Governing New European Democracies

Governing New European Democracies Jean Blondel, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Darina Malovà Governing New European Demo...

Author: Jean Blondel | Ferdinand Muller-Rommel | Darina Malova

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Governing New European Democracies Jean Blondel, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Darina Malovà

Governing New European Democracies

Titles of other books by the authors: Also by Jean Blondel VOTERS, PARTIES AND LEADERS COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES POLITICAL PARTIES THE DISCIPLINE OF POLITICS WORLD LEADERS THE ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP GOVERNING TOGETHER (with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel ) PARTY AND GOVERNMENT (with Maurizio Cotta) CABINETS IN WESTERN EUROPE (with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel ) PEOPLE AND PARLIAMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (with Richard Sinnott and Pale Svensson) THE NATURE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT (with Maurizio Cotta) CABINETS IN EASTERN EUROPE (with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel ) Also by Ferdinand Müller-Rommel NEW POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE SMALL PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE (with Geoffrey Pridham) CABINETS IN WESTERN EUROPE (with Jean Blondel ) GOVERNING TOGETHER (with Jean Blondel ) GREEN PARTIES IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS (with Thomas Poguntke) POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE NEW EUROPE (with Richard Luther) CABINETS IN EASTERN EUROPE (with Jean Blondel )

Governing New European Democracies Jean Blondel Professorial Fellow, European University Institute, Florence and University of Siena

Ferdinand Müller-Rommel Professor of Comparative Government University of Lüneburg, Germany and

Darina Malovà Professor of Political Science Comenius University, Slovakia With

Katja Fettelschoss Gabriela Ilonszki Dobrinka Kostova Matej Kovacic Alenka Krasovec Algis Krupavicius Zdenka Mansfeldova Andris Runcis and

Georg and Erik Sootla

© Jean Blondel, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Darina Malovà

2007

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author(s) has/have asserted his/her/their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9404–2 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–9404–8 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Blondel, Jean, 1929Governing new European democracies / Jean Blondel, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, and Darina Malovà. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–9404–8 (cloth) 1. Cabinet system—Europe, Eastern. 2. Representative government and representation—Europe, Eastern. 3. Post-communism—Europe, Eastern. 4. Democracy—Europe, Eastern. 5. Europe, Eastern—Politics and government—1989-I. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. II. Malovà, Darina. III. Title. JN96.A58B58 2007 320.9437—dc22 2006049476 10 16

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents List of Tables

vii

List of Figures

ix

Preface

x

Notes on the Contributors

xiii

Introduction 1

The Cabinet as the New Form of Government in Post-Communist Democracies

Part I: 2 3 4 5

Ministers and the Administrative Support of the Cabinet

How Ministers View the Role of Prime Ministers’ Offices Ministers and the Role of Civil Servants in Cabinet Decision-Making

Part IV: 10 11

Parties and Types of Cabinets in the View of Ministers

Party Government and Cabinet Decision-Making Coalitions, Single-Party Governments and Cabinet Decision-Making

Part III: 8 9

The General Arrangements

The End of Communism and the New Party System The Anatomy of Central Eastern European Cabinets The Rules and the Operating Procedures in Cabinet An Overall Descriptive View: What Ministers Think of Cabinet Government

Part II: 6 7

1

The Members of the Cabinet in the Views of the Ministers

Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Finance Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making v

3 21 23 39 57 72

87 89 102

121 123 136

149 151 166

vi

12 13

Contents

Prime Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Conclusion

Appendixes 1 2 3

The number of ministerial interviews per country (1990–2003) Questionnaire on rules, agenda setting, cabinet meetings and committees Ministerial questionnaire and codebook

177 193 205 205 207 209

Notes

223

Bibliography

228

Index

235

List of Tables 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 5.1 6.1 7.1

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2 10.1 10.2 11.1 11.2

Number of effective parties in Central Eastern European countries 1989–2004 Voter turnout in the Central Eastern European countries (in percentages, 1989–2004) Regime transition and founding cabinets Duration of party cabinets (in years, 1990–2003) Duration of cabinet types (in years, 1990–2003) Duration of ministers (in years, 1990–2003) Duration of prime ministers (in years, 1990–2003) Types and durability of cabinet governments (in years, 1990–2003) The relation between different types of duration (Pearson’s) Ministerial views on cabinet decision-making (ranking of countries) Importance given to party and involvement of parties (in per cent) Proportions of ministers from coalitions and single-party cabinets and attitudes to cabinet system (percentages) Role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages) The changing role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages) Types of government and the role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages) Prime ministerial leadership and the role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages) Confidence in information, trust in quality of civil servants’ work and type of collaboration (percentage) Country and mode of relationship (percentages) Debates in cabinet (percentages) Types of ministerial behaviour (percentages) The most important minister in cabinet (percentages) Solving a conflict with the minister of finance (percentages) vii

27 35 44 45 48 52 53 54 55 81 100

107 128 129 130 131 142 143 155 161 172 174

viii

12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5

List of Tables

Prime ministers’ style and their relative strength, according to ministers (percentages) Prime ministers’ fields of involvement and their relative strength according to ministers (percentages) Type of government and prime ministers’ strength according to ministers (percentages) Strength of prime minister by party affiliation according to ministers (percentages) Strength of prime minister by country according to ministers (percentages)

185 185 187 187 188

List of Figures 2.1 8.1 8.2

Supply vs demand volatility in Central Eastern Europe Types of prime ministers’ offices Classification of prime ministers’ offices

ix

37 126 134

Preface The Preface of Governing Together, a volume on which this work has largely been modelled, opens in the following way: ‘By the closing years of the twentieth century, one can say without fear of contradiction that cabinet government has been a great success’ (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993: vii). Such a conclusion is even more appropriate somewhat over ten years later, not just because cabinet government continues to be a success in Western European countries, but because, as Governing Together was being written, cabinet government was emerging in the ‘new’ liberal democracies of East-Central Europe and of the Balkans: a few years later, by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, one can also state that cabinet government has not just emerged in the countries of that region, but that it is unquestionably ‘a great success’. Yet one might have expected progress in this direction to be slow, tortuous, even marred by failures. For cabinet government is successful only if it is representative, but up to a point, if the party or parties supporting the government ‘intrude’ to an extent only in the life of the cabinet and if the ministers act, but moderately, in a collegial manner. These are all ‘virtues’ likely to be achieved after long experience of the perils of excessive representativeness, undue ‘partitocracy’, overinsistence on collegial discussions. In East-Central Europe and the Balkans, however, these ‘virtues’ seem to have been acquired almost instantaneously. It is probably true that the European Union has played a part in that success. The curious, almost paradoxical, point is that the EU is primarily, and in some ways almost exclusively, economic, but that its influence, both within its borders and beyond, has been a major one on political structures and political life. Although at no point did the EU declare that the ‘new’ democracies of East-Central Europe and the Balkans ‘had’ to adopt a parliamentary-cabinet system, rather than a presidential one for instance, or that they should have a meaningful party system enabling citizens to be confronted with reasonably clear choices at election time, these developments have occurred in the countries of the region, while, on the contrary, further East, forms of presidentialism have prevailed and party systems have at best been inchoate. The present volume is thus devoted to the analysis of that sudden and successful implantation of the cabinet system in ten countries which had been ruled by a communist regime for almost half a century after x

Preface

xi

having had little previous experience, if any at all, of such a system. These ten are all eight East-Central polities (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) and two countries from the East Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria). In this book we summarize these countries under the notion of Central Eastern European countries. The volume naturally follows closely the pattern of the earlier Western European study; in particular, it is based entirely, as Governing Together was, on the results of interviews of a large number of ministers in the ten countries. The aim is not to explain why cabinet government has been a success, but to tell what the actors, namely the ministers, believe to be the character of the decision-making process in the cabinets to which they have belonged. Such an inquiry would not have been possible without the collaboration of over 300 ministers who agreed to participate in the interviews: to these we owe everything and we wish to express here our profound gratitude. The interviews were conducted by a group of scholars from the countries concerned to whom we also owe our thanks for having generously and enthusiastically given their time to ensure that the operation was a success. The interviews were conducted in autumn 2003 and in the first few months of 2004, on the basis of a codebook, based as closely as possible on the Western European one and finalized at meetings of the whole group (see Appendix 1). Most members of that group have contributed to single chapters of this volume, but special thanks must be extended to R. Markowski and A. Mungiu-Pippidi for their contribution to the preparation of the codebook and, above all, for the interviews conducted respectively in Poland and Romania. The principal authors of this study have adjusted all chapters and written five themselves, while four chapters have been co-authored with members of the group (Chapter 3 with K. Fettelschoss; Chapter 7 with D. Kostova; Chapter 11 with A. Runcis; and Chapter 12 with G. Ilonski). For four chapters, single members of the group hold primary responsibility (Chapter 2, A. Krupavicius; Chapter 8, G. and E. Sootla; Chapter 9, A. Krasovec and M. Kovacic; Chapter 10: Z. Mansfeldova). This group would not have been brought together were it not for the fact that a meeting of political scientists in East-Central Europe and the Balkans was organized, in November 2001, under the joint sponsorship of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and of the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute in Florence, where the meeting was held. That meeting took place as a result of the determination of Yves Mény, who at the time combined the positions of director of the Schuman Centre and of

xii

Preface

chairman of the ECPR, as well as of the wide network of contacts and active organization skills of Jan Zielonka, then at the Centre and currently at St Antony’s College, Oxford. It was during a lunch break at that meeting that a number of participants committed themselves to studying attitudes of ministers in the region by means of interviews. Thus Yves Mény and Jan Zielonka have provided the occasion required for the project to emerge. We owe both of them a special gratitude. A project such as this could not have materialized without significant financial support and continuous technical and administrative help. The data collection on cabinet types and cabinet duration has been financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft within the framework of a larger project on ‘Patterns of Democracy in Central Eastern Europe’(Mu 618/14). We were also most fortunate in attracting the interest of the Thyssen Stiftung, whose generous grant (30.05.0.071) made it possible to turn the idea into reality, while the University of Lüneburg rendered the project feasible in a whole manner of ways. We wish to record here our particular thanks to the Foundation and to the University of Lüneburg as well as to the European University Institute and to the Comenius University for the help they gave in the course of the development of the project. Most directly, however, we wish to thank the assistants and the administrative staff of the University of Lüneburg, in particular Katja Fettelschoss who helped so magnificently in creating the SPSS data file, and Dagmar Krech for her efficient administrative support. Without them, this work would not have been able to proceed smoothly and rapidly. To record our thanks here is thus the least that we can do. Last but not least, we wish to thank Alison Howson and her colleagues at Palgrave for their confidence in the participants and the continuous support which they gave to the enterprise. Working for this project was an exciting experience; for the two Western Europeans among the three of us, it was also a major educational experience. It is high time that political scientists from Western Europe and from Central Eastern Europe should come together more closely and indeed constitute a single profession. Whatever the intrinsic scholarly merits of this volume may be, one of its clear positive side effects has been, even if only in a modest manner, to hasten the time when such a single profession becomes a reality. JEAN BLONDEL, FERDINAND MÜLLER-ROMMEL AND DARINA MALOVÀ FLORENCE, LÜNEBURG AND BRATISLAVA MAY 2006

Notes on the Contributors Katja Fettelschoss is researcher at the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Lüneburg, Germany. Gabriela Ilonszki is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration, Budapest, Hungary. Dobrinka Kostova is Professor at the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and Guest Professor at the University of Fribourg. Matej Kovacis is researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubjana, Slovenia. Alenka Krasovec is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubjana, Slovenia. Algis Krupavicius is Professor in the Policy and Public Administration Institute, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania. Zdenka Mansfeldova is member of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic. Andris Runcis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Latvia. Erik Sootla is researcher at the Department of Government, Tallinn University of Educational Sciences, Estonia. Georg Sootla is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Government, Tallinn University of Educational Sciences, Estonia.

xiii

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Introduction


1 The Cabinet as the New Form of Government in Post-Communist Democracies

This book explores the ways in which ministers, prime ministers and, in some cases, presidents take decisions in ‘parliamentary cabinets’ or, more briefly, in ‘cabinets’, which are the type of government which replaced the communist systems in Central Eastern European countries.1 Substantial progress has been made since the 1980s in analyzing the characteristics of the life of such cabinets in Western Europe (Blondel and Thiebault, 1991; Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Luebbert, 1986; Strom, 1990; Woldentorp et al., 2000), but only a few studies have been conducted with respect to the cabinets which emerged after the fall of communism in the individual countries of Central Eastern Europe (Koroseny 1999; Schiemann 2004; Shleifer 1997; Stefan 2004, Vass 1993). This book constitutes an attempt to fill this gap, by analyzing the characteristics of cabinet decision-making in ten Central Eastern European democracies: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. A study of this kind not only helps to document the way in which cabinets of the region have taken their decisions, however: it also contributes to the elaboration of a framework for the general analysis of cabinet decision-making. It undertakes this examination of Central Eastern European cabinets in very special conditions, as the cabinet system of government was introduced suddenly around 1990 as communism fell: an enormous pressure was subsequently placed on these cabinets to take large numbers of major political, economic and social decisions at great speed. That new political order emerged in the context of a legacy of former regimes in which words such as ‘government’ and ‘cabinet’ were not in common use: ‘governments’ were then referred to as ‘councils of ministers’, as in the Soviet system, and prime ministers were merely their ‘chairmen’. These councils and their heads were fully subordinated to the Communist 3

4

Introduction

party politburo and normally played no active role in determining the country’s policies, the only exception being when the posts of council chairman and of the chief party secretary were occupied by the same person. The insignificance of ‘councils of ministers’ was due in part to the nomenklatura system, as the Communist party leadership exercised effective control over all key appointments, including political and administrative positions, as well as of ministers and of the chairmen of the councils of ministers. These ‘councils of ministers’ were not autonomous bodies; their heads and their members, the ministers, were not truly responsible for the key decisions: their tasks were primarily administrative and technical in character; the members of communist governments implemented the decisions taken by the Communist party leadership and, in the hierarchy of the former regime, the most powerful figure was the general secretary. Finally, the style of the communist leadership in most Central Eastern European countries was based on a high degree of secrecy. The cabinet system has developed remarkably since 1990 in the 16 countries of the area – eight in East-Central Europe and eight in Southeastern Europe. This has occurred despite the fact that there have been differences in the political evolution of these countries, especially between those of East-Central Europe and those of Southeastern Europe. In the countries in the first of these two groups, except to an extent Poland during the early period, a classical parliamentary system was adopted from the start; in Southeastern Europe, semi-presidentialism prevailed, with the exception of Bulgaria. In much of ex-Yugoslavia and also in Albania, semi-presidentialism even enabled nationalistic leaders to rule in an authoritarian manner throughout much of the 1990s, while a similar development occurred in Moldova, more worryingly perhaps, since it took place, not in the 1990s, but later, and seemingly partly as a result of the growing influence of Russia in the country. Yet, even in Moldova, the cabinet formula remained in place. This is in itself a success, for, if the interwar experience was to have been any guide, one would have predicted that the cabinet system would have prevailed only in exceptional circumstances, Czechoslovakia being in point of fact the single exception at the time. How the cabinet system of government spread so widely across East-Central Europe and Southeastern Europe needs therefore to be explored.

The tension between the two requirements of cabinet government – representativeness and efficiency The reason why the success of the cabinet system in the area must be regarded as remarkable is because that system can function satisfactorily

The Cabinet in Post-Communist Democracies

5

only if an equilibrium is found between two opposite requirements – those of representativeness and of efficiency. The requirement of representativeness means that, uniquely in cabinet government (except for the Swiss model which is partly reproduced in the European Union), decision-making is in the hands of the whole cabinet and not, as for instance in the presidential system, solely in the hands of the leader of the government. The cabinet has therefore to be, at least to some extent, ‘collective’ or at least ‘collegial’: decisions are taken ‘together’. This requirement of ‘togetherness’ is regarded as central to the cabinet system because such a mode of operation is felt to be a more liberal, more democratic and therefore superior form of decision-making as well as because it follows from the fact that the cabinet emanates from parliament and, to survive, has to be closely linked at least to the majority, if not to the whole of the parliament. Yet this representative-cum-collective principle runs directly against the requirement of efficiency, as efficiency entails that decisions be taken speedily despite the continuous increase in the number and complexity of these decisions. Since representativeness entails ‘togetherness’ in decisionmaking, decisions are likely to be taken only after substantial discussions. This may mean delays in elaborating compromises or even the abandonment of original proposals and, perhaps, in the worst cases, the fall of the cabinet. If the cabinet does fall, the question of the internal effectiveness of the cabinet then becomes to an extent superseded by what may be regarded as a more serious menace – more serious perhaps because it is more visible – namely, that the cabinet may be unable, if its majority is slim or is divided among a number of parties, not all of which are necessarily disciplined, to see its policies implemented. Worries about the capacity of the cabinet to be decisive become replaced by questions about the capacity of the cabinet to steer the ship of state at all. If the cabinet is frequently defeated in parliament and if, perhaps as a direct consequence, a series of cabinets follow each other in rapid succession, the legitimacy of the political system is brought seriously into question. The end-result may even be the collapse of the regime, as occurred not just in the Third World, but in Western Europe, both before the Second World War, as in Italy, Portugal, Spain, or Germany, and after the Second World War, as in France. Of course, the collapse of a regime is not due exclusively to the procrastination resulting from the collective character of the cabinet, but the collective character of the cabinet is always likely to render decisionmaking problematic and particularly inefficient if a major crisis occurs. Yet to abandon ‘togetherness’ in the cabinet would entail abandoning,

6

Introduction

not just the cabinet system, but also the parliamentary system, an outcome regarded as unacceptable since such a move would mean adopting (or perhaps returning to) practices which smack of authoritarianism as when the ministers depend hierarchically on the head of the government. The fact that the danger of the fall of the cabinet is often regarded as serious results in a feeling, prevalent in Western Europe before the Second World War although less widespread in the last few decades of the twentieth century, that the cabinet system is a fragile plant which needs to be carefully nurtured if there is not to be cabinet instability. In the process, instability is regarded as the danger par excellence and stability becomes the key test of the success of all cabinet systems and in particular of new ones, such as the systems established in Central Eastern Europe. Being so clear-cut and visible, cabinet stability has come to be seen as the number one indicator of the performance of cabinets.

The forms which ‘streamlining’ takes in cabinet decision-making In order to avoid instability and to try and ensure that the cabinet makes prompt decisions, some constraints had to be placed on the representative principle, limitations which inevitably entail ‘streamlining’ cabinet government by means of a number of constraints and thus moving at least some distance away from a fully ‘collective’ mode of ‘togetherness’ and towards a ‘softer’ ‘collegial’ relationship among cabinet members. In the Western European case these constraints have taken place on a number of different planes: one needs to see how far the same types of constraints have operated in an identical manner in Central and Eastern European cabinets. To ‘streamline’ processes of decision-making in cabinets without abandoning the principle that ministers are all to be involved jointly in these processes, the extent to which the government is collective must be reduced in a manner which is acceptable to these ministers. The key aims should be to limit the volume of business reaching the cabinet and to modify the way in which this business is handled. The reduction in volume must have, at one extreme, the effect of avoiding permitting the cabinet to discuss matters which are ideologically so controversial that long and potentially explosive debates are likely to take place and, at the other, the effect of ensuring that time is not wasted on a huge number of trivial issues. Items to be discussed must therefore be ‘intermediate’ between these two poles and relate primarily to important matters which cause relatively few conflicts of principle. These items must then be handled at


7

the meeting in such a way that ministers are not confronted with openended debating opportunities but with ‘well-prepared’ proposals, so that discussions in cabinet do not meander or become indecisive. Thus, both the nature of the inputs and the behaviour of ministers must be regulated. Admittedly, it is difficult to find an ‘ideal’ arrangement and the process of decision-making may turn out to be either ‘too’ ‘streamlined’ or not ‘guided’ enough. This is why one should endeavour to measure variations in the nature of the ‘streamlining’ which takes place and this is one of the reasons why the record of Central and Eastern European cabinets since the early 1990s can be most revealing. In Western Europe, the ‘streamlining’ of cabinet decision-making has occurred in four main ways: 1. Procedural arrangements have been introduced to regulate the number of meetings, the number and role of committees, the structure and effective power of the prime minister’s and president’s staff. 2. Parties supporting the government have tended to shape the agenda of the cabinet when it is formed and to exercise pressure on members of the cabinet when these are in office. 3. Prime ministers, as well as, in those cases in which they are directly involved, presidents, have typically used their authority and their personal influence to ensure that the cabinet is as efficient as possible. 4. Ministers often decide, for a variety of reasons, not to participate extensively in cabinet decision-making. These factors have to be related to the broader ‘societal’ environment and, in particular, to the part played by groups and social movements, by the media and by public servants, notably those close to the ministers. All of these attempt to influence decision-making and to bring to the attention of the members of the cabinet those questions which are of concern to them. Their role is indirect, however, as it tends to be exercised on the cabinet by putting pressure on the parties supporting the government or on the ministers. This book therefore investigates the manner in which ‘streamlining’ contributes to the limitation of the representative and collective decisionmaking process in Central Eastern European cabinets in a context in which there are likely to be substantial variations across the area. This is so partly because the cabinet system was adopted suddenly and partly because cabinets had to deal with an almost total restructuring of the social and economic fabric of their countries. This introductory chapter aims to provide a framework, first, by way of examining the manner in which

8

Introduction

‘streamlining’ has taken in Western Europe and, second, by identifying the main ways in which processes in Central Eastern European cabinets developed.

How ‘streamlining’ in cabinet decision-making was able to take place in Western Europe Let us begin by considering the procedural arrangements put in place in Western Europe to cope with the large increases in the amount of government business which had to be transacted. The key constraint was that meetings of the cabinet should not normally take place more than once a week and that they should last no longer than two or three hours. In some countries, such as the Netherlands and Finland, weekly meetings have been extended somewhat beyond, but, even there, ministers have had at most a few hours at their disposal to conduct the business of the state. This is a small amount, but must remain so because cabinet members, being heads of departments, often large and complex departments, can only spend a limited amount of their time on cabinet affairs. Two main developments have been particularly instrumental in ‘streamlining’ Western European cabinets. On the one hand, there has been a multiplication of cabinet committees, some ad hoc, others permanent (Mackie and Hogwood, 1985). Their main function has been to study the policy proposals emerging from the departments, to come to an agreement, at least in principle, on these proposals and thus to resolve potential conflicts in advance of the full cabinet meeting. Increasingly, it has become the practice for matters to reach the cabinet meeting only once they have been ‘managed’ in this way. Admittedly, these committees are ‘cabinet committees’: they include the ministers from the departments directly concerned with the policies under consideration; they are typically chaired by the prime minister or by a senior minister. To this extent, the cabinet is ‘partially’ involved, but the whole cabinet is not. As proposals reach the cabinet only when they are ‘ripe’, so to speak, the cabinet is likely to give its approval with little discussion. Indeed, if serious objections are made to a proposal during the cabinet meeting, that proposal will almost certainly be referred back to the committee for further consideration. The cabinet meeting therefore becomes a kind of ‘appeal’ body and is not primarily involved even in the final elaboration of the proposals it approves. Cabinet committees have become truly effective only because, on the other hand, a substantial cabinet secretariat has also been put in place almost everywhere in Western Europe in the course of the twentieth


9

century, with a view to ‘policing’ the activities of the government in general and to regulating the flow of business reaching the cabinet. The tasks of this secretariat are threefold. First, it prepares the agenda of cabinet meetings in agreement with the prime minister, drafts the minutes of the meetings and circulates them. Secondly, while preparing the agenda, it ensures that proposals have been agreed in a cabinet committee before being included in the list of items to be discussed. The amount of time ‘wasted’ in debating ‘ill-prepared’ proposals is thereby reduced automatically. Thirdly, the secretariat follows the implementation of cabinet decisions in the various departments: it asks for explanations when compliance is not forthcoming and, if noncompliance persists, reports the matter to the prime minister. Admittedly, the cabinet secretariat can fulfill these functions effectively only if it is large enough to supervise the activities of all the departments and if its head has enough authority with relation to senior civil servants and even to ministers. This is neither self-evident nor universally the case: but, in Western Europe at least, secretariats generally have enough prestige, clout, but also savoir-faire, to achieve the desired results, which consist in ‘streamlining’ markedly – and perhaps in some case too much – the process of decision-making in cabinets. Moreover, in Western Europe at least, both secretariat and cabinet committees are able to fulfill the functions for which they have been set up because, by and large, they enjoy the support of those who belong to the cabinet, the ministers and the prime minister. The key role of parties in providing support to ‘streamlining’ cabinet decision-making To be effective, the procedural arrangements need the support of a force which is deeply embedded in the structure of the political system: the only force which can have such an effect is that of the political parties. It is indeed not by accident that cabinet government has come, at least in Western Europe, to be labelled ‘party government’. The point in time at which this development occurred in Western Europe varied from country to country: but that it has occurred is abundantly clear, even if the precise definition of what constitutes party government is still controversial (Blondel and Cotta, 2000). What led to the strong involvement of parties in government was the fact that, electoral contests having become battles between parties, the notion that the government should reflect the outcome of these battles seemed to follow logically: cabinets had to be composed on the basis of party majorities in parliament. What enabled ‘supporting’ parties to become involved in ‘streamlining’ the cabinet, however, was that parties, or at least the most significant parties, became,

10

Introduction

almost throughout Western Europe, fairly stable, well-organized, and disciplined. Admittedly, the ‘streamlining’ of the operation of the cabinet has been an unintended effect of the emergence of party government. Yet, as soon as they are effective bodies, parties become engaged in a process of this nature by the very fact that they are involved in the activities of the governments which they support. They are involved in three ways: by playing a part in appointments to the cabinet, by having a role in the distribution of the patronage which the government has at its disposal and, above all, by being concerned with governmental policies. This last characteristic leads them directly to ‘streamline’ the cabinet, as their interest in policy-making makes them circumscribe both what the government shall do and what it shall not do and they do so both when the cabinet is constituted and once it is installed in office. Before the constitution of the cabinet, party involvement stems from the election program and from the elaboration of the governmental program, which can be a very long written document. During the life of the cabinet, the supporting party or parties may well intervene if a new problem arises which was not anticipated when the government was established or if a controversy occurs which the government cannot solve. If things go wrong, the supporting party or parties may also be responsible for the fall of the cabinet. While these parties thus act overtly as gatekeepers, their influence has also less visible aspects. Single-party and coalition governments differ in this respect. In single-party governments, this less visible effect is direct, as ministers are likely to share a common political outlook and will tend to agree broadly on the goals the government pursues. The number of issues about which there will be major conflict in cabinet will therefore be limited: they will tend to be restricted to the means by which policies can be implemented or to new and unforeseen circumstances, especially in relation to foreign affairs. This leaves scope for debate, but that scope is markedly smaller than if the entire ideological spectrum was represented in the cabinet. Admittedly, single-party governments are typically constituted when the party has a large electoral base and there will therefore probably be some division of opinion in that party and even organized factions. Yet the sharpness of conflicts is likely to be somewhat blunted as many ministers will have been together in the party for years; they will also have to fight the next election together. The election programme also acts as a major restraining element if some ministers disagree with governmental policy. The combination of relative ideological proximity and of practical party considerations thus results in a marked limitation in the amount of debate taking place in single-party cabinets.


11

Somewhat paradoxically, coalition cabinets are often even more restrained than single-party cabinets. Such a generalization is subject to exceptions, as there are many types of coalitions, from ‘minimum size’ to large and even ‘grand’. Truly ‘grand’ coalitions are rare; they usually occur when the country is in turmoil (Müller and Strom, 2000; De Swann, 1973). As most coalitions tend to be ‘minimum size’ or a little larger, they are likely to be composed of parties which are ideologically not very distant from each other: this constitutes a de facto constraint on the extent to which conflict will occur. Moreover, coalitions exist because a number of parties decide that it is in their interest to form and support a cabinet, partly because they see advantages for the party and especially the party elite and partly because they fear an alternative government composed of opposition parties. To prevent troubles within the cabinet, a governmental ‘coalition agreement’ is thus critical: this determines, sometimes in detail, what the government will do. Such an agreement may leave even less scope for debate among ministers than is the case in singleparty governments. The effect may be that the ministers from the parties belonging to the coalition become ‘delegates’ of the party. Potentially conflictual issues are either not raised at all (the coalition agreement being silent about them) or, if they come to be raised, they are dealt with by the parties who have to look for compromises if the government is to remain in being. Therefore, parties markedly limit the extent to which conflicts occur at all in cabinet (especially in single-party governments), reduce the sharpness of conflicts (again especially in single-party governments, as a result of the election programme) or ensure that matters are decided elsewhere and not in the cabinet (especially in coalition governments). Yet this occurs only if parties are strong enough to be able to impose on the cabinet the ‘streamlining’ of its activities. If they are weak, especially if they are based on personalities who have come together mainly for reasons of electoral convenience, they may simply lack the clout to force ministers to follow their lead. Western European parties have not only been in general strong enough to achieve the desired effect; in some cases, it has been argued that they were too strong, a development referred to as ‘partitocracy’. Yet it is far from axiomatic that parties will have the same strength everywhere. The success of prime ministers markedly depends on them running ‘efficient’ cabinets Meanwhile, Western European prime ministers, as leaders of the cabinet, as well as French presidents outside the periods of ‘cohabitation’, have a

12

Introduction

direct interest in ensuring that the ministers do not ‘fall out of line’. They are therefore likely to contribute markedly to the ‘streamlining’ of the decision-making process. Of course, the extent to which the prime minister acts in this fashion naturally varies appreciably, admittedly, depending upon a series of factors ranging from the overall conditions under which the government operates at a given point in time (if there is a major crisis, for instance), through the characteristics of the political system (practices of prime ministerial leadership may or may not be prevalent), including constitutional rules (for instance, the German Chancellor is elected alone by the Bundestag, before the government is constituted), to the standing of the prime minister in the sole or main party in government (having been the truly recognised leader or being a compromise choice). The psychological predispositions of the prime minister also play a part and, indeed, may well vary over time. The effect of these factors is to encourage prime ministers to be strongly involved in the progress of proposals at cabinet meetings. Some do so more than others, of course, but prime ministers who wish to exercise little influence, to ‘reign but not govern’, are both rare and unlikely to remain in office for very long. The key distinction to be drawn among prime ministers is that between ‘arbitrators’ and ‘activists’, not a straightforward dichotomy, to be sure, but one which helps to provide an indication as to the main goal of a given head of the government. Yet whether they are skilful ‘arbitrators’ or strong ‘activists’, or indeed whether they adopt a mixture of both ‘genres’, by their actions prime ministers reduce the extent of ‘togetherness’ in the cabinet. ‘Activist’ prime ministers give prominence to what they want to see achieved and therefore play down, indeed may stop, what is not to their liking, while the reputation of ‘arbitrators’ depends upon them being able to show that the business of the cabinet proceeds smoothly, without the ‘hiccups’ resulting from ‘too much discussion’. Those who let the cabinet behave in what would be regarded as a ‘disorderly’ or ‘directionless’ manner are likely to be heavily criticized: it is in their interest to prevent these impressions from being widespread by reducing ‘togetherness’ in decision-making and by fostering ‘efficiency’. This result can be achieved in a variety of ways. First, procedures can be used and, in particular, the key power of agenda setting. Indeed, even the location of an issue sufficiently low down on the agenda will result in it being raised at a time, towards the end of the meeting, when many ministers wish to leave and discussion will be shortened. Secondly, if conflict does occur over a proposal which had seemed to have been well ‘prepared’, the prime minister is likely to refer that proposal back to the committee for further deliberation. Thirdly, if one or a few ministers are


13

anxious to discuss a matter or propose a policy about which the prime minister has doubts, he or she is likely to talk individually to the ministers concerned, attempt to convince them, cajole them if possible, warn them if necessary. The sign of a good ‘arbitrating’ prime minister is that he or she succeeds in these efforts: the prime minister gains prestige in the process, while also ensuring that the business of the cabinet progresses speedily and harmoniously. Not all ministers may wish to be fully involved in cabinet decisions Finally, not all ministers may wish to participate extensively in debates within cabinet. The view that this body will act in a collegial manner is largely predicated on the assumption that ministers are ‘enlightened amateurs’ who are able and willing to make contributions on all matters in a meaningful manner. Such a conception, perhaps valid in the past, simply seems unrealistic in the present circumstances: ministers may have views, but cannot be expected to be equally knowledgeable about foreign affairs, defence, the economy, education, the social services and thus to participate fully in debates on all these subjects. There are indeed five broad factors likely to affect the extent to which ministers will participate. First, they may be psychologically more or less predisposed to discuss the issues being raised: they may be ‘spectators’ or view themselves as ‘ambassadors’ of their departments rather than truly active members (Headey, 1974). Secondly, they may be more or less involved because of their background: lawyers or teachers are more likely to want to participate than specialists such as doctors or engineers (Blondel and Thiebault, 1991). Thirdly, some ministers have a broader area of competence than others because of their past career, for instance if they have been in more than one post. Fourthly, ministers may or may not be well briefed in advance about the implications of the policies under discussion, for instance by their personal advisers. Finally, most ministers head a department; their main activity is in that department: they spend most of their time there and their reputation as ministers, both within the department and more widely, largely depends on their success in the department. It is therefore not particularly useful for them to engage at cabinet meetings in open battles with other government members over issues which do not concern their department directly. Thus, for all these reasons, ministers are far from automatically fostering collective decisionmaking: in many – perhaps most – cases, they may well prefer to refrain from taking an overt stand. In the name of efficiency, cabinet decision-making processes thus lose much of their ‘collegial’ character. The history of Western European cabinets

14

Introduction

in the course of the twentieth century has indeed been primarily one in which efforts were made to move away from ‘easy-going’, unstructured, indeed typically ‘unminuted’ meetings to situations in which much of what goes on becomes rather formal and even ritualized. Admittedly, occasionally, a major issue is being fully discussed, for instance as a result of an unexpected crisis. It is because such occasions may occur that the cabinet system is special and must retain that special character: such cases cannot easily be dealt with in ‘hierarchical’ governments. These occasions are rare, however: Indeed, they have to be rare if the system is to function adequately on a daily basis. Thus, ‘streamlining’ prevails, perhaps even too much ‘streamlining’, the extent of that ‘streamlining’ depending on the existence of a complex series of arrangements and of modes of behavior. These have taken years to emerge and ‘mature’ in Western Europe: did similar developments take place and, if so, how effective are they in the ‘new’ cabinet systems of Central Eastern Europe?

The ‘streamlining’ of cabinets in Central Eastern Europe The problems which cabinets faced in Central Eastern Europe after the end of communism were identical to those which Western European cabinets had faced, but in a more urgent manner and on the basis of very limited, if any, experience. As in Western Europe, cabinets in Central Eastern Europe were set up formally as representative bodies: their members were expected to take collective decisions. As in Western Europe, the representative character of the cabinet has had to be reduced by the need to take decisions speedily and efficiently. As in Western Europe, too, this reduction resulted from the factors which were identified in the previous section. Interviewing ministers as the most likely way of finding out what happens in cabinet Yet the impact of these factors is not likely to have been the same everywhere. While rules can be rather easily elaborated and while these can determine, for instance, what the powers of cabinet committees are to be or what functions cabinet secretariats should fulfill, the implementation of these rules is likely to pose serious problems, some of which may not be easily overcome. What has therefore to be determined is thus not only what the arrangements were expected to achieve, but what they did in fact achieve. To find out what has actually taken place in political life is notoriously difficult: it is particularly difficult in the case of ‘non-transparent’ bodies such as cabinets. One has therefore to rely on


15

second-hand information. Naturally, the closer to ‘reality’ the information one is able to gather, the more reliable it is likely to be. This is why, as in the volume devoted to cabinet decision-making in Western Europe published in 1993, Governing Together, it was essential to undertake the study of decision-making in Central Eastern European cabinets by interviewing a large proportion of those (in this case 320 of them) who were directly involved – the ministers. They are the actors who did – or did not – participate actively in cabinet decisions. Information given by ministers is not without limitations, admittedly, as cabinet members may not always remember the past or may embellish it; they are also likely to have a partial view of what happened. Yet interviews of ministers remain the means par excellence on the basis of which the reality of the processes of decision-making in cabinets can be discovered. Ultimately, even if the picture of what did occur is not fully comprehensive, an analysis based on ministerial interviews can give an impression of what is likely to have occurred, as was the case when a study of the same kind was undertaken in Western Europe (Appendixes 1, 2 and 3). The nature of procedural arrangements in Central Eastern European cabinets and the extent to which these are implemented Very quickly following the fall of communism and almost as soon as the cabinets themselves were established, procedural arrangements designed to ‘streamline’ the decision-making process were indeed introduced. The advice given by various western organizations, in particular by the OECD, was heeded. The two sets of procedural arrangements which were regarded as being most relevant in this context were the establishment of committees and of a cabinet secretariat. The process of establishment and implementation of these arrangements was also monitored by international organizations. Yet the question still arises as to whether, in the daily or weekly reality of cabinet meetings, these arrangements have come to have the ‘full’ effect which they were expected to have. First, one has to find out how far cabinet committees ensure that matters are truly ‘prepared’ before they arrive on the table of the cabinet meeting. Secondly, one has to determine how far the cabinet secretariat is in a position to determine the content of the agenda and in particular to prevent ‘unprepared’ matters from being discussed at the meeting as well as to assess the speed of the implementation process. Difficulties may have occurred in this respect as ministers may not always exercise restraint, as prime ministers may not always have had the required authority or the disposition to act and as parties may well be too weak to induce ministers and prime ministers to

16

Introduction

abide by the procedural arrangements designed to ‘streamline’ the decision process. Do ministers tend to accept ‘streamlining’ arrangements in Central Eastern European cabinets? Together with prime ministers and presidents, ministers are the actors engaged in the process of decision-making in cabinets. However strongly procedural arrangements may formally ‘streamline’ the process, the implementation of the rules does not depend solely on what happens in the committees, nor on what secretariats are able to do. Effective ‘streamlining’ depends also – and perhaps above all – on whether ministers are prepared to let decisions be taken even if they do not agree or even if they feel they could not participate sufficiently in the process. Meanwhile, the reasons which led Western European ministers to agree to a somewhat diminished ‘collegial’ character of the cabinet decisionmaking process may not all be equally valid in Central Eastern Europe. Cabinet behaviour in Western Europe has been largely based on a learning process which passed from one generation of ministers to the next. A culture has been acquired in this way on the basis of which cabinet members have become able to decide what they can realistically achieve and therefore what kind of behavior in cabinet is most appropriate. If the culture of cabinets is acquired by such a learning process from one set of ministers to another, members of Central Eastern European cabinets are unlikely to have come quickly to the conclusion that they should voluntarily limit their participation in the cabinet. Assuming that time is required for a ‘culture of restraint’ to emerge, one would therefore expect both attitudes and patterns of behaviour to have changed gradually over the course of the 1990s. This would mean that ministers would hold different attitudes and have different patterns of behaviour in the early years of the twenty-first century from those which characterized their predecessors a decade earlier. Alternatively, ministers in the earlier period might have been prepared not to participate fully in debates in the cabinets to which they belonged because they had been socialized, on the basis of what was probably the case in the ‘administrative’ governments which existed in Eastern Europe under communism, to see decisions being taken with little or no discussion except by the specialists in charge of the proposals which were submitted. This would suggest, in particular, that those ministers who had been associated, even if not closely, with the ex-communist parties or their allies would be much more likely to accept the ‘streamlining’ of the cabinet than ministers who had not had such a previous association. That effect would


17

be expected to taper off over time, however, as the number of ministers who had experienced political life under communism were declining. If both views were valid, that is to say if their communist background led ministers of the early period to practice self-censorship, while a ‘culture of restraint’ was gradually acquired by ministers of the second generation, ‘streamlining’ in the cabinet may well have been broadly accepted by cabinet members throughout the whole period. Yet these conclusions have to be tested and one might at least expect practices to have been different across the countries of the region. This is precisely the reason why ministerial interviews are crucial – they are the only way in which one might be able to discover the way in which cabinets have responded to the need to streamline the decision-making process. Do prime ministers and (occasionally) presidents tend to enforce ‘streamlining’ arrangements in Central Eastern European cabinets? However large the restraint which ministers impose on themselves because of their past or current ministerial experience, prime ministers and presidents can be expected to play a significant part in the ‘streamlining’ of cabinet decision-making. Yet this part may well have also varied markedly across the area. There is, indeed, a contrast between Central Eastern Europe – where cabinets were led by prime ministers and not by presidents, like for instance in Poland in the early period and to an extent in Lithuania – and Southeastern Europe – where the majority of countries had a working ‘semi-presidential’ system, with the president playing in the life of the government the kind of role which French presidents have played since 1958 – at least outside periods of ‘cohabitation’. Although that contrast is particularly sharp when the countries of the ‘West Balkans’ are being examined, the role of the president has tended to be large in Romania, while Bulgaria was rather exceptional in the Balkans for not having had ‘strong’ presidents. The role of the prime minister in the ‘dual’ arrangement which ‘semi-presidentialism’ fosters seems to have varied markedly, even if one excludes the cases of Croatia under Tudjman and of Serbia under Milosevic. Prime ministers in ‘semi-presidential’ systems did not always have merely an ‘administrative’ role, any more than they have in France when there is no ‘cohabitation’: there are thus marked variations in the authority of the prime ministers in Romania, for instance. In general, however, whatever difficulties follow from the existence of the dual leadership of president and prime minister, presidents did help to shape the new cabinet system by providing a degree of stability in the early post-communist years and thus enabling the ministers to become accustomed during the ‘transition’ period to the roles which they were having to fulfill.

18

Introduction

Meanwhile, in the countries of Central Eastern Europe, a sufficient number of prime ministers have been regarded as having been ‘strong’ to provide a basis for the conclusion that they have contributed significantly to the fact that the cabinet system as it has been known across most of Western Europe also took root in Central Eastern Europe. In the main, difficulties have emerged primarily, on the one hand, in Estonia and Latvia, where the multi-party system led to a degree of prime ministerial as well as of cabinet instability (in sharp contrast to Slovenia, where one of the longest-standing prime ministers became president of the Republic, in a manner resembling similar cases in Ireland before the Second World War and in Portugal in the 1990s) and, on the other hand, in Slovakia, where the way in which Meciar ruled the country has generally been regarded as going somewhat beyond the limits of ‘normal’ liberaldemocratic government, though he was perhaps not as authoritarian in running his cabinets as might have been expected. Are parties in Central Eastern Europe strong enough to ensure that ‘streamlining’ effectively takes place? Remarkably, the countries of Central Eastern Europe do not have just parties: they also working party systems. This is in contrast to several of the countries of the CIS; indeed, it is doubtful whether one can describe Russia, the Ukraine, let alone Belarus, as having had a ‘working party system’ to date. To this formal extent, the countries which are being examined here fulfill the necessary condition that parties have to exist if parliamentary cabinets are to operate meaningfully. Yet, for the ‘streamlining’ of cabinet decision-making to be truly effective, parties must be strong enough to be able to ensure that their ‘representatives’ in the cabinet follow the line which they have taken. As a matter of fact, on many issues weaker parties may be unable to adopt any consistent line. Moreover, one element of party strength is stability: party systems either should not be composed or should be composed only rarely of new parties emerging either alongside or as a replacement for some of the older ones. Not all Central Eastern party systems fulfill these last two sets of conditions. Indeed, the surprise is perhaps that several party systems did fulfill them.

What the answers given by ministers can help to ascertain When one considers the overall need for ‘streamlining’ cabinet decisionmaking, three questions arise, all of which entail that detailed empirical analyses based on ministerial interviews should be undertaken. The first


19

concerns the ways in which the ‘actors’ themselves are felt to be satisfied with the way in which the cabinets to which they have belonged made their decisions. By asking the ministers themselves how far they have wanted and have been able to be involved in the process of cabinet decision-making, one will begin to establish a concrete impression of the extent to which the cabinet does have a representative character; one will also discover how far the ministers feel that the current arrangements provide a combination of representativeness and of ‘streamlining’ which, in their opinion, leads to efficiency without unduly restricting discussion. The second question concerns the ways in which the forces which contribute to the ‘streamlining’ of cabinets combine with and relate to each other. By inquiring of the ministers how far the decision-making processes are affected by the parties represented in the cabinet, the prime ministers under whom they served, or the cabinet secretariat or the civil service in general one will also have a concrete impression of the mechanisms by which the ‘streamlining’ of decision-making processes has tended to take place and of the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms. The third question concerns the extent to which there are variations from country to country and whether these variations markedly affect either the extent of ‘togetherness’ or the degree of ‘streamlining’ in the cabinet. In Western Europe, the impression has prevailed, based on some, but only some evidence, that these variations were relatively small, although the feeling also prevails that some cabinets allow more debates than others – the Finnish or Dutch cabinets, for instance, rather than the British or French cabinets. There is as yet not even a general impression of this kind in the context of Central Eastern European cabinets. It seems at least possible that there should be more debates in, say, Estonian or Latvian cabinets than in Czech or Hungarian cabinets. Yet this has to be ascertained by also taking into account the extent to which these cabinets were able to handle the large amount of business which was coming before them.

The structure of the book Although this work is essentially devoted to the analysis of the replies of ministers from the ten countries of the study, the ‘stage’ has first to be presented: this means describing the main characteristics of party systems and the main trends in the composition and duration of cabinets as well as the constitutional and procedural arrangements that regulate cabinet life. This is the object of Chapters 2 to 4. Chapters 5 to 7 are then devoted to an examination of the views of ministers about the way in which the cabinets in which they served did operate, about the part

20

Introduction

played by parties, and about the relative merits of single-party and coalition governments. Chapters 8 and 9 consider the way in which ministers judge the activities of the members of prime ministers’ offices and of the civil servants in the departments of which they were the heads. Finally, Chapters 10 to 12 describe how ministers assess their own role and that of their colleagues, as well as the particular role played by ministers of finance and by prime ministers. In the conclusion, the general characteristics of cabinet government in Central Eastern Europe are outlined. Comparisons with Western European cabinets are drawn throughout the study. It is hoped that such an empirical analysis of decision-making in the cabinets of ten Central Eastern European countries will provide a concrete, comparative description of the ways in which cabinets have emerged and developed in the area in the course of the first decade since the end of communism. It is hoped that this inquiry will also begin to provide indications likely to lead gradually to more accurate generalizations about the ways in which cabinet government functions as well as about the way in which it can function efficiently and effectively. The end of communism led to the opening up of a whole new region to a political system which had so far existed primarily in Western Europe and in parts of the Commonwealth. The extension of the cabinet system to Central Eastern Europe thus provides an opportunity for a better understanding of the way in which a number of elements – the parties supporting the cabinet, the attitudes and behaviour of the members of the cabinet and the procedures structuring the life of the cabinet – combine to give cabinet government its special character: it is to an analysis of these elements that the following chapters are devoted.

Part I The General Arrangements


2 The End of Communism and the New Party System

As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, the parties which support the cabinet and indeed may have representatives in the cabinet are among the key mechanisms which help to shape policy-making; but this is markedly more likely to occur if these parties are strong, on the one hand, for instance by having extensive roots in the population and by showing unity of purpose, and, on the other, if they are both stable and are widely expected to be stable. These are conditions which tend to be met if time his allowed to elapse and thus parties and the party system become ‘institutionalized’, however: the least that can be said is that the way in which parties and party systems emerged in most countries of Central Eastern Europe was far from providing an ideal basis for such a gradual institutionalization process. Admittedly, in Hungary, to an extent in Slovenia, as well as in Poland through the part played by Solidarity, the final years of the communist regime saw moves taking place in the direction of ‘alternative’ groupings and organizations: but these were the only countries in which opportunities of this kind occurred. In the other countries of the region which are more specifically studied in this volume, the fall of the communist regime was so sudden and even unexpected that there was no ‘breathing space’ during which new political arrangements could be put in place. Moreover, neither the single-party system which prevailed under communism nor the system of forced coalitions dominated by the communist party which existed in some of these countries were good training grounds for the preparation of competitive party systems: this is indeed why the fact that competitive party systems did emerge at all constitutes is itself a success, but this is also why, unsurprisingly, substantial differences among the countries are to be found in the extent to which the new parties came to be strong ‘plants’ with roots in the society and the party system was to show stability. As a matter of fact, it should be remembered 23

24


that there are also important variations among Western European parties in terms of the strength of these parties and the stability of the party systems. This chapter needs therefore first to refer, however briefly, to the ways in which the competitive party system emerged in the context of what have been described as the ‘founding elections’ which led to the end of the communist regime. The chapter will then examine the evolution of party systems from the early 1990s to the first years of the twenty-first century, before considering how these party systems can be classified and the extent to which parties have come to divide along a Left–Right dimension. Finally, the stability of the parties will be examined in the light of the emergence of new parties sometimes backed by a substantial proportion of the electorate.

