the religious camp and in the secularist camp, while the “majority of Americans tend to be humanists, who are simultaneously religious and secular” (Casanova, 1994, 38). Beyond the fact that the Enlightenment viewpoint is now only accepted by a cognitive minority, the Enlightenment understanding of secularization has to be corrected because, empirically speaking, there is compelling evidence that the secularization process has not unfolded as the theorists had projected that it would. Furthermore, there has been a softening of the positions in both the religious and the secular camps in recent years. On the one hand, the “charisma of reason, which proved its historical efficacy during the Enlightenment and the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century, . . . [has] largely disappeared” (Schluchter, 1989, 255). On the other hand, there has been a conscious realization on the part of modern religion that a significant portion of the modernist critique of religion was not merely the expression of antireligion animus, but an accurate account of empirical reality. Casanova argues that the realization of the limits of reason and an acceptance of a portion of the rational critique of religion have contributed to a rapprochement between the religious and the secular in recent decades. Speaking of the mutual move on the part of the religious and secular spheres toward rapprochement, Casanova notes: The rapprochement has been reciprocal, for religion has often served and continues to serve as a bulwark against “dialectics of enlightenment” and as a protector of human rights and humanist values against the secular. (Casanova, 1994, 39)

The fact that Casanova sees Weber’s disenchantment thesis positing an unbridgeable divide between religion and science (and the religious and the secular) is evidenced by the fact that he does not refer to Weber’s work except with reference to the divide. In fact, Casanova identifies Weber’s work as being one of the basic sources upon which the hypothesis of this divide has been constructed. In offering his own evaluation of the need and the manner in which this divide can be bridged, Casanova does not see Weber’s work as containing any resources or pointers that could prove useful in this task. The interpretation of Weber offered by Wittenberg and Casanova is illustrative of the generally accepted view of Weber’s work. In sum, this interpretation sees Weber’s assessment of the movement of history and modern culture as implying the inevitable disenchantment and secularization of all human culture in the near future, with religion being consigned to a diminishing corner of human social life. In other words, the disenchanted fate of our times is actually the historical

AN ENLIGHTENMENT READING OF WEBER / 39 manifestation and historical inevitability of the unbridgeable divide between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism. The fact that this is a truncated and one-sided interpretation of Weber’s work on the issue of the relationship between religion and science can be demonstrated by looking at Weber’s writings on the character and components of scientific inquiry. Weber’s writings on this topic are often referred to as his “methodology of the social sciences.” In fact, it is Wittenberg’s scathing critique of Weber that points the present inquiry in this direction. As noted earlier, Wittenberg states that the manner in which Weber framed his entire discussion about the disenchantment of the world belies the conclusions that he reached. In other words, the principles according to which Weber carried out his scientific inquiry present the most readily available refutation of the conclusions reached by the disenchantment thesis. Leaving aside the issue of whether there is a fundamental contradiction between Weber’s science and his methodology of science, the discussion now turns to Weber’s methodological writings with a view to gaining more critical insight into Weber’s view of the relationship between religion and science in the modern disenchanted milieu.

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C HAPTER 2 B EYOND THE E NLIGHTENMENT: W EBER ON THE I RREDUCIBLE R ELATIONSHIP B ETWEEN FAITH AND S CIENCE

Weber’s self-conscious acceptance of the value of scientific rationality is expressed in the assertion that science is an absolutely unique source of knowledge, and the one “for whom scientific truth is of no value will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of science in just those respects in which it is unique . . .” (OSS, 110 ff.). Weber sees scientific truth as being a unique source of knowledge insofar as it offers “the provision of concepts and judgments which are neither empirical reality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner” (OSS, 111). In asserting that scientific rationality is a unique source of knowledge that is intimately tied with progress and that such knowledge is worth having, Weber is very much a part of the Enlightenment tradition. But Weber moves beyond the naïve Enlightenment confidence in scientific rationalism when he carefully details its limitations. He raises the issue of the limitations of science with reference to the work of Tolstoy: Now, this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in Occidental culture for millennia, and, in general, this “progress,” to which science belongs as a link and motive force, do they have any meanings that go beyond the purely practical and technical? You will find this question raised in the most principled form in the works of Leo Tolstoy. He came to raise the question in a peculiar way. All his broodings increasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: for civilized man death has no meaning. (SV, 139)

Weber concurs with Tolstoy on this point and links the meaninglessness of death in the disenchanted period with the limitations of the value of science. Again using Tolstoy as the reference point, Weber notes: “Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’ ” (SV, 143). For Weber, science is of great technical and theoretical value because it is a unique source of knowledge. But in the final analysis its value is limited by the fact that it cannot positively answer “the only question that is important for us.” Here Weber is recognizing the limitations of scientific

42 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY rationalism. In the final analysis, the limitation of science can be summed up thus: [T]he fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the result of its analysis, be it ever so perfect. (OSS, 57)

For Weber, scientific rationality, investigation, and knowledge reach their limits when issues of meaning, value, and significance are to be resolved—the very issues that are the most pressing of human concerns. The conscious recognition of the limitations of scientific reasoning is an expression of the post-Enlightenment aspect of Weber’s thought. In the words of Horowitz and Maley, Max Weber’s work is exemplary in expressing and at least partially articulating the moment at which the Enlightenment becomes irreversibly reflective concerning its own reason. (Horowitz and Maley, 1994, 1)

Horowitz and Maley go on to note that Nietzsche’s work marks the end of the Enlightenment’s innocence regarding its supreme confidence in the meaning and significance of rationalism. Taking Nietzsche’s critique into account, Weber’s work simultaneously marks a self-conscious acceptance of the uniqueness and value of scientific rationality, as well as a self-critical recognition of the problematic it has given rise to.1 While scientific truth has provided knowledge of the world that cannot be had by any other means, it has also created a problematic that is unique in human history—the disenchantment of the world. The disenchantment of the world, in part, refers to the phenomenon of a world that has become devoid of all meaning and significance in the face of the scientific, rational critique of all philosophical and religious attempts to confer meaning and significance on the world. The self conscious and self-critical engagement with the Enlightenment intellectual tradition is illustrative of Weber’s departure from that tradition. A review of Weber’s writing on the methodology of the social sciences reveals that in addition to being aware of certain shortcomings of scientific rationalism, he saw certain aspects of this rationalism and the empirical reality studied by this rationalism unnoticed by Enlightenment thinkers. He identified a suprarational dimension of scientific rationalism and an empirical dimension of religious rationalism that had been overlooked (or ignored) by Enlightenment thought. Weber’s scientific analysis and explication of the following themes reveal a clear break from the Enlightenment hypothesis of an unbridgeable divide between religion and science: (a) The faith dimension of science. (b) The empirical dimension of faith. (c) Weber’s personal attitude toward the religion vs. science divide. A review of these three issues reveals that in the place of an unbridgeable (Enlightenment) divide between religion and science, it becomes possible to posit a (Weberian) difference between the two—with the further possibility that this difference can be mediated by establishing a relationship between the two.

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 43 2.1

The Faith Dimension of Science

Weber begins the concluding remarks of his article on “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” (1904) with these words: We are now at the end of this discussion, the only purpose of which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith and to make explicit the meaning of the quest for social and economic knowledge. (OSS, 110)

Weber’s assertion that science stands in intimate proximity to faith runs counter to the established Enlightenment claim that there is an unbridgeable divide between the two.2 It is not just Weber’s observation that faith and science stand in very close proximity that is of significance, the context in which this observation is made only adds to its significance. The quote is taken from an article written to explicitly outline the editorial policy of a journal that Weber began coediting with Sombart and Jaffe in 1904. The title of the journal was the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.3 The importance of this article is expressed by Weber himself in the opening lines of the article: When a social science journal which also at times concerns itself with a social policy, appears for the first time or passes into the hands of a new editorial board, it is customary to ask about its “line.” We, too, must seek to answer this question . . . Even though or perhaps because, we are concerned with “self-evident truths,” this occasion provides the opportunity to cast some light on the nature of the “social sciences” as we understand them, in such manner that it can be useful, if not to the specialist, then to the reader who is more remote from actual scientific work. (OSS, 50)

This article serves as a statement, or “line” as Weber calls it, that outlines the editorial policy of the journal. In doing so, it interrogates some of the “self-evident truths” regarding the self-understanding/definition of the social and cultural sciences. After these opening words, the article goes on to discuss a variety of issues related to the methodology of the social sciences, all of which lead up to the conclusion that only a “hair line . . . separates science from faith.” In the conclusion, Weber further details the relationship between science and faith with respect to two specific points: (a) the place of presuppositions in science and (b) the place of value judgments in science. He notes: The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge is alone able to give us. (OSS, 110)

The objective validity of scientific knowledge presupposes an acceptance of the presuppositions on which the inquiry is based and an acceptance of the value offered by scientific knowledge. While these two factors combine to form the basis of all science, a comprehensive description of the cultural sciences requires the inclusion of one additional factor. Weber posits that the centrality of meaning (Sinn) must be

44 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY highlighted when providing an accurate description of the cultural sciences. Weber describes the fundamental presupposition of the cultural sciences in these words: The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any “culture” in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance. (OSS, 81)

This presupposition of the cultural sciences contains a presupposition within it in the form of a value judgment that posits that the cultural sciences are a source of valuable knowledge about empirical reality that cannot be had from any other source. This value judgment is expressed in the claim that human beings have the ability to “take a deliberate attitude towards the world” and endow meaning and significance on the world. Even though this value judgment lies at the foundation of scientific inquiry about empirical reality, it cannot be reduced to empirical reality or deduced from it. Weber describes the origin of such value judgments or “evaluative ideas” in these words: Evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such. The “objectivity” of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas. (OSS, 111)

For Weber, empirical data and the scientific analysis of empirical data are, in principle, incapable of furnishing “proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas.” The presupposition on which all science is based, the value of scientific knowledge, and the fundamental presupposition of the cultural sciences are all evaluative ideas and none of them can be justified on strictly scientific grounds. Speaking of the place of presuppositions in science and the acceptance of these presuppositions, Weber notes: “No science is absolutely free from presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions” (SV, 153). If an individual chooses to reject the presuppositions of science, no scientific or logical proof can be provided to him/her demonstrating the soundness of the presuppositions, and if the presuppositions on which science is based are rejected, the value of science itself is negated. The acceptance of these presuppositions and the value judgments implicit in them is a value judgment itself. For Weber, the acceptance of this value judgment is no more scientifically valid than its rejection. The acceptance or rejection of this (and any other value judgment) simply lies outside the scientific sphere. In even more direct terms, Weber identifies science as a “truth” that cannot be justified in scientific terms: The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 45 truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man’s original nature. (OSS, 110)

For Weber, the acceptance of the truth of science (and all the evaluative ideas underlying it) is an act of belief, and the “belief in the value of scientific truth” cannot be justified by appealing to either a necessity of scientific laws or a necessity inherent in human nature. In offering this analysis, Weber echoes Nietzche’s sentiments regarding the character of the “discipline” of science: To make possible for this discipline to begin, must there not be some prior conviction— even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself ? We see that science also rests on faith; there is simply no science “without presuppositions.” (Nietzsche, 1974, 280 ff.)

The hairline separating faith from science can be described from two different angles. On the one hand, accepting the value of scientific inquiry is itself an act of faith that cannot be justified on scientific grounds. On the other hand, scientific inquiry is composed of a number of extra-scientific factors such as presuppositions and evaluative ideas that cannot be reduced to or deduced from empirical reality. Both of these factors figure prominently in the transcendental presupposition of the cultural sciences that posits that human beings have the ability to take a deliberate attitude toward the world in which they live and infuse meaning into the world. In sum, all sciences studying empirical reality, the cultural sciences no less than the other, are based on suprarational factors such as presuppositions, evaluative ideas—and ultimately on a suprarational affirmation of the validity of these presuppositions and evaluative ideas. In addition to suprarational presuppositions and suprarational affirmation of these presuppositions being a part of scientific inquiry, Weber identifies another suprarational element in scientific inquiry. Weber argues that a study of the main scientists and principal scientific discoveries leads to the conclusion that “the really great advances in knowledge in mathematics and the natural sciences” are the product of “the intuitive flashes of imagination” (LCS, 176). If an individual is not gifted with the ability to produce imaginative “ideas or ideal intuitions,” that person may become an excellent “clerk or . . . technical official” (SV, 136), but such a person will never become a great scientist. The ability to “divine” scientific hypotheses by means of an “ ‘intuitive’ gift” (LCS, 176) that cause revolutionary advances in scientific knowledge sets the genuinely great scientist (and great scientific discoveries) apart from the technical application of already known scientific knowledge by technical experts. The possession of these intuitive gifts and the inspired scientific findings they produce is not something that can be rationally explained or attained: “Now, whether we have scientific inspiration depends upon destinies that are hidden from us, and besides upon ‘gifts’ ” (SV, 136). Weber criticizes the notion that scientific inquiry is exclusively a matter of mechanical measurements, experimental manipulations, or the development of purely rational processes.4 He posits that a considered reflection on the issue reveals

46 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY the fact that the role of “inspiration” is as critical in scientific inquiry as it is in art: [I]nspiration plays no less a role in science than it does in the realm of art. It is a childish notion to think that a mathematician attains any scientifically valuable results by sitting at his desk with a ruler, calculating machines or other mechanical means. The mathematical imagination of a Weierstrass is naturally quite differently oriented in meaning and result than is the imagination of an artist, and differs basically in quality. But the psychological processes do not differ. Both are frenzy (in the sense of Plato’s “mania”) and “inspiration.” (SV, 136)

Calculations and experiments come into play at a relatively later stage in the process of scientific discovery, when the insights gained through frenzy, mania, inspiration, and so on have been formulated in the form of rationalized hypotheses, and these hypotheses have to be subject to empirical and analytical validation. Weber posits that this is as true of the historical sciences as it is of the natural and mathematical sciences. After noting that all the great advances in the natural and mathematical sciences have originally been in the form of hypotheses produced by suprarational intuitive flashes of brilliance, Weber goes on to note that the hypotheses are [t]hen “verified” vis-à-vis the facts, i.e. their validity is tested in procedures involving the use of already available empirical knowledge and they are “formulated” in a logically correct way. The same is true in history: when we insist here on the dependence of the knowledge of the “essential” on the use of the concept of objective possibility, we assert nothing at all about the psychologically interesting question which does not, however, concern us here, namely, how does an historical hypothesis arise in the mind of the investigator? We are here concerned only with the question of the logical category under which the hypothesis is to be demonstrated as valid in case of dispute or doubt, for it is that which determines its logical “structure.” (LCS, 176)

The rationalized, logical structure of scientific hypotheses represents the objective form in which knowledge claims are presented in order to be tested, critiqued, and/or verified. While this is an essential step in the process of scientific inquiry, one should not lose sight of the fact that the origin of a truly original/revolutionary scientific hypothesis is the suprarational intuitive flashes of brilliance experienced by the scientist. In light of the foregoing discussion, Weber’s description of the “objective validity of empirical knowledge” (OSS, 110) leads to a radically different understanding of the “objective” character of science than that proposed by Enlightenment thought. Enlightenment thought viewed science as being “objective” because it was completely free from the subjective values, desires, orientations, and fears of the scientist. Scientific inquiry had to be expunged of all subjective factors because these factors can lead to nothing more than knowledge of particulars, whereas objective scientific inquiry yields knowledge of universals. In contrast, Weber asserts that the objective rational validity of scientific inquiry is based on three subjective suprarational factors: (a) presuppositions and value judgments, (b) the affirmation of these presuppositions and value judgments, and (c) intuitive flashes of brilliance that give rise to new scientific hypotheses. For Weber, these subjective suprarational factors do not detract

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 47 from the objective and rational character of science, they actually make science possible. These subjective characteristics are so intimately a part of the scientific enterprise that science is hardly imaginable in their absence: A chaos of “existential judgments” about countless individual events would be the only result of a serious attempt to analyze reality “without presuppositions.” . . . Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality. (OSS, 78)

Weber asserts that cultural values play a critical role in bringing order to the chaotic form of an observed phenomenon that presents itself to the observer. These cultural values contain the extra-scientific, suprarational factors on which the scientific inquiry is based. For Weber, scientific inquiry is not possible in the absence of specific subjective, extra-scientific factors. While Weber’s description of science and scientific knowledge sees subjective factors and value judgments to be an integral part of scientific inquiry, his very definition of science argues for a value-free science. As noted earlier, Weber sees science as being a unique source of knowledge about empirical reality because it provides “concepts and judgments which are neither empirical reality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner” (OSS, 111). In providing these concepts and judgments that facilitate the ordering of empirical reality in a valid manner, science is (or should be) completely free of value judgments. Weber seems to be saying that, while science is based on certain subjective factors and value judgments, it is at the same time free of certain subjective factors and value judgments. This apparent contradiction in Weber’s thought is clarified by Löwith in these words: What Max Weber’s call for a value-free science sought none the less to demonstrate was that, in spite of science’s emancipation, its “facts” were underpinned by specific preconceived value-judgements of a moral and semi-religious type, some of which even approximated to fundamental principles. Science was to become free, in the sense that its value-judgements were to become decisive, logically consistent and self-reflexive, rather than remaining concealed, both to others and to science itself, under the cloak of “scientific knowledge.” Weber’s call for the value-freedom of scientific judgement does not represent a regression to pure scientificity; on the contrary, he is seeking to bring those extra-scientific criteria of judgement into the scientific equation . . . . (Löwith, 1989, 146)

For Weber, the value-free character of science is not related to the fact that it is free of subjective factors and value judgments of a “moral and semi-religious type.” Science is value-free in the sense that its “moral and semi-religious” dimension has become “decisive, logically consistent and self-reflexive, rather than remaining concealed.” Science becomes science only when its extra-scientific dimension is explicitly recognized, accounted for, and made clear. As long as the extra-scientific, semireligious dimension of science remains concealed from the view of the scientist, science falls short of being science.

48 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY Weber’s consciousness of the fact that extra-scientific criteria underpinned scientific knowledge5 led him to reject the claim that the objectivity of science is either rooted in or leads to the knowledge of universally valid laws. He asserts that any claim of the objectivity of the analysis of cultural events that “proceeds according to the thesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality [to] ‘laws,’ is meaningless” (OSS, 80). This is not because “laws” are not at work in social, psychological, historical (i.e., cultural) phenomena, but rather because an adequate understanding of such phenomena cannot be reduced to the discovery of these “laws” or their application to particular situations once they have been discovered. While knowledge and application of “laws” is an important part of understanding empirical reality, empirical reality cannot be reduced to such “laws,” because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situations. In which sense and in which situations this is the case is not revealed to us by any law; it is decided according to the value-ideas in the light of which we view “culture” in each individual case. (OSS, 80 ff.)

In science, the knowledge of laws is not an end in itself, it is “one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining [an] end”—in the cultural sciences, the end is the study and understanding of the most important part of empirical reality, that is, meaning (Sinn). For Weber, the objectivity of science cannot be reduced to abstract general laws, it must take account of the subjective factors such as presuppositions, value judgments, and the role of intuition as they are all related to issues of meaning and significance in the scientific enterprise. In sum, only a hairline separates faith and science not only because science contains an extra-scientific, semireligious dimension within it, but also because the affirmation or rejection of the value of scientific knowledge is an act of faith: Only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgment meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith. (OSS, 55)

Weber wrote these words in the first extended discussion of the methodology of the social science that he undertook in 1904. He uttered the following words, detailing the hairline difference between faith and science, in the last public lecture that he delivered before his death: All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid; these are the general foundations of our orientation in the world; and, at least for our special question, these presuppositions are the least problematic aspect of science. Science further presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is “worth being known.” In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position towards life. (SV, 143)

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 49 For Weber, the acceptance of the value of scientific knowledge is to judge the validity of the value—and as is the case with the judgment of all values, this judgment is a matter of faith, not science. Furthermore, the employment of scientific knowledge toward a chosen end is something that cannot be decided on purely rational or scientific grounds. One must accept or reject the use of science toward particular ends according to one’s “ultimate position towards life.” In other words, both the acceptance of the value of science and the employment of science toward a particular end are matters of faith that cannot be justified in purely rational terms. Given Weber’s description of scientific knowledge and the presuppositions and value-ideas on which it is based, it can be surmised: Rational scientific inquiry is made possible by a suprarational, faithful affirmation of the following presuppositions and value-ideas: (a) Scientific truth about empirical reality is real. (b) Scientific truth about empirical reality can be known. (c) Scientific truth about empirical reality is worth knowing. Given the transcendental presupposition of cultural science, the following adjustments have to be made to the above summary: (a) Human beings invest meaning in the world. (b) The meaning invested by human beings can be known. (c) The meaning invested by human beings is worth knowing.

2.2 The Empirical Dimension of Faith For Weber, the hairline separating faith from science is not just the result of the fact that scientific inquiry contains a suprarational “moral and semi-religious” dimension. It is also the case that faith in the validity of religious values and ideas invariably gives birth to “semi-empirical” factors that can be investigated scientifically. In other words, just as empirical science contains nonempirical factors that can only be accounted for in terms of faith, religious faith contains elements that find their expression in the form of concrete, empirical reality. Weber notes: The belief which we all have in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity of ultimate and final values, in which the meaning of our existence is rooted, is not incompatible with the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints from which empirical reality gets its significance. Both these views are, on the contrary, in harmony with each other. (OSS, 111)

The harmony between meta-empirical validity of final values and the constant change of empirical reality is accounted for in terms of the culture constructed by human beings. Meta-empirical faith in nonempirical, nonscientific presuppositions and value judgments finds its expression in concrete and empirical terms in the form of human culture—whether one is referring to the religious or the scientific

50 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY dimension of culture. For Weber, the very definition of culture points to the fact that culture is ultimately constructed from the perspective of meta-empirical, nonscientific factors such as meaning and significance: “ ‘Culture’ is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). But at the same time, this very definition of culture makes it plain that it is no less the case that culture finds its expression in the form of concrete, empirical reality within the bounds of history. For Weber, matters related to belief in the validity of ultimate and final values cannot be divorced from concrete, empirical reality: Life with its irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible. The concrete form in which value-relevance occurs remains perpetually in flux, ever subject to change in the dimly seen future of human culture. The light which emanates from those highest evaluative ideas always falls on an ever changing finite segment of the vast chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time. (OSS, 111)

Issues related to meaning, significance, and faith express themselves in a variety of concrete forms that become the source of data for the cultural scientist to observe and analyze. Even though it is usually assumed that matters of religious faith deal almost exclusively with otherworldly concerns and spiritual/metaphysical interpretations of the universe, Weber posits that this is an incomplete description of religious faith. He argues that however much religious teachings may be concerned with mythological world images and concerns for otherworldly salvation, religious behavior itself is very much directed toward the material world and the here and now: The most elementary forms of behavior motivated by religious or magical factors are oriented to this world. “That it may go well with thee . . . and that thou mayest prolong thy days upon the earth” (Deut. 4:40) expresses the reason for the performance of actions enjoined by religion or magic . . . religious or magical behavior or thinking must not be set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct, particularly since even the ends of the religious and magical actions are predominantly economic. (SR, 1)

Health, wealth, and a productive life are all matters concerned with this world, and the most elementary forms of religious behavior seek to secure these worldly goods for the actor. Not only are the “most elementary forms” of religious behavior oriented toward this world, the most advanced forms of religious behavior, are also concerned with attaining religious goods in this world. Weber notes that, unlike the layperson, the religious virtuoso is not primarily concerned with material goods like health, wealth, and long life in this world. The virtuoso is more concerned with experiencing union, ecstasy, Nirvana, annihilation, in short, some manifestation of salvation. While the goal appears to be otherworldly for the virtuoso, the ends of his religious commitment are this-worldly. The virtuoso seeks to attain the goal in the here and now of this world, not in the hereafter of another world. Weber notes that this is the case from the perspective of the actors themselves: Psychologically considered, man in quest of salvation has been primarily preoccupied by attitudes of the here and now . . . for the devout the sacred value, first and above all,

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 51 has been a psychological state in the here and now. Primarily this state consists in the emotional attitude per se, which was directly called forth by the specifically religious (or magical) act, by methodical asceticism, or by contemplation. (SPWR, 278)

There is a significant difference between the layperson and the religious virtuoso. The layperson seeks to attain worldly goods while the virtuoso seeks to attain spiritual goods. But in the final analysis, there is no difference between the two because both of them seek to attain their goal in the here and now of this world. To the degree that religious behavior concerns itself with the attainment of goods in this world and affects the behavior and attitude of its adherents accordingly—behavior that can be observed and analyzed by the cultural scientist—religious faith has an empirical dimension that is amenable to scientific inquiry. Religious behavior is not the only source of empirical data that provides insight into religious faith. The manner in which human beings articulate and express their understanding of the universe and of the human being’s place in it is a second source of empirical data related to matters of faith. Weber notes that from the earliest period in human history, the concrete, material world of nature that human beings encounter and experience has never been considered to be the complete manifestation of reality. A spirit, soul, apparition, or some other numinous entity was thought to lie behind the phenomenon that is experienced in the world of nature. Even in its most primitive form, religious behavior leads to the “displacement of naturalism” because of the notion that a numinous entity is “concealed ‘behind’ and responsible for the activity” of natural objects and phenomena (SR, 3). This supra-natural numinous reality becomes the focus of human attention in their efforts to meet their material and ideal interests, because it is the spirit behind the object that has to be manipulated, coaxed, and/or placated in order to attain the desired results: Since it is assumed that behind real things and events there is something else, distinctive and spiritual, of which real events are only the symptoms or indeed the symbols, an effort must be made to influence, not the concrete things, but the spiritual powers that express themselves through concrete things. (SR, 6 ff.)

A rational explanation/understanding of the reality behind or above the empirical reality is the second source of the concrete form in which issues related to religious faith express themselves. This rational explanation/understanding of the reality behind empirical reality manifests itself in the form of world images that have been expressed in the form of myths, legends, stories, and scientific theories that human cultures have articulated during the course of history. In the most general sense, “rational” means “systematic arrangement” (SPWR, 293) of the constantly changing empirical reality that appears to be disordered, in terms of general, abstract concepts. A rationalized world image emerges as a result of the human attempt to systematically arrange the discrete, diverse, and often divergent natural experiences and phenomena into a comprehensible totality. In relationship to the world image, rationalization refers to “an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts” (SPWR, 293). Here, attention to the concrete material reality orients human attention toward

52 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY theoretical and abstract concepts. The rationalization of the world image is related to, but not the same thing as, the rationalization of human behavior. The latter refers to the determination of proper behavior or action in order to achieve desired results, and seeks to distinguish between a limited set of “valid” norms from amongst an almost infinite number of actions that human beings are capable of. Rationalization in this case refers to “the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means” (SPWR, 293). The manner in which human beings rationalize their worldly behavior, and the manner in which they articulate a rationalized understanding of the universe and the human being’s place in it are two examples of the concrete form that belief in religious values and ideas expresses itself. Besides and beyond rationalizing their worldview and their worldly behavior, there is a third example of the empirical dimension of religious faith. The fact that human existence is uncertain and precarious is obvious, as is the fact that certain human beings enjoy good fortune and others suffer from bad fortune. Weber notes that human beings have to account for the precarious and uncertain nature of their existence conceptually, safeguard this existence practically, and also account for the varying fortunes that different human beings are subject to in life. At times of suffering and misfortune, and by those suffering from such travails, the gap between the “what is” and “what ought to be” has to be bridged. The universally observed “problem of unjust suffering” (RRW, 353) has to be accounted for rationally in order to make such suffering bearable. At times of good fortune and for those experiencing good fortune, the “what is” is not sufficient in itself, it has to be legitimized: “The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune” (SPWR, 271). The attempt to legitimize the “what is” by the fortunate and the attempt to account for it by the less fortunate evidences the importance of meaning. For Weber, the manner in which meaning is attached to either suffering or good fortune is of great significance in the development of human thought. Speaking of the common theme that underlies all religious thought, Weber notes: Behind them all always lies a stand towards something in the actual world which is experienced as specifically “senseless.” Thus, the demand has been implied: that the world order in its totality is, could, and should somehow be a meaningful “cosmos.” (SPWR, 281)

The formulation of a theodicy that offers a rational explanation for the contradiction between the claim of a meaningful existence and an apparently meaningless empirical reality is another example of the concrete form that religious faith in ultimate values can take. In essence, theodicy is the rationalized explication of the fundamental religious “presupposition that the course of the world be somehow meaningful, at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men” (RRW, 353). Theodicy offers a rational explanation for the suffering encountered in the world with reference to a rationalized image of the world, underpinned by the presupposition that human existence is meaningful. It goes on to posit ultimate salvation (or deliverance from every form of suffering) for those who behave according to a particular rationalized

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 53 code of ethics. Given what Weber has said about the elements that make up religious faith, the following summary can be offered. Religious faith is based on the suprarational affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas that: (a) The cosmos and human existence in the cosmos is meaningful. (b) Salvation from suffering (i.e., meaninglessness) can be had. (c) Salvation from suffering (i.e., meaninglessness) is worth having. Weber argues that the need for a rationalized understanding of human fate and suffering in the world furthers the process of the abstraction of human thought. The attempt to forge a meaningful cosmos, at the level of intellectual–theoretical and practical–ethical planes, out of the chaotic empirical reality that confronts the human senses is “the core of genuine religious rationalism” (SPWR, 281). The implication of the attempt to find meaning when the concrete, empirical reality is experienced as being devoid of meaning is far reaching. Speaking of the attempt to account for the discrepancy between the “what is” and “what ought to be,” Parsons notes: [T]he search for grounds of meaning which can resolve the discrepancies must lead to continually more “ultimate” reference points which are progressively further removed from the levels of common sense experience on which the discrepancies originally arise. (SR, lvii f.)

Just as the human encounter with the natural world initiates the process of abstraction from the natural world, the human attempt to explain the concrete, sociohistorical condition of individuals and societies orients human attention toward a supra-sensual, supra-empirical realm that lies behind or above the realm of concrete experience. The meaning of human existence (or the ultimate reference point) is not to be found in the realm of concrete experience but in the realm that lies behind or above it. Weber posits that the search for the meaning of human existence is directly related to the articulation of a rationalized and abstracted world image: “The need for ethical interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of the distribution of fortunes among men increased with the growing rationality of conceptions of the world” (SPWR, 275). A more rationalized conception of the world leads to a more acute awareness of the problem of meaning and the problematic of salvation. Just as one cannot separate the material and ideal interests of human beings from their rationalized world image, the manner in which human beings seek to attach meaning to human existence cannot be separated from the rationalized world image. The rational worldly behavior that human beings engage in (to attain “religious” goods), the rationalized world image that they articulate (to express “religious” meaning), and the rational attempt to formulate a theodicy (to express the ultimate “religious” value of salvation) provide the cultural scientist with sources of empirical data that can be used in the study and analysis of religious faith. Weber’s inquiry into the sociology of religion is underpinned by the presupposition that a scientist can get an insight into the subjective faith of an actor by studying certain empirical factors. To begin with, the most empirical of all factors is the

54 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY practical–ethical behavior that the actor engages in while pursuing his/her material interests. This behavior, for its part, takes place within certain parameters that are shaped by a rationalized world image that the actor carries with him/herself all the time (whether consciously or subconsciously). Weber posits that there is a reflexive relationship between material interests and world image. The reflexive nature of this relationship is illustrated by Weber in one of his better-known quotes: Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. (SPWR, 280)

For Weber, a disciplined scientific inquiry into cultural phenomena needs to take account of this reflexive relationship between human behavior in the world and human ideas about the world. But an inquiry into the behavioral patterns and world images of the actor is not an end in itself; it is a means toward understanding something more fundamental. Weber posits that meaningful scientific inquiry requires that the study of these empirical factors take place with reference to the psychological, subjective significance or meaning (Sinn) that these factors have for the subject under study (SR, 1). The fact that an understanding of significance and meaning (Sinn) is the object of all scientific study of human culture is implicit in the very definition of culture. As noted above, Weber defines culture as “a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). For Weber, the study of human behavior in the world, human ideas about the world, and the cultural institutions that result from such behavior and ideas turns out to be a form of psychological analysis, insofar as this analysis attempts to understand the meaning and significance (Sinn) that particular actions, ideas, and institutions have for the actor. Weber’s following observation, while specifically referring to the economic aspect of culture, applies to the study of human culture in general as well: Indeed, the partly brilliant attempts which have been made hitherto to interpret economic phenomena psychologically show in any case that the procedure does not begin with the analysis of psychological qualities, moving then to the analysis of social institutions, but that, on the contrary, insight into the psychological preconditions and consequences of institutions presupposes a precise knowledge of the latter and the scientific analysis of their structure. (OSS, 88)

For Weber, “a precise knowledge” of the facts related to the “psychological preconditions and consequences” of the institutions under conditions is a fundamental prerequisite to the understanding of the value (i.e., meaning) invested/conferred upon these institutions by the human actors. In short, it is the goal of the cultural sciences to undertake a scientific analysis of the facts of particular institutions in order to come to an understanding of the value (i.e., meaning) invested in these institutions by the actors themselves. Weber emphasizes the fact that while the goal of the cultural sciences is to understand a subjective value (i.e., meaning), the means of reaching the goal is the study

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 55 of objective facts. According to Weber, an attempt to understand the psychological significance of a particular act or institution should not begin psychological analysis per se, but from precise knowledge and scientific analysis of the act/institution under consideration. In other words, an understanding of the psychological significance and meaning of particular acts, ideas, and institutions cannot be deduced from preestablished a priori laws or from a purely empathetic understanding of the investigator. Rather, this understanding results from a study of concrete empirical facts combined with the ability of the scientist/student to understand the possible meaning and significance that the phenomena may have for the actor: Social-psychological research involves the study of various very disparate individual types of cultural elements with reference to their interpretability by our empathetic understanding. Through social-psychological research, with the knowledge of individual institutions as a point of departure, we will learn increasingly how to understand institutions in a psychological way. We will not however deduce the institutions from psychological laws or explain them by elementary psychological phenomena. (OSS, 89)

Hennis discerns a spiritualist dimension in Weber’s methodology insofar as this methodology tries to uncover the psychological meaning and significance that particular acts, ideas, and institutions have in particular cultural settings: [O]ne can . . . say that Weber’s sociology, as a sociology of Verstehen which seeks to understand and explain every action and behavior, must necessarily be “spiritualist” in nature. “Rational action” of a purposively rational type is to a certain extent only the unambiguous, standardized unit of measurement with whose aid one can bring order to infinitely more important human and historical “deviations.” (Hennis, 1998, 100)

Weber’s sociology, insofar as it is a sociology of Verstehen, is possible only if the investigator is able to overcome the fact/value dichotomy during the course of his/her investigation. On the one hand, the investigator must recognize and accept the fact that Sinn (a subjective value) is expressed in a variety of empirical forms (or as objective facts). This means that the investigator must acknowledge and accept the fact that a scientific understanding of subjective value conferred by the actor is possible only through the investigator’s precise and detailed knowledge of objective facts. On the other hand, the investigator needs to be cognizant of his/her own role/ position in the investigation. Even though the investigation seeks to study objective facts, it is taking place from the perspective of the investigator’s own subjective value ideas. For Weber, the scientific analysis of objective cultural facts is meaningful and possible only from the perspective of the investigator’s subjective value-ideas: To be sure, without the investigator’s evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality. Just as without the investigator’s conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reality is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal belief, the refraction of values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his work. (OSS, 82)

56 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY While the goal of the cultural sciences is the study of objective cultural phenomena, this study of cultural objects always and everywhere is possible only because of subjective interest in the phenomena on the part of the investigator. Consequently, the objective study of facts by the cultural sciences is possible only because of subjective meaning/value attached to particular facts by the investigator: [C]ultural science in our sense involves “subjective” presuppositions insofar as it concerns itself only with those elements of reality which have some relationship, however indirect, to events to which we attach cultural significance. (OSS, 82)

While Weber himself explicitly stated that only a “hair-line . . . separates science from faith” (OSS, 110), the foregoing discussion evidences that even though a distance remains between the two, this separation has been bridged over by Weber’s reflections on the methodology and definition of the cultural sciences. Suprarational faithful affirmations of particular values and ideas are made meaningful, and scientific inquiry is made possible by the exact same confluence of factors: the fact that value judgments and issues of meaning are meaningful only if they are expressed in a form that has empirical content. For Weber, the relationship between Sinn and empirical facts, is characterized by a reflexivity that cannot be reduced to linear causality.6 Weber’s approach recognizes an intimate relationship between belief in ultimate values and empirical facts, and attempts to understand the former in light of the latter without reducing them to the latter. Given Weber’s definition of science and culture, this attempt does not make any rational sense in the absence of an empirical dimension of faith and belief that can be observed by the scientist. Just as one cannot understand science and scientific inquiry in the absence of extra scientific, suprarational factors of a moral and semireligious type that underpin scientific inquiry, one cannot understand issues of meaning, significance, and faith in the absence of concrete factors of a semi-empirical type in which such faith expresses itself. Consequently, the close proximity of faith and science can be demonstrated from two different, but intimately related, perspectives. First, the presence of extra-scientific presuppositions within science and the suprarational affirmations of these presuppositions on the part of the scientist demonstrate that faith claims are an integral part of scientific rationalism. Second, the fact that the faith claims of religion inevitably manifest themselves in rationalized form at both the theoretical and practical levels demonstrates that faith has an empirical dimension that is amenable to scientific inquiry. 2.3 Weber the Person on Religion and Science The preceding discussion suggests that one cannot divorce the practice of science carried out by a scientist in his/her professional life from an act of faith on the part of the scientist in his/her private life. This should be as true of Weber as of any other scientist. Weber’s reflections on the methodology of the social sciences show that Weber the practicing social scientist was acutely aware of the fact that any commitment to the scientific enterprise was the result of a faith in science that could not be justified scientifically. As noted above, Weber asserts that scientific truth is of no

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 57 value to the one who does not accept its validity, and the acceptance of its validity is the result of certain cultural values that cannot be explained in scientific terms or in terms of human nature. On a more personal level, Weber was just as acutely aware of the fact that this commitment to the value of scientific truth made certain demands upon him that required the unconditional sacrifice of all other convictions. Reflecting on his own vocation as a scientist, Weber notes: Whether . . . science is a worthwhile “vocation” for somebody, and whether science itself has an objectively valuable “vocation” are again value judgments about which nothing can be said in the lecture-room. To affirm the value of science is a presupposition for teaching here. I personally by my very work answer in the affirmative, and I also do so from precisely the standpoint that hates intellectualism as the worst devil . . . . (SV, 152)

While Weber the teacher could not teach or advocate that scientific inquiry is a vocation worth pursuing in the classroom, he personally affirmed the value of science by his very practice of it—and he made the affirmation in the most passionate terms. The affirmation of science as a vocation worth pursuing requires Weber to bridge the fact/value dichotomy at a very practical level—in fact, his affirmation is not possible without bridging the dichotomy. He affirmed the value of science because he acknowledged and accepted the presupposition that science is a unique source of knowledge about empirical reality and that this knowledge is worth having. At the same time, Weber is equally aware of the fact that the very vocation that he is committed to contains within it the possibility of giving rise to a form of intellectualism, which is the worst of all devils. Weber’s understanding of and commitment to the value of science is matched by an awareness of and loathing for the problematic that scientific intellectualism has given rise to. The simultaneous appreciation of the value and limitations of science on Weber’s part produces a tension in his thought that resonates throughout his work. Wolin notes that Weber’s scholarship “issues from the frustration of a consciousness that knows its deepest values are owed to religion but that its vocational commitments are to the enemy” (Wolin, 1981, 421). In making this observation, Wolin is implying that Weber’s consciousness and scholarship are specific illustrations of a general observation made by Nietzsche that a scientist’s faith in the value in science is a suprarational assertion that cannot be validated scientifically: But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. (Nietzsche, 1974, 283)

