The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies EUROPE IN TRANSITION: THE NYU EUROPEAN STUDIES ...

Author: Michelle Hale Williams

54 downloads 958 Views 961KB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies

EUROPE IN TRANSITION: THE NYU EUROPEAN STUDIES SERIES

The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After Edited by Martin Schain Europe at the Polls: The European Elections of 1999 Edited by Pascal Perrineau, Gérard Grunberg, and Colette Ysmal Unions, Immigration, and Internationalization: New Challenges and Changing Coalitions in the United States and France By Leah Haus Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe Edited by Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy Edited by Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy By Thomas W. Gold Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Reunification Germany Edited by Richard Alba and Peter Schmidt Germany on the Road to “Normalcy”: Policies and Politics of the Red–Green Federal Government (1998–2002) Edited by Werner Reutter The Politics of Language: Essays on Languages, State and Society Edited by Tony Judt and Denis lacorne Realigning Interests: Crisis and Credibility in European Monetary Integration By Michele Chang The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies By Michelle Hale Williams

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies Michelle Hale Williams

THE IMPACT OF RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN WEST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

© Michelle Hale Williams, 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7415–0 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7415–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Williams, Michelle Hale. The impact of radical right-wing parties in West European democracies/Michelle Hale Williams. p. cm.—(Europe in transition: the NYU European studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: The radical right making noise or changes?—Why is so little known about impacts of peripheral parties?—A theory of peripheral party impact—The impact of radical right parties across Western Europe—The entrepreneurial front in France—German parties have opportunity without actualization—The EPÖ find a winning combination in leadership and the third lager—Peripheral parties are making changes. ISBN 1–4039–7415–2 1. Political parties—Europe, Western. 2. Conservatism—Europe, Western. 3. Right-wing extremists—Europe, Western. 4. Europe—Politics and government—20th century. I. Title. II. Series. JN50.W55 2006 324.2'13094—dc22

2006041588

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: September 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Dedicated to Grace Catherine

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

List of Tables

viii

List of Figures

ix

List of Abbreviations (Key Political Parties)

x

Acknowledgments

xi

Chapter 1

Is the Radical Right Making Noise or Changes?

1

Chapter 2

Why is so Little Known About Impacts of Peripheral Parties?

11

Chapter 3

A Theory of Peripheral Party Impact

33

Chapter 4

The Impact of Radical Right Parties Across Western Europe

53

The Entrepreneurial National Front in France

79

Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8

German Parties Have Opportunity Without Actualization

113

The FPÖ Finds a Winning Combination in Leadership and the Third Lager

153

Peripheral Parties are Making Changes

187

Appendices

211

Notes

217

References

219

Index

237

List of Tables

2.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3

Types of Mainstream Political Parties Tools Used by the Radical Right Wing Typology of Radical Right-Wing Parties Austrian Socioeconomic Data Ranked by Region Percentage of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 1991–1997 Percentage of those who find people of another nationality or race living among them “disturbing” Radical Right Seats in the European Parliament Key French Events of 1997 Seats Won by Radical Right-Wing Parties in State Legislatures Key German Events of 2000–2001 FPÖ seats in the National Council 1956–1999 Change from One Administration to the Next Comparison of Opportunity Structures Comparison of Model Fitness Comparison of Impact

21 39 56 62 65 66 75 100 130 144 164 186 188 196 200

List of Figures

1.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2

Focusing on Radical Right Party Impact Downsian Party Positioning Logic Right-Wing Peripheral Party Goal Relationship between Party Organization and Impact Levels of Impact Immigration Used as an Omnibus Issue European Racism Volume of European Parliament Initiatives Index of European Migration Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issus 1990–2002 Election Year Effect on Article Volume Effect of the National Front on the French Party System Legislative Volume on Immigration 1990–2002 Legislative Volume by Terms in Office Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issue 1990–2002 Variance in News Coverage between CDU and SPD Administrations Legislative Volume on Immigration 1990–2002 FPÖ: Provincial Election Results 1981–2000 Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issue 1990–2002 Legislative Volume on the Immigration Issue 1990–2002 Immigration Initiatives by Electoral Terms 1990–2002 Comparison of Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issue 1990–2002 Comparison of Legislative Volume on the Immigration Issue 1990–2002

4 36 37 38 44 60 67 72 73 100 102 107 109 110 143 145 150 165 178 184 185 203 205

Abbreviations of key political parties discussed CDU CSU DRP DVU FDP FN FPÖ MNR MSI NPD NSDAP ÖVP PCF PDS PFN PS REP RPR SPD SPÖ SRP UDF

Christian Democratic Union, Germany Christian Social Union, Germany German Reich Party, Germany German People’s Union, Germany Free Democratic Party, Germany National Front, France Austrian Freedom Party National Republican Movement, France Italian Social Movement National Democratic Party, Germany National Socialist German Workers Party, Germany Austrian People’s Party Communist Party, France Party of Democratic Socialism, Germany New Force Party, France Socialist Party, France Republican Party, Germany Rally for the Republic, France Social Democratic Party, Germany Social Democratic Party of Austria Socialist Reich Party, Germany Union for French Democracy

Acknowledgments

I have received constructive advice on this project from leading scholars throughout the United States and Europe. I would like to thank especially Martin Schain, Chair of the New York University Center for European Studies. He provided expertise and critical insights on early drafts of the manuscript. His knowledge of radical right-wing parties and the politics of immigration provided key contributions to improve the work. I also would like to thank several leading scholars in the field of political party research, public-opinion research, and the study of the radical right. Thank you to Pascal Perrineau, Professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and director of the Centre d’Etude de la Vie Politique en France (CEVIPOF) in Paris, for his advice on measurement strategies for radical right-wing party impact assessment. Thank you to Nonna Mayer, Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France. Professor Mayer made time to meet with me at odd hours to offer advice on using public-opinion data to approximate radical right impacts. Thank you to Sieglinde Rosenberger, Professor of Political Science at the University of Vienna, Austria for advice on researching political parties in Austria and for source recommendations. Thank you to Timm Beichelt, of the Lehrstuhl für Politikwissenschaft at the Viadrina University, Frankfurt an der Oder, Germany, for looking over the research design and offering scholarly criticism of the method and theoretical framework of this work. I also wish to acknowledge the help that I received from officials of the various party organizations, as well as national-level legislators and bureaucrats in Austria, France, and Germany. I conducted many interviews in the field, using forty-five of those interviews intensively in my manuscript. Insights derived from these interviews proved invaluable in my case-study analysis. I would like to thank the TIRES program promoting scholarly exchanges between universities in the European Union and the United States on topics related to Transnationalism, Immigration, Racism, Ethnocentrism, and the state for supporting my fieldwork. I benefited

xii

●

Acknowledgments

immensely from the doors that this program opened for me and for contacts with scholars participating in the program including Michael Minkenberg at the Viadrina Universität in Frankfurt an der Oder, Germany. I would also like to thank Lynn Staeheli, Professor of Geography at the University of Colorado at Boulder. During fieldwork for this project, I received assistance and support from several people along the way. In particular I would like to thank Hanneliese Losert, for taking an active interest in my work and for offering tremendous logistical assistance during my time in Vienna. Thank you also to the Losert family: Dieter, Hannelore, and Anne Marie as well as to Andreas Rajal in Vienna. In Paris, I would like to thank the Soccart family for their support of my research efforts and for allowing me to stay in their Paris home during my fieldwork. Thank you to Jacques, Martine, Violette, and Capucine. Special gratitude goes to William Safran. I owe much to his expertise, tutelage, and inspiration. He has offered constructive criticism through countless iterations of this project, spurring new ideas and refinements at each step along the way. He continues to challenge me to be both a better scholar and a better person. My other mentors at the University of Colorado gave thoughtful criticism and enormous help in this project. Thank you to Susan Clarke for continuing to encourage me, providing insight and advice beyond my time at Colorado. In this project, you helped me to see the way to rigorously compare case findings to make this analysis more powerful. Thank you to Sven Steinmo, for showing me how to use historical institutionalism to make sense of complex issues in comparative politics. Your comments on early drafts of this work provided greater clarity and also helped me to see how the work fits into a broader discussion of democratic theory and the role that parties play. Thank you to James Scarritt for providing suggestions on how to make this manuscript structurally clearer and theoretically more direct. Finally, thank you to my family: Steve, Grace, Baxter, Mother, and Dad. You always believe in me and you support me. You are my enablers and I am grateful to you beyond what I can express.

CHAPTER ONE

Is the Radical Right Making Noise or Changes?

Overview of Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Party Success In April 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the French far right-wing political party the National Front, won 17 percent of the first-round ballots in the French presidential election. This gave him second-place standing in the first round and set up a runoff election for the presidency between Le Pen and mainstream right party candidate, the incumbent Jacques Chirac. Such national-level presence for the radical right wing may have been thought unimaginable in the early 1990s, when they surged onto the political scene in many West European governments. However, by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the radical right wing had asserted itself nationally in several countries. Radical right-wing leaders entered the governing coalitions in the Netherlands (July 2002), Denmark (November 2001), Italy (May 2001), and Austria (November 1999). The radical right wing had become difficult to dismiss by the end of the twentieth century, yet scholars had no idea how to assess the threat that it poses, if any, and the nature of its effect. Clearly parties of the radical right wing demonstrate a consistent and increasing presence over the past thirteen years or more. However, whether or not the radical right matters in terms of having an impact on governments and societies remains unclear. After all, under its best circumstances the radical right remains only in junior positions within governing coalitions. In many cases, radical right-wing parties do not even hold seats in national legislatures. Indeed, they do create a commotion, attract media attention,

2

●

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties

and prompt both public support and protest, but the story ends there. Yet, on the other hand, what if the radical right has accomplished more than mere noise making? Maybe these parties have changed politics in noticeable and concrete ways, despite their marginal status. This book investigates their effect. The argument presented here is that peripheral parties matter in unorthodox ways. Despite the smallness in size and often extraparliamentary status of radical right-wing parties, their impact is felt throughout Western Europe. Their survival and success depend upon their ability to create their own political opportunities. They use available political resources and navigate around the constraining effect of existing institutions. Their entrepreneurial ability to frame issues and manipulate sentiment makes them a fascinating focus for analysis. However, much of what has been written to date on political parties and the radical right wing fails to address the question of impact for peripheral parties. Political party theory has thus far concentrated on the influence of large, mainstream, catch-all parties while neglecting the more-complicated dynamics of opposition influence. This book attempts to develop and model a process explanation not simply of the influence of opposition but specifically of the more-marginal peripheral parties. It introduces several measures of influence evaluating their empirical capacity to assess impact. It considers impact at three levels—those of agendas, institutions, and policy. Why Measure the Impact of Peripheral Parties? Existing work on the radical right wing has attempted to define what is meant by radical right-wing or right-wing extremist parties. Typologies have been suggested for delineating various kinds of radical right-wing party across countries highlighting issue concerns or rhetoric and associations with events and causes both past and present. Scholars have also attempted to describe the historical and organizational characteristics of radical right-wing parties, including charismatic leadership, hierarchical structures, development and evolution, and often unconventional electoral campaigning. Beyond descriptive work, scholars have worked on theories of cause and effect. These studies often set the electoral success of radical right-wing parties as the dependent variable and then suggest socioeconomic factors as the causal, independent variables. The independent variables usually include factors such as rising immigration rates, population density, and unemployment rates, as well as declining economic indicators, quality of education, health-care access, national

Noise or Changes?

●

3

identity, and moral values. These studies generally attempt to argue that radical right-wing parties are a function of popular-level discontent with status quo socioeconomic or cultural factors. A shortcoming of existing literature on the subject is the lack of attention given to the effects of political parties outside of government. As described in Chapter 2, the work on political party impact has typically concentrated on the way parties with a majority or plurality of the popular vote pass into law the platform issues most important to them. Such an approach suggests that parties finding themselves outside of power serve little purpose apart from providing a voice of opposition, which matters only to signal varying degrees of discontent. The assumption is that parties in opposition only bide their time until election victories present them with the prospect of coming to power and having real influence. Such a characterization appears to underestimate the potential of opposition parties to wield influence. Scholars and political figures alike have long alluded to a threat potential from radical right-wing parties. The surge in research proliferating through the 1990s on radical right-wing parties came about because these parties were thought to be significant. Yet research has still to demonstrate their significance in any sort of systematic, wellconceptualized investigation. This book embarks at this point, accepting the causal analysis and evidence for the rise of the radical right. It begins with the next step, exploring what these parties have done and whether or not they matter over the period that they have been on the rise. Figure 1.1 illustrates various facets of the study of the radical right wing. The right side of the diagram illustrates the emphasis of this book, highlighting it in bold print. This investigation focuses on the effect of radical right-wing parties, where past work has concentrated mostly on their cause by describing these parties and explaining the factors in their rise. Peripheral Parties as a Vehicle for Change At the macro level, this book is about understanding political change in advanced capitalist, Western democracies. It explores one impetus for change: radical right-wing parties. It argues that traditional notions suggesting that only political parties in power can alter governments and social policy have been shortsighted. It suggests that peripheral parties also play a role in shaping political agendas and formulating policy. My approach accepts the occurrence of and various reasons for rising electoral support for radical right-wing parties and asks a subsequent

4

●


Agenda change Unemployment

Immigration

Economic growth

Right-wing radical parties

Institutional change

Social conditions Policy change Culture, values

Figure 1.1

Focusing on Radical Right Party Impact

question: why should one be concerned? In other words, I emphasize implications of the empirical phenomenon of increased radical rightwing party support. My research investigates whether or not specific ramifications accompany the rise of radical right-wing parties. I want to establish whether there are clear impacts that justify documented fears accompanying the increase in right-wing radicalism in democratic Western Europe. I develop indicators and measure the impact that radical right-wing parties have on agendas, institutions, and policy. The genius and innovation of radical right-wing parties in Europe, and what makes them particularly interesting, are their strategy. While political parties have generally been viewed as a vehicle for the organized representation of popular interests, the radical right-wing parties have reversed this relationship. To some extent the radical right attempts to create the popular interests that provide a basis for party organization. They have determined that the mainstream parties monopolize positions on issues of the economy, and foreign policy. The mainstream parties attempt to address pressing concerns, responding to public opinion. Therefore the opportunity for the radical right-wing parties must come not from reacting to issue concerns but from creating new ones. The key to success for radical right-wing parties has been in selecting the salient issues to make central in their positions. They look for events in the status quo that can be manipulated into causes of fear and alarm. They then transform these events into threats. Wisely moving away from the obvious material concerns such as economic growth or unemployment that preoccupy the mainstream parties, the radical right wing has found that what people fear perhaps more than the economic conditions

Noise or Changes?

●

5

that confront them is the loss of their identity. It is not that people do not fear poor conditions, but perhaps that they view these as more-easily reversed than loss of identity, culture, and values. Or maybe people fail to see causes for declining social conditions and the radical right presents a scapegoat in immigrants. Either way, by connecting real problems to loss of identity and pointing to foreigners as the culprits, the radical right has woven together an elaborate scenario for threat. The radical right-wing parties generate the perception of crisis and doom, mobilizing people to respond and relate. Unlike mainstream parties, which react to events singularly and only as they arise, radical right-wing parties provide a context and identify an overarching threat, thereby isolating immigrants as the perpetrators. The strategic construction of their anti-immigrant position allows the radical right-wing parties to voice more than protest and opposition. With their rhetoric of creating better social conditions including security, protecting the welfare state amid globalization, caution regarding the deepening of the European Union, and preserving the identity of the nation against encroachment or corruption, they find favor among people who feel threatened by changing conditions in their societies. Instead of merely opposing immigrants, they are able to portray themselves as standing for concrete conditions and values. Still immigration remains their critical issue. As national governments attempt to cope with realities of increasing global migration, citizens react to the changing demographics, and the uncertainty accompanying this change provides an opportunity for the radical right. Radical right-wing political parties have become a central voice of anti-immigrant positions, voicing a threat from the continued influx of immigrants. Particularly in the early 1990s, Europe faced rising numbers of immigrants coming as asylum seekers. Through much of the postwar period, Europe welcomed people from former colonies claiming citizenship, former nationals displaced during wars and upheavals, or those seeking a better standard of living and greater opportunities in advanced industrial democracies. Although each country in Europe strikes its own balance between the degree of resentment against immigrants and a willingness to assimilate them, a common trend is evident in the rising support of radical right-wing parties across the continent in recent years. The Structure of the Book To accomplish both the macro-level goal of understanding political change in advanced capitalist, Western democracies and the micro-level

6

●


goal of exploring the impact of radical right-wing parties, both a typology and a conceptualization of the impact of peripheral parties is used here. Indicators for peripheral party impact have not been developed and systematically applied. This book introduces indicators of impact, justifying their utility and validity. These indicators are then evaluated empirically in order to ascertain whether or not the radical right-wing parties effect measurable impacts in Western Europe. In order to understand how impact occurs, the process through which radical right-wing parties have an impact is traced and a model of their influence constructed. Additionally, various impact measures are applied in case studies examined over time to see how much impact these parties have. For purposes of this book, most indicators are evaluated during the twelve-year period from 1990 to 2002, since the rapid rise of the radical right wing across Western Europe can readily be traced to the early 1990s. This book looks at the phenomenon of radical right-wing party influence both generally across many countries and specifically in France, Germany, and Austria. Patterns and trends emerge from the generalizations about radical right-wing party impact in chapter 4, in which West European countries are systematically evaluated. In the case studies, I look more closely at the patterns and processes of influence in three West European democracies: Austria (Freedom Party), France (National Front, National Republican Movement) and Germany (Republicans, National Democratic Party, and German People’s Union). For the purposes of this research, radical right-wing parties can be classified based on their issue focus and spatial position on the left–right political, ideological spectrum. Radical right-wing parties include those parties that mobilize popular support surrounding contemporary issues that are relevant to the masses, particularly immigration, and take positions that are extremely conservative politically. Three dimensions of impact have been developed in this research. First, the agenda-setting dimension considers the indirect influence of right-wing parties on political discourse and popular opinion about pressing concerns in government and society. Second, the institutional level suggests that institutions constrain and provide opportunities for radical right-wing parties, so that the radical right may have a structural impact particularly affecting the political party system. Third, the policy dimension examines a direct influence through legislation and initiatives. This includes formal parliamentary debates, legislative initiatives, and laws passed. I employ both statistical and more subjective methods of analysis. I use various measures of impact to provide a more comprehensive

Noise or Changes?

●

7

assessment, since impact assessment of individual political parties remains largely ignored or underdeveloped to date. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the development of a model and theory of peripheral party impact based on the behavior of radical right-wing parties. The current state of research on radical right-wing political parties is described, ranging from works on classifying the radical right, to studies of the origin and evolution of the organizations, to causeeffect analysis of radical right-wing party electoral success. In addition to work on radical right-wing parties, this chapter explores the work on political parties, more generally engaging the question “Do parties matter?” The debate about whether parties provide institutional structure or exhibit intentional agency, as self-conscious decision-makers, is presented. The purpose, goals, and actions of parties are discussed in the context of propositions from key theorists of political parties. Yet, the argument is made that most of the theories that exist explain mass parties better than they do marginal, opposition parties, such as the peripheral parties of the radical right. Much is known about the accomplishments of political parties in positions of majority power or coalition leadership, but what about other parties? Do they shape the political party system or the political system more generally? Finally, social movements are discussed to show that studies of such popular movements have come closer than studies of political parties in exploring the effects of opposition groups in terms of bringing social change. Peripheral parties are playing pivotal roles in shaping politics today, and more attention should be given to analysis of their actions. Chapter 3 establishes the criteria that differentiate peripheral parties from their more mainstream counterparts. Although some studies have dismissed small parties as unimportant, many reasons exist for expecting that marginal parties of the radical right are impacting politics in Western Europe today. Whereas conventional wisdom has long accepted as axiomatic that political party influence comes from being the single party or the dominant party in the coalition holding majority power, this chapter suggests otherwise. Different standards of measurement are required for assessing the impact of peripheral parties. Conventional channels of influence exerted by majority parties or coalitions are not available to peripheral parties, therefore they must be more creative and opportunistic in their strategy and tactics. This chapter suggests several indicators that capture the unconventional influence of the radical, right-wing, peripheral parties. Their impact can be observed at three levels of abstraction: agenda-setting, institution-shaping, and policy-making. Each level is conceptualized and indicators of influence at each level are discussed in the chapter.

8

●


Analysis begins in chapter 4, in which mostly statistical evidence from fifteen countries across Western Europe is evaluated. The chapter begins by developing a process model to show how radical right-wing parties generate fear to create influence. It argues that there is a key difference among radical right-wing parties between those that are entrepreneurial and those that have remained tied to old fascist or neo-Nazi legacies. The entrepreneurial radical right parties began to gain momentum in the 1980s following the model presented by the French National Front. The main far right parties of Western Europe since World War II are divided into a typology in this chapter according to whether they are fascist legacy parties, entrepreneurial, or bandwagoners. The entrepreneurs have had the most political impact. Appropriate impact measures are taken at the three levels of analysis presented in chapter 3: agenda-setting, institution-shaping, and policymaking. Evidence comes from statistics and survey research reports. This chapter concludes by presenting a general, West European model of radical right-wing party influence. Trends are outlined for the three types of radical right-wing party described in this chapter. An overall picture of the effects of radical right-wing parties across Western Europe emerges from this chapter. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present evidence from three cases under more intensive investigation: France, Germany, and Austria. From these chapters, a clear picture of the major radical right-wing parties in each country emerges. Multiple indicators of radical right-wing party impact are developed and evaluated in each case. The radical right-wing parties are traced in more historical detail highlighting pivotal points in their growth. Leadership and personalities are explored and organizational structures explained. Their behavior and styles are explicated. Patterns of influence emerge, related to key strategies employed. Interview data are used to substantiate observations. Modeling of impact is undertaken in each of these cases. The conclusion in chapter 8 ties together the lessons from individual cases and evaluates the generalizable evidence from all four analysis chapters. An overall picture of radical right-wing impact emerges showing increasing innovation in tactics and, as a result, greater impact over time. Linkage patterns are developed to suggest how the radical rightwing parties bring changes in key policy-decision issue areas. The relative successes and failures are compared to determine the factors that appear to be decisive in achieving impact success. Conclusion This book moves in a new direction in developing and empirically testing measures of radical right-wing party impact. The research holds

Noise or Changes?

●

9

promise for studies of peripheral parties, third parties, smaller parties, interest groups, and social movements. It also sheds light on the way political change can be affected in advanced industrial democracies, considering the possibility that radical right-wing parties succeed when democracy fails. The idea that groups outside of the power centers of government can and do have an impact, bringing social change, alters the way channels of influence are conceptualized and access is studied. New ideas about success for extralegislative groups emerge, opening the door to future work on political impact. John Kingdon quotes Victor Hugo in the first line of his first chapter of the groundbreaking 1984 work on agenda-setting in the U.S. Congress, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, with Hugo saying, “[G]reater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” The time has come to give credit to groups working behind the scenes and outside of traditional channels to bring change in their societies by assigning impact measures to their efforts. The time has come to evaluate the radical right-wing in Europe based not on its ties to a Nazi past but based on the changes it realizes in a dynamic present.


CHAPTER 2

Why Is So Little Known About Impacts of Peripheral Parties?

P

arty impact remains an undeveloped area in work on radical right-wing parties. Most comparative studies on the radical right have focused on definitions, classifications, identification of voters, and isolation of socioeconomic factors that appear to prompt increased electoral success. Some scholars have alluded to the importance of understanding the effects of these parties; however, the theoretical framework and indicators for effects have yet to be developed and systematically applied. A review of the literature on radical right-wing parties follows. Yet in order to work on conceptualization and understanding the impact of these parties, it becomes necessary to look beyond existing scholarship on the radical right to both the political parties literature and the literature on social movements. The parties literature contributes general theories of party behavior, some of which may be extrapolated to radical right-wing parties. Social movements’ work has accomplished more than the political parties literature in terms of conceptualizing and isolating effects, making its insights significant. What We Know About Radical Right-Wing Political Parties Generally, two types of work on radical right-wing parties have already been done. Many scholars have taken a descriptive approach. Their work mainly attempts to define right-wing radicalism, discuss histories and leaders of right-wing radical political parties, and profile demographics of right-wing radical voters. Other scholars have done explanatory work

12

●


with electoral success of radical right-wing parties as the dependent variable. This work uses different theories to explain the vote for radical right-wing parties. This section discusses both of these types of work, then turns to a few representative works suggesting current directions of research, and concludes by suggesting several cause-effect studies that serve as precursors to systematic investigations of the impact of radical right-wing parties. Descriptive Work The descriptive work begins with a search for criteria for radical right-wing parties. European-political-parties specialist Daniel Seiler has called them “deviant cases,” distinct from the catch-all mainstream parties (Seiler 1980). However, scholars have not been able to agree on a standard definition of radical right-wing parties. As Paul Hainsworth points out, such parties do not tend to be uniform or do not possess similar characteristics (Hainsworth 2000, 4). Many factors can serve to position these parties ideologically to the right of mainstream parties, yet these factors occur in a variety of combinations within individual radical right-wing parties. In other words, there is no clear formula for becoming a radical right-wing party. For this and other reasons, some prominent scholars in this speciality have been skeptical about the possibility of establishing a typology of radical right-wing parties. They suggest that comparative studies of the radical right-wing are made complicated and perhaps impossible by country-specific features. For instance, Klaus von Beyme has argued that it is nearly impossible to find common ground among parties clustering on the extreme right-wing pole of the political spectrum (Beyme 1988). A notable overview to this debate over how to identify and define radical right-wing parties can be found in the work of Cas Mudde (Mudde 1996). He points out the imprecision in scholarship on the radical right wing and the loose usage of terminology such as neo-nazi, fascist, extremist, radical, and populist, for instance. Mudde himself prefers the term extremist to radical right wing, yet he presents the reasons for the use of either term. He suggests that these parties have success in waves, with his focus period 1980–1995 considered the third wave.1 A second comprehensive introduction to radical right-wing parties comes from Piero Ignazi. Ignazi has identified two types of such parties: those with fascist associations, the old type, and those with no fascist association but with “antisystem” attitudes, the new type (Ignazi 1992). To distinguish between these two types, Ignazi uses a left-to-right

Impacts of Peripheral Parties

●

13

political spectrum position or spatial criterion, a system-attitude criterion that considers whether or not the party undermines system legitimacy, and a historic-ideological criterion based on whether or not the party demonstrates ties to fascism of the interwar period. He suggests that both types of radical right-wing party position themselves to the right of the mainstream parties. However, when a party to the right of the mainstream fosters distrust in the political system and additionally exhibits fascist characteristics, it can be classified as the old type. When a party to the right of the mainstream fosters systemic distrust but without fascist ties, it should be classified as a party of the new type (Ignazi 1992, 12–13). Despite the dichotomy suggested by Ignazi, in the literature any party to the right-of-center that does not fit into the conservative mainstream is eligible to be called radical right-wing. Four prominent characterizations of the radical right wing have emerged: the fascist legacy, the list of features strategy, the populist description, and the protest party portrayal. Jürg Steiner agrees that the radical right-wing parties are in some ways derived directly from European fascism of the first part of the twentieth century (Steiner 1995, 13). Piero Ignazi also presents this type of “old” radical right-wing party that is connected to the fascist historical legacy (Ignazi 1992). Geoff Eley, a noted German historian and scholar, describes the peculiarities that set fascism apart from other conservative movements, including a central social organization, strong nationalism, and the idea of a “race-community” secured through battling foreign influences (Eley 1990, 52). The list-of-features strategy for defining the radical right-wing parties is best exemplified by the work of Falter and Schumann, which presents ten features: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anticommunism, antiparliamentarism, antipluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for a strong political leader or executive, anti-Americanism, and cultural pessimism (Falter and Schumann 1988, 101). The populist description suggests that the right-wing radical parties utilize status quo conditions of anxiety and frustration with everything from the economy to the government to appeal to the average person (Betz 1994, 4). Finally, radical right-wing parties have been classified as protest parties because they typically stand against many things such as present social values, present socioeconomic conditions, immigrants, and foreigners. Paul Taggart suggests that populist candidates often employ an opposition or antieverything strategy, opportunistically challenging the legitimacy of their competition in order to construct their own identity (Taggart 1995, 37). Rather than defining themselves explicitly by their own objectives,

14

●


populists notoriously define themselves by what they stand against. Radical right-wing parties frequently exhibit this characteristic as they attempt to position themselves strategically often by taking up issue space where other parties leave a vacuum (Kitschelt 1995). All four of these ways to characterize the radical right wing fail to provide reasons for their legitimacy and beg questions about the criteria employed. In particular, the list-of-features approach suggests a garbagecan model, where many items listed apply to special cases. No contemporary radical right-wing party displays all of these features, and some of the criteria appear outdated, such as anticommunism, or vague in their reference, such as militarism or antiparliamentarism. If antiparliamentarism is meant to imply opposition to democratic government, this does not appear to fit many contemporary examples. Some of the moreapplicable qualities from the list appear to be antipluralism, ethnocentrism, and law-and-order thinking. The populist classification often lacks a foundation in terms of what is meant by populism. Populist parties generally suggest an ability to relate to the common citizen. Yet the term populism is often used loosely without concrete reference to the popular concerns upon which the radical right draws. Finally, the protestparty category tends to be superficial, since all parties in opposition advocate change and suggest alternative policies to those of the administration in government. Whether the radical right wing expresses stronger protest or some other kind of unique aspect in its protest usually remains unexplained with this classification. A second type of descriptive work in the literature chronicles the history of radical right-wing political parties and their key leaders. Several collections in edited volumes on right-wing radicalism take this approach (Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hainsworth 2000; Braun and Scheinberg 1997; Cheles, Ferguson, and Vaughan 1995; Merkl 1997). Generally, these volumes devote individual chapters to countries, and country specialists discuss the context for the rise of radical right-wing parties such as social conditions, competition with other political parties, and leadership changes in the historical perspective. This work attempts to connect periods of radical right-wing success with correlative conditions surrounding this success. Third, descriptive work often profiles the demographic characteristics of radical right-wing party members and voters. These works have found that radical right-wing parties attract voters and party members for a variety of reasons including frustration, alienation, protest, fear, nationalist sentiment, Nazi or fascist sympathies, pan-Germanism, racism, and attachment to traditional values. As a result, no stereotypical


●

15

radical right-wing voter profile prevails. Several generalizations have been suggested in the literature, however. For instance, in Germany the Republican Party finds support among people with only elementary- or primary-school education and materialist (as opposed to postmaterialist) value orientations (Minkenberg 1992, 72–76). In the 1995 French presidential elections, National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen earned more working-class votes than any other candidate (Eatwell 2000, 420). Males were disproportionately represented among voters for Austria’s Freedom Party constituting 62 percent of their support in the 1999 parliamentary elections (Luther 2000, 431). A “macho factor” has also been elaborated in studies of France (Safran 1993, 23) and Germany (Winkler and Schumann 1998, 103). Several other generalizations have been proposed in the literature, including higher numbers of young people, higher numbers of old people, unemployed people, exCommunists, or urbanites. However, these generalizations have not held across countries and out of their specific context. Explanatory Work Explanatory work on radical right-wing parties attempts to explain voting for them. Such work attempts to establish a causal relationship between different independent variables, depending on the theory applied, and the dependent variable of electoral support for radical right-wing parties. This overview of the explanatory literature divides the work into categories based on the dominant theoretical approach employed to explain the vote for the radical right-wing parties: structuralist, culturalist, or rationalist. According to the structuralist argument, the basis for the radical rightwing party’s success in Western Europe can be attributed to the emergence of a new political party system. The mainstream, centrist parties, which that were once thought to be the “catch-all” and “professionalbureaucratic parties,” have weakened (Taggart 1995). These mainstream parties have lost support as issue concerns have replaced ideological concerns in many West European democracies. The issue focus appears to have opened the door for the radical right-wing parties to gain more mainstream appeal. Radical parties on both the right and left edges of the political spectrum are not just single-issue parties anymore. Rather they appear to be taking positions on a variety of issues of importance to the public (Betz 1994, 108). Radical right-wing parties have developed more complete platform positions and have come to represent opposition against the failures of the established party system.

16

●


The culturalist explanation says that there is a new politics in Western Europe emerging because of a generational value shift (Minkenberg 1992; Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990). Scholars suggest that Europeans today have come of age in times of material security. The priorities that result from such comfortable material circumstances have been termed postmaterialist. Postmaterial values include personal freedoms, democratization, and cultured society. The postmaterialist new left in Europe has been associated with environmental protection as a chief concern and connected to the rise of Green parties. The new left also supports democratization efforts. The new right is the materialist reaction, a counter discourse, to the new left with concerns such as economic growth, fighting crime, and promoting law and order (Minkenberg 2000, 180). The rationalist explanation puts forth a strategic voting argument on the part of individual voters and a strategic party-positioning argument explaining party behavior. The rationalist voter logic finds support in arguments that radical right-wing voters blame immigrants for causing their local economic and social turmoil. For instance, they blame high unemployment rates and a decline in the number of available unskilled, working-class jobs on the influx of immigrants, whom they accuse of taking those jobs away from local people (Merkl 1997, 5; Husbands 1992, 268). The rationalist party logic says that radical right-wing parties behave strategically to take votes away from mainstream parties. When the mainstream parties of the moderate left and right converge toward the median voter, political space opens up for the fringe parties to gain political space. A vacuum is left across certain issue areas, and the more-radical parties are able to expand their platforms to absorb a wider area of issue domains. Cause-Effect Work Typically, work that has operationalized success of the radical right-wing parties had done so by measuring electoral success. For the third wave of radical right-wing parties, identified from 1980–1995 by Cas Mudde, the rise of these parties is measured in terms of their increasing electoral success over several elections (Mudde 1996, 225). Looking at election results to determine how important radical right-wing parties have been from country to country has been the most common measure for several reasons. First, election results are easy data to obtain. Second, election results are easily analyzed statistically because they are presented as continuous variables with the most manipulability in common data analysis software such as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Statistical Analysis Systems (SAS), or Stata.


●

17

More recently, two scholars have begun to look beyond election results to consider the impact of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe. Michael Minkenberg and Martin Schain both suggest the need for studying right-wing radical party impact taking different approaches. In a chapter in the edited volume Shadows Over Europe, Schain examines the impact of the National Front in France considering electoral, organizational, and policy effects (Schain 2002). The chapter uses electoral data, exit-polling results, and the author’s reflections on events surrounding recent elections to make inferences about the role of the National Front in bringing changes. Electoral effects are analyzed using party-identification or party-alignment data to examine when voters have changed parties to join the National Front. Using public-opinion data, Schain shows that the issues of immigration and security, central to the National Front, have become important issues for voters of other political parties as well. For organizational effects, he considers how the National Front has been able to expand its “network” of support beyond loyalists to recruit other supporters based on strategic positioning. Schain finds that the increase in local-level offices held by the National Front, as well as its increased ability to shape issues to appeal to a broader array of constituents, such as workers, has contributed to influence. The third type of effect considered by Schain is policy effect. This level mainly examines official government policy. The author uses immigration legislation as his indicator. Tracing specific events deemed important in the evolution of immigration policy since the early 1990s, Schain suggests that key decisions were influenced by the way the National Front portrayed the immigration issue. He makes the case that mainstream parties co-opted essential elements of the radical right-wing positions on immigration in order to better position themselves. He suggests that issue co-optation has been occurring. In the Schain chapter, all three types of effect are based on the notion that the National Front has cast a broader net to attract support. The implication in each case is that other parties co-opt positions of the radical right wing in order to take back the vote. The author does a good job at taking steps toward conceptualizing elements of radical rightwing impact, examining electoral, organizational, and policy effects. However, the indicators for political party impact need to be more-clearly specified and systematically evaluated. In the chapter, the connections between selected events and outcomes lack intermediate linkages and accompanying logic; they provide simultaneous occurrences without suggesting why and how one may cause the other. Additional work needs to be done to more-closely approximate links between the parties

18

●


and observable changes or outcomes. Furthermore, this work operates under the assumption that effects occur when other parties respond and react. However this study begs the question of whether additional effects exist independent of co-optation and the response of other parties. Another scholar working on radical right-wing impact in recent years, Michael Minkenberg, has also found evidence of issue co-optation suggesting that this shows evidence of the impact of the radical right wing (Minkenberg 1998, 15–17). He acknowledges the difficulty of assessing radical right-wing party impact when these parties do not hold seats in parliaments, yet argues that in both France and Germany there are specific instances in which the mainstream right parties appear to adopt “part of the new radical right’s agenda” (Minkenberg 1998, 14–17). He finds no evidence or mixed results on other levels of impact such as public opinion, radical right-wing protest effects, and partysystem effects (i.e., whether the radical right parties react to the mainstream or vice versa). In a separate study of impact, Minkenberg tests whether representation in parliament for radical right-wing parties consistently produces policy results (Minkenberg 2001). He uses legislation and executive action as measures of impact, selectively examining legislative changes in immigration policy over time when radical right-wing parties occupy power, both at local and national levels. His analysis looks to key points in immigrationpolicy debate in four countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, to ascertain whether radical right-wing parties appear to be influential in the direction of change. The work emphasizes the dynamism of the interaction between radical right-wing parties and the political party system, using the concept of opportunity structures from social movements literature to suggest a two-way relationship of cause and effect. Both authors make important contributions to conceptualizing the impact of the radical right wing. They suggest types of impact, especially those relating to legislation and policies. They also describe dynamics of the relationship between radical right-wing parties and the party system, where each potentially influences the other and issue co-optation occurs. Following these important contributions moving the literature toward impact, more work on the linkages, intermediate logic, modeling of the process of influence, and development of the indicators to measure impact is required. Do Parties Matter? To know whether radical right-wing parties do create an impact, it is essential to place them in the context of their environment, the political


●

19

party system. Political parties behave according to their place and competitive struggle to expand their share of issue space within the political party system. Even though the literature on the political party system is dense, much can be gained from a survey of several key contributions. The most important and enduring theories emerge in the decades following the Second World War, and some of the most important theorists on the political party system are Roberto Michels, Maurice Duverger, Anthony Downs, and Giovanni Sartori. Their theories suggest how parties behave. Most of the literature on political parties has been empirical and descriptive rather than theoretical. Attention has commonly been directed at typologies, organization, and function. Party systems have been discussed to describe relationships between parties and spatial relationships. Parties have been identified with the ideological or policy positions for which they stand. Also, party system change and the factors that influence it have been a focal point for discussion. Voting studies have also profiled party membership and supporters. This section reviews significant contributions to political party theory, then turns to political party adaptation and change, and the structure and function of parties. These aspects of political parties seem especially relevant to better understanding the impact of radical right-wing parties by contributing to discernment of how they strategically change or compete, and how they organize and behave to promote their agenda. Finally, this section, reviewing the political parties literature, concludes with a summary of what is known about political parties and their impact. Key Theories for Understanding Party Behavior To place radical right-wing parties in context, several big theories of political party organization and behavior offer insight. Such grand theories suggest how political parties function and why they behave as they do. The strategy of positioning oneself as a political party is discussed, as well as how to organize and how to function within certain institutional constraints by understanding their consequence. Roberto Michels’s contribution to the study of political parties is his “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1915). His book addresses political party organization. Michels suggests that elites direct party activity from the top down. To make his case, he examines early social democratic parties in Europe. He finds that no matter how committed members of a political party are to ideology, power in political parties is exercised by elites at the top in leadership positions. His theory of top–down control looks at parties, but he generalizes his findings to all organizations and collective behavior within them.

20

●


Anthony Downs contributes a model of political party competition that has endured as a framework for analysis for over forty years (Downs 1957). He argues that political parties behave as rational, strategic actors. They position themselves along the left-to-right spectrum of political ideology in order to maximize their potential to win votes. He posits that political parties adopt their policy positions intentionally as they judge the political climate surrounding constituents. The parties try to position themselves as close as possible to the major concentrations of voters. The goal of political parties according to this theory is vote-seeking in order to win political office and power in government decision-making. Maurice Duverger gained recognition by presenting a theory that political institutions determine the political party system (Duverger 1951). Specifically, Duverger suggested that electoral systems based on simple-majority, single-ballot rules tend to produce two-partyism. This became known as Duverger’s law. This law meant that electoral systems based on simple-majority with a second ballot or proportional representation tend to produce multipartyism. However in addition to this contribution to theory on party systems, Duverger also addresses the party structure of individual parties. He considers party origins, party types (Communist, Socialist, Labor, liberal, conservative, and rightist), and party organization. For Duverger, West European party membership goes beyond mere support. Instead, membership implies a social contract between members and the party and suggests commitment. Members who pay dues commit themselves to the ideals championed by the party (Duverger 1964, 63–64). Giovanni Sartori focuses his analysis on party behavior as a part of the party system (Sartori 1976). He does not focus on issues that other scholars had concentrated on, such as membership, structure, or leadership. Instead, Sartori examines party competition. He changed the way multiparty systems were viewed by suggesting that as the number of parties increases, instability does not necessarily result. For Sartori much depends on the type of pluralism that exists, particularly whether it is polarized or moderate. He finds that polarized pluralism tends to produce antisystem parties that pull the other parties apart. On the other hand, moderate pluralism promotes party convergence to the point of resembling a two-party system. Change in Political Parties and the Party System Political parties have undoubtedly evolved over time. Reasons for parties to change include perceived needs, internal party politics, and new


●

21

dynamics of competition with other parties (Wolinetz 1989). The idea of perceived needs suggests that as support for the party declines in combination with their perception that they cannot regain power given the current party system, parties likely make significant changes in behavior, organization, and strategy. Internal politics within the party may also play an important role in strategy changes and the generation of new rules for party competition in the party system. For example, internal splits within the party or control by extremely opportunistic leaders provide internal reasons for party system change. Finally, the “marketplace” or the context in which political parties find themselves competing with other parties may lead parties to change their strategy (Wolinetz 1989, 119). The mainstream political parties, those that contend for power in the government, provide the focal point for many studies of parties and party systems. These parties have undergone substantial changes over time. Scholars have classified them as cadre parties, mass parties, catchall parties, and cartel parties at various points in time (table 2.1). The earliest parties in Europe and the United States have commonly been classified as cadre or caucus parties. These parties came about in times of limited suffrage when elites dominated government decision-making. The idea of the times was that political parties came about naturally as Edmund Burke envisioned them—groups of men in pursuit of the common public (or private, depending on one’s perspective) interest (Katz and Mair 1995, 9). Government decisions were made by elites and implemented from the top down (Michels 1915). Cadre or caucus parties were something akin to old-boys’ clubs with leaders as trustees rather than representatives of the people. Mass parties emerged in the era of industrialization, urbanization, and broader suffrage. Parties became machines of political activism, as previously disenfranchised groups sought representation and a voice in government (Katz and Mair 1995, 10). Mass parties often developed along class lines. They clearly differentiated themselves in their party programmes, taking stands according to the specific interests that they Table 2.1 Types of Mainstream Political Parties

cadre mass catch-all cartel

Organizational basis

Leadership basis

Goals

elite class, ideology issues marketing

trustees delegates entrepreneurs managers

public interest or private promote cause promote issues win

22

●


represented. Mass parties were parties of integration, bringing people of common interest together based on shared ideology (Kirchheimer 1966b, 190, 197). Perhaps the most notable scholar to write about mass parties was Maurice Duverger. The parties that Duverger studied championed causes not issues (Duverger 1951). The Socialist Party provides an example of a mass party that is based on common beliefs and situations among its members. Such parties tend to evoke loyalty among members as they commit themselves to the party. People’s lives reflect their partisanship. Otto Kirchheimer predicted in the mid-1960s that mass parties would be replaced by catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966a). Kirchheimer drew upon observations of the pattern of historical associations, the declining importance of social classes, and what he called the “de-ideologization” of political parties, in particular the German and Austrian Social Democratic parties (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187). He also cited trends of increased secularism and increased materialism as reasons for the development of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190). Kirchheimer proved visionary for anticipating the importance of party image replacing party programmes, leadership charisma replacing activist leadership, and issue importance replacing the championing of causes (Kirchheimer 1966a, 192–193). He compared the “marketing” of catch-all political parties to marketing a brand-name product. Yet he also foresaw the precarious positions in which catch-all parties would find themselves as voters “switch to another party as a consumer switches to a competitive brand” (Kirchheimer 1966a, 192). The rise of catch-all parties meant a marked decline in party affiliation and party loyalty, that had accompanied mass integration parties. Richard Katz and Peter Mair have suggested that the days of the catch-all party have also come to an end. They present a theory of a new type of political party in the mid-1990s, a cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995). The cartel party behaves like a business.2 It sets for its main objective winning office, but not so that it can represent or act on citizen interests or issue concerns. Its competition with other political parties is based not on differences in ideological belief or issue opinion but on positioning by those marketing the party. The cartol parties are managed professionally. According to Katz and Mair, a critical difference between other parties and cartel parties is that the latter are partnerships, led by professional politicians, “not associations of, or for, the citizens” (Katz and Mair 1995, 22). The argument is that parties have become so similar as catch-all parties, that the consensus in government has trumped the idea of parties alternating in power as governing versus


●

23

opposition. As differences of opinion on issues between mainstream parties continue to decrease, the authors argue that politics becomes less about contention and more about marketing a product that differs little from the other product except in attempts to be more competitive as a brand (see also the argument on brand marketing in Schattschneider 1956). This classification of new parties has not yet been widely adopted or accepted. What Political Parties Do Political parties contribute both structure and agency in the political party system. They function as an organizational unit, providing a basis for voting differentiation, interest aggregation and mobilization, and leadership for government. In structural terms, parties may also provide a link between the masses and government and a channel for the articulation of opinion. Anthony King (1969) gives a useful six-point observation on the ways parties structure politics, and many of his suggestions are discussed here. Yet another perspective on political parties characterizes them according to their goals as political actors. For example, parties may be office-seeking or motivated more by the promotion of issues and policies. This section elaborates on both perspectives on the role of political parties. Parties as Structure The structural role of the political party includes providing delineation among competing options for voting. Political parties provide the dividing lines articulating different platforms on the issues important to voters at election time. Ideally, parties take different positions on key issues, allowing voters to align themselves with the parties that most closely approximate their own interests. In the words of Leon Epstein, “All that is meant by the awkward word ‘structuring’ is the imposition of an order or pattern enabling voters to choose candidates according to their labels” (Epstein 1967, 77). Sigmund Neumann suggests that political parties are “brokers of ideas, constantly clarifying, systematizing, and expounding the party’s doctrine” (Neumann 1956, 396). In sum, both agree that an important function of political parties is to articulate a party platform that provides voters with decision criteria and allows them to distinguish from among competing options when they vote. Structurally, parties also serve an integrative function, bringing people together and then mobilizing them for political action (King 1969).

24

●


Otto Kirchheimer suggests that parties function “as channels for integrating individuals and groups into the existing political order” (Kirchheimer 1966b, 188–189). Parties can provide common ground on issues, a bond among like-minded individuals, and an attachment or identity for the people who unite behind them. Yet, this function of parties appears most obvious to the extent that political party identification is high. Where partisan loyalties prove low, it is less likely that parties provide much integration. Parties recruit leaders. Through nomination and party conferences at all levels, political parties select and groom their leaders from among the party loyal. Such closed processes of choosing party elites exclude many potential candidates from political office in actual practice. Candidates with the best of intentions or policy ideas generally cannot compete with the momentum, power, legitimacy, and position of strong political parties. Yet only those candidates who follow typical patterns rising within political parties gain access to high political office and leadership, at least generally speaking. This process excludes and eliminates many potential candidates, prompting some scholars to suggest that political parties can be somewhat undemocratic internally. Hans Daalder suggests that by looking at whether or not public office can be readily attained outside of political party channels, one can determine the extent of control wielded by parties and party elites over political recruitment (Daalder 1966, 75). Daalder finds that some parties and party systems are more powerful or exclusive than others, as the degree of party-centered recruitment varies across West European political party systems. Parties can structure the organization of government. This suggests that they have authority over decision-making in various arenas of government, through their partisan representatives in office. Parties organize government to the extent that members of parties unite on the job and act in unison with one another. As Anthony King describes, “what is meant is the arrangements under which, or the processes through whereby, persons in government or the various elements of government come to act in concert” (King 1969, 133). The suggestion is not that strict party discipline always prevails. Nor is it implied that parties take unified positions without internal dissent and disagreement on issues. Yet political parties have the ability, at times and to varying degrees, to provide dividing lines, coherence, and structure to political debates and decision-making. Parties delineate their positions in party platforms. These platforms often become the basis for debates in government for framing policy.


