The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer (Philosophical Studies Series)

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KEITH LEHRER

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES VOLUME 95

Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer

Editor Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson Associate Editor Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans Marian David, University of Notre Dame Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KEITH LEHRER Edited by

ERIK J. OLSSON University of Constance, Germany

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 1-4020-1605-0

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Cover art: MetaMe, Keith Lehrer, 2002, Oil painting, 16˝ × 20˝

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Table of Contents PREF ACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

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INTRODUCTION ............................................ . Erik J. Olsson: "The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer"

EXTERNALISMVS. INTERNALISM ............................ 21 Chapter 1, Ernest Sosa: "Epistemology: Does it Depend on Independence?" . . . . . . .. 23 Chapter 2 John Greco: "Why Not Reliabilism?" ............................. 31 Chapter 3 Jonathan L. Kvanvig: "Justification and Proper Basing" ............... 43 Chapter 4 Todd Stewart: "Lehrer on Knowledge and Causation" ................ 63 Chapter 5 Volker Halbach: "Can we Grasp Consistency?" ..................... 75

COHERENCE AND PERSONAL JUSTIFICATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 89 Chapter 6 Glenn Ross: "Reasonable Acceptance and the Lottery Paradox: The Case for a More Credulous Consistency" ....................... 91 Chapter 7 Charles B. Cross: "Relational Coherence and Cumulative Reasoning" . .. 109 Chapter 8 Wolfgang Spohn: "Lehrer Meets Ranking Theory" .................. 129 Chapter 9 Carl G. Wagner: "Two Dogmas ofProbabilism" .................... 143

vi TRUSTWORTHINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 153 Chapter 10 James Van Cleve: "Lehrer, Reid, and the First of All Principles" ....... 155 Chapter 11 G. J. Mattey: "Self-Trust and the Reasonableness of Acceptance" ...... 173 Chapter 12 Richard N. Manning: "The Dialectic Illusion ofa Vicious Bootstrap" ... 195

UNDEFEA TED JUSTIFICATION AND THE GETTlER PROBLEM .. 217 Chapter 13 Hans Rott: "Lehrer's Dynamic Theory of Knowledge" ............... 219 Chapter 14 Gordian Haas: "Some Remarks on the Definition of Lehrer's Ultrasystem" ......................................... 243 Chapter 15 Jacob Rosenthal: "On Lehrer's Solution to the Gettier Problem" ....... 253

SKEPTICISM .............................................. 261 Chapter 16 John W. Bender: "Skepticism, Justification and the Trustworthiness Argument" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 263 Chapter 17 Peter Klein: "Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism" ............... 281 Chapter 18 David A. Truncellito: "The Ultrasystem and the Conditional Fallacy" ... 299 Chapter 19 Keith Lehrer: "Coherence, Circularity and Consistency: Lehrer Replies" ............................................. 309

PREFACE Few have contributed so much to the articulation and defense of internalism and the coherence theory as Keith Lehrer. Thanks to his persistent efforts, we are in a better position to appreciate their consequences and assess their tenability. The authors who have contributed to this book were asked to take a closer look at Lehrer's epistemology from their own different perspectives. Many are, of course, critical; that is in the nature of the game. But the reader will also find several constructive attempts to defend or improve on Lehrer's theory. In the final essay, Lehrer gives his replies. All articles appear here for the first time. I am personally indebted to Keith Lehrer in many different ways. Most importantly, his Theory of Knowledge was the first book I read on epistemology, and it made me start thinking seriously about the subject. I never stopped. In recent years I have had the great pleasure of meeting Keith and discussing philosophical issues with him on several occasions. I take the opportunity here to express my gratitude for this and also for his support and practical advice in connection with this book project. Ann Hickman has done an excellent job in preparing the book for publication, for which I am extremely grateful. Thanks also to Christopher von Buelow and Radu Dudau for their editorial assistance. Finally, my warm thanks goes to all contributing authors for their dedication and commitment. My own work was financed by the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) as a contribution to the research project Logic in Philosophy (Logik in der Philosophie). Involved in this research project, among the authors, are also Wolfgang Spohn, Hans Rott, Volker Halbach and, as associated members, Gordian Haas and Jacob Rosenthal. Erik J. Olsson

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Introduction THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KEITH LEHRER Erik J. Olsson University of Constance

Fido sees that there is a bone on the plate, but does Fido know that there is a bone on the plate? David, a two-year-old, sees that the door to the refrigerator is open, but does he know that it is open? Examples such as these prompt very different reactions from philosophers. Some think it is obvious that Fido and David know, and that they know in the same sense as adult humans do. Others respond, equally emphatically, that they do not know, at least not in the same way as adult humans. Philosophers ofthe latter inclination may grant that someone who believes that Fido knows is allowed to use the term 'know' in any way he or she wishes and, further, that there might be some point in defining a concept of knowledge applicable also to Fido; but, they will urge, that concept will not be of great interest if what we really care about is human knowledge in its characteristic form. Keith Lehrer belongs to the second category of epistemologists for whom the mere possession of correct information is insufficient for human knowledge, however reliable the source delivering the information may have been. In order to know one must, in addition, recognize that the information one possesses is correct. This additional demand for reasons internal to the subject -characteristic of the position known as internalism-excludes poor old Fido, and probably also David, neither of whom can plausibly be credited with the conceptual resources required for such recognition, for "[t]hey lack any conception of the distinction between veracity and correct information, on the one hand, and deception and misinformation, on the other" (Lehrer, 2000, p. 11). Why is it so important to recognize that one's sources are reliable? Why does it not suffice that they actually are reliable, that the belief was caused in a reliable way? Lehrer's answer, if! understand him correctly, is that the role of E.J. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 1-20. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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knowledge in human reasoning is essential to its nature (ibid., p. 6), and one role of knowledge concerns its employment in reasoning, e.g., in confirming some hypotheses and refuting others. It is essential to knowledge that it enables us to "reason about what is true or false, what is real and unreal" and to justify our knowledge claims "in critical discussion and rational confrontation" (ibid., p. 11). Thus, knowledge, as Lehrer conceives it, is, in its essence, "inextricably woven into reasoning, justification, confirmation, and refutation" (ibid., p. 6). An externalist will certainly agree that knowledge plays an important role in reasoning, but he or she will typically resist the conclusion that this role is essential to its nature. He or she will concede that it is a good thing to have reasons for one's beliefs-for instance, in convincing others that we know-while insisting that having such reasons is not an ingredient in the very concept of knowledge (see for instance Dretske, 1991). An externalist might even grant that having reasons is part of the pre-systematic concept of knowledge, and yet argue that there are good grounds, in this case, to depart from it in favor of an allegedly more fruitful externalist conception. Several of the papers in this volume address, directly or indirectly, the internalism/externalism issue, e.g., the articles by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and Volker Halbach. Lehrer's view on justification and causation is discussed in the papers by Jonathan L. Kvanvig and Todd Stewart. Highly relevant in this connection is also the article by James Van Cleve. The main purpose of this introduction is to survey the main ideas in Lehrer's epistemology, so as to provide the necessary background against which the other papers in this volume can be more readily appreciated. Another aim is to point out what might be some difficulties in Lehrer's view. A majority of these issues are explored in greater detail in the other contributions to this book, and I have added references to guide the reader to the corresponding places. This introduction, then, is also intended to serve as a conceptual and argumentative map of the present book. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Lehrer are to the 2000 edition of his Theory of Knowledge (abbreviated TK). Theory of Knowledge, an extended and thoroughly revised version of Lehrer's early book Knowledge, was published for the first time in 1990. Between the two editions there are some interesting differences that will play a role later in this introduction.

1.

COHERENCE AND PERSONAL JUSTIFICATION

Lehrer subscribes to a traditional post-Gettier analysis of knowledge, according to which a subject S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S accepts that p, (iii) S is (personally or subjectively) justified in accepting that p, and (iv) S is justified in accepting that p in some way that does not depend on

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a false statement. The last clause is intended to take care of troublesome Gettier examples, a topic I will return to later. The particular interest of Lehrer's theory lies of course in its details. Taking truth for granted, let us focus first on the condition of acceptance: for S to know that p, S must accept that p. Why "acceptance" and not "belief', and what might be the difference between the two? Acceptance, Lehrer writes, is an attitude defined in terms of some purpose and involves an evaluation of whether the attitude fulfills the purpose. Moreover the special kind of acceptance relevant to knowledge is acceptance for the purpose of "attaining truth and avoiding error with respect to the very thing one accepts" (p. 13): to accept that p if and only ifp. Belief, on the other hand, is not defined in terms of a purpose. Belief may happen to serve the purpose of attaining truth and avoiding error but it is not defined in terms of that, or any other, purpose. We may, to take Lehrer's example, believe that a loved one is safe because of the comfort of believing this, and not because of an intrinsic interest in the truth of the matter. Belief, Lehrer argues, is not the attitude characteristic of genuine knowledge; acceptance is. Another feature of acceptance that will playa role later is that it is a functional state, being characterized by the role it plays in thought, inference and action. Obviously much hinges on the third condition of personal justification. In Lehrer's view, such justification amounts to coherence with a background system. The relevant background system---called the evaluation system -consists of three parts: the acceptance system, the preference system and the reasoning system. The acceptance system is the core of the evaluation system and is defined as the set of states of acceptance of S described by statements of the form "S accepts that p" attributing to S just those things S accepts at t with the objective of obtaining truth and avoiding error with respect to the content accepted, that is, with respect to the content that p (p. 130). In the 1990' sedition of TK, the background system was equated with the acceptance system. Suppose, to take an example, that S accepts that Paris is the capital of France. That might lead one to expect that the statement "Paris is the capital of France" should be an element of S's acceptance system. But this, as we just saw, is not how Lehrer defines the notion. Rather, the acceptance system contains the statement "S accepts that Paris is the capital of France". So, when Lehrer writes that in personal justification we must start with what we accept (p. 123), this does not mean that we are allowed to take the truth of "Paris is the capital of France" and other propositions we accept for granted. It means only that we may take for granted that we accept those things, i.e., that we take a certain attitude, that of acceptance, towards those propositions. Lehrer sometimes calls the set of all propositions p such that "S accepts that p" is in the acceptance system the content of that system, a practice I will follow here.

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The preference system of Sat t over acceptances is defined as the set of states of preference described by statements of the form "S prefers accepting that P to accepting that q" attributing to S just those preferences S has at t with the objective of obtaining truth and avoiding error with respect to the contents of the acceptances. Finally, the reasoning system of S at t is the set of states of reasoning described by statements of the form "S reasons from acceptance of the premises PI' P2' and forth to Pj to acceptance of the conclusion COO with the objective of obtaining truth and avoiding error with respect to the content of the acceptances. What is Lehrer's motivation for introducing the preference and reasoning systems as part of the evaluation system? As for preferences, he writes the following in his book Self- Trust (pp. 27-28): "I have said before that a person is personally justified in accepting something if and only if acceptance of it coheres with the acceptance system of the person. I now think that will not suffice, because preferences are also essential to the kind of coherence that yields justified acceptance." It is also of interest to note that, in Lehrer's view, the justification of preferences parallels the justification of acceptances: "Thus, personally justified acceptance, acceptance justified for me, is acceptance that coheres with an evaluation system including preferences, just as personally justified preference, preference justified for me, is preference that coheres with an evaluation system that includes acceptances" (ibid., p. 28). I will return to the reasoning system in connection with the Gettier problem. So much for the evaluation system. Justification, we are told, is coherence with that system. How, then, should we understand coherence? The intuitive idea is that we can think of all sorts of objections an imaginative critic may raise to what a person accepts. These objection might be directly incompatible with what the person accepts or they might, while being compatible with the thing accepted, threaten to undermine my reliability in making assessments of the kind in question. For instance, a critic might object to my claim that I see a tree by suggesting that I am merely hallucinating. That would be an example of the first sort of objection. As an example of the second sort, we might take a case in which the critic replies that I cannot tell whether I am hallucinating or not (Lehrer, 1989, p. 253). Coherence, and personal justification, results when all objections have been met. Thus, the process of justifying a claim has the character of a game with the objections and answers being the different moves the players can make. Lehrer, fittingly, calls it the justification game. If all the objections raised by the critic can be met, then the claimant wins the game. If she wins the game, her original claim coheres with the evaluation system and she is personally or subjectively justified in accepting her original claim; ifnot, she is not justified in her acceptance (TK, 1990b, p. 119). Lehrer is careful to point out that the justification game is only a "heuristic device for understanding the

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considerations that make a person justified in accepting something rather than a psychological model of mental processes" (ibid.). Leaving heuristic considerations aside, Lehrer's semi-formal definition ofjustification runs as follows: S is personally justified in acceptingp at t if only if p coheres with S's evaluation system at t. Further, p coheres with S's evaluation system at t if and only if all objection to p are answered or neutralized relative to S's evaluation system at t. This raises the question of how the notion of an objection should be understood, and what it might mean that an objection is answered or neutralized relative to an evaluation system. Lehrer defines the notion of an objection as follows: 0 is an objection to p if and only if it is more reasonable to accept that p on the assumption that 0 is false than on the assumption that 0 is true (relative to S's evaluation system and t). An objection o to p is answered, moreover, if and only if 0 is an objection to p, but it is more reasonable for S to accept p than to accept 0 (with the appropriate relativizations). In the 1990 edition of TK, objections were called "competitors" and answered objection were said to be "beaten". Before citing Lehrer's definition of neutralization, it might be helpful to consider an example. Suppose I claim to be seeing a zebra and I am faced with the objection that I am sleeping and dreaming that I see a zebra. Then I might be in a position to answer this objection by showing how it follows from my evaluation system that it is more reasonable that I am actually seeing a zebra than that I am merely dreaming that I see one. But suppose the critic instead were to object merely that people sometimes dream that they see zebras. This is an objection, in Lehrer's technical sense, to my claim that I see a zebra; for it is less reasonable to accept that I actually see a zebra if people sometimes dream that they see zebras than if people never dream that they see zebras. And yet it may be very difficult to answer this objection by showing that it is less reasonable to accept than my claim that I see a zebra for the simple reason that it is very reasonable to accept that people sometimes dream they see zebras. In order to allow the claimant to counter objections of this sort, Lehrer introduces the notion of neutralization. The idea is that I should be allowed to counter an objection by pointing out its irrelevance to the issue. In this case, I would be allowed to reply that the objection that people sometimes dream that they see zebras is irrelevant because I am not dreaming. Lehrer defines neturalization as follows: n neutralizes 0 as an objection to p if and only if 0 is an objection to p, the conjunction of 0 and n is not an objection to p, and it is as reasonable for S to accept the conjunction of 0 and n as to accept 0 alone (with the appropriate relativizations). In the example the conjunction that people sometimes dream they see zebras and that I am not dreaming is not an objection to my seeing a zebra. Moreover, it is, we grant, as reasonable for me to accept this conjunction as it is to accept that people sometimes dream they see zebras alone.

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It is not evident that this is the correct way of defining neutralization. Moreover, on pain of triviality, this definition rules out a probabilistic interpretation of reasonableness. For, disregarding some uninteresting limit cases, a conjunction is always less probable than its conjuncts. Hence, on a probabilistic reading of reasonableness a conj unction can never be as reasonable as one of its conjuncts, which means that no objection can be neutralized. For more on comparative reasonableness and neutralization, see the contributions to this volume by Glenn Ross, Charles B. Cross, and Wolfgang Spohn. A related problem in the theory of probability is explored in Carl G. Wagner's paper. Also relevant in this connection are the contributions by G. J. Mattey and Hans Rott. Glenn Ross looks at Lehrer's theory from the point of view of the lottery paradox. The reader might wish to consult Olsson (1998) for another perspective on Lehrer's treatment of the paradoxes of justification. The part of Lehrer's theory that I have outlined so far is intended to specify under what conditions a person is justified in accepting a proposition from the point of view of that person's own evaluation system. But it also suggests a solution to another problem, viz., the problem of specifying rules for inductive inference. This problem can be stated in the following form: Given a set of propositions that I accept, what am I entitled to accept in addition? Obviously I should be allowed to accept everything that follows logically from what I accept. More interestingly, I might also be entitled to accept some propositions which, although they do not follow logically from what I accept, are nevertheless very plausible on that basis. Lehrer's theory suggests the following solution to this problem: in addition to what I accept, I may accept all propositions that cohere with what I accept. The problem of inference is not exactly the same problem as Lehrer's problem of justification, if only because, for the purposes of inductive inference, we would like to start with what we accept and not merely with reports about what we accept. There are also indications that the problem ofjustification, as Lehrer sees it, is one ofjustifying acceptance based on some sort of input (in the form of reports), whereas the problem of inductive inference is one of adding things in the absence of input. 1 The fruitfulness of Lehrer' s semi-formal theory of personal justification for the purposes of inductive inference is explored, in this volume, by Charles B. Cross and Wolfgang Spohn. See also Hans Rott's contribution.

2.

TRUSTWORTHINESS

Where does self-trust or trustworthiness come in? Knowledge, as Lehrer defines it, requires personal justification with the evaluation system of the person. But as that system is defined preciously little will be personally justified. Statements of the form ItS accepts that pIt constitute too meager a basis for

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concluding anything interesting about the relative reasonableness of more substantial claims. They are mere reports of what I accept, and little follows unless I can somehow conclude that what they report is true or at least plausible. So how do I get from "I accepts that p" to p itself? Lehrer's answer is to invoke the principle of trustworthiness. In addition to my other acceptances, I must accept that I am trustworthy, that is, I must accept the following principle: (T) I am trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the objective of accepting something just in case it is true.

In the 1990 edition of TK, Lehrer employed the principle of trustworthiness as a principle of detachment, allowing me to detach p from "I accept that p". The 2000 edition is less optimistic in this respect. According to the view stated there, trustworthiness in combination with "I accept that p" does not allow me to conclude that p is true but only my being reasonable in accepting that p. The reasoning leading up to this conclusion-Lehrer's trustworthiness argumentruns as follows: (T) I am trustworthy in what 1 accept with the objective of

accepting something just in case it is true. I accept that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. Therefore, 1 am trustworthy in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. Therefore, 1 am reasonable in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. The trustworthiness argument illustrates the alleged explanatory role of trustworthiness. That I am reasonable in accepting that p may be explained by my being trustworthy, provided that the premises of the trustworthiness argument are true. In particular it must be true that I am actually trustworthy, since a false premise does not explain anything. Lehrer stresses that the principle (T) should not be seen as saying that I am always trustworthy. Rather, it is a statement of a capacity or disposition to be trustworthy and is compatible with my failing now and then. Hence, the inference from my general trustworthiness to my being reasonable in accepting p is inductive rather than deductive. Moreover, my trustworthiness is not only a matter of my past track record in obtaining truth and avoiding error. For "I may proceed in a manner that is worthy of my trust in what 1 accept but be deceived through no fault of my own", as would be the case if I were deceived by a Cartesian demon (p. 139). It is only required that "I am as trustworthy as the

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circumstances allow" (p. 140). For more on the intended interpretation of the principle of trustworthiness, see the first chapter in Lehrer's Self-Trust. There are corresponding principles of trustworthiness for the other parts of the evaluations system. Thus I may accept that I am trustworthy in what I prefer with the objective of preferring to accept somethingjust in case it is true. By an argument paralleling the trustworthiness argument for acceptance I may then conclude that I am reasonable in having a given preference. By the same token, I may accept that I am trustworthy in how I reason, from which I may conclude that I am reasonable in my reasoning to a given conclusion. My acceptance of the principle of trustworthiness does not automatically make my other acceptances justified; but it does make them reasonable and hence in that way it contributes to their justification. This raises the question of how to justify trustworthiness itself. Trustworthiness can hardly contribute to the justification of other acceptances unless it is itself justified or at least reasonable. Lehrer's basic answer is that trustworthiness applies not only to other acceptances but also to itself. We recall that, for any proposition p which I accept for the purpose of obtaining truth and avoiding error, I may reason from the acceptance of my trustworthiness to the reasonableness of my accepting that p. As a special case, I may reason from the acceptance of my trustworthiness to the reasonableness of my accepting that I am trustworthy. Lehrer has characterized the special role played by self-trust using an analogy from Thomas Reid: ''just as light, in revealing the illuminated object, at the same time reveals itself, so the principle, in rendering the acceptance of other things reasonable, at the same time renders the acceptance of itself reasonable" (p. 143). Reid's epistemology has had a profound influence on Lehrer's theorizing about self-trust. On Lehrer's interpretation, one of Reid's principles of common sense is applicable to all other principles including itself. See Lehrer (1989) and, for a discussion of Lehrer's Reid interpretation, James Van Cleve's article in the present volume. As in the case of other acceptances, the trustworthiness argument falls short of establishing that I am justified in my acceptance of (1). It only establishes that I am reasonable in my acceptance (provided that the premises are true). For me to be justified in my acceptance of (1), all objections to that claim have to be answered or neutralized. In order to answer or neutralize such objections I will need to refer to other things I accept. Hence, even in the case of (1), background information is required in order for me to be personally justified in accepting it. The principle (1) does not justify itselfbut depends for its justification on the background system of other things we accept. Therefore it would be incorrect to call it a basic belief in the foundationalist sense. Lehrer has suggested that (1) is more like a keystone in an arch. Without the keystone, the

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arch would collapse; at the same time the keystone is supported by the other stones in the arch. Is the circularity involved in the argument from my acceptance of my trustworthiness to the reasonableness of that acceptance a vicious one? Lehrer has argued that it is not vicious by pointing out that his intention is not to use (T) as a premise to prove something to a skeptic, but rather to use it for explanatory purposes, the claim being that the principle of trustworthiness can be used for explaining why it is reasonable for us to accept what we accept. Indeed, the shift from justification to explanation makes it less obvious that the circle is vicious. Lehrer even thinks that circularity in this case may be a virtue rather than a vice. It is, he notices, preferable to leave as little as possible unexplained. Hence, an explanation that does not only explain why other acceptances are reasonable but also why its own acceptance is reasonable is better in this respect that an explanation which accomplishes the former but not the latter. Several contributors to this volume express dissatisfaction with Lehrer's discussion of trustworthiness. As some point out, what Lehrer says about the possible explanatory merits of self-trust seems irrelevant to the issue of justification. Lehrer's view on the matter is examined in the contributions by James Van Cleve, G. J. Mattey and Richard N. Manning. The papers by John W. Bender, John Greco and Peter Klein contain related material. Manning, for instance, contends that difficulties arise because of Lehrer's presupposition that the principle of trustworthiness is something that needs to be argued for in the first place. In Manning's view, by contrast, self-trust is a transcendental condition on the possibility of our epistemic practice.

3.

IN WHAT SENSE IS LEHRER'S THEORY A COHERENCE THEORY?

What has been said so far raises the following question: In what sense, if any, is Lehrer's theory a coherence theory, as Lehrer claims it is (at least in part)? If one takes it as essential that such a theory make use of a concept of systematic or global coherence, then Lehrer's theory is clearly not a coherence theory. For in Lehrer's view, "[c]oherence ... is not a global feature of the system" (1997, p. 31). Rather, what he calls coherence, as we have seen, is a relation between an evaluation system and a proposition. This relation, moreover, "does not depend on global features of the system" (ibid.). This notwithstanding, Lehrer has said that the content of the acceptance system should be logically consistent, thus referring to the global feature of consistency (1991, p. 131). Lehrer has also addressed the issue of consistency in his paper "Reason and Consistency", reprinted as Chapter 6 in Metamind. The role of

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consistency in an internalist epistemology is explored in Volker Halbach's contribution to this volume. What reasons, then, are there for calling the relation of meeting objections to a given claim relative to an evaluation system a relation of coherence? As I understand Lehrer, his answer is that it is a relation of "fitting together with", rather than, say, a relation of "being inferable from". He writes, in the 1990 edition of TK: "[i]f it is more reasonable for me to accept one of [several] conflicting claims than the other on the basis of my acceptance system, then that claim fits better or coheres better with my acceptance system" (p. 116). He also contends that "[a] belief may be completely justified for a person because of some relation ofthe belief to a system to which it belongs, the way it coherence with the system, just as a nose may be beautiful because of some relation of the nose to a face, the way it fits with the face" (p. 88). Lehrer is here claiming that a statement's cohering with a system is analogous with a nose's fitting with a face. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Olsson, 1999), this analogy is incompatible with Lehrer's contention that coherence does not depend on global features of a system. For when we say that a nose fits with a face, we mean that combining the two yields a beautiful overall result, so that the nose fits with the face in virtue of the underlying global property of beauty. If cohering is analogous to fitting, as Lehrer proposes, then a statement coheres with a system if combining the two yields a coherent overall result, so that the statement fits with the system in virtue ofthe underlying global property of coherence. This, again, clashes with Lehrer's declaration that coherence does not depend on global features ofthe system. So Lehrer's relation of coherence with an evaluation system has little to do with coherence properly so called, being more akin to inference. Nevertheless, Lehrer's more recent ideas about trustworthiness are arguably sufficient to turn his theory into a coherence theory after all. As we have observed, there is a circularity involved in the argument from my acceptance of my trustworthiness to the reasonableness of that very acceptance. And a salient feature of a coherence theory is presumably that it licenses circular reasoning-at least this is one popular way of characterizing such a theory.

4.

THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM

Externalist theories allow for a modest psychological makeup of the knower. Internalist theories, on the other hand, are typically much more demanding in this respect, insisting that the knowing subject be capable of various higher level cognitive states. Lehrer's internal ism, as we have seen, is no exception to this general rule. According to Lehrer, I am not in a position to

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know, say, that I see a tree over there, unless I also accept my trustworthiness in relevant matters. But is it psychologically realistic to suppose that acceptances about other acceptances-in particular about their trustworthiness-are necessary for knowledge? It seems that people often make perceptual claims without ever having thought about the trustworthiness of their perceptual faculties. Are we then forced to say that they do not know what they claim to know? While Lehrer concedes that some "unrealistic theory of belief maintaining that all beliefs are occurrent states may yield the consequence that we lack such beliefs [about trustworthiness]" (p. 202), he contends that his own theory of acceptance avoids this conclusion. For according to the latter the mental state of acceptance is a functional state, one that plays a role in thought, inference and action. As a consequence, I may be said to accept that p at a time t even if my acceptance ofp is not something I am contemplating at t. What is essential to my acceptance of p is how I think, infer and act. This holds, in particular, for my acceptance of my trustworthiness, which need not be present to my mind either. As Lehrer puts it, "[ w]e think, infer, and act, in a way manifesting our trust in what we accept" (ibid.). He concludes that "it is appropriate and not at all unrealistic to suppose that, in addition to the other things we accept, we accept our own trustworthiness and the reliability of it as well" (ibid.). But does this clever defense against charges of lack of psychological realism really work? Let us first ask this question: What would be the difference between the functional role of my acceptingp only and the functional role of my accepting, in addition, my trustworthiness in matters concerningp? Suppose that I accept that p without accepting my trustworthiness in matters concerning p. This means that I am inclined to think, infer and act in a certain way. More precisely, my acceptance of p amounts to my being "inclined to assent to it automatically, to draw inferences based on the assumption of it, and, in general, to act as though it were true" (Lehrer, 1989, p. 270). For instance, suppose that I am planning to take a walk. My acceptance that it is raining will then manifest itself in my acting as though it were true, e.g., in my being inclined to bring my umbrella. My acceptance that it is raining will also manifest itself in my being inclined to infer, and thus to accept, further propositions as well, e.g., that the ground will be wet. This new acceptance in turn will make me inclined to put on my boots rather than my less sturdy Italian shoes, and so on. Now add to my acceptance that p my further acceptance that I am trustworthy in matters concerning p. My suspicion is that this addition contributes nothing to how I will think, infer and act beyond what was already part of my acceptance of p. To continue the example, my acceptance that it is raining will manifest itself in my being inclined to bring my umbrella and infer that the ground will be wet, and so on. Add to this my acceptance of my trustworthiness in telling whether it is raining or not. This addition has no

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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KEITH LEHRER

further effect on my dispositions to think, infer and act. I will still be inclined to bring my umbrella and to infer that the ground will be wet, and no new dispositions to think, infer and act seem to come forth. From the point of view of how I think, infer and act, there is no difference between, on the one hand, my accepting that p and, on the other hand, my accepting that p and, in addition, that I am trustworthy regarding p. Rather, these two descriptions-"my accepting that p" and "my accepting that p and, in addition, that I am trustworthy regarding p"-are merely two different characterizations of one and the same functional state, namely, that in which I accept that p. The upshot of all this is to confront Lehrer with the following dilemma. Without a functional theory of acceptance, his theory is indeed vulnerable to charges of lack of psychological realism. But the same functional theory which solves this problem so neatly has the unwelcome effect of trivia Ii zing the very idea of trustwort hi ness, reducing trustworthy acceptance to mere acceptance. A related objection is raised in John Greco's contribution to this volume.

5.

UNDEFEATED JUSTIFICATION AND THE GETTlER PROBLEM

In a classical paper, Edmund Gettier gave a counter example to defining knowledge as justified true belief. The variation discussed by Lehrer runs as follows. A teacher wonders whether any of her students owns a Ferrari. She has strong evidence that one student, Mr. Nogot, owns one. Mr. Nogot says he owns a Ferrari, he drives one and has all the papers proving that he owns one, and so on. The teacher has no reason to think that there be other Ferrari owners among her students. From her evidence she concludes that Mr. Nogot owns a Ferrari, from which she draws the further conclusion that someone in her class owns a Ferrari. Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Nogot has lied about the Ferrari. He does not own one and the evidence he has presented was fabricated for the purposes of improving his social status. This notwithstanding, there is another student, Mr. Havit, who does own a Ferrari, though the teacher has no evidence of this. Hence, the teacher's belief that someone in her class owns a Ferrari is true after all. Moreover, being based on good evidence, her belief is also justified. Yet it seems intuitively incorrect to say that the teacher knows that someone in her class owns a Ferrari. Rather, she was just lucky that there was a real Ferrari owner in her class. The teacher's justification for believing that someone in her class owns a Ferrari depends on the false premise that Mr. N ogot owns a Ferrari. Hence, the obvious reaction is to add a fourth requirement to the definition of knowledge to the effect that the subject's knowledge claim not be dependent on a false

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premise. However, as Lehrer notices, one can construct a similar example in which no false premise is in play. For the teacher could conceivably conclude directly from the evidence (Mr. Nogot is a student of my class, he has told me that he owns a Ferrari, and so on) that someone in her class owns a Ferrari without first concluding that Mr. Nogot does. And we tend to think that she would not know that there is a Ferrari owner in her class in this case either. In the 1990 edition of TK, Lehrer suggested an elegant general approach to Gettier type cases. The idea was to consider not only the subject's actual acceptance system but also acceptance systems that can be obtained from that system by removing any false statement or replacing any such statement by its negation. The collection of all systems obtained in this manner he called the ultrasystem of the subject. Lehrer then required that the subject's claim, in order to count as knowledge, be justified relative to all elements of the ultrasystem, in which case the subject's justification was said to be undefeated. It is obvious that this proposal takes care ofthe original Ferrari example. For one element of the ultrasystem is obtained by replacing the claim that Mr. Nogot owns a Ferrari by its negation, so that the teacher is no longer justified in concluding that someone owns a Ferrari. Let us also examine how the proposal applies to the more difficult example in which the teacher never accepted that Mr. Nogot owns a Ferrari in the first place, but concluded directly from the evidence that someone in her class owns one. Lehrer argues that in this case the teacher would nevertheless subscribe to the conditional "If the evidence I have that Nogot owns a Ferrari is true, then Nogot owns a Ferrari". We may now construct an element of the ultrasystem by replacing this conditional statement by its negation, i.e., by "The evidence I have that Nogot owns a Ferrari is true but Nogot does not own a Ferrari". Clearly, the teacher is not justified in accepting that someone in her class owns a Ferrari on the basis ofthe member of the ultrasystem thus constructed, and therefore she does not know what she claims to know. One problem with this intriguing proposal has to do with how to eliminate and replace statements while retaining logical integrity. Suppose that p is to be eliminated (or more exactly "I accept that pOl) and that p is implied by q which the subject also accepts. Then, as Lehrer points out (1990b, p. 141), it is not sufficient just to remove p but q has to be removed as well; otherwise p can be derived back from q. However, as Hans Rott observes in his contribution, and also in his book from 2001, elimination is unexpectedly complicated. The same goes for replacement which is quite a subtle type of change in need of more careful attention. There is an interesting connection here between the 1990 version of Lehrer's theory and the area of philosophical logic called belief revision theory in which problems of the kind just mentioned has been studied independently by logicians since the seventies. This connection is explored in Rott's paper.

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Promising as Lehrer's 1990 solution may seem, the 2000 edition of TK features a substantially different approach to Gettier problems. The new solution is simpler in that only one alternative system is taken into account-the one obtained from the present system by removing all false judgments-and no complicated contractions and replacements are called for. The new solution is more complex in another respect, though, since the system from which judgments are deleted is now the more complex evaluation system and not the simpler acceptance system (which, we recall, is but a part of the evaluation system). Hence not only false acceptances are removed but also preferences for accepting something false over something true as well as unsound patterns of reasoning. The result is called the ultrasystem, a term which has thus been given a new definition? Finally, for the subject to know that p it is necessary that p be justified relative to the ultrasystem. In the preface to the 2000 edition of TK, Lehrer writes that the new solution to Gettier problems is based on a "simplified" and "improved" conception of an ultrasystem, claims that are not substantiated in the course of his book. As we have seen, while the new conception is simpler in some respects, it is more complex in another respect, being based on a more complex conception of a background system. Moreover, it is not clear that the new proposal represents an improvement, since, as I will try to make likely, Lehrer's new treatment of the hard Ferrari example (in which the teacher or claimant concluded directly from the evidence that someone owns a Ferrari) is not entirely convincing. The idea behind what Lehrer calls the ultra justification game is that the ultracritic should try to disprove the claimant on the basis of the claimant's ultrasystem. Lehrer envisages the following ultra justification game to illustrate the outcome of applying his new proposal to the hard Ferrari example: Claimant: Someone in my class owns a Ferrari. If I have the evidence that Nogot owns a Ferrari, that he is student in my class, that he has told me that he owns a Ferrari, that he has shown me papers stating that he owns a Ferrari and that he drives a Ferrari, then Nogot owns a Ferrari. I have all that evidence consisting of true claims. Ultracritic: You must eliminate your hypothetical claim that if you have the evidence that Nogot owns a Ferrari, that he is student in your class, that he has told you that he owns a Ferrari, that he has shown you papers stating that he owns a Ferrari and that he drives a Ferrari, then he owns a Ferrari! The evidence you have that Nogot owns a Ferrari is true, but Nogot does not own a Ferrari. It is not more reasonable for you to accept that someone in your class

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owns a Ferrari than that no one does. No one in your class owns a Ferrari. (My italics.) Lehrer now maintains that the claimant, on the basis of her ultrasystem, will not be able to answer or neutralize the ultracritic's objection. As I understand it, Lehrer's analysis of the hard Ferrari example is intended to illustrate the claim that "[t]he proper solution to these [Gettier] problems may be obtained from the ultrajustification game by extending the role of the critic in the game to include considerations of preferences and reasonings that supplement the acceptance system in the evaluation system of the claimant" (p. 160). Clearly, this particular example must be taken to illustrate considerations of reasonings. Now, the ultracritic may instruct the claimant to give up a piece of reasoning only if that reasoning is unsound. In the example, she instructs her to give up her reasoning from the evidence about Mr. Nogot's driving a Ferrari etc. to his owning a Ferrari. But is that reasoning really unsound? I think not. The fact that the premises are true but the conclusion false in the example only serves to disprove the deductive validity of the inference, but this is beside the point, since the claimant is not committed to its deductive validity but at most to its inductive validity. As an inductive inference it is sound. For the conclusion that Mr. Nogot owns a Ferrari is highly probable on the evidence of his driving one, showing papers stating that he owns one etc. But perhaps Lehrer did not after all intend his new analysis of the hard Ferrari example to illustrate the elimination of reasonings from the evaluation system. Perhaps we should think of the hypothetical linking the evidence about Nogotto his owning a Ferrari not as belonging to the reasoning system butto the acceptance system (as in the 1990 edition of TK). But in that case it is unclear what role the reasoning system plays in Lehrer's analysis of Gettier cases. Does it perform any useful function at all? Hence, it is not evident that Lehrer's new approach to the Gettier problem amounts to an improvement in comparison to the old. Of course, some logicians that were attracted to the 1990 version of Lehrer's theory primarily because of its interesting relationship to belief revision theory will be quite happy with this observation. Yet, Lehrer might be able to derive some support for his new approach from Gordian Haas's article in this volume, in which Haas presents a formal argument to the effect that the complicated elimination and replacement operations occurring in the older approach are actually superfluous. Jacob Rosenthal argues, in his contribution, that both solutions presented by Lehrer are unsatisfactory. Undefeated justification and the Gettier problem are also discussed in the papers by John Greco, Peter Klein and Wolfgang Spohn.