Weber’s affirmation of the value of scientific truth is the expression of an extra scientific, metaphysical faith. While Weber’s personal affirmation of science as a vocation worth pursuing is an act of faith in science, scientific rationality in his day and age has undermined the validity of all faith claims. But Weber continues to affirm his faith in science in spite of the fact that the progress of science contributes

58 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY to the undermining of all faith claims. Weber has to make this leap of faith in order to invest his work with meaning and significance in an age of disenchantment. It appears that Weber’s continued affirmation of the value of science in an age of disenchantment evidences that he himself is making a “sacrifice of the intellect.” Scientific inquiry has laid bare the fact that the world and everything in it is devoid of meaning; Weber’s conscious choice of pursuing the vocation of science challenges this scientific position. The implications in this incongruity are far reaching. The fact that the affirmation of the value of science, in the form of acknowledging it to be a vocation worth pursuing, amounts to a leap of faith is barely concealed in Weber’s work. He acknowledges that religious thought and certain philosophical claims presuppose that “the world must have meaning, and the question is how to interpret this meaning so that it is intellectually conceivable” (SV, 153). Then Weber goes on to detail this point by noting: It is the same as with Kant’s epistemology. He took for his point of departure the presupposition: “Scientific truth exists and it is valid,” and then asked: “Under which presuppositions of thought is truth possible and meaningful?” The modern aestheticians . . . proceed from the presupposition that “works of art exist,” and then ask: “How is their existence meaningful and possible?” (SV, 154)

Weber, no less than Kant, affirms the presupposition that “scientific truth exists and it is valid.” According to his description, this presupposition is an “essentially religious and philosophical presupposition” (SV, 154). Furthermore, acceptance of this religious/philosophical presupposition or this leap of faith cannot/should not be divorced from the question: “How is the existence of this truth meaningful and possible?” (SV, 154). Weber’s writing on the methodology of the social sciences explores these very questions. By pursuing his vocation as a scientist and pondering over the question of “How is scientific truth possible?” and “What is the meaning of scientific truth?” in his methodological writings, Weber affirms the presupposition that scientific truth exists and is worth pursuing. In light of Weber’s own exposition of the issue, this essentially amounts to a “religious and philosophical” affirmation in the value of science. In making the affirmation that he personally values the pursuit of science as a vocation, Weber is making an extrascientific affirmation without which his pursuit of the vocation would not be possible. The following observation by Wolin on Weber’s methodological work points to the extra-scientific dimension of Weber’s affirmation: The methodologist seizes the opportunity to show the researcher that science cannot flourish without “evaluative ideas” for it is these that nourish notions of what is “significant” and hence worthy of inquiry. “Significance” becomes the crucial concept in Weber’s politics of knowledge. It symbolizes the moment of freedom for the social scientist when he registers his affirmations, when he exchanges the settled routines of the inquiry for the risks of action. It is akin to a form of momentary and secular salvation for it creates meaning in an otherwise meaningless world. (Wolin, 1981, 419)

The comments by Wolin evidence that it is not only Weber’s consciousness that is ultimately indebted to religious values, but also that religious values provide the

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 59 central axis around which his methodology of the social sciences is built—there can be no science without a faithful affirmation of science. In short, Weber the scientist has to offer a “sacrifice of the intellect” in the form of affirming the value of science in a disenchanted age in order to experience a “form of momentary and secular salvation . . .” The observations on Weber’s part regarding the intimate proximity of faith and science—and the reasoning behind them—need to be balanced with his equally forceful assertion that science cannot be reduced to a matter of faith. This is evident in the very definition of scientific knowledge because science is a unique avenue to knowledge about empirical reality, which provides knowledge about empirical reality that faith alone cannot give. On the one hand, Weber’s methodology describes how presuppositions and evaluative ideas that together go into making decisions about matters of significance are central elements of any genuine, objective scientific inquiry—thus placing science and faith in intimate proximity. On the other hand, Weber emphasizes that science must remain free of value considerations in the sense that science should not be reduced to presuppositions and evaluative ideas that have been sanctified by the claims of having reached the level of unquestioned scientific objectivity. This makes the presuppositions and evaluative ideas of science immune from empirical critique and makes science a value-laden enterprise. Löwith summarizes Weber’s position on the simultaneous intimate proximity of science and faith and its value-free character in these words: It is a “very fine line indeed ” which separates science from belief in ultimate values. Indeed scientific judgment is never completely to be split off from evaluative assessment; it is simply necessary to maintain the distinction between the two. What can and must be done, if the cause of scientific objectivity is to be served, is to highlight and make accountable precisely those factors which are not scientifically demonstrable but which are none the less relevant to science. (Löwith, 1989, 146)

The intimate proximity of faith and science has far-reaching implications for the attitude that individuals adopt toward the modern disenchanted condition. Looking at the responses of two groups of people in the disenchanted world, the religious believer and the modern intellectual, Weber argues that response of the modern, secular intellectual is less dignified than the response of the religious believer. He notes that in a disenchanted world, there is a “need of some modern intellectuals to furnish their souls” with something religious, holy, and sacred (SV, 154). In order to fill this need, they try to construct new religions in the absence of genuine prophecy. For Weber, such an attempt is predestined to failure because it is a betrayal of both religion and science. And the results of such an attempt are bound to be monstrous: If one tries intellectually to construe new religions without a new and genuine prophecy, then, in an inner sense, something similar will result, but with still worse effects. And academic prophecy, finally, will create only fanatical sects but never a genuine community. (SV, 155)

60 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY The established religions of the traditional church offer a much better, and intellectually more sound, alternative to religions based on academic prophecy: To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him. After all, they do not make it hard for him. One way or another he has to bring his “intellectual sacrifice”—that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall not rebuke him. For such an intellectual sacrifice in favor of an unconditional religious devotion is ethically quite different a matter than the evasion of the plain duty of intellectual integrity, which sets in if one lacks the courage to clarify one’s own ultimate standpoint and rather facilitates this duty by feeble relative judgments. (SV, 155)

For Weber, making the intellectual sacrifice and returning to the old churches is an ethically superior response to the disenchanted fate of the times than intellectual and scientific pursuits that do not have the courage to “clarify one’s own ultimate standpoint.” The highest value of intellectual and scientific inquiry is plain “intellectual integrity”—and those who try to invest the world with rational/scientific meaning and significance grossly offend this integrity by their futile attempts, because no such meaning and significance can ever be had. It is better to make the intellectual sacrifice and return to the church (masjid, synagogue, or temple) rather than engage in intellectually dishonest and ultimately futile pursuits: In my eyes, such religious return stands higher than the academic prophecy, which does not clearly realize that in the lecture-rooms of the university no other virtue holds but plain intellectual integrity. (SV, 155 ff )

The ethical soundness of the religious return in the face of the fate of our times, when compared to academic prophecy is further detailed by Weber in a personal letter to Ferdinand Tönnies. Weber’s characterization of himself as being “religiously unmusical” is the most well-known phrase from this correspondence and this can be interpreted to be a reflection of his Enlightenment mindset. But looking at what Weber said prior to describing himself as being “religiously unmusical” and what he says afterward, shows that this is a gross misreading of Weber’s position. Weber notes: It goes without saying that religions must clash with scientific truth insofar as they assert empirical facts or the causal impact on them of something supernatural. However, when I studied modern Catholic literature in Rome a few years ago, I became convinced how hopeless it is to think that there are any scientific results that this church cannot digest. The steady and slow impact of the practical consequences of our view of nature and history may make these ecclesiastical powers wither away . . . but no anti-clericalism based on “metaphysical” naturalism can accomplish this. I could not participate in such anti-clericalism. (Schluchter, 1979, 82 fn)

In drawing a causal link between empirical fact and supernatural causes, religion clashes with science but remains internally consistent with its own principles. While drawing the link between empirical reality and supernatural causes is scientifically unsound, it is ethically sound insofar as it does not violate religion’s own self-understanding and

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 61 self-definition. But when modern intellectuals use science to construct naturalistic metaphysical systems, not only do they clash with religion by offering a rival metaphysical system, but they also violate some of the most fundamental principles of scientific inquiry. In constructing such systems, the modern intellectuals present their own personal, relative judgments in the form of scientific truth, without attending to the rigorous scientific responsibility of intellectual integrity that requires a careful and rational explication of the scientist’s own standpoint and presuppositions. By presenting their own personal judgments in the form of scientific truth, the modern intellectuals are guilty of an ethical transgression because they violate science’s own self-understanding and self-definition. This ethical transgression on the part of modern intellectuals unnecessarily aggravates the clash between religion and science and takes the form of a dispute between two rival parties. For Weber, while religion and science must ultimately clash, Weber the scientist will not become a party in the dispute. After making the aforementioned observation, Weber becomes self-reflective and offers an evaluation of his own state of mind regarding his personal fate in a disenchanted world: It is true that I am absolutely unmusical in matters religious and that I have neither the need nor the ability to erect any religious edifices within me—that is simply impossible for me, and I reject it. But after examining myself carefully I must say that I am neither anti-religious nor irreligious. In this regard too I consider myself a cripple, a stunted man whose fate it is to admit honestly that he must put up with this state of affairs (so as not to fall for some romantic swindle). I am like a tree stump from which new shoots can sometimes grow, but I must not pretend to be a grown tree. (Schluchter, 1979, 82 fn)

Describing himself as being religiously unmusical and at the same time being “neither anti-religious nor irreligious” can be seen as being a reflection of Weber’s Enlightenment consciousness. But, by recognizing that he can be no more than the stump of a tree “from which new shoots can grow” but never a “grown tree,” Weber’s post-Enlightenment consciousness manifests itself in the form of a conscious realization of the limitations of rational, scientific inquiry. Weber acknowledges the fact that he cannot produce scientific value/meaning, or a naturalistic metaphysical system, to fill the vacuum that is the result of being religiously unmusical. In stark contrast, Enlightenment thought actively strove (and its present-day proponents still strive) to produce a variety of rational metaphysical systems to fill the vacuum that had been created by the rational critique of religion. In terms of evaluating others, there are significant implications of a consciousness that is simultaneously religiously unmusical but also aware of its own limitations: From this follows quite a bit: For you a theologian of liberal persuasion (whether Catholic or Protestant) is necessarily most abhorrent as the typical representative of a halfway position; for me he is in human terms infinitely more valuable and interesting . . . than the intellectual (and basically cheap) pharisaism of naturalism, which is intolerably fashionable and in which there is much less life than in the religious position. (Schluchter, 1979, 82 fn)

62 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY Comparatively speaking, Weber has more respect for theologians who are engaged in an attempt to bring religion into conversation with science than with modern intellectuals who attempt to construct new religions with the aid of academic prophecy. The theologians are “infinitely more valuable and interesting” as human beings than the religiously unmusical individuals who try to fashion naturalistic philosophies and metaphysics on the back of scientific findings.7 The latter are a pretentious lot who imagine that they can become fully grown trees, whereas in fact they can be nothing more than stumps from which (maybe) “new shoots can sometimes grow.” In other words, while he finds it admirable that there are no scientific results that the “church cannot digest,” he finds “the intellectual . . . pharisaism of naturalism” of the modern intellectuals to be abhorrent. Furthermore, as problematic as the modern theological attempt to bridge the gap between science and religion may be, for Weber, this attempt still has greater potential to nurture life than (pseudo)scientific naturalism. The foregoing analysis of Weber’s work on the issue of the hairline dividing faith and science and the comments of Wolin and Löwith on this aspect of Weber’s work suggest that Weber’s position on the issue is a departure from the Enlightenment understanding of the relationship between religion and science. In line with Enlightenment thought, Weber recognizes that there is an obvious difference between religious faith and scientific knowledge. Religious belief ultimately depends on the “possession” of faith or other holy states that, properly speaking, do not represent “knowledge” (SV, 154). In order to genuinely possess faith, “the devout reaches the point where the Augustinian sentence holds: credo non quod, sed quia absurdum est” (SV, 154). According to Weber, religious faith requires a conscious sacrifice of the intellect as a basic prerequisite for the possession of faith. This sacrifice of the intellect is something that cannot be justified on scientific grounds. In making the sacrifice of the intellect a fundamental prerequisite of faith, religion has set itself over and against science/rationality: The capacity for the accomplishment of religious virtuosos—the “intellectual sacrifice”—is the decisive characteristic of the positively religious man. That this is so is shown by the fact that in spite of (or rather in consequence) of theology (which unveils it) the tension between the value-spheres of “science” and the sphere of “the holy” is unbridgeable. (SV, 154)

The fact that there is an unbridgeable divide between the value spheres of “science” and “the holy” evidences that a difference between faith and science does exist. But it is only by conflating faith with “the holy” that a claim can be made that an unbridgeable divide exists between faith and science. The fact that faith cannot be conflated with the holy is evidenced by what Weber has already said regarding belief in ultimate values and the manner in which scientific inquiry is itself based on such a belief and makes such beliefs the object of its inquiry. On the one hand, the holy resides beyond the domain of scientific inquiry that requires faith to be possessed. On the other hand, science itself is based on a faith commitment (and also studies such commitments). These two points taken together suggest that, according to Weber, faith is common to both science and the holy. For Weber, religious faith seeks to give the believer possession of the holy (i.e., salvation) in return

BEYOND THE ENLIGHTENMENT / 63 for a sacrifice of the intellect, and scientific faith seeks to provide a unique form of knowledge of empirical reality by requiring a disciplining of the intellect. But as noted earlier, the difference between the two is not as stark as Weber thought. The pursuit of scientific knowledge in a disenchanted age also requires a sacrifice of the intellect because the disenchanted intellect posits that there is no such thing as meaning in the cosmos, while the pursuit of science as a vocation requires an intellectual rejection of this claim. Consequently, while the ends of religion and science are very different, the means of attaining the ends are exactly the same. The means express themselves in the form of a faithful affirmation of the respective presuppositions on which religion and science are based and a faithful affirmation that the goods (i.e., values) offered by the two are worth having. Furthermore, acting in accordance with these faithful affirmations requires a sacrifice of the intellect irrespective of whether one wants to attain the ends of religion (salvation) or the ends of science (knowledge). By examining a life that is lived in and shaped by the pursuit of the goods offered by either science or religion, one can see that not only is there a close proximity between faith and science, but also that the two are intimately related. A life lived in the pursuit of scientific goods provides the scientists with the empirical data that he/she can use to investigate the most subjective of categories—Sinn. At the same time, this pursuit reveals to the investigator that he/she cannot have these goods in the absence of an extra-scientific, suprarational faith in the value of scientific knowledge. The fact that Weber’s life was shaped by this faith is obvious enough from even a cursory glance at his biography. In short, it is not only at a theoretical and methodological level that Weber sees only a hairline separating faith from science, but also the very life he lived as an individual who had chosen science as a vocation provides the most compelling empirical evidence of the fact that faith and science stand in intimate proximity. Beginning with his earliest work on the methodology of the social sciences, continuing throughout his life, and culminating in the last public lectures that he delivered in his life, Weber’s stance on the relationship between religion and science cannot be mistaken for a simplistic Enlightenment statement on the issue. Weber’s work demonstrates a much more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between religion and science than the (non)relationship posited by Enlightenment thought. On three important points Weber’s work reflects a break from Enlightenment thought on the issue of the relationship between religion and science: (a) Only a hairline separates faith and science. (b) Scientific knowledge and religious belief are made possible by a suprarational faithful affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas underpinning each. (c) Individuals attempting to bridge the gap between religion and science are more worthy of respect than those attempting to construct naturalistic, “scientific” metaphysics that seeks to replace religion. In light of the foregoing discussion, the following can be stated with confidence: While there is a clear difference between religion and science as far as Weber is

64 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY concerned, his work cannot be categorized as a “vitriolic attack on religion” (Wittenberg, 1989, 118) by any stretch of the imagination. And contrary to the implication by omission made by Casanova, Weber’s work contains resources that can be utilized to initiate/advance the rapprochement between religion and science. Weber notes that while science cannot ultimately decide issues of meaning, significance, and value, it does have something to offer to those who discuss such issues in an intelligent and disciplined manner. This point can be illustrated by returning to the question posed by Tolstoy that was cited at the beginning of this chapter and Weber’s response to the question. Weber quotes Tolstoy as saying: “Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: ‘what shall we do and how shall we live?’ ” (SV, 143). He then goes to give his own evaluation of Tolstoy’s observation in these words: That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives “no” answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly. (SV, 143)

By saying that while science cannot give an answer to questions of ultimate meaning and value, but may still be of use to those “who put the question correctly,” Weber is establishing a bridge over the hairline that separates science from faith. In building a bridge over the two, he is establishing a relationship between faith and science, without conflating them. This point can be further illustrated by discussing in greater detail certain issues that have been mentioned in passing in the foregoing pages. It has been noted that Sinn is the crucial category that provides the cultural sciences with the subject matter that is to be investigated. It has been mentioned in passing that Weber’s understanding of Sinn and the manner in which it is investigated by the scientist bridges the fact/value dichotomy. In the context of that discussion, it was implied that Weber also bridges the subject/object dichotomy. A closer look at the manner in which Weber’s methodology bridges the fact/value and subject/object dichotomies reveals that it is precisely the bridging of these dichotomies that allows a bridge to be established over the hairline separating science from faith.

C HAPTER 3 T HE VALUE OF S CIENCE IN A D ISENCHANTED A GE : B RIDGING THE FACT /VALUE D ICHOTOMY

As noted in chapter 1, Weber posits that the notion of “progress” has put an indelible “imprint of meaninglessness” on modern life because death becomes meaningless in a cosmos that is itself bereft of meaning and in the pursuit of modern cultural goods to which no meaning can be attached. For Weber, progress is closely identified with the continued rationalization of science, both in its technical and theoretical aspects. Consequently, the progress of science contributes to the increasing meaninglessness of modern human existence by progressively disenchanting the world even more and thereby making death that much more meaningless. In short, the progress of science is directly proportional to the intensification of meaninglessness. It is against this background that Weber asks the apparently paradoxical question: Has “progress” as such a recognizable meaning that goes beyond the technical, so that to serve it is a meaningful vocation? . . . To raise this question is to ask for the vocation of science within the total life of humanity. What is the value of science? (SV, 140)

Weber the scientist is aware of the fact that his work is contributing to the ongoing progress of science. While contribution to the progress of science has recognizable technical significance, Weber asks the broader question of the relationship of the progress of science to a “meaningful vocation.” In posing the question in these terms, he is interested in exploring the vocation of science as it relates to the “total life of humanity,” not just as it relates to him as an individual. Weber wants to know if pursuing scientific inquiry can go beyond merely technical and practical contributions to human society and make a more meaningful contribution to the total life of humanity. Weber’s concern can be restated in these terms: In an age of disenchanted meaninglessness, can the scientific study of empirical facts make a meaningful contribution to human concerns about values? This question became especially acute in Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu when two competing groups staked polar opposite claims regarding the relationship between science and values.1 Dubbed the Werturteilsstreit (the battle of value-relevance), it pitted the proponents of Wertfreiheit (value-freedom) against the proponents of Wertbeziehung (valuerelevance).2 The former argued that science could not be science until and unless it was purged of all value concerns and value-ideas. The latter argued that science was

66 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY inevitably tied to value-ideas and that it could pass judgment on the validity (or invalidity) of such ideas. In light of the discussion in the previous chapter, it is obvious that Weber would reject both of these two extreme positions. Weber’s positive statement of his position on the relationship between science and values emerges when looking at his exposition of the value of science in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness. In light of the direct relationship between progress and science and between progress and meaninglessness, the answer to the question “What is the value of science?” in the total life of humanity appears to be: “Science has no value.” Science can have no value because science is simultaneously the result of and the catalyst for “progress,” and “progress” does not have any “recognizable meaning” beyond “the purely practical and technical” (SV, 139). This leads to the conclusion that science cannot be assigned a vocation within the total life of humanity. Consequently, the scientific study of empirical facts is of no practical relevance to the ultimate value concerns of humanity. Weber defers to Tolstoy’s judgment on this issue—but then goes on to problematize the conclusion by asking a more nuanced question. Weber acknowledges the limitation of the value of science when he agrees with Tolstoy that; “Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’ ” (SV, 143). Knowledge of empirical facts offered by science cannot in any way answer the most important value concerns that human beings have. As noted in chapter 1, Weber rejects any and all claims that science can be used to construct values, provide definitive answers to value concerns, or construct a Weltanschauung. But Weber goes on to qualify his agreement with Tolstoy in these words: That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives “no” answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly. (SV, 143)

In order to appreciate the value of science in this regard, Weber argues that one should have a clear understanding of its limitations. For Weber, there is a reflexive relationship between understanding the value of science and understanding its limitations. A distorted understanding of its limitations leads to a distorted understanding of its value. The individuals who try to construct naturalistic metaphysics on the back of scientific findings, invest science with a value that cannot be possibly attached to it. They overestimate the value of science because of the fact that they do not understand the limitations of science. Conversely, a distorted understanding of the limitations of science leads to a distorted understanding of its value. The individuals who agree with Tolstoy that science cannot answer the only question that is really important to us, and then carry on the discussion of issues related to meaning without any reference to science, do so precisely because they do not understand the value of science. For Weber, while it cannot provide a direct answer to the only question that is meaningful to us, “science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly” (SV, 143): The general force of Weber’s argument may be understood as follows: social science can make only an indirect contribution to public ethical and political debates by addressing

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 67 a series of questions which are not addressed by other “voices”—politicians, philosophers, moralists, etc. Paradoxically, as a precondition for making any contribution at all we have to start from the recognition of the limits of science and critical reflection is general and of the relative weakness of the power base from which the specialist operates. (Scott, 1995, 69 ff.)

The fact that Weber considers scientific truth to be a singularly unique source of knowledge (OSS, 111) is directly related to science’s unique contribution to the discussions of value and meaning. Consequently, an understanding of science’s indirect contribution to debates surrounding value and meaning should be developed in light of an understanding of the uniqueness of the scientific way of knowing and the unique contribution that this way of knowing can make to discussions about meaning and significance. The following pages explore the possible contributions that scientific analysis of empirical facts can make to questions of value and meaning. The question “What is the value of science?” is explored in terms of the manner in which science can meaningfully contribute to discussions about the following issues: (a) practical rationalization and the disenchanted “struggle of the gods”; (b) theoretical rationalization and the disenchanted world image; (c) the significance of meaning in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness. On each of these three accounts, Weber’s methodology of the social sciences explicitly bridges the fact/value dichotomy. It is only by bridging this dichotomy that the cultural sciences have a subject matter that can be studied, that is, meaning (Sinn). For the cultural sciences, the penultimate “fact” that is to be investigated is meaning (Sinn). This is evidenced by Weber’s definition of “culture” as “a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). It is the “value”-conferring capacity of human beings and not some abstract universal law or innate characteristic of human nature that provides the cultural sciences with the “facts” that become the subject matter of scientific inquiry. Weber’s description of the transcendental presupposition of the cultural sciences taken together with his description of the fundamental character of the social/cultural sciences details this point further. The transcendental presupposition of the cultural sciences is that “we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (OSS, 81). The only type of science that Weber the social/cultural scientist is interested in “is an empirical science of concrete reality” (OSS, 72). In sum, the value-conferring capacity of cultural beings brings into existence the facts of “concrete reality” that are investigated by Weber’s type of “empirical science.” The description of the way in which Weber relates the valueconferring capacity of human beings to the study of concrete fact by empirical science proves to be critical in adequately valuating the value of science in a disenchanted milieu or understanding science’s vocation in an era of meaninglessness. 3.1

Science: A Uniquely Modern Way of Knowing

Before addressing the question “What is the value of science?,” the question “What is science?” needs to be addressed in more precise terms. This will highlight the uniqueness

68 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of scientific knowledge, among others ways of knowing, and thereby inform the subsequent discussion on science’s contribution to issues of value and meaning. Human beings have been pursuing their material and ideal needs and constructing world images since the earliest periods of known history. While the pursuit of interests and the construction of images have been universal traits of human history, the specific manner in which human beings, at a particular point and place in history, have carried out these tasks has been almost infinitely varied. The variation has been determined by a complex admixture of magic (in a multitude of forms), religion (in a multitude of [sometimes contradicting] forms), and rationality (in a variety of forms). For Weber, science is the uniquely modern rational means by which moderns carry out the universal tasks of the pursuit of interests and the construction of world image. The modern scientific means toward achieving universally desired ends is selfconsciously divorced from magic and religion. For Weber, the difference between the scientific means and the religious and magical means is not that the former is “rational” and the latter are “irrational.” It is only dilettantes and pseudo-philosophers/scientists who distinguish science from religion and magic in such terms. Weber notes: Magic, . . ., has been just as systematically “rationalized” as physics. The earliest intentionally rational therapy involved almost the complete rejection of the cure of empirical symptoms by empirically tested herbs and potions in favor of the exorcism of (what was thought to be) the “real” (magical, daemonic) cause of the ailment. Formally, it had exactly the same highly rational structure as many of the most important developments in modern therapy. (MEN, 34)

For Weber, the difference between science and other forms of rationalization is not that science is “rational” and the others “irrational”; it is not even the case that science is “more rational” and the others are “less rational.” Weber argues that the difference lies in the particular tools and methods on which scientific rationalism is based. In contradistinction to magic and religion, science is unique in that it is characterized by “the provision of concepts and judgments which are neither empirical reality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner” (OSS, 111). The two tools that science employs to order empirical reality in “a valid manner” are (a) the concept and (b) the rational experiment. The concept is an artificial abstraction from empirical reality that is neither equivalent to the grounds from which it is abstracted nor a reproduction of those grounds. While the discovery of the concept as an analytical tool can be traced back to Socrates and his disciples Plato and Aristotle, the Greeks were not the only ones in the world to discover it. In India one finds the beginnings of a logic that is quite similar to that of Aristotle’s. But nowhere else do we find this realization of the significance of the concept. In Greece, for the first time, appeared a handy means by which one could put the logical screws upon somebody so that he could not come out without admitting either that he knew nothing or that this and nothing else was truth. (SV, 141)

The concept played the role of “putting the logical screws” on the thought process of an individual so that the individual was forced to discipline his/her thinking process. Just as the concept allowed for a degree of disciplined ordering, expression, and

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 69 critical analysis of human thought that had not been hitherto possible, the rational experiment made a disciplined ordering, observation, and critical analysis of empirical reality that had not been hitherto possible. According to Weber, the principled use of the rational experiment as a means of studying empirical reality appeared during the Renaissance and coincided with the rediscovery of the Hellenic spirit. Weber describes the significance and the origins of the rational experiment in these words: The experiment is a means of reliably controlling experience. Without it, present-day empirical science would be impossible. There were experiments earlier; for instance, in India physiological experiments were made in the service of ascetic yoga technique; in Hellenic antiquity, mathematical experiments were made for the purpose of war technology; and in the Middle Ages, for purposes of mining. But to raise the experiment to a principle of research was the achievement of the Renaissance. They were the great innovators in art, who were the pioneers of experiment. (SV, 141)

Having its origin in the field of art, especially painting and music, the rational experiment entered the field of science through the work of Galileo and Bacon (SV, 141 ff.). Even though the precursors of the concept and the rational experiment are to be found in non-Western societies, according to Weber, it is in the West that they were developed with the greatest degree of internal consistency and used as a matter of principle. Consequently, modern science developed in the West and not anywhere else. Using the concept to discipline abstract thought and the rational experiment to discipline observation of empirical reality, modern science provides a unique means of acquiring knowledge that cannot be had from any other source. The fact that science provides a unique means of acquiring knowledge about empirical reality can be demonstrated by looking at the presuppositions that invest meaning in the concept and the experiment. The fundamental presupposition of science that underlies the use of the concept and of the experiment as a means of obtaining knowledge is “the existence of unconditionally valid type of knowledge . . . i.e., the analytical ordering of . . . reality” (OSS, 63). The “analytical ordering of reality” is to be distinguished from “empirical reality” and/or “reproduction” of empirical reality in light of the fact that “[i]t is not the ‘actual’ interconnections of ‘things’ but the conceptual interconnections of problems which define the scope of the various sciences” (OSS, 69). The fact that the goal of the sciences is to posit the “conceptual interconnections of problems” and not the “ ‘actual’ interconnection of ‘things’ ” has far-reaching implications. The acceptance of the conceptual interconnections of problems as being a valid source of knowledge about empirical reality requires the acceptance of the presupposition that, while the concept is neither a derivative nor a reproduction of empirical reality, it nonetheless provides access to knowledge about empirical reality. In the final analysis, the acceptance of this presupposition cannot be justified in scientific terms: its acceptance (or rejection) is a matter of extra-scientific factors—it is a matter of faith. Even though it has been cited before, the following observation by Weber is worth repeating in light of the discussion that has taken place since it was cited earlier: The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth

70 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man’s original nature. (OSS, 110)

While an individual is free to reject the value of scientific truth, he/she should keep in mind that he/she “will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of science in just those respects in which it is unique” (OSS, 111). While the acceptance or rejection of science is a matter of faith, acknowledging its uniqueness and utility is practically inevitable for us moderns: Science today is a “vocation” organized in special disciplines in the service of selfclarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so long as we remain true to ourselves. (SV, 152)

The fruits of science can only be attained in a manner that is decisively different from the manner in which the sages and philosophers of old attained their knowledge. As moderns, remaining true to ourselves requires that we remain conscious of our historical situation and recognize the value and uniqueness of scientific knowledge. For Weber, the vocation of science aims at providing self-clarification and establishing relations between already known facts with the aid of special tools and methods of analysis, of which the abstract concept and the controlled experiment are examples. In addition to these tools and methods, there is an additional element that is as much a part of scientific inquiry as the concept and the experiment, the interests and values of the scientist undertaking the inquiry. In very explicit terms, Weber asserts that there is a subjective dimension to the scientific enterprise insofar as the problem or question to be investigated is decisively shaped by “motives and values” of the investigator: [I]n [the] social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical “questions.” Hence the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values. (OSS, 61)

If an investigator self-consciously interrogates him/herself and asks why he/she chose to pursue the investigation of this particular issue and not some other, the investigator would discover that the selection of the object of investigation is the result of the investigator’s concern with a perceived problem in ones own culture. Weber notes that, if they want to be honest with themselves, scientists (especially cultural scientists) cannot but reach this conclusion. He asserts that the investigators have to acknowledge that they are pursuing a particular question and not some other “because certain concrete situations seem to be incompatible with, or seem to threaten, the realization of certain ideal values in which they believe” (OSS, 61). In short, the “facts” that the cultural scientist chooses to investigate are determined by the “fact” that the investigator feels that “certain concrete situations” appear to challenge or undermine certain values that he/she holds dear. It is a subjective cultural

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 71 concern of the investigator that initiates objective scientific analysis. Once the investigation has started, the investigator should set his/her subjective concerns aside. The goal of the investigation is not to affirm or repudiate the investigator’s own cultural values because, as a matter of principle, science cannot perform this function. The only thing that scientific inquiry can do is provide the conceptual tools that make possible a degree and type of clarity about cultural values that cannot be had from any other source. Once the investigator makes the choice to investigate a particular cultural problem, science provides the objective tools and methods of analysis that must be strictly adhered to by the individual doing the investigation. Once the process of scientific inquiry begins, the tools and methods offered by science— the abstract concept and the controlled experiment—make weighty demands on the investigator to keep his/her subjective tendencies out of the process of analysis as it unfolds. It is only by observing strictly objective criteria, during the course of investigating problems identified as such because of subjective concerns, that scientists can obtain the fruits of “self-clarification” and knowledge of “the conceptual interconnection of problems.” Besides describing the epistemological uniqueness and value of science, Weber acknowledges the fact that science could be, and has been, valued in different ways in different cultural settings. Beginning with Plato’s analogy of the cave in which “the sun . . . is the truth of science, which alone seizes not upon illusions and shadows, but upon the true being” (SV, 140), science had been valued differently in different historical periods. Detailing Weber’s insights on the topics, Schluchter notes: Science has been regarded successively as an avenue to true being (in Greek philosophy), to true art (in the Renaissance), to true nature (in the period of the emergence of natural science), to the true God (under the influence of Protestantism and Puritanism), and finally to true happiness (in the nineteenth century). (Schluchter, 1989, 270)

But as Schluchter goes on to note, all of these claims about the value and meaning of science turned to be illusions by the beginning of the twentieth century. In Weber’s immediate cultural environment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the value of science had become highly dubitable on two different accounts. First, the attempt to value science as a way to happiness and/or meaning had proven to be an illusion. Weber noted that no educated individual “aside from a few big children in university chairs or editorial offices” (SV, 143) really believed that science could lead to meaning and happiness, because the mature individuals knew the limitations of science—it could only provide conceptual knowledge about empirical reality and nothing more. Second, many of the youth in Weber’s day viewed science as a power hostile to human life that had to be fought as a matter of principle in order to experience the vitality of life. In contrast to the sun and the way to true being, science had come to be viewed as an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony hands seek to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with it. But here in life, in what for Plato was the play of the shadows on the walls of the cave, genuine reality is pulsating; and the rest are derivatives of life, lifeless ghosts, and nothing else. (SV, 141)

72 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY The youthful critics saw science divorced from all concerns about values, meaning, and the “blood-and-the-sap of true life.” For Weber, while “a few big children” in university chairs and editorial offices grossly overestimated the value of science because they could not appreciate its limits, the youthful critics of science underestimated its capacities and therefore did not appreciate its value.3 Weber’s appreciation of science was very much informed by a conscious knowledge of its limitations. As noted above, Weber is aware of the fact that science cannot give an answer to the one and only question that really matters to all human beings: “What shall we do and how shall we live?” But he also goes on to note that science may nonetheless be a unique and most valuable source of knowledge for the individual who poses the question correctly. Weber posits that science is of value on three different accounts. First, it “contributes to the technology of controlling life by calculating external objects as well as man’s activities” (SV, 150). In this capacity, it plays the role of “the greengrocer of the American boy” (SV, 150). But science goes beyond the functions of the greengrocer by providing the “methods of thinking, the tools and the training for thought” (SV, 150 ff.). Even though this second function “amounts to no more than the means for procuring vegetables” (SV, 151), it is a valuable function nonetheless. Beyond these two functions, there is a third function of science in providing “clarity” where it is already “presupposed that we ourselves possess clarity” (SV, 151). In light of the discussion above regarding the question “What is science?” it is Weber’s position that science possesses clarity about its own identity and characteristics. Being thus clear about its own origins and defining characteristics, science is in a position to provide a degree of clarity to those who pose the question “What shall we do and how shall we live?” properly.4 Science provides a particular type and degree of clarity with respect to practical rationalization, theoretical rationalization, and the significance of meaning. Even though the nature and scope of clarity differs in each of the three cases, science provides a service in each of the three cases that cannot be availed from any other source. The following discussion takes up each of the three cases separately and discusses the issue of science’s clarifying role in greater detail. 3.2 Practical Rationalization and the Value of Science Any discussion of practical rationalization in the modern period has to take into account the division of practical life across a variety of differentiated, autonomous value spheres. As noted in chapter 1, the economic, political, esthetic, and erotic worldly spheres are all defined in terms of their own particular immanent values that can be neither subsumed under any meta-value nor reconciled with each other. Weber uses theological language and imagery to describe the fundamental irreconcilability of the different value spheres by referring to this disenchanted autonomy of the value spheres as disenchanted polytheism or the struggle of the gods. The modern pursuit of material and ideal interests in the modern world takes as its point of departure the one fundamental fact, that so long a life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. (SV, 152)

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 73 While science cannot bring this struggle of the gods “to a final conclusion,” it can help the mortals who are living amidst this struggle to make more informed (and therefore more responsible) decisions regarding the possible courses of action that one can pursue after he/she has decided to serve a particular god. For Weber, a value (or a god) is an end that can be pursued (worshipped) by a variety of means. While science cannot pass judgment regarding what value (or god) one should pursue (worship), it has something uniquely valuable to offer regarding the means that are chosen to pursue the end. Weber posits that science can provide a valuable service in shaping human behavior that is “oriented primarily in terms of the categories ‘end’ and ‘means’ ” because the “question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis” (OSS, 52). At a given time, with a given value as the desired end, and within particular conditions/limitations, science can offer clarity regarding the course of action one chooses to pursue a particular value. This is due to the fact that there are always a number of different courses of action (means) that can be chosen to pursue a particular end (value). Weber notes that while each end is “bound to certain indispensable means,” making a choice among the means needs to take into account the fact that the pursuit of an end brings with it the “inevitability of certain, not directly desired repercussions” (MEN, 21). In light of these factors accompanying any chosen course of action, science can judge the appropriateness of the means chosen and the inevitable undesired consequences that one will have to face as one pursues a desired end. On the first point, science can help one “estimate the chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means” (OSS, 53). One is free to select any value that he/she desires at a given time and he/she could also choose from amongst numerous different means to attain the value. But all the means would not be equally efficient: some may be theoretically possible but not practically feasible due to particular cultural circumstances. It may even be the case that “it is absolutely impossible to realize the object of preference, even in a remotely approximate way, because no means of carrying it out can be discovered” (MEN, 21). Science is of value insofar as it has the ability to pass judgment on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the means available to attain a desired end. By passing judgment on the means available, science can indirectly criticize the setting of the end itself as practically meaningful (on the basis of the existing historical situation) or as meaningless with reference to existing conditions. (OSS, 53)

In addition to helping determine the possibility of a particular means being more practical than the others, science can determine the consequences which the application of the means to be used will produce in addition to the eventual achievement of the proposed end, as a result of the interdependence of all events. (OSS, 53)

Any given course of action brings with it certain costs. It may very well be the case that, in pursuing a particular end, one is required to expend energies and resources

74 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY that he/she might deem better spent in the pursuit of a different end. The second contribution of science is the determination of the consequences, or costs, that one will incur by following a particular course of action. The attainment of the end is the desired consequence of the action and the costs are the undesirable consequences. Science can help the individual to identify “the probable appearance of undesired repercussions which might directly or indirectly render the realization [of the end] undesirable” (MEN, 21). By helping one to calculate the undesired consequences of a chosen course of action, science can “provide the acting person with the ability to weigh and compare the undesirable as over against the desirable consequences of his action” (OSS, 53). In order for a person to act “with a sense of responsibility” (OSS, 53), he/she has to take great pains to avail him/herself of this particularly (and uniquely) valuable service of science. Weber notes that the value of science vis-à-vis the course of action chosen by individuals to pursue material and ideal interests is the fact that science lends clarity to (1) the indispensable means, and (2) the inevitable repercussions, and (3) the thus conditioned competition of numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences, are all that an empirical science can demonstrate with the means at its disposal. (MEN, 18)

At the conclusion of the discussion regarding the value of science in terms of determining a particular course of action, Weber touches upon the limitations of science in this regard. As noted earlier, for Weber, autonomization of the different value spheres (i.e., the struggle of the gods) is a defining characteristic of modern times. But an individual cannot live in perpetual conflict and “it is necessary to make a choice” (SV, 152) on how to live his/her life in the midst of this struggle. In the process of either making a choice among the different values, or choosing a particular course of action from among a number of possible courses to pursue a particular value, the individual cannot mechanically tally the pros and cons and then declare his/her choice to be “scientific”: Nothing is ever gained in any scientific sense whatever by “on the one hand” and “on the other,” by seven reasons “for” and six “against” a certain event . . . and by weighing them off against one another in cameralistic fashion or like modern Chinese administrative memoranda. (MEN, 24)

While scientific analysis can make valuable contributions in terms of clarifying the means that one can adopt to pursue the chosen value, no amount of scientific calculation can offer an “objective” answer regarding the most appropriate means to employ to pursue a chosen end. Weber notes that it is sometimes asserted that scientific analysis can determine the middle course between two extremes, and that this middle course is the most “objective” (and therefore the most scientifically valid) choice. He characterizes this type of thought process as an attempt to “theoretically delude itself about the profound seriousness of [the] situation or practically shirk its consequences” (OSS, 57). Commenting on the attempt to establish a “scientifically objective” middle course, Weber goes on to note: But this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific “objectivity.” Scientifically the “middle course” is not truer even by a hair’s breadth, than the most extreme party ideals

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 75 of the right or left. Nowhere are the interests of science more poorly served in the long run than in those situations where one refuses to see uncomfortable facts and the realities of life in all their starkness. The Archiv will struggle relentlessly against the severe self-deception which asserts that through the synthesis of several party points of view, or by following a line between them, practical norms of scientific validity can be arrived at. (OSS, 57 ff.)