The emergence of a competitive party system through ‘founding elections’ The ‘founding’ or ‘constituent’ elections which took place after the fall of communism were obviously critical for the future development of parties and party systems; they were also exceptional in character. These elections were critical in that they introduced the new ‘rules of the game’: free elections meant that the major political players accepted political competition as the only meaningful way of establishing a sustainable democratic order; they also meant that these actors made ‘the convocation of elections an increasingly attractive means for conflict resolution’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1993: 40). It is interesting to note in this respect that these elections were marked by very little violence. They allowed the citizens to express their political views freely. They encouraged political participation, and, after years of political repression, they served to provide the emerging democratic governments with the seal of legitimacy (Garber and Bjornlund, 1992). It therefore makes good sense to describe these democratic elections as ‘founding’ or ‘constituent’ elections: ‘without elections the full array of institutions that constitute a new democratic political society – such as legislatures, constituent assemblies, and competitive political parties – simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legality, and legitimacy’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 71). Yet these elections were also exceptional in character. In particular, they differed substantially from subsequent elections by virtue of the important part played by broad, amorphous, umbrella organizations which tended to break up and recombine into smaller groups or factions once some of their members had been elected into office. At least four groups of elites played

The End of Communism and the New Party System

25

a major part in the transition to democracy – the hard-liners and the ‘softliners’ within the ruling elite, the radicals and the moderates within the opposition. These groups of elites were often seen as strategic or decisive groups. It is normally suggested that the best way for a competitive system to become institutionalized in such a context is for the two moderate groups to join forces and to elaborate a ‘pact’ designed to cover the period of transition towards democracy: such an elite-level negotiated transition was considered as the most favorable option for the future consolidation of the new regime since political parties on the Western European model simply did not exist in Eastern European polities. Would-be party systems in the region were more dependent upon coalescence within the initial democratic reform movement than upon splits within the surviving communist parties. As Olson and Norton (1996: 6) point out, flux, splits and coalitions of would-be party organizations in and outside of parliament, which tended to be more frequent as elections approached, widely characterized the early developmental stages of the democratic party systems in Central Eastern Europe. The general fluidity of the initial party systems notwithstanding, the political stage in the new democracies was reconfigured along multi-party lines well before the second round of democratic elections. The four groups of the new would-be political elite which were mentioned above – namely the hard-liners and ‘soft-liners’ within the ruling elite, the radicals and the moderates within the opposition – played a very large part in establishing the new party systems of East-Central and Southeastern Europe. Some (remaining) hard-liners from the old elite formed new communist parties, for instance in the case of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic and the Communist Party of Slovakia. ‘Soft-liners’ of the old elite in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria created and joined new popular and influential left-wing political parties. The moderates from the former democratic opposition were among the founders of various liberal and centre-right parties such as the Estonian Coalition Party, Latvia’s Way, the Liberal Union in Lithuania and the Alliance of Free Democrats in Hungary. Finally, the radicals from the former opposition created a number of right-wing and nationalist parties, for instance, the Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia and the Homeland Union in Lithuania. It would be an oversimplification to state that only members of the former ruling elite and of the mainstream mass opposition movements were responsible for the foundation of new parties in Central Eastern Europe, however. In several countries, a number of so-called historical

26


parties which had existed during the pre-war period were re-established between 1988 and 1991. Among these parties were the Social Democrats in Hungary and Lithuania, the Christian Democrats in Slovenia and in Czechoslovakia as well as the Agrarian party in Hungary, together with some nationalist parties, as in Lithuania. In addition to these traditional parties, new ones, such as the Greens and some regionalist parties, were created. Finally, single-issue parties, often based on interest groups, were also set up during the period of transition to democracy in some countries, such as the Democratic Party of Pensioners in Slovenia or the Bulgarian Business Bloc.

Party development in Central Eastern Europe since the end of communism In the ten Central Eastern European countries under consideration here, 246 parties, or an average of 24.6 parties per country, gained at least one per cent of the votes in at least one election during the 1990s; 60 per cent of these parties (147 of them and an average of 14.7 per cent per country) were able to win at least two seats in the national parliament at some point during the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century (Rose and Munro 2003: 39): this is obviously a large number. If one concentrates on ‘relevant’ parties, however, that is to say on those which have been strong enough to affect the decision-making process in the legislature and to play a part in the building of cabinets, the numbers are much smaller. This has been the case from the start, indeed even more so at the ‘founding elections’: instead of there being as many as 14.7 parties per country, the number of these ‘relevant’ parties oscillated between 3.6 and 5 since the fall of communism, with an average of 4.4 parties over the 15-year period during which the ten countries are under consideration. This average number of parties is very similar to the one which is found in Western Europe, where there was an average of 4.3 parties in 1989 (Lane and Ersson 1994) (Table 2.1). Variations from country to country were substantial, however, as were the variations over time in at least many of the countries. The average number of relevant parties which were present at successive elections throughout the elections period was at its lowest in Hungary and Bulgaria (under three relevant parties), followed by Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic (under four relevant parties) and highest in Slovakia (6.5 relevant parties); in the other four countries, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and Romania, the average number was between 4.5 and a little over five parties.

3.63

4.94

2.40 4.80 2.89 5.70 5.05 2.98 11.05 4.74 3.18 6.58

First multi-party

4.56

2.72 4.14 3.44 4.14 7.58 3.40 3.87 4.27 6.51 5.51

Second multi-party

4.23

2.97 3.70 2.48 5.49 5.48 4.20 2.95 3.69 6.51 4.85

Third multi-party

4.41

3.06 3.80 — 4.67 5.01 5.40 3.59 4.86 — 4.89

Fourth multi-party

0.30

0.30 0.50 0.48 0.73 1.22 1.06 3.81 0.53 1.92 0.81

St. deviation*

Notes: *standard deviation calculated only since the first multi-party elections in each country. **median of country calculated only since the first multi-party elections in each country. Sources: BEC; W. Ismayr (2002); Election Database Eastern Europe; Studies on Parties and Elections; Wolfram Nordsieck calculations, 2000 (http://www.parties-and-elections.de)

Average

2.42 2.22 3.78 2.89 1.97 1.98 — 2.14 4.98 10.33

Founding elections

Number of effective parties in Central Eastern European countries (1989–2004)

Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Table 2.1

4.48

2.85 3.97 2.89 5.08 5.27 3.80 3.73 4.51 6.51 5.20

Median of country**

27

28


Trends since 1990 in the number of relevant parties varied appreciably from country to country. There were three cases – those of Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria – in which the average number of relevant parties increased. In a fourth country, Latvia, that number first increased, only to decrease subsequently. In two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the number decreased: it had been particularly high at the ‘founding election’ in Slovenia, where no less than ten relevant parties emerged. Finally, in three countries – Estonia, Hungary and Romania – the number of relevant parties remained stable, while it is difficult to give a realistic figure of the number of relevant parties for Poland, as, in that country, on the Right, parties did on occasion combine without merging only subsequently to split. To summarize the developments of parties and party systems in Central Eastern Europe since the fall of communism, one can refer to three successive waves. The first wave coincided with the ‘founding elections’ and might be described as a phase of ‘limited pluralism’: the average number of relevant parties was relatively low (3.6 parties), with the exception of Slovenia; this was probably due to the fact that, during the initial phase of democratization, political competition was still restricted to an extent in practice. There were two or three political groups only in some countries, namely the non-communist opposition, the reform communists and the hard-line communists. The second wave started with the second election, at which the average number of relevant parties across the ten countries increased to 4.9. This phase might be described as that of ‘oversized pluralism’: interestingly, a similar development occurred in some Western European countries in the transition period to democracy. The next election brought about a further new trend and initiated a third wave of changes, which was marked by a reduction in the average number of effective parties to 4.4. This move can be described as being the first step in a phase of ‘stable pluralism’. The number of relevant parties may not necessarily remain stable in the future, but it has remained relatively stable through three elections: this does at least suggest that there is apparently no pressure for an increase in the average number of relevant parties across the ten countries, but there is no sign either that this average is likely to drop below four in the foreseeable future.

Types of party systems When only relevant parties are taken into account, Central Eastern European party systems can be classified into four types: two-party,


29

two-and-a-half-party, multi-party with a dominant party and multiparty without a dominant party. The two-party system is the least widespread: only the Hungarian party system might be characterized after the election of 2002 as having a near-two-party configuration, because of the overwhelming dominance, on the one hand, of the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party, which emerged from the Communist party after having reformed its structure and its policies, and, on the other, of the right-wing FIDESZ: this party in effect replaced the Hungarian Democratic Forum which had dominated the first few years of postcommunist politics in the country, but which collapsed, in large part after the death of its founder and leader, Antall. A minor partner in that quasi-two-party system is constituted by the Alliance of Young Democrats, which is associated with the Hungarian Socialist Party. The two-and-a-half-party system exists only in Bulgaria, where the left-wing Bulgarian Socialist Party and the right-wing Union of Democratic Forces competed against each other between 1992 and 2001. The National Movement Simeon II, named after the Bulgarian King Simeon Saxe-Coburg, won a landslide victory at the parliamentary elections of 2001, but declined sharply at the subsequent election of 2005. The third position has been typically occupied by the Movement for Rights and Freedom which tends to represent particularly the Turkish minority. A multi-party system with a dominant party emerged in two countries – the Czech Republic and Poland – both of which had strong left-wing parties, at least, in the Polish case, up to 2005, the Left being essentially represented in Poland by the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) and in the Czech Republic primarily by the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSDP). A unique feature of the Czech party system for the region is the fact that the Social Democratic Party did not emerge from a reconstituted Communist party, as was the case in Hungary or Poland, but was a genuinely distinct organization. Meanwhile, a separate and sizeable Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia remained in existence and has won more than 10 per cent of votes at parliamentary elections since 1990. At their 1995 Congress, the Czech Social Democratic Party passed a resolution of non-cooperation with the Communist Party as it was a political organization which still had its roots in the old repressive regime. This self-restraint of the CSDP meant that it refused to build a left-wing coalition with the communists after the 1998 and 2002 general elections. In 2002 the Czech Social Democrats made a coalition agreement with two centre-right parties, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party and the Freedom Union-Democratic

30


Union. However, the strength of the Czech Social Democratic Party was illustrated by the fact that this party was not only able to form a singleparty (minority) government between 1998 and 2002, but also to win two consecutive parliamentary elections, an infrequent occurrence in East-Central and Southeastern Europe, where, on the contrary, a leftwing ruling party typically loses power at the subsequent election. Apart from the Czech Social Democratic Party, the only other examples of leftwing parties remaining in power for more than one term are constituted by the cases of the Romanian Social Democratic Party in alliance, together with the Conservative Party in 2000 and 2004, and the Slovenian Liberal Democratic Party in 1996 and 2000. Meanwhile, the Polish Democratic Left Alliance outperformed divided right-wing parties at both the 1993 and 2001 parliamentary elections, although it was unable to form a single-party government. The Polish Democratic Left Alliance ruled the country in coalition with the Polish Peasant Party from 1993 to 1997 and formed the government once again with that party as well as with the Labor Union in 2001, but it lost heavily to two centre-right parties, the Civic Platform and the conservative Law and Justice Party, receiving only 11 per cent of votes at the 2005 parliamentary election. The political Right in the Czech Republic and Poland has been divided into liberal, conservative, Christian Democratic and nationalist parties, although the Czech Civic Democratic Party was much stronger than the other Czech parties on the Right – the Christian Democratic UnionCzechoslovak People’s Party and the Freedom Union-Democratic Union. In Poland, an almost ‘heroic’ attempt was made to consolidate the political Right by establishing the Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) in 1997: that ‘combination’ of parties did rule the country in a coalition with the liberal Freedom Union between 1997 and 2001, but it disintegrated while in office and gave rise to four political groupings in 2001, Electoral Action Solidarity, Law and Justice, the League of Polish Families and the Civic Platform. Meanwhile, multi-party systems without a dominant party are to be found in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, although there are substantial differences among these. Romania might even be classified as having a multi-party system with a dominant party: the Social Democratic Party of Romania has indeed been the leading political party in the country since 1992, but it was able to win the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections only in tandem with the Conservative Party. Moreover, the National Liberal Party, the conservative Democratic Party, the ethnic Democratic Alliance of Hungarians as well as the


31

nationalist People’s Party of Great Romania successfully challenged the Social Democratic Party from the Right. Lithuania constitutes another complex case. Up to the 2000 election, it seemed possible to conclude that the Lithuanian party system is not characterized by the kind of fragmentation typical of Estonia and Latvia, the underlying structure of the Lithuanian party system being reminiscent of that of Poland. Party labels, at least those of mainstream parties, are familiar to students of West European politics: indeed, Lithuanian political parties have a tendency to imitate West European, and particularly Scandinavian, parties. This may result in programmatic and social profiles not conducive to converting existing divisions into lasting cleavages: yet the simple structure of the Lithuanian party system proved to be a major source of political stability. In the Lithuanian context of lowdensity civil society, political parties even served as vehicles of political modernization (Zeruolis 1998: 139). At the 2000 election, however, massive party fragmentation shook the ‘perfect and stable’ Lithuanian party system with two new political parties, the Liberals and the New Union (Social Liberals), suddenly entering the stage of parliamentary politics. The New Union (Social Liberals) obtained almost 20 per cent of the votes while another 20 per cent went to the Liberal Union. The second political earthquake of the Lithuanian party system occurred at the 2004 general election. The new challenger was the Labor Party (LP), led by Viktor Uspaskich, a Russian-born businessman and member of parliament since 2000, officially registered as the 38th political party in the country in November 2003. The Labor Party held its founding congress in October 2003 and, according to opinion polls, immediately became the most popular party in the country, at 16 per cent, compared to 13 per cent for the ruling Social Democrats. It was regarded as a populist organization with no clear ideological direction and identity. The 2004 European elections anticipated the success at the subsequent general election in the same year. Most of the support for the Labor Party came from rural and peripheral areas, especially from central Lithuania, as well as from lowincome and socially insecure voters. The party thus won 16 out of 48 seats at the second ballot and gained 31 per cent of the seats overall, while another protest party, ‘For Order and Justice’, formed by the former president Paksas after his impeachment, obtained 11 seats. Paksas was not able to stand himself because a decision of the Constitutional Court had banned him from holding any public position requiring the oath. Overall, new parties took 46 per cent of total vote in 2004. Thus, since the 2000 general election, the Lithuanian party system has to be defined as multiparty without a dominant party.

32


The party systems in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia are more straightforward. In these countries, the share of votes for the largest parliamentary party has been higher than 30 per cent only four times since the introduction of multi-party elections. Meciar’s Movement for Democratic Slovakia crossed the 30 per cent barrier in 1992 by even receiving support from 37 per cent of the electorate; in 1993 Latvia’s Way gained 32 per cent of the total vote; the Estonian Coalition Party achieved a major victory in 1995 with 32 per cent; the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia obtained 36 of the votes at the 2000 parliamentary elections. Overall, multi-party systems without a dominant party emerged in these countries almost immediately after the transition to democracy occurred.

Is there a Left–Right polarization of the parties? The Left–Right continuum provides another means of classifying party systems in Central Eastern Europe, if ‘the structure of the party system is defined not only by how many parties compete in the elections but also by the number of dimensions on which parties compete’ (Rose and Munro 2003: 47). Yet it is also often the case that parties are spread on a space which is ‘fragmented along up to half a dozen different dimensions’ (Rose and Munro 2003: 50). Such an ideological structure is frequently characterized as being rather ‘fuzzy’. In such a context, voters usually lack the experience and knowledge required to differentiate among the parties in terms of dimensions or in terms of issues (Rose and Munro 2003: 50–2). In the early 1990s, in Central Eastern Europe the Left–Right ideology played little part in structuring party behaviour, but the political scene then changed rapidly: party competition and political mobilization gradually became based increasingly on ideological standpoints and a clear-cut programmatic identity became almost a precondition for a party’s survival and subsequent success. As in Western Europe, the Left–Right dimension thus became important for the ideological identification of parties within the party systems (Kitschelt et al. 1999). One finds at least four types of party systems in the region in terms of the Left–Right cleavage. These are: 1. Bipolar party systems with a small number of parties on the Left and Right, all of which are united and strong; 2. Systems with fairly united left-wing parties composed at most of two parties and a divided as well as relatively weak political Right; 3. Systems with fairly united right-wing parties and a divided as well as relatively weak political Left;


33

4. Fragmented party systems or party systems without dominant parties of any ideological leaning. Hungary and Bulgaria fit best the first model. Poland until the 2005 parliamentary election, Romania and in part the Czech Republic are in the second group, with a unipolar Left and a divided as well as relatively weak political Right: in these countries the left-wing parties (Polish Democratic Left Alliance, Czech Social Democratic Party and Romanian Social Democratic Party) successfully mobilized no less than one-quarter of participating voters since the early 1990s. The third type can be found in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, but the saliency of the Left–Right division is rather low: in Estonia and Latvia, for instance, new non-ideological parties started winning parliamentary elections after 2000, although these parties did form governmental coalitions with established and more ideologically oriented parties. The fourth type, that of a multipolar fragmented party system or of a party system without dominant parties, these having no ideological leaning, emerged in Slovakia in 1998 after Meciar’s Movement for Democratic Slovakia lost power. Three parties on the Left (Social Democracy, the Party of the Democratic Left and the Communist Party of Slovakia), three Christian democratic parties (the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, the Hungarian Coalition Party, the Christian Democratic Movement), the liberal Alliance of the New Citizen and two nationalists’ parties (the Slovak National Party and the Movement for Democratic Slovakia) competed against each other: at the 2002 general election, 26 political organizations presented candidates (Ucen 2003: 1071). The party system was thus very fragmented. It is difficult to classify Lithuanian parties on a Left–Right continuum. In two parliaments out of four, mainstream left- and right-wing parties secured stable parliamentary majorities, the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party in 1992 and the Homeland Union in 1996: from 1992 to 2000 Lithuania had all the characteristics of a bipolar party system, with few parties, all of which were united and strong, representing the Left and the Right: fluctuations from Left to Right were then a feature of Lithuanian party politics. After the 2000 election, parliament came to be dominated by the Centre–Left majority of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and of the New Union, but only in mid-2001 did these two parties agree to form a government. After the 2004 election these two parties then agreed to form a coalition with the Labor Party and the Union of Peasants and New Democracy in a new four-party Centre–Left coalition. The fragmentation of the Lithuanian party system since 2000

34


led to the emergence of a multipolar party system without dominant left-wing or right-wing parties. Thus the extent to which there is identifiable Left–Right polarization in Central Eastern Europe varies markedly. It is rather high in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. It is much less marked in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. It was marked in Lithuania in the first period, but has become hazier since then. Finally, in Slovakia, the desire of many parties to prevent the return of Meciar’s party to power resulted in the construction of an alliance which largely ignored the Left–Right continuum.

How stable are parties in Central Eastern Europe? Two main factors have to be taken into account when describing the extent of stability of the party systems in Central Eastern Europe: these are the size of the turnout and the extent of electoral volatility. Large variations in voter turnout can be observed in the region not only from country to country, but over time in individual countries. After the ‘founding election’, where electoral participation was very high in most countries (typically about 80 per cent), turnout declined in the ten countries analyzed here to drop to 60 per cent at the last cycle of parliamentary elections: thus more than one-fifth of previously active voters ceased to come to the polls by the early 2000s. There are substantial variations, however: in Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria, for instance, turnout was on average over 70 per cent; it was much lower in Lithuania and Poland. A number of reasons account for that declining turnout, among them the raising of the electoral threshold, a deep distrust of political parties and the inability of governments to fulfill voter expectations, the oversupply of parties and weak party loyalties. Growing voter apathy seems thus to constitute an indication of potential rather than actual party system instability in Central Eastern Europe (Table 2.2). The second indicator, volatility, does not only help to measure the size of the movements from one party to another in successive elections: it also provides a means of assessing the relative strength and the mobilization capacity of political parties. It thus constitutes a key instrument to determine party system stability. While, in Western European democracies volatility is relatively low and does not, on average, exceed 21 points (Rose, Munro and Mackie 1998: 118), few Central Eastern European countries can compete with this level. This is the case of Slovakia at 20 points (1992, 1994), Romania, at 16 (1996), the Czech Republic also at 16 (1998) (Rose, Munro and Mackie 1998: 119). In the ten countries

1991 83.9

1994 75.2

1997 62.9

2001 66.7

72.22

First multi-party elections

Second multi-party elections

Third multi-party elections

Fourth multi-party elections

Average

78.04

2002 58.0

1998 74.0

1996 76.4

1992 85.1

1990 96.7

Czech Republic

53.20

2002 70.5

1998 56.3

1994 68.9

1990 69.5

Hungary

65.86

2003 58.2

1999 57.4

1995 68.9

1992 66.8

1990 78.0

Estonia

77.30

2002 71.5

1998 71.9

1995 71.9

1993 89.9

1990 81.3

Latvia

60.88

2004 45.9

2000 58.6

1996 52.9

1992 75.3

1990 71.7

Lithuania

Sources: Rose, Munro, Mackie 1998; PARLINE Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org

1990 90.8

Bulgaria

50.32

2001 46.3

1997 47.9

1993 52.1

1991 43.2

1989 62.1

Poland

Voter turnout in the Central Eastern European countries (in percentages, 1989–2004)

Founding elections

Table 2.2

70.66

2004 58.5

2000 56.5

1996 76.0

1992 76.1

1990 86.2

Romania

74.64

2004 60.5

2000 70.2

1996 73.7

1992 85.7

1990 83.1

Slovenia

79.40

2002 70.0

1998 84.2

1994 75.6

1992 84.2

1990 83.0

Slovakia

35

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analysed here taken together volatility did not decrease between 1991 to 2000 but remained constant at 26 points (Sikk 2005: 395); only the Czech Republic and Slovenia experienced a decrease, while there was a substantial increase in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. Electoral behaviour theory suggests that volatility is high during the first few cycles of democratic elections: for instance, the volatility index was at 24 points in Austria, at 52 points in West Germany, and at 46 points in Italy during the first two postwar elections. It then decreased subsequently (Rose and Munro 2003: 80). In the ten countries analysed here, on the other hand, the volatility level did not fall (Rose and Munro 2003: 81) and the index is twice as high as it is in Western Europe, this being an indication that the party systems in the region are still unstable. Rose and Munro note that electoral volatility has two aspects, as it reflects the influence of both supply and demand. Supply-side volatility is structural and shows the extent to which the parties which offer themselves at election remain the same or tend to change as a result of the entry and exit of parties on the political stage. On the other hand, voters’ changes in party preferences result in demand-side volatility. Supply-side changes in parties, according to Rose and Munro, are the primary cause of electoral volatility in all Central Eastern European countries, except for Hungary (Rose and Munro 2003: 81–2) (Figure 2.1). The electoral success of new political parties also reflects the oversupply of parties in the region. New political parties can be defined as those political organizations which ‘are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members’ (Sikk 2005: 399). Between 1991 and 2000 genuinely new parties received 12 per cent of votes and gained 5 per cent of parliamentary seats (Sikk 2005: 401). These figures are comparable to the performance of new parties in Western Europe. Data about the performance of new parties in Central Eastern Europe are somewhat contradictory, however: they are therefore difficult to interpret. According to Rose and Munro (2003), the third set of democratic elections (1993–1998) showed that an average of 6.8 parties dropped out of competition while 3.5 new parties entered and won seats. In the fourth set of elections (1997–2002), the number of parties dropping out was 5.0 and was also greater than new parties winning votes (2.3), but in the fifth set (2001–2004) the number of new parties winning votes reached 3.0 and is greater than that of parties disappearing. The electoral influence of new parties in the region can hardly be wholly accounted for by institutional or electoral characteristics, such as


Hungary

24 25

Bulgaria

47.5 30.5

15.5

Estonia

34.5 27

Slovenia

49

16.5

Czech Republic

59.5

12

Slovakia

64

14

Latvia

71.5

13

Lithuania

76

1

Romania 0

76.5 10

20

30

Supply volatility

Figure 2.1

45

25

Poland

37

40

50

60

70

80

90

Demand volatility

Supply vs demand volatility in Central Eastern Europe

Source: Rose and Munro 2003; The electoral volatility index recalculated on the basis of the Pedersen formula, that is to say on the total change of votes divided by two (see Pedersen 1979).

federalism, legislative–executive relations or district magnitude, as is possible in western democracies (Wiley 1998: 236–9). As a matter of fact, the strength of new parties in Central Eastern Europe is based on underdeveloped and changing party attachments mainly affected by short-term factors, such as social and economic conditions, and the inability of parties in government to deliver on voter expectations, the high dependence of parties on personal leadership, the high frequency of conflicts at the level of the party leadership, as well as the sheer ‘oversupply’ of parties. A threat to party system stability in Central Eastern Europe which has become more serious since the beginning of the twenty-first century is the substantial increase in importance and political weight of ‘populist’ parties in the region’s parliaments and governments. ‘Populist’ ideology is rather vague, but it includes the rejection of ‘established’ parties, the idea that governing should be grounded in the volonté générale, proposals to break down intermediary structures and to construct more direct links between the people and the leader (De Raadt, Hollanders et al. 2004: 5–11). In some countries ‘populist’ parties have entered ruling coalitions as in the case of the New Era Party in Latvia in 2002, of Res Publica in Estonia in 2003 and of the Labour Party in Lithuania in 2004.

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Rose and Munro (2003: 71) argue that ‘the stable party system is completely institutionalized when there is a stable equilibrium between supply and demand, in which the same parties compete at successive elections and votes change only a few percentage points from one election to the next’. On the basis of such a definition, party systems in East-Central and Southeastern Europe are best described as being in ‘structural disequilibrium’, a situation in which there is marked competition between the parties, but the supply of parties changes substantially from one election to the next. Such a ‘structural disequilibrium’ will cease only when the supply of parties becomes stable in the region.

Conclusion Citizen satisfaction or dissatisfaction with parties as democratic political institutions becomes an increasingly important factor if one is to understand how well the new democracies of the region do function. High rates of electoral volatility might be potentially the single biggest danger for party system stability, as they show that even the major parties lack the ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters, without even considering whether they are able to attract undecided voters. Meanwhile, a substantial proportion of the voters moved away from the electoral process altogether and ceased to participate after having been markedly involved in the early post-communist period. Party systems in Central Eastern Europe differ from each other, as they do in Western Europe. No two party systems in the region are identical, but the predominant system is that of the multi-party system with no dominant party. Yet this development is combined, in most party systems, with the fact that centripetal forces leading towards stability are more powerful than centrifugal forces which might result in ineffectiveness and possible breakdown. Despite the challenges that these new party systems still face, competitiveness based on a lively multi-party system is not in danger of being abandoned: there is no prospect that citizens will favour an authoritarian solution in any of the countries in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it even seems that the major parties understand gradually better that they depend on permanent supporters, that a stable electorate requires well-defined ideological identities and that their organization must be well articulated.

3 The Anatomy of Central Eastern European Cabinets

Cabinet government has been typically described as ‘party government’: given that parties and party systems have, by and large, successfully developed in the ten countries of Eastern Europe studied in this volume, there is a prima facie case for concluding that the cabinets of these countries broadly operate in the way cabinets operate in other parts of the world and in Western Europe in particular. Of course, this does not mean that cabinets in the region all have the same characteristics, any more, as a matter of fact, than that Western European cabinets all share the same characteristics: it means only, but crucially, that parties are central to the structure – indeed to the very existence – of cabinet government. The three elements of the definition of a cabinet are: same parties, same legislature, and the same prime minister. It is unsurprising that parties should be central to the very existence of cabinet government: quite the contrary, parties are inherently central to cabinet government because parties are the only means by which cabinet government, as a collective institution, achieves the representative character which was discussed at some length in the introduction and which makes cabinet government unique. That representative character is in turn due to the fact that the cabinet is closely linked to the legislature, to parliament, as the cabinet cannot survive unless the legislature is willing to give it its ‘confidence’ or at least does not vote a ‘censure’ motion. It is because the cabinet as a body is in some manner representative of the legislature (or is at least ‘accepted’ by the legislature) and not merely because its members belong to parties that cabinet government is a unique system of government. Members of governments may belong to parties in other systems, for instance in presidential systems; but in presidential systems the fact that members of the government also belong to parties is ‘coincidental’, so to speak: it is not an intrinsic feature of the system. 39

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Two key consequences for the definition of what constitutes a cabinet follow from the fact that the cabinet is, through the parties ‘belonging’ to that cabinet, linked to the legislature. The first consequence is that, because parties are the means by which cabinets have thus a ‘representative’ character, some parties, and not others, are part of the way a given cabinet is described. Presidential governments are centred on the president alone: it is up to him or her to appoint members of the cabinet, whatever parties they belong to. Not so in cabinet government: the parties which belong to a given cabinet are part of the definition of that cabinet. The second consequence stems from the fact that, through the parties, there is a tie between cabinet and legislature: a given cabinet exists only so long as the legislature which supports (or accepts) that cabinet also exists; conversely, the end of that legislature also means the end of that cabinet. No cabinet can survive beyond the life of the legislature under which it was set up. These two elements – same parties, same legislature – are thus two of the characteristics by which a given cabinet is defined. There is a third characteristic, moreover, namely that the head of the cabinet must also be the same. The definition which has just been drawn has two important implications for the examination of the ‘anatomy’ of cabinets, whether in Central Eastern Europe or elsewhere. The first implication relates to parties: it is essential to know which parties belong to a given cabinet, since the entry or departure of a party means that a new cabinet is being formed, even if the prime minister remains the same and the legislature remains the same. We need therefore to examine, if not necessarily the detailed party composition of each cabinet, at least the broad character of that composition and, to begin with, whether there is only one party or more than one party in a given cabinet. The second implication relates to the duration of cabinets. As was noted in the introduction, the question of the duration of cabinets has played a major part in the assessment of the worth of cabinet systems in general and of some cabinet systems in particular. Since efficiency is difficult to measure, the duration of the cabinet has been regarded as the indicator par excellence of the extent to which a given cabinet and, by extension, cabinet government in a given country can be regarded as successful. It is therefore no exaggeration to state that the fear of instability is embedded in reflections about cabinet government. Moreover, while instability is to some extent concealed in the case of presidential systems since the president remains in office, however many changes in the members of the government may be taking place, cabinet instability is for all to see as the fall of a cabinet is

The Anatomy of CEE Cabinets

41

a major political event. Yet instability in cabinet government can and does occur at three levels: there is instability of cabinets, but also ministerial and prime ministerial instability. However, while a change in party composition results in a new cabinet, changes of individual ministers may not do so as long as the parties in the cabinet remain the same. The instability of cabinets therefore can be, and indeed often is, divorced from the instability of ministers within these cabinets. In this chapter, we will therefore consider the party composition of Central Eastern European cabinets and the possible relationship between party composition and the duration of cabinets. We will also look at the duration in office of the ministers who belong to these cabinets and of the prime ministers who head these cabinets: a realistic description of the ‘anatomy’ of cabinets entails that one examines in some detail ministerial and prime ministerial longevity in office alongside the party composition and the longevity of cabinets. Before doing so, however, in the context of the cabinets of the region, we need to consider, as in the previous chapter, how and when cabinet government was ‘founded’ in each country, for there have been ‘founding’ cabinets as well as there have been ‘founding’ elections in Central Eastern Europe; one must in particular determine at what point in time a ‘normal’ cabinet was established in the ten countries of the region. This chapter is therefore divided into three sections. The first is concerned with a general overview of the cabinets which have been in existence in the ten countries, beginning with the ‘founding’ cabinets. The second examines the party composition and duration of cabinets and the third analyses the duration in office of the members of these cabinets.

Cabinets in Central Eastern Europe from the end of communism to the early part of the twenty-first century The study which is undertaken in this volume is a study of decision-making processes in cabinets, that is to say of bodies which have the special characteristics which were discussed in general in the introductory chapter and in greater detail in the early pages of this chapter. This means that the study has to cover cabinets, but only cabinets. Since the governments of communist states did not have the characteristics of cabinets, it becomes necessary to determine with precision which governments in the ten countries analysed here can be regarded as ‘cabinets’. This poses the question of the starting point of the investigation; it also poses the question of the end point of the investigation, that is to say, of the last cabinets which are being studied. Furthermore, it poses the question of whether or not,

42


during the period of investigation, some governments may have to be excluded from the analysis on the grounds that they are not, strictly speaking, cabinets. ‘Founding cabinets’: Three conditions Just as there were ‘founding elections’ there were ‘founding cabinets’: but the determination of what was the ‘founding cabinet’ in a given country is not straightforward: indeed, three conditions have to be fulfilled for the government of a given country to be regarded as a cabinet. There had to have been a ‘founding’, that is to say a competitive election; there had to have been a new constitution or at any rate amendments to the pre-existing communist constitution; and there had also to have been state independence. Let us begin with the third of these conditions. This has to be raised as only four of the ten countries studied here – Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria – existed as independent states under communist rule. The other six countries were not ‘independent’: three of them were the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, since they were previously part of the Soviet Union; Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia; the Czech Republic and Slovakia were part of Czechoslovakia. In the Baltic States, the first free elections took place in 1990 and these were followed by the formation of the first non-communist cabinets; these first post-communist cabinets did not operate in independent states, but in sub-state units which only became politically independent from the Soviet Union in 1991 and adopted their constitutions in 1992–93 (Klingemann and Taylor 1995). The same holds true for Slovenia, where the first non-communist government was formed after the first free election in 1990, but before state independence in 1991. The Czech Republic and Slovakia separated formally on 1 January 1993. The other two conditions apply to all ten states. A ‘founding cabinet’ had naturally to emerge from a competitive election, but, because cabinet government has a special character, there could not be a ‘founding cabinet’ until parliament or a referendum had approved a new constitution or a set of amendments establishing the cabinet system of government. Thus, even if one leaves aside the question of state independence, a number of different paths were followed. In some cases an ‘intermediate’ government was set up which was no longer wholly communist, but had not as yet been legitimized by a ‘normal’ competitive election. The structure of some of these governments in that transitional phase was similar to the one which had prevailed under communist rule: there were a large number of ministries and a pyramidal arrangement in the cabinet, with a ‘presidium’ to which the prime minister and a number of deputy prime ministers


43

belonged. These governments were not ‘cabinets’ in the strict sense of the word. Moreover, the sequence between constitutional change and the holding of a competitive election was not the same in every country. The simplest, most ‘logical’ and speediest set of arrangements was that adopted in Hungary. In that country, the former communists dissolved their party and created a new Hungarian Socialist Party, which approved an amended Constitution defining Hungary as an independent democratic state in October 1989. The first free general election took place in March and April 1990 and the first non-communist cabinet, which took office in May 1990, was therefore the ‘founding cabinet’. In Bulgaria and Romania, the process was more convoluted. An interim ‘Constituent Assembly’ and an interim government were at first responsible for drafting a new constitution. Only after the constitution was approved by parliament (or by referendum) did new elections take place; the interim democratic government resigned and was replaced by a fully responsible ‘cabinet’. In Poland, the first free election took place in 1991 before the ‘little constitution’ which introduced the cabinet system was passed by parliament in 1992; however, the 1991 cabinet was the ‘founding’ cabinet as it operated on the basis of a temporary Constitution based on the 1952 Polish Constitution (Table 3.1). Formally 68 cabinets are analysed in this study, but in reality only 61 once ‘caretaker’ cabinets are excluded. The starting point of the analysis conducted in this study is thus the moment when a cabinet was constituted after a fully competitive election had occurred and a new or revised constitution had been adopted; in the six countries which were not previously independent, formal independence had also to have taken place. Table 3.1 indicates the moment at which the ‘founding’ cabinet was constituted – a moment which varies from May 1990 in Hungary to January 1993 in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The end point of the analysis is 31 December 2003: only cabinets which had ceased to rule by that date are part of the investigation; the analysis covers ministers and prime ministers in office during the same period as that of the cabinets which are considered. Yet seven of these ‘cabinets’ had still to be excluded as they were ‘caretaker’ in character. ‘Caretaker’ cabinets do not fit the ‘normal’ definition of cabinets, both substantively because they are not expected to engage in ‘new’ policies, but merely ‘administer’ the country, and formally because they do not proceed from parliament, typically since there was no longer a majority in parliament and an election was about to be held to resolve the majority problem. Consequently, such cabinets tend not to be composed of party representatives, precisely because parliament is deadlocked, but of ‘technicians’ appointed by the Head of State to overcome the difficulty.

44


Table 3.1

Regime transition and founding cabinets

Country

Date of independence

Date of adoption of constitution

— 01.01.1993

12.07.1991 16.12.1992

10.06.19901 07.12.1990 08.11.1991 08.06.19902 29.06.19903 01.01.19934

06.09.1991 — 06.09.1991 06.09.1991 — — 01.01.1993 25.06.1991

28.06.1992 18.10.1989 06.07.19935 25.10.1992 17.10.1992 08.12.1991 01.09.1992 23.12.1991

21.03.1990 25.03.1990 21.03.1990 24.02.1990 27.10.1991 20.05.19906 08.06.1990 08.04.1990

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Free elections

First noncommunist cabinet

03.04.1990 23.05.1990 05.05.1990 17.03.1990 23.12.1991 01.10.1991 29.06.19907 16.05.1990

Founding cabinet

21.10.1992 23.05.1990 04.07.1993 02.12.1992 23.12.1991 13.11.1992 12.01.1993 12.01.1993

Notes: 1 Election to Constituent Assembly. 2 Czechoslovak Federal Assembly. 3 Czechoslovak federal government, inauguration of first Czech state government on 30.06.1990. 4 Government in office as Czech state government since 02.07.1992. 5 Reimplementation of the 1922 Constitution. 6 Election to Constituent Assembly. 7 Czechoslovak federal government, inauguration of first Slovak state government on 28.06.1990.

‘Caretaker’ cabinets last for a few months only and are expected to leave office when a ‘regular’ cabinet emerges from the election. The seven ‘caretaker’ cabinets which were constituted in the countries analysed here were spread over five countries – Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. There were therefore only 61 ‘normal’ cabinets for the ten- to 12-year period in the ten countries, an average of about six per country. These are the cabinets on which the analysis of the rest of this chapter is based (Table 3.2).

Cabinet party composition and duration in Central Eastern Europe The question of the party composition of cabinets has attracted considerable attention in Western Europe, in part because of the perception of a possible relationship between party composition and the duration of cabinets. A number of propositions have been empirically tested in this respect in that region: whether these propositions are also valid for the ‘new’ cabinet governments of Eastern Europe needs therefore to be examined.

The Anatomy of CEE Cabinets Table 3.2

Duration of party cabinets (in years, 1990–2003)

Country


45

Cabinets

1 2 3 4 5 6 1.14 1.80 0.27 2.05 0.27 4.17 3.50 1.49 0.53 3.99 2.03 3.58 1.19 0.28 0.45 1.76 0.18 1.20

0.45 0.56 1.26 2.94 0.79 2.04 0.66 1.86

0.54 3.97 1.15 0.79 0.49 0.27 0.32 1.05

1.08 3.89 0.48 2.43 1.36 1.29 0.74 3.27

7

8

9

0.63 0.99 1.73 1.66 3.96 2.05

Mean all

2.29 3.00

1.62 2.38

1.31 3.00 0.93 1.38 1.32 1.34 1.62 1.65

1.31 3.00 0.93 1.22 1.23 1.01 1.62 1.65

10

0.28 2.04 2.83 1.19 0.67 0.45 0.92 0.04 3.88 0.48

Mean excluding Caretakers

0.19 0.44 0.80 2.51 0.68 2.6 1.36 1.36 0.02 1.02

Source: Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss, Harfst 2004: 878–92.

The question of the party composition of cabinets has two aspects, analytically distinct but partly related in practice. One aspect concerns the number of parties represented in the cabinet: there may be single-party or coalition cabinets and coalitions may include a varying number of parties, sometimes as many as five or more. In the Western European case, a relationship has been shown to exist between the duration in office of cabinets and the number of parties which composed these cabinets. The second aspect of the party composition of cabinet touches on the size of the support enjoyed by the cabinet in the legislature: there are, thus, majority and minority cabinets. The range is indeed vast between cabinets which are composed of parties which represent a small minority in parliament and cabinets which include representatives of almost every party in parliament, a simplified distinction among majority cabinets being that between ‘minimum winning’ and ‘oversized’ cabinets. In the Western European case, a relationship has also been shown to exist between the duration in office of cabinets and their majority or minority character (Powell, 1982; Lijphart, 1999). The notion of coalition cabinets stems directly from the link between cabinet and parliament in cabinet government: unless a party has an absolute majority in parliament – or is at least very close to having such a majority – a coalition appears inevitable. As the probability seems relatively low that a party should obtain an absolute majority in parliament on its own, one would expect coalitions to be frequent in cabinet government. Admittedly, in Western Europe, single-party governments are not

46


exceptional, but they are in a relatively small minority. Only in Britain has there never been a need to build a coalition during the entire the postSecond World War period, largely as a result of the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system. Yet single-party governments have been found to exist more than occasionally in a number of other Western European countries, especially in Spain, Portugal and Greece, and, but, especially before the 1980s, in Ireland, Sweden and Austria as well (Blondel and Thiebault, 1991). As the building of a coalition seems inherently more problematic than the building of a single-party government and as, consequently, the more parties are involved in a coalition, the more problems are likely to occur, it does not seem surprising that, at least in Western Europe, the duration of single-party cabinets should have been found to be longer than that of coalitions in general and that, the more parties there are in a coalition, the less durable the cabinet should be (Lijphart, 1999). Coalitions have therefore often been regarded as significantly contributing to instability in cabinet governments, especially in those coalitions which include more than two or three parties. While it seems natural that cabinet governments should differ as a result of the number of parties of which they are constituted, it seems less understandable that a distinction should also be drawn between minority and majority cabinets, except perhaps at the margin, when a party has obtained very nearly a majority in parliament and where only a very small number of ‘outside supporters’ are needed for such a party to be able to rule alone. Meanwhile, in theory at least, other types of minority cabinets would seem to be ruled out since, in order to survive, a cabinet needs the support of parliament: yet minority cabinets do occur in Western Europe. A number of explanations have been given to account for the occurrence of minority cabinets (Lijphart, 1999; Strom, 1990). For instance, some parties have found it in their interest to support a cabinet without joining it, as these parties then do not have to share (at least most of) the blame at the next election if the cabinet proves to be unsuccessful. Moreover, particularly in the case of some Scandinavian countries, the ties between cabinet and parliament are said to be sufficiently close for the cabinet to enjoy a working relationship with parliament even when that cabinet needs the support of parties not represented in the government. The distribution of single-party cabinets, coalitions, majority and minority cabinets in Central Eastern Europe In the ten countries studied here, as was to be expected, there is both a preponderance of coalitions and a preponderance of majority cabinets, but while four-fifths of the cabinets have been coalitions (49 out of 61), only


47

two-thirds have been majority cabinets (39 out of 61). Minority cabinets are thus a rather frequent occurrence, although, as has just been pointed out, their existence seems somewhat inconsistent with the notion that cabinets should be based in principle on a parliamentary majority. Let us examine the distribution of the cabinets in somewhat greater detail and assess whether their duration is apparently affected by that distribution (Table 3.3). Four general points can be made about the distribution between singleparty and coalition governments and between majority and minority cabinets. First, coalition cabinets were found to have been formed in all ten of the countries analysed here, while single-party cabinets were found to have taken place in only six countries: Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Secondly, there is little difference in the distribution of majority and minority cabinets across the ten countries: majority cabinets were found everywhere and minority cabinets were found everywhere except in Hungary. Thirdly, there is a relationship between the distribution of single-party and coalition cabinets, on the one hand, and of majority and minority cabinets, on the other: only four of the 12 singleparty cabinets are majority in character, as against 35 of the 49 coalitions. Single-party majority cabinets are found only in Lithuania and Bulgaria, while single-party minority cabinets were found in five of the six countries which had single-party cabinets. Meanwhile, the 14 minority coalitions are found in only four countries: Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Bulgaria. Finally, the 35 coalitions which were majority in character were divided almost equally between ‘minimal winning’ (19) and ‘surplus’ (16): the proportion of surplus majority cabinets is large: there is therefore no support in Central Eastern European cabinets for the view, sometimes expressed earlier in the literature, that ‘minimum winning’ coalitions are somehow more ‘normal’ than ‘surplus’ coalitions, as parties would not wish to spread widely the advantages of governmental rule. Cabinet duration in Central Eastern Europe Average cabinet duration in the ten countries analysed here was 1.6 years, a longevity which is not markedly lower than that of Western European cabinets, which has been calculated at 1.8 years for the period between 1950 and 1983 (Budge and Keman, 1990: 161). As Table 3.3 shows, there are large variations across the ten countries. Two had comparatively stable cabinets, Hungary (an average of 3 years) and the Czech Republic (an average of 2.4 years): since legislatures normally last a maximum of four years and sometimes less because they are dissolved earlier, a cabinet duration of three or even two-and-a-half-years is rather high. Meanwhile,

6.80 68

Mean Average N Cabinets

2.06 39

3.11 3.50 1.39 3.00 1.00 1.52 1.59 1.32 2.08 2.09

Majority cabinet

1.17 22

0.82 0.68 0.87 1.36 0.70 0.77

1.47 2.74 1.17

Minority cabinet

0.27 7

0.28 0.49 0.03

0.27 0.27

2.49 4

1.86

3.11

1.17 8

1.36 1.02 0.66

1.14 3.99 1.16

1.70 49

1.80 2.50 1.35 3.00 0.93 1.14 1.31 1.50 1.82 1.65

Single- Coalition party cabinet

Types of Cabinet Caretaker Singlecabinet party

Note: *Caretaker cabinets not included in duration measurement. Source: Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss, Harfst, 2004: 878–92.

6 (1) 4 (1) 8 4 10 7 (1) 9 (1) 8 (1) 6 6

Cabinets N

Duration of cabinet types (in years, 1990–2003)


Table 3.3

1.86 19

1.46 2.57

1.59

0.64

3.50 1.39

2.08 16

1.32 3.96 1.63

3.00 1.38 1.22

Minimal Surplus winning cabinet

1.13 14

0.77

1.80 1.49

Multi-party

1.62 2.38 1.30 3.00 0.93 1.22 1.23 1.01 1.62 1.65

Duration*

48


49

the duration of cabinets is average in three countries – Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria, significantly below average, at about 1.3 years, in a further three – two of the Baltic States, Estonia and Lithuania, and Poland. It is really low only in two countries – Latvia and Romania – each averaging around one year. These are averages which conceal substantial variations from cabinet to cabinet, in particular in relation to five countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria: in only one of these, Lithuania, have cabinets lasted less at the end of the period than at the beginning, while, in the other four, they have tended to have a longer duration as the years have passed. Thus, in the ten countries taken together, the average duration of the first (‘founding’) cabinet was under 1.4 years, but the average duration of the last cabinet being analysed was around 2.3 years. This suggests that there might have been a gradual strengthening of cabinets in the region. As in Western Europe, majority single-party cabinets lasted appreciably longer than majority coalition cabinets in the region (2.5 vs 1.7 years), but the evidence is limited since, as was noted earlier, there were only four single-party majority cabinets. Among coalitions, there was a substantial difference between majority cabinets (of which there were 35) and minority cabinets (of which there were 14), the former lasting on average about two years, while the latter lasted only a little over one year. There was little difference between ‘minimum size’ and ‘surplus’ coalitions in terms of their average duration. Although averages of under two years may appear low in an absolute sense, they are comparable to those observed in Western Europe and although cabinets tend to be unstable in Latvia and Romania, those of Hungary and of the Czech Republic are unquestionably stable and the cabinets of the other countries are also fairly close to the average. Moreover, it also seems, as we just saw, that the average duration of cabinets was appreciably shorter during the early post-communist years – a finding which might be related to the problems posed by the transition in the early years of the new governmental system. Finally, it must be remembered that a cabinet duration of two to three years is close to the maximum which can be achieved in view of the fact that no cabinet can last longer than the parliament in which it was set up. Thus, the overall conclusion must be that the cabinets of the countries of Central Eastern Europe compare rather well, in terms of their stability at least, with those of other countries which have adopted a system of cabinet government.

50


Cabinets, ministers and prime ministers in Central Eastern Europe The duration of ministers in office in a given country, calculated on a yearly basis, depends both upon the number of ministers who held office during the period under consideration in that country and upon the number of cabinet posts which existed every year in that country: this last number does vary a little, as some posts are created while others (more rarely) are abolished. Throughout the twentieth century, the number of cabinet posts has gradually increased across the world, cabinets being typically composed of around twenty ministers, in some cases a little less, in some cases somewhat more, at the beginning of the twenty-first. In the ten Central Eastern countries analysed here, the average number of cabinet posts has been 18, with a maximum of 21 in Poland and Romania and a minimum of 15 in Estonia (Müller-Rommel et al. 2004: 876). The total number of cabinet posts for the ten countries for the period covered in this analysis is 1,789. During the period of this study 901 cabinet ministers occupied one or more of these ministerial posts in the ten countries analysed here, giving an average of 90 ministers per country. The average tenure of ministers was exactly two years, not markedly more than the average duration of the cabinets to which these ministers belonged (1.6 years): this is in is, on average, contrast with Western Europe, where ministerial duration is, on average, twice as long as cabinet duration (Bakema, 1991: 74). The turnover of ministers was therefore high in most countries, particularly during the phase of transition following the demise of the communist system. If the duration in office is a measure of ministerial experience, and if a minimum of three years is needed for a politician to become effective (Rose, 1974), the majority of ministers in the ten countries analysed here did not have enough time to have substantial governmental expertise. Naturally, there were variations in both the number and the average duration of ministers across the ten countries. The minimum number of ministers during the period was about 70 in four of the countries – Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia; the maximum was 137 ministers in Poland. In the other five countries, that number ranged between 80 (Estonia) and 107 (Bulgaria). Smaller countries (the Baltic States and Slovenia) tend to have had fewer ministers in office, while Romania and, especially, Poland, the two largest states, had respectively the third largest and the largest number of cabinet ministers. Variations in the duration of ministers in office were substantial. Almost a third of the third ministers analysed here (29 per cent) stayed in office for less than a year, nearly half (47 per cent) between one and three years


51

and about a quarter more than three years. There are also appreciable variations across countries. In Slovenia, for instance, ministers stayed in office nearly twice as long as ministers in Bulgaria. Overall, ministers can be classified into two groups in terms of their tenure: in one group, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, the percentage of ministers in office more than three years is relatively high; in the other, which includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, the average duration of ministers in office is substantially less than three years. Among the countries with comparatively short-lived ministers are Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria, while in only three countries – the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia – have ten or more ministers remained in office for more than three years. Thus, if expertise in decision-making is the result of the existence of a group of senior ministers, then the majority of the cabinets examined here consisted of ‘non-professional’ ministers, while Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia are the countries where ministers have the greatest political experience (Table 3.4). The duration of prime ministers in office is also only a little longer than that of cabinets. As is well known, prime ministers are the most powerful members of cabinets; in principle, they can determine all policy issues in which they have a special interest. Yet a minimum of three years in office also appears to be required for a prime minister to become an effective decision-maker. Therefore, in this case duration also provides some indication of the potential political impact of the head of the government on both the cabinet and national policies. 48 persons served as prime ministers in the ten countries analysed here. Their average duration in office was 2.4 years in office: as in the case of ministers, this average is rather low and compares unfavourably with the average of Western European prime ministers. Variations around the average are substantial, however. One-third of all prime ministers (15 out of 48) held office for less than one year: This group includes one prime minister from each country, two from Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria and three out of six prime ministers from Lithuania. Around 40 per cent of the prime ministers remained in office for between one and three years and the last final 30 per cent (13 prime ministers) remained in office for more than three years. Among these, nine prime ministers stayed in office for more than four years: Klaus (Czech Republic) and Meciar (Slovakia) were each prime ministers for five years; Laar (Estonia), for 4.8 years; Vacaroiu (Romania) for 4.1 years; and Zeman (Czech Republic), Horn (Hungary), Buzek (Poland) and Dzurinda stayed in office four years each. The record for duration is held by Dronvsek of Slovenia, who stayed in office for 9.4 years before becoming president of his country.