●

25

Parties attempt to differentiate themselves from other parties by taking contrary positions on key issues. The divergence that parties portray on policy issues often structures opposing sides of debates in the legislature or other public forums. Parties have various reasons for implementing policy or for advocating policy positions ranging from representational to electoral competition (Epstein 1967, ch. 10). Besides providing clear division on key issues, parties can also organize government by bringing pressure upon government through lining up along party lines to advocate specific courses of action. Epstein points out that policy changes may be a product of interest groups or individuals in powerful positions, civil servants, the media, or academics (Epstein 1967, 272–288). The precise catalyst for policy formulation comes through a complex process and tends to be difficult to isolate singularly. However, one may conclude that parties play a role in structuring policy outcomes because they portray positions on issues and put pressure on government through their numbers and through individual partisans in office to adopt certain policy measures. They are not exclusive causes of policy change but certainly provide a contributing cause. Parties also structure government through their interest-aggregation function. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell posit that parties serve “the function of converting demands into general policy alternatives” and that this process is known as interest aggregation (Almond and Powell 1966, 98). E.E. Schattschneider suggests that political parties reflect the needs of the community as people come together and work together (Schattschneider 1956, 194–195). Parties ascertain and account for popular interests. They then “accommodate” them and convert them into policy alternatives (King 1969, 138). Still, parties do not provide the only mechanism for interest aggregation, as trade unions, business associations, bowling leagues, clubs, civic groups, and families all provide arenas for interest aggregation. In the American case, scholars such as Samuel Eldersfeld have challenged the notion that parties aggregate interests at all. Eldersfeld does not believe that the American Democratic and Republican parties effectively mediate group claims and division even within their own ranks. Instead, he finds high levels of factionalism without a coherent and consistent voice (Eldersfeld 1958, 188). Harry Eckstein looked at interest groups and found that interest aggregation appears to occur after elections rather than before (Eldersfeld 1960, 162). He suggests that postelection is the time when interest groups join forces, make compromises, and give ground to adjust their positions on issues and policy. Some suggest that Eckstein’s observation may hold for political parties as well. Yet to the

26

●


extent that parties bring voters together behind particular positions prior to elections in order to make their ballot choices, it seems clear that some interest aggregation occurs before the votes are cast as well. Parties as Agents The perspective of structural effects of political parties presents one interpretation of the significance of what political parties do. However, another perspective views political parties as individual actors making calculated decisions and behaving strategically in the pursuit of goals. When viewed as actors, political parties have mainly been classified into at least three types: vote-seeking, office-seeking and issue- or policyseeking. These classifications are based on the goals that parties aim to obtain. While the parties-as-structure and parties-as-agent literatures do not suggest mutually exclusive purposes for political parties, scholars who write about parties tend to present either one side or the other to simplify their analysis. As vote-seekers, political parties have been portrayed as primarily concerned with increasing their power by maximizing their appeal to voters. According to this theory, parties believe that to wield power in government they must have as much popular support as possible. The assumption is that votes translate into power in government. When a party has support of the people, it has the ability to control the processes and outcomes of governments. For this reason parties seek to maximize their vote-winning potential by positioning themselves to appeal to as many voters as they can. Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this position has been Anthony Downs in his rational-choice analysis of political party competition, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). As described in detail above, Downs argues that political parties position themselves ideologically or on issues most intentionally in places where they feel they can best maximize their number of supporters (see also Janda 1980, Lawson 1976). Office-seeking may appear to be a similar objective to vote-seeking. However, scholars who endorse the office-seeking goal of political parties suggest that power comes not just through elected office but also through the political appointments and negotiations that occur behind the scenes to secure positions and power. Those who study vote-seeking tend to work on electoral competition, while those who study office-seeking focus on governmental coalitions in parliamentary democracies (Strom 1990, 567). Scholars such as William Riker (Riker 1962) and Michael


●

27

Leiserson (Leiserson 1968) view political parties as power-seekers, yet power for them is not limited to electoral results or votes but extends to the overall picture of parties holding positions of influence both in the foreground of representative government and, vitally, in the background as strategists, advisors, agency chiefs, and in other appointed positions. Policy-seeking or issue-oriented approaches have typically presented an argument that political parties may have a goal that revolves around accomplishing a platform agenda or bringing policy change on one or several specific issues. However, traditionally scholars taking this position have presented policy-seeking as a supplementary goal to office- or vote-seeking rather than as mutually exclusive or as a substitute (Axelrod 1970; Lijphart 1984; Luebbert 1986). As Kaare Strom summarizes, “policy-oriented coalition theory typically assumes that parties also pursue office at least instrumentally, as elective office is taken to be a precondition for policy influence” (Strom 1990). Yet some scholars have suggested more exclusivity among these goals. For instance Robert Harmel and John Robertson have distinguished what they call “contender parties” from “promoter parties” (Harmel and Robertson 1985, 517). They argue that contender parties operate under the perception that they can be, at least eventually, successful. On the other hand, promoter parties may recognize that they are unlikely to win votes or seats, but their “major objective is to use the party as a vehicle for bringing attention to a particular issue or cause.” Yet, these authors present this typology in their conclusions only, as their piece is mainly about the reasons for the formation of new political parties. The idea of promoter parties has not been fully developed or applied empirically. G. Bingham Powell has applied a similar classification scheme to extremist parties, dividing them into “contender parties” and “protest parties,” yet the distinction is based largely on chances for electoral success rather than separate goals (Powell 1982, 94). The main criticism of all literature on political party functions and actions continues to be that political parties cannot be isolated as exclusive causes of the arrangement or outcome that follows. The inability of political scientists to hold all other factors that may be influential constant and to point definitively to political parties as cause has hindered the theoretical development of political parties literature in the second half of the twentieth century up to today. However, this book asserts that where the evidence points to political parties as an important cause or factor in outcomes, the time has come to attribute importance to parties. The literature avoids such connections. However, the

28

●


laboratory for social scientists contains a multitude of factors that can neither be eliminated nor isolated in their significance when explaining empirical phenomena. Impact as Understood with Social Movements Scholarship about social movements also provides insight for my work. Particularly where right-wing radical parties are marginalized from the power centers of politics, or outside of government altogether, they can be likened in many respects to social movements. They arguably do not have the same access of mainstream political parties to official channels of power in the political party system. They may receive less state money for campaigning, reduced air time on state-owned television and radio prior to elections, and face a burden of proof that established parties do not confront. Their tactics and organizational structures may differ from those of mainstream parties. The line between political parties and interest groups has always been a fine one except for the prominent institutional role for mainstream parties. The same difficulty ensues when distinguishing a social movement. Yet, the social movements literature has contributed more than the parties literature to the study of impacts. The social movements literature focuses on the political opportunities available to organized groups in society that stand for particular interests and that strive to influence government policy and discourse (McAdam 1996). From the student movements in the late 1960s forward, social movements have been examined for their relevance to society and to politics. One suggestion in this literature is that certain objective social conditions lead to the appeal of political platforms that emphasize such things as frustration and relative deprivation (Kornhauser 1959; Davies 1971; Gurr 1970). This means that groups that capitalize on contemporary problems have a chance to win support among the masses on key issues. This seems to inform the strategy of radical right-wing parties. Another suggestion in the literature is that regardless of objective grievances, what matters is the political context that allows an opening for change (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995). For instance, this argument says that government scandals or elite power struggles should provide a prime opportunity for other groups to step into power. Several works move toward studying impact. One is a 1989 study finding that the civil-rights movement led to the electoral success of black officials in the South (Button 1989). The women’s movement in the United States has been linked to Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of


●

29

1964, arguing that women’s opportunities are enlarged with this legislation (Costain 1992). Donatella della Porta found that government policies have been expanded in Germany and Italy to include more legal channels of citizen dissent and also that police professionalization of protest control has resulted from the demonstrations of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in these two countries (della Porta 1996). Two works from social movements scholars offer great insight for understanding impact more clearly, which may help in formulating methods of measurement. Both William Gamson and Paul Schumaker present typologies of policy effects that prove useful for understanding the dimensions of impact (Gamson 1975; Gamson 1990; Schumaker 1975). Schumaker has five criteria for measuring the responsiveness of the political system to social movements: access responsiveness, agenda responsiveness, policy responsiveness, output responsiveness, and impact responsiveness (Schumaker 1975, 494–495; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999, xxiii). Access responsiveness refers to whether or not the “target,” referring to the decision-maker in power, is willing to hear the concerns of the opposition. Agenda responsiveness refers to the target’s willingness to place opposition concerns on the agenda. Policy responsiveness indicates the target’s adoption of new policies mainly through legislation reflecting the opposition demands. Output responsiveness is the target’s implementation of such new policies. Impact responsiveness refers to “the degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in alleviating the grievances of the protest group” (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995, 283). For Schumaker, the target, that is, the administration or parliamentary decision-makers, proves central to assessing impact. Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander follow Schumaker’s typology and add to it a level of responsiveness implied by Herbert Kitschelt’s discussion of “structural impacts.” They identify six variables that could be evaluated to identify impact, adding structural impact from Kitschelt, in which the institutional structures themselves are actually altered (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995, 284). For the access level they identify opposition congressional testimony or amicus, advisory briefs in court. For the agenda level they suggest that desired bills are introduced in the legislature. For the policy level they suggest that desired legislation is adopted. For the output level they suggest that legislation is enforced in the direction that the opposition desired. For the impact level they suggest that the legislation has the consequences that the opposition intended. Finally, for the structural level they suggest that the system, specifically institutions, has been altered to increase the opportunities for movement influence. For

30

●


Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander, the legislation component from Schumaker’s typology is one level of impact to examine while structures or institutions are another. The Sum of What is Known about Political Parties and Impact To date, most of what has been written about the impact of political parties deals exclusively with policy effects. Convergence theorists suggest that variation in policy outputs cannot be explained by different political, economic, or institutional factors because industrialized societies are becoming too similar. Other scholars disagree that Politics does Matter, to borrow the title from an article by Castles and McKinlay arguing that partisan values impact policy outcomes (Castles and McKinlay 1979). Other theories about parties and policy impact include the institutional-constraint arguments of classic party theorists such as Duverger and Sartori, arguing that institutional arrangements determine or shape political outcomes and processes (Duverger 1964; Sartori 1976). Additionally, several scholars have tested the hypothesis that policy outputs depend on the left-to-right spatial position of political parties in power and vary accordingly and predictably, for example, on economic policy right-wing conservative parties in power tend to cut welfare spending (Hicks, Swank, and Ambuhl 1989). The common denominator in each attempt to link political parties and policy outcomes has been the position in power of the political party. In past studies, indicators for policy effect of parties (parties in power) have included government spending, taxation, or legislation and regulation (Imbeau, Petry, and Lamari 2001, 6). Generally, it has been assumed that the political party must be in the leadership position or a powerful participant in the governing coalition to impact policy (Budge and Keman 1993; Laver and Budge 1992). Smaller, extraparliamentary parties have received little to no attention regarding their effects and impact. Studies of minor parties, such as the Greens in Europe, have typically avoided dealing with their impact in any specific terms. However, one important study of the German Greens suggests that if their impact is to be studied, it should be measured in terms of their effect on discourse, on political culture, their electoral success or party power position, and the extent to which their platform issues have been implemented (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992). Little is understood about the important question of peripheral political parties and their effects. Citizens of democracies believe that


●

31

political parties are important and that there should be more than one of them in each country’s political party system. Still, the proof of the significance of parties taking positions outside of the center majority has been lacking. The effects of these parties have proven elusive and difficult to measure. Scholars assume their importance but have yet to systematically evaluate their effect. The next chapter lays the groundwork for such evaluation, presenting a theory of peripheral party behavior and effects.


CHAPTER 3


A

major contribution of this book comes through its innovation in the area of political party influence. Where existing work and conventional wisdom in the field have long accepted as axiomatic that political party influence comes from being the single party or the dominant party in the coalition holding majority power, I suggest otherwise. Peripheral parties matter (the process), they have influence (the conditions), and they demonstrate substantial effects (the magnitude). Despite smallness in terms of membership and electoral returns that often preclude them from gaining seats at the national level of government, peripheral parties, such as those of the radical right-wing, are having a significant impact throughout Western Europe. Their level of success varies from country to country, however. Factors such as institutional constraints, opportunity structures, entrepreneurial leadership and strategies, and issue salience determine their success. This chapter constructs a model showing the pattern of influence including how and under what circumstances these parties have influence. What is a Peripheral Party? Peripheral parties are those that compete for political influence outside of mainstream channels of power. They have emerged following the restructuring of politics in Europe after the Second World War. To date, they have not held majorities or pluralities in national government. They tend to direct their attention to single or small numbers of issues, making them the focal point of their objectives. They tend to operate on the fringes of the political spectrum, or in open issue space between the

34

●


mainstream left and right parties in the case of Liberal/Center parties. Observers of these parties have referred to them as “small parties” (Müller-Rommel and Pridham 1991), “new parties” relating to the New Politics of postmaterialism (Inglehart 1990; Minkenberg 1992; Poguntke 1987), or “extraparliamentary” when they are not sitting in legislatures. Peripheral parties are the antithesis of catch-all parties in terms of their focus, objectives, and tactics. I consider peripheral parties to be those parties that have emerged in response to what Otto Kirchheimer predicted would be the end of opposition, that is the rise of mass, ideologically nondescript, catch-all parties after the Second World War (Kirchheimer 1966a; Kirchheimer 1966b). Kirchheimer envisioned that the mainstream parties of the left and right would continue to widen their bases of support. As this occurred, they would become more neutral on policy issues, attempting to find the broadest appeal without alienating segments of their constituency. Writing about party programs he said, “Concretizations must remain general enough so that they cannot be turned from electoral weapons to engines of assault against the party which first mounted them . . . The catch-all party will do its utmost to establish consensus to avoid party realignment” (Kirchheimer, 1966a, 197). My book has important implications for all of these types of peripheral party. However, my work concentrates specifically on radical rightwing parties in Western Europe. These parties began to emerge between the 1970s and 1980s. However, the rise of the radical right-wing parties across Western Europe did not occur until the 1990s. They emphasize their opposition to foreign influences and immigration overwhelmingly in their rhetoric and platforms. Other key concerns for these parties include security, and they recommend strengthening law and order in their societies. Globalization threatens national identity, they claim, advocating a return to traditional values. More liberal social values, part of the New Politics of postmaterialism, have generated a reaction on the part of the radical right-wing according to some scholars attempting to explain their recent rise (Minkenberg 1992). These parties have been making gains throughout Europe over the last decade and the time has come to evaluate their role in politics more systematically. Five Reasons to Expect that Radical Right-Wing Parties Have an Impact Proposition 1: Success of political parties is not simply electoral. Their ability to influence ideas, shape issues, structure discourse, and generate legislation also provides a measure of success.

A Theory of Impact

●

35

Proposition 2: Radical right-wing parties vary substantially. The farther the radical right moves away from movement organization toward political party organization, the greater its prospects for policy impact will be. Proposition 3: Being in national government increases the likelihood of impact. Whether having seats or as a coalitions partner, direct access to the institutional channels of influence allows greater visibility and legislative power. Proposition 4: Mainstream parties of the center-right and center-left adjust their strategies to attempt to co-opt salient issues from the radical right. Proposition 5: Entrepreneurial leadership improves chances for impact. These leaders can create issue salience. Proposition one suggests the importance of popular-level mobilization and support in assessing the impact of a particular political party. While this may seem obvious in some respects, the tendency in the literature has been to equate voting numbers with political party success. To the contrary, perhaps a successful party is one that manipulates popular opinion, even when this does not translate into winning the most votes. A frequent debate when evaluating majoritarian democracy is whether or not it matters if the conviction of a minority is ten times stronger than the conviction of a majority that remains rather indifferent on an issue. Whose will should prevail? In such debates it becomes tempting to suggest that magnitude of conviction matters. In other words, changes are made on the fringes of particular policy positions. When the majority has indifferent opinions on an issue at the center of politics, minorities have the opportunity to shape the position on the fringe. This is not to suggest that substantial changes will or should occur. Rather, it is to argue that a persuasive minority has particular opportunity to change opinion where there is general indifference. It has the power to generate incremental change. Both William Riker’s median voter theory and in particular Anthony Downs’s theory of party competition illustrate this point (Downs 1957; Riker 1962). Both these scholars address the strategic behavior of political parties as they position themselves to appeal to the median voter or capture the most votes. The model assumes a normal distribution of ideological preference among voters on the left-to-right scale. It presents a one-dimensional continuum of political party positions taken as an aggregate of all of their separate issue positions. Downs argues that that the greatest concentration of voters is found under the peak of the normal curve, the center of the continuum of party positions. He

36

●


suggests that parties can strategically adjust their position on the continuum as they attempt to capture more voters and win office. For his model, leaders are indifferent about the actual merits of a given policy but embrace it in order to better position themselves and attract more votes. Voters, then, make rational decisions based on the merits of platforms put forth by political parties. For Downs, political parties are anchored in a particular ideological domain, which limits their range of motion. For example, no party can leapfrog over another party on the continuum when adjusting its position (Downs 1957, 122–123). In the Downsian model, parties tend to move toward the center to attract more votes, as illustrated in figure 3.1. Down’s model has been criticized on several points, including its requirement of perfect information and a rigid, normal distribution of voters. The general criticisms of rational choice theories apply. However, its heuristic value provides a solid basis for modeling the spatial relationship among political parties. However, what if the motivation for a political party is not to win office so that it can rule the government? Some political parties realistically recognize that they will never be a ruling party. They may be junior coalition partners at the very best. However due to their position, and given the inability to leapfrog as suggested by Downs, these parties cannot hope to capture a majority or plurality of votes. Such parties have other goals. The best that they can hope for are alternative channels of influence. They will not make government policy, so they must strive to influence it from the outside. The Downsian logic of movement, then, does not apply to such parties. They do not always seek the center position and to capture the most votes. The peripheral parties can move towards the center or away from it. Additionally, their platforms need not be as comprehensive since everyone knows they are not going

Radical left

Figure 3.1

Center left

Downsian Party Positioning Logic

Center right

Radical right

A Theory of Impact

Old center

Figure 3.2

●

37

New center

Right-Wing Peripheral Party Goal

to govern with it. They can pick and choose their issues, knowing from the outset that their impact will most likely come one issue at a time. Their target becomes public opinion. They seek clear focus on individual issues where they can speak out, get attention, and cause people to think about things in ways that they had not before. Their goal is to reach people on the fringes of the mainstream and cause them to adopt radical positions. In this way, they may be able to shift the entire Downsian continuum in their direction as illustrated in figure 3.2. Peripheral parties get their important issues into the mainstream by changing the way people think about them. They change the popular discourse, the agendas first of people and then of governments. This is where their impact becomes evident. They plant a seed in the popular consciousness, which over time can be strategically manipulated. Proposition two suggests that structure and the organization of a party matters for its impact. Newly emerging work on the difference between political parties and social movements suggests that the political parties and social movements take advantage of different opportunity structures (Minkenberg 2002). In many ways this work picks up the question of an organizational threshold providing demarcation between political parties and interest groups. I avoid this debate regarding the genesis point at which a movement becomes a party and what the preconditions or factors might be. One can look at the sophistication of organizational structure to separate parties from movements dichotomously in the same way that scholars do with interest groups. The closer a group gets to sophisticated party organization, the more likely their prospects for effective policy impact will be. The simple relationship is illustrated graphically in figure 3.3. The rationale for this proposition is based on the concept of opportunity structures in the social movements literature. Sidney Tarrow has


●

Protest

Type of impact

Policy

38

Movement

Party

Type of organization

Figure 3.3

Relationship between Party Organization and Impact

written that opportunity structures are persistent incentives for collective action, which shape people’s expectations for success or failure (Tarrow 1994, 85). The concept proves useful even apart from rational choice orientations, as it suggests that context determines opportunities for group action. In other words, factors such as the relationship between and within other parties, socioeconomic conditions, institutional arrangements in the government, and pressing problems confronting the state and concerning the people all prove relevant to the openings or opportunities for movements or parties to be successful. The tools used by movements of the radical right-wing are different than those used by highly organized parties of the radical right wing. Both types of organization can use the tools appropriate to them and successfully have impact. The German radical right wing, for instance, appears highly fragmented and has been cited as an example of weak party organization (Minkenberg 1998; Backes and Mudde 2000). However, weak parties can still effectively get their message out. The German radical right wing utilizes demonstrations, underground newspapers, and the Internet to reach audiences, to stir public reaction, and to make its point on issues. The German case is particularly interesting because of the criminal law protections precluding hate speech or “incitement to violence and hatred against ‘segments’ of the population.” Other restrictions on the freedom to assemble come in the Basic Law Article 21, banning antidemocratic political parties, and Article 9,

A Theory of Impact

●

39

Table 3.1 Tools Used by the Radical Right Wing Type of influence Social Movement Low-org. Party High-org. Party

Protests Propaganda Internet Regular demonstrations media opinion ✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Public leadership

Entrepreneurial

✓

✓

Policy

banning extremist organizations. Certainly the opportunity structures or the context for influence of radical right-wing groups in Germany is severely restricted. However, right-wing radical groups in Germany have found alternative ways to attract attention and listeners to their message. For example, they have highly developed websites that promote xenophobic messages. One way by which they get around the barriers to these messages (the criminal law prohibition of inciting racial hatred) is by hosting their Internet sites on servers located outside of Germany, most often in the United States, where free speech is protected without such content restrictions. The German case is one example of the logic of this relationship between organizational structure and type of impact. I explore it in several cases in the chapters that follow. Table 3.1 summarizes the argument that I make. In sum, the argument maintains that actors operate under the constraints of their institutional context. However, the relationship can be dynamic, as actors can choose their courses of action and work to alter and shape their institutional context as well. As historical institutionalist approaches reveal, a bidirectional relationship exists between agents and structures (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). They play off each other. As such interaction occurs between agents and structures, outcomes can be altered beyond what appears possible at the outset of the process. Beyond the nexus between organizational structure and type of influence as described in proposition two, in proposition three I consider the power position of the radical right wing as a relevant factor in impact assessment. Some radical right-wing groups have more limited power in terms of direct access to central government decision-making, such as the social movements. Other radical right-wing parties are extraparliamentary and would be expected to have reduced access than those parties that sit in national parliament. I consider cases in Western

40

●


Europe where right-wing radical parties have varying degrees of power in the central government. The radical right in France, Germany, and Austria varies on this power position factor. The Austrian party has had the most direct access to the central government. Since the 1999 elections the Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been the junior partner in the central governing coalition headed by the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). The FPÖ heads several key government ministries and have substantial representation in the Nationalrat. In France, the National Front (FN) has been largely kept out of the parliament due to the single-member district system of electing representatives (except from 1986–1988 when proportional representation was used). Yet in France, the radical right-wing party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen won approximately 15 percent of the vote in the 1995 presidential elections and came in second place in the presidential primary election in 2002. Also, the party has occupied seats in government at the regional, district, and local levels in France and won contests to place FN mayors in several French towns (Hainsworth, 2000). German radical right-wing parties have had the least access to the central government. In Germany, none of the radical right-wing parties hold seats in the Bundestag because of a 5 percent threshold requiring that a party win at least 5 percent of the vote share before being eligible to hold any seats. This proposition refutes the work of political parties scholars who have argued that only parties of government have important impact. In the past, most studies that ask “do parties matter?” have been framing the question to reference parties of government. For example, one of the earliest and best known among such accounts was Richard Rose’s book Do Parties Make a Difference? In it, Rose analyzes the power of majority parties in Great Britain, confining the role of the opposition to criticism of government while developing policies to implement when in power. The partisan theory scholars argue that the party composition of government determines policy outcomes (Castles 1982; Hibbs 1977; Hibbs 1992; Schmidt 1982; Schmidt 1997; Tufte 1978). Other scholars have argued that the position of political parties relative to the power structure of government, for example, participation in the government coalition, determines impact on policy (Budge and Keman 1993; Laver and Budge 1992). Proposition four posits that part of the influence of the radical right wing comes through a threat perceived by other parties who then adapt their positions to preclude radical right-wing electoral success. This is not to suggest that center-right and center-left catch-all parties fear that

A Theory of Impact

●

41

radical right-wing parties will win control of the government (although they came closer to this than ever before in the 1999 election in Austria, the 2002 election for presidency in France, the 2001 Italian election, and the 1999 election in Switzerland). The threat generally has to do with voter realignments or party-switching and salient issue positions. The mainstream parties do not want to see their voters leave them and join fringe parties. The more broadly they can position themselves, thus attracting the most voters, the better are their electoral chances. Yet as work from Herbert Kitschelt has suggested, radical right-wing parties have been successful at finding opening on the right-wing spectrum and taking issue space away from mainstream right-wing parties (Kitschelt 1995). The mainstream right recognizes such a threat and works to counter it. Recent work on the radical right-wing parties in Europe has begun to suggest that issue co-optation is occurring, where mainstream right parties adopt popular positions that have been promoted by the radical right (Minkenberg 1998; Schain 2002). This is a strategic attempt to take back such issue space and avoid losing voters to the fringe parties. Proposition five argues for consideration of agency in addition to structure. While many of the radical right-wing parties do not have charismatic, strategic, individual leaders, the ones that do can be expected to achieve greater success. Leaders who are also entrepreneurs tactically evaluate the context in which they find themselves to isolate areas of opportunity. They can make something out of little or nothing. The entrepreneurial skills of the party leader in navigating the political landscape and working with or separating the radical right-wing from other parties can be critical for the national-level success of a peripheral party. Issue salience can be created by entrepreneurial leaders. Strategically, peripheral parties can take a nonissue and transform it into a rallying point. Radical right-wing parties have been particularly successful in this way. They carefully select issues that they can transform with nostalgia, symbolism, and slogans into those of pressing concern among the public. The following chapters trace the process of salient issue creation using public opinion data. Other leadership factors beyond entrepreneurial ability may also be relevant to radical right-wing party impact assessments. Some scholars have pointed to the importance of charisma (Eatwell 2002; Hainsworth 2000, 13; Helms 1997, 38). However, it must be pointed out that charisma may be a necessary though not a sufficient condition for radical right-wing party success. Without entrepreneurial skills, without knowing how to manipulate the rules of the game, a charismatic leader

42

●


may not achieve desired impacts. Roger Eatwell points specifically to Haider in Austria, Le Pen in France, and Schönhuber in Germany as good examples of leaders with an ability to “exploit such opportunities” including the use of popular media to communicate their messages and party platforms (Eatwell 2000, 417). The democratic rules of the game constrain right wing parties, yet the more successful ones are those whose leaders know how to strategically position the party for maximum efficacy. Measuring Impact Political impact or influence is the capacity to change a course of events that might develop differently without the introduction of the impact stimulus. In order for a political party to have impact, it must gain recognition, set itself apart from other parties, and connect itself to at least one if not several salient issues that resonate with people. In politics, influence determines the ability to alter political discourse, to introduce important issues, to develop fresh ideas, and to induce action. In democracies, influence and impact have traditionally been associated with political parties in positions of power, or in other words “parties of government.” In majoritarian electoral systems, a party of government is a political party that has the full mandate by virtue of the majority of popular support. In proportional representation electoral systems, a party of government may be one of several comprising the coalition of parties that governs. Parties of government have clear channels of influence and impact on the politics of their societies. They introduce bills, pass legislation, and make official state policy declarations. Such influence is predictable given the rules of the game for democratic government, in which the majority rules. However, what distinguishes a democracy from a dictatorship is the legitimacy of opposition. Certainly the value of opposition goes beyond sitting quietly, plotting future moves, and waiting. Still, few studies have undertaken estimates of the impact of the opposition. Several explanations for this deficit exist. First, scholars disagree about what constitutes opposition or movement success and thus how to measure it. For instance, does political influence mean the implementation of legislation according to party or movement objectives? Or does influence also include simply bringing issues to the table and getting them discussed more widely among the general public? Political influence extends beyond government legislation to social and cultural mores and values. Yet, the assessment of such changes becomes much more difficult to

A Theory of Impact

●

43

quantify and therefore to evaluate. Second, even when changes can be isolated, tracing them to a particular source can be problematic. The link between a given change and the activities of a particular opposition party or movement proves difficult given the array of other factors involved in political competition. Often, several parties and movements support a particular issue to varying degrees, and attributing issue success to any single source may not be valid or realistic. Despite the complicating factors, the need exists to formalize a model of peripheral party impact. In the absence of such a model, scholars could only feign astonishment when Jean-Marie Le Pen defeated Lionel Jospin in the 2002 French presidential primary or when radical rightwing leaders entered the governing coalitions in the Netherlands (July 2002), Denmark (November 2001), Italy (May 2001), and Austria (November 1999). It can no longer be taken for granted that the radical right wing in Europe poses no threat. It is a mistake to dismiss the party as fragmented groups of street gangs with shaved heads and localized vigilantes chanting slogans and painting graffiti signs. Today the members of this party sit in governments, from the national to the local level across Western Europe. In many cases, they have developed effective, organized political parties to disseminate their message and to contend for both formal and informal political power. It is therefore important to attempt to model their behavior, to discern patterns of influence, and to cultivate techniques for evaluating their impact. My conceptualization of peripheral party success or impact emphasizes what John Kingdon has called the “predecision” phase of policy (Kingdon 1984, 1; see also Considine 1998). In other words, one must account for the opportunity to influence decision-making prior to the stage of formal legislation. Most studies of party impact do not consider the importance of political debates, popular discourse, or the process of brining an issue to saliency. However this is most likely the critical stage of influence for peripheral parties. I argue that while impact on legislation should be considered, it is only one of at least three levels of political party impact on the political system. My work explores institutional effects, agenda influence, as well as policy influence that includes but is not limited to legislation. Testing the Theory I treat impact broadly as political influence. This includes the ability to get the opposition’s message into popular discourse as well as to affect political courses of action. I model three levels of impact using a

44

●


pyramid to represent the wide, popular level of impact at the agenda level, the more-narrow possibilities for impact at the institutional level, and the most limited possibilities for impact at the policy level (figure 3.4). First, the widest possibilities for impact come at the agenda level. I suggest an agenda level that emphasizes influence on political discourse and public opinion. My agenda level is perhaps most consistent with the work on agendas by John Kingdon, Frank Baumgartner, and Bryan Jones, as well as Mark Considine. Baumgartner, Jones and Considine use the term “agenda” to mean the issue priorities or cycle of new ideas about policy replacing the old ideas (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Considine 1998). Considine stresses the importance of discussions about issues in his construction of agendas. He talks about the importance of the predecision stage of legislation, which includes the informal political discourse in a society and the way actors in the political system respond (Considine 1998). This is an active process of interaction among a broad cast of participants from the government and the public arenas. Kingdon’s approach also views agendas as a dynamic process where problems, policies, and opportunities combine and interact with the political environment (Kingdon 1984). He stresses further the role of media and the role of ideas that have particular salience at specific times and given particular circumstances. In democracies, political agenda-setting incorporates a variety of actors outside of the legislature including political parties, interest groups, social movements and the priorities of the general public or voters that all combine to affect agendas. For this reason public opinion proves important, as well as political discussion in the public and among officials of government. In sum, agendas reflect ideas, opinions, and their articulation among people. The second level, institutions, represents the effect of radical rightwing parties on the political system. My use of the term political system

Policy Institutions Agendas Figure 3.4

Levels of Impact

A Theory of Impact

●

45

refers to the institutional structure of government. It includes the relationship between political parties, the position of parties on the political ideological spectrum (left, moderate, or right), the type of democratic system (presidential versus parliamentary, federal versus unitary), the type of electoral system (proportional representation versus single-member districts), and the laws or policies that constrain social behavior. I contend that different institutions present different opportunity structures for political actors. I suggest a dynamic relationship between political parties and the political system. I believe that parties can alter the political system. This is less true of the polity type or electoral system type and more true of the political party structures, especially spatial relationships. I explore the possibility that radical right-wing parties affect other parties in the political system by shifting the ideological spectrum farther to the right. These radical parties seek out their opportunities for influence where other parties leave vacuums by failing to address popular concerns. Electoral politics presents a zero-sum dilemma with particular parties gaining votes at the expense of others. Recognizing this, center parties must guard against incursion into their ideological or issue space from the fringes. As radical right-wing parties gain electoral support, other parties positioned to the right of center on the ideological spectrum may shift their platforms away from the moderate or centrist positions farther toward the right in attempts at issue co-optation, or to take issue space back from the fringes. They attempt to diminish the effect of radical right-wing opportunism by expanding their own party platforms to include issues that appeal to voters supporting parties of the radical right. As moderate parties do this, they move themselves outward from the center. Even though my emphasis in the book is on political party relationships and their effects due to right-wing radical parties, I do not rule out rare cases of other institutional impacts. Electoral system rules may change or constitutions may be revised to alter the existing democratic system type in reaction to radical right-wing parties. France has a history of such change from the beginning of the Fifth Republic, when proportional representation was abandoned on the grounds that it promoted extremist parties. The Socialists brought proportional representation back in 1985. They were hoping to minimize Gaullist influence but returned to a single-member district system again following the 1986 elections. The shift occurred in part because the National Front had gained thirty-five deputies in the National Assembly. Additionally, in Germany the Basic Law of 1949 reflects a clear intention to structure

46

●


institutions to preclude radical right-wing party success following the rise to power of the Nazi Party under the institutional rules of the Weimar Democracy. The German Constitution was changed in 1949 to require a 5-percent threshold of the popular vote for parliamentary seats. It also explicitly prohibits antidemocratic parties in Article 21. At the third level, policy impact is evaluated using legislative initiatives and laws to evaluate the effectiveness of the radical right at moving its key issues to the implementation phase. Policy impacts have been the most widely studied in the past because they are more concrete and easily documented. The most difficult causal leap at this level is in taking an issue concern and assigning it to a specific party. In other words, to the extent that immigration is the priority issue of the radical right-wing parties, the argument that increased anti-immigration legislation can be attributed to them presumes that they are the key element driving the issue forward. Undeniably, interaction effects abound in legislatures and any issue has multiple influences upon its legislative form and outcome. Yet I argue that the radical right is a central actor in advancing its core issues. The fact that the radical right focuses on the issue before other parties make that adjustment in their programmes coupled with the way that the radical right has demonstrated repeatedly the centrality of this core issue to its purpose aids in creating a basis for intermediate cause-effect logic in the measurement of policy-level impact. Scope of This Study This book examines right-wing radical parties cross-nationally in Western Europe. In addition, I present three case studies of: Austria (Freedom Party), France (National Front and National Republican Movement), and Germany (the Republikaner, the National Democratic Party, and the German People’s Party). Radical right-wing parties investigated here have been selected based on their issue focus and spatial position on the left–right ideological spectrum. I argue that radical right-wing parties include those parties that mobilize popular support surrounding contemporary issues that are relevant to the masses, particularly immigration, security, and globalization concerns. I use the term right-wing radicalism in the European or specifically German sense.1 In the German traditional usage, the terms radical and extremist mean different orientations toward democracy. The two orientations distinguish the right-wing political parties holding views that can be considered far to the right of the ideological spectrum from those which are

A Theory of Impact

●

47

additionally antidemocratic in their objectives. Extremism, in the European sense, implies that political parties are openly antidemocratic or unconstitutional in their aims (Mudde 1996). The political parties studied here do not present openly antidemocratic platform positions. Using the West European countries of the European Union as case studies, the effects of radical right-wing parties can be evaluated using quantitative data. Increasingly data are being collected that include all European Union countries in one data set. In the past, researchers often had to use country-specific data that were not measured in the same way across countries, creating some problems of standardization and interpretation of results. Better cross-national data allow the opportunity to look for generalizable trends in the relationship between radical rightwing parties and their effects. Public opinion studies, such as the European Values Survey and the Eurobarometer Survey provide comparable data across European Union countries on a variety of social and political issues. Data on the attitudes toward immigrants over time are used to look for correlations with the rise or resurgence of radical rightwing parties. Additionally, scholars such as Ian Budge and Hans-Dieter Klingemann along with others on their research team (Budge et al. 2001), as well as Marcel Lubbers’s Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political Parties 2000 data set, have developed their own political parties’ positioning datasets using West European countries as their cases. These time series datasets can be used in statistical tests including correlation and regression estimates. The three cases selected for intensive case study were chosen to allow variation on such independent variables as institutional constraints, opportunity structures, organizational structures, and entrepreneurial leadership. Some of the intercountry differences include the power position in government, whether a party is part of the coalition or outside of government. In Austria the radical right-wing party is a partner in the governing coalition, in France it holds office at local levels of government, and in Germany it has not been very successful at gaining seats in elective government at all. Regarding entrepreneurial leadership, the tactics of Haider in Austria for example have been quite different from those used by Le Pen in terms of content and design. In Germany the party leaders lack the ability to unify the radical right wing and have not been able to position the parties in mainstream political arenas. The cases have different pressing concerns, and public opinion varies among them on key issues. Also, the institutional arrangements in each country differ in terms of the way democracy is structured, presenting different types of opportunities and constraints in each case.

48

●


These three case studies present a similar type of right-wing radicalism. Each case demonstrates a right-wing radicalism that must come to terms with the legacy of fascism2. Unlike the Progress parties of Scandinavia, which have been called radical right-wing, or the anti–European Union parties such as in Switzerland, or the secessionist and national separatist right-wing of Belgium, or the new wave of the right-wing such as in Denmark and the Netherlands, the right wing in these three cases is constantly coping with the past and remains tied to ideas of an ethnically pure society. Such parties are frequently linked to remarks about a better time referring to the Nazi period or ideas of racial superiority, or defending such remarks by their party leadership. This does not plague many of the other parties with agendas that are largely anti-European, broadly populist, or nationalist. Even though the radical right-wing in these three countries should not be called neo-Nazi, their connection to a fascist historical past is more direct and persists in a larger degree than in other countries of Western Europe. Despite the differences described above, which make comparison of these three countries interesting, they form a “most similar cases” research design, which allows for some control of additional variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970). These countries demonstrate a similar polity type. They possess similar standards of living, levels of industrialization, consolidated democratic governmental institutions, and roles as a host country for immigration. They have common and often intertwined historical experiences, or as Jürg Steiner puts it: they are “bound together by a common culture based on centuries of close interaction” (Steiner 1995, xi). Guy Peters acknowledges certain limitations of the most-similar-cases research design: “Comparative design tends to rely upon fewer cases, but ones that are selected purposefully rather than at random” (Peters 1998, 36). Such intentional case selection, also called selecting on the dependent variable, can present selection bias problems in research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This project does not select on the dependent variable despite the most-similar-cases design. The dependent variable measures the impact of right-wing parties, which is by nature a measure of degree. Therefore, despite the fact that the cases are similar, variation on dependent variables follows. Whereas Harry Eckstein viewed the case study as capturing a single event at a specific point in time (Eckstein 1975, 85), I intend to use the case study as a means of tracing a process over time. Several scholars have referred to this method as the developmental case study, where decision-making or implementation is studied across time (Peters 1998,

A Theory of Impact

●

49

152; Bartolini 1993, 141). I trace a process by identifying a path through which peripheral political parties have impact. I present patterns of interaction and effects. Method of Analysis Given the absence of existing impact studies on peripheral parties, one goal of this book is to conceptualize the impact of radical right-wing parties. A second goal is to develop indicators or measures of radical right-wing party impact. This is done using the three-level concept of impact elaborated above in this chapter, with multiple indicators for each level explored in the chapters that follow. The indicators are tested empirically over twelve years from 1990 to 2002 using reliable data that is available for that time period. This study examines the impact of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe since 1990. They begin to rise in prominence across Western Europe at that time. Also immigration began to increase again in Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism, and right-wing radical parties have made opposition to immigration a central issue. Generally speaking, the postwar period in Europe had two immigration booms (1950–1970, 1989–1999) with a period of slowdown in between (1971–1988). I begin with 1990 both for practical reasons in my data collection, where I needed to limit my research to a manageable number of years, and because of the significance of the 1990s for rapid increases in immigration throughout Western Europe. Several events in the 1990s prompted these immigration increases. The collapse of the Soviet Union sent many emigrants Westward. From 1991–1994 Bosnian refugees were fleeing the former Yugoslavia. In 1994–1995 Chechen refugees fled the Russian invasion of Chechnya. In 1995 Germany issued 1.3 million temporary work permits. In 1997 Italy hosted Kurdish, Albanian, and Iraqi asylum seekers. In 1998–1999 the Kosovo crisis displaced over 900,000 refugees. Furthermore, political and economic crises in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa sent emigrants from those countries to Europe. In 1990 the European governments received over 500,000 applications for asylum. By 1992 the number had increased to over 700,000 applications. In fieldwork conducted during the 2001–2002 academic year, I interviewed over forty-five subjects including legislative office-holders, legislative staffers, political party leaders including leaders of radical right-wing parties, civil servants with policy input, and scholars. Questions were standardized with a core set of questions being asked of

50

●


all subjects. However, additional questions were added specific to the positions delineated above to get at more specialized knowledge. These interviews were conducted in my three case-study countries: Austria, France, and Germany. The interview language in Austria and Germany was German. The interview language in France was English. Legislators interviewed generally served on interior committees in the legislature, in which decisions about immigration and law and order in their societies are made. These people contributed knowledge about the decision-making process on key radical right-wing issues of immigration and law and order. Other legislators interviewed served as delegates to the European Union parliament or within domestic legislatures on European Union committees. These subjects were selected because opposition to the European Union has also been a key rallying point for radical right-wing parties. Additionally, the radical right wing has attempted to gain seats in the European Union parliament with greater success than it has generally had in national legislatures. These subjects were able to address questions about the behavior of the radical right-wing party members in the European parliament. In addition to the interviews, documents were collected in the field, such as political party platforms, political party position papers, campaign materials, election results, survey data, party position data, newspaper articles, government reports, and the text of legislation. In the analysis chapters that follow, many of these materials are employed in impact measures. Because radical right-wing party impact measures have not been documented prior to this study, several different measures will be developed and evaluated empirically in this research to identify the most promising ones for future work. Contribution of This Research This book is an important early step in the scholarship on radical rightwing party impact. Peripheral party significance is conceptualized, and several measures for assessing impact are examined. This moves the scholarship on far right parties in a new direction away from definition and electoral explanation, toward the substantive questions of policy relevance. This book addresses the real-world concerns of governments about the threat from a fascist revival in Western Europe, or of radical antipluralist elements that might undermine democracy. Both statistical evidence and case-specific work on three countries provide a broad perspective on radical right-wing party impact. This allows generalization on some measures, but also tests these through detailed analysis of cases.

A Theory of Impact

●

51

This work bridges gaps between political parties and social movements scholarship. Borrowing from the social movements literature some methodological insights and also some theoretical orientations, this research advances the study of political parties by applying alternative approaches and methods. Perhaps the failure of scholars of political parties to thoroughly assess the impact of the Greens and other moremarginal parties in societies is due to the traditional treatment of party impact as measured by electoral success. This book evaluates whether parties do matter even when they are not in positions of power because they influence discourse and the political agenda. The measures constructed and applied here could be used to examine other parties that do not have direct channels of power. In multiparty systems, these include the Green parties, Communist parties, and Liberal/Center parties. This work also has key relevance for advancing the study of third-party “spoilers” in two-party systems such as the “Perot effect” or the role played by Ralph Nader’s Environmental Party in the 2000 elections in the United States. Tracing the process of influence by peripheral parties reveals that they often create their own opportunities. They cannot compete with mainstream parties directly, so they turn to alternative methods. Their tactics and goals cannot be evaluated according to traditional rules of political party behavior as applied to catch-all parties. Different rules apply to them. Peripheral parties matter, in exciting, dynamic ways. Their influence is being felt across Western Europe. They will not be taking over governments. However that is precisely the point—they do not have to!


CHAPTER 4

The Impact of Radical Right Parties Across Western Europe

T

his chapter takes a cross-national approach to investigating the impact of radical right-wing parties in mostly western European Union countries. European Union countries of Western Europe were selected based largely on the comparability of available data for these countries; however right-wing radical parties in Norway and Switzerland are also discussed. For purposes of this analysis, radical right-wing parties are those located spatially to the right of center of mainstream parties in terms of ideological placement or those that promote xenophobia and social exclusion for certain out-groups or foreigners in their societies. The first goal of this chapter is to model right-wing radical influence generally. This includes reconstructing the process of radical right-wing party influence across Western Europe since 1990 based on relevant details in the evolution of radical right-wing parties over time. It further includes explicating the strategy and key decisions made by party leaders to pursue certain objectives and issue concerns above others. The way that the parties frame themselves and their key issues becomes important in this account of the pattern of influence. A second goal of this chapter is to develop and evaluate indicators of radical right-wing party impact at three levels: agenda, institutional, and policy. The second part of this chapter is devoted to this endeavor. Indicators of radical right-wing party impact are developed for each impact level. Application of the indicators across Europe are made. Then the indicators are used to gauge measures of impact and to determine whether the radical right appears to be having a generalizable effect

54

●


across Western Europe or whether the impact appears more pronounced in specific countries or with specific types of radical right-wing party. Where pronounced pockets of impact are observed, attempts are made to identify key factors influencing the variation on the indicators. How Radical Right-Wing Parties Create Influence Radical right-wing parties reinvented themselves in the mid- to late 1980s. The impetus for change came from opportunities emerging in the political party system, as political parties of both the mainstream left and the mainstream right appeared to be converging in the center of many West European political party spectrums. The parties on both sides of the mainstream agreed largely on many issues including the importance of the welfare state and deepening of the European Union, still known then as the European Community. In other words, the postwar consensus was in full force and opposition was in decline, much as Otto Kirchheimer had anticipated twenty years earlier (Kirchheimer 1966a; Kirchheimer 1966b). With political parties converging in the center, or dominant coalitions holding power over extended periods of time, including grand coalitions in Austria or the “gang-of-four” parties in France, as National Front leader Jean-Marie LePen referred to them (Safran 1993), viable opposition remained in the background or it simply did not exist. At the same time, communist parties appeared to be in decline across Europe. As the Soviet Union, the world’s preeminent, practical example of communist government, weakened and eventually collapsed, the ideals of communism and the political parties of the radical left-wing receded as well. Taken as a whole, the political party system in the mid- to late 1980s appeared devoid of legitimate opposition. However, to the savvy strategist, the void of opposition could appear as an opening rather than a hole. Certainly there were grievances among people in these societies at the time, yet the voice of the opposition was weak or relatively silent. This condition persisted until the leadership of one or several small, struggling, radical right-wing parties saw the opening in the political party system and developed a strategy for stepping into it effectively as a voice of the opposition. Radical right-wing parties carefully crafted their central defining issue, immigration, as an omnibus issue through which other socioeconomic concerns of the day could be funneled. In so doing, they redefined themselves as an opposition speaking to many concerns through a central theme: immigration.

Radical Right Parties

●

55

Types of Radical Right Parties Not all radical right-wing parties are the same. To understand the reinvention of the radical right wing, it becomes useful to construct a typology delineating those parties that initially undertook a renewal from others included in the radical right-wing party family. Various typologies already exist in the literature. Some make an ideological distinction between parties advocating or displaying characteristics of fascism from parties that distance themselves from fascism. This distinction is made by Piero Ignazi in distinguishing the “old traditional” from the “new postindustrial” radical right-wing parties (Ignazi 1992; Ignazi 1997; see also Betz 1994; Gibson 2002; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 1995; Taggart 1995). Rachel Gibson offers an innovative classification scheme using the timing of adoption of the immigration issue to delineate various types of radical right-wing party (Gibson 2002, pp. 10–11). She identifies three groups of parties: co-optive, latent, and original. Co-optive parties are those that adopted the immigration issue some time later after their founding. In other words anti-immigration is not their original position. As examples in this category, Gibson includes the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss People’s Party, and the Danish Progress Party. On the other hand, so-called latent parties have always been anti-immigrant but the magnitude of the issue varies over time for these parties. Gibson includes the Italian National Alliance, the German National Democrats, and the French National Front as latent parties. In the category of original anti-immigrant parties, Gibson places parties whose raison d’être has always been opposition to immigrants. Most of these parties emerged in the last two decades of the twentieth century, and include the Belgian National Front, the Danish People’s Party, the German People’s Union, the Dutch Center Party, the Greek National Party, and the British National Front. This book introduces a typology based on calculated decision-making as reflected in changing platform strategy by radical right-wing parties. Output and the activities of radical right-wing parties provide the focus of this analysis; therefore grouping the parties according to their behavior and output informs the model and aids in impact assessment. To differentiate among parties, the timing of the adoption of new strategies is used, as some parties appear to lead the way in innovation whereas others follow. The typology presented in this book, therefore, divides parties of the radical right wing according to their role in the reinvention process. Specifically, did they seize the opportunity to recreate themselves, did they copy the successful model of other parties, or did

56

●


they sit idly by clinging to their traditional orientation and roles? Table 4.1 outlines this typology. Parties that maintained a fascist legacy through the 1980s relatively content with their marginal status fit the fascist-legacy classification. These parties appear to have found themselves comfortable in their association with the past and did not actively seek out new opportunities to gain influence by repositioning themselves in the 1980s or 1990s. A second category, the entrepreneurs, saw opportunities in the political party system of the mid- to late 1980s and aggressively sought strategies to position themselves to take advantage of the openings. These parties reformulated their platforms, introduced charismatic leaders, played to the media for publicity, adopted politically correct language to distance themselves from fascist rhetoric, and presented themselves in a new style that many authors have called populist. The third category, the bandwagoners, watched expectantly as the entrepreneurs reinvented politics on the fringes of the Table 4.1 Typology of Radical Right-Wing Parties Fascist legacy ●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

National Democrats— Germany (f.1964) People’s Union— Germany (f.1987) National Front— Belgium (f.1987) Notional Front—Spain (f.1984) National Democrats— Austria (f.1967) Social Movement—Italy (f.1946) National Front—Britain (f.1967) Center Party— Netherlands (f.1986) *Republicans— Germany (1994)

Entrepreneurs ●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

National Front-France (1982–1983) Freedom Party—Austria (1986) Progress Party— Denmark (1985–1986) Progress Party— Norway (1985–1986) Center Democrats— Netherlands (f.1984) bec. Conservative Dems. 1998 National Alliance—Italy (1988–1986) Vlaams Blok-Belgium (1985–1986) Northern League—Italy (f.1986) Automobile Party— Switzerland (f.1986) bec. Freedom Party 1992 *Republicans— Germany (1988–1989)

Bandwagoners ●

●

●

●

●

●

People’s Party— Switzerland (1992) List (Pim Fortuyn)— Netherlands (f.2001) People’s Party— Denmark (f.1995) Schill Party—Germany (f.2001) National Democrats— Britain (f.1993) National Republican Movement—France (f.1999)

* indicates that the German Republicans are listed in two columns because they changed their party orientation substantially in 1994, as discussed in chapter 6 on pages 123–4.