The forceful tone of Weber’s writing speaks for itself. In this context, he states that an attempt to calibrate a “middle way” and label it as being “scientifically objective” is more damaging to the cause of science than the attempts by various circles to demonstrate that the validity of their party dogmas can be demonstrated scientifically. Scientific analysis can make the individual aware of certain facts that will help him/her make an informed and responsible decision about a particular course of action, it cannot, however, make the decision for the actor. Along with the fact that no particular course of action can be labeled as being more “scientifically objective” than an alternative course of action, no amount of scientific analysis can decide whether or not a particular end is worth pursuing given the means that are available. Weber states in categorical terms: “[I]t can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived” (OSS, 52). Like the empirical natural sciences, the empirical social/cultural sciences strive to provide a valid analytical ordering of reality and nothing more. They do not strive any further because they are not capable of delivering anything more. Consequently, the individual should not look to science to play a role greater than can be expected of it in order to escape his/her own responsibility in making a choice: The social sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty of making a choice, and they therefore should not create the impression that they can do so. (MEN, 19)

In short, while a scientific analysis of a particular course of action is possible (and Weber would add indispensable) if we are to act responsibly, a scientific choice of a course of action is impossible. In the end, the responsibility of the choice belongs to the individual alone. For Weber, it is of utmost importance that this limitation of science at the level of practical rationalization be clearly recognized and appreciated. This is due to the fact that many moderns are unwilling or unable to make the choice themselves and attempt to conscript science for this purpose. Afterward they present their own personal choice as a “scientifically objective” course of action. Such (mis)use of science amounts to an abdication of responsibility that is the product of complacency and/or immaturity on the part of the moderns. Weber describes the predicament of the moderns in the midst of the irreconcilable clash of value spheres in modern times: They avoid the choice between “God” and the “Devil” and their own ultimate decision as to which of the conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which by the other. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, which is distasteful to the complacent but

76 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY which is, nonetheless, inescapable, consists in the insight that every single important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul—as in Plato—chooses its own fate. (MEN, 18)

While the complacent ardently desire it to be otherwise, the disenchanted modern condition makes it ever more clear that science cannot choose, only “the soul” of a man/woman is capable of making the choice. Even though many moderns have turned to science in the hope of escaping from the responsibility of making a choice regarding “ultimate decisions,” by appealing to “scientific objectivity,” Weber argues that this is an act of intellectual cowardice. Those who ask science to make such decisions for them are asking of science far more than it can deliver. Weber notes that in terms of practical rationalization, the value of science rests on the fact that it can make the individual realize that all action and naturally, according to the circumstances, inaction imply in their consequences the espousal of certain values—and herewith—what is today so willingly overlooked—the rejection of certain others. The act of choice itself is his own responsibility. (OSS, 53)

At the level of practical rationalization, science provides clarity regarding the options that one has as he/she pursues a particular end. At the same time, science makes it absolutely clear that the act of choosing belongs to the individual alone. In short, since science is a unique source of knowledge, it is uniquely positioned to help an individual wanting to act responsibly. Knowledge of facts provided by scientific analysis helps the individual make a more responsible decision regarding a particular value than would be the case if the actor did not take the scientific analysis of facts into consideration. 3.3 Theoretical Rationalization and the Value of Science Having looked at the value of science in terms of practical rationalization, the discussion now turns to the value of science in terms of theoretical rationalization. As noted in chapter 1, the disenchanted world image produces a view of the cosmos in which the cosmos and everything in it is considered to be governed by the laws of natural causality. A view of the universe that is understood in terms of its own immanent laws of causality cannot be viewed as having any intrinsic meaning. Knowledge of the laws governing the universe cannot be considered as being synonymous with a meaningful interpretation of the cosmos. While science has something to say about the former, it has to remain silent about the latter. Referring to the “fate of an epoch which has eaten from the tree of knowledge” (OSS, 57), Weber notes: It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us. (OSS, 57)

Just as there is a struggle of the gods at the level of practical rationalization, there is a struggle of the gods at the level of “general views of life and the universe,” that is,

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 77 world image. As we have seen in terms of practical rationalization, while science offers a limited (but exceedingly and uniquely important) service during the decision-making process, the choice of the god that one decides to serve is ultimately the responsibility of the individual. The choice can be informed by science but under no circumstances can it be called a “scientific” choice. The relationship of science to matters of theoretical rationalization is similar. While empirical knowledge about the universe is all that science can offer us, perpetually “increasing empirical knowledge” can never lead to a coherent and meaningful interpretation of the universe. In spite of the inability of science to present a coherent and meaningful interpretation of the universe, it can offer valuable assistance in terms of lending clarity and cogency to the decision-making process that culminates in articulating a meaningful understanding of the universe. At the level of practical rationalization, the primary contribution of science was determining the feasibility of a chosen end in light of the available means, making apparent the undesired consequences that inevitably accompany the pursuit of the chosen end and laying bare the ultimate value that is being served in the pursuit of the chosen end. At the level of theoretical rationalization, the primary contribution of science is providing clarity regarding the internal logical consistency of the chosen world image and laying bare the inevitably present but usually hidden presuppositions and tensions in the world image. The value of science at the level of theoretical rationalization is of direct practical import because commitment to a particular world image inevitably determines the parameters within which decisions about a course of action are made. Weber notes that one observes a great deal of disagreement in a society regarding matters of social policy (or other collective pursuits). He posits that many of the disagreements regarding the means to be used to pursue a given end are usually rooted in the fact that it is presupposed that both parties have come to an agreement upon the ends (or ultimate value). But very often this is not the case because the ends themselves are understood in terms of differing world-images that are implicitly informing the conflicting positions taken by the parties in the debate. Speaking of the disagreement on a particular issue of social policy, he notes: “[T]he conflict occurs not merely, as we are too easily inclined to believe today, between ‘class interests’ but between general views of life and the universe as well” (OSS, 56). For Weber, the explicit disagreements regarding matters of practical rationalization are often the reflection of implicit disagreements regarding matters of theoretical rationalization. During the course of the debate, it is the “practical” matters and differences that are almost always aired, with the “theoretical” assumptions going largely unstated. An intelligent discussion as well as an adequate resolution of debates concerning “practical” matters require that the “theoretical” assumptions also be addressed. Scientific inquiry can offer a unique and valuable service in this regard also. Weber notes that investigating matters related to theoretical rationalization requires the use of more generalized and therefore more abstract concepts and “experiments” than the investigation of practical behavior: One thing is certain under all circumstances, namely, the more “general” the problem involved, i.e., in this case, the broader its cultural significance, the less subject it is to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical sciences and the

78 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY greater the role played by value-ideas (Wertideen) and the ultimate and highest personal axioms of belief. (OSS, 56)

Because the cultural significance of the world image is broader than that of practical behavior, the role of value-ideas (Wertideen) is greater in its construction. The degree of abstraction in expressing and judging a world image is greater than that of expressing and judging a course of action. Even though the level of analysis is more general and abstract, science does have the capacity to evaluate the most general of all value judgments, the construction of a world image. Even though it is more abstract (and therefore a more “difficult” exercise), its importance cannot be discounted because the choice of practical ends is related to ultimate values in the broadest sense of the term, which are (consciously or unconsciously) expressed in a world image. Among the functions that a scientific evaluation of value judgments can play is this: The elaboration and explication of the ultimate, internally “consistent” value-axioms, from which the divergent attitudes are derived . . . This procedure is essentially an operation which begins with concrete particular evaluations and analyzes their meanings and then moves to the more general level of irreducible evaluations. It does not use the techniques of an empirical discipline and it produces no new knowledge of facts. Its “validity” is similar to that of logic. (MEN, 20)

A world image is the systematic presentation of value-axioms that present “a general view of life and the universe as well.” While the evaluation of a world image (or value-axioms) cannot be considered an “empirical” undertaking, it utilizes empirical data to pass judgments “similar to that of logic” on the validity to proposed world image. At this level, the clarity offered by scientific analysis of the world image judges the internal logical consistency of the world image. In undertaking a critical evaluation of the value-axioms on which a world image is constructed, science takes a skeptical stance toward the fundamental presuppositions that the proponents of the world image take for granted. In adopting this critical stance, science offers an invaluable service by providing a perspective on the matter that cannot be had otherwise. Weber notes that “[f ]undamental doubt is the father of knowledge” and such doubt is not possible without standing “outside the conventions and presuppositions” of the perspective from which knowledge claims are being made (MEN, 7). Standing outside the conventions lays bare the problems and tensions that escape the notice of those who are the advocates of a given knowledge claim and have taken the conventions/presuppositions as being self-evident. Weber argues that it is the fundamental and basic function of science to investigate all that is usually taken for granted: “The specific function of science, it seems to me, is . . . to ask questions about these things which convention makes self-evident” (MEN, 13). This “specific function” of science is directly related to the “primary task” of the teacher of science: The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize “inconvenient” facts—I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every party opinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less than for others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if he compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. (SV, 147)

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 79 By asking questions about those things that convention makes self-evident and bringing “inconvenient” facts to the surface, science forces the advocates of a knowledge claim/world image to either modify or otherwise better elaborate their positions. Such an exercise is of great value for both the proponents and their opponents. For the proponent it leads to greater self-clarification and better self-understanding. For the opponents it leads to a better understanding of the differences with the other party. In the former case, the heightened self-understanding contributes to an improved ethic of responsibility and in the latter case, a better understanding of the differences leads to a more productive and fruitful conversation among the parties involved: The real significance of a discussion of evaluations lies in its contribution to the understanding of what one’s opponent—or one’s self—really means—i.e., in understanding the evaluations which really and not merely allegedly separate the discussants and consequently in enabling one to take up a position with reference to this value. (MEN, 14)

While the task of analyzing a world image is more abstract than the task of analyzing a course of action, science does have the ability to analyze the “value-ideas” and “axioms of belief ” that go into making up a world image. Using the conceptual tools at its disposal, science has the ability to judge whether or not a given world image is internally consistent. Furthermore, if a particular world image is judged to be internally inconsistent, science can suggest the modifications that will have to be made in order to make it consistent. On a macro level, a particular world image attempts to respond to at least one, and usually all of the three questions below: (a) does a concrete event occur thus and so or otherwise, or (b) why do the concrete events in question occur thus and so and not otherwise, or (c) does a given event ordinarily succeed another one according to a certain law and with what degree of probability. (MEN, 19)

A perfectly consistent world image is one that can answer all of these three issues and withstand external criticism regarding the consistency of its claims at the same time. In judging the consistency of a given world image, science not only renders a valuable service to both the proponents and opponents of the image, but it also performs a function that can be demanded of it: It can be shown strictly “scientifically” that this conception of [a given] ideal is the only internally consistent one and cannot be refuted by external “facts.” I think that a service is thereby rendered to the proponents as well as the opponents [of the ideal]—one which they can rightly demand of science. (MEN, 24)

In light of the discussion on theodicy in the previous chapter, this particular function of science presents itself as a means of judging the validity of the claims of a particular world image to have bridged the gap between the “what is” and “what ought to be.” An internally consistent ideal that cannot be refuted by external facts is one that can fully account for the empirical “what is” in terms of the ideal of “what ought to be.” In judging the internal consistency of a particular world image,

80 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY the investigator has to take an additional step of abstraction from that required to judge the feasibility of a proposed program of action. Even though no world image can claim the status of being “scientifically objective,” science does have the ability to judge the internal consistency of a particular world image—leaving it entirely up to the individual to decide whether or not to accept a particular world image as one’s own. 3.4

Meaning and Knowledge: Bridging the Fact/Value Dichotomy

At the level of practical rationalization, science can judge the feasibility and the undesired consequences related to a given course of action. At the level of theoretical rationalization, science can judge the internal consistency of the value-axioms on which a given view of the universe is based. In both cases, the value of science is the provision of clarity regarding one’s actions and beliefs—a type of clarity that cannot be had from any other source. While science has a specific value in terms of practical rationalization and a related but different value in terms of theoretical rationalization, the two values taken together produce a third value that is related to the other two but is unique in its own terms. Stated in formal terms, this value is The deduction of “implications” (for those accepting certain value-judgements) which follow from certain irreducible value-axioms, when the practical evaluation of factual situations is based on these axioms alone. This deduction depends on one hand, on logic, and on the other, on empirical observation for the completest possible casuistic analyses of all such empirical situations as are in principle subject to practical evaluation. (MEN, 20)

Stated in somewhat less formal terms, the clarity that science provides into one’s actions and world image leads to a better understanding of the meaning (i.e., “the deduction of ‘implications’ ”) that the course of action has for the actor who acts on the basis of “certain value-judgments.” Science provides the tools of “empirical observation” that can evaluate the feasibility of a proposed course of action. At the same time, science provides the tool of “logic” that can evaluate the system of “irreducible value-axioms” (the world image) that determines the parameters within which the course of action is to be carried out. By providing the tools that allow one to gain better clarity regarding one’s actions and one’s view of the world, science makes it possible for the individual to gain a better understanding and give a more coherent account of the meaning of his/her own action and his/her own image of the world. Science can offer nothing for the moderns in terms of a direct answer to the question “What shall we do and how shall we live?” For Tolstoy, the one who posed this question, and for Weber, the one who used it as the axis around which his most well-known public lecture revolved, this is “the only question important for us.” Weber states in explicit terms that science has nothing to say about “truly ‘ultimate’ problems” and that “the limits of science” have been reached at the point when such problems arise (SV, 151). The resolution of these ultimate problems ultimately rests upon the choices/decisions that human beings make, and the choices/decisions made to resolve these problems cannot be labeled as “scientific” by any stretch of the imagination. After talking of the limits of science regarding “ultimate problems,” Weber goes on to summarize the value of science regarding the thought process that

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 81 goes into the attempt to resolve these problems. From a scientific point of view, the following issues can be resolved in principle: In terms of its meaning, such and such a practical stance can be derived with internal consistency, and hence integrity, from this or that ultimate weltanschaulishe position. Perhaps it can only be derived from one such fundamental position, or maybe from several, but it cannot be derived from these or those other positions. Figuratively speaking, you serve this god or you offend the other god when you decide to adhere to this position. And if you remain faithful to yourself, you will necessarily come to certain final conclusions that subjectively make sense. This much, in principle at least, can be accomplished. (SV, 151)

On the one hand, science cannot judge the value of a particular world image, a specific course of action, or the meaning attached to either of the two. But on the other hand, it can judge the internal consistency of the relationship that is posited between a particular course of action and a particular world image, and by extension judge the validity of the meaning that is attached to the chosen world image and/or course of action. If scientific inquiry and teaching is done in a competent and consistent manner, then science “can force the individual, or at least . . . help him, to give an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct” (SV, 152). The value of science, with respect to meaning, is such that it can force (or assist) the individual to give an account of the ultimate meaning of his/her own conduct and values in a unique form that makes the value claims of the proponent amenable to rational, scientific analysis, and criticism. This is a function that only science can play. For Weber, the relationship between science and meaning is not merely the fact that science is a means of getting unique insight into meaning. Meaning in turn offers something unique to science, something that science cannot get from any other source. From Weber’s perspective, the cultural sciences as such would not even be possible without meaning. This is obvious in light of Weber’s very definition of “culture.” He notes: “ ‘Culture’ is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). A given cultural phenomenon, at a given time in history cannot be understood and/or studied apart from the manner in which human beings living in that culture “confer meaning and significance” to the finite segment of reality, thereby giving rise to observable actions, institutions, and rationalized expressions of ideas. For its part, the study of phenomena generated by meaning is not possible without an investigator who finds the scientific study of these phenomena to be meaningful. Meaning is the origin (or root) of both the empirical reality studied by the investigator and the reason initiating the scientific study of empirical reality. Weber describes the relationship between meaning and cultural phenomena and meaning and the scientific investigation of such phenomena in these words: The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any “culture” in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. Whatever may be the content of

82 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY this attitude—these phenomena have cultural significance for us and on this significance alone rests its scientific interest. (OSS, 81)

For Weber, the manner in which cultural beings confer meaning on the world and the reasons that cultural beings undertake an investigation of meaning was/is not the result of any universal laws or some immutable human nature. It is only because of, and to the degree that, humans confer meaning and significance on a finite segment of empirical reality that the study of this reality is scientifically possible. Now we are in a position to directly answer the question, “What is the value of science?” in an era of disenchanted meaninglessness. The answer is that science gives unique insight into and lends unique clarity to issues related to meaning (Sinn). Given the fact that meaning is simultaneously the source of the empirical reality that the scientist investigates and also the reason that the scientist undertakes the investigation, we see that Weber’s insights into the methodology of the social sciences bridge the fact/value dichotomy. If we identify “meaning” as the answer to the question, “What does science study?” then we can describe the dynamics during the course of a scientific investigation in the following words. From the perspective of the scientist, meaning is a fact in empirical reality that he/she has selected for the purpose of scientific investigation. At the same time, from the perspective of the actor, meaning is a value that he/she has conferred on the world, giving rise to the empirical reality that the scientist is investigating. But this is only one-half of the picture. While meaning is a fact in the world that is being investigated by the scientist, the reason he/she is investigating this particular fact and not some other is because its scientific explication will help the scientist get greater insight and clarity into a particular value that he/she holds dear. Similarly, while meaning is a value that the actor has conferred on the world, it is simultaneously a fact that helps him/her make sense of the chaotic surroundings. Consequently, meaning (Sinn) cannot be called a “fact” or a “value” in any absolute sense. That which makes human culture possible and all human cultural activities possible—the cultural activity of scientific investigation no less than any other cultural activity—is simultaneously a fact and a value.5 As noted in the concluding section of chapter 1, Wolin’s characterization of the modern predicament in light of Weber’s analysis may very well be on the mark: Meaninglessness was no longer an aesthetic experience of the few, but a contagion. Having undermined religious, moral and political beliefs, the forces of rationalization had finally exposed the meaning of meaninglessness to be power without right. (Wolin, 1981, 422)

But this characterization cannot be considered in isolation from the centrality of meaning in Weber’s methodology of the social/cultural sciences. The view of rationalization as having “exposed the meaning of meaninglessness to be power without right” as being the terminating point of Weber’s sociology has to be balanced by an understanding of his rationalization of the methodology of the social sciences that leads to a sharpened awareness of the significance of meaning. The progressive rationalization of the methodology of the natural sciences followed by the cultural sciences has established not only the logical efficacy of the concept of meaning, but

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 83 also its categorical indispensability. In other words, the increasing self-awareness engendered by a critical reflection on the methodology that underpins scientific inquiry reveals that meaning is at the very center of the inquiry. Weber’s methodology of the social/cultural sciences posits the categorical indispensability of that which Weber’s historical sociology demonstrates to have become superfluous, that is, meaning (Sinn). While Weber himself never stated the matter as such, in the context of the present discussion, it can be asserted that the penultimate value of science in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness is the discovery that meaning is not only an empirical fact in human culture, but also a value that makes all cultural activity (including scientific inquiry) possible.6 The manner in which Weber responds to the questions “What is the value of science?” and “What does science study?” makes it clear that his valuation and definition of science are very different from the Enlightenment valuation and definition. Kaye describes Weber’s break from the Enlightenment tradition on these issues in these words: Weber’s project is . . . to explore the origins and manifestations of Western rationality and, above all, to confront the internal and external tensions increasingly experienced in our rationalized and disenchanted culture in order to preserve the possibility of living a life truly worthy of man: a life of conscious, responsible devotion to, and preservation of “the spiritual and moral excellence of humanity.” It is with meaning, not order that Weber is ultimately concerned. (Kaye, 1992, 47)

Whereas Enlightenment thought valued scientific inquiry for its ability to lead to a discovery of the laws of a preexisting rational order, Weber’s methodology values science for its ability to help the investigator understand the meaning of particular cultural phenomena. Chowers offers a more detailed discussion regarding Weber’s concern with meaning, and shows this concern to be multidimensional. According to Chowers, Weber’s anthropology can be summed up in the following words: “human beings have the internal necessity, as well as the capacity, to interpret their lives and the cosmos as a whole in a meaningful way” (Chowers, 1995, 127). The universal impetus toward rationalization, in the sense of seeking internal logical consistency of both ideas and action (RRW, 324), evidences that human beings have a need for and the ability to interpret themselves and their world in a meaningful way. Chowers argues that Weber’s sociology of religion is based on the presupposition that human beings have a need for a meaningful interpretation of the world: [U]nderlying Weber’s project, particularly in his sociology of religion, are some essentialist convictions about human beings, the most important of which is a vision of humans as homo-hermeneut, beings that require a meaningful existence. (Chowers, 1995, 124)

Even though one may take issue with Chowers regarding the characterization of this being an “essentialist conviction” of Weber’s, the fact that Weber sees the human beings as “homo-hermeneut, beings that require a meaningful existence” can be fully substantiated with reference to Weber’s work. While Weber’s anthropology shows the

84 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY human being to be a homo-hermeneut, Weber’s analysis of modern culture shows a grave deficit of meaning in the modern world: The crisis of modern culture is multi-faceted, but is primarily the result of the impoverishment of the sources of meaning, which came about with the disenchantment and rationalization of the world. (Chowers, 1995, 130)

It is in light of these observations by Chowers of the human need for meaning and the absence of meaning in modern culture that the claim that “it is with meaning, not order, that Weber is ultimately concerned” (Kaye, 1992, 47) presents itself with full force. Weber’s understanding of science shows scientific inquiry to be composed of a variety of elements, including but not limited to observation of empirical reality by means of abstract constructs and general laws. But one cannot conduct scientific inquiry with the aid of these elements alone. A study of empirical reality from the perspective of general laws and abstract concepts might lead to a naturalistic understanding of order in the universe, but nothing more. In the end, the significance of meaning must be brought into play for meaningful scientific inquiry—meaning on the part of the investigator explaining why he/she is investigating the meaning conferred by this particular actor in this particular activity/institution and not some other. Given the fact that this cultural scientific inquiry is being carried out in a disenchanted, meaningless cultural setting creates a paradox for the cultural scientist—a paradox that is symptomatic of a larger malaise: The cultural scientist exemplifies the modern paradox of meaning: an investigator of the disenchantment of the world and of the objectification and rationalization of social organizations, he is nevertheless the prototype of the Occidental self because of his heightened quest for meaning. By studying how meaning flees from the world, both in the natural and social realms, Weber grappled with what he thought was the most crucial question of his age, while at the same time inquiring into the foundations and prospects of his own vocation. (Chowers, 1995, 137)

In studying the natural and cultural world around him, Weber detailed the manner in which meaning had been expunged from the modern world by rationalized investigation. By investigating the foundations and prospects of his own vocation, in the form of critical analysis/explication of the methodology of the social sciences, Weber discovered/detailed the manner in which meaning lies at the very heart of scientific inquiry. Whereas the modern rationalized means of political organization, economic activity, and scientific investigation cause meaning to die at the very roots (see chapter 1), meaning is the fons vitae from which modern science (as understood and practiced by Weber) receives its very sustenance. The fact that Weber’s understanding of science was centrally concerned with the significance of meaning rather than the study of order, thereby breaking with the established understanding of science and social science, was recognized by some of his contemporaries writing more than six decades before Kaye and Chowers. Landshut notes that Weber’s “scientific work essentially falls into two parts: a series of epistemological studies dealing with the methods of the social sciences, and a

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 85 series of sociological and historical studies” (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 101). On both accounts, the “inner tendency” of the “scientific work springs from a living question within man himself as being in pursuit of understanding . . .” (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110). By tracing scientific inquiry to roots in the “living question within man himself ” Weber breaks with the traditional motive of the social sciences, their explicit or implicit concern with salus publica, [although] scientific understanding remains in its own way organically connected with the decisive human question in his work. Max Weber returns the secret and aporia of life the more decisively to the sphere of personal existence . . . . (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110)

The pursuit of understanding on the part of the investigator springs from the depths of the investigator’s own personal experience (or “soul”) that makes such a pursuit meaningful. Something in the scientist’s soul is disturbed by the fact that something in the surrounding culture is challenging or undermining the scientist’s own understanding of “decisive human question[s].” The goal of the investigation itself leads the investigator to probe the inner world of an actor and attempt to understand the manner in which the actor meaningfully understood the world and meaningfully acted in the world. But this is not the end of the investigation. Equipped with this understanding of the “other,” the scientist turns his/her gaze inward to gain a better understanding of his/her own inner world. In short, the scientist undertakes an investigation of the way individuals in a different cultural setting understood/conferred meaning in/on the world, so that the investigator can gain greater insight and clarity into an understanding of meaning in his/her own cultural condition. Not unlike Landshut’s evaluation, Rickert also sees Weber blazing a new trail in his writings on the methodology of the social sciences. Rickert notes that in theory Weber argued for the strict separation of subjective contemplation and the pursuit of objective knowledge. All the while that Weber was arguing for such a separation, his own practice of science demonstrated that an integration of the two was indeed possible. The same Weber who was engaged in intense contemplation about the meaning and significance of the cultural sciences as a methodologist of the social sciences was also engaged in specialized research of specialized subjects as a social scientist in the pursuit of specialized knowledge. Rickert sums up Weber’s achievement in these words: Weber did not wish to be a philosopher, and as a “specialist” he was indeed not one. Nevertheless, quite apart from his teachings on methodology, he is of great importance to philosophy. His person with its double talent represents the most interesting problem for philosophy in its pursuit of unity. He did not solve the problem, but anyone who considers him can learn that the ancient question of the relation of the vita contemplativa to the vita activa is also the most modern question imaginable. (Rickert, 1989 [1926], 85 ff.)

Rickert notes that Weber the scientist and methodologist is perfectly justified in stating that science cannot yield truth (or vision of the Platonic sun). But by acknowledging that science can provide a degree and type of clarity about truth claims that

86 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY cannot be had from any other source, “Weber himself is closer to what he seems to be opposing than he was aware” (Rickert, 1989 [1926], 83) regarding the ability of scientific analysis of empirical fact to provide insight into issues of meaning and significance. In other words, while Weber firmly asserts that there is a gap between fact and value from a scientific perspective because science cannot pass a judgment on the meaningfulness of a value claim, Weber’s scientific methodology establishes a relationship between fact and value on two different accounts. First, an understanding of value commitments (whether practical or theoretical) on the part of the actor express themselves in the form of empirical facts. At this level, science has the potential to provide the actor with a degree of clarity regarding his/her value commitments that cannot be had from any other source. Second, in carrying out cultural scientific analysis, the investigator takes meaning and significance to be a fact that is studied, but from the perspective of his/her own particular value position that has made the scientific/factual inquiry meaningful. At this level, the investigator gains a better understanding of his/her own value commitments as a result of the scientific/factual inquiry into meaning invested in particular cultural phenomena by the actors. By putting forth the argument that only a hairline separates faith from science, and supporting this assertion by a careful exposition of the methodology of the social sciences, Weber breaks the Enlightenment tradition that saw an unbridgeable divide between faith and science. In presenting a self-conscious and self-critical account of what is at the center of social/cultural scientific inquiry, Weber is led to the conclusion that in the end it is meaning (Sinn). In reaching this conclusion, Weber bridges the fact/value dichotomy at both the methodological and practical levels. The present chapter began by posing the question, “What is the value of science?” in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness. This is a question that Weber posed himself. For Weber, science can indeed make a meaningful contribution to the total life of humanity. Science’s contribution does not lie in the fact that it can offer a direct answer to the only question that really matters to human beings/humanity, “What shall we do and how shall we live?” because science cannot give a direct answer to any question about meaning and value. The contribution of science, or its vocation in a disenchanted era, is that it can serve as a unique means of accessing knowledge about the importance and possibility of meaning in an era of disenchanted meaninglessness. The vocation of science in the era of disenchanted meaningless is not to furnish the moderns with meaning but to make them conscious of the indispensability of meaning in human life and culture. (This point is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.) Additionally, science can provide the moderns with knowledge of empirical facts that lends clarity to their understanding and discussion of meaning. The discussion regarding the relationship between fact and value can be summarized as such: (a) At the level of practical rationalization, scientific knowledge can provide clarity regarding the range of options available for a course of action, given a particular goal/value. Additionally, scientific knowledge can provide clarity regarding the feasibility, costs, and possible unintended consequences of the chosen course of action undertaken to achieve a particular goal/value.

BRIDGING THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY / 87 (b) At the level of theoretical rationalization, scientific knowledge can provide clarity regarding the internal, logical consistency of a particular world image and logical validity of claims made with reference to a particular worldview. Additionally, scientific knowledge can provide clarity regarding the possibility of attaining particular values within the framework of a particular world image. (c) In terms of the significance of meaning, the methodology of the social sciences shows meaning to be categorically indispensable in order for the very possibility of real scientific inquiry. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Weber’s work bridges the fact/value dichotomy at both the methodological and the practical levels. It is by bridging this dichotomy that the study of meaning (Sinn) is made possible and with it the very definition of culture and the very possibility of the cultural sciences. This is a notable achievement in itself, but it is only a part of the picture. The fact that meaning can be viewed as both a fact and a value in Weber’s methodology suggests that Weber is challenging the notion that an unbridgeable divide separates subject from object. A look at the manner in which Weber formulates his position on how “objectively valid” scientific knowledge is attained in the cultural sciences reveals that he does indeed bridge the subject/object dichotomy. In other words, Weber’s methodology bridges the fact/value dichotomy in response to the question: “What do the cultural sciences study?” His methodology also bridges the subject/object dichotomy in response to the question: “How do the cultural sciences arrive at an ‘objectively valid’ account of meaning?” The following chapter focuses on this question.

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C HAPTER 4 T HE C ONSTITUTIVE C OMPONENTS OF S CIENTIFIC I NQUIRY: B RIDGING THE S UBJECT /O BJECT D ICHOTOMY

Weber notes that the cultural sciences investigate and provide “knowledge of reality with respect to its cultural significance” (OSS, 75). In other words, meaning (Sinn) is the “what?” that the cultural sciences study. But keeping in mind that meaning cannot be characterized as either a “fact” or a “value” in some absolutely “objective” sense, the question emerges regarding the “objective” character of knowledge provided by the scientific investigation of meaningful cultural phenomena. Weber describes the presupposition implicit in this question in these terms: When we distinguished in principle between “value-judgment” and “empirical knowledge,” we presupposed the existence of an unconditional valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i.e., the analytical order of empirical social reality. (OSS, 63)

Even though meaning (Sinn) is simultaneously a fact and a value, Weber posits that a distinction can be drawn between the two different aspects and that scientific inquiry requires an “objective” distinction between the two. This claim is itself based on the presupposition that there exists an “unconditional valid type” of knowledge by means of which this distinction can be drawn. Speaking of this presupposition, Weber notes: “This presupposition now becomes our problem in the sense that we must discuss the meaning of objectively ‘valid’ truth in the social sciences” (OSS, 63). In other words, how do we arrive at objectively valid scientific knowledge (or “truth”)? The manner in which Weber investigates and eventually resolves this question parallels and complements the manner in which he investigates and resolves the question: What does scientific inquiry investigate? The significance of Weber’s work in this regard is best illustrated by juxtaposing his position with other positions on the same issue. In Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu there were two major schools of thought locked in a heated debate on the question of “How do we arrive at objectively valid scientific knowledge?” Proponents of the historicist method argued that scientific truth expressed itself in the form of objective scientific laws that governed (and therefore explained) the development of culture and the behavior of cultural beings. For this school, the goal of all scientific inquiry was to offer a causal explanation of observed cultural phenomena in the form of objective laws. From this perspective, valid scientific knowledge became such only if it was free

90 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of any and all subjective elements. In contrast, proponents of the Verstehen method argued that scientifically valid truth expressed itself in the form of normative cultural values that governed (and therefore explained) the development of human culture since the beginning of time. For this school, the goal of all scientific inquiry was to offer an interpretive understanding of cultural phenomena by means of subjective empathy. From this perspective, valid scientific knowledge became such only if it was free of any and all objective elements. Subsequent history called the debate between these two schools on this particular issue the Methodenstreit (the battle of the methods). Weber’s own exposition of a methodology that arrives at “scientific truth” emerged in the midst of this debate. In contrast to both positions, Weber argued that scientifically valid truth is expressed in the form of an objectively possible hypothesis—the validity of which can be established only after it is subject to further scientific analysis. From Weber’s perspective, the goal of all scientific inquiry is to offer imputations about empirical phenomena by means of causal interpretation of such phenomena in a form that makes these imputations amenable to validation (or invalidation) by future empirical experience. For Weber, all objectively valid knowledge (i.e., scientific truth) is arrived at with the aid of certain subjective and objective elements, but at the same time, it must be free of other types of subjective and objective elements. In identifying imputation as the penultimate manifestation of scientific knowledge, Weber explicitly bridges the subject/object dichotomy, complementing the bridging of the fact/value dichotomy by identifying Sinn as being the penultimate object of social scientific inquiry. The discussion of Sinn in Weber’s methodology contains implicit pointers that moves are being made toward overcoming the subject/object dichotomy—it is in the form of the imputation that the dichotomy is explicitly bridged. The present chapter follows the pointers already discussed in the previous chapter and details the manner in which Weber’s overcoming of the fact/value dichotomy is complemented by his overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy. Because of the contextual relevance of the Methodenstreit to the emergence of Weber’s position, the present chapter begins by discussing some of the major themes and issues in the debate. Then it goes on to describe Weber’s critique (and selective appropriation) of the methodologies of the historicist method and the Verstehen method. This exposition of the “how?” of scientific inquiry complements Weber’s exposition of the “what?” of scientific inquiry and provides further evidence to substantiate Weber’s observation that only a “hair-line . . . separates science from faith.” 4.1 The Methodenstreit: The Issues and Parties In the most general terms, the “battle of the methods” revolved around the question: “Can a discipline whose methods illuminate the physical and biological world be applied to the sphere of human action?” (Diggins, 1996, 114). The Methodenstreit was reflective of an effort to establish the epistemological foundations of the cultural sciences and this effort took place in the midst of a neo-Kantian reaction to Hegelian metaphysics in the last decades of the nineteenth century in Germany: Weber’s neo-Kantian contemporaries, reacting to a lofty Hegelian metaphysics that made no effort to assimilate natural science, sought to find ways to use philosophy in order to have access to truths about history, society, and culture . . . This “battle”

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 91 reflected an intense German will to know and a deep desire to understand what it is one understands when something is said to be understood. (Diggins, 1996, 114)

While the battle itself was about “science,” it was concerned with fundamental philosophical issues. The question “what is it that one understands when something is said to be understood?” and the question of “how does one arrive at even making a claim of having understood something?” are philosophical questions. Consequently, a discussion of philosophical issues played a critical role in the manner in which the Methodenstreit unfolded. For his part, Weber was a leading participant in the methodological and philosophical debates raging during his time. Weber began to add his voice to the debate in 1903 with the publication of his first methodological work titled “Roscher’s ‘Historical Method.’ ” His contributions to the debate continued until the last years of his life with the publication of “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics” in 1917. Oakes notes that the Methodenstreit “took place in German academic social science during the two decades before WWI” and that it was during this time period that the crisis regarding “the foundation of the sociocultural sciences” reached its peak (RK, 17). Consequently, Weber’s contributions spanned the most intense and critical period of the debate and these contributions were made during his most productive and mature years of scholarly output. The battle of the methods had two distinct but related aspects because of the two different but related tasks facing the practitioners of the social and cultural sciences. On the one hand they had to establish the scientific status of social/cultural sciences by demonstrating that there was some fundamental type of similarity between the social/cultural sciences and the natural/physical sciences. On the other hand they had to establish the independent identity of the social/cultural sciences from the natural/physical sciences by demonstrating that there was something fundamentally unique about the former that set them apart from the latter. In other words, the founding fathers of the modern social/cultural sciences in the late nineteenth century had to “establish both the scientific status and the methodological autonomy of the sociocultural disciplines” (Ciaffa, 1998, 41). There was no doubt among the social/ cultural scientists that these disciplines aimed for (and actually attained) objectively valid knowledge (or scientific truth) just like the natural/physical sciences. But at the same time, there was a general sense among some of the leading cultural/social scientists that these particular disciplines either offered a unique type of knowledge, or arrived at it in a unique way that set the social/cultural sciences apart from natural/physical sciences. In retrospect, the Methodenstreit can be seen as an effort on the part of a group of social/cultural scientists to articulate this vague, general sense with greater clarity and precision. Prior to Weber’s entry into the discussion, two polarized positions characterized the methodological self-understanding of the cultural sciences.1 Truzzi has used the terms “positivistic-naturalistic” and “humanistic-culturalistic” to describe the two positions (Truzzi, 1974, 2). Generally speaking, the former position was that of the historicist method and posited that at the very basic methodological level there was no difference between the sociocultural sciences and the natural sciences. The fact that there was no difference at the methodological level was directly related to the

92 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY fact that there is no fundamental difference between facts in the natural world and facts in the cultural world: The same sorts of reasoning, method, and explanatory role were seen to characterize the social and the natural sciences. Social facts, like physical facts, were said to be equally real, equally empirical, and equally measurable, and it was believed that their study would ultimately generate the same kind of law-like propositions and explanatory coverage believed to be present in the natural sciences. (Truzzi, 1974, 1)

From the positivistic-naturalistic position, events in the domain of human culture could be analyzed and explained from the perspective of abstract, universal laws and it was the goal of cultural scientific inquiry to discover these causal laws and to explain cultural events in terms of these laws. In sum, this position was premised on two presuppositions: (a) that there was no fundamental difference between natural phenomena and cultural phenomena and (b) the methodological approach and conceptual tools used to analyze the cultural phenomena could/should have the same “objective” character as those used to analyze natural/physical phenomena. In both cases, “objective” abstract, universal laws were accorded explanatory and causal value in the scientific understanding of the phenomena under consideration. Some of the leading historians and economists of Weber’s day were notable advocates of the positivistic-naturalistic position. Even if they did not state the matter in such explicit terms, advocates of this position argued that “the methods of the natural sciences, especially the search for empirical regularities, should be extended to the social and cultural studies as well” (Ringer, 1997, 20). A study of these empirical regularities would lead to the discovery of laws governing human behavior, society, and culture. This in turn would make possible a causal explanation of all the objects of cultural scientific inquiry in terms of these laws. It is not difficult to see how this position could come to not only accord explanatory value to abstract, universal laws, but also attribute causality to these laws—as was the case in the natural and physical sciences. Knies, a leading economist and historian of economics, was a major advocate of this position whom Weber directly engaged in the Methodenstreit. Knies and the other advocates of this position “believed that relationship between [cultural] events could only be based upon the natural necessity of deterministic laws” (Ringer, 1997, 25). In contrast to the objectivist position, the humanistic-culturalistic camp posited that there was a fundamental, basic difference between natural phenomena and cultural phenomena. Social and cultural phenomena are meaningful forms of activity not only to the scientist–observer but to the subjects–actors themselves; and these meaningful elements in action . . . account greatly for the variations one observes in [human] behavior. (Truzzi, 1974, 1)

Since the subject matter of the cultural sciences—cultural phenomena—carry an irreducible element of meaningfulness for both the actor and the observer, the ultimate goal of the cultural sciences is to understand and interpret this meaningfulness. It is the presence of the element of meaningfulness that distinguishes the cultural realm from the natural realm. Because there is something in cultural phenomena that

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 93 is absent in natural phenomena (i.e., meaning), the study of cultural phenomena requires the utilization of an approach/tool for which there is no need in the natural sciences. For the early proponents of the humanistic-culturalistic camp, understanding and interpretation of meaning were to be achieved “not through the methods of the natural sciences but only by means of empathetic identification with the values and meanings examined in the minds of the social actors” (Truzzi, 174, 9). The proponents of this position posited that the “values and meanings . . . in the minds of the actors” could be scientifically understood and interpreted by the subjective empathetic feelings of the investigator. It was by means of his/her subjective empathetic feelings that the investigator was able to understand and interpret the meaning and significance that the cultural event/institution under study had for the actor and offer a scientifically “objective” account of this meaning. In Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu, Dilthey’s work was among the most influential and widely recognized example of the humanistic-culturalistic position. His position was based on a clear and unambiguous distinction between Natur (nature) and Geist (spirit). For Dilthey, the domain of Geist, not Natur, was the proper subject of inquiry for the cultural scientist seeking to understand and interpret human behavior/institutions: While human beings as psychophysical or biological entities are part of nature, Dilthey held, practitioners of the interpretive disciplines deal essentially with the human mind and spirit (Geist), as it has expressed itself in the historical world. (Ringer, 1997, 26 ff.)