901

Total

2.00

1.50 2.50 1.98 2.39 1.76 1.57 1.69 1.89 2.51 2.63

Average duration

4.3

21.5 0.0 1.3 0.0 2.8 4.1 7.3 5.7 0.0 0.0

%

46

23 0 1 0 2 4 10 6 0 0

N

Up to 100 days

24.3

14.0 22.2 25.0 18.0 26.8 37.8 25.5 24.8 28.8 20.3

% 15 16 20 16 19 37 35 26 21 14

N

219

Up to 1 year

28.8

34.6 29.2 30.0 28.1 40.8 25.5 40.9 24.8 17.8 15.9

%

267

37 21 24 25 29 25 56 26 13 11

N

1–2 years

18.2

22.4 15.3 25.0 19.1 11.3 20.4 9.5 25.7 8.2 24.6

%

163

24 11 20 17 8 20 13 27 6 17

N

2–3 years

13.6

0.0 9.7 8.8 23.6 12.7 10.2 10.2 8.6 28.8 23.2

%

114

0 7 7 21 9 10 14 9 21 16

N

3–4 years

Source: Own calculation on the basis of the CEE minister data bank, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Lüneburg.

107 72 80 89 71 98 137 105 73 69

Number of ministers

Duration of ministers (in years, 1990–2003)


Table 3.4

10.9

7.5 23.6 10.0 11.2 5.6 2.0 6.6 10.5 16.4 15.9

%

92

8 17 8 10 4 2 9 11 12 11

N

4 years and above

52

The Anatomy of CEE Cabinets Table 3.5 Country

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Total

53

Duration of prime ministers (in years, 1990–2003) Number Average of prime duration ministers of prime ministers

Up to one year %

Up to three years N

%

Three years and above N

%

N

6 3

1.62 3.31

33.3 33.3

2 1

50.0

3

16.7 66.7

1 2

5 4 6 6 7 6 3 2

2.09 3.00 1.55 1.43 1.58 1.35 3.25 5.16

20.0 25.0 16.7 50.0 28.6 33.3 33.3 50.0

1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1

60.0

3

20.0 75.0

1 3

83.3 33.3 57.1 50.0

5 2 4 3

16.7 14.3 16.7 66.7 50.0

1 1 1 2 1

48

2.43

32.4

15

33.4

20

34.3

13

Source: Own calculations on the basis of the CEE minister data bank, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Lüneburg.

Overall, two-thirds of the prime ministers in the ten countries seem not to have stayed in office long enough to exercise a major policy impact and only one-third (13) of prime ministers can be expected to have had enough time to develop and implement effective policies (Table 3.5). The duration of cabinets, ministers, and prime ministers combined Table 3.6 provides a combined overview of the duration of cabinets and of the tenure of ministers and prime ministers from the early 1990s to 2003. Two conclusions emerge. First, on average, as in Western Europe, the duration in office of ministers (two years) and of prime ministers (2.4 years) was higher than the duration of the cabinets (1.6 years) in the ten countries of Central Eastern Europe analysed here. That trend also characterized nine of the countries, the exception being Bulgaria, where the duration of cabinets and the tenure of prime ministers and ministers was about the same (1.4–1.6 years). Secondly, there is a close relationship between, cabinet, ministerial and prime ministerial duration. Countries with long-lasting cabinets, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, are also the ones where the ministerial and prime ministerial duration was longest; ministerial and prime ministerial duration is relatively

54


Table 3.6

Types and durability of cabinet governments (in years, 1990–2003)

Country

Average duration in years

Rank order Mean Scores

CAB (rank)

PM (rank)

MIN (rank)

Type I Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia

1.65 (3) 2.38 (2) 3.00 (1) 1.62(4)

5.16 (1) 3.31 (2) 3.00 (4) 3.25 (3)

2.54 (1) 2.35 (4) 2.37 (3) 2.41(2)

1.30 2.60 2.60 3.00

Type II Estonia Poland Bulgaria

1.31 (8) 1.23 (6) 1.62 (5)

2.09 (5) 1.58 (7) 1.62 (6)

1.90 (6) 1.67 (7) 1.45 (10)

6.30 6.70 7.00

Type III Romania Lithuania Latvia

1.01 (9) 1.22 (7) 0.93 (10)

1.35 (10) 1.43 (9) 1.55 (8)

1.93 (5) 1.55 (9) 1.61 (8)

8.00 8.30 8.70

Total

1.6

2.43

1.98

Source: Own calculations on the basis of Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.

low in countries with short-lived cabinets, such as those of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Poland and Romania. However, the direction of influence in that relationship does remain questionable (Table 3.6). Index of governmental stability As cabinet stability differs appreciably from country to country, an index of governmental stability was constructed, based on the average ranking of cabinet, prime ministerial and ministerial duration in each country, the highest duration being ranked as 1 and the shortest as 10. Hungary, for instance, has the highest average cabinet duration of the ten countries (three years). It therefore scores 1 while Latvia, with the lowest average of cabinet duration (0.9 years), scores 10. The mean of the three rankings is then calculated for each country: the lower that overall mean, the higher cabinet, ministerial and prime ministerial durability and stability. The scores given in Table 3.6 show that there are three distinct groups. The first group (stable governments) consists of four countries which have both the longest cabinet duration and the longest prime ministerial and ministerial tenure: Slovenia, which scores 1.3, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which score 2.6, and Slovakia, which scores 3.0, belong to that group. The overall stability score of these countries is accounted for in

The Anatomy of CEE Cabinets Table 3.7

55

The relation between different types of duration (Pearson’s) Duration

Cabinet duration Prime ministers’ duration Ministers’ duration

Cabinet

Prime ministers

Ministers

xxx .80 .58

xxx .71

xxx

particular by the long duration in office of prime ministers. The second group (moderately stable governments) includes Estonia, with a score of 6.3, Poland, with a score of 6.7, and Bulgaria, with a score of 7.0. The third group (unstable governments) is composed of Romania, with a score of 8.0, Lithuania, with a score of 8.3, and Latvia, with a score of 8.7. In this last group, the fact that the average duration of the prime ministers in office is even lower than the tenure of ministers appears to account for the instability of the government in these countries. Overall, the duration of prime ministers in office appears to play a greater part than the duration of ministers in accounting for the stability of governments, as Table 3.7 suggests. The strength of the association between prime ministerial duration and cabinet duration (.80) is higher than the relation between ministerial tenure and cabinet duration (.58), perhaps unsurprisingly since the same prime minister has to remain in office for the cabinet also to remain the same (Table 3.7).

Conclusion The overall examination of the development of cabinets in Central Eastern Europe from the end of communism to the first decade of the twenty-first century provides support for the view that these cabinets have been a marked success. There are relatively few single-party governments: coalitions therefore prevail, but a substantial majority of these coalitions are majority in character and these majority coalitions last slightly longer than the average cabinet (1.7 years) in the ten countries. The party system may not be truly entrenched in a number of countries, as we observed in the previous chapter, but the presence of parties, even in the context of coalitions, appears to lead to relatively stable cabinets; endemic instability, as is perhaps the case in Latvia, is exceptional. While the longevity of cabinets does not therefore seem to constitute a problem, the duration of ministers and prime ministers in office, at least in a substantial number of countries, appears to be less satisfactory. As a

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general proposition, given the fact that cabinet government is often regarded as inefficient in part because of its representative character, a greater stability of ministers and prime ministers appears to constitute a way of compensating for what might be described as the inherent ‘handicap’ of the system. The size of that ‘compensation’ is unquestionably largerin Western Europe than it appears to be in Central Eastern Europe. Yet a period of little more than a decade makes it simply impossible for truly long ministerial and prime ministerial durations to have occurred. This is even more the case for Central Eastern Europe because the starting point of the analysis was also the starting point of what is in effect a wholly new system of government for the countries of the region: we did indeed notice that cabinets lasted somewhat longer, among several countries at least, in the latter part of the period under analysis. If this trend continues, ministers and prime ministers will gradually acquire greater experience and more professionalism, while the desire of leaders and ministers to exercise more influence within the European Union is likely to act as a deterrent against rapid governmental turnover.

4 The Rules and the Operating Procedures in Cabinet

As was noted in the introductory chapter, the speed with which most of the countries of Central Eastern Europe adopted the parliamentary system of government has been truly impressive. The reasons for this development are obviously many and it is not the object of this study to consider them in any detail: they are taken here as the point of departure of the analysis. It is sufficient to note that there was manifest eagerness, among the countries of the region, to become quickly associated with a Western Europe from which they had been separated for decades: In political terms, Western Europe meant the parliamentary system. The choice of the parliamentary system raises intriguing questions in terms of governmental structure and policy-making processes. The parliamentary system is a highly complex formula, more subtle than the presidential system if it is to operate effectively (Lijphart, 1992). The presidential system is expected to function more or less in the way the rules state that it should: this is not the case with the parliamentary system in general and with its executive element, the cabinet, in particular. To function effectively, the parliamentary system has to operate on the basis of arrangements, which, while taking a number of rules into account, either supersede or modify these rules markedly. As a result, the operation of that system of government is in reality far from being what it is supposed to be from a juridical (especially constitutional) standpoint. This is indeed one of the reasons why the effective implementation of the parliamentary system – or perhaps in this context strictly speaking of the ‘parliamentary-cabinet’ system – in Central Eastern Europe is little short of miraculous. It is not only because a ‘sovereign’ parliament tends to be so closely guided by the government that the ‘sovereignty’ of that parliament has to be regarded as a myth. Perhaps the most surprising matter is that a rather peculiar, indeed sophisticated system, 57

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in which formal rules survive without being questioned, should have been accepted by the countries of East-Central and Southeastern Europe: these countries, in the same way and to the same extent as the countries of Continental Europe and of Scandinavia, have in practice internalized, so to speak, in their governmental ideology and their governmental behaviour, the complete evolution of the British governmental arrangements from the eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries. It is therefore both interesting in theory and very important in practice to examine the life of cabinets in the ten countries analysed here. In view of what has just been pointed out, we need to determine the rules, and, to begin with, the formal rules, only to consider how these rules have been modified, as if they were geological layers, by a series of arrangements which often rendered these rules inoperative. The formal ‘pillar’ on which cabinets are founded is, of course, the constitution, since this determines whether the overall system is parliamentary in the sense that the government needs the continued support of the legislature to be able to remain in office. All ten countries analysed here fall in this category. Yet constitutions do not go much beyond determining the ways in which the government comes to be constituted or loses power (Elster et al. 1998; Verheijen 1997a). There is naturally some reference in the constitution to the existence of the ‘government’, that is to say of a body including the prime minister, perhaps one or more deputy prime ministers and ministers: but little more is said about the way in which that ‘government’, which, in the course of this volume, is referred to as the ‘cabinet’, to follow the usual vocabulary, conducts its affairs. Since the constitution provides only the broad framework within which governments are established and remain in office, one must go beyond the constitution and examine the life of cabinets and, to begin with, the extent to which the cabinet is effectively truly at the top of the decisionmaking process. Parliamentary systems not only organize a relationship between government and parliament; they also organize a relationship between the government and the Head of State, that is to say, in the countries of Central Eastern Europe, the President of the Republic, since none of these states is a monarchy. That relationship is partly determined by the constitution, but practices can differ appreciably from one country to another, over and above what the constitution may stipulate. Indeed, the matter goes beyond the notion of ‘semi-presidential’ government, a notion which is in any case rather imprecise (Elgie 1999). The reality of the relationship between Head of State and government has to be considered and there are differences, among the ten countries analyzed here, in the way in which this relationship has developed.

The Rules and Operating Procedures in Cabinet

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Yet the main purpose of this chapter is to describe, as precisely as possible, the life of cabinets in the ten countries. As one has to go well beyond what the constitution states, serious problems of information arise, both with respect to rules of conduct and about practices. A comprehensive study of both these rules of conduct and these practices was undertaken at the end of the twentieth century under the aegis of the OECD, in the context of the Sigma programme;1 but that inquiry has not been replicated in the early years of the twenty-first century, despite the fact that changes occurred since the study was completed. The description given in this chapter of the way in which cabinets operate is thus based in large part on information originating from the Sigma studies, but supplemented by answers given by the ministers themselves to the questionnaire which was administered to them and by data provided directly by the participants in this volume by means of a special survey.2 This chapter is thus divided into three sections. The general constitutional framework within which cabinets operate is described in the first section. The effective role of Heads of State is examined in the second. The third section analyses the characteristics of cabinet arrangements: it does this on the basis of the consideration of the three key ways in which decision-making processes are structured – that is to say, the number and duration of meetings, the nature and extent of the support given by the prime ministerial office and the type and functions of committees of the cabinet. Throughout the chapter, reference is made to the situation in Western Europe while the conclusion returns more specifically to that matter.

The cabinet in the constitutions of Central Eastern Europe Parliamentary constitutions are typically rather laconic about the conditions under which the government is expected to operate: constitutions from the ten countries analysed here do not differ in this respect. The few clauses which relate to governments only account for the formal way in which these are set up and cease to exist and describe their role in the most general manner. Little change has taken place in this respect as a result of constitutional amendments or as a result of a new constitution being introduced, as occurred in Poland and Slovakia, except with respect to the position of the President of the Republic, who lost powers in Poland and who came to be elected by universal suffrage, but with little change in powers, in Slovakia. In eight of the ten countries analysed here, the president of the republic is entrusted with the task of nominating the prime minister.

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In Bulgaria, the president is constrained to choose the person nominated by the largest parliamentary group, with further sets of requirements in the constitution if the first candidate prime minister does not receive the confidence of parliament. In the other seven cases, the president is ostensibly free to choose, although the party system, the parliamentary situation and, when relevant, the electoral results limit the power which the president can exercise. In the last two countries, Estonia and Hungary, the prime minister is appointed by parliament and not by the president: whether this makes much difference in practice is arguable, in Hungary, because the electoral result has so far made it clear who the prime minister was to be and, in Estonia, because it seems that the president does play a substantial behind-the-scenes role in finding a suitable candidate. Meanwhile, perhaps to ensure that the process of selection of the government be not too long, the constitutions of Estonia, Poland and Romania stipulate that the prime minister must ask for the confidence of parliament within respectively, 14, 15 and 10 days. The end of governments tends not to be determined by means of special rules in the constitutions of the countries which are analysed here, despite the fact that, at least in the West, the fear of cabinet instability has given rise in a number of cases to the introduction of special procedures. Naturally enough, constitutions cannot prevent governments from resigning, irrespective of any formal move against them. Indeed, in Western Europe, resignations of this type have often tended to occur where governments have been relatively weak, largely because they lacked a solid party base. However, constitutions can merely attempt to reduce the likelihood of such resignations by making it relatively difficult for parliament to pass ‘no-confidence’ motions and moves of this kind have been embodied in some Western European constitutions – such as those of Germany, Spain and France. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, only in Hungary and, since 1992, as a result of the ‘little constitution’, in Poland, is the ‘no-confidence’ motion made stringent in this manner: a ‘constructive motion of confidence’, on the German model, has to be introduced and passed for the government to be formally obliged to resign. On the other hand, also in Hungary, the government can ask for a vote of confidence and this vote is subjected to the normal majority procedure. The strength and relatively small number of relevant Hungarian parties have indeed ensured that the stability of Hungarian governments has not been affected. In the other countries examined here, normal majority procedures apply with respect to both confidence and no-confidence motions. Moreover, and also by an ordinary majority vote, in Latvia, Poland and Slovakia, the


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parliament can vote a motion of ‘no-confidence’ in individual ministers, a procedure which is more characteristic of presidential than of parliamentary governments. Thus, by and large, the constitutional arrangements relating to the life and death of governments are the ‘classic’ ones which do not attempt to place special hurdles on the behaviour of the legislature. Those who drafted the constitutions of these countries did not seem unduly worried about the possible instability of the governments they were establishing. Constitutions do not enter at all into the characteristics of the life of governments. All they do typically is state that the government is composed of the prime minister and the ministers; in four cases – those of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia – deputy prime ministers are also mentioned, while the Romanian constitution declares that the government is composed of ‘the prime minister, ministers and others’ (art. 101). Whether this means that the governments of other countries could not include deputy prime ministers seems highly unlikely. The composition of the government is not a subject which seems to have been of particular concern to constitution drafters. Only in the Latvian constitution is it stated that the number of ministers is determined by law (art. 57). The silence of other constitutions on this subject suggests that governments are free to determine the number of ministers and the fields that their departments are to cover. Estonia is the only country which states that the State Secretary, who is the head of the State Chancellery, attends the meetings of the government and can speak at these meetings (art. 95): this does not mean that this official is not present at the meetings of the cabinet in the other countries. Various formulas are adopted by the constitutions to state that the government is concerned with the policy-making process, but it seems clear that the notion is broadly the same across the ten countries examined here. The government is regarded as being in charge of the affairs of the nation. On the other hand, nothing is said about the way in which that government comes to take its decisions, except for the fact that, in the cases of both the Czech Republic and in Poland, it is held to act ‘collectively’: how these ‘collective’ decisions are arrived at is not defined. No constitution stipulates for instance that votes are to be taken or that majority rule in cabinet is expected to prevail. Most remarkably, the constitutions of the ten states are surprisingly imprecise about the role of the prime minister in the life of the government, in contrast with many of the more modern Western European constitutions. Thus, the Estonian, Latvian, Hungarian, Slovak and Slovenian constitutions are silent on the subject of the role of the prime minister, except

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for the fact that the Latvian and Hungarian constitutions state that the meetings of the council of ministers are chaired by the prime minister, a provision which probably means a contrario that that council is not chaired by the president (respectively art. 37 and 60). Yet, while the other constitutions are a little less laconic about the role of the prime minister, only in the Bulgarian document is there what might be regarded as a strong sentence – namely that the prime minister ‘leads and coordinates the overall policy of the government and bears responsibility for it’ (art. 108). In the Czech case it is said that the prime minister ‘organizes the government’ (art. 77) and in the Polish case that ‘the prime minister manages the work of the council of ministers’ (art. 148), a statement which is little different from that which is made in the Romanian constitution, while in the Lithuanian case the role of the prime minister is described only indirectly, by stating that ‘the prime minister presents his (sic) program to parliament’ (art. 92). One has therefore to turn to practices to have some idea of the real role of prime ministers in the political life of the countries examined here. This does not mean that the constitutions of the ten countries analysed here are of little importance with respect to the governmental system. These constitutions had a crucial role as they have determined the overall framework of the governmental system by stipulating, in all ten cases, that this governmental system is parliamentary and not presidential and even, in the context of the parliamentary system, that the part played by presidents during the lifetime of the government remains limited.

The President of the Republic and the cabinet In all ten countries, the President of the Republic, who is elected everywhere for five years and can only be re-elected once, tends to occupy, in the early years of the twenty-first century, a position of prestige rather than of power. This is so whether the president is elected by universal suffrage (six cases out of ten after the constitution was amended in this direction in Slovakia in 2001) or by parliament, as in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. There have been some changes in terms of power, however: they suggest that one must distinguish between two periods, some presidents having been rather more influential in the early years of the post-communist regime than subsequently. The role of the president tends to fall into one of three types. One of these is that of the purely representative Head of State, on the German model. A second type, more akin to that of the president of Italy, at least under the ‘First Republic’, characterizes presidents who become involved,


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sometimes reluctantly, sometimes more eagerly, in the choice of the prime minister and the building-up of governmental coalitions, because the party system is rather complex and governmental majorities do not emerge directly from the polls. The presidents of these countries are thus associated in the conduct of affairs in their country, but only indirectly and rather spasmodically. Finally, the third type, which can be labelled ‘semi-presidential’, corresponds to cases in which presidents attempt to influence policy directly over and above any part they may play in the appointment of the prime minister and of some of the ministers. The parallel is that of the French Fifth Republic president outside periods of ‘cohabitation’. In the early 1990s, presidents of the purely ‘representative’ type were found in three countries – Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Only once in the Czech Republic, when Klaus’s government fell, did Havel actively seek to build a coalition; that effort was fairly unsuccessful, as a social democratic government emerged from the subsequent general election and that government agreed with Klaus and his party on policymaking arrangements (Wolchik 1997). In four countries – Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria – the president has been involved periodically in the construction of coalitions because the outcome of elections was unclear or governments fell during the lifetime of a parliament. Finally, in the remaining three countries – Lithuania, Poland and Romania – presidents attempted, with a varying degree of success, to play a significant part in policy-making. Since the late 1990s, to begin with, there was a decline in the number of presidents who were actively involved in the building-up of coalitions. The first Bulgarian president, Jelev, was confronted in a number of cases with situations in which he did have to intervene; his successor did not have to do so up to 2005, as the government had then clear majorities. Since 2005, however, the Bulgarian president has become once more involved in the building of cabinets, as the presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. Meanwhile, the ‘semi-presidential’ category became even more depleted. Semi-presidentialism in Poland ended with the defeat of Walesa in 1995: his successor, Kwasnieski, decided not only to act differently (and less controversially), but specifically stressed that he was to act as a ‘representative’ Head of State (Jasiewicz 1997). The new constitution of 1997 formally embodied the change: Polish presidents can no longer play a significant part in policy-making, although the president elected in 2005 may have aspirations to play at least some part. There have been oscillations in Romania. During his first term, Iliescu was unquestionably

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directly involved in policy-making. His successor, the conservative Constantinescu, seemed to be more than occasionally overtaken by events and the presidency lost considerable prestige in the process. The role of the president seemed to decline further when Iliescu returned to power in 2000, as he no longer desired to be markedly involved, perhaps because of his age. In 2004, however, with the election of Basescu, the idea of a ‘semi-presidential’ Romanian president has come to be once more in the news. As a result, by the early years of the twenty-first century, four out of ten presidents in Central Eastern Europe were of the ‘representative’ type: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Four presidents have played a significant part in the building of governmental coalitions – those of Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania are the only two countries whose presidents appear, albeit not always, to belong to something approaching the ‘semi- presidential’ type.

Cabinet rules and practices Thus, except to a very limited extent, the constitution does not define the rules which govern the life of the cabinets of the ten countries which are analysed here (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001). This situation is no different from the one which prevails in Western Europe; moreover, as in Western Europe, the life of the cabinet in the ten countries analysed here has tended to be regulated by standing orders, although both legislation and a code of practice also played a substantial part. The survey, which was undertaken especially in relation to this study and for which replies were obtained for eight countries (there was no response from Latvia and Lithuania), indicates that, in six of these eight countries, legislation and standing orders played a part in the elaboration of cabinet rules, while no answer was given for the Czech Republic; the only country in which neither legislation nor standing orders were said to have played a part was Hungary. There was a sharper contrast among the eight countries with respect to the existence of a more informal code of practice: in three of the countries (Estonia, Slovenia and Romania), such a code of practice was said not to exist, while its existence was recognized alongside legislation and standing orders in four of the other five. The Hungarian cabinet stands alone in not having been regulated by legislation or by standing orders, but exclusively by a code of practice. Taken together, in all of the eight countries surveyed, these documents are said to cover jointly most of the rules under which cabinet decisionmaking takes place.


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Rules were adopted at markedly different points in time since the end of communism; they were already in force in 1991 or 1992 in Hungary and Romania, but were only adopted in 1998 and later in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. There appear to have been, moreover, variations over time from cabinet to cabinet in the procedures which are applied, the single exception being that of the Slovenian cabinet, for which it is said that these rules remained ‘mostly unchanged across cabinets’. This state of affairs may be due in part to the fact that, in Slovenia, the same prime minister remained in office for much of the period; moreover, in Slovenia as well, both the Law on Government of 1993 and the Standing Orders, also of 1993, are said to have been altered in a ‘minor manner’ five times between 1994 and 2001. Meanwhile, apart from Poland, for which there were ‘considerable variations’ in the rules over time, the survey indicates that, in the case of the other six countries for which information was obtained, ‘most procedures remain stable’ despite variations in some respects. Meetings of the cabinet Cabinet meetings are attended, apart from ministers, by a number of officials of the cabinet secretariat and by the cabinet secretary in particular. Typically, junior ministers do not attend, except to represent a minister who cannot be present and, even then, the junior minister does not have the right to vote. There are two rather special arrangements, however, which concern Estonia and Lithuania. In both these countries meetings are attended by substantial numbers of officials – for example, state controllers and representatives of the parliament in the Lithuanian case or county governors in the Estonian case. In Lithuania, therefore, some 60 to 70 persons normally attend the meeting. Though these outsiders are mere spectators, the nature of the cabinet meeting is obviously markedly altered as a result of this practice. In all of the countries surveyed here except Poland, for which information was lacking, the cabinet meets once a week, as is the case in Western Europe. Meetings take place either on Wednesdays (three countries) or on Thursdays (five countries), with the situation being unknown for Latvia and Poland.3 These meetings appear to last longer in most of the ten countries analysed here than in Western European cabinets, but there are substantial variations, from as short as an hour or an hour and a half in Estonia to as long as five hours or more in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania: indeed, the cabinet is said to have met occasionally for up to ten hours in the last two of these countries.4 The duration of cabinet meetings is intermediate in Slovenia and Bulgaria – between two and four hours.

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Among at least half the countries there is a tendency for meetings to have become shorter over time. While the situation in this respect is unknown in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Two countries had no change in duration: these are Hungary (where meetings last five hours) and Slovenia (where meetings last between two and three hours). The reduction in the duration of meetings, which appears to affect a substantial number of countries, is an indication that cabinet meetings have come to be ‘routinized’. This is indeed what occurred in the Czech Republic, where, in order to reduce the duration of meetings which appear to have lasted up to ten hours occasionally, matters to be decided on have been divided into an A and a B group and points in the A group are adopted without debate. When asked whether there were instances of disagreement at cabinet meetings, ministers in our survey sample divided almost down the middle to state that such instances occurred very often or often (56 per cent), on the one hand, or seldom (41 per cent), on the other, with 3 per cent stating that disagreements never ever occurred (Appendix 2). Whether they occur frequently or not, however, disagreements appear to be resolved only rarely by means of voting. In four countries – Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania – this is said to be the practice, as in Western Europe. In Poland and Bulgaria, votes are said to be taken ‘sometimes’; on the other hand, they ‘never’ occur in Hungarian cabinets. There is one outstanding exception to this general trend, that of the Czech Republic, as votes are said to occur at every cabinet meeting in that country. Practices relating to cabinet meetings are thus not markedly different in the ten countries examined here from the practices observed in Western Europe. There is perhaps a slight tendency for cabinet meetings to last longer and, even more, to have lasted longer in the early years of the new parliamentary system, perhaps because ministers were new to the conditions under which cabinet decision-making can be expected to function; the burden of decision-making was probably also heavier at the time than is typically the case in the West. Overall, however, there are more similarities than there are differences, both among the ten countries examined here and between these and Western European countries. The agenda of the cabinet and the role of the cabinet secretariat The procedure on the basis of which items are discussed and decided on in cabinet has become tight everywhere. Indeed, the streamlining has been remarkable and remarkably rapid, thus rendering the practices of the cabinet in Central Eastern European countries similar to the practices


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of their Western European counterparts. This could not have been achieved without the existence of a cabinet secretariat playing a key part in steering and controlling the flow of business to the cabinet. Much of the power of the cabinet secretariat revolves around preparing the agenda. This is drafted everywhere by the secretariat, the secretary presenting that draft to the prime minister for approval, a few days before the scheduled meeting, after which the agenda is circulated, typically between two and six days before the meeting takes place; in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, although not in Hungary and Romania, the agenda is also published. While the prime minister does formally approve the agenda, the secretariat appears to play a truly crucial role, as, possibly more than the prime minister, at any rate on many issues, the secretariat decides whether a proposal is ready to be sent to the cabinet or not. The rules of procedure in Slovenia are particularly stringent: ‘Only those matters which the working bodies of the government have already debated and which have been prepared in accordance with the resolutions of the working bodies and the standard procedure defined in the Standing Order of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia may be included in the agenda.’ The practice does not seem to be different in the other countries examined here. What ‘preparation’ means can, however, obviously vary. The Lithuanian standing orders explain in some detail what must take place with respect to proposals coming from the various departments: ‘If there are different opinions on the items presented for discussion, these opinions must be heard. In case of need, opinions are also expressed by corresponding trade unions and public organizations.’ As was stated earlier, the Lithuanian cabinet meeting takes place with a large number of spectators being present, but the same kind of preoccupation appears to have been in the minds of the drafters of the Slovak rules of procedure. There is at least as much stress on legal aspects and therefore on the role of legal specialists or of officials of the ministry of justice as on the role of the ministry of finance. Only in Estonia is it explicitly stated that ‘preparation’ includes discussions among ministers ‘at meetings of the government coalition’. The cabinet secretariat is presumably everywhere charged with the task of ensuring that the ministries concerned have been involved and have made recommendations about proposals, but the point is made most explicitly in the Romanian rules of procedure. The cabinet meeting is thus well prepared. The procedures which are established are thus primarily formal; yet, at least in one country, Bulgaria, some stress is placed on informal arrangements. ‘[I]nformal meetings between members of the Council of Ministers

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play an important role in the decision-making process. Their function is to prepare the meetings of the Council of Ministers and to resolve problems over proposed agenda items in advance of the Council of ministers. Informal meetings are usually held several times a week.’ During the meeting, members of the secretariat take the minutes, which are then circulated among the members of the cabinet. The rules of procedure also place a strong emphasis on implementation. In Estonia, ‘ministries are required to provide information regarding the performance of duties within their area of government to the State Chancellery who maintains a general record of the implementation of Rikikogu (parliament) and Government decisions’. Similar procedures are indicated for the other countries. In Hungary, the prime minister’s office has to prepare a monthly report on the state of implementation of tasks. In Romania a ‘Directorate for Evidence’ examines the cases in which deadlines are not met. Only in Slovakia is the application of decisions taken by the cabinet not checked by the secretariat but by the cabinet itself. A determined effort has thus been made in the countries examined here to ensure that the process of decision-making in the cabinet should be efficient and speedy, although the interests indirectly concerned by the proposals are also taken under consideration. Even if the standards described in the standing orders are not always met, the fact that the cabinets have approved this type of standing orders clearly suggests that those in charge of decision-making are aware of the problems which parliamentary government would face if the cabinet was allowed to take its decisions without stringent procedures. The implementation of these stringent procedures requires a powerful cabinet secretariat. This means not only that competent personnel must be appointed but that this personnel has the authority to obtain that ministers accept the decisions taken, whether about what is (or more likely is not) placed on the agenda or about the monitoring of the implementation process. This appears to be the case in the ten countries examined here, although there are inevitably differences in the size and structure of the secretariats. The extent to which these differences occur is discussed further in Chapter 8. The role of committees The study undertaken by Sigma at the end of the 1990s described the part played by a variety of ‘subordinate’ bodies of the cabinet in Central Eastern European countries. To meet the requirements resulting from the stringent procedures which have just been outlined, governments of the region had to set up bodies designed to examine the feasibility of


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proposals coming to the cabinet and the state of readiness of the documents supporting these proposals. This shows that Central Eastern European countries, in the spate of a few years, created institutional mechanisms able to satisfy the requirements of the modern parliamentary system of government. The bodies ‘subordinated to the cabinet’ are of various types: there are substantial variations from country to country not just in terms of their number, but also in terms of the functions they are expected to fulfill (Goetz and Wollmann 2001). As in Western Europe, these committees handle matters at various levels. Some are truly committees of the cabinet, being composed of the key ministers involved and chaired by the prime minister or a senior minister, for instance a deputy prime minister: these committees may even ‘pre-decide’ matters in the name of the cabinet. Other committees are composed principally of civil servants, tend to meet early on in the development of proposals and aim to iron out problems (mainly administrative) which might occur among the departments concerned; they may well be chaired by someone from the cabinet secretariat. Yet other committees are composed of outsiders expected to advise the government on policy and are thus more like ‘working parties’ than like cabinet committees. Even among those bodies which can be regarded as genuine ‘cabinet committees’, there are appreciable differences among the countries analysed here in terms of their role. They may either be highly specialized or cover a wide area of governmental activity. This has an effect on their numbers. Among the ten countries examined here, if one leaves aside the two cases of Latvia and Poland, where the number and character of cabinet committees could not be ascertained, one observes a sharp difference between two groups. On the one hand, in five countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania – there are between three (Estonia, Romania) and six (Slovenia) such ‘cabinet committees’: at least in principle, these could be regarded as important for the process of cabinet decision-making. Each committee deals with a broad sector of governmental activity, such as the economy, social matters, defence or security. On the other hand, in the remaining three countries, committees are more numerous and are appreciably more specialized. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are respectively ten and eleven committees while, in Bulgaria, there are as many as twenty-seven. Committees of this kind can be expected to be less important in the decision-making process. As a matter of fact, there is some ambiguity with respect to the nature of the committees in the three countries. In Bulgaria, the Sigma study

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had previously identified only ‘two commissions that support the Council of Ministers and can be considered as sub-councils of the Council of Ministers’: these might be regarded as constituting genuine ‘cabinet committees’, but they were not referred to again in the 2004 survey. In the Czech Republic, the 2004 survey notes the existence of a standing advisory ‘Council’ with responsibility for general issues alongside the 11 ‘commissions’ which deal with specialized matters and are also temporary. Yet, while these may not be regarded as being truly ‘cabinet committees’, it is also doubtful whether the single standing advisory ‘Council’ can be regarded as a cabinet committee: it may merely be a kind of substitute for the cabinet itself as, unlike the cabinet, it meets in private. In Slovakia, where there are 11 rather specialized committees, there were already nine ‘government advisory bodies’ when Sigma undertook its survey in the late 1990s. It was also noted that there was a special organ, the ‘Council for Economic and Social Consensus of Slovakia’: yet that body could not be regarded as a ‘cabinet committee’, as it included members nominated by the social partners and seemed therefore to play the part which an ‘Economic and Social Council’ is set up to fulfill in some Western European countries. The cabinet committee structure may therefore still be ‘in the making’ in at least a number of the countries studied here. While there are thus differences in the purview of cabinet committees, there are also differences in terms of their membership, of the method of appointment, of who decides on their powers and, indeed, of these powers. Such differences affect both the countries in which the number of cabinet committees is small and those where it is large. In general, except for the powers held by the committees, the variations which can be detected tend to be on a country-by-country basis. In Hungary, the prime minister decides who chairs the committees, who are the members and what powers they have; the same pattern is observed in Poland. In Estonia and, with respect to the last two of these three characteristics, in Romania, these decisions are taken on the contrary by the cabinet, at any rate formally; the cabinet also appears to be taking the decision in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia with respect to the committees which are set up in these two countries. In Slovenia and, with respect to the choice of the chair, in Romania, the situation varies from committee to committee. The formal powers of these committees also vary. In four countries – Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania – the committees are said to prepare the decisions but not to decide in the name of the cabinet; on the other hand, the case of the Czech Republic is ambiguous, since the


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very character of the committees is also ambiguous; in Estonia, although the number of cabinet committees is small and these could therefore be expected to be influential, they are in fact weak and tend to be forums where matters are debated rather than decided upon. In two countries – Poland and Bulgaria – the role of the committees varies: this suggests that, in some cases at least, these committees have powers to decide. The differences in the nature, organization and power of cabinet committees among the countries examined here suggest that there is uncertainty about what the relative role of cabinet and cabinet committees should be. Detailed analyses of series of decisions would have to be undertaken in each of the countries for precise answers to be given to the question of the effective role of cabinet committees, as modes of behaviour are not only likely to often modify formal arrangements, but are likely to do so slowly and almost imperceptibly. In the absence of these detailed studies, one can only conclude that, while the cabinet committee structure is still ‘in the making’, the cabinet is nonetheless helped to a substantial extent by these ‘subordinated bodies’.

Conclusion The rules and procedures of cabinets in the ten countries which are examined here are thus complex and highly elaborate. They confirm the impression that the procedures of these cabinets have, perhaps to an extent under Western European influence, become complex and sophisticated. Cabinets in the region have developed the kinds of codes of practice which are required if they are to achieve the levels of decision-making efficiency which the public at large is likely to expect of them. In the process, however, the scope of collective processes, which are ostensibly a key characteristic of parliamentary cabinets, is inevitably reduced, as it has been reduced in Western European cabinets: sub-groups of the cabinet rather than the whole cabinet become involved in detailed ‘preparation’ of many decisions. What has now to be examined is how the ministers evaluate the way these cabinets have been operating. The form that the parliamentary-cabinet system has taken in Central Eastern Europe had to be efficient in order to be generally acceptable in the countries concerned. It has also to be regarded as acceptable by the actors themselves if it is to become solidly entrenched and no questions are to be asked about its legitimacy.

5 An Overall Descriptive View: What Ministers Think of Cabinet Government

As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the introduction of the parliamentarycabinet system in Central Eastern Europe after the fall of communism had a profound and direct impact on the way in which government was to be conducted. Neither the population nor the politicians had experienced that system in any part of the region for around half a century; in some countries, cabinet government in its fully developed form had not even been implanted before the Second World War. Given such a background, one might have expected that the abrupt introduction of cabinet government would have led to serious problems and, in particular, that the ministers and their immediate advisers would have felt themselves wholly unprepared to take decisions in the context of this entirely new system. Yet, it is clear on the basis of general impressions gleaned from the early life of these cabinets across the region that the transition to the new form of government does not seem to have raised difficulties: indeed, the contrary seems to have occurred. One must go beyond these impressions, however, and explore the reactions of those who were the actors – namely the ministers themselves. Those ministers who were interviewed were asked five questions designed specifically to determine whether they felt that the cabinet system was acceptable to them. One of these questions aimed to discover whether or not the ministers were satisfied ‘on the whole’ with the cabinet decision-making process. The other four touched on the extent to which the cabinet system was regarded as effective, whether major questions were ‘thoroughly’ debated in cabinet, whether there were many instances of ‘substantial’ disagreements in cabinet and whether decisions tended to be arrived at on the basis of consensus. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the answers to these questions and thus to obtain a more detailed picture of what ministers felt of cabinet government as it was developing before their eyes. The chapter is divided 72

What Ministers Think of Cabinet Government

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into two sections. In the first section, the pattern of reactions to the five questions is examined in general across the ten countries of the study; that pattern is then compared, as far as possible, to that which emerged from answers given to similar questions, over a decade earlier, by Western European ministers. The second section considers the extent to which patterns of answers vary across the ten countries of the study while also comparing these variations with those which had been found to exist among Western European countries.

Overall attitudes to cabinet decision-making processes The five questions which have been referred to belong to three types (see ministerial questionnaire in Appendix 3 at the end of this book). One aims to determine the general feelings of ministers about the cabinet decisionmaking process: it asks whether these are ‘satisfied on the whole’ with that process. A second question, also general, can be defined as descriptive, at any rate from a subjective standpoint, as it asks ministers whether they think that the cabinet is ‘effective’: presumably, satisfaction with the process is in large part dependent on the conclusion that they think that the system is effective. The last three questions are also descriptive, but are more specific: views about these more specific reactions can be regarded as helping to build a general impression about the ‘effectiveness’ of the system. They are concerned with the extent to which major issues are ‘thoroughly’ debated in cabinet, with the extent to which there are ‘substantial’ disagreements in cabinet and with the extent to which, among the ways in which solutions to disagreements are found, a collective cabinet decision-making system is achieved, in particular by means of consensus.1 Extent of satisfaction with cabinet decision-making processes Let us first examine the extent to which ministers feel ‘satisfied’ with the decision-making process in cabinet. Interviewees had the choice between two symmetrical sets of answers – namely ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’, on the one hand, and ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’, on the other. There was no ‘middle’ answer, although the answer ‘satisfied’ could have been regarded by some ministers as a ‘safe’ answer. The proportion of the ministers satisfied with the way in which the first or only cabinet to which they had belonged is very large: 60 per cent of the interviewees declared that they were ‘satisfied’ and a further 22 per cent that they were ‘very satisfied’. The ‘dissatisfied’ were 16 per cent and the ‘very dissatisfied’ two per cent. The great majority are therefore happy with the

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process of decision-making: the new system of government does not appear to pose problems to most members of the cabinets, although a minority of about one-fifth of the ministers may feel differently. The effectiveness of cabinets On the ‘effectiveness’ of cabinet decision-making, ministers were asked whether they thought that the first or only cabinet to which they had belonged had been ‘effective on the whole’ in decision-making. One of four answers could be given: ‘very often’, ‘often’, ‘rarely’, ‘never’. Half the ministers (51 per cent) adopted the middle position and stated that that these cabinets had been ‘often effective’. The over half divided unevenly between a third (32 per cent) who stated that the cabinets had been ‘very often effective’, 16 per cent that they had been ‘rarely effective’ and one per cent that they had ‘never’ been effective. Only a small minority thus expressed outright discontent with the outcomes of the new system by stating that that system was ‘rarely effective’. In principle, views about effectiveness may be related to satisfaction, although the relationship may be a complex one. A relationship does exist since, among those who felt the cabinet was ‘very effective’, 55 per cent were ‘very satisfied’ and 4 per cent ‘dissatisfied’, while among those who felt that the cabinet was ‘not effective’, 6 per cent were ‘very satisfied’ and 51 per cent ‘dissatisfied’. Extent of debates, disagreements, role of consensus and effectiveness The last three questions can be regarded as possible components of ‘effectiveness’. One of these asked ministers whether they believed that cabinet meetings were occasions during which ‘major issues were thoroughly debated’. Here, too, one of four answers could be given: ‘very often’, ‘often’, ‘rarely’, ‘never’. Only 2 per cent of the ministers answered never: it was most unlikely that ministers would believe that such debates never occurred, let alone say so! Those who were somewhat unsure about how to reply would therefore probably plump for the middle answer (‘often’), while those who were truly positive would say ‘very often’ and those who were negative would say ‘rarely’. The middle answer was selected by one-third of the interviewees (35 per cent): the majority (about twothirds) did therefore want to express a genuine view. Of these two-thirds, nearly twice as many answered ‘very often’ (41 per cent) as answered ‘rarely’ (22 per cent). The second of these three questions goes somewhat further in exploring the nature of the ‘debates’ which, in the opinion of ministers, take place


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in cabinet: it asks about the extent to which there have been ‘substantial disagreements among cabinet members’ in the cabinets to which these ministers had belonged. 15 per cent of the respondents said that this was ‘very often’ the case in the first or only cabinet in which the ministers participated, 42 per cent that this was ‘often’ the case, 41 per cent that this was ‘rare’ and 3 per cent that it ‘never’ occurred. If, here too, almost no minister could be expected to say that disagreements ‘never’ occurred and if the middle answer (‘often’) could also be regarded as indicating that the minister concerned was rather uncertain, there was, in contrast to what was said about the extent to which there were ‘thorough’ debates, almost three times as many interviewees who stated that disagreements were ‘rare’ than stated that disagreements occurred ‘very often’. Since one would not expect disagreements in cabinets to be endemic without leading to a rapid dissolution of the cabinet itself, the fact that more than half of the ministers said that disagreements were not ‘rare’ may seem to be about right in the context of lively, but still workable bodies. Meanwhile, as disagreements are said to be fairly frequent, one can also note that, for a substantial majority of ministers, if not for all of them, the cabinet is not a mere ‘ratifying’ body. Moreover, there may be a tendency for the incidence of disagreements in cabinet to decline over the period: ministers who had belonged successively to two cabinets or more divided two to one in claiming that the second of these cabinets was less conflictual than the first. Finally, the third of the three questions is concerned with the way in which the disagreements tend to be resolved. The answers given here range from suggesting that a fully collective solution is found to suggesting that decisions are taken by a few, or even by the prime minister alone. The answer given most frequently, though not by a majority, admittedly, is that ‘consensual’ solutions are found: 31 per cent of the ministers stated that this was the case for the first or only cabinet to which ministers belonged. Another ‘collective’ solution mentioned by a little over onetenth of the interviewees was that ‘discussions among ministers’ was the chosen mechanism. While these answers give an idea of the extent to which parties and the prime minister play a part in cabinet decisionmaking, a point which shall be examined further in Chapters 6 and 12 respectively, there is widespread support for the view that cabinets act collectively. A clear relationship exists between the questions which have just been examined. Two-fifths of those who felt that ‘thorough’ debates occurred ‘very often’ about major issues also felt that that disagreements occurred ‘very often’, while this was only the case for 10 per cent of those who felt

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that ‘thorough’ debates were ‘rare’. Conversely, 30 per cent of those who felt that ‘thorough’ debates occurred ‘very often’ felt that that disagreements were ‘rare’, while this was the case of almost half (48 per cent) among those who felt that ‘thorough’ debates occurred ‘rarely’. Moreover, those cabinets in which ‘thorough debates’ over major issues were said to have occurred ‘very often’ were also those in which solutions were said to tend more often to be found by means of consensus: consensus prevailed in 43 per cent of the cases, as against only a quarter where ‘thorough debates’ over major issues occurred ‘often’ or ‘rarely’; however, this is somewhat compensated by the fact that the other collective solution to disagreements, that which resulted from discussions among ministers, took place more frequently where ‘thorough debates’ over major issues were said to occur ‘often’ or ‘rarely’ rather than when they are said to occur ‘very often’ (respectively 18, 22 and 9 per cent). There is also a relationship between the sense that the cabinet decisionmaking process was effective and the three more specific ‘descriptive’ variables which were just analyzed. Ministers are more likely to consider the process to be ‘effective’ when there are ‘very often’ ‘thorough debates’ (61 per cent) than when these occur ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ (42 per cent); they are less likely to feel that the cabinet is ‘effective’ when disagreements occur ‘very often’: this seems to suggest that ministers want cabinets to discuss, but not to disagree too much. On the other hand, the extent of effectiveness is not regarded by ministers as being affected whether disagreements are solved by consensus or by other means: it is the existence of disagreements, whatever the outcome, which may be affecting effectiveness. Moreover, in all three cases, those who answered ‘often’ to the ‘effectiveness’ question also tended to answer ‘often’ to the questions about debates and about disagreements: this appears to support the view that the ‘often’ answer is adopted by ministers who are somewhat uncertain about what the characteristics of decision-making in cabinet have been. A direct relationship also exists between attitudes to satisfaction and the more specific ‘descriptive’ variables. Specifically, when there are ‘very often’ ‘thorough debates’, ministers are more likely to be ‘very satisfied’ (63 per cent) than ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’ (26 per cent), but there is no difference with respect to the extent of disagreements and relatively little whether disagreements are solved by consensus or by other means: the proportion of those who were ‘very satisfied’ with the decision-making process was 31 per cent among those who noted that consensus prevailed in order to solve disagreements, as against 22 per cent only among those who were ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’ with that process.


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The overall conclusion has, therefore, to be balanced. Satisfaction is very high, as we saw, but the ‘descriptive’ answers do not seem entirely to account for that satisfaction. Overall, two-fifths of the respondents did say that major issues were ‘thoroughly debated’ ‘very often’: this proportion is substantial, but not overwhelming. Given that cabinets were concerned with major questions before these were sent to parliament, the proportion of those who felt that ‘thorough debates’ took place on these issues might have been larger; equally surprising is the fact that as many as one-fifth of the ministers should have felt that ‘thorough debates’ on such issues should ‘rarely’ have taken place. Meanwhile, the majority of ministers recognize that major disagreements occurred in cabinet, although consensus presumably helped to overcome these disagreements in many cases at least. Cabinets are therefore seen by most as lively places, but a substantial minority distances itself to an extent from such a picture. Attitudes to cabinet decision-making in East and West compared In the questionnaire administered in 1991 to ministers from 12 Western European countries, the effectiveness question was not asked and, while questions about satisfaction, about debates on major issues, about disagreements in cabinet and about solutions to these disagreements were identical in their wording to those in the questionnaire given to Central and Eastern European ministers a decade later, the choices given were typically somewhat different. Thus, on instances of ‘thorough debates about major issues’, Western European ministers were given the choice of answering ‘yes always’, ‘yes sometimes’ or ‘no’; on instances of ‘substantial disagreements’, these ministers were given the choice of answering ‘frequent’, ‘occasional’, ‘rare’ or ‘none’. Finally, in selecting the most appropriate solutions to disagreements, Western European ministers had the opportunity to give multiple answers, while this was not the case in the case of ministers in Central Eastern Europe. There are, however, enough similarities to allow for broad comparisons. Patterns of distribution of answers in the two surveys tend to be similar, with only some variations. First, on whether major issues were ‘thoroughly debated’, somewhat more Western European ministers plumped for the middle answer (‘sometimes’) (52 per cent) than ministers in Central Eastern Europe (‘often’) (41 per cent), possibly because the only ‘superior’ alternative open to Western European ministers was to answer ‘always’ rather than, as in the case of Central Eastern Europe, ‘very often’; but more Central Eastern European ministers answered ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ than Western European ministers (24 compared to 14 per cent). This confirms the view that many ‘major issues’ may have been agreed to

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‘on the nod’ in Central Eastern Europe, perhaps because these ‘major issues’ were so numerous. Secondly, regarding whether or not disagreements occurred in cabinet, Western European ministers also tended to choose more frequently the ‘middle’ answer (‘occasionally’) (58 per cent) than ministers in Central Eastern Europe did the ‘middle’ answer (‘often’) (42 per cent). In this case, too, more ministers in Central Eastern Europe than in Western Europe stated that disagreements occurred ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ (42 compared to 25 per cent). The ‘consensual’ solution was the one most frequently adopted in both cases, but a direct comparison is impossible since Western European ministers were permitted to give multiple answers. Western Europeans stated that consensus prevailed in over two-thirds of the cases (69 per cent) as against 30 per cent in the case of the Central Eastern European ministers, but there were three times as many answers among Western European ministers as they were ministers interviewed. Perhaps because of this general tendency to discuss rather less and to disagree rather less, ministers in Central Eastern Europe emerge as being somewhat more satisfied with the decision-making process in cabinet than their Western European counterparts, although the difference is not very large: among those who were asked the question and did reply, 60 per cent of the Central Eastern European ministers were ‘satisfied’ and 22 per cent ‘very satisfied’, while the corresponding proportions in Western Europe were 55 and 15 per cent; the proportion of ‘dissatisfied’ is naturally much larger: 30 per cent of the Western European ministers were ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’, as against 18 per cent among ministers in Central Eastern Europe. The comparison with Western Europe suggests that ministers in Central Eastern Europe did thus feel ‘at home’, so to speak, in the cabinet system to an extent which is indeed remarkable. Whether greater satisfaction among Central Eastern European cabinet members about these matters is related to other attitudes of ministers will be examined in Chapter 10.