●

57

right-wing and then adopted similar styles, platforms, and strategies for attracting support. They did so, essentially, after the formula for success had already been tested successfully by the entrepreneurs. The dates shown next to each party indicate either when the party was founded with an “f ” or the date when the party shifted its position to adopt an anti-immigrant platform. These dates are drawn largely from the work of Rachel Gibson, however with several recent additions such as the Schill Party in Germany and the List (Pim Fortuyn) in the Netherlands. To develop the above typology, I used Gibson’s data on the dates of party founding and adoption of the anti-immigrant position, giving consideration to Piero Ignazi’s distinction between old and new parties to arrive at three categories (Gibson 2002; Ignazi 1997). The typology is used to support the model of influence developed in this chapter and to qualify variation in impact across Western Europe. A New Image for the Radical Right Wing Some scholars suggest that the pattern of reinvention adopted by the entrepreneurs among the radical right wing began with the French National Front (Hainsworth 2000, 11). The typology above shows that the French National Front makes the shift to anti-immigration platforms in the early 1980s. Other parties in the entrepreneur category do not make the shift until the mid- to late 1980s. This suggests that the French National Front may have carved out the niche and established a path for others to follow. Following the French National Front, the entrepreneur parties created an image in the 1980s that was politically correct, dynamic, media savvy, and arguably populist. Some of the parties in this category recreated themselves in this new image, while others entered the political scene for the first time in the 1980s displaying these traits. The new image included a political correctness, as they carefully phrased their opposition to immigrants in terms of economic competition or protecting the rights of average Europeans. Roberto Michels found that parties of the radical left see the value in adjusting their platform positions beyond core beliefs to appeal to a wider audience (Michels 1915). The radical right-wing party leaders appear to have observed the same thing for their parties in the 1980s. They needed a broad, mobilizing issue and they created one in their calculated framing of the immigration issue. Scrutiny reveals that the new language adopted by the radical right of establishing a European society differs little from Germany for the Germans or France for the French. It is essentially Europe for the Europeans, but as one article points out, this really includes “white”

58

●


Europeans only (Hossay and Zolberg 2002, 307). In an interview, Peter Sichrovsky, Freedom Party member and Austrian delegate to the European Parliament, makes reference to this new notion of Europe for Europeans when explaining the European idea of multiculturalism. Sichrovsky suggests that at the European level the goal is to achieve a “mosaic of Europe. Each tile contributes an important part, beautiful and unique, that makes the picture complete when brought together with the other tiles (Sichrovsky 2001).” However, within this language of blending is the clear suggestion that differences are real and should be preserved. In other words, the suggestion of the mosaic is not to assimilate but to let each piece display its distinctive qualities. An undertone of exclusivity pervades such suggestions. Certainly if the qualities that divide Europeans are to be maintained, then the notion that nonEuropeans can ever belong to the mosaic of Europe appears unrealistic. Racism and xenophobia persist in such talk about multiculturalism, veiled with soft-sounding rhetoric for exclusionary ideas. No direct campaign for racial purity can be seen, yet a subtle, nuanced racism persists. As Hans-Georg Betz explains, the shift is a strategic calculation on the part of the radical right-wing parties made “not out of conviction [but rather] out of expediency” (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 3). He suggests a learning curve from past experience with racist rhetoric. He says that when the radical right wing “transgressed the acceptable boundaries of permissible and acceptable political discourse” it became demonized in the press and lost votes in elections. It needed to change its image and adopting a more positive slant on the foreigner issue provided such an opportunity for modification. Politically correct anti-immigrant positions stem from material concerns about the immigrant influx rather than overt racism. Rachel Gibson distinguishes opposition to immigration as either identity-based or resource-based, with the first type derived from cultural differences and the second rooted in physical provisions for a population (Gibson 2002, Ch.6). She argues that by grounding opposition to immigration in material concerns, political parties get away with “covert racism.” For instance, parties blame immigrants for using up the dwindling state benefits due to the native population. Such welfare chauvinism has become widely legitimized amid concerns across Europe stemming from globalization and the ability to provide welfare-state benefits to future generations, or the demographic deficit facing Europe in terms of not having enough young workers to pay the pension benefits of an aging population. Skilled politicians of the radical right wing have been able to oppose immigrants on the grounds that national governments seem


●

59

incapable of providing for their growing populations as immigrants pour into their countries. It becomes easier to blame the immigrant outsiders than to face the realities of demographic change within their societies. Dutch radical right-wing leader Pim Fortuyn provides a good example of this politically correct opposition to immigration in the name of the greater national good. He makes the case for economic limitations, a material- or resource-based argument, saying “the annual stream of tens of thousands of newcomers, who largely end up as illegal aliens, must stop. Full is full” (Hossay and Zolberg 2002, 307). By “full” Fortuyn suggests that resources are limited, and that as immigrants take shares out of the national supply there are fewer for everyone until there is a shortage. Yet such opposition to immigration is positioned as a positive element, national preference, rather than as a negative one, anti-immigrant or racist. Having charismatic party leadership has proven to be an added advantage during the radical right-wing party renewal process. Time and again, leaders such as Gianfranco Fini of the Italian National Alliance and Jean-Marie LePen of the French National Front have demonstrated their ability to capture the attention of audiences through their speeches and use of the media. Meanwhile, a new breed of young, physically attractive, captivating leaders emerged in Austria, with Jörg Haider of the Freedom Party, and Belgium, with Filip Dewinter of the Vlaams Blok. Patrick Hossay and Aristide Zolberg comment on the importance of this new, younger breed of leadership saying that “Haider’s charm and professional polish transformed the Freedom Party from a group of political misfits, waffling on the margins of politics, to a governing partner” (Hossay and Zolberg 2002, 305). Of the Vlaams Blok’s Dewinter they add, he is “thirty-seven years old with an undeniable boyish charm and an ability to convincingly deny his party’s racist character.” The revamped radical right-wing parties of the 1980s used the media to spread their message. They held demonstrations and marches, gave speeches, published leaflets and brochures, used the Internet, and generally created interest around themselves by tapping into public frustrations. Initially frustrations included distrust in government, unemployment, uncertainty regarding the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, then German reunification, and the immigration wave that accompanied the end of Soviet communism. Using immigration as a funnel or omnibus issue, the radical right wing traced virtually all other social problems back to immigrants. This scapegoating became their new strategy. Even as public frustrations shifted to health-care access and declining quality of education, criminality, and law and order in the

60

●


mid- to late 1990s, the retooled radical right wing was able to link these concerns to foreigners living in their countries. Essentially, immigration as an omnibus issue became the cause of all socioeconomic problems according to the rhetoric of the radical right wing. Climate of Fear The genius or madness of the radical right wing appears to be their innovation at creating a climate of fear upon which their omnibus issue, immigration, feeds. Their propaganda, rallies and marches, speeches, and manipulation of the media have allowed them to stir concerns among people disproportionate to actual socioeconomic problems. They have been able to attach themselves to social problems, such as unemployment and crime, whatever the pressing issue of the day may be. Skillfully, they spin the issue to show how governments refuse to address it, placing themselves in the vacuum holding solutions: the radical right wing to the rescue. With the decline in meaningful opposition described above, they portray themselves as the parties of protest to existing conditions meanwhile offering an answer. The way out of crises revolves around reducing immigration, as they spin socioeconomic woes as the consequence of immigrants. The process is illustrated in figure 4.1. The solution demands reducing or eliminating immigrants, a course of action completely consistent with the ideological goals of the radical right wing. Using immigration as a funnel allows right-wing radical parties to translate popular concerns of the day into problems caused by foreigners in their societies. This gave them the dynamism in the 1980s to establish themselves as a viable voice of opposition, standing against the ineptness

Unemployment Poor education Solution: Crime

Funnel issue: Immigration

Security Decaying values

Figure 4.1

Immigration Used as an Omnibus Issue

Fewer immigrants


●

61

of governments across Western Europe, which were failing to solve pressing problems. They took all that is wrong in their societies and used it as a report card by which to evaluate governments and mainstream parties in power. Given the waning of legitimate opposition in the political party system, the radical right wing has picked up support along both the ideological left and right sides of the political spectrum, where growing dissatisfaction with the status quo thrives. In the absence of competition from the radical left wing, the traditional haven for the blue-collar malcontents or anyone with socioeconomic grievances based on disparity, the radical right wing has become a voice for many people disenchanted with their economic status, the modernization losers (Immerfall 1998, 250–252). This is in addition to their traditional base of support among conservative, identity-based losers of modernization— those who feel that social values decay as modern society emerges. They were able to present solutions to contemporary problems that were compatible with their ideological objectives. Yet, the radical right wing did more than react to problems, but rather to some extent it created them as well. The climate of fear consists of all the sorts of discomfort and alienation that people feel with their current situation. It involves worry that poor social and economic conditions exist and that they promise to get worse. Characterized by pessimism, frustration, a social-victim’s complex, and often a sense of hopelessness, the climate of fear has been a byproduct of rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions toward the end of the twentieth century. Various terms refer to the changes occurring in Western society at the close of the last century such as postindustrialism, postmaterialism (Inglehart 1990), modernization (Heitmeyer 1993; Kitschelt 1995), or new values (Minkenberg 2000). Whichever term is applied, the implication is that sweeping and rapid changes occurred and perhaps continue to occur. Changing times and uncertainty provide an amenable context for unrealistic fears inspired and propagated by the radical right wing. They have been able to construct a climate of fear on top of shifting conditions and the accompanying apprehensions. Using real or perceived existing problems, parties of the radical right highlight how bad the situation might become if allowed to continue along its present course. The climate of fear surrounding immigration appears to have come about as a result of radical right-wing party posturing. Fears have been inflated beyond what the realities of conditions ought to produce. The socioeconomic conditions alone in West European countries do not directly correlate with levels of support for right-wing radical parties. In

62

●


Table 4.2 Austrian Socioeconomic Data Ranked by Region # Right vote

%

Unemployment rate

%

Immigration

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

38.6 30.2 29.4 29.2 28 26.9 26.8 22.5 21

KAERNTEN NIEDEROESTERREICH TIROL BURGENLAND OBERORESTERREICH VORARLBERG WIEN SALZBURG STEIERMARK

9 9 8.1 7.1 6.9 6.3 6.1 5.3 4.9

BURGENLAND OBEROESTERREICH SALZBURG VORARLBERG TIROL STEIERMARK WIEN NIEDEROESTERREICH KAERNTEN

NIEDEROESTERREICH WIEN STEIERMARK TIROL VORARLBERG BURGENLAND SALZBURG OBEROESTERREICH KAERNTEN

69940 10963 10342 7542 6542 4876 3771 3008 1392

fact, more common than not fears and support for radical right-wing parties vary randomly with socioeconomic factors that supposedly cause them, such as unemployment and immigration. In table 4.2 below, regions in Austria are ranked by three criteria: support for radical rightwing parties, unemployment rates, and immigration statistics. Support for the radical right wing is highest in the regions of Niederoesterreich, Wien, Steiermark, Tirol, and Vorarlberg. Yet when comparing the five regions most supportive of the radical right-wing parties to the top five regions where unemployment is high, only Niederoesterreich and Tirol recur. Equally striking is the lack of a clear correlation between immigration and support for radical right-wing parties. The top three immigration regions do not reappear in the top five regions supporting the radical right wing at the polls. Only at the middle level of immigration does a correlation appear, as fourth- and fifth-ranked regions for immigration Vorarlburg and Tirol are in fifth and fourth positions, respectively, in terms of support for the radical right wing. This suggests that the correlation between support for the radical right wing and socioeconomic factors is not linear and cannot be directly correlated. The relationship between the radical right wing and socioeconomic factors proves equally uneven across Western Europe. In France, for example, the top five departments voting for the radical right wing in 1997 were Provence Alpes Cote D’Azur, Alsace, Champgne Ardenne, Languedoc Roussillon, and Rhone Alpes (Appendix 1). Neither Alsace nor Champgne Ardenne occurs in the top five ranking for highest unemployment rates or immigration numbers. In Germany, Sachsen and Berlin are in the top five for supporting the radical right wing but not for the other two variables. In Switzerland, Basel-Landschaft, Nidwalden, and Thurgau are in the top five for radical right-wing


●

63

support but rank eighteenth, twenty-second and fifteenth respectively out of the 26 cantons on unemployment and twelfth, twenty-first, and sixteenth respectively on immigration. The relationship between the socioeconomic variables and radical right-wing support appears erratic at best. The lack of a direct correlation on the socioeconomic variables supports the argument that backing for radical right-wing parties has less to do with real conditions in European societies and more to do with perceived circumstances. This is important in the theory of influence advanced in this book that to some extent radical right-wing parties create their own opportunities. The parties use real conditions to magnify fears about their consequences to an unrealistic degree. As Stefan Immerfall confirms, “more often than not it is fear of unemployment and social dislocation rather than actual experience that motivates support” for the radical right-wing parties (Immerfall 1998, 250). These parties create the climate of fear in order to bolster their base of support and to attract attention to their cause. Analysis of Impact Across Western Europe Agenda-setting The climate of fear created by the radical right-wing parties is intended to produce increased anti-immigrant sentiment among the populace. The goal of the parties ultimately appears to be reducing the number of immigrants coming into their countries or, in more extreme cases, sending immigrants back to their countries of origin. At the popular level, the impact of radical right-wing parties depends upon their ability to sway public opinion regarding immigrants or foreigners—meaning those among them who are not of European blood and heritage. Therefore public opinion regarding “others” within West European societies, be they asylum seekers, immigrants, or guest workers, provides a measure of radical right-wing party impact. Negative public opinion toward immigrants serves as an indicator for agenda-level radical rightwing party impact. The logic of this indicator is that since the radical right promotes the climate of fear, rising public anxieties and xenophobia measure their success. Using the Eurobarometer, a bi-annual publication of public-opinion survey research conducted across European Union countries, I have compiled data from 1989 to the year 2000. The questions asked vary from survey to survey, even though the survey attempts to keep consistent

64

●


themes over time. The data compiled reflect subtle differences in the wording of the questions asked, even though the direction of the questions is the same. For example, to measure anti-immigrant sentiment I have used a question asking respondents whether they felt that restrictions need to be placed on immigrants coming into their countries, as well as a question asking whether they feel that there are too many immigrants coming into their countries. Both questions attempt to get at negative feelings toward immigrants. Differences in magnitude across questions appear to be moderate. Racism on the rise as the priority to combat racism recedes seems to present a double measure of success for the radical right-wing efforts to promote xenophobia. The European Commission proclaimed 1997 the “European Year Against Racism.” However, concerns about racism across Europe appear to be declining by the end of the 1990s. The Eurobarometer survey found that Europeans felt that fighting racism was less of a priority in 1997 than it was in 1989. Where 56 percent of those surveyed in 1989 felt that racism was an important priority, only 22 percent felt that way in 1997 (EUMC 1998). Across Western Europe, acceptance of asylum seekers and tolerance of racial minorities appears to have decreased from the early 1990s to the end of the decade. The level of unrestricted acceptance of persons looking for political asylum has decreased from 24 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 1997. Tolerance of difference appears to be in decline as well. When asked about their feelings with regard to people who are different than they are, including people of an ethnic minority, another nationality, or a different religion or culture living in their countries, West Europeans seem increasingly uncomfortable. In 1989, 37 percent of those questioned said that they felt there were too many outsiders living among them. Yet, by 1997 the figure had risen 4 percent to 41 percent of people expressing this opinion. Within the individual countries of the western part of the European Union, anti-immigrant sentiment both increased and declined moderately at various times throughout the 1990s. The general trend over the period shows increased anti-immigrant sentiment, however. With the exception of the United Kingdom, which changes slightly in a negative direction from 43 percent to 42 percent, the countries examined all exhibit an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment from 1991 to 1997 (table 4.3). Both Belgium and France consistently show anti-immigrant sentiment levels above the average across western European Union countries. Other countries demonstrate above-average levels in all but one of the years surveyed, including Denmark, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom.


●

65

Table 4.3 Percentage of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 1991–1997

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom W Europe total

1991

1992

1994

50 32

48 43

57 41

41 37 27 22 28 10 29 11 12

40 34 35 17 28 19 29 13 14

55 40 64 8 46 23 47 30 27

43

41

42

33

34

43

1996

1997 50 60 46 10 46 52 71 19 53 33 42 28 20 39 42

45

45

Source: Figures taken from Eurobarometer survey numbers 35, 37, 42, 45, 48.

Also notably, half of the Austrians surveyed expressed anti-immigrant sentiment in 1997 after they were included in the survey upon joining the European Union. Two other countries show above-average levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in one or two of the surveys: Italy and the Netherlands. The countries that are consistently below the European average include Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. In comparing these figures with the countries displaying prominent radical right-wing parties during this period, trends emerge. Using the typology of right-wing radical parties developed above, a correlation appears between countries with higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and those with entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties. For example, Belgium and France consistently display above-average levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and have entrepreneurial parties, the Vlaams Blok and the National Front. Then the second-highest levels of anti-immigrant sentiment were found in Denmark, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom. With the exception of Greece, each of these states has either an entrepreneurial radical right-wing party or a bandwagoning party that mimicked that type of party. In Denmark this includes the Progress Party and the People’s Party. In Germany, the Republicans and the Schill Party fit the criteria. In the United Kingdom the same decisive factors apply to the National Democrats. Then with

66

●


the remaining standouts on anti-immigrant sentiment, Austria has the Freedom Party, Italy has the National Alliance and the Northern League, and the Netherlands has the Center Democrats and List (Pim Fortuyn), all of which provide examples of either entrepreneur- or bandwagonertype parties. This correlation suggests that where entrepreneurial parties and those parties that copied them exist in Western Europe, there are correspondingly higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment than where they do not. Additionally, the fact that these parties adopted their antiimmigrant positions in the mid- to late 1980s, many of them not finetuning the formula until 1990s, suggests that they may have played a part in fueling the resentment and negative feelings toward immigrants evident in the public-opinion data from 1990 forward. By the end of the millennium, the picture continued to look bleak regarding racist sentiments in Europe. With all of the talk of assimilation and tolerance, more than one in ten Europeans feel uncomfortable with people whom they judge to be different from themselves. When asked about people of other nationalities and people of diverse races in their countries, one in five people expressed their anxiety in Belgium, Denmark, and Greece (table 4.4). Germany, France, and Ireland also

Table 4.4 Percentage of those who find people of another nationality or race living among them “disturbing” 2000-Nationality

2000-Race

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom

15 20 24 8 17 17 38 17 12 9 17 9 4 11

14 27 23 11 19 17 24 20 14 9 10 11 5 11

17

16

W Europe total

15

15

Source: Figures taken from Eurobarometer survey number 53.

●

67

m ar k Fi nl an d Fr an c G er e m an G y re ec e Ire la nd Lu I xe taly m N bou et he rg rla nd s Po rtu ga l Sp ai n U ni Sw ed te d Ki en W ng do Eu m ro pe to ta l

en

D

Be

Au

lg iu m

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 st ria

Percentage


Racist

Figure 4.2

Somewhat racist to racist

European Racism

Source: Data from Eurobarometer Special Report number 113, 1997.

show noticeably higher levels of discomfort with others who are not like the native population in key ways. This data could not be placed into a trend with the 1990–1997 data, as the questions asked to develop it diverge too significantly from earlier surveys to be used comparably. Yet, the figures indicate considerable levels of anxiety about foreigners and suggest that the problem persists into the year 2000. Perhaps most alarming is the data providing measures of racism across Western Europe. Survey respondents were asked to gauge their personal feelings of racism, placing themselves into one of four categories: “not at all racist,” “a little racist,” “quite racist,” or “very racist.” The results of the survey are presented in figure 4.2, where the first bar for each country represents survey respondents classifying themselves as either “very racist” or “quite racist.” The second bar for each country signifies an addition of the “a-little-racist” category to the two already indicated. In other words, the only people excluded from the second bar are those who classify themselves as “not at all racist.” The figures prove distressing, as over 40 percent of the populations of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and France classify themselves as racist. Noteworthy is the fact that each of these four countries has entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties according to the typology constructed above. These findings imply that entrepreneur parties appear to be successfully propagating their racist rhetoric and beliefs among the masses. One out of every two West Europeans in the countries examined is racist to some degree, excluding only Luxembourg and Portugal.

68

●


Institution-shaping This study is relatively unique in its effort to measure the impact of the spatial position of radical right-wing parties compared to the position of other parties. However, several scholars have suggested that radical right-wing parties have affected the ideological or issue positions adopted by other parties in the party system (see, for example; Winkler and Schumann 1998, 97; Eatwell 2000, 422; Backes and Mudde 2000, 466; Minkenberg 1998, 17; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 453). This section of analysis both evaluates the relationship between party positions on issues or issue co-optation and extends the analysis to test an indicator of this interparty spatial relationship, namely a left-right issue position measure. Examination of the relationship between political parties is central to asking whether other political parties adjust their positions on the immigration issue in response to shifts on the issue by radical right-wing parties. My working assumption is that radical rightwing parties impact other parties by causing them to shift farther to the right on the issue of immigration when the right-wing radical parties position themselves more to the right on the issue. Using data from the Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political Parties 2000 dataset collected by Marcel Lubbers, I investigate the hypothesis that radical right-wing parties have an influence on the other four types of party in terms of their positions on immigration. The cross-national data comprises the fifteen European Union countries plus Norway and Switzerland. From the Lubbers data, I constructed five new variables to represent five broad types of political party: far right, mainstream right, mainstream left, liberal or center, and green. Each variable measures the left-to-right ideological scale position on the issue of immigration for each broad type of political party. Measures are taken at three points in time between 1990 and 2000. Preliminary analysis of the data indicates either a complex relationship or the lack of a relationship between party positions and the position taken on immigration by the radical right-wing parties across Western Europe. To better determine which explanation is more accurate, I examined correlations. The bivariate correlations indicated weaker than expected relationships between the positions taken by the far right and other parties on the immigration issue (Appendix 2). I expected a strong relationship between far right parties and mainstream right parties since both compete for voters on the right side of a left–right ideological spectrum. This follows a Downsian logic of party opportunism and competition for voters across a left-to-right ideological


●

69

spectrum (Downs 1957, Ch. 8). I would expect a similar strong relationship between green parties and the mainstream left competing for ideological space on the left side of the spectrum. On the left, a strong, positive relationship could be observed between the mainstream left and green parties (.43). However on the right side, the relationship between the far right and mainstream right was weak (.27). A substantive explanation for the weak relationship on the right could be that the mainstream right dismisses the activity of the far right on immigration or does not view the challenge on the far right as legitimate enough to act upon or alter policy positions in response. A statistical explanation might be that the relationship is not in fact linear and therefore cannot be measured accurately using correlations that assume linearity. Testing the second explanation of nonlinearity provides insight. Given the lack of a pattern in the scatterplot matrix (Appendix 2), I investigated the bivariate scatterplots finding the lack of a linear pattern in the relationships between the far right and the four other party types (Appendix 3). Instead, the data points appear scattered, even after eliminating outliers and attempting log transformations of the data. Furthermore, the residual plots are skewed rather than evenly distributed around the zero line. I applied techniques of spline fitting using lambda as well as polynomial fitting to search for nonlinear relationships, hoping to be able to apply Tukey’s bulge and determine an equation to be used for curvilinear regression analysis. However these techniques did not work due to the multidirectional curves in each bivariate relationship (see plot of polynomial fits, Appendix 3). I compared the plot estimates of covariance as well as the residual plots and found that the far-right parties best fit polynomial relationships of higher degrees from 4 to 6 (Appendix 3). What this meant for my analysis was that the relationship between the position taken on immigration by right-wing radical parties and other parties in the party system is both weak and complex. The polynomials indicate that as radical right-wing parties move farther to the right on the immigration issue, sometimes the mainstream right also shifts right and at other times it does not. Again this suggests that the mainstream right and other parties view the right-wing radical challenge as illegitimate. There appears to be no simple, unidirectional pattern in the variance. Finally, the amount of variance that can be explained in the relationship between the far right and any single party, the R squares, are low ranging from 8 percent to 12 percent. The R squares of this magnitude were only found after determining higher order polynomials to approximate the closest fit in the bivariate relationships (Appendix 3). In other

70

●


words, several other factors besides the position of radical right-wing parties must be taken into account to explain the shift in party positions of the other four party types considered here. Some of these factors might include popular opinion on the issue, issue saliency in terms of crisis status, as well as strategic planning by the parties in terms of their issue priorities and positions for winning votes and for constructing their images. In conclusion, the cross-national data analysis on party position interactions between the radical right-wing parties and other parties across Western Europe on the immigration issue suggests a lack of direct effects. In other words, the other parties do not adapt their positions on immigration directly because of the position shifts on the issue by radical right-wing parties. Instead, I found a complex relationship where other factors beyond radical right-wing party positions influence other parties’ positions on the immigration issue. These other factors prove decisive, since the simple party position relationships lack clear patterns and strength. Future work on the party position relationships should seek to identify the other factors important to understanding the relationship between party positions, such as specific campaign scenarios, candidate or party leadership strategies, social or economic circumstances, and as the social movements literature describes opportunity structures for the parties. Policy-making The policy impact of right-wing radical parties across Europe involves both advocating more restrictive immigration declarations and downplaying the significance of a European problem with xenophobia. Besides the obvious anti-immigration stance, it appears that a secondary goal of these parties may be to block legislation that promotes multiculturalism, assimilation, and broad definitions of citizenship based on residence rather than blood. This section makes the case for using legislative activity as an indicator of radical right-wing party impact on government policy. Having already made the argument that the immigration issue provides the focal point for radical right-wing parties, legislative initiatives on the issues of immigration and racism provide a yardstick by which to measure radical right-wing party impact. The fact that these parties have been able to take the immigration issue from relative unimportance and make it a centerpiece of political campaigns suggests that increased attention to this issue owes much to their efforts. This seems particularly true since the evidence presented above demonstrates


●

71

that immigration figures do not correlate directly with support for the radical right wing. Instead, immigration fears outpace actual figures for numbers of immigrants. This feeds the hypothesis that the immigration issue is created rather than contextual; it exists mainly as a result of the climate of fear generated by the radical right rather than stemming from actual social conditions. As European integration has progressed rapidly over the past decade, legislative initiatives of the European Parliament offer one indicator of the influence on policy of radical right-wing parties across Europe. Although the jurisdiction of the European Parliament does not supercede that of national governments, its declarations provide a powerful steering influence on national decision-making. It has the resources and authority to conduct cross-border monitoring of key trends and compile comprehensive reports that inform national governments, according to member Glyn Ford (Ford 1992, 3). Having evidence on phenomena occurring across Europe, Ford suggests, often carries greater weight and produces more action in response than does national-level information. This section begins by analyzing the amount of legislative initiatives on immigration and racism at the European level. Action on this issue tends to be restrictive, limiting or controlling immigration, as theoretically more open doors exist absent official policy controls. Initiatives on immigration tend to favor the position of the radical right wing. On the other hand, racism is an issue that the radical right wing would like to see ignored. In other words, less action on this issue favors the radical right-wing objective. Also in this section, the partisan composition of the European Parliament will be investigated to determine the radical right-wing party presence and potential for influence. The radical right wing has been able to win seats at the level of the European Parliament even when it is ineffective in doing so at the national level, as has generally been the case. The presence and opportunity for direct legislative influence at the European level presents itself more readily for many radical right-wing parties. The radical right is introducing bills and speaking out on issues in the European Parliament. The activity of the European Parliament shows that the importance of the immigration issue has generally continued to swell since 1994. With the exception of a dip in 1997, the European Parliament has considered ever-increasing numbers of initiatives on the issue of immigration since 1994 (figure 4.3). This suggests that the climate of fear may have effectively shifted issue priorities to make immigration increasingly significant enough to

72

●


30

Legislative Initiatives

25 racism

immigration

20 15 10 5 0 1994

Figure 4.3

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Volume of European Parliament Initiatives

Source: Legislative Observatory, database of legislative dossiers of the European Parliament.

produce a policy response. Of particular importance to the theory of radical right-wing party influence is the fact that the feeling of a necessity to address immigration concerns among Europeans persists despite actual declines in immigration numbers across Western Europe during this period. On the other hand, legislative initiatives dealing with racism increase from 1994 to 1995 but then decline fairly steadily until 2002. This suggests that the European Parliament does not appear to actively address problems of racism in Europe over this period. Even though the problem has been identified by the European Union’s Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), which reports that racism has been increasing over the decade of the 1990s, the European Parliament has not been aggressively responsive on that issue. Additionally, the pattern found in legislative initiatives does not correspond to that of migration, which actually declines in the middle period of the decade (figure 4.4). Interaction effects abound in legislatures, as individual political parties do not act in isolation but through coalition compromises and within particular strategic and institutional constraints. Still, the trends observed suggest that right-wing radical parties may have influence in accomplishing their goals of drawing attention to the immigration issue and limiting legislative action to address racism in European societies.


●

73

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Figure 4.4

Index of European Migration

Source: Eurostat. Net migration is estimated on the basis of the difference population chance and natural increase (correct net migration). The figures are rates per thousand inhabitants.

Officials from radical right-wing parties have disclosed in personal interviews that the radical right views the European Parliament as a forum for its views outside of the national-level scrutiny that generally accompanies them (Schleiter 2002, Sichrovsky 2001). These parties see the European Parliament as having increasing influence throughout the member countries and therefore see their possibilities for having sway growing as they unite with other like-minded parties at the European level. The radical right-wing party elites have met together with their counterparts in other European Union member states to discuss strategies for winning more seats and having greater influence at the European level (Schleiter 2002). They hope that their presence at the European level will help them to structure policy for Europe and have greater impact in their home countries as well. Perhaps to avoid the stigma of a party label and what radical rightwing parties may view as baseless discrimination, members of these parties currently attach themselves to one of two groups at the level of the European Parliament. They either affiliate with the Non-Attached group or the Union for Europe of the Nations Group, the latter of which claims to stand first for “a Europe based on the freedom of nations to decide, where diversity is the first of all riches and not a Federal Europe

74

●


which would subject sovereign nations and take away the identity of European peoples” (UEN Group Manifesto 2001). The political rhetoric suggests that Union for Europe of the Nations opposes increased European integration to the extent of subordinating national sovereignty to European control. It stands on principles of nationalism and for the preservation of national differences or distinctions. National identity proves of core importance and assimilation is not something to be desired, either assimilation within or outside of the European Union countries. Since its founding in 1999, the Union for Europe of the Nations group has introduced thirty legislative initiatives in the European Parliament. By comparison, the Non-Affiliated group has introduced forty-one legislative initiatives since 1994. In prior parliamentary sessions, the radical right has gone by other labels. In the first session, all twenty-one radical right-wing party members associated with the European Non-Affiliated group. In both the second and third sessions, seventeen of the respectively twenty-four and twenty-seven radical right-wing party members comprised a European-level group of Rightists with the remaining Rightists joining the Non-Affiliated group. By the fourth parliamentary session the Rightist group label disappeared and all radical right-wing party members joined the Non-Affiliated group. By the fifth session they divided across two groups again with eleven of twenty-six right-wing radical members sitting with the Union for Europe of the Nations group while the remaining fifteen sat with the Non-Affiliated group. The adjustments in radical right-wing party affiliation at the European level suggest attempts to escape the negative stigma associated with the radical right. They initially called themselves Non-Affiliated, then adopted the Rightist label in the mid-1980s as the parties began their transformation and won increasing support for their anti-immigrant position. However, by 1994 the radical right wing had come under increasing scrutiny across Europe in association with skinhead violence and so called neo-Nazism. The “Rightist” name for the European Parliament group disappeared and all of the radical right-wing members shifted back to the Non-Affiliated group. A new group formed for the fifth parliamentary session, the Union for Europe of the Nations, and many right-wing radicals moved to that group label. For example, in the fourth parliament thirty-six out of the thirty-eight members of the NonAffiliated group or 95 percent belonged to recognizable right-wing radical parties at the national level. In the fifth parliament, this number dropped to fifteen of thirty-one or 48 percent of Non-Affiliated members. The names have changed over time but the trend from the first


●

75

Table 4.5 Radical Right Seats in the European Parliament 1st 1979–1984 21

2nd 1984–1989 24

3rd 1989–1994 27

4th 1994–1999 31

5th 1999–2004 26

European Parliament through the fourth shows a clear increase in the number of seats going to radical right-wing party members (table 4.5). Although the fifth parliament appears to show a decline in the trend of increasing radical right-wing party presence at the European level, considering bridge parties alters this outlook. The fifth parliament appears to show a decline among the radical right with only twenty-six radical right-wing party members represented (Appendix 4). Eleven of the twenty-two Union for Europe of the Nations members, or 50 percent, are members of national radical right-wing parties. However, closer examination of the remaining members of both the NonAffiliated group and Union for Europe of the Nations shows additional radical right sympathizers. These sympathizers come from French bridge parties, or parties positioned in between the mainstream right and the radical right that share many issue concerns with the radical right wing. At the European level, these bridge party members affiliate more closely with the radical right than with the mainstream right, choosing to belong to the Non-Affiliated group and Union for Europe of the Nations instead of the mainstream right Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats. Apart from the radical right members, the remaining 52 percent of the Non-Affiliated group members include those affiliated at the national level with Mouvement pour la France, the nationalist party of Fillipe de Villiers, Sans Etiquette, a French party with apparent anti-Muslim positions, Euskal Herritarrok, a Spanish Basque leftist party, Lista Emma Bonino, an Italian left radical party, and the Democratic Unionist Party for Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. Both Mouvement pour la France and Sans Etiquette can be considered bridge parties in the European Parliament. If these parties are counted with the radical right, then 71 percent of the Non-Affiliated members of the fifth parliament or twenty-two members of the Non-Affiliated lean toward the radical right wing. The Union for Europe of the Nations group has three members who fit the bridge-party criteria. These members come from a French nationalist party, Rassemblement pour la France. Other parties, not connected to the radical right, in the Union for Europe of the Nations group include Fianna Fáil Party (Ireland), Partido Popular (Portugal), and Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (France-pro-Moroccan). If the

76

●


three members of Rassemblement pour la France are added to the eleven right-wing radicals in the UEN group, this brings their total to fourteen. From both parties then, the total right wing affiliation of the fifth parliament comes to thirty-six members (Appendix 4). This shows a consistent increasing trend in radical right-wing support over all five European Parliaments to date. It also indicates that parties that moderate their views at the national level identifying themselves with the mainstream right, such as Mouvement pour la France, Sans Etiquette, and Rassemblement pour la France, boldly align with the radical right by the fifth European Parliament. Despite the shifting labels attached to them, the radical right wing appears to be successful at winning increasing numbers of seats and therefore having a continued presence at the European Parliament. As they expressed in interviews, the European Parliament provides a forum where the national-level stigma attached to some party members appears less pronounced. They also have been able to adopt new labels and perhaps to camouflage some of their more radical views behind the guise of preserving Europe for the Europeans or the sanctity of the nations as separate entities not to be assimilated. Their presence in the European Parliament with 36 of 626 members or around 6 percent of total seats in the current session gives them some influence in policy positions advocated across Europe. In interviews, leaders from these parties also expressed the opportunity of networking with their radical right-wing counterparts at this level to share ideas for strategy and influence. They certainly appear to have increased their potential for that at the European level. Probably the strongest indicator of success at the European level, however, resides in the trends for racism and immigration legislation since the fourth parliament began in 1994. The fact that the significance of racism appears to have fallen off with fewer and fewer initiatives moving forward during this time suggests that the radical right may have been successful at stifling the perceived importance of that issue. At the same time, immigration initiatives have been on the rise, as more restrictive policies have been moved forward for consideration in the European Parliament. This also favors the radical right wing, which advocates limits on the number of foreigners in their countries. The overall trend in legislative initiatives at the European level favors the radial right position. Conclusions This chapter has developed a model of radical right-wing party influence. It has suggested that the radical right strategically designed


●

77

immigration as a funnel issue for all other social and economic concerns. It argues that the radical right intentionally promotes irrational fears, often exaggerating the severity of existing problems and conditions in order to generate popular unrest. Using this model as a basis for understanding radical right-wing party impact, the investigation at three levels of impact reveals several things. First, correlations do not exist between actual statistics and popular concern or legislative action on immigration. This appears to feed the argument developed in the model of influence that radical right-wing parties create the climate of fear. Second, at the agenda level, rising popular concern about immigrants in the absence of actual conditions to motivate them provides a basis for the argument that the radical right has clouded the judgment of Europeans. Therefore, they appear to be having popular influence. Third, the party position data suggests that the institutional effects of the radical-right parties remain inconclusive. They do not influence other parties all of the time with their maneuvers, yet this does not rule out a lack of influence. It merely indicates that other parties respond sometimes though not all the time to the strategies executed by radical right-wing parties. Issue co-option seems to occur, although perhaps at critical times rather than at all times. Finally, the European Parliament appears to be increasingly important as a vehicle for radical right-wing influence. The radical right-wing parties have steadily increased their presence there, and the issue positions that they advocate appear to be receiving attention in the directions that they intend. In other words, racism is being downplayed while increasingly restrictive immigration measures continue to move forward. Although interaction effects and outside influences cannot be ruled out, the correlational evidence presented in this chapter justifies the position that the radical right-wing parties have influence across Europe. In particular, the correlation between entrepreneurial parties and the bandwagoners that imitated them in the 1990s with especially high levels of impact as measured by the indicators developed above suggests that these types of right-wing radical parties have the best chances for success. The reinvention of the radical right wing that begins with the French National Front in the early 1980s, and the strategy of the immigration omnibus issue, affords the radical right its impact.


CHAPTER 5


T

he National Front and its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen often receive credit for introducing the professional organization and the strategic model for the successful radical right-wing party of the late twentieth century. Le Pen was the first to turn the corner moving the radical right wing in Europe away from its fascist historical ties towards more politically correct and socially acceptable forms. This chapter considers key factors in the political life of the National Front since its founding in 1972 that have proven instrumental in its ability to have an impact on French politics and society. Using evidence from personal interviews, documentary sources, archival research, and secondary source material, the chapter examines evidence where the influence of the National Front has been manifest. First, the propositions from chapter 3 are evaluated for their explanatory power in the French case. Second, the model developed in chapter 4 for crossnational radical right-wing party influence is applied to the French case to determine how well it accounts for French radical right-wing influence. Finally, data is applied to measure the impact of the French radical right on three levels of impact analysis: agenda, institutional, and policy. They Learned to Ask the Right Questions In 1984 Laurent Fabius, the Socialist Prime Minister at that time, admitted in a televised interview that National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen was asking the right questions but accused him of providing the

80

●


wrong answers. The interview was broadcast on the television program L’heure de verité (The Hour of Truth). This program has political figures respond to questions from political journalists. Reportedly, the prime minister went on to comment that he found it shocking that “these ideas of the Far Right are in some way becoming commonplace and little by little, they are filtering down, even into the forces of the traditional Right” (Marcus 1995, 74). Whether shock value played a role or not, the National Front was influencing politics and other political parties through the propagation of its ideology among French people. More than likely the prime minister did not aim to bestow praise upon Le Pen, yet his comments acknowledge the impact of the National Front. While disagreeing with the policy prescriptions of the National Front, Fabius grants its success at presenting the relevant issues or asking the right questions as well as influencing the other political parties. He goes so far as to suggest that the mainstream right has become more right wing as a result of Le Pen’s party. This is precisely where the National Front has exerted its influence—in introducing, cultivating, and popularizing political issues and in causing the mainstream right and other parties to shift their positions accordingly. This section begins with a brief discussion of the relevant details of party organization from its founding. Then it traces the influence of the National Front using criteria derived from the five propositions set forth in chapter 3 as a framework for understanding: innovative influence, party organization, power position, spatial relationships, and leadership. Early Challenges and Darkest Days The early years of the National Front hardly reflect the potential that was to come later. A learning curve has been involved in the development process of the National Front. It was officially chartered as a political party in 1972, yet for more than ten years it struggled to find relevance and to develop its core. When it was founded, its purpose was to provide a unifying organization for the disparate elements of the French far right, which had remained fragmented since the Second World War. It had strong fascist ties at the time of its founding. The assemblage of far right groups emerging after the Second World War combined various key emphases. The initial challenge for the National Front was to find a way to bring unity amidst the factions. One component element was Action Française, a movement for restoring the monarchy and returning French society to Catholic moral values from the time prior to the French Revolution. Its progenitor was Charles

Entrepreneurial National Front

●

81

Maurras, who in the 1960s blamed the “four alien nations” including Jews, Freemasons, Protestants, and foreigners for the demise of the French nation and society (DeClair 1999, 14). Supporters of Vichy France, or the authoritarian government that followed the collapse of the Third Republic in July of 1940 after the defeat of French forces by the German army in the Second World War, have also been tied to the early National Front (Safran 1993). The Vichy government has been linked to Nazi Germany and accused of the deportation of Jews to Germany during the war. Poujadists also came under the umbrella of the National Front in the 1970s. The movement began as a defence of the petite bourgeoisie with Pierre Poujade leading a local organization in protest against changes in tax collection policies in the 1950s (Rémond 1982, 251). Over time the Poujadists adopted other positions and came to stand for nationalism, antiparliamentarism, antistatism and antisemitism (DeClair 1999, 19). Another group forming part of the National Front in 1972 included the supporters of a French Algeria also known as L’Algerie Française. These nationalists never forgave Charles de Gaulle for his failure to live up to a promise to retain Algeria under French control. This group espoused strong nationalism and viewed the loss of control over Algeria as further diminution of the French empire. Finally, the student activism in much of Europe during the mid-to-late 1960s produced two groups, namely Occident in 1964 and then Ordre Nouveau (New Order) in 1969. Occident recruited young people for militant street violence and activism but lacked the necessary organizational and intellectual basis to have much influence on French politics. One year following the ban of Occident by the government in November of 1968, Ordre Nouveau emerged as a movement determined to broaden its base beyond university campuses to establish a large political party. It adopted the model of the Italian radical rightwing party, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) (DeClair 1999, 31). Jonathan Marcus has called Ordre Nouveau “France’s most important postwar neo-fascist organization” (Marcus 1995, 12). It provided a foundation of support upon which the National Front could build. The National Front was established by the leadership of Ordre Nouveau in 1972 as an umbrella organization bringing together the disparate elements of the French far right wing. It was intended that the National Front would provide new legitimacy for the French radical right, as the stigma of militant activism remained tied to Ordre Nouveau. By creating a new party, the ideas could be given a fresh start, tabula rasa without the pejorative connotation that surrounded the radical right-wing. “It [the National Front] was also to be a ‘front’ organization

82

●


in the literal sense, providing a respectable political facade behind which the more traditional activist and street politics of the Far Right would continue” (Marcus 1995, 12). Legitimacy was something that the far right wing lacked after the Second World War, yet desperately needed if it was to be a political contender. Alain de Benoist has been credited with recognizing the lack of intellectualism on the far right that led to the deliberate development of the Nouvelle Droite (the New Right) philosophers and writers in the late 1960s and early 1970s (DeClair 1999, 27). Core components of the Nouvelle Droite include think-tank organizations such as the Groupement de Recherches et d’Études pour la Civilsation Européenne (GRECE), the Research Group for the study of European Civilization, and its offshoot the Club de l’Horloge, literally the Clock Club. The Nouvelle Droite helped to provide some distance between the rhetoric of militant activists on the far right and the National Front through its scholarly research and publications that expressed far right perspectives. The contribution of an intellectual basis for the radical right proved critical to its prospects for future widespread success. Yet, the intellectual basis for politics of the radical right needed a vehicle for popular mobilization and political action. The National Front was the party intended from its origin as such as vehicle. The National Front needed to transform itself from an activist organizational type, to which it owed its roots, into a professional political party. The early version of the National Front contained too many activists and too few political strategists to effectively translate its ideas into political influence. As Ordre Nouveau had intended, the National Front modeled itself upon the Italian MSI party and even copied that party’s emblem, a tricolor flame. Its 1973 campaign slogan was “Defending the French” and its political platform endorsed family values by advocating an increase in the French birthrate, supported corporatism and small businesses, and opposed immigration (Marcus 1995, 19). However, until the end of the 1970s, the National Front was plagued by infighting among its many factions. Jean-Marie Le Pen was not able to effectively consolidate the various groups within the National Front until an unexpected event weakened the more radical elements in the party. An opportunity for consolidation occurred unexpectedly in the late 1970s. A car bomb exploded in 1978 killing one of the key Ordre Nouveau figures within the National Front, François Duprat (Marcus 1995, 21). The disarray within the Ordre Nouveau faction after the death of Duprat gave Le Pen an opportunity to position himself clearly at the center of the party organization. The death of Duprat came at the same time that Le Pen was observing key differences in the marginally more successful strategy of his rival


●

83

party on the far right, Pascal Gauchon’s Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN), the New Force Party. Founded in 1974, the PFN had already decided that rather than “going it alone” it would prefer to become a marginal element partnered with the mainstream right wing. Through such an alliance, the PFN anticipated that it might be able to effectively shift the mainstream parties farther to the right (Marcus 1995, 21). Such coalition-building objectives introduced the new strategy that Le Pen adopted in the early 1980s after the PFN had disappeared from the political landscape. Alliances with the mainstream right, especially locallevel party lists, would provide the opportunity for the National Front’s electoral breakthrough in 1983. Developing Innovative Influence Many peripheral political parties emerge only to quickly fail and fade away. However, the ones that endure display a learning curve as they search for opportunities while assessing their mistakes or weaknesses and undertaking corrective action. After its initial struggle to find a political niche from its founding in 1972 until its first local-level electoral victories in the early 1980s, The National Front learned to have innovative influence. It learned to constantly adapt and adjust its strategy in order to optimize its potential. Jonathan Marcus has suggested a three-stage process of adjustment and evolution from the founding of the party in 1972 through 1994 in his book (Marcus 1995, chap. 3). He calls the period between 1972 and 1984 “putting down roots,” as this is the time outlined above when the National Front worked to overcome internal fragmentation and to find legitimacy. Le Pen refers to this same period as “crossing the desert” (DeClair 1999, 42). Toward the end of this time frame the National Front begins to reap some reward for its efforts of over ten years with local election victories in Dreux in 1983 and at the level of the European Parliament in 1984. In Dreux, an industrial town southwest of Paris, the National Front participated in a joint candidate list with two parties of the mainstream right, the Union for French Democracy (UDF), a party with Christian Democratic roots, and Rally for the Republic (RPR), a Gaullist party. This alliance successfully defeated the incumbent Socialists at the municipal level and earned four National Front candidates seats on the town council in Dreux (Marcus 1995, 54). In the campaign leading up to European elections, Le Pen appeared on the television program L’heure de verité where notable political figures are quizzed by a panel of political journalists. Le Pen’s popularity increased following the appearance, and the legitimacy of his party polled better as well. A Taylor Nelson Sofres Group opinion

84

●


survey conducted months after the television show found nearly one-fifth of those surveyed affirming that “Le Pen was as much a part of the legitimate opposition as the leaders of the RPR and UDF” (Marcus 1995, 56). The media presence of Le Pen had generated a favorable response, and the public appeared to be willing to accept the National Front as a viable voice of the opposition. In the European elections that followed in June, the National Front won seats for ten deputies in the European Parliament. After 1983 and 1984, they were now serious contenders for political representation on the fringes of politics. Between 1985 and 1990 several key strategic changes are made contributing to increased influence of the radical right that fall under the same rubric of party professionalization and positioning.5 During this period, the National Front attracted new members and consolidated its electorate. The party drew new members away from traditional parties of the mainstream right (Schain 1999, 2). It developed a core of loyal voters while successfully broadening its electoral base to include new members that were not traditionally affiliated with the radical right (Mayer and Perrineau 1990, 178). From 1986–1988, the National Front took advantage of a brief shift from the French majoritarian electoral system to proportional representation to send thirty-five deputies to the National Assembly (Safran 2003, 94). By the end of the party’s transformation during this period, Le Pen won an impressive 14.4 percent of the popular vote in the first round of presidential elections in 1988 representing the support of 4.4 million voters. The third stage of adjustment for the National Front has been labeled “progress and isolation” by Jonathan Marcus. It begins in 1991 and continues through the publishing of Marcus’s book in 1995. I argue that the progress and isolation aptly continues to the present time with only minor setbacks such as the party split in December 1998, when one faction split off to form the National Republican Movement (MNR). The progress of the National Front is immediately evident in its mobilization capacity as measured in electoral support for the party, which continues to expand from 1991. In the legislative elections of 1993 the National Front was able to recruit about a million new or former voters to support the National Front, a remarkable feat that it was able to repeat in the 1997 legislative elections (Schain 2000, 75). Another indicator of increasing progress since the 1988 elections was the party’s ability to field candidates in the second round of legislative elections, usually meaning that the party had won the most or the second-largest number of votes at the constituency level in the first round. In 1988, the National Front contested the second round in only 14 constituencies.


●

85

However, in 1993 the figure had increased to 100 constituencies and by 1997 the National Front was competing on the second round ballot in 132 constituencies (Schain 2000, 77). Most recently, the National Front shocked the world by making it to the second-round runoff in presidential elections in 2002 by narrowly defeating the incumbent prime minister and Socialist Party candidate, Lionel Jospin. Although he lost in the second round to mainstream right candidate Jacques Chirac by a wide margin, Le Pen received the second-largest number of votes nationwide to stand against the top vote-getter Chirac. He was at the center of second-round national-level politics for the first time, a clear indication of the progress of this radical right-wing party. The isolation component of this period can be simply summarized as a continued refusal of the National Front to make alliances with the mainstream right; likewise the mainstream right refused to ally with the National Front. In personal interviews conducted with party elites of the National Front prior to the elections of 2002, I asked whether the National Front would advise its voters to support other parties if it did not reach the second round in either presidential or legislative contests. Delegate General of the National Front Bruno Gollnisch told me in a personal interview that joining forces with the other party of the radical right wing, the National Republican Movement (MNR) would be out of the question. If it had been a political divergence that allowed them [MNR] to leave the party, we could have disagreed about Europe, for example, and these doctrinal disagreements could have led to strife, it would have been possible to united together to overcome that type of thing. That was not the problem. The problem really was personal ambition. Mégret tried in a way, in my opinion a dishonest way, to take over the party through a meeting that did not meet legal requirements to be a real congress with everybody present and so on. And at least two or three leaders of this operation [MNR] produced a lack of confidence that prevents us from working together. With some who followed them there would not be this problem. Those who were not the conspirators, the plotters, we do not have this problem with them. (Gollnisch 2002)

Deputy Director of Legal Affairs Marcel Ceccaldi echoes the position that the National Front would not want its voters to support other parties even if that meant that they did not vote or that their vote for the National Front took votes away from other parties on the right side of the political spectrum. Jacques Chirac [the candidate of the mainstream right] is more offensive than Jospin [the Socialist]. This man has no conviction, Chirac. He is a

86

●


man of treason. When he was Prime Minister for Giscard he betrayed him. When he speaks seven years ago about immigration he talks about the smell of the immigrants, and after that he has no conviction. And a man with no conviction is a danger for a country. (Ceccaldi, 2002)

Ceccaldi attacks the mainstream right party leader, Jacques Chirac, on a personal level. Yet his comments reveal a preference for the Socialist party leader Lionel Jospin above Chirac, even though Chirac’s party positions itself more closely to the National Front. In other words the National Front would prefer to play spoiler rather than allow a party more likely to introduce policy initiatives most closely parallel to those of the National Front to come into power. Today, the National Front appears so determined to win support alone without alliances with the mainstream right, despite the risk that a party of the left might come to power altogether. Resentment of the mainstream right and in particular Jacques Chirac, who ordered his party not to make alliances with the radical right at any level of government even if it meant giving up power to the left (Le Monde 1985), has been deeply embedded in a bitter competition between elements on the right wing over the last decade about how best to position themselves strategically to maximize their potential. The controversy over isolationist practices or alliances with the mainstream right to share coalitional power and have more direct access to central channels of political power was at the core of the rift that divided the party between Le Pen and Bruno Mégret’s breakaway party, the MNR. The National Front has stayed close to its isolationist position toward other parties. Structuring the Party Organization As described above, the National Front was created in an attempt to move the far right away from its militant extremist image in 1972. The struggle pitting the activist and fascist elements against more moderates who sought to establish the party’s legitimacy throughout the 1970s persisted into the early 1980s. It was not until the middle of the 1980s that JeanMarie Le Pen made great strides toward legitimizing the National Front by recruiting intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite into party leadership positions. The introduction of an intelligentsia proved instrumental in constructing the omnibus6 issue of immigration and positioning it properly to make it a winning issue with broad appeal among the populace. In the mid-1980s, elite recruitment efforts resulted in bringing several prominent politicians from mainstream right splinter groups into the


●

87

National Front. These “notables,” as Edward DeClair has dubbed them, included: Edouard Frédéric-Dupont, Yvon Briant, Bruno Gollnisch, and Bruno Mégret (DeClair 1999, 64 and 162). Gollnisch was a university professor specializing in Japanese studies and international law before joining the party in 1983. He was the eighty-first candidate on the party list for the European elections in 1984 and has since served in local elected office and as a European deputy. In 1995 he replaced Carl Lang as the party’s secretary general in charge of day-to-day operations of the party and recruitment, the number three position in the party hierarchy after the party president (Le Pen) and the Delegate General (Mégret in 1995). When the party split in 1999, Lang returned to the position of secretary general and Gollnisch became the delegate general with responsibilities including refining party ideology and crafting the political platform, positioning him in the party’s number-two slot just below Jean-Marie Le Pen. Mégret preceded Gollnisch as delegate general of the National Front, taking the position in 1988 when he joined the party. The ability of the National Front to attract such notables lent it credibility and legitimacy at a critical time in its development as a party (DeClair 1999, 162). The party platforms and literature published as a result of the influence on party positioning wielded by the notables added to the growing credibility of the party from the late 1980s into the early 1990s. In addition to the notables crafting party strategy and recruiting new members, the National Front became more organized as a professional party machine by the late 1980s. A key part of establishing an effective party machine was displaying an efficacious ideology (Dufay and Jaign 2002). Think-tanks staffed with academics and political strategists sympathetic to the National Front formed the backbone of its ideological development. The party established the Scientific Council in 1989 and set up a second think-tank called the Centre d’Etudes et d’Argumentaires (Center for Study and Debate) at party headquarters to contribute to policy formation and platform development (Marcus 1995, 43). Bruno Mégret supervised the introduction of a new right intellectual magazine, Identité as one vehicle for propagating the message of the National Front. In 1993, the party added a weekly newspaper to its publications entitled National Hebdo. A magazine entitled Français d’abord! appears bimonthly with editorials by Le Pen, political messages, articles about national and world events, as well as book and film reviews. In all, the party had nearly thirty print media publications of various types coming from its Paris headquarters by the end of the twentieth century (Davies 1999, 270). It produced an additional twenty-seven publications at the regional level by that time.