Dilthey’s identification of Geist as the proper domain of study for the cultural scientist can be better appreciated when it is understood that for him human existence insofar as it is uniquely human lies apart from Natur in the realm of Geist. A cultural scientist, like the natural scientist, has to focus his/her attention on a particular set of available data that will be subject to scientific inquiry. In stark contrast to the natural scientist, the meaningfulness of the subject of inquiry to the cultural scientist’s own concerns is the determining factor in making the choice. For Dilthey, the very act of choosing the subject of inquiry by the cultural scientist demonstrates the fact that a common Geist links the investigator to that which is being investigated. The act of selection is made in terms of meaningful social types ultimately based on a psychic unity of mankind which allows the understanding of the past and unknown in terms of the present and known. (Truzzi, 1974, 9)

Not only does the “psychic unity of mankind” allow the investigator to make a meaningful selection, but it also allows him/her to understand the phenomenon under investigation. Because of the psychic unity of humanity, Dilthey posited that the human mind has the capacity of empathetic understanding and this capacity could be utilized in the interpretation of historical phenomena. With the aid of a variety of cultural artifacts, an individual could reconstruct a portion of the historical world or reenact a particular historical episode. The fact that human beings can learn other languages means that they have access to historical eras and events of cultures different from their own. All historical events and institutions have been the

94 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY result of particular motives and intentions so much so that “human purposes and values are realized in the network of meanings and intellectual influences that make up the historical world” (Ringer, 1997, 29). To the extent that an investigator is capable of empathy, he/she is capable of understanding the particular motive, intention, and/or meaning of a reconstructed cultural or historical event. The fact that all human beings “live in a historical world of inherited meaning” (Ringer, 1997, 28) means that they are all capable of empathizing with the events and peoples of the past from whom they have inherited their own historical situation. When this empathizing or experiencing is done for the purposes of understanding a historical event, it is called Verstehen (understanding). For Dilthey, the Geisteswissenschaften (the human/cultural sciences) are qualitatively different from the Naturwissenschaften (the natural sciences) because the former both begin with and culminate in the investigator’s empathetic Verstehen of the object under investigation. For Dilthey, Verstehen is not even a possibility when studying natural objects because there is nothing in the natural/physical world with which an investigator can empathize. The difference between the objectivism of the historicist method and subjectivism of the Verstehen method can be looked at from two different perspectives. First, the two positions differed regarding the nature of the object of scientific inquiry. For the historicist method there was no qualitative difference between natural phenomena and cultural phenomena. From the Verstehen perspective, there was a qualitative difference between cultural and natural phenomena—cultural phenomena had a unique quality (i.e., meaning) that was missing from natural phenomena. Second, the two positions differed regarding the definition of the “objectively valid” knowledge that the investigator was striving to acquire. For the historicist position, objectively valid scientific knowledge came in the form of abstract, universal laws that could be used to offer a causal explanation of the phenomena under study. For the Verstehen method, scientific truth was obtained by means of subjective empathetic feelings that could be used to offer an “objective” interpretive understanding of the phenomena under study. Depending on what position one took, the intrusion of either objective factors or subjective factors compromised the objective validity of scientific truth. For the historicist method, scientific inquiry had to be purged of all subjective factors (i.e., the investigator’s prejudices, concerns, interpretations, etc.) in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Proponents of the Verstehen method argued that the use of any objective factors such as universal, abstract concepts, during the course of scientific inquiry compromised the scientific integrity of the Geisteswissenschaften. Prior to Weber, a number of attempts were made to mediate between these two poles. While these attempts are valuable in and of themselves, they are of special relevance to the present discussion because of their direct role in Weber’s own contribution to the Methodenstreit. At the time that Weber began to make his own contribution to formulating a mediating position, a group of scholars broadly categorized as neo-Kantians had already begun to make initial moves in this direction. One of the most prominent thinkers among the neo-Kantians was Windelband, who gave a speech in 1894 titled “History and the Natural Sciences” that proved to be very influential. He posited that rather than focus on the phenomena that is being studied by the natural and cultural

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 95 sciences, a distinction should be made on the basis of the type of knowledge that the different sciences seek to attain (Ringer, 1997, 32). For Windelband, while the natural sciences “pursue ‘nomothetic’ knowledge of the general in the form of invariant ‘laws’,” the sociocultural sciences aim at attaining “ ‘idiographic’ knowledge of singular patterns or events” (Ringer, 1997, 32). The reason why different modes of inquiry are needed to approach natural and cultural phenomena is the fact that for the purposes of scientific analysis, any given lump of coal would be considered interchangeable with other individuals of its type, whereas Goethe would not be similarly interchangeable with other poets or historical figures of his age. (Ciaffa, 1998, 53)

Goethe, or any aspect of culture for that matter, is deemed worthy of study because it has come to be “regarded as significant from the standpoint of cultural values” (Ciaffa, 1998, 53). A lump of coal, or any aspect of the natural or physical world is deemed worthy of study because of its universal and immutable characteristics. The natural and physical science aim at acquiring nomothetic knowledge, while cultural sciences aim at acquiring idiographic knowledge. In making this distinction, Windelband was stating in explicit and formal terms what was already implicitly present in the positions of the historicist and the Verstehen methods. He went on to note that “the same set of phenomena can be studied in both the nomothetic and the idiographic mode, and that the borderline between the two approaches in not absolute” (Ringer, 1997, 32). Building upon this insight, he posited that even though in the final analysis the understanding of historical and cultural phenomena can be gained only by means of tact, intuition, and personal insight, the investigator must employ nomothetic tools when studying cultural phenomena in their particularity. The acknowledgment by the neo-Kantians that the cultural sciences needed to employ general, abstract (i.e., “objective”) concepts in order to arrive at an understanding of the particular brought the historicist and Verstehen positions closer together. The rapprochement of the two poles was advanced further by one of Windelband’s younger protégés in the neo-Kantian school, Rickert. Rickert noted that, from the perspective of logic, there is no difference between empirical reality in the natural world and the cultural world, insofar as this empirical reality is amenable to scientific investigation. In both the cases, empirical reality present to itself to the observer as an “immeasurable” and “illimitable manifold” (Ciaffa, 1997, 46) of which only a selected portion can be chosen as an object of investigation. Not only does reality in general possess this characteristic, but any chosen segment of reality is also characterized thus, as is a chosen segment of the segment and a chosen segment of that segment, ad infinitum. This leads to the conclusion of the “inexhaustibility of empirical reality for the knowing and perceiving subject” (Ciaffa, 1997, 47). Bruun summarizes Rickert’s understanding of the problem and he responds in these words: Since immediate reality is infinite in its multiplicity, any science has to select its subject matter from it. The objectivity of the scientific results therefore cannot reside in their correspondence with the material on which they are based, since this material is always the result of a prior selection and processing; instead the objectivity of the result must depend on the objectivity of the criteria of this prior selection. Since the criteria of

96 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY selection in the historical, “cultural” sciences are cultural values, we need a demonstration of the empirical objectivity of these values; Rickert carries out this demonstration by establishing empirically that the cultural values in question are normatively general. (Bruun, 1972, 131 ff.)

For Rickert, logically speaking, there can be no such thing as knowledge of the universal, or universally valid general laws, because empirical reality can only be captured and studied in its particularity. He noted that “cultural values” inevitably and invariably determine which finite segment of the infinite flux of empirical reality is selected for observation by the investigator. For Rickert, the objectivity of scientific knowledge was based on the fact that “objectively valid” cultural values provided the criteria for selection. Since the criteria for selection were objectively valid, they assured the objectivity of the knowledge claims resulting from an inquiry based on them. While Windelband’s work established the need for general laws in the study of the particular, Rickert’s work established the fact that even in the study of the most universal, the investigator is actually studying a particular segment of the universal— the selection of which is invariably determined by the cultural values of the investigator. In short, Windelband and Rickert contributed to the closing of the gap between the objectivism of the historicist method and the subjectivism of the Verstehen method from different sides.

4.2 A Logical Flaw in the Methodenstreit Even though his predecessors and some of his colleagues had closed the gap between the opposing positions, it is Weber’s unique contributions to the debate that bridges the divide between the historicist and the Verstehen methods. Weber’s methodology of scientific inquiry synthesizes particular elements from the two positions, after subjecting both positions to critical logical and methodological analysis.2 Since Weber’s methodology develops as a result of a critical conversation with the other two positions, a look at Weber’s particular objections to the two positions serves as a good preface to describing his own. Weber notes that the two parties in the debate have not recognized the limitations of their favored approach and as a result they have not been able to appreciate the value inherent in the other approach. The inability of the historicist position to recognize the limitations of abstract, universal laws and the lack of appreciation of the interpretive role of the investigator, compromises the validity of scientific knowledge. Conversely, the inability of the proponents of the Verstehen method to recognize the limitations of intuitive empathy and their lack of appreciation of the role of general, abstract concepts in scientific inquiry compromises the integrity of scientific truth. In short, both the objectivism of the historicist method and the subjectivism of the Verstehen method are obstacles to scientific truth, but for different reasons. Weber “acknowledges an irreducible interpretive element in the sociocultural sciences” (Ciaffa, 1998, 43). But he criticizes the account offered by the proponents of the Verstehen method of the role played by intuition and empathy in the interpretation of cultural phenomena. Speaking of intuitional feelings instigated by

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 97 empathy, Weber notes: On the whole their theoretical value for science decreases as their aesthetic charm increases. Under certain circumstances they can have significant “heuristic” value. Under other circumstances, however, they can constitute an obstacle to empirical knowledge. This is because they obscure the awareness that the “intuition” is constituted by the emotional content of the observer, not by those of the “epoch” described . . . . (RK, 180)

Knowledge based on “intuitions” remains suspect because there is no way of determining the source of the intuitions—are they evaluations that the observer is making of the object, or are they feelings that the object is rousing in the observer? Furthermore, the use of empathy to approach an object of study has the risk of making the observer completely lose sight of the goal of scientific research. The empathetic approach aims to attain a “formula which reproduces the ‘synthesis of feeling’ ” between the observer and object of study (RK, 180). And the result of this “synthesis” is expressed in terms of the “total character” of the object that was observed/experienced and this total characterization takes the place of scientific analysis. This synthesis should not be mistaken for scientific analysis because there is no way to test the validity of the knowledge claims that are based on such a synthesis. This point, by itself, renders knowledge claims generated by empathetic feelings to be scientifically invalid. The undisciplined use of intuitive empathy in the Verstehen method obscures and diminishes the positive role of subjective factors in scientific inquiry: Subjective, emotional “interpretation” in this form does not constitute empirical, historical knowledge of real relations (causal relations). Nor does it constitute that which it otherwise could be: interpretation based on values. (RK, 181)

Weber notes that while the intuitions of the investigator play a critical role in generating scientific knowledge, subjective factors cannot be the sole source of “valid” scientific knowledge (RK, 180). In line with the Verstehen method, Weber notes: “Every type of purely direct concrete description bears the mark of artistic portrayal. ‘Each sees what is in his own heart.’ ” (OSS, 107). But such an “artistic portrayal” of empirical reality does not and cannot be classified as “scientific truth” or “objectively valid scientific knowledge” of empirical reality. This is because from Weber’s perspective: “Valid judgments always presuppose the logical analysis of what is concretely and immediately perceived, that is, the use of concepts” (OSS, 107). The failure of the Verstehen method to allow (or account) for the presence of “objective” concepts in scientific inquiry, knowledge, and judgment compromised the integrity of scientific truth. For Weber it is only with the aid of “objective” concepts that scientific claims can be subjected to critical analysis. Whereas one group of cultural scientists erred in the direction of defining the cultural sciences in particular and subjective terms, the other group erred in the direction of defining them in excessively general and objective terms. The historicist method worked on the assumption that social scientific inquiry could lead to the discovery of universal laws governing social and cultural development and that these laws could be used to give the causal explanation of all cultural phenomena. This position was based on the assumption that detailed and persistent observation of

98 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY empirical reality would lead to the discovery of certain regularities and patterns. These patterns and regularities could in turn be correlated with certain cultural phenomena—thereby leading to the discovery of the “cause” of such phenomena. And “with the progressive completeness of observation, these correlations will eventually be elevated to the logical status of ‘natural law’ ” (RK, 63). Subsequently, causality would be ascribed to these laws, in the sense that empirical reality would be considered as an effect that was caused by the impact of these laws on reality. In terms of their scientific value, Weber has the same view regarding the utility of “objective” general laws as he has of “subjective” intuitive feelings. Weber characterized the objectivist tendency in the cultural sciences as the attempt to “construct a closed system of concepts, in which reality is synthesized in some sort of permanently and universally valid classification and from which it can be deduced” (OSS, 84). This attempt is based on the premise that cultural reality unfolds during the course of history according to universally valid abstract (i.e., “objective”) laws that can be derived from a study of the particulars of history. This premise itself has been borrowed from the natural sciences because in its origin the rational analysis of society [by the cultural sciences] arose in close connection with the modern development of natural science, so it remained related to it in its whole method of approach. (OSS, 85)

But a particular cultural phenomenon cannot be explained in terms of universally valid, abstract laws any more than it can be understood by the subjective, intuitive feelings. As is the case with the subjective mode of studying cultural phenomena, there is no “necessary logical relationship” between universal abstract laws and particular cultural phenomena (OSS, 77). The belief in this necessary logical relationship is part of the intellectual heritage that has been inherited by the individuals positing it. In the natural sciences, the practical evaluative attitude toward what was immediately and technically useful was closely associated from the very first with the hope, taken over as a heritage of antiquity and further elaborated, of attaining purely “objective” (i.e. independent of all individual contingencies) monistic knowledge of the totality of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity and mathematical form. It was thought that this hope could be realized by the method of generalizing abstraction and the formulation of laws based on empirical analysis. (OSS, 85)

This hope, attitude, and method of studying empirical reality flowed from the natural sciences into the cultural sciences but, for Weber, it is based on a simple and obvious logical mistake. Since empirical reality is an immeasurable and infinite manifold, any “law” based on observation of this reality is the result of observing only a particular segment of empirical reality. Logically speaking, there is no necessary correlation between a “law” derived from the observation of the particular segment and other parts of reality that have not been observed. The positing of this correlation is an act of interpretation. As a matter of fact, even the claim that the observed part of empirical reality behaves according to a particular “law” is an act of interpretation. Consequently, any attempt to deduce universally valid laws based on knowledge

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 99 claims about a particular segment of the universal will remain incomplete, and any claim that even the particular segment of observed reality will always behave according to a particular “law” cannot be falsified. For Weber, the objectivism of the historicist approach prevents them from noticing the fact that an interpretive act on the part of the investigator is inherently a part of all scientific inquiry. To link a “law” with an event in empirical reality (either as a “cause” of reality, or as being derived from reality) is fundamentally an interpretive act. The role played by the investigator’s subjective interpretation in scientific inquiry and judgment remains hidden in the historicist methodology. Just as there is a fundamental difference between subjective, intuitive interpretation and scientific knowledge of cultural phenomena, there is a fundamental difference between objective, abstract generalizations and scientific knowledge of empirical, cultural reality. Weber notes: “The ‘abstract’-theoretical method even today shows unmediated and ostensibly irreconcilable cleavage from empirical-historical research” (OSS, 87). He posits that any theory explaining the great variety of historical and cultural phenomena in terms of “true” or “essential” abstractions, or universal laws, is the result of “naturalistic prejudices” that have influenced the cultural sciences: Nothing . . . is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the “true” content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such “ideas” as real “forces” and as a “true” reality which operates behind the passage of events and which works itself out in history. (OSS, 94)

Even though there is a “fundamental methodological distinction” between knowledge of abstract laws and knowledge of historical/cultural phenomena, the construction of a system of abstract and therefore purely formal propositions analogous to those of the natural sciences, is the only means of analyzing and intellectually mastering the complexity of social life. (OSS, 87)

In short, while abstract laws and generalities “may have extraordinary heuristic value” in the scientific analysis of cultural phenomena, they cannot be accorded “causal status” (RK, 63). It is worth noting that Weber uses the exact same terms to describe the constraints of personal intuitive feelings and universal, abstract laws in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of empirical reality—during the course of scientific inquiry they can be employed only as heuristic devices but not accorded interpretive value in the former case or causal status in the latter case. Weber criticizes the use of intuitive empathy by the Verstehen method and the use of abstract laws by the historicist method in very strong terms. But his critique is limited to the manner in which their respective partisans employ these devices and not a rejection of the devices themselves. If anything, Weber has a sharply heightened sense of the constructive role that personal intuition and abstract laws play in shaping scientific knowledge, inquiry, and judgment. Weber’s appreciation of the place of

100 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY intuition in scientific inquiry has already been detailed in chapter 2 (section 2.1)— Weber observes that there is no genuine discovery/breakthrough in science in the absence of intuitive inspiration. Weber’s appreciation of the place of the abstract concept in scientific inquiry has been detailed in chapter 3 (section 3.1)—Weber observes that abstract, general concepts and the controlled experiment define the very character of science. In sum, it is neither personal empathy/intuition nor abstract laws/concepts that Weber criticizes. He criticizes the manner in which they are understood and employed by their respective partisans in the Methodenstreit. Weber traces the objectivism of historicism and the subjectivism of the Verstehen method to a common mistake made by both positions—a naturalistic understanding of science. As noted above, Weber identifies “naturalistic prejudices” as the root cause of the claim that there is an inherent and immanent link between abstract laws and empirical reality. Weber’s assertion that the Verstehen method is also based on a naturalistic understanding of science appears to be counterintuitive. But a closer look at the issue reveals that the subjectivism of the Verstehen method and objectivism of the historicist method are indeed different sides of the same coin—a naturalistic error in the understanding of science. Weber uses the term “psychologism” (RK, 167) to describe the position that human emotions such as empathy and intuition can be accorded interpretive value. This position rejects the use of abstract concepts in the study of history and culture because of its “objective” character. Such concepts “have only a general, therefore abstract, nature” and as “a consequence of the necessarily abstract character of concepts” concrete objects cannot be subsumed under them (RK, 167). Since the purpose of the cultural sciences is to attain knowledge of the concrete and particular, for the Verstehen position, it logically follows that these disciplines have to dispense with the use of abstract, general concepts and rely on “a series of ‘intuitions’ ” (RK, 167). Weber posits that this type of psychologistic affirmation of intuition and critique of abstract concepts is “the consequence of . . . naturalistic errors” (RK, 167). These errors can be summarized in these terms: (a) Conflated understanding of two different types of concept; (b) conflated understanding of two different types of intuitions; and (c) not recognizing the gap between experience and knowledge claims about experience. Weber notes that the Verstehen method makes a distinction between an abstract concept and an intuition. An intuition provides direct and immediate knowledge of a particular, concrete object, while a concept establishes abstract, general relations among concrete objects. The naturalistic error begins with positing that “only relational concepts of absolute precision, that is those which can be expressed in terms of causal equivalence, are genuine ‘concepts’ ” (RK, 168). Weber notes that “even physics employs concepts which fail to satisfy this condition” (RK, 168). The fact that even physics employs concepts that are not concepts according to the naturalistic understanding of science evidences that there are other types of concepts than the one type allowed by the naturalistic definition. According to Weber, there are two types of concepts because concepts can have two different types of relationship with objects. On the one hand, abstract concepts cannot subsume concrete objects

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 101 because concrete objects are an illimitable manifold and the concept can only subsume a part of the infinite manifold. In this case, the concrete object is “more” than the abstract concept (RK, 167). On the other hand, abstract concepts transcend concrete objects because they can establish relations between objects—relationships that are not “given” in empirical reality. In its capacity to establish relations between objects, the abstract concept is “more” than the object. For Weber, naturalism conflates these two definitions of the concept by declaring that only the relational concept is “genuine” and that any concept that does not fit this definition is not a concept by definition. Both the Verstehen method and the historicist method accept this conflated, naturalistic definition of the concept, the former categorically rejecting its scientific value because it is “less” than empirical reality and the latter attributing all explanatory and causal value to it because it is “more” than empirical reality. In both the cases, the scientific value and the corresponding limitation of the concept have not been properly appreciated. The Verstehen position fails to see that the abstract concept can offer them something that concrete experience cannot—the ability to posit relations among objects. It also fails to see that it itself uses abstract concepts in its methodology—the “concept” that is not considered as such by the naturalistic definition of the term. Given its capacity to establish relations between concrete objects, the abstract concept also makes logical critique in the cultural sciences possible because “logic concerns (only) general concepts and their definitions” (RK, 167). For Weber, the use of the abstract concept in scientific inquiry makes the cultural sciences real sciences insofar as it makes logical critique of scientific knowledge claims possible. Such a critique is precluded in the Verstehen understanding of science because for this position all genuine scientific knowledge is a product of particular, subjective intuitions that are, by definition, immune from logical, analytical critique. The historicist method for its part fails to see the limitations of the abstract concept. It cannot be considered universally valid in the sense of offering an exhaustive (and eternal) description of empirical reality because it has been abstracted from the observation of a particular segment of reality observed under particular conditions, during a particular period of time. Consequently, while the abstraction can establish relations among the particular objects of reality from which it has been abstracted, it cannot subsume or account for all empirical reality. By failing to recognize that the concept is less than the empirical reality that it describes, the historicist method rules out the possibility of empirical reality having the ability to modify the abstract concept. If a part of empirical reality does not conform to the abstract concept, that part of empirical reality is labeled as an anomaly that will eventually come to be accounted for with the passage of time—with the assumption always being that the concept will subsume the anomaly. Weber’s valuation of the abstract concepts sees it as a valuable heuristic tool for scientific analysis that concrete experience does not afford, but with the reservation that the abstract relation is only a heuristic tool and not a universally valid generalization. As is detailed a little later, Weber sees not only the possibility of empirical reality modifying the conceptual apparatus constructed by scientists, but he also claims that this is an inevitability if science is to continue to advance.

102 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY For Weber, the conflated understanding of the concept by proponents of the Verstehen method deprives scientific knowledge of its conceptual content. And the conflated understanding of the concept by the historicist method equates conceptual knowledge with empirical reality. In both cases, the objective validity of scientific knowledge is undermined, because for Weber objective scientific knowledge is neither a copy nor a reproduction of empirical reality (contra the historicist method), but it is rather a conceptual ordering of empirical reality in a valid manner (contra the Verstehen method). In other words, Weber’s very definition of “scientific knowledge” depends on (or is the result of ) his correction of the naturalistic (i.e., conflated) definition of “concept.” His affirmation corrects the conflated understanding of “concept” on the part of the Verstehen method and affirms its value as heuristic device. At the same time, his reservation corrects the conflated understanding of the historicist method and sees the concept as something that is derived from empirical reality but not as something that reproduces empirical reality or (even less) subsumes it. With regard to intuition, the principles of the debate are the same but the positions of the parties are different. The proponents of Verstehen accept the role of intuition in scientific inquiry and the historicist position rejects it—but both base their respective positions on a naturalistic understanding of intuition. Such an understanding posits that “ ‘concepts of objects’ are not ‘concepts,’ but rather ‘intuitions’ ” (RK, 168). Weber argues that this position fails to take into account the fact that there are two different modes of intuiting: The intuitive self-evidence of mathematical propositions is quite different from the “intuitability” of the multiplicities of “experience,” immediately given “in” us and “external to” us, experienced and accessible to experience. (RK, 168)

The manner in which 2 ⫹ 2 ⫽ 4 is “intuited” is different from the manner in which objects in the world (experience external to us) and feelings/emotions (experiences immediately given in us) are “intuited.” The intuition of experience “is a thoroughly synthetic construct” because its intuited unity “is constituted by the selection of those aspects which are essential from the point of view of specific theoretical goals” (RK, 168). The intuition of synthetic constructs whose composition is determined by preexisting criteria is not the same thing as the intuition of mathematical propositions. To the degree that the synthetic construct is a product of thought, the construct has a conceptual (or logical) relation to empirical reality as opposed to an actual (or necessary) relation. Consequently, this “intuited” synthetic construct is a “concept,” at least if this expression is not artificially restricted to denote only one part of that conceptual apparatus which is articulated in a language and produced by the discursive analysis of the empirically given. (RK, 169)

The naturalistic understanding of intuition does not recognize the fact that there is a qualitative difference between the way that mathematical propositions are intuited and synthetic constructs are intuitively applied to experience (or derived from experience). The Verstehen method considers all intuitions to be of the mathematical proposition type. Consequently, they consider the interpretive understanding produced by such intuitions to be as self-evidently valid as mathematical propositions. Weber argues

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 103 that if human beings were capable of such a direct intuitive grasp and understanding of empirical reality, then they would have no need for scientific knowledge at all. The historicist method considers all intuitions to be of the synthetic construct type and therefore invalid. Consequently, they deny any relation between intuition and objectively valid scientific knowledge. Weber’s critique shows this position overlooks (or negates) the fact that all synthesis is rooted in the “interpretive imagination” (RK, 156) of the investigator. When numerous observations of empirical phenomena are “synthesized” to produce a “law” that supposedly applies to all of them (and all others of their kind that have not been observed), such a synthesis invariably springs from the investigator’s personal intuition. Similarly, any synthesis of an already known law with an observed phenomenon in empirical reality that results in a causal explanation of the observed phenomenon is also a “synthetic construct” springing from the interpretive imagination of the investigator. Weber breaks with the conflated, naturalistic definition of “intuition” and recognizes the two types of intuitions. This reconstructed understanding of intuition allows Weber to recognize the scientific limitations of intuition that the subjectivism of the Verstehen method overlooks and appreciate the scientific value of intuition that the objectivism of the historicist method obscures. A conflated understanding of concept and intuition by both the historicist and Verstehen methods leads to penultimate conflated understanding of naturalistic science—a conflated understanding of causality. The historicist method located the “cause” of all phenomena (both natural and cultural) in the immanent link between abstract concepts (in the form of universally valid law) and concrete experience. For this position, abstract, universal law plays a dual role. On the one hand, it offers an objectively valid description of empirical reality, and on the other hand, it offers a causal explanation of empirical reality. The Verstehen method located the “cause” of cultural phenomena in the immanent link between personal intuition and concrete experience. For this position, empathetic intuition plays a dual role. On the one hand, it makes direct and unmediated encounter with concrete experience possible, and on the other hand, it facilitates an objectively valid interpretive understanding of concrete experience. The naturalistic understanding of causality is the cause of a fundamental mistake made by both the historicist and Verstehen methods. This mistake results in both perspectives keeping a fundamental and irreducible element of scientific inquiry “in petto” (or hidden from observation, and thereby from analysis and criticism). Given what has been said above about the role of the “interpretive imagination” in scientific inquiry, the historicist method fails to appreciate the fact that there is no direct naturalistic/mechanistic relation between law and concrete experience. The relation between the two invariably and inherently contains an interpretive element that the investigator contributes to the inquiry. This interpretive element is not to be found either in the phenomenon that is being observed or in the law that is being used to account for the phenomenon. The naturalistic/mechanistic understanding of causality on the part of the historicist method keeps the role of the interpretive imagination of the investigator in scientific inquiry “in petto.” Similarly, given what has been said above about the abstract concept, the Verstehen method fails to appreciate the fact that there is no direct naturalistic/ mechanistic link between intuition and concrete experience. The relation between the two is invariably and

104 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY inherently mediated by abstract concepts that are used by the investigator to describe and interpret the phenomenon. Such concepts are found neither in the investigator’s personal intuition nor in the phenomenon that is being observed—but the role of abstract concept remains “in petto” in the Verstehen method. For Weber, whenever an element of scientific inquiry that leads up to the production of scientific knowledge is kept in petto, the objective validity of the knowledge that is produced is compromised. Weber argues that an elementary analysis of even the most basic knowledge claims about empirical reality demonstrates that abstract concepts and the interpretive imagination come into play in the construction of a knowledge claim. It is often assumed that the simplest of claims about the most obvious and self-evident facts in empirical reality are devoid of interpretive elements or logical/analytical problems. Such an assumption is based on the presupposition that direct experience of empirical reality combined with the soundness of one’s mind are sufficient in making valid judgments and statements about empirical reality. But Weber notes that any “existential proposition, ” even one as simple as “Peter takes a walk,” presupposes “logical operations as soon as it constitutes a ‘proposition’ the ‘validity’ of which . . . is to be established” (RK, 169). To begin with the statement “Peter takes a walk” is not the expression of some self-evident truth that is given in experience; it is the expression of an interpretive judgment offered by an individual after observing a “fact” in empirical reality. In addition to the experience of empirical reality and the soundness of one’s mind, Weber identifies “logical operations” as essential components of the most elementary judgments about empirical reality. This is the case not only for statements about empirical reality but also for “the reflective analysis of one’s own action” (LCS, 177). Such an analysis apparently does not contain any logical operations and does not present any analytical problems “since one’s action is directly given in experience and—assuming mental ‘health’—is ‘understandable’ without further ado and hence is naturally ‘reproducible’ in memory directly” (LCS, 177). Weber goes on to note: Very simple reflections show that it is not, however, so, and that the “valid” answer to the question: why did I act that way, constitutes a categorically formed construct which is to be raised to the level of demonstrable judgment only by the use of abstractions. This is true even though the “demonstration” is in fact here conducted in the mind of the “acting person” himself. (LCS, 177)

Abstract concepts are needed in order to reflect upon and analyze all experience, including the experience “given in” ourselves (i.e., our own decisions, judgments about our own actions). This is no less the case in relation to knowledge claims “outside” ourselves about events of cultural significance. Weber notes: Reflective knowledge, even of one’s own experience, is nowhere and never a literally “repeated experience” or a simple “photograph” of what was experienced; the “experience,” when it is made into an “object,” acquires perspectives and interrelationships which were not “known” in the experience itself. The idea formed in later reflection, of one’s own past action is no different in this respect from the idea so formed of a past

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 105 concrete natural event in the external world, which had been experienced by one’s self or which was reported by someone else. (LCS, 178)

In the absence of abstraction, there can be no claims about empirical reality that can be subjected to critique and analysis for the purpose of verification/falsification. This is the case not only for knowledge claims about the most simple and immediate claims about empirical reality but also for the most complex and distant aspects of empirical reality: the causal analysis of personal action proceeds logically in exactly the same way as the causal analysis of the “historical significance” of the Battle of Marathon, i.e. by isolation, generalization, and the construction of judgments of possibility. (LCS, 177)

In short, knowledge claims about even the most immediate of all experience, the experience of our own feelings, contains logical operations that are made possible by abstract, “objective” concepts. Similarly, knowledge claims about the most basic or “self-evident” truths about empirical reality are inevitably and irreducibly interpretive judgments whose truth value is never a given. Weber’s reflections on the constituent elements of scientific inquiry lay bare a particular element that the historicist position approach keeps in petto (i.e., the interpretive imagination of the investigator or individual making the knowledge claim). At the same time, it lays bare another element that the Verstehen method keeps in petto (i.e., the abstract concept that the investigator employs to analyze and organize his/her experience). For Weber, the three essential elements that go into producing “valid” scientific knowledge are: (a) experience in/of empirical reality (b) isolation and generalization of elements from that experience, and (c) making interpretive judgments about the experience. In identifying the three elements as being irreducible components of scientific knowledge claims, Weber is breaking from the objectivism of the historicist method and the subjectivism of the Verstehen method—while at the same time incorporating objective and subjective elements in his own method of scientific inquiry. A closer look at Weber’s description of the components of scientific inquiry reveals that he not only incorporates objective and subjective elements from the other two positions but also transforms them and makes them more meaningful. 4.3

Imputation and Ideal Type: Bridging the Subject/Object Dichotomy

Having recognized both the limitations and the value of the subjectivist and objectivist understandings of science and causality, Weber offers his own synthetic construct as an alternative. He posits that in the cultural sciences causality cannot be attributed to either abstract universal laws or understood purely in terms of subjective intuitions. For Weber, a genuinely scientific account of causality in the cultural sciences contains both subjective and objective elements but is reducible to neither— and this account comes in the form of an “imputation.” Weber notes: Where the individuality of a phenomenon is concerned, the question of causality is not a question of laws [or intuitions] but of concrete causal relationships; it is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general rubric as a representative case but

106 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. It is in brief a question of imputation. (OSS, 78 ff.)

For Weber, a scientific account of the “cause” of a particular phenomenon must be presented in the form of an “imputation” if the knowledge claim is to be accorded the status of “objectively valid knowledge.” A closer look at the process that leads up to the making of an imputation and its contents reveals that the phrase “objectively valid knowledge” has a very specific meaning. From the perspective of the historicist method, such knowledge comes in the form of an absolutely certain causal explanation. This causal explanation is arrived at (and expressed in the form of ) universal, abstract laws (that are themselves absolutely certain). From the perspective of the Verstehen method, “objectively valid” knowledge comes in the form of infallible interpretive understanding of cultural phenomena. This interpretive understanding is arrived at (and expressed in the form of ) subjective, intuitive empathy (which is itself indubitable and infallible). In both cases, the “validity” of scientific knowledge is practically synonymous with “certainty.” In contrast to these two positions, Weber sees objectively valid knowledge as being expressed in the form of an “objectively possible hypothesis.” This hypothesis is expressed in the form of an imputation that is arrived at by means of causal interpretation (as it is actually a causal interpretation itself ). For Weber, the “validity” of a scientific knowledge claim does not depend upon its “certainty” but rather on its “possibility.” A look at the process that leads up to the imputing of an imputation reveals that it consists of both objective elements and subjective elements. Two elements make up the objective side of the imputation: (a) already known and accepted nomological regularities (i.e., “laws”) and (b) “ideal-types” constructed by the investigator. Two elements make up the subjective side of the imputation: (a) the cultural values of the investigator that initiates and provides orientation to his/her investigation and (b) the investigator’s own interpretive imagination that he/she continuously employs in the selection and synthesis of data during the course of the investigation. All of the elements are simultaneously present in the investigation. Their interplay is characterized by tension-filled but mutually enriching relations (that are constantly shifting). The following discussion describes the relations of the four elements in greater detail. The fact that subjective and objective factors come into play at the beginning and during the course of the scientific investigation was partially addressed in chapter 3. The object that is chosen to be studied is chosen because it has been deemed significant due to its relationship with “the cultural values with which we [as investigators] approach reality” (OSS, 78). But the investigation of social reality itself takes place with the aid of abstract general laws: [T]he construction of a system of abstract and therefore purely formal propositions analogous to those of the exact natural sciences, is the only means of analyzing and intellectually mastering the complexity of social life. (OSS, 87)

In other words, while subjective factors are dominant in the selection of the object of inquiry, objective elements are dominant in the manner in which the investigator carries out his/her investigation. Not only are subjective and objective elements

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 107 present at the beginning and during the course of the scientific investigation, but they are also present at the very end of the investigation when the investigator presents his/her conclusions. The conclusions are presented in the form of an imputation—the investigator’s own hypothesis regarding the cause of the phenomenon under study. In the investigator’s making of an imputation, or offering a causal interpretation for the phenomenon under study, Weber sees a dynamic interaction between objective and subjective elements: Wherever the causal explanation of a “cultural phenomenon”—an “historical individual” is under consideration, the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation of their concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the individuality of which is culturally significant [from the evaluative viewpoint of the investigator]. (OSS, 79)

While a valid imputation is not possible without the aid of general abstract (objective) “laws,” such “laws” are not in and of themselves sufficient to arrive at an imputation. Weber details the role of personal intuition of the investigator (i.e., the “subjective” element) in a causal imputation in these words: The extent to which the historian (in the widest sense of the word) can perform this imputation in a reasonably certain manner with his imagination sharpened by personal experience and trained in analytic methods and the extent to which he must have recourse to the aid of special disciplines which make it possible, varies with the individual case. Everywhere, however, . . . the more certain and the more comprehensive our general knowledge the greater is the certainty of imputation. (OSS, 79 ff.)