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6.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KEITH LEHRER

THE ANSWER TO SKEPTICISM

What is Lehrer's reply to skepticism? In answering this question I will try to distillate two different and, as I hope to show, conflicting tendencies in Lehrer's work. According to Lehrer, the sophisticated common sense philosopher, there is no need to bother with radical skepticism, and this is so for purely methodological reasons. We can safely assume that we know most of the common sense things we think we know, and we do not have to take various skeptical hypotheses into account. Lehrer, the moderate skeptic, is of a different opinion. According to him, we have knowledge only if we are not systematically deceived. If we are deceived, e.g. by a Cartesian demon, then we do not know anything at all. Let us start with Lehrer, the common sense philosopher. Lehrer addresses skepticism already in the first chapter of TK in which he rejects Cartesian epistemology and its method of pretending to total ignorance in the hope of arriving at something completely certain (p. 2). He rejects it in favor of what he calls critical epistemology which is said to be "neither skeptical nor metaphysical" (ibid.), beginning with "common sense and scientific assumption about what is real and what is known" (p. 3). These convictions, he adds, "constitute our data, perhaps even conflicting data if common sense and science conflict" (ibid.). For example, the critical epistemologist takes for granted the premise that we have knowledge of the internal world of our ideas from consciousness and of the external world of matter from observation (p. 4). The object of philosophical inquiry in general, and critical epistemology in particular, is to account for the data in a way that is "systematic and critical" (p. 3). That it is critical means that "[s]ometimes we explain the data and sometimes we explain the data away" (p. 4). The best systematic account of the data may be one which, "in a few instances" (ibid.), does not classify as knowledge what was classified as such by common sense. For instance, such data would include my claims that I know that I am sitting before my computer now, that Paris is the capital of France, that George W. Bush is the president of the United States, and so on. It would be the job of the critical epistemologist to find what is common to all, or most, of these presumed instances of knowledge, e.g., thatthey have been derived from reliable sources, or are examples of justified true beliefs, and so on. A few pages later, Lehrer clarifies the task of the critical epistemologist further by saying that she should aim at explicating concepts in the sense of RudolfCarnap, i.e., by generating new philosophically and scientifically useful concepts. Carnap required of an explication that the explicatum (the concept resulting from the explication) be (1) similar to the explicandum (the original pre-systematic concept that is to be explicated), (2) exact, (3) fruitful and (4) simple. More precisely, the explicatum should be similar to the explicandum in

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such a way that the explicatum can be used in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, but the similarity need not be very close. The explicatum, besides being exact, should also be fruitful in the sense of being useful for formulating universal statements (empirical laws and logical theorems). Finally, the explicatum should be as simple as the other more important desiderata permit. Lehrer's characterization of critical epistemology conveys the impression that he is essentially a common sense philosopher in the tradition of G. E. Moore. Like G. E. Moore, he repudiates the idea that epistemology should engage in radical doubt concerning common sense knowledge claims. Yet being based on a general view as to the nature of philosophical and scientific definitions, Lehrer's approach is more sophisticated than Moore's position, which, lacking a more solid methodological foundation, amounts to ruling out skepticism on the sole grounds that it conflicts with common sense. It is not difficult to appreciate that from the point of view of Lehrer's critical epistemology, even in the sophisticated form referring to Carnap's notion of explication, radical skepticism can be dismissed for methodological reasons alone. For a radical skeptic will want to define knowledge so that most or all of our common sense knowledge claims turn out false, e.g., by insisting that anything worthy of the name must be such that there is no logical possibility of error. Hence, any such attempt will score very poorly as regards Carnap' s criterion of similarity to the explicandum. To compensate for this, it would have to do extremely well in other respects, i.e., regarding exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity. But even ifit can be given an exact and simple definition, a skeptical conception of knowledge will be a complete failure with respect to the important desideratum of fruitfulness: a concept under which nothing, or very little, falls will be utterly useless for articulating laws and theories. We would not accept a definition of water that makes nothing qualify as water; and we should be equally discontent with a definition of knowledge that makes nothing qualify as such. Almost any other proposal one could think of will fare better. The (sophisticated) common sense position is presented in the introductory chapter of TK, but its influence seems to decline as the book develops, and in Chapter 9 radical skepticism makes a surprising comeback as an epistemological threat that must be "answered". Lehrer's reasoning in defense of what is, in effect, a moderate skepticism is not easy to follow, and I will not be able to cover all details here. Nonetheless, the main idea seems to be the following. We cannot rule out the possibility that we may be in error regarding what we accept because of the general fallibility of our faculties and because we may be deceived by a Cartesian demon. However, our fallibility does not imply a lack of personal justification on our part in accepting what we do accept. For we may still be able to answer or neutralize all objections on the basis of our acceptance system, or so Lehrer claims. This is accomplished by our

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acceptance of our own trustworthiness which serves to neutralize all objections referring to our fallibility (p. 220). Recall that, in general, n neutralizes 0 as an objection to p if accepting the conjunction of 0 and n is not an objection to p and is as reasonable as to accept 0 alone (relative to a person, an evaluation system and a point in time). The principle of trustworthiness neutralizes fallibilism as an objection to any specific knowledge claim since it is, Lehrer contends, as reasonable to accept both that we are fallible and that we are trustworthy as it is to accept that we are fallible alone. This last step is clearly one of the weaker links in Lehrer's argument, and, to the best of my knowledge, Lehrer has presented no detailed argument in its support. To continue the argument, personal justification is not sufficient for knowledge. In order for me to know, my personal justification must be undefeated by errors in the evaluation system. For instance, it must be true that I am really trustworthy, or the neutralization of the fallibilistic objection will fail relative to the ultrasystem. In short, if there is a demon, I will fail to know even the most basic thing: "[i]fwe were massively mistaken, as we would be if the Cartesian demon were loose in the land, then we would lack knowledge" (p. 209). On the other hand, if there is no demon, I will presumably know most common sense things. Lehrer's argument does not allow us to conclude, on good grounds, that we have knowledge. On the other hand, we may not conclude that we are ignorant either. Whether we know or not depends on whether we are systematically deceived or not. Since, as a matter of principle, we can have no empirical evidence either for or against systematic deception, I take it that Lehrer's moderately skeptical concept of knowledge will be useless in formulating empirical laws and theories. This is, of course, a problematic fact on the background of Lehrer's methodological reliance on Carnap's notion of explication. This moderately skeptical view should be contrasted with what I take to be Lehrer's common sense position, according to which we do have knowledge whether we are systematically deceived or not (if systematic deception is at all regarded a serious possibility). It should also be distinguished from radical skepticism, or at least one form of it, according to which we are ignorant whether we are systematically deceived or not. Lehrer, the common sense philosopher, is in conflict with Lehrer, the moderate skeptic. For, as I interpret the former, he is saying that we have knowledge even if we are systematically deceived. This is denied by the latter, according to whom systematic deception implies ignorance. For reasons already noted, I find the view of Lehrer, the moderate skeptic, unconvincing. A crucial step relies on the rather vague idea of comparative reasonableness and, more fundamentally, it is unclear to me what the methodological basis for his answer to skepticism might be. On the other hand,

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I have great sympathy for Lehrer, the sophisticated common sense philosopher, who has a simple and, in my view, entirely satisfactory answer to skepticism based on some general methodological considerations concerning the nature of philosophical and scientific definitions. Lehrer's answer to skepticism is critically assessed in the contributions by John W. Bender and Peter Klein. There is also the issue of whether Lehrer's theory implies radical skepticism concerning facts of acceptance. Robert Shope (1978) has argued that Lehrer, in his account of undefeated justification, commits the "conditional fallacy". A similar objection is raised by Peter Klein in this volume. Suppose that I accept some proposition p which is actually false. While p's falsity prevents me from knowing that p, it should not prevent me from knowing that 1 accept that p. But Lehrer's theory seems to have just this consequence: if p is false, 1 cannot know even that 1 accept that p. The reason is that "I accept that p" will not be in the ultrasystem, making it impossible for me to answer or neutralize the objection that 1 do not accept that p. Lehrer, as a matter of fact, has addressed this problem in the latest edition of TK, in which the ultrasystem is required to acknowledge the existence of the eliminated states of acceptance, preference and reasoning in the original evaluation system (p. 160). The conditional fallacy is discussed in David A. Truncellito's contribution to this volume. Truncellito maintains that the objection rests on a misunderstanding of Lehrer's account. The purpose of this introduction has been merely to give a brief overview of Lehrer's theory of knowledge and justification, and to indicate what might be possible troubles. It goes without saying that there is much more to be said about Lehrer's epistemology. My perhaps most serious omission concerns his and Carl G. Wagner's celebrated theory of rational consensus which they have developed in a series of papers and an influential book, Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Wagner's paper in the present volume discusses some probabilistic issues of importance to this other, no less important, aspect of Lehrer's epistemological theorizing. 3

ENDNOTES 1 Lehrer writes on p. 10 in TK: "We shall be concerned with an analysis that will be useful for explaining how people know that the input (the reports and representations) they receive from other people, their own senses, and reason is correct information rather than error and misinformation. A person may receive a representation that p as input without knowing that the representation is correct and, therefore, without knowing that p." 2 For reasons that that will emerge later, the ultrasystem is also required to acknowledge the existence ofthe eliminated states of acceptance, preference and reasoning in the original evaluation system (p. 160). 3 Thanks are due to Gordian Haas for his comments on an earlier version of this introduction.

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REFERENCES Carnap, R. (1950), Logical Foundations ofProbability, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Dretske, F. (1991), "Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational vs. Reliable Belief', Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 40: 15-30. Lehrer, K. (1974), Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Lehrer, K. (1975), "Reason and Consistency", in Analysis and Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of R, M Chisholm, Lehrer, K. (ed.), Dordrecht. Lehrer, K. (1989), "Reply to My Critics", in The Current State ofthe Coherence Theory, Bender, J. W. (ed.), Philosophical Studies Series, Vol. 44, Kluwer, Dordrecht. Lehrer, K. (I 990a), Metamind, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Lehrer, K. (1990b), Theory of Knowledge, First Edition, Westview Press, Boulder. Lehrer, K. (1991), "Reply to Mylan Engel", Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 40: 131-133. Lehrer, K. (1997), Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Lehrer, K. (2000), Theory of Knowledge, Second Edition, Westview Press, Boulder. Lehrer, K, and Wagner, C. G. (1981), Rational Consensus in Science and SOCiety, Reidel, Dordrecht. Olsson, E. 1. (1998), "Competing for Acceptance: Lehrer's Rule and the Paradoxes of Justification", Theoria, Vol. 64: 34-54. Olsson, E. J. (1999), "Cohering With", Erkenntnis, Vol. 50, Nos. 2-3: 273-291. Rott, H. (2001), Change, Choice and Inference, Oxford Logic Guides No. 42, Oxford University Press. Shope, R. (1978), 'The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy", Journal ofPhilosophy, Vol. 75: 397-413.

EXTERNALISM VS. INTERNALISM

Chapter 1 EPISTEMOLOGY: DOES IT DEPEND ON INDEPENDENCE?1 Ernest Sosa Brown University and Rutgers University

It is Lehrer's epistemology that most engages me, and that is what I will focus on here, while acknowledging his more recent extraepistemological analogies and comparisons, and the parallel forms of reasoning that he uncovers concerning ethics, and even wisdom, autonomy, and love. Perhaps we will go astray in abstracting thus from the broader context. If so, I hope Keith will set us straight. Let me begin with a word of explanation about my title. Independence there is Lehrer's term, by which he means non supervenience. And here is the question on which I will focus: What is the place of supervenience in epistemology? Most epistemologists take epistemology to include as a central concern the study of normative epistemic statuses such as epistemic justification, warrant, rationality, reasonableness, and knowledge itself. It is widely held that although the normative is not definable in terms of the nonnormative, nevertheless it does supervene on the nonnormative. Recall the notorious naturalistic fallacy. The mistake there is essentially that of trying to define the normative through the nonnormative. It was G.E. Moore who brought that fallacy to our attention, but Moore himself also advocated a thesis of the supervenience of the normative on the nonnormative. As for the supervenience of the epistemically normative, that would seem just a special case of the supervenience of the normative generally. Again, the orthodox stance has it that epistemic justification and other normative epistemic statuses supervene. This is often just taken for granted as it silently structures reflection and research in the field. Main controversies, such as internalism/externalism and foundationalism/coherentism, can often 23 E.!. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 23-30. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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be seen as disagreements over the general shape of how justification supervenes. Occasionally this becomes explicit, especially in recent work. For example, in a recent defense of epistemic internal ism, Conee and Feldman call their version mentalism, which is the thesis that the epistemic justification of any belief supervenes on the mental properties of the believer. I myself favor the boringly orthodox stance. Lehrer, by contrast, has argued for the more exciting contrarian view, that the epistemically normative does not supervene. Excitingly contrarian views are bound to meet resistance, however, and in keeping with my role as commentator I intend in what follows dutifully to resist. In epistemology, Lehrer has been a vigorous opponent of externalism and foundational ism. Together with Bonjour and others influenced by Wilfrid Sellars, he has rejected simplistic thermometer conceptions of knowledge as belief with appropriate causal, or tracking, or reliabilist properties. These properties may all remain outside the relevant grasp of the believer, after all, in which case they can give him "information" but hardly knowledge. What more is required? Here Lehrer's internal ism and coherentism come to the fore. To know that p, one needs a coherent perspective wherein one "accepts that p with the goal of gaining truth and avoiding error." Accepting that p is not just believing it. It is rather an evaluative stance on the question whether p, to the effect that it is advisable to accept it, with a view to gaining truth and avoiding error. No matter how coherently and deeply one might defend one's acceptance of p with further supportive acceptances, however, this will not ensure that one knows, since one's justification can still be defeated. How so? Through the falsity of enough of the supportive structure that lends coherence to one's acceptance ofp. Either one's justification is defeated, then, or it is not. If one's justification is defeated, if the removal of falsehood does entail the loss of sufficiently coherent support, then one's acceptance of p is justified personally but not also verifically. If one's justification is not defeated, on the other hand, if one's accepting p is still supported with sufficient coherence even after the removal of all such falsehood, then one's acceptance of p is justified both personally and verifically. It is one's acceptance system in the search for truth (and avoidance of error) that determines what one is justified in accepting. Only what coheres with one's system is one justified in accepting. How then does acceptance of a hypothesis cohere with such a system? This is detailed through a complex set of definitions, but the key idea is that accepting the hypothesis needs to be reasonable enough in the light of the acceptance system. (Here I am simplifying by focusing on the acceptance system, whereas Lehrer's more recent, fuller view would replace the acceptance system with the so-called

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evaluation system, which includes not only acceptances and evaluations of acceptances of various sorts, but also preferences and evaluations of preferences of various sorts. My simplified account is thus a caricature, but one that does, I hope, still convey, perhaps more vividly, key features of the epistemology proper.) Crucial to Lehrer's defense of such coherentism is his claim that the epistemic does not supervene on the nonepistemic and natural. In his view, only this rejection of supervenience enables him to defend his favored coherentism from its rival, foundationalism. So how should we understand the rejected supervenience thesis? What is the supervenience at issue? Properties X supervene on properties Y if and only if whenever an X property is exemplified, this follows necessarily from the exemplification of a Yproperty.

That then is what is required for epistemic properties of beliefs to supervene on their natural, nonepistemic properties. According to Lehrer, no such requirement is satisfied by the epistemic relative to the nonepistemic: there are no nonepistemic, natural properties and relations, such that whenever one reasonably accepts something, this is entailed by the fact that one's acceptance exemplifies such natural properties or enters into such natural relations. One might take coherentism to offer an advantage over foundationalism for those who prize explanation. Thus compare the following two principles: one foundationalist, one coherentist. (F)

IfNBp, then Jp, where NB is a naturalistic property of basic beliefs and J is a property of justification. To the question, why are we justified in accepting that p ifNB of p, the answer is that we just are ... 2

(CSR)

If S has an evaluation [acceptance] system A which contains (CSR) and p n-coheres with A, then S is justified in accepting that p.

If On-coheres' were defined non-epistemically, perhaps in terms of some naturalistic probability relation such as relative truth frequency, this principle could be construed as a principle of supervenience .... 3

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Now, it may be thought an advantage of CSR-coherentism that one could explain one's justification for acceptance of CSR by appeal to CSR itself, so long as CSR itself n-coheres with one's evaluation [acceptance] system A. It may be thought that F would be denied this explanatory advantage. But this is only an illusion. After all, there is no reason why F could not itself have foundationalist property NB, in which case the foundationalist could equally explain his justification for accepting F by appeal to F itself. Having recognized that no advantage accrues to coherentism through the reasoning just reviewed, Lehrer reacts as follows: If we are interested, therefore, in arguing that the coherence theory has an advantage in explaining why things are justified that the foundations theory must lack, we must reject the thesis of supervenience and argue for a coherence theory that makes justification independent [non supervenient]. Moreover, we must do this in such a way as to show why coherence leads to the doctrine of independence and the foundations theory does not. But how can we accomplish this? What is there about coherence that yields independence?4

"The answer, in brief, is that an adequate account of coherence must involve epistemic notions." Lehrer argues for this both with regard to the undefeated justification requisite for knowledge and also with regard to the personal justification requisite for undefeated justification. I confess that the structure of Lehrer's argument for this stance is not crystal clear to me. So far as I have been able to get it in focus, however, it seems to depend on a point made for example in the following two passages: ... I am trustworthy in what I accept only if I can tell whether I am trustworthy or not. I must be able to tell whether I am trustworthy or not about something in order to be trustworthy about it. I must accept that I am trustworthy when I am and not accept that I am trustworthy when I am not, at least a trustworthy amount of the time. 5 ... if I am asked how often a person must be correct in order to be trustworthy over time, I can only say, uninformatively, that he must be right a trustworthy amount of the time. 6

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If I have understood him properly, Lehrer reasons that even so much as personal justification requires that the subject be trustworthy enough, and there's no specifying in nonepistemic terms how trustworthy that needs to be. So even the most basic epistemic state, personal justification, will fail to supervene on the nonepistemic. Equally, therefore, will the more complex epistemic states, of verific justification and of knowledge, also fail to supervene, constituted as they are out of personal justification. 7 I have the following three questions about this way of reasoning in favor of coherentism and against supervenience. 1. Even if the relevant epistemic statuses, of knowledge, say, and of epistemic reasonability and justification, are to be understood in terms of coherence, and even if an adequate "account" of coherence must involve epistemic notions, how does this refute the supervenience of the epistemic? Compare tallness. It may be that there is no way to define 'tall relative to group G' without using tallness terminology. Thus it may not be possible to do so without using the predicate "sufficiently taller than the average" or the like, which will only raise the question "Sufficiently for what?"-to which the only acceptable answer may be "Sufficiently to make one tall." Yet, even if any adequate account of tallness must in that way involve tallness notions, so that in effect there is no acceptable noncircular definition of that notion, surely tallness does supervene on the distribution of heights over the relevant group. Moreover, the point here need not be restricted to relative terms such as 'tall' and its cognates. It would seem to apply well beyond that, to any terms that while indefinable in terms of some basis still supervene on that basis. (And the point would apply not only to definability but also to reducibility, if the standards for biconditional reducibility are set lower than those for outright definability. It would still be plausibly arguable that failure of biconditional reducibility to a certain basis is compatible with supervenience on that basis.) Suppose we do need to appeal in our explication of our concept of tallness, such as it is, to "sufficiently taller than the average to make one tall." Surely we can still insist quite plausibly that whenever someone S is tall (relative to group G) this follows necessarily from the distribution of heights in group G, including S's own height. Moreover, it would still seem plausible that, relative to any possible counterpart group with the same distribution of heights, necessarily the counterpart of subject S would also be tall (relative to the counterpart of group G) as a necessary consequence of that distribution of heights. Note, moreover, that it does not matter for our purposes how the people in that counterpart group use the word 'tall' or what contextual variation there might be to their proper and truthful application of that word.

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That does not affect the truth or falsehood of what we say when we say that in that group what matters to whether the counterpart of S is tall is the distribution of heights in the group. Here we are of course relying on what we mean by 'tall' and on whatever contextual constraints there may be on our present proper and truthful use of such terminology. So it is important to distinguish our question of whether tallness-relative-to-G supervenes on the distribution of heights alone, from the question of whether the correctness of applications of 'tall (for group G)' in group G is entailed simply by the distribution of heights. (Obviously it is not entailed simply by that; such correctness is also crucially dependent on the standards operative in group G for the use of the relevant terminology, which need not coincide with our standards. ) Our question should also be distinguished, moreover, from the question whether our attributions of 'tall (for group G)' have their correctness determined simply by the distribution of heights. Here again, the answer to our correctness-of-attribution question is clearly in the negative, since here again a crucial factor determinative of such correctness will be the standards and meanings for the predicate among the relevant set of speakers, those the correctness of whose attributions is at issue. But this further factor is surely not determinative of which of us is actually tall; it is determinative rather of which of us is now truthfully and properly said to be "tall" (which in turn is distinct from the question of which of us is now truthfully and properly said to be tall.) 2. Lehrer's defense of coherentism relies on the idea that coherentism comports better with the nonsupervenience of the epistemic. And he believes this to be so in virtue of something else he believes: namely, that there is no "account" of the epistemic in nonepistemic terms. So far I have questioned whether nonsupervenience would indeed derive from such lack of an "account." Be that as it may, there is now this further question: Why should we suppose that no foundationalist status could be akin to coherence in failing to have any adequate "account" in nonepistemic terms? Take clarity and distinctness as the relevant foundationalist status. In fact, Descartes's proposal is in terms of enough clarity and distinctness. And, in any case, even if it is not Descartes's own, a foundationalist proposal could be defined in terms of enough clarity and distinctness. This would of course raise the question "Enough for what?"-to which the only acceptable answer might then be "Enough to give one certainty (or justification, or reasonableness, etc.)." Suppose, only for the sake of argument, that the indefinability in nonepistemic terms of the key epistemic status used by a theory (foundationalist or coherentist) would make that epistemic status independent (nonsupervenient). And suppose, again only for the sake of argument, that

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this would give that theory an advantage in competition with its rival theories of that epistemic status. In that case, it would seem that our foundationalism of enough clarity and distinctness would share the supposed advantages of coherentism. 3. Suppose, again only for the sake of argument, that coherence is inextricably epistemic, and, furthermore independent: that it does not supervene on the nonepistemic. And consider a foundationalist theory on which epistemic status does supervene on nonepistemic properties. Why should this give an advantage to coherent ism? If foundational justification is in fact supervenient, might this not give an advantage to foundationalism: namely, that it provides an account of epistemic justification, and of knowledge, and explains how these are supervenient on the nonepistemic? So long as the foundational account is able to do as well as the coherentist account in every other relevant respect, why should the coherentist account derive any advantage from the fact that it invokes only properties that are independent and not supervenient? Having thought hard about Lehrer's work for years, I was not about to stop doing so for this occasion. Thinking hard about something often leads to a lot of questions, of course, and much of the fun of philosophy is in the give and take of question and answer. I have tried to present my questions as starkly and clearly as I could, so as to avoid side issues and distracting qualifications. This does incur the risk of overlooking important subtleties. But if my questions are based on oversight or misunderstanding, they may at least elicit from Keith a fuller account of just how his anti supervenience argument for coherentism is supposed to go. It is an honor to have this opportunity to importune my friend, and I look forward to his response. 8

ENDNOTES I This paper originated as a talk in a Symposium in honor of Keith Lehrer held as part of the 2001 Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association. I remember meeting Keith at an APA "smoker," as they were called in the early sixties. Keith was then a professor in the legendary Wayne State department, I a graduate student at Pitt. Little did we know that our paths would cross so often in the years to follow, always to my benefit, as Keith realized his brilliant potential, with many publications on issues of main interest to us both, especially in epistemology. Though we started out far apart, over the ensuing decades our relevant views have converged steadily. To dwell on agreement would be boring, however, so here I will discuss one main remaining disagreement. 2 Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 62. 3 Ibid., p. 65. 4 Ibid., p. 67.

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5 Self- Trust, pp. 70-l. (, "Replies," in a book symposium on Self-Trust in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999): 1065-74; p. 1071. 7 On the question of supervenience there is a gulf between Lehrer and me. Already in "How Do You Know'?" (APO, 1974; reprinted in my Knowledge in Perspective), r am committed to the supervenience of the epistemic: Every case of knowledge by a subject S is said there to require a Tree of knowledge, such that: "Trees display true epistemic propositions concerning S and they also show what 'makes their propositions true' via epistemic principles .... A tree must do this for every epistemic proposition that constitutes one of its nodes. That is to say, trees contain no epistemic terminal nodes. It is in this sense that trees provide complete epistemic explanations .... " (KIP, p. 33.) 8 For illuminating discussion of epistemic supervenience and of Lehrer's views see James Van Cleve's "Epistemic Supervenience revisited," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX (1999): 1049-1055, part of a PPR book symposium on Lehrer's Self-Trust, along with Lehrer's reply to Van Cleve on pp. 1069-1071. That in turn continues a conversation between the two of them over many years, continued first in Self-Trust, and then in the book symposium. My present paper joins that conversation, to which I had also been invited already in Lehrer's book.

Chapter 2 WHY NOT RELIABILISM? John Greco Fordham University

When I was a graduate student I would have gone to great lengths to talk with Keith Lehrer about epistemology. In fact, I did! Hearing that Lehrer would be talking at my alma mater, Georgetown University, I drove down to Washington D.C. from Providence, listened to his talk, and got myself invited to dinner. Much to the Georgetown students' horror, and probably Lehrer's as well, I proceeded to monopolize his time with my questions and commentary. (Sorry about that, Keith.) In any case, it is a great honor for me now to be invited to engage Lehrer more formally and more appropriately. I very much appreciate this opportunity. In his Theory ofKnowledge Lehrer tells us that his coherentist theory can be regarded as a form of reliabilism. 1 His reasoning is that, on his view, reliability is a necessary condition of both undefeated justification and knowledge. More specifically, personal justification requires that one accept both of the following principles: (T) I am trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the objective of accepting something just in case it is true, and (TR) If! am trustworthy in what I accept, then I am reliable in obtaining truth and avoiding error in what I accept.

Moreover, undefeated justification and knowledge require that both of these acceptances be true. Hence undefeated justification and knowledge require reliability regarding what one accepts. (194) Notice that the reliability that Lehrer's view requires is reliability of the knower herself, as opposed to 31 E.1. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 31-41. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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reliability of her methods, or her evidence, or something else. Hence Lehrer's view is a version of what I have elsewhere called "agent reliabilism"; i.e., he requires that the knower herself, the cognitive agent, be reliable regarding what she accepts. 2 In this paper I want to raise the following question: Why isn't agent reliability enough? Or better, why does knowledge require, in addition to agent reliability, further conditions regarding coherence? In pursuing this question, I will consider what I take to be Lehrer's three most important arguments for thinking that agent reliability is not enough, and that therefore something further, such as coherence, is required. I will argue that none of Lehrer's arguments against a non-coherentist version of reliabilism is persuasive. Lehrer's three arguments can be summed up as follows. 1.

Knowledge has a functional role in science and in practical reasoning, and this functional role requires abilities involving articulation, reason-giving, and defense against objections. Hence the grounds of knowledge must be in an appropriate way available to the knower, as they are in a coherence theory.

2.

Externalism in general, and reliabilism in particular, are open to "the opacity objection." More specifically, they are open to counter-examples such as that ofMr. Truetemp, in which a) the person in question is reliable in what he accepts, but b) this reliability is opaque to him. Contra reliabilism, such persons lack knowledge. However, coherence removes opacity and thereby issues in knowledge.

3.

Gettier problems show that true reliable acceptance is not sufficient for knowledge. However, coherence requires further conditions, and these work so as to solve Gettier problems.

In the next section I will consider Lehrer's first argument rather briefly. I will then tum to the opacity objection in a more extended way. Here my argument will be this: Depending on how we interpret Lehrer's conditions for coherence, we must say either a) that Mr. Truetemp satisfies those conditions and therefore knows, or b) that in ordinary cases of perception, people do not satisfy those conditions and therefore do not know. If (a), then the counterexamples employed by the opacity objection fail to distinguish Lehrer's coherentism from non-coherentist versions of reliabilism. If (b), then Lehrer's coherentism has unacceptable skeptical results. I will end by considering Lehrer's treatment ofGettier problems. Here I will argue that a non-coherentist version of agent reliabilism can adopt a strategy very similar to Lehrer's.

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Lehrer has long endorsed a broadly Sellarsian theme: that knowledge properly so-called involves abilities to articulate and give one's reasons, and to defend one's knowledge and reasons against relevant objections. In the second edition of his Theory of Knowledge, for example, Lehrer writes: It is fundamental to the kind of human knowledge that concerns us in this book that it is inextricably woven into reasoning, justification, confirmation, and refutation. It is required both for the ratiocination of theoretical speculation in science and practical sagacity in everyday life. To do science-to engage in experimental inquiry and scientific ratiocination-one must be able to tell whether one has correct information or not.. .. Engaging in law or commerce requires the same sort of knowledge, which may be used as the premises of critical reflection or claimed as the prizes of informed reasoning. (6)

This same theme is the basis for objections to both foundationalism and externalism. Thus Lehrer objects to a foundationalist account of perceptual beliefs on the following grounds: Perceptual beliefs are considered innocent until proven guilty when we care not the least whether the belief is innocent or guilty. Once we do care, though, we start to ask serious questions, the ones concerning justification .... We seek to determine if the person has information that would enable him to determine whether he actually sees the thing he thinks he does and render him justified. (74)

A similar objection is lodged against externalism. As in our refutation offoundationalism, what is missing from the accounts of externalists is the needed supplementation of background information and the transparency of it.... Such information is what is needed to supplement the information contained in the belief alone, and it is precisely the sort of information required for coherence and irrefutable justification. (185-6)

The reasoning behind these objections can be reconstructed as follows. First, knowledge plays an essential role in scientific inquiry and practical wisdom, which role makes knowledge "inextricably woven into reasoning, justification, confirmation, and refutation." But these, in turn, issue in the

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requirement of relevant background information. In other words, such background information is needed to make possible the knowledge-related practices of reasoning, justification, confirmation, and refutation. This sounds reasonable enough, but it raises the question of psychological plausibility. Namely, is it plausible that we typically have the background information that is required? For example, do we typically have relevant information about our perceptual faculties, the circumstances in which they are reliable, and whether we are presently situated in such circumstances? Lehrer's answer to the psychological plausibility objection is to understand background information in terms of acceptances, and to understand acceptances in terms of their functional role in reasoning, confirmation, etc. 3 Hence, for S to accept that her perceptual faculties are reliable in present circumstances does not require that she explicitly judges that this is so. Rather, it requires only that S act in certain ways when in certain circumstances. But can we think of this sort of implicit acceptance as background information, as we would have to for it to be relevant to coherence and justification? Lehrer's answer is yes: A person may be said to have information he cannot easily describe and to employ such information in various ways. For example, suppose I know the shortest route from Rochester to Buffalo, though I cannot tell you the name of the highway. Moreover, imagine that I am not very good at giving directions, so I cannot tell you how to get from Rochester to Buffalo .... That I make the trip successfully on many occasions shows that I have the required information, which I might find difficult to articulate, about the route from Rochester to Buffalo. Similarly, my reliability in accepting that I see when I do, or even in accepting that I feel or think when I do, depends on my ability to employ information, which I might find difficult to articulate, about seeing, feeling, and thinking. (74-5)

The problem is now this: The present objection to externalism, and the motivation for turning to a coherentist version of reliabilism, is that knowledge requires background information for the purposes of reasoning, justification, confirmation, and refutation. But now, it turns out, the background information that coherence provides need not be available for use in these activities. It would seem that Sellarsian themes regarding the role of knowledge in science and practical wisdom cannot be used to motivate Lehrer's coherentism over noncoherentist reliabilism.

2. THE OPACITY OBJECTION TO RELIABILISM. The opacity objection to externalism in general and to reliabilism in particular is as follows.

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There is, however, a general objection to all externalist theories that is as simple to state as it is fundamental: the external relationship might be opaque to the subject, who has no idea that her beliefs are produced, caused, or causally sustained by a reliable belief-forming process or properly functioning cogntive faculty .... All externalist theories share a common defect, to wit, that they provide accounts of the possession of information, which may be opaque to the subject, rather than of the attainment of transparent knowledge. (185)

The opacity objection is illustrated by the case ofMr. Trutemp. Suppose a person, Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by an experimental surgeon who invents a small device that is both a very accurate thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts .... Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are correct temperature thoughts. All told, this is a reliable belief-forming process and a properly functioning cognitive faculty. Now imagine, finally, that Mr. Truetemp has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted in his brain and is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about the temperature; but he never checks a thermometer to determine whether these thoughts about the temperature are correct. He accepts them unrefiectively, another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. It is. Does he know that it is? Surely not. He has no idea whether he or his thoughts about the temperature are reliable. (187)

The example ofMr. Truetemp is supposed to serve as a counter-example to reliabilism. More specifically, it is supposed to be a counterexample to noncoherentist versions of reliabilism. The idea is that Mr. Truetemp does not know, although he does fulfill the conditions for knowledge set down by noncoherentist reliabilism. However, the example does not serve Lehrer's purposes unless some other things are true as well. First, it must be the case that Mr. Truetemp does not know on the conditions for knowledge set down by Lehrer's coherentist theory. Otherwise, the Truetemp example will not distinguish noncoherentist reliabilism from coherentist reliabilism. Furthermore, it cannot be the case that Lehrer's theory is overly restrictive, so that it turns out that, on his view, there is no knowledge even in ordinary cases of perception. Otherwise, the fact that Lehrer's theory rules that Mr. Truetemp does not know will not indicate a virtue of his theory. Accordingly, for the Truetemp example to work for Lehrer against non-coherentist reliabilism, all of the following three conditions must be fulfilled: 1.

Mr. Truetemp knows on non-coherentist reliabilism,

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Mr. Truetemp does not know on Lehrer's coherentist reliabilism, and

3.

Ordinary cases of perception count as knowledge on Lehrer's coherentist reliabilism.

I will now argue that there is no way to interpret Lehrer's theory so that all of these conditions are fulfilled. More specifically, on some interpretations of Lehrer's theory, Mr. Truetemp knows. On other interpretations, ordinary cases of perception do not count as knowledge. First, it is not clear why Mr. Truetemp does not know on Lehrer's account. Specifically, it is not clear why Truetemp is not in the same position, vis-a.-vis coherence, as knowers are in ordinary cases. Consider, for example, Lehrer's remarks concerning knowledge and skepticism. Although we thank the skeptic for reminding us that...we sometimes err and are ever fallible in our judgment, we may at the same time neutralize her objection .... The objection based on our fallibility is neutralized by our trustworthiness. It is as reasonable to accept both that we are fallible and that we are trustworthy in a truth-connected way as it is to accept only that we are fallible. (220) In general, Lehrer thinks, we can invoke our trustworthiness to reason that some acceptance is reasonable. A consequence of adding principle (T) to my evaluation system is that I may reason from it and the acceptance of some target acceptance that p to the conclusion that the target acceptance is reasonable. My reasoning would be as follows. T. I am trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the objective of accepting something just in case it is true. I accept that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. Therefore, I am trustworthy in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. Therefore, I am reasonable in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true.

The argument from trustworthiness to reasonableness, which I shall refer to as the trustworthiness argument, assumes that my trustworthiness may explain why it is reasonable for me to accept what I do. (139)

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The relevant question is, why can't Mr. Truetemp reason in exactly the same way? Put differently, why isn't the reasonableness of Mr. Truetemp's acceptance about the temperature explained in exactly the same way? Moreover, why can't Mr. Truetemp invoke principle (TR) to reason even further, and to conclude that his acceptances about the temperature are not only trustworthy, but reliable? Again, consider how, according to Lehrer, the dialectic with the skeptic proceeds in ordinary cases. Critic (or skeptic): Let us admit that your are intellectually trustworthy and intellectually virtuous, as you claim. You are, nevertheless, in error because such trustworthiness and virtue fail to achieve their purpose. What you accept in this trustworthy and virtuous way is not reliably connected with the truth .... What should the claimant reply? The reply must be that the critic or skeptic is wrong! ...

Claimant: What I accept in this trustworthy and virtuous way is reliably connected with truth in a successful way. The way of virtue is also the way of truth. (211-2)

Again, why can't Mr. Truetemp follow the same dialectic? If he can, then Truetemp knows on Lehrer's account, and so the Truetemp case does not distinguish non-coherentist reliabilism from Lehrer's coherentism. I assume that Lehrer thinks that Mr. Truetemp cannot follow the same dialectic. However, it is not clear why. One reason that suggests itself is that Mr. Truetemp accepts his thoughts about the temperature "unreflectively." But what does this mean? One thing it might mean is that Truetemp has no further acceptances regarding his trustworthiness and reliability in this regard, and so does not have the requisite materials in his evaluation system to sustain a relevant dialectic. However, it is not at all clear that Mr. Truetemp does not have the relevant acceptances in his system. Remember, Lehrer defines acceptances in terms of their functionality in action and thought. But according to the example, Mr. Truetemp does act and think as if he thinks that he is trustworthy and reliable regarding his ability to determine the temperature. He acts and thinks more or less the way that normal people do regarding their ability to determine simple mathematical truths, or regarding their ability to determine colors in good light. That is, he acts and thinks as if he thinks that he is trustworthy and reliable, although he makes no conscious judgements in this regard. Moreover, Mr. Truetemp is reliable in the relevant regard, and therefore his acceptances are true and convert personal justification to undefeated justification and knowledge.

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Lehrer might object that Mr. Truetemp cannot explain his ability to tell the temperature in any detailed way; i.e. in a way more specific than referring to principles (T) and (TR). But neither could most people defend their ability to tell colors in any detailed way. Most people, I assume, would simply insist that they can tell, or else very quickly get into a quite inadequate (and probably false) explanation as to how they can tell. Let me be clear: The point I am making here is not that Mr. Truetemp knows. On the contrary, I think that he does not know, and below I will offer my own explanation regarding why he does not know. My point, rather, is that Lehrer's coherence theory is faced with the dilemma set out above. Depending on how one interprets Lehrer's conditions for coherence and knowledge, either a) Truetemp has the requisite true acceptances in his evaluation system, in which case he knows, or b) he does not, in which case neither do ordinary perceivers, and so they don't know. Let us consider one more reply on Lehrer's behalf, however. Lehrer might argue that there are true objections (or competitors) in the Truetemp case, which defeat Truetemp's personal justification, and which are not present in cases of ordinary perception. For example, Lehrer might argue, Truetemp cannot answer the following objecton: (0) Someone has implanted a device in your brain, and that is why you believe what you do about the temperature. Notice, however, that (0) is misleading: (0) counts as an objection on Lehrer's view, since it is less reasonable for Truetemp to accept what he does about the temperature on the assumption that (0) is true than it is on the assumption that (0) is false on the basis ofTruetemp's evaluation system. However, Truetemp is perfectly reliable in matters regarding the temperature, and so the objection is misleading insofar as it suggests a reason against Truetemp's belief. But now consider that there will also be misleading objections available against S's acceptances in ordinary cases of perception. For example: (0') You are reliable in your perceptual beliefs in conditions C but not C', and it is possible that you are presently in conditions C'. Or consider: (0") There are experts in philosophy and science who believe that apples are not red and that the sky is not blue. How are these sorts of objections to be answered in ordinary cases of perception? Why should we think that such objections always can be answered? For example, consider that C' in (0') might describe conditions about which S is wholly ignorant, or perhaps conditions that S lacks the conceptual capacities even to consider. Similarly, S might have no idea why anyone would accept that (0") is true, and no idea how to reply to such considerations if she did have an idea of them. Perhaps S can neutralize (0') and (0") by referring to principle (T) and/or principle (TR) above. Or maybe she can neutralize the objections in some other way. But if she can, why can't Mr. Truetemp neutralize (0) in the same way? Again, depending on how Lehrer's theory is supposed to handle

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misleading objections, it would seem that either a) Truetemp has the requisite true acceptances in his evaluation system to neutralize such objections, in which case he knows, or b) he does not, in which case neither do ordinary perceivers, and so they don't know. Either way, the Truetemp case does not serve Lehrer's purposes in the opacity objection against externalism and reliabilism.