88

●


In addition to print media, the National Front has impressive facilities for broadcasting and electronic publication inside its St. Cloud party headquarters. I was given a guided tour of the production facility in the spring of 2002 where I saw a television studio, a recording studio for audio broadcast, a printing shop for campaign posters, pamphlets, other campaign materials, and official party literature. A recent party publication that I was given on my visit is a new biography of Le Pen with large pages that contain mainly glossy photographs of his life and career. I was introduced to a webmaster who designs and manages the party’s website, which is a colorful, sophisticated, and always current link to the party, its message, and its people. In fact, the National Front was the first French political party to host its own website (Davies 1999, 6). On the Web, computer users can view video clips of speeches or listen to Radio Le Pen, as well as find party documents and platform information. The Internet has become an important tool for the party in communicating its message and reaching a wider audience in recent years as more French people have gained access to the Internet. Solid Power Position The National Front has never been a party of government at the national level. Only when the electoral system was briefly shifted from majority to proportional representation in 1986 legislative elections did the party send more than one or two deputies to the National Assembly. The National Front made its best run ever at the presidency in June 2002 when its candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of voting for the first time in party history only to lose to frontrunner Jacques Chirac decisively. Therefore access to traditional national centers of power and decision-making, the legislature and the presidency, have eluded the National Front. It appears more likely that they have searched for and found less traditional ways to have their influence apart from parliament and executive office. One alternative path for influence has been vigorously seeking office at the subnational level. Though regional and municipal power does not offer the reach that national power does, the strategy of the National Front at more local levels suggests a building blocks attitude of “one city at a time.” They have been able to win office on municipal councils, as mayors, and in regional assemblies. For example, in the local elections of 1995, the National Front fielded 25,000 candidates, and approximately 2000 municipal councilors were elected. Martin Schain comments on this success saying, “Its capacity to present this vast army


●

89

of candidates is a good indication of the political distance that the FN had traveled in the previous decade, and success at the municipal level provided a building block for future candidacies” (Schain 1999, 5). A key indicator of success for the party in the 1995 municipal elections was its ability to win in three large towns including Orange, Marignane, and Toulon and nearly claiming Nice as well except that the candidate there had a falling out with Le Pen (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 448). The three mayors won office in three-way runoff elections where the mainstream parties were divided on the left and right against them. However, significantly in 1997 Catherine Mégret, wife of then National Front Delegate General Bruno Mégret, won a victory for the party to become mayor of Vitrolles. Her victory was particularly important because she won in a head-to-head, two-person runoff in the second round. “The message from Vitrolles was that under Bruno Mégret’s guidance, it [the party] could win over 50 percent of the vote” (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 449). Having candidates who were serious contenders at local levels gave the party the leverage that it needed to bargain for patronage positions and additional influence. The mainstream right parties were under tremendous pressure to make deals with the National Front or risk giving local control to the left, particularly Socialist Party candidates. In 1992, the National Front had representatives in every regional assembly and the mainstream right relied upon the votes of National Front regional councilors to make its majority in fourteen of the twenty-two regions (Schain 1999, 11). Where the National Front joined local-level coalition governments in the late 1990s, it negotiated in order to place its supporters in administrative posts. Evidence suggests that even when the party was not formally a part of the governing coalition, it was still able to position its personnel in office in many regions where it had clout. As regional president of Auvergne, Valéry Giscard-d’Estaing appointed thirty-seven regional councilors of the National Front to office including school boards in an effort to contain their challenge to his party and position (Schain 2002, 235). Direct impacts of the National Front’s growing power at the local levels are apparent in local policy changes reflecting the ideological and issue position of the radical right. The national preference position of the party differentiating citizenship rights of the French and “others” in society became clear in local policy initiatives. The anti-immigrant stance was reflected locally as National Front mayors increased funding to hire more police to combat crime allegedly caused by immigrants, aggressively enforced laws against begging, loitering or drinking in

90

●


public places, and cut the provision of kosher or halal meals in the schools to save money (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 449). Also marriages to persons of another nationality were blocked (Minkenberg 2001, 8). In their local jurisdictions, the party also exerted their influence over cultural affairs in an effort to combat the corrupt, modern values perpetuated through contemporary art, music, and theater. Public funding was often withdrawn for the arts and licenses for venues were revoked in some cases. Meanwhile demonstrations and propaganda directed against the National Front were prohibited despite the fact that such policy violates civil liberties (Minkenberg 2001, 8). Local libraries in towns governed by the National Front acquired new right (Nouvelle Droite) publications “as a means of ensuring that the town’s political balance was reflected in the library’s books and magazines” (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 449). In sum, mayors and other local-level officials were able to make key changes at the local level that reflect the party’s broader objectives. They have been able to use their power indirectly through leverage and directly through actual policy changes that they initiate. Commanding Relationships with Other Parties Opportunity structures for the radical right in France have enabled the party to achieve some measures of success and to attain stability in the party system. Perhaps the greatest challenge for a new party entering competition with the established mainstream parties is survival. But the radical right was able to take advantage of political space left vacant by other parties when it made its initial breakthrough in the 1980s (Kitschelt 1995, 98). In the postwar era, France had been dominated by the right wing until a left-wing coalition came to power in 1981. The mainstream right Gaullists held power until 1974, then government control shifted toward a centrist, although rightward leaning, government under Giscard d’Estaing through 1981 (Safran 2003, 91). The dominance of the Socialists in partnership with the Communists from 1981 provided opportunity for the radical right wing to establish itself. In its breakthrough election in Dreux in 1983, the National Front was invited to join a list with the two prominent mainstream right parties, the UDF and RPR in an effort to combine forces to unseat the left wing. Le Pen boasted after that election that the two mainstream parties depended upon his party to secure their own positions over the Socialists (Marcus 1995, 134–135). For the mayor of Paris at that time, Jacques Chirac, the National Front was the lesser of two evils compared


●

91

to the other peripheral party with which the mainstream right might align itself, the French Communist Party (PCF). By the later 1980s, the mainstream right would more actively try to distance itself from the National Front and attempt to win back its voters who had defected to the radical right wing. The National Front capitalized on both ideological and issue space left vacant as the radical left challenge occupied the mainstream right in the early 1980s. The National Front’s main issue, immigration, had emerged on its platform by 1983. Although themes and framing have continued to evolve on the immigration issue, the National Front made opposition to immigration its central issue from the time of its electoral breakthrough in Dreux. Meanwhile, parties of the mainstream left and right remained ambivalent toward the issue (Marcus 1995, 73). The vacuum in opposition has persisted to today as mainstream parties converge more often in the center or shift to the right and then back to the center leaving a void on the fringe for voices of opposition to fill. As the rival radical right-wing party, the National Republican Movement’s (MNR) director of foreign and international relations Philippe Schleiter explains the need for viable political opposition: I think the political life in France is condemned as it is today. I will explain. The UDF and RPR are dead parties. The people in these parties are not and the voters are not, but the way that they [the parties] consider political life and the political goals for the future is quite out-moded and irrelevant for today. (Schleiter 2002)

The radical right correctly assessed its opportunity to fill a vacuum in the French political party system. It emerged on the scene skillfully positioning itself to maintain its fringe element while adding a dimension of more moderate positioning to take over space left open by the mainstream right as it had moved toward the center consensus. Charismatic Leadership The prospects for the survival of the National Front absent Jean-Marie Le Pen appear uncertain. A cult of personality has developed around the party leader, and his biography rivals the party platform for prominence in party literature and imaging. The events of Le Pen’s life have been presented in narrative form, playing up key traits for political advantage such as his time spent serving as a French paratrooper or fighting to maintain French Algeria. He has been at the center of the party since the

92

●


early years of its founding, and his image continues to mark most party propaganda. His presence has become intertwined with the ideology of the party, making his face more widely recognized than the party’s emblem, the tricolor flame. Le Pen has been a top–down leader, micromanaging many of the day-to-day functions of the party, and his centrality in the organization cannot be mistaken. Without a doubt, Jean-Marie Le Pen is one of the most charismatic political leaders in Europe today. He is a powerful orator with rhetorical finesse. The people with whom I talked informally on the streets of Paris during my fieldwork admitted sitting down to watch his speeches or tuning in to his radio addresses during the weeks leading up to the 2002 elections, even when they would position themselves on the leftof-center politically. When asked why they paid attention to him, the responses ranged from wondering what wild antics he might attempt to being mesmerized by his speaking style. His extemporaneous style with powerful force has been compared to American charismatic evangelists who have generally appeared unusually passionate about their subjects, as evident in their delivery (Marcus 1995, 28). Yet, to focus exclusively on his charismatic leadership style would be a mistake, as his political acumen should not be underestimated or dismissed. He has made key decisions through much of the 1980s to position the party to enlarge its support, and to insert strong but loyal leaders in subordinate positions within the party organization. As Jonathan Marcus summarizes, “Le Pen may not have been the first to recognize that the Far Right needed a new political strategy. But he alone was able to carry out this transformation” (Marcus 1995, 12). He held the disparate factions of the radical right together during the 1970s, bringing unity where there had been disharmony. Meanwhile, he strengthened the party by enticing supporters away from other parties. Le Pen built the party largely on his own decisions through the mid-to-late 1980s. It was not until the 1988 presidential elections that he began to rely more heavily on his intelligentsia for policy ideas and positioning strategies. Publicly, he attributes much of his success as party president to his ability to discern the concerns of the French people. A major French newspaper Le Monde quoted Le Pen in 1983 as claiming, “I say out loud what people here are thinking inside- that uncontrolled immigration leads to disorder and insecurity. In the streets where foreigners sometimes represent 40 percent of the population, French people have the impression of being submerged and excluded” (Marcus 1995, 54). Le Pen personifies this populist element of the National Front, carefully constructing himself as a man of the people. He is populist to the extent


●

93

that he claims to be one man among the masses, speaking for them about their pressing concerns (see discussion of populist features of contemporary radical right-wing parties in Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998). He has strategically adapted the issue focus and issue framing of the National Front several times over the history of the party in attempts to capture changing concerns of the times (DeClair 1999, 115). A Good Fit for the General European Model of Influence Given the specific features of the French case discussed in the preceding section, the model generalized for radical right-wing party influence across Europe must be evaluated for its relevance and explanatory power in this case. Four criteria characterize the model put forward in chapter 4. The first is influence creation, in other words going beyond filling a vacant slot but instead creating issue space where it did not exist before. Second, the typology introduced divides parties of the radical right as fascist legacy type, entrepreneurial, or bandwagoning. The French radical right must be categorized for better understanding. Third, I examine whether the parties went through a reinvention process to more closely approximate a winning formula of broadening their support base while honing their issue positions. Finally, I examine the method of the radical right for mobilizing popular reaction, specifically for generating fear. Creating Influence The National Front serves as the clear model for radical right-wing parties in terms of issue creation. It has been able to manufacture issue concerns disproportionate to or in the absence of actual conditions that might organically elicit these concerns. Several scholars have examined the pattern of popular support for radical right-wing issues and compared it with the timing of positions taken by the National Front on the issues. They have found that the shifts in positioning by the party appear to precede popular attitude shifts. For example, with both the immigration issue and the law and order issue, Paul Hainsworth and Paul Mitchell have found evidence suggesting that the National Front popularized these issues as chief concerns (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 453). Martin Schain evaluated voting patterns and exit poll data to find that between 1984 and 1997 the National Front took issues that were low priority among people initially and brought them to issue importance. Schain argues that immigration and law and order were not considered a priority in 1984. However four years later, “the importance

94

●


of these issues ranked with such issues as social inequality, and far higher than concerns about the environment, corruption and the construction of Europe; only concern with unemployment ranked higher” (Schain 1999, 8). Schain argues that this sequence of events suggests the party’s role as the catalyst for “normalizing its issue priorities,” implying a causal logic of influence. The Ultimate Entrepreneurial Type The National Front provides a textbook example of the entrepreneurial type of radical right-wing party. After its struggle to consolidate internal factions, develop coherent platforms, and find ways to attract voters in the 1970s, it recognized the need to position itself more broadly in order to expand its electoral base. Such collective introspection on the part of parties comes rarely, and the ability to arrive at decisive conclusions about appropriate changes occurs even less often. However, as Le Pen had begun to establish his authority over the party, especially following the death of François Duprat in 1978, he was able to make central decisions about new strategy to achieve goals. Fortunately for Le Pen, he went out on a limb, and the branch did not collapse. Le Pen changed his language and moved his image away from racist and often violent activism towards the type of executive traits he aspired to wield in national public office in the future. He became more presidential, behaving more as a statesman than as a protester or rebel (DeClair 1999, 71). He became increasingly litigious, often appearing in court as a plaintiff pursuing recompense for slander against him. His credibility and image became increasingly important. His biography was reworked to highlight statesman-like characteristics. His story came to resemble a rags-to-riches tale of hardships overcome, diligent work with perseverance, strong patriotism and nationalism, and a star rising to the top of his party. As Le Pen modified his behavior, he made certain that the members of his staff and party organizations carefully minded their public manners as well. In interviews with party elites it becomes obvious that they choose their words carefully on sensitive subjects.7 They also never fail to highlight the media’s attempt to demonize them by drumming up what party officials deem false accusations about racism and extremism. Party leaders, especially Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Mégret, were visionaries arguably leading the transformation for not only the French far right movement but also providing the formula for other parties to follow. They effectively amassed a support base, the intellectual and


●

95

ideological foundation, the organization and the strategy to become a contender party, not to be dismissed. These factors have been described above. The professional party machine as observed in the National Front combines both active and capable leadership with a popular presence. It gets the message out, often by using innovative techniques such as the Internet, a vast array of publications, or media manipulation. The party has actively sought out openings in the political party system, either by posing as a spoiler to the mainstream right or in alliances with it as immediate circumstances dictate. When the leftist government was in power in the 1980s, the party seized its opportunity to occupy additional ideological space as the mainstream right moved toward the center to try and compete with the Socialist-led government. All of the factors contributing to the National Front’s entrepreneurism also rely on a fundamental logistic variable—money. Without adequate financial resources, many peripheral parties enter the party system but do not endure. Under Le Pen’s direction, the party adopted nontraditional revenue raising practices. In its finance management, the party’s money has been controlled centrally by Le Pen. He knows that the party must rely heavily on its own money, as it has not been ubiquitous enough politically to receive large quantities of state funding. His entrepreneurial skills surfaced early in the 1970s as he was able to amass more than requisite resources to fund party endeavors. One factor was a sizable inheritance in the late 1970s, whereby Le Pen increased his personal wealth. Le Pen inherited about 24 million Francs from Hubert Lambert, a wealthy cement industrialist who died in 1976. Lambert also left prime real estate in the affluent Paris suburb of St. Cloud to Le Pen. The property was used as a private residence for Le Pen and his family after their Paris apartment was bombed, and then as the party headquarters when it was moved from Paris in the 1990s. The National Front collected membership dues and donations from supporters, yet for the typically smaller membership of a peripheral party these do not generate enough revenue in themselves to run a professional party machine. To compete with larger mass parties (Le Pen takes every opportunity to assure that he has such intentions) more revenue is needed. To secure additional funds, the party holds events such as family carnivals and other fund raisers where fees are charged. Additionally, for those considering entering leadership positions or party lists as candidates for election, personal wealth of the candidate proves vital. “To obtain a good position on the party list, National Front candidates are expected to pay for the privilege of representing the party” (Marcus 1995, 42). If elected, they are required to donate up to half of their salaries paid for their

96

●


public service to the national party headquarters. Also the party has benefited financially by a change in the national election laws providing for state funds in 1993. Where previously state funds were awarded according to the number of seats a party held in the legislature, after 1993 amounts were awarded based on the proportion of popular votes a party won in the general election. Reinventing the National Front Adjustments in the party rhetoric and platform also signal the shift to more professional politics and politically correct behavior in the mid1980s. The National Front adopted more moderate language to distance itself from fascist rhetoric, and presented itself in a new style that many authors have called populist to imply a common person’s perspective on contemporary issues (Vernet 2002). The language of the party has evolved from its rudimentary and unsophisticated form in the 1970s to become somewhat more socially acceptable in the 1980s. For example in the late 1970s, party publications such as the journal Le National contained questionable discussions about matters including “the survival of the white nations,” and “biological and historical specificity of the French people” (Davies 1999, 21). Such terminology appears reminiscent of the Aryan race diatribe of the German National Socialist Workers Party of the Nazi era. Slogans were simplistic in the late 1970s as well, such as “One Million Unemployed is One Million Immigrants Too Many.” The party learned to tone down its inflammatory rhetoric throughout the 1980s. The radical right has gone from unacceptable extremist language to what René Rémond has called “a relatively moderate and legalistic” discourse (Rémond 1969). It has continued to take antiimmigrant positions but does so under the guise of economics rather than racism. In other words, the party has learned that it is much more socially acceptable to oppose immigration because immigrants take French jobs and state benefits away from deserving French citizens. Over twenty years ago party rhetoric began to speak of problems of integrating non-Western cultures, such as Islam, with the Western culture in France. This allowed party officials to address the terrorist threat of Arab groups in France in the 1980s (Davies 1999, 21). In a tactical maneuver, the National Front refined its language in order to communicate a message that French people were more willing to hear (see Birenbaum 1992; Shields 1989). By the early 1990s, Delegate General Bruno Mégret had developed the concept of “national preference” to contain the party’s anti-immigration


●

97

message in softer tones (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 444). This meant simply that French and perhaps European Union nationals were preferred over “others” in terms of their entitlement to state social welfare benefits. Also prominent in the 1993 party program was the party’s opposition to globalization, or mondialism as it is called in French (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 445). Globalization was characterized as a threat to French identity as it breaks down borders and creates cultural blending. This allowed the party to argue that borders are important and that controlling people who cross them is necessary. By the late 1990s, a primary issue for the party was law and order (Pégard 2002). With law and order, the antiimmigrant position became the argument that more immigrants cause more crime. Although the party framed immigration using national preference rhetoric, then globalization, then law and order during the 1990s, it continued to pursue a course of advocating little or no immigration. Immigration continued to be the omnibus issue through which popular social problems of the day were funneled. The racist rhetoric was simply removed from the outward message, as instead the party appeared to offer solutions to pressing problems. In a personal interview with a deputy to the French National Assembly from the Socialist party, the conscious rhetorical shift was substantiated: The extreme right in France today is smart and they are not that extreme in the way that they express themselves. They are not openly racist, they are not openly anti-Semitic, and they are not openly nostalgic about Nazism, so they are very careful in their discourse. (Jean-Marie Bockel 2002)

As prime minister, Fabius suggested that the National Front asked the right questions but lacked answers in that televised interview in 1984 described above, they found the right answers through the intellectual framing of their immigration issue. In this endeavor, the party was greatly aided by their think-tank associates from GRECE and the Club de l’Horloge; through their intellectual party elite they became able to spin issues effectively. Climate of Fear Two themes provide the basis for the climate of fear generated by the National Front in recent years: sovereignty and security. With globalization, the party argues that sovereignty is threatened; France will be consumed by larger imperialist countries, such as the United States or by large supranational organizations such as the European Union. The

98

●


distinguishing qualities of what it means to be French will be lost in the process of integration, the party claims. Security has become arguably the most important political issue in France today. For the National Front, insécurité equates to fear and social unease caused by a large foreign population (Davies 1999, 158). The party has recently stirred feelings of insecurity among French people by emphasizing a growing problem of criminality among young people. The National Front draws the link between increasing crime rates in France and immigrants. The crimes tend to be heavily concentrated in and around urban areas and the perpetrators are generally young persons. The National Front has assigned the blame for these crimes to foreigners, constructing an image of dangerous immigrants in order to arouse popular concerns. Pascal Perrineau suggests that the National Front behaved strategically and used great insight in putting together this scenario of immigrant criminality. He says that the “invention of the ‘diabolic nature’ of the North African immigrant has demonstrated the movement’s incredible political astuteness in recognizing that the French have still not resolved the problem of the painful collective memory of the Algerian War” (Perrineau 2000, 267). Furthermore, the facts of the crimes look different than the fears that have emerged. In reality, according to Gerard Fuchs, who is an economist in addition to being a member of parliament, immigrants are not the cause of increased criminality. Rather, he suggests that the problem is economic with criminality rates highest among the unemployed or underemployed. When asked whether the problem presented by the National Front of increased criminality caused by immigrants is truly a problem, Fuchs said the following: What is true is that young people who are committing this sort of actions are coming from low income families and the percentage with the respect to the families of foreign origin is not higher. (Fuchs 2002)

According to Fuchs, the radical right has been influential in France to the extent that it has generated debate on issues and created concern about things that are not real. I mean they [the National Front and radical right parties] have played a great role in putting security discussions in the front of the newspaper. And for awhile at the beginning of high unemployment rates, the National Front was saying just throw out foreign people and the problem will be solved. (Fuchs 2002)


●

99

This statement confirms that the party has been able to get its message out using mass media. By identifying a real social problem, such as unemployment, and then suggesting a solution in getting immigrants out of France, the National Front has been able to present a complete package while mainstream politicians struggle to come up with effective solutions. The party has referred to the problem of immigrants in France as Libanisation or “Lebanonisation” (Davies 1999, 159). This reference is to a France that is divided by factions and at war with itself. It suggests ongoing conflict between majority and minority groups within the French population. The solution then is to eliminate the minority. Analysis of the Impact of the French Radical Right Agenda-setting To evaluate the influence of radical right-wing parties on the agendasetting level, media coverage of the immigration issue serves as an indicator of the issue’s mass influence, potential to infiltrate popular discourse, and penetration or dispersion among the general public. In other words, media coverage reflects whether the issue is high, medium, or low profile among the public at given points in time. Le Monde, A mainstream, daily newspaper with national distribution, was selected for the analysis. Using articles collected on the subject of immigration beginning in 1990, I organized the data to reflect monthly counts and annual counts of articles through July 15, 2002. The amount of media coverage of the defining issue for radical right-wing parties indicates whether the issue is high or low profile, and thus the potential for this issue to influence the political agenda. Since the immigration issue is of central importance to the radical right wing, as it structures its campaigns in the 1990s around promoting the issue, the fact that the issue gains influence or loses influence provides a measure of the impact of the radical right wing in setting the political agenda on this issue. Whether articles are for or against immigration does not matter as the National Front benefits by keeping the issue “in the public eye” (Marcus 1995, 80). Examination of the data shows considerable fluctuation in the number of newspaper articles published annually on immigration. The data show years with clear increases in the number of articles on immigration. Yet, these are almost always immediately followed by a year of lesser volume. In France, the year of decrease following a year of increase almost always returns to the level prior to the increase, as indicated by the tent or triangular pattern of the line between two years in figure 5.1.

100


●

1400

Articles on immigration

1200 1000 800 600 400 200

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 5.1

Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issus 1990–2002

Note: Figures through July of 2002 only. Source: Articles collected from Le Monde.

Table 5.1 Key French Events of 1997 Jan. 11, 1997

Feb. 10, 1997 Feb. 23, 1997 May 25, 1997 Nov. 24, 1997 Nov. 30, 1997 Dec. 27, 1997

Islamic Radicals Sentenced for Marrakesh Bombing Killing Tourists National Front Wins Control of a 4th City in Southern France Thousands Protest French Immigration Bill Wary On Economy, A Sullen France Goes to the Polls Flood of Kurdish Immigrants from Turkey and Iraq France Passes an Eased Nationality Law French Far-Right Leader Convicted of Slighting Holocaust

Source: Headlines taken from the New York Times.

With the exception of 1997, the other years reveal cycles of moderate increase and decrease in French volume but with mainly two levels of higher and lower. Clearly a single discernable peak in 1997 requires closer consideration and explanation. Several reasons may account for the peak in media coverage of immigration in France in 1997. Examination of key headlines from France in 1997 provides initial insight on the internal conditions within France during that year (table 5.1). In France, a main event of 1997 was the national election called by President Jacques Chirac one year ahead of schedule. Generally, election years tend to heighten issue salience and promote increased discussion in political circles, among the media and among the public. This


●

101

particular election year in France presented several confounding factors that allowed radical right-wing ideas to gain more widespread appeal. Increasing violence among youths, particularly in urban suburbs, was being perpetrated by French citizens of foreign origin. As the New York Times wrote in January 1997, “young Frenchmen of North African descent in drug- and crime-ridden suburbs have become susceptible to the appeal of militant Islam.” Blame became displaced upon immigrants and their descendants, particularly Muslims, causing heightened tension between ethnic groups in France. Such attention called attention to labels differentiating those of North African descent or those practicing Islam as their religion from French people in assigning blame. Further complicating the issue, many Kurdish immigrants came to France for asylum in 1997 from Turkey and Iraq. In February the conservative government passed an immigration bill aimed at dramatically restricting immigration opportunities despite some public opposition claiming that such measures only increase scapegoating of foreigners for problems in French society. When the Socialists came to power in the parliament following May elections, one of their first moves in June was to relax immigration restrictions and to review applications that had been recently denied. This came as a result of a campaign promise that the Socialists had made. Other election issues permeating the campaigns of 1997 included the sluggish economy and worries about the single currency proposed for 2002 in addition to globalization concerns regarding American control of the world economy.8 The National Front in France capitalized on controversy surrounding the immigration issue in the 1997 elections. Its campaign argued for tighter immigration restrictions. The year started off triumphant for it at the local level, as they won control of the municipal council of the Marseilles suburb of Vitrolles. This gave the party control of its fourth city. In the May elections, the National Front won 14.9 percent of the vote in the first round. Although it did not win any parliamentary seats, by the second round it had experienced gains in every department except Paris, Mayenne (Brittany), and Alpes Maritime near Nice. The peak in support for the National Front in 1997 reflects controversy over the issues that the party propagates at the center of election year campaigns. As reflected in the selective headlines reviewed, Islamic radicals were giving credence to the National Front’s argument that a civil war over culture was being waged in France between those of Western backgrounds and those of Muslim descent. Kurdish asylum seekers were seeking shelter and sustenance in France at a time when unemployment and economic uncertainty were hotly contested topics in

102

●


election campaigning. Finally, immigration policy went from increased restrictiveness through legislation early in the year to more liberal after the Socialist-led government took office in the summer. Waffling on the issue fueled demonstrators and protests on both sides, keeping the issue at the forefront of people’s minds. France shows several ups and downs in media attention to immigration. As figure 5.2 shows, there are essentially three points reflecting declines over the previous year, in 1992, 1994, and 1999. The issue coverage never falls below the level of its first decline during the period in 1992. Therefore, the level of decline stabilizes. All of the other years tend to reflect moderate to significant increases in issue attention in the media. Another dimension to this pattern of increase and decrease reveals that election years tend to trigger increases in media coverage on the issue over the year preceding the election. The presidential election of 1995 did not generate as much attention to the immigration issue as parliamentary contests in 1993 and 1997 or when both types of election occurred in the same year as during 2002, the year only partially reflected in the chart above. The relatively high levels of media attention to immigration in 1990 and 1991 reflect the aftermath of the 1988 election, another joint presidential and parliamentary election year as is the case in 2002. They also reflect increased asylum and immigration 1400 1200

Articles

1000 800 600 400 200

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Years Legend stripes = Election years

Figure 5.2

Election Year Effect on Article Volume

Note: * 2002 figure is partial through July. Source: Articles collected from Le Monde. Presidential elections occurred in 1995 and 2002, while parliamentary elections occurred in 1993, 1997, and 2002.


●

103

debates occurring across Europe as a result of the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe. In sum, the French case shows a relatively high volume of media attention on the immigration issue throughout the period investigated. Even in years with the least amount of issue coverage, immigration appears in over 450 articles. In peak years that total soars to nearly 1300 articles. Both figures reflect much discussion of immigration in France. Yet also noteworthy is the enormous variance, with a 187 percent increase when comparing the year with the lowest volume to the year with the highest volume. This combined with the finding that election years drive the volume upwards suggests the heavy politicization of the immigration issue in France. The amount of attention to the issue neither shows steady increases nor decreases over the period under investigation. Instead volume fluctuates dramatically and seems to consistently covary with election years. Institution-shaping Evidence of issue co-option indicates that the radical right-wing parties in France have had an effect on other parties in the party system. To the extent that other parties have adopted the issue positions of the radical right in attempts to take issue space away from peripheral parties, they in turn shift their own positions further to the right on key issues such as immigration. As other parties adjust their positions to compete with the radical right, parties like the National Front have successfully altered the political party system moving those parties co-opting its positions farther to the right in their own political space. In other words, the radical right has had an impact through issue co-option by successfully moving other political parties to take up its issue concerns. This is an institutional impact, as the party system shifts to the right in response to the radical right. Previous chapters have shown that the National Front introduced the immigration issue in a way that made it compelling in France. It was able to stir public concern so that politicians from other political parties were forced to respond to the issue or appear negligent. Other parties began to view the immigration issue and the propaganda from the radical right wing as threatening to their own positions. The Socialists and Communists on the left lost working-class voters who were frustrated with unemployment to the National Front, which argues that the immigrants take French jobs (Baudet 2002). The mainstream parties on the right began to lose voters on their right fringe, as many of their

104

●


nationalists and conservative elements concerned with globalization and law and order transferred their support to the radical right. In sum, other parties clearly reacted to radical right-wing party positioning. The Left Proves Indecisive The National Front made immigration an important issue by the 1980s. Yet the Socialist government that came into power in 1981 under Francois Mitterand failed to come up with a coherent position on the issue. The Socialists chose to attack the credibility of the National Front rather than confront the immigration issue, which ironically had been raised by the left originally. The strategy of questioning radical right-wing party credibility failed as the issue concern had already been implanted. Next, the Socialists tried dealing with the so-called effects of immigration, such as unemployment or inadequate welfare state benefits. However, this strategy also failed as “it quickly became clear that the real motor behind policy in this area [immigration] was not so much the objective problems posed by immigration, but the public perception of these problems” (Marcus 1995, 79). The National Front had created an irrational fear that could not be dealt with through rational policy action. The Socialists were uncertain about how to deal with the immigration issue, as their traditional propensity toward providing for the social underclass seemed to make them a likely defender of immigrants. Their tendency was inaction or to stand behind broad inclusive notions of French citizenship. Still, the pressure to respond to the radical right challenge prompted Socialist Prime Minister Edith Cresson to talk about chartering planes to deport illegal immigrants in 1991, and she co-opted a policy put forth by the National Front to establish quarantine or detention centers for asylum seekers (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 453). When the Socialists returned to power in 1997 under Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, they again tried to actively contain the National Front by responding with actions such as increased border patrols and controls and also stopping foreigners at the border and detaining them when they carried invalid documentation for entry (Minkenberg 1998, 15). Torn between their egalitarian, civic notion of democracy and a rising tide of concern about the social consequences of immigrants in France emphasized by the radical right wing, the Socialists often chose inaction. The challenge by the late 1980s was to find solutions to the problem of immigration, as the issue had become entrenched and could not be simply swept aside. The Socialists had become a party with “the wrong answers to the right questions” (Marcus 1995, 150).


●

105

The Communists fared no better. They might have been inclined to agree with the National Front, as they were the first party to complain about immigrants taking jobs away from French workers. The National Front had simply been able to do what the Communists failed to accomplish in the 1970s and early 1980s, namely framing immigration as a top issue concern in the minds of French people. The Communists were violent activists in their opposition to immigration. In 1980 they vandalized a hostel occupied by immigrant workers, using a bulldozer to sever the power supply and staircases used for entry (Marcus 1995, 77). The Communist argument was that immigrants are an evil caused by capitalism and that they deprive local people of social benefits and jobs, create backwardness in the schools, and drive up health-care costs. Ironically, this is the same argument picked up successfully by the National Front in the late 1980s and 1990s in its economic objection to immigrants. This suggests that the issue was not in itself a political kingmaker, but rather it took a party with solid organization, strong leadership, and the right marketing strategy to secure issue success. The Mainstream Right Attempts Cooption and Containment The breakthrough of the National Front was a wake-up call to the mainstream right. It lost voters to the radical right wing and it began to actively guard its issue space in reaction once they realized that the immigration issue had popular resonance. The mainstream right began a practice of condemning the National Front publicly at the national level, while making political alliances with them locally and adopting policies that looked remarkably similar to those advocated by the radical right in order to secure its own position relative to the political left wing. As evidence of the issue co-option from the mainstream right, the Chirac government in cohabitation with Socialist President François Mitterand from 1986–1988 tightened immigration controls, restored random identity-card checks, and chartered a plane to deport over one hundred Malian refugees (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 453). These changes came at the time when the National Front had thirty-five deputies in the National Assembly. In a personal interview, Bruno Gollnisch, Delegate General of the National Front, recalls vividly the manner in which the mainstream right parties co-opted the initiatives proposed by the radical right-wing deputies: It was already the case when I was elected to the parliament of the National Assembly in 1986, for example. It was very surprising but the

106

●


UDF and RPR common platform had been copied from our platform. And when we entered parliament, it was for us kind of a joke. Whenever there was a discussion about a bill in the national assembly we used to submit amendments, for example before a bill becomes a law. And we took the amendments strictly from their platform- Up to the strict wording of the sentences. And I noted it in the debate: ‘Uh we think the candidates from the RPR and UDF will vote for this amendment because it is taken from their platform, uh number 3 line number 15.’ And they voted against it, just because it was us and saying this platform was for nothing but to cheat the voters . . . and so yes these platforms are a way to measure this [issue co-option]. We call it “Lepenisation des Esprit” Lepenization of minds. (Gollnisch 2002)

The government of Edouard Balladur from 1993 to 1995 also shows evidence of issue co-option. The Balladur government, again in cohabitation with President Mitterrand, repealed the droit du sol (law of the soil) providing for French citizenship for those born in France of nonFrench parents,9 tightened naturalization and family reunion laws, and gave extra powers for search and seizure to the police (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000, 453). These changes reflect the positions advocated by the radical right, including citizenship based on descent rather than birth in France and the calls for increased emphasis on law and order to combat crimes caused by immigrants. The previous chapter analyzed the institutional impact of the radical right across Europe statistically finding that the mainstream right parties do not adjust there positions on immigration systematically each time the radical right moves its position either further to the right fringe or closer to the center of political ideological space. The French case suggests one reason why the statistics indicate no direct correlation. In the French case, governments of both the left and right tend to adjust their positions further to the right on the immigration issue in order to contain support for the National Front as elections draw near. For example, with the 1993 Balladur government, Jonathan Marcus comments that “once again [as in 1986] the [mainstream] Right’s legislative programme was influenced by the prospect of a Presidential election and the need to reassure right-wing voters. The government launched a three-pronged assault to prove that it was tough on immigration” (Marcus 1995, 90–91). Jacques Chirac made an unforgettable and now-infamous comment during local-level campaigning about the “odors and noises” of immigrants. The left-leaning newspaper Libération quoted Chirac on June 21, 1991 using an anecdote about a typical French worker living in a working-class Paris district of Goutte d’Or,


●

107

“who sees his next door neighbors—a family where there’s one father, three or four wives and twenty-odd kids, getting fifty thousand francs in social security payments without going to work; add to that the noise and the smell and it drives the French worker crazy. It’s not racist to say that we can no longer afford to re-unite families” (Marcus 1995, 93). The political rhetoric of the mainstream right appears to move more toward that of the radical right in order to rally election support. In sum, the other political parties in France have adjusted their positions to respond to the success of the radical right at making immigration an important issue concern. Many of the other parties underestimated the appeal of the National Front message, criticizing the party and Le Pen through the 1980s. It appears that they expected the National Front to disappear without ever having had measurable influence. Instead, the National Front presented them with a popular issue that evoked fear among French people and they did not know how to handle it. The issue contradicted basic principles that define their party in some cases, namely the Socialists, or it took issue space away from them and they tried to beat it rather than to join it initially, as with the Gaullists and Christian Democrats. The interaction of other French parties with the National Front is represented in the diagram below (figure 5.3). The dotted lines indicate the “natural” positions of key party families in the French party system. The arrows indicate the direction moved by these party families in response to the increased appeal of the National Front’s platform.10 The solid lines show the new positions of the other parties after they reacted to the move towards moderation from the radical right (towards the mainstream right on the diagram above) as the National

Communists

Socialists

UDF

Gaullists

Far right

The left Figure 5.3

The right Effect of the National Front on the French Party System

108

●


Front increased its legitimacy, professionalized its party, and toned down its rhetoric through its process of reinvention in the mid-1980s. The Communists lost many of their former supporters to the National Front as the radical right took up the working-person’s cause against threats of globalization and immigrants stealing local jobs; this is indicated on the diagram by the arrow leading away from the Communists and directly to the Radical Right. Unlike the Communists, who did not adapt to combat the loss of its supporters to the far right wing, the other parties adjusted their positions more towards the right to try and take back voters lost to the Radical Right and to prevent others from transferring their support to the Radical Right. In sum, the National Front has moved other French parties to the right of their previous positions providing an indication of its institutional effect. The French party system has moved toward a consensus about the need to restrict immigration and increase law and order, as instigated by the radical right. Policy-making The third impact measure assesses policy-making effects by examining legislative activity on the immigration issue, including laws, decrees, policy statements, and other official position statements coming from the parliament. This provides a gauge of right-wing radical influence on legislation and policy. Legislative activity counts were obtained by searching in the Journal officiel in order to determine how much parliamentary activity addresses the omnibus issue for the radical right-wing, immigration, over the last twelve years. The underlying assumption is that government activity reacts to the radical right-wing pressure to make immigration a central political issue either by curbing immigration or by relaxing immigration restrictions. As with similar studies counting environmental legislation as an indicator of the success of green parties and movements, this study counts immigration legislation as a measure of radical right-wing party success. Clearly, the data show a steady trend of increasing initiatives on immigration throughout the period investigated (figure 5.4). The peak year is 2001 but there is also a trend toward a heightened level of activity beginning in 1993 through 1996. This increase correlates with the period in which a right wing government held power. The Socialist-led government was ousted in 1993 parliamentary elections giving way to the right-of-center government led by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. Legislative control remains with the right


●

109

45

Initiatives on immigration

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Figure 5.4

Legislative Volume on Immigration 1990–2002

Note: Figures reflect result of data collected through July of 2002. The 2002 figure is likely higher. Source: Legislative initiatives collected form the Journal official.

wing until 1997 elections lead to a majority coalition on the left under Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. It is precisely this period from 1993 to 1997 when legislative activity on immigration steadily and dramatically increases. This correlation suggests that the mainstream right governments were moving radical right issues through the legislature. The radical right appears to have its greatest policy impact under right-of-center governments based on the evidence of the period under investigation. France exhibits a major increase in legislative activity in 2001. This might be due to incidents of increasing violence in France over the course of 2001. The perpetrators were mostly people often portrayed as Muslims or skinheads fighting the Muslims, which fueled a climate of anti-immigrant sentiment among some French. Additionally, security proved a high concern in France in 2001 even prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Documented threats to personal security in French neighborhoods added to the French experiences with Muslim terrorists in the past, mainly Algerians, combined to increase scapegoating of foreigners for many social ills. A clearer picture of increasing numbers of legislative initiatives on immigration over the entire period under investigation emerges when the years are grouped according to governmental administrations. Legislative terms provide a better way to see patterns in these data

110

●


140

initiatives on immigration

120 100 80 60 40 20

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 5.5

Legislative Volume by Terms in Office

Note: Figures reflect results of data collected through July of 2002. The 2002 figure is likely higher. Source: Legislative initiatives collected from the Journal official.

because administrations are often judged by overall achievements in office rather than individual years. For example, there are often periods in office for adjustment initially and for transition or a lame duck period later. Looking at terms of office, the overall pattern is a steady increase over the last 11.5 years (figure 5.5). Each successive administration has demonstrated more overall legislative activity on the immigration issue than previous administrations. This pattern indicates that the radical right wing objective of generating greater policy responses on the immigration issue has been achieved. This accomplishment has come about despite their marginal status with respect to the ability to introduce legislation directly in the National Assembly. Conclusions The National Front has remained a force to be contended with in French elections for over two decades. It has demonstrated its ability to calculate effective strategies and to position itself to win support away from other parties. By introducing the immigration issue, it was able to move itself out of the ideological confusion it faced throughout the 1970s, to its breakthrough in the early 1980s. Since then, it utilizes innovative techniques such as the Internet and its own publications to


●

111

reach a wide variety of people. Its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, displays a rhetorical command and a finesse enabling him to speak to a wide variety of people. The party transformed itself from a fringe element in the 1970s, to a professional political machine by the late 1980s. From the late 1980s, the National Front has had an impact on French politics. Clearly in setting the agenda, the National Front has made the immigration issue a hotly debated topic in French politics. At the institutional level, it forced other parties to respond rather than avoid the issue, although most other parties attempted to avoid dealing with immigration initially. And the increasing volume of legislation over successive governmental administrations suggests another level of impact of the National Front. It has achieved its goal of getting more and more legislative initiatives considered, despite its position outside of the chambers of the National Assembly. It has done so by making the immigration issue so important in the minds of the public that the parties in power have to take action on it. By generating the climate of fear, the National Front has made mainstream parties in the legislature take action to restrict immigration. By altering the way immigrants are perceived and making them the enemies of the French people, the National Front has achieved success. As Jonathan Marcus summarizes, “Immigration was increasingly perceived to be a problem; for many people, the problem. And while mainstream parties struggled to cope, Le Pen skillfully manipulated the issue. Their failings left him the conductor of the orchestra; Le Pen set the agenda, and henceforth everyone would dance to his tune” (Marcus 1995, 99). In many ways the other French parties, the media, and the public continue to dance to Le Pen’s tune.


CHAPTER 6

German Parties Have Opportunity Without Actualization

The parties of the German radical right remain fragmented and organizationally underdeveloped. They have not experienced electoral success at the national level and have had inconsistent local-level success. They appear to be a receptacle of radical right-wing supporters only when the mainstream parties are perceived to be negligent on issues of immigration and national identity. The radical right in Germany comes closer to being aptly labeled a “protest party” than the parties in the other two cases examined in this study. The German radical rightwing parties appear to get votes when economic and social conditions deteriorate and when simultaneously the mainstream parties appear inept. Yet, they are not viewed as viable parties of government even by those who cast votes for them. A vote for the German radical right is more clearly a vote against the established mainstream parties than it is a vote of confidence in the abilities of the radical right wing to bring results. This chapter examines the influence of radical right-wing parties in Germany in terms of their opportunities and constraints. Using evidence from personal interviews, documentary sources, archival research, and secondary source material, the chapter argues that although these parties have had favorable opportunity structures, they have been largely ineffective at turning opportunities into efficacy. First, the propositions from chapter 3 are evaluated for their explanatory power in the German case. Second, the model developed in chapter 4 for cross-national radical right-wing party influence is applied to the German case to determine how well it accounts for German radical right-wing influence. Finally, data are applied to

114

●


measure the impact of the German radical right on three levels of impact analysis: agenda, institutions, and policy. Identifying with Identity Politics—Niche Influence for the German Radical Right Unlike the French case, the radical right-wing parties in Germany were not the first to introduce the immigration issue nor were they the most extreme on the issue. General consensus that immigrants presented a problem for Germany pervaded all mainstream political parties in the 1980s. With the exception of the Green Party, all parties discussed concerns about the growing foreign population in Germany and advocated changing German asylum policy to make it more restrictive. Neither the position nor the rhetoric of the far-right parties differed dramatically from the mainstream. Instead several similarities were evident between the far right and the mainstream right parties—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), its Bavarian counterpart. This should not be surprising, as the most entrepreneurial of the German radical right-wing parties, the Republican Party, was founded by members of the mainstream right CSU. Even though they were not the issue entrepreneurs, there was no question that the central issue for the German radical right was German identity. There is no question that the radical right stands for a “Germany for Germans.” While other parties made immigration themes and German nationalism one among many of their concerns, the radical right made it their focus and raison d’être. Additionally, the spin of the radical right placed more emphasis on threats to national identity than did mainstream parties. So even though the German radical right did not introduce a new issue as the French had done, they found their niche in politicizing the identity element of immigration and asylum debates rather than the economic element of immigration. Identity politics continued to have resonance in Germany, long after the radical right throughout the rest of Western Europe had recognized a need to redevelop its message around the economic arguments about immigration to broaden its support base and to be politically correct in the age of multiculturalism. Nazism and German Identity—We are Not A Country of Immigrants! The legacy of the Nazi past complicates the German case. The German government, parties, and people have struggled for more than half of a

German Parties

●

115

century now to redefine their identity. Overall, Germans and their government have been conscientious and careful to avoid references to the German Fatherland and open admissions of German pride have been largely self-suppressed. Yet beginning with Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1982, a turning point had arrived in terms of overcoming the legacy of the past and moving forward from it to reestablish German national identity. This became known as the German Wende or renewal. Germany is one of the few countries in the world today, along with Israel, Japan, and several Arab countries, that defines their citizenship according to principles of jus sanguinis (law of the blood) rather than jus soli (law of the soil). In Western Europe, the majority of countries have adopted more-liberal citizenship standards over the second half of the twentieth century. However, both Switzerland and Austria have held on to varying degrees of jus sanguinis in their citizenship laws. Although many changes in German citizenship law have been made, beginning with modifications in 1993, Germans still base their ideas of inclusiveness in the political community on kinship and blood ties rather than on place of birth and the civic community under one government. The German tradition of a völkisch or ethnic ascriptive community based on identity politics has presented a unique cultural obstacle for handling immigrants in the latter half of the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first century. This legacy has been a factor in the positioning of the German radical right in its approach to national identity. This approach would not be effective in other societies without this völkisch cultural legacy. As argued in chapter 4, the winning formula for the reinvented radical right-wing parties of the 1980s and 1990s included shedding the fascist legacy of ethnic nationalism and taking on the economic and resource-based arguments against immigration. Another legacy of Nazism pertaining to the current context in which radical right-wing parties find themselves is the institutional constraints evident in the postwar Basic Law. The German Basic Law Article 21 bans antidemocratic political parties, and Article 9 bans extremist organizations (Kagedan 1997, 108). The provisions allow the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to investigate the activities of groups in Germany in order to determine their level of threat to the democratic order. Also, German law provides penalties for the crime of incitement of racial hatred. Determining the scope of such hatred is left to judges, but the law attempts to ensure that mobilizing xenophobia can be prosecuted, sending a signal that it will not be tolerated in German society. The postwar German government has gone to great lengths to demonstrate its commitment to the democratic order and to show its readiness

116

●


to combat threats to that order. It intends to ensure that Nazi elements do not return to power in postwar Germany. Such provisions provide a constraint on the ability of radical right-wing parties to express themselves openly. Waves of the German Radical Right The radical right-wing parties in Germany have been unable to consolidate a steady base of support. Instead, they experience short bursts of local-level success followed by decline a few years later. In each wave of the German radical right described here, a different radical right-wing party rises and then falls. There have been four such waves since the Second World War.1 The first wave marks the short-lived success of the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) between 1950 and 1952. The second wave occurred between 1966 and 1969 as the National Democratic Party (NPD) experienced limited electoral success. The third wave began in the middle of the 1980s with the rise of the Republican Party in Germany. The third wave came to an end in 1993 when the popular support for the radical right declined sharply following passage of legislation restricting the right to political asylum in Germany. The fourth wave began with the 1997–1998 state level electoral successes of the German People’s Union (DVU). The SRP was a successor of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) of the Nazis. It openly expressed admiration of Hitler and glorified the idea of an exclusive blood community of the German people. The SRP wanted to continue what Hitler had begun including carrying out his “social revolution” (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 52). The peak of SRP electoral success came in 1951 when the party won 11 percent of the vote in elections for the state legislature of Lower Saxony and nearly 8 percent in Bremen. Following these results, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer instigated a ban of the party through the Federal Constitutional Court on the grounds that it posed a threat to the postwar democracy. The government applied Article 21 of the constitution, and the SRP was subsequently banned in 1952. Most members of the SRP transferred their membership to the German Reich Party (DRP) following the ban. However, the DRP struggled to survive under careful government scrutiny, and it received no more than 1.1 percent of the vote in the three elections that it contested in 1953, 1957, and 1961. The second wave began in 1966, two years after the founding of the NPD. DRP leaders founded the new party with the expectation that

German Parties

●

117

through a new name and a new party they could maintain their ideological position. Perhaps by removing the term “Reich” from the name and inserting “Democratic” instead, they sought to change the outward image of the party and begin anew with a clean slate. However, the core of the new party was composed of former leaders and members of the DRP, meaning the NPD membership drew largely from former Nazis (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 54). The party knew that it needed to distance itself from the Nazi past in order to establish its legitimacy and avoid a ban. It chose to concern itself with German reunification as its main issue and to talk of rebuilding the German national community with the restoration of traditional morals and values. It also broadened its message to include talk of third-way economics in between communism and capitalism and also of environmental protections, in particular its opposition to nuclear power plants in Germany. The strategy proved successful in attracting many former supporters of radical right-wing parties back to the fringes. Between 1966 and 1968 the party was represented by sixty-one deputies in seven out of the eight state legislatures. A shift from former strongholds of radical right-wing party supporters for the SRP in North Germany occurred as the greatest successes for the NPD in the middle 1960s came in southern Germany, especially in the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 54). However, the success was transitory, and by the 1970s the NPD began to decline. Party members began to lose confidence as the party failed to achieve a national-level breakthrough since it never obtained the requisite 5-percent threshold of support in Bundestag elections. Additionally, it was plagued by internal divisions over whether it should pursue more extreme and militant methods or should work toward acceptance in coalition partnerships with mainstream right parties. Many supporters abandoned the NPD in the early 1970s, and militants joined radical right-wing movements and neo-Nazi groups, where they could express their beliefs and their frustration at the lack of representation of their interests in the Bundestag. The third wave of radical right-wing activity in Germany began in the mid-1980s and can probably be dated from 1985, the time that Franz Schönhuber took over as leader of the Republican Party. It arguably extends to 1993, when the Bundestag passed legislation to further restrict the right to asylum in Germany. The Republican Party was founded in 1983 by three disgruntled members of the mainstream right party based in southern Germany, the Christian Social Union (CSU). The CSU typically partners with the larger mainstream right

118

●


party the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in national-level elections and governing coalitions but represents a slightly more-conservative element in mainstream right politics. The founders of the Republican Party included two CSU Bundestag deputies, Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voigt, along with prominent television journalist Franz Schönhuber. The three were prompted to leave the CSU and start a new party after the Bavarian leader of the state legislature from the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, negotiated a controversial loan of several thousandmillion Deutschmarks to the German Democratic Republic (Stöss 1991, 198). The policy was considered to be overly “reconciliatory” in a climate where great tension between the two Germanies persisted (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 55). Handlos was the leader of the Republicans in the party’s first two years, operating it as another conservative party situated slightly to the right of the mainstream parties. However, the party shifted significantly farther to the nationalist right when a power struggle led to Handlos’s replacement by Schönhuber at the party’s helm in 1985. Schönhuber was ideologically farther to the right-wing fringe than his more moderate co-founding counterparts. He had served in the Waffen-SS bodyguard unit attached directly to Adolf Hitler with the mission to protect the life of the Führer during World War II (Heneghan 2000, 91). He had stronger beliefs about the importance of historical revision to restore German pride than his co-founders, whose objections to the CSU had more to do with policy choices. Schönhuber was aware of the need to carefully position his party in the mid-to-late 1980s to avoid intense scrutiny by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Braunthal 1999, 156). The Verfassungsschutz, as it is called in German, literally means protection of the constitution. It functions as a monitoring agency observing parties and other elements in German society in order to assess their propensity for posing threats to democracy. Schönhuber chose to distance himself from preexisting radical right-wing parties and movements including the NPD and the DVU. He wanted the Republican Party to be more of a populist, protest party presenting itself as supportive of the existing system of government but opposed to the mainstream parties and their inability to solve pressing problems such as criminality and unemployment (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 55). The party program centered on advocacy for German unification but also stressed law and order and spoke of the preservation of German identity amid heightened asylum pressures. Several scholars suggest that through the late 1980s, the Republicans were a bridge party positioned between the radical right fringes of the

German Parties

●

119

NPD and DVU and the mainstream right of the CDU and CSU (Kitschelt 1995; Stöss 1991; Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993). Yet as the asylum debates heated up into 1992, the party began to show more of its underlying fascist tendencies. The party rhetoric shifted to using no uncertain terms in its demands that foreigners be deported from Germany. The fourth wave highlights the 1997 and 1998 state-level success of the DVU. Although founded as a political movement in 1971, the DVU stayed away from party politics until 1987. During the electoral decline of the NPD and its internal divisions of the 1970s, the DVU formed to provide radical right-wing agitators a forum for their agitation. As became the cycle in Germany when radical right-wing parties decline, movements on the fringe and right-wing radical groups developed to absorb the popular sentiment that lacked an institutional home. Such groups gained momentum after the SRP was banned in 1952 followed by the failure of the DRP to fill a vacuum on the political far right wing. As Ekkart Zimmermann and Thomas Saalfeld explain, “Similar to the 1950s, parapolitical networks functioned as ‘reserve positions’ after the major extremist right-wing party had failed electorally” (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 57). The DVU first emerged then as a parent organization to several splinter militant social movements. Common positions among these groups included clearing the records of many Waffen-SS soldiers charged as Nazi war criminals, sending guest workers back to their native countries, reunification with recognition of its 1937 borders, and general reduction of foreign influence (including that of the United States) in German media. In 1997 the DVU won 4.97 percent of the vote in the city-state elections in Hamburg. It narrowly missed gaining representation due to the 5-percent threshold for legislative seats for German parties. Then in April 1998, the DVU won 12.9 percent of the vote in state legislative elections in Saxony-Anhalt. The DVU’s showing in 1998 represented the highest percentage of votes ever won by a postwar radical right-wing party in Germany. Credit for the success was attributed by analysts to the two-tothree million Deutschmark campaign financed mostly by party leader Gerhard Frey (Braunthal 1999, 158). Frey, a wealthy publisher from Bavaria, poured his own money into this campaign. The money was used largely for direct mailings and posters and other publicly displayed propaganda. The target demographic group was young males under thirty who viewed themselves as “modernization losers.” Modernization losers are those who suffered direct losses of jobs and income by the process of German unification and forces of globalization.