For Weber, the investigator’s own imagination, personal experience, and training in the area of specialty are as much a part of the imputation as “the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences” (ie., “laws”). The causal imputation offered by the investigator utilizes abstract laws and personal intuitions, but the imputation itself cannot be categorized as either a “law” or an “intuition.” In other words, while both subjective and objective elements are in an imputation, these elements differ from “intuition” as understood by the Verstehen method and “law” as understood by the historicist method. The subjective element in an imputation is to be distinguished from a subjective intuition by the fact that it is determined by factors beyond those immediately present at the time when the imputation is made at the end of the investigation. Weber notes that during the course of scientific analysis, an exhaustive causal investigation of any phenomenon in its full reality is not only practically impossible—it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual case, the “essential” features of an event. (OSS, 78)

At the end of the investigation, the investigator imputes only those causes to the event that account for the “essential” features of the event. The question naturally arises: How does one distinguish between the “essential” and “non-essential” features

108 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of an event? Weber posits that this issue, which is so crucial at the end of an investigation when a causal imputation has to be offered, is determined by the conditions present at the very beginning of the investigation: When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary presupposition that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that he should have the necessary “point of view” for this distinction, we mean that they must understand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or unconsciously to universal “cultural values” and to select out of those relationships which are significant for us. (OSS, 82)

The “point of view” from which the investigator begins his/her investigation determines the parameters within which the causal imputation is made at the end of the investigation. In contrast to the historicist method, the investigation does not provide a universally and eternally exhaustive causal explanation of the phenomenon under consideration. The causal interpretation that is offered is valid only under particular historical conditions and circumstances and in light of particular cultural values. In contrast to the Verstehen claim that intuitive empathy provides an objectively valid understanding of the phenomenon, the subjective element in Weber’s causal imputation limits the explanation of the phenomenon to only that segment of empirical reality that has been deemed meaningful or “essential” from the perspective of a particular “point of view.” The cultural values and historical conditions shaping/initiating the investigation have to be clearly stated and acknowledged by the investigator. These factors will determine the character and definition of the conceptual apparatus that he/she designs/adopts in order to carry out the investigation. This conceptual apparatus for its part will not be “subjective” in the same sense that the “point of view” is/was subjective—the apparatus will have an “objective” character to it that is missing from the “point of view.” It is this apparatus that will impart an “objective” character to the investigation (or knowledge claim): There is no absolutely “objective” scientific analysis of culture [or] of “social phenomena” independent of special and “one-sided” viewpoints according to which—expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes. (OSS, 72)

The study of all cultural and social phenomena takes place from the perspective of a particular point of view but the study itself takes place with the aid of objective conceptual apparatus. This apparatus manifests itself in the form of “ ‘one sided’ viewpoints,” according to which particular segments of cultural and social phenomena are “selected, analyzed, and organized for expository purposes.” In sum, the subjective dimension of a causal imputation expresses itself in an objective form (i.e., expressly stated “ ‘one-sided’ viewpoints”) that can be subject to critique, analysis, and correction. Just as the subjective element in Weber’s causal imputation is very different from the subjective character of the causality of the subjectivists, Weber distinguishes the objective element in an imputation from the “law” of the objectivists. Weber notes

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 109 that “laws” cannot be of any value in terms of offering a causal explanation of an empirical phenomenon: Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of “laws,” we are helpless in the face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an individual fact possible—since the description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention. (OSS, 78)

He notes that in offering a causal imputation, the investigator is not concerned with “laws” in the narrower exact natural science sense, but with adequate causal relationships expressed in rules and with the application of the category of “objective possibility.” (OSS, 80)

In the place of the “laws” of the historicist method (which are valuable only as heuristic devices for Weber), causal interpretation (i.e., an imputation) of an individual, culturally significant fact is offered in terms of “adequate causal relationships expressed in rules and with the application of the category of ‘objective possibility’.” In offering a causal imputation in the form of rules that differ from laws, the investigator employs certain “objective” conceptual apparatuses and rational constructions. Weber describes the conceptual apparatuses and rational constructions and their relationship to an imputation in these words: For purposes of the causal imputation of empirical events, we need the rational, empirical-technical and logical constructions, which help us to answer the question as to what a behavior pattern or thought pattern (i.e. philosophical system) would be like if it possessed completely rational, empirical, and logical “correctness” and “consistency.” (MEN, 42)

Weber calls the “rational, empirical-technical and logical constructions” employed to offer a causal imputation “ideal types” (MEN, 42). He defines the “ideal type” as “a mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic characterization of individual concrete patterns which are significant in their uniqueness” (OSS, 100). Given the fact that the “ideal type” is virtually synonymous with Weber’s methodology, it would not be out of place to offer the following (self-reflective) observation. In terms of reference to secondary literature, this part of the discussion is by far the most poor. The reason for this is simple—there is no substantive discussion of “imputation” in the secondary literature and this fact evidences the fundamental misunderstanding of the place of the ideal type in Weber’s methodology. The pages and decades of tortured debate on this topic are not unrelated to the fact that Weber scholarship has not recognized the fact that the ideal type is a means to an end, not an end in itself. In other words, the total disregard for the place of imputation in Weber’s methodology is directly related to the misunderstanding of the character and role of the ideal type. This points to huge lacunae in Weber scholarship on two accounts: (a) for Weber, causal interpretation in the cultural sciences can only be

110 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY expressed in the form of an “imputation” and (b) the ideal-type is a conceptual tool (a means) that aids the making of an imputation (an end). Consequently, the value and character of the ideal-type cannot be appreciated and understood without reference to the “ends” for which it is to be employed, that is, the making of an imputation. In Weber scholarship, the ideal-type appears as a freestanding, independent entity that has been accorded a methodological autonomy (or value) all its own. The following discussion provides clear evidence from Weber’s own writing that the ideal-type is a means to be used for the ultimate end in the cultural sciences, the making of an imputation. The fact that Weber scholarship has practically divorced the “means” (i.e., the ideal-type) in Weber’s methodology from the “ends” (imputation) is symptomatic of a larger lacuna in Weber scholarship (to be detailed in the next chapter), which in turn is a reflection of the modern cultural condition (meaninglessness and disenchantment). Since there can be no genuinely scientific analysis of “ends” divorced from “means” or understanding of “means” without taking “ends” into account, the discussion and understanding of ideal-types divorced from imputation is bound to be flawed.3 Now back to the discussion of the character and role of the ideal-type in Weber’s methodology. For Weber, the ideal-type is one of the “objective” elements in scientific inquiry but its “objective” character is fundamentally different from the “objective laws” as this latter term is defined by the historicist method. The ideal-type construction is “objective” in a very specific sense because an irreducible subjective element is inherent in it. Weber notes that if an investigator attempts to study “Christianity” in the Middle Ages, the investigation cannot even begin without an adequate definition of “Christianity” (or the “Middle Ages” for that matter). Weber notes that “Christianity” is a combination of articles of faith, norms from church law and custom, maxims of conduct, and countless concrete interrelationships which we have fused into an “idea.” It is a synthesis which we could not succeed in attaining with consistency without the application of ideal-type concepts. (OSS, 96)

Out of the “countless concrete relationships” that can be labeled “Christianity” (or the “Middle Ages”), the investigator has to explicitly identify the particular constellation of relationships that mean “Christianity” from his/her perspective. He/she can choose an already existing constellation that has been described as “Christianity” or offer an entirely new one. Whatever the case may be, the precise identity of the “Christianity” that the investigator seeks to study can only be expressed in the form of an ideal-type. It will obviously not be a copy of “Christianity” as an empirical phenomenon or a direct copy of such phenomena—the definition will be an abstract concept derived from empirical reality, which will be used to conceptually master that reality. Weber notes that the investigator has a great deal of freedom when constructing the ideal-type: For the purposes of characterizing a specific type of attitude, the investigator may construct either an ideal-type which is identical with his own personal ethical norms, and in this sense objectively “correct,” or one which ethically is thoroughly in conflict with his own normative attitudes; and he may then compare the behavior of the people being investigated with it. Or else he may construct an ideal-typical attitude of which he has neither positive nor negative evaluations. (MEN, 43)

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 111 This description of the manner in which the ideal-type is constructed reveals the “subjective” element in it. The “objective” character of the ideal-type is described by Weber in these words: Whatever the content of the ideal-type, be it an ethical, a legal, an aesthetic, or a religious norm, or a technical, an economic, or a cultural maxim or any other type of valuation in the most rational form possible, it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain them causally. (MEN, 43)

In other words, while the content of the ideal-type is largely determined by subjective judgments on the part of the investigator, the manner in which the ideal-type is employed in the investigation has to meet certain objective criteria. Weber notes: In the method of investigation, the guiding “point of view” is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. (OSS, 84)

Weber describes the value and limitations of viewing empirical reality through the prism of ideal-types in these words: All expositions of the “essence” of Christianity are ideal types enjoying only a necessarily very relative and problematic validity when they are intended to be regarded as the historical portrayal of empirically existing facts. On the other hand, such presentations are of great value when they are used as conceptual instruments for comparison with and the measurement of reality. They are indispensable for this purpose. (OSS, 97)

Weber notes that there is an inherent danger in confusing (or conflating) the ideal-type with empirical reality. This usually happens under the influence of a naturalistic conception of science or empirical reality where empirical reality is viewed as the effect of supra-empirical causes (i.e., “laws”). Weber notes that complications emerge during the course of scientific inquiry that reintroduce “the naturalistic prejudice that the goal of the social sciences must be the reduction of reality to ‘laws’ ” (OSS, 101). For Weber, “laws” are nothing more than ideal-types that conceptually express “developmental sequences” that have been abstracted from empirical reality. He notes: Developmental sequences too can be constructed into ideal types and these constructs can have quite considerable heuristic value. But this quite particularly gives rise to the danger that the ideal type and reality will be confused with one another. (OSS, 101)

Weber carefully distinguishes between the two different senses of “ideal”—because this very confusion is the root cause of conflating the “ideal” (i.e., ideal-type) with the “real” (i.e., empirical reality). In the term, “ideal-type,” the word “ideal” does not refer to “a ‘model’ or what ‘ought’ to exist” (OSS, 92). He uses the word “ideal” in a

112 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY strictly logical sense in which constructing an ideal-type is a matter of constructing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as “objectively possible” and which appear as adequate from the nomological standpoint. (OSS, 92)

This description of the ideal-type identifies both the subjective and objective elements in the construct. Weber sees an intimate relationship between the ideal-type, the empirical reality that it is derived from (and helps to interpret), and the causal imputation that is offered with its aid. He notes: An ideal-type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild ). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gendankenbild ) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. (OSS, 90)

The ideal-type is a purely abstract concept that cannot be found anywhere in empirical reality, but it plays two critical roles in facilitating the scientific analysis of empirical reality. It is indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal-typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no “hypothesis” but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. (OSS, 90)

In sum, the ideal-type: (a) is not “real” but facilitates the conceptually coherent analysis of empirical reality in its capacity as a heuristic device and (b) guides the formation and articulation of the imputational hypothesis. In its dual role, the ideal-type provides the objective criteria against which the subjective element (personal experience and imagination of the investigator) in the research program will be judged. Describing the objective delimiting role of the ideal-type, Weber notes: It is a conceptual construct (Gedankenbild ) which is neither historical reality nor even the “true” reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. Such concepts are constructs in terms of which we formulate relationships by the application of the category of objective possibility. By means of this category, the adequacy of our imagination, oriented and disciplined by reality, is judged. (OSS, 93)

While the ideal-type plays a delimiting role in judging the adequacy of the investigator’s imagination and personal experience, the ideal-type cannot be accorded objective (normative) status because it itself is limited by empirical factors. This is due to the fact that the passage of time inevitably brings with it the shifting of evaluative

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 113 positions and this shift in evaluative positions changes the investigator’s relationship with empirical reality. The change in relationship renders certain conceptual apparatuses and methodological approaches obsolete and requires the construction of new concepts and employment of new methods. Weber notes: It should be understood that since really definitive historical concepts are not in general to be thought of as an ultimate end in view of the inevitable shift of the guiding valueideas, the construction of sharp and unambiguous concepts relevant to the concrete individual viewpoint which directs our interest in any given time, affords the possibility of clearly realizing the limits of their validity. (OSS, 107)

Consequently, the ideal-type both limits human imagination and empirical reality, and is limited by human imagination and empirical reality. In sum, empirical reality has the capacity to (and invariably eventually does) modify the conceptual and methodological apparatus of scientific inquiry. It is only because this is the case (and only in such cases) that science is able to discover “new” dimensions, aspects, and meanings in/of empirical reality. Unlike the historicist and Verstehen methods, for Weber, “objectively valid” scientific knowledge is not to be equated with “objectively certain” knowledge. From the historicist perspective, all scientifically valid knowledge comes in the form a logically certain proposition—that is, “x (particular phenomenon) is the effect of y (universal law)” or “y (universal law) will invariably cause x (particular phenomenon).” From the Verstehen perspective, all scientific valid knowledge comes in the form of an absolutely certain interpretive act—that is, “x (empirical fact) means y (cultural value)” or “y (cultural value) invariably produces x (empirical fact).” In stark contrast, Weber’s causal interpretation expressed in the form of an imputation offers “objectively possible” knowledge, not “objectively certain” knowledge. In Weber’s methodology, the “validity” of scientific knowledge is not to be equated with “certainty” but with “possibility.” In contradistinction to the causal explanation of the historicist method and the interpretive understanding of the Verstehen method, Weber’s imputation via causal interpretation can be expressed in the following manner: “In light of known ‘laws’ (x), if the observed phenomena has the following properties (y) then it probably means (z).” Or “In light of known ‘laws’ (x), if the observed phenomena has the properties (y) then (z) will be the probable result.” Weber notes that an imputation as “the judgment of objective possibility . . . is capable of a whole range of degrees of certainty” (LCS, 181). The confidence with which an imputation will be offered (and accepted) will inevitably be determined by the established (known) track record of the objective elements (the performance of known “laws” and the ideal-types in previous inquiry) used in the construction of the imputation and the subjective strengths (interpretive imagination, etc.) of the individual offering the imputation. Weber describes the elements and dynamics that go into constructing imputations or “judgments of possibility” in these words: [T]here can be no doubt that it is a matter of isolation and generalization. This means that we do decompose the “given” into “components” [so] that every one of them is fitted into an “empirical rule”; hence, that it can be determined what effect each of

114 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY them, with others present as “conditions,” “could be expected” to have, in accordance with an empirical rule. A judgment of “possibility” in the sense in which the expression is used here, means, then, the continuous reference to “empirical rules” (Erfahrungsreglen). The category “possibility” is thus not used in its negative form . . . Rather, to the contrary, it signifies here the reference to a positive knowledge of the “laws of events,” to our “nomological” knowledge . . . . (LCS, 173 ff.)

While it is offered as “possibility” when it is constructed, the validity of the imputation is to be judged by empirical reality. If further observations of empirical phenomena actually conform to the “possibility” that was imputed in the imputation, then the tools, methods, and value ideas informing the imputation are affirmed. If the converse is the case, then these very things have to be reevaluated. In short, the imputation is an objectively possible hypothesis that is amenable to further empirical (or inductive) tests. If the tests affirm the hypothesis, then it can be used to affirm (or construct) deductive “laws” for the further study of empirical reality.4 Weber’s exposition of the interplay of empirical reality and the conceptual apparatus of science (including the “subjective” input of the investigator) in the production of scientific knowledge reveals a reflexive relationship between the subject carrying out the inquiry (i.e., science) and the object of the inquiry (i.e., empirical reality). Weber notes that the history of the development of the cultural sciences shows itself to be a process of constant construction and reconstruction of the conceptual apparatus employed by science to apprehend and comprehend empirical reality: This process shows that in the cultural sciences concept-construction depends on the setting of the problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture itself. The relationship between concept and reality in the cultural sciences involves the transitoriness of all such syntheses. The great attempts at theory-construction in our science were always useful for revealing the limit of the significance of those points of view which provided their foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of the social sciences are substantively tied up with the shift in practical cultural problems and take the guise of a critique of concept-construction. Adherence to the purpose of this critique and therewith the investigation of the principles of syntheses in the social sciences shall be among the primary tasks of our journal. (OSS, 105 ff.)

Insofar as empirical reality has the capacity to challenge and undermine the concepts constructed to understand it, and abstract concepts have the ability to provide knowledge about empirical reality that cannot be had from anywhere else, it is “among the primary tasks” of Weber’s journal (and scholarship) to critique any ontological distinction that is made between subject and object. In contrast to the naturalistic understanding of causality where the conceptual apparatus and interpretive dynamics leading up to the claims of causality remain hidden and the subject/object dichotomy remains intact, causal imputation clearly displays the logical operations that lead up to its claims of causal interpretation. Because of the conflated understanding of causality on the part of the historicist and Verstehen methods, both approaches cannot adequately account for a very important (and maybe all important) type of knowledge—problematic knowledge. Weber describes problematic knowledge, and the manner that it is dealt with

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 115 by naturalistic science in these words: Those elements in each individual event which are left unaccounted for by the selection of their elements subsumable under the “law” [or “intuition”] are considered scientifically unintegrated residues which will be taken care of in the further perfection of the system of “laws” [or the further perfection of “intuitions”]. Alternatively they will be viewed as “accidental” and therefore scientifically unimportant because they do not fit into the structure of “law” [or “intuition”] . . . . (OSS, 73)

By taking the position that problematic knowledge will be dealt with in the future by the perfection of existing knowledge, or that problematic knowledge is scientifically unimportant, naturalism directly obstructs the “discovery of the problematic character of that standpoint” from which the knowledge claim has been made (OSS, 85). This makes naturalism immune to external, empirical criticism and directly blocks the further development of the scientific enterprise. The possibility that it is not the “problematic knowledge” that is problematic but rather the conceptual apparatus or the value position being used to analyze the knowledge is a logical impossibility from the perspective of the historicist method and the Verstehen method, respectively. In stark contrast, the imputational standpoint sees problematic knowledge as having the ability and the right to make a demand on science to critically evaluate its own conceptual tools, research methods, and/or value orientations. Given the fact that scientific knowledge is by definition that which is liable to outside (objective) critique the conflated understanding of causality cannot be the basis of scientific knowledge because the logical structure of knowledge is manifested only when it is problematic and its empirical validity must be demonstrated in a concrete case. It is only a demonstration which unconditionally requires the (relative) precision of concepts. (RK, 170)

Both the causal explanation offered by historicist science via universal laws and the interpretive understanding offered by the Verstehen method via intuitive empathy see a linear, unidirectional relationship between objectively valid scientific knowledge (i.e., the subject) and empirical reality (i.e., the object). Objectively valid scientific knowledge (in the form of universal laws or intuitive empathy) has the authority to pass judgment on concrete experience and to shape the human understanding of concrete experience. But in the naturalistic understanding of science, concrete experience in/of empirical reality does not have the capacity to modify the scientific framework through which that experience is being viewed and understood. Weber’s view of causal imputation rejects this linear, unidirectional relationship between scientific inquiry (i.e., the subject) and concrete experience (i.e., the object). For Weber, concrete experience has the ability to correct and modify the tools, methods, and value-ideas of scientific inquiry, just as much as, if not more than, scientific inquiry has the capacity to correct and modify human understanding of concrete experience. In Weber’s exposition of the methodology of scientific inquiry, the distinction between the inquiring subject (i.e., science) and the investigated object (i.e., empirical reality) is not absolute. This is obvious in light of Weber’s understanding

116 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of the place of problematic knowledge in scientific inquiry. For Weber, problematic knowledge may (in some cases) indeed be scientifically unimportant, but more importantly (in other cases) it may be evidence of the fact that the “scientific” tools, method, and value-ideas that are being used to study empirical reality are in need of revision. Weber posits that it is novel, unexpected, and inexplicable experiences in empirical reality that guarantee the progress and growth of the cultural sciences: The intellectual apparatus which the past has developed through the analysis, or more truthfully, the analytical rearrangement of the immediately given reality, and through which the latter’s integration by concepts which correspond to the state of its knowledge and the focus of its interest, is in constant tension with the new knowledge which we can and desire to wrest from reality. The progress of cultural science occurs through this conflict. Its result is the perpetual reconstruction of those concepts through which we seek to comprehend reality. (OSS, 105)

It is only by bridging the subject/object dichotomy that Weber can posit a reflexive relationship between the “intellectual apparatus” of scientific inquiry, the empirical reality that is studied and the culturally informed point of view from which this reality is studied. Weber describes the reflexive and dynamic relationship between these components of scientific inquiry with reference to the value of the ideal-type: It serves as a harbor until one has learned to navigate safely in the vast sea of empirical facts. The coming of age of science in fact always implies the transcendence of the idealtype, insofar as it was thought of as possessing empirical validity or as a class concept (Gattungsbegriff ) . . . there are sciences to which eternal youth is granted, and the historical disciplines are among them—all those to which the eternally onward flowing stream of culture perpetually brings new problems. At the very heart of their task lies not only the transciency of all ideal types but also at the same time the inevitability of new ones. (OSS, 104)

The “eternally onward flowing stream of culture” constantly poses a challenge to the established “scientific” understanding and appreciation of culture by bringing to light new problems and contentions that have to be addressed. As new conditions pose new challenges, they naturally demand the reevaluation of existing “objective” knowledge claims and “scientific” modes of inquiry. Weber notes that all scientific concepts and hypotheses are human constructions by the human mind. There is no reason whatsoever to raise such historically and culturally determined constructions (or experiences) to the status of objectively valid, eternally universal truths. If anything, empirical reality and the human encounter with empirical reality (i.e., the objects of scientific inquiry) require not only a constant revaluation of these synthetic constructs, but also the reshaping of the foundations on which they are constructed (i.e., the subjective standpoint from which all scientific inquiry begins). In other words, scientific inquiry does not merely study “objects out there” in the empirical world. All such study of “objects out there” is merely a means to an end—the critical valuation of the “subject” (i.e., science and the tools and methods it uses) that is doing the studying. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Weber’s methodology bridges the subject/object dichotomy on three different but related accounts. First, Weber

BRIDGING THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY / 117 demonstrates that all scientific inquiry is composed of subjective elements (cultural values initiating and shaping the inquiry, the interpretive imagination of the investigator) and objective elements (known nomological regularities or “laws” and idealtypes).5 Second, Weber notes that all scientific truth or “objectively valid knowledge” is expressed in the form of an imputation that is “objective” in a very specific sense (it can be subject to critical scientific analysis) and also “subjective” in a very specific sense (it is a hypothesis—maybe even a work of art—constructed in the investigator’s personal imagination).6 Third, scientific inquiry is an exercise in not merely understanding, interpreting, explaining “objective” phenomena “out there.” In the end, the result of all such study is to produce better understanding and clarification of the “subject” that is studying the “object” so that the “subject” (i.e., science) can modify, refine, and revise its own tools, methods, and value-ideas.7 As was the case in the bridging of the fact/value dichotomy, the subject/object dichotomy is not bridged by conflating the identity of the two elements, but by positing (or imputing) a dynamic, reflexive relationship, between them. In imputing such a relationship, Weber simultaneously affirms the distinction and identity of the subject and the object. The imputation of a relationship between the subject and the object complements the imputation of a relationship between fact and value—and both of these imputed relationships can, in turn, be used to impute the presence of a bridge over the hairline that separates faith from science (identified in chapter 2). A reading of Weber that sees him positing only a hairline separation between faith and science and imputing a relationship between fact/value and subject/object evidences the fact that Weber has significantly departed from Enlightenment thought. In seeing Weber’s work as a departure from Enlightenment thought, novel possibilities emerge regarding the significance of Weber’s work in the postmodern setting. The next chapter explores these possibilities.

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C HAPTER 5 D ISENCHANTING D ISENCHANTMENT: B RIDGING THE S CIENCE /R ELIGION D ICHOTOMY

Having looked at the “what?” and the “how?” of scientific inquiry, the discussion now turns to the “why?”; more specifically to “why does a scientist undertake a scientific investigation of culture?” An exploration of the “why?” of scientific inquiry, as Weber understood the answer to this question, reveals that his scientifically valid answer to this question has an irreducible religious element in it. At the very end of his life, Weber wrote an “introduction” that was to be put at the beginning of his collected essays on the sociology of religion. In this “introduction,” he explicitly states the value-idea that informed the trajectory of his scientific inquiry: Any child of modern European culture will, unavoidably and justifiably, address universal–historical themes with a particular question in mind: What combination of circumstances called forth the broad range of ideas and cultural forces that on the one hand arose in the West, and only in the West, and on the other hand stood—at least as we like to imagine—in a line of historical development endowed in all civilizations with significance and validity? (PESC, 149)

For Weber, two things are a given: (a) modern culture is characterized by a uniquely “developed” manifestation of a “broad range of ideas and cultural forces” and (b) an “underdeveloped” manifestation of these very same ideas and cultural forces is to be found in every human culture known to historians. The two givens taken together mean that the completely disenchanted character of modern culture represents the actualization of a potential that is present in all known cultures—where all known cultures had experienced only partial disenchantment. In his broad range of studies related to “universal–historical themes,” Weber had one “particular question in mind.” Weber’s lifetime inquiry sought to identify those factors in modern Western history that “caused” the universally latent potential of complete disenchantment of culture to actualize itself in a particular (i.e., Weber’s own) historical–cultural situation. The question emerges as to why Weber would spend his entire mature academic career investigating this particular subject, not some other. For Weber, an investigator takes up the investigation of a particular subject because he/she seeks to better understand the factors that are challenging or undermining a particular value-commitment that he/she has (see section 2.1). Weber the scientist undertakes a scientific investigation

120 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY of the “causes” of disenchantment because Weber the human being is troubled by the fact that disenchantment is challenging and undermining certain valuecommitments that he considers worth having and affirming. Kalberg identifies the value-commitments that Weber felt were threatened by the unique modern manifestation of the universal–historical process of intellectualization and rationalization: Weber viewed the political, economic and religious context out of which compassion, ethical action, and a reflective individualism had arisen in the West as having largely disappeared, hence endangering their viability, answers to these queries became especially urgent. Would ethical values continue to orient human action? (PESC, lxiv)

For Kalberg, the immediacy of Weber’s concern with the effects of disenchantment on the individual psyche and the place of ethical values in modern society “served to call forth the Herculean motivations required” to undertake his study of the sociology of religion (PESC, lxiv). In short, Weber was, as any intelligent and self-reflective “child” of modern culture would be, deeply concerned with the problematic that disenchantment was engendering. More so than almost any other “child” of modern culture, Weber sought to gain an “objective” and “scientific” understanding of disenchantment by studying empirical reality—with the hope that this understanding would prove to be meaningful in the attempt to remedy the problematic. The foregoing suggests that Weber’s scholarship contains valuable resources if one is committed to the value-idea that disenchantment needs to be disenchanted. This would be naturally the case, given the fact that Weber had consciously recognized the problematic nature of disenchantment long before it became academically fashionable to do so. With this as the background, the discussion now turns to the value of Weber’s work in the postmodern period.1 The discussion in the previous three chapters offered a reading of Weber’s work that shows Weber to be simultaneously critiquing and correcting the disenchanting dichotomies of faith vs. science, fact vs. value, and subject vs. object. Viewing Weber’s methodology as breaking with Enlightenment dichotomies and establishing bridges opens up possibilities of investing Weber’s work with a value that cannot be invested in it if Weber is viewed as “a child of the Enlightenment born too late” (Wittenberg, 1989, 119). This can be illustrated by looking at two recent valuations of Weber’s work. Hekman (1994) and Gane (2001) note that the current resurgence of interest in Weber is in large part due to the fact that aspects of his thought can be appropriated in articulating a critique of the modern episteme (Hekman) and modern culture (Gane). But both of them go on to note that the value of Weber’s work is limited to articulating a critique of the modern disenchanted condition. For both of them, the value of Weber’s work does not extend to making a meaningful contribution to articulating a viable alternative to contemporary disenchantment, because in the final analysis, they see Weber remaining committed to Enlightenment thought. In other words, they value Weber’s work only insofar as it provides a useful description of the process of disenchantment, but they see no value in Weber’s work in their task of articulating an alternative to disenchantment. A closer look at their work reveals that limiting the value of Weber’s work for only a critique of the modern condition is not unrelated to Hekman’s and Gane’s valuation of Weber as being essentially an Enlightenment thinker.

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 121 Hekman notes that Weber “perceived that the positivist definition of science excludes the social sciences” and he “brilliantly restructured the positivist program and revealed the errors with regard to the social sciences” (Hekman, 1994, 268). In restructuring the positivist program, Weber created a space for the social sciences within the modern episteme. Hekman sees significant value in Weber’ work insofar as it critiques the positivist paradigm but she has strong reservations regarding the value of Weber’s work in terms of offering a viable postmodern alternative to the modern episteme. She posits that Weber’s critique of the positivist paradigm is done entirely within the categories of Enlightenment thought, and, as a result, Weber remains fundamentally committed to the positivist paradigm. The evidence she offers for this valuation is that Weber remains committed to the fundamental Enlightenment dichotomies: Following the positivists Weber adheres to two key dichotomies of the modern episteme: subject/object and fact/value. His adherence to these two dichotomies structures his philosophy of social science as well as his ethics. (Hekman, 1994, 268)

She goes on to note “[b]ecause of Weber’s adherence to the central dichotomies of Enlightenment thought he has no option but to accept the ‘iron cage’ of which he writes” (Hekman, 1994, 269). For Hekman, the value of Weber’s work lies in the fact that “Weber can be seen as representing the last gasp of the modern episteme and, hence, pointing the way out of it” (Hekman, 1994, 268). Gane’s valuation of Weber’s work is similar to that of Hekman. He argues that while Weber’s work can be valued from a variety of different perspectives, his work has the most to offer in terms of his theory and critique of modernity (i.e., Weber’s disenchantment thesis). Speaking of Weber’s theory of modernity, Gane notes: This theory remains of great contemporary significance for it views the development and trajectory of Western rationalism with a degree of pessimism, and connects the process of rationalization (the “secularization, intellectualization, and the systematization of the everyday world”) to the loss of authentic meaning in modern life. (Gane, 2002, 2)

The fact that Weber’s work contains a theory and critique of modernity evidences that there exists an implicit dialogue between postmodern theory and Weber, one concerning the trajectory of Western culture, and, more specifically, the cultural crisis that has resulted from the rationalization and disenchantment of the world. (Gane, 2001, 4)

For Gane, the dialogue between postmodern theory and Weber ends when the critique of modernity concludes and the articulation of postmodern alternatives begins. Like Hekman, Gane sees inherent limitations in Weber’s work that preclude the possibility of Weber making any meaningful contribution to the articulation of a postmodern alternative to the modern condition. For Gane, limitations inherent in Weber’s work are due to the fact that he continues to work with and remain

122 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY committed to the modern order: Weber’s work is distinctly modern in orientation, seeking not only to establish objective historical facts that may be used to inform responsible value-judgments, but to place limits on the development and uses of instrumental reason. Weber remains critical of the nature and trajectory of modernity, while at the same time working within and against the limits of this order. (Gane, 2002, 154)

While Weber’s response to the disenchantment and intellectualization of the world is articulated from “within and against the limits” of modern culture, the postmodern response to the rationalization and disenchantment of the world seeks, by contrast, not to work within the limits of modern reason but to transgress precisely these limits through exposition of form of difference and otherness. (Gane, 2002, 154)

Like Hekman, Gane notes that there is value in Weber’s work insofar as it can be appropriated to critique the modern condition. But neither Hekman nor Gane see anything of significant value in Weber’s work when it comes to articulating a viable postmodern alternative, because for both of them, Weber thought remains trapped inside the modern/Enlightenment paradigm. The evidence presented in chapter 2 illustrates the fact that Weber’s work challenges the Enlightenment understanding of the (non)relation between faith and science. The evidence presented in chapters 3 and 4 establishes the fact that Weber’s methodology of the social sciences bridges the fact/value and subject/object dichotomies. In light of the evidence presented in the previous three chapters, it can be asserted with confidence that Weber’s work is not trapped inside the dichotomies of the Enlightenment, as Hekman and Gane (among many others) have asserted. In the context of the present discussion, this value presents itself in the form of valuing Weber’s work not just as a critique of the modern condition, but also as a resource that can positively contribute to formulating a viable postmodern alternative to the modern disenchanted condition. The present discussion begins by reviewing the analysis of Weber’s methodology of the social sciences offered by Alexander (1983), Ringer (1997), and Ciaffa (1998). In contrast to Gane and Hekman, all three of these thinkers see Weber’s methodology breaking out of the dichotomous logic of Enlightenment thought and formulating a relational logic. After detailing this point with reference to the works of Alexander, Ringer, and Ciaffa, the discussion returns to its origin—the concluding pages of “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” The intent of this return to the beginning in the concluding chapter is to glean some insights into Weber’s own view regarding the fate of his work in a disenchanted age, from the perspective of his own work. Weber recognized the fact that his work would inevitably fall victim to the process of disenchantment (i.e., loss of meaning and significance) as it is subject to and used for rationalized, intellectualized inquiry. But in the end he held out the hope that his work, while being an expression and investigation of scientific rationality, would come to be valued in a uniquely modern, scientific way. Namely, that his scientific work would contribute to the investing of meaning and significance into

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 123 human life and the human intellect in the not too distant future by paving the way for the disenchanting of disenchantment. 5.1 The Relational Character of Weber’s Methodology: Some Recent Valuations The discussion in the previous two chapters presented the evidence to support the claim that Weber’s methodology establishes a bridge over the hairline that separates faith from science by bridging the fact/value and subject/object dichotomies. The significance of this achievement can be better appreciated by putting his insights about the methodology of scientific inquiry into comparative and historical perspective. This perspective in its turn has to be viewed in relation to the value-orientation that informed Weber’s scientific inquiry in the first place. Whereas a number of Weber scholars have described how Weber’s methodology bridges one or the other of the aforementioned dichotomies, the fact that he has bridged more than one of the dichotomies is often overlooked. This seriously detracts from appreciating the significance of Weber’s achievement because there is an intimate relationship between the bridging of the three dichotomies as one is rooted in (or leads to) the bridging of the other two. Some scholars, who have studied Weber’s methodology of the social sciences, anticipate the direction that the discussion presently takes. Alexander (1983) focuses his attention on the fact that Weber’s methodology bridges the materialist vs. idealist dichotomy, Ringer (1997) on the bridging of the object vs. subject dichotomy, and Ciaffa (1998) on the bridging of the fact vs. value dichotomy. The discussion builds upon the insights of these three scholars by bringing their respective insights into relation with each other, thereby preparing the groundwork for returning back to viewing Weber’s work from the perspective of the value-orientation that shaped his scientific inquiry. Alexander summarizes Weber’s achievement in these words: In the mature sociology that began after the breakdown period, Weber achieved a theoretical synthesis never before achieved, indeed, never even attempted by the other founders of classical sociology [i.e., Marx and Durkheim]. He converted the idealist and materialist traditions into analytic strands of a more inclusive multidimensional order, so that instead of choosing between them he would devote his sociology to establishing the nature of their interrelations. (Alexander, 1982, III, 126)

Looking at the issue from the point of view of the logic and methodology of the social sciences, the scientific study culture was dominated by either one of two one-dimensional theories in Weber’s immediate intellectual milieu. These onedimensional theories expressed themselves in the form of the materialism of Marxian methodology and the idealism of Durkheimian methodology. For Alexander, Marx’s work is characterized by an overemphasis on the material factors in the formation of culture and society, while Durkheim’s work is characterized by an overemphasis on the ideal factors. Alexander notes that while both Marx and Durkheim make invaluable contributions to the advancement of the scientific study of culture, their respective works suffer from a serious shortcoming because of this one-dimensional character. He goes on to describe the fate of the pioneering insights of Marx

124 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY and Durkheim: The most important students of Marx, . . ., can be seen as moving toward “Durkheimian” propositions at every turn. Durkheim’s students . . . moved in exactly the opposite direction. They embraced, partially and inconsistently to be sure, the kind of materialist notions associated with Marx. (Alexander, 1982, II, 370)

The fact that neither Marxian materialism nor Durkheimian idealism provides a sufficiently adequate model for the study of society and culture is clearly evidenced by the “history of equivocation and revision in the idealist and materialist traditions of classical sociology” (Alexander, 1982, II, 370). For Alexander, the work of Weber has to be viewed from the perspective of this impasse at the level of the theoretical logic underpinning the dominant approaches in the study of the social/cultural sciences. Alexander goes on to note that in the place of the established, materialist, and idealist modes of inquiry, [w]e would do well . . . to seek a theoretical mode that starts from a multidimensional premise. Only such a more inclusive theory, it would seem, can produce a truly satisfactory explanation of the complexity of social life. The classical proponent of this effort of integration was Max Weber. (Alexander, 1982, II, 370)

Alexander argues that a close study of Weber’s early work, produced between 1889 and 1897, reveals that Weber has initiated in his early writings an extraordinarily significant break with the one-dimensional traditions of sociological thought, a rupture that may even, in Hegel’s language, be called “world historical.” (Alexander, 1982, III, 16)

While there were some proponents of the idealist position who were trying to incorporate elements of the materialist position into their work, and there were some proponents of the materialist position trying to incorporate elements of the idealist position, there was no one like Weber. Consequently the “theoretical synthesis” achieved by Weber in his mature writings was not so much a novel development in his thought, as it was the conscious articulation and systematization of an approach that he had already adopted in his earliest work. Even when Weber was writing on the history of law and economics prior to his nervous breakdown, his approach to the subject was characterized by a “dual attitude of incorporation and critique” (Alexander, 1982, III, 6) of the materialist and idealist strands in the study of society and culture. Alexander notes: It would not be entirely inappropriate to see the early Weber—in terms of theoretical logic, not actual history—as a “Durkheimian revisionist” awkwardly coupling powerful norms with efficacious interests . . . Yet an analogy with Marxist revisionism would be even more to the point . . . To escape his inheritance from the German Idealist tradition, Weber embraced instrumental kinds of theorizing, both in their Realpolitik and Marxian forms. (Alexander, 1982, III, 17)

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 125 Alexander offers this evaluation of Weber’s work by looking at the character of Weber’s early writings, not Weber’s explicit statements on the methodology of the social sciences. Prior to his nervous breakdown in 1897, Weber did not produce an explicit statement on the theory or methodology of the social sciences. But in the immediate aftermath of his recovery from the breakdown (beginning in 1902), Weber produced explicit statements outlining the salient characters of his methodology of the social sciences. The “first essays of [Weber’s] maturity” are concerned with issues of the logic and methodology of the social and cultural sciences (Alexander, 1982, III, 23). Weber undertakes a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the cultural and social sciences with full awareness of and in response to the fact that “[r]adical shifts” have taken place “in the points of view which constitute any item as an object of investigation” (RK, 15). Even though these developments (in the form of “radical shifts”) have taken place outside the domain of the cultural and social sciences (i.e., in the areas of philosophy and logic), they have a direct bearing on the manner in which scientific investigation of culture is to be carried out. This is due to the fact that these developments “require a revision of the logic of scientific research that has hitherto prevailed within the discipline” (RK, 15). It is under these conditions, and in this time period (i.e., 1902–1905) that Weber is better able to articulate his alternative to the idealist and materialist traditions from which he has broken . . . Weber achieves in his later works the first truly synthetic strand of sociological theory, a multidimensional analysis in which he is fundamentally reconstructing idealist and materialist theory rather than simply “drawing upon” them. (Alexander, 1982, III, 23)

Whereas Alexander looks at Weber’s achievement from the perspective of theoretical logic in the area of sociology and producing “the first truly synthetic strand of sociological inquiry,” Ringer offers a historical valuation of Weber’s achievement from the perspective of Weber’s own cultural and intellectual milieu. Even though Alexander and Ringer are evaluating Weber from two different perspectives, the conclusions they reach are very similar. While Alexander sees Weber “fundamentally reconstructing idealist and materialist theory rather than simply ‘drawing upon’ them,” Ringer notes: One way to appreciate Max Weber’s extraordinary achievement as a methodologist of the cultural and social sciences is to understand him historically, in relation to his own intellectual field. Seen in that way, Weber perfectly typifies the clarifying critic who restates, rationalizes, and thus partly transcends the assumptions of his own culture. (Ringer, 1997, 168)