3.

GETTlER PROBLEMS

I now turn to Lehrer's third argument against non-coherentist reliabilism: that true reliable acceptance is not sufficient for knowledge. Another equally important reason why reliabilism will not suffice [for the sort ofjustification required for knowledge] is that global reliability might be irrelevant locally. Consider again the case of Mr. Goodsumer, who sums reliably but not in the particular case. He is not trustworthy in the way he sums in this case. Trustworthiness must be connected with truth in order for personal justification to convert to knowledge in the particular case. (224)

What is the nature ofthe required connection? What does it mean to say that trustworthiness in what one accepts is successfully connected with truth in what one accepts in the particular case? It cannot mean, as we have noted in the case of Goodsumer, that being trustworthy in what one accepts is generally or reliably successful. It means that the person is successful in accepting what is true because she accepts what she does in a trustworthy way in the particular case. Her trustworthiness explains her success in accepting what is true .... Her trustworthiness and the reliability of it explains her success in the particular case. (223)

This is a very nice idea. In Gettier cases, the person has true acceptance but it is only a matter of luck that the acceptance is true. In cases of knowledge, the person has true acceptance because she is trustworthy (or virtuous) in the way that she accepts what she does. This idea does not give the advantage to coherentism over non-coherentist reliabilism, however, because the reliabilist can say the same thing. More specifically, the agent reliabilist can say the same thing: in cases of knowledge, S accepts what is true because she is reliable. 4 This move is particularly attractive from the perspective of agent reliabilism, since in general credit is closely tied to agent reliability. For example, we give an athlete credit when we think that she accomplishes her feat because she has great abilities. According to Aristotle, actions deserving moral credit "proceed from a firm and unchangeable character."s The present

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suggestion is that knowledge involves a kind of intellectual credit. In cases of knowledge, it is to S's credit that she accepts what is true; i.e. she accepts what is true because she is reliable in the relevant way. Finally, the present perspective gives us an explanation as to why Mr. Truetemp does not know. Namely, the tempucomp in Truetemp's brain undermines the notion that he accepts the truth because he is reliable. In other words, it is not to Truetemp's credit that he accepts the truth. Consider the following remarks by Joel Feinberg, concerning the requirements for moral credit. should like to suggest that the more important to a full and comprehensive understanding of a triggered action the actor's own dispositions and thresholds are, the more likely we are to consider the act truly his, provided that those dispositions and thresholds are not biologically or psychologically abnormal and that they were not imposed on him by manipulation. 6

In other words, we do not consider Truetemp's acceptances about the temperature to be truly his, in the sense required for intellectual credit, precisely because they are the result of dispositions and thresholds that are "biologically and psychologically abnormal" and "imposed on him by manipulation." Truetemp accepts the truth because the tempucomp is reliable, not because he is reliable. 7 Hence agent reliabilism can endorse Lehrer's strategy for solving Gettier problems, and can place this strategy within a general theory of credit. Moreover, this strategy gives agent reliabilism resources for explain ing why Mr. Truetemp does not know. None of this has anything to do with coherentism, however. I conclude, then, that Lehrer does not give us good reasons to prefer coherentism to non-coherentist versions of agent reliabilism. 8

ENDNOTES IKeith Lehrer, Theory 0/ Knowledge, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), p. 172. Below, all page numbers in the text refer to this volume. 2. See my "Agent Reliabilism," Philosophical Perspectives. J3, Epistemology, James Tomberlin, ed. (Atascadero. CA: Ridgeview Press, 1999); and Putting Skeptics in Their Place (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 3. See Lehrer's "Replies" in The Current State 0/ the Coherence Theory, John Bender, ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); and Theory o/Knowledge, esp. pp. 39-40. 4. I argue for this account ofknowledge in "Knowledge as Credit for True Belief," in Intellectual Virtue. Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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Nicomachean Ethics, II.4. Joel Feinberg suggests that all attributions of moral credit imply that the action in question proceeds from character. This is probably too strong. Nevertheless, there is a special sort of moral credit, with which Aristotle is concerned, that does imply this. See .Toe I Feinberg, DOing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 126. 6. Doing and Deserving, p. 171. Emphasis added. 7 More needs to be said, of course. I try to say some of it in "Knowledge as Credit for True Belief." On my own view, abnormality and manipulation do not always undermine positive epistemic status. But they do in cases where they undermine credit. x. I would like to thank Keith Lehrer and Ernest Sosa for helpful conversations on relevant issues. 5.

Chapter 3 JUSTIFICATION AND PROPER BASING' Jonathan L. Kvanvig University of Missouri

Some thirty or so years ago, Keith Lehrer attacked the idea that causation has much to do with knowledge or justification with the case of the gypsy lawyer, and has more recently endorsed the same kind of attack with the case of the racist scientist. 2 These cases threaten not only causal theories of knowledge but also theories of knowledge or justification which require that one's evidence be at least a partial cause of one's belief. They threaten, that is, the view that causation is at the heart of the distinction between propositional justification, the justification one has for the content of one's belief, and doxastic justification, the justification which attaches to the believing itself. When justification attaches to the believing itself rather than merely to the content of what is believed, it is because one holds the belief in question on the basis of the evidence. When justification only attaches to propositional contents, there is a failure of such basing, e.g., one may have the evidence but believe for different reasons. This distinction is important for at least two reasons. First, only doxastically justified beliefs are candidates for knowledge, on any theory which requires justification for knowledge. Propositional justification is a step in the right direction, but if one's believing itself is not justified, one cannot have met the justificatory requirements for knowledge. Second, only doxastically justified beliefs satisfy any purely intellectual requirement to believe claims that are justified, for any such requirement will surely include the requirement that we hold such beliefs for the right reason, i.e., on the basis of that which justifies them. So a proper account of the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification is important for a complete theory of justification and for a complete theory of knowledge. 43 E.J. Olsson (ed.). The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 43-62. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Though Lehrer's arguments played a role in the abandonment of causal theories of knowledge, the epistemological community has not endorsed his view that a causal account of the basing relation is defective. In some cases, epistemologists have simply found Lehrer's examples unpersuasive,3 and in other cases, they have argued against the conclusion Lehrer draws from his examples. I want to look at this issue here, for I think that there is more to be said on behalf of Lehrer's view than has been appreciated. Causality is ubiquitous in nearly all of our experience of the world, but it is not conceptually involved in the concepts of knowledge or justification. In particular, Lehrer is right that the basing relation is not a species of causal relation. A terminological point is in order before beginning. There is a sense in which, when someone denies that evidence needs to be causally responsible for belief in order for it to be doxastically justified or to count as knowledge, that person is denying that belief needs to be based on that evidence. After all, in such cases, belief is not causally grounded in, nor explained by, awareness of the evidence. That is not the concept of basing that is relevant here, however. What is central here is the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Two jurors, for example, can be presented with precisely the same evidence and both believe the defendant is innocent. One might believe this claim by attending to the evidence, and the other because his horoscope said, "you will need courage today to make a negative judgment about a very bad person." In the second case, the juror does not attend to the evidence or even consider the question of whether the evidence confirms the guilt of the defendant. He hears the evidence and forms beliefs about it, but this experience is not connected at all with his belief. So, whereas the first juror is doxastically justified and may know, on the basis of the evidence, that the defendant is guilty, the secondjuror only has propositional justification and fails to know on the basis of the evidence that the defendant is guilty. The concept of basing that is relevant here is that concept central to this distinction. Even ifthere are other concepts of basing on which a person can be said to know without basing belief on evidence (because the evidence doesn't cause the belief), the concept of concern here is that concept in virtue of which we distinguish candidates for knowledge in terms of whether the person has doxastic or merely propositional justification for belief.

1.

LEHRER'S EXAMPLES

We can begin with Lehrer's examples. The first case concerns a gypsy lawyer of a client accused of eight murders. The lawyer consults the Tarot cards, and they say that the client is guilty of committing all but the eighth murder. The lawyer believes what the cards say, and his conviction of the innocence of his client regarding the eighth murder leads him to reconsider the

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evidence, which he now comes to see conclusively establishes that his client is innocent of the eighth murder. Lehrer then goes on to claim: He freely admits, however, that the evidence which he claims shows that he knows his client to be innocent of that crime is not what convinced him of the innocence of his client, and, indeed, would not convince him now were he not already convinced by the cards ... His conviction could not be increased by his consideration of the evidence because he was already completely convinced. On the other hand, were his faith in the cards to collapse, then emotional factors which influence others would sway him too. Therefore the evidence which completely justifies his belief does not explain why he believes as he does, his faith in the cards explains that, and the evidence in no way supports ... or partially explains why he believes as he does. 4 Lehrer thus claims that the lawyer knows that his client is innocent even though the evidence which justifies his belief does not either prompt his original acquisition of the belief, nor does the evidence lend increased confidence in the belief once it is discovered, nor does the evidence at present sustain the belief. This last point is true in virtue of the fact that, if the influence of the cards were removed, emotional factors would hold sway and the lawyer would no longer believe that his client was innocent. Nonetheless the lawyer now knows and justifiably believes that his client is innocent of the eighth murder. More recently, Lehrer has forwarded the case of Ms. Prejudice: Imagine the case of Ms. Prejudice, who out of prejudice against a race believes that the members of the race who have a certain disease get the disease because of their genetic makeup. Of course, she, being very racist, believes this is a sign oftheir racial inferiority, and she is totally convinced because of her racism that the disease is the result of the genetic constitution of the race. Now imagine that Ms. Prejudice becomes a medical student and learns, to her pleasure, of the medical evidence that supports her prejudiced conviction. She becomes, however, a medical expert of the highest quality, fully capable of separating her prejudices from her scientific studies. As luck would have it, she becomes part of a research team assigned the task of checking on the genetic basis of the disease .... She wants to make sure it [the disease] really is [genetically caused], and she will force them [her co-investigators] to investigate with the greatest care every reason for doubting that the disease is genetically caused. She wants to make absolutely sure that she cannot be charged with concluding on the basis of the scientific evidence that the disease is genetically caused because of prejudice. Of course, her belief that the disease is genetically caused is the result of her still very intense prejudice, but her scientific evaluation ofthe evidence in favor of this belief must be rigorously tested.

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JUSTIFICATION AND PROPER BASING Every objection to the claim is considered and refuted by the team, all of whom, except for Ms. Prejudice, who plays devil's advocate, are completely without prejudice. They all conclude that the scientific evidence shows conclusively that the disease is genetically caused, as Ms. Prejudice has believed all along. After the investigation, she knows that the disease is genetically caused. She has the same evidence ... for believing this as the other members of her team, and if they know that the disease is genetically caused, so does she. But her belief is the product of an improperly functioning system of racial prejudice. 5

Just as in the case of the gypsy lawyer, the racist scientist initially comes to a belief on the basis of suspect motivations. According to Lehrer, these motivations remain the basis for the belief even after learning of the evidence that confirms the belief. Still, Lehrer claims, the racist scientist has knowledge (and, by implication, justification) if her colleagues do. After all, they have worked on the project together, knowing the intellectual character and prejudices of each member of the team. It is obvious that, if asked who on the team knows and who doesn't, they'd be perplexed at the idea of having to draw such a distinction. They'd surely say that either everyone knows or no one does. Since I will be focusing on the issue of the proper construal ofthe basing relation, it will be useful to recast the discussion in terms of it. The lawyer and the scientist each have adequate evidence for thinking what they do, but they do not initially base their beliefs on that evidence. Later on, each comes to see that the evidence confirms their belief, even though the evidence is not even a partial cause of their beliefs. Since there is nonetheless a distinction between merely having sufficient evidence for a belief and having that evidence justifY one's believing of the claim in question, we can characterize the two cases as follows. The lawyer and the scientist come to be doxastically justified in believing what they were originally not doxastically justified in believing, and this claim implies that they satisfY whatever basing relation between evidence and belief is appropriate for capturing the distinction between doxastic justification and propositional justification. Their beliefs are nonetheless not caused, not even partially, by their awareness of the evidence; their deficient intellectual characters result in still-true regrettable causal stories about their beliefs. Thus, if we accept Lehrer's account, a causal account of the basing relation is mistaken.

2.

AUDI'S DEFENSE

Causal theorists have gone in two different directions in response to such cases. Some have admitted the existence of knowledge and proper basing after

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investigation by the principals involved, and have attempted to save the heart of the causal theory by giving up the claim that any actual causal relations are required. Instead, they have attempted to salvage some causality in knowledge by finding a true counterfactual involving a causal relation between evidence and belief which is true and hence is compatible with these admissions, claiming that this causality-embedded counterfactual is necessary for knowledge. 6 I have argued against such theories elsewhere/ but will bypass the issues involved here. For such emendations of a causal requirement on the basing relation do not amount to a defense of a causal theory of basing. Instead, they agree with Lehrer that a causal requirement is mistaken, so they pose no threat to the conclusion Lehrer wishes to draw from his examples. The other direction is to argue against the claim that the players in Lehrer's examples come to have doxastically justified beliefs and hence against the claim that they have knowledge. Robert Audi presents the only sustained defense in the literature of this position, and his discussion focuses on the case of the gypsy lawyer. He says, Let us first consider some consequences of Lehrer's interpretation of the example. Recall the assumption that the cards are not actually relevant to p. Thus, even though S (here the gypsy) has (objectively) good evidence for p, given a contrary verdict from the cards he would (other things equal) have had the false belief that not-po Second, given his faith in the cards, he would have believed p even if it had been false, indeed, even if, on the basis of the cards, it had not been rendered so much as objectively likely (to any degree) to be true, i.e., very roughly, likely to some degree given the actual facts relevant to p... Third, S would have believed other falsehoods about the crime, had the cards pointed to them, e.g., that the client's spouse committed it. These points, especially the second, strongly suggest that S does not justifiably believe p. It is, after all, simply good fortune (because the cards happened to be right) that S did not believe something false in place of p. Surely if one's belief that p is justified by good evidence, it cannot be simply good fortune that one did not believe something false instead. 8 Audi here worries about a certain sort of epistemic luck in believing a proposition. This sort of luck is present when one is indiscriminate with respect to the truth. In the case of the lawyer, his reliance on the cards makes him indiscriminate with respect to the claim that his client is innocent. As Audi claims, "given his faith in the cards, he would have believed p even if it had been false, indeed, even if, on the basis of the cards, it had not been rendered so much as objectively likely (to any degree) to be true." This feature of the gypsy lawyer case runs counter to what Audi sees as a reliable indicator connection established by the presence of personal justification. That connection is that

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personal justification implies that if the proposition in question were not true, the person in question would not believe it. Audi thus claims that because the lawyer's belief is just a matter of this sort of epistemic luck, or "good fortune" as he puts it, it is wrong to think that the lawyer really knows, or justifiably believes, that his client is innocent of the eighth murder. Audi seems to recognize some weakness in this defense of the causal requirement, however. Consider his formulation of the reliable indicator connection: [T]here is also an important (and far less widely recognized) connection between personal justification and truth. The latter connection is our main concern here. In the most common cases where Ss belief that p is justified by good evidence, q, S would not have believed p if p were not true or at least objectively likely to be true. For here S would not have believed p ifhe had not believed q, in virtue of which-since q is (objectively) good evidence for p-p is at least objectively likely. There is, I suggest, a measure of protection from believing falsehoods which justification by good evidence provides. 9

Audi claims that there is a connection between personal justification (what I have been calling doxastic justification) and a measure of protection from believing falsehoods. The protection arises from the reliable indicator requirement, to the effect that if the claim had not been true, the person in question would not have believed it. This protective clause is supposed to support a rejection of Lehrer's account of his examples, but notice that Audi does not give a complete endorsement of the clause. Rather, he claims that the requirement holds "in the most common cases ... " A response on behalf of Lehrer is easy if this qualifier is taken seriously, for gypsy lawyer cases need not be all that common in order to undermine the causal view. If it is granted that the reliable indicator connection only holds in the most common cases, however, it is not clear how the reliable indicator connection can form a strong enough reason for maintaining that there is an exceptionless causal sustaining requirement. Yet that is just the structure of Audi's argument: he holds that there is a reliable indicator connection which holds in the most common cases and uses this information to conclude that there is an exceptionless causal sustaining requirement. That argument is not telling against Lehrer's view, for it would be at least as plausible to conclude from Audi's premise that there is a causal sustenance element in the most common cases of knowledge. Furthermore, Audi's worries about the presence of luck are not telling, either. It is well-known that it takes a cooperative environment for knowledge to occur. Think, for example of Goldman's fake barn case, in which the residents of a certain area undermine our claim to knowledge by planting a huge

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number offake barns in a landscape in which we happen to focus on the one real barn. Suppose, though, that they were only giddily considering the fun they'd have doing so, but decide at the last minute not to play such ajoke on us. We'd have knowledge in such a case, but be lucky to have it. Or suppose that they decide to play the joke on us, but we serendipitously happen to take a different road and happen to look at a different landscape with no fake barns on it. Perhaps a black cat crossed the road, and our superstitions led us to turn to the right rather than the left in order to avoid the horror of having the cat cross the fork in the road that we traveled. Then we'd still have knowledge, but be lucky to have it. Audi might insist that these are not the kinds of luck that knowledge rules out, whereas the kind he is speaking of is that kind. To defend such a position, we would need an account of the distinction between these two kinds of luck, and Audi recognizes that no such account will be forthcoming by appeal to the reliable indicator connection (since it can only be said to hold in the most common cases). In addition, progress on the dispute between Audi and Lehrer is not going to be made by relying on some delineation of the various kinds of luck that might infect belief. As I see it, the only way to determine what kind of luck knowledge rules out is to forward an acceptable account of knowledge, and then classify instances ofluck in terms of that account. That is, I see no grounds for thinking that we could sort instances of luck into kinds apart from our interest in the nature of knowledge, and have one of these kinds be just the right kind to solve the Gettier problem. In the absence of the plausibility of this approach to the Gettier problem, appeals to the concept of luck will end up as unconvincing as relevant alternative responses to skepticism, which claim that skepticism is false because one need only be immune from error in relevant alternatives, among which are not found skeptical alternatives. For these reasons, Audi's arguments based on the concepts ofluck and reliable indication against Lehrer's examples must be determined to be unsuccessful.

3.

A GENERAL APPROACH TO JUSTIFICATION

In terms of persuading the reader to accept the alternative conclusion that a causal theory of the basing relation is mistaken, the discussion to this point has done little more than the presentation of the gypsy lawyer case itself would have done. We have seen that the arguments against Lehrer's examples are unconvincing, but it remains the case that this example has not moved many to reject causal accounts. It seems, then, that some further argument would be useful, and I believe there is a strong argument to buttress Lehrer's examples from the general nature of justification. I say "general nature," because justification is not only a property of beliefs but also of actions. It is plausible,

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therefore, to assume that a proper account of justified beliefwill be extendable to an account of justified behavior. I want to argue that a theoretically unified approach to the concept of justification, one that attends not only to the nature of justification as a feature of belief but also to its nature as a feature of action, provides a strong argument against a causal view of the basing relation. In the arena of action, the causal view maintains that there is a distinction between reasons which only justify the action performed and reasons which justify the performance of the action. On the causal view, if the reasons are causally responsible (in the right way) for the action in question, then those reasons justify the performance of the action as well as the action itself; otherwise they can only justify the action itself. In this way, the causal account of rational action claims to have explained the difference between a sort of personal justification, where the performance of an action is justified, and a more impersonal justification, where only the action performed, but not the performing of it, is justified. This distinction mirrors the distinction we have in the arena of belief between propositional justification and doxastic justification. I believe this causal view is not adequate and I shall argue that it cannot make sense of one feature of justification. Most of us discover, at one time or another, that our motivations for behavior are less than desirable. I shall argue that one response to this awareness, a response in which justification is created where it did not exist before, is one for which the causal view cannot account. Let us begin by considering a bit of behavior which is to be assumed to lack full justification. Suppose Jim is running for Congress, where this behavior is to be explained by an irrational desire to prove his critics wrong. This desire arose because, being from the hill country in Texas, he believes that people make fun of him and ridicule him because there is no possibility of his ever "amounting to much." As a matter of fact, Jim has no reason to believe this and is just showing paranoid tendencies, but he does hold the beliefs in question and because he does, he forms the desire to prove his critics wrong. So, Jim is running for Congress to show that he has amounted to something. Regardless of how common or understandable such motivations are, they present an explanation for Jim's actions which does not amount to ajustification of them. Whatever reasons there might be which could justify Jim's running for Congress, this irrational desire to prove his critics wrong (irrational because his beliefthat there are such critics is unfounded) is not among them. Further, suppose that Jim has not detected his real motivations and that he has given reasons both to himself and others for running which have been quite different from the "real" reasons for which he runs. But now, having advanced in years and self-understanding, Jim has come to realize his true motives. He has come to realize that the reasons he has given for running are not what brings him to run for Congress.

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In evaluating the plausibility of this causal view, I will be employing two kinds of claims as a guide to which causal connections exist in a given case. First, I will employ counterfactuals. One theory of causation is a counterfactual theory, on which to say that one event or state is the cause of another is to say (roughly) that, were the first event or state absent, the second would be absent as well. 10 There are many problems with this theory of causation, II one ofwhich is especially pertinent here. For, at most, the counterfactual theory of causation is only adequate for deterministic causation, and is wholly implausible regarding probabilistic causality. In order to address this concern, I will also look at the issue of probability enhancement by proposed causal factors, in addition to the counterfactuals to be examined. In each case, I do not presume that the concept of causality can be analyzed or explicated in terms of these notions. I only presuppose that the existence or lack of such is good evidence regarding the existence of causal connections. In the case we are considering, we have sufficient evidence for thinking that Jim's running for Congress is the result of his irrational desire because, if Jim's irrational desire were absent, he would quit the campaign. Perhaps he would become a beach bum instead. When Jim's self-awareness increases, Jim comes to realize thatthe reasons he has been offering for his behavior (i) did not originally prompt the behavior, (ii) have not, in the past, sustained the behavior, and (iii) do not now sustain the behavior. Regarding this third fact, what Jim realizes is that he is so constituted at present that the reasons he has offered do not even enhance the probability of his running, even if we were to control for the causal force of his irrational desire. Upon confronting these rather disturbing facts, Jim then reasons as follows: "the inadequate motivations both past and present are regrettable and everything possible ought to be done to alter them; but, until this alteration can be accomplished, everything possible ought to be done to maintain some motivation or other to keep running for Congress since, after all, it is nonetheless true that I am extraordinarily good at convincing others of correct policy, that I am best qualified to serve the constituents of this district, and if persons were to attempt to quit doing everything which is done for inadequate reasons, not (as) much good would be done." So, Jim concludes, he ought to do all in his power to keep the race for Congress alive in spite of his bad motivations. There is an epistemic fact about Jim which needs to be explained by a satisfactory account of justification. How to express this fact is a bit troublesome, but we might try to put the point as follows. Jim has made progress of a purely theoretical sort toward the goal of being perfectly rational, of achieving the justificatory ideal. He has achieved a level of coherence between thought and action which, though not ideal, is closer to the ideal than what his prior self had achieved, first in ignorance of his true motivations and next in a quandary about what to make of the tension between his behavior and

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his awareness of his inadequate motivations. The fact which must be explained is this progress. The explanation I will argue for is that the progress achieved is that sort attaching to the performance of the action in question which, when it obtains, justifies the performance of that action. Of course, this explanation cannot be employed by the causal theory, because the reasoning process above does not have any causal impact on the particular behavior with which we are concerned. Call the reasoning process in question "R". The occurrence of R is compatible with the following truths: (a) if Jim did not have his irrational desire, he would no longer be running for Congress; (b) even if R had not occurred, Jim would still be running for Congress; and (c) if R had occurred and Jim's irrational desire disappeared, Jim would no longer run for Congress. Moreover, if we were to find a way to control for the effect of Jim's irrational desire, R would have no probabilistic effect on Jim's behavior. Surely it is reasonable to assume that R will affect his overall behavior at some point, for that is exactly what the reasoning process shows Jim's intentions to be; but it need not have any immediate causal impact on his running for Congress. We might capture this point by calling the reasoning process a meta-motivational or meta-causal reasoning process. If the reasoning process is a motivational one, i.e., if it is even minimally causally efficacious with respect to the action in question, it would be quite confused; for it includes the recognition that Jim cannot, simply by willing it or thinking about it, alter his motivation at present. I shall assume, though, that Jim is not so confused. What needs to be explained, to repeat, is the progress Jim makes in the above case. What I shall argue is that any of the explanations open to a causal theory do not sufficiently explain this progress, and thus that the causal theory is shown to be inadequate by cases involving meta-motivational reasoning processes. In order to defend these claims, we need some understanding of the components of the justificatory ideal so we will be able to ascertain the variety of alternative explanations open to the causal theory. This ideal requires, first, that all actions, beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., be fully justified, i.e., all actions be justified ones to perform, and all mental states be justified states in which to be. Further, it requires that one justifiably perform all of one's actions, and justifiably be in all the relevant mental states in question. Finally, this ideal requires that the person in question have certain character traits which I shall refer to loosely using the notion of being fully rational. The first two requirements of the ideal relate, first, to the actions and states themselves, and then to the relation between the person and the actions and states. This final requirement relates to the person alone: he/she must be fully, or ideally, rational as well. So, we are looking for an explanation in one of these three areas for the progress that Jim has made in reconciling his running with his inadequate motivations.

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Consider first the implications of the causal theory which give no explanation of Jim's progress. The causal theory denies that Jim's running is justified either before or after his discovery and resolution of his real motives, i.e., prior to Jim's discovery his running is not justified, after discovering his motivations and prior to his formulation of R his running is not justified, and after formulating R his running is not justified. In what follows, I will refer to these three stages of this case as stages one, two, and three, respectively. A causal theorist may say that there is an impersonal justification in all three stages for the action which Jim performs, but he must deny at each stage that Jim's performing ofthat action is justified. As we have just seen, this answer can be maintained only if the causal theory can also explain the progress Jim makes toward the justificatory ideal in some other way than by claiming he comes to have a justification for the performance of an action where he previously only had a justification for the content ofthe action. We can categorize the options which a causal theory can appeal to by which to explain the movement toward the ideal as follows. First, the theory can appeal either to some present difference in Jim or to a difference there will be in the future. If the appeal is to some present difference in Jim, the options are several: (i) the appeal may be to some internal mental state of Jim which becomes (more) justified, (ii) the appeal may be to certain acts or omissions, or aspects of certain acts or omissions, which undergo an increase in their level of justification, or (iii) the appeal may be that Jim, himself becomes more rational. As far as I can tell, there are no other options to which a causal theorist can appeal. In order to show that the causal theory is inadequate, what needs to be done is to show that Jim's progress is compatible with no increases of the sort described in the last paragraph to which a causal theorist might appeal. I shall begin this extended argument to eliminate the available options by considering the appeal to features of the future. We shall see that this option is the least attractive, and thus we will devote the major portion of this elimination argument to features of the present and features of Jim himself to which a causal theorist might appeal in explaining Jim's progress.

4.

FEATURES OF THE FUTURE

The causal theorist might attempt to account for the case by claiming that the only difference is a future difference. So, for example, the causal theorist might hold that, given R, it is now true that in the future, Jim will justifiably run for Congress (perhaps when he comes up for re-election); whereas withoutR, he will not. On this option, no present difference exists except for the fact that it is now true that the future will be different than it otherwise would have been.

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This claim seems straightforwardly wrong, however. There is clearly a present difference between stages one and three, and any view which cannot explain that difference is inadequate. Once we have recognized our inadequate motivations and seen that it is better that our behavior not change, we are closer to the justificatory ideal, at that instant, than we were before. Were we to die in the next instant, our legacy should include our having made such an advance during the final moments of our lives. If the above explanation of the difference is all that the causal theorist can offer, all he can say is that we would have made such an advance had we not expired. Hence, the causal theorist must look at features of the present for an account of Jim's progress.

5.

INTERNAL FEATURES OF THE PRESENT

A more promising attempt looks for certain mental states to which a causal theorist might appeal to explain Jim's progress, mental states which in virtue of their enhanced justificatory state can explain Jim's progress toward ideal rationality. The answer to the question whether there are such mental states is, I think, no. First, the progress is not merely a matter of increased self-awareness. Jim is no more aware of himself after reconciling his inadequate motivations with his continued playing than he was before that reconciliation, i.e., no increase in self-awareness occurs between stages two and three. Yet, progress is clearly achieved between stages two and three, so we cannot explain his progress by appeal to some increased self-awareness. Also, we cannot explain the progress made by an appeal to an increase in the rationality of any of Jim's beliefs or desires. First, consider his desire to run for Congress. If Jim's desire is to run in order to show his critics wrong, this desire has the same irrational status both before and after constructing R. On the other hand, it might be claimed that Jim has the desire to run, after constructing R, in order to use his abilities for his constituents, thus making the desire to run a rational one where no such desire was rational before constructing R. The problem with this view is that Jim need not have any such desire. He may only intend to come to have that sort of desire, knowing (regrettably) that his only present desire is to show his critics wrong. So, in either case, the causal theory cannot be rescued by appeal to Jim's desire to run for Congress. An appeal to Jim's desire or intention to alter his motivational structure is of no use either. Jim could have added this desire or intention (and had either be justified) prior to constructing R and hence prior to resolving his motivations with the continuation of his campaign. In other words, such a desire or intention could have been added before stage three arises, and hence before the progress which needs to be explained had been achieved. In fact, if Jim is like the rest of us, he probably added this desire or intention in stage two prior to resolving his

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behavior with his motivations. And yet his distinctive progress does not occur until stage three. Hence, neither of these internal states can be the only explanation of the difference in Jim's state before constructing R and after constructing R. The final internal state to which a causal theorist might appeal is Jim's belief that he should (continue to) run for Congress. A causal theorist might claim that, before constructing R, this belief was not doxastically justified, for it was sustained by Jim's desire to prove his critics wrong; after constructing R, R comes (at least in part) to sustain that belief. Hence, the progress Jim makes is to be accounted for by noting that, before constructing R, Jim may have had ajustification for thinking that he should continue to run, but he did notjustifiably believe that claim. After constructing R, he comes to justifiably believe that he should continue the campaign. The difficulty with this attempt is that there is no reason to think that R must sustain in part the belief in question. The irrational desire to prove his critics wrong may be responsible both for his behavior and for his belief that he should continue the campaign. Jim may know this sad fact about himself, and try to sever the causal connection between his desire and this belief in addition to trying to sever the causal connection between his desire and his running for Congress. Nonetheless, it is still intuitively obvious that Jim has made progress; thus, appeal to the belief in question will not explain this progress. Moreover, there is something unsatisfying about the general approach suggested here, that Jim's progress can be explained by citing some additional mental states that are justified. Mere numbers of unrelated beliefs, desires, intentions, or other mental states would add to Jim's overall epistemic condition, but would not explain the unique kind of progress Jim has made. Furthermore, the mere addition of further justified mental states about the particular issue of running for progress won't explain his progress either. For note that such changes are bound to occur between stages one and two, for the simple reason that new experience can be counted on to provide additional evidence for new mental attitudes. Yet, the sense of progress that Jim makes between stages two and three is simply not there in the transition from stage one, where he is unaware of his inadequate motivations, to stage two, where he becomes aware of them. With this new awareness comes a host of new mental attitudes about himself and his situation, attitudes which we may presume to be justified. Some progress in terms ofjustification or rationality has been achieved because of this change, but it is not the distinctive kind achieved in the transition from stage two to stage three. This fact suggests that it is not in virtue of addingj Llstified mental states that explains the progress Jim has made. So, it would seem, appeal to internal states cannot salvage the causal theory from the case of the ill-motivated politician. Let us turn then to a different area to see if it offers more hope for the causal theory, for if internal

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states cannot explain what needs to be explained, perhaps external features, i.e., that which counts as overt behavior by Jim, can.

6.

ACTS, OMISSIONS, AND ASPECTS OF EACH

These external features include the acts, omissions, and aspects of each which characterize or might characterize Jim at present. One such external feature which cannot be of any use to the causal theorist is the act of running for Congress itself. That act had a justification for it before Jim discovered his motivations for performing it, and presumably the act itself is also justified after Jim constructs R. Further, the causal theorist cannot hold that Jim justifiably performs the act either before or after constructing R, for in neither stage does that which justifies the act causally sustain his so acting. A causal theorist might claim, though, that the act in question comes to have a greater justification, or perhaps a justification all things considered (of which Jim is aware), after constructing R. The appeal to a greater justification, though, does not explain the advance toward the justificatory ideal. For one can acquire a greater justification for believing, e.g., that all ravens are black just by seeing another black raven, without making any such advance. The intuitively obvious point about Jim is that he has made that sort of progress, and since greater justification can occur without such progress, citing it in this case does not explain that progress. Nor does the appeal to justification all things considered explain the progress. The only way for this appeal to explain the progress would be for the act to fail to be justified, all things considered, before Jim undergoes the reasoning process in question, for otherwise there would be no difference (on these grounds) between the first and second stages. Yet, when Jim was not aware of his poor motivations for running, he had ajustification, all things considered, for his campaign; so if we are to accept this explanation, we must hold that after finding out about his poor motivations, Jim loses this justification, and then regains it after engaging in the reasoning process described. This explanation is inadequate precisely because the process from lack of awareness to reconciliation through the reasoning process involves progress toward an ideal, whereas the proposed explanation leaves Jim at the same level after the total process as before. Hence, this attempt fails to free the causal theory of the counterexample of the ill-motivated politician. Could the causal theorist claim that Jim has greater justification than he had before for running for Congress? I think the answer is no. On the proposal above, Jim loses justification for running when he becomes aware of his inadequate motivations. This information defeats whatever justified his running in the first place. The force of the reasoning process is, then, to override the defeating information. When such overriding occurs, the force of the original

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justification is reinstated, but it is not enhanced. For enhancement to occur, some other explanation of the stages would have to be forthcoming. Perhaps a causal theorist might appeal to however Jim is proceeding in attempting to alter his motivational structure. Perhaps this act is justified and can explain Jim's progress. It cannot. Jim may be doing nothing at present to even attempt to alter his motivational structure. His intention may be simply to take any actions he can find to alter it, but he may not have found any as yet. Since there are no other actions which Jim must be performing at the time in question, perhaps a causal theorist will appeal to acts which Jim omits to perform to explain his advance in rationality. Perhaps one might appeal to Jim's not taking steps that will alter his desires and cause him to quit the Congressional race, or to Jim's not looking for acts to undermine the effects of his inadequate motivational structure. Any such explanation is adequate only if it is the omitting which is justified, and not just the content of the omission. If we suppose that only the omission (and not Jim's omitting) is justified, no progress will have been explained. Rather, such instances present an even greater need for progress toward the ideal in question because, in the case at hand, if only the omission were justified, we would have a case in which an omission occurs but the omitting is not justified. Such an explanation would add to Jim's problems regarding justification, not explain how he is eliminating them. So, any omission cited needs to be justifiably omitted. Regarding steps which would alter his desires and cause him to quit the race, it is hard to see why one would think Jim justifiably omits such steps. Perhaps ifhe had some steps in mind, he could justifiably omit them; but Jim may have no idea of how to go about altering his desires and thereby cause himself to quit the race. There simply is no good reason to suppose that Jim justifiably omits such actions. This argument does not affect Jim's omitting to look for such steps. Jim's not looking may be justified, but it is not clear that this fact helps the causal theory. When an absence of action is justified, at least in certain types of cases, such justification obtains only because some other action (which is not an omission) is justified. The sorts of cases in which this is so are cases where the action, the omission of which is justified, has a primafacie justification for it. F or example, if a doctor's failing to stop and help an accident victim is justified, it is so justified only in virtue of some other action overriding the importance of the first (such as being needed at a more serious operation at the hospital). In Jim's case, looking for a way to alter his motivational structure isprimafacie justified--at least in part because it is either a part of, or inextricably linked to, Jim's performing an action which will alter his motivational structure (an action which Jim correctly believes to be prima facie justified). So to say that Jim justifiably fails to look for such an action cannot be the end of the story. For to

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say that an omission of a prima facie justified act is justified requires the justification of some other action which implies that the primafacie justification for the omission is overridden. Thus, the difference in levels of rationality before and after having reconciled his bad motivations with continuing to run cannot be explained merely by claiming that certain omissions are justified. That may be true, but if it is, it is only true in virtue of Jim's justifiably doing something else. One obvious option here is that it is justified in virtue of its understood relationship to Jim's running for Congress in spite of his inadequate motivations, but that explanation is not open to the causal theory. For it would first have to be granted that Jim s running is itself personally justified since its impersonal justification is no different from stage one to stage three. Without appeal to this action and its justification, however, it is hard to see where to find an action whose justification confers justification on the omission in question. So we must conclude that this attempt at an explanation is only as good as some other one as yet forthcoming. The only remaining alternative is to claim that some of Jim's actions, or some aspects of his action, are justified while some others are not. The causal theorist might hold that Jim's running is not justified, though his attempting to help his constituents is. Or he might claim that Jim's running is not justified though his acting so as to alter his motivational structure is. This approach does not work either. For the aspects of the action, or the different acts (however one chooses to individuate actions), are inextricably linked. Perhaps some of the elements are primafacie unjustified whereas others are prima facie justified. Given the inextricable linkage that occurs, however, none of the elements can achieve actualjustificatory status without all the others achieving the same status. There may be possible circumstances in which the linkage is dissolved so that, say, Jim's running is not justified and yet his attempting to help his constituents is. But it would be quite regrettable if this possibility were taken to imply that the justificatory status actually diverges. For the only way to make sense of the transition from prima facie justification to actual justification is with reference to the entire set of elements of the actual circumstances--to say that a prima facie justified action is actually justified is to say that there is nothing else in the actual circumstances that overrides the primafacie justification. And to say that a prima facie unjustified action is not on the whole justified is to say that no other action has a primafacie justification strong enough to override the prima facie lack of justification in such a way as to justify the second action. But that is equivalent to requiring that the justificatory status of the elements stand or fall together, given that they are all parts of the same situation. Thus, the causal theorist cannot hold that Jim's playing is not justified whereas his using his talents is, and hence we must look I

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elsewhere if the causal theory is to escape the case of the ill-motivated politician.