120

●


Both phenomena have transformed economies to create greater demand for highly skilled workers (or as Peter Drucker [1994] has put it— knowledge workers). Modernization losers have become a primary target of radical right-wing parties throughout the 1990s with the many social changes affecting German society (Kitschelt 1995, 221; Schubarth 1997, 237). To target them in the 1997 and 1998 state-level campaigns, the DVU used slogans such as “German money for German jobs” and “Foreigner bandits get out” (Braunthal 1999, 158). The fourth wave parties capitalized upon frustrations with the mainstream parties generated by deteriorating socioeconomic conditions for some sectors of the population. Key Deficiencies in Innovative Influence In contrast to the French National Front, the German radical right-wing parties often appear reluctant to adapt their positions to the political climate of the times. The previous chapter discussed populist elements of the National Front with Jean-Marie Le Pen claiming to represent the common man by “saying out loud what people are thinking inside” (Marcus 1995, 54). The German Republicans make the same claim that they represent the interests of the common man (Kitschelt 1995, 226; Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 20). However, the evidence to support the populism of the German radical right wing seems less clear. These parties do a poor job of reading public opinion and responding to the contemporary concerns of the populace. Instead, their message remains largely the same, as they focus on German nationalism and restoring Germany to its previous position of dominance based on power and international recognition. When Schönhuber asserts that he speaks for the common people, he presumes that their major concern is the restoration of German pride. He explains, “I get the most applause when I announce that the re-education program is over and humble pie has been taken off the menu. When I say I’m proud to be a German—people have waited years to hear that” (quoted in Heneghan 2000, 92). The German radical right remains anchored to its message of identity politics even as popular concerns shift toward economic and other social issues. It appears to assume that the primary concern of the majority of Germans is preserving their German identity. As Michael Minkenberg (1996, 234) has put it, the German radical right offers “history creation” where a vacuum in the German collective memory exists following the Hitler era. These parties want to instigate

German Parties

●

121

discussions of history highlighting all of the great German accomplishments, including what they consider successes of the Second World War. They are frustrated that the subject has been tabooed by the victorious allies of the Second World War. They want children to be taught German history and to be proud of it. They want adults to be free to express their feelings of self-satisfaction and self-respect for the accomplishments of their ancestors. In a personal interview, FDP party official Daniella Zehentner confirmed that the radical right appeals to those who are frustrated with taboos of the past: People in Germany are rebelling against the idea of always being put into a box with Hitler, the NSDAP and so forth. Some people are looked upon as being very courageous to say we have too many foreigners in the country [right-wing radicals]. But I think that there is a big difference between saying we have too many foreigners and we have to do something about that or having a law and then voting or trying to vote for these parties [radicals]. (Zehentner 2002)

Even though people remain reluctant to vote for the radical right-wing parties, as Zehentner suggests, the parties have found sympathizers with their message that the time has come to break with the pejorative associations of history. Still, for many Germans, identity was not their primary concern. Given the many changes facing Germany and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, from asylum seekers, to unification, to civil war in former Yugoslavia, identity politics were often secondary to more-pressing material concerns in the minds of the masses. Other contemporary issues surpassed German identity politics in the minds of most Germans in the 1980s and 1990s (Bergmann 1997, 29). Yet, the radical right parties did not adapt their platforms to appeal to people’s changing concerns. Their positions remained identity-based politics rather than practical, contemporary affairs (Kitschelt 1995, 238). They were able to find enough people willing to hear and support their message of preserving the German identity that though they lost support as other issues became higher than identity in the mind of the masses they did not fade away. Where the National Front in France learned from its mistakes and continued to alter its position and platform from its founding in 1972 to the present time, the German radical right-wing parties display numerous peaks and valleys in their performance. They do not appear to learn significantly from past mistakes. And as illustrated by the four waves described above, their successes tend to be short-lived, lasting only for a period of a few years each.

122

●


Fragmentation and Disarray in the Party Structures Despite evidence that radical right-wing parties in Germany knew that they needed to distance themselves from Nazism to gain respectability as legitimate political parties, they proved ineffective at doing so in practice. When the NPD was founded in 1964, many of its members still recalled the banning of the SRP in 1952. They knew that the new party needed to carefully calculate its language and overt racism or risk a similar fate. As it became clear that the NPD had little chance of national electoral success after its rise in the mid-1960s, the party began to radicalize. By the late 1960s, the NPD became the first party to introduce the phrase “Ausländer raus” (“Foreigners Get Out!”) in a desperate attempt to attract support and prevent its decline (Merkl 1997, 28). This pattern recurred in the DVU and Republican Party as well: as support dwindled they became increasingly radicalized. Internal disputes drastically weakened the NPD over the course of the 1970s as militants and moderates battled over how best to position the party without compromising its core premises such as “rehabilitation of nationalism and the Nazi past” (Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 54). The NPD experienced little electoral success at local or national levels from the 1970s to the 1990s, although many of their members continued to agitate through noninstitutional channels, such as social movements of the radical right. The party apparently discerned that it had nothing to lose by increasing its radicalism. Particularly in the 1990s, the NPD began to posture its party organization as a radical element. In 1995, party leader Günter Deckert was sentenced to two years in jail for making provocative speeches full of racial slurs and xenophobic rhetoric (Braunthal 1999, 156). The state party leader from Bavaria, Udo Voigt, succeeded Deckert. Voigt initiated a campaign to openly and actively recruit young people from skinhead movements and other militants to the party. This campaign particularly targeted frustrated young men in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) states. The DVU began to contest elections in 1987, putting forth its own party lists for the first time in some state-level elections under the party name DVU-Liste D (the “D” stands for Deutschland ). From the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the DVU-Liste D and NPD put forth several joint party lists. In 1986, the party leaders came to the conclusion to unite their efforts under NPD leader Martin Mußgnug and DVU-Liste D leader Gerhard Frey. This alliance strategy appeared wiser than competing with one another and then in turn competing against the Republican Party for far right voters, especially since the Republicans

German Parties

●

123

had been gaining ground on the far right since 1985. The alliance succeeded in producing the first state-level legislative seat for the far right since the 1968 NPD electoral breakthrough; the seat was won in legislature in Bremen (Stöss 1991, 192). The DVU-Liste D exceeded the 5-percent threshold and won seats at the local level again in Bremen in 1991 and then in the state of Schleswig-Holstein in 1992. However, the party deputies acted inconsistently, often disagreeing with one another in state legislatures (Braunthal 1999, 158). Ultimately, internal party divisions plagued the party precluding maximum institutional impact and efficacy in the legislature. The Republicans have been rife with division over their party’s politics from its founding in 1983. The early power struggle over whether to moderate or radicalize the party platform placed Franz Schönhuber in power in 1985. The strategy from the mid-1980s was to carefully avoid links to extremism and to utilize every opportunity to affirm faith in the democratic order (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 13). Yet despite the party leader’s attempts to give the party a law-abiding image, dissenters opposed the moderate stance. Fragmentation occurred at state levels of the organization. Members began to clamor that the party leader was imposing softer politics from the top down against the wishes of many members within the party (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 14). Like the NPD before it, the Republican Party intended to maintain a moremoderate position, setting itself apart from more radical elements. Still it failed as its members asserted increasing pressure. Despite recognition on the part of Republican Party leadership of the need to carefully position it between the mainstream right and the radical fringe, the party shifted farther to the right in the early 1990s. It had achieved much success in the late 1980s as the self-proclaimed “Party of Reunification,” a reference to the fact that it had made uniting the two Germanies a core component of its position from it founding in 1983 (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 6). Although this was not the only issue for the Republicans, who also stood for issues including German nationalism and tighter asylum restrictions in the late 1980s, the party experienced an “existential crisis” following unification as one of their main rallying cries had been addressed with policy solutions by the mainstream right (Schmid 1996, 75). By 1993, the Republicans had significantly declined in terms of their membership and support. As their support waned, they also chose to follow the pattern of radicalizing their platform in attempts to hang onto support (Kitschelt 1995, 210–211). In 1994, a power struggle at the helm of the party unseated Franz Schönhuber and replaced him with a thirty-nine-year-old lawyer

124

●


and physician, a party activist from Stuttgart, Rolf Schlierer. Schlierer wanted to return the Republicans to more-moderate positions, suggesting the Freedom Party of Austria as a model for such change. However, the damage to the reputation of the Republican Party appears to have already been done by that point. The party had been under watch by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution since the early 1990s, and the federal agency had published evidence that the party had occasional ties with known neo-Nazis (Braunthal 1999, 156). In addition, speeches by party officials were found to contain inflammatory xenophobic language. The party image had been tarnished. In addition to weaknesses and fragmentation within the organizational structures of the parties, not to mention the intraparty competition dividing the far right, the radical right in Germany has lacked characteristics of the professional political party organization. The party headquarters are decentralized and located outside of the political corridor in Berlin. They prove incapable of recruiting political elites and intellectuals and have failed to connect themselves with think-tank organizations of the New Right. The German far right parties also lack the financial resources to sustain electoral campaigns and their party apparatuses. Finally, their media-production-and-distribution capacity is relatively underdeveloped with respect to their journals, newspapers, radio broadcasts, and websites on the Internet. The party headquarters are haphazardly managed and lack centralized authority. The party leaders are scattered throughout the country. For example, Republican Party leader Rolf Schlierer keeps his office and residence in Stuttgart, far away from the party headquarters in Berlin. The parties remain largely decentralized and lack full-time strategists and staffs in their party headquarters. In my own experience conducting interviews at party headquarters in Berlin with state-level leaders from both the Republicans and the NPD, I found only two to four people (three of them youths) staffing the party headquarters of these two parties. Certainly, the full-time political strategists and party officials found with professional party organizations appeared to be lacking with the radical right-wing parties in Germany. Also, the facilities for party headquarters reflect a less-than-professional party image. The Republicans are located in a Northeastern suburb of Berlin-Pankow, behind a guarded gate on the premises of the Embassy of Lebanon. The NPD is located in the East Berlin suburb of Köpenick, in a building with covered windows and two steel doors in its entry corridor. Both facilities suggest an almost defensive fortification and posture attempting to hide from the public rather than presenting an open door.

German Parties

●

125

Perhaps this is not surprising given vigorous demonstrations against the radical right. Prominent figures have not abandoned the mainstream parties of the right to move to radical right-wing parties. Unlike the French case, where recognizable figures of the intellectual right wing aligned themselves with the National Front in the 1980s, German radical right-wing parties have not been able to attract recognizable figures that might be able to lend them a measure of legitimacy. “Unlike their counterparts in the Weimar Republic, the present economic and cultural elite have not been very sympathetic toward right-wing populist parties” (Winkler and Schumann 1998, 100). Even the Republican Party, which arguably tried the hardest of all German radical right-wing parties to establish itself as a bridge party between mainstream and radical right parties, proved unable to amass the support of recognizable leaders or intellectuals of the Neue Rechte or “New Right.” Supporters of the CDU and CSU parties have not moved to switch their loyalty to the radical right-wing parties. On the contrary, most members transferred their associations from far right militant and fascist groups or from Nazi successor parties of the radical right wing, such as the NPD (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 22). The lack of party switching may be due to the stigma associated with radical right-wing parties in Germany, as well as the institutional constraints that limit such a party from becoming strong. Intellectuals of the Neue Rechte have not become institutionally established in German radical right-wing parties. German right-wing intellectuals have developed a parallel movement taking up similar issues and causes as radical right-wing parties without direct ties between the two. The intellectual debates in New Right circles in Germany have most typically addressed past issues rather than present concerns. Thomas Schmid describes the backwardness of the German New Right in comparison with the French saying, “Unlike in France, the new movement was without intellectual influence . . . because they insisted on remaining ‘old-fashioned’ rightists—while the French right caused a stir of debates about ethnopluralism and the right to difference” (Schmid 1996, 74). Intellectuals of the New Right participate in the historians’ debate or Historikerstreit. This debate involves a push for a recontextualization of German history to cast a more positive light on the events of the German role in the Second World War. The Nazi past should be reconsidered and recognized for its achievements and worthy goals according to the right-wing position. The goal is to “develop a new German national consciousness derived from collective historical identity” (Minkenberg 1992, 71). However, as the intellectuals have failed to

126

●


connect in any formal way with far right parties, the parties have been left to appear as fringe groups without an intellectual argument or core. This has served to undermine their credibility and the public perception of them. The lack of overt credibility has direct consequences hindering the ability of these parties to function effectively and efficiently. One such consequence is the inability to recruit candidates. The radical right-wing parties in Germany have proven unable to recruit candidates to stand for election. Association with the radical right is not respectable, and therefore even those persons who may sympathize with its positions are reluctant to associate with the party. Even high-profile positions in the party such as standing for public office as a party representative have proven difficult to fill. As a result, candidates have been in short supply and radical right-wing parties have often proven unable to contest elections at the state and municipal levels due to a shortage of candidates to stand for election (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 22). An additional consequence of the lack of credibility has been the inability of the parties to amass sufficient funds to wage professional political campaigns. Absent elites who tend to bring their wealth to bear in political parties and lack a consistent membership support base, radical right-wing parties in Germany have remained limited in terms of the tactics that they can employ to gain electoral support and to disseminate their message. The publications and political propaganda resources for getting the message of radical right-wing parties to the masses have remained much less extensive than those of the National Front in France. The first thing ones notices about these parties is that their published political party platforms resemble brochures rather than official declarations of the party program such as those published by the six more widely recognized German parties (The SPD, CDU, CSU, FPD, PDS, and Greens). The NPD party program is a thirteen page 8.25 inch by 4 inch document whose first line after the heading Grundgedanken (fundamental principles) states: “The concepts and positions of the postwar era have been worn out” (NPD 2001). It addresses fifteen points from No. 8 “Germany must be German Again” to No. 4 “The Economy must Serve the Needs of the Volk”—a veiled exclusivist reference meaning that the economy should benefit blood Germans over others living and working in Germany. The party program offers several paragraphs supporting each theme but without reference to policy solutions. The positions are justified on the basis of ideological merit rather than practical policy solutions. The DVU program is even more poorly constructed and presented. It is a 7.25 inch by 4 inch flyer consisting of five pages of text

German Parties

●

127

on thirteen principle positions. Its first proposition is, “German vital interests must be protected” (DVU 2002). In the first sentence the argument is clarified to include protecting the German identity against encroachment. The Republican Party has by far the most professional of the party platforms. It consists of an 8 inch by 6 inch soft-cover book with 120 pages. The German flag is displayed in full color on the cover. It is organized into eighteen chapters dealing with subjects from European Union politics, security, the environment, jobs and social security, and education (REP 2001). Although still weak on policy solutions to pressing problems, the Republican Party comes the closest of the three to addressing political issues of the campaign. Beyond their platforms, the German parties publish mostly monthly newspapers, such as the Republicans’ Der Republikaner and the NPD’s DS: Deutsche Stimme (“German Voice”). No publisher information is printed in Der Republikaner.2 Deutsche Stimme is published by the NPD in Riesa, Germany; however the party does not have an official office in that city suggesting the use of an outsourced publisher. The most extensive publications from radical right-wing parties in Germany come from the DVU, whose leader is, himself, a publisher. Gerhard Frey’s publishing house conglomerate produces three weekly right-wing newspapers including Deutsche National-Zeitung (DNZ) “German National Newspaper,” Deutsche Anzeiger (DA) “German Informer,” and Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (DWZ) “German Weekly Newspaper” (Stöss 1991, 193). The publications coming from all of the German parties regularly contain articles addressing the need for historical revisionism regarding the Second World War, as well as articles criticizing the cultural hegemony and imperialist politics of the United States, and articles highlighting problems in German society caused by foreigners, generally with accompanying photographs depicting them in their native dress and often in unflattering situations. The parties have been unable to establish professional media machines for themselves, despite the media experience of key leaders in the radical right-wing parties in Germany such as Gerhard Frey, the wealthy Munich-based publisher and leader of the DVU since the time of its founding to the present, as well as the most widely recognized leader of the Republicans, Franz Schönhuber who had been a television personality in Bavaria before becoming a co-founder of the Republican party. The knowledge of media utilization and positioning would appear to be in place for these parties. A possible explanation for the lack of sophisticated publishing houses may be the heavy government scrutiny on the content of such publications and propaganda coming from the

128

●


Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Germany. The German parties run the risk of appearing too soft on issues and losing their support base if they attempt to appease federal officials monitoring them, or they may find themselves in jeopardy of proceedings brought against them to ban their parties if they express themselves openly and through inflammatory rhetoric that might mobilize their supporters. A new and more-innovative tool utilized by the German parties to get their message out to voters has been the Internet. The radical right has found a legal loophole in the World Wide Web, as the German government does not have jurisdiction over Internet servers located outside of Germany (Fromm and Kernbach 2001). In other words, the constitutional provisions in Germany that govern the democratic behavior of political parties and the civil law that guards against hate speech, Nazism, racism, and threats to social order do not cover Internet content when the websites are based on servers outside of Germany. This is why the websites operated by these parties do not have the suffix “.de” indicating a German-based server. Using the Internet, the radical right has been less constrained in recent years than ever before in postwar Germany to exercise free speech. The NPD monthly newspaper Deutsche Stimme explained the importance of the Internet as a tool in disseminating the message of the German opposition on the radical right: “In times of absolute media controls, the Internet is the last medium where freedom of information is truly guaranteed” (Deutsche Stimme, No. 9 Sept 2000). The article went on to say that an additional advantage of the Internet for opposition parties of the radical right is that it is a cost-effective way of reaching the masses. Other advantages include the ability to get the message out quickly and anonymously (Wetzel 2001, 135). Anonymity in the German case proves vital, as the stigma of the past and the negative stereotype of being under watch by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution may cause those who might otherwise be sympathizers to shy away from radical right-wing parties. To the extent that they can present their messages anonymously on the Internet, they stand to reach more people through their issue appeal. The overwhelming deficiencies of German radical right-wing parties, as well as the institutional constraints militating against them, preclude them from operating as professional political parties in a traditional sense. Their operations are disorganized and decentralized and they fail to produce policy-oriented propaganda and campaign materials. If they are to have expectations of becoming parties of government in the future, they have many changes to make in their party organizations. Yet, in a personal interview, the Berlin party leader for the Republican

German Parties

●

129

Party suggested to me that his party is well aware of its outsider status. When asked if it is a party of government, he responded: If you mean in administrative terms, then our goal is to come into the opposition role. There can one first prove what one can do. We think little of our chances to be able to take advantage of opportunities to get into government, as we must first clear the 5 percent threshold. But we can offer support for those who break off from the administration. The CDU and SPD are in decline and people do not relate to them anymore. But when Stoiber gets up and says he will bring change one can only laugh. Kohl had already talked of such a moral reversal when he came to power. But this never came to pass. You can see that today what the Pisa study indicates is that the renewal did not occur and instead a foreignization [Überfremdung] has resulted. (Tempel 2002)

Even the most professional of the radical right-wing parties in Germany recognizes that its role may be indefinitely confined to one of opposition. In sum, the German parties of the radical right have not displayed many features of professional political parties and as a consequence may more-closely approximate movement organizations rather than parties. Isolated Power Position In the postwar era, the German radical right-wing parties have ever had representation in the Bundestag. Their success had been confined to state legislatures. However, even at the state level of government, the parties have had success in only seven of the sixteen federal states over the last fifteen years (see table 6.1). During this time, the Republican Party has won the most seats, with forty seats in two state legislatures. The DVU has had broader support but with thirty seats, fewer comparatively in total. The Schill Party has not been discussed yet, but has been the most competitive radical right-wing party recently. This party won a remarkable twenty-five seats in its first state-level election in Hamburg. The party was founded in Hamburg by party leader Ronald Schill. Schill, a judge from Hamburg, created the party in response to what he observed to be a growing discomfort in the port city of Hamburg with a large population of foreigners. Schill’s party was presented to voters as a “new right” alternative party with no ties to the fascist past. It pledged to combat growing criminality and to strengthen law and order in society (Pötzl and Wassermann 2001, 52–53). Between 2001 and 2003, the Schill Party has found support in several other states surrounding Hamburg.

130

●


Table 6.1 Seats Won by Radical Right-Wing Parties in State Legislatures 1987–88 1989–90 1991

1992

1996

1998 1999

2001

Bavaria Berlin 11 (REP) Brandenburg 5 (DVU) Bremen 1 (DVU) 6 (DVU) 1 (DVU) Baden-Württemberg 15 (REP) 14 (REP) Hesse Hamburg 25 (Schill) Lower Saxony Mecklenburg-Vorpommern North Rhine Westphaila Rhineland-Palatinate Saarland Saxony Saxony-Anhalt 16 (DVU) Schleswig-Holstein 6 (DVU) Thüringen Source: Results compiled from state level statistical offices and http://www.election.de/.

Its second largest percentage came in Saxony-Anhalt in 2002 where it won 4.5 percent of the vote. The party won 1 and then 1.7 percent of the vote respectively in Lower Saxony and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Its most recent votes came in Hesse with 0.5 percent of the vote in early 2003. The Republicans had deputies in state legislatures three times in two different states located in two geographic poles of the country. The party won seats in Berlin one year prior to unification largely campaigning to bring unification and addressing the large population of immigrants and asylum seekers in Berlin due to its location as a gateway to the Federal Republic and West Germany. The other state where the Republicans have won seats in two elections during the period evaluated is BadenWürttemberg. This state is located in southwestern Germany and its largest city is Stuttgart, the home of the party leader after 1994, Rolf Schlierer. Southern Germany has provided the backbone of West German support for radical right-wing parties over the last several decades; therefore this state showing is not especially surprising. The DVU has found its success concentrated in the North German states. It has had its most consistent presence in the state legislature in Bremen. Bremen is a city-state in Lower Saxony located in close proximity to another city-state that has had recent radical right-wing party success, Hamburg. Roger Karapin explains the receptiveness to politics of the radical right and in particular the DVU in Bremen as a backlash

German Parties

●

131

against liberal asylum and immigrant politics of the left governments in this city-state (Karapin 2002, 202). He adds that the voters in Bremen viewed the DVU as the party more capable of dealing with foreigner problems than the mainstream parties. In other words, a lack of trust in mainstream parties in coping with this issue led to support for the DVU. Another key victory for the DVU came in the 1998 state elections in Saxony-Anhalt. This vote has also been dubbed a protest against mainstream parties and their apparent inability to handle problems associated with foreigners in this state (Karapin 2002, 210). Also credited for this unprecedented number of seats won by the DVU is the massive amount of money poured into the state election campaign by Gerhard Frey (Braunthal 1999, 158). Despite limited success at gaining initial access to the state legislatures, the mainstream parties remained united in their determination to block the radical right-wing parties from having an effect. Bundestag deputy from the CDU Hartmut Koschyk explains the logic of isolation and containment that his party uses in dealings with the radical right at various levels of government: There are always 2 or 3 percent of people among us who vote for these [radical] parties in elections. Those would be greater numbers except that these are undemocratic parties. But there are themes raised by these parties that get popular attention. When the immigration question is not resolved by the parties in parliament, then these [radical] parties pick up the issue and make it their own. The problem of the legislature becomes an advantage for those [radical] parties making them stronger. But if we solve the problem in parliament, then the people say we don’t need the NPD and others. Instead the parties [in government] get the job done fine. (Koschyk 2002)

As mainstream parties recognize the issue concerns that cause people to support the radical right-wing parties, they are able to take action to satisfy public concerns. Such preemptive action aims to take the underlying cause of radical right-wing appeal away. As the mainstream parties appear to be taking action on key issues, the radical right-wing parties lose their appeal as the “alternative” or the “viable opposition” that they draw upon as parties of protest. Limited Relationships with Other Parties German mass political parties recognized the potential for the immigration issue to become explosive early in the late 1970s. Because of their

132

●


history, they have been particularly sensitive on issues of German policy toward “outsiders” in their political community. So as public sentiment towards guest workers began to change in the late 1970s, the mainstream parties of the left and right responded proactively. They believed that if they could position themselves to contain the issue, they could limit the potential of the well-known latent xenophobic elements in German society. The mainstream parties have cyclically shifted their positions farther to the ideological right in attempts to preempt potential support for radical right-wing parties. It has been only when the mainstream has proven ineffective with their policy solutions that space for the radical right has opened briefly on the right-wing fringe. In Germany, mainstream parties began to tackle the asylum and immigration issues in the early 1980s, years before the entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties undertook their transformations toward entrepreneurial politics or were even founded in some cases. Immigration had not been a political issue at all in Germany through the middle 1970s. In fact, the Germans were passively accepting the Turkish guest workers living among them through the early 1970s. Of course, the expectation was that they would leave after their work in rebuilding postwar Germany was complete. During the 1950s and 1960s, the three key groups in German decision-making since the Second World War— business, labor, and government—were in agreement that immigrants were a positive element of German society, necessary to stimulating economic growth (Chapin 1997, 95). The pro-immigrant position shifted noticeably, however, with the onset of the global oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent economic downturn. As unemployment began to rise in Germany, rhetoric from the Social Democratic government, in coalition with its partners the Free Democrats, began to utilize the now familiar adage that Germany “is not a country of immigration” (Chapin 1997, 95). Yet, the language of the coalition government became increasingly cryptic on the subject of immigrants in the late 1970s as it expressed mutually exclusive propositions that Germany was not an immigrant country but still recognized the need for guest workers in the German economy for the foreseeable future (Katzenstein 1987). The asylum issue burst to the political forefront in 1980. The main cause for heightened attention was the fact that the number of asylum seekers coming to Germany more than doubled from 1979 to 1980, shooting upwards from 51,493 asylum seekers in 1979 to 107,818 in 1980 (Chapin 1997, 97). Rising xenophobia among the public during this time put pressure on governing parties to take action (Watts 1997, 13). The inconsistent policy of the SPD-FDP coalition faced increasing

German Parties

●

133

public dissatisfaction and demands for action. In 1980, the coalition appointed a committee to study the issue and to minimize the public concerns (Perlmutter 2002, 273). By 1980, the SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was talking of the importance of integrating Turkish guest workers while at the same time admitting that Germany had reached its limits in terms of bringing in future immigrants (Chapin 1997, 99). Chancellor Schmidt made a comment in 1980 that might be likened to the notorious “odors and noises” reference made by Jacques Chirac and recounted in chapter 5. Schmidt reportedly said, “It’s not easy for Germans who live in an apartment house and don’t like the smell of garlic to have to put up with it and even to have a lamb slaughtered in the hallway” (Martin and Miller 1990, 10). As the 1982 elections approached, the coalition admitted that some policy changes on asylum were needed. However, the proposals that they put forward were not as restrictive as those advocated by the CDU and CSU in opposition. As the results of the elections demonstrated, the public wanted the more-restrictive policy approach by the early 1980s. The tide had officially changed and Germany was anti-immigration by that point. The radical right-wing parties were not a political factor during this time. The existing party, the NPD, was in hibernation through the late 1970s, still reeling from its electoral decline in the 1960s. The DVU and Republicans had not yet been formed as political parties. So the debate was being structured by public opinion resulting from changing circumstances and the rhetoric and policy positions of the mainstream parties. The CDU-CSU and FDP coalition came to power in the 1983 general elections, ending the social-liberal coalition tenure in office, which had lasted from 1969–1982. Helmut Kohl became chancellor of the new government, having campaigned promising a Wende (turning-point) through not just economic growth but also “a profound political and cultural ‘reversal’ ” (Kitschelt 1995, 213). The renewal that Kohl promised to bring about included a coming to terms with the Second World War past, and a restoration of pride in being German. In his first address to the Bundestag upon becoming the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl declared that immigrants, guest-worker policy reform, and asylum were his top priorities (Katzenstein 1987, 248–251). By the 1980s, both the mainstream right and left parties had come to a consensus that immigration needed to be restricted. They disagreed about the specific policy details for action, yet they agreed that action needed to be taken. Even though the radical right-wing parties had not introduced the immigration issue and politicized it in Germany, they had their

134

●


opportunity to step in with solutions in the late 1980s. By that time, the vacuum anticipated by political parties theorist Otto Kirchheimer opened up space in the German political party spectrum (Kirchheimer 1966a, 1966b). The two mainstream parties had achieved consensus and converged in the center-right position on the political ideological spectrum, as the decision by both sides to restrict immigration moved them both to the right on that issue. The failure of the mainstream parties of the right and left to cope with the foreigner issue and the economic and social effects of heightened immigration opened issue space on the right fringe of the political spectrum. The radical right-wing parties experienced limited opportunities for success and influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s because they advocated radically more-restrictive policies than the mainstream parties and because they talked about threats to the German identity from foreigners, which still remained a subject that was taboo for mainstream elements. When the mainstream right acted decisively to pass comprehensive revisions to restrict the right to political asylum in Germany in 1993, the radical right challenge faded for several years from prominence. Leadership Challenges Gerard Braunthal has argued that the German radical right would be sitting in the Bundestag today if it had a “talented and charismatic” leader comparable to Jean-Marie Le Pen in France or Jörg Haider in Austria (Braunthal 1999, 159). He points to personal rivalries among radical right-wing elites in Germany and talks of “turf wars” among the existing parties and movements that preclude unity, coherence, and strength. The parties undermine themselves through their infighting, which could be resolved by the presence of a central, compelling leader who could bring them together. Party elites themselves seem to recognize their leadership shortcomings, yet they struggle to bring about changes. For example, the Republican Party leader Rolf Schlierer wanted to copy the party style of Haider in Austria when he took over as party leader in 1994 (Braunthal 1999, 155). However, he did not have the wherewithal to implement such a renewal. Overall, the leaders of the German radical right lack charisma, intellectualism, credibility, and professional party experience. The waves of parties rising and falling in prominence on the radical right wing suggest a dearth of leaders who can move the parties progressively forward. The leaders of the radical right come and go, often through internal power struggles. This would not be the case if any one

German Parties

●

135

of them could develop a broad base of support and build the parties to positions of strength. Such objective successes sustained over time would give them positions of power within their parties, as well as earning them some measure of outward status. Instead, radial right leaders, with the exception of the financier of the DVU Gerhard Frey, tend to come and go in the German parties. One reason for transitory leadership may be that these parties have not adopted the winning formula of populism. German radical rightwing party elites do not appear to construct their platforms or develop their strategies with the goal of mass appeal. Instead, they continue to talk about the same issues over time, most notably reviving German pride and identity. According to Paul Taggart, a simple rule of thumb for discerning whether or not a party has uncovered the winning formula of the entrepreneurial new right parties is whether or not the name of an individual leader comes to mind in association with the party name (Taggart 1995, 41). If it does not, Taggart suggests that party has not accomplished the “populist” objective. Populist parties persuade the public that their leaders understand popular concerns. German radical right-wing parties appear to lack such visionary leadership that would direct them to use the omnibus issue of immigration as a funnel for key problems causing public anxiety. The German parties have instead remained tied to clearing the names of Nazi war criminals, falsely claiming their own success for achieving unification in 1990, and agonizing about amorphous threats to the German identity. The Ill-Fitting General European Model of Influence The model generalized for radical right-wing party influence across Europe does not closely approximate the German case. Four criteria have been used to characterize that model as advanced in chapter 4. These are discussed further in this book. However, the purpose of this section is to develop an alternative model to the omnibus immigrationissue funnel for the German case. The German case demonstrates a lack of the criteria evident in the winning formula for radical right-wing party appeal. Yet, it would be an error to dismiss German radical rightwing parties as irrelevant. Even though they did not introduce the immigration issue to the political debates in the last two or three decades, their presence has changed the progress of that debate. Where the mainstream left and right parties reached a right-of-center consensus to limit immigration, the radical right influenced the policy outcome to the

136

●


extent that it emerged as far more restrictive than would have otherwise been the case. Despite the fact that these parties lack organizational features, leadership, and strategies to be considered entrepreneurs, their intermittent presence has contributed to stirring the underlying xenophobia and resentment latent in the German population. These sentiments are not new in Germany, but they had long been repressed. The radical rightwing agitation contributed to opening the lid on Nazi revisionist debates and the German pride and identity questions that had been long tabooed and repressed. This is not the typical path for radical right-wing party influence and it does not fit the model. As a result, the German radical right has not been as influential as its better organized and entrepreneurial counterparts. Yet, it has been an unmistakable part of shaping the discourse. Creating Influence Leading German scholar of the radical right from the University of Cologne Wilhelm Heitmeyer contributed the following warning regarding the influence of the radical right wing at a conference convened by the Minister President of North Rhine Westphalia in Düsseldorf during the August of 2000 to discuss their effects: It is crucial to turn one’s attention to the middle of society, because it is there that problems arise which have the potential effect to manifest themselves in people-despising violence from the right-extreme fringe. (Heitmeyer 2000, quoted in Butterwegge and Häusler 2001, 3)

He was suggesting a need to monitor the middle class, the heart of German society, to get in touch with the thoughts of average people on the immigration issue. The freeze in public discussion and education about the Third Reich following the Second World War had persisted for over twenty-five years before it came to a crisis point in the late 1970s. Alfred Dregger, a CDU leader in parliament urged that West Germany “step out of Adolf Hitler’s shadow,” and CSU party leader and Bavarian Prime Minister Franz-Josef Strauss adviced, “We must step out of Adolf Hitler’s poisonous atmosphere. We must once again become a people that does not walk with the stoop of a convict of world history but with the upright stride of confident citizens who are proud to be German” (Schmidt 1993, 122). It was in this atmosphere that the

German Parties

●

137

government promising the Wende under Chancellor Kohl got underway in the early 1980s. Immigration had not been a postwar political issue in Germany before the economic downturn of the 1970s. It had not been politicized prior to that time, and did not become politicized until popular sentiment changed and mainstream political parties adopted it (Chapin 1997, 55; Messina 1990, 33). Yet once the issue became political in Germany, it revived a number of quiescent prejudices and xenophobic feelings latent among many who had supported the position taken by Hitler against foreigners and “outsiders” to the German ethnic community. While Hitler and his ethnic cleansing had become clearly a wrong of history for most Germans, the idea of a German community based on blood ties was not so far-fetched. In fact many Germans felt a part of such a community based on their lineage. The fact that German citizenship law in the postwar era continued to be based on such delineation only legitimized this position. Even though the German radical right-wing parties do not deserve the credit for implanting such ideas in the minds of Germans, they played a role in rabble-rousing support for highly restrictive policy changes to asylum law and immigration practices. Opinion poll results suggest that the radical right-wing parties received protest votes out of frustration when the performance of the mainstream parties on the foreigner issue was judged to be unsatisfactory (Karapin 2002, 204). This was exactly as they had planned, that by using social movement tactics they might point to the deficiencies of established parties and bring attention to their cause. Frank Schwerdt, NPD party leader at the Berlin headquarters, suggested that their tactics aim at taking the message to the streets in order to stir frustrated people to react to their message: We have particular influence over people who are not loyal members of political parties, the undecided or nonaligned. Through demonstrations and other activities we can influence them. (Schwerdt 2002)

Because the radical right-wing parties make identity politics their central focus, voters either trust them to handle the foreigner issue when the mainstream parties fail or view them as a legitimate receptacle of a protest vote, intended to send a message to the mainstream parties (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993). An interaction effect of both of these explanations may more likely explain support for the radical right wing. Latent xenophobia exists in Germany and it is nothing new. While the

138

●


radical right-wing parties did not implant it, they add the dimension of identity threats to the rhetoric of the debate and arguably intensify public concerns. Backsliding to a Fascist Legacy Type As argued above, the German radical right-wing parties knew in 1964 when the NPD was founded that they needed to get away from the legacy of Nazism. Republican Party leaders Schönhuber and Schlierer have both expressed the need to craft careful party platforms and language, the latter even suggesting the Freedom Party in Austria as a model of how radical right-wing interests can work together through mainstream politics to accomplish their objectives. However, the parties proved vulnerable to retreating to their roots and recruiting neo-Nazis within a matter of years after they gained some measure of political support. The DVU-Liste D intentionally positioned itself in its most successful state election in Saxony-Anhalt in 1998 as the party offering solutions to social problems such as unemployment and criminality. For a short time, it adopted the winning formula of entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties, in taking pressing contemporary issues and offering solutions to them consistent with the party’s anti-immigrant position (Karapin 2002, 211). It was successful at blaming foreigners for pressing problems. Yet, the DVU-Liste D campaign in Saxony-Anhalt encouraged voters to cast their votes to express frustration with the mainstream parties, rather than as votes of confidence in the platform of the radical right. One of its main slogans was “this time make it a protest vote” and the party appeared to hope merely to repeat the cycle of past radical right-wing parties in Germany of short-lived bursts of success followed by decline as the mainstream parties got the message. The DVU did not appear to be in this for the long term, and voters probably recognized that. The evidence about the backsliding potential of the Schill Party remains inconclusive at this point. I classified this party as a bandwagoner in chapter 4. It has avoided the identity-based politics stance taken by the other three radical right-wing parties under scrutiny in this chapter. It appears to resemble the Dutch, Danish, and Scandinavian racial rightwing parties in that it formulates its position almost exclusively around the economic or resource-based criticism of continued immigration to Western Europe. Whether or not such a position can be maintained in Germany over time remains to be seen; at present the party has just over

German Parties

●

139

two years of experience as a political party. Skeptics might argue that the unique German political culture surrounding the definition of citizenship as a race community precludes even the best attempts at rhetorical distance from such themes as time progresses. This remains to be seen. Reinvention of the German Radical Right My position is that the German parties have proven unable to reinvent themselves apart from their fascist legacy. The parties put together only unstable, heterogeneous bases of popular support when they are able to increase their popular levels of support at all (Watts 1997, 41). As discussed above, the parties typically face decision points where they are forced to choose between moderate, new right politics and radicalization to avoid losing their traditional base of support. As supported by evidence already presented in this chapter, these crises have tended to produce a radicalization response and a return to recruitment from militant subcultural groups, as well as a rhetorical and strategic shift farther to the right. As they do this, the far right parties become increasingly inflammatory and often become flagged for watch by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The cycle has proven difficult to break out of so far. Climate of Fear German radical right-wing parties deserve the most credit for their ability to bring the focus of immigration debates back around to identity politics. The mainstream parties appear to shift to the right in response to public sentiment about real problems facing Germany. In addition, as they do so they spout rhetoric that sounds remarkably like that used by the radical right wing. They are careful not to cross lines of political acceptability and democratic limits, yet government officials debate whether the country is or is not a country of immigrants. In other countries, the mainstream tends to agree that they must have immigrants and the debate revolves around policy details of integrating them. In personal interviews I asked politicians and party officials throughout Germany about comments made in early 2002 by Johannes Rau, the German President. Rau had remarked that “Germany has had immigrants, has them now, and will continue to have them in the future. Whoever comes to us should belong and also feel as though they belong” (Tagesspiegel 2002). However, respondents varied in terms of their affirmation of such a statement. A CDU deputy, Ursula Heinen, suggests

140

●


that Germany must learn to cope with immigrants but that it has a long way to go before it achieves “belonging”: The third generation of Turks lives in Germany today. We invited the first generation to come as workers. Many from the first generation stayed to take advantage of possibilities here and their children were born here and have become integrated. The next generations continue to be better integrated than their parents. However, some challenges include language barriers. The Turks often speak poor German. This is problematic in the schools. We have more criminality. In total the Turks in Germany have become more accepted but it takes time and changes must be made. (Heinen 2002)

Several members of parliament are second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants. One of those, SPD deputy Sebastian Edathy, believes that Turks have opportunities in Germany but that there are still many prejudices that must be overcome. He traces much of the difficulty of integrating immigrants to the German citizenship law basing citizenship on blood ties to the community. A sociologist prior to joining the Bundestag, he has done extensive research on the topic and even published a book about the way that parliament has handled the citizenship issue from 1870–1999 (Edathy 2000). Edathy suggests that parties of the radical right wing feed upon stereotypes of foreigners and prejudices that are deeply rooted in the German identity as defined in its citizenship law. He suggests that to overcome such embedded identity issues of “us” versus “them” a re-education process must occur and the results will come only over time: We cannot go around banning parties [referring to recent proceedings brought against the NPD]. That is not a solution. We must prevent this type of sentiment from arising. Beginning in the schools, for instance, with education regarding tolerance. (Edathy 2002)

The suggestion from most of those that I talked with regarding German multiculturalism is that it will not come easily and without enormous efforts to reform German political culture. Most agree that Germany was not established as a country with immigrants and over time the dividing lines between the native community and outsiders became increasingly solidified both through laws and practices. The change must come in people’s perceptions of foreigners, but most agree that government and political parties have a role to play in shaping this process and leading the change.

German Parties

●

141

Residual prejudice combined with physical conditions has moved the foreigner issue to crisis points in Germany over the past decade or more. The asylum issue was not simply a German overreaction to a problem confronting all states in Western Europe, as might be assumed based on Germany’s history and reputation for intolerance. For example, Germany absorbed 79 percent of the asylum seekers coming into Western Europe in 1992 (Heneghan 2000, 94). It has borne a heavy burden due to the combination of its geographic location as the gateway to Western Europe and its most liberal asylum policy up until the changes of 1993 restrictions. Asylum problems are a real and present danger for Germany (Chapin 1997, ch. 5). Yet when coupled with an ongoing question “Who belongs to the German society?,” the results became explosive. Key political debates over immigration during the last twenty years in Germany have involved confounding issues such as German pride and the German identity. Even in recent years, prominent leaders of both the left and the right wing have entered the fray taking sides on the issue. The consensus tends to support traditional and relatively comparative notions of what it means to be German. For instance, President Rau, in attempts to tone down the debate, suggested in a television interview that Germans should be “glad” or “thankful” to be German but suggested that “pride” was perhaps not the best portrayal (Cohen 2001). Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder placed himself on the side of German pride calling himself “a German patriot, who is proud of his country” (Cohen 2001). The importance of pride was also confirmed by Angela Merkel, leader of the opposition CDU party in the Bundestag, who said “only when we can speak again of a concept like the German Fatherland in an uncritical way are we going to be taken seriously by our international partners” (Cohen 2000b). The fact that the debate on immigration has come down to a perceived threat to German identity and revived the historians’ debate or historikerstreit about pride in being German indicates a measure of success for the radical right wing. An SPD deputy to the German Bundestag explained the manipulation of identity threats as follows: The radical parties use these themes to generate fear among the population. This is a problem and the SPD and FDP and others agree that this is happening. They pass blame for criminality, no job, no apartment. The fear is indoctrinated in this way and that can not stand! They claim that the German identity is in danger. (Reuter 2002)

The radical right has concerned itself primarily with German identity often to the neglect of more-pressing issues. It set for itself the purpose

142

●


of reminding people about the Holocaust and the irrationality of the taboo placed on German identity and pride by an external international community. These themes play uniquely prominent roles in the German discussion of foreigners and the political community. Daniella Zehentner of the FDP explains how radical right parties use the foreigner question to generate frustration and fears: Just yesterday we had the Remembrance Day for Jewish victims of the Second World War and the flags were posted. There is always something to remind us. I think the young people are fed up with this. They had nothing to do with it. This feeling of being a victim or being penalized as the bad ones—it is constantly being brought up and I think people are a little fed up with it. So I think we are coming to a point where we have to be careful what is happening. And if successive right-wing parties are not able to fill this gap we will have more and more new parties dropping into the far right or left hand corners. (Zehentner 2002)

Where distinctions can be made between resource-based immigration arguments and identity-based ones (see for instance Gibson 2002), the Germans have taken the identity-based path. This does not appear compatible with the entrepreneurial radical right-wing winning formula, and yet the German parties appear to have had some measure of influence on German politics despite their deviation from the tried and tested path of recently successful radical right-wing parties across Europe. Analysis of the Impact of the German Radical Right Agenda-setting Media coverage of the immigration issue serves as an indicator of the influence of radical right-wing parties on the agenda-setting level because it reveals the issue’s mass appeal. The Frankfurter Allgemeine, a mainstream daily German newspaper with national distribution, was selected for the analysis. Articles were collected on the subject of immigration beginning in 1993.3 The data was organized to reflect monthly counts and annual counts of articles through July 15, 2002. By shaping the discussion on immigration and by agitating to keep the issue high profile, the radical right-wing parties secure a measure of success. Unlike the French case, in Germany the media measure proves more complicated and less reliable. This is because the mainstream parties had

German Parties

●

143

arrived at consensus to restrict immigration in the early 1980s and again in 1992 and therefore the issue was also centrally important to them. Therefore, much initiative in the German case has come from mainstream parties supplanted by the radical right wing. While this complicates the clarity of results, the findings must be understood through the context of the case-study analysis presented above, which indicates that the radical right wing played a role in directing the rhetoric on the issue toward identity politics rather than economic aspects of immigration. Therefore, as the issue became increasingly pervasive in the media, the case-study analysis suggests that it was presented with a slant toward identity politics and this direction came largely from propaganda put forth by radical right-wing parties. The newspaper article counts in Germany show an overall pattern of increasing attention, although generally incremental rather than of dramatic increases. A tent pattern of increases and decreases emerges in figure 6.1, where the year of decrease following a year of increase almost always returns to the level prior to the increase. Therefore, between the years 1993 and 1999 where this pattern repeats, there are boundaries containing the modest amounts of increase and decrease. No radical changes appear to be occurring with the exception of the years 2000 and 2001 with 716 and 822 articles respectively. Prior to that time the range 900


800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 6.1

Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issue 1990–2002

Note: Figures reflecting media coverage for 2002 represent only results of data collected through July of 2002. The 2002 figure is significantly higher. Source: Articles collected from Frankfurter Allgemeine.

144

●


had been from 433 to 215. Peak volume periods occur in Germany over two years in 2000 and 2001. Although the data for 2002 only counts newspaper articles through July 15, the evident trend suggests that 2002 will also be a peak year when volume totals can be assessed. The German peak in 2000–2001 may be traced to several factors occurring in society at that time. There is no doubt that immigration was a hotly contested issue in Germany during these two years. Hate crimes were persistent, and calls for a stronger government response increased. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer expressed pessimism about the eradication of far rightist violence in eastern Germany, saying that it would take more than a generation to overcome wounds in an area that remains in the “twilight zone” between democratic and authoritarian traditions (Cohen 2000a). Fischer went on to point out that the problem is widespread, however, and not confined to the states of the former East Germany. The mainstream right, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) experienced devastating scandals resulting in the discrediting of Helmut Kohl and his leadership of Germany through much of the 1990s. The Socialist-led government discussed proceedings to ban the far right-wing party the NPD for neo-Nazi and unconstitutional activity. Political debates continued over the impending shortage of technical workers forecast for Germany and the society’s reservations about being or becoming a multicultural society. Table 6.2 displays headlines that capture many of these events and reveal important happenings during those years. Perhaps the most important policy measure of the year 2000 was the Green Card bill. Harianto Wijaya, an Indonesian man who had studied in Germany, became the recipient of the first German Green Card allowing him to continue to live and work in Germany. He is a software engineer (Stern 2000).

Table 6.2 Key German Events of 2000–2001 Jan. 19, 2000 July 29, 2000 Aug. 21, 2000 Oct. 5, 2000 Dec. 4, 2000 Sept. 24, 2001 Nov. 8, 2001

Kohl Resigns German Party Post After He Is Rebuked for Scandal Germans Say Nine Wounded By Bomb Were Immigrants Most Recent Killing May Push Germans to Act on Hate Crime Germany Marks a Decade of Unity Is Germany on the Road to Diversity? The Parties Clash Rightist Judge Shows Strongly In Hamburg German Cabinet Supports New Immigration Laws

Source: Headlines taken from the New York Times.

German Parties

●

145

900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

Articles

A relationship becomes evident in figure 6.2 between administrations in office and media coverage of the immigration issue. One correlation with the dramatic increase in newspaper coverage and popular debate over the immigration issue is that it occurs as the mainstream right government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl that governed from 1982–1998 leaves office and is replaced by a Socialist-led government. In 1998, the administration of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took office Schöeder’s left-of-center government held power as the immigration debate heated up and a large increase in publicity on the issue occurred. The radical right-wing parties did not significantly increase their electoral potential or state-level seats in government during this period of 2000–2001. However, three years prior to the increase in media attention, radical right-wing parties made an important change that may have had some effect. In 1996, two radical right-wing parties, the Republicans and NPD, launched their first Internet sites with intentions of increasing their reach to more people (Fromm and Kernbach 2001, 14). As audiences found the radical right message of identity politics on the World Wide Web it is possible that this new propaganda tool influenced changes in public opinion on the issue prompting the sharp increase in media attention observed.

Years Legend solid = CDU-led, stripes = SPD-led Figure 6.2

Variance in News Coverage between CDU and SPD Administrations

Note: Figures through July of 2002 only. Source: Articles collected from Frankfurter Allgemeine. Pattern highlights the regime change to government under the SPD and Chancellor Schröder after the departure from office of CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

146

●


Already, in 1997 Gerhard Schröder bowed to public-opinion pressure calling for restrictions on the immigrant threat. During a campaign stop, he proclaimed, “whoever abuses our guest worker policy will find himself with only one option—to get out and indeed quickly!” (Butterwegge and Häusler 2001, 30). Through the campaign leading to the 1998 national legislative elections, it became clear that the immigration issue had become politicized as an identity threat issue and some credit for that goes to the radical right-wing parties (Butterwegge and Häusler 2001, 27). The context was that immigration must be stopped in order to preserve German identity, and migration had become an abstract concept synonymous with threat or Überfremdung, literally being overtaken by foreigners (Butterwegge and Häusler 2001, 27). The massive propaganda campaign by the DVU in the 1998 state elections in Saxony-Anhalt, where they won nearly 13 percent of the popular vote and 16 seats by “making it a protest vote” (Karapin 2002, 211), apparently sent the proper signal to those in power to make immigration their campaign issue. Meredith Watts used an analogy regarding the radical right movement’s attacks on foreigners in Rostock in 1992 saying that it sent government officials a “yellow card,” referring to a warning signal in soccer (Watts 1997, 35). This analogy seems appropriate as well in describing the role played by radical right-wing parties in the latter half of the 1990s; they were agitating on identity politics and placing the issue into the forefront of public campaigns and debates so that government officials found themselves on warning to deal with the issue decisively or face popular removal in the elections of 1998 and then 2002. Institutional-shaping The way German radical right-wing parties affect other parties in the political party system provides an indication of their institutional impact. German parties did not have opportunities to cooperate in joint lists or coalition government with mainstream right parties at even the local level, in contrast to the French case where this was an important building block to broader influence. The German parties have lacked the professionalism and elite experience necessary to accomplish their objectives in state legislatures, and therefore their initiatives there have proven largely unsuccessful. They have not been able to build alliances with other parties and have remained largely isolated in government. Additionally, the mainstream parties were responding to the immigration issue long before the radical right made it their priority. If anything,

German Parties

●

147

the radical right copied the mainstream parties on this appeal for more restrictiveness. However, despite all of these hindrances to impact, the German radical right influenced the language adopted by other parties in dealing with the issue. Additionally, they may have prompted mainstream parties to position themselves farther to the right on the issue in attempts to contain the radical right. Isolation on the Fringe With seats in state legislatures, the radical right-wing would have seemingly had its first opportunity to influence politics directly. However, without political experience, strong guidance, and consistent policy orchestrated at the national-level party offices, radical right-wing deputies struggled and failed in state office. They did not do the research on bills or have the staff support to present comprehensive legislative initiatives on issues of key concern to the party. The most notable DVU-Liste D initiative called for increased security on German trains (Minkenberg 1998, 14). The deputies from the DVU-Liste D gaining entry to the parliaments of Saxony-Anhalt in 1998 and in Brandenburg in 1999 were equally ineffective and nonproductive. In Saxony-Anhalt, state deputies did not introduce any legislation between 1998 and 2001. In Brandenburg, two bills were introduced but dealt with issues such as the status and salary of civil servants, which were peripheral to the core platform of the party (Minkenberg 2001, 11). In Baden-Württemberg, the Republican Party concentrated its work in the state legislature on “law and order, foreigners, education and traffic.” Their two bill introductions focused on the status of civil servants and a pro-family amendment to the state constitution (Minkenberg 2001, 11). In addition to a lack of technical expertise, the parties proved internally divided in state legislatures. The deputies sitting together in the legislature often fought with each other over their positions. As one scholar describes it, the radical right-wing deputies were so “preoccupied with preventing the breakup of their parliamentary groups” that they proved ineffective at accomplishing the business of introducing initiatives and arguing their case (Minkenberg 1998, 14). They wasted their opportunity to directly affect legislative debates by fighting among themselves. If they had stronger leadership through the ranks of their party elites, such debates would be settled outside of the legislature whenever possible. Yet as they lacked such leadership, the deputies were left to muddle along ineffectively in the state legislatures.