As a clarifying critic, Weber’s originality and genius “must be conceived as the critical revision of an intellectual heritage, rather than the ‘creation’ of a ‘new idea’—or the linear continuation of an established tradition” (Ringer, 1997, 169). Weber’s intellectual and cultural milieu was largely defined by the critical idealism of the neoKantian school, and by the materialist interpretation of history of the historicist

126 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY method. Weber’s attitude toward both positions was one of critical appropriation and integration of selected aspects of both positions. Ringer notes that while Weber “took Marx very seriously” on a number of different levels, he flatly rejected the notion that all causal connections in history can “ultimately” be traced back to economic conditions, however defined, or that all historical processes are essentially unidirectional. (Ringer, 1997, 151)

Ringer goes on to argue that Weber’s “rejection” of historical materialism “should not be overinterpreted to mean that Weber championed the primacy of ‘spiritual’ forces, historical ‘idealism,’ or the creative role of ‘great men’ in history” (Ringer, 1997, 151)—that is, idealism in its various forms. Ringer supports this contention by noting the fact that Weber does not consider “ideas” or “spirit” as being the determinants of historical developments. He does this by quoting an oft cited passage from Weber’s work, and noting that this passage “should be read quite literally” (Ringer, 1997, 153): Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. (SPWR, 280)

If this passage is read literally, it is clear that Weber’s “rejection” of the materialist interpretation of history does not mean that he has embraced the idealist position. This passage simultaneously rejects the materialist and idealist positions, while embracing important elements from both and positing a reflexive relationship between the two. It is Weber’s ability to both critique and clarify the prevalent opposing tendencies in his intellectual and cultural milieu that allows him to articulate a position that integrates the materialist and idealist positions. Ringer describes the implications of Weber’s synthesis of the idealist and materialist positions in these words: One of Max Weber’s greatest achievements was his integration of two divergent perspectives that have divided theorists and practitioners of the historical, social, and cultural sciences since the nineteenth century. (Ringer, 1997, 1)

In more specific terms, the integration was of “two lines of analysis [which] may be called the ‘interpretive’ and the ‘explanatory’ approaches” (Ringer, 1997, 1). Weber’s insights made it possible to integrate intuitive interpretive understanding advocated by the proponents of the Verstehen method with causal explanation advocated by the proponents of the historicist method. While Weber’s achievement was a response to the conditions and crises that were characteristic of his own intellectual milieu, Ringer posits that the value of this achievement becomes even more significant in light of the fact that it contains valuable resources that can address many contemporary problematics: Weber may help us to navigate the maelstrom of multiple definitions, thoughtless or deliberate conflations, and irrelevant factual claims that have accumulated around the

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 127 false antitheses of “interpretation” and “explanation,” the “humanities” (or “cultural sciences”) and the “social sciences,” the “objective” and “subjective.” (Ringer, 1997, 174)

Weber’s work contains resources that can do more than just “help us navigate the maelstrom of multiple definitions” surrounding the interpretation/explanation, social/cultural and subject/object dichotomies. Ciaffa details the implications of Weber’s synthesis on the fact/value dichotomy. For Ciaffa, the fact that Weber is able to simultaneously critique and appropriate the idealism of his neo-Kantian teachers and the positivism of his historicist colleagues makes it possible for him to bridge the fact/value dichotomy. The neo-Kantians posited that the social and cultural sciences are “to be methodologically distinguished from the natural sciences by virtue of the fact [that they] are uniquely and essentially ‘value relevant’ ” (Ciaffa, 1998, 22). The positivists on the other hand argued that, in order for the social and cultural sciences to attain the status of “science,” they must remain dedicated to the study of facts and remain completely and unambiguously free of the influence of any nonscientific values. Ciaffa notes that the proponents of value-freedom posit that extrascientific values, even those that embody our most basic beliefs about what is just, moral, etc . . . need not and should not influence the procedures whereby scientific theories are formed and assessed. (Ciaffa, 1998, 20)

Ciaffa goes on to note that Weber’s position regarding the issues of value-relevance and value-freedom is shaped by and in response to an ostensible conflict between its two principal theses, with one thesis according cultural values an essential function in the logic of social scientific inquiry, and the other asserting that the social sciences must remain value-free as regards social issues. (Ciaffa, 1998, 23)

While almost all of his contemporaries were decisively coming down on the side of either value-freedom or value-relevance, Weber formulated a methodological position that integrated these opposing strands. Ciaffa notes, “Weber refuses to concede any conflict between his two most basic methodological theses, and repeatedly asserts that social science is both value-free and value-related ” (Ciaffa, 1998, 23). Ciaffa sees Weber advocating value-freedom at the practical level, and valuerelevance at the methodological level. At the practical level, the social and cultural sciences cannot and should not “validate moral and political claims” (Ciaffa, 1998, 14)—or any other value-judgments for that matter (see chapter 3). But at the level of methodology, Weber acknowledges, accepts, and conceptually delimits “the influence of shifting sociocultural values on the social sciences” (Ciaffa, 1998, 14). Weber’s position simultaneously bridges and dissolves the “[s]tandard appeals to the fact/value distinction” (Ciaffa, 1998, 21). What makes Weber’s achievement even more significant in this regard is the fact that his position “implies neither a collapse of scientific objectivity in the methodological spheres, nor a capitulation to irrationalism in the domain of practical reflection” (Ciaffa, 1998, 157). For Ciaffa, it is important to keep this in mind when engaging with Weber’s work so that one does not interpret Weber in a way that is a reflection of one’s own misreading, rather than

128 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY the position being advocated by Weber. Ciaffa notes that there is more than enough evidence in the body of Weber’s methodological work [that] is adequate to counteract the more orthodox readings of Weber as (1) an advocate of the positivist ideal of value-freedom, and (2) a blatant ethical noncognitivist [i.e. idealist]. (Ciaffa, 1998, 157)

After noting that he has “interpreted Weber’s work ‘selectively,’ in accordance with my own interests and interests of the present intellectual milieu” (Ciaffa, 1998, 158), he goes on to note that the manner in which Weber navigates the positivist/idealist divide holds great potential for shedding light on contemporary debates: I would hope that [Weber] might also appreciate my attempt to bring his work into dialogue with contemporary reflection on the metascientific issues that concerned him most, and that he might further concur . . . that his work has much more to offer contemporary discussions than has been recognized thus far. In my view, this is especially true with regard to two philosophical fronts that continue to take shape on either side of neonormativist critical theory—i.e., those that represent the lingering positivist challenge, on the one hand, and the historicist challenge of “postmodern” thought, on the other. (Ciaffa, 1998, 158)

In his own way, Ciaffa is affirming the valuation of Weber’s work offered by Ringer and Alexander before him. The common theme running through the reading of Weber by these three scholars is that they interpret his work as breaking from the established dichotomies of idealism/materialism (Alexander), subject/object (Ringer), and fact/value (Ciaffa). Both in theory (in his writings on the methodology of the social sciences) and in practice, Weber employed a relational methodology that viewed idealism/materialism, fact/value, and subject/object as two intimately (and ultimately) related poles at the end of a spectrum, not as mutually exclusive poles at the end of a dichotomy. In light of these relational valuations of Weber, two explanations can be offered for the fact that Weber’s work has been almost always interpreted as the expression of Enlightenment dichotomies. First, there is that fact that Weber expressed his ideas and the value-positions in the language of “dichotomous logic that informs, or deforms, much of the later work” (Alexander, 1983, III, 129). Not being a philosopher or logician himself, he had to employ the language and terms provided to him by the specialists in these disciplines. Consequently, he lacked the specialists’ technical language in which to express the relational logic on which his methodology of the social sciences is based. Second, and perhaps more important, the individuals interpreting Weber’s work have done so from a particular perspective and it is this perspective that deforms Weber’s work. A relational reading of Weber (in contrast to dichotomous reading) makes it possible to see Weber’s work as a valuable resource for not only critiquing certain aspects of the modern disenchanted condition, but also for articulating a postmodern2 alternative. Given Weber’s stance in the value-freedom/value-relevance debate in the Werturteilsstreit and the subject/object debate in the Methodenstreit, it is safe to say that any Weberian postmodern alternative will not be a negation of the modern but a critical appropriation of certain aspects of the modern. Given the fact that

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 129 Weber’s work contains rich possibilities for contributing to a postmodern alternative, the question emerges as to why this potential was not recognized earlier—and why it remains largely unappreciated even now. The concrete evidence for the postmodern value of Weber’s work can be demonstrated by looking at this issue from the perspective of Weber’s own writings. This perspective will reveal that it is difficult to produce another causal explanation for the fate that has befallen Weber’s work, of equal or better explanatory power than the description given by Weber himself. 5.2 Two Possibilities of Progress: Disenchantment and Self-Awareness The relational reading of Weber’s methodology presented in the previous three chapters began with the beginning of the concluding section of Weber’s essay titled, “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” He began his conclusion by noting that the whole purpose of the preceding discussion was to identify and delineate “the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith” (OSS, 112). Weber goes on to describe the fate of the cultural sciences in an era where faith and science come to be viewed as being separated by an unbridgeable abyss rather than a hairline. In offering this description in the final paragraph of “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” Weber is describing the fate of his own scholarly achievements as much as he is offering a description of the cultural sciences in general: All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular setting of problems and has established its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general. (OSS, 112)

Given Weber’s description of disenchantment as the fate of the times, it is not at all surprising that, “in an age of specialization,” the cultural sciences will eventually come to “consider the analysis of data as an end in itself ” and will “discontinue assessing the value of individual facts in terms of the relationship to ultimate value-ideas.” This “age of specialization” is a specific expression of the disenchantment of modern culture and both are characterized by the loss of “awareness of . . . ultimate rootedness in . . . value-ideas in general”—that is, the loss of meaning and significance. As detailed in chapter 1, the progress of scientific rationality makes it inevitable that facts become divorced from value-ideas and come to be rationally analyzed in their own immanent terms. The divorce of facts from values is only the most overarching manifestation of a process where the progress of scientific rationality makes the emergence, differentiation, and drive toward rationalized autonomy of different value spheres inevitable. The cultural sciences are a victim of disenchantment no less than other aspects of modern culture—and Weber’s particular contribution to these sciences is no less than any other scholar’s contribution. Disenchantment in this context means not only the divorce of fact from value, but the further divorce of particular facts from the general body of facts. After noting that cultural science will eventually “lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in value-ideas,” Weber goes on to note that “it is well that

130 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY it should be so” (OSS, 112). This sense of resignation on Weber’s part is not so much a value judgment as a description of the relationship between “progress” and the impulse toward fragmentation, differentiation, and rationalized autonomy. Even though up till this point “progress” has been identified with specialization, differentiation, and the demise of meaning and significance, a closer look at Weber’s work reveals that there is a very different possibility inherent in the process of “progress”—that is, increased self-awareness and capacity for communication. Before detailing this point further, it would be most helpful to look at what “progress” does not mean for Weber. In very strong terms, Weber asserts that it is obviously clear and scientifically demonstrable that “progress” does not mean knowing “more” or knowing “better” than the individuals and epochs that have not experienced “progress.” The following passage is worth quoting at length because it spells out Weber’s position on this issue clearly. Talking about the meaning of scientific progress and how it should be understood, Weber addresses his audience directly: Does it mean that we, today, for instance, everyone sitting in this hall, have greater knowledge of the conditions of life under which we exist than has an American Indian or a Hottentot? Hardly. Unless he is a physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has no idea how the car happened to get into motion. And he does not need to know . . . The savage knows incomparably more about his tool. When we spend money today I bet that even if there are colleagues in political economy here in the hall, almost every one of them will hold a different answer in readiness to the question: How does it happen that one can buy something for money—sometimes more and sometimes less? The savage knows what he does in order to get his daily food and which institutions serve him in this pursuit. The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. (SV, 139)

Weber’s assertion that “progress” does not imply knowing more or knowing better provides the background against which his value-neutral description of “progress” is formulated. He provides the means of understanding “progress” and its relationship to fragmentation and differentiation in the context of his discussion on ethical neutrality, where he offers a value-neutral description of progress. One can naturally use the term “progress” in an absolutely non evaluative way if one identifies it with the “continuation” of some concrete process of change viewed in isolation. (MEN, 27)

Weber goes on to detail the nonevaluative description of “progress” insofar as one can speak of the progress “in the ‘scope’ or ‘capacity’ of a concrete ‘mind’ or . . . of an ‘epoch’ ” (MEN, 27): In the sphere of the emotional, affective content of our own subjective behavior, the quantitative increase and . . . the qualitative diversification of the possible modes of response can be designated as the progress of psychic “differentiation” without reference to any evaluations. (MEN, 27)

Without passing any value judgments as to whether it is a good thing or a bad thing, progress as psychic differentiation refers to the “quantitative increase and qualitative

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 131 diversification of the possible modes of response” of an individual, society, culture, epoch, and so on, as it reacts to the varying challenges and opportunities that its cultural environment presents. Weber uses the term “progressive differentiation” to describe this particular manifestation of “progress” and notes that “undoubtedly such a ‘progressive differentiation’ does exist” (MEN, 28). But Weber cautions that while increased responsiveness is indicative of progressive differentiation, it should not be confused or conflated with it: An increased responsiveness to nuances—due sometimes to the increased rationalization and intellectualization of life and sometimes to the increase in the amount of importance which the individual attributes to all his actions (even the least significant)—can very often lead to the illusion of progressive differentiation. This responsiveness can, of course, either indicate or promote this progressive differentiation . . . Be that as it may, [progressive differentiation] exists, and whether one designates progressive differentiation as “progress” is a matter of terminological convenience. (MEN, 28)

Up till this point, Weber has made the case for the existence of progressive differentiation, that is, the “quantitative and qualitative diversification of the possible modes of response,” from a scientific, rational perspective. The ability for increased responsiveness evidences a more developed and differentiated psyche (MEN, 27). This nuanced description of a more developed psyche has to be carefully distinguished from, and purged of any value judgments. Weber notes that when speaking of “progress” one must not attach any value judgments to it: But as to whether one should evaluate it as “progress” in the sense of an increase in “inner richness” cannot be decided by any empirical discipline. The empirical disciplines have nothing at all to say about whether the various possibilities in the sphere of feeling which have just emerged or which have been recently raised to the level of consciousness and the new “tensions” and “problems” which are often associated with them are to be evaluated in one way or another. (MEN, 28)

Even though one cannot speak of the value of “progress” or “progressive differentiation” in a judgmental and normative sense, one can speak of it in an intellectualist sense. Weber notes: In the sphere of the evaluation of subjective experience, “progressive differentiation” is to be identified with an increase in “value” only in the intellectualist sense of an increase in self-awareness or of an increasing capacity for expression and communication. (MEN, 28)

The fact that one can only speak of the value of “progress” in an intellectualist sense means that practically speaking, “increase in self-awareness or . . . an increasing capacity of expression and communication” is a possibility but not a necessity that could be the result of “progress.” Even though Weber is speaking in a slightly different context, the point that he makes in the following passage is relevant to the relationship between progressive differentiation and increased self-awareness/self-expression: [N]ot every “progressive” step in the use of “correct” means is achieved by “progress” in subjective rationality. An increase in subjectively rational conduct can lead to objectively more “efficient” conduct but it is not inevitable. (MEN, 35)

132 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY Just as the “progress” of subjective rationality makes more efficient conduct possible without necessitating it, progressive differentiation makes increased self-awareness and capacity for self-expression possible but does not necessitate it. Consequently, increased self-awareness and self-expression are possibilities inherent in progressive differentiation. These possibilities have to be considered (and accounted for) alongside the possibilities of disenchantment and the loss of meaning that are also inherent in the progress of scientific rationality. In sum, the two possibilities of progress and differentiation are: (a) increasing disenchantment; (b) increasing self-awareness and capacity for self-expression. Which of the two possibilities actually obtains in a particular case depends on the value-ideas informing the action of the actor and the historical/cultural conditions shaping the actor’s environment. Weber goes on to note that the latent potential for increased self-awareness and self-expression in the aftermath of progressive differentiation is actualized as a result of the shift in the cultural standpoint from which (or in which) scientific inquiry is taking place. After noting that the cultural sciences are fated to lose the “awareness of [their] ultimate rootedness in value-ideas” thereby bringing the process of progressive differentiation to its culmination in the form of disenchantment, and then saying that “it is well that should be so”—because this is the inescapable fate in the age of disenchantment—Weber goes on to note: But there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes. The significance of unreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight. The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then science too prepares to change its standpoint and its analytical apparatus. (OSS, 112)

A change in the “atmosphere,” that is, the cultural and historical circumstances in which scientific inquiry is taking place, can initiate a reevaluation of the “unreflectively utilized viewpoints” that had been determining the character and trajectory of the inquiry. Even though “the road is lost in the twilight” of specialized, intellectualized, differentiated inquiry, Weber argues that science has an internal need and logic all its own that causes it to eventually revolt against such a tendency, because scientific inquiry is ultimately led out of the twilight by the “light of the great cultural problems.” It is important to recall that, for Weber, science is not something that merely shapes our study of empirical reality; science is something that remains open to empirical reality and is shaped by it (see section 4.3). The encounter with novel cultural problems impels science to free itself from being subject to and used for meaningless specialized, intellectualized, and rationalized inquiry that is divorced from concerns about ultimate value-ideas, and “change its standpoint” and “analytical apparatus.” At this point, science revolts against progress as disenchantment, engages in critical self-reflection, and makes progress in the form of increased selfawareness and self-expression. Weber ends the discussion on the editorial line to be adopted by one of the most well-known journals in the history of the social sciences

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 133 in a most “unscientific” or “irrational” way—affirming his own “rational,” “scientific” observation about empirical reality by citing a quatrain from the greatest German poet: [Science] follows those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction to its labors: . . . der neue Trieb erwacht, Ich eile fort, ihr ewiges Licht zu trinken, Vor mir den Tag und under mir die Nacht, Den Himmel uber mir unter mir die Wellen.3 (OSS, 112)

In sum, Weber is arguing that science will eventually follow that path which is able to invest scientific inquiry with meaning, significance, and value. This is something that specialized, intellectualized, rationalized inquiry simply cannot do. Consequently, the investing of such meaning, significance, and value will come from cultural standpoints that are outside (or seek to stand outside) the disenchanted worldview. But such standpoints will have to be able to accept and integrate science into their worldview on science’s own terms. In other words, while science will follow that path which is able to invest it with meaning, significance, and value, it is equally the case that science will follow only that path (or be amenable with that cultural standpoint) which has the capacity to embrace scientific rationality on two different (but related) accounts. First, the path (or cultural standpoint) will have to affirm the validity, value, and uniqueness of scientific knowledge. Second, the path will have to accept the value and validity of rational and scientific inquiry/evaluation of its own understanding of meaning, significance, and value judgments. Establishing such a relationship between science and cultural standpoints will not be the result of specialized, intellectualized, rationalized inquiry—it will be the result of the work of an artist. For Weber, the artist who is able to breathe new life into the cultural sciences in the disenchanted age will be someone who is able to relate the already known facts of science, with already known values of culture. Weber notes that “genuine artistry . . . manifests itself through its ability to produce new knowledge by interpreting known facts according to known viewpoints” (OSS, 112). This means that the individual will be able to establish a relationship between science as a fact (and study of facts) with already known value-ideas (and the source of valueideas). The latter will obviously belong to extra-scientific spheres. The genuine artistry of the artist rests in the fact that he/she is able to establish a mutually enriching relationship between two poles that everyone else interprets as being two ends of a mutually exclusive dichotomy—in other words, the artist sees relational duality where others see irreconcilable dichotomies. Establishing this relationship between the two poles in the aftermath of progressive differentiation means that both poles in the relationship gain greater self-awareness of their respective scope and limitation. It also means that both are able to express themselves more coherently and rationally when clarifying their own positions regarding their scope and limitations, as well as any concerns they may have regarding the claims of the other pole. The possibility of progressive differentiation leading to heightened self-awareness and self-expression represents an alternative to progressive differentiation leading to disenchantment and meaninglessness.4 The following section explores the “progress” of Weber studies

134 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY with a view to determining which of the two possibilities of “progress” has actually obtained with respect to Weber’s scholarship. 5.3 The “Progress” of Weber Scholarship: From Disenchantment to Self-Awareness Given the possibility of progress as disenchantment and meaninglessness and progress as heightened self-awareness and self-expression, the discussion now turns back to a valuation of Weber’s work. How can one view the “progress” in Weber studies since Weber’s death in 1920? The fact that Weber’s own scholarship has experienced “progress” cum fragmentation and differentiation is obvious from even a cursory glance at the development of Weber studies after Weber’s death. Developments in the study and analysis of Weber’s work have been characterized by progressive fragmentation, beginning with the divorce between the fact of his scholarly output and the values that informed it (i.e., the deep angst about disenchantment as a problematic). Beyond the divorce of fact from value, the particular facts of his scholarship (understood as different subject areas of study in the present context) have been divided into two broad, mutually exclusive categories: the sociology of culture and the methodology of the social sciences. This dichotomous reading of Weber’s corpus has been further exacerbated by a further subdivision of his sociology and methodology. His sociology of culture has been divided into the sociology of religion, sociology of music, sociology of politics, sociology of law, and so on and so forth. His methodology of the social sciences has been subdivided into the categories of value-freedom/relevance, concept formation, ideal types, and so on and so forth. The sheer scope and breadth of Weber’s scholarly output is such that some scholars have considered it a major undertaking to identify a unifying theme in one collection of his work—for example, Tenbruk looking for thematic unity in Weber’s Economy and Society (Tenbruk, 1980). Others have written major works with the explicit intention of bringing thematic coherence to Weber’s corpus—for example, Bendix (1962). Bendix’s undertaking is more daunting than that of Tenbruk because his explicit intention “has been to make Weber’s sociological work more accessible and more thematically coherent than it is either in the original or in translation” (Bendix, 1962, ix). Bendix’s undertaking is quite daunting indeed given the fact that (at least in his own mind) he brings thematic coherence to Weber’s work where even Weber failed to do so. But like Tenbruk, Bendix consciously focuses his attention on one aspect of Weber’s corpus, that is, Weber’s sociological work, and quite deliberately leaves aside the methodological writings. And neither of them meaningfully or coherently address Weber’s value-orientation that shaped his scientific study of sociological facts—that is, Weber’s profound personal concern with the disenchantment of modern culture and its implications. The examples of Tenbruk and Bendix5 are cited here only to illustrate the fact that “progress” in the area of Weber studies has been characterized by the fragmentation and differentiation of different aspects of Weber’s scholarship no less than the fragmentation and differentiation of other areas of modern culture. Even though the dominant voices in Weber scholarship have seen Weber’s work to be fraught with dichotomies and ambiguities, the valuations offered by Alexander, Ringer, and Ciaffa show Weber to be an artist par excellence who is masterfully

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 135 establishing relationships between already known facts and already known view points. The work of these three Weber scholars provides the building blocks that can be used to construct a more coherent and meaningful interpretation of Weber’s work. Each of the three thinkers focuses on one aspect of Weber’s artistry—Alexander on the idealist/realist part, Ringer on the subject/object part, and Ciaffa on the fact/value part. While the particular relational reading of Weber offered by each of the three is valuable in and of itself, its true significance is highlighted only when it is read in relation with the other two readings. Weber’s positing of a relational dynamic between subject and object instead of a dichotomy is dependent on (or results in) his positing a similar relationship between fact and value. Both of these relationships, in turn, are dependent on (or result in) his positing a relational dynamic between the materialist and idealist poles. While the progressive differentiation of Weber studies since his death has led mostly to the excessive intellectualization and rationalization of his scholarly legacy, it has also created the possibility of a deeper understanding of the meaning and significance of his work as well as a more “rational” (i.e., systematic) expression of this deeper understanding. This is evidenced by the fact that the readings of Weber offered by Alexander, Ringer, and Ciaffa explicitly posit a relational understanding of Weber’s corpus, in response to interpretations that see Weber’s corpus as being a polyglot of differentiated, unrelated, specialized studies. These three thinkers produce their reading of Weber not just by directly engaging with Weber’s text, but by engaging with Weber’s texts in light of (or in response to) the earlier differentiated and specialized studies/interpretations of Weber. In other words, the progressive differentiation of Weber’s intellectual legacy has created the conditions and opened the possibility of uncovering/appreciating an alternative post-Enlightenment, relational reading of Weber’s work to replace the predominant Enlightenment, dichotomous reading that has been in vogue in Weber studies. But this is only a possibility and nothing more. The actualization of this possibility depends upon approaching Weber’s work from a value-position outside of his work that invests significance and value in the work that cannot be invested in it from the perspective of specialized, rationalized, intellectualized study. At the same time, given the details discussed in chapter 3 (especially section 3.4), it is also necessary that the valueposition from which Weber’s work is being valued is itself amenable to having it own significance and value-ideas being clarified by Weber’s insights on the character and dynamics of scientific rationality. What Weber said for science in general is as applicable to the future fate of his own work: “It follows those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction to its labors” (OSS, 112). Weber’s work cannot be valued and appreciated from within the sphere of his own corpus—for Weber, value or meaning cannot be attached to any element from the perspective of its own imminent value sphere. For the very same reasons, no meaning or significance can be attached to Weber’s work from the perspective of scientific rationality. If Weber’s work is to have any significance and value, it will have to be invested into his work from the perspective of the great cultural questions and quandaries facing contemporary culture. The uncovering and appreciation of the relational character of Weber’s approach should not be considered a novel discovery of latter-day Weber scholarship. Even

136 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY though it has been recognized by only a few, this possibility was recognized in Weber’s own day and has had its proponents since his day. For example, Landshut sees Weber’s scholarship being a watershed event in the “progress” of intellectual history—“progress” in both the differentiating and disenchanting sense of the word, and progress in the heightening of self-awareness and self-expression sense of the word. In an essay titled “Max Weber’s Significance for Intellectual History” written in 1930, Landshut described the differentiating and disenchanting character of Weber’s work by looking at the personality of Weber as being the scientific investigator par excellence, which in turn is symptomatic of the disenchanted age: It appears that Max Weber himself is the prototype of the complete emptying of all human spontaneity from objective work, of the complete separation of person and thing, by virtue of which any work must become a mechanical, subordinate function, and the specialist himself a technical specialist; this division appears to reproduce the same soul-destroying misery of the professional and private life that permeates the whole of contemporary society. (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 100)

This aspect of Weber’s work demonstrates his contribution to the “progress” of intellectual history in the sense of contributing to the process of differentiation, intellectualization, rationalization and so on (i.e., to the process of disenchantment). But Landshut goes on to qualify this valuation of Weber and Weber’s work: Yet where this self-abnegation is carried out with such clear awareness and by someone with such a sovereign mastery of world facts as the scientist Max Weber, the question arises whether this division might not be founded in a yet higher unity. What is more, if this holds true for Weber’s personal life, it also applies to science’s experience of the problems of the age, for his life is taken to represent, as a scientific existence, the practical manifestation of the self-awareness of the times. (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 100 ff.)

When interpreted from an intellectualist and rationalized perspective, modern science in general and Weber’s scholarly legacy in particular appear to be engaged only in the study of discrete particulars and practically divorced from the “problems of the age.” But Landshut sees Weber’s (and modern science’s) obsession with the study of the particular as a means toward a larger end, that is, “the practical manifestation of the self-awareness of the times.” This aspect of Weber’s work evidences his contribution to the “progress” of intellectual history in the sense of contributing to the heightening of self-awareness and self-expression by identifying and clarifying the most pressing issues (i.e., cultural value-ideas) that the disenchantment of the world brings to the fore for the moderns. Landshut goes on to detail this point: It is evident . . . both from the logical–methodological problems and the historical– sociological ones, that the inner tendency of Max Weber’s scientific work springs from a living question within man himself as being in pursuit of understanding, for it demonstrates man’s questioning nature to be precisely that by its exposure to the lack of binding power exercised by the public sphere. (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110)

By following the “inner tendency” of his scientific work, and his calling (i.e., vocation) to be a scientist, Weber comes to the point, and brings intellectual history to the point

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 137 where “[t]he disenchantment of the world puts the ‘groundlessness’ of free existence, in all its mysteriousness, at the center of debate” (Landshut, 1989 [1930], 110). Weber’s scholarship makes the discussion of “actual problems of our human existence” (Löwith, 1982, 25) a subject of meaningful scientific, rational discourse in an era where scientific rationality is divesting everything of meaning. The following observation by Löwith, originally offered in 1932, highlights the centrality of ultimate value-concerns and meaning in Weber’s rational, scientific investigations: In his treatment of the “objectivity” of knowledge in the social sciences Weber was concerned first of all to raise the question “what is the meaning and purpose of a scientific critique of ideals and value judgments?” And he carried out this inquiry, too, in a “rational” manner, with reference to a responsible relation between means and ends. (Löwth, 1982, 106)

For Landshut, Weber’s work uncovers, underscores, and highlights the importance of the “religious” question of human existence “in all its mysteriousness,” no less than (or as a result of ) the exposition of the fact and reasons behind the disenchantment of the world by scientific rationality. For Löwith, Weber’s scientifically “objective” and “rational” investigations lay bare the fact that issues of “ultimate principles and the orientations based upon them” have to be meaningfully addressed and redressed because genuine scientific inquiry cannot take place in the absence of a value-stance regarding the “alpha and omega of a basic conception of what is truly real and therefore really worth knowing” (Löwth, 1982, 106). 5.4

Weber and the Disenchanting of Disenchantment

Thus far the discussion of Weber has contrasted his description of the process of disenchantment (chapter 1) with the principles of his methodology of the social sciences (chapters 2–4). This contrast has revealed that Weber’s methodology is based on a relational logic that transforms dichotomies into relational dualities, thereby making possible meaningful scientific inquiry and scientific inquiry meaningful. The process of disenchantment, for its part affirms disenchanting dichotomies and thereby forestalls the possibility of meaningful scientific inquiry. An assumption that can be easily made in light of this contrast is that Weber’s scientific methodology contains resources that can be utilized to at least arrest the process of the scientific disenchantment of human culture—and maybe even reverse the process. In other words, Weber’s insights contain resources that can be appropriated to challenge the “fate of our times” by at least beginning the process of rationally disenchanting the disenchantment of the world. With this assumption as the value-idea guiding the inquiry, the discussion turns to exploring this possibility. In the exploration of this possibility, a number of Weber’s positions that have been discussed previously are discussed again—the difference being that when they were mentioned previously, they were mentioned in relation to a variety of different issues, whereas now they are detailed in direct relation to each other. In Weber’s words, the following discussion attempts to “produce new knowledge [about Weber’s work] by interpreting already known facts [that have been detailed in previous chapters] according to known viewpoints [that have been established as a result of the foregoing discussions]” (OSS, 112).

138 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY The facts of the central role of causal imputation, human beings investing meaning in the world, and suprarational affirmation of the suprarational presuppositions of science in Weber’s methodology are interpreted in light of Weber’s concern with disenchantment as “fate of our times.” As noted in section 1.1, Weber posits that “[s]cientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction” of the process of disenchantment that has been unfolding over many millennia (SV, 138). The conceptual and methodological tools of scientific inquiry push the tension inherent between religious rationalism and scientific rationalism to a breaking point—and eventually beyond the breaking point. The break occurs with the scientific postulate of a “cosmos of natural causality” that negates the religious conception of a “cosmos of ethical, compensatory causality” (RRW, 355). A disenchanted image of the cosmos (and of the human being’s place in the cosmos) is made practically inevitable by the claim that the cosmos functions according to imminent, inner-worldly causal mechanisms (i.e., laws) that can be discovered and understood by means of rational, scientific investigation. Weber notes: The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. (RRW, 350)

Weber’s reflections on the methodology of the social sciences reveal that there is no such thing as a “causal mechanism” in the cosmos—there are no “laws” that mechanistically or deterministically govern the cosmos or the behavior of anything in the cosmos. As detailed in section 4.2, Weber uses the work of the leading logicians of the day to critique the naturalistic understanding of causality. For Weber, it makes no sense to speak of laws “causing” observable, empirical phenomena either in the natural world or in the cultural world, as the objectivists of his day were wont to do. As detailed in section 4.3, Weber’s methodology is based on an understanding of causality that uses the concept of “laws” as a heuristic device that facilitates conceptual mastery of particular recurring patterns that are observed in empirical reality. These “laws” are used as heuristic devices, and nothing more in order to facilitate a “causal imputation” that in its turn affirms or produces objectively valid scientific knowledge about empirical reality. In the face of Weber’s account of causal imputation and the evidence he brings to bear in the formulation and justification of this alternative understanding of “causality,” it is exceedingly difficult to continue to posit the efficacy of “natural causality” and “causal mechanism” in any rationally coherent or scientifically meaningful manner. Weber’s notion of causal imputation has disenchanted disenchantment by demonstrating that the fundamental premise on which disenchantment is based (i.e., the claim of “natural causality”) is not rationally tenable from the perspective of the logic underpinning scientific inquiry. While causal imputation does not validate the religious alternative of “ethical, compensatory causality,” this does not in any way detract from the fact that it invalidates the “scientific” notion of “natural causality.” In short, the self-conscious and self-critical understanding and explanation of empirical events from the perspective of Weber’s methodology of the cultural/social sciences directly challenges the disenchanting effects of the intellectualized notion of “natural causality.”

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 139 Weber’s methodology disenchants disenchantment on another level—by directly challenging the claim that “meaning” (Sinn) does not exist. Disenchanting scientific rationalism concerns itself with the study and discovery of a preexisting rational order that determines the parameters within which the cosmos (and everything in it) functions. Ostensibly, the discovery of “causal laws” is the means that will ultimately lead to a full and comprehensive understanding of the “order” in/of the cosmos and everything in it. As detailed in section 1.3, Weber notes that a world image produced by scientific rationality negates the religious claim that “the world as a cosmos must satisfy the demands of a religious ethic or evince some ‘meaning’ ” (RRW, 355). As a matter of principle, scientific rationality has negated any religious, philosophical, and metaphysical “approach which in any way asks for a ‘meaning’ of inner-worldly occurrences” (RRW, 351). Along with negating any nonscientific attempt to invest meaning in the world, scientific rationality is unable to invest any scientific meaning in the world because the concept of “natural causality” forestalls any such attempt. “In the name of ‘intellectual integrity’ ” (SV, 355), science can neither invest any meaning in the world, nor affirm any nonscientific investment of meaning in the world—thereby disenchanting the world. Disenchantment of the world is the parallel process of increased intellectualization and rationalization on the one hand, and loss of meaning on the other. In stark contrast, meaning (Sinn) is the alpha and the omega of Weber’s methodology. This is the second point on which Weber disenchants disenchantment. As detailed in section 3.4, the beginning of Weber’s social science is the study of something called “culture,” and according to Weber “culture” is “a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). While Weber’s methodology locates its roots in a dimension of empirical reality that is held to be meaningful by human beings, the omega of the methodology is “the transcendental presupposition of every cultural science” that “we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (OSS, 81). If there is no such thing as meaning, as posited by disenchanting scientific rationalism, then there is no such thing as cultural/social science (as understood by Weber). Weber’s methodology of the cultural/social sciences does not offer a religious or metaphysical proposition that “the world is inherently meaningful.” But it makes an empirical observation that all human beings, in all places, at all times have “invested meaning in the world”—the cultural scientist undertaking scientific inquiry in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness no less than any other human being carrying out any other cultural activity at any other time in history. Consequently, meaning is as much (if not more) a part and parcel of empirical reality as the heavenly bodies (studied by the astronomers), the chemicals (studied by the chemists), the birds and bees (studied by the biologists), and so on and so forth. From Weber’s perspective, in the absence of meaning, there is no such thing as “cultural science,” or any other “science” for that matter. The only reason scientists have engaged in the study of heavenly bodies, chemicals, birds and bees, and so on is because these elements constitute a tiny segment of “a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process . . . on which human beings confer[ed] meaning and significance” (OSS, 81). For Weber, the discernment of recurring

140 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY patterns (i.e., “laws” or “rational order”) is a heuristic tool to be used in the understanding and explication of meaning and significance. The ends of scientific rationalism (the discovery of “laws”) are a means toward an end for Weber. In sum, the rationalistic understanding of “rational order” and “natural causality,” characterizing the natural sciences, makes the “belief that there is any such a thing as ‘meaning’ in the universe die out at its very roots” (SV, 142). But, as detailed in section 3.5, that which the natural sciences cause to die at its very root (i.e., meaning) is the ground in which Weber’s social/cultural sciences are rooted. In return, the definition of “culture” and the “transcendental presupposition” of Weber’s social/cultural sciences nourish and enrich (as they study and explicate) the ground in which they are rooted. As noted in section 2.1, the definition of “culture” and the “transcendental presupposition” of the social/cultural science provide the fundamental presuppositions and value-ideas of social/cultural scientific inquiry: (a) Human beings invest meaning in the world. (b) Meaning can be known. (c) Meaning is worth knowing. As detailed in section 3.4, establishing a direct relationship between the meaningfulness of meaning and science is among the most significant values of Weber’s “rationalized” understanding of science in an age of disenchanting rationalization. Besides offering causal imputation and meaning as a means to disenchant disenchantment, Weber’s methodology challenges the intellectualized conception of “rational certainty,” thereby further disenchanting disenchantment. Weber notes that due to the fact that science has created a “cosmos of natural causality,” it has been “unable to answer with certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions” (RRW, 355). As noted at the end of section 2.1, the three fundamental presuppositions on which all scientific inquiry is based are that (a) Scientific knowledge/truth is real. (b) Scientific knowledge/truth can be known. (c) Scientific knowledge/truth is worth knowing. Even though “rational certainty” is the standard by which scientific rationalism measures and values everything else, it is incapable of establishing or demonstrating the validity of any of the aforementioned presuppositions in a “rationally certain” manner. The inability of scientific rationalism to rationally account for the “ground” (i.e., the presuppositions and value-ideas) on which it is based is perhaps the greatest and most telling of its failures. But, where scientific rationalism fails Weber’s methodology offers a rationally coherent account of these presuppositions. As detailed in section 2.1, Weber posits that “no science can prove its fundamental value” (SV, 153) to the individual who rejects the presuppositions on which science is based. But this is not a unique anomaly in the case of science because not only is science incapable of proving its own fundamental value, it is incapable of proving the worth of any fundamental value. For Weber, the positive affirmation (or negative

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 141 rejection) of any and all values is a matter of faith, not rational certainty: Only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgments meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith. (OSS, 55)

For Weber, the pursuit of science, as a human activity, requires a faithful (i.e., suprarational) affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas on which it is based, just as the activity of religion requires a faithful (i.e., suprarational) affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas on which religion is based. Weber does note that religion has a longer list of presuppositions that need to be faithfully affirmed than does science and he also notes that in the end, religion ultimately demands a sacrifice of the intellect (SV, 154). In spite of these differences, which may not be as pronounced as Weber thought, Weber has established the fact that the rational pursuit of scientific knowledge requires a suprarational affirmation of the presuppositions on which the activity of science is based and the extra-scientific affirmation of its value-ideas. In other words, Weber demonstrates that scientific inquiry is not a self-generating activity but rather a cultural good that is generated by a suprarational affirmation of certain presuppositions—as is the case with any and all cultural goods and human activities. In rationally demonstrating that the very possibility of science as a human activity is rooted in suprarational affirmation, Weber’s methodology further disenchants the disenchanting rationalism that has consistently used rationality to disenchant everything else. Weber’s rationalization of the methodology of the social/cultural sciences does to scientific rationalism what scientific rationalism had done to religious rationalism, and what religious rationalism had earlier done to the enchanted symbiosis—it has revealed to be “profane,” that which had been considered “sacred.” Scientific rationalism has considered natural causality, rational order, and rational certainty as “sacred” principles—the principles by which everything else could and would be questioned, scrutinized, and judged while being beyond question and scrutiny themselves. Weber’s rational reflection on these “sacred” principles reveals them to be “profane”—human constructions raised to the level of “heavenly” authority, from where they sit in judgment on any, every, and all things. Speaking in reference to the social psychology of world religions, Weber notes: The various great ways of leading rational and methodical life have been characterized by irrational presuppositions, which have been accepted simply as “given” and which have been incorporated into such ways of life. (SPWR, 281)