7.

RATIONALITY OF THE PERSON

The final option open to the causal theorist is to claim that, whereas no progress is made in the areas considered above, progress is made in that Jim, himself is more rational after constructing R than before. It is, on this option, progress regarding the rationality of the person in question (rather than his (present or future) mental states, acts or omissions) which explains Jim's progress. In order to evaluate this attempt to rescue a causal theory, we must consider what it is for a person to be rational. When we claim that a person is rational, there are two things we might be claiming: first, we may be saying something about the collection of actual beliefs, actions, etc., of the person and noting that the collection is constituted by a sufficiently high degree of rational beliefs, actions, etc., to warrant calling the person a rational one; or, alternatively, we may be claiming that a positive evaluation applies to the character of that person. The first option is ruled out by the above discussion of the internal and external features of the case ofthe ill-motivated politician, for all the same points can be made about the presence of rational belief and action as were made about the presence of justified belief. So let us concentrate on the second option. On it, to say that a person is rational is to say something about the way in which that person determines what to do and how to do it, what to believe, what and how to change, or what and how not to change. In other words, we are saying something about the dispositions of the person in question to proceed rationally or justifiably in forming and holding beliefs, choosing actions, etc. To return to the case of Jim, our ill-motivated politician, the causal theory is claiming that Jim has better dispositions with regard to his actions, beliefs, desires, etc., after constructing R than he had before constructing R. There is something to be said in favor of the view that, through the process of self-discovery, Jim himself becomes more rational. Perhaps prior to learning of his poor motivations, he was disposed to form beliefs and perform actions in line with poor motivations; after becoming aware of his poor motivations, he is less inclined to do so. After learning that his irrational desire can prompt his behavior, perhaps he is less likely to form a belief or perform an action when all it has in its favor is that it satisfies such an irrational desire. This difference is not sufficient for the causal theorist. In the case of the politician, we have three separate stages: the first stage is where he is unaware of his poor motivations, the second is where he becomes aware of his poor

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motivations, and the third stage involves his reconciliation of his poor motivations with his continuing to play professionally. Any advance in the rationality of Jim's character, as clarified in the last paragraph, occurs in the second stage, for his awareness of his poor motivations and the role his irrational desire can play in his behavior have already been perceived prior to the reconciliation in question. The progress Jim makes for which we are seeking an explanation, however, occurs most obviously at stage three. Hence, this explanation fails to account for the data. It may be thought that Jim adds an intention in the third stage, so that this stage involves two distinctive elements: first, the reconciliation about the particular bit of behavior under question and second, an intention to alter his motivational structure if he can. It might then be claimed that the progress to be explained is that the additional intention is justified, and given its presence Jim is both better off now and will be better off in the future. The intention in question could just as easily have been added during the second stage, however, and if it were added at that point, it would still be the case that Jim makes progress toward ideal rationality in the third stage. Thus, the case does not depend on the additional intention at the third stage. Further, even if the added intention were central to the third stage, that would not explain the progress in question, for, as we saw earlier, appeals to desires, intentions, and increased self-awareness on their own do not explain the distinctive advance characteristic of stage three, as opposed to stage two, which involves increased self-awareness and new mental attitudes which can be presumed to bejustified. It appears, then, that the causal theorist has no resources whatsoever by which to explain the progress Jim makes toward ideal rationality. It is important to notice that none of my arguments against the causal view here presupposes a deterministic theory of causation. These arguments work just as well against the proposal that Jim's reasoning provides some degree of causal support, however minute. It is just as possible for this reasoning to occur and have no probabilistic causal impact on his behavior as it is for it to occur without having a deterministic impact. A denial of this possibility could be sustained only by arguing that reasons must always be causes, but such a claim wreaks havoc with the idea that Jim's running failed initially to be personally justified. For in stage one, Jim has reasons for what he is doing (he gives these reasons to himself and to others when asked), and hence if reasons are always causally active in some way, these reasons would have to be partial causes even in stage one. Such a maneuver would make a defense of the causal view even more difficult than it is on the assumption that reasons need not always be causes, for if reasons are always causes, then the causal view has no interesting story to tell to distinguish doxastic from propositional justification. No matter how causal theorists wish to view such a problem, however, the point remains that nothing argued here presumes a non-probabilistic account of

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causation. So there is nowhere for a causal theorist to turn for rescue from the case of the ill-motivated politician.

8.

CONCLUSION

The most natural account ofthis case is just this: before constructing R, Jim did not possess the kind of rationality which implies that he is justifiably running for Congress; but after constructing R, his running is rational in a way which implies that it is perfectly justified. The advance Jim makes is to be explained by his moving from performing a justified action to justifiably performing that action, from performing an impersonally justified action to performing a personally justified one. Such a conclusion gives us an account of the nature of justification that covers the variety of things to which it applies and one which fits well with Lehrer's intuitions about the gypsy lawyer and the racist scientist. The only relevant difference between the racist scientist and the ill-motivated politician, in this view, is that the scientist has no remorse for her racism whereas the politician has regrets for his motivational structure. In that way, the politician is better offthan the scientist. Still, the relevant beliefs and actions are on par, being justified by the reasons available to each person, contrary to the demands of the causal account of basing. One may worry here that in accepting the non-causal account of the case given above, we have lost the obvious point that there is something lacking about Jim and his relation to his Congressional campaign. That is not so. We can readily grant that Jim has not achieved ideal rationality, even if it turns out that the lack of rationality in his running for Congress is the last vestige of irrationality or lack of justification remaining among any of his acts, beliefs, intentions, desires, valuations, etc. In order to be ideally rational, Jim must have a proper character; and having a proper character requires being disposed toward rationality and justification in the arenas of action, belief, desire, intention, valuation, etc. Resolving his inadequate motivations with his continued running surely does not eliminate the character flaw he possesses, even if this event is part of the process toward character perfection. I close with one last word of speculation on the attractions of the causal theory. Perhaps the more fundamental kinds of knowledge, such as perceptual knowledge, are kinds for which meta-motivational reasoning processes such as those discussed here are not possible. Perhaps, that is, perceptual beliefs rely essentially for their justification on a causal element in perception, and no circuitous route through a meta-motivational reasoning process could make up for a faulty causal story about such beliefs. Given the central place that perceptual knowledge plays in the construction and defense of theories of

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knowledge, it would be understandable for theorists to generalize from what may be true of such fundamental kinds of knowledge to all knowledge of any type. It would still be a mistake, but an understandable one.

ENDNOTES I. This essay is written in honor of Lehrer's luminary career in philosophy, out of deep respect for his intellectual achievements and gratitude for his acquaintance and gracious assistance throughout my career. It is a privilege to know him, and I dedicate this essay to a splendid human being and brilliant philosopher.

2 Keith Lehrer, Knowledge, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1974), pp. 124-125; "Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence," in Jonathan L. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), pp. 25-46. 3 The common attitude is represented in discussion of the issue by John Pollock, who footnotes his claim that the basing relation is in part a causal relation as follows: "Lehrer has argued against this, but I do not find his counterexample persuasive," (Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), p. 81). He offers no argument, supplies no discussion. 4 Keith Lehrer, Knowledge, pp. 124-125. 5 Keith Lehrer, 'Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence,' pp. 33-34. 6 See, for example, Marshall Swain, Reasons and Knowledge, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), chapter 3. 7 See "Swain on the Basing Relation," Analysis, Vol. 45, No.3, June 1985, pp. 153-158. Lory Lemke criticizes my arguments in "Kvanvig and Swain on the Basing Relation," Analysis, Vol. 46, No.3, June 1986, pp. 138-144; I reply to his objections in "On Lemke's Defense of a Causal Basing Requirement," Analysis, Vol. 47, No.3, June 1987, pp. 162-167. 8 Robert Audi, "The Causal Structure of Indirect Justification," Journal of Philosophy, 1983, p. 406. 9 ibid., p. 407. 10 For a developed defense of the counterfactual theory of causation, see David Lewis, Countelfactuals, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973). II See, e.g., Jaegwon Kim, "Causes and Counterfactuals," in Ernest Sosa, ed., Causation and Conditionals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 192-195.

Chapter 4 LEHRER ON KNOWLEDGE AND CAUSATION T odd Stewart University ofArizona

Keith Lehrer has argued that it is possible to have knowledge of a proposition despite the fact that one's belief in that proposition is causally unrelated to one's epistemic reasons. This is an interesting and contentious claim, but an assessment of it is not the task of this paper. Instead, I will argue that Lehrer, and perhaps one critic as well, both take Lehrer's theory to entail that knowledge is possible without causation by reasons, but that this is mistaken. Lehrer's theory as it stands actually delivers no verdict on the issue of whether proper causation is necessary for knowledge or a belief's being justified. While this means that the coherence of Lehrer's theory can be saved should his treatment of these issues yield counterintuitive results, it also means that the theory as it currently stands is incomplete. The theory simply does not make any predictions about certain kinds of examples, and this reveals that Lehrer's theory is unfinished in an important respect. Let us turn to the racist Mr. Raco, which is where Lehrer asserts that an agent can be completely justified and yet that agent's reasons need play no causal role in the explanation ofthe belief that is completely justified. Here is Lehrer's statement ofthe case: It is easy to imagine the case of someone who comes to believe something for the wrong reason and, consequently, cannot be said to be justified in his belief, but who, as a result of his belief, uncovers some evidence which completely justifies his belief. Suppose that a man, Mr. Raco, is racially prejudiced and, as a result, believes that the members of some race are sllsceptible to some disease to which members of his race are not susceptible. 63 E.J. Olsson (ed.). The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 63-74. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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KNOWLEDGE AND CAUSA nON This belief, we may imagine, is an unshakable conviction. It is so strong a conviction that no evidence to the contrary would weaken his prejudiced conviction, and no evidence in favor would strengthen it. Now imagine that Mr. Raco becomes a doctor and begins to study the disease in question. Imagine that he reads all that is known about the disease and discovers that the evidence, which is quite conclusive, confirms his conviction. The scientific evidence shows that only members of the race in question are susceptible to the disease. We may imagine as well that Mr. Raco has become a medical expert perfectly capable of understanding the canons of scientific evidence, though, unfortunately, he becomes no less prejudiced as a result of this. Nevertheless, he understands and appreciates the evidence as well as any medical expert and, as a result, has reason for his belief that justifies it. He has discovered that his conviction is confirmed by the scientific evidence. He knows that only members of the other race are susceptible to the disease in question. Yet, the reasons that justify him in this belief do not causally explain the belief. The belief is the result of prejudice, not reason, but it is confirmed by reason which provides the justification for the belief. Prejudice gives Mr. Raco conviction, but reason gives him justification. I

I find the case a bit underdescribed by Lehrer. Two critical pieces of the example are left unstated: (1) whether or not Mr. Raco, when asked about his belief regarding the susceptibility of a particular minority to some disorder, lists off the relevant scientific studies as his reasons, and (2) if Mr. Raco himself takes these scientific studies to be his reasons of ifhe simply gives these reasons to others to stop them from attacking his racism. I think that the case is meant to be one in which Mr. Raco does in fact respond to challenges by citing the scientific studies and in which he does sincerely take his reasons to be those studies. Mr. Raco does not realize that the root of his belief is his racism. What Lehrer intends is to put forward a case where the agent honestly takes his reasons to be ones which are not the actual cause of the belief or acceptance? The important thing to notice about the example is that Lehrer does clearly claim that Mr. Raco knows and is completely justified in believing that members of the race in question are susceptible to the disease. A brief sketch of the relevant pieces of Lehrer's theory is warranted at this point. Knowledge according to Lehrer is, roughly, completely justified true belief (acceptance).3 A belief is completely justified when it is both personally and verifically justified. 4 Lehrer uses complete justification as a technical term, so it is important that he explicitly claims that Mr. Raco is completely justified. This means that Lehrer thinks that Mr. Raco is both personally and verifically

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justified according to his theory. Lehrer's analyses of personal and verific justification will be discussed below when we turn to whether or not Mr. Raco is in fact completely justified in his racist belief according to the theory as it stands. Dirk Koppelberg has criticized Lehrer's claim that appropriate causation is not necessary for justification and knowledge. While Koppelberg never explicitly claims that Lehrer's own theory has this consequence, he does say some things that make it plausible that he thinks this. For example, he opens his "Justification and Causation" with the following: Coherence theorists subscribe to the thesis that epistemic justification consists in appropriately specified inferential relations among beliefs. In contrast many reliabilists hold that it is the causal origin or the causal sustenance of a belief which is responsible for epistemic justification ... Keith Lehrer and Thomas Bartelborth have vigorously argued that any theory ofjustification which allows for causal considerations is deeply mistaken. 5 From this, we can infer that since Lehrer is a coherence theorist and further thinks that any correct theory excludes causal factors as irrelevant to whether or not a belief is justified, Lehrer's own theory must exclude these causal factors, since otherwise Lehrer's own theory would (a) not be a coherence theory, and (b) be incorrect. This is such an obvious inference that I suspect that Koppelberg would endorse it. Again he never actually addresses the issue of whether or not Mr. Raco is justified according to Lehrer's theory since he is more interested in showing that Mr. Raco is not justified according to the various notions of justification that Koppelberg thinks to be correct. 6 Koppelberg ends his paper by making similar general remarks about causation and coherence theories. He writes, "A genuine coherence theory claims that epistemic justification consists in adequately specified inferential relations among belief contents--causal relations among belief states do not matter.,,7 Again, the inference to the claim that Lehrer's theory, insofar as it is a coherence theory, will entail that a belief may be justified even if it is not appropriately related to its justifying reasons is obvious. So, I think it fair to claim that Koppelberg would agree that Lehrer's theory is committed to the view that appropriate causation is not necessary for a belief's being justified. Of course, Koppelberg would use this to claim that Lehrer's theory is false, but this is not important at present. Interestingly enough, the arguments later in this paper will show that Koppelberg (and perhaps Lehrer as well if he sees coherentism as being logically incompatible with giving a role to causation) is simply incorrect to suppose that coherence theories must by their nature exclude the causal origin

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or sustenance of belief from consideration. For, while Koppelberg is correct that coherentism considers only inferential relations between beliefs, if the beliefs themselves have partially causal content, the inferential relations themselves will be impacted by this. While it is still presumably true that the facts of causation themselves do not matter when it comes to being personally justified (as I will explain below), when we add whatever Gettier conditions, etc., are necessary in order to create an account of knowledge, the facts about the causation of a belief may become relevant. And we should always remember that Lehrer is ultimately interested in an analysis of knowledge, and hence Gettier conditions are an important component of his theory. In his theory, verific justification plays the role of bridging the gap between personal justification and knowledge. And, as I hope to show, verific justification leaves room for appropriate causation as a necessary condition for knowledge, as it is a possibility that claims about what is a reason for what have a causal component built into their content. 8 So, while it is perhaps true that bare coherence theories do not make room for causation, when we add whatever is necessary to these theories for an account of knowledge, causation may become relevant once again. Now that we have seen that both Lehrer and a critic take Mr. Raco to be completely justified according to Lehrer's theory, we must assess whether this is correct. Recall that, according to Lehrer, a belief is completely justified if and only if that belief is both personally and verifically justified. Let me now briefly sketch Lehrer's basic theory of personal justification, and explain why Lehrer's theory says that Mr. Raco is personally justified (assuming that he meets all of Lehrer's other conditions). According to Lehrer's final account of personal justification: S is personally justified in accepting that p at t if and only if everything that competes with p for S on the basis of the acceptance system of Sat t is beaten or neutralized on the basis of the acceptance system of Sat t. 9 A proposition C competes with p for an agent (given her acceptance system) if it is less reasonable for that agent to accept p on the assumption that c is true than to accept that p on the assumption that c is false.1O In other words, c competes with p iff Rs(P/c) < Rs(P/~c).1l Proposition p beats c for S iff c competes with p but it is more reasonable for S to accept that p than to accept that c on the basis of the agent's acceptance system (all at a time). Again, we might express this as:p beats c iffRs(P/c) Rs(c). Finally, n neutralizes c as a competitor of p for S iff c competes with p for S, but the conjunction of nand c does not compete with p for S, and it is as reasonable for S to accept this conjunction as to accept c alone according to S's acceptance

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system. This can be represented as: n neutralizes c as a competitor of p iff (Rs(P/c) < Rs(P/~c) and Rs(P/(c !\ n)) ~ Rs(P/~(c !\ n)) and Rs(c !\ n) ~ RS(C).12 In the case at hand, Mr. Raco does meet all of these conditions. In terms of the scientific evidence which Mr. Raco believes, all competitors to Mr. Raco's beliefs are beaten or neutralized. For example, if the skeptic suggests (as per the justification game) that one of the scientific studies could be inappropriate, Mr. Raco can respond that given his knowledge of how the studies were conducted, etc., it is more reasonable for him to believe that the studies are fair and accurate (this competitor is hence beaten). But, suppose the skeptic offers the following competitor: c.

You (Mr. Raco) are not causally influenced in your belief by the scientific evidence.

Mr. Raco can neutralize this competitor by claiming something like the following:

n.

The scientific evidence I possess shows that what I believe is true, and it really doesn't matter whether or not the possession of the evidence in this case causally influences my belief. I am concerned in believing what is true about who suffers from this disease, so why should I care about the causation of my belief?

Proposition n can neutralize c, assuming that c does in fact compete with the racist belief, because the conjunction of c and n does not compete with p given Mr. Raco's beliefs and it is at least as reasonable for Mr. Raco to accept this conjunction as to accept c alone given his acceptance system.13 For, we can stipulate that Mr. Raco does in fact accept various things that do appropriately support n. Hence, c is neutralized and Mr. Raco is personally justified in his belief despite the evidentially-illicit causation of his belief. So far, we have seen that Lehrer's theory does entail that Mr. Raco is personally justified. But, is Mr. Raco verifically justified? Unfortunately, I think that Lehrer's theory as it stands does not deliver any verdict on this issue. Further, this failure can be traced to the fact that Lehrer's theory actually takes no stand at all on whether appropriate causation by reasons is necessary for a belief to be completely justified or an instance of knowledge. Here we should separate Lehrer from his theory; clearly, Lehrer thinks that causation is not required for justification. But, surprisingly, Lehrer's theory as it stands does not commit itself on this question. Let us now turn to the argument for this claim. An agent's verific justification system is what remains of her personal j ustification system but with

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all false beliefs deleted. If belief in a given proposition can be justified on the basis of what remains (and these propositions can all be verifically justified as well, and so on until a special kind of circle emerges), then that belief is verifically justified. Thus, if we wanted to show that Mr. Raco is not verifically justified in his racist belief, we would need to locate false beliefs that will be used in support of the belief in question (either directly or in the handling of competitors suggested by the skeptic). And, this is the heart of the problem: Lehrer needs to explicitly claim that certain propositions are true or false in order for his theory to entail that Mr. Raco has or lacks verific justification. But, Lehrer's theory as it stands simply does not do this. Because of this, it is impossible to say whether Mr. Raco's racist belief is verifically justified according to the theory. To see this, suppose that the skeptic makes the following claim during the ultra-justification game: 14 c.

Mr. Raco, the reasons you give for your belief that the minority suffers from a disease are good reasons but they are not your reasons because they have no causal influence on your belief. As this is the case, despite the fact that they are good reasons, since they are not your reasons, they do not justify your bel ief.

Before moving to Mr. Raco's reply to competitor c, a brief discussion of a reason vs. one's own reason is in order. I think that there is a fairly intuitive difference between the two that can be brought out by considering cases where one has lied about why one believes something but has nonetheless provided a good reason for the belief. Suppose that Wendy is trying to convince her friend Greg that a certain mathematical theorem is true. Knowing that Greg is a bit slow when it comes to math, she claims that Mr. Mathright (their high-school calculus teacher who was renowned for his care, professionalism, and precision) said the theorem was true. Actually, Wendy holds the theorem to be true because she proved it herself one afternoon in a fit of inspiration. IS Mr. Mathright did say that the theorem is true. But, Wendy is a bit of a skeptic about trusting others; she refuses to take anyone's authority as a justification for a mathematical claim until she can establish it for herself. Awareness of Mr. Mathright's assertions and reputation alone would suffice to justify most people's acceptance of the theorem. 16 So, as it happens Wendy has offered a good reason for accepting the theorem to be true. But, it is not her reason. She lied to Greg to simplify matters. Wendy believes the theorem on the basis of her proof. When one gives one's own reason, one is tacitly making a claim about the causation of one's beliefs; this explains how it is possible to lie about one's

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reasons while still giving what is a good reason. Causation is actually part of the content of certain reasons claims, and hence relevant to their truth or falsity. So, when Wendy claims that she accepts a certain mathematical proposition on the basis of Mr. Mathright's testimony, a necessary condition for the truth of her claim is that Mr. Mathright's testimony itself or her belief that there was such testimony was in some part causally responsible for producing or sustaining the belief in the mathematical proposition. Because this causal component is false in Wendy's case (and further we may assume that Wendy believes it to be false as well - this must be added so that Wendy counts as actually having lied), Wendy has lied about her reasons for accepting the mathematical proposition. I? This, I hope, helps to make sense of c above; causation can and does enter the picture where one's own reasons are concerned. The skeptic then claims that only one's own reasons are relevant to justification. This is the skeptic's objection to Mr. Raco. So, what can Mr. Raco say in response to c? He could try to beat this competitor by saying the following: b.

Justifying reasons need not be my own reasons (in the sense just clarified). The reasons I just gave are the ones that justify me (Raco) in believing what I do whether or not these reasons have any causal influence on my belief in this case. For example, the valid deduction of a conclusion from justified premises (when I know that these premises are justified and the deduction valid) is enough to justify my belief in the conclusion even though the these facts are not the causes of my belief in the conclusion. IS

But, here it matters very much whether b is true or false. One can only beat or neutralize a competitor in the ultra-justification game with a proposition if that proposition is true. Otherwise, the skeptic is allowed to delete the belief and make any other necessary adjustments to the agent's doxastic system in light of this deletion. So, if b is true, and Mr. Raco responds to c with b, then b beats c and Mr. Raco is verifically as well as personally justified in his belief (assuming that b is in fact both personally and verifically justified as well). Hence, he knows thatthe minority suffers from some peculiar and otherwise rare disease. However, if b is false, then the skeptic can say this, excluding b from use in the ultra-justification game. This means that b would not beat c, and therefore Mr. Raco would not have knowledge according to Lehrer's theory as it is not the case that all competitors have been beaten or neutralized. 19 Thus, we can appreciate the critical importance of the truth or falsity of b in Lehrer's theory.

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The problem is that Lehrer's theory does not actually tell us whether b is true or false. The core of Lehrer's theory-all of Lehrer's definitions, formal principles, etC.-is compatible with conflicting judgements about Mr. Raco; if b is true, then Mr. Raco is verifically justified in his racist belief, but if b is false then Mr. Raco is not verifically justified. One way of better seeing this is by noticing that one could adjust Lehrer's theory to require appropriate causation merely by understanding all reasons claims as about one's own reasons. Mr. Raco's own reasons are not the scientific studies but rather his racism (if we count this as a reason at all). Therefore, when Mr. Raco replies to the skeptic with b and the skeptic rebuts him and deletes the proposition from Mr. Raco's acceptance system, Mr. Raco is left without good reasons for his racist belief. Thus, this belief will fail to be verifically justified and will not be an instance of knowledge. To secure this result, however, no changes were made anywhere to Lehrer's stated theory of knowledge and justification. No definitions were adjusted, nor were any principles rewritten. Even the spirit of Lehrer's theory is preserved here; only our conception of how we are related to a fact, as encoded in the statement of our reasons for acceptance, and truth and falsity (as the externalist bridge between personal justification and knowledge) are relevant to justification. 20 This in itself helps make clear that Lehrer's theory simply does not entail a verdict except in light of the truth or falsity of various propositions which the theory itself does not entail. The deeper significance of this sort of concern is that Lehrer's theory is incomplete as it stands. In particular, it will only deliver verdicts about certain kinds of cases when it is supplemented by specific claims as to the truth or falsity of certain propositions that might be used to beat or neutralize various skeptical objections. For, an agent can be personally justified in accepting that a proposition beats or neutralizes a competitor or objection and yet not be verifically justified in believing this. This reveals a more troubling problem for Lehrer's theory: all of the definitions and principles do little to actuaIly pin down exactly when an agent is verifically justified. These principles wiIl need to be supplemented with various contentful claims about what is true and false before it will be possible to derive results about verific justification. 21 This leaves us with the question as to whether it matters that Lehrer's theory is incomplete. On the one hand, the incompleteness of the theory means that it may be adjusted in all sorts of ways without changing the existing theory itself. So, as I argued above, Lehrer's theory can be made to account for the intuition that Mr. Raco's racist beliefis not an instance of knowledge by adding a claim about the falsity of a certain proposition that will be employed by the agent when she attempts to neutralize or beat the skeptic's objections in the ultra-justification game. And, it might be considered a considerable virtue of a theory that it remains silent about, yet compatible with, all sorts of contentious claims about the relationship of causation to justification, etc. At the very least,

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the theory is weaker than it perhaps appears, but hence more flexible because of this. In some sense, this is as it should be since Lehrer's theory is fallibilist and allows that an agent can be personally justified and yet lack knowledge. But, it also makes clear that the externalist components of Lehrer's theory- namely the creation of an ultra-system by the deletion of all false beliefs-play such an important role that we can only assess knowledge claims according to Lehrer's theory if we have an indication of exactly what propositions are true and false and hence which propositions an agent may use to neutralize or beat objections, remembering that all false propositions will be deleted by the skeptic in the ultra-justification game. Lehrer's treatment of the Mr. Raco case makes clear what Lehrer thinks, namely that knowledge is possible without causation by justifying reasons. But, Lehrer would need to explicitly add claims about the truth or falsity of various kinds of propositions likely to be employed to meet the skeptic's objections in the ultra-justification game to his theory for it to entail this result. On the other hand, this incompleteness makes Lehrer's theory very difficult to assess, and might even make the theory nearly unfalsifiable. Testing our intuitions against the theory as it stands may be impossible in some cases, as with Mr. Raco. Critics will have to be extremely careful to make sure that Lehrer's theory really does deliver certain results before they can present compelling counterexamples. Because of this, it might be best to focus on the general structural features of the theory and refrain from the usual sort of counterexamples until the theory is modified so as to have clear consequences about various kinds of cases, but this severely limits our ability to determine whether or not Lehrer's theory is a good one. The flexibility of the theory is here purchased at the cost of our ability to test the theory in various respects. I have argued that Keith Lehrer's theory of knowledge does not in fact have some of the consequences that Lehrer and others have taken it to have. In particular, Lehrer's theory as it stands remains silent about the relationship of causation to justification. Indeed, it seems possible to easily accommodate the view that causation is necessary for justification by simply understanding reasons claims as always being partly causal. Causation would enter the picture here because it is explicitly represented in reasons claims, and improper causation can make such reasons claims false. Of course, Lehrer's theory is also compatible with the view that justifying reasons need not be causal. Whether the incompleteness of Lehrer's theory is a virtue or a vice, and both the flexibility and difficulty of assessment this incompleteness reveals, I leave to the reader to decide. 22

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ENDNOTES I Lehrer (1990), pp. 169-70. The Mr. Raco case also appears in Lehrer's more recent (2000) second edition in an essentially unchanged form on p. 196. 2 Dirk Koppelberg understands the case in basically the same way. See his (1999), p. 452. 3 Hereafter I will speak in terms of belief rather than acceptance merely for ease of exegesis. Acceptance, however, is not the same as belief according to Lehrer; rather, acceptance is something like belief with the goals of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. 4 See Lehrer (1990), p. 149. 5 Koppelberg (1999), p. 447. (, In some sense, Koppelberg never takes Lehrer's theory of justification very seriously at all. Koppelberg never assesses Lehrer's theory but rather simply argues that Mr. Raco is not justified according to various other conceptions of justification. Insofar as there is any direct contact between Koppelberg and Lehrer, it is that Koppelberg would deny that Mr. Raco has knowledge of the proposition belief in which is sustained or caused by prejudice. See fn. 21, p. 460. 7 Koppelberg, p. 459. 8 One might argue that what this shows is that Lehrer's theory is not really a coherence theory after all. This taxonomic maneuver strikes me as unsatisfying, though. Lehrer's theory strikes me as an exemplar of a certain type of coherence theory (with certain externalist components of the sort needed to solve the Gettier problem), and it would do injustice to our taxonomy to classify it otherwise. In particular, I think that we will always have to add non-coherence factors - most obviously truth - to our account of knowledge, and so as long as one's basic theory of justification is coherentist, one should be classified as a coherentist. This does seem true of Lehrer's theory. 9 Lehrer, p. 126. 10 For convenience, I have dropped reference to a specific time t t!'om the definitions. II I intend Rs to be interpreted as reasonableness given acceptance system S. Obviously, reasonableness is not the same thing as probability on many interpretations of probability, and the notation I use is strikingly similar to that of the probability calculus. According to Lehrer, as reasonableness is a primitive normative notion, it seems unlikely that any view of probability which is non-normative could adequately cxpress Lehrer's position. But, the point of my use of this notation here is simply to help make clear some of Lehrer's definitions in a condensed format. 12 All of these definitions can be found in Lehrer, pp. 117-126. 13 It is not actually clear to me that c as I state it does compete with Mr. Raco's racist belief. But, if it does not, the skeptic can presumably work c into something that is a competitor that can be neutralized (or perhaps beaten) with something approximately like n. For example, the skeptic might claim that it unreasonable to hold a belief if it is not causally responsive to evidence. We could then understand n as rebutting this further claim which would act as a competitor to the racist belief. 14 In the ultra-justification game, the skeptic is allowed to simply delete any false propositions (and all propositions that logically imply this proposition) used in the defense of some other proposition, disqualifying such stricken propositions from use as justifiers. This is core of the difference between the justification and ultra-justification games. See Lehrer, pp. 141-44. 15 Read the "because" in this sentence as both causal and justificatory. 16 I wish to remain neutral on how it is that testimony justifies what the content of what the testifier says (viz., whether testimony proceeds on the basis of perception and induction, or whether it has some sort of intrinsic a priori authority as a basic source of belief, etc.). I use testimony here only because it helped make for a clear example. 17 I am being intentionally vague here about exactly what is to count as a reason. Is it Wendy's belief that Mr. Mathright testified, or Mr. Mathright's testimony, or something else entirely? I do not think that my argument depends on any specific construal of a reason, so I leave it to the reader to supply their own preferred notion. What I am suggesting, however, is that one could very easily

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build an explicit causal component into the truth conditions for at least some of these conceptions ofa reason. 18 I think we need to treat this proposition as beating the skeptic's objection rather than neutralizing it because one cannot consistently believe both c and b. Second, I will admit that I am a bit concerned that it is far from likely that any average person, even one with a bit of philosophical savvy, would respond to the skeptic's challenge in this way. I fear that perhaps Lehrer's account may exclude many intuitive cases of knowledge. But, this is an argument for another time. 19 Interestingly enough, one might try to explain differences in intuition (which a small poll has revealed do seem to diverge) about the Mr. Raco case by focusing on one's attitude towards b. If one thinks that b is true, then one will likely have the intuition that Mr. Raco does have knowledge. On the other hand, if one sees b as false, then one will be inclined to deny that Mr. Raco has knowledge. 20 See Lehrer (1990), p. 153. 21 I suspect that this problem is not limited to various causal principles of justification. For example, the skeptic might challenge certain people on the grounds that their justifications are too short. Instead of presenting any content-dependent reasons for accepting thatp, suppose the agent simply argues that she is trustworthy in what she accepts and hence, given that she accepts that p, p is likely to be true (this argument will work for any proposition which the agent accepts). Suppose that the skeptic objects that not everything that the agent believes can be justified with this universal argument. Suppose that the agent replies by simply reapplying the simple argument again: since the agent accepts that his justifications are long enough to justify his beliefs, and what he accepts he accepts in a trustworthy manner, it is probably true that his arguments are long enough to justify his belief. Is this an effective way of beating the skeptic's objection? This will depend where verific justification is concerned on whether or not the agent's reply is in fact true. But, does Lehrer's theory as it stands tell us whether or not we can use this simple universal argument to completely justify all our beliefs? This is not clear to me. 22. Thanks to Keith Lehrer for his support and comments on drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Erik Olsson and to Paul Thorn for their extremely helpful suggestions.

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REFERENCES Koppelberg, Dirk. "Justification and Causation." Erkenntnis 50, 447-462 (1990). Lehrer, Keith. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, co: Westview Press, 1990. Lehrer, Keith. Theory of Knowledge, Second Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000.

Chapter 5 CAN WE GRASP CONSISTENCY? Volker Halbach University of Constance

In this paper, I will scrutinize a family of arguments which are supposed to show that consistency is not accessible in an epistemically relevant sense. If these arguments were sound, then consistency would be on a par with external facts: neither are directly accessible to us. External factors are not directly accessible because they need to be mediated in some way. Consistency would be inaccessible, according to these arguments, because proving or determining consistency in the relevant cases exceeds our intellectual capabilities. Thus, if consistency were actually inaccessible, then consistency could hardly playa role in an internalist account of epistemology. Traditionally (for instance, in Schlick's account (1934)), however, consistency has been seen as a main ingredient of coherence. Modern epistemologists, like Bonjour (1985), have also used consistency as a criterion of coherence, and they have even used consistency in order to define coherence. The arguments against the accessibility of consistency jeopardizes this central role of consistency in any internalist account of epistemic justification. I Thus, epistemic justification cannot imply the consistency of the belief system. If consistency is not directly accessible, then it cannot be used as a criterion for consistency on an internalist account. Keith Lehrer's epistemology is not internalist. Internalist justification, however, is an important ingredient of Lehrers's account since internalist justification is a necessary condition for 'full' justification. Because of the Gettier problem, external factors enter the definition of one form of epistemic justification on Lehrer's account. Lehrer (1990b), for instance, distinguishes between personal and undefeated justification. External factors form part of the definition of the latter. Undefeated justification is then used in the definition of 75 E.J. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 75-87. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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knowledge. As we will show, this account of internalism makes Lehrer's theory as vulnerable to the arguments mentioned above as an actually internalist theory-if consistency is employed as a condition for internal justification. Lehrer's opinion on the relationship of consistency and justification has not been constant, as I will show below. In (1991), he explicitly endorses the view that consistency is a necessary condition for justification: 2 Our acceptance systems may not be deductively closed, but the deductive closure of an acceptance system fully articulates the logical content of the system. The content of an inconsistent system would, therefore, be useless for the purposes of justifying anything and would, consequently, fail to serve as the basis of knowledge. Thus justification implies the consistency of the acceptance system. 3 The quoted passage does not imply that we have a direct grasp of the consistency of our acceptance system, and Lehrer avoided, as far as I can see, such strong claims. The reason for avoiding such a commitment may be, in part, the argument I will discuss in this paper. Implicitly, however, consistency is also central for Lehrer's theory, for an inconsistent theory logically refutes any given belief. One would like to conclude that an inconsistent belief system therefore also defeats any belief. It seems hard to see how Lehrer can avoid that consequence, although he must deny this when claiming that beliefs can be justified on the basis of an inconsistent belief system. Therefore, one has to be, at least, very careful about inconsistency. The reader is sent to the above mentioned papers (Lehrer 1990a) and (Lehrer 1999) for a discussion of this topic. At any rate, it seems interesting to see to what extent consistency can be used as a criterion for justification and coherence in a framework like Lehrer's. In the following, I will discuss the arguments against the accessibility of consistency in a general setting in order to see whether consistency can be used as a criterion for epistemic justification. I will not explore what consequences are implied for particular theories like Lehrer's or Bonjour's. The point of this paper is modest: I will show that some of these arguments have been accepted rashly and that their scope is more limited than is often assumed. I hope that this is interesting enough. For these arguments have had a major impact, and they have influenced many epistemologists. Thus, I will examine whether the arguments actually demonstrate that consistency is not accessible and, in this respect, is much like an external factor. The problem is vague, of course. In the first place, it has to be specified whether one is dealing with the consistency of arbitrary sets of beliefs or only with the consistency of one or more specific sets like one's belief system, (i.e., the set of beliefs one accepts). Moreover, I have to specify for whom consistency is or

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is not accessible. Is consistency accessible only to intellectually perfect beings with no limits of their computational powers, or also to human beings with their imperfections? The arguments differ in their scope. Some purport to show that consistency is inaccessible to agents with limited computational abilities, while other are supposed to apply to perfect agents too. Furthermore, accessibility itself is a vague notion. Must we have a 'direct grasp' of consistency, or are we allowed to employ auxiliary resources in order to prove or check consistency? For instance, may we calculate with the aid of paper and pencil, or even with the aid of a computer? Rather than giving here at the beginning a precise account of accessibility, consistency, and so on, I will instead examine what is achieved by the respective arguments, since they differ widely in their scope. As we shall see, some arguments actually prove that consistency is not accessible in a very strong sense; but accessibility in this strong sense hardly matters for the purposes of epistemology. The arguments against the attainability of consistency for epistemological purposes rely on an assumption about belief systems; viz., that belief systems can be represented by sets of sentences. Something can be said for the view that belief systems are more than just pure sets of sentences. However, for our purposes considering sets of sentences and their consistency is sufficient: a belief system is consistent if and only if the corresponding set of sentences is consistent. If this assumption were denied, then the arguments I will scrutinize would not get off the ground at all, and there would be no need to refute them. In the following, I will consider the arguments. I start with the most radical and basic arguments, and then move to more sophisticated arguments. In particular, I will move on to arguments that rely on more and more technically sophisticated arguments.