148

●


Containment by the Mainstream Even at the height of third-wave radical right-wing agitating in 1989, the mainstream parties continued to forbid alliances with the fringe parties at all levels even if this meant electoral sacrifices (Veen, Lepszy, and Mnich 1993, 5). The strategy of the Kohl government had been to co-opt support for the radical right-wing parties by positioning itself far enough to the right so that it attracted fringe sympathizers (Perlmutter 2002, 274–275). The mainstream right was well aware of popular sentiment that provided a foundation for favorable opportunity structures on the far right wing of politics. They were aware of studies of popular opinion from the late 1970s and in the 1980s that showed a propensity for people to relate to the identity-based arguments directed against foreigners in Germany. They also recognized that increasingly people appeared ready to discuss and address the taboos of the collective German memory after the Second World War (Schmid 1996, 73). In addition, polls taken over the course of the 1980s showed that 25 to 80 percent of Germans blamed foreigners for taking jobs away from Germans (Chapin 1997, 57). Such compelling evidence did not go unnoticed by mainstream politicians of both the left and the right. Given the data before them, mainstream politicians made the decision to block radical right-wing party support on the foreigner issue by making it central in their own platforms. The CDU and CSU were prepared to move their positions far to the right to block the radical right in the mid-to-late 1980s. Chancellor Kohl reportedly justified such a move saying that if asylum were to become an electoral issue then “ghosts could be raised that could not be controlled” (Perlmutter 2002, 276). In other words, the taboo issues contained after the Second World War were likely to burst back onto the scene invoking sentiments that could easily spiral beyond those acceptable in the democratic order if the foreigner issue were permitted to be politicized by the radical right. He saw an urgent need to act to position the mainstream, which had legitimacy and was therefore better equipped to handle the issue through normal democratic procedures, to take the momentum away from the radical right wing. This strategy of toughness on the issue played through the media and public opinion well until the failure to follow through on promises associated with the German Wende provided an opening for the third wave of the radical right to exert itself as a protest to the mainstream inaction in the late 1980s. Yet, that move on the part of the Kohl government satisfied a public that might have otherwise placed its trust in the radical right parties on this issue as it became

German Parties

●

149

increasingly contentious throughout the 1980s. Instead, the radical right parties became a reservoir of the protest vote with only short-lived spurts tempered by mainstream party activity on the issue. In sum, to have ignored the issue would have been suicidal for the mainstream parties, and by acting they weakened the radical right’s power. Identity Politics Prevails From the 1982 Wende instituted by the Kohl government, to the debate over German pride recurring in the final years of the twentieth century, Germans have been searching for their postwar identity for more than twenty years now. Mainstream political parties and heads of government could not avoid joining the discussions as they were not going to simply go away if left undisturbed. Collective memory was emerging from the taboos and its period of silence due to pressures from a public who wanted to talk about it. The future on this subject would be shaped by those who took on the issue and shaped it their way at this opportune time. As Michael Stürmer, historian and advisor to Chancellor Kohl, commented in a 1985 article appearing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, “in a land without history, the future is won by those who supply memory, shape concepts and interpret the past” (Stürmer 1985). The Kohl government followed this advice. The SPD joined the side of sharp restrictions on asylum seekers, moving its position decidedly to the right in 1992 as well. By the time Chancellor Schröder weighed in to discuss his commitment to German pride in 2001, the direction of the course of the foreigner debate in Germany had long been set. It had proceeded as a matter of German identity in the face of Überfremdung or “being taken over by foreigners” (Butterwegge and Häusler 2001). Policy-making Examination of legislative initiatives on the immigration issue exposes the limited efficacy of the German radical right-wing parties in affecting government policy. The analysis includes laws, decrees, policy statements, and other official-position statements coming from the federal parliament, the Bundestag, during the period investigated from 1990 through the July of 2002. German legislative-activity counts were obtained through searching by subject in the Parliamentary Documentation, a legislative journal archive (Parlamentsdokumentation, DIP). The underlying assumption of using initiatives as an indicator of peripheral party impact on policy is that government activity reacts to the radical

150


●

right-wing pressure to make immigration a central political issue either by curbing immigration or by lightening immigration restrictions. Using a method already employed in similar studies, such as those counting environmental legislation as an indicator of the success of green parties and movements, this study counts immigration legislation as a measure of right-wing radical success. The peak for German legislative activity on immigration came in the year 2000. This corresponds with the German peak in newspaper coverage of immigration in 2000–2001. The explanations presented in the analysis of agenda-setting impact above apply here, as the same years appear to be the most important for immigration initiatives as for newspaper articles. Most notably the Green Card legislation, as well as discussions in political circles regarding Germany as a multicultural society promoting deeper integration of foreigners stirred action in parliament. Other factors mentioned above, such as increases in hate crimes, violence in the new states of the East, trials of neo-Nazi youths, and action to ban the NPD also contributed to pressure on the government to take legislative action. Germany displays a rapid increase to relatively high levels of legislative activity in 1997. However, by 1998 the activity decreases markedly only to begin a rebound in 1999 to higher levels in 2000–2001 (figure 6.3).


25

20

15

10

5

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 6.3

Legislative Volume on Immigration 1990–2002

Note: Figures reflect results of data collected through July of 2002. The 2002 figure is likely higher. Source: Legislative initiatives collected from the Parlamentsdokumentation, DIP archives of the German Bundestag.

German Parties

●

151

This jump in the number of initiatives in 1997 suggests a last attempt on the part of the Kohl government to hold on to its precarious power position approaching national elections in 1998. It appears likely that the Kohl government anticipated the strategy of the SPD on the foreigner issue, which was to adopt it and promise to tighten immigration restrictions, in the year prior to the campaign. As cited above, the SPD campaign included rhetoric suggesting that it would evict any foreign workers found contributing to criminality or not abiding by the terms of their guest worker status (Butterwegge and Häusler 2001, 30). Given such tough talking by the SPD in 1997, it seems likely that the CDU-led government responded in kind by attempting to prove itself as the party most capable of bringing action on the immigration issue through its many legislative initiatives during 1997. The radical right-wing parties kept the pressure on the mainstream over the course of the period under investigation. They surprised many observers with their electoral victories to win state-level seats in Berlin, Bremen, and Baden-Württemburg between 1989 and 1992. Although right-wing radical parties were widely considered illegitimate parties or at least not parties of government (Watts 1997, 36), these parties represented the popular disaffection with mainstream parties as they won intermittent support. A public opinion survey in June of 1989 showed that nearly 20 percent of respondents credited the Republican Party with raising issues that would not otherwise be raised by mainstream parties (Chapin 1997, 58). Yet, the policy results were produced largely by the mainstream parties in reaction to some radical right-wing agitation. The fact that the mainstream parties were concerned about the issue in the late 1970s suggests that action would have been taken regardless of the presence of the radical right-wing parties. Still, what can probably be extrapolated is that the radical right-wing played a role in shaping the way that policy was worded with harsher language directed at the foreign population. Conclusion The German radical right-wing parties draw on unique features of German history to influence the shape of the immigration debate. However, the debate itself is waged through the initiative of the mainstream parties. They were the first to bring the issue into political debate, and they focus efforts to try and preclude the issue from being manipulated by the radical right. The German radical right has had limited success at drawing upon the identity-based arguments against

152

●


immigrants in Germany. This book argues that this fascist-legacy type of radical right-wing party should be less successful than its entrepreneurial counterparts in mobilizing popular attention and in accomplishing political objectives. The German case does not demonstrate particularly effective radical right-wing parties. Instead, the German parties prove weak on the indicators described in this chapter for radical right-wing party impact. The German case necessarily involves the complexity of its past in discussions of foreigners and their status in Germany. However, the mainstream parties in Germany have effectively been the champions of restricting foreigners and reclaiming German national pride, leaving little room for such discourse on the radical right wing. Although they are careful, mainstream parties address identity-based concerns regarding foreigners. This has allowed only limited and temporary radical right-wing party opportunities. Also contributing to their marginal status, the German radical right-wing parties do not exhibit many qualities that might contribute to their success. The argument could be made that the German radical right-wing would be more successful if it were to adopt the winning formula of populist appeals utilized by the entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties throughout Western Europe. For this to occur, however, the German radical right would first have to establish itself as a professional political party. For many reasons discussed in this chapter, including factions and a decentralized organization, lack of leadership, and the absence of an intellectual connection to New Right think-tanks and elites, the German radical right-wing would need to undertake a major renovation to move in this direction. It also would need to take issue space and members away from the mainstream parties, where moderate strategies for dealing with foreigners as well as answers to questions of restoring German identity have been developed. These complicating barriers both institutional and based on political culture have so far proved insurmountable. Instead, the radical right-wing parties have had their instances of success through the more-fascist-legacy style of party approach. Whether or not the structural constraints are so firmly entrenched that they cannot be overcome remains to be seen. But in the very least, these parties must overcome their organizational deficiencies if they are to pose any challenge in the future.

CHAPTER 7

The FPÖ Finds a Winning Combination in Leadership and the Third Lager

The Austrian Freedom party took the lessons of Le Pen and the National Front from the 1980s and transformed them into its own unique brand of Austrian right-wing radicalism in the 1990s. The Freedom Party (FPÖ) had the unique context of a deteriorating consociational relationship based on corporatism, proportional allocation of civil service jobs (Proporz), and grand coalition government. Three established political cleavages or “camps” (Lager) have persisted in Austria throughout the twentieth century, namely socialists, Catholic conservatives, and nationalists. The FPÖ emerged out of the nationalist cleavage. These institutional structures have remained highly stable into the 1980s and provide both constraints and opportunities for the radical right in Austria. The FPÖ has been able to take advantage of an existing national consciousness imbued with overt racism that was never reformed following its zenith in the period surrounding the Second World War. The party has capitalized upon favorable political and social conditions during their development and consolidation phases. This chapter examines the impact of the Austrian radical right-wing party, using evidence from personal interviews, documentary sources, archival research, and secondary source material. First, the propositions from chapter 3 are evaluated for their explanatory power in the Austrian case. Second, the model developed in chapter 4 for cross-national radical right-wing party influence is applied to the Austrian case to determine how well it

154

●


accounts for Austrian radical right-wing influence. Finally, data will be employed in order to measure the impact of the Austrian radical right on three levels of impact: agenda, institutions, and policy. The Freedom Party Made the Most of Its Circumstances The Freedom Party did not have to create an issue to propel it to prominence. Instead, it surged to distinction through the tactical ingenuity of a visionary leader. Jörg Haider, leader of the Freedom Party (either overtly or surreptitiously) from 1984 to April of 2005, correctly assessed the potential for exploitation of existing xenophobia among the Austrian population. He made a key strategic decision to frame his party as the long overdue liberators of postwar Austria, promising to return the country to its roots by bringing the discussion of Austrian identity to the political agenda. Haider recognized that a vacuum existed in the collective national psyche, which had never come to terms with its culpability in the ethnic cleansing of the Second World War. Austria had been permitted and even encouraged by the Allies to take on the guise of victimization at the hands of Hitler and Nazi Germany in the Second World War. The country was not forced to make reparations or issue internationally broadcast public apologies after the war. Neither its population nor its complicit officials were made to suffer the fate of war tribunals as the Germans were. Instead, the Allies allowed Austria to take on a new identity following the Second World War. Rather than admit its guilt in the mass murder of millions of Jews and other minority groups in the Holocaust, Austria claimed to be Hitler’s first victim. Austria reinvented itself as the country where the “hills are alive— with the Sound of Music” as represented by dirndls, beer tents, ski slopes, and Mozart; it intentionally distanced itself from images of swastikas, Nazis, and militants. This arrangement enabled Austria to escape the harsh penalties and outside administration by foreign governments that the Germans experienced. Austria adopted a new image and ensured the Allies that it had every intention of living up to that image. Through the State Treaty and Declaration of Permanent Neutrality in 1955, Austria regained its independence and declared its neutrality (Kramer 1996, 153), one measure demonstrating its commitment to policing its own behavior. A consociational governing arrangement was instituted providing for power sharing between the mainstream left and right parties, which included provisions for a grand coalition, a social partnership extending political partisanship into private business and

The FPÖ

●

155

social life (pillarization), and cooperation between various interest groups in society on matters of government policy. This provided for a pervasive institutionalized consensus and guaranteed that radical parties could not come to power in postwar Austria. These measures alleviated the anxieties of the Allies, who were much more preoccupied with reforming Germany. As a result, Austria has never de-Nazified. Instead it simply stopped talking it. Given these circumstances, it does not seem surprising that xenophobia and racism have persisted in the Austrian population, despite the institutional measures to contain nationalist sentiments keeping them from becoming too powerful. Jörg Haider appears to have capitalized upon persistent Austrian racism. He correctly appraised a political climate needing to reconstruct its true national identity. He recognized popular frustration with the Proporz system, governmental corruption, and patronage, which permitted the two mainstream parties to act as an untouchable elite invulnerable to opposition or challenge. Perhaps most importantly, he saw that power in Austria originates with people, despite their institutional disenfranchisement under the consensus government. He structured the strategy of his party to take advantage of such frustration and to fill a void in the political system, where voices of opposition had long been left out of the consensus arrangement. In the Austrian case, the people had lost touch with themselves through the process of burying their past and looking forward without ever dealing with bygone events. They found themselves in a repressive environment without a voice to express themselves. Given such a milieu, the person or party that could liberate the Austrian people and restore their national identity stood to gain their allegiance and support. Haider always intended to be that person. He explains: Whoever exercises a decisive influence on the consciousness of people has power. It is a question of the cultural hegemony in our society. This does not have to be exercise by those who have power in the socio-economic field. In modern mass society, culture has completely detached itself from the social order. (Haider 1993; Haider 1995, 21)

In his quest for power, Haider intuited that the consensus government had lost its mandate—that the population’s passive acceptance was waning leaving a political void. Haider determined to fill that void by positioning himself as a man of the people, articulating their frustration and asserting their identity.

156

●


Journey of a Party from Nazis, to Liberals, to New Right Populism The victorious powers in the Second World War licensed only two parties in 1945, the mainstream left Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Christian Democrats later renamed the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). In 1949, the Allies licensed a third party called the League of Independents (VdU). These three parties officially composed the three Lager or “camps” representative of divisions in Austrian politics after the Second World War (Pelinka and Rosenberger 2000, 136). The first camp included the socialists, the second camp was composed of the Catholic conservatives, and the third camp originally represented a voice for the general opposition later clarified as a manifestation of nationalliberal interests. In 1956, the third camp underwent a name change, as the VdU became the Freedom Party (FPÖ). Through several stages of its history as a party, the FPÖ went from a band of former Nazis, to a liberal-center party, and finally to a nationalist opposition party. These stages are discussed below, drawing upon distinctions made by Austrian political scientist Karl Richard Luther. From 1956 to approximately 1965, Luther calls the FPÖ a “ghetto” party (Luther 2000, 428). Whereas its predecessor party the VdU had achieved nearly 12 percent of the vote in its first year as a party, the FPÖ started with 8 percent, declined to 5 percent, and found itself completely contained by the two-party government at all levels. It advocated pan-Germanism and stood against all that the mainstream consensus parties represented. The party lacked support as the spirit of opposition did not exist in Austria at this time. The Austrians apparently preferred to hide behind their newfound consensus, which had extricated them from the uncomfortable position of defending their complicity in the Holocaust. They were busy creating their new image as a neutral, cultural center. Therefore a party that attempted to take issue with the two-party consociational government was not popular among Austrians searching for stability at all costs. Opposition was not a popular position at this time. The second stage of FPÖ development from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s has been classified by Luther as the “normalization” period (Luther 2000, 428). He argues that votes for the party achieved constancy at around 5.5 percent and a loyal core of supporters emerged. Yet the party continued to lack influence, as its numbers were miniscule and its lacked representation. It was during this period that the party transitioned toward more liberal-centrist politics. It began to move away

The FPÖ

●

157

from its German nationalist roots broadening its platform to include liberal economic free markets and centrist politics. During this period it sought to position itself similarly to the German Free Democratic Party under the leadership of Friedrich Peter, who had known Nazi ties during the war but claimed to have rethought his position since then. Peter’s FPÖ wanted to offer itself as a viable coalition partner available to either the left or right mainstream parties (Riedlsperger 1998, 29). However, the institutional constraints of the consociational government precluded such alliances. The mainstream parties were comfortable in their positions of unchallenged power and had no incentives to seek junior coalition partners. Also, the legitimacy of this new liberal-centrist orientation remained questionable given its National Socialist origins. During this period, the consensus government of the ÖVP and SPÖ remained popular and in control of the political party system. From the late 1970s until 1986 the FPÖ experienced an “acceptance” stage in its political development (Luther 2000, 429). The party’s electoral fortunes dropped to under 5 percent of popular support in 1983. Yet by the early 1980s, its good behavior as a liberal-centrist party convinced the other Lager that it could make an attractive junior partner for the governing coalition. In 1979, the party had joined the Liberal International group of liberal parties. It was building its political credentials. In 1983, SPÖ leader Bruno Kreisky invited Norbert Steger’s FPÖ to enter his coalition government. Steger became vice chancellor of Austria through this alliance. Yet despite achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the other political parties, the FPÖ continued to lose its constituency. Support for and membership in the party continued to decline. It became clear that the public did not want to voice its concerns in the form of liberal-centrist politics. The fourth and final stage of FPÖ development began in 1986 and continued through the 1999 elections. This stage has been identified as the period of “populist protest” by Luther (Luther 2000, 429). This stage begins with the internal party-leadership conflict in 1986 that resulted in Vice Chancellor Steger’s replacement by Jörg Haider. Haider represented the nationalist roots of the party and expressed the dissatisfaction of many of its core members from the earlier, more stable period from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. The party’s nationalist wing had grown disgruntled with the decision of Steger to move the party to the liberal center of the political spectrum. Haider’s accession to the party helm caused the SPÖ to dissolve its coalition arrangement with the FPÖ on the grounds that the party position had shifted dramatically with the replacement of Steger. Through the late 1980s, Haider moved the party

158

●


increasingly further to the right side of the political spectrum. He put forward a nationalist agenda including first pan-Germanism and later Austrian nationalism and renewal. He took advantage of a changing climate in the 1980s when the public proved more receptive to opposition against the consensus politics of mainstream left and right parties than it had in earlier periods. The population was growing increasingly dissatisfied with grand coalitions and consensus and searching for a voice of opposition by the mid-1980s. The challenge for the FPÖ was in finding the right message with which to articulate such frustrations. Tapping the Source of Innovative Influence The FPÖ began to emphasize Austrian identity questions when it returned to its nationalist roots after Jörg Haider came to power in 1986. Haider moved the party away from liberal-centrism toward nationalism. Timing and coincidental events aided Haider on his course to bringing Austrian identity back into political debates. Two factors were of central importance: the increased tension in the consociational arrangement and the Waldheim Affair in 1986. The first created instability in the consensus government and the second opened the Pandora’s Box of postwar victimization imaging. Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ was able to translate these opportunities into political influence over the decade and a half of its political development and consolidation. By the time that Haider came to power, consensus government under the two mainstream parties was experiencing its first shock waves since the Second World War. This process began in 1966, as the grand coalition gave way to the two parties alternating in power. This change tested the idea of social partnership and weakened the governing arrangement that had promoted stability in Austria for twenty years. Even though the grand coalition reemerged in 1986, the institutions of parliament had become more powerful than ever before in the postwar period during this time when individual parties alternated in power to govern (Mitten 2002, 187). This was because the consensus government precluded actual democracy by largely predetermining the representation in the legislature to create balance. This resulted in incremental changes and relative stagnation. However, as parties held power individually and their own positions became dominant, they utilized the institutional functions of the legislature to a larger degree. The weakened grand coalition and stronger parliamentary institutions provided openings in the institutional structure to an unprecedented degree in 1986, when the grand coalition returned just as Jörg Haider was rising to power.

The FPÖ

●

159

The Waldheim Affair of 1986 also produced new opportunities for an opposition party such as the FPÖ, which had a tradition of articulating historical revisionism and disclaiming the victim complex image of postwar Austria as weak and not factual. When Kurt Waldheim ascended to the Austrian presidency in 1986, details of his past affiliation with Nazism came to public attention for the first time. In March 1986, the Austrian weekly news magazine Profil published evidence that Waldheim had been a member of the Nazi Student Union prior to the Anscluss (joining) with Germany in 1938, a member of a mounted unit of SA storm-troopers between 1937 and 1939, and served in an Army unit in the Balkans after 1942 that was known for deportations of Jews and other savagery (Bassett 1990). Waldheim denied the allegations initially, then claimed to have forgotten the events, and finally suggested that he and many other Austrians had been compelled by the Germans and that he had simply “done his duty” (Wodak and Pelinka 2002, xii). He articulated the familiar victimization scenario that had become the core of Austrian postwar identity. However, by 1986 Austrians were not willing to perpetuate that myth any longer, as it had created a vacuum in their self-identity. They could no longer deny their innocence and many rallied to defend Waldheim against external criticisms. As he was shunned in many diplomatic circles, including Western Europe, where he received no official state invitations, as well as the United States, where the State Department placed him on its official “watch list” in 1987, he became a symbol of the collective persecution of the Austrian people, who still felt allegiances to Nazism and continued to endorse its objectives. Austrians adopted “paranoid self-pity —‘the whole world is against us’ ” as the fallout over Waldheim’s media trial occurred (Hofmann 1988, 325). This served to generate feelings of nationalism in the face of international criticism. The important legacy of this event in terms of its effect on the opportunity structures of the FPÖ is that it broke the taboos created in the process of re-imaging Austria as a victim of Hitler in the Second World War. It brought an end to the postwar Austrian pattern of silence regarding Nazism. It opened the doors to discussions of Austrian identity and nationality and raised the question of what it meant to be an Austrian. One answer had to do with pan-Germanism, but by the early 1990s the FPÖ had shifted this dialogue away from German nationalism toward a uniquely Austrian identity. This new identity included elements of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rule of the Hapsburgs, and emphasized an ethnic community based on blood succession demarcating the Austrian volk from others.

160

●


Professionalizing the Party Organization The FPÖ has undergone various organizational adjustments under the leadership of Haider, as he worked to position the party as a party of government. His goal for the party extended beyond the more reasonable goal for peripheral parties of simply having nontraditional channels of influence in agenda-setting. Instead, Haider’s vision was that the FPÖ should become a party wielding its power directly from a position inside the national government (Luther 2000, 432). To this end, Haider worked to shape the party preparing it for ascendancy. Beginning in 1986 when he assumed party leadership, the party became increasingly centralized, developed an efficient party machine at all levels, recruited elites and notables, strengthened connections with think-tanks and intellectuals of the New Right, and utilized publications and other media to disseminate its message. Overall, the party established its credibility as a legitimate party of government through this calculated process of professionalizing its organization over the last fifteen years. The FPÖ has been labeled a Führerpartei (leader party), suggesting its authoritarian organizational tendencies (Kuhn 2000). Its organizational structure has reflected a pyramidal design with party leader Haider at the top directing its activities. Local party offices had some power in terms of choosing their campaign issues, yet these had to be supplemental and not contradictory to those coming down from the main party office under Haider’s management. In 1992, the leader’s office was formally created by changes in the party statutes that increased Haider’s power and control (Luther 2000, 434). Throughout the 1990s, he intervened more and more directly in the affairs of local level party offices, especially in the process of candidate selection. Haider also asserted his influence in the process of political recruitments. Haider proved persuasive in recruiting political candidates of some standing. He staffed his party with several intellectuals, many of whom had published materials in publications of the New Right or who had achieved positions of status in intellectual circles (Kuhn 2000). One of his most remarkable tickets of candidates was put together for the 1996 elections to the European Parliament. Among those candidates was Peter Sichrovsky, a prominent Jew whose parents had fled the Nazis to England. Sichrovsky was known in Austria as a former left-wing liberal and leading journalist having worked for the Viennese daily newspaper Der Standard as well as the major German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. He was married to an American, and was living in Chicago, Illinois at the time that Haider recruited him. Sichrovsky was supposedly

The FPÖ

●

161

attracted to the FPÖ because of its position of opposition to the consociational system, especially the corrupt grand coalition government (Sully 1997, 171). Sichrovsky joined the FPÖ ticket wanting to bring change in the established political party system that had long-dominated Austrian politics. In a personal interview conducted in between sessions at the party congress at the Hotel Intercontinental in Vienna, Sichrovsky explained the unique opportunity to change the system through the FPÖ. He claims that such change is his party’s greatest accomplishment so far: We had a situation where for 30 years the head of government was from the Socialist party- most of the time in a coalition with the conservative party. So if you define democracy as the possibility for political change, then we missed this. We had no political change, it was always the same people, and it was always the same party. It was like in the old time in a monarchy the same family rules the country over generations and generations and generations, so I think that the most important success was political change. New people came- new people with new ideas who were not part of a corrupt establishment. So I think if you talk about development of democracy and modernization, this improved the level of democracy. It is a very important step for Austria after the war. 50 years after the war we finally came to a level which was very normal in other European countries where there is political change from the left to the right or the other way. We had never had this. It was always the same government always the same people and they divided the government among two parties. You know you could not even become the head of a soccer team if you were not a member of one of those two parties. So this was a great opportunity. It did not solve the problems from the past but it was a great opportunity. The second step now is that the government proves that they make the best out of this opportunity. Some dramatic changes have happened in the last two years that have pushed us toward democratic development. (Sichrovsky 2001)

Increasingly under fire as a Jew supporting the political agenda of a Nazisympathizer, Sichrovsky described a reformed Haider, who had taken his daughters to the Holocaust museum in Washington, D.C. to teach them about the regrettable atrocities against Jews committed by the Nazis (Sully 1997, 172). Other prominent figures on the impressive 1996 FPÖ ticket included ski-team trainer Franz Linser, intended to appeal to fans of the country’s top spectator-sport as well as to present an academic candidate. Linser came from the Tyrol region in the Austrian Alps and had worked on a university faculty there in a sports-science department. An environmentalist who had worked for a left-wing magazine was also on that ticket as a representative defector from other political parties.

162

●


Haider also recruited prominent women to the party, including former lawyer and judge Helene Partik-Pable and the first female vice chancellor, who took office in February 2000, Susanne Riess-Passer. The most prominent think-tank group affiliated directly with the FPÖ is its in-house organization, the Freiheitliche Akademie. This organization has often had the task of putting together propaganda defending Haider against slanders of his reputation and credibility. For example, in its 2001 publication In Brennpunkt (in focus) the group has a chapter entitled “So hat’s Jörg gesagt und gemeint” (What Jörg said and meant) where it presents Haider’s verbal slips of the tongue and attempts to rationalize and explain them. In the previous year, the group published Waffe Wort (Words as Weapons), which also endeavored to analyze what it portrayed as “hypocrisy and blind condemnation” of the party undertaken as a conspiracy to halt the advance of the FPÖ. The cover of this publication depicts several slanders directed against Haider, including calling him “the junior dictator” and uses the phrase “Haiders Kampf ” (Haider’s Struggle) with clear reference to the book authored by Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. In addition to the slanders, a gun sight is displayed locked onto the phrase “Die FPÖ im Visier der Gutmenschen’ “ (The FPÖ under fire from good people), where “good people” is used sarcastically. Although the FPÖ seemingly does not have a publishing house or printing press on its premises at the new offices for party headquarters in Vienna’s financial district on Eßlinggasse, it does have professionallooking publications. Of particular distinction is the party program. The program is published in a volume resembling a journal with 11.5 by 8.5 inch dimensions. It is a full-color publication, with no writing on its cover except for a small FPÖ logo in the upper right-hand corner; the cover displays a full-cover photograph of Jörg Haider in casual attire sitting in a relaxed position and grinning broadly. It is replete with color photographs of the party leader in action undertaking activities from skydiving to rock climbing. In addition, it contains photographs of Austrian families and cultural icons, such as the golden statue of Johann Strauss in the Stadtpark (main city park), or the imposing facade of the Staatsoper (State Opera House) near the center of downtown Vienna (FPÖ 1998). Despite its garish packaging, the platform itself is complex and fairly sophisticated (Mitten 2002, 197). It covers the key issues discussed by most parties of government from foreign policy, law and order, the economy, social policy, education, and the environment. The press in Austria operate under a fairly unique Austrian condition based on patronage politics; the various media outlets had ties to and

The FPÖ

●

163

received funding from political parties with which they were affiliated (Sully 1997, 30). This makes the relationship between the media and political parties in Austria most direct. As a result, the media slant on politics tends to be extremely biased still today, as patronage has persisted with only modest improvements since the end of consensus government and the weakening of the social partnership arrangements that emerged after the Second World War. For example, the Neue Kronen Zeitung is a newspaper that exhibits the viewpoint of the FPÖ (Mitten 2002, 197), while the Der Standard newspaper tends to reflect the mainstream conservative ÖVP perspective on issues and events. Such ties between media and parties in Austria offer one explanation for the relatively modest publishing operation run by the FPÖ in comparison with that of the National Front in France; the FPÖ has been able to find outlets for its voice among existing media and has not needed to create new ones to disseminate its message. The party does have a sophisticated website at www.fpoe.at, however it often puts forth disclaimers regarding the similar web address www.fpo.at, which is known for its provocative Nazi propaganda; the web address obviously intends to portray ties to the FPÖ, although the party claims no responsibility and even condemns this website as part of a smear campaign directed against the party (FPÖ 2001, 2). Another organizational advantage of the FPÖ is the independent wealth of its former party leader Jörg Haider. Like Le Pen in France, Haider inherited an estate and money. Haider’s inheritance came from an uncle in Carinthia, who left his estate as well as his private fortune to his nephew. Haider has commented that the bequeath came as something of a surprise; he offers the possible motive that his uncle must have seen the potential in Haider’s vision and career objectives and believed in both (Sully 1997, 220). Incidentally, the uncle’s estate has been linked to property confiscated from the Jews under Nazi reign. Yet Haider has only expressed his gratitude for this inheritance, which has contributed to the ability of himself and of his party to wage professional campaigns. The party also benefited by increased amounts of state financing as it gained larger percentages of vote share over time. The prominent figures among the party elite also brought their fortunes to bear through their contributions to the party. Additionally, the party holds fund-raising events to acquire more revenue. The party has not lacked operating funds. In fact, it asked its elected officials to pledge any public income above five times the average wage to charities (Sully 1997, 14). This gesture was intended to signal that the party was serious in its position against corruption and patronage, as it applied the same

164

●


standards that it advocated to its own members. The party wanted to demonstrate that its own elites would not be living lives of luxury on public funds, a criticism it had levied against the two mainstream parties and their administrations in government. A party that was itself struggling for funds would not likely be in a position to advocate such charitable expenditures. A Tradition of Central Power Positions The FPÖ has by far the strongest tradition of holding both nationaland state-level political offices of the cases investigated in this study. Since its founding in 1956, the party has won seats for representatives in the National Council of parliament in every election. Seats in the Austrian parliament are allocated on the basis of proportional representation (Müller 1996, 29) rather than the single-member district system, which has served to keep the National Front out of national office more often than not. Also, the Austrian electoral rules establish a 4 percent threshold, slightly less-restrictive than the 5 percent rule that has precluded the German radical right-wing parties from gaining national level seats thus far. The FPÖ has received more than 4 percent of the vote in every election since it was founded in 1956 (table 7.1). In addition to holding seats, the FPÖ has held cabinet posts under the 1983–1986 coalition government with the SPÖ and again through

Table 7.1

Year

Party Leader

1956 1959 1962 1966 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999

Reinthaller Peter Peter Peter Peter Peter Peter Götz Steger Haider Haider Haider Haider Haider

% Votes

Seats

6.52 7.7 7.04 5.35 5.52 5.45 5.41 6.06 4.98 9.73 16.64 22.5 21.89 26.91

6 8 8 6 6 10 10 11 12 18 33 42 40 52

FPÖ Seats in the National Council 1956–1999

Source: Ministry of Interior, Vienna; also adaptation from chart on page 45 of FPÖ (2001), im Brennpunkt: Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs.

The FPÖ

●

165

the 1999–2002 coalition with the ÖVP. In its first coalition partnership, it held only two cabinet posts or roughly one-fifth of the ministries (Luther 2000, 433). In its second coalition, it held more than half of the ministerial posts. Many of these ministerial posts were of key significance as the rough parity in votes between the FPÖ and ÖVP in that election placed the two parties on more or less equal footing in forming the coalition. Therefore in 1999, the FPÖ claimed control over six of the eleven ministries including defence, justice, finance, transport innovation and technology, social security and generations, as well as public service and sport. At state and municipal levels, the FPÖ candidates have also won elected office wielding power at other levels of government. In state legislatures, the party has increased its vote share and seat allocations over time. As figure 7.1 indicates, within each state a trend is visible in state level election results for the FPÖ over the past twenty years. In each state level election, the party begins modestly in the early 1980s but as the Haider leadership ensues the party fortunes increase significantly. Also, between 1981 and 1999 the number of local councilors increased from 1677 to 4876, the number of mayors rose from 27 to 36 and the number of deputy mayors nearly tripled from 46 to 127 (Luther

45 40 35

Percentage

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Burgenland

Carinthia

Lower Austria

Salzburg

Styria

Tyrol

Upper Austria

Vienna

Vorarlberg

Province

Election 1

Figure 7.1

Election 2

Election 3

Election 4

Election 5

FPÖ: Provincial Election Results 1981–2000

Note: Election years vary from state to state, therefore the elections have been taken in order for each state and lassified generically by numbers rather than years. Source: Verbindungstelle der Bundesländer, Vienna. Adapted from FPÖ (2001) im Brennpunkt: Die Freiheitlich Partei Österreichs. Published by the Freiheitiliche Akademie.

166

●


2000, 432). The party leader Jörg Haider won the governorship of the state of Carinthia, his home state and one of the nine federal states of Austria. He was elected governor by the Carinthian parliament three times, in 1989, 1999, and 2004. Such relatively unprecedented access to traditional corridors of power in governments, sustained over time and with a trend of increase, places the Austrian FPÖ in a position where its opportunities to influence politics appear heightened by its direct participation in legislative debates and by its centrality as the third Lager in Austrian politics. Based on such strong positioning, the FPÖ has not needed to rely on militants and extremist activists to get its message out as parties blocked from power might. The FPÖ is in the Austrian government and my hypothesis argued in chapter 3 was that such a power position should incline the party towards more and more direct opportunities for political influence. Yet as SPÖ deputy to the Austrian National Council Rudolf Parnigoni explains in a personal interview, simply getting seats in the legislature doors does not automatically translate into a party wielding influence and having power there. Sometimes yes [a party in a junior partner coalition position or in opposition can impose its core programmatic issues to exert influence on the parliamentary agenda]. In part this is possible when one presents a pressing issue or generates discussions on such issues. Also through the procedural order, the rules for legislative sessions, one has the opportunity to introduce new issues onto the agenda. But this does not mean that a party without the dominant position in parliament [as coalition leader] can bring to pass the outcome it intends on the issue it introduces or speaks to. However to have influence over issues discussed and how they are discussed in parliament, or to instigate debates among the general public on such matters, that is certainly possible from subordinate positions. (Parnigoni 2001)

Therefore, although having a favorable power position in terms of being a part of the governing coalition or holding seats in national or state level legislatures is a step toward exerting greater influence on the political agenda and legislation that goes forward, it does not guarantee a particular outcome. Furthermore, simply being present at the debates is a necessary condition for direct influence but not a sufficient one. Party unity matters, in terms of presenting a united front. As Elisabeth Hlavac, an SPÖ deputy, explains in a personal interview: It is different from the United States because the parties have a much stronger position. And the individual parliamentarian has a weaker one.

The FPÖ

●

167

So you belong to a party and then you belong to the corresponding parliamentary group. And it is more the party than the individual that is deciding. One thing is that we have party conferences when we decide about resolutions and motions of all kinds. And this should be, not always, the lines in Parliament or town halls or wherever. (Hlavac 2001)

So parties must determine their position collectively before entering parliament, since a key part of their strength lies in their unity. The system of party governance works when there is party discipline and where lone individualists stay with the party line rather than breaking away and adopting their own positions. Where party discipline breaks down, parliamentary governments may be forced to dissolve through a vote of no confidence. Fragmented parties make weak representatives in government and generally fail to accomplish their objectives. In addition to taking part in discussions and presenting a unified agenda, a party must arguably have strong leadership and good strategic positioning on arguments to succeed. In sum, being present in national and more-local levels of government is an advantage for the FPÖ. Yet it does not in itself guarantee successful impact. In fact, the compromises necessary for it to govern as a partner with the ÖVP may serve to modify its radicalism and domesticate its behavior.

Oppositional Relationships with Other Parties Political space is a more important variable in the Austrian case than in either of the French or German cases already discussed. Only in the Austrian case was a consociational power-sharing arrangement instituted following the Second World War, with a key component being the Proporz system and an entrenched grand coalition of mainstream right and left parties. Austrian political scientist from the University of Salzburg Volkmar Lauber called the grand coalition that dominated postwar Austria as “designed to make it difficult for one party to try to oppress the other . . . the supreme expression of the new principle of consociationalism” (Lauber 1996, 254). He explains that the grand coalition was a reaction to external pressures following the Second World War during the occupation for moderation and reconstruction but to a great extent also emerged because of the interwar experience, where polarized extremism produced civil war and authoritarianism (Lauber 1996, 254). A strong desire to preclude future recurrences of such events led to the consociational arrangements that included social

168

●


partnership, corporatism, and the institutionalization of the grand coalition of political party power-sharing among the two mainstream right and left parties. During the 1970s, the FPÖ intended to work within existing institutional constraints, expecting that its only opportunity to change its marginal status was through forging alliances with one or the other mainstream parties, since they held the monopoly on power. During the 1970s, the FPÖ began to foster a relationship with the Socialists rather than maintaining its weak position of opposition to the grand coalition (Lauber 1996, 255). The strategy paid off in terms of delivering its intended target, and entry into the coalition as a junior partner under the SPÖ came about in 1983–1986. In the party platform of 1985, the FPÖ stated its support for patronage-free government, where multiparty systems compete openly and where instruments of direct democracy are employed. However, the party did not make this position a source of its opposition to the two mainstream parties until Haider came to power the following year. When Jörg Haider took control of the FPÖ in 1986, the strategy changed from supporting the two-party system and hoping for limited rewards to ending the two-party system. The party wanted to inaugurate a Third Republic based on real party competition without the patronage and corruption that had accompanied consensus government throughout the postwar period. The FPÖ became the first party to voice its frustration with the patronage and corruption of the twoparty consociational government (Bunzl 2002, 64; Kitschelt 1995, 200). The term “Third Republic” came into usage by the FPÖ in 1994 (Sully 1997, 30–31), although the party had always positioned itself in opposition to the grand coalition arrangement since Haider took power. The opportunity to oppose an institutional arrangement that had become increasingly corrupt and archaic provides the party with a unique context. As Richard Rose explains, the rise of the FPÖ was made possible by the end of consensus government and the failure of established parties (Rose 2000, 26). In his 1995 book, Haider explained the party’s position on inaugurating a new system of government saying, “Our call is for a ‘Third Republic’ a new era free from party patronage and nepotism. The coalition parties denounce this as ‘dangerous’ and for them it is. The Third Republic would put an end to their hitherto unquestioned rule. These old parties have everything to fear from more competition and openness (Haider 1993; Haider 1995, xi). The failure of the grand coalition propelled the rise of its primary opponent, the FPÖ.

The FPÖ

●

169

Leadership Means Almost Everything Although comparisons are often made among radical right-wing party leaders, Jörg Haider is a party boss without parallel. He has carefully cultivated his image, and has been called a “dangerous chameleon” by the Financial Times of London because of his ability to adapt his rhetoric, message, style, and personality to the changing contexts in which he finds himself (Financial Times 1999). His photograph graces the cover of the party program and photos of him enjoying hobbies and smiling broadly can be found throughout most official party documents. Even after he had stepped down as the party leader in February of 2000, the campaigns that followed used his image on posters and utilized his public speaking abilities to rally support for them. One such policy campaign included Kindergeld (money for children), which offered supplemental money to families with children enabling mothers to choose to stay home rather than entering the workplace out of financial necessity. This issue passed the Austrian legislature in 2001, yet Haider was pictured surrounded by blonde-haired blue-eyed babies on the posters blanketing Vienna streets in the Fall of 2001, with the official party leader Vice Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer sitting by his side. His image has become an important tool for advancing radical rightwing party objectives both inside and outside of Austria since the 1990s. Haider’s face can be found on radical right-wing party posters in many other West European countries. For instance, he is displayed on a poster used by the German Republican Party for the 2002 national elections. The poster suggests that Haider’s way is the radical right-wing way and his accomplishments provide the model for others to follow. Richard Mitten presents Haider and his FPÖ as precedent-setters who built upon the model set forth by the National Front in the 1980s, adapting it to the Austrian context to maximize its utility. “With Haider cast as a kind of xenophobic Everyman, ‘Haiderism’ has become the new specter haunting Europe” (Mitten 2002, 181). Perhaps Jean-Marie Le Pen inaugurated the New Right model in the 1980s, but Haider’s entry into the governing coalition in February of 2000 marks a new precedent for all other radical right-wing parties having similar aspirations. When I talked with Haider in a personal interview at his office at party headquarters in Vienna in December of 2001, his magnetic charm was unavoidable. He asked me about Colorado, how the ski season had been the previous year, and about my university and research. Of course to get to this point, I had to follow his quick pace down the office hallway and place my foot in his doorway after he had already said, as

170

●


his secretary introduced me upon his arrival, that he did not have time to talk with me. He refused to be tape-recorded and initially seemed skeptical about my motives for aggressively trying to see him at the party office. Yet more than likely the unpleasantness of throwing me out and causing a scene appeared a greater evil than granting several minutes of his time in the end. He seemed pleasantly surprised and again skeptical as I explained that my research seeks to assess the impact that his party has on politics. He boasted proudly of the accomplishments of the party that he reinvented in the mid-1980s: We are the future of Austrian politics. We are changing the system. As our record shows, our policies are becoming Austria’s policies. Watch us and you will see what we can do as we have only begun. (Haider 2001)

His political skill is unmistakable, as he turned my more-difficult questions into opportunities for unrelated extemporaneous speeches like no other politician that I had interviewed before him or afterward had done. He kept his comments brief and demonstrated that he was in command of this interview through his controlled responses, positive spin, and effervescent smile. He revealed no more and no less than necessary, and when he was finished he stood to go. As I walked with him and his bodyguard to his car waiting on the street in front of the party office, I watched as workmen doing construction outside the building suddenly recognized him. They quickly came down from their ladders and set aside their work projects to surround him asking for autographs and handshakes. His bodyguard handed him postcards displaying his image and he autographed one for each man who had gathered before stepping into the waiting car. In his wake, I watched as the workmen appeared star struck and awed by the unprecedented access to him. They continued to talk loudly and enthusiastically as I left the scene. Haider is an Austrian celebrity. Anthropologist Andre Gingrich has done work observing Haider over a period of time, and he explains that when Haider makes an appearance it is comparable to the fanfare of a superstar. Gingrich interviewed someone in the crowd after Haider had arrived by helicopter to make a surprise stop at a ski resort. The subject commented, “It was like Hollywood, as if Arnold Schwarzenegger or Bruce Willis had dropped in” (Gingrich 2002, 71). Gingrich also recounts similar appearances at discotheques, sporting events, and beer tents. He says that Haider utilizes an advance team, to make sure all of the necessary preparations are made before he arrives so that the photo opportunities are perfect. His entourage varies appropriately with the

The FPÖ

●

171

events. When Haider goes to a night club he has his Buberlpartei (posse of young rascals—as the media have dubbed them) in tow (Gingrich 2002, 76). As Gingrich describes, they drive up in fancy sports cars, talk on cellular phones permanently attached to their ears, working their way through the crowd handing out autographed photos of Haider as well as other party information. On the other hand, when Haider makes an appearance at inns in the rural countryside, he is more likely to be flanked by his wife and daughters and fittingly attired in traditional native dress including Lederhosen (leather short pants). When arriving for political meetings, he usually wears stylish Armani suits and is surrounded by well-dressed party intellectuals (Gingrich 2002, 75). In addition to his dress code, Haider can change his speech patterns to match his surroundings as well. He has been known to adopt Austrian colloquialisms and speak dialect when in the countryside or speaking to veterans groups. Then he switches to Hochdeutsch (high German) for outings in Vienna or political meetings and official speeches (Gingrich 2002, 75). The image of Haider draws many to the party and its message. He is the bungee-jumping, New York City marathon-running, Harvard economics-studying, rock-climbing, Alpine-skiing, smooth-talking, allaround common man of the people. He has successfully constructed a balance between celebrity and everyman, between hip and common, between sage and average. The common man image, portrays him as the individual taking on enormous challenges as any person could do if they so choose. He is the David fighting against Goliath or the small man up against a bloated party bureaucracy (Sully 1997, 62). He is the Robin Hood, not robbing the money of the rich to pay the poor but robbing the power of the bureaucrats to give to the people (Sully 1997, 36). Yet he also has his alter ego for appropriate occasions, the incomparable celebrity of the Alps. In sum, he has political skills, he knows how to manipulate the media, he is a keen strategist and he has a vision for reforming the Austrian political system. Yet this could describe many good politicians. Haider is additionally a larger-than-life image. He is a leader combining vision with unparalleled charisma. Applying the General European Model of Influence to an Opportune Context The Austrian case demonstrates an exceptionally successful execution of the general European model with an additional case-specific explanatory variable that proves decisive in the high level of success achieved in this

172

●


case, the unreformed Nazi past. The general model is evaluated to consider how a lack of de-Nazification and the idea of an organic nation foster especially favorable conditions for the radical right in Austria. The four criteria evaluated in the two cases already considered are applied in the Austrian case. First, the ability of the FPÖ to create political influence is evaluated in specific context of Austria. I argue that instead of introducing new issues, the Austrian radical right plays upon existing sentiments. Second, the typology is applied to the Austrian case to suggest that the FPÖ exemplifies entrepreneurial characteristics. Third, I examine the reinvention process of the FPÖ beginning in 1986 with the rise of new leadership. Finally, I examine the climate of fear manipulated by the FPÖ to its political advantage. Creating Influence through Revisiting the Nazi Past As already outlined, the Waldheim affair coincided with the year of Jörg Haider’s takeover of the FPÖ and brought repressed sentiments to the surface. These included frustration with Nazi war trials, empathy with Hitler’s goals, and widespread xenophobia. A hole in the Austrian spirit was also revealed, which was the result of a country forced to reinvent itself or face the culpability and prosecution that had crippled Germany after the Second World War. Austrians still identified with notions of the superiority of the Germanic people, considering itself part of that group. This became evident in the pan-Germanism that became the popular position galvanizing support for the VdU and FPÖ during their early years. When Haider came onto the scene, it was precisely the right time to address the taboos of the past, as the silence on issues of Austrian identity had been broken for the first time. Although Haider did not create the sentiment that fueled his campaign to restore Austrian identity and to remove the corrupt grand coalition’s dominance over Austrian politics, he fed upon it. He was able to claim that the two-party system served to maintain stability by keeping people and their viewpoints out of politics. It was a cover for underlying dissatisfaction that could not be articulated. Haider did bring the immigration issue back into political debates, however. During the 1970s and much of the 1980s, immigration was a nonissue in Austria. The grand coalition social partners did not discuss it; businesses had come to appreciate guest workers that had arrived to provide labor following the devastation of the Second World War. Policy on foreign workers came from the Ministry of Social Affairs at that time (Bauböck 2002, 248). This ministry had for its goal provisions for popular welfare

The FPÖ

●

173

and the social climate. Generally speaking, foreigners were not considered a problem in Austria through the late 1980s. By the early 1990s, the Ministry of Interior had taken over jurisdiction of immigration issues in Austria. This signaled the shift from considering the issue a matter of cultural assimilation to framing the issue as a threat to internal security. From 1989 forward, the FPÖ had adopted identity-based arguments for why foreigners presented problems for Austria. The ethnic difference between foreigners and Austrians became the causal factor in explanations of Austria’s current or future problems. “The political rhetoric of the FPÖ since 1986, but especially since 1989, has consistently promoted ‘ethnic’ explanations for real or imagined social and economic problems, wagering that the presence that exists in contemporary Austria towards ethnic minorities as well as foreigners from eastern and southern Europe, and more recently from Africa, could be tapped to increase its vote” (Mitten 2002, 188). To summarize, the FPÖ did not have to generate xenophobic sentiment as the French arguably did through economic rationalizations of the immigrant threat. Instead, the prejudice already existed in Austria and needed only to be channeled toward identity politics. An Obvious Entrepreneurial Type Jörg Haider and his FPÖ became polarizers in a country of postwar consensus. They broke the mold, reinvented the wheel, and introduced the first challenge to the corruption and patronage of the consociationalist system that had promoted two-party dominance. In so doing, the FPÖ demonstrated its ability to venture into uncertain directions, taking risks and learning from its mistakes. These characteristics support the classification of the FPÖ as a clear entrepreneurial-party type. Officials of the party consistently responded to my interviews probing their thoughts on the successes and failures of the party as it developed saying that its most important success was to break with the old corrupt system that had hampered political expression and genuine democracy. In a personal interview with FPÖ deputy to the National Council Dr. Helene Partik-Pable, she confirms the importance of that institutional adjustment brought about by her party. When one examines the political history of Austria, one necessarily observes the central position of power sharing between the SPÖ and ÖVP following the Second World War. One also observes the abuse of power practiced under this arrangement through Proporz. This was initially

174

●


positive. It promoted stability and precluded the party system from becoming deeply divided by policy differences and disputes. (Partik-Pable 2001)

The FPÖ took calculated risks in standing up to the grand coalition consensus government. Opening issues that had been set aside for forty years could have easily given way to mass level instability beyond the scope of FPÖ abilities to contain it or respond to it. In times when multiculturalism was becoming a catch-phrase of the 1990s, with the European Union moving toward increased integration and talk of a European identity supplanting national identity by the end of the twentieth century, the FPÖ took the risky position of standing alone in Austria against deeper and wider European Union. The idea of mixing the people of Europe without respect for their unique national heritages proved difficult to accept for the FPÖ, with its core ideas of a separate Austrian identity (Pelinka 2002, 222). As FPÖ deputy Helene Partik-Pable describes the unique Austrian identity in a personal interview, she explains the tension with European citizenship as follows: We are not a multicultural society. And that is true of all states of Europe. Instead, here in Europe there are deeply rooted cultures, which are hundreds of years old. America has a multicultural society, where for reasons based on the American development produced a culture where many cultures have always mixed. However in Europe, the basis for a multicultural society has not existed and did not develop that way (Partik-Pable 2002).

She had been cited previously as a key proponent within the FPÖ of the position that foreigners are outsiders, and that they are markedly separate. “Ask the officials about the character of black Africans! They do not only look different . . . they are different. They are especially aggressive. This is especially because of their nature” (Gärtner 2002, 29). The FPÖ has remained committed to its position that people of different races cannot be combined as one nation. They maintain that Austria is not a melting pot, and to try and force different ethnicities together only breeds social problems (Haider 1995, 30). Reinventing the Freedom Party This party’s reinvention has already been discussed at length to explain the process through which the FPÖ took advantage of existing

The FPÖ

●

175

opportunity structures, arguably unique to Austria, that were evident in 1986 when Haider took over leadership of the party. This section will not recount those details. Instead, another way in which the party was able to reinvent itself under Haider’s direction will be taken up here. The party was able to become a flexible voice of popular unrest on a variety of issues and themes. The chameleon-like nature of the party leader was transferred to his malleable party platform and the party’s ability to continually learn and renew itself from 1986 forward. Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ has modified issue positions that had ceased to be used in mobilizing public concern, many of which run risks of evoking condemnation and scrutiny from the international community, namely pan-Germanism and connections to the Nazi past. The mainstream parties have used such questionable aspects of party speeches and activities to demonize it as having a neo-Nazi agenda. Yet the FPÖ has thus far been able to deflect such hostility and maneuver itself into respectable positions. Two explanations appear possible. First, the political climate in Austria tolerates references to Hitler and overt racism of a magnitude that would never be permitted in postwar Germany. Edmund Stoiber, leader of Bavaria’s CSU party, took the position that “the kind of views as expressed by FPÖ politicians on the Nazi past would force any German politician to resign on the same day” (Manoschek 2002, 8). Therefore, as the Holocaust and Austrian identity have become more widely discussed since 1986, the self-policing political correctness found in Germany largely as a result of postwar deNazification is not found in Austria. The ÖVP has been known to be openly anti-Semitic (Markovits 2002, 112), and the SPÖ knowingly recruited Nazis to the party after the war (Markovits 2002, 108). Nazis were not isolated and punished in Austria, but they persisted all around and likewise their racism remains relatively ubiquitous. Second, an “anything-goes” political climate has emerged in Austria in the aftermath of the collapse of the postwar consensus (Wodak 2002, xxi–xxii). As the old stability of consensus government has receded, political tactics and rhetoric have become increasingly inflammatory and usually go unchecked. Although political corruption and scandals are nothing new for postwar Austria, open references to Nazism by public figures has become noticeably more widespread after 1986. This only contributes to the climate of uncontrolled expression and unscrupulous behavior on the part of many public officials. Yet such behavior normally does not incur penalties in Austrian politics. This climate of political promiscuity allows radical right risk-taking without consequences.