Weber’s keen insight into the methodology of the social sciences reveals that this is as true of science as for any religion insofar as science has been embraced as one of the “great ways of leading rational and methodical life.” Weber’s methodology disenchants the key concepts on which disenchanting scientific rationalism rests by laying bare the “irrational presuppositions which have been accepted simply as ‘given’ ” by scientific rationalism. Weber’s methodology replaces the principles of disenchanting scientific rationalism in which the “irrational presuppositions” remain hidden, with principles in which the suprarational aspect of scientific rationality

142 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY are clearly displayed: (a) Natural/mechanistic causality as science’s explanatory device is replaced by causal interpretation (i.e., imputation). (b) Preexistent rational/mechanical order of the world as the object of scientific inquiry is replaced by scientific exploration of humanly constructed meaning and significance in the world. (c) Rational certainty as goal and characteristic of scientific inquiry is replaced by objectively possible, suprarational affirmation of the presuppositions and value-ideas on which science is based. The fact that Weber’s methodology of (social) scientific inquiry disenchants disenchanting scientific rationalism is clear enough. But the disenchanting effects of Weber’s methodology on scientific rationalism do not herald a return to the religious rationalism that was disenchanted by scientific rationalism at an earlier stage in the rationalization process. Weber’s understanding of imputation, meaning, and suprarational affirmation of presuppositions should not (and cannot) be mistaken for providing the means that make it possible to articulate a faithful assertion of the meaning of the world of pre-disenchantment religious rationalism. But the fact that Weber’s methodology does not (and cannot) affirm the validity of religious rationalism, after having disenchanted scientific rationalism, does not in any way detract from the fact that Weber’s methodology of (social) scientific inquiry rationally disenchants “the most important” part of the intellectualizing and rationalizing process that has been in progress for millennia. Weber’s methodology of the social/cultural sciences is not the only resource in Weber’s legacy that contains resources that can be appropriated to disenchant disenchantment. It must be emphasized here that Weber’s insights into the methodology of the social sciences are not the products of disembodied, abstract reflection—they are the products of reflections on a vocational commitment to the praxis of science. Consequently, Weber’s achievements as a methodologist of the social sciences cannot be divorced from his vocational praxis of science. This means that Weber’s vocational praxis contains additional resources that can be appropriated to disenchant disenchantment. Chapter 1 noted that even though they are related, the effects of disenchantment are different at the level of practical rationalization than they are at the level of theoretical rationalization. The foregoing discussion has described aspects of Weber’s legacy that disenchant disenchantment at the theoretical level. The discussion now turns to the practical level, because it is with respect to this level that Weber’s vocational praxis is of special value in disenchanting disenchantment. As noted in section 1.2, the effects of disenchantment at the level of practical rationalization manifest themselves as a “struggle of the gods.” At this level, the penultimate values (the “gods”) of the various worldly spheres are locked in a ceaseless and intractable struggle with the penultimate religious ethic (i.e., universal brotherhood). Impersonal bureaucracy and claim to the monopoly on legitimate violence of the political sphere, and impersonal money and the competition of interests of the economic sphere undermine the claims of both the universality and the brotherhood of the religious ethic. The irrational escape (i.e., salvation) from the

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 143 routines of everyday life offered by an artificially created cosmos of the esthetic sphere and the intense irrational experience of erotic love offered by the erotic sphere challenge and undermine the religious understanding of brotherhood and salvation. Just as the struggle between the penultimate values of the worldly spheres and the religious ethic is intractable and inevitable, the struggle between the different worldly values is also intractable and inevitable. There is no way to rationally reconcile the conflict that is (and has forever been) raging between the different values of the worldly spheres. The ethic of universal brotherhood mediated the struggle between the different worldly spheres and kept the peace among them (so to speak) at one time in history. But with the progressive rationalization of the inner logic of each of the different value spheres and the progression of differentiation to rationalized autonomy, even the illusion of peace among the spheres has been shattered. In short, disenchantment of the world at the level of practical rationalization presents itself in the form of the intractable and inevitable “struggle of the gods.” Weber seems to be resigned to this state of affairs and does not see much hope of this struggle ever being resolved meaningfully. It is difficult to find evidence in Weber’s scholarly corpus that would allow for the inference that he feels otherwise. In spite of this apparent poverty, there is a richness and wealth in Weber’s life that obviously and clearly demonstrates that a “struggle of the gods” can be resolved meaningfully. Weber the practicing social/cultural scientist passionately pursued his vocation in the midst of raging struggles regarding the very meaning of “science” and “cultural science.” In these struggles, the partisans of particular “gods” battled with each other to establish the supremacy of their own “god” over all other competitors. As detailed in chapter 3, in the Werturteilsstreit (the battle of value-relevance) the “god” of facts battled the “god” of values. The battle among these two “gods” became even more convoluted when it gave birth to other “gods,” in the form of mediating positions between the two extremes that in turn had their own proponents who were as passionately committed to their “gods” as anyone else. As detailed in chapter 4, in the Methodenstreit (the battle of the methods), the “god” of subjectivism battled the “god” of objectivism—a battle that became even more convoluted with the birth of other “gods” as a consequence of the original battle. By the time Weber arrived on the scene, “gods” of every hue and color, size and shape, were populating the battlefield— a battlefield on which peace had to be established first if any meaningful (scientific) activity was to take place. Weber’s success in navigating this battlefield and establishing peace (at least at the personal level) speaks for itself. If the valuations offered by Alexander, Ringer, and Ciaffa (among others) are correct, then Weber’s methodology is still ahead of many of the latest trends in contemporary scholarly circles when it comes to resolving the struggles between the “gods” of fact and value and the “gods” of subjectivism and objectivism. Even though Weber’s work does not resolve the particular struggle of the gods of the worldly spheres, his success in resolving the struggle of gods in the sphere of the methodology of the social/cultural sciences demonstrates that a “struggle of the gods” is not inherently intractable—such a struggle can be resolved meaningfully and fruitfully. The defining character of the manner in which Weber navigated the battlefield of both the Weruteilsstreit and the Methodenstreit is establishing relations (bridges) where others see only dualisms (dichotomies). Weber’s incomparable success in

144 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY the different battles in the area of the methodology of the social/cultural sciences can be traced to a commitment to two ideals that are outside (but related) to the battlefield: (a) A vocational commitment to science as praxis. (b) An absolute, unflinching commitment to intellectual integrity. The following observation by Weber sums up the relation of his commitment to these two ideals and his success in the area of methodology: Only by laying bare and solving substantive problems can sciences be established and their methods developed. On the other hand, purely epistemological and methodological reflections have never played the crucial role in such developments. Such discussion can become important for the enterprise of science only when, as a result of considerable shifts of the “viewpoint” from which a datum becomes the object of analysis, the idea emerges that the new “viewpoint” also requires a revision of the logical forms in which the “enterprise” has heretofore operated, and when, accordingly, uncertainty about the “nature” of one’s work arises. (LCS, 116)

For Weber, the praxis of science has to precede any fruitful reflection on the methods of science. But when the conditions so demand, critical reflections on the methods of science should be done so thoroughly and completely that they should not shrink from the possibility of having to revise the “logical forms” of the “enterprise”—even if this revision means the reformulation of the very “nature” of the work. Weber consciously acknowledges that it is the emergence of new “viewpoints” in the cultural milieu of the scientist that create the conditions that put into question, and require the refashioning of, the accepted “logical forms” of science’s methodology. Weber the methodologist did not flinch from revising the “logical forms” of science’s methodology, so much so that it put into question the central tenets of natural causality, preexisting rational order and rational certainty on which scientific rationalism had been resting in his day—Weber’s methodology of the social sciences does indeed reformulate the very “nature” of science. Explicitly, there is scant evidence in Weber’s writings that he felt the “struggle of the gods” of the worldly spheres could ever be resolved or that the highest values of the worldly spheres could come to peace with the penultimate religious ethical value of universal brotherhood. Nonetheless, Weber’s life does explicitly evidence that a “struggle of the gods” can indeed be resolved in the form of a life informed by an uncompromising commitment to an ethical ideal (absolute intellectual honesty/ integrity in Weber’s case) that guides a vocational commitment to a consciously chosen praxis (science in Weber’s case). Consequently, if there is “struggle of the gods” that appears to be intractable, this does not mean that it cannot be resolved because there is some immutable, universal, absolute “law” that forestalls the possibility of its resolution. Given adequate cultural conditions, a commitment to certain value-ideas (i.e., that the struggle can and should be resolved) and the requisite knowledge required for the resolution, the struggle can indeed be resolved. Earlier in the discussion, it was noted that Weber’s achievements in bridging the idealist/materialist, subject/object, and fact/value dichotomies can be adequately

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 145 appreciated when it is understood that each of the bridges is related to and depends on the other two. Similarly, the significance of Weber’s resolution of the fact/value and subject/object “struggle of the gods” becomes meaningful only in light of the fact that this resolution is rooted in (or leads to) the resolution of the struggle between the “god of science” and the “god of faith.” For Weber, “the only purpose” of the whole discussion detailing the relational character/dynamics of subject/object and fact/value “was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from faith” (OSS, 110). Another way of stating this position is that the “god of science” is not locked in an inevitable and intractable struggle to the death with the “god of faith”— the two of them lie in such close proximity and are so intimately related to each other that it appears that the debilitation of one would mean the debilitation of the other. It is only when a harmonious relationship is established between the “god of science” and the “god of faith” that meaningful scientific knowledge can be attained. Without the resolution of the struggle between subject/object, imputation (as understood by Weber) is logically and methodologically impossible. Without the resolution of the struggle between fact/value, meaning (as understood by Weber) is logically and methodologically impossible. Without a resolution of the struggle between the “god of science” and the “god of faith,” “the meaning of the quest” for scientific knowledge (OSS, 110) cannot be articulated in rational, coherent, logical terms— thereby forestalling the possibility of the rational (i.e., self-conscious, self-critical) pursuit of meaningful, scientific knowledge. In establishing a relation between the “god of science” and the “god of faith,” Weber’s rational reflections on methodology and rational practice of science further disenchants the disenchanting rationalism that was premised on (and deepened) the divide between faith and science. It would be worth pausing and examining the manner in which Weber resolves the struggle between the “god of science” and the “god of faith.” This with a view to gleaning some hints on if (or how) the struggle between the different “gods” of the other worldly spheres—politics, economics, esthetic, and erotic—might be resolved. This in turn might be a prelude to (or result of ) resolving the struggle between the “god of the world” and the “god of heavens.” Weber’s rational inquiry into the character of the rationality of scientific rationalism revealed “irrational presuppositions” that had been accepted “simply as ‘given’ ” by the proponents of scientific rationalism. But when these “givens” were subject to critical, rational inquiry, it was revealed that there was something most “non-rational” about them. This in turn meant that rational scientific inquiry is built on the bedrock of suprarational, extrascientific grounds—this is the key insight that allows Weber to resolve the struggle between the “god of science” and the “god of faith.” A research program taking this approach as its model will have to look at the rationality of the disenchanted political, economic, esthetic, and erotic spheres and investigate whether or not there are any “irrational presuppositions” that have been simply taken as “givens” at the root of the respective rationalities of the different worldly spheres. Here it must be kept in mind that if “irrational presuppositions” are identified, they will be “irrational” only from the point of view of the rationalism of the particular sphere that is under consideration. Building on the model that Weber offers for laying bare the scientifically irrational presuppositions and unscientific value-ideas that are hidden in the

146 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY claims of scientific rationalism, a taking forward of Weber’s project would seek to uncover: (a) politically irrational presuppositions and extra-political value-ideas in the roots of political rationalism;6 (b) economically irrational presuppositions and extra-economic value-ideas in the roots of economic rationalism; (c) esthetically irrational presuppositions and extra-esthetic value-ideas in the roots of esthetic rationalism; (d) erotically irrational presuppositions and extra-erotic value-ideas in the roots of erotic rationalism. If any irrationalities and “extras” are discovered in the different rational spheres and they are rationally explicated, then novel possibilities would emerge regarding the relationship of the different worldly spheres to each other—and their relationship to the religious ethic.7 The discovery of the irrationality present in a rationalized structure (whether theoretical or practical) is the beginning point of self-awareness and capacity for enhanced self-expression—as well as the beginning point of disenchantment. Weber’s methodology concretely demonstrates how a rationalized structure can be disenchanted (he has done this with the worldly intellectual sphere) and opens the way for disenchanting the other disenchanted worldly spheres. The increased self-awareness and capacity for self-expression that also results from increased rationalization opens up the possibility of seeing and giving voice to new relations and possibilities that were not deemed possible prior to disenchantment. Consequently, disenchantment does not have to be the great tragedy of modern culture, it could be the prelude to new mutually enriching relations and new cultural possibilities. Weber’s reflections on the methodology of (social) scientific inquiry disenchant disenchantment at the level of theoretical rationalization and his praxis of science disenchants disenchantment at the level of practical rationalization—the two being distinct, but related aspects of his scholarly endeavors. Using the phrase that Alexander borrowed from Hegel, Weber’s achievement can justifiably be called “world historical” in this regard—but this is still not the complete picture. This chapter began with identifying the value-idea that shaped the orientation of Weber’s scientific pursuits (both methodological and practical)—a desire to understand the “causes” that led to the complete disenchantment of culture only in the modern West, even though partial disenchantment can be found in every human culture known to historians. It was also noted, in line with Weber’s own methodological reflections and Kalberg’s observation, that Weber sought to explore this issue because he was deeply concerned with the problematic that disenchantment had given birth to. Weber, as a conscientious human being, noticed disenchantment endangering the viability of “compassion, ethical action, and reflective individualism” (PESC, lxiv) in the world. The implicit assumption in Weber’s pursuit of scientific knowledge that bridges the two aforementioned premises, is that acquiring scientific understanding of the causes of disenchantment will make it possible to redress the problematic that disenchantment has given birth to. It is difficult to imagine Weber genuinely considering his vocation to be a meaningful vocation in the absence of this assumption.

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 147 Weber’s decision to carry on with his scientific project in the face of continuing disenchantment, with the hope that his efforts would contribute to redressing the problematic of disenchantment is the most forceful and compelling evidence of Weber disenchanting disenchantment. In short, Weber’s personal stand in the face of “the fate of our times” (i.e., disenchantment) and his continuing quest for a meaningful life in the face of disenchanting meaninglessness evidences that for Weber there is a real possibility of salvation from the disenchanted condition. In the absence of this hypothesis, Weber’s lifelong labor appears to be a completely irrational and meaningless enterprise. Weber notes that the “two highest conceptions of sublimated religious doctrines of salvation are ‘rebirth’ and ‘redemption’ ” (SPWR, 279). He notes that in the past religious revivals have resulted from the efforts of intellectual strata working to “sublimate the possession of sacred values into a belief in ‘redemption’ ” (SPWR, 280). He goes on to posit that while in very general terms “redemption” has meant liberation from all sorts of suffering in the world, it attained a specific significance only where it expressed a systematic and rationalized “image of the world” and represented a stand in the face of the world. For meaning as well as the intended and actual psychological quality of redemption has depended upon such a world image and such a stand. (SPWR, 280)

For Weber, beyond the commonly understood meaning of “redemption,” it means “a stand in the face of the world”—a claim that the world and the human condition in it does not have to be as it actually is, it could be otherwise. This stand is a protest against the empirically existent human condition in the world and a hope/claim that a better condition is possible. But even the theoretical possibility of such a stand, to say nothing of its practicality, depends on the theoretical image that the individual accepts as being “real.” In other words, the kind of practical stand that one can take (i.e., what one can protest against or hope for) depends upon the theoretical image of the world that one has: “ ‘From what’ and ‘for what’ one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, could be redeemed, depended upon one’s image of the world” (SPWR, 280). From this perspective, an intellectual who formulates a theoretical world image that offers novel possibilities of human existence in the world—that intellectual is fulfilling the most basic prerequisite for the beginning of a “religious revival.” The fact that Weber has offered a new world image is clear enough. The “world” that Weber the scientist devoted his life to studying is very different from the “world” of mechanistic naturalism studied by the proponents of Enlightenment, scientific rationalism. As noted previously, Weber’s world image, though a critique and correction of the rationalistic world image, does not herald a return to the pre-disenchanted religious world image. But just as his world image incorporates modified aspects from the world image of scientific rationalism, it also incorporates modified aspects from the world image of religious rationalism. It is obvious enough that Weber himself does not point the way to “redemption.” But the world image that emerges as a result of his methodological reflections (a world understood and shaped by causal imputation, historically constructed meaning, and suprarational affirmation of presuppositions and value-ideas) offers the parameters within which any meaningful quest for redemption

148 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY will have to take place in the era of disenchantment. In sum, the theoretical world image offered by Weber allows for the possibility of redemption from disenchantment. It makes redemption from the process of rationalization a rationally viable, live option, not merely a theoretical (or mystical) possibility. In making redemption a live option, Weber’s legacy firmly affirms the following three presuppositions: (a) The meaningfulness of scientific inquiry of meaning evidences that salvation (from meaningless disenchantment) is real. (b) Salvation (from disenchantment) can be attained. (c) Salvation (from disenchantment) is worth attaining. The careful reader will have recognized that Weber is affirming (in a modified form) the basic presuppositions that lie at the root of all religious rationalism (as noted in section 2.2). It has been often noted that Weber’s reflections on the possibilities for/of human culture in the aftermath of disenchantment are characterized by a resigned pathos that does not see a realistic possibility of a rationally viable alternative. The concluding remarks that Weber makes at the end of three of his more well-known works provide support for the claim that Weber had a sense of tragic resignation about the future prospects of culture. At the conclusion of Politics as a Vocation, Weber quotes a sonnet from Shakespeare that celebrates the onset of summer because it promises to be the time when the hopes of spring are fulfilled. But looking to the future, dispassionately, in light of the hopes attached to it by many of his contemporaries of all intellectual and political stripes, Weber notes: “Not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now” (PV, 128). Weber expresses his sense of tragic resignation in even more dramatic and explicitly religious terms at the conclusion of Science as a Vocation. He concludes his presentation by quoting a passage from the Hebrew Bible in which the end of the night and the approaching of dawn symbolizes the deliverance from exile and the promise of a new beginning. For Weber, this passage represents the millennia-old hopes and aspirations of a people for the emergence of “new prophets and saviors” because these charismatically endowed persons would usher in a new dawn and the end of the night—he goes on to note that “we are shaken” when we realize the fate of the people who have been waiting for the new dawn for more than two millennia. Weber reminds those hoping to be delivered from the modern disenchanted condition by new prophets and saviors that the first disenchanted people in history (the Israelites) have been waiting for saviors and prophets for more than two millennia. Plain intellectual integrity compels Weber to point out to the newest (and most completely) disenchanted peoples that they should not expect their wait to be any shorter than that of the first disenchanted people. Speaking to the moderns waiting to be delivered from the exile of disenchantment by a charismatic leader, Weber states: Integrity, however, compels us to state that for the many who today tarry for new prophets and saviors, the situation is the same as resounds in the beautiful Edomite watchman’s song of the period of exile that has been included among Isaiah’s oracles: He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman, what of the night? The watchman said,

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 149 The morning cometh, and also the night: if ye will enquire, enquire ye: return, come. (SV, 156)

In the concluding pages of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber integrates sociological, religious, and historic themes to express the same sense of tragic resignation about the future prospects of human culture. He notes that in the past “the concern for material goods” was nothing more than a “lightweight coat” that the saint could cast off at will. But “fate” would have it that a “steel-hard casing” has been forged out of this lightweight coat with the passage of time (PESC, 123)— a casing in which the totality of modern culture is trapped and which cannot be thrown off. In nonmetaphorical term, “material goods [have] acquired an increasing and, in the end, inescapable power over people—as never before in history” (PESC, 124). Looking to the future of human culture, Weber sees a number of possibilities—each of which are objectively possible. But the tone and content of his description leave little doubt regarding the one possibility that Weber feels will actually obtain: No one any longer knows who will live in this steel-hard casing and whether entirely new prophets or a might rebirth of ancient ideals will stand at the end of this prodigious development. Or, however, if neither, whether a mechanized ossification, embellished with a sort of rigidly compelled sense of self-importance, will arise. Then, indeed, if ossification appears, the saying might be true for the “last humans” in this long civilizational development: Narrow specialists without mind, pleasure seekers without heart; in its conceit, this nothingness imagines it has climbed to a level of humanity never before attained. (PESC, 124)

In light of the way that Weber concludes his discussion in Politics as a Vocation, Science as a Vocation and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, one can very well conclude that Weber’s work does not have any resources that allow one to be hopeful about the future. There is nothing that Weber the sociologist of culture has to offer those who wish to challenge the “fate of our times”—the only advice that Weber has to offer in the midst of meaningless disenchantment is that we all “set to work and ‘the demands of the day,’ in human relations as well as in our vocation” (SV, 156). Even though there is a degree of accuracy in this reading of Weber, it is obviously an incomplete reading—given what Weber the methodologist of the social sciences has written. The tone of Weber’s conclusion in “ ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” is markedly different from the attitude of resigned pathos of Weber the sociologist of culture. In the concluding paragraph of his most comprehensive piece on the methodology of the social sciences, Weber asserts that science will not only rebel against disenchanting rationalization, but it will also not be content with being merely an instrument of disenchanting rationalization. On the contrary, science will follow “those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction to its labors” (OSS, 112). Furthermore, science will make possible a better self-understanding and enhance the capacity for self-expression of the “stars” that are able to invest its labor with meaning and direction. In the concluding pages of this article, there is a sense of the inevitability that science will eventually rebel against disenchantment and

150 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY point the way out of it—the internal logic of scientific rationality shows this to be an inevitability. In other words, the conclusion envisions a different fate for science (and by extension culture) inevitably emerging than the disenchanted “fate of our times.” Whereas Weber the sociologist of culture documents the manner in which scientific rationalism has been the most important of all the factors that caused the disenchantment of modern culture, Weber the methodologist shows scientific rationality to be the most important of all factors causing the disenchantment of disenchantment—and opening up a new horizon of cultural possibilities in the future. In Religious Rejections of the World and Their Direction, Weber details how the emergence of a particular kind of religious actor in human culture initiated the process of disenchantment. This actor was an intellectual whose rational (and rationalizing) reflection on the character and teachings of religion revealed a gap between the “religious” and the “worldly.” The differentiation of the two spheres is taken further by subsequent rationalization and the “economic,” “political,” “esthetic,” and “erotic” spheres gradually differentiating themselves from the “religious” and from each other. In sum, the complete disenchantment of culture can be seen as the unintended consequence of a particular type of religiosity. Conversely, the evidence presented in this book shows Weber to be a particular kind of modern intellectual whose work contains the resources to disenchant disenchantment. Weber’s rational (and rationalizing) reflection on the character and methodology of scientific inquiry reveals a fundamental and irreducible bridge between the “religious” and the “worldly.” It is in this capacity of disenchanting disenchantment and establishing a bridge between the “religious” and the “worldly” that Weber is perhaps best embodying the “vocation of science” in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness—articulating an alternative to the “fate of our times” other than the one dictated by the prevalent rationalized structures and world images. The sole purpose of the above discussion has been to demonstrate that only a hairline separates Weber’s science from faith concerns and to make explicit the meaning of Weber’s quest for objectively valid scientific knowledge. Weber’s observation about modern culture in general is no less true of his own legacy: For certain, even with the best will, the modern person seems generally unable to imagine how large a significance those components of our consciousness rooted in religious belief have actually had upon culture . . . and the organization of life. (PESC, 125)

It can be justifiably said that modern scholarship is “generally unable to imagine” the profound significance that “components of [Weber’s] consciousness rooted in religious belief ” had upon the spirit of his scholarship and the ethics of his vocational commitment to science. Weber was no philosopher, economist, historian, lawyer—in the intellectualized and rationalized sense of the terms. Even more obviously and certainly he was no theologian—in the intellectualized and rationalized sense of the word. Weber’s reflections on the methodology of (social) scientific inquiry and his vocational commitment to science offer no answer whatsoever to the only question that really matters to us—the only question that has really mattered to all human beings, in all places, at all times: “What shall we do? And how shall we live?” But in

BRIDGING THE SCIENCE/RELIGION DICHOTOMY / 151 light of the foregoing discussion, it can be stated with confidence that Weber’s legacy is a uniquely valuable resource of knowledge for those who pose the question correctly. The uniqueness of Weber’s contribution to this discussion can be illustrated by summing up the foregoing discussion in the form of a “syllogism.” The discussion in this and the previous three chapters has revolved around the issues of the relationship between the religion and science—in one form or another. Weber’s work shows that religion and science are different interpretations of the exact same “syllogism.” The presuppositions and value-ideas that religious and scientific rationality share can be summed up thus: (a) Meaning is real. (b) Meaning can be had. (c) Meaning is worth having. The religious interpretation of this “syllogism” is: (a) The universe is inherently meaningful (according to a revealed world-image). (b) One can live a meaningful life (by following the discipline of a religious ethic). (c) A meaningful life is worth living (because it leads to the possibility of redemption from a worldly condition one finds intolerable). The scientific interpretation of this “syllogism” is: (a) Human beings confer meaning on the universe (according to the observed behavior of all human beings, in all places, at all times). (b) This meaning can be understood (by following the discipline of scientific inquiry). (c) This meaning is worth understanding (because it leads to the possibility of redemption from a cultural condition one finds intolerable). Given what Weber has said about the faith/science, fact/value, and subject/object dichotomies, it is safe to say that one cannot intelligently talk about the “religious” without reference to the “scientific” and one cannot rationally talk about the “scientific” without reference to the “religious.” Weber’s contribution to the progress of scientific rationality leads to a greater self-awareness and capacity for self-expression on the part of science. After Weber’s analysis, aspects of scientific rationality that had remained (or were kept) hidden are brought into the open. Weber’s analysis shows scientific rationality to have much more in common with religious rationality than was previously believed. Not only does Weber’s work lay bare this commonality, it also opens up the possibility of a mutually enriching conversation between the two. It should be kept in mind that Weber expressed admiration for individuals struggling to promote such a conversation and contempt for those attempting to replace religion with (social) scientific metaphysics (see Section 2.3). Consequently, the taking forward of this conversation using the resources in Weber’s scholarship means remaining true to Weber’s spirit.

152 / THE POSTMODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF MAX WEBER’S LEGACY As was the case in Weber’s day, many are hearkening and yearning for a “re-enchantment” of the world today. Whether they are the pseudo-prophets in the churches (or masjids, synagogues, temples) or “big children” occupying academic chairs in the universities, from Weber’s perspective, these individuals do not measure up to “the demands of the day.” There is nothing in Weber’s work that provides any evidence for the presence of supernatural charisma in the world. Because enchantment requires the presence of the supernatural in the natural world, one cannot talk about re-enchantment being a Weberian possibility. But Weber does conclusively demonstrate the presence of the suprarational element in all rationality—scientific rationality no less than any other rationality. In other words Weber’s corpus provides the evidence for the reality of the suprarational, not the supernatural. The ultimate value in Weberian methodology is “plain intellectual integrity”—this is the one and all important value that is the life-blood of genuine scientific inquiry. This value requires two things: (a) that the hope for re-enchantment be abandoned and (b) the suprarational elements in scientific rationality be recognized, embraced, and accounted for. In making these demands the Weberian corpus asks us to look at the enchantment/ disenchantment dialectic from a new perspective and in return this corpus opens up new intellectual and cultural horizons only obscurely perceived previously.

E NDNOTES

Chapter 1 1. The term “modern” is used in a very general historico-epistemological sense. It refers to a specific historical claim that there exists universally valid, rational reason that is uniquely capable of providing an exhaustive, objective, and universally valid description of all of reality (Hekman, 1994, 282 ff.). The modern era is characterized by “the practical universalization of reason . . . the thoroughgoing rationalization and intellectualization of all the action and the symbolic systems of society” (Markus, 1992, 32). The term “postmodern” is also used in a very general historico-epistemological sense, in contradistinction to the “modern.” It refers to that historical claim, which challenges the universality and the universalization of the modernist understanding of reason. In the place of a universal, objectively valid, rational metanarrative “postmodernism is that which works to expose and transgress the limits of the modern order through the aporetic resuscitation of forms of difference or otherness which are repressed by, or concealed within, this [i.e. modern] order” (Gane, 2002, 10). The term “fragmentation of reason” and the demise of its inner unity/coherence (Markus, 1992, 32) describes the postmodern position vis-à-vis the contemporary situation in which the modernist view of reason finds itself. 2. Given what Weber has said about modern science, economics, and politics it is a patent misinterpretation of Weber to claim that Weber sees a linear and necessary development from the enchanted to the religious to the disenchanted cultural conditions. For Weber, modern science, economics, or politics are neither the products of any immutable character present in human nature nor any unalterable, immutable, universal “laws” that necessitate and dictate an unalterable course of historical development. Specific citations from Weber’s work on this account are presented in the forthcoming pages. 3. The terms “practical rationalization,” “theoretical rationalization,” and “rationality,” as they are used in the present discussion, call for some comment. Kaye (1992, 53) uses the terms “practical rationalization” and “theoretical rationalization” to describe what Weber calls the rationalization of the “practical–ethical attitude” and the “intellectual–theoretical” attitude (RRW, 324). Weber posits that “rationality, in the sense of logical or teleological ‘consistency’ . . . has and always has had power over man, however limited and unstable this power is and has been in the face of other forces of historical life” (RRW, 324). While the degree and manner in which this power has exercised its influence in human affairs during the course of history has been infinitely varied, the fact of its exercise and influence is a universal given for Weber. The fundamental characteristic of rationality is the “imperative for consistency” (RRW, 324). The quest and urge for consistency has expressed itself in almost infinitely diverse ways and in almost infinitely diverse areas. Practical rationalization refers to following the imperative of consistency in the manner in which human beings behave and act in the world, as they attempt to procure their material and ideal interests—Weber calls this the “practical–ethical attitude” (RRW, 324). But human beings don’t behave any which way they please, their behavior is itself shaped by a rationalized

154 / ENDNOTES understanding of the world, which makes certain modes of behavior possible, others possible but undesirable, still others possible and desirable and perhaps some seemingly impossible but most desirable. Theoretical rationalization refers to following the imperative of consistency at the level of rationally conceptualizing the image of the world and the human being’s place in it—Weber calls this the “intellectual–theoretical attitude” (RRW, 324). In short the term “practical rationalization” refers to the manner in which rationality has shaped the practical–ethical behavior of human beings in the world. And “theoretical rationalization” refers to the manner in which rationality has shaped the theoretical– intellectual concepts and conceptual systems that human beings have articulated during the course of history to describe their understanding of the world and the human being’s place in it. 4. The term “brotherhood” should be understood in the context in which Weber used it, not in the gender-specific sense in which it is expressed. In its Weberian context the term can be understood to be referring to “human solidarity.” The gender-specific sense in which the concept of “human solidarity” (and its opposite) is expressed, is retained only for practical purposes and not as the expression of a value judgment. 5. This is the first point of a parallel between Weber’s view on science and politics. For Weber the religion vs. science divide presents itself on two levels: (a) science negates the religious claim that the universe is inherently meaningful and (b) science posits a “battle of the gods” at the level of ethics in the place of religious claim of universal brotherhood as the integrative ethic. Another interpretation of the disenchantment thesis can be that it posits an unbridgeable divide between religion and politics. For Weber the teachings of “religion” stand in irreconcilable tension with the demands of “politics” on two different but related accounts. He illustrates these differences by referring to the Gospels, more specifically to the Sermon on the Mount. First, Weber notes: By the Sermon on the Mount we mean the absolute ethic of the gospel, which is a more serious matter than those who are fond of quoting these commandments today believe. This ethic is no joking matter . . . it is not a cab, which one can have stopped at one’s pleasure; it is all or nothing. This is precisely the meaning of the gospel, if trivialities are not to result. Hence, for instance, it was said of the wealthy young man, “he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.” The evangelist commandment, however, is unconditional and unambiguous: give what thou hast—absolutely everything. The politician will say this is a socially senseless imposition as long as it is not carried out everywhere. Thus the politician upholds taxation, confiscatory taxation, outright confiscation; in a word compulsion and regulation for all. (PV, 119) Since politics is a cultural activity in the world, of the world, and for the world, it uses worldly means in the pursuit of its worldly values. Since religion’s ultimate value is not of this world or for this world, it asks it adherents to sever all connections with the material goods of this world in the pursuit of otherworldly salvation. Second, Or, take the example, “turn the other cheek”: This command is unconditional and does not question the source of the other’s authority to strike. Except for a saint it is an ethic of indignity. This is it: one must be saintly in everything; at least in intention, one must live like Jesus, the apostles, St. Francis, and their like. Then this ethic makes sense, and expresses a kind of dignity; otherwise, it does not. For if it is said, in line with the acosmic ethic of love, “Resist not him that is evil with force,” for the politician the reverse proposition holds, “thou shalt resist evil by force,” or else you are responsible for the evil winning out. He who wishes to follow the ethic of the gospel should abstain from strikes, for strikes mean compulsion . . . (PV, 119 ff.)

ENDNOTES / 155 Whereas nonresistance (i.e., love) is the most noble religious ideal in the world, the use of force and compulsion is the indispensable means for carrying out political activity. Weber sums up the two differences between “religion” and “politics” in these words: The position of the Gospels is absolutely unambiguous on the decisive points. They are in opposition not just to war, of which they make no specific mention, but ultimately to each and every law of the social world, if this seeks to be a place of worldly “culture”, one devoted to beauty, dignity, honor and greatness of man as a creature of this earth. (BTL, 78) Rationalized religious behavior and rationalized political behavior, naturally contradict each other. If one wants to be truly “religious” (in contrast to being “trivially” religious) then one must follow the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount in every respect—the imperative of inner consistency demands this—renounce all violence and give up all worldly possessions. But from the political perspective this is clearly “undignified” behavior— politics has its own inner logic and its imperative for inner consistency requires that the “dignity . . . of man as a creature of this earth” be upheld by all means necessary, including the use of violence. If this is all that Weber has to say on the matter, then there is indeed an unbridgeable divide between religion and politics. But a more considered reading of Weber’s work reveals that his work contains the resources to bridge this divide, just as it contains the resources to bridge the religion vs. science divide. 6. Even though Hume died almost a century before Weber’s birth, his views on the (non) relationship of religion and science marks “the completion of a paradigm shift” (Preus, 1987, xiv) in modern thought. This paradigm shift exercised great influence in Weber’s day, and continues to do so even today. Preus notes: Hume produced a thoroughgoing naturalistic critique of all available theological explanations of religion, whether rationalistic or revelational. But only because he pursued the logical consequences of his critique in his Natural History of Religion (1757) can we claim for him the achievement of a paradigmatic moment. For Hume not only undercut all appeals to supernatural causes of religion, but went on to propose alternative paths of explanation of the available data—paths hat are still traveled by scholars of religion. (Preus, 1987, xv) 7. The critique of Weber offered by Wittenberg and Casanova as being an advocate/example of Enlightenment thought is intended to be illustrative not comprehensive. There are many others who view Weber’s work as an exemplary expression of Enlightenment thought. For a Thomist critique of Weber in this regard, see Midgley (1983). For a critique from the position of “radical orthodoxy,” see Milbank (1998, 75–143). Even though he is referring to only one of Weber’s works, the absoluteness of Barbalett’s verdict suggests that he might just as well be speaking of Weber’s scholarship in general: “Max Weber’s The Protestant Spirit and the Spirit of Capitalism is a manual of Cartesian principles concerning rationality, emotion, and the opposition between them” (Barbalett, 2000, 349).