Country variations Fluctuations from country to country can naturally be expected in the responses given by ministers to the questions analysed in this chapter. To simplify the analysis, this examination is conducted on the basis of the proportions of the ‘most positive’ answers which ministers gave in each country, that is to say the proportions of those who replied that ‘thorough debates’ occurred ‘very often’, of those who replied that ‘substantial disagreements’ occurred ‘very often’, of those who supported ‘consensus’


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solutions in cases of substantial disagreements, of those who stated that decision-making processes were ‘very often’ effective, and of those who were ‘very satisfied’ with these processes. The range of country fluctuations with respect to cabinet decision-making processes To begin with, there are large fluctuations from country to country in the distribution of answers given by ministers in Central Eastern Europe. The two largest sets of fluctuations concern the extent to which ministers think that ‘thorough debates’ about major issues occurred ‘very often’ in the cabinets to which they had belonged and the extent to which ministers mentioned consensus as the basis for the solution of disagreements. In the first case, fluctuations ranged between 5 and 100 per cent among the ministers of the ten countries, for an average of 41 per cent; in the second, they ranged between 6 and 100 per cent among the ministers of the ten countries, for an average of 30 per cent. The fluctuations which occur with respect to the other three questions are somewhat smaller, but still rather large. On whether cabinet processes were felt to be very often effective, the range was between 10 and 60 per cent, the average being 32 per cent. Among those who said that disagreements occurred ‘very often’, country fluctuations ranged between 0 and 36 per cent, the average being 15 per cent and among those who said they were ‘very satisfied’ with cabinet decision-making processes the range was between 4 and 38 per cent, the average being 22 per cent. There are thus somewhat smaller fluctuations from one country to another with respect to assessments of effectiveness and of feelings of satisfaction with the decision-making process than with respect to the occurrence of ‘thorough debates’ or of ‘substantial disagreements’. Something similar also occurs in Western Europe: variations are larger among the ‘most positive’ answers to the question concerned with ‘thorough debates’ on major issues. The mean was 32 per cent, but the range extended from 0 to 91 per cent; the range was much smaller with respect to the extent of satisfaction with cabinet decision-making processes (from 0 to 29 per cent) with a mean of 13 per cent. Range of fluctuations at the level of each country The range of fluctuations around the average thus varies from very large to moderate: yet the distribution of these fluctuations is not random, neither among the replies given for each country nor among all the countries. At the level of each country, first, one finds a widespread tendency for the ministers to react in a way which, to an extent, links the questions analysed

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here. This was perhaps to be expected, since, on average, we found links between the answers given by ministers to these questions, for instance between the extent to which ‘thorough debates’ take place ‘very often’ and the extent to which cabinet processes are regarded as being ‘very often’ efficient. Thus, these relationships are not a freak consequence of the process of averaging. The existence of links between the replies at the level of each country means that those who state that there is a high proportion of ‘thorough debates’ on major issues in each country also tend to view the process of cabinet decision-making to be ‘very often’ effective and to feel that that process is ‘very satisfactory’; this also means that a high, intermediate or low incidence of ‘substantial disagreements’ and a strong, medium or low level of support for consensus solutions to these disagreements are also associated with a high, intermediate or low score on the three questions which have just been referred to. Three groups of countries There are not only links between the replies given by the ministers at the level of each country. There is also ‘country clustering’, so to speak: there are ‘groups’ of countries in which ministers give analogous, if not admittedly wholly identical, sets of answers to the questions analysed here – a tendency which is indeed also found in Western Europe, although the distinction between the groups is not as marked. To examine this point, countries have been ranked on the basis of the proportion of ‘most positive’ replies given to each of the five questions: the country which has the highest proportion of such positive replies for a given question is ranked first for the question, the country which has the second highest proportion of such positive replies for that question is ranked second for that question and so on successively up to ten (there are ten countries) for each of the questions. The overall score for each country is obtained by adding the rankings for the five questions (see Table 5.1). Three groups emerge in Central Eastern Europe when the positions of the countries with respect to all five questions analysed here are taken into account. The first group includes those countries which, on average, score highest on all the questions put to their ministers: this comprises Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. A second, intermediate, group is composed of Lithuania, Poland and Rumania. Finally, ministers are least likely to give a highly ‘positive’ answer to the five questions in Slovakia and Slovenia. There are, of course, variations with respect to individual questions. The Czech Republic, for instance, which scores third place overall, is ranked

What Ministers Think of Cabinet Government Table 5.1

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Ministerial views on cabinet decision-making (ranking of countries) Issues1 Consensus2 Effectiveness3 Satisfaction4 Disagreement5

Total

Group I: Czech Rep. Latvia Bulgaria Estonia Hungary

1 6 2 5 3

1 2 4 2 8

1 3 2 5 4

6 4 3 2 1

4 1 8 6 4

13 16 19 20 20

Group II: Rumania Lithuania Poland

7 4 9

7 5 3

8 9 7

5 8 10

3 6 7

30 32 36

Group III: Slovenia Slovakia

8 10

9 10

10 6

7 9

8 8

42 43

Notes: 1 Importance of party and issues debated. 2 Consensus on disagreements. 3 Effectiveness of cabinet decision-making. 4 Satisfaction with cabinet decision-making. 5 Importance of disagreements.

first for three of the questions, those relating to ‘thorough debates’, to consensus and to effectiveness, but it ranks only fourth with respect to ‘substantial disagreements’: Latvian ministers are proportionately the most numerous of the ministers of all Central Eastern European countries to state that such disagreements occur. Moreover, while Czech ministers feel that the cabinets to which they belonged were ‘most often’ effective, they are far from being ‘very satisfied’ with the cabinet decision-making process: the Czech Republic ranks only sixth on that question. Thus, Czech ministers are among the least likely to see a close relationship between the effectiveness of the decision-making process and satisfaction with that process, despite the fact that, in general, a positive relationship exists between views about the effectiveness of cabinets and feelings of strong satisfaction about these cabinets. On the other hand, Hungarian ministers are the most satisfied of all of the ten countries in respect of the decision-making process in cabinet; they also score fairly highly overall on the ‘most positive’ answers to all five questions, but they score low (indeed appreciably lower than the average) on the extent to which consensus takes place in order to solve disagreements in cabinet (the country ranks eighth on that question). Bulgarian

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ministers score rather high on the ‘most positive’ answers to four questions, but tend to believe that few disagreements occur in cabinet (the country is eighth on that question). Bulgarian ministers are therefore among those who contribute to the overall conclusion, stated above, that ‘substantial disagreements’ in cabinet may not always be regarded by ministers as contributing to the cabinet being assessed as effective and the cabinet decision-making process being felt very satisfactory. Slovak and Slovenian ministers also have broadly similar attitudes: they do not believe that ‘thorough debates’ take place in cabinet very often; they do not believe that there are very often substantial disagreements; they do not believe either that consensual solutions occur frequently to solve such disagreements that might occur; they tend to feel that the cabinet decision-making process is not particularly effective nor are they very satisfied with that process. Whether these views are due to the fact that, in both countries, though admittedly in a different manner, one strong prime minister emerged who was able to dominate the political scene can be an object of speculation only. Moreover, some differences also appear: Slovak ministers are proportionately a little more numerous than Slovenian ministers in stating that the process is ‘very often’ effective (the country ranks sixth on that question) while Slovenian ministers are proportionately more numerous than Slovak ministers in being ‘very satisfied’ with that process (the country ranks seventh on that question). Lithuania and the two largest countries analysed in this study – Poland and Rumania – form an intermediate group: they hold on average the sixth place among the ten countries. There are, however, some differences among them, with Polish ministers being the ‘least positive’ of the three sets of ministers and Rumanian ministers the ‘most positive’. In all three cases, ministers note the existence of numerous instances of substantial disagreements, these being, also in all three countries, solved relatively frequently by means of consensus, but the scores are not very high, however, even on these two questions – with the exceptions of Rumania on ‘disagreements’ and Poland on consensus. Moreover, views about the effectiveness of the cabinet and feelings of satisfaction are not very ‘positive’, except to a certain extent among Rumanian ministers (whose country ranks fifth on that question). Among the ministers of these three countries, Rumanian ministers are the most likely, or, more accurately, the least unlikely, to declare themselves ‘very satisfied’ with the process of decision-making. The existence of these three distinct groups and the fact that ministers describe the characteristics of the life of the cabinets to which they have belonged in a coherent manner constitute internal reliability checks on


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the method used in this study; but it also indicates that there are ‘styles’ of cabinet. One cannot go further and in particular determine why this appears to be the case. Some ministerial reactions may indeed be the consequence of a socialization process within the ‘political class’: the idea that a cabinet is ‘effective’ or that a given mode of behaviour is ‘satisfactory’ may be due to ‘prevailing feelings’ among politicians that the government has these characteristics. Yet such an interpretation seems more likely to be valid with respect to the feelings of satisfaction and to general assessments of effectiveness than to such detailed judgements as those which assess the incidence of ‘thorough debates’, of ‘substantial disagreements’ or of consensus. The fact that there is, in general, at least a moderate relationship among the directions of the replies to all five questions seems to suggest that the two overall assessments given by ministers are, to an extent, linked to the descriptions of the specific modes of behaviour; but the fact that the association is not always strong suggests that there is some leeway and that there is space for what might be ‘general’ socialization effects, as is shown, for instance, by the examples given above from the Czech Republic (where ministers are rather negative about satisfaction) or of Hungary (where ministers are, by contrast, very positive about satisfaction). However, even if assessments of effectiveness and feelings of satisfaction are considered separately, the same five countries remain ‘at the top’ and the patterns which have been identified continue to emerge even when are only taking into account those questions for which the range of variations from country to country is relatively small. The survey which is analysed here does not make it possible to conclude whether a general ‘ministerial’ socialization process has a significant influence: but it is at least permissible to raise the issue, especially since a similar pattern of clustering is found to exist in the answers given by Western European ministers. In Western Europe, too, there is indeed a tendency for the attitudes of ministers to the cabinet decision-making process to be clustered into at least two groups, and at most three, the division between the second and the third group not being as marked as it is in the case of Central Eastern European countries (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993: 179ff ). In Western Europe, four countries are ‘most positive’ with regard to the cabinet decision-making process: these are Austria, Finland, Ireland and Norway. Seven countries are divided to an extent between a group of three countries – composed of Belgium, Germany and Italy – in which ministers are rather more ‘positive’ about the cabinet decision-making process than are those of France, Britain, Denmark and Sweden. The case of the Netherlands is somewhat undetermined because of the absence of

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data on consensus. Rather surprisingly, the Northern countries are sharply divided: ministers in Finland and Norway are ‘most positive’ towards their cabinets, while this is not the case of ministers from Denmark and Sweden, although Danish ministers, despite their very low scores on the other questions, are the most satisfied of all Western ministers about the decision-making process. The comparison between attitudes of ministers to the cabinet at the level of individual countries therefore provides evidence for the view that, in Central Eastern Europe, the patterns of these attitudes are analogous to the patterns found in the ‘established’ and ‘consolidated’ parliamentary cabinet systems of Western Europe. This is so both in terms of the size of the fluctuations across the countries and in terms of the extent to which these fluctuations tend to affect all the questions similarly in each country and indeed in groups of countries. Thus, while the distribution of attitudes of ministers in the cabinets of the ten countries which are studied here does vary, it is in a manner which appears entirely ‘normal’.

Conclusion Three broad conclusions can be drawn from this inquiry into the ways in which the ministers of the countries analysed here assessed the cabinets to which they had belonged. First, these ministers have had no difficulty in adapting to the cabinet system. We began this chapter, indeed this volume, by asking whether the generational traditions which had been built in the region would have rendered problematic, and perhaps even impeded, the acceptance of the cabinet system as the key decisionmaking organization by those who were to be its main protagonists. From our findings, the answer is loud and clear: there is no sign whatsoever suggesting that ministers find it difficult or inconvenient to work within the new system. The arrangement is ‘consolidated’ if consolidation means that there is no alternative on the mental horizon of the actors. Thus, ministers from Central Eastern Europe fare well in comparison with Western European ministers; indeed they may even be somewhat more supportive of the system than their Western European colleagues. Secondly, there is a broad link between the extent to which ministers feel satisfied with the cabinet decision-making system, the effectiveness of that system and the extent to which ‘thorough debates’ about major issues are presented to the cabinet. Ministers appreciate the fact that the cabinet is confronted with the problems of the nation and that it has substantial discussions about these problems. This does not necessarily mean, at any rate to the same extent, that ministers feel that there are


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(perhaps even that there should be) ‘substantial’ disagreements, though there are many who both feel that debates occur very frequently and that disagreements also occur frequently. Moreover, many feel that these disagreements tend to be solved by consensus, although other solutions, mostly less ‘collegial’, are also said to take place. A direct comparison with the Western European situation cannot be made in this respect, yet there does seem to be a broad similarity between the characteristics of assessments in the two regions. Thirdly, substantial differences are naturally found from country to country with respect to these assessments, but these differences have two characteristics. On the one hand, the patterns of these differences respect in general, at the country level, the point which was made in the previous paragraph about the linkage between assessments of specific characteristics, as well as views on the effectiveness of the system and on levels of satisfaction with that system. The overall average does not create connections among the replies which would not exist at the level of each country. On the other hand, these differences lead to the emergence of three groups of countries from the point of view of the reactions of ministers to the cabinet system. In five countries – two of the Baltic States, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria – views are truly positive. In a further three – the two most populated countries, Poland and Romania, and Lithuania – assessments are somewhat less favourable, though they continue to be generally positive. In the last two – Slovakia and Slovenia – there is less recognition of the benefits of the system, possibly because, in these two countries, at least one strong prime minister may have rendered the collegial character of the cabinet less evident. Yet, even in that third group, there is substantial support for the cabinet system: it is not as if there should be a complete contrast between the three groups any more than there is a complete contrast between similar groups in Western Europe.


Part II Parties and Types of Cabinets in the View of Ministers


6 Party Government and Cabinet Decision-Making

Cabinet government has often been described as ‘party government’, although what exactly party government consists of still remains rather unclear, despite attempts made in a number of studies which appeared since the 1980s to give a more precise contour to the concept (Rose 1974; Castles and Wildenmann 1986; Blondel and Cotta 1996, 2000; Luther and Müller-Rommel 2005). The most precise definition is that of Richard Katz (1987: 43) who lists three conditions for a government to be referred to as ‘party government’. These are that ‘all major governmental decisions must be taken by people chosen in elections conducted along party lines or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such people’, that ‘policy must be decided by the governing party when there is a monocolour government, or by negotiation among the parties when there is a coalition’ and that ‘the highest officials (for example cabinet ministers and especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties and be responsible to the people through their parties’. The party or parties which are being considered are, of course, the ‘supporting’ parties and not the opposition, although, in some cases at least, which parties are ‘supporting’ is not entirely clear, in particular, but not exclusively, in the case of minority governments (Blondel and Cotta 1996, 2000). Moreover, the conditions listed by Richard Katz pose some problems. They are somewhat imprecise in the case of the first (‘all major governmental decisions. . .’), since what constitutes a ‘major’ governmental decision is obviously unclear, or too stringent in the case of the third (‘the highest officials (cabinet ministers and especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties. . . .’), since there may be independents or ‘technicians’ among the ministers. Yet the definition provides a framework on the basis of which the subject can be circumscribed. 89

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Although we are concerned here exclusively with the views of ministers on the role of party in government and not with more fundamental questions of a normative or empirical character, these matters need at least to be referred to at the outset. The most serious normative question concerns the extent to which one wishes to see the party or parties to be ‘running’ the government; the most serious empirical question relates to the intriguing problem of what or who can be said to ‘embody’ the party. The question of the relative ‘autonomy’, even ‘independence’, of the ministers vis-à-vis the party is at stake and this question has been a major source of friction in parliamentary systems in practice as well as an insoluble problem in theory. The question of who or what body can be said to ‘represent’ the party raises, for instance, the matter of the position of the national executive. Those party ‘members’ in the government are prone to claim that it is up to them to interpret what is in the ‘general interest’ of the country and that the government must be able to act in ways which ‘the party’ may not even be comfortable with. At the root of the problem is whether the party or parties supporting the government can impose a line to ministers as well as, and perhaps more importantly, whether it is indeed right that supporting parties should be entitled to do so (Blondel and Cotta 2000: 1–17). Yet these problems are crucial as it is universally agreed, if only by tacit accord, that the cabinet system cannot function effectively or perhaps even at all unless it is ‘party government’. What needs to be done here is nonetheless more limited. It consists in examining, as precisely as possible, the ways in which party becomes inserted in the life of the governments in Central Eastern Europe. This means investigating three main aspects. One aspect is biographical and is concerned with the manner in which ministers are individually involved in the life of the party to which they belong, both before they become ministers and when they are ministers. If party government plays any part at all in cabinet decision-making processes, it must be because the members of the cabinets are, to an extent, ‘party men and women’. The second aspect of this inquiry entails examining how far the parties supporting the government play a part in the cabinet decision-making process, not just in general, through the party programmes, but in the context of the elaboration of particular policies. Such an examination will reveal how wide is the involvement of the supporting parties in cabinet decision-making. Thirdly, we need to obtain an assessment of the extent to which ministers judge the parties to play an important part, as they could be widely involved and yet be regarded as less influential as other bodies. Of course, on these matters, and especially on the last two of these points, we have to rely on the views and judgements of the ministers.

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However, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, only the recollections of participants can give a picture of what does actually occur in cabinet. The chapter therefore successively analyses these three aspects of party involvement in Central Eastern European cabinets. First, it considers how close the connection of ministers has been to the parties to which they have belonged both before they joined the government and once they were in government. Secondly, it reports, albeit in a necessarily rather succinct manner, on the ways these ministers describe the involvement of parties in the activities of cabinets. Thirdly, it examines how far this involvement of parties in the life of the cabinets is judged to be truly important in the decision-making process. As in the previous chapter, these matters are considered both overall at the level of all ten countries of the study and at the level of the individual countries, while, to the extent that it is possible, comparisons are drawn with analogous findings made earlier in the context of Western European governments.

How far are ministers ‘party men and women’? Ostensibly at least, governments in the countries studied here constitute examples of party government: 98 per cent of the ministers interviewed belonged to one form or another of the cabinets which had been set up around parties, the other 2 per cent having belonged to caretaker governments. Moreover, when asked about the party meetings which ministers attended, less than 4 per cent stated that the question was not relevant to their case. The impact of parties on ministers Such a large extent of ‘partyness’, to use Richard Katz’s expression, does not necessarily entail a great involvement in the life of the party, either before the person interviewed became a minister or even since he or she has become a minister. When asked ‘which personal experiences would you consider to have been particularly useful for your activity as minister?’, three-quarters of the answers referred to prior knowledge of the matter or to technical competence (exactly 75 per cent), 7 per cent referred to junior ministerial experience and 5 per cent gave no information: only 12 per cent referred, indeed not even to direct party experience but, indirectly, to experience acquired as an MP. This experience is not likely to have had a major influence, moreover, since an impact appears to have been recognized by 12 per cent of the interviewees only despite the fact that 58 per cent had been members of their parliament, admittedly perhaps in some cases for short periods only; meanwhile, only 15 per cent

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had been junior ministers and yet half of these only noted that the experience had left some traces.1 Whatever happened before they joined the cabinet, most interviewees said that, once they were ministers, they had both close and good relationships with the parties to which they belonged. Only 8 per cent of the sample stated that they did not usually attend party meetings. Of the other 92 per cent, a third said that they attended some official meetings, 9 per cent some unofficial meetings (mainly in parliament) and nearly half (46 per cent) a mixture of both formal and informal meetings. That relationship was said to be close by over two-thirds of the ministers (69 per cent) and only in 6 per cent of the cases was it said that there was no cooperation. The collaboration was also said by the ministers to have been equally close with the parliamentary party (63 per cent). Yet this ‘close’ collaboration does not appear to have had very strong implications for the ministers’ behavior, since only 5 per cent among them stated that they briefed themselves on cabinet matters by means of the party. Thus there is ostensibly ‘party government’ in Central Eastern European cabinets in the sense that substantial collaboration is said to exist between ministers and the organs of the corresponding supporting parties; there is also evidence, however, that these ministers have not been actively seeking that collaboration nor have they been markedly affected by the party in the context of policy developments in cabinet. Yet this situation does not seem to be markedly different in Western Europe, where a substantial majority of the ministers interviewed said that they attended ‘some’ official party meetings (58 per cent), but many fewer than in Central Eastern Europe stated that they attended both informal and formal meetings (9 per cent as compared to 46 per cent). The collaboration with party was said by 49 per cent of the Western European ministers to have taken place, as against 69 per cent among the ministers of the countries studied here. Admittedly, many more Western European ministers stated that they had benefited from their experience as an MP (48 per cent against 12 per cent), but this was in a context in which 80 per cent had been MPs, in which tenure was longer and in which separate questions were asked about the forms of influence which might have affected ministers before joining the cabinet: nonetheless 21 per cent stated that they had not benefited from their experience as an MP (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993: 153ff). Party influence on ministers from country to country Large fluctuations from country to country are found in the extent to which ministers’ links with their party are substantial: they are as large as


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the fluctuations found in the previous chapter with respect to the attitudes of ministers to the cabinet decision-making process. Thus, the proportion of those who stated that the experience they had as an MP was particularly useful varies between 0 and 37 per cent, with an average of 11 per cent; the proportion of those who said they attended some official party meetings varies from 6 to 80 per cent, for an average of 27 per cent; the proportion of those who said that they attended meetings of both an official and an unofficial character varied from 0 to 68 per cent, for an average of 47 per cent. One finds similar variations, ranging from 13 to 60 per cent among the ministers who said that there was little collaboration with the party, for an average of 29 per cent (and from 0 to 40 per cent among the ministers who said that there was little collaboration with the parliamentary party, for an average of 27 per cent). There are even country variations from 0 to 25 per cent among ministers who mention the party in reply to the question asking them how they briefed themselves on cabinet matters, the overall average being a mere five per cent. The patterns of these country fluctuations are markedly less structured in the context of the relationship between ministers and their party, however, than on attitudes to the cabinet decision-making process. There are here no clearly distinct ‘groups’ of countries where the relationship between the ministers and their party is large, intermediate or small. Fluctuations tend to vary apparently from question to question, except in the case of the Czech Republic, whose ministers state that they are surprisingly that they are most unlikely to have had a close relationship with their party either before or after joining the cabinet: none of them felt that their experience as an MP was particularly useful for their work as minister and none of them used the party to become briefed on cabinet matters (the average being 5 per cent); 20 per cent among them attended no party meetings (the average being 10 per cent), 60 per cent had had little collaboration with their party (the average being 29 per cent). There were even very limited links between Czech ministers and their parliamentary party: 60 per cent stated that they had no collaboration at all with that body (the average being 6 per cent). On the other hand, ministers from Hungary, Lithuania and Poland are less likely, and those from Slovakia are more likely, to have a close relationship with their party. In general, apart from ministers from the Czech Republic, the ministers from Lithuania and Poland are those who, overall, are least linked to their party. Fluctuations of the same order of magnitude characterized the answers of Western European ministers when they answered similar questions relating to their relationship with their party. Thus, their experience as

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an MP was on average regarded as particularly valuable to 48 per cent of the ministers, but this percentage varied from between 16 and 73 per cent at the country level. No case of non-attendance of ministers to party meetings was registered for Denmark, but this was said to be the case for more than three-quarters of the ministers (78 per cent) in France. Instances of close cooperation with the party were said not to have taken place at all in France, but to have taken place in the case of all the Danish ministers who were interviewed. The party background of ministers does play a part in Central Eastern Europe as in Western Europe in building a bridge between party and government and thus constitutes an element which contributes to the emergence of ‘party government’: that part is relatively modest, however, more modest perhaps than it ‘should’ be, not seemingly because the parties and cabinets studied here are recent developments, however, as there is no strong evidence indicating that the situation is very different in Western Europe. Quite the contrary, in both regions, the part which party plays in shaping the life of ministers varies markedly and rather erratically from country to country although in one case, that of the Czech Republic, the part played by party in the life of ministers appears to be systematically very low.

Direct involvement of parties on cabinet decision-making: the ministers’ views Whatever background ministers may have had in the party, one can surely justifiably refer to the existence of ‘party government’ in the strong sense of the word only if the decisions taken by the cabinet are affected by what the supporting party or parties may have wanted. This is why one needs to examine the ways in which parties are involved in the process of cabinet decision-making. The direct involvement of parties in the cabinet decision-making process means in effect a kind of ‘intrusion’ of the parties in that process. It is ‘intrusion’ as members of cabinets are expected to take their decisions as a result and at the end of a deliberation taking place exclusively among themselves. If party – or, for that matter, any other body – becomes involved in the process, this must be either because, before cabinet deliberation occurs, that deliberation is constrained by preconditions imposed by an external organ or because the deliberative process is unable to reach a conclusion. Two questions were therefore put to the ministers to obtain an impression of the extent to which such situations occur. The first asked: ‘If you feel that matters were not fully discussed in cabinet, where in your experience did discussions


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mostly took place?’ The second followed inquiries into disagreements in cabinet and asked: ‘How were these disagreements mostly solved?’ Ministers were also asked about the strategy they themselves adopted in bringing an issue to cabinet and how they dealt with the conflicts they might have individually with the finance ministers: in neither of these two cases, however, did the ministers mention the party as an organ which might have provided the solution. The role of parties in cabinet decision-making To the question ‘Where did discussions mostly take place over matters which were not fully discussed in cabinet?, 18 per cent of the ministers answered that such discussions took place within parties, a proportion which at first seems to be relatively small, but which is by far the largest, if one excludes the undefined category of ‘other’ (17 per cent), of the answers referring to ‘organs outside the cabinet’. Parliament is mentioned by under 5 per cent of the ministers, the president by slightly over 3 per cent, and the bureaucracy and interest groups by slightly over one per cent each. Altogether these ‘outside organs’ were mentioned by less than 11 per cent of the respondents. The three answers which received substantial mentions were informal ministerial bodies (14 per cent), cabinet committees (22 per cent) and prime minister and ministers (15 per cent). Thus, while the cabinet as such may not have been in many cases the place where real discussions occurred, these discussions tended to occur mainly, and one should add unsurprisingly, in what might be termed ‘partial cabinets’, including ‘subordinate bodies’, of the cabinet (exactly half the ministers mentioned these types of arrangements). On the other hand, nearly a fifth of the ministers volunteered to mention parties and parties were by far the outside bodies which were most widely mentioned. Comparisons with Western Europe cannot be made directly since, in that case, ministers were asked to reply successively, by ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’, with respect to the role of different bodies, whether they were internal or outside organs. Yet what was referred to earlier as ‘partial cabinets’ also received the largest numbers of mentions – in all cases around 50 per cent stating that they were involved, while only about one-quarter said they were not; the relative position of parties by comparison with other outside organs, bureaucracy and interest groups, was less ‘favourable’ in Western Europe than in the countries analysed here, however. Parties received more mentions than other outside organs, bureaucracy and interest groups, but by a smaller margin – the bureaucracy being mentioned by 21 per cent (against 38 per cent who said that it was not) and interest groups by 13 per cent (against 39 per cent who said that they

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were not) (‘others’ were mentioned by 17 per cent against 30 per cent who said they were not) (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993). Parties seem therefore to occupy a more prominent position in the countries analysed here than in Western Europe, though perhaps because neither the bureaucracy nor interest groups have acquired the status which they have in Western Europe. As we saw in the previous chapter, cases of disagreement were eventually often solved in the cabinets studied here by means of consensus (31 per cent), but in a majority of cases the solution was found elsewhere. Three ways were regarded by ministers as being, alongside consensus, the most frequently practiced, imposition by the prime minister (17 per cent), discussions among ministers (12 per cent) and involvement by the ‘coalition council’ (16 per cent). Other mechanisms, all internal to the government, cabinet committees, discussions between the prime minister and one or more ministers and reference back to the sponsoring department were mentioned by 19 per cent of the ministers. Thus, the ‘coalition council’ was the only outside organ which was regarded as playing a part in the resolution of these conflicts, the ‘coalition council’ being the body representing the parties supporting the government. Parties as such were not mentioned, that council being the ‘functional equivalent’ in the case of a coalition; in a single-party government, the solution is found ‘internally’ in the cabinet, especially by or through the prime minister, the prime minister acting in this case both as head of the government and as embodying the party. Yet the fact that the coalition council, not the ‘parties’ as such, are involved in the resolution of conflicts which coalition cabinets appear unable to solve by themselves indicates that coalitions cabinet are somewhat ‘cushioned’ from direct pressure from the supporting parties. Neither the parties as such, nor any ‘coalition council’, was mentioned in the context of the analysis of the solution of disagreements in Western Europe. All the alternatives given (which also led to a series of separate questions to ministers) were internal to the cabinet system and were constituted by the prime minister or ‘partial cabinets’. There may therefore be in Western European cabinets even less of an appeal to parties when there are disagreements than there is in the case of the cabinets analyzed here. Country variations in the involvement of parties Meanwhile, country variations are substantial on both indicators in this respect as well. In the ten countries, the involvement of parties in issues which the cabinet did not debate fully ranges from 0 to 61 per cent and


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the involvement of the coalition council in matters over which there has been disagreement in the cabinet ranges from 0 to 33 per cent. There is a little more consistency between the answers to the two questions than there is about the various ways in which individual ministers have been and continue to be connected to parties. The countries in which the incidence of ‘party government’ has been non-existent are, again, the Czech Republic, but also Estonia and Latvia, while this incidence has been small in Hungary and Slovenia. The involvement has been large in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and, to a slightly more limited extent, Slovakia. However, except for the Czech Republic, at one extreme, and Slovakia, at the other, there is only a limited relationship between the extent to which ministers are individually linked to their party and the extent to which parties are said by ministers to have ‘intruded’ in the cabinet decision-making process. Here again, the cabinets of Central Eastern Europe are not special: equally large fluctuations have taken place among the Western European countries with respect to which parties have been involved in issues which the cabinet could not debate fully. In France, but also in Britain, there was no involvement of this kind at all, while the involvement was substantial (57 per cent) in Denmark (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993).

The importance of parties’ impact on cabinet decision-making Parties thus play a part in the processes by which cabinets take their decisions. Yet it does not necessarily follow that that part, however large, should have an important, let alone a very important impact on cabinet decision-making. The concept of ‘party government’ requires, not merely that the supporting party or parties be involved, but that this involvement should be important. To this effect, ministers were asked to evaluate what, in their opinion, was the importance of the party of the minister concerned in cabinet decision-making. ‘In your time as minister, how important was your party (the party that nominated you) for cabinet decision making?’ This wording, and the concentration on the party of the minister in particular, were designed to obtain an answer to the question of importance which was not only as frank as possible, but as informed as possible: it is easier for someone to realize whether his or her own party has been influential than to know whether this is the case of other parties in a coalition. Moreover, a minister might be tempted either to exaggerate or to underestimate the influence of any other party on the government because of the competition

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which inevitably exists between the parties of a coalition: the response about one’s own party is likely, on balance, to be closer to what did occur. 29 per cent of the ministers replied that their party was ‘very important’ to cabinet decision-making, 41 per cent that it was ‘important’, 20 per cent that it was ‘a little important’ and 7 per cent was that it was not important. Those who gave either of the two extreme answers expressed themselves clearly. The proportion of ministers who simply do not think that party counts at all is very small in the cabinets of the ten countries (7 per cent – or 11 per cent if one adds the 4 per cent whose answers were ‘not applicable’). In contrast to the very small proportion of interviewees who feel that the party is unimportant, almost one-third of all the ministers felt the party to be ‘very important’ in cabinet decision-making: this is an appreciably larger group than the number of those who said that party was involved in matters in which there had not been full discussion in cabinet (17 per cent) or that the cabinet council was called to solve disagreements within the cabinet (17 per cent). Thus, in passing the judgement which they passed, the ministers who felt that their party was ‘very important’ clearly also took into account a variety of other elements in which the party played a major part, including perhaps some of the topics which had been placed in the programme of the government at the instigation of the party. While the answers at both extremes of the range thus provide a clear message, it is more difficult to interpret the other two types of answers – those of ministers who said that the party was ‘important’ and of those who said that it was ‘a little important’. Perhaps the 20 per cent who gave the last of these two answers were being ‘polite’ and were in reality trying to say something which was not very different from what had been said by the colleagues who had claimed that that the party was ‘not important’. If this interpretation is correct, it follows that ministers divide in effect in the same proportion, at both ends of the scale (a little under a third in each case), between those who feel the party makes a genuine difference and those who feel the contrary. We are then left with the two-fifths of the ministers who judge that their party is ‘important’. There is often a tendency for the ‘middle’ answers to be chosen by those who are not sure of their own feelings. If so, the ministers who opt for that answer should be regarded as not being really able to decide whether the party is ‘really’ important or is only, let us say, ‘somewhat’ influential. Whatever interpretation is given to this last group, the general conclusion must be that around one-third of ministers are prepared to state


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that the party does make a major difference to the decision-making processes in cabinet. Meanwhile, a similar proportion feels the contrary, though it may be appreciably smaller depending on the meaning given to the answer ‘a little important’. Thus, for at least a substantial minority, ‘party government’ is a reality in Central Eastern Europe. To analyse further the possible impact of the notion of ‘importance’ of party, cross-tabulations were undertaken between the answers to the question which has just been examined and answers given to questions discussed in the previous sections of this chapter and relating to the involvement of supporting parties in cabinet decision-making and in the career of the ministers. A relationship does indeed emerge between the ‘importance’ given by ministers to their party and the part attributed by these ministers to parties in matters not fully discussed in cabinet: 45 per cent of those who mentioned the party as the place where these matters had been discussed felt that party was very important, as against 25 per cent among all the other answers given. Meanwhile, the ministers who mentioned the coalition council as providing a solution to disagreements formed 31 per cent of the respondents who said that party was very important, while those who mentioned other bodies as providing the solution were 26 per cent: the trend was limited here, but it was in the right direction. Similar relationships also emerge when the levels of importance of their own party in the eyes of the respondents is cross-tabulated with aspects of the career of the ministers. Thus, among the ministers who think that their experience as an MP has been particularly valuable, 38 per cent feel that their party is very important: they are 24 per cent only among the ministers who mention other career backgrounds as having been particularly valuable. Similarly, among the ministers who have had both official and unofficial meetings with their party, 39 per cent feel that their party is very important: they are 28 per cent only among the ministers who have had only official meetings or have had no meetings involving their party. Even more, among the ministers who state that they had close cooperation with their party, 33 per cent feel that their party is very important: they are 5 per cent only among the ministers who have not experienced close collaboration. While these trends do not constitute a proof that party does affect behavior in cabinet as well as attitudes of ministers, there is at least substantial evidence going in that direction (Table 6.1). Unfortunately, the question about the ‘importance’ of party was not asked of Western European ministers: the only substitute which can be used is a question inquiring whether party was the reason for ministers

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Table 6.1

Importance given to party and involvement of parties (in per cent) Party viewed as

Role of party in debates outside cabinet Role of coalition council Role of experience as MPs Involvement in both official and unofficial party meetings Close cooperation with party

Very important

Not very important

Other

Total

45

25

30

100

31 38 39

26 24 28

43 38 33

100 100 100

33

5

62

100

being ‘important’, the other questions referring to other sources of ‘ministerial importance’, such as the substance of the ministry, the status of the minister, and the seniority and the official position of the minister. While this question can only give an indirect indication of the importance of the party for the ministers concerned, it is interesting to note that 38 per cent answered ‘yes’ and 28 per cent answered ‘no’, while slightly over one-third gave no answer at all: this suggests that, for Western European ministers, the role of party is far from overwhelming (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993). One cannot therefore conclude that there is a striking difference in this respect between Western European and Central Eastern European cabinets any more than in other elements of the picture which came to be drawn in this and the previous chapters. As on other aspects, variations from country to country are substantial with respect to the extent to which party is judged ‘very important’, ‘important’, ‘a little important’ or ‘not important’. Thus, over half the Bulgarian ministers and half the Latvian ministers feel that party is ‘very important’, with the Slovak and Estonian ministers not being very far behind (respectively 41 and 37 per cent); on the other hand, unsurprisingly given what was found already about their feeling for party, no Czech minister feels that party is very important for cabinet decisionmaking; nor did any Lithuanian or Slovenian minister do so, while only one Hungarian minister does so. In Western Europe, too, variations from country to country are massive: French and Irish ministers scarcely believe that their party has any importance in cabinet decision-making (only 5 and 6 per cent respectively say it does), while above all the Belgians, but also Austrians, Italians, Finns and Dutch strongly feel the contrary (from 74 to 56 per cent among them). If party government does exist to a significant extent, there are major fluctuations from country to country,


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both among those countries which are regarded as having practiced cabinet government for decades and among those where the cabinet system is recent.

Conclusion In the course of this chapter, the existence and the limitations of party government have emerged as two contrasting elements of a single picture. There are differences at the level of the party background and party involvement of individual ministers; there are differences in terms of the extent to which party ‘intrudes’ in what seem to be difficult moments of the life of the cabinet; there are, above all, differences in the importance attributed to party by the ministers themselves, differences which are compounded by some problems of interpretation in the answers given. The contrast is also to be found at the level of individual country findings, as there are large but, in most cases, apparently erratic fluctuations, the only country whose ministers are markedly consistent in stating that party does not play much of a part being the Czech Republic. Given these contrasts, the overall conclusion must be that party government exists to an extent, but that party government is also challenged to an extent. This does not seem to be due to the fact that the cabinets studied here are young. There is little difference with Western European cabinets in this respect: there is in both regions a mixture of reticence and acceptance. The existence of these contrasts with respect to party government may be unsurprising. From the outset, this volume has emphasized the fact that the cabinet system is unique in its attempt to achieve both representative and efficient government. There has to be ‘a dose’ of party government, if representativeness is to be achieved; but there have to be a managerial and a technical strength if there is to be efficiency: ministers have to know about their jobs as ministers in order to achieve results. Party government is only one element in the equation. It is therefore logical that the two elements should be recognized and that party government should be present, but not overwhelming.

7 Coalitions, Single-Party Governments and Cabinet Decision-Making

As was pointed out in the introductory chapter of this volume, the cabinet system is the only form of government which faces the tension between collegiality and efficiency. This dilemma is rendered more difficult to solve, moreover, as collegiality is expected to be achieved among ministers who are also representative of opinion in the public at large by means of the political parties, and that representative character can be broader or narrower depending upon the extent to which, by means of coalitions, parties in parliament also have seats in the government. It has long been suggested, because representation can be broader or narrower, that the nature of the cabinet decision process is likely to be influenced by the nature of the party composition of that body. If there is single-party government, decision-making problems seem likely to be minimized as the members of the government can be expected to share a common ideological outlook. Coalition governments, by contrast, have been felt likely to be either ineffectual or unstable: ineffectual if the ministers from different parties cannot agree on the policies to follow, unstable if these ministers prefer to break the cabinet to being made to adopt policies which they do not really accept. Yet coalitions are numerous; they are sometimes unstable, but this is far from being always the case (Lijphart 1984, 1999). Single-party governments may be regarded as preferable on a number of grounds, and from the point of view of decision-making in particular, as decisions might be easier to take: but they are often, in practice, an unrealistic goal as a result of the distribution of the parties in parliament. Coalitions then become inevitable. This has been the case in many Western European countries and also throughout Central Eastern Europe following the fall of communism: indeed, the proportion of single-party governments has been much smaller in Central Eastern Europe since the 1990s than in 102

Coalitions and Single-Party Governments

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Western Europe during the second half of the twentieth century. As against as many as 34 per cent of the ministers interviewed in the 12-country Western European survey who served in single-party cabinets, this was the case of only 8 per cent of the ministers who were interviewed for this study (34 cases). This means that political parties in Central Eastern Europe are rarely strong enough to form a government alone, either because they lack the required number of parliamentary seats or because they are unable to enlist external support from parties which do not wish to join the government. Despite such a situation, by and large cabinet government in Central Eastern Europe has functioned remarkably well. This suggests that in these countries the cabinet has satisfactorily combined the requirements of collegiality and efficiency. Yet such an achievement may not have taken place to the same extent everywhere or all the time in all the countries – even in all the countries covered by this study: variations may be due in part to idiosyncratic national characteristics; but, whatever the reason, coalitions are not likely to be equally successful everywhere. The question which arises is whether the size of the coalition – i.e. a small ‘minimum winning’, or a large ‘surplus majority’ – makes any difference in this respect. As surplus majority coalitions include more parties than would be theoretically required by the arithmetic of parliamentary majorities, the danger may be that such cabinets might be ‘ineffectual’. These more representative cabinets might be, in Lijphart’s terms, ‘consensual’, but the combination of collegiality and efficiency might be more difficult to achieve (Lijphart, 1984, 1999). As a matter of fact, there has been an almost equal split between ‘minimum winning’ and ‘surplus majority’ coalitions in Central Eastern European countries. It was noted in Chapter 3 that the 35 majority coalition cabinets were found to divide almost equally between ‘minimum winning’ and ‘surplus’ (19 and 16); in the survey, the proportions of ministers belonging to ‘minimum winning’ and ‘surplus’ coalitions are also almost equal (41 and 38 per cent). It may not be possible to be sure that these find it difficult to combine collegiality and effectiveness, but one can discover whether ministers having belonged to one of these two types react differently when referring to the achievements of these coalitions. Not all cabinets are coalitions, however, nor are all coalitions or singleparty governments of a majority character. In Western Europe, many minority governments occur, as, for example, when parties give ‘external’ support instead of participating in the cabinet, in the hope of obtaining pay-offs in policy terms. It is not possible to state a priori whether that ‘external’ support gives the government a de facto ‘minimum winning’

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or ‘surplus majority’ basis: indeed, the same government may see its support change – perhaps increasing, more often shrinking. What seems likely is that these governments need to have a somewhat ‘open’ approach to the support which they receive and often have to conduct difficult negotiations with the parties which did not wish to participate in them (Strom, 1990). The proportions of both minority and single-party governments are small in Central Eastern Europe and these proportions are even smaller among the ministers interviewed in the survey: while constituting 32 per cent of the cabinets, as indicated in Chapter 3, ministers from minority governments formed 15 per cent of the sample, the ratio of singleparty to coalitions among them being two to one. Coalition governments are therefore divided into three categories – minority, ‘minimum winning’ and ‘surplus’ – nearly equal in terms of the number of cabinets, as was shown in Chapter 3 (14, 19 and 16 per cent ), but unequal in terms of the proportion of ministers interviewed (11, 41 and 38 per cent). Although the number of minority and single-party cabinets is small in Central Eastern Europe, one can nonetheless discover whether ministers who belonged to these governments have been as ‘comfortable’ in minority coalitions and single-party cabinets as in minimum winning or surplus majority coalitions since the distribution of these ‘less representative’ cabinets tends to be clustered in some countries rather than being spread out evenly across the area. As a result, the ten countries analysed here fall into three overlapping groups. First, differences between minimum winning and surplus majority governments can be observed in seven countries, not in all ten, as in Estonia and Lithuania no minister was interviewed from among surplus majority or minimum winning majority coalitions respectively and, in the Czech Republic, only one minister was interviewed from a surplus majority coalition. Secondly, differences between majority and minority coalitions can be observed in five countries – Estonia, the Czech Republic and three of the seven countries of the first group (Latvia and, with certain reservations, Poland and Slovenia). Finally, differences between single-party cabinets and coalitions can be observed in two countries, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, where a significant number of ministers from single-party cabinets are found alongside ministers from coalitions.1 In the more representative cabinets, that is to say in cabinets in which the political base of cabinet is wide, both collegiality and efficiency would seem likely to be more difficult to achieve: frustration may develop among the ministers, as they may feel that, despite their broad ‘representative’ character, they are less ‘effective’ in a number of ways than their


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colleagues from less ‘representative’ cabinets. Ministerial attitudes towards the cabinet decision-making process examined in general in Chapter 5 may be less positive where ministers belong to surplus majority coalitions than where they belong to minimum winning majority coalitions or even to minority coalitions or single-party governments. Meanwhile, one might also wonder whether ‘party government’ would have a different character in more broadly representative cabinets than in cabinets which are more narrowly based. Those ministers who are closest to their party may prefer a narrowly based government, although, at least in Western Europe, some of the most ‘partitocratic’ countries – Belgium and, at least up to the 1990s, Italy – also tended to have more often surplus majority coalition governments. How far is it the case that strong support for ‘party government’ is more associated, in the minds of ministers, with broadly than with narrowly representative governments? The aim of the previous two chapters was to explore the nature of ministerial attitudes to the cabinet decision-making process (Chapter 5) and the nature of ministerial reactions to party government (Chapter 6). This chapter follows directly from these inquiries by examining how far these attitudes vary depending on the type of party structure of the cabinet. It is naturally divided into two sections. The first addresses attitudes to the cabinet decision-making process and the second to ‘party government’, but, in both cases, in so far as these attitudes and behaviour appear related to the existence of narrower or broader majority coalitions, of majority or minority coalitions or of single-party governments. Country variations among the Central and Eastern European countries concerned are examined in both sections, while, where possible, comparisons are drawn with the 1991 survey of Western European ministers.