1.

A SIMPLE ARGUMENT

The following is the most radical argument I will consider. According to this argument, consistency cannot be checked by human beings for more than a very limited number of beliefs. Thus, not even reference to the complexity of truth tables, or similar metalogical aspects, are envoked. In his presentation ofChemiak's (1986) account, Hooker (1994) writes: In practice, humans can only juggle a few beliefs simultaneously in consciousness to check for consistency, to make and check inferences, and so forth-less than ten for most of us, and only so long as they are simple in structure. [ ... ] It is simply not possible to carry out even partial global consistency checks, [ ... ]

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An even stronger claim is made by Kornblith (1989, p. 211): It is not simply that human beings have difficulty in determining the con-

sistency of large sets of sentences. It is simply beyond the powers of any possible computational device to determine the consistency of a large set of sentences.

I agree that human beings are not able to determine the consistency of arbitrary large sets of sentences for their consistency. But in order to attain justification a subject only has to prove that its own belief system is consistent. Thus, Kornblith seems to think that humans are not able to establish the consistency of a set of sentences that is as large as our belief systems. However, it is not in general impossible for human beings to establish the consistency of certain large and even infinite sets. Kornblith's claim taken as a universal statement is simply false. It is not generally beyond the powers of any possible computational device to determine the consistency of large sets of sentences. Logicians prove consistency of infinite sets of axioms all the time. Peano Arithmetic PA, for instance, is given by infinitely many axioms and cannot be axiomatized by a finite set of axioms. Nevertheless, it does not exceed the capabilities of the average logician to show the consistency of PA by providing a model, or by proving its consistency in Gentzen's style (cut elimination). Further examples can be found in abundance. In general, a high cardinality of an axiom set does not prevent logicians from providing consistency proofs. In general, consistency proofs do not require that we juggle all sentences of a set simultaneously in consciousness; this is not necessary for carrying out consistency proofs. In a consistency argument, we do not have to use the sentences of the set in question, which is impossible; rather we only have to talk about them. The latter is no problem; we can say that all sentences in a set have a certain property. In particular, we can ascribe certain formal properties to all sentences in a set and finally arrive at the conclusion that a contradiction cannot be derived from these sentences. Therefore, the argument does not show, by any means, that we cannot determine the consistency of sets with more than ten sentences.

2.

THE SOPHISTICATED ARGUMENTS

I now turn to more elaborate arguments. These arguments, it is claimed, show that consistency is inaccessible to human epistemic subjects for metamathematical reasons.

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There are, at least, three results in metamathematics that have been employed in order to prove the inaccessibility of consistency. The arguments fall into three classes: • Complexity of truth tables. This point concerns consistency only with respect to propositional logic. Propositional logic is decidable; a straightforward method for checking it is provided by the truth table method, which is taught in almost any introductory course to logic. There are 2n many different assignments of truth values to n propositional variables. Thus, a propositional sentence with, for instance, 12 propositional variables yields a truth table with 212 = 4096 many lines. It is easily seen that even very simple sentences are hard to check for consistency with the truth table method and practically cannot be checked for consistency by the truth table method. • Undecidability of predicate logic (Church's Theorem). In contrast to propositional logic, predicate logic is not decidable. There is no decision procedure to determine whether a given (recursive or even finite) set of sentences is or is not consistent. This argument is essentially different from the preceding because it shows that there are general recursiontheoretic problems in checking a set of sentences for consistency, not just "practical" problems. • Unprovability of consistency (G6del's Second Theorem). No system satisfying some minimal requirements can prove its own consistency. There is not only no decision method for consistency, but we also cannot even stumble by chance over a proof of consistency. We cannot show in our system of beliefs that the set of all beliefs is consistent. Only this argument needs the requirement that the consistency of the set of beliefs must be proved within the belief system. Thus, it is different from both preceding arguments. How conclusive are the three arguments? Do they show that consistency is like an external factor in being out of our control and in being (in the relevant cases) inaccessible to us?

2.1.

Truth Table Complexity

According to this argument, checking belief systems for consistency may be feasible for computational devices exceeding our capabilites, but human beings are not able to carry out computations required for consistency checks of 'normal' belief systems. While consistency might be accessible to ideal epistemic

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agents with less restrictions on their computational capabilities, human beings are precluded from checking or establishing the consistency of their belief systems. Cherniak (1986) has emphasized the relevance of the complexity of truth tables for consistency checks in epistemology. Even comparably short sentences yield many lines in their respective truth tables. Does this imply that consistency is not verifiable in cases that matter for the coherence theory of knowledge? Arguments involving the complexity of truth tables should not impress the epistemologist. In the first place, there are methods other than truth tables for checking a set of sentences for its propositional consistency. In fact, these other procedures may terminate very quickly. These tricks are taught in introductory logic courses. Furthermore, it is not unnatural to assume that the elements of a belief system have a not too complicated propositional structure. Even if the belief system of a person is built up from many propositional atoms, they will hardly be combined in one complicated sentence. In practice, humans are unable to grasp sentences with excessively many propositional atoms. 4 At a propositional level, a typical belief system will consist of many unrelated sentences; they will stand alongside each other without many connections. And it is easy and not complex to check a set {PI, P2, P3, ... } for consistency because we do not have to go through all lines of the truth table. In order to instantiate the claim that belief systems are usually very simple at the propositional level, I could present physical and mathematical theories formalized in propositional logic. It should be obvious that the resulting propositional sentences would be very simple. Thus, the arguments relying on the complexity of truth tables for checking consistency do not threaten the claim that consistency is accessible to us. From these arguments, it cannot be seen why a person should not have grasp of the consistency of his or her system. Truth tables are a very bad tool for checking consistency. I do not want to challenge their value for didactical purposes, but they are hardly ever employed in consistency proofs outside of the toy world of propositional logic. Since the argument concerning truth tables does not show that the consistency ofhis/her belief system is not accessible to a subject, I leave propositional logic and tum to predicate logic. Propositional consistency does not matter anyway. What matters is general consistency, which is much better parsed as consistency in quantificationallogic.

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Church's Theorem

The arguments of the second class, relying on Church's Theorem, provide a harder challenge. Church's Theorem does not claim that consistency of a given system is hard to compute, rather it states that there is no general method for checking consistency, at least not for epistemic agents whose computational capabilities do not exceed those of Turing machines. Therefore, it cannot be argued as above that there are somehow better methods to decide whether a belief system is consistent. Church's Theorem concerns all possible methods of checking consistency of arbitrary systems without regard to their computational complexity. Church's Theorem states that there are no such methods at all. First, I will show that a certain direct retort does not succeed. It has been argued that the computational capabilities of human agents are not limited to those of ideal Turing machines. Obviously, the argument involving Church's Theorem relies on the assumption that epistemic agents do not have means to check consistency that go beyond those of ideal computer programs. But, obviously, this assumption also obtains: real humans have only finite resources, which are much less than a Turing machine has. The latter has unlimited memory, no temporal limitations for computations (as long as they are finite), etc. What ideal epistemic agents can or can not do may, naturally, be controversial. It can be claimed consistently that ideal epistemic agents are not bound to recursive methods. God, it may be said, is an ideal agent and he/she knows how to solve any problem whether it is computable (in the sense of recursion theory) or not. Although there is no inherent mistake in the concept of such an ideal epistemic agent, it is not interesting for the present topic. In the following, I will not consider agents who have justified divine intuitions about the consistency of belief sets. Nevertheless, I do not think that Church's Theorem shows that consistency is inaccessible. It shows only that we do not have a general method for deciding whether a set of sentences is consistent or not. It does not show that we cannot decide and even prove consistency in all relevant cases. Here it is useful to take a closer look at the proof of Church's Theorem. Using G6del's techniques, it is shown that there is an undecidable finitely axiomatized theory Q, called Robinson's arithmetic. 5 In particular, there is no general recursive method for deciding whether a given sentence A is provable in Q or not. This is a consequence of G6del's First Theorem for Q. If fA Q is the conjunction of all axioms of Q, then there is also, consequently, no recursive procedure for deciding whether fA Q ----> A is logically valid or not. Hence, there is no recursive procedure for deciding whether any arbitrary sentence is logically valid or not. From this it can also be deduced that consistency of a given sentence in

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predicate logic is not decidable. A sentence A is consistent with Q if and only if Q does not prove ....,A, that is, if and only if fA Q - t ....,A is not logically valid. But, as shown above, there is no recursive method to check whether a sentence of the form fA Q - t ....,A is logically valid or not. Thus, there is no effective procedure for deciding whether a sentence A is consistent with Q, or for deciding whether fA Q 1\ A is consistent. The most plausible strategy for defending the accessibility of consistency consists in the denial that a general method for checking consistency has to be applied. This means that the description above of how we should revise our belief system is faulty. There is no simple check for consistency; rather, we sometimes have to try hard to establish consistency. But still we can say that a set of beliefs is only justified if its consistency has been demonstrated. Of course, there is no general procedure for checking consistency, but why should an epistemic agent be required to have a general procedure for deciding whether an arbitrary set of sentences (belief system) is consistent or not? For obtaining epistemic justification, he needs a consistency proof for his very own belief system, but not for the belief system of other people or any other belief system different from his own. This description is compatible with Church's Theorem. It does not follow from this theorem that we cannot prove the consistency of the system Q. That is, we might be able to refute that fA Q - t 1- is logically valid, although there is no general test for the validity of sentences of the form fA Q - t A. Actually, there are straightforward proofs of the consistency of Q. 6 It may well be that we can prove the consistency of our belief system, although we lack a general procedure for determining whether a given set of sentences is consistent or not. Thus consistency would be accessible in all relevant cases, but inaccessible in some others. Church's Theorem actually raises a problem for certain accounts of belief revision. There are accounts that describe how we should deal with new information as follows. Assume that S is the set of beliefs you have already acquired, and suppose further that there is a new input A. Now check first whether the new belief A is consistent with the old stock S of beliefs. If it is consistent, simply add A to the set S of old beliefs and you obtain the new belief system S U { A }, which incorporates A. If A is not consistent with the beliefs in S, then do something else. Many formal approaches to belief revision are concerned with this "something else". But here I am not interested in the problem of how our belief system can be revised in such a way that a new (consistent) belief set is obtained in the case that A is not consistent with S. Here I am interested in the earlier step where it is required to check whether A is consistent with S. Most formal ac-

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counts of belief revision deal only with propositional logic. Thus "consistency" is to be understood in terms of propositional logic. Since propositional logic is decidable, the check for consistency can be carried out in principle (although it may require fairly complex computations). But ifthis picture of how new beliefs are incorporated in our belief system is applied to predicate logic, a fundamental difficulty arises. Epistemic agents do not know how to obey the command "check first whether the new belief A is consistent with the old stock S of beliefs!" According to Church's Theorem, there is no general recursive method to carry out this check. So there might be a general problem for the applicability of formal accounts of belief revision. But I do not take it as a conclusive argument against the claim that consistency is not accessible in a sense relevant for epistemology.

2.3.

Godel's Second Theorem

It can be granted that consistency of very complex belief systems can be shown,

and that the complexity of truth tables and Church's Theorem do not contradict this observation. In fact, consistency proofs of even very strong systems can be very simple in terms of length of proofs. Thus, I conclude that the above arguments cannot disprove conclusively that consistency is accessible. Here is an interesting twist. What tools do we have at our disposal in order to establish the consistency of our belief system? Obviously, we must carry out the consistency proof of our belief system on the basis of what we believe, that is, on the basis of our belief system. For we can use in our reasoning only assumptions we already believe. The consistency of the belief system must be established within that very belief system. Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem seems to tell us that such a consistency proof cannot work, according to the slogan "No system can prove its own consistency." So, proving consistency of one's belief system does not produce problems because the proofs are too complex or because there is no uniform procedure to check consistency, but rather because the resources for the proof are limited in the case we are interested in, namely where we try to prove consistency of a belief system within that very same belief system. In all interesting cases, the consistency of a belief system can only be established in a more comprehensive belief system, or so it seems. In the discussion of the argument based on Church's Theorem, I claimed that consistency proofs can be carried out although we lack a decision procedure for consistency. These consistency proofs, however, require means that go beyond the resources available in the system for which consistency is shown. The consistency of Peano Arithmetic, for instance, can easily be shown within set

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theory, or in Peano Arithmetic plus some additional principles like transfinite induction up to co, but not within Peano Arithmetic, or so it is claimed. I grant that G6del's Theorem on the unprovability of consistency poses the hardest challenge for consistency as an epistemically valuable criterion of coherence. However, the case is far from being clear because of some nontrivial metamathematical problems that have some bearing on the problem. As is well known, it is not so easy to state G6del's Second Theorem in a precise and general form. The slogan "No system can prove its own consistency" is at least misleading if not simply false. In this paper, I do not discuss all ins and outs ofG6del's Second Theorem. I will only mention some points that seem relevant to our discussion. In the first place, most formulations of G6del 's theorems pertain to arithmetical languages. In particular, consistency is expressed in this arithmetical language via some coding. Epistemologists, however, did not claim that coherence requires provability of certain arithmetical sentences that somehow 'express' consistency relative to some coding. Thus, if G6dels theorems are relevant at all, they must be generalized beyond the realm of arithmetical languages. Even if it is assumed that the belief system is entirely formulated in an arithmetical language, it is by no means clear that a system cannot prove its own consistency. I will hint at only a few well-known technical details. What is the consistency statement for a formal system S? Usually one provides a formula Bew (x) that represents (numerates) provability within the system. That is, Bew( n) is provable (relative to a system to be specified) if and only if n is the code of a formula provable in S (where n is a numeral for the number n). Then, the consistency statement is defined as -.Bew(#(O =I- 0)). However, there are many formulas representing provability in S. For some, G6del's Second Incompleteness Theorem holds; for others, it does not. There is a strong feeling among logicians that those consistency statements for which the second incompleteness theorem does not hold are somehow unnatural. But so far no-one has been able to give a clear account of 'naturalness.' Feferman (1960) has succeeded in providing certain technical conditions on Bew( x) that allow for a proof of the incompleteness theorem, but these conditions fall short of being 'natural.' Therefore, the second incompleteness theorem is inconclusive as an argument against consistency as a necessary condition for coherence. Popular simplified formulations of the second incompleteness theorem like "No system can prove its own consistency" may indeed pose a problem for somebody claiming that consistency is accessible to us. However, the mathematical facts do not support these formulations. Therefore, I believe that the burden of proof is with

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those who claim that consistency is not attainable because of Gbdel 's theorem; they have to provide versions of the theorem that yield their claim that consistency is not within our reach.

3.

CONCLUSION

I have shown that the arguments that are purported to prove that consistency is as little accessible to us as purely external facts are not conclusive. Of course, consistency is not accessible, if 'accessible' is understood in a very strong way, for we do not have general procedures for determining whether an arbitrary given set of sentences is consistent. But this kind of accessibility is not required for most epistemological purposes. For those purposes, we only need to establish the consistency of our own belief system or the consistency of our belief system with another belief. Although I have shown that the discussed arguments are not conclusive, I do not claim that consistency actually is accessible in a relevant sense. Church's Theorem and Gbdel's Second Theorem will make it hard to give a general account of how justification is obtained if consistency is to be used as a partial criterion for justification. The arena is open again. Acknowledgements. The paper was presented to the Belgian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Brussels, Belgium, on 23 January 1999. The helpful suggestions of the audience are gratefully acknowledged. The work on this paper was carried out while the author was a member of the research group Logic in Philosophy financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. I thank David McCarty and the members of the research group and, in particular, Erik Olsson for useful suggestions and discussions.

ENDNOTES 1 Moreover, these arguments have also been employed against extemalist coherence theories. See Komblith's (1989) attack on Hmman's (1973) theory. 2 After the quote below, Lehrer also discusses the prospects of working with inconsistent belief systems. 3 According to this quote, an inconsistent acceptance system does not justify any belief. In the more recent paper (1999), Lehrer explicitly maintains on p. 252 that beliefs can be justified on the basis of inconsistent belief systems. I quote another passage where he seems to suggest that inconsistency might not be fatal to our efforts to obtain justified beliefs. He writes in (l990a, p. 166):

Hence one who values consistency as an end in itself should recognize that a person with equally pure intellectual concerns may reasonably accept an inconsistent set of sentences. What he accepts may be suited to the objectives of obtaining new information and eschewing error.

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4 At this place it makes a difference how belief is defined. If, linguistically speaking, the limited performance of a subject is neglected and only his or her competence is considered, then a person may believe even very long sentences and in fact sentences of arbitrary length. However, if there is no limit imposed on the perfonnance of a subject, then there is no limit on the complexity of truth tables that can be calculated. 5 There is also another system called Robinson's arithmetic which is usually designated by R. 6 Just how valuable the consistency proofs for Q are is a different problem. In the light of Go del's Second Incompleteness Theorem, the value of these consistency proofs may be doubted. I will return to this point below.

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REFERENCES Bonjour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure C?f Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Chemiak, Christopher. 1986. Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Feferman, Solomon. 1960. "Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting." Fundamenta Mathematicae XLIX:35-91. Harman, Gilbert. 1973. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hooker, Cliff A. 1994. "Idealization, Naturalism, and Rationality: Some Lessons from Minimal Rationality." Synthese 99:181-231. Komblith, Hilary. 1989. "The Unattainability of Goherence." In The Current State C?fthe Coherence Theory, edited by John Bender, 207-214. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Lehrer, Keith. 1990a. "Reason and Consistency." In Metamind, 148-166. Oxford: Clarendon Press . .- - . 1990b. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press. - - - . 1991. "Reply to Mylan Engel." Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:131-133. - - - . 1999. "Justification, Coherence and Knowledge." Erkenntnis 50:243-258. Schlick, Moritz. 1934. "Uber das Fundament der Erkenntnis." Erkenntnis 4:79-99.

COHERENCE AND PERSONAL JUSTIFICATION

Chapter 6 REASONABLE ACCEPTANCE AND THE LOTTERY PARADOX: THE CASE FOR A MORE CREDULOUS CONSISTENCY Glenn Ross Franklin and Marshall College

In his formulation of coherentist theories of knowledge and epistemic justification, Keith Lehrer has often returned to the lottery paradox to draw important lessons. Some of these lessons are about knowledge. Lehrer has maintained that if a lottery has lots of tickets, only one of which will win, one cannot know, simply on probabilistic grounds, that any particular ticket will not win. Lehrer also defends a less obvious lesson: that it is not even reasonable to accept that one's ticket will not win. It is not clear, however, that Lehrer's theory of personal justification has this consequence. It is even less clear that it should. The lottery paradox for reasonable acceptance can be seen as a dilemma, and Lehrer's resolution amounts to swallowing a skeptical horn of that dilemma. Showing that this resolution is too skeptical requires that we canvas several similar approaches to the lottery paradox. Since I agree with Lehrer and Iikeminded philosophers that the other horn of the dilemma, an inconsistency resolution, is wholly unacceptable, I endorse slipping between the horns. Nonetheless, I find that there is much in Lehrer's general theory of reasonable acceptance that is congenial to my view.

1.

ADILEMMA

In a fair lottery with very many tickets, and only one winning ticket, I should be very confident that my ticket would lose. My reasons for being highly confident would seem to make it epistemically permissible for me to accept that 91 E.J. Olsson (ed.). The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 91-107. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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my ticket will lose. Yet, since my reasons for accepting that my ticket will lose are qualitatively identical to my reasons for accepting that any other ticket will lose, I do not have any epistemic reason to prefer accepting that my ticket will lose to accepting that some other ticket will lose. It seems epistemically wrong and arbitrary to accept that which I recognize I have no better reason for accepting than that which I choose not to accept. So, either I should not accept, of any ticket, that it will lose, or I should accept, of each and every ticket, that it wi\l lose. To refuse to accept of any ticket that it will lose in a very large lottery seems immoderately skeptical. To accept that a given ticket will lose is attractively less cautious. Yet, if it would be arbitrary and epistemically unreasonable to accept that one ticket will lose and not to accept the same of the other tickets, then one cannot accept of one ticket that it will lose without being obliged to accept the same of all the rest. If I accept of each ticket that it will lose, but also accept that some ticket will win, my acceptances will be selfrecognizably inconsistent. That seems just as bad. , Keith Lehrer 1 and many others (e.g., Mark Kaplan 2 , John Pollocko, Sharon Ryan4, and Dana K. Nelkin 5) adopt the epistemically cautious resolution and insist that considerations of consistency demand that one should uniformly withhold judgment on each proposition that a particular lottery ticket will lose. Richard Fole/ and Peter Klein7 opt for the much more credulous recommendation that one can be recognizably inconsistent: accepting of each ticket that it will lose while also accepting that some ticket will win. I propose that we can slip through the horns by adopting a consistently credulous approach 8 : one can rationally accept that one's ticket will lose, while not accepting that of many of the others, even though one is no less confident that they too willlose. 9 Both the skeptical and the inconsistency solutions presuppose a principle of symmetry: that if! have equally good reason to accept of any ticket that it will lose as I have to accept that any other ticket will lose, I should adopt the same attitude uniformly. I should either accept of each ticket that it will lose or not accept of any ticket that it will lose.

2.

LEHRER'S RESOLUTION: NEUTRALIZING THE COMPETITION

Lehrer accepts the principle of symmetry and argues that considerations of consistency show it is not reasonable to accept that any lottery ticket will lose. He then proceeds to show how he can get this result from his theory of rational acceptance. His theory involves a few technical terms that must first be defined.

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Lehrer analyzes personal justification in terms of coherence in an acceptance system. Whether a statement is reasonable to accept depends upon what statements compete with it. The notion of competition is defined as follows: c competes with p for S on the basis of the acceptance system of S at t if and only if it is less reasonable for S to accept that p on the assumption that c is true than on the assumption that c is false on the basis of the acceptance system of Sat t.10 Naturally, statements beat their competition for reasonab Ie acceptance when they are more reasonable to accept. p beats c for S on [the acceptance system of S] at t if and only if c competes with p for S [on the acceptance system of S] at t and it is

more reasonable for S to accept that p than to accept that c on [the acceptance system of S] at t. Lehrer provides a heuristic device to aid in our understanding of these conditions: a scenario in which a claimant to reasonable acceptance plays a game with a skeptic. In this justification game, the skeptic produces challenges that compete with the statements the claimant accepts. The claimant then responds to these challenges by defending her claims, for example, by showing that the competing claim can be beaten. If all the challenges raised by the skeptic are beaten, then the claimant wins the justification game and is personally justified. Claimant: I see a snake. Skeptic: You are dreaming you are seeing a snake. Claimant: It is more reasonable to accept that I see a snake than that I am dreaming that I am seeing a snake. The point of the game is not to refute the skeptic, but to exhibit those elements of one's acceptance system that justify the original claim. Still, a statement need not beat all of its competitors to merit reasonable acceptance. It is sufficient to neutralize the competition. The notion of neutralization is defined thusly: n neutralizes c as a competitor ofp for S on [the acceptance system of S] at t if and only if c competes with p for S on [the acceptance system of S] at t, but the conjunction of c and n does not compete with p for S on [the acceptance system of S] at t, and it is as reasonable for S to accept the conjunction of c and n as to accept c alone on [the acceptance system of S] at t.ll

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In the following justification game, a challenge is neutralized, not beaten: Claimant: I see a snake. Skeptic: People sometimes dream that they see snakes. Claimant: I am not now dreaming. The reason that the claimant's response neutralizes the skeptical challenge is that it is as reasonable to accept the conjunction that I am not now dreaming even though people sometimes dream that they see snakes as it is to accept that people sometimes dream that they see snakes. Though a conjunction is less probable than its conjunct, the additional informational content of a conjunction can make it as reasonable to accept as the conjunct inasmuch as it can have greater epistemic utility. Now we are in a position to consider how Lehrer utilizes his theory to handle the lottery paradox: The definition of justification given above, when combined with the formula for reasonable acceptance, yields the correct result that I am not justified in accepting that the number one ticket has not won. Consider the following move in the justification game: Claimant: The number one ticket has not won. Skeptic: The number two ticket has not won. The skeptic has produced a competitor to my claim because, by definition, c competes with p just in case it is more reasonable to accept that p on the assumption that c is false than on the assumption that c is true. If what she has claimed is false and the number two ticket has won, then my claim must be true. On the other hand, on the assumption that what she has claimed is true, the probability of my claim is reduced to 98/99 because the number of potential winners is reduced to 99. In this case, the utilities of accepting the two claims, the skeptic's, and mine are obviously the same, and, therefore, the comparative reasonableness of the two claims is the same. Consequently, the skeptic's claim is not beaten, it is as reasonable as mine, and it cannot be neutralized either. 12 The very last claim, however, demands an argument. Why should we think that the skeptic's claim could not be neutralized? Could it not be that the conjunctive claim that both the number one ticket and the number two ticket have not won, while less probable than the claim that the number one ticket has not won, is at least as reasonable in virtue of its additional informational content? It is not obvious that the rate of increase in the utility, as we conjoin these lottery

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statements, will never be as great as the rate of decrease in the probability. So, it is not obvious that the skeptic's objection cannot be neutralized. Whether or not Lehrer's theory is adequate to the task of giving him the result he seeks for resolving the lottery paradox, the fundamental question is whether he is seeking the right result. Do considerations of consistency preclude the rational acceptance of any lottery proposition? Let us turn to an argument that withholding on such lottery statements is analogous to withholding on many other statements about the future, statements that we have adequate inductive reasons to accept.

3.

AGAINST BOTH EXCESSIVE EPISTEMIC CAUTION AND RECOGNIZED INCONSISTENCY

The fact that my lottery ticket is very probably a loser constitutes a good reason for accepting that it will lose as long as merely probabilistic grounds can suffice for reasonable acceptance that my ticket is not going to win. Such probabilistic reasons are adequate for reasonable acceptance if lottery situations are analogous to situations in which one has merely probabilistic, but adequate, grounds for various empirical acceptances. There do seem to be many lotterylike empirical claims about that which is unobserved, where our evidence, though statistical, seems perfectly adequate for reasonable acceptance. Ifso, then by analogy, it can be reasonable to accept that one's lottery ticket will lose. Jonathan Vogel has suggested that lottery-like empirical statements abound. One is the proposition that a meteorite will not hit the place where I am sitting right now. I have no better reason to accept this than I have to accept of any other place of comparable size on the surface of the globe that a meteorite will not hit there at some particular time. Moreover, ifI consider a long enough span of time, I have high confidence that a meteorite will hit somewhere and sometime. Yet, even with no better reason to deny that the meteorite will now hit here than I have to deny that it will hit somewhere else at some other time, I confidently assert and accept that a meteorite will not hit me here and now. Likewise it is reasonable for me to accept that a satellite due to fall out of orbit will not hit my house, though pieces of it are expected to hit somewhere. Further, it is reasonable for me to accept that I will not be burned to death by a pyroclastic flow of hot ash from Mount Rainier while I spend a few days at a conference in Seattle, though I fully expect that eventually such events will occur around active volcanoes. I can reasonably accept an earthquake will not kill me during my next visit to Los Angeles, despite my having good reason to expect there will be such earthquakes, and resultant fatalities, sometime or other. 13 It would seem immoderately cautious and skeptical to deny that I can reasonably accept that a meteorite will not hit me, or that the satellite falling out

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of orbit will not hit my house, or that I will not be killed by a volcano while in Seattle or an earthquake while in Los Angeles. The skepticism will be extreme if we endorse a restricted principle of closure for reasonable acceptance. Suppose I am subject to epistemic criticism for failing to accept what I recognize to follow, in a deductively immediate manner, from that which I accept. Then, if it is unreasonable to accept that a meteorite will not imminently crush me, it is unreasonable to accept anything that entails this negative fact, including any fact about my future life. Yet, even if we do not accept such a limited principle of closure, it still seems immoderately skeptical and cautious to maintain that an epistemically scrupulous individual should refrain from accepting that a meteorite will not hit here and now, despite reasons that should make one highly confident that this proposition is true. Yet we should also not follow Foley and Klein and contend that it is rational to accept of each ticket that it will lose, despite the recognition that these acceptances are not logically compatible with accepting that one of the tickets will win. We should resist this position, as Kaplan and Pollock have argued, because if recognized inconsistency does not leave one vulnerable to epistemic criticism, then there is no dialectical point in providing a reductio ad absurdum of someone else's position. That reductios do have epistemic weight shows that recognized inconsistency is an epistemological vice.

4.

IS THE LOTTERY CASE RELEVANTLY UNIQUE?

It is incumbent on those who reject the above argument from analogy, who think we can rationally accept that we will survive the next five minutes but not that our lottery ticket will lose, to try to find some relevant disanalogy to distinguish the lotter~ and the lottery-like cases. Keith DeRose 4 offers an interesting proposal when considering what differences might account for why a lottery-like proposition is knowable or assertible while a lottery proposition is not. Since it is plausible to connect what is assertible with what is rational to accept, one might think that his proposals could plausibly carry over to our problem and provide those wishing to reject the analogical argument with a relevant disanalogy. DeRose considers a case in which I accept that the Bulls won last night despite the fact that I know that the paper sometimes misprints the scores. I have no better reason to think the Bulls won than I have when I read a misprinted score that has them winning when they did not. DeRose perceives a difference between this case and that of the lottery in the truth-values of corresponding counterfactuals. In the lottery case, but not the score-reading case, I would have accepted the relevant claim even had it been false. That is, I would accept that my ticket would lose, even if my ticket were to be the one that will win. On the

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other hand, it is false that I would still accept that the Bulls had won even ifthey had not. For, had the Bulls not won, I very well might have read an accurate newspaper account of the game and consequently have accepted that they did not win. 15 Yet, whether an accepted statement passes or fails DeRose's subjunctive conditional test cannot make the difference between whether or not it is rational to accept it. Consider a revised newspaper case proposed by DeRose, in which one knows that each day there is one, and only one, copy of the newspaper in which all of the sports scores are inverted. Using DeRose's criterion as a requirement for rational acceptance on this case yields the consequence that one can rationally accept that the Bulls won on the basis of the reported score in the paper. Yet, one cannot rationally accept that one's paper is not the defective copy. Nonetheless, one's grounds for accepting that the Bulls won is the score that is reported in one's copy of the paper. It would seem that if one cannot reasonably accept that one does not have a non-defective paper, and one recognizes that fact, then one cannot reasonably accept that the Bulls won. Since it is epistemically reasonable to accept in these circumstances that the Bulls won, I conclude that DeRose's test, though possibly demarcating cases of knowledge and assertibility, will not work as a criterion for demarcating cases of rational acceptance. Another unique feature of the lottery case that might be exploited to provide a disanalogy with the lottery-like cases is the fact that in the lottery case one knows that there is a winning ticket. Since one knows that there is a winning ticket of the lottery, one knows that there is some objective probability of one's winning. So one might contend that though it may be reasonable to accept that one will probably lose, it is not reasonable to accept that one will lose. On the other hand, despite the probability that not all parts of the satellite will burn up before reaching the earth's surface, one cannot take it for granted that some parts will reach the ground. 16 Since one does not know that any parts of the satellite will hit the ground, one cannot be certain that there is any objective probability of my house being hit. So, perhaps this difference could allow one to claim that in the lottery case, one cannot rationally accept that one's ticket is a loser, while in the case of the satellite, one can reasonably accept that one's house will not be hit. That this disanalogy is not adequate to the task at hand is apparent, however, if we consider a revised lottery case. Suppose that one ticket among the million or so tickets is designated the "No Winner" ticket and is assigned to no one, so that if that ticket is selected, no ticket wins. If it is reasonable for you to accept that the satellite will not hit your house because you cannot be sure that any part of the satellite will crash anywhere, then it is similarly reasonable for me to accept that my ticket is not a winner. For, one cannot take it for granted that any ticket is a winner, and it is very unlikely that any particular ticket will win. Yet, since one knows that one ticket will be selected, then according to this line,

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it is still unreasonable for me to accept that my ticket was not selected. So, I can reasonably accept that my ticket will lose, but not reasonably accept that it was not selected. This cannot be right. For, I know, by an immediate inference, that if my ticket is not the winner then it was not selected, since I know that it is not the No Winner ticket. So, if it is reasonable to accept that my ticket will lose, then it is reasonable to accept that my ticket was not selected. It follows, that whether or not I know that some lottery ticket will lose cannot matter in the reasonability of accepting whether a particular ticket will lose. Good analogies cut both ways. If you are convinced you do not have good reason to accept that your lottery ticket is a loser, you could use the analogy to lottery-like cases to argue that you similarly have no good reason to accept that your house will fail to be hit by the satellite. Dana K Nelkin, in seeking to find a difference between lottery situations and cases in which inductive reasoning based on perception is justified, argues that the feature of lottery inferences that makes them epistemically unjustified lies precisely in the purely statistical nature of the evidence. Thus, on Nelkin's account, there is no difference between the lottery situations and the lottery-like situations, so long as one's evidence in both cases is purely statistical. Nelkin argues that statistical inferences are only acceptable when grounded in presuppositions of a causal explanation of the statistical evidence. The intuitive costs of this account are evident when Nelkin considers a case proposed by Gilbert Harman. I? If Mary will be in Trenton only if she wins the lottery, and in New York otherwise, then if one cannot rationally accept that Mary will not win the lottery, it would seem that one could not rationally accept that Mary will be in New York. Nelkin responds by conceding this implausible consequence, and responds that such situations are relatively rare. Nelkin's position is immoderately skeptical. If it is not rationally permissible to accept that your house will not be hit by a satellite or a meteorite, on purely statistical grounds, then if a limited closure of recognized immediate inferences holds, then it would seem to be correspondingly impermissible to accept that which presupposes that we will not be hit by a meteorite, and then it is difficult to imagine much of anything in our future about which one could form a reasonable expectation. Moreover, even if limited closure fails, apparently justified statistical inferences are not all that rare, and not confined to the future. If you were to tell me that you randomly flipped twenty heads in a row yesterday. I would infer that you were flipping for a long time. I do so on the basis of statistical considerations, and not because I accept that there is a causal connection between flipping a coin for a long time and getting twenty heads in a row. It would seem that such purely statistical inferences are both common and reasonable. Using a generalization of Keith Lehrer's Racehorse Paradox,18 John Pollock has provided a technical argument to show how one can turn any statistical syllogistic inference from high probability into a lottery-like form. 19

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Since Pollock incorporates a principle of symmetry into his analysis of the lottery to show that any lottery inference to accepting that any particular ticket will lose is "collectively defeated," and thus unreasonable, he needs some difference between lottery situations and lottery-like situations to avoid immoderate inductive skepticism. He suggests that the difference lies in the projectibility or non-projectibility of disjunctive predicates. Nonetheless, he admits that this is only to label the difference, and not to provide an account of it, since projectibility is understood in terms of which inferences are epistemically acceptable to draw. 20 Moreover to adopt his analysis of the lottery case in terms of "collective defeat" would be to presuppose the very issue at stake in this paper: the principle of symmetry. Absent any other account of why we have reasonable acceptance in the case of the meteorites, earthquakes, and volcanoes, but not in the case of the lottery, the lottery and the lottery-like cases would seem analogous. It is epistemically reasonable for me to accept that my lottery ticket will lose, just as it is epistemically reasonable for you to accept that a satellite will not hit your house tonight.

5.