Chapter 2 1. Recent Weber scholarship has uncovered a strong influence of Nietzsche’s thought on Weber’s work that went largely unnoticed by earlier Weber scholarship. This influence has been documented and commented upon by, among others, David Owen in “Autonomy and ‘Inner Distance’: A Trace of Nietzsche in Weber” in History of the Human Sciences, 1991, 4/1: 79–91. Tracy Strong has put forward the argument that Weber consciously structured the essay “The Social Psychology of World Religions” along the same lines as

156 / ENDNOTES Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Besides the resemblance in the structure of the essay, Weber echoes key aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity, but does stop short of calling the entire ethical enterprise into question, as Nietzsche does. See, “ ‘What Have We to Do with Morals?’ Nietzsche and Weber on History and Ethics” in History of the Human Sciences, 1992, 5/3: 9–18. In putting forth the argument that there is a direct link between these two works, Strong is concurring with an earlier observation offered by Wilhelm Hennis. Hennis has also proposed that while Nietzsche is not explicitly mentioned by Weber in his essay on the social psychology of world religions, the whole essay is “an analysis of the role that according to Nietzsche, affliction played in the formation of salvation religions” (Hennis, 1988, 152). Hennis goes on to note that “the parallels between Nietzches’ ‘brilliant essay’ (as Weber called the third section of On the Genealogy of Morals) and his own essays are so striking that, once indicated, they cannot escape our notice” (Hennis, 1988, 155). 2. For Weber it is not only science that stands in close proximity to faith, in even stronger terms he posits that there can be no such thing as politics in the absence of faith: . . . the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner strength. Exactly what the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power and uses power, looks like is a matter faith. The politician may serve national, humanitarian, social, ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious ends. The politician may be sustained by a strong belief in “progress”—no matter in which sense—or he may coolly reject this kind of belief. He may claim to stand in the service of an “idea” or, rejecting this in principle, he may want to serve external ends of everyday life. However, some kind of faith must always exist. Otherwise it is absolutely true that the curse of the creature’s worthlessness overshadows even the externally strongest political successes. (PV, 117) Whatever their other differences maybe (and there are many) and however profound these difference may be (and they are very profound) politics and religion share one thing in common—faith. Weber notes that the goods that politics has to offer cannot be had in the absence of faith, even more significantly there can no cultural activity called “politics” in the absence of faith. The implications of this observation by Weber are far reaching and are explored further in the following pages of the chapter. 3. Shils describes the occasion and intent behind the writing of this piece: The essay on “Objectivity” had its immediate origins in [Weber’s] desire to clarify the implications of a very concrete problem. Weber, together with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffe, was assuming the editorship of Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik which was, from his assumption of editorial responsibility in 1904 until its suspension in 1933, probably the greatest periodical publication in the field of the social sciences in any language. He wished to make explicit the standards which the editors would apply and to which they would expect their contributors would conform. In doing so, his powerful mind, which strove restlessly for clarity at levels where his contemporaries were satisfied with ambiguities and cliches, drove through to the fundamental problems of the relationship between general sociological concepts and propositions on the one hand, and concrete historical reality on the other. Another problem which was to engage him until his death—the problem of the relationship between evaluative standpoints or normative judgments and empirical knowledge—received its first full statement in this essay. (OSS, iii ff.) According to Shils this essay is both a reflection and a statement of Weber’s deep concern for logical and methodological clarity. At the same time it is the “first full statement” that

ENDNOTES / 157 Weber produced on a problem that would “engage him until his death”—i.e., the place of value judgments in the scientific enterprise. 4. Weber appears to be saying that science is not made with the “head” alone—something in addition to cool, detached objectivity is needed in order to sustain, nourish, and cultivate the vocation of science. In quite explicit terms Weber notes that “Surely, politics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the head alone” (PV, 127). He details this point at another place in his lecture: Politics is made with the head, not with other parts of the body or soul. And yet devotion to politics, if it is not to be frivolous intellectual play but rather genuinely human conduct, can be born and nourished from passion alone. (PV, 115). Given what Weber has to say about the maxim that “from good comes only good; but from evil only evil follows” it appears that any “success” in the field of politics is the result of “destinies hidden from us, and besides ‘gifts.’ ” Speaking of this maxim, coined by a close friend of his who was also a well-known politician, Weber notes: But it is rather astonishing that such a thesis could come to light two thousand five hundred years after the Upanishads. Not only the whole course of world history, but every frank examination of everyday experience points to the very opposite. The development of religions all over the world is determined by the fact that the very opposite is true . . . This problem—the experience of irrationality of the world—has been the driving force of all religious evolution. The Indian karma, Persian dualism, the doctrine of original sin, predestination, deus absconditus, all these have grown out of this experience. Also the early Christians knew full well the world is governed by demons and that he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant. (PV, 122 ff.) 5. The account of “value-free” science offered by Löwith is to be contrasted with that offered by Wolf, insofar as this distinction has a bearing on the present discussion as it unfolds in the following chapters. Wolf interprets Weber’s notion of the value-freedom of science in these words: While on the one hand Weber’s insistence upon the “value-freedom of science” had certainly established a separation between the worlds of belief and knowledge, of the systematic and the operational, he sought on the other hand time and again to achieve a new synthesis in the concept of fate, to suffuse these separate domains with the common glow of the supra-rational vital energy which derived its power from a divinely inspired existentiality. (Wolf, 1989, 123) Wolf ’s interpretation of Weber’s notion of “value-free” science sees it as implying an empirical divide between “the worlds of belief and knowledge, of the systematic and the operational.” Löwith’s more considered and accurate interpretation sees the notion of “value-free” science implying a conceptual distinction between faith and science that cannot be reduced (or raised) to the level of empirical reality. Most of Weber scholarship has tended to agree with Wolf on this issue, but a review of Weber’s own writings clearly evidences that Löwith’s interpretation is much closer to Weber’s own position in that he sees the difference in conceptual terms, not in empirical terms. The evidence from Weber’s own work to support Löwith’s assessment is presented in the next chapter. 6. Scholars looking at Weber’s work have questioned whether Weber succeeds in his attempt to stay clear of linear causality. After quoting Weber as saying “Thus far the continuum of European culture has known neither completed cyclical movements nor an unambiguously

158 / ENDNOTES oriented ‘unilinear development,’ ” Gerth and Mills assert that they “nevertheless feel justified in holding that a unilinear construction is clearly implied in Weber’s idea of the bureaucratic trend” (FMW, 51). Mitzman’s position is similar to that of Gerth and Mills. Referring to Weber, Mitzman notes: “for all his theoretical emphasis on plural causation, Weber later came very close to what amounted to a transposition of Marx’s monistic explanation from the economic to the political realm” (Mitzman, 1970, 183 ff.). Mitzman identifies the bureaucracy as being at the base of the Weberian superstructure, in the place of the economic base of the Marxian superstructure. Turner is also of the opinion that a certain interpretation of the concept of “elective affinity” comes “very close to a Marxist view that beliefs are socially constructed in terms of dominant economic interests” (Turner, 1992, 45). For a recent spirited defense of Weber’s “principled commitment to multicausality” and his work exemplifying “radically multicausal analyses” see Kalberg, 1994. Kalberg argues: “Weber’s historicist stress upon individual constellations and the dynamics of historical contingency, as well as his refusal to view ‘abstract uniformities,’ including even ideal types, as other than heuristic concepts indicates a deep commitment to a broadly multicausal methodology, as does his explicit rejection of all theories of universal stages and laws” (Kalberg, 1994, 52). Ringer (1997) has offered an excellent explication of the issues that are so often confused when this aspect of Weber’s work is discussed. The term “singular causal analysis” refers to the “what” of Weber’s object of study. For example in PESC, Weber is offering a causal analysis of one particular cultural phenomenon at one particular time in history—capitalism in modern Western Europe. In order to study this particularity he employs a “multicausal methodology” and offers a “multicausal analysis” for the purposes of comparison and contrast so that he can isolate a particular “cause” that he can offer as a causal interpretation for this particular cultural phenomenon. While Weber engages in multicausal analysis to offer a scientific account of a particular cultural phenomenon, the Verstehen method and the Historical School endeavored to identify a single cause that could be used to give a scientific account of multiple phenomena in empirical reality—and perhaps of all phenomena in empirical reality. This issue is detailed in chapter 4. 7. The words that Weber uses to critique Weltanschauugs—politicians are almost the same as the words that he uses to critique Weltanschauugs—scientists. And the words that he uses to complement those attempting to bridge the religion vs. science divide are strikingly similar to the words he uses to complement those attempting to bridge the divide between spiritual values and politics: If in these times, which, in your opinion, are not times of “sterile” excitation— excitation is not, after all, genuine passion—if now suddenly the Weltanschauungs— politicians crop up en masse and pass the watchword, “The world is stupid and not base, not I,” “The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon the others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baselessness I shall eradicate,” then I declare frankly that I would first inquire into the degree of inner poise backing this ethic of ultimate ends. I am under the impression that in nine out of ten cases I deal with windbags who do not fully realize what they take upon themselves but who intoxicate themselves with romantic sensations. From a human point of view this is not very interesting to me, nor does it move me profoundly. However, it is immensely moving when a mature man—no matter whether old or young in years—is aware of a responsibility of the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says’: “Here I stand; I can do no other.” There is something genuinely human and moving. And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realize the possibility of finding himself at some time in that position. (PV, 127)

ENDNOTES / 159 Chapter 3 1. Weber asks the very same question with respect to politics. His lecture “Politics as a Vocation” revolves around “the general question of what politics as a vocation means and what it can mean” (PV, 77). After providing the requisite definitions, identifying the actors, delineating the roles and tracing the historical development of all that he considers most relevant to his discussion of politics, Weber begins the concluding part of his lecture by posing the following question: “What calling can politics fulfill quite independently of its goals within the total ethical economy of human conduct—which is, so to speak, the ethical locus where politics is at home?” (PV, 117). In other words, after having examined politics as a “fact” in/of human culture, Weber turns his attention to the “value” of politics in the total life of humanity—and what contribution can the factual/scientific study of politics make to the human understanding of values. 2. For a detailed description of the dates, parties, and positions in the Wertulteilsstreit, see Ciaffa (1998). Ciaffa offers an excellent descriptive and critical analysis of the debate. His analysis of the debate is not merely of historical interest—he demonstrates the relevance of this debate to late twentieth-century discussions on the relationship of values to scientific inquiry. 3. Any discussion of the value of science has to take into account the unique characteristics of science that set it apart from other cultural activities. Weber has identified the abstract concept and the controlled experiment as the “means” unique to science. Similarly, any discussion of the value of politics has to begin with an understanding of the uniqueness of politics as a cultural activity. For Weber this uniqueness can only be defined in terms of “the specific means peculiar to it”—and in the case of “every political association” this is “the use of physical force” (PV, 78). Every human culture, at all times in history has known a “political association” of some type or another. In the modern cultural condition, the nation-state has become the “political association” par excellence. Weber notes: Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state—nobody says that—but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib—have known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that “territory” is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the “right” to use violence. Hence, “politics” for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power among states or among groups within a state. (PV, 78) In other words while science can be considered to lay claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of rationality the nation-state lays claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. 4. For Weber politics has nothing whatsoever to say about the ends (or values) towards which the means available to nation-state are to be employed—the state is solely concerned with exercising power/violence. Weber notes: The developments of the past few decades, and especially the unprecedented events to which we are now witness, have heightened the prestige of the state tremendously. Of all the various associations, it alone is accorded “legitimate” power over life, death, and liberty. Its agencies use these powers against external enemies in

160 / ENDNOTES wartime and against internal resistance in both war and peace. In peacetime, it is the greatest entrepreneur in economic life and the most powerful collector of tributes from the citizenry; and in time of war, it disposes of unlimited power over all available economic goods. Its modern rationalized form of organization has made achievements possible in many spheres which could not have been approximated by any other sort of social organization. It is almost inevitable that people should conclude that it represents the “ultimate” value—especially in the political sphere— and that all social actions should be evaluated in terms of their relations to its interests. This is an inadmissible deduction of a value-judgment from a statement of fact, even if we disregard, for the time being, the ambiguity of the conclusions drawn from that value-judgment. (MEN, 46) 5. While the bridging of the fact/value dichotomy in Weber’s writing on the methodology of scientific inquiry yields (or requires) the concept of “meaning,” the bridging of this dichotomy in his writing on politics yields (or requires) the concept of “legitimacy.” He notes: Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?. (PV, 78) In short, the exercise of power/violence requires that those exercising it and those subject to it accept it as being “legitimate.” After highlighting the place of legitimacy in politics, Weber begins to look for its source: It is understood that, in reality, obedience is determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope—fear of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power-holder, hope for reward in this world or in the beyond—and besides all this, by interests of the most varied sort . . . However, in asking for the “legitimations” of this obedience, one meets with these three “pure” types: “traditional,” “charismatic,” and “legal.” These conceptions of legitimacy and their inner justification are of very great significance for the structure of domination. (PV, 79) He goes on to note that “legitimacy” is composed of not only “inner” values/justifications but also “outer” facts/material goods: Organized domination, which calls for continuous administration, requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be bearers of legitimate power. On the other hand, by virtue of this obedience, organized domination requires the control of those material goods which in a given case are necessary for the use of physical violence. Thus, organized domination requires control of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration. The administrative staff, which externally represents the organization of political domination, is, of course, like any other organization, bound by obedience to the power-holder and not alone by the concept of legitimacy, of which we have just spoken. There are two other means, both of which appeal to personal interests: material reward and social honor. (PV, 80) Not unlike Weber’s concept of “meaning,” the concept of “legitimacy” is simultaneously a fact and a value—depending on the perspective from which the concept is viewed, and conditions under which it is viewed.

ENDNOTES / 161 6. Weber’s study of politics reveals that not only is legitimacy a fact in all politics, it is simultaneously a value that makes all political activity possible. The crisis of legitimacy in modern politics rests on the fact that the fact of power and domination is raised to the level of the highest value—after the modern state has expropriated all and any means by which its claim could be challenged: Everywhere the development of the modern state is initiated through the action of the prince. He paves the way for the expropriation of the autonomous and “private” bearers of executive power who stand beside him, of those who in their own right possess the means of administration, warfare, and financial organization, as well as politically usable goods of all sorts. The whole process is a complete parallel with the development of the capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of the independent producers. In the end, the modern state controls the total means of political organization, which actually come together under a single head. No single official personally owns the money he pays out, or the buildings, stores, tools and war machines he controls. (PV, 82) But in making the “fact” of power and violence the ultimate “value,” modern politics has put the very issue of legitimacy into question. Just as modern science has rejected any and all claims of any “meaning” in the universe besides its pursuit of rationalized knowledge, the modern state has rejected any and all claims of legitimacy in the world besides the legitimacy that it holds. But neither modern science nor modern politics can provide an adequate account of the grounds on which their own claims stand. In his analysis of political trends in which he was a participant/observer Weber is able to discern developments in modern politics that seem to be the first steps towards challenging this totalitarian claim: In the contemporary “state”—and this is essential for the concept of state—the “separation” of the administrative staff, of the administrative officials, and of the workers from the material means of administrative organization is completed. Here the most modern development begins, and we see with our own eyes the attempt to inaugurate the expropriation of this expropriation of the political means, and therewith of political power. (PV, 82) The value of Weber’s scientific investigation of politics in an age of disenchanted meaninglessness appears to be that Weber’s investigation establishes the categorical indispensability of a concept that modern politics renders/considers completely irrelevant—that is, of legitimacy.

Chapter 4 1. For a general description of the intellectual climate and context in which Weber articulated his position on the methodology of the sociocultural sciences see Alexander, 1983, vol. 3, 4–10. For a detailed description of both the context and Weber’s intellectual antecedents, see Ringer, 1997, 7–62 and Ciaffa, 1998, 40–56. 2. For an excellent description of the manner in which Weber’s methodology attempts to simultaneously critique and affirm aspects of the objectivist and subjectivist positions, see Hekman, 1994. While Hekman offers an excellent descriptive analysis, her critique of Weber’s methodology is colored by her commitments to certain postmodern positions, especially that of Foucault. 3. In the secondary reading I came across only two indirect references to the relationship between ideal type and imputation. First Ringer: In any case, one cannot understand Weber’s doctrine of ideal types apart from his broader vision of causal analysis and interpretation. For Weber and for us, in sum,

162 / ENDNOTES ideal types make sense only to the extent that they permit discriminations and counterfactual “comparisons” involved in the construction of adequate interpretations or explanations. (Ringer, 1997, 5) Ringer goes on to devote an entire chapter detailing this point. Second Kalberg has an entire chapter titled “Ideal Types as Hypothesis-Forming Models” (Kalberg, 1994, 92–142). He notes that Weber continuously constructs ideal-types throughout Economy and Society “to offer causal explanation of unique cases and developments” (Kalberg, 1994, 92). But in both cases, neither of the two authors go beyond these observations to explore the methodological significance and meaning of the relationship between ideal type and “causal analysis and interpretation” or “causal explanation.” It is only by explicitly recognizing the fact that the ideal type is a means to an end that the true significance of Weber’s methodology can be appreciated—for Weber the ideal type is a means and the imputation is the end. By identifying the imputation as the form in which a scientific hypothesis is offered, Weber is identifying a third mode of scientific inquiry besides induction and deduction. It is obviously the case that Weber accepts and employs the inductive and deductive modes of inquiry in his methodology and practice of science—the degree to which he employs the two has been recognized and debated in agonizing detail in Weber scholarship. But Weber’s genius and originality lies in recognizing and employing a third mode of scientific inquiry, imputation—and accounting for it in his methodology. The real significance of this “discovery” by Weber becomes clear when it is demonstrated that his methodology makes possible not only the “unification of the cultural and social sciences,” (as demonstrated by Ringer) it contains all the resources to unify the natural/physical sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the social/cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). 4. Huff sees a remarkable similarity between Weber’s notion of imputation and C.S. Peirce’s notion of abduction, see Peirce (1955). Huff notes that schematically speaking an imputation is very similar to an abduction. In both cases, scientific knowledge of empirical reality is the product of a reasoning process that passes through these stages: [G]iven some puzzling (actions or) events, these events would make sense if they were part of a hypothetical constellation of processes characterized by properties a,b,c. If such hypothetical processes (and their properties) did obtain then the puzzling (actions or) events would follow “as a matter of course.” (Huff, 1984, 68) This observation by Huff, made in passing in the concluding pages of his survey of Weber’s methodology, contains an insight that needs to be explored in greater depth if the latent potential in Weber’s methodological writings is to be truly appreciated. Not only is Weber’s notion of imputation remarkably similar to Peirce’s notion of abduction, Weber’s entire explication of the methodology of scientific inquiry is remarkably similar to Peirce’s. A comparative study of the two thinkers, with respect to a common issue will reveal that at the beginning of the twentieth century both of them resolved some of the most difficult and seemingly intractable problems in the area of the methodology of scientific inquiry— the unification of the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften being among the most prominent. If a resolution continues to elude the scholarly community at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it demonstrates the degree of self-understanding and selfknowledge characteristic of this community far more than it evidences the difficulty of the “problem.” 5. Just as all scientific inquiry is composed on subjective and objective elements, Weber’s description of politics suggests that all political activity is also made up of subjective and objective elements. He notes: One can say that three pre-eminent qualities are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion.

ENDNOTES / 163 This means passion in the sense of matter-of-factness, of passionate devotion to a “cause,” to the god or demon who is its overlord. It is not passion in the sense of that inner bearing which my late friend, George Simmel, used to designate as “sterile excitation,” . . . It is an excitation that plays so great a part with our intellectuals in this carnival we decorate with the proud name of “revolution.” It is a “romanticism of the intellectually interesting,” running into emptiness devoid of all feeling of objective responsibility. To be sure, mere passion, however genuinely felt, is not enough. It does not make a politician, unless passion as devotion to a “cause” also make responsibility to this cause the guiding star of action. And for this, a sense of proportion is needed. This is the decisive psychological quality of the politician: his ability to let realities work upon him with inner concentration and calmness. Hence his distance to things and men. “Lack of distance” per se is one of the deadly sins of every politician. It is one of those qualities the breeding of which will condemn the progeny of our intellectuals to political incapacity. (PV, 115) Weber notes that the “passionate devotion” (a subjective state) has to be complemented by a sense of “matter-of-factness” (objective distance) in order to give rise to a genuine “political personality.” A purely subjective pursuit of power, without maintaining objective distance can only lead to disaster. Speaking of the politician, Weber notes: He works with striving for power as an unavoidable means. Therefore, “power instincts,” as is usually said, belongs indeed to his normal qualities. The sin against the lofty spirit of his vocation, however, begins where this striving for power ceases to be objective and becomes purely personal self-intoxication, instead of exclusively entering the service of “the cause.” For ultimately there are only two kinds of deadly sins in the field of politics: lack of objectivity and—often but not always identical with it—irresponsibility. Vanity, the need personally to stand in the foreground as clearly as possible, strongly tempts the politicians to commit one or both of these sins . . . Although, or rather just because, power is the unavoidable means, and striving for power is one of the driving forces of all politics, there is no more harmful distortion of political force than the parvenu-like braggart with power, and the vain self-reflection in the feeling of power, and in general every worship of power per se. The mere “power politician” may get strong effects, but actually his work leads nowhere and is senseless. (Among us, too, an ardently promoted cult seeks to glorify him.) In this, the critics of “power politics” are absolutely right. From the sudden inner collapse of typical representatives of this mentality, we can see what inner weakness and impotence hides behind this boastful but entirely empty gesture. It is a product of a shoddy and superficially blasé attitude towards the meaning of human conduct: and it has no relation whatsoever to the knowledge of the tragedy with which all human action, but especially political action, is truly interwoven. (PV, 116 ff.) 6. In Weber’s methodology of (social) scientific inquiry, an imputation represents an objectively possible hypothesis about empirical reality. As already noted it is “objective” and “subjective” in a very specific sense—and an ideal-type which is itself an “imputation” of sorts plays a critical role in its formulation. In sum an imputation is the result (or maybe the cause) of bridging the subject/object dichotomy in the methodology of scientific inquiry. At the political level, it appears that “ethics” is the result (or maybe the cause) of bridging the subject/object dichotomy. Weber makes a distinction between the “ethics of absolute ends” and the “ethics of responsibility” and he also makes a distinction between two types of political actors: the political leader in charge of the political organization and the official or bureaucrat responsible for the day-to-day running of the organization.

164 / ENDNOTES Because their roles are quite different the ethical demands that “politics” places on the two groups appear to be quite different: According to his proper vocation, the genuine official . . . will not engage in politics. Rather, he should engage in impartial “administration.” This also holds for the so-called “political” administrator, at least officially, in so far as the raison d’etat, that is, the vital interests of the ruling order, are not in question. Sine ira et studio, “without scorn and bias,” he shall administer his office. Hence, he shall not do precisely what the politician, the leader as well as his following, must always and necessarily do, namely, fight. To take a stand, to be passionate—ira et stadium—is the politician’s element, and above all the element of the political leader. His conduct is subject to quite a different, indeed, exactly the opposite principle of responsibility from that of the civil servant. The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears to him wrong and if, despite the civil servant’s remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the apparatus would fall to pieces. The honor of the political leader, of the leading statesman, however, lies precisely in an exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer. (PV, 95) It appears that the political leader is called upon to practice the “ethic of ultimate ends” and the political official is called upon to practice the “ethic of responsibility.” But Weber himself clarifies this point toward the end of his lecture: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the “salvation of the soul.” If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking, and two diabolic forces which enter the play remain unknown to the actor. These are inexorable and produce consequences for his action and even for his inner self, to which he must helplessly submit, unless he perceives them. (PV, 126) Here Weber is explicitly stating that if a political leader categorically dispenses with the “ethic of responsibility” his action will be disastrous not only in political terms but also in personal terms. In the absence of an “inner distance” and cool sense of detachment, the political leader will not have the ability to distinguish between his/her own vain, impulsive desires and the needs/interests of the “cause” that he/she is serving. Conversely, in the absence of remarkable degree of inner strength and passionate commitment to his/her profession (i.e., commitment to an “ethic of absolute ends”) the political official or bureaucrat will simply not have the ability to “execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities” as if it “agreed with his own conviction.” In other words, a genuine attitude of sine era et studio can only be cultivated in the presence of passionate commitment, and the claim ira et stadium is meaningful only when it is uttered by an individual capable of a remarkable degree of self-detachment. Ethically irresponsible action will almost inevitably result from the decisions made by political officials lacking passionate commitment to their professions and political leaders lacking objective detachment from their calling. 7. Weber notes that “feeling of power” is one of the “inner enjoyments” that a career in politics offers. Because this “feeling of power” is a cultural good that cannot be acquired from any other human activity (PV, 114 ff.), all those wishing to possess it must engage in politics. This insight combined with description of ethically responsible political action

ENDNOTES / 165 suggests that political activity is not merely about the exercise of power “out there” in the world, it is simultaneously (and perhaps more importantly) an exercise of power over one’s self—in the form of self-control and self-discipline. The ability to control and “dominate” a variety of inner impulses that are part and parcel of the human personality is a fundamental pre-requisite for any ethically responsible political action in the world. This is as true for the political official as it is for the political leader. Weber’s reflections on politics as a vocation lays bare the fact that genuine politics is as much about self-control and selfdiscipline as it is about the domination and control of others: The sentence: “The devil is old; grow old to understand him!” does not refer to age in terms of chronological years. I have never permitted myself to lose out in a discussion through a reference to a date on a birth certificate; but the mere fact that someone is twenty years of age and I am over fifty is no cause for me to think that this alone is an achievement before which I am overawed. Age is not decisive; what is decisive is the trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly. (PV, 126 ff.) The vocation of politics provides a unique opportunity, among all other cultural activities, to come to know the ways of the “devil” and discipline oneself “inwardly” in a way that one can get a perspective on the “realities of life” and gain the strength to “face such realities” that is not possible otherwise.

Chapter 5 1. It is worth reiterating here the sense in which the terms “modern” and “postmodern” are to be understood in the context of the present discussion with reference to what was stated in chapter 1. The term “modern” is used in a very general historico-epistemological sense. It refers to a specific historical claim that there exists a universally valid, rational reason that is uniquely capable of providing an exhaustive, objective, and universally valid description of all of reality (Hekman, 1994, 282 ff.). The modern era is characterized by “the practical universalization of reason . . . the thoroughgoing rationalization and intellectualization of all the action and the symbolic systems of society” (Markus, 1992, 32). The term “postmodern” is also used in a very general historic-epistemological sense, in contradistinction to the “modern.” It refers to that historical claim, which challenges the universality and the universalization of the modernist understanding of reason. In the place of a universal, objectively valid, rational metanarrative, “postmodernism is that which works to expose and transgress the limits of the modern order through the aporetic resuscitation of forms of difference or otherness which are repressed by, or concealed within, this [i.e., modern] order” (Gane, 2002, 10). The term “fragmentation of reason” and the demise of its inner unity/coherence (Markus, 1992, 32) describes the postmodern position vis-à-vis the contemporary situation in which the modernist view of reason finds itself. 2. Once again it is worth emphasizing that by using the term “postmodern” I do not mean to identify Weber, anachronistically, with more recent forms of European post-structuralism, deconstructionism, and other forms of contemporary postmodernism. I only mean to suggest that Weber is profoundly conscious of the problems inherent in the Enlightenment project—and Weber is “postmodern” to the degree that he does all he can to consciously address these problems to the best of his ability given the resources and cultural conditions in which he is living. 3. Faust, Act I, Scene II (Translated by Bayard-Taylor) “The newborn impulse fires my mind, I hasten on, his beams eternal drinking,

166 / ENDNOTES The Day before me and the Night behind. Above me Heaven unfurled, the floor of waves beneath me.” 4. In light of the discussion in this section, it is quite obvious that Weber’s understanding of “progress” is quite different from the definition/understanding that is often attributed to him—for Weber it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about “progress” in universal, necessitarian, linear terms. While this point has been implicit in the foregoing discussion, this appears to be a good place to make it explicit—one can say the same thing about Weber’s understanding of “rationality” and the definition/understanding that is often attributed to him. For Weber it makes no sense whatsoever to talk about “rationality” in universal, necessatrarian, linear terms. In one of his endnotes in PESC he states: Something is never “irrational” in itself but only from a particular “rational” vantage point. For the nonreligious person every religious way of organizing life is irrational; for the hedonist every ascetic organization of life is “irrational” even if it may be, measured against its ultimate values, a “rationalization.” If this essay wishes to make any contribution at all, may it be to unveil the many-sidedness of a concept—the “rational”—that only appears to be straightforward and linear. (PESC, 170, fn. 10) By citing a concrete example, Weber expresses the same point in even more pointed terms: Magic, . . ., has been just as systematically “rationalized” as physics. The earliest intentionally rational therapy involved the almost complete rejection of the cure of empirical symptoms by empirically tested herbs and potions in favor of the exorcism of (what was thought to be) the “real” (magical, daemonic) cause of the ailment. Formally, it had exactly the same highly rational structure as many of the most important developments in modern therapy. (MEN, 34) Consequently, any acceptance and affirmation of modern medicine (or modern physics) because it is “rational” and the rejection of magic because it is “irrational” evidences the lack of self-understanding and self-awareness on the part of the (modern) individuals taking such a position. For Weber magic is no more and no less “rational” than modern medicine (or physics). Even though they are no different in terms of being more or less “rational,” magic and modern medicine (or physics) are different in terms of the goods (or ends/values) that they promise to deliver. Therefore, the choice of one “rationality” and the rejection of the other has more to do with the value that is placed in the goods (or the fruits) that one offers and the other does not. 5. The examples of Tenbruk and Bendix are cited only for illustrative purposes. Their reading of Weber is dualistic on two different, but related, counts: (a) divorcing his scholarship on the sociology of culture from his work on the methodology of (social) scientific inquiry and (b) divorcing the value-orientation informing Weber’s pursuit of scientific knowledge from his scientific findings. This type of differentiated and fragmented reading of Weber is a defining characteristic of most Weber scholarship. This is not to suggest that there is no value in such a differentiated and fragmented reading of Weber. If approached with a particular value-orientation, this differentiated and fragmented reading of Weber can become a most valuable tool in gaining deeper insights into his scholarship. This point is detailed shortly. 6. Even though the discussion of Weber’s views on politics has been carried out in a hasty (and perhaps harried) manner, the following can be offered as the starting point (or maybe the conclusion) of Weber’s analysis of the political sphere. For Weber the exercise of power, domination, and violence are the means that are specific to political activity—means that distinguish it from all other human cultural activities. As a human cultural activity, politics, like all other human cultural activities, appears to be made possible by presuppositions

ENDNOTES / 167 and extra-political value-ideas that are outside its own sphere. If “politics” is understood specifically in terms of the means that are unique to it, then it is made possible by politically irrational elements. Given the discussion in chapter 3, the nonpolitical elements in political rationality can be summarized thus: (a) Political legitimacy is real. (b) Political legitimacy can be had. (c) Political legitimacy is worth having. The discussion in chapter 4 suggested that for Weber the exercise of power, violence, and domination in the world “out there” must be accompanied by the highest regard for ethics by the political actor. This regard for ethics should express itself in the form of passionate commitment to a political cause (or task) complemented by self-control, self-discipline and inner distance in the service of the cause (or task). In other words politics is as much an exercise in self-mastery as it is an exercise in dominating others. For Weber political activity divorced from self-mastery inevitably produces results that lead to the loss of control over what is “out there”—that over which one thought one had control. Combining what Weber has said about legitimacy, ethics, and the exercise of power, we can draw the following conclusion: If the political exercise of power (i.e., domination of others) is divorced from ethics (i.e., self-mastery and self-control), the legitimacy of any/all achievements attained by the exercise of violence/power will stand discredited. Once legitimacy is undermined then political activity, by definition, ceases to be real. Weber’s observations at the conclusion of World War I and the terms on which it was concluded, poignantly summarize the relationship between “legitimacy” and “ethics” by challenging the claim that an immediate “success” in the realm of politics evidences the “rightness” of the action. This claim is similar to that of a suitor who wins the hand of a maiden, and then proceeds to conclude that this is evidence that he was “worthy” of her hand while his competitor was not: It is no different, of course, if after a victorious war the victor in undignified selfrighteousness claims, “I have won because I was right.” Or, if somebody under the frightfulness of war collapses psychologically, and instead of simply saying it was just too much, he feels the need to legitimizing his war weariness to himself by substituting the feeling, “I could not bear it because I had to fight for a morally bad cause.” And likewise with the defeated in war. Instead of searching like old women for the “guilty one” after the war—in a situation in which the structure of society produced the war—everyone with a manly and controlled attitude would tell the enemy, “We lost the war. You have won it. That is now all over. Now let us discuss what conclusions must be drawn according to the objective interests came into play and what is the main thing view of the responsibility towards the future which above all burdens the victor.” Anything less is undignified and will become a boomerang. A nation forgives if its interests have been damaged, but no nation forgives if its honor has been offended, especially by a bigoted self-righteousness. Every new document that comes to light after decades revives the undignified lamentations, the hatred and scorn, instead of allowing the war at its end to be buried, at least morally. This is possible only through objectivity and chivalry and above all only through dignity. But never is it possible through an “ethic,” which in truth signifies a lack of dignity on both sides. Instead of being concerned about what the politician is interested in, the future and the responsibility towards the future, this ethic is concerned about politically sterile questions of past guilt, if such guilt exists at all. And it overlooks the unavoidable falsification of the whole problem, through very material interests: namely, the victor’s interests in the greatest possible moral and material gain; the hopes of the defeated to trade in advantages

168 / ENDNOTES through confessions of guilt. If anything is “vulgar,” then, this is, and it is the result of this fashion of exploiting “ethics” as a means of “being in the right.” (PV, 118). There is very little doubt in Weber’s mind regarding the fate of the “peace” achieved by equating “legitimacy” with the ethical claim of “being in the right” and then proceeding to reap material benefits from this “ethical” claim. He notes that “when the period of exhaustion will have passed, the peace will be discredited, not the war” (PV, 120). Less than two decades after Weber spoke these words the “peace” of Versailles stood completely discredited. 7. This approach toward “re-enchantment” would remain faithful to Weber’s methodology of scientific inquiry and his sociological study of culture. Such an approach stands in sharp contrast to the proposal offered by Gane (2002). After offering a positive valuation of Weber’s critique of disenchanting rationalism, Gane turns to the postmodernism of Lyotard, Foucault, and Baudrillard for the possibilities of “re-enchanting” modern culture because he feels that Weber’s thought does not contain the resources to move towards “re-enchantment.” There are two significant shortcomings in Gane’s proposal. First, the postmodernist project advocated by Gane at the beginning of the twenty-first century can be critiqued on the same grounds that Weber critiqued the modernist project of a naturalistic metaphysics in the beginning of the twentieth century (see 2.3). In both a value-laden Weltanschauung based on a patently unscientific metaphysics is presented in the garb of (social) science. In his reading of Lyotard, Gane senses the possibility that the aesthetic sphere seems to “resist and perhaps even threaten the instrumental rationalism which is intrinsic to modern culture” (Gane, 2002, 10). Weber would see Gane’s identification of the aesthetic sphere and modern culture with certain “intrinsic” characteristics as unwarranted metaphysical claims that cannot be justified (social) scientifically. Gane goes on to offer a rereading of Foucault’s “genealogical history” and shows it to be based on a “presentist metanarrative” that “conceals the value and direction of its own enterprise” (Gane, 2002, 11). Gane acknowledges that these are the very characteristics of modern culture that need to be critiqued and transcended. This is a very peculiar proposal on Gane’s part because Weber critiques modern scientific rationalism precisely because it is a “presentist metanarrative” that is unconscious of the value-ideas, presuppositions, and historical trajectory underpinning it. To offer Foucault’s vision as a response to the disenchantment effected by scientific rationalism is to offer a choice between “six of one and a half dozen of the other.” Finally, Gane turns to Baudillard’s work on symbolic exchange. What Gane finds most appealing in Baudillard’s work is “that whereas Weber refuses to place faith in the possibility of the re-enchantment of the world, Baudillard works to affirm this possibility” (Gane, 2002, 11). But at the same time Gane recognizes that Baudillard’s faith in the possibility of “re-enchantment” appears to be based on an underestimation of the “capacity of Western culture to resist the threat of forms that are other to itself ” (Gane, 2002, 11). Perhaps more overtly than Lyotard and Foucault, Baudillard’s is a Weltanschauungs response to disenchantment as the “fate of our times,” a response that simply does not meet the “demands of the day.” The second shortcoming in Gane’s proposal is the fact that the responses offered by Lyotard, Foucault, and Baudillard are responses to particular manifestations of disenchantment and are therefore partial, fragmented, and differentiated. What is more, it appears that the three responses are mutually antagonistic. This attempt at “re-enchantment” is characterized by the same fundamental problems that characterize disenchantment— meaninglessness at the level of theoretical rationalization and an irreconcilable “battle of the gods” at the level of practical rationalization. That much having been said, Gane has made a most valuable contribution to cultural criticism in general and Weber studies in particular by attempting to discover the cultural “meaning” that informed Weber’s scientific study of culture and the possible cultural significance or “meaning” that Weber’s work may still hold.

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N AME I NDEX

Alexander, J. 6, 123–5, 134–5 Barbour, I. 2 Bendix, R. 2, 134 Bruun, H.H. 96 Buddha 34 Casanova, J. 1, 3, 37–8, 64 Chowers, E. 4 Ciaffa, J. 1, 6, 91, 95, 96, 127–9, 134–5 Dilthey, W. 93–4 Durkheim 123–5 Francis 34 Frued, S. 36 Gane, N.

1, 6, 120–2

Hegel 146 Hekman, S. 1, 6, 120–2 Hennis, W. 55 Horowitz, A. 42 Hume, D. 36

Landshut, S. 84–5, 136 Lawrence, B. 1 Löwith, K. 3, 4, 7, 59, 137 Maley, T. 42 Marx, K. 123–5 Mitzman, A. 2 Nietzsche, F. 42, 45, 57 Oakes, G. 91 Parsons, T. 53 Plato 57, 71 Polkinghorne, J. 2 Rickert, H. 85–6, 95–6 Ringer, F. 1, 6, 92, 95, 125–7, 134–5 Schluchter, W. 1, 2, 3, 36, 37–8, 60, 71 Sombart, W. 43

Jaffe 43 Jesus 34

Tenbruk, F. 134 Tolstoy 41, 64, 66, 80 Tönnies, F. 60 Truzzi 91, 92

Kalberg, S. 120, 146 Kant, I. 58 Kaye, H. 83, 84 Knies, K. 92

Windelband, W. 94, 95–6 Wittenberg 1, 2, 34–6, 37, 64 Wolin, S. 34, 57, 58, 82

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S UBJECT I NDEX

Absraction 52–3, 80, 101, 104 Actions 73–5 Anti-Religious Skepticism 33 Archuv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 43 Art see value-spheres (aesthetic) Artist 133 Asceticism 20, 25 Beliefs 45, 49 Bureaucracy 23 Causal laws 91–3 Causality 16, 29–31, 97–8, 103–5 Charisma 9–10, 148–9 Concept 68–9, 96–8, 100–2 Conflation 100–5 Consistency 78–80 Cultural Values 47 Culture Definition 50 and meaning 81–2 and meaninglessness 32 Death 32 Determinism 91–3 Differentiation 15–16 Disenchantment 9 “fate of times” 11–17 meaning 16 of modern culture 10, 33 Empathetic understanding 93–4, 97 Enchantment 9, 33, 156 Ethics and empirical reality 50–1, 53–4 and worldly spheres 17–28

Experiment 68–9 Extra-Scientific 47–8, 58 Faith 13, 48, 62–3, 145 empirical dimension 49–56 and science 43–9, 59 Geist 93 Geisteswissenschaften 94 Gods 18–19, 72–3, 142–7 Hegelianism 90–1 Heuristic devices 99 Historicist method 89–90 Homo-hermeneut 83–4 Ideal interests 54 Ideal types 108–13 Idealism 123–5 Ideographic knowledge 95 Immediate knowledge 100 Imputation 90, 105–14, 138 Inspiration 46 Intellect 14 Intellectual integrity 60 Intellectual sacrifice 13–15, 60, 62 Intellectualism 57 Intellectualization 11–12 Interpretive understanding 103 Intuition 95–6, 102–3 Laws 48, 76, 98 Logic 1, 101, 104 Love 20–1 Magic 68 Market 20

176 / SUBJECT INDEX Material interests 54 Materialism 123–5 Mathematics 102 Meaning 15, 22, 30 and cultural science 43–4, 54, 139–40 and value of science 80–7 Meaninglessness 34, 65 Means/Ends 73–4 Metaphysics 61–2 Methodenstreit 90–6 Money 20 Natur 93 Naturalism 98–9, 102 Naturwissenchaften 94 Neo-Kantianism 90, 95 Nomothetic knowledge 95 Objective possibility 89–96 Objective validity 113–14 Objectivity 43, 89–90 Politics 7 Polytheism 27–8 Presuppositions 12, 31, 43, 77–8, 89 of cultural science 44 of scientific inquiry 58 Problematic knowledge 114–17 Progress 65, 134–7 and self-awareness 130–2 Prophecy 14, 17, 59 Psychologism 100 Rationalism definition 11 scientific and religious 28–9 Scientific versus religious 14, 16 Rationalization 11 of methodology of social science 141–2 practical 11, 17–28 theoretical 11, 28–34, 52 and value of science 72–80

Religion And Enlightenment 36–7 rapproachment with science 60–2, 152–6 Versus rationalism 12, 15–16 Religious Ethic 19 Responsibility 75–6 Salvation 52–3, 147–8 Science and clarity 72 definition 41, 67–72 faith dimension 56 limitations 41 Scientific Rationalism 12, 18 Secularization 37 Sermon on Mount 18 Social Policy 77 Subjectivity And cultural inquiry 70–1 And scientific knowledge 97–8 Supra-rational 45 Theodicy 29–30, 52 Theology as a science 12–13 Validity 43, 49, 89–90, 105 Value-freedom 47, 65 Value-ideas 55, 65, 78, 129–30 Value judgments 43 Value-relevance 65 Value-spheres aesthetic 23–4 economic 19–20, 34 erotic 24–6 political 21–3 religious 18–26 Verstehen 55 Vocation of science 65 Weber’s 57–8, 144–5 War 22 World Image 51, 53–4, 76–8