Cabinet composition and decision-making As pointed out in Chapter 5, most ministers from the countries studied here were comfortable with the decision-making process in the cabinets to which they belonged, despite the fact that cabinet government was new to a large majority – if not to all – of them. To see whether the attitudes of ministers to the character of cabinet decision-making is in any way affected by the type of cabinet composition – single-party or coalition, small or large coalitions – we need to re-examine the five questions analysed in Chapter 5. Three of these inquired about specific characteristics of the life of the cabinets while the other two were concerned with the effectiveness of the decision-making process and with degrees of satisfaction about that process. Let us first see whether judgements differ

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about the character of the decision-making process in broad surplus majority coalition and in narrower minimum winning coalition. Ministerial attitudes to the cabinet decision-making process in surplus majority and minimum winning coalitions Perhaps surprisingly, the broad answer is that there is either no or very little difference in the assessments made by the ministers from the two different types of majority coalitions: the distribution of the answers to all five questions is almost identical. Ministers from surplus majority governments are proportionately as likely as ministers from minimum winning coalitions to state that issues are very often thoroughly debated in cabinet and as numerous as ministers from minimum winning coalitions in stating that there are substantial disagreements in cabinet. They are also proportionately as numerous in stating that these disagreements are rare: since disagreements are likely to be detrimental to the sound development of cabinet government, fewer disagreements can be regarded as a positive feature in cabinets. Ministers in both types of coalitions are also proportionately as numerous in stating that consensus is the way in which disagreements are solved in cabinet. Meanwhile, proportionately as many ministers in both types of coalitions claim that the cabinet is very often effective and as many ministers that it is rarely effective. Finally, ministers in both types of coalitions are proportionately as likely to be very satisfied and as likely to be dissatisfied. Whatever differences there are on a few aspects, these are tiny. It appears to make no difference to ministers whether the basis of the coalition is broad or narrow, in other words whether it is more or less representative, in terms of the specific characteristics of the decision-making process or general judgments passed by the ministers concerned about this decision-making process (Table 7.1). Differences emerge, on the other hand, when majority coalitions are compared to minority coalitions, despite the fact that the numbers of ministers concerned is small (34 in all). On three of the five indicators, ministers from minority coalitions are more positive with respect to the decision-making process in the cabinets in which they served than those ministers who belonged to either type of majority coalitions. On the fourth indicator which relates to debates about major issues, there is only a ‘halfdifference’, so to speak: proportionately more ministers from minority coalitions state that debates occurred ‘very often’ than ministers from majority coalitions, but more of these ministers from minority coalitions also state that debates occurred rarely than among ministers from majority coalitions. Only on the fifth indicator, which is concerned with disagreements in cabinet, are ministers from minority coalitions less positive


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Table 7.1 Proportions of ministers from coalitions and single-party cabinets and attitudes to cabinet system (percentages) Coalitions

Single-party

Mean

Minority

Minimum winning

Issues thoroughly debated Very often Rare

35 35

41 24

43 17

42 23

40 25

Substantial disagreements Very often Rare

21 27

16 40

15 46

4 35

14 37

49

27

28

46

37

Effective Very often Rare

32 6

31 18

30 19

35 8

32 13

Satisfied Very satisfied Dissatisfied

29 12

22 19

18 17

27 27

24 19

(34)

(132)

(123)

(26)

(315)

Solving disagreements by consensus

(N)

Surplus majority

towards the decision-making process in the cabinets in which they served than ministers who have belonged to majority coalitions: proportionately more ministers from minority coalitions state that disagreements occurred often than do ministers from majority coalitions. Minority coalitions are therefore viewed at one level as more contentious than other coalitions, yet this is within a context in which appreciably more ministers from these minority coalitions than ministers from majority coalitions state that ‘consensus’ is the way in which disagreements were solved. Minority coalitions thus appear to be regarded as being not just more effective and more satisfactory but, in general, also more collegial. Ministerial attitudes to the cabinet decision-making process in single-party governments The number of ministers from single-party governments interviewed is small (26). Yet significant differences emerge with majority coalitions over four of the questions analysed here, the exception being the question which relates to major issues being debated in cabinet where the proportions are almost identical with those found for majority coalitions. Substantial disagreements were proportionately appreciably

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fewer, according to the ministers concerned, than in majority coalitions: this might be expected of single-party governments, since the members of these cabinets normally have a similar outlook on policies. The proportion of these relatively few disagreements solved by consensus is also said to be larger than in majority coalition governments. More singleparty governments are said to be ‘often effective’ and fewer are said to be ‘rarely’ effective than is the case with majority coalitions. Finally, the proportion of ministers who are very satisfied with the decision-making process in single-party governments is larger than is the case among ministers from majority coalitions, though the proportions of ministers dissatisfied with the decision-making process in single-party governments is also larger than among ministers from majority coalitions. Majority coalitions are thus viewed rather less positively than other types of governments. Thus, the greater representativeness of majority coalitions does not appear to ministers to be a ‘bonus’: these governments appear to be somewhat less efficient, even perhaps less collegial, than governments which are somewhat narrower, whether minority coalitions or single-party cabinets; meanwhile, the size of the majority coalition does not seem to make any difference in this respect. A comparison of Central Eastern European and Western European cabinets As was noted in Chapter 5, comparisons with the findings for Western Europe are difficult on a number of grounds. The question about the effectiveness of the cabinet was not asked in Western Europe; the wording of answers was also somewhat different: in particular, Western European ministers could merely say that major issues were debated ‘always’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘not at all’, with the possible consequence that the proportion of strongly positive answers was automatically smaller in Western Europe. Moreover, multiple answers were possible when answering the question of how disagreements tended to be solved. A further difficulty stemmed from the fact that no distinction was made in the Western European study between minimum winning and surplus coalitions, but a threefold distinction was made between ‘minority’, ‘near-majority’ and ‘majority’ with respect to single-party governments, as single-party governments were markedly more numerous in Western Europe. However, this division does show that, as in Central Eastern Europe, there is also less dissatisfaction with single-party governments than with coalitions in Western Europe, by 23 per cent against 34 per cent. Two broad conclusions emerge from the comparison. First, in both sets of countries a similar tendency is found for single-party government


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to be rather more open to solving disagreements by consensus than coalition governments, while the proportion of issues which were thoroughly debated was about the same, whether the cabinet was a coalition or single-party. Thus, in both areas single-party governments are less likely to be prone to substantial disagreements than coalition governments, possibly because they are composed of ministers more likely to hold similar views. Moreover, although the study of ministers in Western Europe does not allow for a distinction to be drawn between minimum winning and surplus coalitions, one can distinguish among the number of parties in coalitions: the proportion of cases of substantial disagreements recorded by the relevant ministers increases regularly as the number of parties in the coalition increases, from 4 per cent in single-party systems and 11 per cent in two-party coalitions to 36 per cent in five-party coalitions. Secondly, views about the cabinet are somewhat more positive among the ministers of the ten countries analysed here than they were among Western European ministers. The point was already noted in Chapter 5, but it is confirmed, at least in the context of the distinction between singleparty and coalition governments. The proportion of ‘thoroughly debated’ issues in the two sets of countries cannot be directly compared because of differences in the wording of the answers allowed, admittedly: but the proportion of ministers from the countries analysed here who feel that disagreements occur ‘rarely’ is appreciably larger and the proportion of ministers who are ‘very satisfied’ with the decision-making process is also higher than was recorded among Western European ministers, whether the cabinets concerned are coalitions or single-party governments. The comparison between findings from Central Eastern Europe and findings from Western Europe thus confirms the tentative impression that coalitions are probably less likely than single-party governments to be regarded positively and, indeed, that minority coalitions are perhaps more satisfactory than majority coalitions, whether these are narrowly or broadly constructed. While ministers in Central Eastern Europe are ‘comfortable’ with both coalitions and single-party governments, they are not particularly favourable to more representative cabinets: from the point of view of these ministers, larger coalitions do not seem to have any particular virtues. Ministerial views about coalitions and single-party governments at the level of individual countries At the level of individual countries, comparisons about views on the cabinet decision-making process can be made in relation to seven countries.

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There are variations, but these remain somewhat limited, especially with reference to the reactions of ministers to both types of coalitions; where they differ in this respect, this tends to be because surplus coalitions are favoured to an extent. On effectiveness, however, there is a division of opinion: ministers from five countries tend to praise surplus coalitions more, while, by contrast, those from Slovakia and Slovenia tend to feel the contrary. Slovenia is also the only one among the seven countries where more ministers tend to feel ‘very satisfied’ with the decision-making process in minimum winning coalitions than in surplus coalitions; but the number of ministers from surplus majority cabinets from that country is small (four). Thus, although there are also countries, particularly in Hungary and Bulgaria, in which little difference is found between these ministerial attitudes, the overall finding that attitudes of ministers to the cabinet decision-making process are similar in both types of majority coalitions may to an extent be the consequence of averaging. There are also variations in the relative support given by ministers to majority and minority coalitions in the five countries for which it is possible to draw comparisons. However, only in Latvia is the number of ministers interviewed from among minority coalition cabinets truly significant (17); indeed, these constitute half the ministers belonging to that category, the only other country where the number is not small being Estonia. Latvia is also the country where ministers from minority coalitions tend to be more ‘optimistic’ than ministers from majority coalitions: they are proportionately more numerous in stating that issues are very often thoroughly discussed, that consensus is the solution to disagreements and that the decision-making process is very satisfactory; only on the effectiveness of the cabinet system are Latvian ministers from majority coalitions proportionately more numerous in being ‘very satisfied’. Estonian ministers are somewhat more varied in their reactions, but even these are proportionately more numerous in favouring majority coalitions only with respect to the extent to which ‘thorough debates’ over major issues take place and to the extent to which there are ‘substantial disagreements’ in cabinet: this does not prevent Estonian ministers from minority coalitions from being proportionately more numerous in being ‘very satisfied’ with the cabinet system. It may therefore be that the overall conclusion reached earlier in this section and according to which minority coalitions are viewed more favourably than majority coalitions is partly the result of the fact that Latvian ministers interviewed formed half the ministers from the minority coalition cabinets who were interviewed. As was noted earlier, Lithuania and the Czech Republic are the only two countries for which ministerial attitudes to the cabinet system in


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single-party and coalition government can be compared. With respect to the effectiveness of that cabinet system the position of ministers in both types of government is near-identical; ministers are also equally satisfied in both types of governments, though there is slightly more support for single-party governments in Lithuania on this point than there is for coalitions (all of which, in this case, are of the surplus majority variety). On the other hand, in both countries, the view prevails that coalitions are the form of government in which issues are more often thoroughly debated, but also where disagreements are more frequent, while the consensus solution tends to be viewed as prevailing more in single-party governments. Single-party governments are, therefore, viewed favourably in both countries with no apparent impact of the fact that, in Lithuania, single-party governments were of a majority character while they were of a minority character in the Czech Republic. Despite these differences, individual country cases do not alter the broad conclusion that the cabinet decision-making process is viewed favourably whether this process takes place in coalitions which are large or small, minority or majority, or whether it takes place in coalitions or in single-party governments, even if the conclusion that there is little to choose in this respect between minimum winning and surplus majority coalitions has perhaps to be somewhat played down. It may also be that the apparently larger overall support for minority coalitions is due to a substantial extent to the fact that Latvia is the country from which many ministers from minority coalitions have been drawn, but even that conclusion is, to a certain extent, supported in other countries, Estonia in particular. The cases of Lithuania and the Czech Republic also indicate that single-party governments are appreciated, admittedly in the few cases in which this type of government has occurred in Central Eastern Europe, at least in the first decade of cabinet government in the region. The view that more broadly representative cabinets are regarded as preferable by those who serve in these cabinets is, to say the least, not sustained by the evidence of the survey.

Cabinet composition and ‘party government’ In Chapter 6, we considered three aspects of the way in which ministers may have felt that ‘party government’ took place in the cabinets to which they had belonged: (i) the nature of the relationship of ministers to their own party; (ii) the way in which party ‘intruded’ in the life of the cabinet; and (iii) the importance which ministers attributed to parties in cabinet life. On the first point, the broad conclusion was that

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ministers had close links with their party, but did not seem to be dependent upon their party. On the second point, ‘partial cabinets’ rather than the parties seemed to be the places where discussions occurred over ‘major issues’ when these discussions did not take place fully within the cabinet itself; decisions were also found to be made primarily within the cabinet area when there were ‘substantial disagreements’. On the question of the importance of party, there was evidence of a division of opinion among the ministers. Do these conclusions vary depending upon the type of coalition and upon whether the cabinet is of the single-party type or is a coalition? The links between ministers and their party in coalitions and single-party governments In Chapter 6 four indicators were used to help assess how far the behaviour of ministers could be affected by the relationship which these ministers had with their party. One was concerned with the pre-ministerial background and inquired whether having been an MP was regarded ‘as particularly useful’. Only 12 per cent said so overall, with the range being between 9 and 15 per cent from minority to surplus majority coalitions; the rating was even lower among ministers from single-party governments, since not one of the many Latvian ministers and only one of the Czech ministers who had belonged to a single-party government thought that a parliamentary experience had been ‘particularly useful’. Thus, variations are very small and differ little from the finding, in Western Europe, that there is no difference in this respect between single-party and coalition governments. Variations on a country basis are also small in this respect. Thus, there is at most a limited tendency for parliamentary experience to be regarded as having had a marginally larger effect in coalitions than in single-party governments in the countries analysed here and any such effect is restricted to a small minority. The other three indicators analysed in Chapter 6 are linked to the relationship between ministers when in office and their party. One question asked which types of party meetings were usually attended by ministers, a second what kind of relationship ministers had with the top party executive, and the third whether ministers were briefed by their party on cabinet matters. Little needs to be said about the last of these since the proportion of cases in which ministers were briefed by their party was minuscule and scarcely affected by the type of party base of the government: the range was between nil in the case of single-party governments and 3 per cent in minority coalitions.


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There is a clear relationship, on the other hand, between the extent to which ministers were regularly in touch with their party and the nature of the coalition or the single-party or coalition character of the cabinet. This is particularly the case with the relation to the extent to which ministers attended party meetings. The proportion of both official and unofficial party meetings attended by the ministers concerned increases from 35 per cent among those who belonged to minority cabinets through 46 per cent among those among those who belonged to minimum winning majority cabinets to 59 per cent among those who belonged to surplus majority cabinets, with a corresponding decline among the ministers who only attended official meetings: thus, as the representative character of coalitions increases, ministers feel either the need or the desire to attend more meetings of the party to which they belong; the same trend towards an increase in attendance paralleling an increase in representativeness can be observed among single-party cabinets, since only 19 per cent of the ministers concerned attended both official and unofficial meetings of their party. There is also some relationship, albeit one which is appreciably less marked, between the size of the party base of the cabinet and the extent to which there is close cooperation between ministers and their party. However, to the extent that there is any trend at all, it is the reverse of that which is observed in relation to cooperation with the party: while 85 per cent of the ministers from minority coalitions state that there was close cooperation with their party, the extent of ‘close cooperation’ falls to 71 per cent among ministers from minimum winning majority coalitions and to 68 per cent among ministers from surplus majority coalitions; that trend is not found to extend to single-party governments, on the other hand, since only 46 per cent of the ministers belonging to that type of cabinet stated that there was close cooperation with their party. Country variations are substantial with respect both to minimum winning and surplus coalitions among the seven countries for which comparisons are possible, but they are more marked about reported attendance at both official and unofficial meetings than about reported close collaboration. Indeed, on the closeness of collaboration, only two countries – Hungary and Bulgaria – score low with respect to minimum winning coalitions, with Hungary also scoring low with respect to surplus coalitions. The remaining five of the seven countries which can be compared in this respect are on the average or slightly above the average: thus, except for Bulgaria, the extent to which ministers from these countries report that relations with their party has been close is very

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similar whether these ministers belong to minimum winning coalitions or to surplus majority coalitions. There are somewhat more variations in the replies to the question of attendance to meetings, both within each category and for the same country between scores on minimum winning coalitions and on surplus coalitions, though, even there, only two countries, Slovakia and Bulgaria, score very differently with respect to the two types of coalitions. In Western Europe, single-party governments appear to have attracted more links between ministers and their party than coalitions, in terms of both attendance at meetings and collaboration with the executive, while we saw that the contrary was true in Central Eastern Europe. This somewhat lower degree of partisan activity among ministers from single-party governments, given the fact that these come essentially from Lithuania and the Czech Republic, echoes the point made in Chapter 6 which suggested that Czech ministers tend to see party as relatively ‘unimportant’. It should nonetheless be pointed out that, in the Czech Republic at least, the fact that the prime minister was the party leader could have led to the view, among some respondents, that party and government were in virtual osmosis. Political parties and the life of the cabinet Two indicators were used in Chapter 6 to assess how far ministers felt that parties affected the life of the government. One of these related to the extent to which parties were involved in discussions over matters not fully discussed in cabinet; the other concerned the extent to which the cabinet council was involved in cases of disagreement in the cabinet. Only a small minority thought that such an involvement was taking place in either case and, indeed, that minority was about the same on both aspects (18 and 16 per cent respectively). There are differences between the two sets of involvement when the nature of the party structure of the cabinet is taken into account, however. As in many other respects, there is also no apparent difference between the attitudes of ministers from minimum winning and those from surplus majority coalitions with respect to the involvement of parties in discussions over issues which were not fully examined in cabinet (19 and 17 per cent respectively); but there are differences between majority and minority coalitions in this respect (27 per cent feel that the party is involved), as well as between single-party government and coalitions in general: in single-party cabinets only 12 per cent feel that party is involved outside the cabinet. These findings seem logical: in single-party governments, cabinet and party coincide and there appears to be no


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reason why the cabinet would have to look for support in the party if major issues emerge that the government cannot resolve. Indeed, the same trend was found in Western Europe: while, among the ministers who responded, 46 per cent of those who had been in coalition governments said that there were discussions in parties on issues which the cabinet did not fully discuss, the corresponding proportion among ministers from single-party governments was 39 per cent. Conversely, there may be a strong need to go to a party or parties outside the cabinet in minority coalition governments if an issue arises that the government cannot resolve: the cabinet may well be unable to solve that issue because the bodies making difficulties are the supporting parties outside the cabinet. There is not the same convergence of views between ministers from minimum winning and surplus majority cabinets with respect to the role of the cabinet council when disagreements occur. The cabinet council, as noted in Chapter 6, is the body representing the parties of the coalition in a coalition and it is therefore ‘between’ these parties and the cabinet. Ministers from minimum winning coalitions are those who feel most that the cabinet council is involved (26 per cent); this is appreciably less the case in surplus coalitions (12 per cent); it is even less so in minority coalitions (9 per cent) and, of course, the question does not arise in single-party governments. That more widespread feeling among ministers from minimum winning coalitions than among ministers from surplus majority coalitions seems to correspond to the fact that minimum winning coalitions are probably, in general, more fragile than surplus majority coalitions: disagreements may well therefore need more often to be settled by returning to the ‘fathers’ of the coalition. Interestingly, the importance of the cabinet council in minimum winning coalitions is underlined by the fact that the proportion of ministers from minimum winning coalitions who believe that disagreements tend to be solved by the cabinet council is equal to the proportion of those among them who believe that these disagreements tend to be solved by consensus. Yet, overall, while some difference between types of coalitions does emerge, not only is the ‘intrusion’ of parties in the life of cabinets not felt by ministers to be large, but it is also not felt by these ministers to vary truly markedly depending on the basis of the composition of the cabinet. Country variations are not large either among ministers with respect to the extent to which parties are involved in ‘major issues’ which the cabinet does not fully discuss. Nor are there substantial differences between what ministers from minimum winning and from surplus majority coalitions believe to be the case with regard to the role of party in both

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types of coalitions. The relatively small difference which is found between minority coalitions and other types of coalitions appears to be largely due to Latvian ministers who, as we noted earlier, constitute half the ministers from minority coalitions who were interviewed. There are some differences with respect to the involvement of the cabinet council between minimum winning and surplus majority coalitions, but they are not large and are mainly due to the fact that more Polish and Romanian ministers from minimum winning coalitions than from surplus majority coalitions stated that the cabinet council was involved, the only country where a contrary trend is found to exist being Slovakia. The importance of party in the eyes of the ministers We saw in Chapter 6 that almost as many ministers stated that their party was ‘very important’ in cabinet decision-making (29 per cent) as stated that it was ‘a little important’ or ‘not important’ (27 per cent). Meanwhile 41 per cent of the ministers stood in the middle, so to speak, and said that their party was ‘important’, the main question being what the ‘true’ meaning was of that middle position. Within this general context, the reactions of ministers having belonged to the various types of coalitions and to single-party governments follow a somewhat complex pattern. With respect to the distinction between minimum winning and surplus majority coalitions, to begin with, the proportion of ministers who said that the role of party in the cabinet decision-making process was ‘very important’ is very close to the average in both cases (minimum winning, 27 per cent; surplus majority coalitions, 31 per cent, the average being 29 per cent), as was found to be the case in many of the analyses of this chapter. At the same time, however, proportionately more ministers who have to surplus coalitions said that parties were ‘a little important’ (28 per cent) than ministers having belonged to minimum winning coalitions (17 per cent), while the corresponding proportions of ministers who said that parties were ‘important’ were, respectively, 33 and 45 per cent. It is somewhat intriguing that the difference was only between those ministers who said that the party was ‘important’ and those who said that the party was ‘a little important’: indeed, it is rather difficult to understand why the proportion of ministers from surplus coalitions who said that the party was ‘very important’ should simultaneously be fractionally higher than it is among ministers having belonged to minimum winning coalitions. It may nonetheless be, as was already suggested about the role of the coalition council, that the fragility of minimum winning coalitions accounted for parties being viewed as ‘important’ by more


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ministers from these coalitions than by ministers from surplus majority coalitions. This point is reinforced when one considers the reactions of ministers from minority coalitions in comparison to the reactions of ministers from majority coalitions: in minority coalitions, not only is there a minute proportion of the ministers who say that the role of party is ‘a little important’ (3 per cent – only one case), but the proportion of those who say that the role of party is ‘very important’ is much larger – at 47 per cent. Clearly, the fact that ministers from these cabinets feel the ‘weight’ of the parties on their shoulders must indicate that they feel that these minority coalitions need to be nursed by the parties if they are to survive. On the other hand, the proportion of ministers from singleparty governments who say that the role of party is ‘very important’ is very small (9 per cent), possibly on the grounds, suggested earlier, that party and cabinet are to a large extent ‘fused’ in these situations, even in single-party minority governments. Meanwhile, 62 per cent of the ministers from single-party cabinets state that the role of parties is ‘important’ – more so, perhaps justifiably, if they belonged to minority single-party cabinets than in majority single-party cabinets. Findings about ministerial attitudes among single-party and coalition governments in the Western European case go in the same direction, despite the fact that the question was phrased differently, since ministers could reply only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to whether party was important in single-party government and in coalitions: of those who replied, 35 per cent of ministers from single-party governments said ‘yes’, while the corresponding proportion among ministers from coalition governments was 65 per cent. There is therefore little doubt that, for the ministers themselves, the role of party differs in importance in the cabinets of the countries analyzed here, both among the various types of coalitions and between coalitions and single-party governments. On a country-by-country basis, there were few ministers from singleparty governments and even fewer who stated that party was ‘very important’. In minority coalitions, there were variations in the findings: the proportion of ministers stating that party was ‘very important’ was particularly high in Latvia, but no minister felt the same in Poland or Slovenia. The distribution was uneven among ministers belonging to minimum winning and surplus coalitions: in both cases, country scores ranged from 10 to 15 per cent at one extreme to about half at the other, but the numbers of ministers who stated that parties had only ‘a little importance’ in minimum winning coalitions was lower in absolute numbers in five out of the seven countries where comparisons are possible and in

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the other two (Slovenia and Romania) the numbers were identical: the movement which was noticeable at the overall level is thus reproduced very generally at the country-by-country level. Thus, there is in many respects a relationship between the importance attributed to party government and the fact that ministers belonged to different types of coalitions or to single-party government. On the whole, the bigger differences which are found to occur are not between the two types of majority coalitions, but between these two types and minority coalitions as well as between coalitions and single-party governments. The importance attributed to party appears to varies markedly depending on whether the cabinet needs external party support, as in minority cabinets and to an extent even in minimum winning coalitions, or does not need any external support, as in single-party governments and in surplus majority cabinets. Yet the interpretation of the importance of this role hinges upon the meaning to be given to the answer ‘importance’ given by the ministers: as was pointed out in Chapter 6, it is not entirely clear that the word should necessarily be taken at face value. This is in part because the ministers themselves do not appear to suggest that they are markedly dependent on their party for their own behaviour and in part because, in describing the extent to which parties or coalition councils intervene, ministers do not indicate that these interventions affect more than relatively small minorities of situations. There is a degree of ‘party government’, in cabinets of Central Eastern Europe, but its extent appears to depend rather instrumentally on the coalition or single party and on the minority or majority character of the coalitions, and much less on whether the coalition is modestly or strongly representative of the shades of opinion in parliament and the public at large.

Conclusion Most cabinets of Central Eastern Europe are coalitions, indeed majority coalitions: it is not so much within majority coalitions, however, that ministerial attitudes to cabinet decision-making and to views about ‘party government’ tend to vary markedly: on the whole, whether they belonged to minimum winning or to surplus coalitions, ministers tended to view both the cabinet decision-making equally positively and the part played by parties as equally modest. The greater or lesser representative character of the cabinet seems only to affect these views marginally, and this was only the case in some countries. Somewhat paradoxically, the relatively small numbers of cases of minority coalition and of single-party


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governments are those which provide the clearest variations from the overall average, though, here too, these variations are not always large. Thus, to say the least, support for minority coalitions and for singleparty governments is far from being small or even smaller than support for the ‘more representative’ majority coalitions. Above all, ministers do not seem to seek representativeness: they do not seem to feel that either collegiality or effectiveness is likely to be better achieved by means of more representative cabinets.


Part III Ministers and the Administrative Support of the Cabinet


8 How Ministers View the Role of Prime Ministers’ Offices

Prime ministers’ offices and their staff play an important part in the decision-making processes of cabinet governments. They initiate political issues and coordinate the flow of business between ministers and their ministries, the governing parties and the prime minister (Blondel 1982; Müller-Rommel 1993). Thus, prime ministerial staffs belong to the ‘core executive’ which has been studied in the literature (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990). One of the most sophisticated empirical analyses in the field is that of Peters and his colleagues who presented a comparative overview of the different role and of the various tasks of prime ministers’ offices in western democracies. The authors confirm that the coordination of cabinet proposals by prime ministerial staff has become a crucial variable helping to measure cabinet capacity at all stages of the policy-making process (Peters et al. 2000). Compared to Western Europe, little information is available relating to the role of prime ministers’ offices and of prime ministerial staff in Central Eastern Europe. Studies of core executives in the region following the fall of communism were primarily undertaken in the field of public administration (Goetz and Wollmann, 2001; Verheijen 2001). According to Goetz and Wollmann, prime ministers’ offices should primarily be an instrument for the effective administrative coordination of government policy-making and implementation. Hence, the German Bundeskanzleramt served as a unique benchmark for a professional and efficient prime ministerial office in Central Eastern Europe, whereas other institutional configurations of these offices, such as the political preparation of cabinet proposals, were considered less important inferior and remained underdeveloped. Yet for core executives in Central and Eastern Europe the coordination of politics and policy are equally important and must be analysed equally. 123

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This chapter first describes the development of the prime ministers’ offices in the transition period. Secondly, the different types of prime ministers’ offices are classified according to two dimensions. Thirdly, the role and tasks of prime ministers’ offices are analysed in the light of these dimensions. Finally, a classification is undertaken of prime ministers’ offices in the ten countries under consideration.

Prime ministers’ offices and the communist legacy Under the communist regime, communist parties had a monopoly of policy-making. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, ministers lacked the power to initiate policies. The government was also very divided on sectoral lines. Ministries and ministers as members of the Council of Ministers had extensive autonomy: they not only worked out policy directives, but supervised – through the nomenklatura – appointments and activities (Sootla 2001). Thus, the chairman of the Council of Ministers was not the only and primary authority in steering governmental activities. For this reason a huge Council of Ministers’ office was established at the centre of government. It had the enormously difficult task of ensuring as much coordination as possible between the branch ministries. In addition, it also had to steer and manage dozens of inter-branch services. All relations and exchanges, which in a market economy are managed by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market and monetary systems, were managed administratively by the state apparatus in Soviet-type societies. The apex of this huge structure was the Council of Ministers and the Council of Ministers’ Office. Therefore, the new democratic political forces inherited a system where the government had a rather limited experience of collective policy-making. The enormous administrative machine started to crumble as a result of the introduction of the market economy; but the reorganization of the central coordinating body was a difficult task which needed a strong political will. Although the old model of the Council Ministers’ Office was technocratic and limited in power (especially political ones), it still had a strong impact on the institutionalization of prime ministers’ offices during the transition phase. The multiple administrative reforms, many of which have been inspired by the Western European example, and the radical changes in the political system altered, to a varying extent, the impact of the socialist legacy. Thus, after more than a decade of transition and reforms of core executives in Central Eastern Europe, one can distinguish three groups of countries in each of which prime ministers’ offices developed along similar lines. The first group of countries experienced a dominant communist ideology during the Soviet regime. In these countries national values and

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a professional bureaucracy had hardly any opportunity to acquire legitimacy within the population. The old bureaucracy was unable to institutionalize itself into the new parliamentary-cabinet system and new political elites were free to monopolize policy-making. Thus, the tasks of the new democratic cabinet governments were strictly concerned with the development of new political values. Another priority was given to the reduction of the central bureaucracy in strategic decision-making. Hence the new cabinets in these countries ceased to rely on existing administrative support structures. Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic are the clearest examples of this development. In these countries, prime ministers’ offices did not follow bureaucratic structures. The staff of these offices had strong political power. In the second group of countries, the former communists retained some autonomy during the transition to democracy and even constituted themselves into an opposition to Moscow rule. Consequently, members of the local communist elites were able to achieve some trade-offs and they avoided the implementation of decisions which would lead to a questioning of key issues relating to the nation and society. In this context, the members of the professional bureaucracy linked to the communist party were able to retain some legitimacy after the collapse of communist rule. They could form left-wing parties which used, to a large extent, the organizational resources of the communist party branches, and of the regional and central government. No radical opposition between the new political elites and the old professional central bureaucracy developed. The former central bureaucracy was carefully redesigned into a structure of administrative support for the new cabinet governments. Lithuania, Poland and Hungary fall into this group. In the third group of countries the former communist bureaucratic structure, with its mechanisms of central coordination, remained in existence even after the transition. In these countries, cabinet ministers had no clear political responsibility, for instance, vis-à-vis the political parties, and therefore held extensive individual powers in the cabinet decision-making process. They were supported by numerous vice-ministers and political advisers which rendered impossible the development of policy coordinating prime ministers’ offices. Romania, Bulgaria and, to an extent, Slovakia belong to this group.

Types of prime ministers’ offices In the three groups of countries, the role and the task of prime ministers’ offices differ significantly. Yet in all countries these offices provide political

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TYPE 1

TYPE 2

TYPE 3

TYPE 4

Policy Coordination

Political Coordination

Cabinet support structure

Prime Minister’s support structure

Figure 8.1

Types of prime ministers’ offices

and administrative support to the cabinet: this support can be analysed according to two dimensions, that of cabinet versus prime minister support structure and that of political coordination versus policy coordination (Figure 8.1). At one end of the first dimension, the office provides support to the cabinet as a whole (cabinet office). In this case the prime minister plays the part of primus inter pares who holds formal authority over the cabinet office and also directs a small prime minister’s office staffed by personal political advisers and secretaries providing logistical and secretarial services. There are also usually numerous vice-prime ministers with their supporting offices as well as ministers without portfolio who are given specific policy fields. At the other end of the dimension is a prime minister’s office predominantly responsible for the promotion of the political leadership of the prime minister over the ministers and for strategically controlling cabinet decision-making. The extent to which the prime minister’s office successfully secures and extends the leadership of the prime minister depends upon whether the office is able to provide (political) advice autonomously and to ensure direct control on behalf of the prime minister. The success of this office is also largely dependent on the existence of external party support for the prime minister. In the second dimension, the role of prime ministers’ offices differs significantly in terms of political and policy coordination. On the one hand, political coordination refers to the task of ensuring cabinet support to be provided by the main political actors in the decision-making process,


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e.g. the ministers themselves, the government parties and the parliamentary groups as well as various interest groups. Prime ministers’ offices then have the task of seeing that new conflicts or controversial debates about the cabinet agenda are avoided. On the other hand, the need for policy coordination occurs when internal political conflicts are less intensive and when there is no direct party pressure on the policy issues advanced in cabinet. The policy coordination role of the prime minister’s office is therefore based on sets of highly consensual actions. Prime ministers’ offices then provide a source of professional policy advice and of strategic planning. Their tasks may also focus on the control, coordination and process of policy implementation. This role implies the existence of managerial and steering capabilities (and structures) in the offices. On the basis of these two dimensions we may identify four different types of prime ministerial offices (Figure 8.1): Type 1 consists of cabinet offices which serve the cabinet as a whole while the prime minister in this case is supported by a small number of political advisers in the Chancellery. Type 2 corresponds to offices which serve the whole cabinet as strategic centres ensuring efficient coordination and consistency in cabinet decisionmaking. Type 3 refers to cabinet offices supporting the leading role of the prime minister in the policy-making process. These prime ministers’ offices coordinate political matters going to cabinet purely in the interest of the prime minister. In Type 4 prime ministers’ offices primarily carry out the role of policy coordination under the strong leadership of the prime minister. In this case, the prime minister is in charge of administrative and political control and guides cabinet policies from their initiation to their implementation.

The role of prime ministers’ offices according to the ministers In the ministerial survey on which this study is based respondents were asked about the extent of administrative, political and administrativepolitical support provided by the prime minister’s office. About half of the ministers (47 per cent) stated that prime ministers’ offices had an administrative role, while only 8 per cent believed that the office had a political role. The remaining 45 per cent felt that prime ministers’ offices had both a political and an administrative role. The administrative role of prime ministers offices consists essentially in cabinet agenda setting (71 per cent): political advice and support of the prime minister as well as policy coordination for cabinet decision-making is not typically part of the administrative role of these offices (29 per cent). Thus, most prime ministers’ offices

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Table 8.1

Role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages) Administrative

Slovakia Slovenia Hungary Bulgaria Lithuania Estonia Czech Republic Romania Poland Latvia Average

77 63 62 58 46 46 39 36 34 32 46

Political

0 0 6 3 0 18 15 8 3 20 8

Administrative and political 23 37 32 39 54 37 46 56 63 48 46

Total

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

are staffed with professional career civil servants who focus primarily on administrative work. On the other hand, according to 79 per cent of the ministers, the political role of the prime ministers’ offices takes the form of strong political advice and support through the prime ministerial staff, while only 13 per cent think that policy coordination is part of the political role of the prime minister’s office. In this case the prime ministerial staff is directly linked to the prime minister. The political and administrative role of prime ministers’ offices is fairly evenly divided between three major tasks: 40 per cent of the respondents believe that agenda setting is the primary role of administrative-political prime ministers’ offices, 37 per cent think that these offices advise the prime minister politically and 23 per cent feel that these offices fulfill major policy coordinating tasks. Thus, ministers believe that agenda setting and personal political advice to the prime minister are the major roles of the prime ministerial staff. However, there are major variations across the ten countries. For instance, ministers in Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria believe that the prime ministers’ offices in their countries perform a strong administrative role; in Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, prime ministers’ offices are said to have a strong political role, whereas in Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the offices are said to have primarily an administrative-political role (Table 8.1). Among the administrative roles of prime ministers’ offices, agenda setting was most frequently mentioned by the ministers from Slovenia (80 per cent) and Slovakia (83 per cent), followed by those from Poland and Lithuania (59 per cent). The role of political advice was mentioned most frequently by ministers from the Czech Republic (60 per cent) followed by

How Ministers View Prime Ministers’ Offices Table 8.2

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The changing role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages)

Did the roles of PMO differ in various cabinets?

No

Yes

Somewhat

Not applicable

Total

Slovakia Slovenia Latvia

91 90 66

0 0 11

9 0 23

0 9 0

100 100 100

Czech Republic Hungary Bulgaria Lithuania Estonia Romania Poland

86 57 52 30 13 6 4

5 30 20 24 28 21 14

0 12 20 13 8 3 4

9 0 8 33 51 70 78

100 100 100 100 100 100 100

those from Estonia and Latvia (39 per cent). In the other countries prime ministers’ offices were not regarded as playing an important part in advising prime ministers politically. The changing role of prime ministers’ offices During the first few years after the transition occurred the organization of cabinet work changed more often and much faster than the organization of its administrative support structures. In order to identify changes in the support structure of the prime ministers’ offices, respondents were asked whether the role of prime ministers’ offices had changed under different cabinets. Table 8.2 shows that in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia the role of prime ministers’ offices has been rather stable, whereas in Estonia, Poland and Romania the support structure of the offices has changed significantly. In the remaining countries the institutional stability of prime ministers’ offices has also been low. Types of government and the view of ministers about the role of prime ministers’ offices One reason for the changing role of prime ministers’ offices might be the composition of cabinets. Table 8.3 provides evidence showing that prime ministers’ offices play a different part in majority coalitions and in single-party governments. About half the ministers from majority coalition cabinets believe that prime ministers’ offices play an administrative part while the other half think that they play a political and administrative one. On the other hand, 77 per cent of the ministers from single-party governments stated that prime ministers’ offices played

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Table 8.3 Types of government and the role of prime ministers’ offices (percentages) Type of government

Single-party majority Minimum winning Surplus Single party minority Multi-party minority Caretaker

Roles of PMO Administrative

Political

Politico-administrative

Total

77 41 46 43 48 56

0 11 5 14 13 6

23 48 49 43 39 38

100 100 100 100 100 100

only an administrative part, while no respondent claimed that prime ministerial staffs had a political role. This finding is unsurprising since single-party majority governments usually have no problems of political coordination and can therefore enjoy a more collegial decision-making style. Finally, Table 8.3 shows that prime ministers’ offices in minority governments and minimal winning cabinets perform a more political role. The type of government seems thus to be an important variable in helping to explain differences in the various roles that prime ministers’ offices undertake in Central Eastern Europe. Prime ministers’ leadership and the role of prime ministers’ offices The different support structures of prime ministers’ offices might also be dependent upon the leadership style of the prime minister: a strong prime minister is likely to have a different impact on the role and the functioning of his office than a weak head of government. Strong prime ministers are expected to use the administrative infrastructure of the office to strengthen their own position; weak prime ministers are expected to receive more political advice and support from the prime ministerial staff. Table 8.4 confirms these expectations: 48 per cent of the respondents believe that the prime minister’s office plays an administrative part under a strong prime minister, while 26 per cent of the ministers only think that weak prime ministers receive administrative support. The data also provide evidence that the political support of prime ministers’ offices is stronger under weak than under strong prime ministers. There is indeed additional evidence suggesting that the impact of prime ministers’ offices on cabinet decision-making is greater under weak than under strong prime ministers. Half of the respondents (51 per cent) consider the impact of the prime ministers’ offices as being too great under weak


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Table 8.4 Prime ministerial leadership and the role of prime ministers offices (percentages) Role of prime ministers office

Administrative Political Political/administrative Total

Strength of prime ministers leadership style Strong

Weak

48 9 43 100

27 8 65 100

prime ministers, whereas only 20 per cent view the impact of the office as being too great under strong prime ministers. Moreover, 70 per cent of the respondents considered the impact of the prime minister’s office to be more adequate under stronger prime ministers, whereas only 33 per cent of the ministers who considered the prime minister as weak believed that the prime minister’s office had an adequate impact on cabinet decision-making. This finding leads to the conclusion that ministers obviously feel that the prime minister’s office has a stronger impact on cabinet decision-making when the staff advises the prime minister politically. Not surprisingly, too, respondents feel that, if it has an administrative role only, the prime minister’s office does not have a strong impact on cabinet decision-making.

Classification of prime ministers’ offices Prime ministers’ offices can indeed be classified on the basis of the two dimensions of prime ministerial roles described earlier in this chapter (Figure 8.1). In the first quadrant (Type 1) the prime minister’s office coordinates the political issues for the cabinet as a whole. It controls the political proposals coming from the ministries and advise primarily ministers and ministries. Prime ministers’ offices are therefore in charge of the administrative and political coordination of different interests which emerge from the coalition partners and from individual ministers. The primary task of these offices is to prevent conflicts from arising during cabinet meetings. To achieve this goal, the offices may organize confidential informal meetings between the prime minister and some ministers in which civil servants are not allowed to participate. Furthermore, the office may initiate and prepare coalition council meetings where the coalition agreement could become a Holy Book for those partners who are not willing to cooperate in cabinet decision-making. Yet the impact

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of these offices on cabinet decision-making is to a large extent dependent on the strength of the prime minister. When prime ministers are weak or inactive prime ministers’ offices may have considerable power as a device of partisan control over prime ministers or over cabinet affairs. When the prime minister is strong, the office may achieve political trade-offs for the prime minister through political negotiation in informal ministerial meetings. In the Czech Republic, for instance, the cabinet office created a wide array of inter-ministerial coordinating bodies and advisory consultative arrangements. This is also true in the case of Estonia, where the prime minister’s office informally negotiates and coordinates the political issues which are then decided in cabinet. In Latvia, where coalition building has been very complex and administrative coordination is expected to play a large part, the cabinet office (the State Chancellery) is also far from being merely a technical tool serving the cabinet: as a matter of fact, policy planning and political coordination have been developed in that office. Overall, such findings confirm the view that the prime ministerial staffs in this category (Type 1) basically fulfill the tasks of preventing conflicts and of helping to realize consensual agreements among the coalition partners on political issues prior to cabinet meetings. The cabinet support structures of the second quadrant (Type 2) are similar to those of Type 1, except for the fact that in this instance the prime ministers’ offices are predominantly in charge of policy rather than political coordination. These offices have competence and authority over administrative coordination in a number of policy fields, such as the reform of the public administration system, EU policy, the role and the function of the civil service and the government’s information technology service. In such a context, the prime ministers’ offices support individual ministries as well as the cabinet as a whole rather than the prime minister, while only a small office within a large State Chancellery is responsible for offering political advice to the prime minister. As in Type 1, these cabinet offices aim to achieve consensus among the members of the coalition, for instance by ensuring a wide involvement of all relevant political actors in various decision-making arenas while leaving technical decisions to the discretion of the sector ministries. Thus cabinet offices of this type tend to focus on policy coordination through bureaucratic mediation. Three countries are broadly of this type. In Bulgaria (somewhat earlier) and especially in Romania, cabinet offices are still very large bureaucratic structures within the central government which have the task of coordinating government policy not so much by means of political consensus at the cabinet level as through administrative devices. The main role of


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the prime ministers’ offices in both countries is to mediate and settle conflicts between powerful sector ministries and independent agencies which were formerly – or are still – part of the governments’ support structure. In Bulgaria, for instance, at the end of 1990 over 100 such independent agencies were formally subordinated to the cabinet. Meanwhile, policy units advising the prime minister, staffed with political appointees, were created only at the end of the 1990s. Slovakia and Bulgaria have also initiated a reform programme aiming at setting up political structures designed to advise the cabinet and the prime minister. In the third quadrant (Type 3) the main function of the prime minister’s office is to support the prime minister’s power and leadership in the process of managing politics in the core executive. These offices are usually run by a politically appointed state secretary, who deals with the political coordination of policy proposals. In contemporary Central Eastern Europe only Slovenia falls in this category. In Slovenia, the process of cabinet decision-making and the role of prime ministers’ offices are doubly unique. To begin with, cabinet committees have a large degree of discretion and the right to decide in the name of cabinet. Thus, the Slovenian prime minister’s office is a strategic actor in policy-making merely because it services and advises cabinet committees. Secondly, the government may take its decisions by means of the so-called ‘correspondence sessions’, when there is consensus in the cabinet or no interest is shown on some issues. In such a context the prime minister’s office plays a central part in achieving that consensus and in mediating between the various actors during the ‘correspondence sessions’. In addition, the cabinet agenda in Slovenia contains two specific items which emphasize the role of prime ministers’ offices. First, in the cabinet meeting the decisions previously taken and the feedback about their implementation are routinely reviewed. Secondly, at the end of the meeting a discussion takes place about the most critical issues to be discussed at the next cabinet meeting. Prime ministers’ offices are directly involved in both aspects, as their staff monitors the implementation of cabinet decisions and prepares the ground for a consensus-oriented discussion over conflicting issues in cabinet. Thus, the office operates as a broker with respect to the political goals of the prime minister and of individual ministers. Prime ministers’ offices of Type 4 are those which provide the strongest support to the prime minister and have the greatest power to coordinate cabinet policy-making and to oversee the implementation of decisions. These offices may provide support to prime ministers who then come to be in charge of virtually all matters in which coordination is needed,

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Cabinet support structure

TYPE 1

TYPE 2

Czech Republic Romania Slovakia

Bulgaria

Latvia

TYPE 3

TYPE 4

Slovenia

Policy Coordination

Political Coordination

Estonia

Poland

Lithuania Hungary Prime Minister’s support structure

Figure 8.2

Classification of prime ministers’ offices

from technical assistance to cabinet meetings through the development of cabinet strategies to the administrative coordination of implementation. Advice to the prime minister is considered to be professional support. As policy proposals are developed in the prime minister’s office or passed through dense filters of professional advice, proposals initiated by individual ministers are regarded as being less well-prepared. The institutional behaviour of prime ministerial offices therefore limits the politicization of the policy process: this aspect of the role of prime ministers’ offices enables cabinet decision-making to be more rational – at least as much as is possible in the context of coalition politics. Yet the ability to command this huge apparatus depends markedly upon the personal skills which the prime minister displays in balancing the inputs of the politically appointed professionals and the more traditional influence of career civil servants.


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This type of prime minister’s office exists in Hungary, Lithuania and, since 1996–97, in Poland. In Hungary the management of all aspects of the role of the prime minister’s office is in the hands of politically appointed top officials. Policy advice to the prime minister and coordination tasks are entrusted largely to career civil servants. Furthermore, several strategic units in the prime minister’s office are managed by the powerful head of the office, who holds the status of a minister. The prime minister’s personal political advisers, who are also members of the overall office, coordinate a large block of sectoral administrative units. Prime ministers’ offices in Poland play a similar part, but the competition between political and administrative roles and between the corresponding units in the prime minister’s office is larger than in Slovenia. In the case of a weak prime minister this could lead to increasing political autonomy of the prime ministerial staff with regard to policy issues. This type of prime minister’s office may therefore result in prime ministerial leadership moving towards bureaucratic mediation which may in turn reduce the extent to which policy-making is flexible and innovative (Figure 8.2).

Conclusion The activities initiated by the administrative and political staff in prime ministers’ offices are an important feature of the cabinet decision-making processes in the countries studied; yet cabinet and prime ministers’ offices developed in different ways across Central Eastern Europe. The functions and responsibilities of the prime ministerial staff tend presumably to vary accordingly. In some countries – Lithuania, Poland and Hungary – the role and the function of these offices are very similar to those of the prime ministerial staff in Western Europe while in other countries – Romania and Bulgaria – the organizational structure remains close to the old system. During the transition from communism, prime ministers’ offices in several Central Eastern European countries did not develop in the same direction as their counterparts in Western Europe. In the latter countries, the offices were predominantly responsible for the strengthening of the administrative structures in cabinet decision-making, while in Central Eastern Europe the prime ministerial staff played a strong political part in the process of cabinet decision-making, for instance by developing coherent policy strategies and new forms of political leadership over the bureaucracy. There are, thus, manifest country idiosyncrasies and these appear to be based on structural characteristics of different socialist legacies.

9 Ministers and the Role of Civil Servants in Cabinet Decision-Making

This chapter is concerned with the way in which ministers in Central Eastern Europe view their relationship with civil servants. The relationship between ‘politicians’ and ‘administrators’ has been controversial in many countries across the world and has even led to the suggestion that civil servants may subvert democracy and assume power. Public administration specialists have indeed advanced different models of what the relationship can be. Thus, Peters and Pierre suggest that the relationship between civil servants and politicians may be studied under two different perspectives – namely, the ‘(self-described) roles of politicians and civil servants’, on the one hand, and ‘the effects of systematic factors on relationships within the public sector’, on the other (Peters and Pierre 2001: 3). The first approach was put forward by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) in their empirical study of bureaucrats while the latter approach is associated with the work of Peters (1986). Both approaches focus on the relative power of politicians and civil servants in policymaking processes and they are both concerned with the development of a professional and politically neutral administration. Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman suggest four different types of behavioural roles of the political and administrative elite. At one extreme is Weber’s and Wilson’s ideal concept, according to which politicians alone should be involved in policy-making processes, while civil servants should merely provide administrative assistance and implement public policies; at the other, any difference in the roles of politicians and of civil servants in policy-making processes disappears: civil servants can become politicians, while politicians frequently and without any significant limits become civil servants. Meanwhile, Peters (1996) developed five models to analyse the relationships between politicians and civil servants. At one extreme there is also a 136

Ministers, Civil Servants and Cabinets

137

politics/administration dichotomy which is similar to the one presented by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman. There are then two models in which there is close cooperation between the two sides, the village life model, in which political and administrative elites have very similar interests, ideas and values, and the functional village life model, where there is true ‘horizontal’ integration of politicians and civil servants. The fourth model is adversarial and is characterized by the presence of real conflicts between the two sets of actors in the policy-making process: competition between politicians and civil servants can be silent, as when the administration is working according to the established way regardless of politicians’ intentions and decisions, or loud, as when civil servants plainly and openly oppose the intentions or decisions of politicians and try to further their own interests, ideas, goals and values. Finally, the administrative model corresponds to the rather widespread belief that civil servants have greater power in the policy-making process than is normally expected. In this model the politician’s role is reduced and usually limited to confirming the decisions and policies prepared by civil servants. Both Peters and Aberbach et al. indicate that the role of politicians and civil servants and, consequently, the power of these two sets of actors in the policy-making process have changed over time. There is controversy over this matter, however. On the one hand, Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981), Etzioni-Halevy (1983), Peters (1986), and Caiden (1996) all state that the part played by civil servants in the preparation, monitoring and implementation of policy proposals is increasing in modern government. On the other, an empirical study conducted by Marsh, Smith and Richards (2000) found that ministers had a markedly more important role than civil servants in the policy-making process. This chapter analyses the way in which ministers perceive the role and relative strength of civil servants in the cabinet decision-making process in the ten countries included in this study. It is divided into three sections. The first describes the role of the administration of the state in the region before and after the transition to democracy. The second reports on what ministers think about their relationship with their civil servants in Central Eastern Europe while the third examines whether these ministerial reactions amount in the end to a common or to a differentiated view of such a relationship.

The role of civil servants before and after the transition The structure of the administration of the state in contemporary Central Eastern Europe is built on different traditions (Verheijen 1999c). The three

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Ministers and the Administrative Support of Cabinet

Baltic States experienced Russian and German influence. Poland experienced the influence of both of these as well as that of Austria. Hungary developed its own administrative system; this was also applied to Slovakia, which formed part of the Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Czech Republic and Slovenia were included in the Austrian part of that empire and hence exposed to Austrian influence. German influence prevailed in Bulgaria. After the Second World War, the administrative systems of Central Eastern European countries were exposed to what Hegedus called ‘national Marxism’ (1970: 28). The key characteristic of this system was that it was an adaptation of Marxism to the state administration. This resulted in administrative systems in which highly specialized, hierarchical and increasingly standardized bureaucracies developed in effectively every area of social and political life (Hegedus 1970: 51). Since every aspect of daily life was thus regulated, the national administration played a critical part in the life of all the citizens in the region. Thus in the socialist countries the state administration moved from being a ‘servant of the ruling class’ to being the holder of autonomous power. A major characteristic of Marxist state administration was also the existence of divided power structures between state and Communist party (Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1992; Verheijen 1999a). As a matter of fact, tasks were divided between the two elements since the state administration carried out only part of the traditional functions assigned to the bureaucracy in democratic systems. On the other hand, party administration was composed of loyal party members who worked on the basis of the principle that the state administration was subordinated to political power. Party administrators thus developed policies, gave orders and controlled state administrators. In some countries party administration was integrated in the state administration, with senior party officials simultaneously holding high-level civil service positions in ministries. Such an arrangement resulted in a fully politicized bureaucracy in most ministries (Verheijen 1999a). During the transition period which followed the fall of communism in the early 1990s, the former communist countries faced two key problems. First, the state administration needed to be de-politicized. As Malova and Haughton (2002: 108) pointed out, the new parties in power replaced as many members of the staff as possible in the administration; however, that high turnover rate of personnel was also a consequence of low wages and of the fact that the positions and powers civil servants were not sufficiently clarified and stabilized. Secondly, moreover, the immense political, social and economic problems which had to be handled and handled


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simultaneously could be achieved only after major administrative reforms had been introduced and implemented. The European Union had a large impact on administrative reforms in Central Eastern Europe. It regularly issued reports and opinions about the reforms which took place in the bureaucracies of the countries concerned as well as on the extent to which these were implementing the acquis communautaire. These actions clearly had the effect of increasing the reform process in all ten countries, but the European Union did not provide a general model indicating what these reforms should be: what was suggested was merely a framework of the goals which had to be achieved by these reforms. As Malova and Haughton indicated (2002: 103), ‘inherited structures, historical experiences, political actors’ preferences during the transition, deal sweeteners during round-table talks, a concern for historical continuity and the pull of the European Union all played their part in administrative reform in post-communist countries’. As a result, administrative reform in Central Eastern Europe has been influenced by different Western European countries. When one looks at administrative structures at the national level, one finds that the German model has been followed in most Central Eastern European countries, that the Swedish model was generally followed in the Baltic States and that the French model was followed in Poland. There has therefore been a manifest tendency to return to the ‘continental roots’ of pre-1945 administrative arrangements (Verheijen 1999c: 331). Although major administrative reforms have been introduced in all the countries, in 2002 the European Union stated that the national civil service in Central Eastern Europe had not yet reached the required levels of professionalism. Indeed, even the legal basis for the development of a modern and professional administration was found to be inadequate in most countries, while in those where an adequate legal basis was introduced, members of the political class had still not fully accepted the need for a professionally autonomous civil service. As a matter of fact, the idea of a professional and autonomous administration entails the presence of well-educated, well-trained and qualified civil servants able to supply politicians with expert knowledge, arguments and advice. Furthermore, in a professional administration, politicians have confidence in the quality of the civil servants’ work and trust them to provide reliable information. In reality, the former communist countries have continued to face two challenges in bringing about the administrative reforms which were required: they needed to make a clear separation between politics and public administration, on the one hand; on the other, they needed to

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introduce the managerial and institutional changes which modern democracies had come to adopt (Verheijen 1999c). Some differences must therefore be expected among the administrative structures of postcommunist countries, since these have had different historical legacies and administrative traditions; but such differences as may be found are likely to be limited by the fact that all of the administrative systems existing in Central Eastern Europe were exposed for nearly half a century to a ‘socialist’ set of bureaucratic arrangements.