SLIPPING THROUGH THE HORNS

Both horns of the lottery dilemma presuppose the symmetry principle: If we have no better reason to accept a statement than to accept another, then our attitude toward each should be the same. We should either accept both or accept neither. Symmetry Principle (for Reasonable Acceptance): If S recognizes at t that p and q are equally reasonable for S to accept at t on the basis of the acceptance system of Sat t then it is reasonable for S to accept that p at t on the basis of the acceptance system of S at t only if it is reasonable for S both to accept that p and to accept that q on the basis of the acceptance system of S at t. In the lottery, this throws us back onto our two horns: either we do not accept of any particular ticket that it will lose, or we accept of all tickets that they will lose despite our recognizing the inconsistency with our accepting that some ticket will win. Gilbert Harman considers a via media: ... To say one can infer this of any ticket is not to say one can infer it of all. Given that one has inferred ticket number 1 will not win, then one must suppose the odds against ticket number 2 are no longer 999,999 to 1, but only 999,998 to 1. And after one infers

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THE LOTTERY PARADOX ticket number 2 won't win, one must change the odds on ticket number 3 to 999,997 to 1, and so on. If one could get to ticket number 999,999, one would have to suppose the odds were even, 1 to 1, so at that point the hypothesis that this ticket will not win would be no better than the hypothesis that it will win, and one could infer no further. (Presumably one would have to have stopped before this point.)21

There is thus no inconsistency in accepting that some tickets will lose while not accepting that of others. Yet, that is not to say that such arbitrary choices are epistemically reasonable. Indeed, they will not be, if the symmetry principle holds. Harman seems to endorse a symmetry principle for epistemic acceptance, for he takes non-arbitrariness to be a mark that distinguishes theoretical from practical choices: Theoretical and practical reasoning differ in this respect. In practical reasoning one can be justified in satisficing even in choosing among competing plans at the same level. In fact, often this is just what one should do-make an arbitrary choice of a satisfactory plan to accomplish one's goals. But in theoretical reasoning one would not be justified in making an arbitrary choice of what to believe among competing hypotheses at the same level. 22 John Pollock maintains that confusion between practical and epistemic reasoning underlies any temptation to give up a symmetry principle: The preceding considerations suggest that the controversy over skeptical and credulous reasoning stems from a confusion of epistemic reasoning (reasoning about what to believe) with practical reasoning (reasoning about what to do). In practical reasoning, if one has no basis for choosing between two alternative plans, one should choose at random. The classical illustration of this is the medieval tale of Buridan's ass who starved to death standing midway between two equally succulent bales of hay because he could not decide from which to eat. This marks an important difference between practical reasoning and epistemic reasoning. An agent making practical decisions must first decide what to believe and then use that in deciding what to do, but these are two different matters. If the evidence favoring two alternative hypotheses is equally good, the agent should record that fact and withhold belief.23

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In arguing against the acceptability of reasoning in the credulous manner described by Harman, Dana Nelkin elides this sharp distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning and offers a pragmatic consideration in defense of symmetry: Suppose, with Harman, that Jim can rationally infer that t1 through t999,000, say, will lose. Jim is also rational in believing that one of t1 through 1,000,000 will not lose. It would seem to follow that Jim could rationally infer a logical consequence of these beliefs, namely, that one oft999,001-tl,000,000 will not lose. But this is strongly counterintuitive. If Jim were rational in believing that one of those 1,000 tickets will win, then, depending on the order of his inferences, he should either try to get his hands on one of those 1,000 tickets or feel fortunate to be holding one of them already! But there is no reason for Jim to do either of these things. Thus, Harman's argument fails ... 24 Plausibly, a rejection of the principle of symmetry should not provide this much license. For one could reject symmetry, and accept of several tickets that they will lose without practicing a form of epistemic brinksmanship and accepting that all but a particular 1,000 will lose. More importantly, however, it is to misunderstand the acceptance system of such a reasoner to think that there need be any acceptance of a proposition to the effect that the tickets one accepts to be losers are objectively different from the tickets one does not accept to be losers. Obviously, not to accept that a ticket will lose is not to accept that it will not lose. Less obviously, not to accept that a ticket will lose is not to have less confidence that it will lose. To treat the difference between accepting that one lottery ticket will lose and not accepting that another will lose as implying a distinction in the reasons for accepting that the one or the other will lose, i.e., in the comparative confidence levels one has that one or the other will lose, is tantamount to presupposing the symmetry principle itselfl Let us return, then, to the charge that to defend the reasonability of rejecting the symmetry principle is to confuse pragmatic and epistemic reasons. Can such arbitrariness be justified only pragmatically and never epistemically? The answer depends on the nature of epistemic justification. Those who take a deontological approach to epistemic normativity might insist that the principle of symmetry has a priori plausibility.25 It is less clear why those who take a more consequentialist approach to epistemic justification should be similarly moved to accept symmetry at the price of foregoing the chance to accept highly probable and plausible lottery propositions (and perhaps also lottery-like propositions). It is a familiar theme of Keith Lehrer's work on epistemic acceptability that "the goal of acceptance

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is to obtain truth and avoid error.,,26 If truth is our ultimate aim, why can we not have purely epistemic reasons to reject symmetry and accept some lottery propositions? Are there philosophers who question symmetry for what appear to be purely epistemological reasons? It would seem so. In "Sellars on Induction Reconsidered," Lehrer displays a new interpretation of Wilfrid Sellars's view of empirical acceptance rules, a view that violates a non-arbitrariness condition that is implied by the Symmetry Principle. Here is how Lehrer describes Sellars's view: If one is only concerned with getting a maximum of true observation statements, then it is reasonable to accept all of the statements' a] is B,' 'a2is B,' and so forth to 'a" is B.' In the interest of accepting true observation statements, this policy is warranted when the probability that an a] is B is greater than 112. But, and this is the heart of the new interpretation, such acceptance is only prima facie reasonable. When we ask, not what is prima facie reasonable, but what is reasonable sans phrase, the answer will be different. For then we must be concerned, not only with accepting as many true observation statements as possible, but also with maintaining coherence among statements of different types, for example, observation statements and generalizations about the population, and this will preclude us from accepting all the observation statements mentioned so as to avoid inconsistency. Thus, according to the new interpretation, this way to combine the objectives of accepting true observation statements and at the same time maintaining explanatory coherence is to accept the percentage ofthe observation statements, provided it is greater than 50%, that corresponds to the percentage of members ofK that are known to be B in the total population. For example, if we know that 3/4 K are Band K satisfies the pertinent relevance conditions, then we accept 75% of the statements of the form' a] is B. ,27 While Lehrer maintains his own commitment to symmetry, he does allow that Sellars's position is "justified by systematic epistemic objectives and is in no way ad hoc ... ,,28 I agree. Sellars's position demonstrates that rejection of symmetry can be grounded in purely epistemological, not pragmatic, considerations. In rejecting symmetry, we need not endorse a position akin to Sellars's. If we did, we would license accepting of all but one ticket that it lose! That is obviously too permissive. Yet, is there not good reason to accept of a few tickets that they will lose, while not getting carried away? The only barrier in our way is the Symmetry Principle.

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Yet, if it is permissible to accept of any lottery ticket that it will lose, is it not permissible to accept that they all are losers? If this is not just another appeal to the Symmetry Principle, then there is a confusion underlying the question. Permissibility is not adjunctive. I may be permitted to have any fruit in the fruit basket but not be permitted to have them all. My being permitted to have the pear may depend upon whether I have already exercised my permission to have the banana. Similarly, what is reasonable to accept is contingent on what is already accepted. Since Lehrer's analysis of personal justification does not presuppose the Symmetry Principle, it has the flexibility to provide an analysis of personal justification for the more credulous reasoner. This, by my lights, is a virtue of his analysis. 29 To see how we can use Lehrer's analysis for less skeptical purposes, consider again the justification game, this time played between a skeptic and a credulous reasoner: Claimant: The number one ticket has not won. Skeptic: The number two ticket has not won. Claimant: It is as reasonable for me to accept both that the number two ticket has not won and that the number one ticket has not won as to accept the former alone. (While the conjunction is less probable than either conjunct, the added informational content outweighs the negligible additional risk of error.) The claimant has won this round by neutralizing the skeptic's challenge. The claimant's original claim, 'The number one ticket has not won', neutralizes the skeptic's challenge, inasmuch as the conjunction of their two claims is at least as reasonable as the claimant's original claim. Of course it could happen that this conjunction of the objection with the original claim does not neutralize the objection. This will happen if the increase in informational content due to conjoining does not outweigh the decrease in probability. For example, if the lottery is not very large, then the probability of these two tickets losing could be substantially less than the probability of one ticket losing. In a three-ticket lottery, the probability is thereby halved. It follows that in a small lottery one is not personally justified in accepting that one holds a losing ticket. That is as it should be. The game could continue with the claimant winning round after round by neutralizing the opposition: Claimant: The number one ticket has not won. Skeptic: The number two and number three tickets have not won. Claimant: It is as reasonable for me to accept that the tickets numbered one, two and three have not won as to accept just that the number one ticket has won. (While the conjunction is less probable

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THE LOTTERY PARADOX than either conjunct, the added informational content outweighs the negligible additional risk of error.)

For some large n, the increase in informational content gained by accepting that every ticket among the n tickets will lose is offset by the corresponding decreased probability. Consider this continuation of the game: Skeptic: The number two through number n tickets (for some large n) have not won. Claimant: It is more reasonable for me to accept that the number one ticket has not won than to accept that the number two through n tickets have not won. The claimant wins this round by beating the skeptic's challenge. What happens in the transition from neutralizing to beating? Suppose the expected utility of accepting that ticket one will lose is equal to the expected utility of accepting that tickets one through m will lose. Suppose further that the skeptic attempts the following objection: Skeptic: The number two through m tickets have not won. On our first supposition, it is no less reasonable to accept that ticket one will lose on the assumption that ticket two through m will all lose than on the assumption that they will not all lose. Consequently, this objection of the skeptic does not compete with the original claim and is thus not a legal move for the skeptic in the justification game. We might worry about what happens on precise boundaries. We should not. Given the limitations of human reasoners to make very fine epistemic distinctions, the supposition of one ticket's losing will only make the relevant epistemic difference if the lottery is too small for one to reasonably accept that a particular ticket will lose. In a very large lottery, if we can successfully judge that an objection by the skeptic is indeed a competitor, then we will be able to neutralize or beat it. If one cannot judge whether an objection competes, then it should not defeat one's personal justification. 30 Notice that up to this point, the Symmetry Principle has not come into play. So, let us consider these moves: Skeptic: You do not accept that the number two ticket has not won but you have no better reason to accept that the number one ticket has not won. Claimant: The Symmetry Principle is false.

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So long as the claimant is personally justified in rejecting the Symmetry Principle, the claimant has successfully neutralized the skeptic's last challenge. There are good theoretical reasons to reject the Symmetry Principle. We accept in order to gain truth and avoid error. Basing acceptance on purely statistical grounds can be epistemically reasonable when the prospects for gain are great and the risks of loss small. A concomitant commitment to coherence provides the epistemological basis for our avoiding recognized inconsistency. Thus, I commend a position of credulous consistency as the most plausible of the three resolutions of the lottery paradox for reasonable acceptance. The lesson of the lottery is that we can sometimes have no better reason to accept, but reason enough.

ENDNOTES I Keith Lehrer, Metamind, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 235-6 and Theory of Knowledge, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 129-30. 2 Mark Kaplan, "Believing the Improbable, " Philosophical Studies 77 (1995), pp. 117-46, particularly pp. 136-7 and Decision Theory as Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996, pp. 139-40. lJohn Pollock, Cognitive Carpentry: a Blueprintfor How to Build a Person, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT/Bradford, 1995, chapter 2. 4Sharon Ryan, 'The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency," Synthese 109 (1996), pp. 121-41, particularly p. 126. Ryan is working with a strong notion of justified belie( i. e., whatever justification knowledge requires. In the lottery paradox I am considering, the relevant concept of justification ranges from a weak notion of epistemic rational permissibility to a concept of justification no stronger than Lehrer's notion of personal justification. S DanaK. Nelkin, "The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality," Philosophical Review 109 (2000) pp. 373-409. 6Richard Foley, Working Without a Net, New York: Oxford, 1993, pp. 164-5. 7Peter Klein, "The Virtues of Inconsistency," Monist 68 (1985), pp. 105-35, particularly p 108. Note that Klein, like Ryan, is presuming a notion ofjustified beliefthat is required for knowledge. R I borrow the labels' skeptical' and 'credu lous' for the two positions one can take on symmetry from John Pollock, "Justification and Defeat," Artificial Intelligence 67 (1994), 377-407, who in turn acknowledges borrowing from D. S. Touretzky, J. F. Horty, and R. H. Thomason, who speak of credulous and skeptical reasoners. 9 Bayesians who reject the notion of acceptance in favor of quantitative measures of confidence would reject all three positions. I will not rehearse the standard replies to such Bayesians. 10 Theory of Knowledge, p. 118. II Theory of Knowledge, p. 125. These definitions of competition, neutralization, and personal justification are essentially preserved in Lehrer, Self Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 30. 12 Theory of Knowledge, p. 130. 13 See Jonathan Vogel in "Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle':>" in Doubting, Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross (eds.), pp. 13-27, for several such cases where we would ordinarily claim to have knowledge though they appear to be analogous to lottery situations. 14 Keith DeRose, "Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996) pp. 568-580.

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15 For this account to succeed, we must reject Robert Stalnaker's principle of conditional excluded middle for counterfactuals. 16 It is just this disanalogy that Sharon Ryan exploits in (1996). 17 Gilbert Harman, Change in View: Principles 0/ Reasoning, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford/MIT, 1986, p. 71. 18 Keith Lehrer, "Coherence and the Racehorse Paradox," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, (1980) 5, pp. 183-192. 19 John L. Pollock, "How to Use Probabilities in Reasoning," Philosophical Studies 64 (1991), pp. 65-85. Also see Pollock's "A Solution to the Problem ofInduction," Noiis 18 (1984), pp. 423-461 and "Justification and Defeat," Artificial Intelligence 67 (1994), pp. 377-407. 20 Pollock (1991), pp. 80-1. 21 Change in View, p. 71. 22 Change in View, p. 68. 23 Pollock (1994), p. 383. 24 Nelkin (2000), pp. 377-8. 25 Epistemological deontologists might also demur from such a defense of symmetry, seeing considerations of high probability and coherent acceptance as trumping aprima/acie reasonability behind symmetry. 26 Theory o/Knowledge, p. 121. 27 Lehrer (1983), p. 471. 28 Lehrer (1983), p. 469. 29 Note that this flexibility to accommodate more credulous intuitions on the lottery is not shared by Pollock's (1994) notion of justification, inasmuch as his "Principle of Collective Defeat" (p. 383) incorporates a symmetry principle. 30 The argument can be fully spelled out as follows: Suppose the skeptic offers this challenge: Skeptic: The number two through m tickets have not won. There are three cases to consider: (a) The expected epistemic utility of accepting that ticket one will lose is less than the expected epistemic utility of accepting that all of the tickets one through m will lose. In this case, the statement that ticket number one will lose neutralizes the challenge, as in the first two rounds above. (b) The expected epistemic utility of accepting that ticket one will lose is equal to the expected epistemic utility of accepting that all of the tickets 1 through m will lose. In this case, the statement that tickets numbered two through m will all lose does not compete with the original claim ofthe claimant. It is no less reasonable to accept that ticket one will lose on the assumption that ticket two through m will all lose than on the assumption that they will not all lose. ©) The expected epistemic utility of accepting that ticket one will lose is greater than the expected epistemic utility of accepting that tickets one through m will lose. There are two sub-cases: (c-i) The expected utility of accepting that ticket one will lose is greater than the expected epistemic utility of accepting that tickets two through m will lose. In this case, the statement that ticket number one will lose beats the challenge, as in the above case for large n. (c-ii) The expected utility of accepting that ticket one will lose is less than or equal to the expected utility of accepting that tickets two through m will lose. Given the limitations in our abilities to make fine discriminations in the expected utility for the acceptance of statements, these cases will not arise unless the lottery is small enough for one ticket to make such a difference. So, in a very large lottery, these cases will not arise for human reasoners. If we can successfully

GLENN ROSS judge that an objection by the skeptic is indeed a competitor, then we will be able to neutralize or beat it. If we cannot judge whether an objection competes, then it does not defeat our personal justification.

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Chapter 7 RELATIONAL COHERENCE AND CUMULATIVE REASONING Charles B. Cross* University of Georgia

According to Keith Lehrer's (1974, 1986, 1988, and 2000) theory of knowledge, coherence is the basis of epistemic justification. In Lehrer's theory, coherence is a relation between a proposition and what Lehrer (2000: 170) defines as an evaluation system: D 1. A system X is an evaluation system of S if and only if X contains (a) states expressed by statements of the form, 'S accepts that p', attributing to S just those things that S accepts with the objective of accepting that p if and only if p (the acceptance system of S), (b) states expressed by statements of the form, 'S prefers accepting p to accepting q', attributing to S just those things that S prefers accepting with the same objective concerning acceptance, (the preference system of S), and (c) states expressed by statements of the form, 'S reasons from p, q, r, and so forth to conclusion c', attributing to S just those states of reasoning with the objective of being sound (having true premises and being valid). Based on the notion of an evaluation system, Lehrer (2000: 170) defines justification in terms of coherence as follows: D2. S is justified in accepting p at t on system X of S at t if and only if p coheres with X of S at t. Now, to the question, "What conclusions should one draw from the propositions one accepts?" it would seem sensible to answer, "One should draw those conclusions whose acceptance would be justified on the basis of what one accepts." 109 E.J. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 109-127. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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But if this is right, then Lehrer's account of justification should be interpretable not only as a theory of justification but as a theory of inductive inference, too. In what follows I shall investigate the consequences of interpreting Lehrer's account of system-relative justification as a theory of inductive inference. In Section 1, I set out Lehrer's theory of coherence. In Section 2, I present the elements of the theory of cumulative reasoning, I a widely known and well workedout proof theory for inductive reasoning. In Section 3, I formulate a definition of inductive inference in terms of a simplified version of Lehrer's analysis of coherence, and I discuss what assumptions about coherence would be sufficient to make the account of inductive inference derivable from his theory of justification conform to a series of widely discussed general principles, including those constitutive of cumulative reasoning. In Section 4, I consider the epistemological significance of the theory of inductive reasoning developed in Section 3.

1.

LEHRER'S THEORY OF COHERENCE

Having defined justification in terms of coherence, Lehrer (2000: 170) fleshes out the notion of coherence in the following reformulation of D2: D3. S is justified in accepting pat t on system X of Sat t if and only if all objections to p are answered or neutralized for S on X at t. Thus, on Lehrer's account, p coheres with X of Sat t if and only if all objections to p are answered or neutralized for S on X at t. Lehrer (2000: 170) defines the notions of objection, answering, and neutralizing as follows: D4.

0 is an objection to p for S on X at t if and only if it is more reasonable for S to accept that p on the assumption that 0 is false than on the assumption that 0 is true, on X at t.

D5. An objection 0 to p is answered for S on X at t if and only if 0 is an objection to p for S on X at t, and it is more reasonable for S to accept p than to accept 0 on X at t. D6. n neutralizes 0 as an objection to p for S on X at t if and only if o is an objection to p for S on X at t, the conjunction of 0 and n is not an objection to p for S on X at t, and it is as reasonable for S to accept the conjunction of 0 and n as to accept 0 alone on X at t. D4, D5, and D6 appeal to an undefined notion of relative reasonableness that Lehrer takes as primitive. 2 The following example, which adapts the example in Lehrer 1988:342 to Lehrer's (2000) new terminology, applies this notion of reasonableness in an illustration of D5.

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Wendy tells Keith that Fred Feldman's book is now in print. Is Keith justified in believing this? Keith's background information includes that he edits a series in which the book appears and that Wendy works for the publisher and is trustworthy about when books appear in the series. Now suppose that some skeptic proposes to Keith that Wendy is lying. The claim that Wendy is lying is an objection to the claim that the book is in print, but, on the basis of Keith's background information, it is more reasonable for Keith to accept that Wendy is telling the truth and that the book has been published than to accept that Wendy is lying. In this example, the claim Wendy is lying is an objection to the claim Feldman's book is in print because it is more reasonable for the subject to accept Feldman's book is in print on the assumption Wendy is not lying than on the assumption Wendy is lying. Since it is more reasonable for the subject to accept The book has been published than to accept Wendy is lying, the claim Feldman's book is in print answers the objection Wendy is lying. But is every objection to Feldman's book is in print answered? Consider this example, again adapted (with updated terminology) from the example in Lehrer 1988:342: Imagine the skeptic persists and says, "Well, you know people sometimes lie about when books are in print." Now this skeptical innuendo does count as an objection to the claim Keith believes in a sort of indirect way. It would be more reasonable for Keith to accept that Feldman's book is in print on the assumption that people do not ever lie about when books are in print than on the assumption that they do sometimes lie. Moreover, it is quite reasonable for Keith to accept that people do sometimes lie about these matters. But this skeptical innuendo, though it cannot be answered, can be neutralized by conjoining the reply that Wendy is not lying. Of course, the reasonableness of accepting the latter depends on Keith's background information about Wendy. The claim Wendy is not lying neutralizes the claim People sometimes lie about when books are in print as an objection to Feldman's book is in print because People sometimes lie about when books are in print, but Wendy is not lying is not an objection to Feldman's book is in print, and because it is as reasonable to accept People sometimes lie, but Wendy is not lying as to accept People sometimes lie by itself, given the subject's background evaluation system. If every objection to Feldman's book is in print is either answered (like the claim Wendy is lying) or neutralized (like the claim People sometimes lie about when books

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are in print), then the subject is justified in accepting that Feldman's book is in print. This example illustrates how natural it would be to interpret Lehrer's necessary and sufficient condition for justification relative to an evaluation system as a sufficient condition for the permissibility of an inference. The subject Keith in the previous example who asks, "Am I justified in believing that Feldman's book is in print?", may be using certain background information and skeptical alternatives to evaluate the epistemological status of a belief he already holds, or he may be considering whether to accept Feldman's book is in print as a new belief on the basis of that background information. But to consider whether to accept a given claim on the basis of given background information is to consider whether to infer that claim from the background information. This would be an inductive inference, of course, since the claim Feldman's book is in print does not follow deductively from the subject's background information, but the fact that the subject would be justified in believing this claim surely indicates that it would be a good inductive inference. What are the consequences of reinterpreting Lehrer's account of justification relative to an evaluation system as an account of inductive inference? In order to answer this question we will first need an introduction to the theory of inductive inference in its most general form: the theory of cumulative reasoning.

2.

CUMULATIVE REASONING

Systems of deductive inference (for example, classical first-order logic) satisfy three well-known conditions often labeled Reflexivity, Monotonicity, and Cut 3 Reflexivity If p E X then X f- p. Monotonicity If X f- p and X r;;:; Y, then Y f- p. Cut If X U {p} f- q and X f- p then X f- q. But most of the reasoning subjects actually do on a day-to-day basis (such as inference to the best explanation) is inductive. Despite its nondeductive character, it is possible to theorize in a proof-theoretic way about inductive reasoning, and formal approaches to inductive reasoning abound in the artificial intelligence literature. 4 Formally, the most conspicuous way in which inductive inference differs from deductive inference is the fact that inductive inference is nonmonotonic. Where 'X ~ p' means that p is an inductive consequence of X (under some given conception of inductive inference represented by '~'), it is possible for it to be the case that X ~ p and X r;;:; Y even though Y If p. For example,

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let X, Y, andp be the following:

= {'This match was struck', 'Oxygen was present'}, Y = X U {'This match was wet when struck'}, X

p = 'This match lit'.

Knowing that the match was struck and that oxygen was present, we can reasonably infer that the match lit. But if our evidence is expanded to include information that the match was wet, then the inference to the conclusion that the match lit is not licensed given the expanded evidence. If in the above list of conditions Monotonicity is replaced by the weaker condition of Cautious Monotony, the result is a version of what Gabbay (1985) calls cumulative inference: Reflexivity If p E X then X ~ p. Cautious Monotony If X ~ p and X ~ q, then X U {p} ~ q. Cut If Xu {p} ~ q and X ~ p then X ~ q. Makinson (1989) and Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (1990) present semantical approaches to cumulative inference based in part on Shoham's (1988) notion of preferential entailment. By investigating how Lehrer's notion of relational coherence can be interpreted as an account of inductive reasoning we will be developing an alternative to the received preferential model semantics for cumulative inference.

3. 'p COHERES WITH X' AS A SPECIES OF CUMULATIVE INFERENCE In our application of Lehrer's conception of justification below we will assume that the time variable t and epistemic subject variable S are fixed and so can be dropped. Since in the context of inference-making what will matter about an evaluation system is the set of propositions accepted in the acceptance system component, we will depart from Lehrer's use of the variable X. Specifically, instead of assuming that X represents a triple consisting of an acceptance system, a preference system, and a reasoning system, we will assume that X represents the sentences which formulate the claims that are accepted in the acceptance system component of an evaluation system. In other words, X will range over the sets of sentences expressing the p's that S accepts in a range of possible

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evaluation systems associated with some fixed S and t. Now, different evaluation systems in Lehrer's theory can share the same acceptance system, hence a subject's evaluation system at a given time is not strictly a function of his or her acceptance system. But in the coherence-based theory of inductive consequence to be explored below, the inductive consequences associated with a given evaluation system will be a function of the acceptance system component alone. Accordingly, the theory of inductive reasoning presented below may appear to assume that a subject's reasoning and preference systems are a function of his or her acceptance system. How can this be reconciled with the spirit of Lehrer's theory? The conflict is only apparent. When two evaluation systems incorporate the same acceptance system but not the same preference and reasoning systems, this means that the two evaluation systems in question are associated with different relations of comparative reasonableness relative to the given acceptance system. In the theory of inductive consequence developed below, the inductive consequences of X are determined in part by comparative reasonableness relative to X. When two evaluation systems incorporate the same acceptance system but not the same preference and reasoning systems, this means that the two evaluation systems in question are associated with different notions of inductive consequence. Lehrer's theory of evaluation systems is therefore, potentially, a theory of the dynamics of the inductive inference concept-a theory of inductive logic revision. We shall not offer a dynamic theory here. The theory to be presented below will concern the statics of coherence-based inductive inference. Since we are taking the variables S and t as fixed, Lehrer's seven-place relation of comparative reasonableness ("it is more reasonable for S to accept that p on the assumption that q than to accept r on the assumption that s on the basis of X at t") will become a five-place relation ("it is more reasonable to accept p on the assumption q than to accept r on the assumption s on the basis of X,,).5 These modifications allow us to define 'X ~ p' as in C1 below and work with C2-C6 instead of Lehrer's D2-D6. We will assume a background deductive logic whose consequence relation is represented by the straight turnstile 'f-'. 6 We will assume that this background logic is a compact, consistent extension of classical tmth-functionallogic and that an expressively complete set of boolean connectives is available in the language: C 1. Where p is a sentence and X a set of sentences, X X f- or p is justified on the basis of X.

~

p iff either

C2. p is justified on the basis of X if and only if p coheres with X. C3. p coheres with X if and only if all objections to p are answered or

neutralized on X.

CHARLES B. CROSS C4.

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is an objection to P on X if and only if it is more reasonable to accept p on the assumption of --'0 than on the assumption of 0 on the basis of X. 0

C5. p answers 0 on X if and only if 0 is an objection to p on X, and it is more reasonable to accept p than to accept 0 on X. C6. n neutralizes 0 as an objection to p on X if and only if 0 is an objection to p on X; and 0 & n is not an objection to p on X; and it is as reasonable to accept 0 & n as to accept 0 alone on X. Since the account of cumulative inference to be given below is developed with classical logic as a background, Cl is formulated in such a way that if X is logically inconsistent then X f-v p for all p. Coherence figures in whether X f-v p only if X is logically consistent. It would be interesting to see a paraconsistent version of the logic developed here, but that is a project for another occasion.

3.1.

Basic Postulates aud Related Results

Given C 1-C6, the key to the logic of 'f-v' will of course be the logic of the comparative reasonableness relation. Lehrer (2000:144) states that he takes comparative reasonableness as undefined, but he identifies both probability (Lehrer 2000:144) and epistemic utility (Lehrer 2000:146) as factors in the determination of the degree of reasonableness of a claim. Lehrer (2000: 146) even provides an expected utility equation for calculating degrees of reasonableness. Our approach to comparative reasonableness will be entirely nonquantitative. 7 We will treat comparative reasonableness relative to a set X of sentences as a binary relation >- x relating one pair (p, q) of sentences to another such pair. A locution of the form 'It is more reasonable to accept p on the assumption of q than to accept r on the assumption of s on the basis of X' will thus be abbreviated '(p, q) >- x (r, s)'. With comparative reasonableness understood qualitatively, the following all seem plausible as principles of comparative reasonableness:

Noutriviality If (p, q)

>- x (r, s) then X

}L .

Asymmetry If(p,q) >-x (r,s) then (r,s) 'Ix (p,q). Irreftexivity If X

}L,

then (p, q)

'I x (p, q). 'I X (p3, q3)

then

Equivalence If p -Jf- p' and q -Jf- q' and r -Jf- r' and s -Jf- s', then (p, q) (r,s) iff (p',q') >-x (r',s').

>- X

Negative Transitivity If (PI, ql)

(PI, ql)

'I x (P3, q3).

'I X (p2, q2)

and (p2, q2)

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Superiority If X f- p and X .J.L, then (p, T) onX.

»- x (q, T) for all objections q to p

Enlargement for Objections If X ~ p, then every objection to q on X is an objection to q on X U {p}. Enlargement for Answering If X ~ p and 0 is an objection to q on both X and Xu {p}, then q answers 0 on.X only if q answers 0 on Xu {p}. Enlargement for Neutralizing If X ~ p and 0 is an objection to q on both X and X U {p}, then for all n, n neutralizes 0 as an objection to q on X only if n neutralizes 0 as an objection to q on X U {p}. Reduction for Objections If X ~ p, then every objection to q on X U {p} is an objection to q on X. Reduction for Answering If X ~ p and 0 is an objection to q on both X and X U {p}, then q answers 0 on X U {p} only if q answers 0 on X. Reduction for Neutralizing If X ~ p and 0 is an objection to q on both X and X U {p}, then for all n, n neutralizes 0 as an objection to q on X U {p} only if n neutralizes 0 as an objection to q on X.

Nontriviality conveys the idea that distinctions of comparative reasonableness cannot be made if X is inconsistent. 8 Asymmetry and Irreflexivity are supported intuitively by the more in more reasonable than. To expose the significance of Negative Transitivity, let us next make the following definition:

(p,q)

~x

(r,s)

ifandonlyif

(p,q)

'l-x (r,s) and (r,s) 'l-x (p,q).

The following result follows immediately by Nontriviality, Irreflexivity, Asymmetry, and Negative Transitivity: Theorem 1 For any fixed X, of the form (p, q).

~x

is an equivalence relation on the set ofpairs

That is, ~ x is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive for any fixed X. The fact that ~ x is an equivalence relation makes it acceptable to interpret' (p, q) ~ x (r, s)' as meaning it is as reasonable to accept p given q as to accept r given s on the basis of X. Where q and s are both logical truths, '(p, q) ~ x (r, s)' means p is as reasonable as r on X, and it is this notion of equal reasonableness that we appeal to in C6. The fact that ~x is an equivalence relation also yields the following useful substitution principle.

CHARLES B. CROSS Theorem 2

If (PI , qI)

(rI' 8r) iff(p2, q2)

'::::.X (p2, q2) and (rIl 81) '::::.x (r2' 82), then (PI, qr)

>- X (r2' 82).

117

>- x

Proof: Assume that (PI, qI) '::::.x (p2, q2) and (rI, 8r) '::::.x (r2, 82). Now for reductio suppose that (PI, qr) >- X (rI' 8r), but (p2, q2) >I- X (r2' 82). By hypothesis, (PI, qI) >I- X (p2, q2) and (p2, q2) >I- X (r2' 82) and (r2' 82) >I- X (rI' 81). By two applications of Negative Transitivity, (PI, qr) >I- X (rI, 81), which is contrary to hypothesis. So by reductio if (PI, qI) >- X (rr, 81) then (p2, q2) >- X (r2' 82)' An exactly similar argument shows that if (p2, q2) >- X (r2, 82) then (PI, qI) >- X (rI' 8r). (QED)

Equivalence has this direct consequence: Theorem 3

If X f-v P and P -1r q,

then X

f-v

q.

Proof: Suppose that X f-v P and P -1r q. If X r then X f-v q follows immediately, so suppose X j,L. Then every objection to P on X is either answered or neutralized. Let 0 be an obj ection to q on X. Then (q, -'0) >- X (q, 0), but since P -1r q it follows by Equivalence that (p, -'0) >- X (p, 0). Hence 0 is an objection to p, so 0 is either answered or neutralized as an objection to P on X. Suppose that 0 is answered as an objection to P on X. Then (p, T) >- x (0, T), but since P -1r q, it follows by Equivalence that (q, T) >- x (0, T). Hence 0 is answered as an objection to q on X. Alternatively, suppose that n neutralizes 0 as an objection to P onX. Then (p, -,(o&n)) >l-x (p, o&n) and (o&n, T) '::::.x (0, T). Since P -1r q, it follows by Equivalence that (q, -, (0 & n)) >I- x (q, 0 & n), so n neutralizes 0 as an objection to q. So 0 is either answered or neutralized as an objection to q on X. Generalizing on 0, it follows that X f-v q. (QED)

Superiority expresses the idea that the logical consequences of a consistent set X answer all of their respective objections. The role of Superiority in the logic of coherence is to ensure that the principle of Supraclassicality holds for f-v: Theorem 4

If X r

P then X

f-v p.

Proof: Suppose that X r p. If X r, then X f-v P by C1 and we are done. Alternatively, suppose X j,L. Then, by Superiority, P answers all of its objections on X. Hence X f-v p. (QED)

Theorem 4 has Reflexivity as a direct consequence: Theorem 5

IfP E

X then X

f-v p.

As far as coherence is concerned, Enlargement and Reduction for Objections together entail that if P coheres with X and X is logically consistent, then P has

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the same objections on X as on X U {p}. If P coheres with X and X is logically consistent, then Enlargement and Reduction for Answering entail that the same pairs of claims stand in the answering relation on X as on X U {p}, whereas Enlargement and Reduction for Neutralizing entail that the same objections to a given claim are neutralized by the same neutralizers on X as on X U {p}. Thus, expanding a given set of claims by adding something that coheres with the given set neither increases nor decreases the set of claims that cohere. As far as ~ is concerned, the principles of Enlargement and Reduction for Objections, Answering, and Neutralizing serve to ensure that Cautious Monotony and Cut hold: Theorem 6

If X

~ p and X ~ q, then X U {p} ~ q.

Proof: Suppose that X ~ pandX ~ q. If XU{p} 1-, thenXU{p} ~ q by CI, so suppose Xu {p} }L , and let a be an objection to q on X U {p}. By Reduction for Objections, a is an objection to q on X. Since X ~ q, a is answered or neutralized as an objection to q on X. By Enlargement for Answering and Enlargement for Neutralizing, a is answered or neutralized as an objection to q on X U {p}. Generalizing on 0, X U {p} ~ q. (QED) Theorem 7

If X

U {p} ~ q and X ~ p, then X ~ q.

Proof: Suppose that Xu {p} ~ q and X ~ p. If X 1-, then X ~ q by CI, so suppose X }L, and let a be an objection to q on X. By Enlargement for Objections, a is an objection to q on Xu {p}. Since Xu {p} ~ q, a is answered or neutralized as an objection to q on X U {p}. By Reduction for Answering and Reduction for Neutralizing, 0 is answered or neutralized as an objection to q on X. Generalizing on 0, X ~ q. (QED)

Of course, the six Enlargement and Reduction principles can be assumed to be lemmas whose basis lies in further assumptions about comparative reasonableness. What further assumptions are needed? The following invariance principle for comparative reasonableness turns out to suffice: Invariance Under Inductive Expansion (IUIE) If X }L and X ~ p, then for all q, r, s, and t, (q, r) >- X (s, t) iff (q, r) >- xu{p} (s, t). Theorem 8 IUIE implies Enlargement for Objections. Proof: Assume IUIE and X ~ p, and let a be an objection to q on X. Then (q,--,o) >-x (q,o). ByIUIE, (q,--,o) >-xu{p} (q,o),henceoisanobjectiontoq on Xu {p}. (QED)

CHARLES B. CROSS

119

Theorem 9 IUIE implies Reduction for Objections. Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 8. (QED) Theorem 10 IUIE implies Enlargementfor Answering. Proof: Assume that X f-v p and 0 is an objection to q on both X and X U {p} and q answers 0 onX. Then (q, T) >- x (0, T). By IUIE, (q, T) >- xU{p} (0, T). Hence q answers 0 on Xu {p}. (QED) Theorem 11 IUIE implies Reduction for Answering. Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 10. (QED) Theorem 12 IUIE implies Enlargement for Neutralizing. Proof: Assume that X f-v p and 0 is an objection to q on both X and X U {p}. Let n neutralize 0 as an objection to q on X. Then (q, -'(0 & n)) 'I- x (q, 0 & n) and (0 & n, T) ~x (0, T). By IUIE, (q, -'(0 & n)) 'I- xu{p} (q,o & n) and (o&n, T) ~xu{p} (0, T). HencenneutralizesoasanobjectiontoqonXU{p}. (QED) Theorem 13 IUIE implies Reduction for Neutralizing. Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 12. (QED) 3.2.

Some Postulates aud Results for Negation

Since the language in which our logic is formulated includes an expressively complete set of truth-functional connectives, every sentence (including every logical truth) has a boolean negation. The following postulates seem reasonable as principles relating comparative reasonableness to sentences and their negations:

Inconsistency If X J.L and {p, q} f--- and {p} J.L and {q} J.L, then (p, -,q)

(p, q). Top/Bottom If X J.L and {p} J.L, then (T, p) Bottom/Top If X J.L, then el,.1)

>- x (.1, T).

Exclusive Objection for.1 If (.1, -,p)

>- x (.1,p), then f--- p.

Exclusive Equivalence If X J.L and (.1, T) Top Level If X J.L and (T, T)

~x

>- x Cl, p).

~x

(p, T), then {p}

(p, T), then f--- p.

f---.

>- x

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RELATIONAL COHERENCE AND CUMULATIVE REASONING

The upshot of Inconsistency is that a pair of individually consistent but jointly inconsistent statements are always objections to one another. Top/Bottom entails that a logical truth is always more reasonable, given a consistent assumption p, than any contradiction given that same assumption. Assuming Equivalence, Bottom/Top entails that every logical truth is an objection to every contradiction, and Exclusive Objection for ..l entails that every objection to a contradiction is a logical truth. Exclusive Equivalence entails that anything which is exactly as reasonable as a contradiction is itself a contradiction. Top Level entails that anything which is exactly as reasonable as a logical truth is itself a logical truth. An important consequence of this collection of principles is the thesis that f-v has the property of Consistency Preservation: Theorem 14

If X ¥

then there is no p such that X

f-v p and X f-v

-'p.