176

●


The party’s ability to reinvent itself time and again over the last decade and a half has contributed to its relative success as a party of the radical right wing. It has been recognized as a party that adapts to changing circumstances with apparent ease (Bauböck 2002, 246; Sully 1997, 57). The FPÖ has found a niche in its flexibility. In an age of declining partisanship and increased issue-voting, the FPÖ has been able to find a consistent winning position in its populist issue appeals and its antiestablishment attacks on the mainstream left and right parties, which notoriously have neglected the concerns of the people. As FPÖ deputy Peter Sichrovsky explains in a personal interview: The party is a new type that is neither left nor right-wing in the traditional sense. Instead, the idea of Mr. Haider is that you become something of a problem solving organization for the needs of the people. And whatever it [the problem] is you try to come up with the best solution. (Sichrovsky 2001)

He continues: We did not position ourselves in such an extremely definite way like these two parties [ÖVP and SPÖ]. We are not the extreme right like Le Pen and we are not the environmental left party like the Greens. We have always been more open. We have always been more open to other people from other parties. I come more from the liberal side, others come more from the right side, and we have people coming form the Socialists . . . we ask the voters what they want before formulating the program. It is a new style of politics that concentrates on the problems that people define that they expect to have resolved by the government. (Sichrovsky 2001)

The strategy of the FPÖ to reinvent itself as a populist party that responds directly to the concerns of people has provided it with a fertile political position in the Austrian party system. Climate of Fear—The Fine Line and Careful Balancing The FPÖ appears to have undertaken a balancing act between stirring fears of identity-based threats with posturing itself as the new, antiestablishment opposition. Even in a position of power as a coalition partner, the party represents the common person’s defence against issues of concern. It presents a professional image of a party capable of governing. Yet the notorious “slip-ups” of Jörg Haider and some of the more

The FPÖ

●

177

right-wing nationalist party members and the fact that they continue to recur throughout the period under investigation suggest that at least for some members of the party, a learning curve on such political correctness has either not occurred or is not desirable. Those scholars who suggest that the party desires to continue to keep identity-based politics on its political agenda, albeit balanced by attention to whatever issues of the day need solutions, claim that the verbal mistakes appear to often be calculated and intentional (Mitten 2002; Sully 1997; Wodak 2002; Knight 1992; Wal 2002). These actions may indicate a desire on the part of the party to broaden its electoral base while keeping its Nazi-legacy loyalists in the third Lager. However, the Nazi language and the notorious “slip-ups” play upon the identity-based politics questions unresolved in Austria since the Second World War. They are intended to reach beyond a far right voting constituency to mobilize widespread sentiments of racism and xenophobia. The “slip ups” are too numerous to recount individually here, but I highlight some of the more-notorious ones to provide some understanding of their content and potential effect. Haider has been widely cited for claiming that “the birth of the Austrian nation was ideologically-deformed, since belonging to a people is one thing but belonging to a state is another” (Gärtner 2002, 17). This emphasizes the notion of jus sanguinis (law of blood) citizenship that underscores the exclusivist notion of in-groups relative to out-groups in the Austrian political community. He has been accused of praising the employment policy of the German Third Reich under the Nazis suggesting that it was sound and efficient. Such overt references to Nazism in a positive light suggest an attempt to glorify the Holocaust. He has used the term “penal camps” to refer to the Nazi gas chambers where millions were murdered (Wodak 2002, 43). He praised the Wehrmacht Nazi soldiers in the notorious Krumpendorf speech to veterans (Sully 1997). These are a small sampling of the various accounts of overt references to Nazism and racist xenophobia, yet they convey the style in which these references have been conveyed. As Ruth Wodak, a Viennese professor of linguistics points out, vague language is often used tactically, to communicate the intended references to the people who would be mobilized by their symbolism and motivational power (Wodak 2002, 38). She suggests that simple terms are used to convey a complex reality of a Nazi legacy that was never overcome in Austria. Such rhetorical tools are used to delineate the collective Austrian identity group from those outside of that specific category.

178


●

Analysis of the Impact of the Austrian Radical Right Agenda-setting Operating under the assumption that media coverage provides an indicator of trends in the popular agenda, Kurier a mainstream, daily Austrian newspaper with national distribution was selected for the agenda impact analysis. Articles on immigration were collected beginning in 1992.1 Organization of the data reflects monthly counts and annual counts of articles through July 15, 2002. This evidence indicates that by shaping the discussion on immigration and by agitating to keep the issue high profile, the radical right-wing parties secure a measure of success. Austria exhibits a significant increase in the volume of articles on immigration in the year 2000. This can still be seen as a part of a decade-long pattern of increase, as the graph below illustrates. Even though the increase in 2000 is significantly large and should be explained as an important increase, it follows a positive, curvilinear pattern (figure 7.2).

600


500 400 300 200 100

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 7.2

Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issue 1990–2002

Note: Figures from 2002 reflect only data collected through July and therefore underestimate by as much as half the annual total. Source: Articles collected from Kurier. Available archive begins with 1992.

The FPÖ

●

179

The steady increase in the volume of media discourse surrounding the immigration issue in Austria during the 1990s, reflects the consistent amplification of the Freedom Party and its message throughout that time. The party made strides toward its greatest electoral success to date occurring in the 1999 elections. In 1990 the FPÖ won 16.6 percent, in 1994, 22.5 percent, and in 1995, 21.9 percent in national elections (Sully 1997, 8). In 1999, the FPÖ won 26.9 percent of the popular vote nationwide. This gave it the second-most votes of any party in that election and made it a coalition partner by Austrian election laws. It actually received slightly more votes than its coalition partner the ÖVP, but in a good faith gesture toward the controversial new governing coalition of that time, it offered the chancellor’s office to the established right-wing party. The peak in Austria in 2000–2001 arguably reflects the influence of the coalition between the Austrian People’s Party and the Freedom Party achieved in the 1999 elections. Controversial from the outset, with condemnation from the European Union, this new government was surrounded by media attention. When Haider stepped down from his role as the party’s national leader to be succeeded by Susanne Riess-Passer, the media attention continued surrounding him personally, as well as the party and its new national leadership in the coalition. Immigration restriction has been a key issue for the FPÖ and although it arguably became somewhat “domesticated” in its role as a coalition partner, the party continued to press for further restrictions once in power as a part of the governing coalition. To the extent that media attention can be viewed as an indicator of issue importance, the Austrian case is the clearest one considered in this investigation showing a steady pattern of the ever-increasing media coverage of the immigration issue. This suggests that throughout this time of FPÖ activity to promote the issue, the media carried the message forward. This increased the propensity for radical right-wing party influence through their anti-immigration issue positions. Regardless of whether the articles are open or restrictive toward immigration, the issue has been placed on the public agenda for debate to an increasing degree over the past approximately twelve years. This is an indicator of impact for the radical right in bringing heightened attention to the immigration issue. This causes questions related to immigration policy to be asked, including how to define the Austrian identity and how to create divisions between the in-groups and out-groups in society. The results observed in the newspaper data reflect the tactical positioning of the issue by the FPÖ and the trend showing clear increases in issue

180

●


prominence indicates the success of the FPÖ at placing the issue centrally on the popular political agenda. Institution-shaping A unique spatial relationship persists among the Austrian political parties as a result of the legacy of grand coalition government and consociationalism. The postwar period was dominated by the two mainstream parties which cooperated and worked together providing political stability but without adequate popular representation of interests. The Green party and Communists remained marginalized throughout the postwar period. Unlike the other two cases already discussed, the communist party was not permitted as a fourth Lager following the Second World War, and it died off without such an institutional role. The Greens in Austria have been traditionally weak, and viewed by their potential coalition partners on the left of center, the SPÖ, as organizationally underdeveloped and lacking the credentials of a party of government. SPÖ deputy Elisabeth Hlavac explains: We did not want to work together with the FPÖ, and many of us do not want to work together with the Greens. Well, many [members of our party] think that they [the Greens] are not reliable, and, of course there are some fields [policy areas] where it is difficult [to work together with the Greens]. (Hlavac 2001)

This situation meant that the FPÖ had plenty of issue space where it could step in to fill existing vacuums. The main obstacle had traditionally been the institutionalized acceptance of consensus government. But as this passive acceptance waned in the 1980s, the openings on the right fringe allowed the FPÖ to stake its position as the voice of aggregate opposition to the defacto two-party-dominant system. Demonization by the left From 1986 when Haider takes control of the FPÖ with a platform expressing its intentions to reify pan-German nationalism and making plain its opposition to the existing control of Austrian politics by the ÖVP and SPÖ parties, the mainstream left and right went on the offensive. Chancellor Franz Vranitzky came to power as leader of the SPÖ in 1986 and his tenure in office continued until 1997. He recognized the potential threat to the comfortable positions long enjoyed by his party and the ÖVP and he undertook an aggressive defamation of character

The FPÖ

●

181

campaign against the FPÖ and Jörg Haider (Mitten 2002, 199). The first phase of rebuffing the FPÖ threat was to discredit its political legitimacy and to suggest that its leader was a neo-Nazi bent on disrupting the postwar political order in Austria by evoking taboos and bringing out demons of the past. Prospects for partners on the right The ÖVP remained more open to the possibility to an alliance with the FPÖ. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, it vacillated between rapprochement and alliance formation with the FPÖ to co-opting the foreigner issue by adopting more restrictive policies (Mitten 2002, 185; Sully 1997, 143). The ÖVP played a key role in its support of Haider for the Carinthian governorship in 1989, yet by 1991 it had become disillusioned with many of his policies and troubled by his personality (Riedlsperger 1998, 39). Attempted co-option by the mainstream After the smear campaign, the SPÖ also attempted co-option by moving its policy position regarding foreigners towards heightened restrictiveness. Both parties expected that by taking aggressive action against immigrants and asylum seekers themselves, they could co-opt the issue salience and take issue space back from the FPÖ. However, what they failed to recognize was Haider’s manipulation of the identity issue of Austria’s postwar re-imaging and the effect of the lack of coming to terms with Austria’s Second World War past. By combining identitybased opposition to foreigners with the campaign for a Third Republic against patronage and corruption of the Proporz and social partnership arrangements from two-party dominance, the combination provided fertile ground for new opposition politics in Austria. Calling the shots Although it would be a mistake to claim that the FPÖ has imposed its will on the 2000 coalition government with the ÖVP or has had unchecked influence over the 1990s, several notable examples of its influence emerge. First, in the mid-1990s, the party tested its “Austria First!” position by launching a national-level attack, based mainly in the cultural capital Vienna, against foreign artists (Gingrich 2002, 82–85). The FPÖ claimed that foreign art was being given preference above Austrian art, from paintings and sculpture to theater pieces and musical compositions. The party succeeded in getting some funding for foreign

182

●


art cut or reduced, and even prompted some foreign artists to flee the oppressive climate created around them by the party. Second, the party introduced more initiatives in parliament than ever before in the legislative term between 1995 and 1999. It sponsored over hundred bills dealing with a broad array of mainstream political issues positioning itself as the renovator of ÖVP and SPÖ antiquated policies, and was successful in several of these endeavors. The party moved politics further to the right through these legislative successes on such issues as curtailing party finance in 1996, providing a constitutional status for the traditional family in 1997, lowering the percentage of legally employed foreigners permissible to 6 percent in 1997, revising citizenship law to include the statement that Austria is not a country of immigration in 1997, tightening asylum restrictions in 1998, and changing the regulation of funds for victims of the Nazis in 1999 (Minkenberg 2001, 13). Third, the FPÖ-ÖVP government sent former Wehrmacht soldiers into Austrian schools to talk to school children about history in 2000 (Manoschek 2002, 11). The alleged agenda was to propagate radical rightwing ideology among school children. The class discussions included presenting the position that the Allies actually started the war. Language such as the “so-called Holocaust” was reportedly used in these talks and denials that Nazis had ordered mass murders were made. Evidence came to light that at least four of the twenty speakers engaged in these lectures were known radical right-wing activists. When the news got around regarding these talks, the Ministry of Education was forced to cancel future talks. Fourth, issues of law and order, criminality from foreigners and security of the Austrian identity against threats were central FPÖ issues during the 1999 campaign. Posters warned of Überfremdung (overforeignization) and Haider spoke of the danger to Austria of having too many foreigners than could be sustained. Many of these issues became translated into policy initiatives put forward under the coalition government in which the FPÖ took part from February 2000. This marked their impact in terms of getting other parties to cooperate in pushing forward their measures. Kindergeld has already been mentioned in this paper as one example of such impact on other parties. In a personal interview, SPÖ deputy Elisabeth Hlavac observes that increased security measures and law and order policies have been other issues in which the FPÖ has had a measurable effect: But in the FPO and OVP there always were some law and order people in the way that we call it (the pejorative). And they are much stronger now and sometime when we were in the coalition with the OVP we could stop

The FPÖ

●

183

them but now there is no one to stop them because the FPO is the driving force and the OVP is happy to do it with them. (Hlavac 2001)

Hlavac specifically names the FPÖ as the catalyst moving the ÖVP to support core Freedom Party positions. In sum, not only have the traditional mainstream parties had to adjust their positions to the radical right, but the radical right has had some success in getting its policies implemented by putting pressure on the mainstream parties to facilitate such action either in legislative debates or through coalition negotiations. Policy-making This section examines law counts obtained from the Bundesgesetzblätter, the Federal Law Gazette in Austria. The volume counts reflect the number of legislative initiatives on the immigration issue. The analysis includes laws, decrees, policy statements and other official position statements coming from the Nationalrat, during the period investigated from 1990 through July of 2002. This indicator presumes that individual party effects can be extrapolated to aggregate outcomes achieved through a complex interaction process among the various components of governments. As the Freedom Party has made immigrants and the foreigner issue a central theme, it monopolizes that issue, shaping and steering it to a greater extent that the other parties do. This study, therefore, counts immigration legislation as a measure of right-wing radical party success, attributing increased initiatives on the issue in large part to successful manipulation by the radical right. The peak year for legislative activity in Austria was 2001. As with Germany’s peak year for legislative activity, Austria’s highest volume years correspond to its peak period of newspaper coverage. Noticeably, the volume for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001 suggests much higher levels of legislative activity than in all of the previous years examined (figure 7.3). Explaining 1999 volume requires some elaboration on what has been said above in the agenda-setting analysis, because 1999 is the year prior to the rise to the governing coalition of the Freedom Party. The high numbers in 1999 suggest that the socialist majority (SPÖ) in parliament, in coalition with the mainstream right (ÖVP) was reacting to the demand for action on the immigration issue prior to the rise to coalition power of the radical right-wing FPÖ. The high volume observed for 1999 could indicate an attempt on the part of the mainstream parties of the right and left to co-opt the immigration issue, which is so critical to the platform of the FPÖ. They may

184


●

30


25 20 15 10 5

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 7.3

Legislative Volume on the Immigration Issue 1990–2002

Note: Figures from 2002 reflect only data collected through July and therefore underestimate by as much as half the annual total. Source: Legislative initiatives collected from the Bundesgesetzblätter archives of the Austrian Nationalrat.

have anticipated the rising popularity of the radical-right wing on this issue and attempted to take away some of its issue space by initiating preemptive legislation. As argued above, the 1999 campaign was a particularly intense one with the issues of over-foreignization, security and law and order fears emphasized to heightened degrees. A slightly different picture emerges when legislative activity is viewed according to legislative terms of office rather than individual years. Suspecting that legislative terms may be a better way to see patterns in this data because administrations are often judged by overall achievements in office rather than individual years, the data was also arranged to control for differences by term of office. For example, there are often periods in office for adjustment initially and for transition or a lameduck period later. Looking at terms of office in figure 7.4, the overall pattern is a steady increase over the last eleven-and-a-half years. Each successive administration has demonstrated more overall legislative activity on the immigration issue than previous administrations. The exception is in 1995, where a one-year decline is observed. This, however, is due to the fact that this particular Austrian administration served just over one year in office, November 7, 1994 to January 14, 1996. Yet the pattern reflects a stair-step design where a huge upward

The FPÖ

●

185

70


60 50 40 30 20 10

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02

0

Figure 7.4 Immigration Initiatives by Electoral Terms 1990–2002 Note: Figures from 2002 reflect only data collected through July. Source: Legislative initiatives collected from the Bundesgesetzblätter archives of the Austrian Nationalrat, shown by governmental administration.

slope of relatively high volume is evident beginning with the 1996 government. In the case exploration of this chapter, the middle 1990s have been depicted as a reformulation period for the party as it plotted a strategy to recover from its 1995 disappointments. The period from 1996 to 1999 reflects the increased pressure for action on the foreigner issue as the FPÖ framed it through linkages to crime and insecurity in preparation for its campaign of 1999. The enormous increase to the high level of activity on the issue in 1996 represents a 440 percent increase over the activity of the previous administration (table 7.2). The party consolidation and the refocusing of its message in preparations for the 1999 campaign appear to have worked to bring legislative action on immigration. The mainstream parties undertook aggressive action in the mid-1990s culminating in a desperate attempt to demonstrate its commitment to resolving problems of foreigners in Austria in the election year of 1999. The trend in ever-increasing numbers of legislative initiatives during the time frame investigated suggests that some credit goes to the FPÖ for bringing changes on its key legislative issue. The increase observed corresponds to case-study evidence showing that the party became increasingly professionalized throughout this period, honing its message to achieve maximum appeal. The correlations observed between the case evidence and the empirical findings indicate that the policy efficacy of

186

●

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties Table 7.2 Change from One Administration to the Next Austria

% change

11/1990–11/1994 11/1994–1/1996 11/1996–10/1999 10/1999–7/2002*

— ↓47.4% ↑440% ↑14.8%

* indicates data collected for 2002 only through July. Source: legislative initiatives collected from the Bundesgesetzblätter archives of the Austrian Nationalrat, shown by governmental administration.

the FPÖ was markedly greater in the second half of the 1990s. As the party fine-tuned its identity-based message, the level of legislative responsiveness appears to have increased substantially. Such a correlation between radical right-wing party consolidation and increased legislative activity on immigration suggests that the FPÖ played a role in bringing about some of these policy changes. Conclusions The Austrian case provides an example where a favorable cultural context of repressed identity issues and openings in the political party spectrum where mainstream parties had converged in the center under consensus government provided unique opportunities for the FPÖ. The party was able to take advantage of existing circumstances at precisely the time when the identity issues were being brought out into public discussion for the first time since the postwar settlement through the Waldheim Affair. The party leader that came to power at this point in the party’s development combined critical elements of charisma, political skill, and intelligence. He created an image for himself and one for the party that could easily adapt to changing circumstances. Through this image the party was able to easily fill the void of political opposition caused by the convergence of the mainstream parties in their postwar consociational partnership. As a result of these conditions, the party proved able to assert its will in many areas of politics. The Freedom Party set the precedent for utilizing real popular concerns and funneling them through the immigration issue. Yet the difference in the Austria case, as well as in the German one, is that the issue was framed using identity justifications rather than economic ones. This worked especially well in the Austrian case because it has never come to terms with its experience of the Second World War.

CHAPTER 8

Peripheral Parties are Making Changes

T

he main finding of this book is that peripheral parties matter in unorthodox ways. They do not have to be sitting in parliaments to bring about substantial changes. Successful peripheral parties of the radical right wing appear to be listening more carefully to what their domestic population is saying than do the mainstream parties. They are learning to operate within given institutional constraints in order to make the most of the opportunities available to them for influence. They are finding their voice and bringing their message to bear at various levels of government. This investigation has tested new techniques for evaluating the impact of peripheral parties and concluded that they are having substantial effects at agenda, institutional, and policy levels of impact. There is no single winning formula that applies to all radical right-wing parties. Different national contexts combine with a diverse set of opportunity structures to produce the environment in which radical right-wing parties operate. However, common to all is the need to reinvent themselves in the 1980s and 1990s to get away from fascism and to position themselves as legitimate parties of government. Strong leadership has proven an important advantage in this process of consolidation. The radical right-wing parties have to varying degrees impacted the politics of West European countries. Their ability to have maximum impact depends upon various factors, the most important of which have been isolated and evaluated in this study. Peripheral parties are taking action and their effects have been negligently underestimated in most studies of political parties. They

188

●


Table 8.1 Comparison of Opportunity Structures

Innovative Influence Party Organized Powerful Position Spatial Niche Leadership

CrossNational Fascists

CrossNational Enterpreneurs

CrossNational Bandwagonners

National Front

Republicans

DVU

NPD

FPÖ

weak weak weak weak moderate

strong variable strong strong strong

strong moderate variable moderate variable

strong strong moderate strong strong

moderate weak weak weak weak

weak weak weak weak weak

weak weak weak weak weak

strong strong strong strong strong

have often been characterized as sideline observers rather than as important political actors. The tendency to dismiss them not simply as opposition but as marginal opposition has been ubiquitous. However, this investigation has found evidence of peripheral parties of the radical right wing that are bringing about changes in popular discourse on issues, in the behavior and strategy of other political parties, and in the policy initiatives that are going forward at national levels of government across Western Europe today. Factors in Radical Right-Wing Party Impact The way radical right-wing parties confront their opportunity structures determines their ability to have an impact. Institutions constrain radical right-wing opportunities. However, resourceful radical right-wing parties also affect their institutional environment. Such inventive parties find openings in their environment and find ways to maximize their effectiveness despite factors that stand against them. Several characteristics for radical right-wing party effectiveness were hypothesized in chapter 3. A summary of the findings is presented in table 8.1. These features are reviewed below to briefly outline the important distinctions that account for the classifications presented of strong, moderate, weak, or variable indications. Factors Across Western Europe Innovative Influence The fascist-legacy type of radical right-wing party outlined in chapter 4 demonstrates weakness in its ability to have innovative influence. As defined in that chapter, fascist-legacy parties refuse to adapt their rhetoric and objectives to the winning formula of populism and

Peripheral Parties

●

189

economic arguments against immigrants. Instead, parties of this type remain tied to racism and purely identity-based arguments against foreigners in their societies. They have not reinvented themselves and they appear resistant to changing their style over time. By contrast, the entrepreneurial-party type provides the model for trying new strategies and recreating their identity, mostly in the 1980s. These parties saw the advantage in changing their orientation and tactics. They skillfully went about reinventing themselves with populist appeals. Finally, the third party type, the bandwagoners, emerged largely in the early to mid-1990s following the pattern established by the entrepreneurs. These parties also exhibit strong characteristics of innovative influence, although they are copied from the entrepreneurs. Party Organization Weak party organization has plagued the advancement of fascist-legacy parties. They often lack cohesion and often find themselves the victim of social stigma, which hampers their ability to openly organize and recruit members. They fail to demonstrate party dynamism and to grow their organizations effectively. The entrepreneurial type varies in terms of its organizational strength and coherence. The French National Front and Austrian Freedom Party fall into this category and as discussed at length both are organizationally strong. However, other parties such as the Norwegian Progress Party, the Danish Progress Party, and the Dutch Center Democrats have had periods of organizational strength but also have position shifts and loose networks internally at other times. Therefore this type varies in its organizational strength. The bandwagoner type has moderate organizational strength. As these parties develop in the mid- to late 1990s, much of their structural expansion remains to be seen. Power Position The fascist-legacy type parties have been effectively marginalized within the political party system. The have had little opportunity to hold government office or to work together with other parties. The entrepreneurs have been strong and effective at gaining seats at various levels of public office from national legislatures as in the Austrian, Italian, Danish, and Italian cases, for example. They also have regional strongholds in France and Belgium. The bandwagoner parties have achieved mixed results in this area. The Schill Party in Germany has had spurts of enormous success in some German states in recent years. Also the Dutch

190

●


List (Pim Fortuyn) Party and the Swiss People’s Party have participated at the national level of government in positions of junior partnership and power. Spatial Relationships The fascists have been isolated on the political fringe. Only the entrepreneurial parties have had robust successes in altering their respective political party systems. They have been able to shift the politics of immigration farther to the right, as they have been able to advocate and largely achieve increasingly restrictive politics directed against foreigners. Bandwagoner parties have had moderate influence on spatial relationships. Some have been largely relativized in terms of their influence on other political parties, such as the French National Republican Movement and British National Democrats. On the other hand, several of the others including the Danish Progress Party and List (Pim Fortuyn) in the Netherlands have arguably altered the way other parties respond to the foreigner issue. In the Dutch case, the List Party leader Pim Fortuyn was increasingly outspoken about the condition of too many immigrants to sustain in his country. His rhetoric fueled the election campaign in 2002 and caused mainstream parties to react by admitting that the immigrant situation posed problems for the country. Leadership Strong leaders are admired and sought after for the fascist-legacy party type. These parties tend to be the most traditionally authoritarian and hierarchical of the party types outlined here. Such parties require strong leadership. However, their ability to recruit and sustain strong leaders over time has often been subject to pressures of the postwar European consensus that guards against resurgent fascism. Credible leaders have often avoided association with such parties. Entrepreneurial parties generally have strong, recognizable leaders including the Belgian Dewinter, the French Le Pen, the Austrian Haider, and the Italian Fini. The bandwagoners vary in their leadership strength with recognizable figures in the Swiss leader Blöcher, the Danish leader Rasmüssen, and the former Dutch leader Fortuyn. However, Bruno Mégret has been largely ineffective at the helm of the National Republican Movement in France, and the British National Democrats do not have a prominent recognizable leader.

Peripheral Parties

●

191

Factors in France, Germany, and Austria Innovative Influence The peripheral parties that adapt themselves to changing conditions experience greater success than those that do not. Both the French and Austrian radical right-wing parties learned from their mistakes. They tested new strategies, tried new approaches, and continued to modify their platforms and the rhetoric that they employed to articulate them. Such changes were always based on perceived shifts in the key concerns of the population. Both parties experienced struggles and a lack of coherent direction in their early years. As a result, they continued to change their message, their image, and their tactics to adjust to their dynamic environment. Haider has been called a chameleon, and Le Pen learned to “ask the right questions.” Their success came from their innovation and their ability to continually rejuvenate themselves. By contrast, in the German case the parties of the radical right-wing continue to articulate old messages about pan-Germanism and nationalism. More than in the other two cases, the German parties express themselves through references to the past rather than offering insights for the future. They have experienced peaks and valleys over the course of their political development; however unlike the other two cases they do not show a consistent trajectory of increasing their position. Instead their influence comes in spurts. Their electoral fortunes appear to be at the mercy of the mainstream parties, in particular the mainstream right, as radical right success increases when the mainstream right comes to power. Yet as the mainstream right moves to co-opt radical right issues, the radical right-wing fortunes decline. The German radical right-wing has not been innovative in carving out its own niche. Instead, it appears to be supported by voters only as a protest option, not as a legitimate party of government. Party Organization The peripheral parties that function as professional party machines have greater success. All radical right-wing parties of the latter half of the twentieth century have experienced instability in their process of development. Those parties that regressed to looser social-movement activity in their periods of decline, or those that had their members turn to militant, extremist behavior as party fortunes receded, struggled to regain legitimacy. In particular, the German parties were prone to such cycles.

192

●


On the other hand, parties that worked on modifying their party structure or their platform under duress came through the difficult times with more consolidated parties. The Austrians restructured creating greater centralization in their party organization when facing difficult times in the mid-1990s. The French recruited several new elites below Le Pen with fresh, intellectual perspectives when their party experienced stagnation in the early and mid-1980s. Professional parties have connections to think-tanks, intellectual circles, and prominent individuals. Both the French and Austrian cases demonstrate such ties between radical right-wing parties and legitimizing groups. Additionally, highly organized parties have experienced and welltrained staffs. They produce journals, newspapers, and websites to disseminate their message widely. The German case shows underdeveloped print media and a lack of access to most other media. German radical rightwing parties had simplistic brochure-style campaign materials and tabloid newspapers. German parties are the most prone to taking to the streets and shouting their message in demonstrations. This appears to have been less effective than the tools used by more-professional parties of the radical right to gain legitimacy for themselves and for their issue positions. Power Position Peripheral parties can be effective outside of national government. However, seats at various levels of government held consistently over time, appear to widen the potential support base and lend credibility to the parties as parties of government. For the Austrian FPÖ, being a coalition partner may have a domesticating effect. For instance, the flamboyant and controversial party leader Jörg Haider did not get the satisfaction of becoming the vice-chancellor of his party’s coalition government arrangement. Because of his inflammatory rhetoric and questionable sentiments regarding National Socialism, he had to run the party from behind the scenes and leave the National Council. In some respects, the party’s wings were clipped by joining the coalition. They had to cooperate and temper some of their positions in order to be a partner in government. For the National Front in France, its “one-seat-at-a-time” approach appears to have led to gradual increases in credibility and incremental changes often beginning at local levels of government. Certainly, having seats, speaking on the floor of legislatures, sitting on municipal councils, and all offices held afforded an opportunity to spread the party’s message. It was able to make alliances at local levels at various times.

Peripheral Parties

●

193

However, such opportunities have remained localized. The National Front typically does not have deputies in the national legislature, and therefore it must also employ nontraditional tactics to spread its message. One tool for the National Front to increase its presence has been the Internet. It has a sophisticated website and updates its web pages regularly. It utilizes a variety of media to appeal to a wide array of people. It has the most publications of the radical right-wing parties, from books to journals to newspapers, and the quality of its print media is professional. The National Front orchestrates media opportunities and its elites never shrink from the opportunity to speak on television or radio. The party does not operate as a traditional political party and it seeks alternative mechanisms through which to reach its audience. The German radical right holds few power positions. Its holds statelevel seats in legislatures; however these seats tend to be lost quickly in subsequent elections. The party members tend to backslide toward militant activism when the parties fail to maintain their positions. As a result of its outsider status in politics, the German radical right has not been able to establish its credibility. It receives sporadic opposition votes but this has not been enough to enable it to wield much influence. Spatial Relationships The evidence of the case studies suggests that mainstream party apathy on the immigration issue presents the greatest opportunity for the radical right-wing parties. Where the mainstream parties fail to act or act ineffectively, the radical right-wing finds openings and can carve out a niche on the political spectrum. An interesting finding is that the mainstream right position matters more in radical right-wing success in some instances and the mainstream left position in others. For instance, in Germany the radical right experiences success and finds more opportunities to increase its support when the CDU-CSU governs. The radical right-wing appears to feed off of the momentum to restrict immigration put forth by the mainstream right parties in Germany. When they fail, the radical right increases its support. On the other hand in France, the radical right fills a vacuum on the right side of the spectrum, when the socialists are in power. In the French case, when the spectrum is shifted to the left, the National Front has been able to be competitive in attempts to shift the spectrum back to the right. The Austrian case is unique, as the FPÖ has positioned itself as opposition to the grand coalition. The Austrian parties were neither left nor right but converged at the center when the radical right began to increase its success.

194

●


Leadership Strong charismatic leadership proves critical for success. The two cases that demonstrate this variable are more successful (France and Austria) and the one that lacks it is not very successful. Many reasons appear to account for this. Strong leaders have been able to hold radical right-wing parties together in most instances of party fragmentation. Peripheral parties struggle in the process of finding issue space, developing their position, and battling other parties for constituents. Their marginal position makes them more vulnerable to these difficulties than established parties with a solid support base and clearly demarcated ideological position. Strong leadership can generate centralization under challenging conditions. Radical right-wing leaders have been able to foster a cult of personality, bringing attention to their parties as they bring attention to themselves. In the French and Austrian cases, leaders have made people want to watch them and stop to listen to them and this has been important in their ability to reach the population.

Additional Factors Two additional factors became clear in the research, a Nazi past and jus sanguinis citizenship laws. Both the German and Austrian cases demonstrate that the existence of a Nazi past provides a residual base of support for xenophobia. Unlike the French case, where the immigration issue is created and introduced by the National Front, in the German and Austrian cases, the radical right needs only to stir existing sentiments. Such latent xenophobia provides an advantage in the German and Austrian cases. Still the German parties fail to achieve greater success for the other reasons articulated above. Citizenship based on jus sanguinis or kinship rather than place of birth creates psychological difficulties for its people when confronted with accommodating outsiders. The tradition of having membership in the political community based on blood ties to that community proves difficult to revise with legal changes and amendments. Such an understanding of who belongs and who does not is not simply a state of mind but involves real, unchangeable physical attributes. Where citizenship based on blood ties exists in Germany and Austria, the politics of immigration involves identity. Foreigners are not identified as Germans or Austrians and they can never be considered a full part of the political community until the notion that kinship entitles one to membership has been replaced. Yet whether or not such a fundamental organizing

Peripheral Parties

●

195

principle of a society can simply be revised on paper remains to be seen. On the other hand, the French have a citizenship law based on jus soli, which is based on place of birth. In such a context where the children of immigrants automatically become citizens, the arguments against immigrants must be framed differently. In France, the anti-immigrant position tends to be framed in terms of economic competition with immigrants, as this has resonance with people. Identity angles would probably be dismissed as racist more quickly in such cases, as the French identity does not have the same meaning as it would were it based on blood. In their counter-attacks against the radical right, mainstream parties would do well to consider the basis of their citizenship law as it defines who the in-groups and out-groups in society are. Mainstream parties that try to address the socioeconomic symptoms of right-wing radicalism do not treat the disease in countries that define their in-group based on kinship ties. In the Austrian case, for example, the country was not experiencing especially difficult economic or social problems as the FPÖ increased its support base. As the mainstream right attempted to address the economy and other tangible problems, the radical right continued to win voters away from them. This was because the radical right was talking about the Austrian identity and the mainstream parties were talking about the objective consequences of immigration. The German case, however, shows the mainstream right adopting the identity-based angle that provided political space for the radical right in Austria. The German mainstream right pursued both economic as well as identity approaches to antiforeigner sentiment. By combining both perspectives, the German mainstream parties proved effective overall at taking issue space away from the radical right wing. This provides another reason for the relative failure of radical right-wing parties in Germany. In other words, the mainstream right and left have been careful not to distance themselves too substantially from ideas of jus sanguinis citizenship although admitting needs for qualified foreign workers today and in the future given the demographic deficit of an aging population and fewer workers paying into social-welfare benefits. Modeling Radical Right-Wing Impact The general European model of radical right-wing party influence required some alteration in its application to the three cases. However as table 8.2 reveals, overall the model appears to be a good fit. The model suggests that the radical right parties create their issues rather than

196

●


Table 8.2 Comparison of Model Fitness

Creating Influence Entrepreneurial type Reinvention Climate of Fear

CrossNational Fascists

Cross-National Entrepreneurs

Cross-National Bandwagoners

National Front

Republicans

DVU

NPD

FPö

weak weak weak moderate

strong strong strong strong

strong moderate non-applicable moderate


weak moderate weak weak

weak weak weak weak

weak weak weak weak


simply respond to the ones that are already there. It posits that entrepreneurial-party types are more successful than fascist-legacy types because they utilize what they have in nontraditional ways to make the most of their opportunities. The model also contends that parties must reinvent themselves, always adapting to fit changing circumstances. Finally, the climate of fear, which is more imagined than real, indicates successful influence of right-wing radical parties. It is through fear that they mobilize their support. Entrepreneurial-type parties provide the basis for the model. The four criteria presented in the model reflect creativity, adaptation, and the ability to change strategically. These features separate entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties from other types and present a winning formula of factors. A General West European Model Creating Influence Fascist-legacy parties do not strategically evaluate the political climate and construct their own opportunities to have influence. Instead, they remain grounded in their defence of traditional values and society showing little evidence of progressive strategy. On the other hand, entrepreneurial parties introduce the immigration issue into debates in their societies. If they do not bring the issue forward for the first time, they reintroduce it using new language and tactics. This ability to invent an issue despite objective socioeconomic indicators suggesting that the presence of immigrants does not pose imminent threats is a hallmark of the entrepreneurial parties. The bandwagoners imitate this successful issue-introduction maneuver in attempts to follow the proven path demonstrated by the entrepreneurial-party accomplishments of the 1980s.

Peripheral Parties

●

197

Entrepreneurial Type The typology in chapter 4 uses entrepreneurship to separate the fascistlegacy parties from the other two types. The fascist-legacy parties are clearly not entrepreneurial as they do not behave strategically and fail to exhibit qualities of inventiveness and improvement. The entrepreneurs earn their name because they do demonstrate these characteristics in the 1980s and the bandwagoners adopt the style and features of the entrepreneurs in the 1990s. Reinvention A failure to recreate themselves has hindered attempts by fascist-legacy parties to enlarge their membership base and to establish themselves as legitimate contender parties. They have generally not proven resilient due to their commitment to old ideology and methods without openness to trying new approaches. Their efficacy is expected to remain limited and their position marginal largely for this reason. On the other hand, the winning formula was developed by the entrepreneurial parties of the 1980s. They assessed their context, learned from mistakes of the past, and went through a process of re-imaging their party to establish credibility, gain positions, and win more votes and support. The bandwagoners attempted to imitate the style of the entrepreneurial parties from their founding. Therefore, rather than going through a reinvention process, bandwagoners form and initially adopt the winning formula of the entrepreneurial parties.

Climate of Fear The climate of fear has been utilized by all three party types. Still, the entrepreneurs have been the most effective and have developed the strongest climate of fear. This party type undertook its promotion of fear of foreigners in order to find a way to use the immigration issue as a funnel for other popular concerns. They have relied heavily on their ability to stir public anxieties in order to find their support base. On the other hand, the other two party types show only moderate degrees of the climate of fear. The bandwagoners have not needed to rely on fear to the degree that the entrepreneurs did. The issue niche had already been carved out in the 1980s by the entrepreneurs, and the bandwagoners, while they do utilize it, do not need to devote as much energy to perpetuating the fear; it has already been firmly rooted. The fascist-legacy

198

●


parties also did not consciously mobilize fear to win support. They show only moderate measures of the climate of fear, as it is not an objective design of theirs to generate it. Instead, they rely upon the idea of fundamental racial hierarchies and promote ideas of the superiority of the native race. They do not feel the need to make their identity-based argument more relevant by attempting to attach it to contemporary social and economic issues as the entrepreneurs do.

Modeling for France, Germany, and Austria Creating Influence The three cases suggest three slightly different processes of influence creation and varying degrees of impact. In the French case, the National Front introduced the immigration issue. The issue was not a concern prior to the party’s breakthrough but it became one soon afterwards. This exhibits clear influence creation, as the central issue appears on the agenda where it did not previously exist and arguably would not exist absent the National Front. In the German case, the parties did not play such a dominant role. The German radical right joins discussions of the German identity and policy on asylum seekers already occurring in the 1970s and 1980s. The radical right advances identity-based arguments and advocates greater German pride in national history; however the mainstream parties simultaneously do the same. The German radical right uses more inflammatory language than mainstream parties, yet it is a matter of degree. Given the aversion on the part of the German populace to appear racist or antidemocratic, the highly seditious language used by the radical right-wing parties only further serves to delegitimize and isolate them on the political margins. Finally, in the Austrian case the radical right wing reintroduces the immigration issue through bringing about discussions of the postwar Austrian identity after the Waldheim Affair. Austrian identity politics never disappeared completely after the war, although the Austrians adopted a new identity to distance themselves from their Nazi past. Haider changed identity politics in additional ways by reintroducing the issue of immigration as related to Austrian identity and “Austria first” rather than traditional pan-Germanism. Entrepreneurial Type The case evidence suggests that entrepreneurial parties prove more effective than those that remain tied to the fascist legacy. The German case

Peripheral Parties

●

199

provides evidence of parties that have remained closely tied to their Nazi roots. The DVU and NPD experienced limited amounts of success and it tended to be short-lived. The Republican Party made the most progress in getting away from Nazism, yet when its popularity waned it tended to radicalize in attempts to win back support. German radical right-wing parties do not exhibit characteristics of entrepreneurial parties. The French and Austrian radical right-wing parties took more risks in testing new strategies. They learned through trial and error, making continued progress in the period under investigation, experiencing minor setbacks but generally showing ever greater influence. Reinvention In France and Austria, where the parties proactively change their image and message several times in response to contemporary trends, adopting the language of economic anti-immigrant positions in the 1990s to broaden their support bases, the parties have greater success. They moved away from militant extremists and worked to re-image themselves as parties of government. They did this through cultivating the image of their leaders and through associations with intellectuals and prominent figures. The German parties failed to cultivate new images. They continued to rely on young men with shaved heads and wearing combat boots to hand out flyers and to staff their party offices. They often hold demonstration marches in which the same young men wave party flags and shout slogans. They have not tempered their language and continue to speak harshly of foreigners. In short, the German radical right wing has not been able to present itself as a legitimate party of government. It continues to appear as a band of thugs rather than as a party that could be at home in the Bundestag. Climate of Fear The climate of fear has been utilized in all three cases to mobilize support for the radical right-wing parties. The parties in all three cases have been able to either generate new xenophobia, in France, or to play upon existing racism, in Germany and Austria. All three cases show that the radical right-wing parties have been able to scapegoat foreigners in their societies. They have taken problems in their societies and pointed the finger of blame at foreigners living among them. In this endeavor, parties in all three cases have been successful. They have contributed to public anxieties about foreigners through their discourse and

200

●


propaganda, so that governments have no choice but to respond with proposed solutions or they will face losing office. The main difference among the parties in the three cases is that the German parties do not create a new climate, as the French party does. The German parties also do not stir fears that have long been dormant, as the Austrian party does. Instead, the German parties contribute to a climate of fear that already exists, feeding upon longstanding prejudices and popular concerns. The German radical right-wing parties certainly join the discussions about foreigners causing problems for German society and posing challenges for German identity, yet they are not the first to initiate such discourse and they are not alone in perpetuating it. Comparing the Impact of Right-Wing Radical Parties Aggregate cross-national analysis and detailed analysis of specific cases produced mixed conclusions about the impact of the radical right parties (table 8.3). Cross-national German analysis found strongest results on the agenda level of analysis, too much complexity to draw conclusions on the institutional level, and some moderate impact at the policy level. By contrast, the case-study findings presented the strongest evidence of policy-level impacts, strong evidence in two cases at the institutional level, and weakest results on the agenda media indicator. Yet such differences do not diminish the importance of the impact evidence found. Instead, different lenses have been applied in this study and the pictures that emerge emphasize divergent factors and use a variety of indicators. The cross-national lens highlights generalizable conclusions. It uses statistics and broad groupings of parties to produce findings. On the other hand, the case-study lens pays more attention to context and details. A process for each party can be followed and facts combine with the environment to provide explanations that at times override immediately apparent assessments. In other words, these two approaches

Table 8.3 Comparison of Impact

Agenda level Institutional level Policy level

Cross National

National Front

German Parties

FPÖ

stong complex moderate

moderate strong strong

moderate weak strong

strong strong strong

Peripheral Parties

●

201

have applied alternative techniques for analysis and come to varied conclusions. Yet, the approaches focus on different factors and therefore such results are not terribly surprising. Instead, the findings suggest that further research should work to test and refine the cross-national data but also to provide more context for the various parties discussed in chapter 4. Deeper probing holds promise for reconciling and explaining such inconsistencies that result from applying various techniques in the analysis.

Cross National Findings Agenda Level Trends observed in survey research suggest that radical right-wing parties across Western Europe succeed in stirring public fears, and mobilizing racism and xenophobia. The data analyzed in chapter 4 shows generally high and increasing levels of anti-immigrant sentiment from 1991–1997. It also finds that on average 15 percent of West Europeans find people of another nationality or race living among them “disturbing.” It appears that despite all of the efforts to promote tolerance and assimilation in the 1990s, culminating in the 1997 European Union “Year against Racism,” the problem has persisted and escalated. In fact, the particular presence of entrepreneurial radical right-wing parties correlates with conditions where more than 40 percent of the populations of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and France classified themselves as racist according to the data analyzed. This led to the conclusion in chapter 4 that radical right-wing parties are affecting popular discourse and opinion on the issue of immigrants. They appear to be having strong impacts on this level, as popular opinion has grown increasingly xenophobic during the period under investigation. Institutional Level The findings at the institutional level prompted the conclusion that a linear relationship between the spatial positioning of the radical rightwing parties and the mainstream parties, and other parties across Western Europe does not exist. Instead a more-complex polynomial relationship is evident. From the statistical analysis of data on party positioning on the immigration issue from 1990 to 2000 across western European Union countries for which data was available, I found that a complex relationship exists. In other words, the data analysis suggests

202

●


that other parties adjust their positions as the radical right-wing parties move farther to the left or right. In particular, the strongest relationships were found between mainstream parties and radical right-wing parties. This makes sense, as these parties have the most to lose by giving spatial ground to the radical challenges on the fringe of their issue position. However, other parties do not always make adjustments simultaneously or in reaction to the radical right-wing parties and their moves. I argue that this is also not terribly surprising, as parties choose their battles. This means that during elections years, for instance, mainstream parties may prove more likely to react to radical right-wing parties than they are at other times when there is less of an immediate threat to their issue space. Such arguments provide pressing questions for future crossnational analysis of spatial relationships between parties in the party system.

Policy Level Findings at the policy level were not as robust as the agenda-level results and therefore I have classified them as indicative of moderate impact. The policy objective of radical right-wing parties is to promote more restrictive policy initiatives on immigration while reducing the number of initiatives aimed at increasing tolerance and combating racism. The data shows both moderate increases and decreases in both types of policy initiative over the course of two parliamentary administrations beginning with the fourth sitting European Parliament in 1994. Higher volumes of immigration initiatives, I argue, suggest that more restrictive measures are moving forward while the lower volume of initiatives on racism implies less of a priority for combating racism. Yet the trend evidence is somewhat inconclusive. I also evaluate the composition of the European Parliament to assess the potential for policy-level impact and argue that the radical rightwing parties have generally increased their number of seats held over the five successive parliamentary administrations beginning in 1979. From the first to the fifth European Parliaments, the radical right-wing has increased its number of seats from twenty-one seats to twenty-six seats, and by considering bridge parties the figure for the fifth administration rises to thirty-six seats. I also found evidence from my personal interviews with members of radical right-wing parties in the European Parliament that they view this arena as holding great potential for an influential cross-national radical right-wing association.

Peripheral Parties

●

203

Country Case-Study Findings Agenda Level In comparing the evidence from newspaper data across the three cases, it appears that the French radical right-wing may have had greater influence overall in terms of getting immigration talked about more than in the other two cases (figure 8.1). The volume of articles per year is higher in France than in the other two countries. As the National Front continued to press the issue before the public, it appears to have had an effect in setting the agenda so that the immigration was often before the public for consideration. Because the National Front receives credit for introducing this issue in the first place, the fact that the issue has become widely discussed marks the party’s success. The German and Austrian radical right-wing parties appear to have increased their relative efficacy over time. As the media volume count reveals, in 1999 both cases show rising attention to the immigration issue in the press. The data in these two cases suggest that the radicalright wing parties have taken advantage of more-favorable opportunity structures for them at the end of the 1990s than they found in the early 1990s. In the Austrian case, the FPÖ underwent renovation and increased centralization in the mid-1990s. This may have contributed to its ability to draw more attention to immigration several years thereafter. 1400 Newspaper articles

1200 1000 800 600 400 200

20 02

20 00

19 98

19 96

19 94

19 92

19 90

0

Years France Figure 8.1

Germany

Austria

Comparison of Newspaper Coverage of the Immigration Issue 1990–2002

Note: Figures from 2002 reflect only data collected through July. Source: Articles collected from Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine, and Kurier.

204

●


The German volume actually surpasses that of the French case in the year 2000. However, as the German mainstream parties can hardly be differentiated from the radical right-wing parties in their position on immigration, the effect observed cannot be entirely attributed to the radical right. The radical right-wing in Germany continued to be fragmented and unprofessional in its legislative behavior at state levels in the late 1990s. Where the radical right-wing parties in Germany were having influence, it mainly involved attracting protest voters during short periods of frustration with mainstream action rather than amassing a stable support base. For example, in the DVU campaign of 1998–1999 it used a slogan calling for voters to “Make it a Protest Vote.” The party recognized that it carried a stigma and that it was not viewed as a viable party of government. Still, the DVU was able to win modest support thereby sending a signal to other parties that the public was frustrated and wanted action. Institutional Impact Elites of radical right-wing parties indicated in personal interviews that they counted it a measure of their success when mainstream parties had to adjust their positions on immigration to be more restrictive because of the radical right. In all three cases, such shifting to the right occurs. In the French and German cases, the mainstream parties start out on the offensive and remain there. The French mainstream parties watched with surprise as the National Front gained power and offices from the early 1980s. They practiced the strategy of taking action on the immigration issue to steal issue space away from the radical right. In Germany, the Kohl government started to actively address the foreigner issue during the time of exile for the NPD and even before the Republicans and the DVU, at least in its party form, came onto the scene. As the German radical right-wing parties began to stir popular sentiment with their slogans and rhetoric, the mainstream right responded by taking aggressive action on the issue. The German mainstream right appears to be the most successful of all cases examined here at taking back issue space lost to the radical right-wing parties in subsequent elections. The radical right-wing parties rise and then fall quickly in Germany, whereas by contrast they have been able to establish themselves and then stabilize in the other two cases. Policy Impact The policy indicators reveal that impact on one level need not always correspond to impact on another level.

Peripheral Parties

●

205

For instance, France has a bimodal distribution in its volume of legislative initiatives. The first peak comes in the middle of the 1990s and the second peak in 2001 (figure 8.2). A presidential election occurred in France in 1995 and both legislative and presidential elections were held in 2002. Both peaks in France had to do with election campaigning and the centrality of the immigration issue for campaigns. This is due in no small measure to the high profile campaigning on the issue by the National Front. Whereas the German volume surpassed that of the Austrian case in terms of agenda-setting as measured by media, the Austrians surpassed the Germans and came close to the level of volume observed in France with legislative initiatives. The Austrian legislature took more and more action on the issue throughout the period examined. This indicates that the constant adjustments in FPÖ strategy appear to have paid off in terms of putting pressure on governments to consider immigration initiatives. The German legislature began the 1990s with some of the highest volumes of immigration initiatives each year. During that time the radical right-wing parties, as well as the mainstream right parties, were able to take advantage of changing conditions such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and asylum seekers coming into Germany at high rates to focus 45


40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

France

Figure 8.2

Germany

20 02

20 00

19 98

19 96

19 94

19 92

19 90

0

Austria

Comparison of Legislative Volume on the Immigration Issue 1990–2002

Note: Figures from 2002 reflect only data collected through July. Source: Legislative initiatives collected from the French Journal Parlamentsdokumentation, DIP, and the Austrian Bundesgesetzblätter.

officiel,

the

German

206

●


national attention on the immigration issue. In 1997 the German case shows the highest levels of legislative activity on immigration of all three cases. Then in 2000, the German level increases to parity with the French volume and falls just below the surging Austrian volume. Although the German radical right-wing parties along with mainstream parties appear able to rally sporadic increases in legislative activity on the issue, they are unable to sustain steady amounts. Instead the German pattern reflects the volatility of the issue in the German case. Peripheral Parties Do Matter In Unorthodox Ways Various indicators provide evidence that peripheral parties are having impacts across West European democracies. The most successful parties have found inventive ways to carve out their issue positions and to mobilize their support bases. Such parties have increased their support over time, established their credibility within the party system, and adapted to changing conditions with targeted messages. Although further research is needed on several indicators and at the three levels of impact, this study demonstrates clear impacts of peripheral parties. This book has presented a model of radical right-wing party influence and developed several indicators for measuring radical right-wing party impact. A theoretical framework has been put forward to provide several working assumptions and the logic to support them. Evidence has been examined cross nationally to draw preliminary conclusions. Additionally, in three cases paths have been traced and details have been provided to evaluate the model and impacts using empirical tests plus contextual evidence in order to explain observations. They are Listening Radical right-wing parties claim to articulate what the people want but often are unable to do so for reasons of political correctness, peer pressure, and even legal restriction. This book demonstrates that the radical right used immigration as an omnibus issue through which it could funnel a number of other issue concerns. These parties claimed to address the woes of the day such as unemployment, education-system failures, and social decay by linking these to a main causal factor that they stood vocally against, namely immigration. Radical right-wing parties have been able to take whatever issue is popular at a given time and respond to it by setting themselves up as the populist, protest party opposed to the mainstream parties in power.

Peripheral Parties

●

207

They are Learning Evidence above has demonstrated a learning curve for radical right-wing parties beginning in the mid-1980s. These parties have reinvented themselves in response to the obstacles that they encountered in the first few decades after the Second World War as their message had become somewhat taboo. Today, many radical right-wing parties are having an influence on politics in Western Europe. The countries examined in this study confront increasing xenophobia and racism throughout the 1990s and continuing into the twenty-first century. Mainstream parties have been unable to completely co-opt the issue space of radical right-wing parties, but have come the closest to doing so in the German case. The fact that radical right-wing parties have not faded from the scene reflects their ability to establish and consolidate their position. In this analysis, the best evidence is found in the French and Austrian cases, where the most consolidation of radical right-wing party positions and the greatest amount of differentiation from mainstream parties has been observed. The radical right-wing parties have generally grown stronger and more influential as they have recreated themselves to become increasingly professionalized and consolidated. They have both cultivated new media such as the Internet and changed their strategies to get their message out to wider audiences. The evidence presented has consistently demonstrated trends of increasing efficacy in the French and Austrian cases. Lessons of the postwar period of radical right-wing party failure have been incorporated in the changes made to improve the prospects for their continued success.