How ministers assess their relationship with civil servants As was pointed out above, a professional administration and a good relationship between ministers and civil servants are associated with welleducated, well-trained and qualified civil servants able to supply politicians with expert knowledge, arguments and advice. If we apply these propositions to the case of the ten countries examined in our study and given that the various reports of the European Union on administrative reform in Central Eastern Europe had stated that the level of professionalism was still inadequate in the majority of these countries, ministers would seem to be unlikely to pass positive judgements about their civil servants. We would expect, on the contrary, that ministers would not show great confidence in the quality of the civil servants’ work or in the reliability of the information that they receive from these civil servants. To assess how ministers feel about these matters, four questions were asked in the survey undertaken for this study. The first aimed to find out how respondents judged the level of collaboration which they had with their civil servants (Variable 57): ‘In the matter of minister–civil servant relationships, what kind of rapport did you establish with the officials in your department?’ Respondents could answer that there was ‘good collaboration’, ‘overselling by civil servants’, ‘blocking by civil servants’, ‘mutual blocking’ or ‘other’. The second question was concerned with the reliability of the information received (Variable 58): ‘Would you trust your civil servants to provide reliable information?’ Respondents could answer that the information was ‘mostly reliable’, ‘sometimes reliable’, ‘rarely reliable’ or ‘not at all reliable’. The third question touched on the question of the quality of their work (Variable 59): ‘Are you confident with the quality of civil servants’ work?’ Respondents could answer that they were ‘mostly confident’, ‘sometimes confident’, ‘rarely confident’ or ‘not at all confident’. Finally, the fourth question asked ministers: ‘How did you brief yourself about cabinet matters?’ (Variable 69).


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Respondents could answer that they were briefed by the cabinet secretariat, by their officials, by their personal staff, by their own party, by outside policy advisers or by others. There was no opportunity to answer ‘don’t know’ to any of the four questions. Contrary to what might have been expected, the answers of the ministers to the first three of these questions were very – indeed extraordinarily – positive. This is particularly the case with respect to the first question: no less than 85 per cent of the respondents stated that collaboration was good, while only 4 per cent stated that there was ‘overselling by civil servants’, 3 per cent that there was ‘blocking by civil servants’, under one per cent that there was ‘mutual blocking’; 7 per cent gave ‘other’ answers. These answers are indeed more positive than they had been found to be, ten years earlier, in the early 1990s, in Western Europe. In the ministerial survey which was conducted then in that region, ‘only’ 68 per cent of the respondents felt that there was ‘good collaboration’ with the civil servants while 21 per cent stated that there was ‘overselling’ or ‘blocking’. Even that level of support was higher than might have been expected, given the size of the criticisms expressed in some Western European countries about the way politicians were felt to relate to civil servants. Yet, if the proportion of favourable answers was surprisingly large in the Western European case, the larger proportion of favourable answers given to the same question in Central Eastern Europe must be regarded as truly extraordinarily large. It seems to suggest that either the European Union was unaware of the state of affairs in the region or ministers were unaware of what was really meant by true ‘professionalism’. However, not only do most ministers from Central Eastern Europe feel that their collaboration with civil servants is good, but most ministers from the region also feel that the information provided by civil servants is reliable and most ministers do have confidence in the quality of the work of civil servants: no fewer than 73 per cent of the ministers stated that the information received was ‘mostly’ reliable, while 59 per cent were ‘mostly’ confident with the quality of their civil servants’ work. Admittedly, one might detect a small amount of doubt in the case of the answers to these two questions, since respondents were only asked to state that they found the information given by civil servants to be ‘most often’ reliable or that they were ‘mostly’ confident about the work of their civil servants: this does allow, in principle, for the contingency that there might be (a few) cases when the information was not ‘reliable’ or cases in which the ministers did not have confidence in the work which was conducted. Moreover, perhaps it is unsurprising that only a minority of

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ministers should have plumped for the second answer which could be given, namely that the information coming from their civil servants was ‘sometimes’ reliable or that they were merely ‘sometimes’ confident about the work of these civil servants: such an answer is in reality rather negative (Table 9.1). Furthermore, the two questions were asked in succession and there might have been some ‘contamination’, despite the fact that the proportion of those who said they were confident in the work of their civil servants was smaller than the proportion of those who said that the information they received was reliable: 93 per cent of those who felt that the information they received from civil servants was ‘mostly reliable’ were also ‘mostly confident’ of the quality of the work of their civil servants; that proportion drops to 52 per cent among those who felt that the information they received from civil servants was ‘sometimes reliable’ and to 21 per cent among those who felt that the information they received from civil servants was ‘rarely reliable’. As on other matters, there are variations between countries in the pattern of reactions of ministers to civil servants, but these variations are much smaller among the answers given to the question related to the ‘collaboration’ which these ministers had with civil servants than among the answers to the other two questions. Thus, on the question as to whether collaboration was good, the least positive answers came from Lithuania, Table 9.1 Confidence in information, trust in quality of civil servants’ work and type of collaboration (percentage) Good collaboration Confidence in information given Mostly confident 82 Sometimes 15 confident Rarely, 3 or not at all confident Total (N) 100 (273) Trust in quality of work Mostly trusted Sometimes trusted Trusted rarely, or not at all Total (N)

66 30 4 100 (272)

Overselling/blocking and mutual blocking

Other

Total

13 61

26 52

73 21

26

22

6

100 (23) 16 42 42 100 (24)

100 (23) 26 43 31 100 (23)

100 (319) 59 32 9 100 (319)


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Romania, Latvia and the Czech Republic (between 77 and 81 per cent) while the most positive came from Poland and Slovakia (96 per cent): the range was thus only 21 per cent (Table 9.2). Meanwhile, with regard to the reliability of the information received, the range was 47 per cent – from 44 per cent in Lithuania to 91 per cent in Slovakia. Interestingly, Lithuania and Slovakia were also at both extremes. On confidence about the quality of the work of the civil servants, the range was as wide as 55 per cent – from 23 per cent this time in Slovakia to 78 per cent in Poland – the range being wider despite the fact that the average is lower (59 instead of 73 per cent). This difference in range might suggest that the answers to the first question reflect the existence of a more ‘solid’ viewpoint about civil servants than the answers to the other two questions, which seem more ‘erratic’. By and large, however, despite the massive difference in the reaction of Slovak ministers to these two questions, the countries at both ends of the range tend to be broadly the same ones: Poland, Romania and Slovenia register high scores, not just on the last two questions but on all three, while Lithuania and the Czech Republic score rather low on all three of them: there is, therefore, at least some evidence that, despite a greater degree of ‘erraticness’ in the answers to two of the questions, all three must reflect, at least in broad terms, what the ministers believe. Where there is a big difference, however, is on the fourth question which asks about the persons or bodies likely to brief the ministers when they prepare for cabinet meetings. As we noted, respondents could answer that they were briefed by the cabinet secretariat, by their officials, by their personal staff, by their own party, by outside policy advisers or

Table 9.2.

Country and mode of relationship (percentages)

Poland Slovakia Estonia Bulgaria Hungary Slovenia Czech Republic Latvia Romania Lithuania

Good collaboration

Overselling/blocking by civil servants

Mutual blocking

Other

Total (N)

95.6 95.5 89.7 88.0 85.0 81.0 81.0 80.0 78.8 76.4

2.2 4.5 10.3 4.0 2.5 0.0 9.5 2.5 21.2 11.8

0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 19.0 9.5 17.5 0.0 11.8

100 (45) 100 (22) 100 (39) 100 (25) 100 (40) 100 (21) 100 (21) 100 (40) 100 (23) 100 (34)

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by others. Despite the fact that a very large proportion of ministers stated that they trusted the ‘reliability’ of the information given by civil servants, had ‘confidence’ in the quality of the work of civil servants or had ‘good collaboration’ with their civil servants, only 31 per cent of these ministers said that they were briefed by their officials about cabinet matters. The important alternatives chosen were not the party (only 5 per cent stated that they were briefed by officials from their own party) or external policy advisers (only 2 per cent stated that they briefed by such advisers) or even ‘others’ (only 13 per cent stated that this was the case): exactly 50 per cent of those who briefed ministers belonged to two groups only – the personal staff of these ministers (27 per cent) and the cabinet secretariat (23 per cent). Ministers may trust their civil servants to give them ‘reliable’ information, but civil servants are in a minority in briefing ministers for the cabinet. This would seem particularly surprising since ministers could be expected to have to present and defend in cabinet the proposals which had been prepared by the civil servants of their department. Admittedly, the interpretation to be given to these results is rendered somewhat problematic as, on this question as well, variations from one country to another are extremely large: while 31 per cent of the ministers, on average, stated that officials briefed them for cabinet decision-making, the range was from 10 per cent in Estonia, 12 per cent in both Lithuania and Romania and 14 per cent in the Czech Republic, on the one hand, to, on the other, 62 per cent in Slovenia and even 81 per cent in Slovakia. Yet it does remain the case that the proportions of ministers who were briefed by civil servants are significantly lower, in the large majority of countries, than the proportions of ministers who felt able to show profound satisfaction with their civil servants in general. There is therefore a limit to the conclusions that can be drawn from the highly positive reactions of ministers to their civil servants. On the one hand, ministers in the ten countries studied here are clearly happy about the way their civil servants work and how they relate to them. On the other hand, there is an apparent gradation: ministers are very happy indeed about the collaboration they have with civil servants, but are perhaps a little less enthusiastic about the reliability of information and the quality of the work of these civil servants. Above all, while civil servants are judged by a very large majority of ministers to be wholly satisfactory in their specific domain, many fewer ministers appear to ask advice from these civil servants when the question arises as to which group of persons will be helping them in fulfilling their duties as members of the cabinet.


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Cabinet work and the ministerial assessment of civil service advice There is ostensibly something amounting to a contradiction between the positive views expressed by most ministers about their civil servants and the fact that only a minority is briefed by these civil servants when it comes to cabinet matters. One might at first conclude that there is inconsistency, but this view seems difficult to sustain as the question about how ministers are briefed came very soon after the others which were concerned with the civil service: it seems hard to believe that these answers should have been forgotten. Alternatively, one might conclude that there is a degree of exaggeration in the size of the praise for civil servants in relation to their collaboration with ministers: ministers could have felt that they ‘should’ be uniformly supportive of this collaboration, but that they could be rather less supportive of more detailed aspects of their relationship with their civil servants. Such an interpretation may be valid in some cases, but it seems difficult to believe that such a line should have been taken systematically by many ministers. A further interpretation might be that ministers (or at least a majority among them) hold the view that a distinction has to be drawn between what is ‘political’ and what is ‘administrative’ and that the role of ministers is indeed wholly different from that of civil servants. They may hold this view even though, as we saw earlier, differences between politicians and administrators are far from being as clear as they were felt to be in the past; indeed, it is perhaps no longer clear at all. Such an interpretation of what ministers believe may be justified on the general grounds that many politicians surely feel that their activity is ostensibly distinct from that of civil servants since they have, at least in a democratic context, to explain and defend what they are doing to the public at large. An interpretation of this kind would also account for the fact that ministers could be, in their vast majority, satisfied with the way in which civil servants act within their department and yet not think that civil servants should be truly involved in the kind of ‘political’ questions which are discussed in cabinet. That interpretation may indeed not be inconsistent with another, which is somewhat less broad in scope but more closely connected to the division of labour characterizing the activities of the ministers themselves. Ministers are concerned with both their department and with cabinet decision-making: these two aspects of their activities are different in scope and nature, even if, in some cases, they intersect. Meanwhile, civil servants are naturally primarily – if not exclusively in most cases – concerned with

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the matters of the department in which they work. While they could be very useful to their ministers in relation to those matters of their department which come to the cabinet, this is obviously not the case for other matters. It may even be argued that civil servants are not well prepared to offer advice about matters which go beyond the remit of their department. Such an interpretation could explain why a substantial proportion of ministers (around a quarter in each case) feel that, in order to fulfill their role in the cabinet, they should either go to the cabinet secretariat (which knows more about the whole of the problems which the cabinet has to discuss) or rely on their own personal advisers (who can guide them in terms of the political line to take on a variety of matters). In this interpretation, the role of civil servants might very well vary depending upon the particular case of a given department: the ministers who will have a particular need to be briefed by their officials will be those who find themselves having a large number of matters going to the cabinet from their department. There is indeed a degree of empirical support for this last interpretation. On the one hand, there is very little evidence suggesting the existence of any relationship between the extent to which ministers are satisfied with the way in which decisions are taken in cabinet and the extent to which they regard civil servants as producing or as not producing reliable information or as working in a way which attracts ministers’ confidence. Admittedly, only 67 per cent of those ministers who are dissatisfied with cabinet decision-making, as against 76 or 75 per cent of those who are very satisfied or simply satisfied, feel that the information which civil servants produce is mostly reliable; but those who are dissatisfied with cabinet decisionmaking are as likely to be confident about the quality of work of their civil servants as those who are very satisfied, while those who are simply satisfied are a little less likely to have that confidence (respectively 63, 62 and 58 per cent, leading to an average of 59 per cent). Similarly, it is difficult to see any real difference in the patterns of answers to the questions of confidence about the information given and the level of trust in the quality of work between those ministers who feel that they can take decisions on their own – that is to say without referring to the cabinet – and those who feel that they cannot. Those who rarely had a problem about taking decisions on their own were exactly as likely to find the information given by ministers ‘mostly reliable’ (77 per cent in both cases) as those who stated that they often had a problem in this respect. Indeed, those who rarely had a problem about taking decisions on their own were less likely to be confident about the quality of the work of


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their civil servants than those who stated that they often had problems about taking decisions on their own (54 compared to 69 per cent). Meanwhile, on the other hand, there is some relationship between the extent to which ministers find the information given to them ‘mostly reliable’, the extent to which ministers feel ‘mostly confident’ about the quality of their civil servants’ work and the extent to which these ministers state that they are briefed by their officials for cabinet matters. In both cases, one finds twice as many ministers in the category of those who are ‘most often’ as in the category ‘rarely’. The comparison between these sets of findings and those which were mentioned earlier suggests that the level of satisfaction which ministers may have about cabinet decisionmaking or even the extent to which they can make their own decisions about the affairs of their department is not related to the views which they have about civil service reliability or quality of work; but the views which ministers have about these characteristics of civil servants’ work are to a degree associated with the extent to which ministers rely on civil servants when they need to be briefed about cabinet matters.

Conclusion A report published in 2002 by the European Union stated that a professional administration had not yet emerged in Central Eastern Europe. One would therefore have expected that the ministers who were interviewed for this study would tend to express dissatisfaction with the daily work of their civil servants: however, the findings of this study come to a very different conclusion. A very large majority of the ministers who were interviewed appeared to be fully satisfied. Almost all of them were mostly happy with the kind of collaboration they had with the civil servants in their department; large majorities among the ministers also ‘mostly’ felt that they could have confidence in the way these civil servants handled business and ‘mostly’ believed that they could trust the information which their civil servants were giving them. There is a caveat to this picture, however: despite their very good rapport with their civil servants, only a minority of ministers are prepared to go to the officials in their department in order to be briefed with respect to matters concerned with the cabinet decision-making process. This does seem rather surprising, given that ministers presumably had to present and defend department proposals in cabinet meetings. That finding does appear to suggest that a kind of division of labour exists, indeed even perhaps a division tout court, in the way ministers from Central Eastern Europe regard the work of their civil servants and the way they regard

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their own work: civil servants appear to be viewed as being essentially ‘administrators’ – in this case as ‘good’ administrators – but ministers may continue to think that their work is different. However much such a conclusion goes against the ‘modern’ interpretation of the role of the civil service which was presented earlier in this chapter, ministers may be feeling that a separation does exist between them and their civil servants as they have a dual role and their role in cabinet is, to some extent, incidental to many, perhaps most, activities of civil servants. In the end, there is therefore probably no contradiction between the view which ministers have of their own role and the view which the large majority of them also have that civil servants fulfill well the functions which are truly theirs in the departments to which they belong.

Part IV The Members of the Cabinet in the Views of the Ministers


10 Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making

Having examined the nature and extent of the support which the cabinet receives, we need now to turn to the key actors in the governmental decision-making process – the ministers – as well as to those among the ministers who can be expected to play an even greater part, the ministers of finance and the prime ministers. The role and influence of ministers of finance and of prime ministers will be analysed in the next two chapters; this chapter concentrates on those who might be described as ‘ordinary’ cabinet ministers in Central Eastern Europe. Before moving to the heart of the subject, however, we need once again to recall the peculiar character of the cabinet as a decision-making body. To simplify perhaps somewhat, that peculiar character comes from the fact that ministers fulfill two primary tasks in parliamentary governments and that these two tasks are, to a certain extent, contradictory. First, with the exception of ministers without portfolio and the prime minister, they each head a department and, in this capacity, they have to address the issues and defend the interests of their department. Secondly, they belong to the cabinet as a ‘collective’ body and therefore, whether they like it or not, contribute to solving those problems which are faced by the entire government; that involvement means that they are acting beyond or even perhaps entirely outside the scope of their portfolio (Headey 1974: 54; Blondel 1993: 182).1 This double function of cabinet members is peculiar to parliamentary government, although it has come to be regarded as ‘natural’. An inevitable consequence of the fact that ministers have to play this double role is that they will vary in the extent to which they are willing and even able to devote the same attention to both functions. Studies undertaken in Western Europe have shown that there are indeed appreciable differences in this respect (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993). 151

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As a result, a broad distinction tends to be made among cabinet members between ‘amateurs’ and ‘specialists’ or between ‘generalists’, sometimes referred to as ‘all-rounders’, who tend to be concerned with overall governmental activities, on the one hand, and ‘departmentalists’, who primarily concentrate their attention on matters concerning the ministry which they head. Such a distinction only relates, of course, to active participation: as a matter of fact, it does not follow from the fact that someone is not markedly concerned with matters outside the department of which he or she is the head that that minister will necessarily be an active departmentalist. The same can be said about those ministers who are classified as ‘generalists’. Another distinction needs therefore to be taken into account – namely, the extent to which ministers are ‘actively’ involved in one or both functions in which they have to be concerned. In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the role of cabinet ministers, one needs therefore to take into account both dimensions – the dimension of greater or lesser ‘activism’ and the dimension of greater or lesser ‘departmentalism’. We will therefore consider successively these points in the course of this chapter. First, we shall examine the extent to which ministers from Central Eastern Europe are involved in the life of the cabinet in general and can therefore be regarded as ‘generalists’. In the second section, we shall examine the extent to which ministers from the ten countries analysed here are strong ‘departmentalists’. The third section will bring these two aspects together by considering the extent to which ministers are ‘actively’ involved in both aspects of their role, in one of them only or are less actively concerned. Finally, in a fourth section, we shall examine the views of the ministers about the kinds of skills which, in their opinion, are required to enable them to best fulfill the complex tasks facing those who are members of a cabinet in a parliamentary system. We noted in the previous chapters that we had to rely on the ministers to obtain information on the nature of the decision-making process in cabinet. We have also pointed out in several instances throughout this volume that these judgements were naturally ‘subjective’: ministers may distort – even unintentionally – the descriptions which they give; memory is selective and is influenced by personal perceptions of important events and emotional evaluations of these events. While bearing this in mind, it would seem nonetheless highly exaggerated to conclude that the responses given by ministers do not reflect, at least in broad terms, the reality of attitudes and behaviour of cabinet members. There is in particular no reason to expect intended systematic bias in these

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responses and it must be remembered that information was obtained from over 300 ministers in the study which is being reported here.

Involvement of ministers in cabinet life Let us first consider the part which ministers play in cabinet decisionmaking in general. In Chapter 5 we examined the matter ‘globally’ by analysing whether ministers felt that the cabinet was indeed the ‘place where major issues were thoroughly debated’, as well as the extent to which there were disagreements in cabinet and how these were typically resolved. The main conclusion which was drawn was that the cabinet was regarded by ministers from Central Eastern Europe as being a key decision-making body. Having assessed the extent to which cabinet meetings could be described as lively, we now turn to assessing how far ministers individually feel that they participated in the process of cabinet decision-making. We can hypothesize, without fear of being proved empirically incorrect, that not all ministers are likely to be equally involved in the debates taking place in the cabinets in which they served: thus, the extent of what might be referred to as the ‘individual activism’ of ministers with respect to cabinet life can be expected to differ. Studies of cabinet decision-making in Western Europe have indeed already shown that ‘individual activism’ does vary among decision-makers, as studies of decision-making in other types of bodies have naturally also shown (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993; Barber 1965). This means examining to what extent ministers can be described as true ‘generalists’. Such an analysis entails going beyond the formal point according to which, since the cabinet is the body which decides on governmental policy, cabinet ministers are in some sense all part of the final outcome of cabinet deliberations. Being a ‘generalist’ does not simply mean that, by virtue of the principle of collective cabinet government, decisions in the end involve the whole cabinet and may indeed even lead to voting on specific issues, as occurs in the Czech Republic, indeed markedly more than elsewhere (Kolár et al. 2002). To be a true ‘generalist’ implies actively participating, during cabinet meetings, in matters beyond what the department requires. To obtain an impression of the level of ‘individual activism’ of ministers in cabinet deliberations, ministers were asked: ‘Did you yourself go out of your departmental area in cabinet discussions?’ (Var. 23). They were given the choice to state whether they did so ‘very often’, ‘often’, ‘seldom’ or ‘never’. The replies to the question were markedly positive. Around three-fifths of the ministers from the ten countries (62 per cent)

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stated they had crossed the borders of their department issues ‘very often’ (30 per cent) or ‘often’ (32 per cent); however, a further 33 per cent declared that they were ‘seldom’ involved in this way and 5 per cent that they were ‘never’ involved. There may be a degree of ‘overenthusiam’ in the pattern of answers as in respect to some other questions discussed in earlier chapters. However, a substantial minority plainly stated that they were not ‘active’ generalists, as against most ministers claiming that they participated to a substantial extent in the deliberations of the cabinet. Moreover, the true meaning of the ‘often’ response may be somewhat unclear; indeed, the nature of the contributions of ministers may vary in both character and significance. They might be vague, perhaps emotional. Some ministers may be ‘chronic debaters’ who like to oppose or feel the need to speak, if only to repeat the statements of those who spoke before them. Others may have a considerable knowledge and a broad area of competence because of the experience they had in the past. There are also ministers whose departments have higher levels of resources and can provide well-informed assessments on the items which are debated at cabinet meetings. As ministers do not have time to obtain information on their own, they must instruct their secretariat to prepare that information: the support and resources of the secretariat vary from department to department and so does the opportunity which ministers have to benefit from expert services. There is an interesting link between what might be described as the reactions of ministers about their own behaviour in cabinet and the judgement which they pass about the behaviour of their colleagues: those ministers who say that they have been involved ‘very often’ in cabinet discussions beyond their departmental area are appreciably more likely also to say that ‘the cabinet is a place where major issues [are] thoroughly debated’. 59 per cent of these ministers stated that issues were ‘very often’ debated in cabinet, while the overall average is 41 per cent and there were only respectively 30 and 31 per cent among those who stated that they went ‘often’ or ‘seldom’ ‘out of [their] departmental area in cabinet discussions’. However, it is not entirely clear how this relationship should be interpreted. On the one hand, it might be that there is ‘overenthusiasm’ or even ‘wishful thinking’ in both cases. On the other hand, the two characteristics may indeed be linked because of what can be described as the general ‘atmosphere’ in the cabinet: ministers may be involved ‘very often’ in discussions outside the scope of their department in those cabinets in which there is a general tendency for ministers to contribute to a large variety of topics (Table 10.1).

Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Table 10.1

Debates in cabinet (percentages)

Minister went beyond the scope of their department Very often Often Seldom Never Total

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Participation in debates was common Very often

Often

Seldom

Never

Total

56 22 22 — 100

46 29 23 2 100

20 36 36 8 100

21 26 46 7 100

30 31 34 5 100

Little difference can be found in the proportion of ‘active’ generalists in terms of the occupational background of ministers: teachers and lawyers, as well as economists, are found in roughly equal proportions among both ‘active’ and ‘less active’ generalists, although those who had a more ‘technical’ background were more likely to state that they were ‘seldom’ involved in cabinet discussions outside their departmental area. Nor is there any significant difference in terms of the type of cabinet: despite the fact that one might have expected coalitions with small majorities to induce ministers to act in a more disciplined manner, ministers from these types of coalitions claim that they have not been any less ready to participate in debates outside the scope of their department than ministers from other types of coalitions or from single-party governments. There is perhaps some difference between Left and Right, however, although the numbers in each cell are small, as ‘active’ generalists are somewhat more likely to be drawn from among conservative or liberal parties than among ministers belonging to socialist, agrarian, nationalist as well as far-right parties. As was pointed out in earlier chapters, the choice of answers for ministers in the 1991 Western European survey were somewhat different, being among ‘often’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘never’. 37 per cent of the ministers said that they themselves went ‘often’ outside the field of their department, 45 per cent that they did so sometimes and 14 per cent never. Since there was no opportunity to state that they were ‘very often’ involved in that way, these interviewees may not have been as ‘overenthusiastic’ in their replies. However, the difference is such that ministers from Central Eastern Europe appear genuinely more likely to go beyond the borders of their own department than those of Western Europe. Indeed, these findings tally with what was noted in Chapter 5 about the extent to which major issues were more often debated in the cabinets of the countries studied here than in Western Europe.

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Meanwhile, the same type of relationship was found in Western Europe between the reactions of ministers about their own behaviour in cabinet and the judgement passed about the behaviour of colleagues: while, overall, 37 per cent of the ministers stated that they it was ‘common’ for ministers to have ‘participated in discussions not related to their departmental matters’, this was said to be the case by 63 per cent of the ministers among those who said that they themselves ‘often’ ‘participated in discussions not related to their departmental matters’ (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993). In Central Eastern Europe, the variations from country to country are sizeable, though not as large as some of those which were examined in previous chapters. There is a difference of about 30 per cent between the proportion of generalists in Estonia, Hungary and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the proportion of generalists in Poland, Slovenia and Romania. The prevailing ‘atmosphere’ in the cabinet may be part of the reason for these differences. At the level of individual countries, too, a link is found between broader participation among members of the cabinet and the fact that ministers state that the cabinet is ‘a place where major issues are thoroughly debated’. This link is particularly marked among ministers from Hungary and Bulgaria.

Ministers and their role in departmental matters The other main task of ministers of a parliamentary cabinet system consists in dealing with the affairs of the department which they head: this is manifestly the task which occupies them most of the time and in which they cannot but be involved on a daily basis. Yet the way ministers fulfill this task is also likely to differ and even to differ appreciably. Some ministers have their own vision about the tasks and mission of their department and are able to act independently in the interests of their department; other ministers are reserved in their decision-making and seek support from other members of the cabinet. Rather than ask ministers directly whether they were truly active in their department – a question which may not have led to frank answers – it seemed more appropriate to investigate what might be described as the ‘self-confidence’ of cabinet members in relation to their role in their department. The question which was asked was thus: ‘In matters relating to your department, were there decisions that you did not feel able to take on your own?’ (Var. 31). As to the question concerned with the role of the ministers in cabinet, interviewees could answer ‘very often’, ‘often’, ‘seldom’ or ‘never’. While nearly half (46 per cent) said that this


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was the case only rarely and almost one-fifth (19 per cent) that this was never the case, about a quarter (24 per cent) said that this was ‘often’ and 10 per cent that this was even ‘very often’ the case. Thus one-fifth of the ministers were what might be described as being ‘self-confident’ about their role: they did not need to receive advice from the rest of the cabinet in handling the affairs of their department. It is therefore fair to conclude that these ministers were ‘true’ activists with respect to departmental matters. At the other extreme, one-tenth of the ministers appeared to have grave doubts about their ability to handle the matters with which they were confronted. Indeed, despite the fact that only one-third of the ministers stated that they were very often or often confronted with decisions which they could not take on their own, even that assessment may be underestimated to a certain extent: some ministers may have considered it a matter of honour not to admit or may have wanted to preserve their own self-image by not admitting that they were not – or did not feel – competent to take some decisions on their own. A straightforward comparison with Western Europe is not possible in this respect as the question was not then asked in such a direct manner. There were a few differences arising from the occupation of the ministers concerned and some differences arising from the party distribution: in this case, the parties of the Left were a little more likely to have what was referred to as a self-confident attitude towards the department which they headed. As usual, however, the differences which were most marked were among the various countries examined here. In the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia one finds the largest proportions of ministers who stated that they never needed to bring matters to the cabinet (respectively 52, 39 and 33 per cent); by contrast, in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, one found the smallest proportions of ministers who stated that they never needed to bring matters to the cabinet (respectively 0, 3, 3 and 5 per cent). Ministers gave a number of reasons why they could not or did not want to take decisions independently and in particular three of them (Var. 32). Two-fifths of the 256 respondents who had stated that they could not always take decisions relating to their department on their own (41 per cent) stated that this was because there was a need to coordinate matters with other departments, 19 per cent said that the implementation of the decisions concerned was very costly, 16 per cent that the problem was politically contentious. A quarter of the ministers mentioned various other reasons, 5 per cent among whom stated that their need to go to the cabinet was due to the fact that the matter which was raised was too ‘innovative’. By and large, there was little difference in the

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distribution of these reasons among the ministers who stated that they had to refer to the cabinet ‘often’ or ‘seldom’; those who said that they had to refer to the cabinet ‘very often’, however, – of whom they were relatively few – did mention the need for coordination markedly more (63 per cent) than their colleagues. While it is not possible to make a direct comparison between the attitudes of Western European ministers in this respect and that of the ministers analysed here, some points can nonetheless be made. The reason why a straightforward comparison is excluded is because, in the Western European case, interviewees were asked to mention successively the reasons why they might have had to go to cabinet. Thus, one can discover only whether there were similarities and differences in the broad distribution of these answers. As a matter of fact, the distribution seemed to be somewhat different: the reason which was mentioned most often was the contentiousness of the issue (mentioned in 58 per cent of the cases), followed by the need for coordination (53 per cent of the cases); the innovative character of the issue was mentioned less often, but the score was not as low as in the case of East-Central and Southeastern Europe (27 per cent). It does therefore seem that ministers from the countries analysed here have been less likely than ministers from Western Europe to have felt prevented from taking decisions on matters which were politically contentious without referring to the cabinet, despite the fact that the ministers of the countries analysed here appear to have been involved in more profound changes than the ministers from Western Europe. What does remain the case, however, is that only a small proportion (19 per cent) of the ministers from Central Eastern Europe truly willing to exercise their full prerogatives as departmental heads. Admittedly, nearly half of the ministers did state that they only rarely felt the need to go to the cabinet about matters concerning their department, but the proportion of those who said that they did so often or very often was appreciably larger (34 per cent) than the proportion of those who said that they never did so. The ‘true’ ‘departmentalists’ are thus the rather small minority of ministers who stated that they could handle on their own the matters of the ministry of which they were the heads.

Types of ministerial behaviour The fact that some ministers are ‘self-confident’ about their departmental role does not necessarily mean that they do not also intervene often – or even very often – in matters outside the purview of their department.


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Those who are departmentalists may also be oriented towards a greater breadth of problems, speak on problems of other departments, thus contributing to the general cabinet discussions, and involve themselves in extra-departmental matters. Others differ in terms of their ability or willingness to take major decisions independently, even if they are related to their own portfolio. Hence two extreme positions, that of the ‘true’ activists who are prepared to act on their own and that of those who hesitate and who, for various reasons, tend to consult and seek external support for their departmental decisions. How are these two positions related? Are some ministers both fully involved in collective decisionmaking and fully active in terms of decision-making within the boundaries of their own department? In the 12-country analysis of Western European ministers the ‘generalist’–‘departmentalist’ dimension was linked to the ‘more active’–‘less active’ dimension to lead to four types of ministers – ‘activists’, ‘spectators’, ‘departmentalists’ and ‘generalists’ (Blondel 1993: 182f). That fourfold distinction can be adapted to the governments which are analysed here. ‘Activists’ are involved in wider cabinet debates and cross the boundaries of their department; but they also have no difficulties in taking decisions on matters relating to their department. On the other hand, ‘departmentalists’ do not cross the boundaries of their department in cabinet debates; but they do not experience difficulties in taking decisions on matters relating to their department. ‘Generalists’ are active in cabinet meetings: they are involved in wider debates and cross the boundaries of their department; however, they find it hard to take major decisions on their own within the boundaries of their ministry. ‘Spectators’ are rarely involved in cabinet discussions beyond the boundaries of their department; moreover, they are typically unable – or unwilling – to take major decisions relating to their department on their own. Yet these four ‘ideal-types’ are not clearly distinct from one another in the reality of governmental life: on the contrary, they correspond to a variety (indeed, strictly, an infinity) of positions occupied on two continuous dimensions. The survey did not give ministers the opportunity to state precisely what their position was on each of these dimensions: as a matter of fact, these ministers would not have been able to do so even if they had been asked to. Yet interviewees were given the opportunity to select one of four answers to each of the two questions (‘very often’, ‘often’, ‘seldom’ and ‘never’) which concerned respectively the extent of their involvement in cabinet life in general and the extent to which they were ‘self-confident’ in relation to their role in the department which they ran. As a result, it is strictly impossible to define precisely

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which ministers belong to one of the four ‘ideal-types’ that have been described earlier. All one can do is provide a reasonable approximation. To elaborate such an approximation one needs to return to the remark made at various points in this volume about what the ‘true’ meaning might be of answers such as ‘very often’ or ‘seldom’. The meaning of the distinction between ‘very often’ and ‘often’ is particularly important with respect to the extent to which the ministers concerned have been involved in cabinet discussions; on the other hand, the meaning of the distinction between ‘seldom’ and ‘never’ is particularly important with respect to the extent to which the ministers concerned have been taking on their own decisions relating to their department. Yet there is no way in which one can have a ‘precise’ idea of the content of such questions, both because the ministers naturally did not specify what they did mean and because, had they been asked what they did precisely mean, they would almost certainly have been unable to provide a clear answer. As a result, all one can do is adopt two positions – one ‘rigorous’, the other ‘more relaxed’ – to come to a characterization of what might be the ‘real’ position of the ministers. The ‘rigorous’ position consists in regarding as truly active at the level of the cabinet only those ministers who state that they have been ‘very often’ involved in cabinet discussions; similarly, only those ministers who say that they ‘never’ went outside the department to take their decisions would be regarded as truly ‘selfconfident’. The ‘more relaxed’ position consists in regarding as truly active at the level of the cabinet both those ministers who state that they have been ‘very often’ and those who state that they have been ‘often’ involved in cabinet discussions; similarly, in relation to departmental decisionmaking, both the ministers who say that they ‘never’ went outside the department and those who say that they only seldom went outside the department would be regarded as truly ‘self-confident’. The choice of one or the other of the two positions leads to marked differences in the distribution of ministers in the four groups, in particular in the proportions of activists and of spectators. In the first case, the activists are only 4 per cent and the spectators 55 per cent; in the second, the activists are 37 per cent and the spectators are 9 per cent. The proportion of generalists remains the same in both cases (26 per cent), while the proportion of departmentalists rises from 15 to 29 per cent between the first and the second. Since the variations are so large and since, as was noted earlier, a ‘true’ meaning cannot be found either for ‘often’, with respect to involvement in cabinet discussions, or for ‘seldom’ with respect to decision-taking in departments, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the proportion of activists, departmentalists and spectators

Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Table 10.2

Types of ministerial behaviour (percentages)

Active in cabinet

Active in decision-making in own department Yes

Yes

No

Activists ‘relaxed’ (Mean) 37 (20)

‘rigorous’ 26

Generalists ‘relaxed’ (Mean) 26 (26)

Departmentalists ‘rigorous’ ‘relaxed’ (Mean) 15 29 (22)

‘rigorous’ 55

Spectators ‘relaxed’ (Mean) 9 (32)

‘rigorous’ 4 No

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lies somewhere between the ‘rigorous’ and the ‘more relaxed’ positions. If one decides to choose the ‘half-way’ position between the two extremes, the proportion of activists becomes 20 per cent, that of departmentalists 22 per cent and that of spectators 32 per cent, while the proportion of generalists remains 26 per cent (Table 10.2). The calculation which was undertaken in the Western European context – and which was based on rather different answers – suggested fewer activists (9 per cent) and more spectators (43 per cent) than in the countries analysed here while the proportions of generalists (30 per cent) and of departmentalists (22 per cent) were, broadly speaking, the same. Thus, even if one selects the half-way point between the ‘rigorous’ and the ‘more relaxed’ positions, the proportion of activists is higher in Central Eastern Europe than it was found to be in Western Europe. This is consistent with the finding made throughout this volume according to which there was greater involvement of ministers in the countries analysed here than there appeared to have been in the Western European survey. This is perhaps due in part to the fact that the proportion of coalition governments is larger in the ten countries analysed here than it was in the Western European study, although the numbers involved are very small and it is difficult to draw a straightforward conclusion. On the other hand, the proportion of activists appears to be somewhat larger among Conservatives and Liberals than among Socialists and Christian Democrats; it is also larger in Latvia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria than in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland or Romania: but in all these cases, differences are relatively small. Overall, at any rate during the first decade of their involvement in cabinets, ministers from the countries analysed here have been rather more active in cabinet meetings and more self-confident in their departments than ministers appear to be where the cabinet system has been in existence for a longer period, as in Western Europe.

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Personal experience and ministerial career To what extent do ministers have the skills, ability and previous experience required to perform their tasks effectively? In particular in their departmental capacity, ministers have to rely primarily on their background, including the knowledge which they had acquired. Even within their departments, these tasks are diverse, both because the activities of these departments vary markedly and because the style of the interpersonal relationships is also likely to vary. Background and career experience can be expected to have an impact on the way in which ministerial tasks will best be fulfilled (Bakema 1991). Short of being able to assess ‘objectively’ what this impact might have been, at least a ‘subjective’ indication can be inferred from what the ministers themselves thought on the matter. Hence the question which was addressed to the interviewees: ‘Which personal experiences would you consider to have been particularly useful for your activity as minister?’ (Var. 56). Ministers were given four options corresponding to the different types of background which could have been expected to be most important to them, namely ‘prior knowledge of the subject matter of [the] department’, ‘technical capacity or knowledge as manager’, ‘experience as MP’ and ‘experience as junior minister’. We encountered the last two of these responses in Chapter 6 in connection with the part which party may have played in the attitudes of ministers: we found that only a small minority of these ministers (12 per cent) felt that their experience as an MP had been ‘particularly useful’ for their future ministerial experience. Experience as a junior minister was also regarded as having been of value to a very limited proportion of ministers (7 per cent). Thus only onefifth of the ministers felt that political experience was what had counted most, although the experience acquired as a junior minister is likely to have provided an element of managerial experience as well. Meanwhile, managerial experience as such was mentioned by rather more interviewees (27 per cent): that type of experience clearly relates to the ability to handle human resources and to be an effective administrator. Such a background appears valuable in that ministers are not bound by the requirements of a particular department, but are expected to have broad substantive interests and even to be competent in a number of fields, although their real skills should be elsewhere. They should be able to process efficiently the matters which have to be decided on, while, to cover the substance of the decisions concerned, they should know how to choose advisers and teams on which they could rely to provide the information which is required.


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Yet, despite the value which a managerial background might have for ministers, it is the need for specialized expertise which is considered to be most important by the largest number of interviewees: exactly half of them (50 per cent) wish to have the knowledge required by the subject matter of the department which they head. This is so despite the fact that ministers are involved in cabinet discussions over a variety of fields, despite the fact that they may well be in charge of different departments in succession and, even if they only ever hold one post, despite the fact that that post may not be related to the knowledge which they had acquired previously. As a matter of fact, perhaps such a premium given to expertise is not altogether surprising, given that, during the period studied, eight of the ten countries were in the midst of preparations for accession to the European Union and for the harmonization of their respective legal systems with European law. For many, this may have meant having appreciably more knowledge than they had previously acquired, even if managerial experience may also be relevant, in particular to select appropriate advisers and teams that would be able to work well together. In reality, it may be precisely because many ministers had found themselves at the head of a department in which they did not feel technically competent that half the sample stated that ‘prior knowledge of the subject matter of the department’ was the most important requirement. A direct comparison with Western Europe is not possible, as interviewees in that case were given the opportunity to provide a separate answer to each type of background and thus did not have to rank them, as in the case of the countries analysed here. Comparisons are further complicated by the fact that, as was pointed out in Chapter 6, the proportions of Western European ministers who had been MPs were also much larger (about four-fifths as against only about half in Central Eastern Europe); those who had been MPs had also probably remained on average longer in parliament: this must have accounted in part for the fact that the proportion of Western European ministers who felt that political experience was important was much larger than it was in the countries analysed here. However, one difference does emerge between the two regions: in Western Europe, almost the same proportion of ministers (about two-thirds of those who replied) felt that an expert background was as necessary as a managerial background, while there was markedly greater support for the importance of an ‘expert’ background in Central Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Among the countries analysed, however, there were variations in the attitudes of ministers about expertise, managerial skills and political experience: Bulgarian, Latvian and Slovene ministers felt that by far the

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most important experience was expertise with respect to departmental matters (respectively 72, 80 and 81 per cent). Czech, Lithuanian and Polish ministers, on the other hand, gave greater importance to managerial skills (respectively 43, 41 and 44 per cent). Ministers who perceive their political experience, as MPs or as junior ministers, as the most useful experience for their ministerial tasks are found most often in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (respectively 26, 31 and 33 per cent). Whatever background the ministers from the countries analysed here felt was most important, there is apparently no relationship between these views and the extent to which ministers were active in cabinet outside the area of their department or even, perhaps more surprisingly, the extent to which ministers were self-confident enough to deal on their own with the affairs of their department. As a matter of fact, the only ministers who appear to be a little more self-confident with respect to departmental affairs (two-thirds as against three-fifths) were those who stated that a managerial or a political background, as junior ministers, perhaps understandably, but even as MPs, were what counted most; but the difference is so small and, with respect to the political background, the numbers concerned are also so small that no definite conclusion is warranted. Perhaps the most revealing of these patterns of relationships is the striking overall finding that ministers from Central Eastern Europe feel that, in order to be efficient, they need expertise in the field of their department. That point emerges whatever task these ministers are specifically in. In Western Europe, it was found that many ministers wished they had more administrative skills than the experience acquired while being in parliament: the view is the same in the ten countries which are analysed here – with only one proviso, which is that the ministers from these countries are even more inclined than their Western European colleagues to place a premium on the expert knowledge required to handle departmental matters.

Conclusion Ministers are expected to be active heads of their departments and to defend the interests of that department; they are also expected to be active members of the cabinet and thereby to contribute to the cabinet’s collective decision-making. This is not an ‘either–or’ situation, however: it is a double role, but this double role often places conflicting demands upon ministers. An examination of the way in which ministers in Central Eastern Europe describe their performance in government in retrospect suggests that there are more ‘activists’ in the region, who, in addition to


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concentrating on the tasks they need to perform in their department, also make a substantial contribution to cabinet life by participating in collective decision-making and offering their opinion on a wider range of issues than those covered by their department: these ministers actively promoted the interests and issues of their own department and had no problem in taking decisions on issues related to their departmental responsibilities. Meanwhile, the ‘spectators’ – those who do not contribute to the collective decision-making of the cabinet and are more passive in decision-making on issues related to their own portfolio – form only a small minority. In performing the duties of their office, ministers attach the greatest importance to professional expertise, indeed whether they are or not very concerned about being broadly involved in the affairs of the cabinet in general. Few of them attribute importance to the fact that they are – or have been – members of the representative body from which the government emanates: the numbers of those who attach major importance to the experience acquired in parliament are too small to be able to determine whether there was any difference, however, between those ministers who could remain in parliament when in government, as in the Czech Republic, and those who were not entitled to do so, as in Slovakia, Slovenia or Romania. Overall, the experience acquired as an expert or as a manager is much more highly valued than experience acquired as a politician. There is, however, a caveat: it is still not possible to state whether this characteristic is due in part, indeed perhaps in large part, to the intensely technical work which most ministers were involved in during the preparation for the accession to the European Union: the point remains, nonetheless, that, to date, ministers from Central Eastern Europe place the greatest importance on expertise, the second importance on managerial experience, and only third do they rate political background.

11 Finance Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making

Cabinet government is based on the notion that all ministers are equal and contribute to the same extent to what is formally and ostensibly a collective decision-making body. The reality is, of course, different. In the previous chapter, we saw that there were substantial differences in the extent to which the ministers themselves were involved in cabinet decisionmaking, even if there was apparently more collegiality in the cabinets of the countries studied here than there had been in those of Western Europe. Meanwhile, there is something approaching a formal hierarchy between the status of the prime minister and that of the other members of the cabinet, despite the fact that prime ministers need the agreement of their colleagues in order to act. Two key types of differences thus emerge with respect to the involvement of cabinet members in the decision process: one is wholly informal and stems from the extent to which ministers are willing, and perhaps able, to participate actively in that process; the other is close to being formal and results from the manifestly special part played by the prime minister. There is, moreover, an intermediate level at which the role of ministers in cabinet does further vary: this results from the fact that some ministers may be more ‘important’ than others by virtue of the posts which they occupy. Ministers of foreign affairs seem to qualify in view of the part they play in promoting the general interests of the nation. So do ministers of justice, especially in the countries which are analysed here, because of the profound transformation of the legal system which occurred during the period following the fall of communism. Yet ministers of finance seem to have particularly strong claims to belong to this group, given that they alone are in overall charge of governmental patterns of income and expenditure and are therefore effectively exercise control over the actions of the other ministers. Indeed, ministers of finance might exercise an even more 166

Finance Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making

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dominant role than prime ministers: while these interact with other cabinet members only from time to time and in the fields in which they happen to be particularly interested, ministers of finance play a part over the entire field. The ‘objective’ importance of these and perhaps other ministers is manifestly difficult to assess, let alone measure; what can be discovered, however, is the extent to which cabinet members feel that some ministers are indeed above the rest of them because of the position which they hold. To explore what can thus be described as the ‘subjective’ standpoints of cabinet members on this matter, the survey which is analysed here asked ministers to state ‘which minister seems to you to be the most important person in cabinet’ (Var. 27). This led to a sharp distinction. On the one hand, only a small minority felt that ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of justice were more important than the others: 6 per cent mentioned the minister of foreign affairs, 3 per cent the minister of economics, under 3 per cent the minister of justice; a further 25 per cent of the answers were spread out among a variety of other office-holders. On the other hand, almost two-thirds (62 per cent) identified ministers of finance as being the most important members of the cabinet. For the ‘average’ cabinet member, in the countries analysed here, ministers of finance, but not ministers of economics, are thus regarded as being truly ‘above’ the rest of their colleagues: they are also the only ones, at any rate across the region, who are really regarded in this way. That perception has indeed emerged in other surveys conducted in Central Eastern Europe (Pedersen 2005: 204). In Pedersen’s, but also in that of Brusis and Dimitrov, this corresponds to the fact that the ministry of finance has been transformed during the transition period in all of the countries analysed here and has become the main actor in formulating policies as these countries were undergoing major fiscal crises resulting from the regime change (Brusis and Dimitrov 2001: 888ff). This chapter concentrates therefore on the position of ministers of finance as the ministers who are regarded as important by a large majority of their colleagues, while the cases of the ministers of foreign affairs, justice or economics are examined only where their appeal appears to have exceptional characteristics. The first section considers possible ‘objective’ personal characteristics of these ministers which might account for, or at least contribute to, this feeling of ‘importance’, such as the career patterns and the occupational background of those concerned. The second section then analyses the reasons given by cabinet members to account for the ‘importance’ of ministers of finance, both across the region and among the different countries, while the third analyses the ways in which a cabinet

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member reacts when the minister of finance makes proposals to which that cabinet member objects.