Proof: Suppose that X ¥. For reductio, suppose that there is a p such that X f-v p and X f-v -'p. Case 1: Suppose that I- p. Then -,p -II- ..l, so by Theorem 3, X f-v ..l. Since X ¥, it follows that every objection to ..l is either answered or neutralized on X. By Bottom/Top and Equivalence, (..l, -, T) 'r x (..l, T), so T is an objection to ..l on X. Since ¥ -, T, we have by Top/Bottom that (T, T) 'r x (..l, T), so by Asymmetry, (..l, T) >f x (T, T). By Exclusive Objection for ..l, every objection to ..l on X is logically equivalent to T, so by Equivalence, (..l, T) >f x (0, T) for every objection 0 to ..l on X. Hence ..l does not answer any of its objections on X. Let n neutralize 0 as an objection to ..l on X. Then 0 is an objection to ..l on X and 0 & n is not an objection to ..l on X and (0 & n, T) r:::=.x (0, T). Exclusive Objection for ..l implies that 0 -II- T, so by Equivalence we have that T & n is not an objection to ..l on X, i.e. (..l, -,(T & n)) >f x (..l, T & n), and T & n is as reasonable as T on X, i.e. (T & n, T) r:::=.x (T, T). But T & n -II- n, so by Equivalence, (i) (..l, -,n) >f x (..l, n) and (ii) (n, T) r:::=.x (T, T). By Top Level, (ii) implies n -II- T, from which it follows by (i) and Equivalence that (..l,..l) >f x (..l, T), which contradicts Top/Bottom. So a contradiction follows from the hypothesis that I- p. Case 2: Suppose that I- -'p. This hypothesis leads to a contradiction by an argument similar to Case 1. Case 3: Suppose that ¥ p and ¥ -'p. By Inconsistency, (p, -,-,p) 'r x (p, -,p) and (-,p, -,p) 'r X (-,p, p). Hence -,p is an objection to p on X and p is an objection to -'p on X. Since X f-v p and X f-v -,p and X ¥, -,p is either answered or neutralized as an objection to p on X, and p is either answered or neutralized as an objection to -'p on X. Asymmetry implies that p and -,p

CHARLES B. CROSS

121

cannot answer each other. Hence either -,p is neutralized as an objection to p on X, or p is neutralized as an objection to -,p on X. But neither of these alternatives is possible. Let n be any sentence, and suppose for reductio that n neutralizes -,p as an objection to p on X. Then -,p & n is not an objection toponX,i.e. (p,-,(-,p&n)) >l-x (p,-,p&n),and(-,p&n,T) ~x (-,p,T). Since {-,p} J.L, it follows by Exclusive Equivalence that { -,p & n} J.L. Since, in addition, (p, -, (-,p & n)) >I- x (p, -,p & n) and {p} J.L and {p, -,p & n} f-, Inconsistency is contradicted. By reductio, -,p is not neutralized as an objection to p on X. Exchanging p and -'p, an exactly similar argument shows that pis not neutralized as an objection to -,p on X. The hypothesis of Case 3, that J.L p and J.L -'p, therefore leads to a contradiction. (QED) Consistency Preservation is a significant property because any consistencypreserving inference relation that allows inferences which go beyond the deductive consequences of a set must be nonmonotonic: 9 Theorem 15 Suppose that ~ is a relation on pairs consisting of sets of sentences and sentences, and suppose that ~ satisfies Reflexivity, Consistency Preservation, and Superclassicality:

Consistency Preservation: If X ¥ then there is no p such that X ~ p and X ~ -'p. Superciassicality: For some p, X

~

p but X J.L p.

Then ~ is nonmonotonic, i.e. there are X, Y, and p such that X C Y and X ~ p but Y J76 p. Proof: Assume Reflexivity, Consistency Preservation and Superclassicality. By Superclassicality, find a p such that X ~ p but X J.L p. Since X J.L p, it follows that X U { -,p } J.L . By Reflexivity, X U { -,p} ~ -'p, so by Consistency Preservation, Xu {-,p} J76 p. It therefore suffices to let Y = Xu {-,p}. (QED) 3.3.

Postulates and Results for Disjunction

Since Boolean disjunction is present in the object language, it is reasonable to ask how disjunction interacts with our coherence-based inference relation' Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (1990:190) and Makinson (1989:14) consider analogs of the following "introduction on the left" rule for disjunction:

r-' .

Or If X U {p}

r- r and X U {q} r- r, then X U {p V q} r- r.

The Or postulate follows if we make the following reasonable assumptions about objections, answering, and neutralizing.

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RELATIONAL COHERENCE AND CUMULATIVE REASONING

Left Replacement If X U {p} XU{q} r--r.

r-- r

and X U {p} f- q and X U {q} f- p, then

Objection for Disjunctions If Xu {p} J.L and Xu {q} J.L and X U {p} r-- r and Xu { q} r-- r, then every objection to r on Xu {p V q} is an objection to r on both X U {p} and X U {q}. Answering and Neutralizing for Disjunctions If Xu {p} J.L and Xu {q} Y and X U {p} r-- r and X U {q} r-- r, and if 0 is an objection to r on X U {p V q} which is answered or neutralized as an objection to r on X U {p} and as an objection to r on X U {q}, then 0 is answered or neutralized as an objection to r on Xu {p V q}. Theorem 16 If Left Replacement, Objection for Disjunctions, and Answering and Neutralizingfor Disjunctions hold, then the Or postulate holds. Proof: Assume Left Replacement, Objection for Disjunctions, and Answering and Neutralizing for Disjunctions, and suppose that XU{p} r-- rand XU{ q} r-r. If Xu {p V q} f-, then Xu {p V q} r-- r by C 1, so suppose that X U {p V q} J.L . If X U {p} f- , then X U {p V q} f- q, in which case, since X U { q} f- p V q and Xu { q} r-- r, it follows by Left Replacement that X U {p V q} r-- r. Similarly, if X U {q} f-, then X U {p V q} r-- r, so suppose that X U {p} J.L and X U {q } J.L . Let 0 be an objection to r on X U {p V q}. By Objection for Disjunctions, o is an objection to r on X U {p} and on X U {q}. Hence 0 is answered or neutralized as an objection to r on X U {p} and 0 is answered or neutralized as an objection to r on Xu {q}. By Answering and Neutralizing for Disjunction, o is answered or neutralized as an objection to r on Xu {p V q}. Generalizing on 0, X U {p V q} r-- r. (QED)

Left Replacement follows from the following plausible principle on comparative reasonableness, where Cn(X) = {p: X f- p}: Invariance Under Reformulation If Cn(X) = Cn(Y), then for all p, q, r, ands, (p,q) >--x (r,s) iff(p,q) >--y (r,s). Theorem 17 Invariance under Reformulation implies that if X U {p} Xu {p} f- q and Xu {q} f- p, then X U {q} r-- r.

r-- rand

Proof: Assume Invariance under Reformulation and suppose that X U {p} r-- r and X U {p} f- q and X U { q} f- p. If X U { q} f-, then X U { q} r-- r by C 1, so suppose that X U {q} J.L. Since X U {p} f- q and X U {q} f- p, it follows that Cn(X U {p}) = Cn(X U {q}). Let 0 be an objection to r on Xu {q}. Then (r, -'0) >-- xu{ q} (r, 0). By Invariance under Reformulation, (r, -'0) >-- xu{p}

CHARLES B. CROSS

123

(r, 0). Hence 0 is an objection to r on X U {p}. Since X U {p} f"v r, it follows that 0 is answered or neutralized on X U {p}. Case 1: Assume thatr answers 0 on XU{p}. Then (r, T) >- xU{p} (0, T). By Invariance under Reformulation, (r, T) >- xU{q} (0, T). Hence r answers 0 onX U {q}. Case 2: Assume that there is an n such that n neutralizes 0 as an objection to r on Xu {p}. Then (0 & n, -,r) tXU{p} (0 & n, r) and (0 & n, T) ~xu{p} (0, T). By Invariance under Reformulation, (0 & n, -,r) t xU{q} (0 & n, r) and (0 & n, T) ~XU{q} (0, T). Since 0 is also an objection to r on Xu {q}, n neutralizes 0 as an objection to r on Xu {q}. By Cases 1 and 2, it follows that 0 is answered or neutralized as an objection to r on Xu {q}. Hence Xu {q} f"v r, as required. (QED)

The following principle is sufficient to derive Objection for Disjunctions:

Distribution for Disjunction If X U {p} j,L and X U {q} j,L, then for all r, s, t, and u, (r,s) >-xu{pvq} (t,u) only if (r,s) >-xu{p} (t,u) and (r,s) >-xu{q}

(t,u).

Theorem 18 Distribution for Disjunction implies Objection for Disjunctions. Proof: Assume Distribution for Disjunction, and suppose that X U {p} j,L and X U {q} j,L and X U {p} f"v r and X U {q} f"v r. Let 0 be an objection to r on Xu {p V q}. Then (r, -'0) >- xu{pVq} (r,o). By Distribution for Disjunction, (r, -'0) >- xU{p} (r,o) and (r, -'0) >- xU{q} (r,o). Hence 0 is an objection to r on both X U {p} and X U {q}. (QED) The question of how to secure Answering and Neutralizing for Disjunctions via a reasonable principle of comparative reasonability remains an open problem.

3.4.

Deductive Closure for Inductive Consequences

When, as in this paper, cumulative reasoning is formalized in the context of a deductive background logic, the question arises whether the inductive consequences of a set form a deductively closed set. The following proof-theoretic postulates jointly suffice as a definition of deductive closure for 'f"v':

Special Supraclassicality If r- p then X Right Modus Ponens If X

f"v p.

f"v p:J q and X f"v p, then X f"v q.

Special Supraclassicality follows from Supraclassicality and so is a consequence of Superiority, but Special Supraclassicality also follows immediately from Top/ Bottom, Equivalence, and the following two principles:

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RELATIONAL COHERENCE AND CUMULATIVE REASONING

Top/Top (T, T) )- x (T, -.1). Exclusive Objectiou for T If X J.L and (T, ...,p) )- x (T, p), then {p} f-. Theorem 19 .if Top/Bottom, Top/Top, Equivalence, and Exclusive Objection for T hold, then if f- p then X f-v p. Proof: Assume Top/Bottom, Top/Top, Equivalence, and Exclusive Objection for T, and let f- p. If X f-, then X f-v p by Cl, so assume that X J.L. Since (T, T) )- x (T, -.1) by Top/Top, it follows by Equivalence and Exclusive Objection for T that q is an objection to T on X iff q -1f- -.1. Since {T} J.L , it follows by Top/Bottom that (T, T) )- x (-.1, T). Since -.1 -1f- q for every objection q to T on X, it follows by Equivalence that T answers all of its objections on X. Hence X f-v T. Since f- p, p -1f- T; hence by Theorem 3 we have that X f-v p. (QED)

Right Modus Ponens follows if we assume the following three principles: Objection for Conditionals If X J.L and X same objections on X.

f-v p,

Answering for Conditionals If X J.L and X then q answers a on X.

f-v

then q and p ::J q have the

p and p :J q answers a on X,

Neutralizing for Conditionals If X J.L and X f-v p and n neutralizes 0 as an objection to p ::J q on X, then n neutralizes a as an objection to q on X. Theorem 20 .if Objection, Answering, and Neutralizing for Conditionals hold, then if X f-v P ::J q and X f-v p, then X f-v q. Proof: Assume Objection, Answering, and Neutralizing for Conditionals, and suppose that X f-v p::J q and X f-v p. If X f-, then X f-v q by Cl, so suppose that X J.L . Let r be an objection to q on X. Then by Objection for Conditionals, r is an objection to p ::J q on X. Since X f-v p ::J q, r is answered or neutralized as an objection to p ::J q on X. If p ::J q answers r on X, then, by Answering for Conditionals, q answers r on X. If there is an n such that n neutralizes r as an objection to p ::J q on X, then, by Neutralizing for Conditionals, n neutralizes r as an objection to q on X. So r is answered or neutralized as an objection to q on X. Generalizing on r, X f-v q. (QED)

Objection, Answering, and Neutralizing for Conditionals in turn follow from the following simple requirement on comparative reasonableness: Conditional Invariance If X J.L and X (p::Jq,r).

f-v

p, then for all q and r, (q, r)

~x

CHARLES B. CROSS

125

Theorem 21 Conditional Invariance implies ObjectionJor Conditionals. Proof: Assume that X r and X [-v p. Let 0 be an objection to q on X. Then (q, -'0) ;.- x (q,o). By Conditional Invariance, (q, -'0) ~x (p:=J q, -'0) and (q, 0) ~x (p:=J q, 0). By Theorem 2, (p :=J q, -'0) ;.- x (p:=J q, 0). Hence 0 is an objection to p :=J q on X. So every objection to q on X is an objection to p:=J q on X. A similar argument shows that every objection to p :=J q on X is an objection to q on X. (QED) Theorem 22 Conditional Invariance implies AnsweringJor Conditionals. Proof: Assume that X r and X [-v p and p :=J q answers T on X. Then T is an objection to p :=J q on X and (p :=J q, T) ;.- X (T, T). By Theorem 21, T is an objection to q on X. By Conditional Invariance, (q, T) ~x (p:=J q, T), and, since ~x is an equivalence relation, (T, T) ~x (T, T). By Theorem 2, it follows that (q, T) ;.- X (T, T). Hence q answers T on X. (QED) Theorem 23 Conditional Invariance implies NeutralizingJor Conditionals. Proof: Assume that X r and X [-v p and n neutralizes T as an objection to p :=J q on X. Then T is an obj ection to p :=J q on X, and T & n is not an obj ection to p:=J q on X, and (T & n, T) ~x (T, T). By Theorem 21, T is an objection to q on X and T & n is not an objection to q on X. Hence n neutralizes T as an objection to q on X. (QED)

4.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that it is possible to interpret a slightly simplified version of Lehrer's (2000) theory of relational coherence as a species of inductive reasoning, indeed as a species of cumulative reasoning, and we have seen that the cumulativity of this species of inductive reasoning can be derived from certain very plausible assumptions about comparative reasonableness. The additional properties of Consistency Preservation and deductive closure for inductive consequences can also be derived from plausible principles of comparative reasonableness. It remains to be seen whether Or and Answering and Neutralizing for Disjunctions can be derived from plausible principles of comparative reasonableness. As an exercise in logic, the hypothesis that relational coherence is a species of inductive reasoning appears to be a success. But does this way of looking at relational coherence have any epistemological significance? Clearly it does. The criterion of coherence with one's evaluation system is intended by Lehrer, in the first instance, as a means of evaluating the personal justification

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RELATIONAL COHERENCE AND CUMULATIVE REASONING

status of claims that a subject accepts against a larger background consisting of acceptance, reasoning, and preference systems. But any criterion of epistemic justification has to be more than this. Regardless which theory of knowledge is correct, it is surely true that any truth-seeking, error-averse subject who seeks to expand what he or she accepts should add only beliefs which he or she would be justified in holding if he or she held them. And the process of adding beliefs in this fashion is nothing ifnot inductive reasoning. Accordingly, if Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge is correct, then any truth-seeking, error-averse subject wishing to reason inductively should do so by expanding his or her acceptance system to include claims which would cohere with his or her evaluation system. Nothing, therefore, could be more natural in the context of Lehrer's theory of knowledge than an account of inductive reasoning in terms of relational coherence.

ENDNOTES

* I am pleased and honored to participate in celebrating the career of so brilliant a philosopher as Keith Lehrer. Lehrer's status as a leading figure in the field is richly deserved, and, without a doubt, his work will continue to stand the test of time. 1 Cumulativity was defined by Gabbay (1985), but see also Kraus et al. 1990, Makinson 1989, and Makinson 1994. 2 But see Lehrer 2000:144-146 for a discussion of relative reasonableness, probability, and expected value. 3 In this and later sections, the variables p, q, r, and s range over statements in some given language, and the variables X and Y with and without subscripts range over sets of statements. The expression 'X f- p' means that p can be inferred from X in the inference system defined by'f-'. 4 See Makinson 1994 for a survey. 5 In parallel with Lehrer's definitions, "it is more reasonable to accept p than to accept r on the basis of X" will be assumed to mean "it is more reasonable to accept p on the assumption T than to accept r on the assumption T on the basis of X", where T is some fixed logical truth. 1. is defined as -, T. 6 'p -jf- q' will mean that {p} f- q and {q} f- p. Where X is a set of sentences, 'X f- ' will mean that X f- p and X f- -,p for some p. 7 In Lehrer's theory, comparative reasonableness is conditional as well as comparative ("it is more reasonable to accept p on the assumption q than to accept r on the assumption s"). For a well worked-out example of a nonquantitative theory of unconditional comparative reasonableness, see Chisholm and Keirn 1972. 8 It might be argued that distinctions of comparative reasonableness can be made in such cases. If this is right, then our adoption of Nontriviality should be considered a simplifying assumption that reflects a decision not to address comparative reasonableness for inconsistent X. 9 See Cross 1990 for an application of a version of this result to the question of the tenability of the Ramsey test for conditionals.

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REFERENCES Chisholm, R. and R. G. Keirn. 1972. "A system ofepistemic logic." Ratio 14:99-115. Cross, C. 1990. "Belief revision, nonmonotonic reasoning, and the Ramsey test." In Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning, edited by H. Kyburg, R. Loui, and G. Carlson, 223-244. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Gabbay, D. 1985. "Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning in expert systems." In Logics and Models of Concurrent Systems, edited by K. R. Apt, 439-457. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Kraus, S., D. Lehmann, and M. Magidor. 1990. "Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models, and cumulative logics." Artificial Intelligence 44:167-207. Lehrer, K. 1974. Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ~~-. 1986. "The coherence theory of knowledge." Philosophical Topics 14:5-25. ~~-. 1988. "Metaknowledge: Undefeated justification." Synthese 74:329-347. ~~-. 2000. Theory ofKnowledge. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Makinson, D. 1989. "General theory of cumulative inference." In Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 346: Nonmonotonic Reasoning, edited by M. Reinfrank, 1. de Kleer, M. L. Ginsberg, and E. Sandewall, 1-18. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Makinson, D. 1994. "General patterns in nonmonotonic reasoning." In Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Volume 3: Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Uncertain Reasoning, edited by D. M. Gabbay, C. 1. Hogger, and 1. A. Robinson, 35-110. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shoham, Y. 1988. Reasoning about Change. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Chapter 8 LEHRER MEETS RANKING THEORY Wolfgang Spohn University of Konstanz

Meets what? Ranking theory is, as far as I know, the only existing theory suited for underpinning Keith Lehrer's account of knowledge and justification. If this is true, it's high time to bring both together. This is what I shall do in this paper.! However, the result of defining Lehrer's primitive notions in terms of ranking theory will be disappointing: justified acceptance will, depending on the interpretation, either have an unintelligible structure or reduce to mere acceptance, and in the latter interpretation knowledge will reduce to true belief. Of course, this result will require a discussion of who should be disappointed. So, the plan of the paper is simple: In section 1 I shall briefly state what is required for underpinning Lehrer's account and why most of the familiar theories fail to do so. In section 2 I shall briefly motivate and introduce ranking theory. Basing Lehrer's account on it will be entirely straightforward. Section 3 proves the above-mentioned results. Section 4, finally, discusses the possible conclusions.

1.

THE BASIC NOTIONS OF LEHRER'S ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION AND KNOWLEDGE

I shall base my considerations on Lehrer (2000), the most recent presentation of his theory. It indeed adds simplifications and clarifications to the first edition. For instance, the basic notions on which his theory of knowledge and justification builds stand out more clearly. They are summarized in his definition of an evaluation system in Lehrer (2000, p. 170, D 1)2 which consists of three components: (a) an acceptance system, i.e., a set of accepted statements or propositions, (b) a preference system, i.e., a four-place relation among all 129 E.!. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 129-142. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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statements or propositions saying for all A, B, e, D whether A is more reasonable to accept given or on the assumption that ethan B given or on the assumption that D (I symbolize it here as Ale >- BID),3 and (c) a reasoning system, i.e., a set of inferences each consisting of premises and a conclusion. The idea behind (c) is that what a person accepts, and justifiedly accepts, depends also on the inferences she carries out. Here I understand Lehrer as referring to deductive inferences or rather to the inferences taken by the person to be deductively valid and sound. 4 The idea behind (b), by contrast, is to take care of inductive reasoning in the widest sense which is always a matter of weighing reasons and objections on the basis of some such preference system. We shall look in detail at Lehrer's specific proposal for this weighing ofreasons. The first step I would like to take in my present discussion is to fix the reasoning system once for all. The reason is that otherwise my comparative business could not even start. Of course, we shall have to discuss in the final section whether this is already the first misrepresentation of Lehrer that will entail all the other ones. How do I fix that system? Since Lehrer emphasizes again and again that he is interested in acceptance only insofar as it is governed by the aim of truth, I propose to extend this attitude to the objects of belief or acceptance and to conceive of them only insofar they can be true or false, i.e., as truth conditions or propositions. Thereby, I ignore all questions of syntactic structure, of logical equivalence, and of logical entailment, and assume that the rationality constraint of consistency and deductive closure of the acceptance system is trivially satisfied. This entails in particular the assumption that the reasoning system is maximal and has no independent role to play. I am well aware that I am taking this step very swiftly. My excuse is that I am convinced that a lengthy treatment of the issue would not reveal a viable constructive alternative. Having taken this step the task of underpinning reduces to accounting for the acceptance and the preference system. Concerning the latter, the first idea is, of course, to appeal to a probability measure P and to define that Ale >- BID iff P(AIc) > P(BID). However, the relation between probability and acceptance is problematic, as is highlighted by the famous lottery paradox. I am not rejecting all attempts to solve this paradox out of hand, but the mere fact that they are debated heatedly and that all ofthem are contested shows that probability theory is, presently, not a good foundation for Lehrer's theory. Moreover, as I shall point out below, there is a particular feature in Lehrer's notion of neutralizing an objection which prevents any probabilistic interpretation. Olsson (1998a) discusses further difficulties of a purely probabilistic construal of justified acceptance. For similar reasons Lehrer, too, has given up on finding purely probabilistic foundations, which he still hoped to build in Lehrer (1971, 1974). There he suggests, moreover, that the foundations may be construed as some kind of epistemic decision theory. The hint is still found in Lehrer (2000,

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pp.145ff.) and also used for a solution of the lottery paradox. However, I am doubtful because epistemic decision theory has remained a promise that has never been redeemed in a satisfying way in the last 35 years. The basic difficulty, I believe, is this: Probability theory may claim, in a way, to offer a complete epistemology. If so, it is hard to complement it or to merge it with other epistemological ideas like acceptance, epistemic decisions, or whatever, and radical probabilism as Jeffrey (1992) has defended it seems unavoidable. Hence, we should put probability theory aside and rather look at theories dealing directly with acceptance or belief. A large variety of such theories-such as default logic, AGM belief revision theory, Pollock's and other accounts of defeasible and non-monotonic reasoning, etc.-has been developed in the past 25 years. Maybe they provide an account of Lehrer's preference system as well. Alas, they don't. At least, I claim this with confidence with respect to AGM belief revision theory. There it is shown that the behavior of belief revisions is equivalent to the behavior of so-called entrenchment relations. 5 These could indeed fill the role of Lehrer's unconditional preference relation. Maybe entrenchment relations can be generalized so as to capture the special case A IC >- BIC of Lehrer's preference relation which refers twice to the same condition. However, Lehrer requires the full conditional relation, which cannot be accounted for in AGM belief revision theory. I suspect that essentially the same is true of all accounts of defeasible reasoning implicitly or explicitly appealing to some kind of epistemic ordering. There is only one theory that is about belief or acceptance and provides a sufficiently powerful preference system: ranking theory. That's why I said it is the only existing theory suited for underpinning Lehrer's account. What does it look like?

2.

RANKING THEORY

The basics are quickly told. Originally, ranking theory was developed 6 in order to overcome essential restrictions of AGM belief revision theory. As it turns out, AGM theory generally accounts only for one step of belief revision and thereafter returns to a static picture. But, of course, a full dynamics has to account for several or iterated belief changes. The problem has been around since Harper (1976), and there have been quite a number of attempts to solve it within the confines of AGM theorizing.? However, I find these proposals inferior to the one provided by ranking theory. Iterated belief revision is not our concern here. However, there exists a close connection between iterated belief change and full conditional epistemic preference. 8 It is for this reason that ranking theory, though addressed to the former, can also provide for the latter. So let's take a look.

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Let's start with an exhaustive set Wofpossibilities (possible worlds, firstorder valuations, or whatever). Subsets of Ware propositions (let's not worry about their algebraic structure), W itself is the logically true and 0 the logically false proposition. As explained above, I take such propositions as objects of epistemic attitudes. Ranks, then, are grades of disbelief (where I find it natural to take nonnegative integers as grades, but other numbers would do so as well). These grades obey some fundamental laws summarized in Definition 1: K is a ranking function iff K is a function from the power set of W into Nu{ rf)} such that K(W) = 0, K(A) = rf) iff A = 0, and K(AuB) = min{K(A), K(B)}. K(A) is called the rank of A. The rank ofB given A is defined as K(BIA) = K(AnB) - K(A). Hence, K(A) > 0 says that A is disbelieved (to some degree), and K(A) > 0 says that A is believed. 9 K(A) = 0 only expresses that A is not disbelieved and leaves open the possibility that A is not disbelieved as well. Since there is no point here in distinguishing between belief and acceptance, we thus have Definition 2: A is accepted by K iffK(A) > O. {A IA is accepted by K} is the acceptance system ofK. What are the fundamental laws according to Definition I? K(W) = 0 says that the logically true proposition is not disbelieved. The condition that K(A) = rf) iff A = 0 says that it is most strongly believed, i.e., that the logically false proposition is more strongly disbelieved than any other. More substantial is the law ofdisjunction that K(AuB) = min {K(A), K(B)}. Clearly, the disjunction AuB cannot be more firmly disbelieved than either of its disjuncts. Nor can it be less firmly disbelieved than both disjuncts, since this would entail the absurdity that given AuB both, A and B, are disbelieved, though AuB is not. An immediate consequence is the law ofnegation that either K(A) = 0 or K(A) = 0 (or both). A and A cannot be both disbelieved. Perhaps the most important law is the law of conjunction that K(AnB) = K(A) + K(BIA) which follows trivially from the definition of conditional ranks. It says that in order to arrive at the degree of disbelief in AnB one has to sum up the degree of disbelief in A and the additional degree of disbelief in B given A. This, I believe, agrees with intuition. There is a surprisingly well working translation from probabilistic into ranking terms which almost automatically generates a large number of ranking theorems from probability theorems. This applies also to the account of belief change. The basic rule for probabilistic belief change is simple conditionalization according to which one moves to the probabilities conditional on the information received. This is generalized by Jeffrey's conditionalization lO which is

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unrestrictedly performable and thus defines a full dynamics within the realm of strictly positive probability measures. In the corresponding way, such conditionalization with respect to ranks offers a full dynamics of belief or acceptance. 11 This informal hint at belief revision may suffice. However, we should formally introduce belief contraction because Lehrer makes explicit use of it in what he calls the ultrasystem. Belief contraction is the operation of giving up some belief without adding new ones. It is extensively discussed in AGM belief revision theory because it is interchangeable with belief revision.!2 Within ranking theory it is easily defined as well (and turns out then to have all the properties described in AGM theory!3): Definition 3: The contraction K - A of K by A is defined by K - A = K, if K(A) = O. If not, it is defined by (K - A) (B) = K(B) for B 0. Suppose further that B is not answered. This requires K(A) : K(AIB), since K(AIB) = n. But we have supposed that A n Em - En+m+l =f- 0. This secures that B can be neutralized. Take any C such that A n Hence m

: o:(A). Thenq(A) = 1-q(A) < l-o:(A) = (3(A), by Theorem 3.1 (iv), which leads, as above, to a sure loss. 0

e

e

e

e

e

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As noted above, you are perfectly justified in the above situation in refusing to announce threshold prices for events in 8. But there are some additional bets that you ought to be willing to make:

Theorem 3.4. If f3 and a are defined by (3.3) and (3.4) you ought to be willing, for each A c 8, and for all c > 0, to 1° buy lAfor f3(A) - c, and

2° sell lAfor a(A)

+ c.

Proof The argument here is not that you will otherwise suffer a sure loss (no one can make a Dutch book against someone unwilling to bet), but, rather, that 1° and 2° are at least as good as bets you are willing to make. In the case of 10, you'll buy lA. for p(A*) - c = f3(A) - c, so you ought to be willing to buy lA for that price, since if the true D- and 8-states are, respectively, wand e, and w E A*, then e E A, so lA pays off for you in every case that lA* does, and possibly other cases as well. In the case of 2°, you'll sell lA* for p(A*) + c = a(A) + c, so you ought to be willing to sell I A for that price. With wand e as above, if w t/: A *, then T(w) n A = 0, i.e., T(w) c A. Since e E T(w), e t/: A. So in every case in which you avoid paying off on IA* (and perhaps in other cases as well) you will avoid paying off on IA. 0

4.

UPPER AND LOWER SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES

Theorem 3.4 leads naturally to the following generalization of classical subjective probability: Suppose that for each event A c D you are able to assign real numbers A(A) and v(A) such that, for all c > 0, you are willing to 1° buy lA for A(A) - c, and 2° sell IA for v(A)

+ c.

The set functions A and v are then, respectively, your lower and upper subjective probabilities on events in D. Whereas in section 2 above your threshold prices as bettor and bookie were required to be identical, here they may be distinct, with obvious gains in realism and expressive possibility. The following theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding a sure loss in the above situation:

Theorem 4.1. Given the betting commitments 1° and 2° above, you will avoid a sure loss if and only if there exists a coherent probability q on events in D such that (4.1) for all A c D. A(A) ~ q(A) ~ v(A),

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o

Proof See Walley 1981, p. 15.

It follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 that coherence of subjective probabilities, as defined in section 2 above, is not only necessary, but also sufficient to avoid a sure loss (cf. Kemeny 1955 and Lehman 1955). Note that (4.1) is a rather weak condition, which, for example, does not even imply monotonicity of A and u. Buehler (1976) has argued for much more stringent restrictions. Indeed, he claims inter alia that the lower probability A must be additive! Buehler's argument is based on the following theorem.

Theorem 4.2. Suppose that A(A) ~ q(A)for all A c n, where q is a coherent probability, and that A is self-conjugate, i.e., A(A) + A(A) = 1 for all A c D. Then A = q.

Proof Suppose that A(A) < q(A) for some A. Then, by self-conjugacy of A, A(A) = 1- A(A) > 1-q(A) = q(A), contradicting thefact that A is dominated byq. 0 It follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 that if A avoids a sure loss, and is self-conjugate, then A is in fact a coherent probability. Buehler's argument that A must be self-conjugate goes as follows: Clearly, A(A) + A(A) ~ 1; otherwise you will suffer a sure loss. Suppose that A(A) + A(A) < l. Let a and b be such that A(A) < a, A(A) < b, and a + b < l. Then you'll reject buying fA for a and fA for b, even though by accepting both bets you would be guaranteed of the net gain 1 - a - b > O. So you will miss out on a sure gain. Apart from the fact that missing a sure gain is considerably less serious than suffering a sure loss, this argument is further weakened by its dependence on your being offered fA and fA one at a time, with no knowledge that both will be offered. If you were offered these bets simultaneously, you would recognize immediately that you were being offered a certain payoff of 1, and would clearly agree to pay any price less than 1 in exchange. Here is a simple way in which lower and upper probabilities satisfying (4.1) arise: Let P be a nonempty family of coherent probabilities on events in D and let

Ap(A)

:= iuf {p(A)},

vp(A)

:=

pEP

sup{p(A)}.

and

(4.2) (4.3)

pEP

Then Ap and Up satisfy (4.1) as well as the conjugacy relation Ap(A)+up(A) = l. The set functions Ap and Up are, respectively, the lower and upper envelopes

oip·

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TWO DOGMAS OF PROBABILISM

Examples of naturally occurring families 'P (called probasitions in Jeffrey 2001) include such things as 1. the family of all additive representations of some comparative probability relation (Roberts 1976) and 2. the family of all probabilities with respect to which a fixed random variable has a fixed expected value. The Strassenian lower and upper probabilities (3 and a are also envelopes, with 'P = the set of all marginalizations to e of all probabilities Q on 0 x e that are compatible with p and T in the sense that the marginalization of Q to 0 is p and Q(w, e) = 0 if e tt T(w) (Wagner 1992).

5.

CONCLUSION

Dogmatic restrictions on the representation of uncertain judgment, or on the way in which such judgment is revised, undermine the goal offaithfully representing the evidence regarding the state of the world. While Bayesian dogmatism has begun to yield to other principled methods of probability revision, the dogma of precision is still dominant. One source of resistance to working with non-additive upper and lower probabilities is the fear that such measures must necessarily be mathematically intractable. This greatly exaggerates the true state of affairs. While space does not permit a detailed account, we mention that there is a useful theory of upper and lower expectation (see Dempster 1967 and Walley 1981, 1991), as well as a generalization of probability kinematics in which new evidence places bounds on possible revisions of prior in the form of Strassenian upper and lower probabilities (Wagner 1992). Finally, to conclude this paper on the same note on which it began, we remark that there is a theory of consensus for upper and lower probabilities (Wagner 1989) which is remarkably similar to that in Lehrer and Wagner 1981.

ENDNOTES * Research supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-9984005) Reparation thus provides a solution to the old evidence problem, first posed by Glymour (1980). The term "frame of discernment" is due to Shafer (1976). The elements of 0 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., precisely one element of 0, though typically unknown, represents the true state of the world. Multiple frames of discernment may, however, be brought to bear on a single problem, as, for example, when we classify the possible outcomes of selecting an object at random from a set of colored shapes by frames delineating I) the possible colors and 2) the possible shapes. Mathematicians typically refer to 0 as a "sample space." 3 It is implicit here that you are unwilling to pay more than p( A) in 10 and unwilling to take less than p(A) in 2°. In the usual treatment, you must be willing to pay p(A) in 10 and to take p(A) in 2°. We do not require this. A virtue of our treatment is that one can assign proper subsets of 0 (i.e., contingent events) probability one without being in the position of having no prospect of 1

2

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positive gain, and the possibility of a loss (cf. Eannan 1992, p. 41). Our treatment also allows for a natural segue to the account of upper and lower probabilities in section 4. 4 Devotees of the principle of insufficient reason would adopt the unifonn distribution here, thus employing the same distribution in the case of complete ignorance that they would given reliable infonnation that exactly half the balls in the urn are white. 5 In 1967 Dempster, unaware of Strassen's 1964 paper, published a similar analysis. Shafer (1976) offered a sui generis account of set functions having the monotonicity properties of the lower probability (3, regarding such set functions, which he called beliejjimctions, as directly assessable measures of degrees of belief.

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REFERENCES Buehler, R. 1976. "Coherent Preferences." Annals ojStatistics 4: 1051--1064. Dempster, A. 1967. "Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalucd Mapping." Annals of Mathematical Statistics 38:325-339. Earman,1. 1992. Bayes or Bust? Cambridge: MIT Press. Glymour, C. 1980. Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jeffrey, R. 1965. The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1983, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ----. 1988. "Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability." In B. Skyrms and W. Harper (eds.), Causation, Chance, and Credence, vol. I, Dordrecht: Kluwer,221-255. - - - . 1991. "Postscript 1991: New Explanation Revisited." In Jeffrey 1992, 103-107. - - - . 1992. Probability and the Art ofJudgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. '---. 1995. "Probability Reparation: The Problem of New Explanation." Philosophical Studies 77:97-102. 2001. "Petrus Hispanus Lectures, II: Radical Probabilism." Actas da Sociedade Portuguesa da Filosofia (forthcoming; and currently available in http://www . princeton.edu/-bayesway/pu/Lisbon.pdf). Kemeny, 1. 1955. "Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities." Journal o/Symbolic Logic 20:263-273. Lehman, R. 1955. "On Confinnation and Rational Betting." Journal ojSymbolic Logic 20:251262. Lehrer, K. and Wagner, C. 1981. Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Dordrecht: Reidel. Ramsey, F. 1990. "Truth and Probability." In Philosophical Papers ofF P Ramsey, D. H. Mellor, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, F. 1976. Discrete Mathematical Models. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Shafer, G. 1976. A Mathematical Theory oj Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Strassen, V. 1964. "MeBfehler und Information." Zeitschri/i fur Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie 2:273-305. Wagner, C. 1989. "Consensus for Belief Functions and Related Uncertainty Measures." TheOlY and Decision 26:295-304. 1992. "Generalized Probability Kinematics." Erkenntnis 36:245-257. ----. 1997. "Old Evidence and New Explanation." Philosophy ojScience 64:677-691. - - - . 1999. "Old Evidence and New Explanation II." Philosophy oj Science 66:283-288. Walley, P. 1981. "Coherent Lower (and Upper) Probabilities." Technical Report, Department of Statistics, University of Warwick, Coventry, England. - ---'-. 1991. Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. London: Chapman and Hall.

TRUSTWORTHINESS

Chapter 10 LEHRER, REID, AND THE FIRST OF ALL PRINCIPLES James Van Cleve Brown University

Weare indebted to Keith Lehrer for his groundbreaking work on the philosophy of Thomas Reid. He has done a great deal to make the interest and importance of Reid's philosophy clear. I would like to thank him for this, and also to raise certain questions concerning his interpretation of Reid's epistemology. I shall be especially concerned with Lehrer's view that one among Reid's principles of common sense stands out as an indispensably important metaprinciple. In Essay VI, Chapter 5 of the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid presents us with a list of "first principles of contingent truths." Some of these principles are purely or primarily metaphysical; for example, Principle 2 tells us that thoughts require a thinker. But others are plainly intended to have epistemological significance, proclaiming the trustworthiness of consciousness (Principle 1), memory (Principle 3), perception (Principle 5), our faculties in general (Principle 7), our beliefs concerning the minds of others (Principles 8 and 9), testimony (Principle 10), and induction (Principle 12). My concern here is with the proper understanding of the epistemological principles, about which I shall discuss three issues in particular. First, are the epistemological principles on Reid's list principles of truth or principles of evidence? Second, are they principles that must themselves be known if knowledge is to arise in accordance with them? Given Lehrer's interpretation of the principles, this amounts to the question whether knowers must have knowledge of the reliability of their own cognitive faculties. Third, what special role is played by Reid's Principle 7, which says that our natural faculties are not fallacious? This is the principle that 155 E.1. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 155-172. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Lehrer calls the keystone of Reid's system, of crucial importance for the way in which it supports the other elements and itself as well.

1.

DOES REID GIVE US PRINCIPLES OF TRUTH OR PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE?