They are Seizing Opportunities In the cases where favorable conditions prevail, radical right-wing parties have proven resilient and increasingly significant. Where patterns in the various data examined as indicators of impact show volatility, the figures rebound to increase in subsequent years. This is because these parties opportunistically search for vacuums in the political party system. They have been able to capitalize upon issue space left open by mainstream parties that neglect popular concerns. These parties have experimented with a number of tactics to effectively position themselves and adapt to changing times and political circumstances. They have both distanced themselves from other parties and cultivated relationships with them when thought necessary. They have focused on certain issues and then effectively shifted the language and rhetoric to alter their

208

●


emphasis at various points over the past two decades. They make wise decisions at critical junctures that come their way. They are Taking Action These radical right-wing parties have provided at minimum a nuisance to mainstream parties, with their loud rhetoric calling for more-restrictive policies regarding foreigners. Yet, it appears that they have at best achieved real impacts. They have changed the issues that people talk and worry about. They have seized open issue space on the political spectrum, positioning themselves in opposition and forcing the mainstream parties to respond, albeit inconsistently. They have worked to get laws and policies changed, often doing so unconventionally from outside of the national legislature. This evidence suggests that peripheral parties should not be underestimated, as has typically been the case. Implications for Future Research This project has taken an important step toward qualifying and quantifying the impact of peripheral parties. It has suggested three levels of impact for consideration. Future work should evaluate other indicators, comparing findings with those examined here. Additional attention to discourse, both of interview data and the text of newspaper articles and initiatives will add texture and depth to the analysis. Several previously undeveloped factors were uncovered through the process of this research that promise great insight through future research. For instance, the use of the Internet by peripheral parties as a cost-effective media alternative with potentially wide reach may affect the ability of such parties to campaign and disseminate their message. Also the network of radical right-wing parties across Western Europe and their ability to come together institutionally in the European Parliament may affect their ability to learn from each other and cooperate on issues at the European level. Another application of this research in future work may be to extend application of the model to several East European cases. The radical right-wing parties have gained ground in that region throughout the 1990s. They stand for strong nationalism and often oppose globalization and the European Union as well. They often focus on the politics of identity and restoring national pride. These similarities to in particular the German and Austrian cases should provide interesting comparisons and a good test of the generalizability of the model developed here for Western European radical right-wing parties. More broadly, this work has implications for third-party research and the understanding of the competitiveness and effects of minority parties

Peripheral Parties

●

209

in advanced industrial democracies. The ideas of peripheral-party impact should be applied to other marginal parties and across various electoral systems to broaden the scope of these findings. Impacts of third parties and other peripheral parties should be measured in other countries and on both sides of the spectrum of political ideologies. Do Peripheral Parties Succeed Where Democratic Deficits Exist? The parties that reinvented themselves the most successfully combined several traits. First, they listened to the people. They gave their attention to the demands articulated by the public and they framed the immigration issue around those problems. If the population was concerned about unemployment, then the radical right could claim that immigrants took jobs away from natives. If the public was alarmed about declining educational standards in schools, then the radical right could argue that immigrants slow down the progress of teaching and learning in the classrooms. The winning formula has much to do with being perceptive, knowing what the people are concerned about, and then strategically relating those concerns to the presence of foreigners. This finding has important implications for democratic theory. Democracies aim to represent their people, and this study has found that mainstream parties often fail to do so. Under such circumstances, peripheral parties take advantage of openings in the political space where the mainstream parties fail to or refuse to act. This affords the more marginal parties an opportunity to step up and respond to public concerns. A political party in a democracy is supposed to respond to the changing preferences of the people. Yet, mainstream parties often operate with their own strategic agenda. They tend to function more as business units working toward the goal of growing their support base to increase their power rather than to provide for better representation of the public interest. My work has found that radical right-wing parties have found success by filling the gap in representation and by listening to the people. Where elites are pursuing policies without asking their citizens what they think of such policies, peripheral parties stand to gain. The relationship between popular demands and a democratic response by political parties that represent the interests of the people appears to be weak if not lacking altogether in the advanced democracies of Western Europe today. The danger is that where the people cease to be sovereign in a democracy, the democracy ceases to be democratic.


Appendices

Appendix 1 Correlation Data for Socioeconomic Factors and Immigration

Switzerland Rank Right vote 21 13 7 2 20

Tessin Basel-Landschaft Nidwalden Bern Thurgau

unemployment rt 1 Tesin 2 Genf 3 Waadt 4 Wallis 5 Jura immigration 1 Zurich 2 Genf 3 Waadt 4 Bern 5 Aargau

18.5 10.4 8 6.5 5.2 7.8 7.8 7.2 6.9 6.6 12616 10975 9456 6066 3349

France rank right vote 21 1 8 13 22

PROVENCE ALPRES COTE D’AZUR ALSACE CHAMPGNE ARDENNE LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON RHONE ALPES

23.9 21.0 19.2 19.0 18.4

212

●

Werner Reutter unemployment rt 13 LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 17 NORD PAS DE CALAIS 21 PROVENCE ALPRES COTE D’AZUR 2 AQUITAINE 9 CORSE

12.9 11.8 11 10.79 10.1

immigration 12 ILE DE FRANCE 22 RHONE ALPES 21 PROVENCE ALPRES COTE D’AZUR 17 NORD PAS DE CALAIS 15 LORRAINE 13 LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON

1E⫹06 425300 299300 166000 151600 133200

Germany Rank Right vote 1 13 3 2 7

Baden-Wuerttemberg Sachsen Berlin Bayern Hessen

unemployment rt 14 Sachsen-Anhalt 8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 16 Thuringen 13 Sachsen 4 Brandenbrug immigration 10 Nordrhein-Westfalen 1 Baden-Wuerttemberg 2 Bayern 9 Niedersachsen 7 Hessen

4.2 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 16.5 16.1 15 14.4 14.2 184958 178968 170340 151103 88423

Appendix

●

213

Appendix 2 Correlations Far right Far right Mainstream Right Mainstream Left Liberal / Center Green

Main. Rgt.

1.0000 0.2726 0.2591 0.0350 0.0977

0.2726 1.0000 0.2512 ⫺0.1559 0.3052

Main. Left

Liberal / Ctr.

Green

0.2591 0.2512 1.0000 ⫺0.1637 0.4311

0.0350 ⫺0.1559 ⫺0.1637 1.0000 ⫺0.2940

0.0977 0.3052 0.4311 ⫺0.2940 1.0000

CORRELATION SCATTERPLOT MATRIX 9.5

Far right

8.5 7.5 6.5 8 7

MSR

6 5 6.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 8

MSL

6

L/C

4 4 3 G

2 1 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5 5

6

7

82.5

4 5 6

4 5 6 7 8 1

2

3

4

214

Werner Reutter

●

Appendix 3 Bivariate Scatterplots Bivariate Fit of MSR by Farright 8

Bivariate Fit of Liberal/Ctr. byFarright 8

7.5 7 6.5

L/C

MSR

7

6

6 5

5.5 4

5 4.5

3 8

8.5

9 Far right

9.5

10

8

Linear Fit Polynomial Fit Degree = 4 Linear:

8.5 9 Far right

10

Linear Fit Polynomial Fit Degree = 6

Rsquare 0.00178 Not Sig. (0.781)

Linear:

Rsquare 0.00000 Not Sig. (0.986)

Polynomial Degree 4: 0.12370 Sig. (0.030)

Polynomial Degree 6: 0.08275 Not Sig. (0.502)

Bivariate Fit of MSL by Far right 6.5

Bivariate Fit of Greens by Farr ight 4

6

3.5

5.5

3

5

2.5

4.5

G

MSL

9.5

4

2

3.5

1.5

3 1

2.5

0.5

2 8

8.5 9 Far right


Rsquare 0.01278 Not Sig. (0.4544)

Polynomial Degree 6: 0.13048 Sig. (0.041)

9.5

8

10

8.5 9 Far right


Rsquare 0.04294 Not Sig. (0.1995)

Polynomial Degree 6: 0.10893 Not Sig. (0.6788)

9.5

10

Appendix

●

215

Appendix 4 Fifth European Parliament Radical Right Members Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Hr. Mogens N.J. CAMRE Sig.Ra Cristiana MUSCARDINI On. Mauro NOBILIA Sig.Ra Roberta ANGELILLI On. Sergio BERLATO On. Roberto Felice BIGLIARDO On. Antonio MUSSA On. Sebastiano (Nello) MUSUMECI Sig.Ra Adriana POLI BORTONE On. Mariotto SEGNI On. Franz TURCHI Herr Gerhard HAGER Herr Wolfgang ILGENFRITZ Herr Hans KRONBERGER Frau Daniela RASCHHOFER Herr Peter SICHROVSKY De Heer Karel C.C. DILLEN De Heer Frank VANHECKE M. Charles de GRULLE M. Bruno GOLLNISCH M.Carl LANG M. Jean-Marie LE PEN M. Jean-Claude MARTINEZ On. Mario BORGHEZIO On. Gian Paolo GOBBO On. Francesco Enrico SPERONI

country

national party

EU party

Term

Denmark Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Belgium Belgium France France France France France Italy Italy Italy

People’s Party National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance National Alliance Freedom Party Freedom Party Freedom Party Freedom Party Freedom Party Vlaams Blok Vlaams Blok National Front National Front National Front National Front National Front Lega Nord Lega Nord Lega Nord

UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN UEN Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached

5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par

France France France France France France France France France France

Mouvement pour la France Sana étiquette Mouvement pour la France Mouvement pour la France Mouvement pour la France Mouvement pour la France Mouvement pour la France Rassemblement pour la France Rassemblement pour la France Rassemblement pour la France

Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached Nonattached UEN UEN UEN

5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par 5th par

Bridge Parties 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

M. Georges BERTHU Mme Marie-Fran&ccredil;oise GARAUD M. Thierry de LA PERRIERE Mme Elizabeth MONTFORT M. Dominique F.C. SOUCHET Mme Nicole THOMAS-MAURO M. Alexandre VARAUT M. Charles PASQUA Mme lsabelle CAULLERY M. Jean-Charles MARCHIANI


Notes

Chapter 2 Why Is So Little Known about Impacts of Peripheral Parties? 1. Mudde does not specify dates for waves one and two but suggests a reference to Klaus von Beyme’s 1988 article “Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe,” in West European Politics April 1988, p.11. 2. E.E. Schattschneider also talks about the party as a business (Schattschneider 1956).

Chapter 3


1. In the American sense of the word radical or radicalism it has broader meaning, which can include: populism, hostility toward the central government, strong nationalism, anticommunism, Christian fundamentalism, militarism, and resentment of foreigners (Mudde 1996, 231). 2. Italy is another case that may be classified with the three case studies in this investigation for displaying a legacy of fascism in Italian radical right-wing parties.

Chapter 5


1. I combine two separate stages identified by Jonathan Marcus to discuss the next advance of the National Front, the 1985 to 1987 “local confirmation and national breakthrough,” and the 1988–1990 “the ground trembles” years. 2. Jonathan Marcus is apparently the first author to use the phrase “omnibus issue” with reference to the National Front in his 1995 book. Hainsworth and Mitchell adopt the terminology in their 2000 article on the National Front in Parliamentary Affairs p.444. 3. Le Pen himself does not appear to choose his own words so carefully as he makes frequent gaffes in speeches and in the press. 4. On the globalization issue, the far left and far right converged in their position of opposition. 5. Droit du sol was later reinstated by Lionel Jospin’s Socialist government.

218

●

Notes

6. The arrow for the Socialists is bidirectional, signifying their waffling on the issue, first ignoring it largely and later moving their position farther to the right to join the anti-immigrant consensus among key parties.

Chapter 6 German Parties Have Opportunity Without Actualization 1. The first two waves are taken from a classification developed by Richard Stöss (Stoss 1991). I have derived the third and fourth waves based on my own assessment of recent trends. 2. I toured party headquarters in early 2002 and did not see printing facilities on-site. 3. I was unable to access indexed archives for the years 1990–1992.

Chapter 7 The FPÖ Finds a Winning Combination in Leadership and the Third Lager 1. As I was unable to access indexed archives for the years 1990–1991.

References

Almond, Gabriel, and G. Bingham Powell. 1966. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Edited by G. Almond, J. Coleman and L. Pye, The Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Axelrod, Robert. 1970. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham. Backes, Uwe, and Cas Mudde. 2000. “Germany: Extremism without Successful Parties.” Parliamentary Affairs 53:457–68. Bartolini, S. 1993. “On Time and Comparative Research.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 5:131–167. Bassett, Richard. 1990. Waldheim and Austria. New York: Penguin Books. Bauböck, Rainer. 2002. “Constructing the Boundaries of the Volk: Nation-Building and National Populism in Austrian Politics.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Baudet, Marie-Béatrice, and Serge Marti. 2002. “Ce monde du travail qui choisit l’extrême droite.” Le Monde, April 30, 2002, Economie p.I. Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bergmann, Werner. 1997. “Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany since Unification.” In Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after Unification, edited by H. Kurthen, W. Bergmann and R. Erb. New York: Oxford University Press. Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Betz, Hans-Georg, and Stefan Immerfall, eds. 1998. The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Beyme, Klaus von. 1988. “Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe.” West European Politics 11:1–18. Birenbaum, Guy. 1992. Le Front National en politique. Paris: Editions Balland. Bockel, Jean-Marie. 2002. Personal Interview. Member of the Socialist Party serving on the Committee for Internal Affairs in the legislature which considers immigration issues. Representative of the town Mullhouse. Conducted at the legislative office block, Paris, France. January 22, 2002. Braun, Aurel, and Stephen Scheinberg, eds. 1997. The Extreme Right: Freedom and Security at Risk. Boulder: Westview. Braunthal, Gerard. 1999. “The Right-Wing Scene: A Danger to Democracy?” In Between Bonn and Berlin: German Politics Adrift?, edited by M. Hampton and C. Soe. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

220

●

References

Budge, Ian, and Hans Keman. 1993. Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States. New York: Oxford University Press. Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998. New York: Oxford University Press. Bunzl, John. 2002. “Who the Hell is Jörg Haider?” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Burstein, Paul, Rachel Einwohner, and Jocelyn Hollander. 1995. “The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective.” In The Politics of Protest, edited by J.C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Butterwegge, Christoph, and Alexander Häusler. 2001. Report: “Themen der Rechten-Themen Der Mitte: Rechtsextreme Einflüsse auf Debatten zu Migration, Integration und multikulturellem Zusammenleben.” Düsseldorf: Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft der kommunalen Migrantenvertretungen Nordrhein-Westfalen. Button, James. 1989. Blacks and Social Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Castles, F.G., and R.D. McKinlay. 1979. “Does Politics Matter: An Analysis of the Public Welfare Commitment in Advanced Democratic States.” European Journal of Political Research 7:169–186. Castles, Francis (Ed.). 1982. The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States. Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications. Ceccaldi, Marcel. 2002. Personal Interview. Deputy Director of Legal Affairs. Conducted at party headquarters in St. Cloud, France. January 22, 2002 Chapin, Wesley. 1997. Germany for the Germans?: The Political Effects of International Migration. Westport: Greenwood Press. Cheles, Luciano, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan, eds. 1995. The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe. Second ed. New York: Longman. Cohen, Roger. 2000a. “German Official Pessimistic about Far-Right Violence.” New York Times, August 26, 2000. Cohen, Roger. 2000b. “Is Germany on the Road to Diversity? The Parties Clash.” New York Times, December 4, 2000. Cohen, Roger. 2001. “Schroeder Joins the Debate, Taking Side of Pride in Germany.” New York Times, March 20, 2001. Considine, Mark. 1998. “Making Up the Government’s Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 11:297–317. Costain, Anne. 1992. Inviting Women’s Rebellion: A Political Process Interpretation of the Women’s Movement. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Daalder, Hans. 1966. “Parties, Elites and Political Developments in Western Europe.” In Political Parties and Political Development, edited by J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

References

●

221

Davies, J.C., ed. 1971. When Men Revolt and Why: A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution. New York: Free Press. Davies, Peter. 1999. The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse, and Power. New York: Routledge. Della Porta, Donatella. 1996. Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. New York: Cambridge University Press. DeClair, Edward. 1999. Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies and Organization of the French National Front. Durham: Duke University Press. Deutsche Stimme. 2000. Monthly newspaper of the NPD. Number 9, September 2000. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Drucker, Peter. 1994. “The Age of Social Transformation.” The Atlantic Monthly 274 (5):53–80. Dufay, Francois, and Charles Jaigu. 2002. “Le Pen: Histoire d’une Revanche.” Le Point, April 25, 2002, 22–27. Duverger, Maurice. 1951. Les Partis Politiques. Paris: A. Colin. Duverger, Maurice. 1964. Political Parties. Translated by Barbara and Robert North. Third ed. New York: John Wiley. DVU, Deutsche Volksunion. 2002. Parteiprogramm. Munich: DVU. Edathy, Sebastian. 2000. Wo immer auch unsere Wiege gestanden hat. Frankfurt am Main: IKO Verlag. Eatwell, Roger. 2000. “The Rebirth of the ‘Extreme Right’ in Western Europe?” Parliamentary Affairs 53:407–25. Eatwell, Roger. 2002. “Jean-Marie Le Pen, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Rebirth of the Extreme Right Charismatic Leader.” in American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Boston, MA. Eckstein, Harry. 1975. “Case Study and Theory in Political Science.” in Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Edathy, Sebastian. Personal Interview. SPD Bundestag deputy, Interior Committee. Conducted at the legislative office block in Berlin. February 1, 2002. Eldersfeld, Samuel. 1958. “American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method.” In Interest Groups in Four Continents, edited by H. Ehrmann. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Eldersfeld, Samuel. 1960. Pressure Group Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Eley, Geoff. 1990. “Conservatives and Radical Nationalists in Germany: the Production of Fascist Potentials, 1912–28.” In Fascists and Conservatives: the Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentiety Century Europe, edited by M. Blinkhorn. Boston: Unwin Hyman. Epstein, Leon. 1967. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Praeger. EUMC. 1998. Report on “Xenophobia and Racism in Europe.” Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia.

222

●

References

Falter, Juergen, and Siegfried Schumann. 1988. “Affinity Towards Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe.” West European Politics 11 (2). Financial Times. 1999. Financial Times of London, October 4, 1999. Ford, Glyn, ed. 1992. Fascist Europe: The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia. Boulder: Pluto Press. FPÖ. 1998. Das Programm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs. Vienna: Die Freiheitlichen Partei. FPÖ. 2001. im Brennpunkt: Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs. Published by Freiheitliche Akademie. Frankland, E. Gene, and Donald Schoonmaker. 1992. Between Protest and Power: The Green Party in Germany. Boulder: Westview Press. Fromm, Rainer, and Barbara Kernbach. 2001. Rechtsextremismus im Internet: Die Neue Gefahr. München: Olzog Verlag. Fuchs, Gerard. 2002. Personal Interview. Socialist Party deputy to the National Assembly. Member of the legislature’s European Union committee studying EU policy and affairs. Conducted at the legislative office block, Paris, France. January 22, 2002 Gamson, William. 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest. First ed. Homewood: Dorsey Press. Gamson, William. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. Second ed. Belmont: Wadsworth. Gärtner, Reinhold. 2002. “The FPÖ, Foreigners, and Racism in the Haider Era.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Gibson, Rachel. 2002. The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. Gingrich, Andre. 2002. “A Man for all Seasons: An Anthropological Perspective on Public Representation and Cultural Politics of the Austrian Freedom Party.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds. 1999. How Social Movements Matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gollnisch, Bruno. 2002. Personal Interview. National Front Party Delegate General and member of the European Parliament. Conducted at party headquarters in St. Cloud, France. January 22, 2002. Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haider, Jörg. 1993. Die Freiheit, die ich meine. Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Verlag. Haider, Jörg. 1995. The Freedom I Mean. Pine Plains, NY: Swan Books. Haider, Jörg. 2001. Personal Interview. Former Freedom Party Leader and Current Governor of the State of Carinthia. Conducted at FPÖ party headquarters, Vienna. December 3, 2001. Hainsworth, Paul, ed. 2000. The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream. London: Pinter. Hainsworth, Paul, and Paul Mitchell. 2000. “France: The National Front from Crossroads to Crossroads?” Parliamentary Affairs 53:443–56.

References

●

223

Harmel, Robert, and John Robertson. 1985. “Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis.” International Political Science Review 6 (4):501–523. Heinen, Ursula. 2002. Personal Interview. CDU Bundestag deputy, European Union Committee. Conducted at the legislative office block in Berlin. January 31, 2002. Heitmeyer, Wilhelm. 1993. “Hostility and Violence towards Foreigners in Germany.” In Racist Violence in Europe, edited by T. Bjoergo and R. Witte. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Helms, Ludger. 1997. “Right-Wing Populist Parties in Austria and Switzerland: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Support and Conditions of Success.” West European Politics 20:37–52. Heneghan, Tom. 2000. Unchained Eagle: Germany after the Wall. New York: Pearson Education Limited. Hibbs, D.A. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy.” American Political Science Review 71:1467–1487. Hibbs, D.A. 1992. “Partisan Theory after Fifteen Years.” European Journal of Political Economy 8:361–373. Hicks, A., D. Swank, and M. Ambuhl. 1989. “Welfare Expansion Revisited: Policy Routines and Their Mediation by Party, Class, and Crisis.” European Journal of Political Research 17 (4):401–430. Hlavac, Elisabeth. 2001. Personal Interview. Social Democratic Party deputy to the Nationalrat. Conducted at her office in the legislative office block, Vienna. November 29, 2001. Hofmann, Paul. 1988. The Viennese: Splendor, Twilight, and Exile. New York: Anchor Books Doubleday. Hossay, Patrick, and Aristide Zolberg. 2002. “Democracy in Peril?” In Shadows Over Europe: the Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, edited by M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Husbands, Christopher. 1992. “The Other Face of 1992: the Extreme-right Explosion in Western Europe.” Parliamentary Affairs 45:267–285. Ignazi, Piero. 1992. “The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 22:3–34. Ignazi, Piero. 1997. “The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey.” In The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, edited by P. Merkl and L. Weinberg. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers. Imbeau, Louis, Francois Petry, and Moktar Lamari. 2001. “Left-Right Party Ideology and Government Policies: A Meta-Analysis.” European Journal of Political Research 40:1–29. Immerfall, Stefan. 1998. “The Neo-Populist Agenda.” In The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

224

●

References

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Janda, Kenneth. 1980. Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey. New York: Free Press. Kagedan, Ian. 1997. “Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in Germany.” in The Extreme Right: Freedom and Security At Risk, edited by A. Braun and S. Scheinberg. Boulder: Westview Press. Karapin, Roger. 2002. “Far Right Parties and the Construction of Immigration Issues in Germany.” In Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, edited by M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair. 1995. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party.” Party Politics 1:5–28. Katzenstein, Peter. 1987. Policy and Politics in West Germany: the Growth of a Semisovereign State. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. King, Anthony. 1969. “Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections.” Polity 2:111–141. King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kingdon, John. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy. Boston: Little Brown. Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966a. “The Transformation of the West European Party Systems.” In Political Parties and Political Development, edited by J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966b. “The Vanishing Opposition.” In Political Opposition in Western Democracies, edited by R. Dahl. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Knight, Robert. 1992. “Haider, the Freedom Party and the Extreme Right in Austria.” Parliamentary Affairs 45:285–299. Kornhauser, W. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe: Free Press. Koschyk, Hartmut. 2002. Personal Interview. CDU Bundestag deputy, Interior Committee. Conducted at the legislative office block in Berlin. February 1, 2002. Kramer, Helmut. 1996. “Foreign Policy.” In Contemporary Austrian Politics, edited by V. Lauber. Boulder: Westview Press. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Rudd Koopmans, J.W. Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni, eds. 1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kuhn, Rick. 2000. “The Threat of Fascism in Austria.” Monthly Review 52 (2):21–35. Laver, M.J., and Ian Budge. 1992. “Measuring Policy Distances and Modeling Coalition Formation.” In Party Policy and Government Coalitions, edited by M.J. Laver and I. Budge. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

References

●

225

Lawson, Kay. 1976. The Comparative Study of Political Parties. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Lauber, Volkmar. 1996. “Conclusion and Outlook: SPÖ-ÖVP Duopoly.” In Contemporary Austrian Politics, edited by V. Lauber. Boulder: Westview Press. Leiserson, Michael. 1968. “Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan.” American Political Science Review 62:770–87. Le Monde. March 2, 1985. Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press. Luebbert, Gregory. 1986. Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. New York: Columbia University Press. Luther, Kurt Richard. 2000. “Austria: A Democracy Under Threat from the Freedom Party?” Parliamentary Affairs 53:426–442. McAdam, Douglas. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, Doug. 1996. “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions.” In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press. Manoschek, Walter. 2002. “FPÖ, ÖVP and Austria’s Nazi Past.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Marcus, Jonathan. 1995. The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen. New York: New York University Press. Markovits, Andrei. 2002. “Austrian Exceptionalism: Haider, the European Union, the Austrian Past and Present.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Martin, Philip, and Mark Miller. 1990. “Guests or Immigrants? Contradiction and Change in the German Immigration and Policy Debate Since the Recruitment Stop.” Migration World 18 (1):8–13. Mayer, Nonna, and Pascal Perrineau. 1990. “Pourqoi votent-ils pour le Front National?” Pouvoirs 55. Merkl, Peter, and Leonard Weinberg, eds. 1993. Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right. Boulder: Westview Press. Merkl, Peter, and Leonard Weinberg, eds. 1997. The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers. Merkl, Peter. 1997. “Why are they So Strong Now? Comparative Reflections on the Revival of the Radical Right in Europe.” In The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, edited by P. Merkl and L. Weinberg. Portland: Frank Cass. Messina, Anthony. 1990. “Political Impediments to the Resumption of Labor Migration to Western Europe.” West European Politics 13 (1):31–46. Michels, Robert. 1915. Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Translated by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. Glencoe: Free Press.

226

●

References

Minkenberg, Michael. 1992. “The New Right in Germany: The Transformation of Conservatism and the Extreme Right.” European Journal of Political Research 22:55–81. Minkenberg, Michael. 1996. “The Far Right in Unified Germany.” In Research on Democracy and Society, edited by F. Weil. Greenwich: JAI Press. Minkenberg, Michael. 1998. “Context and Consequence: The Impact of the New Radical Right on the Political Process in France and Germany.” German Politics and Society 48:1–23. Minkenberg, Michael. 2000. “The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity.” Government and Opposition 35:170–88. Minkenberg, Michael. 2001. “The Radical Right in Public Office: Agendasetting and Policy Effects.” West European Politics 24 (4):1–21. Minkenberg, Michael. 2002. “The Contemporary Radical Right in Europe: Ideological and Structural Variants Between Party Formation and Movement Mobilization.” in American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Boston, MA. Mitten, Richard. 2002. “Austria all Black and Blue: Jörg Haider, the European Sanctions, and the Political Crisis in Austria.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Mudde, Cas. 1995. “Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86).” European Journal of Political Research 27 (2):203–224. Mudde, Cas. 1996. “The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family.” West European Politics 19:225–248. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, and Geoffrey Pridham (Eds.). 1991. Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives. London: SAGE Publications. Müller, Wolfgang. 1996. “Political Institutions.” In Contemporary Austrian Politics, edited by V. Lauber. Boulder: Westview. Neumann, Sigmund, ed. 1956. Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. NPD, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands. 2001. Parteiprogramm. Berlin: Parteivorstand. Parnigoni, Rudolf. 2001. Personal Interview. Social Democratic Party deputy to the Nationalrat. Conducted at his office in Vienna. November 30, 2001. Partik-Pable, Helene. 2001. Freedom Party deputy to the Nationalrat. Conducted at her office in the Parliament’s Club of the Nationalrat, Vienna. November 29, 2001. Pégard, Catherine. 2002. “Etat de Choc: La faute á qui?” Le Point, April 25, 2002, 8–13. Perrineau, Pascal. 2000. “The Conditions for the Re-emergence of an Extreme Right Wing in France: the National Front 1984–98.” In The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen, edited by E. Arnold. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

References

●

227

Perlmutter, Ted. 2002. “The Politics of Restriction: the Effect of Xenophobic Parties on Italian Immigration Policy and German Asylum Policy.” In Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, edited by M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Peters, Guy B. 1998. Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods. New York: New York University Press. Pelinka, Anton. 2002. “The FPÖ in the European Context.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Pelinka, Anton, and Sieglinde Rosenberger. 2000. Österreichische Politik: Grundlagen, Strukturen, Trends. Vienna: WUV-Universitätsverlag. Poguntke, Thomas. 1987. “New Politics and Party Systems: the Emergence of a New Type of Party?” West European Politics 10:76–88. Pötzl, Norbert, and Andreas Wassermann. 2001. “Berauscht vom Erfolg.” Der Spiegel, November 19, 2001. Powell, G. Bingham. 1982. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Rémond, René. 1969. The Right-Wing in France. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. Rémond, René. 1982. Les droites en France, Fourth Edition. Paris: Aubier Montaigne. REP, Republikaner Partei. 2001. Parteiprogramm- Die Republikaner: Politik fuer Deutsche. Berlin: Die Republikaner Bundesverband. Reuter, Bernd. 2002. Personal Interview. SPD deputy in the Bundestag, Interior Committee. Conducted at the legislative office block in Berlin. February 1, 2002. Riedlsperger, Max. 1998. “The Freedom Party of Austria: From Protest to Radical Right Populism.” In The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, edited by H.-G. Betz and S. Immerfall. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Riker, William. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rose, Richard. 2000. “Trouble in Advanced Democracies? The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland.” Journal of Democracy 11 (2):26–40. Safran, William. 1993. “The National Front in France: From Lunatic Fringe to Limited Respectability.” In Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, edited by P. Merkl and L. Weinberg. Boulder: Westview Press. Safran, William. 2003. The French Polity. Sixth ed. New York: Longman. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schain, Martin. 1999. “The National Front and the French Party System.” French Politics and Society 17 (1):1–16.

228

●

References

Schain, Martin. 2000. “The National Front and the Legislative Elections of 1997.” In How France Votes, edited by M. Lewis-Beck. New York: Chatham House. Schain, Martin. 2002. “The Impact of the French National Front on the French Political System.” In Shadowns over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, edited by M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Schattschneider, E.E. 1956. “United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government.” In Modern Political Parties, edited by S. Neumann. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schleiter, Philippe. 2002. Personal Interview. National Republican Movement Party director of foreign and international relations. Conducted at a coffee shop near MNR party headquarters, in Paris, France. January 16, 2002. Schmid, Thomas. 1996. “Right-Wing Radicalism in the Unified Germany.” In The Resurgence of Right-Wing Radicalism in Germany: New Forms of an Old Phenomenon?, edited by U. Wank. New Jersey: Humanities Press. Schmidt, Manfred. 1982. “The Role of Parties in Shaping Macroeconomic Policy.” in The Impact of Parties: Politics and Parties in Democratic Capitalist States, edited by Francis Castles. Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications. Schmidt, Michael. 1993. The New Reich: Violent Extremism in Unified Germany and Beyond. Translated by Daniel Horch. New York: Pantheon Books. Schmidt, Manfred. 1997. “Parteien und Policy-output.” in Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland, edited by Oskar Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer, and Richard Stöss. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Schubarth, Wilfried. 1997. “Xenophobia Among East German Youth.” In Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany After Unification, edited by H. Kurthen, W. Bergmann and R. Erb. New York: Oxford University Press. Schumaker, Paul. 1975. “Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands.” Journal of Politics 37:488–521. Schwerdt, Frank. 2002. Personal Interview. Berlin Leader of the NPD. Conducted at party headquarters in Berlin-Köpernik. February 6, 2002. Seiler, Daniel. 1980. Partis et Familles Politiques. Paris: PUF. Shields, J. 1989. “Campaigning from the Fringe.” In The French Presidential Elections of 1988, edited by J. Gaffney. Dartmouth: Aldershot. Sichrovsky, Peter. 2001. Personal Interview. Freedom Party delegate to the European Parliament. Conducted during the Freedom Party Congress at the Hotel Intercontinental, in Vienna, Austria. December 3, 2001. Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Steiner, Jürg. 1995. European Democracies. Third ed. White Plains: Longman Publishers. Stern. 2000. “Erste ‘Green Card’ wird vergeben.” Stern.

References

●

229

Stöss, Richard. 1991. Politics Against Democracy: Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany. Translated by Lindsay Batson. Edited by E. Kolinsky, German Studies Series. New York: Berg Publishers. Strom, Kaare. 1990. “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (2):565–98. Stürmer, Michael. 1985. “Geschichte in geschichtslosem Land.” Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 25, 1985. Sully, Melanie. 1997. The Haider Phenomenon. New York: Columbia University Press. Tagesspiegel. 2002. “Wer hierhe kommt soll dazu gehoeren.” Der Tagesspiegel, February 1, 2002, 4. Taggart, Paul. 1995. “New Populist Parties in Western Europe.” West European Politics 18 (1):34–51. Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–75. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power In Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tempel, Gerhard. 2002. Personal Interview. Berlin Leader of the Republikaner Partei. Conducted at party headquarters in Berlin-Pankow. February 5, 2002. Tufte, E.R. 1978. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. UEN Group Manifesto. (n.d.) Retrieved December 2001, from http://www.europarl.eu. int/uen/en/stru/F_grou_en.htm Veen, Hans-Joachim, Norbert Lepszy, and Peter Mnich. 1993. The Republikaner Party in Germany: Right-Wing Menace of Protest Catchall? Edited by W. Laqueur, The Washington Papers- Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Westport: Praeger. Vernet, Daniel. 2002. “Populismes d’Europe.” Le Monde, May 20, 2003, 13–20. Wal, Jessika ter. 2002. “Anti-Foreigner Campaigns in the Austrian Freedom Party and Italian Northern League: The Discursive Construction of Identity.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Watts, Meredith. 1997. Xenophobia in United Germany: Generations, Modernization, and Ideology. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Wetzel, Juliane. 2001. “Rechtsextreme Propaganda im Internet: Ideologietransport and Vernetzung.” In Auf dem Weg zum Bürgerkrieg? Rechtsextremismus und Gewalt gegen Fremde in Deutschland, edited by W. Benz. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. Winkler, Juergen, and Siefried Schumann. 1998. “Radical Right-Wing Parties in Contemporary Germany.” In The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, edited by H.-G. Betz and S. Immerfall. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

230

●

References

Wodak, Ruth. 2002. “Discourse and Politics: the Rhetoric of Exclusion.” In The Haider Phenomenon in Austria, edited by R. Wodak and A. Pelinka. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Wodak, Ruth, and Anton Pelinka, eds. 2002. The Haider Phenomenon in Austria. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Wolinetz, Steven. 1989. “Party System Change: The Catch-all Thesis Revisited.” West European Politics 14:113–28. Zehentner, Daniella. 2002. Personal Interview. Free Democratic Party official. Conducted at party headquarters. January 28, 2002. Zimmermann, Eckart, and Thomas Saalfeld. 1993. “The Three Waves of West German Right-Wing Extremism.” In Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, edited by P. Merkl and L. Weinberg. Boulder: Westview Press.

Index

Action Française, 80 Adenauer, Konrad, 116 agency, see party behavior agenda-setting, see impact Algerians and the Algerian War, 81, 98, 109 alliances, see party behavior anti-Semitic, 97, 175 Article 21 and Article 9, see Basic Law assimilation, 5, 58, 66, 70, 74, 76, 173, 201 asylum seekers, 5, 49, 63–4, 101–2, 104, 114–23, 130–4, 137, 141, 149, 181–2, 198, 205 Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), 40, 55, 153–86, 203, 205, 218, 222, 225, 227, 229 Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), 40, 156–7, 163–7, 173, 179–183 Balladur, Édouard, 106, 108 bandwagoning, see party behavior Basic Law, 38, 45–6, 115 Belgian National Front, 55 Belgium, 48, 56, 59, 64–67, 201, 215 Blöcher, Christoph, 190 Briant, Yvon, 87 bridge parties, 75, 202, 215 Britain, 40, 56 British National Front, 55 Carinthia, 163, 165, 166, 181, 222 case selection, 48 case study method, 47–50, 143, 185, 200, 203, 221

catch-all party, see party, types of Center Democrats, Netherlands, 189 Centre d’Etudes et d’Argumentaries, 87 channels of influence alternative or non-traditional, 7, 9, 28, 33, 36, 122, 160 charisma, see leadership Chirac, Jacques, 1, 85, 86, 88, 90, 100, 106, 133 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 114, 118–119, 125–6, 129, 131, 133, 136, 139, 141, 144–5, 148, 151, 193 Christian Social Union (CSU), 114, 117, 125–6, 133, 136, 144, 148, 175 citizenship, 70, 104, 109, 115, 137–40, 174, 182 jus sanguinis (law of blood) versus jus soli (law of soil), 115, 177, 194–5 national preference, 89 Club de l’Horloge, 82, 97 collective memory, 98, 120, 149, 154 Communist Parties, 15, 20, 51, 54, 90, 91, 103, 105, 107, 108, 180 contender parties, 27, 197 convergence theorists, 30 co-optation, see party behavior Cresson, Edith, 104 crime and criminality, 60, 89, 97–8, 140–1, 151, 182, 185, see also scapegoating

232

●

Index

Danish People’s Party, 55 Danish Progress Party, 55 de Benoist, Alain, 82 de Gaulle, Charles, 81 de Villiers, Fillipe, 75 Deckert, Günter, 122 Democratic Unionist Party for Northern Ireland, 75 demographic deficit, 58, 195 Denmark, 1, 43, 48, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 201, 215 Dewinter, Filip, 59 Downs, Anthony, 19, 20, 26, 35 Dregger, Alfred, 136 Dreux, 83, 90, 91 Drucker, Peter, 120 Duprat, Francois, 82, 94 Duverger, Maurice, 19, 20, 22 electoral systems, 20, 42, see also opportunity structures entrepreneurs, see leadership; party behavior European Parliament Group of the European People’s Party (EPP-ED), 75 Non-Affiliated Group (European Union Parliament), 74–5 Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), 73–5 European Union (EU) opposition to, 5, 48, 50, 97, 174, 208 Euskal Herritarrok, 75 extremism, see radical right-wing parties Fabius, Laurent, 79 fascism and the fascist legacy, 8, 12–14, 48, 50, 55–6, 79–81, 86, 93, 96, 115, 119, 125, 129, 138–9, 152, 187–90, 196–8, 217 fear climate of, see issue framing Fianna Fail Party, 75 Fini, Gianfranco, 59

Finland, 65–7 Fischer, Joschka, 144 Ford, Glyn, 71 Fortuyn, Pim, 56–9, 66, 190 framing, see issue framing Frederic-Dupont, Edouard, 87 Free Democratic Party (FDP), 121, 132–3, 141–2, 157 Freiheitliche Akademie, 162 French Communist Party, 91 Frey, Gerhard, 119, 122, 127, 131, 135 funnel issue, see immigration Gauchon, Pascal, 83 Gaullists, 90, 107 German Constitution, see Basic Law German People’s Party, 46 German People’s Union (DVU), 6, 55, 116–23, 126–35, 138, 146–7, 188, 196, 199, 204 Gingrich, Andre, 170 globalization, 5, 34, 46, 58, 97, 101, 104, 108, 119, 208, 217 Gollnisch, Bruno, 85, 87, 105, 215 Greece, 64–7 Greek National Party, 55 Green Card Bill, 144, 150 Green parties, 30, 51, 114, 126, 176, 180, 214, 221–2 Groupement de Recherches et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation Européene (GRECE), 82, 97 Haider, Jörg, 59, 134, 154–8, 162–3, 166–9, 172–3, 176, 181, 192, 220, 226 Handlos, Franz, 118 Historikerstreit, 125, 141 immigration omnibus or funnel issue, 54, 59, 60, 77, 97, 108, 135, 206, 217 opposition to, identity-based, 58, 61, 121, 138, 142, 148, 151–2, 173, 176–7, 186, 189, 195, 198

Index

●

233

opposition to, resource-based, 58–9, 115, 138, 142 trend, 49, 59, 62–3, 73 see also issue framing impact agenda level, 2–8, 29, 37, 44, 63–7, 77, 99–103, 111, 142–6, 154, 158, 160, 166, 178–80, 198–205 institutional level, 2–8, 29, 44–8, 68–70, 77, 103–8, 111, 146–9, 180–3, 200–2, 204 measurement and modeling, 3–5, 43–6 policy level, 2–8, 17–18, 25–30, 35, 38–40, 70–6, 89–90, 108–10, 149–51, 183–86 see also party success institutional level impact, see impact Ireland, 65–7, 75 issue-creation, 41, 93, 198 issue-framing, 5–7, 57, 61, 91, 93, 104–5, 173 fear, climate of, 60–3, 71–2, 76–7, 97–9, 111, 139–42, 176–7, 196–200 see also immigration issue salience, 33, 35, 41, 100, 181 issues of the radical right, see under individual listings: crime and criminality; European Union, opposition to; globalization immigration; law and order; security; unemployment Italian Social Movement (MSI), 81 Italy, 1, 18, 29, 43, 49, 56, 65–7, 215, 217

Kirchheimer, Otto, 22, 24, 34, 54, 134 Kitschelt, Herbert, 29, 41 knowledge workers, 120 Kohl, Helmut, 115, 133, 144–5 Kreisky, Bruno, 157

Jospin, Lionel, 43, 85, 86, 104, 109, 217

National Alliance, Italy, 55, 59 National Democratic Party (NPD), 6, 46, 116–19, 122–8, 131, 133, 137–40, 144–5, 150, 188, 196, 199, 204

Kindergeld, 169, 182 Kingdon, John, 9, 43–4

Lager, 153, 156–7, 166, 177, 180, 218 Lang, Carl, 87, 215 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1, 15, 40, 43, 79, 82, 86–8, 91–4, 111, 120, 134, 169, 215, 221, 225 leadership charismatic, 2, 22, 41, 59, 91–2 entrepreneurial, 14, 19, 21, 30–5, 41, 53, 56–9, 80, 86, 95, 105, 167–71, 175, 187–90 void in and challenges of, 134–6, 147, 152, 157 League of Independents, 156 legitimacy, 13–14, 24, 42, 81–3, 86–7, 108, 117, 125, 148, 157, 181, 191–2 List (Pim Fortuyn) Party, 56–9, 66, 190 Lista Emma Bonino, 75 Lubbers, Marcel, 47, 68 Luxembourg, 65–7 Marcus, Jonathan, 81–4, 92, 106, 111, 217 marginalized, 28, 180, 189 Maurras, Charles, 80–1 median voter, 16, 35 Megret, Bruno, 86–9, 94–6, 190 Merkel, Angela, 141 Michels, Roberto, 19, 57 modernization losers, 61, 119, 120 Mouvement pour la France (MPF), 75, 76, 215 multiculturalism, 58, 70, 114, 140, 174

234

●

Index

National Front, British, see British National Front National Front, France (FN), 1, 6, 8, 15, 17, 40, 45–6, 54–9, 65, 77, 79–111, 120–1, 125–6, 163–4, 169, 189, 192–4, 198, 200, 203–5, 215 national preference, 59, 89, 96–7 National Republican Movement (MNR), 6, 46, 84–6, 91, 190, 228 National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), 116, 121, 192, see also Nazism nationalism, 13–14, 48, 74–5, 81, 94, 104, 114–15, 118–23, 153–9, 177, 180, 191, 208, 217 Nationalrat, 40, 183–6, 223, 226 Nazism, 74, 81, 97, 114–17, 122–4, 128, 138, 154, 156, 159–61, 175–7, 199 neo-Nazis, 8, 12, 48, 74, 117, 124, 138, 144, 150, 175, 181 Netherlands, 1, 43, 48, 56–7, 65–7, 190 new parties, see party, types of New Politics, 16, 34, 61, 219, 223, 227, 229 New Right (Neue Rechte, Nouvelle Droite), 15–16, 82, 86–7, 90, 124, 129, 135, 139, 152, 156, 160, 169, 226 Norbert Steger, 157 Norway, 53, 56, 68 Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 115, 118, 124, 128, 139 omnibus issue, see immigration opportunity structures, 18, 33, 37–9, 45–7, 70, 90, 113, 148, 159, 175, 187–8, 203 openings and vacuums, 21, 28, 38–41, 115, 153, 168

opposition decline of viable opposition, 34, 54, 60–1, 91, 97, 131, 156–8 influence, 2–3, 7, 29, 42, 129, 166 Ordre Nouveau, 81–2 pan-Germanism, 14, 156–59, 172, 175, 191, 198 Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN), 83 Partido Popular, Ireland, 75 party behavior alliances, 17, 76, 83–6, 95, 105, 119, 146, 148, 157, 168, 189, 192, 208 bandwagoning, 8, 56, 65–6, 77, 93, 138, 189–90, 196–7 competition, 14, 20–1, 25–6, 35, 68, 90, 124, 168 co-optation of issues, 17–18, 35, 41, 45, 55, 68, 77, 103–6, 148, 181–3, 191, 207 entrepreneurial, 2–9, 21, 33, 35, 65–7, 94–5, 114, 135–6, 172–3, 189, 196–8 innovation, 8, 33, 55, 60, 191 interest-aggregation, 23–6 professionalization,79, 82–4, 87, 95–6, 108, 111, 124–9, 134, 152, 163, 176, 185 191–3 reinvention, 54–7, 96, 108, 115, 139, 170–6, 187–9, 207–9 spatial relationship to other parties, see political space strategic, 7–8, 28, 34–9, 47, 51, 126, 137, 175–7, 189, 191–3, 196, 207 structure versus agency, 7, 23–8, 41 party goals 21–7, 34–7 party position power as a function of, 30, 39–42, 47, 88, 128–9, 151, 162–6, 187–9, 192, 199

Index party success, 2–9, 18–31 local, regional and municipal levels, 17–18, 40, 83–90, 101, 113, 116, 122, 126, 133, 160, 165, 189, 192 see also impact party, types of cadre parties, 21–2 cartel parties, 21–2 catch-all parties, 22–4, 34, 40, 51, 54, 134, see also Kirchheimer extraparliamentary parties, 2, 30, 34, 39 mass parties, 7, 21–2, 95, 131 new parties, 23, 34, 57, 142, 223 peripheral parties, 2–9, 33–43 small parties, 7, 34, 226 peripheral parties, see party, types of Peter, Friedrich, 157 pillarization, 155 policy level impact, see impact political space, 16, 36, 90, 103, 167, 195, 209 openings and vacuums, 14–16, 21, 28, 38–45, 60, 91, 115–20, 134, 153–4, 159, 168, 180, 193, 207 populism, 12–14, 48, 56–7, 92–3, 96, 118–20, 125, 135, 152, 156–7, 176, 188–9, 206, 217 Portugal, 65–7, 75 postmaterialism, see New Politics Poujade, Pierre, 81 Progess Parties, 48, 55–6, 65, 189–90, 199 Proporz System, 153–5, 167, 173, 181 protest party, 13–14, 27, 113, 118, 131, 137–8, 146–9, 157, 191, 204–6 racism, 14, 58, 64, 67, 70–7, 94–6, 122, 128, 153–5, 175–7, 189, 199–202, 207, 221–2

●

235

radical right-wing parties defined, 2–5, 12–14, 53, 55–7 radicalism versus extremism, 46–7, 217 typology, 12, 27, 55–7 see also protest party Rally for the Republic (RPR), 83–4, 90–1, 106 Rassemblement pour la France (RPF), 75–6, 215 Rau, Johannes, 139–41 Republikaner, German Republicans (REP), 6, 46, 56, 65, 118–33, 145, 188, 196, 204, 227–9 Riess-Passer, Susanne, 162, 169, 179 Riker, William, 26, 35 Sans Etiquette, 75–6 Sartori, Giovanni, 19–20, 30, 228 scapegoating, 5, 59–63, 101, 109, 199 Schill Party, 56–7, 65, 129–30, 138–9, 189 Schill, Ronald, see Schill Party Schlierer, Rolf, 124, 130, 134, 138 Schmidt, Helmut, 40, 133, 136, 228 Schönhuber, Franz, 42, 117–18, 120, 123, 127, 138 Schröder, Gerhard, 141, 145–6, 149 security as a radical right-wing issue, 16–17, 46, 97–8, 127, 147, 184–5 law and order, 34, 109, 173 perception of insecurity and threats, 5, 182 Social Democratic Party (SPD), 126, 129, 132–3, 140–1, 145, 149, 151 social movements, 7, 9, 11, 18, 28–9, 37, 39, 44, 51, 70, 119, 122 Socialist Reich Party, 116 Socialists, 45, 83, 90, 101–4, 107, 153, 156, 168, 176, 193, 218 Spain, 56, 65–7 Stoiber, Edmund, 45, 56, 129, 175 strategy, see party behavior

236

●

Index

Strauss, Franz-Josef, 118, 136, 162 Sweden, 65, 67 Swiss People’s Party (SVP), 55, 190 Switzerland, 41, 48, 53, 56, 62, 68, 115, 211 Überfremdung or “over-foreignization,” 129, 146, 149, 182, see also xenophobia unemployment, 2, 4, 16, 59–63, 94, 98–9, 101–4, 118, 132, 138, 206, 209, 211–12 Union for French Democracy, 83 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, 75

Verfassungsschutz, see Office for the Protection of the Constitution Vichy Regime, 81 Vlaams Blok, 56, 59, 65, 215 Voigt, Ekkehard, 118, 122 Vranitzky, Franz, 180 Waldheim Affair, 158–9, 172, 186, 198 Weimar Republic, 46, 125 Wende, the German, 115, 133, 137, 148–9 xenophobia, 53, 58, 63–4, 70, 72, 115, 123, 136–7, 154–5, 172, 177, 194, 199, 201, 207

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945 (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Politics in France and Europe (Europe in Transition: the NYU European Studies)

Realigning Interests: Crisis and Credibility in European Monetary Integration (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Language, Nation, and State: Identity Politics in a Multilingual Age (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Germany after the Grand Coalition: Governance and Politics in a Turbulent Environment (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies)

European Television Discourse in Transition

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

Studies in European Realism

Governing New European Democracies

Governing New European Democracies

Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies : Political Parties Behind Closed Doors (Hardcover) (Routledge Ecpr Studies in European Political Science, 13)

The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)

Urban Mindscapes of Europe (European Studies 23) (European Studies: An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics)

Political Parties in New Democracies

The Transition in Eastern Europe: Country Studies

Green Parties and Politics in the European Union (European Public Policy Series)

The New Politics of Unemployment: Radical Policy Initiatives in Western Europe (European Political Science Series)

Reforming the European Commission (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)

Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History)

Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History)

Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe (West European Politics)

Cohesion Policy in the European Union: The Building of Europe

Principles of European Constitutional Law (Modern Studies in European Law)

European Politics in Transition 6th Ed

Political Parties and the European Union

The European Impact Assessment and the Environment

The Handbook of West European Pension Politics

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Migration and Activism in Europe since 1945 (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Politics in France and Europe (Europe in Transition: the NYU European Studies)

Realigning Interests: Crisis and Credibility in European Monetary Integration (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Language, Nation, and State: Identity Politics in a Multilingual Age (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series)

Germany after the Grand Coalition: Governance and Politics in a Turbulent Environment (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies)

European Television Discourse in Transition

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

Studies in European Realism

Governing New European Democracies

Governing New European Democracies

Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies : Political Parties Behind Closed Doors (Hardcover) (Routledge Ecpr Studies in European Political Science, 13)

The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)

Urban Mindscapes of Europe (European Studies 23) (European Studies: An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics)

Political Parties in New Democracies

The Transition in Eastern Europe: Country Studies

Green Parties and Politics in the European Union (European Public Policy Series)

The New Politics of Unemployment: Radical Policy Initiatives in Western Europe (European Political Science Series)

Reforming the European Commission (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)

Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History)

Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History)

Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe (West European Politics)

Cohesion Policy in the European Union: The Building of Europe

Principles of European Constitutional Law (Modern Studies in European Law)

European Politics in Transition 6th Ed

Political Parties and the European Union

The European Impact Assessment and the Environment

The Handbook of West European Pension Politics

Recommend Documents