Do ministers of finance have a special career and background? Ministers of finance might not just be viewed as important but indeed be ‘objectively’ ‘important’ if, having had a special career and/or a special occupational background, they come as a result to occupy a special position in the cabinet. Indeed, in Western Europe, ministers of finance have been said to be ‘no ordinary ministers’, not perhaps so much because they came to their position after having been in the cabinet before, but because of the length of their tenure in the post, especially in countries where ministers move frequently, or because of their past specialization, a third of them having been economists while some had been in industry or in banking (Larsson 1993: 218–20). In the ten countries analysed here, 19 ministers of finance were interviewed. This is a small proportion of the total – about 6 per cent; moreover, the absolute numbers are so small that one can hope only to detect some indications from the personal characteristics of these ministers. The interpretation is indeed rendered more difficult as the ministers interviewed are not evenly spread out across the ten countries: no minister of finance was interviewed in Slovenia or in Romania, while between two and five were interviewed in the three Baltic States and three in Poland. This meant that ministers of finance formed almost 10 per cent of the whole ministerial sample in Lithuania and Poland, 13 per cent in Estonia and as many as a fifth in Latvia; in Hungary, two were interviewed and in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria only one.1 The numbers are small; the trends that emerge are also somewhat contradictory. First, there is no evidence that the career in office of ministers of finance is different from that of other ministers. As a matter of fact, the proportion of ministers of finance who had more than one job and who were therefore in more than one cabinet is lower than the proportion of all ministers and prime ministers: only one in five of the ministers of finance had held two ministerial posts, as against a third of all ministers and over half of the prime ministers. The ministers of finance who were found to have more than one job were from the Czech Republic (the one case of a minister of finance interviewed), Estonia and Latvia (respectively two out of four and one out of five of the ministers of finance interviewed). Thus, there is nothing remarkable about the governmental career of ministers of finance: they are clearly not more ‘senior’ than other ministers in the ten


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countries analysed here. There does appear to be some difference with Western Europe in this respect, although there, too, variations from country to country are large: yet no country from Central and Eastern Europe approximates the UK where four-fifths of the Chancellors of the Exchequer had held a previous ministerial post during the 1945–84 period while this was also true of three-fifths of the ministers of finance of Ireland and of Italy during the same period (Larsson 1993: 220). Secondly, and on the other hand, there is some indication that ministers of finance and of economics may have been somewhat special in the countries analysed here in terms of their occupational background. They appear to be somewhat better prepared for their job than other ministers: onethird of the ministers of finance had been economists. In this respect, the situation does appear to be somewhat similar to the one which was found in Western Europe. Moreover, and as also in Western Europe, there are major differences in the proportion of ministers of finance with an economics background among the countries analysed here. In Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, all the ministers of finance interviewed had an economics background; none had such a background in Poland; in Estonia there was only one out of four, in Latvia one out of five and in Lithuania one out of two. It is interesting, but perhaps unsurprising, that economists should appear to play a special part in Hungary; it is perhaps more surprising that this should also be the case in Slovakia and Bulgaria and not in the Czech Republic. Thirdly, going somewhat further in that direction, the question arises as to whether ministers of finance felt that they had benefited more from their ‘specialized’, ‘managerial’ or ‘political’ experience than was the case for other ministers. As a matter of fact, they had had broadly the same amount of political experience in parliament than other ministers (a little over half), but proportionately many fewer among them had been junior ministers (5 per cent as against 17 per cent among other ministers). On the other hand, there is a marked difference in the extent to which ministers of finance, compared to other ministers, deem a specialist experience to be most valuable: 63 per cent stated this to be the case as against 50 per cent among other ministers (interestingly ministers of finance and indeed ministers of economics are on par with prime ministers in this respect). However, ministers of finance do not rate their managerial experience differently from other ministers (25 per cent as against 29 per cent); ministers of finance rate their parliamentary experience in the same way (11 per cent instead of 13 per cent). Moreover, none of them mentions their experience as a junior minister as having been valuable as against eight per cent among other ministers.

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Ministers of finance are thus somewhat better equipped technically than other ministers: such a background specialization may, to an extent, contribute to them being ‘important’. Yet even in this respect the difference with other ministers remains relatively small and it would seem exaggerated to attribute too much weight to the special character of the background. Meanwhile, in terms of seniority, there appears to be no difference in the countries analysed here between ministers of finance and other ministers. Overall, it does therefore not seem to be so much because of personal characteristics that, ‘objectively’ at least, ministers of finance are ‘special’: the nature of the job is more likely to be the distinguishing factor. It remains to be seen, however, whether this is indeed the opinion of their colleagues in the cabinet.

What makes finance ministers important? As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, cabinet members were asked to state which ministers they considered to be important: on that question, ministers of finance were not only by far the most ‘popular’, but also the only ones who were recognized as important by more than a tiny minority. Thus, in Central Eastern Europe there is a clear differentiation in the recognized status of ministers and that differentiation distinguishes ministers of finance sharply from all their colleagues and places them, in effect, close to the level of prime ministers. What, then, do a large majority of cabinet members mean when they say that ministers of finance are important? To explore this matter, interviewees were asked to answer two further questions. One merely asked, ‘Why is this minister important?’, while the other aimed at understanding why a minority had not selected the minister of finance. These members were asked in turn: ‘And what about the minister of finance? Why is he/she in your view not important?’ (Var. 28 and 29). These two questions make it also possible to discover, not only some of the reasons why ministers of finance were judged ‘important’, but whether these reasons were the same as those mentioned by the cabinet members who rated other ministers as ‘important’. 90 per cent of the ministers gave one of five reasons why they assessed ministers to be important. Three of these reasons concerned the role of the ministers concerned: these were the substance of the job, the status of the minister and the official character of the post; four-fifths of the cabinet members interviewed chose one of these three options. On the other hand, a tiny proportion (2 per cent) mentioned the seniority of the minister concerned and a further 8 per cent the position of the minister in the


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party, while 10 per cent gave a variety of other reasons. Thus the post itself, markedly more than the person holding the post, accounts, in the eyes of cabinet members, for the judgment they pass about the importance of some ministers. There are some differences in the distribution of these reasons depending on the choice made by cabinet members about which minister is deemed to be ‘important’, but, except with respect to ministers of finance, the numbers are too small to indicate a trend: among the 199 interviewees who selected the minister of finance, 90 per cent opted for one of the three reasons connected with the nature of the post, while only 4 per cent stated that the importance of the minister of finance stemmed from the position they held in the party. The view that it is the post, rather than the person concerned, which is felt to be relevant in the case of ministers of finance is thus reinforced by the findings. The type of party composition of the government does appear to have a limited relationship with the reasons given by ministers for assessing some of their colleagues as important. On the one hand, in no case does seniority or the role of the minister in the party play a part in single-party governments, whether of a majority or a minority kind; on the other, the position of the minister in the party plays a substantial part in coalitions and, in particular, in minimum winning coalitions (18 cases out of 131 – or 14 per cent). This judgement is the one which ministers pass about any minister whom they deem important: on the other hand, the difference is not so marked with respect to those who deem the minister of finance to be important: only 7 per cent of these ministers of finance were deemed to be important because of their position in the party by their colleagues in minimum winning coalitions. Thus, the importance of a minister is exclusively related to the post itself in single-party governments, while the notion that ministers of finance are viewed as important is less related to the position of these ministers in their party than is the case for other ministers who are regarded as important. The replies given by ministers to the question of why they did not choose the minister of finance further strengthen the notion that the ministers of finance are regarded as important essentially because of the post which they hold. The answer which was most often given was that the minister was ‘too new’ (16 cases or 20 per cent of those who gave an answer), while only two interviewees stated that the minister was ‘too junior in the party’. The importance attributed to ministers of finance is thus squarely the result of the feeling among their colleagues that the post endows ministers of finance with a markedly superior position.

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While ministers of finance are regarded generally across the ten countries studied here as being far more important than other ministers, there are also appreciable difference in the importance rating given to ministers of finance from country to country. That rating is lowest in Hungary (23 per cent), while it is highest in two of the Baltic States, Latvia and Lithuania (respectively 88 and 91 per cent), but not in Estonia, where it is the second lowest, at 41 per cent. Bulgaria and the Czech Republic are the other two countries where ministers of finance are rated as important by less than the average for the whole group of countries studied here (44 and 57 per cent respectively), while in Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, between 66 and 81 per cent of the ministers interviewed singled out the minister of finance as the most important minister. Meanwhile, Bulgaria and even more Estonia are the two countries where the minister of foreign affairs is given some prominence (respectively 16 and 28 per cent of the ministers of interviewed in these two countries mentioned that minister), Bulgaria being also exceptional as it is the only country in which the minister of economics is regarded as important by a significant group (16 per cent). The minister of justice is given some prominence in one country only, Romania, where 15 per cent of the interviewees stated that that minister is important (Table 11.1). Yet, despite these variations across countries, ministers of finance remain the most ‘popular’ minister in all the countries analysed here: this is so even in the case of Hungary, where the evaluation of cabinet members as important is spread over a variety of ministers, but where the minister of finance is nonetheless the one who is regarded as important by the largest proportion of ministers. What does clearly emerge, therefore, is, on the one hand, that ministers of finance are regarded everywhere as more important than the others, above all on the ground of the nature of the post, while, Table 11.1

The most important minister in cabinet (percentages) Foreign Domestic Finance Economy

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia

16 0 28 0 5 0 0 6 0 5

8 0 13 4 0 0 2 0 0 0

44 57 41 23 88 91 66 70 81 72

16 5 3 3 0 0 0 3 5 0

Justice Other 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 15 0 0

16 38 10 70 7 6 32 6 14 23

Total (N) 100 (25) 100 (21) 100 (39) 100 (40) 100 (40) 100 (34) 100 (44) 100 (33) 100 (21) 100 (22)


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on the other hand, remarkably, so few cabinet members wish to choose the minister of foreign affairs or even the minister of justice as important ministers and a sharp distinction is made with respect to importance between the minister of finance and the minister of economics.

How do cabinet members relate to the minister of finance? Since ministers of finance are regarded as important by so many and since, as is indeed obvious, ministers of finance hold the purse strings and are therefore likely to oppose many aspects of the financial demands of members of the cabinet, the question arises as to how cabinet members attempt at least to resolve the problem when they are in difficulty with their minister of finance (Var. 30). That they should often find themselves in such a situation does emerge from the replies given by cabinet members: overall, in the ten countries analysed here, four-fifths of the ministers interviewed (81 per cent) stated that they had experienced conflict with an important minister, a proportion which, unfortunately, cannot be compared with the situation in Western Europe; that proportion rises to 84 per cent among those who rated the minister of finance as important. Yet there remains a minority of about a fifth of the cabinet members who did not have any conflict with the ministers they deem important and of about a sixth who stated that the minister of finance was important but did not have any conflict with that minister.2 This overall average does conceal variations, some of which are substantial. The variations which occur with respect to the occupations of the ministers are very small: the major exceptions are those of university teachers, lawyers and economists, who are, interestingly, somewhat less likely to have had conflicts with their minister of finance (20–22 per cent as against 16 per cent overall). While the proportion of social democrats who had conflicts with their minister of finance was about average, fewer liberals but more conservatives and socialists had such conflicts. On the other hand, a marked difference emerges in this respect between single-party governments and coalitions: half (52 per cent) of the (admittedly relatively few) ministers who served in single-party governments stated that they had not had conflicts with their minister of finance, while both minimum winning and surplus coalitions experienced somewhat more conflicts than average; only between 10 and 15 per cent of the ministers belonging to these coalitions stated that they had not experienced conflicts. There are also major differences between the ten countries analysed here. In five countries the vast majority of the ministers interviewed had experienced conflicts with their ministers of finance: these were Romania,

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two of the Baltic States, Hungary and Slovenia (only between 4 and 13 per cent did not experience conflicts with them), while, in Slovakia, all of the cabinet members interviewed experienced such conflicts. On the other hand, in Poland, the proportion of cabinet members who stated that they had not experienced conflict with the minister of finance was average (17 per cent), but it was appreciably larger in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, where it was respectively 27, 33 and 39 per cent. Conflicts are thus ‘normal’ in the relationship between ministers of finance and their colleagues, but the extent to which they take place does vary, in some cases substantially, especially from one country to another as well as, apparently between single-party governments and coalitions (Table 11.2). How, then, do the other four-fifths of the cabinet members resolve the problems posed by the conflicts with the ministers they deem important? To explore this matter, cabinet members were asked: ‘If you had a conflict with this important minister [the one the minister had chosen] how did you usually solve this conflict?’ (Var. 30). Interviewees were given the choice among three key options, namely that they ‘dropped the issue’, ‘went to the prime minister’ or ‘went to the cabinet’; they could also say that they chose another solution: indeed nearly half of the ministers (49 per cent) did so. Overall, only one-third of the cabinet ministers interviewed selected one of the three key options which were offered to them. Less than 4 per cent declared that they ‘had dropped the issue’. Among the other two key options, twice as many stated that they went to the prime minister rather than going to the cabinet (19 versus 9 per cent), this being an indication that they probably felt that eventual support given by the prime minister on an issue was more likely to be effective than a hypothetical action by the whole cabinet. These proportions are almost identical if one concentrates on the way cabinet members who deemed the minister of finance to be Table 11.2

Solving a conflict with the minister of finance (percentages)

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia

No conflict

Drop issue

To PM

To Cabinet

Other

Total (N)

27 33 13 11 8 39 17 4 6 0

9 8 6 22 0 7 3 4 0 0

36 8 3 11 6 10 38 53 6 12

0 17 0 11 6 0 17 39 6 0

28 34 78 44 80 45 25 0 82 88

100 (11) 100 (12) 100 (16) 99 (9) 100 (35) 100 (31) 100 (29) 100 (23) 100 (17) 100 (16)


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important react to a conflict they had with that minister (respectively 20 and 10 per cent); on the other hand, but on the understanding that the numbers concerned as very small (20 respondents are concerned), more cabinet members said that they dropped the issue, but also went to the prime minister or to the cabinet (respectively 10, 30 and 15 per cent) among those who singled out the minister of foreign affairs as the important minister. The previous occupations of cabinet members do not appear to make any difference, but the party of the respondent does to a certain extent: social democrats are both more likely to drop the issue or to go to the prime minister, rather than go to the cabinet, while conservatives and Christian democrats are more likely to go to the cabinet: the differences are small, however, and the numbers concerned are also small. There is also a tendency for ministers from surplus majority coalitions to go more to the prime minister, while members of single-party cabinets are more likely simply not to answer than to choose one of the three sets of key answers which have been examined here. Moreover, variations on a country-by-country basis are very large. The proportion of cabinet members whose answer referred to one of the three key choices varies from 95 per cent in Romania to 9 per cent in Estonia. Indeed, in the three Baltic States as well as in Slovakia and Slovenia, the proportions of ministers who selected one of the three key choices given to them are so small that one cannot meaningfully distinguish between them. In the remaining five countries, on the other hand – that is, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria – the distribution of the answers among the three key questions varies appreciably: going to the cabinet, but also dropping the issue is apparently more common in Hungary and the Czech Republic, while, in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, going to the prime minister is the most commonly chosen option, though the proportion of cabinet members who go to the cabinet is also large in Romania where, as was noted earlier, a very large majority of interviewees did select one of the three key options. Comparisons with Western Europe are also rendered difficult, since cabinet members in that region were able to reply successively whether they ‘dropped the issue’, ‘went to the prime minister’ or ‘went to the cabinet’. However, the overall trend does not appear different from what it was found to be in Central Eastern Europe as many fewer said that they ‘dropped the issue’ than chose one of the other two key options, while more (but not in this case many more) said that they went to the prime minister than said that they went to the cabinet.3 The prime minister is thus, for a substantial number – but not for a majority of cabinet members – the person to whom cabinet members go

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when they have a problem with an ‘important’ minister and this applies particularly to ministers of finance who are, as we have seen throughout this chapter, the ministers who are by far most likely to be considered important by their colleagues. Yet the reactions of cabinet members when they are in conflict with a minister whom they deem important have to be seen in a more general context: even if there are conflicts with important ministers, in particular with ministers of finance, and even if these affect a large majority of cabinet members, these also feel, as we saw in Chapter 6, that the decision process in the cabinet is satisfactory. Truly serious conflicts with ministers of finance, as with other ministers, are likely to be rare and many more are likely to be solved by some form of ‘consensus’, since, as we also saw, consensus is judged to be the main way in which problems are solved in cabinet.

Conclusion Ministers of finance have a special position in the structure of cabinet decision-making in Central Eastern Europe, as is also the case in Western Europe. The importance of the budgetary process and the fact that all the ministers are subjected to its constraints means that finance ministers occupy a position which no other minister occupies. Thus, the notion that the cabinet is composed of ‘equal’ members is not only undermined by the existence of the prime minister as well as, informally, by the presence of more active and perhaps more experienced ministers; it is also undermined by the fact that the minister of finance is singled out as being important, with the effect that the cabinet has to be regarded as being, in practice, a three-level structure. The fact that ministers of finance occupy such a position means that they are both close too and unquestionably in competition with the prime minister – also in a way that no other minister is. In the Western European case, it has been pointed out that ‘ministers of finance relate to prime ministers everywhere and on almost every issue’ (Larsson 1993: 208). It has also been noted that, while there was often partnership, there could also be – and indeed was – competition, a situation likely to lead to weakness in the cabinet (Larsson 1993: 210ff). To this extent, once more, the development of the cabinet system in the ten countries analysed here has come to be very similar to the practices of Western Europe: on the role of ministers of finance and on the way cabinet ministers regard the importance of these ministers, the cabinets of Central and Eastern Europe resemble the cabinets of the countries which experienced cabinet government for a much longer period.

12 Prime Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making

In a parliamentary democracy the prime minister is the most influential, powerful and visible member of the government. A major debate has indeed taken place in the academic literature about this power, about the extent to which it has increased in parliamentary democracies and about the effect that such an increase may have on the nature of cabinet decision-making. Prime ministers have been said to vary from those who are ‘chairmen’ and whose ministers act with them to those who are ‘chiefs’ and whose ministers serve under them (Farrell 1971; Andeweg 1997). As a matter of fact, the debate has gone beyond the distinction between ‘chairmen’ and ‘chiefs’, with the notion of ‘prime ministerial’ cabinet having been introduced. The classical description of the ‘chairman’ corresponds to the idea of a collegial government in which the prime minister is merely ‘first among equals’ (Jones 1991; Crossman 1972). The idea of the ‘chief’ refers to strong, even ‘charismatic’ prime ministers who can modify the very nature of cabinet decision-making, especially in Westminster systems, by being able to influence markedly their colleagues and effectively oblige ministers to follow their lead (Weller 1985). However, according to some, cabinet government may gradually give way to a situation in which collective deliberation and decision-making in cabinet are replaced by the ‘monocracy’ of what becomes purely and simply prime ministerial government (Crossman 1963; Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990). This view is generally regarded as extreme, but it may be a realistic description in some situations. A number of factors are said to account for the increased power of prime ministers. These include their enhanced constitutional position, their role in the choice and dismissal of ministers, their visibility in the society – in particular at election time – and the electoral role of prime ministers as well as cultural traditions, personality differences and the features of the 177

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bureaucracy (Jones 1991; Müller, Philipp and Gerlich 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1994: 6f). In contrast to the classical view of cabinet government which is characterized by a high degree of collegiality among ministers, ‘prime ministerial’ government is regarded as concentrating the whole executive authority in the office and the person of the prime minister. The power and autonomy of political leaders within political executives and political parties, together with the emergence of leadership-centred electoral processes appears to have led to a form of presidentialization of cabinet government (Poguntke and Webb 2005). The post-communist transition has also provided further constraints and opportunities for political leadership in Central Eastern Europe, while the role of prime ministers is still ‘in the making’ (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 2001). The newness of the institution, the time dimension and the specific circumstances of post-communist transformation in the respective countries have had an impact alongside the factors which have been observed in Western Europe. The position and role of prime ministers in postcommunist countries in general has therefore to be closely examined: comprehensive country studies of executive leadership are still rare (Haughton, 2005) and comparative studies are still missing. Prime ministers, especially during the first years of the post-communist transition, were described as ineffective because of governmental instability (Taras, 1998; Zielonka, 2001). The political legacy, as well as the special conditions of the early years following the fall of the communist regimes, may have led to frequent governmental crises. There has been a substantial change, however. From situations in which most post-communist governments were shaky, lacked any reliable party base and in many ways were subjected to severe conflicts between governmental parties and individual ministers an increasingly stable executive leadership has gradually emerged in most countries of Central Eastern Europe. After examining the general context of the position of prime ministers, this chapter thus explores the way in which the prime ministers of the ten countries studied here are viewed by ‘their’ ministers. Since those members of governments who were interviewed were close to their premier for a substantial period and therefore experienced the conduct of prime ministers at first hand, they are unquestionably the ones most able to assess the characteristics of prime ministers. King (1975: 211–30) stressed the importance of ministers’ perception of their leader by listing the ‘standing of prime ministers in the eyes of their colleagues’ as being among the factors that determine the power and influence of chief executives. The assumption is that prime ministers with greater stature among their colleagues contribute to the ‘streamlining’ of cabinet decision-making,

Prime Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making

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because these colleagues are more likely to respect the authority of the leader and voluntarily avoid extensive debates.

The institutional, political and administrative context of the prime ministers’ position Even a cursory examination of constitutional changes in Central Eastern Europe reveals both common features in and variations from the overall institutional design. The prevailing institutional model is that of parliamentary democracies with a constitutional review mechanism, of proportional representation, of multi-party systems and of coalition governments. Yet, as in Western Europe, such a common institutional design leaves substantial room for differences among national political institutions and therefore may lead to major variations in the structure within which prime ministers operate; these variations may indeed be more significant than differences in the type of personalities and in political idiosyncrasies within each country (Rose 1991: 9). Newly elected prime ministers in Central Eastern Europe face the dilemma of being strong democratic leaders and yet being confronted with authoritarian temptations while constitutional, political and administrative characteristics also shape the nature of the job of prime minister. In the transition to democratic rule which took place in the 1940s in Germany and in the 1970s in Spain those who drafted the constitution designed the position of prime minister carefully to help to promote stability in the polity, most notably through the introduction of the constructive vote of ‘no-confidence’. Yet, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, there is little guidance about the organization of cabinets in the constitutions of Central Eastern Europe. In particular, the constitutional arrangement of the executive, especially the position of the premier, did not receive as much attention as in the German and Spanish cases, with the exception of Hungary and to an extent of Poland. Indeed, the relative neglect of the premier’s position marks a clear deviation from the Western European model. In general, the tendency was to avoid assigning much power to a single person, be that person president or prime minister (Zielonka, 2001; Malova and Haughton, 2002). Most constitutions of the region provide therefore for weak prime ministerial leadership. On the other hand, the Polish and Hungarian constitutions include provisions that strengthen the position of the prime minister; this is not the case in Lithuania and Romania because of the semi-presidential system which has been adopted in these countries. It seems reasonable to suggest

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that constitutionally stronger than average Polish and Hungarian prime ministers and constitutionally weaker than average Romanian and Lithuanian prime ministers are at the two ends of a continuum. In Hungary, the prime minister is the only member of government who is elected by parliament and who is directly responsible to parliament. These and other constitutional provisions and political conditions turned Hungary into a ‘chancellor democracy,’ particularly when the Orban government came to power after the election of 1998 (Ágh, 2001; Schiemann, 2004). Since the adoption of the constitution in 1997 in Poland the position of the prime minister has been gradually strengthened in terms of the appointment of ministers, of the allocation of ministerial portfolios and by means of the introduction of the constructive vote of ‘no-confidence’ (Zubek, 2001). Meanwhile, the other constitutions give prime ministers few prerogatives: prime ministers may even be forced to accept parliamentary decisions on the dismissal and appointment of individual ministers, as is the case in Lithuania or Slovakia. In addition to constitutional constraints, prime ministers in Central Eastern Europe are also hampered, as elsewhere, by political limitations on their power. The political resources at the disposal of prime ministers depend mainly on the type of government – single-party or coalition, whether minority, minimum winning or surplus – and on the characteristics of the parties. Prime ministers in Western European countries also tend to be leaders of the main governing party: this gives them substantial political authority: the same occurs in some cases in Central Eastern Europe. For example, the relatively strong position of two premiers (Klaus and Zeman) in the Czech Republic appears to have less to do with the constitutional arrangement than with the political context, particularly the relative stability of the party system, the cohesion and discipline of the ruling political parties and substantial inter-party cooperation. The written so-called ‘opposition agreement’ that instituted cooperation between the governing coalition and the strongest opposition party made it possible for the minority Zeman cabinet to govern relatively smoothly (1998–2002). In return for control over some parliamentary committees and the chairmanship of parliament, this agreement provided that the opposition members of parliament would leave the chamber if they did not support the bills submitted by the government; meanwhile, the quorum needed for bills to be passed was lowered. Despite these handicaps, Prime Minister Zeman was generally regarded as a strong leader. The nature of coalition government has also shaped the position of prime ministers and the way in which these could act. Fragmented party systems and unstable parties, often accompanied by a high degree of


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polarization, can hamper the strength of the head of the government. As we know, in Central Eastern Europe, coalitions, either minimal winning or surplus, are the most frequent form of government: the observation that a prime minister in a coalition government must be a conciliator before he or she can be a real leader (Rose, 1991: 18) should apply even more so in the case of Central Eastern Europe than in Western Europe because the prime minister must strike a balance between these two roles in a context in which the political circumstances are uncertain or at least fluid. As we saw in Chapters 8 and 9, administrative resources include the powers of prime ministers over the organization of the cabinet, the directives to be given to ministers over the determination of the cabinet agenda and the running of the cabinet meeting as well as over the establishment and role of cabinet committees. Heads of cabinets also have access to more information than their colleagues as a result of their constitutional position and the development of prime ministerial offices. They enjoy more publicity in the media. They usually play an important international part. These factors may have also influenced the perception of prime ministers by individual ministers in the ten post-communist countries studied here, although other factors, including personality traits, may play a part in the judgements passed by the ministers.

The perception of prime ministers by their ministers Strong or weak leaders? In the context of an assessment of the cabinet decision-making process, cabinet members were asked to report their experience with respect to ‘their’ prime ministers.1 First, ministers were asked to characterize the prime ministers under whom they served as strong or weak (Var. 34). Over twothirds of the ministers interviewed (69 per cent) stated that they were strong; only 10 per cent said that they were weak, 16 per cent choosing an escape option by answering that they were neither strong nor weak. Ministers were also asked whether their prime ministers changed their mode of behaviour (their leadership style) during their terms in office (Var. 42). In this case, too, two-thirds of the respondents (64 per cent) said that there was no change, possibly because stability was regarded as fundamental for governmental efficiency and was therefore looked at with satisfaction. Indeed, three-fifths of the 34 per cent who noted a change reported a move towards a more influential style as against twofifths who reported a move towards less influence. Yet, meanwhile, ‘strength’ is also preferred to ‘weakness’ by the ministers. To begin with, in three-quarters of the cases (77 per cent), the ministers who perceived

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their prime ministers as strong did not report any change of the prime ministerial style; on the other hand, among those who regarded their prime ministers as weak, a change of style was said to have been more frequent: 55 per cent said that this was the case. Moreover, of the 34 per cent of the ministers who reported a change in the leadership style of prime ministers, a substantial majority (58 per cent) reported a turn towards a more ‘forceful’ style. Strength and stability of prime ministerial style seem to go together: as a matter of fact, the longer prime ministers served, the more they were recognized as strong leaders. This may indicate that for whatever reasons, be it personality, leadership skills, party position or temporary circumstances, those premiers who were strong at the beginning of their office were able to maintain their position. Moreover, strong leaders were said to have become stronger (63 per cent), those in the middle also became more influential (67 per cent) and only weak leaders were said to have been weaker (63 per cent). A relationship does exist between strong and weak prime ministership, on the one hand, and overall satisfaction, on the other, as well as with a feeling of effectiveness about cabinet decision-making. Satisfaction is much higher where leadership is strong. Ministers who served under strong leaders were either ‘very satisfied’ (29 per cent) or ‘satisfied’ (60 per cent), while only 11 per cent were dissatisfied; ministers who served under weak heads of government were mostly dissatisfied (63 per cent), with only 37 per cent being ‘satisfied’ and none at all being ‘very satisfied’. The impact of strong leaders on the effectiveness of cabinet decision-making is even more evident: 35 per cent of the ministers stated that cabinets operating under strong leadership were ‘very often’ effective and 55 per cent that they were ‘often’ effective; 65 per cent of those ministers who worked with weak prime ministers said that their cabinet was ‘seldom’ or ‘never’ effective. There are some exceptions, however. Perhaps the two most striking cases are those of the Lithuanian prime minister Slezevicius and of the Slovak prime minister Dzurinda during his first term in office (1998–2002). Slezevicius led a single-party government between 1993 and 1996. All interviewed ministers who served under him found him to be strong, but only half regarded his cabinet as effective and satisfactory, probably because of the deep economic crisis, the collapsing banking system and the privatization scandals which resulted in his enforced resignation. Conversely, in 1998 Dzurinda was confronted with a complicated political situation which led to a surplus majority coalition government based on parties which only had in common the fact that they had fought an election together. Dzurinda was not the chairman of a ‘real’ party, but the head of an electoral coalition of five ideologically disparate parties. Only


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around a quarter of the ministers (27 per cent), regarded him as a strong prime minister, but a huge majority of ministers (91 per cent) acknowledged his effectiveness in managing cabinet decision-making, even if they were not all satisfied with his performance (63 per cent), given the nature of that broad coalition (Haughton 2005). How do prime ministers operate? Ministers were asked whether ‘their’ prime ministers attempted to build consensus, talked to ministers individually, forced solutions, took new initiatives or had some different approach to the exercise of influence on the cabinet (Var. 39). The desire to build consensus is the characteristic of Central Eastern European leaders which is by far the most often mentioned by the ministers who were interviewed: 36 per cent said that this was the prevailing style of their prime ministers, while only 16 per cent stated that these ‘forced the issue’ and 17 per cent that leaders preferred to talk to ministers individually. Even fewer claimed that their prime ministers tended to shape the external context (6 per cent) or took new initiatives (4 per cent). The matters of ‘strength’ and of ‘forcefulness’ are naturally related to the extent to which prime ministers are regarded as wishing to be particularly involved in a given field of government. Ministers were therefore asked to state whether there was such a field and, if so, which it was, that the prime ministers under whom they served tended to be involved. For instance, Western European prime ministers are often regarded as being, above all, involved in foreign affairs (Müller, Philipp and Gerlich 1993: 255; Goetz 2000). The ministers interviewed in Central Eastern Europe were thus asked to state whether the prime ministers under whom they served wished to exercise influence in general governmental organization or whether they had a ‘special’ domain. They were also asked whether these prime ministers wanted to have authority in the fields of foreign affairs, defense, economy, social issues, and coalition problems (Var. 37). In Western Europe 60 per cent of the ministers interviewed mentioned general governmental organization as an area in which their prime minister wanted to be influential, while 21 per cent said these prime ministers were not involved in this way (Müller, Philipp and Gerlich 1993: 256). On the other hand, according to the former members of the cabinets of Central Eastern Europe only 17 per cent of prime ministers were exclusively involved in general governmental organization. This is low compared to the 37 per cent who were entirely devoted to economic matters. Interest in foreign affairs is low (9 per cent), as is interest in coalition problems (3 per cent) and social affairs (4 per cent), while 12 per cent of ministers were vague and said that their prime ministers were involved in

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all these areas or in a ‘special domain’ (9 per cent). The highest priority was therefore given to economic matters, partly, or so it seems, because, during the post-communist transition, the primary task was to move from a planned to a market economy, though possibly also because of the background of the prime ministers concerned, as many of them were either economists (like Klaus of the Czech Republic and Balcerowicz of Poland) or had a strong interest and previous experience in economic affairs (Buzek of Poland and Vähi of Estonia), or, because they had a special relationship with their finance ministers, as between Drnovsek and Gasparovic in Slovenia and between Meciar and Kozlik in Slovakia.

Possible explanations There is still a problem, however, which relates to the meaning and incidence of prime ministerial strength in the minds of ministers. Consensus plays a part, as we saw, but so does the ability of prime ministers to influence the behaviour of ministers and to ‘streamline’ the process of cabinet decision-making. Thus an attempt is made here to identify the connection between these perceptions by means of two sets of explanatory variables – those relating to cabinet decision-making as such and those concerned with the more general characteristics of the political system. It is suggested that the first type of explanatory variable relates directly to ministerial perceptions of their prime ministers, while the second type illustrates the role of the political background. Explanations based on the characteristics of the prime ministers themselves The first group of hypotheses relates to the link between the strength of prime ministers and their style, their field of involvement and their duration in office. Style may not indicate strength by itself, but, since the majority of ministers in Central Eastern Europe have only experienced coalition governments, a consensus-seeking style might have been regarded as a necessary step towards ‘governing together’ or indeed perhaps towards ‘governing at all’. This type of leadership skill cannot therefore be excluded altogether. In terms of field of involvement, strength seems to suggest focusing concretely one’s interest and energy on a particular aspect of political life, while the time spent in office is also an indication of strength. Although consensus-seeking was the most widespread form of prime ministerial style in Central Eastern Europe, strong prime ministers are somewhat less consensus-driven than weak ones, but those who were described as ‘neither strong nor weak’ were even more consensus-seeking.


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Meanwhile, ‘strong’ cabinet leaders tend to talk somewhat more to ministers individually and to take new initiatives while weak leaders do not. Thus, unsurprisingly, seeking initiatives and even having an individual strategy are, to an extent at least, the more common features of strong prime ministers (Table 12.1). The economy is the policy field on which strong prime ministers tend to focus most (42 per cent), with overall governmental organization and foreign affairs being at some distance and all other fields being of very little importance (see Table 12.2): thus those who are regarded as strong Table 12.1 Prime ministers’ style and their relative strength, according to ministers (percentages)

Consensus Talking to ministers individually Forcing the issue Taking new initiatives Shaping the external context Other Not applicable Total

A strong leader

A weak leader

Neither/nor

Not applicable

32 18

45 14

51 18

27 4

15 6

14 0

14 0

27 0

6

6

5

0

21 1 100

20 0 100

10 1 100

9 32 100

Table 12.2 Prime ministers’ fields of involvement and their relative strength according to ministers (percentages) A strong leader A weak leader Neither/nor Not applicable Overall governmental organization Special domain Economy Social affairs Foreign affairs Defence Your department Coalition problems All these areas Others Not applicable Total

18

13

15

14

6 42 1 11 0 1 1 13 6 1 100

22 22 17 6 0 0 4 4 10 2 100

13 26 6 6 1 1 9 10 9 4 100

0 36 5 0 0 0 0 9 0 36 100

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prime ministers in Central Eastern Europe do not place as much emphasis as those who are regarded as weak prime ministers on subjects which are not viewed as highly relevant during the transition to the market economy. Meanwhile, the fields of involvement of weak leaders are more varied and more balanced. The economy and a ‘special domain’ take the lead, but social questions, overall governmental organization, foreign affairs, coalition problems, and other areas are also more frequently mentioned by the ministers under whom these leaders served as being those in which these ‘weaker’ prime ministers are involved. Duration in office appears to be the most important factor among this group of variables accounting for the strength of prime ministers. If we divide prime ministers into two groups – those having served three years or more and those having served less than three years – a clear relationship appears: 61 per cent of the prime ministers who were described as strong served more than three years, while this was the case with only 35 per cent of those who were described as weak and of 26 per cent of those who were described as being ‘neither strong nor weak’. In Central Eastern Europe, especially in the earlier period, there was political turmoil. Being a leader is like riding a tiger, as Mitterrand once noted: Drnovsek of Slovenia, Antall of Hungary or Klaus of the Czech Republic were indeed riding tigers. Given the exceptional circumstances of the time, these long-serving prime ministers can be regarded as having been exceptionally strong. There is, however, another group of long-serving and strong prime ministers: it is composed of those who stayed in power a result of special political circumstances, as occurred in the cases of Zeman of the Czech Republic and of Meciar of Slovakia. In the first of these two cases a minority government was supported or ‘tolerated’ by the main opposition party; in the second, the government was held together by a power-driven and popular leader. Explanations based on the structure of the political system The power of a prime minister over ministers is typically regarded as depending upon the extent to which the cabinet is single-party or is a coalition (Jones 1991; Müller, Philipp and Gerlich 1993). Yet this does not appear to be the case in Central Eastern Europe, although, given that the proportion of single-party governments is small, as we know, a firm conclusion cannot easily be drawn. There is in effect no difference among single-party cabinets and coalition cabinets, whether of the minority, minimum winning or surplus majority character, in terms of the proportion of strong prime ministers, although there is a tendency (based on very small numbers, admittedly) for prime ministers described as being ‘neither


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strong nor weak’ to be proportionately more numerous in coalitions (Table 12.3). Moreover, those ministers who are from the same party as the prime minister are more likely to feel that that prime ministers have been strong, the difference being 11 percentage points (Table 12.4). There are also differences between countries. In the Czech Republic, Slovenia and to a more limited extent Hungary, ministers describe their prime ministers as strong; yet these are also countries in which there is high political stability. In Poland and Romania, on the contrary, the proportion of prime ministers described as strong is appreciably smaller (Table 12.5). Comparative studies of Western Europe concluded that prime ministers’ political resources are most important for the position and role in government of cabinet leaders and that the most important political resource of all is constituted by the party (Jones 1991: 164). During the Table 12.3 Type of government and prime ministers’ strength according to ministers (percentages)

Single-party government Minimal winning coalition Surplus coalition Single-party minority Multi-party minority Caretaker Not applicable

A strong leader

A weak leader

Neither/ nor

Not applicable

Total (N)

82

0

9

9

100 (22)

69

14

14

3

100 (179)

71 71

9 14

18 10

2 5

100 (179) 100 (21)

67

8

20

5

100 (60)

55 0

0 0

28 0

17 100

100 (18) 100 (4)

Table 12.4 Strength of prime minister by party affiliation according to ministers (percentages)

A strong leader A weak leader Neither/nor Not applicable Total (N)

Same party

Different party

75 7 12 6 100 (200)

64 12 20 4 100 (282)

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Table 12.5 Strength of prime minister by country according to ministers (percentages) A strong leader A weak leader Neither/nor Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Bulgaria Romania Poland

100 97 83 73 73 66 65 64 52 43

0 0 4 8 3 7 12 7 31 25

0 0 9 10 23 19 23 19 15 29

Not applicable Total 0 3 4 9 1 8 0 10 2 3

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

transition from communism the stability and strength of political parties and of the party system varied from country to country and over time. All the prime ministers who were either the founders of their party (Klaus, Meciar), successfully transformed their party (Horn) or reached a dominant position in their party (Orbán, Drnovsek) were regarded as strong.2 The constitutional arrangement of the executive powers appeared to influence the position of prime ministers in some countries. Those countries which either have a semi-presidential system (Lithuania and Romania) or had political conflicts over power-sharing between president and prime minister (Poland and, to a limited extent, Bulgaria) had a higher proportion of weak prime ministers than average (a third – in Romania and a quarter in Poland, as against 11 per cent overall); however, political – mainly party and parliamentary – instability in these countries may well have played a part. In Poland, although the constitutional powers of the prime minister increased from 1997 as a result of constitutional changes, only 11 per cent of the ministers concerned rated Buzek as a ‘strong’ prime minister; yet he remained in office for an appreciably longer period than his predecessors. This state of affairs may be due to the strength of the president, Kwasniewski, despite the fact that his powers were reduced in 1997, compared to those of Walesa: he used his political skills and popularity to act as a veto player against Buzek’s right-wing government. The role of some prime ministers was enhanced as a result of their personality and of historical circumstances. Thus, Drnovsek of Slovenia led the Liberal-Democrat Party and his country as prime minister for almost a decade before becoming president. His successor, Rop, did not have the same popular appeal and had to resign in 2004. Similarly, the quality of


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political leadership changed in the Czech Republic after the 2002 election when Zeman resigned from the leadership of the Social Democratic Party: there were to be two different prime ministers in the following two years. Country variations have played an important part in Western Europe, although it is difficult to determine how far this is due to the specific characteristics of the political culture of the countries concerned (Müller, Philipp and Gerlich 1993: 238). The constitutional environment, the political and in particular the party resources, the level of political consolidation all influence the length of tenure of prime ministers. The time variable appears in turn to be most important factor accounting for the strength of prime ministers, while other political factors (party or type of government) seem secondary.

Four types of prime ministers in Central Eastern Europe Studies of prime ministers in Western Europe led to the elaboration of typologies of prime ministers. These focused on constitutional and political factors, such as territorial and vertical decentralization or the type of cabinet (Rose 1991: 18f), on the relations with ministers (Sartori 1976: 102f) and on the prime ministers’ political style, a style which in turn depends on purpose, skill and circumstances (Norton 1988). The belief in the increased power of prime ministers led to the notion of a ‘prime-ministerial’ type of cabinet government, which was referred to in the introduction to this chapter (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990: 8). King (1994) classifies Western European prime ministers in relation to their cabinet on the basis of two criteria – the prime ministers’ decision-making powers and the extent to which the cabinet is collective; this leads him to distinguish between three types of influence of prime ministers – strong, medium and weak. These classifications help to identify the factors which account for the way ministers regard their prime ministers in the ten countries analysed in this study. The data analysed here suggest that, as we saw in chapter 5, there is substantial scope for debate about the character of Central Eastern European cabinets since a large majority of ministers describe their prime ministers as strong, but a large majority also state that these prime ministers mostly seek consensus: part of the explanation may be that prime ministers had to operate, in most cases, in the context of coalition governments. Some prime ministers in the region appear to owe the fact that they are perceived as strong leaders to their personal role in managing the economy, to the influence they exercise on their coalition partners, and to their ability to build and maintain stable coalitions, the power of the prime minister in a

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coalition depending on the extent to which he or she can control the coalition parties. Overall, the fact that there is a relationship between the extent to which prime ministers are regarded as strong and the extent to which cabinet decision-making is viewed as effective suggests that strong prime ministers did contribute to the streamlining of the cabinet decisionmaking process. On the basis of prime ministerial strength and of institutional and political conditions, the cabinets of Central Eastern European countries appear to fall into four categories. Hungary is definitely in the first, as its constitution, compared to the other countries analysed here, gives more power to the prime minister; yet the key to the exercise of these powers is the political context. Only Boros, who succeeded Antall when he died, was not regarded as a strong prime minister, perhaps because he was unable to control what was then ruling party, the Hungarian Forum. Given the organizational stability of the two main parties in the country and the consolidated pattern of party competition, the position of Hungarian prime ministers is exceptionally strong compared to that of prime ministers in the other countries analysed here. Yet the key prerequisite for a fully ‘prime ministerial’ type of government – total control over an overall majority in parliament – occurred only once in Hungary; indeed, even then the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party formed a surplus coalition. This may change in the future, but Hungarian prime ministers seem to be easy to replace if they lose party support or violate coalition agreements, as was the case of Megyessy, who became prime minister after the 2002 elections and was perceived by the public as a strong leader, but lost office after two years: he had not controlled his party and was made to pay the price. Orbán is the only prime minister who, during his tenure in office between 1998 and 2002, did dominate his party, Fidesz, even though he was not its chairman, and translated what were formal powers into full control not just over his own party but also over his coalition partner. A second group of countries comprises those in which prime ministers are strong, but as a result of their own political resources. This group includes Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia under Meciar. In these countries prime ministers are able to exercise control over their own party and also over the coalition partners and can stay in power for a substantial period; they then cease to be ‘chairmen’ to become ‘chiefs’. Such a transformation occurred in Slovakia with Dzurinda during his second term which began after the 2002 election (Haughton 2005). Estonia and Latvia are in a third group in which prime ministers are sometimes regarded as strong (Kallas, Laar, Gailis), but where personal leadership skills are more dependent on the fragmented party system and on


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open party competition. The number and nature of parties in coalitions are the critical variables, as they provide the key to the power of prime ministers. Those heads of government in the two countries who stayed in power even after some coalition party left the government were skillful leaders, but they had to face severe complications stemming from the nature of the coalitions which they were leading. Finally, the fourth group includes countries which have – or have had – a semi-presidential system. Such a system tends to reduce the power of the prime minister, as we noted, perhaps particularly in the post-communist context, since the rules of the game are subject to different interpretations on the part of political leaders: this did occur in Poland, Romania, Lithuania and, to an extent, in Bulgaria.

Conclusion This chapter started with the proposition that, in parliamentary democracies, prime ministers were regarded as the most influential, powerful and visible members of the governments. That proposition was advanced as a result of studies based essentially on Western European cabinets, as well as on the cabinets of Commonwealth and of a number of other polities. The examination of the development of cabinet government in Central Eastern Europe showed that in these countries, too, the proposition was valid. That general statement was followed by others which suggested that there were types of prime ministers: some were ‘chairmen’, others ‘chiefs’; more controversially, a number of scholars suggested that there were also situations in which the cabinet had become ‘prime ministerial’ and that, in this case, the notion that cabinet government is collegial was purely and simply abandoned. If the notion of ‘prime ministerial’ cabinets is controversial, or at least exceptional, in Western Europe, it also seems highly exceptional in the ten countries which have been studied here. What emerged on the contrary was that prime ministers were often regarded as strong by their colleagues in the cabinet, but that such strength was accompanied in the vast majority of cases by efforts made by the leader to keep the cabinet together rather than to impose decisions. Thus, in relation to prime ministers, as with all other aspects of the life of cabinets which have been studied in this volume, cabinets from Central Eastern Europe display patterns of decision-making and of personal relationships which are scarcely any different from those of the countries which had previously been studied. These cabinets appear to steer a middle course between full equality among the ministers and

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domination by the prime minister. This does, indeed, appear to be also the way in which the cabinets of the region, as those of Western Europe, are able to manage and indeed resolve the key contradiction inherent in the parliamentary system, which, as we noted from the start, stems from the fact that the requirement of collegiality has to be associated with the need for effectiveness.

13 Conclusion

We have stated it before, but the point is worth repeating in the conclusion: Central Eastern European countries have successfully adopted the parliamentary-cabinet system of government in the early 1990s and have maintained a high standard of achievement ever since. The odds were against it – as they have been elsewhere, for instance in the countries of the CIS. They were against it because the success of the cabinet system entailed simultaneously the building from scratch of a working pluralistic party system, the emergence of a wholly new political ‘class’ able to operate within the context of an ‘open’ political system and the establishment of administrative structures around the cabinet which could steer and process the amount of policy change which had to take place in the legal, economic and social fields. The results are impressive. The countries of Central Eastern Europe have a governmental system which compares well with the governmental systems of Western Europe – thus wholly justifying the European Union membership of these countries. This study had two aims. The first and more immediate was to provide an understanding of the characteristics of decision-making at the top in Central Eastern Europe by discovering from those who have been directly involved in the process, the ministers, both how they saw the cabinet operating and how they assessed that operation. The second and more long-term aim was to contribute to the building of an empirical comparative study of cabinet government and in particular of the ways in which decision-making takes place in that form of government. About one-third of the countries of the world are now ruled by the cabinet system, including, alongside Central Eastern Europe, nearly all of Western Europe, a large number of Commonwealth countries – from huge India to tiny islands in the Caribbean, and a few others, such as Japan or Israel. The fact that Central Eastern Europe belong to the group means that one can be 193

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somewhat more sanguine about both the regularities and the specificities which one finds in that system of government: over the course of the last few decades, much more has come to be known about cabinet government in Western Europe and in some of the older members of the Commonwealth; to discover how ministers react in the new cabinet systems of Central Eastern Europe means that one is gradually acquiring evidence about most of the relevant universe. To draw at least tentative conclusions about these two aims of the study, let us first return to some of the points which the analysis conducted here has made possible to establish; let us then examine how far findings about Central Eastern Europe can bring us one step further in the direction of a general understanding of the way in which cabinet government operates in contemporary societies.

Cabinet decision-making in Central Eastern Europe: how far can one give credence to ministerial answers? The first and most general conclusion from the study is that the ministers who were interviewed were most positive about decision-making processes in the cabinets to which they belonged. This leads to questions, however, about the extent to which one can rely on the answers which were given. This point was raised in the introductory chapter, admittedly, but in the abstract and largely on the ground that there was no realistic alternative to interviewing ministers if one wanted to find out, not just about the attitudes of these ministers to cabinet decision-making, but about the very nature of cabinet decision-making itself. Now that the ministerial answers have been examined, it seems right to return to the matter and, in particular, to consider two sets of criticisms, one about whether these answers have not been ‘overoptimistic’ and the other about the extent to which ministers can be expected to remember enough about what took place to be able to make overall assessments. First, is it not the case that ministers have been ‘overoptimistic’? 82 per cent were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the cabinet decision-making process; 85 per cent felt that there had been ‘good collaboration’ between them and the civil servants. Do these proportions not indicate a tendency to look a little too much on the ‘rosy side’? It is of course impossible to know whether there has not been some exaggeration here, but, if there has been exaggeration, the ministers in this survey are in good company as the proportion of satisfied Western European ministers was also very large, if a little smaller (70 per cent), while the proportion of Western European ministers who believed that there was ‘good collaboration’ with civil servants was 68 per cent. Thus, either there has been some reluctance in

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both cases to give a negative answer – but this is very unlikely on the part of Western European ministers, as criticisms of the cabinet system and of ministers–civil servants relationships had been widely aired in many forums and publications – or one has to recognize that the participants are manifestly less unhappy about how that system and these relationships operate than are some observers. Thus the most that can be said is that, if there was a degree of ‘overoptimism’ on the part of ministers in this survey, the proportion of such ‘overoptimists’ cannot have been very large. What is perhaps the case is that the ‘true’ meaning of some replies is rather uncertain, as was pointed out in particular in Chapter 7 about the meaning of ‘importance’ in the reply given to the inquiry about the role of party in cabinet decision-making. Overall, moreover, these highly positive answers also have to be placed alongside other assessments about which there were sharp divisions of opinion, for instance, as we saw in Chapter 6, on the extent to which discussions took place outside the cabinet or substantial disagreements occurred. The other type of criticism relates to the ability of ministers to remember what occurred and, if they do, to summarize by means of simple answers the nature of prevailing processes after months and even years may have elapsed since the events. This point may seem valid, but it is noticeable that ministers did provide without difficulty the answers required, as Western European ministers had done a decade earlier. Indeed, the spread of the answers to the ‘factual’ questions varies markedly and yet, where a comparison can be drawn with Western Europe, the pattern is rather similar. This suggests here also that either both surveys elicit wrong responses but with broadly equal distributions or both elicit a valid picture of what ministers experienced while they were in government.

The substantive answers given by ministers in this survey The ministers of Central Eastern Europe have what might be described a ‘modern’ outlook with respect to the cabinet system: they approve of the fact that the cabinet should operate on the basis of structures resembling those of Western Europe, which they were indeed willing to adopt in broad terms. In the cabinets of Central Eastern Europe an apparatus was set up and modes of behaviour developed which are outwardly similar to the apparatus and the modes of behaviour prevailing in Western European cabinets, not to the apparatuses and the modes of behaviour which had characterized Western European cabinets earlier and were altered only slowly in the course of the twentieth century. Cabinet meetings, secretariats and even cabinet committees broadly followed patterns which had

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become widespread in Western Europe, even if the committees do not perform equally well everywhere the gatekeeping functions which they perform in Western Europe, functions which they perform perhaps in this case at times too much at the expense of cabinet collegiality. Despite their general ‘satisfaction’, ministers from Central Eastern Europe are realistic enough to express a variety of sentiments about the way in which, in practice, the cabinet operates. There is thus a marked division of opinion about the extent to which ‘substantial disagreements’ occur in cabinet and about the different sets of arrangements which are adopted to solve these disagreements. The problems posed by collegiality are thus confronted with the need for effectiveness. If ministers are mostly satisfied, this is in a context in which a balance is to be achieved between these two goals in a manner which is not different, as a matter of fact, from the balance achieved by their counterparts from Western Europe. Another difficulty with which ministers have to come to grips arises from the place occupied by party in the life of the government. The cabinet system is representative only insofar as party has a significant role; but the collegiality and, indeed, the status of the cabinet as an autonomous body depend on the party or parties associated with the government not exercising continuous control over governmental action. Ministers in the countries analysed here appear to have been able to overcome this problem by having a close relationship with party committees and party officials, but by combining that relationship with some distance from party suggestions: few are those who ask for party help when decisions have to be taken. There is therefore ‘party government’ in the general and somewhat institutional sense that ministers are associated with a party, but not in the sense in which, at least for the majority of ministers, their party should oblige them to act in a certain way: the case of the Czech ministers is extreme, but it does correspond to a rather widespread underlying attitude. The problem of representation is also affected by the fact that, although ministers from Central Eastern Europe seem not to dislike majority coalitions, they do not seem to find that these coalitions have particular virtues. They may even prefer single-party governments, but the number of cases in which the comparison is possible is limited. The choice between efficiency, and indeed collegiality, on the one hand, and representation, on the other, has to be made: as in Western Europe, but to the extent that it is possible to judge the views of ministers from Central Eastern Europe on this matter, that choice is marginally in favour of cabinets which do not have too wide a political base, these cabinets being also viewed as somewhat less dependent on party for the solution of problems.

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The ministers from the countries analysed in this study are not just satisfied with the administrative support they receive, both from the secretariat and from civil service in general: they are truly enthusiastic. Only a very small minority feels that the secretariat has too much influence, while some ministers even believe that that influence is too limited. Meanwhile, if a small minority only sees the secretariat as helping to steer discussions, this is in a context in which ministers had to choose among a variety of statements about the various roles which secretariats fulfill. Moreover, although ministers appear to draw a distinction between the departmental role of civil servants and the role played by these civil servants in advising ministers on cabinet matters, what is truly remarkable is the overwhelming approval given to the civil service. This overwhelming approval is especially remarkable as it is given at a time when a radical transformation of the societies was taking place and when ministers most strongly needed the clear and loyal support of the members of the departments which they ran. The reactions of ministers to the cabinet system are manifestly coloured by the feelings they have vis-à-vis their colleagues, and in particular the prime minister, as well as by the views they have about their own role and their own scope for action. Most of them note, with approval, that the prime ministers under whom they served were ‘strong’ leaders, while a large majority also recognized that ministers of finance were the most important ministers. Yet these ‘strong’ prime ministers are also regarded as leaders of collegial governments: only 15 per cent of those who were interviewed suggested that prime ministers solved problems by ‘forcing the issue’. Indeed, twice as many ministers said that these ‘strong’ prime ministers operated by means of consensus as said that they operated by ‘forcing the issue’. The collegial nature of the cabinet decision-making process emerges once more when one considers the way in which the ministers in this study describe their behaviour in cabinet. They are by and large more active in cabinet than Western European ministers, as they are appreciably more involved in discussions not related to matters of their department, even if differences in the wording of the answers render a direct comparison somewhat uncertain and therefore leave some ground for speculation. What is clear at least is that the ministers of the countries examined here did take not just their job but the cabinet seriously. Of course, to return to a point made early in this section, it could be that the display of ‘activism’ asserted by large numbers of ministers is another example of ‘overoptimism’. Yet the fact that cabinet meetings lasted longer in Central Eastern Europe suggests that ministers indeed may have taken part more often in discussions than their counterparts from Western Europe have tended to

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do. Admittedly, the variety and depth of the problems under discussion in cabinet could or should have led to even more participation than was in fact the case: but it is surely valuable that the collegial character of cabinets should be recognized by means of an active membership of these cabinets. This is so, even if, at least in theory, there could have been even more participation – indeed, in such a case, perhaps at the expense of the effectiveness of the decision-making process.

What the survey indicates about cabinet government in general Examining the characteristics of cabinet government in Central Eastern Europe is therefore interesting per se, especially given the circumstances in which that form of government was introduced in the region: but these characteristics must also help to build a more general picture of the conditions under which cabinet government is likely to function, and to function best. This is particularly important given what was said early in this volume as well as, now and then, throughout the chapters which followed. The cabinet system of government operates on the basis of practical arrangements which must be such that they allow for contradictory requirements to coexist. These contradictory requirements are essentially those of collegiality and efficiency: collegiality is partly dependent on representativeness, as the cabinet has to be collegial because it includes party men and women who have to act together in order to respond to the requests, perhaps the demands, of those who elected these parties; efficiency means an ability to manage and a knowledge or at least an understanding of specialized, even technical matters: those who are exclusively representatives are unlikely, by and large, to fulfill this last requirement. Not surprisingly, these problems have been aired and there have been ‘ideas’ – if not strictly speaking ‘models’, let alone ‘theories’ – about how the contradiction could be resolved. If one is to view efficiency and collegiality-representation as being at the opposite ends of a continuous dimension, one can imagine that suggestions might be made about what position on this dimension would provide the best results: yet, as a matter of fact, suggestions of this type have not been forthcoming so far. The ‘ideas’ which have been aired have tended to take as givens the various requirements, not so much as a result of an analysis of the dilemmas which cabinet government have to face, but from the almost casual empirical observation that cabinet government had certain characteristics in some countries while having other characteristics in others. Perhaps such a development has resulted from the fact that the analysis

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of cabinet government has primarily taken place at the level of individual countries. Indeed, even comparative studies on the subject have remained circumscribed to a small number of countries, primarily those of Western Europe. This is precisely why the extension of cabinet government to East Central Europe and the Balkans provides a new opportunity which must not be missed. Four key problems have gradually been raised in the context of cabinet government. These are: (1) the contrast between ‘consensual’ versus ‘majoritarian’ government, which was essentially ‘discovered’, so to speak, by A. Lijphart (Lijphart, 1984, 1999); (2) the notion of ‘party government’ and its characteristics, which was primarily examined, as was pointed out in Chapter 7, by R.S. Katz; (3) the problem posed by the role of prime ministers and perhaps other ministers since a ‘hierarchical’ structure may as a result be in the process of being substituted for the collegial principle; and (4) the distinction between ‘amateur’ and ‘specialist’ ministers, often mentioned but not systematically examined, any more than has been the connected matter of the relationship between ministers and civil servants, about which no real solution has been found either, except the purely juridical one according to which ministers should ‘carry the can’ whatever civil servants may do. Let us examine these four points in the light of the analysis of the characteristics of cabinet government in Western Europe and, now, Central Eastern Europe. Consensual and majoritarian cabinets Lijphart was the first to point out that consensual cabinets constituted an entirely different form of cabinet government, and not merely, as many had previously been inclined to believe, an ‘aberration’. This is because Lijphart believes profoundly that governments should be as ‘representative’ as possible if they are to be truly democratic. Yet he also felt it necessary to show that consensual governments were no less efficient than majoritarian governments and he attempted therefore to demonstrate that the policy achievements in consensual governments could be even greater than those of majoritarian ones. If successful, such a demonstration might be expected to mean that the contradiction between collegialityrepresentation and efficiency was in fact overcome: on this point, however, the evidence provided in the volume which Lijphart published in 1999 is mixed. Yet the problem is wider and indeed different, as a consensus approach to government is not merely aimed at – and therefore justified by – ‘better’ policy achievements: it is surely above all concerned to provide all or nearly all with the opportunity to participate at all times in decision-making at the top. This point is indeed critical for countries

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with profound ethnic or linguistic divisions, as some of those in Central Eastern Europe. Yet the broad Western European answer given by ministers to Lijphart’s view has been that these are more satisfied, nonetheless, with single-party governments; the same appears to be the case in the few countries of Central Eastern Europe in which there have been single-party governments. Moreover, minority coalitions are also regarded by ministers as more satisfactory than majority coalitions, while there is almost no difference at all in levels of satisfaction among ministers about whether the coalition is based on a small (minimum winning) or a large (surplus) majority and, therefore, whether the coalition gives or not the widest possible opportunities for representation. This, of course, is the opinion of ministers only. Yet behind that opinion lies the question of collegiality: ministers tend to believe that cabinets based on minority coalitions or on single-party governments are less likely to find themselves controlled from outside and are also less likely to have substantial disagreements. The question, therefore, arises as to whether highly ‘consensual’ cabinets (from the point of view of representation) are not, to an extent, bodies which are both less autonomous and less able to come to decisions by way, precisely, of (in this case internal) consensus! The study of ministerial attitudes in Central Eastern Europe does at least indicate that a contradiction exists between the goal of ‘representation’ and the goal of ‘collegiality’: the dilemma cannot be avoided or by-passed. The problem of ‘party government’ The fact that the study undertaken here supports the views which emerged from the analyses conducted in Western Europe with respect to ‘party government’ suggests that, here too, the matter has to be examined in a more systematic manner than has hitherto been the case. The question of party government has indeed been ignored in the sense that the literature on cabinets merely notes that cabinets are formed by parties, that the representatives of these parties are either in or support from outside the cabinet and that this contributes positively to the representative character of the government. It may indeed be the case that majority coalition governments are, by their very composition, more representative than where parties are not participating in the government from inside or are associated with the government from outside: the point is, however, that such a state of affairs poses the question of the autonomy of the cabinet, unless some solution is found which determines the dividing line between what the party’s or

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parties’ role is to be and what the cabinet can do on its own. Never has such a dividing line been searched for, let alone found. The result is that, in practice, ad hoc arrangements are made of the kind which were identified in the course of this volume for Central Eastern Europe and which had also been identified earlier, in the Western European case. These arrangements consist in ensuring that ministers have a party background and make a habit of regularly meeting with party representatives when they are in office, but do not appear to be particularly concerned with the policy desires of the party. Whether this is the only realistic way of solving the dilemma is as yet not possible to say: it would be most valuable, however, to be able to determine whether other workable solutions have been found in other cabinet systems. The study of cabinets in East-Central Europe, Bulgaria and Romania has made it possible at least to establish that this kind of arrangement is the one which, as in Western Europe, appears to be acceptable both to supporting parties and to the cabinet. A collegial or a hierarchical cabinet?: prime ministers and other ‘important’ ministers The question of ‘prime ministerial’ government has agitated both observers and specialists for decades in connection with the British Cabinet in particular, but it has also been raised in connection with other countries, for instance Germany (Kanzlerdemokratie), while the matter has hovered over other cabinets both from the point of view of the role of certain prime ministers (and presidents in ‘semi-presidential’ systems) and in connection with ‘senior’ ministers, especially ministers of finance. Yet the question is not merely one of practical interest: it does touch on the philosophy of cabinet government as it undermines or perhaps even destroys the notion that the cabinet is a collegial body, where all are formally ‘equal’, and replaces that arrangement by a ‘hierarchical’ model typically characteristic of presidential systems. Yet the pressure for strong, perhaps overwhelming, prime ministerial influence does not result solely from the ambitions of some prime ministers: it results also, and perhaps primarily, from the need for efficiency. A cabinet of about twenty persons will find decisions difficult to take if a truly collegial – egalitarian – system prevails; a variety of ‘tricks’ have therefore to be found to reduce the collegial aspect of the decision-making. Parties play an important part in this respect, but they tend to do so from outside, at least if there is a major conflict; prime ministers and other important ministers, especially ministers of finance, can apply pressure from inside. What they do is less visible and, in particular if the

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prime minister is popular (which he or she should be if the party or parties are to remain in power after the next election), that pressure may be widely regarded as not just acceptable, but even justified. Much has been said about the role of prime ministers in the literature, with a large part of that literature condemning the exaggerated role which some prime ministers may have played. The opinion of ministers on the subject is obviously of great importance: as a matter of fact, one notices that very few ministers resign their posts voluntarily on the grounds that the prime minister is dominant, while many more are simply sacked. In any case, the examination of the assessments of ministers in both this and the earlier Western European study does indicate that ministers do not appear particularly worried by the part which prime ministers (and perhaps other ministers) play in cabinet. ‘Strong’ prime ministers appear to be liked; as was noted earlier, in the eyes of most ministers concerned, the ‘strength’ of these prime ministers does not mean that the prime minister does not operate on the basis of consensus in his or her relation with the cabinet. Thus what is viewed as a ‘dissonance’ by many outsiders appears to be regarded as a satisfactory arrangement, on the whole, by the participants. The problem remains, admittedly, but what is needed, in the first instance, is to understand better why (most) ministers do not appear to ‘resent’ the ‘strength’ of the leader. Here again, since the findings of this study go in the same direction as earlier findings for Western Europe, one needs to understand the way in which, in their minds, ministers reconcile what appears to many outsiders to be a difficult dilemma, if not an impossible contradiction. Amateurs or professionals, generalists or specialists? By accident and not by design, cabinet government started on the basis of the view that its members were to be ‘amateurs’: this has been said, for instance, of the British Cabinet, which has been for decades the model other cabinets were expected to imitate. The ‘amateur’ or ‘generalist’ character of members of cabinets was indeed in sharp contrast to the ‘professional’ or ‘specialist’ character of governments in traditional monarchies, at least when these monarchies attempted to counteract the ‘dangers’ of liberalism by becoming ‘enlightened’. What French kings had done for generations thus became what kings or emperors began to do in other parts of Europe from the latter part of the eighteenth century when choosing their ministers: specialist ministers would help to achieve the social and economic progress which would in turn help to avoid ‘revolution’. As a matter of fact, not all monarchs did avoid revolution; they certainly did not avoid an ‘evolution’ which resulted in them losing their

Conclusion

203

real decision-making power to a cabinet government. Yet, as that ‘evolution’ was often slow or as the notion that ministers should be ‘specialists’ had become deeply ingrained, Western European cabinets became divided into those which – as in the case of the UK, Belgium or Italy – were composed almost exclusively of ‘amateurs’ and those which – as in the case of the Dutch or Austrian cabinets – included large numbers of ‘specialists’. That division remained throughout the twentieth century in Western Europe, French Fifth Republic governments having partly returned to the ‘specialist’ practices which had characterized the old monarchy. Despite the fact that many viewed the practice of appointing ‘specialists’ as undermining the idea of a collegial and egalitarian cabinet, that practice was not abandoned, however, as, coincidentally, technical requirements came to be regarded as essential to the efficiency of modern government. Indeed, some Western European ministers interviewed in the 1990s complained about their limited technical competence, a view shared by the ministers from the countries analysed here, since, as against under 20 per cent who cited experience as an MP or as a junior minister as ‘personal experiences which were particularly useful to [their] activity as minister[s]’, four-fifths mentioned either ‘prior knowledge of the subject matter’ or ‘technical capacity or knowledge’. The cabinet system may still be largely based on the notion that ministers should be ‘amateurs’, but some of the ministers themselves do not appear to believe that this is what they need. Collegiality is undermined in the process, as ‘specialist’ ministers are more likely, at least in principle, to concentrate on their interests and their competence. As ministers from Central Eastern Europe appear to have similar views on this subject to those expressed by many of their Western European counterparts, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there is here a further problem which the analysis of cabinet government has to grapple with, but which it must do after having taken into account what ministers appear to be commonly doing. The examination of the views of ministers about the cabinets to which they belonged thus does not just provide information about what these ministers believe to be the case and about what they think is right: it also provides clues as to how the dilemmas which cabinet government faces tend to be solved in practice. The solutions which ministers adopt or prefer may not be those which should be adopted, but it is surely insufficient to state that cabinet government needs to combine a collegial and representative goal with an efficiency goal: what must be determined is how far – and in what ways – the two goals can be optimized. Ministers tell about the directions in which participants tend to move in order to optimize these goals. Perhaps these directions are not those which should be

204


preferred; but two conclusions follow from the fact that these directions have been adopted, not just in Western Europe, but in those other parts of Europe which chose cabinet government when they had the freedom to do so. The first is that political science needs to make a determined effort to develop general ‘models’ of cabinet government; the second is that such models will be successful only if they take into account the lessons which emerged from the practice of most cabinets and, in particular, of the cabinets of those countries which have recently adopted the system of cabinet government.

Appendix 1 The number of ministerial interviews per country (1990–2003) The general characteristics of the ministerial questionnaire Given the absence of direct access to documents on cabinet decision-making in Central Eastern Europe over the past 15 years, the basic source of information for this book are interviews with ministers who have served in post-communist cabinets. The experience arising from empirical studies with the political elite in various countries has shown that, in the preparation and administration of the interview schedule, care must be taken with respect to five points: 1. The questionnaire must be administered orally if frank and valuable answers are to be obtained. 2. Interviews should not last more than two hours. 3. Confidentiality must be clearly stated from the start. 4. All questions should be open-ended and must be tape recorded. 5. Interviews must be structured in such a way that a comparative analysis becomes possible.

Pre-coding of interviews The questionnaire was prepared to meet these five requirements. In order to ensure a strict comparability (as well as to minimize costs in particular to avoid heavy expenditure on translation), the comparative data in this book are based on answers given by the interviewers to a common pre-coded questionnaire.

Selection of interviews In the ten countries under investigation, the following ministers were excluded from the sample: – – – –

those who were dead, those who had been in office before the constitution was in force those who were still in office those who have been in office less than 12 months

The sample Number

1 2 3

Country

Name of interviewer

Number of interviews

Total number of ministers in office

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia

Dobrinka Kostova Zdenka Mansfeldova

25 21

107 72

Georg and Erik Sootla

39

80 (Continued)

205

206

Appendix 1

The Sample

(Continued)

Number

Country

Name of interviewer

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Total

Gabriela Ilonszki Andris Runcis Algis Krupavicius Radek Markowski Alina Mungiu-Pippidi Darina Malovà Alenka Krasovec

Number of interviews

Total number of ministers in office

40 40 34 45 33 22 21 320

89 71 98 137 105 73 69 901

Appendix 2 Questionnaire on rules, agenda setting, cabinet meetings and committees 1.

RULES

Q. 1 Are any cabinet rules and operating procedures mentioned in: a) legislative statutes YES NO b) standing orders YES NO c) written code of practice YES NO Q. 2 Do the rules mentioned above cover most or few written of the actual procedures of the cabinet? MOST FEW Q. 3 On the whole, do the procedures of the cabinet (circle one X only): a) remain mostly unchanged across cabinets? X b) vary in some respects, but most procedures remain stable? X c) vary considerably? X Q. 4 When were the main rules adopted? (write in year)

2.

AGENDA AND MINUTES

Q. 5 Does the cabinet secretariat circulate the agenda? a) If NO, who does? (write in)

YES

NO

Q. 7 Does the cabinet secretariat circulate the minutes? a) If NO, who does? (write in)

YES

NO

Q. 8 Does the cabinet secretariat check the application? a) If NO, who does? (write in)

YES

NO

Q. 6 How long before the meeting is the agenda circulated? (write in number of days)

3.

CABINET MEETING

Q. 9 Does the cabinet meet weekly? YES NO a) If NO, how frequently? (write in) b) On what day of the week? (write in) Q. 10 How long does it normally last? (approximate hours) Q. 11 Have there been changes in meeting duration? YES NO a) If YES do meetings last more or less MORE LESS Q. 12 Are votes taken at meetings?

NEVER 207

RARELY

SOMETIMES

208

4.

Appendix 2

CABINET COMMITTEES

Q. 13 How many cabinet committees are there now? (number) Q. 14 Has this number changed in the last ten years? a) If yes, are there more or less of them?

YES MORE

NO LESS

Q. 15 List the three most important ones. Q. 16 Who chooses the chair? (circle one cross only) a) PM? X b) Cabinet? X c) Committee members? X d) Varies among these? X Q. 17 Who decides the membership? (circle one cross only) a) PM? X b) Cabinet? X c) Varies among these? X Q. 18 Who determines the powers of committees? (circle one cross only) a) PM? X b) Cabinet? X c) Committee chair? X d) Varies among these? X Q. 19 Are committees able to decide issues or only prepare? (circle one cross only) a) decide X b) prepare X c) varies X

Appendix 3 Ministerial Questionnaire and Codebook Ministers in Central Eastern Europe (N ⴝ 320) Var

Questions

01

In how many cabinets did you serve as minister?

02

In your opinion, was the cabinet a place where major issues in cabinet were thoroughly debated?

03

If minister in more than one cabinet: In this respect did you feel that there were differences among cabinets to which you belonged?

04

If yes, second cabinet: which differences?

05

If yes, third cabinet: which differences?

06

If you feel that matters were not fully discussed in cabinet, where in your experience did that discussions mostly took place?

07

Let us return to discussions in cabinet. In your experience, were there instance of substantial disagreement amongst cabinet members?

08

If minister in more than one cabinet, were there differences with respect to disagreements between cabinets?

09

If yes: was the second cabinet more or less conflictual?

10

If yes: was the third cabinet: as the first cabinet; as the second cabinet; different than the second and the third cabinet?

If yes: how were these disagreements mostly solved? 11

First cabinet

12

Second cabinet

13

Third cabinet

How satisfied are you on the whole with the cabinet decision-making process? 14

First cabinet

15

Second cabinet

16

Third cabinet

00

What were the points which seemed to you in need of reform? (NOT CODED) 209

210

Appendix 3

On the whole do you think that the cabinet you participated was effective in decision making? 17

First cabinet

18

Second cabinet

19

Third cabinet

20

During your time in government, did foreign actors (governments, international organizations) try to influence decision-making in your ministry?

21

In those cases when foreign actors did have influence, would you say that their influence on your decisions were mostly positive or negative?

22

Have you ever felt under pressure from outside actors (NGOs, business organizations etc.) to initiate proposals for cabinet?

23

And now let us come to your own role as minister: Did you yourself go out of your departmental area in cabinet discussions?

In general was it common for ministers to participate in discussions not related to their departmental matters? 24

First cabinet

25

Second cabinet

26

Third cabinet

27

Which minister seems to you to be the most important person in cabinet?

28

Why is this minister important?

29

If minister of finance not mentioned: and what about the minister of finance? Why is he/she in your view not important? If you had a conflict with this important minister how did you usually solve this conflict?

30 31

In matters relating to your department, were there decisions that you did not feel able to take on your own?

32

For what reasons?

33

If you wanted/had to bring an issue to cabinet, what strategy did you follow?

As regards the PMs under whom you have served: Would you say he or she was . . . 34

First Prime Minister

35

Second Prime Minister

On what types of matters was he or she most influential? 36


37


38

Third Prime Minister

Appendix 3

211

In what ways did he or she exercise influence? 39


40


41


Did this mode of behaviour change during the PM’s tenure? 42


43


44


If yes: in what way? 45


46


47


48

What role did the PM’s office (secretariat) play in the cabinet decision-making?

Were there differences in the role the PM’s office (secretariat) from one cabinet to another? 49

First Prime Minister’s office

50

How did the office act? (First PM)

51

Second Prime Minister’s office

52

How did the office act? (Second PM)

53

Third Prime Minister’s office

54

How did the office act? (Third PM)

55

Generally speaking, do you think that the influence of the PM’s office (secretariat) was too large or too limited during your time as minister?

56

Which personal experiences would you consider to have been particularly useful for your activity as minister?

57

In the matter of minister–civil servant relationships: What kind of rapport did you establish with the officials in your department?

58

Would you trust your civil servants to provide reliable information?

59

Are you confident with the quality of civil servants’ work?

60

In your time as minister, how important was your party (the party that nominated you) for cabinet decision-making?

61

What kind of party meetings did you usually attend?

62

What kind of relationship existed between you and the top party executive?

212 63

Appendix 3 What kind of relationship existed between you and the parliamentary party (Fraktion/Faction)?

If you were a minister in a coalition: 64

What sort of contact existed between the coalition partners, to influence collaboration government policy?

65

Were there any differences in decision-making between the coalitions to which you belonged?

66

If yes: in what way for the 2nd coalition?

67

If yes: in what way for the 3rd coalition?

68

If yes: what were the reasons for these differences?

69

How did you brief yourself on cabinet matters?

What about the media? Were the media was most influential . . . 70

. . . on the topics of cabinet discussions?

71

. . . on the amount of time given to cabinet discussions?

72

. . . on the presentation of cabinet decisions?

73

. . . on the substance of cabinet decisions?

74

Is there any specific newspaper which has influenced your decision-making?

75

Is there any specific TV programme which has influenced your decisionmaking?

TO BE FILLED OUT BY THE INTERVIEWER FOR EACH CASE 76

Has the minister ever been elected to a political post prior to his/her first ministerial position?

77

Member of local government

78

Member of Parliament

79

Junior Minister

80

Member of caretaker government

81

Which party did the minister belong to? (during the beginning of turn in office)

82

Did he change his party over time?

83

What was the minister’s occupation during communism?

What type of government did the minister belong to? 84

First government

85

Second government

86

Third government

87

Case number

Appendix 3 88

Country code

00

Name of minister

00

Name of interviewer

00

Date of interview

213

Codebook Variable

Item

Coding

01

cabinets served . . .

1 2 3 4 5 6

from from from from from from

02

issues database

1 2 3 4

very often often seldom never

03

first cabinet

1 0

yes no

04

second cabinet

1 2 3

more debate less debate same as first cabinet

05

third cabinet

1 2 3 4

as first cabinet as second cabinet more debate less debate

06

discussions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

unformal ministerial cabinet committees PM and ministers parties bureaucracy interest groups parliament president other

07

disagreement

1 2 3 4


08

more than one cabinet

1 0

yes no

until until until until until until

(Continued)

214 Codebook

(Continued)

Variable

Item

Coding

09

second cabinet

1 2

more conflictual less conflictual

10

third cabinet

1 2 3

as first cabinet as second cabinet different than second and third cabinet

11

disagreement (first cabinet)

1 2 3 4 5 6

consensus coalition council president PM imposes referred to cabinet committee referred to discussions between PM and a minister referred to discussions between PM and ministers referred back to sponsoring department referred to discussions among ministers

7 8 9 12

disagreement (second cabinet)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

13

disagreement (third cabinet)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

consensus coalition council president PM imposes referred to cabinet committee referred to discussions between PM and a minister referred to discussions between PM and ministers referred back to sponsoring department referred to discussions among ministers consensus coalition council president PM imposes referred to cabinet committee referred to discussions between PM and a minister referred to discussions between PM and ministers referred back to sponsoring department

215

Variable

Item

Coding 9

referred to discussions among ministers

14

satisfied (first cabinet)

1 2 3 4

very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied

15

satisfied (second cabinet)

1 2 3 4


16

satisfied (third cabinet)

1 2 3 4


17

effective (first cabinet)

1 2 3 4


18

effective (second cabinet)

1 2 3 4


19

effective (third cabinet)

1 2 3 4


20

foreign actors

1 2 3 4


21

influence

1 2 3

mostly positive mostly negative not relevant

22

outside actors

1 2 3 4


23

role as minister

1 2 3 4

very often often seldom never (Continued)

216 Codebook

(Continued)

Variable

Item

Coding

24

participate in discussions (first cabinet)

1 2 3 4


25

participate in discussions (second cabinet)

1 2 3 4


26

participate in discussions (third cabinet)

1 2 3 4


27

important minister

1 2 3 4 5 6

foreign domestic finance economics justice other

28

important

1 2 3 4 5 6

substance of minister status seniority of minister official post his/ her party position other reasons

29

minister of finance

1 2 3 99

too junior in party too ‘new’ minister other not applicable

30

conflict

1 2 3 4 99

drop the issue go to PM go to cabinet other not applicable

31

decisions

1 2 3 4


32

reasons

1 2 3 4 5

innovative politically hot cost large coordination other

217

Variable

Item

Coding

33

strategy

1 2 3 4 5 6

agreement with other ministers cabinet committee discussions with PM cabinet secretariat directly to cabinet other

34

first PM was . . .

1 2 3 99

a strong leader a weak leader neither/nor not applicable (respondent was PM)

35

second PM was . . .

1 2 3 99

a strong leader a weak leader neither/nor not applicable (respondent was PM)

36

influence on matters (first PM)

1

overall governmental organization special ‘domain’ economy social affairs foreign affairs defence your department coalition problems all these areas others

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 37

influence on matters (second PM)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

38

influence on matters (third PM)

1 2 3 4

overall governmental organization special ‘domain’ economy social affairs foreign affairs defence your department coalition problems all these areas others overall governmental organization special ‘domain’ economy social affairs (Continued)

218 Codebook Variable

(Continued) Item

Coding 5 6 7 8 9 10

foreign affairs defence your department coalition problems all these areas others

39

influence (first PM)

1 2 3 4 5 6

consensus talking on ministers individually forcing the issue taking new initiatives shaping the external context other

40

influence (second PM)

1 2 3 4 5 6


41

influence (third PM)

1 2 3 4 5 6


42

change over time (first PM)

1 0

yes no

43

change over time (second PM)

1 0

yes no

44

change over time (third PM)

1 0

yes no

45

if yes (first PM)

1 2 0

more influence less influence no change

46

if yes (second PM)

1 2 0


47

if yes (third PM)

1 2 0


48

PM’s office

1 2 3

administrative role political role administrative and political role

219

Variable

Item

Coding

49

differences (first PM)

1 2 0

yes somewhat no

50

office (first PM)

1 2 3 4

7

reparation of the agenda control of policy suggestions advising the PM politically developing own policy suggestions for cabinet building support on government steering the discussion through advising channelling external interests

5 6

51

differences (second PM)

1 2 0

yes somewhat no

52

office (second PM)

1 2 3 4

7

preparation of the agenda control of policy suggestions advising the PM politically developing own policy suggestions for cabinet building support on government steering the discussion through advising channelling external interests

5 6

53

differences (third PM)

1 2 0

yes somewhat no

54

office (third PM)

1 2 3 4

7

preparation of the agenda control of policy suggestions advising the PM politically developing own policy suggestions for cabinet building support on government steering the discussion through advising channelling external interests

5 6

55

influence

1 2 3

too large adequate too limited

56

experiences

1

prior knowledge of the subject matter of your department (Continued)

220 Codebook Variable

(Continued) Item

Coding 2

57

minister – civil servant

1 2 3 4 5

your technical capacity or your knowledge as an administrator your experience as an mp your experience as a junior minister good collaboration overselling by civil servants blocking by civil servants mutual blocking other

58

information

1 2 3 4

yes mostly yes sometimes rarely not at all

59

quality

1 2 3 4

yes mostly yes sometimes rarely not at all

60

party

1 2 3 4

very important important a little important of no importance

61

party meetings

1 2 3 4

some official some unofficial, e.g. factions both official and unofficial none

62

party executive

1 2 3

close cooperation little cooperation no cooperation

63

parliamentary party

1 2 3


64

coalition partner

1 2 3


65

differences decision making

1 0

yes no

66

second coalition

1 2 3 4 99

party summits informal collaboration informal competition no contact not applicable (no in question 65)

3 4

221

Variable

Item

Coding

67

third coalition

1 2 3 4 99

party summits informal collaboration informal competition no contact not applicable (no in question 65)

68

reasons

1 2 3 4 9

prime minister parties prime minister and parties other not applicable (no in question 65)

69

briefing

1 2 3 4 5 6

cabinet secretariat your officials your personal staff your own party/the party that nominated you outside policy adviser other

70

influence (topics)

1 0

yes no

71

influence (discussion)

1 0

yes no

72

influence (decisions)

1 0

yes no

73

influence (substance)

1 0

yes no

74

newspaper

1 0

yes no

75

TV programme

1 0

yes no

TO BE FILLED OUT BE THE INTERVIEWER 76

political post

1 0

yes no

77

local government

1 0

yes no

78

member of parliament

1 0

yes no

79

junior minister

1 0

yes no

80

member of caretaker

1 0

yes no (Continued)

222 Codebook

(Continued)

Variable

Item

Coding

81

party affiliation

Name party:

82

change

83

occupation

84

type of government (first)

1 0

yes no

Name occupation: 1 2 3 4

6

single party government minimal winning coalition surplus coalition single party minority government multi party minority government caretaker government

85

type of government (second)

1 2 3 4 5 6


86

type of government (third)

1 2 3 4 5 6


87

case number

88

country code

00

Name of minister

00

Name of interviewer

00

Date of interview

5

Notes 1

The Cabinet as a New Form of Government in Post-Communist Democracies

1 The word ‘cabinet’ is used in this book as a short-hand expression to refer to the key national decision-making body in ‘parliamentary systems’, such as those of Western Europe or, since the early 1990s, Central Eastern Europe: these ‘cabinets’ formally take their decisions collectively and are responsible to parliament. This is not the case in what are sometimes referred to as ‘cabinets’ in other forms of government.

4

The Rules and the Operating Procedures in Cabinet

1 Sigma studies were undertaken in order to discover the ‘Centre of government profile’ of the countries of Eastern Europe. They are comprehensive about all the aspects of the structure of these governments in the late 1990s. Sigma ceased to exist subsequently and the updating of the information was not undertaken. 2 Participants in this project were asked to reply to a questionnaire about a number of aspects of the life of governments in the early years of the twenty-first century. Replies were obtained for eight of the ten countries examined here, but not for Latvia and Lithuania. The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 1 of this book. 3 The Sigma study of Bulgaria indicated that meetings of the cabinet took place on Mondays in the 1990s. 4 According to the Sigma study, cabinet meetings in Romania lasted three hours only at the end of the 1990s – from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

5

An Overall Descriptive View: What Ministers Think of Cabinet Government

1 Ministers were asked to reply to these questions once, twice or three times, depending on the number of cabinets to which they had belonged. About two-thirds of the respondents were ministers only once. The analysis of this and the following chapters is based, unless otherwise mentioned, on the answers given by ministers in relation to the only or first cabinet to which they had belonged.

6


1 There is indeed a relationship between those ministers who stated that they benefited substantially from their experience as MPs and from their experience as junior ministers: the percentages are 50–40 among those who benefited from 223

224

Notes

having been MPs compared to 26–48 among those who did not benefit from having been MPs.

7

Coalitions, Single-Party Governments and Cabinet Decision-Making

1 The coalition or single-party structure of cabinets of the ministers interviewed in the survey is the following (number of interviews) Country

Total number of interviews

Single-party Min.

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Total

10

25 21 39 40 40 34 45 33 22 21 320

0 10 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 15

Coalitions

Maj. Min. 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 11

0 3 7 0 17 0 4 0 0 3 34

Caretaker

Minimum Surplus 7 7 32 15 5 0 21 20 11 14 132

14 1 0 25 18 19 18 13 11 4 123

3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5


1 Heady (1974) considers two other types of activities of ministers – those of parliamentary and party leader and of undertaking public relations and brokerage activities. In the Central Eastern European case, one needs also to take into account the fact that ‘the change toward a democratically led market economy has challenged central governments to develop skills and requirements normally associated with West European governments, i.e. policy formulation, discussion of policy alternatives, arbitration among contending interests and authoritative decision-making’ (Goetz and Wollmann 2001: 864).

11


1 20 ministers of foreign affairs, 16 ministers of economics and 8 ministers of justice came to be interviewed. No minister of finance was interviewed in Romania while the three Baltic States and Poland were also the countries where substantial numbers of ministers of economics were interviewed. Ministers of finance and ministers of economics were only slightly more likely than other ministers, but less so than prime ministers, to claim that ministers of finance were important ministers! The figures were 63 per cent among ministers of finance, 69 per cent among ministers of economics, 61 per cent among other ministers and 79 per cent among prime ministers.

Notes

225

2 The data do not allow for the possibility of finding out what proportion among all the ministers were in conflict with the minister of finance, but only what proportion among all the ministers were in conflict with the minister they deemed to be important. To come to an approximation of the proportion of ministers who were in conflict with ministers of finance – and how they acted to resolve this conflict – the analysis here thus distinguishes between, on the one hand, all ministers in conflict with important ministers irrespective of who they deemed important and, on the other, those ministers who deemed ministers of finance important (who constitute, as was pointed out earlier, nearly two-thirds of all the ministers interviewed). 3 Interviewees could answer each question by saying Yes or No, while there was an opportunity not to give a definite answer. On whether they ‘dropped the issue’ 12 per cent said yes and 5 per cent said no; on whether they went to the prime minister 38 per cent said yes and 29 per cent said no; on whether they went to the cabinet, 35 per cent said yes and 33 per cent said no. The difference with respect to these last two answers is small, but it does suggest that more went to the prime minister than to the cabinet, as in the ten countries analysed here, though the gap, in this case, is ostensibly much larger.

12


1 Since prime ministers constitute the focus of this chapter (or, rather, the opinions which ministers have about them), it was felt wrong to distinguish among first, second and third governments; on the contrary what was needed was to obtain from ministers an overview of how all prime ministers are regarded, irrespective of the government period. Thus, ministers were counted up to three times depending upon how many governments they served in and gave answers about. As a result, a cumulative opinion of ministers about prime ministers emerges regardless of which term (period) is being commented upon. This means that the opinion of Czech ministers who served in the second Klaus government will be treated together with the opinion of those who served in the first Klaus government because the important thing is what they think about him regardless of the period. This is even more important in cases such as that of Vagnorius of Lithuania, who was prime minister in both 1991 and 1996. The opinion of first-time ministers and of second- or third-time ministers about a given prime minister are considered jointly. The tables thus include 483 answers.

Berov Dimitrov Indzhova Kostov Saskoburgotski Sofiyanski Videnov Klaus Spidla Tosovsky Zeman Kallas Laar Siimann Tarand Vahi Antall Boros Horn Orban Berzins Birkavs Gailis Krasts

BUL BUL BUL BUL BUL BUL BUL CZE CZE CZE CZE EST EST EST EST EST HUN HUN HUN HUN LAT LAT LAT LAT

4 2 2 12 1 3 7 17 1 1 10 10 18 7 6 26 14 8 10 15 9 12 10 9

N. ministers

33.3 0 100 100 0.0 100 50 100 100 0 100 80 77.8 50 49.9 95.7 92.3 42.9 100 93.3 55.6 66.7 88.9 44.4

Strong* (in %)

66.7 0 0 0 100 0 50 0 0 0 0 10 11.1 33.3 25 4.3 7.7 42.9 0 0 44.4 33.3 11.1 55.6

Neither/Nor

0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 11.1 16.7 25.0 0 0 14.3 0 6.7 0 0 0 0

Weak

100 100 50 91.6 0 100.0 85.7 94.1 100 0 100 90 77.7 100 66.7 92.3 100 100 80 93.3 88.9 91.7 90 100

Satisfaction with CDM 100 100 100 91.6 100 100 71.4 88.3 100 0 100 90 88.9 57.1 66.7 88.5 64.3 75 80 86.7 88.9 91.7 100 66.6

Efficiency of CDM

2 Perception of the individual prime ministers and the satisfaction with the cabinet decision-making and its efficiency in percent 226

Kristopans Skele Abisala Kubilius Lubys Paksas Prunskiene Slezevicius Stankevicius Vagnorius Buzek Cimosziewicz Oleksy Olszewski Pawlak Suchocka Ciorbea Isarescu Stolojan Vacaroiu Vasile Drnovsek Dzurinda Meciar

LAT LAT LIT LIT LIT LIT LIT LIT LIT LIT POL POL POL POL POL POL ROM ROM ROM ROM ROM SLO SVK SVK

6 28 3 6 8 6 6 12 6 23 19 11 7 2 9 13 15 8 1 11 13 30 11 15

50 92.8 66.7 60 62.5 33.3 100 100 60 71.5 11.1 90.9 85.7 0 50 30.8 21.4 75 100 81.8 46.2 100 27.3 93.3

33.3 3.6 33.3 40 37.5 33.3 0 0 40 14.3 44.5 0 14.3 0 37.5 46.2 14.3 12.5 0 0 30.8 0 45.5 6.7

16.7 3.6 0 0 0 33.3 0 0 0 14.3 44.5 9.1 0 100 12.5 23.1 64.3 12.5 0 18.2 23.1 0 27.3 0

83.3 92.8 33.3 66.6 75 83.3 83.3 50 33.3 60.9 63.2 81.8 85.7 0 66.7 69.2 40 87.5 0 81.8 30.8 96.7 62.7 100

83.3 88.9 66.6 83.3 62.5 83.3 83.3 50 100 78.2 73.7 90.9 100 0 77.8 76.9 40 75 100 90.9 30.8 90.0 90.9 93.3

227

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Index acquis communuautaire 139 activists 161 Albania 4 Austro-Hungarian Empire 137 Baltic States 50, 85, 138, 172, 175 Bulgaria 3, 50, 69–70, 82, 113, 114, 135, 156, 172 and role of president 63 constitution and prime minister 60 ministers 163 number of parties 28 party collaboration 112 Bundeskanzlerant 123 bureaucracy 95, 124, 139 cabinet agenda 66–8 anatomy 39–56 British 19 ‘caretaker’ 43–4 collective nature 5 collegiality 102, 104, 201–2 committees 8–9, 68–71, 96, 196 composition 44–7, 111–12, 129 conflicts 74, 175 consensual 198–9 council 97, 115 debates 74–7, 154–5 duration of 7, 40–1, 44–5, 46–9, 102 Dutch 19 effectiveness 74 efficiency 4–5, 11–12, 19, 74, 102, 104 fall of 5 France 19 Finnish 19 ‘founding’ 41, 42–4 government 3, 39, 89 hierarchical 201–2 instability 6, 40–1, 60

majority 45, 198–9 meetings 15, 65–6, 195–6 ministers’ attitudes to 73–4, 153–5 minority 45, 47 parliamentary 3, 193 practices 64–70 representativeness 4–5, 19, 104 role of parties 95–6, 97–101, 114–16 rules 57–71 secretariat 9, 14, 16, 66–8 single-party 46–7, 49 stability 17, 54–5 cabinet decision-making 3, 5, 9–10, 14–15, 18–19, 57, 64, 72–3, 83, 89–90, 102, 106–8, 134, 135, 147, 194–5 and finance ministers 166–76 and ministers 151–61 civil servants 137 collegial 13–14, 74, 102, 191 consensus 74, 84 debates 5–7, 74–5 disagreement 74–5, 85 effectiveness 13, 74, 83 ministers’ views of 94–5, 106–8 parties and 95–6 satisfaction with 73–8, 79 streamlining 6–8, 9–10, 12, 14–18, 19 cabinet government 3, 40, 72–85, 89, 166, 196, 197–8 tensions 4–6 cabinet office 126 Caribbean 193 Central Eastern Europe 5, 7, 14, 16, 18, 20, 26, 28, 34, 38, 40, 49, 57, 59, 66, 71, 72, 84, 90, 99, 118, 124, 136, 137, 147, 151, 161, 165, 170, 179, 186 citizen dissatisfaction 38 citizen satisfaction 38 235

236

Index

civil servants 134 and decision-making 136–47 relationship with ministers 140–4, 145–7 civil service advice 137, 139, 145–7 coalition cabinet 11, 45, 46 governments 102 ‘minimum winning’ 103–4, 106, 186 ministerial views of 109–11 ‘surplus majority’ 103–4, 106, 186 collective decision-making 164, 165 collegial decision-making 191 collegiality 6, 191 communism 3, 16, 17, 23, 26, 28, 41, 65, 137, 139, 188 legacy 124–5 ‘Constituent Assembly’ 43 constitutions 58, 59–62 see also individual countries constitutional amendments 59 Council of Ministers 68, 124–5 Croatia 17 Czech Republic 3, 28, 50, 70, 80–1, 85, 114, 125, 137, 143, 154, 157, 165, 172, 196 cabinet committees 70 constitution 62 ministers and party 93 party systems 29–30 prime minister’s role 180, 189 Czechoslovakia 4 debates see cabinet, debates Denmark 94 departments ministers and 156–8, 159, 164–5 duration of cabinet 50–3, 53–4 ministers 50–1, 53–4 prime ministers 51–3, 53–4 East-Central Europe 4, 38 Eastern Europe 3 elections 2004 European 31 ‘constituent’ or ‘founding’ 24 see also individual countries

electoral influence 36 participation 35–6 volatility 36 elites 24, 25 Estonia 3, 18, 50, 67, 125, 156, 172, 190 and president’s role 60 constitution 61 Rikikogu 68 European Union 138, 139, 140, 147, 165, 193 2002 report 147 Fidesz 190 finance ministers 166–76 career and background 168–70 importance of 170–3 relations with other cabinet ministers 173–6 see also ministers; prime minister Finland 8 foreign ministers 166 ‘For Order and Justice’ 31 fragmentation 31 France 17, 94 ‘cohabitation’ 11 Fifth Republic 62–3, 203 Germany 5 Bundestag 12 Governing Together 15 governmental stability 54–5 governments coalition 10–11 end of 60 hierarchical 14 minority 104 single-party 10–11, 45–6, 102–3, 104, 107–8, 109, 114–15 ‘grand’ coalitions 11 Head of State 54, 58, 63 heads of departments 164 Homeland Union 25 Hungary 3, 23, 26, 81, 85, 113, 156, 172, 190 cabinet 64 constitution 62, 190

Index ‘founding’ cabinet 43 party collaboration 112 prime minister and parliament 60 prime minister’s office 135 prime minister’s role 180 relative importance of ministers 172 Hungarian Forum 190 inter-party co-operation Israel 193 Italy 5 Japan

112

193

Kanzlerdemokratie 201 Katz, Richard 89, 91 Latvia 3, 18, 50, 81, 110–11, 116, 125, 143, 190 constitution 61, 62 ministers 163 Latvia’s Way 25 legislative–executive relationship 37 Lijphart, Arend 199 Lithuania 3, 17, 26, 82, 85, 110–11, 114, 143 number of parties 28 party system 31, 33–4 ministers activists 152, 153, 159, 161, 164, 202–3 amateurs 13, 152, 202–3 and civil servants 136–47 and prime ministers’ offices 123–34 departmentalists 158, 159, 160, 161 duration of 50–3, 55, 160 generalists 152, 153, 159, 161, 202–3 interviewing 14–15 professionals 202–3 relation to finance ministers 173–6 relation to prime ministers 181–4 relation to party 90, 91–4 specialists 16, 152, 161, 202–3 spectators 152, 159 ministerial

237

attitudes 83–5, 98–9, 100, 109–11, 140–4 career 99, 162–4 ministerial experiences 162 managerial 162, 163 political 162 ministerial expertise 163 ministerial satisfaction 73–4, 106–8 ministerial views 72–7, 123, 127–31 Moldova 4 Movement for Democratic Slovakia 25 Netherlands 8 ‘no confidence’ motions nomenklatura 4

60–1

OECD 15, 59 ‘oversized pluralism’ 28 parliamentary system 57–8, 191 ‘parliamentary-cabinet’ system 57–8, 72, 191, 193 party government 10, 39, 89–90, 97, 110–18, 200–1 parties and political elite 25–6 as gatekeepers 10 involvement in cabinet decisionmaking 96–7 numbers of 26–8 party communist 4 left-wing 29, 125 populist 37 right-wing 29 party involvement importance of 97–101 party systems 28–32 multi-party 28–9, 30, 38 single-party 28 stability 34–8 two-party 28–9 volatility 34–6 Poland 3, 17, 26, 50, 59, 82, 85, 116, 143, 156, 172 and ‘semi-presidentialism’ 63 cabinet debates 82 constitution of 59, 62 party systems 29–30

238

Index

Poland (Contd.) prime minister’s office 135 prime minister’s role 180, 188 polarization Left–Right 32–4 politburo 4 Portugal 5 post-Communist politics 17 presidential systems 3 presidentialism 4, 62–4 see also semi-presidentialism prime ministers ‘activist’ 12 and cabinet agenda 67 and political system 186–9 ‘chairman’ and ‘chiefs’ 177 context 179–81 duration of 51–3, 54–5 importance of 177 leadership 128–9, 130 office 123, 125–7 relations to other ministers 181–4 strength 184–6 prime minister’s office administrative role 127–8 agenda setting 128 and cabinet agenda 127 coordinating role 126, 131–4 political advice 128 political role 128 Romania 3, 26, 50, 67, 82, 85, 116, 118, 135, 143, 156, 157, 165, 172, 175 and ‘semi-presidentialism’ 63–4

cabinet debates 82 constitution 61 party systems 30 Russia 4 Scandinavia 58 semi-presidentialism 4, 58, 62 Serbia 17 Sigma programme 59, 68, 69 Slovakia 3, 26, 50, 70, 82, 85, 110, 114, 116, 165, 172, 190 cabinet committees 70 cabinet debates 82 new constitution 59 number of parties 28 Slovenia 3, 23, 26, 28, 50, 82, 85, 110, 118, 143, 156, 157, 165, 172 cabinet debates 82 cabinet rules 65 duration of ministers 51 ministers 163 prime minister’s office 133, 135 prime minister’s role 188 socialization processes 83 Solidarity 23 Southeastern Europe 4, 38 sovereignty 57, 58, 59 Spain 5 stable pluralism 28 State Chancellery 132 ‘structural disequilibrium’ 38 transition

25

voter turnout

34–5

Governing New European Democracies

Governing New European Democracies

Political Parties in New Democracies

Federal Democracies

Governing New York State 4th Edition

New York City Politics: Governing Gotham

Party Politics in New Democracies (Comparative Politics)

New York City Politics: Governing Gotham

Governing New York State, 5th Edition

Peter European. New Year

Governing Europe

Multinational Democracies

Multinational Democracies

Governing Medicine

Democracies at War

Governing Sustainable Cities

Governing China: 150-1850

Governing Knowledge in Asia

Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector

Technology and Security: Governing Threats in the New Millennium

Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies

The Great Democracies

Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right (Extremism and Democracy)

Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases

The European Central Bank: The New European Leviathan? (2nd ed)

Governing as New Labour: Policy and Politics Under Blair

This Sovereign Land: A New Vision For Governing The West

The Grindwell Governing Machine

The Grindwell Governing Machine

Governing Global Electronic Networks

Governing New European Democracies