According to Lehrer, Reid's principles are in the first instance principles of truth rather than principles of evidence. He writes, "When one considers the first principles Reid articulates, one finds beliefs telling us about truth instead of evidence.'" He holds that in the end Reid's principles do add up to a theory of evidence, but that is because "evidence for Reid just is information about what is true or false.,,2 He elaborates as follows: The first principles state that the convictions of our faculties are true rather than evident, but the information that our convictions are true is the evidence that grounds them. These first principles are, therefore, principles of evidence as well as principles oftruth.3 To anticipate Lehrer's answer to the second of my three questions, I believe he thinks Reid's principles are principles of evidence only in so far as the subject knows them to be true. I am going to propose an alternative interpretation according to which Reid's principles are principles of evidence in their own right, regardless of whether the subject has any knowledge of them. We must begin by answering the question, What is a first principle? As the name implies, it is a principle that comes first in all reasoning or inquiry; that is to say, it is a principle on which we base other beliefs, but which is based on nothing in turn. In company with tradition going back to Aristotle, Reid thinks that a principle is fit to play this role only if it is self-evident: It is demonstrable, and was long ago demonstrated by Aristotle, that every proposition to which we give a rational assent, must either have its evidence in itself, or derive it from some antecedent proposition. And the same thing may be said of the antecedent proposition. As, therefore, we cannot go back to antecedent propositions without end, the evidence must at last rest upon propositions, one or more, which have their evidence III themselves, that is, upon first principles. (EIP 6.7, p. 685)4

Reid affirms the self-evidence of first principles in many other passages as well, including this one:

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There is no searching for evidence; no weighing of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another. Propositions of the last kind, when they are used in matters of science, have commonly been called axioms; and on whatever occasion they are used, are called first principles, principles of common sense, common notions, self-evident truths. (ElP 6.4, p. 593, with a paragraph break omitted) I shall take it, then, that the central trait of first principles is their self-evidence. A cautionary note: I do not necessarily equate Reid's epistemological principles with first principles. As already noted, there are some first principles (e.g., axioms of mathematics or metaphysics) that are not epistemological principles. More significantly, I believe one should be open as well to the converse possibility that Reid's epistemological principles are not first principles themselves-that they specify first principles without being first principles. So the questions I raise in this section and the next about Reid's epistemological principles are not necessarily questions about principles he regards as first principles. With this in mind, let us tum to the question whether the epistemological principles in Reid's list are principles of truth or principles of evidence. I think the answer depends on a crucial but little noted scope ambiguity in the wording of Principle 1 and several other of the principles as well. Here is how Reid formulates Principle 1: First, then, I hold, as a first principle, the existence of every thing of which I am conscious. (EIP 6.5, p. 617) Two preliminary observations are necessary. First, by 'consciousness' Reid means that by which we have knowledge ofthe operations of our own minds; it is roughly equivalent to introspection. Second, when Reid says "if I am conscious of a certain thought, it exists," we may just as well say "if I am conscious that I am thinking thus and so, then I am thinking thus and so." That will facilitate symbolization without distorting Reid's views. The ambiguity to which I wish to call attention may now be brought out by the following two ways of symbolizing Principle 1 (where 'Cp' is short for 'I am conscious that p'):

lA. It is a first principle that (P)(Cp -> p). lB. (p)(Cp -> it is a first principle thatp).

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Notice that what 1A specifies as a first principle is a principle oftruth-a single principle laying down that all the deliverances of consciousness are true. By contrast, 1B is a principle laying down that each of the deliverances of consciousness is itself a first principle. Unlike lA, which gives us one general first principle, 1B gives us many particular first principles I believe the same ambiguity characterizes Reid's other epistemological principles as well. The principle about perception, for example, with 'Pp' abbreviating 'I perceive thatp', could be understood in either of the following ways: SA. It is a first principle that (P)(Pp -> p). 5B. (P)(Pp -> it is a first principle thatp). The relevance of this ambiguity to our question in this section should be obvious. If the first style offormulation of each principle is correct, then Reid's epistemological principles are in the first instance principles of truth, affirming the reliability of our various faculties. They would amount to principles of evidence only in the company of further assumptions connecting evidence with truth, such as Lehrer's assumption that evidence is information concerning what is true and false. s But if the second style of formulation is correct, Reid's epistemological principles are principles of evidence in their own right (despite not overtly containing the term 'evidence '). They are epistemological principles attributing first-principle status to the propositions in various classes (those attested by consciousness, memory, perception, and so on), and as we have seen, such status is to be explicated in terms of self-evidence. So Reid's epistemological principles would be principles specifying what count as first principles, and it would be a further question whether they are first principles themselves. Although Lehrer does not explicitly consider the difference between 1A and 1B, I believe his discussion of Reid's epistemological principles presupposes a reading of them in the A style. He takes Reid's epistemological principles to be first principles, and he says that these principles "state that the convictions of our faculties are true rather than evident.,,6 Both of these things are in keeping with the A style. My own view (for which I have argued at length elsewhere) is that although Reid himself may not have been entirely clear about the difference between the A and the B styles, he says many things that favor a reading of his epistemological principles in the B style. 7 My purpose here is not to discuss further the relative merits of the A and B readings, but to explore some of the facets of Lehrer's interpretation that go naturally with his A reading of the principles. Suffice it to say that although both Lehrer and I think that Reid's epistemological principles amount in the end to principles of evidence, I take them to be self-sufficient principles of evidence in a way that he does not.

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This difference between us is connected with a difference on another point, to which I now turn.

2.

MUST A KNOWER KNOW THAT HIS FACULTIES ARE RELIABLE?

If Reid's epistemological principles are construed in the way I suggest, there is a sense in which he is an epistemological externalist. It is this: the mere fact that a proposition is a deliverance of perception, memory, or consciousness suffices to make that proposition evident. In order to know that there is a tree in front of one, for example, one need only perceive that there is. Nothing else is necessary. In particular, it is not necessary that the subject know anything about the reliability of sense perception. He need take no thought of that. For the externalist Reid, consciousness, memory, and perception are knowledgeconferring (or at least evidence-conferring) factors that do their job regardless of whether the subject knows anything about their justificatory power. There are many places in Reid where I believe the externalist strain in his thinking is prominent. For example, he says that when light from an object strikes the lower portion of one's retina, that gives one knowledge that the object lies in an upward direction from the eye (Inq.6.12, p. 124-25).8 More generally, he says that signs produce "knowledge and belief' of the things they signify (Inq. 6.24, pp. 190ff.). For example, by a law of our constitution, certain tactile sensations produce in us the belief in a hard, extended object; this belief can be knowledge even for one who has no knowledge that such sensations are reliably connected with such objects. Lehrer has always been opposed to externalist views in epistemology, however, and he finds Reid to be no less opposed: Reid is not a reliabilist of the sort Goldman describes. It would be possible for a belief to be a product of a reliable belief-forming process without our having any idea that this was so, without, that is, our having any information about the trustworthiness of the belieC The theory of evidence is based on the innate first principles of the mind. It is, however, not sufficient for a belief to be evident that it be a product of an innate principle, even a trustworthy and reliable one. A belief could be the product of such a principle and

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THE FIRST OF ALL PRINCIPLES not be evident for the person because the person had no idea whether the belief originated in a way that is trustworthy or deceptive. In fact, the first principles of our nature not only yield beliefs but also information about those beliefs, to wit, that they are trustworthy and not fallacious in origin. 1o

Lehrer is implying (in disagreement with what I suggested in the opening paragraph of this section) that in order to be justified in believing that there is a tree over there, it is not enough to perceive that there is a tree there, even if we do so in accordance with a reliable innate tendency of our constitution. We must in addition have the idea (or the information) that perception is a reliable source of belief. What is it to have such information? Is it merely to believe that perception is reliable? Or is it something stronger-to believe with evidence and truth, and thus to know, that perception is reliable? Let us consider each of these requirements in turn. First, in order to have knowledge from a source, must we believe that the source is reliable? If so, then the generality of mankind do not know very much, for they are seldom as reflective as that. A child or an unreflective adult may take little thought about the faculties whose deliverances she accepts. I believe that this is Reid's own position, as shown in the following passage: We may here take notice of a property of the principle under consideration [that our faculties are not fallacious] that seems to be common to it with many other first principles ... and that is, that in most men it produces its effect without ever being attended to, or made an object of thought. No man ever thinks of this principle, unless when he considers the grounds of skepticism; yet it invariably governs his opinions. When a man in the common course of life gives credit to the testimony of his senses, his memory, or his reason, he does not put the question to himself, whether these faculties may deceive him; yet the trust he reposes in them supposes an inward conviction, that in this instance at least, they do not deceive him. (EIP 6.5, p. 632) It is another property of this and of many first principles that they force assent in particular instances more powerfully than when they are turned into a general proposition. (Ibid.)

Mindful of passages such as these, Lehrer qualifies the requirement that subjects must believe in the reliability of their own faculties. He says that principles such as 'What I perceive to be the case is generally so' must be

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"operative" in us even if we do not explicitly believe them, II and that general principles must be "in us" in the sense that they cause us to believe their particular instances. 12 In what sense do we have general beliefs that cause us to have beliefs in their particular instances? Two observations will help to clarify this matter. First, what Reid and Lehrer mean by an "instance" of a general belief is really an instance of its consequent, obtainable by subsumption (i.e., universal instantiation and modus ponens). If the general proposition is' All deliverances of perception are true', symbolizable as '(P)(Pp -> p)', then an instance of it would be 'there is a tree over there' (if that is what I am now perceiving)Y Second, there is a sense in which one believes implicitly that all Fs are Gs simply by having the disposition to believe, concerning anything one believes to be F, that it is G. In symbols, we could say that one has an implicit belief in '(x)(Fx -> Gx)' if one has the disposition expressed by 'BFx -> BGX.'I4 Ifone has such an implicit belief, one will be caused to believe instances of the consequent of'(x)(Fx -> Gx)' whenever one believes instances of its antecedent. Even if a man never framed in his mind the proposition that perceptual beliefs are generally true, he might still be so constituted that whenever he believes he perceives that p, he also believes that p. (Alternatively, if we wish to accommodate the possibility that sometimes we perceive things without believing that we do, we could say that a general belief in the reliability of perception is operative in S if S is so constituted that whenever he is conscious of perceiving that p (e.g., that there is a tree over there), he believes that pys We have now identified one plausible sense in which ordinary subjects believe in the reliability of their faculties. Even if they do not have general propositions such as 'When I perceive something to be the case, it is the case' explicitly before their minds, their opinions are governed by them, in the sense that whenever they are aware offalling under the antecedent, they will believe the consequent. Let us now tum to the stronger requirement envisioned above-that to know something through a faculty, you must know that the faculty is reliable. I believe that Lehrer accepts this requirement and that he thinks Reid does, too. Of course, if the sense in which we believe in reliability is only the implicit sense just identified, the sense in which we have knowledge of reliability would presumably be implicit in a corresponding sense. I will ignore this complication here. Following Stewart Cohen, the requirement we are now considering may be put thus: I6 (KR) A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for a subject S only if S knows K is reliable.

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Given the way Lehrer understands Reid's epistemological principles (as principles affirming that the deliverances of our faculties are generally true), th is would mean that Reid's epistemological principles contribute to a subject's knowledge only if they are themselves known. It takes but little reflection to see that KR is actually quite a stringent requirement-one that threatens to lead to skepticism. It would lead indeed to skepticism if we made two further assumptions. The first assumption is that what KR lays down as a necessary condition of knowledge through K is a prior condition of such knowledge, that is, that S can know through K that p only if S first knows that K is reliable. The second assumption is that knowledge of the reliabiJity of a source can come about in one way only, namely, by inference from premises obtained from that very source. To illustrate, Descartes tried to establish the reliability of clear and distinct perception by proving the existence and veracity of God, but could obtain the premises for the proof only through clear and distinct perception itself. Others have envisioned proving that a faculty is reliable by appeal to the reliable operation of that faculty in the past-a so-called track record argument-but obtaining the premises for the track-record argument requires using the faculty on whose behalf it is conducted. 17 In sum, it seems that we must know that various of the particular deliverances of a source are true before we can know that the source is reliable. Putting these points together, we would find ourselves in the following predicament: (1)

(2)

We can know that a deliverance of K is true only if we first know that K is reliable. We can know that K is reliable only if we first know, concerning certain of its deliverances, that they are true.

If (1) and (2) are both true, skepticism is the inevitable consequence. Clearly, if we cannot know either of two things without knowing the other first, we must remain ignorant of both of them. How would Reid, the great foe of the skeptic, respond to this threat? If Reid is an externalist, as I have suggested he is at least some of the time, he would deny KR and with it proposition (l). Consciousness, memory, perception, and our other faculties give us knowledge of their deliverances even if we are initially ignorant of their reliability. But Lehrer's Reid is not an externalist, and it must be admitted that there are places where Reid seems to accept a requirement like KR. Here is a notable passage: If any truth can be said to be prior to all others in the order of nature, this [that our faculties are not fallacious] seems to have the best claim; because in every instance of assent, whether upon

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intuitive, demonstrative, or probable evidence, the truth of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of the premises on which our assent is grounded. (EIP 6.5, p. 631-32). Knowledge of anything whatever, Reid seems to be saying, depends on knowledge of a special fact-that our faculties are reliable. Is he saying that knowledge of anything requires knowledge that all of our faculties are reliable, or only that knowledge through a given faculty requires knowledge that that faculty is reliable?18 Either way, the question arises how we are to acquire knowledge of the special fact. If Reid accepts proposition (2) alongside proposition (1), he will have made such knowledge impossible. But Lehrer's Reid, as we shall see, evades this difficulty by rejecting proposition (2). I shall return to this matter after discussing Lehrer's interpretation of Principle 7.

3.

DOES PRINCIPLE 7 PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE?

Here is how Reid formulates the seventh of his principles: 7thly, Another first principle is, that the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. (EIP 6.5, p. 630) According to Lehrer, Principle 7 is the most important principle of al1. 19 It is special in two ways. First, it is a metaprinciple, affirming the truth of all the others.zo Second, it is a looping principle. "The principle vouches for itself. It loops around and supports itself."2l For these reasons, Lehrer calls this principle "the keystone principle of the first principles."n He also calls it "the first first principle.,,23 But if Principle 7 is really the first in importance, why does it occur seventh in a list of twelve? One would have expected that if Principle 7 plays a pre-eminent role, Reid would have put it either at the top or bottom of his list or perhaps outside the list altogether, rather than burying it in the middle. There are ways of understanding Principle 7 as co-ordinate with the other principles, treating of just certain faculties among others, and thus deserving of its place in the middle ofthe list. Philip de Bary has noted that the clause "by which we distinguish truth from error" may have been intended by Reid as a restrictive clause, singling out a subset of the faculties, rather than as a parenthetical gloss on what all faculties do. 24 And yet do not all faculties enable us to distinguish truth from error, informing us that some things are true and others false? So what restriction could Principle 7 be introducing?

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One suggestion for a restricted Principle 7 would be to take the faculties "by which we distinguish truth from error" to be second-order faculties, that is, faculties whereby we judge of other faculties. 25 Ifwe do this, Principle 7 would be a principle about meta-faculties, but it would not necessarily be a metaprinciple. Nor would it be a principle of supreme generality, for it would concern some faculties among others, even if those faculties are of special importance. Against this suggestion, however, is the fact that Reid twice uses the phrase "until God give us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old" (6.5, p. 631; 6.7, p. 678), implying that we have nothing to judge of our faculties but those faculties themselves. Another suggestion would be to take Principle 7 as concerned with reasoning, which is not mentioned elsewhere in Reid's list of principles. 26 Reasoning, Reid tells us, is "the process by which we pass from one judgment to another" (p. 475 in Hamilton). There is some support for this suggestion in the fact that many of Reid's illustrations of Principle 7 are cases of reasoning. For example, immediately following his enunciation of Principle 7, he says, "If any man should demand a proof of this it is impossible to satisfy him ... because to judge of a demonstration, a man must trust his faculties" (EIP 6.5, p. 630; emphasis mine). He follows this up by observing that the very point in question in Principle 7 is whether reasoning may be trusted. These remarks are not decisive, however. If Principle 7 concerned all our faculties, as Lehrer holds, it would concern reasoning, too, so Reid could still make his point that it would beg the question to offer reasoning in support of Principle 7. Moreover, as we read further in Reid's commentary on Principle 7, we find him saying that it is concerned with "all our reasoning and judging powers" (pp. 630 and 632), which suggests a considerably broader scope for Principle 7. But how much broader? De Bary suggests a broader but still restricted scope for Principle 7. Noting that Reid devotes separate Essays in the Intellectual Powers to perception, memory,judging, and reasoning, he proposes that the scope of Principle 7 is just judging and reasoning, not our faculties in general. Against this suggestion, however, is the fact that Reid views perception and memory as special cases of judgment. He says, for example, "There is no more reason to account our senses fallacious, than our reason, our memory, or any other faculty ofjudging which nature has given us" (EIP 2.22, emphasis mine). Confirming this point, Essay 6, "Of Judgment," makes points applicable to all our faculties; indeed, it is in that Essay that we find the list of principles that is our topic in this essay. Moreover, as we read Reid's thirteen paragraphs of commentary on Principle 7, I think it becomes fairly clear that Principle 7 is meant to cover all our faculties. The trust we repose in our senses, our memory, our consciousness, and our reason are all said to be instances ofthe general trust that is affirmed in Principle 7.27

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I shall assume with Lehrer, then, that Principle 7 does indeed concern all of our cognitive faculties-not just some specially delineated faculty or faculties. And yet the question remains: In what way does Principle 7 go beyond the other principles on Reid's list? Why is it not merely redundant-perhaps simply a device enabling Reid to make points concerning all the principles by discussing a single one? To this question, Lehrer's answer is that Principle 7 is a metaprinciple, affirming the truth of the other principles, and a looping principle, affirming the truth of itself as well. In this last way it goes beyond the other principles. If we take Reid's formulations at face value, however, there does not appear to be anything particularly "meta" about Principle 7. The sequence

Consciousness is reliable. Memory is reliable. Perception is reliable. All our faculties are reliable. is comparable with the sequence My dogs are friendly. My cats are friendly. My birds are friendly. All my pets are friendly. The last item on each list does not seem to be much more than a summary of what has gone before. If Principle 7 goes beyond the other principles, it is only by virtue of implying either that I have no faculties not already mentioned or, if I do, that they are reliable, toO.28 Nonetheless, the "meta" and "looping" character of Principle 7 may be brought out more clearly if we rewrite Principle 7 in a way Lehrer has proposed. Principle 7 may be recast, he suggests, as a principle affirming that all first principles are true. 29 So construed, Principle 7 does indeed convey what the other principles convey (that consciousness is reliable because Principle I is true, memory reliable because Principle 3 is true, and so on). But Principle 7 also conveys more, because it is itself a first principle. It therefore implies its own truth by way of self-subsumption: All first principles are true (= Principle 7). Principle 7 is a first principle (i.e., it is a first principle that all first principles are true).

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THE FIRST OF ALL PRINCIPLES Therefore, Principle 7 is true.

The self-subsuming character of Principle 7 may not have been obvious in Reid's formulation, because 'all our faculties are reliable' talks of faculties rather than principles. 30 But Lehrer's rewrite makes the self-subsuming feature manifest, and it is precisely this feature, he thinks, that enables Principle 7 to play its keystone role. I have two questions about Lehrer's rewrite. First, is it a legitimate transcription of Reid's original? 'All first principles are true' would be equivalent to' All our faculties are reliable' provided the following biconditional were true: P is a first principle iff P is a principle affirming the reliability of some faculty or faculties of ours. The right-to-left half of this biconditional depends on whether it can be self-evident that a faculty is reliable-a debatable question, but one to which Lehrer clearly thinks Reid would answer yes, as we shall see further below. The left-to-right half ofthe biconditional is problematic. There are first principles that do not affirm reliability (e.g., particular propositions such as there is a tree in front of me, and metaphysical principles such as the thoughts of which one is conscious must be thoughts of a thinker). But I shall assume that we may qualify Lehrer's rewrite of Principle 7 so as to get around this problem. The more interesting question is this: What do we gain by the rewrite? Lehrer's answer is that we obtain thereby a principle that explains its own truth. He is worried by the prospect of epistemic surds-that is, epistemological principles for which there is no explanation. Given a choice between a surd and a loop-that is, between an unexplained principle and a principle that explains itself-he would always prefer the 100p.3l By making Principle 7 self-subsuming, do we really enable it to play this special explanatory role? A qualm about this may be engendered by considering the following list: 2 + 2 = 4. Aberdeen is northeast of Glasgow. Water boils at 212 degrees F. All the sentences in this list are true. The concern is that the final sentence is semantically ungrounded, just like the truth-teller sentence, 'this sentence is true'. If one of the sentences preceding it were false, that would make the final sentence false. But if all others on the list are true, whether the last is true comes down to whether it is true, and there seems nothing to determine that. There is nothing to make it true or false, so arguably it is neither. The situation seems similar with Principle 7. If the other first principles are all true, then Principle 7 goes beyond them just to the extent

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that it ventures out over the void, with nothing to sustain a truth value for it. So the worry is that in trying to come up with a keystone principle that explains the others and itself in the bargain, we obtain a principle that explains nothing because it lacks truth value. I do not wish to suggest that there is anything automatically defective about general principles that subsume themselves. All necessary propositions are true is itself a necessary proposition, and therefore may be subsumed under itself. But there is no question about its truth value; it is an accepted axiom of modal logic. Similarly, everything that God believes is true would be both selfsubsuming and true (indeed, necessarily true) if there were an essentially omniscient and infallible God who believed it. But it is significant that these examples of self-subsuming propositions that are unproblematically true are necessary truths. There is a necessary connection between the properties that figure in antecedent and consequent, and that is what makes them true. Lehrer, however, does not think that Principle 7 is a necessary truth. He thinks that Reid's first principles of contingent truths are themselves contingent. 32 So he does not have this way of alleviating the worry I have raised that under his construal of it, Principle 7 is semantically ungrounded. I shall return to this worry at the end of the next section. It is time to see how two aspects of Lehrer's interpretation of Reid-the KR requirement on knowledge and the endorsement of looping principles-are connected.

4.

FACULTIES THAT VOUCH FOR THEMSELVES

The problem we left hanging at the end of section 2 was this: if we cannot know anything through a faculty without knowing that that faculty is reliable (as required by KR), how can we know anything at all? The problem can be formulated as a pair of premises that jointly entail skepticism: (1)

(2)

We can know that a deliverance of K is true only if we first know that K is reliable. We can know that K is reliable only if we first know, concerning certain of its deliverances, that they are true.

When the problem is posed this way, it is clear that we can avoid skepticism only by denying (1) or (2). An externalist would deny (1), but Lehrer's Reid is no externalist. So let us consider the option of denying (2)-of denying that knowledge of the reliability of a source must be collected from various of the particular deliverances of that source. If not derived from knowledge of its own particular

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deliverances, from what other knowledge could knowledge of K's reliability be derived? One answer is: from no other knowledge. Knowledge of the reliability of our faculties is epistemically basic. That is the answer given by Lehrer's Reid: we know that our faculties are reliable not by deriving this knowledge from any other knowledge, but simply because the reliability of our faculties is self-evident. 33 It is a self-evident first principle that consciousness is reliable; it is likewise a self-evident first principle that perception is reliable; and so on for all our other faculties. So we have a way of breaking the skeptical impasse set up by propositions (1) and (2). We can accept the condition that KR lays down for all knowledge, but affirm that that condition is thankfully met, owing to the first principles of human knowledge. Let us look more closely at the implications of this. For Lehrer's Reid, we are enabled to know that the particular deliverances of sense perception are reliable because it is a piece of basic knowledge, inferred from no other, that sense perception is reliable. We are still entitled to ask: what is the source of this basic knowledge? Presumably, it is not perception itself, which does not yield truths of such generality.34 If only to give the source a name, let us call it intuition. 35 By KR, intuition yields knowledge only if we know that intuition is reliable. What is the source of that knowledge? This time we may answer that it is intuition itself-intuition intuits its own reliability. Indeed, it seems plausible that we must give an answer of that form sooner or later-KR can admit basic knowledge of the reliability of a source only if there is at least one source that gives basic knowledge of its own reliability. But now let's go back to the principle that perception is reliable. How can that be a first principle if knowledge of it depends on the knowledge that some other faculty, namely, intuition, is reliable? Perhaps the answer is something like this: although it would not be evident (or known) that perception is reliable unless it were evident (or known) that intuition is reliable, that is not because the former proposition derives its evidence from the latter. Rather, intuition confers evidence simultaneously on its primary object (in this case, that perception is reliable) and also on its own reliability.36 The Reidian view that is emerging evidently requires that there be certain faculties or sources that deliver knowledge not only of their primary objects, but also of their own reliability. This may be what Reid himself is getting at in a striking passage comparing evidence to light, which follows immediately upon his suggestion that if any truth be prior to all others, it is Principle 7: How then come we to be assured of this fundamental truth on which all others rest? Perhaps evidence, as in many other respects it resembles light, so in this also, that as light, which is the discoverer of all visible objects, discovers itself at the same time:

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so evidence, which is the voucher for all truth, vouches for itself at the same time. (EIP 6.5, p. 632) 37 The idea would be that as light discloses features both of visible objects and itself, so our cognitive faculties disclose features both of their primary objects and ofthemselves-in particular, their own reliability. With this answer, we have drawn close to Lehrer's interpretation of Principle 7. Recall that for Lehrer, Principle 7 undergirds all the others and itself at the same time. It is a principle that affirms its own truth along with the truth of the other principles. We are now suggesting that there are faculties that apprehend their own reliability along with the reliability of other faculties. We have thus arrived at a view structurally similar to Lehrer's, incorporating the same looping strategy he favors. And we have been led to do so in the attempt to show that knowledge is possible even under the tough demands imposed by KR. It is no accident, then, that a philosopher who, like Lehrer's Reid, holds that there is no knowledge through a faculty without knowledge of its reliability, also holds that there are faculties that vouch for their own reliability. It is now time to return to the worry left unresolved at the end of the previous section-that self-subsuming principles of the sort Lehrer favors would be semantically ungrounded. Is there not an analogous worry about selfauthenticating faculties? Suppose that intuition intuits its own reliability-that is, that I have an intuiting whose content is that all intuitings are true. If all other intuitings are true, what would make that one true? As before, I think it would have to be some sort of necessary connection between the properties of being an intuiting and being true. (If it were simply a matter of the individual truth values of all intuitings, ungroundedness would threaten.) Is there plausibly such a connection, and could Lehrer accept it? I noted above that he does not believe that Reid's principles are metaphysically necessary truths; he would deny that there is any metaphysically necessary connection between being an intuiting and being true. But I expect he might allow that there is a nomologically necessary connection between being an intuiting and being true, and perhaps such a connection would suffice as a truth-maker for the intuiting that all intuitings are true. I leave further exploration ofthat possibility for another occasion.

5.

THE WEB OF SELF-EVIDENCE

There is a side of Lehrer's Reid I have so far left out of account. As we have seen, Lehrer's Reid holds that general principles affirming the reliability of our faculties are evident in themselves and known immediately. But Lehrer also says that particular deliverances of our faculties, such as the beliefthat there is a hard object in my hand, are evident in themselves and known immediately.

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"Our knowledge of both the first principles and the particular beliefs to which they give rise are both immediate .... The [general] principles and [particular] beliefs of common sense fit together like links in a chain, and he that is not fit to pick up the whole should not attempt to lift up any of the parts.,,38 Here Lehrer seems to be telling us that general principles and particular beliefs are both self-evident, but at the same time, that neither generals nor particulars would be evident unless both were part of our system of belief. Is that a consistent combination? Lehrer's Reid is beginning to sound like a coherentist, for whom particular beliefs and general beliefs become evident together once a wide enough body of mutually supporting beliefs is in place. 39 Yet coherence theories are normally taken to repudiate the category of the self-evident, while Lehrer's Reid asserts that plenty of things are self-evident, general principles and particular beliefs alike. What are we to make ofthis? Suppose we say that one belief is epistemically prior to another (or that beliefs in one class are epistemically prior to those in another) iff the latter belief(s) derive their evidence from the evidence of the former, in such fashion that the latter beliefs could not be evident unless the former beliefs were already evident. Suppose we then say that a belief is self-evident iff it is evident, but there is nothing epistemically prior to it. We could then say that a coherence theory that rejects the very idea of epistemic priority is a theory that, rather than repudiating the category of the self-evident, makes every evident belief selfevident. Reid, while not going this far, could hold that particular beliefs and general beliefs depend on each other for their evidence without beliefs of either sort being prior to beliefs of the other sort; thus particulars and generals would both be self-evident. This could be one way in which Reid, as Lehrer says, transcends the dichotomy between foundational ism and coherentism. 40

ENDNOTES 1 Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 197. This book is cited hereafter as Reid. 2 Reid, p. 198. ) Reid, p. 157. 4 This abbreviates Essay 6, Chapter 7, of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. My page references are to the edition edited by Baruch Brody (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969). 5 Another assumption that would convert lA and the other A-style principles to principles of evidence is a reliability theory of justification, but Lehrer and Lehrer's Reid both repudiate reliability theories. (, Reid, p. 157. 7 James Van Cleve, "Reid on the First Principles of Contingent Truths," Reid Studies, 3 (1999), 3-30.

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8 This abbreviates Chapter 6, Section 12, of Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind. My page references are to the volume edited by Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997). 9 Reid, p. 198. IOReid,p.187. 11 Lecture at the NEH Seminar on Thomas Reid, Brown University, August, 2000. 12 Keith Lehrer, "Chisholm, Reid, and the Problem ofthe Epistemic Surd," Philosophical Studies, 60 (1990), 39-45, at p. 40. This article is cited hereafter as "Surd." 13 A substitution instance of the generalization '(x)(Fx -> Gx)' would be the conditional 'Fa-> Ga'; a confirmation instance of it would be the conjunction 'Fa & Ga' (or perhaps an object that is both F and G). What Reid and Lehrer mean by an instance is neither ofthese things, but simply 'Ga'. 14 Ernest Sosa offers an analysis of "implicit commitments" along these lines in Ernest Sosa and James Van Cleve, "Thomas Reid," in The Blackwell Guide to the Modern Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 179-200, beginning on p. 190. For the more radical view that general belief is never anything over and above such BFx -> BGx dispositions, see David Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), ch. 6. 15 Reid may be committed to rejecting this possibility. In his account ofthe system ofLeibniz, he explicitly disapproves of Leibniz's distinction between perception and apperception. "As far as we can discover, every operation of our mind is attended with consciousness, and particularly that which we call the perception of external objects .... No man can perceive an object, without being conscious that he perceives it" (EIP 2.15, pp. 236-37 in Brody). In another place (EIP 3.1, p. 325), he says that consciousness is always attended with belief of that whereof we are conscious. Putting these together, it follows that we never perceive without believing that we perceive. 16 Stewart Cohen, "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 17 See William P. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47 (1986), 1-30. 18 As Ernest Sosa points out to me, there is a further ambiguity in the first disjunct: is it the de dicto knowledge that all my faculties are reliable, or the de re knowledge, concerning each faculty, that it is reliable? 19 Reid, p. 162. 20 Reid, pp. 144, 157, 162, and 187. 21 "Surd," p. 43. 22 "Surd," p. 42. 23 Keith Lehrer, "Reid, Hume, and Common Sense," Reid Studies, 2 (1998),15-25, on p. 15 and elsewhere. 24 Philip de Bary, "Thomas Reid's Metaprinciple," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 74 (2000), 373-83. He reports in note 22 on p. 380 that in Reid's manuscript of the Intellectual Powers at Aberdeen University Library, there are no commas surrounding "by which we distinguish truth from error." 25 I thank Gideon Yaffe and Sue Cox for this suggestion. 26 I thank Alan Hazlett, Nick Treanor, and Ali Eslami for this suggestion. 27 I have in mind the twelfth paragraph of commentary on Principle 7. This paragraph may not be decisive, however, since Reid says he is noting a property that Principle 7 has in common with other principles, and it is just possible that the trust we repose in our senses, our memory, and our reason may illustrate the implicit belief we have in principles other than Principle 7. 28 So that Principle 7 not convey less information than the preceding principles, I am assuming that a reference to the faculties already mentioned is implicit-'the above-mentioned faculties, as well as any others that I possess, are reliable'.

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29 Lecture at the NEH Seminar on Thomas Reid, Brown University, August, 2000. Lehrer's actual formulation was 'all first principles are trustworthy,' where being trustworthy implies both being evident and being true. The fact that trustworthiness implies truth generates the worry about ungroundedness that I raise in the text. 30 Ifwe render 'all our faculties are reliable' as 'all deliverances of our faculties are true', however, we would obtain a principle that is self-subsuming provided it is itself a deliverance of our faculties. 31 Keith Lehrer, Self-Trust (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), pp. 22-23. 32 The "first principles of contingent truths" are so called because they make knowledge of contingent truths possible; this leaves it open whether they are themselves necessary or contingent. It is clear from Reid, p. 157, however, that Lehrer takes them to be contingent. Moreover, to the extent that Lehrer construes the principles as attributing trustworthiness and not just truth, he has a principled reason for regarding them as contingent: he believes that epistemic properties never supervene with metaphysical necessity on nonepistemic properties. On this point, see Chapter 3 of Self-Trust. 33 "Surd," p. 40, and "Reid, Hume, and Common Sense," pp. 22-23. 34 Here I may disagree with Lehrer, who says at p. 22 of "Reid, Hume, and Common Sense" that the first principle about perception comes from the faculty of perception itself. 35 Perhaps a good Reidian name for it would be 'common sense', for Reid tells us that "the sole province of common sense" is "to judge of things self-evident" (EIP 6.2, 567). 36 We see here, by the way, that the Reid who gets around the skeptical impasse by denying (2) must also deny (1). Though he accepts KR, he denies that to have knowledge through K you must have knowledge of K's reliability first. Otherwise, there could be no such thing as basic knowledge of the reliability of a source. Rather, there are cases in which knowledge through K and knowledge ofK's reliability arise simultaneously. 37 Lehrer has drawn on this passage for a somewhat different purpose. He poses a question about Reid from Chisholm: "How can we tell that a belief is evident if not by appeal to a general principle?" He cites the paragraph about light as Reid's answer, glossing it as "the evidence of some beliefs is itself evident.... Ifthere are some beliefs whose evidence is evident to us, we have no need for a criterion to pick them out as evident" ("Surd," p. 41). 38 "Surd," p. 40; see also Reid, pp. 199-200. 39 In the article cited in footnote 16, a coherence theory is Cohen's way around the impasse created by (1) and (2). In effect, he denies both of them, holding that knowledge of the reliability of a source and knowledge of the truth of its particular deliverances depend on each other without either being prior to the other. 40 "Reid, Hume, and Common Sense," p. 16.

Chapter 11 SELF-TRUST AND THE REASONABLENESS OF ACCEPTANCE G. J. Mattey University a/California, Davis

Keith Lehrer's theory of knowledge has undergone considerable transformation since the original version he presented in his 1974 book Knowledge [2]. Among the original elements of the theory, belief has been replaced by acceptance, subjective probability by reasonableness, the doxastic system by the acceptance system, and beating competitors by answering objections. New elements, such as the preference system and the reasoning system, have been added. These changes have enhanced the depth and plausibility of the theory. A feature added in the first edition of Theory of Knowledge [3], the "principle of the trustworthiness of acceptance," also known as "(T)", has by contrast been treated by Lehrer in a way that arouses suspicion. The most recent formulation appears in the second edition of Theory of Knowledge: "I am trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the objective of accepting something just in case it is true" ([6], p. 138). Lehrer makes a case, which will be examined below, that one's acceptance of (T) contributes to the reasonableness of everything that one accepts. By virtue of its form, if principle (T) is accepted with the objective of accepting it just in case it is true, it applies to itself. Then, given its general contribution to the reasonableness of what one accepts, accepting (T) contributes to the reasonableness of accepting (T): "If a person accepts (T), then her acceptance of (T) itself will have the result that it is reasonable for her to accept (T)" ([6], p. 142). Lehrer regards such direct self-application of (T) to be both natural and illuminating. He recognizes that it generates a circle, or "loop," but he claims that the circularity is not vicious, because the loop is explanatory rather than argumentative ([5], p. 136). This paper will examine the role of the principle 173 E.J. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 173-194. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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of trustworthiness in making acceptance reasonable and the way in which it might make itself reasonable.

1.

ACCEPTANCE, JUSTIFICATION, AND KNOWLEDGE

Lehrer intends his theory of knowledge to provide an account of an intellectual sort of know Iedge, one that presupposes a healthy degree of cognitive sophistication. In particular, this kind of knowledge is more than the mere possession of correct information, requiring in addition a recognition of the information as being correct. "It is information that we recognize to be correct that yields the characteristically human sort of knowledge that distinguishes us as adult cognizers from machines, other animals, and even our infant selves" ([6], p. 7). Information recognized as correct "is inextricably woven into reasoning, justification, confirmation, and refutation" ([6], p. 6). A person who possesses correct information must, in order to have knowledge of the type Lehrer is trying to analyze, take the information to be correct. But recognizing information to be correct involves more than this. A person may take information to be correct without any purpose. 1 Purposive recognition of information as correct is what Lehrer calls "acceptance." It is the taking of information to be true in order to satisfY some specific objective. This requires evaluating how well the act of taking the information to be true furthers the objective. Lehrer claims that such evaluation can take place without reflection. "Positive evaluation may occur without reflection when reflection would be otiose and would leave unchanged our intellectual and practical attitudes concerning what we accept" ([4], p. 4. Cf. [6], p. 40.). The kind of acceptance that can be knowledge of the sort to be captured by Lehrer's theory is one based on an evaluation in terms of "the epistemic purpose" of obtaining true information and rejecting false information ([6], p. 14). (We shall call this kind of acceptance "epistemic acceptance.") The purpose is in general to maximize the possession of true information and minimize the possession of false information. The most obvious way in which the evaluation would occur is through reflection on whether acceptance helps to fulfill the epistemic purpose. But since Lehrer claims that acceptance may not require reflection, it appears that he needs to postulate a default mechanism for acceptance in mundane matters so that reflection is called for only when use of that mechanism is inappropriate. 2 If reflection is involved, there is a decision to be made by an epistemic agent whether or not to accept a given piece of information as being true, in order to fulfill the epistemic purpose. 3 When I consider accepting something, I have two options, acceptance and non-acceptance. When I accept something, I have,

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in effect, raised the question, to accept or not to accept, and answered the question with a positive evaluation. ([4], p. 10) The evaluative criterion governing epistemic acceptance is that of "reasonableness." It can be more or less reasonable to accept epistemically a given piece of information. The minimal degree of reasonableness required for a positive evaluation would be that it be more reasonable to accept the information as being true than not to accept the information. 4 Acceptance might be anywhere from barely to massively more reasonable than withholding acceptance. If an epistemic agent is to know that the information he accepts is true, then the reasonableness of accepting as opposed to withholding should be very high. Otherwise, the correctness of his decision to accept would be fortuitous. 5 It is tempting to say that if the reasonableness of acceptance meets a certain threshold level, then the acceptance is justified and thus meets a condition for knowledge of the type under consideration. Lehrer realized from the beginning that such a simple condition for justification is subject to the lottery paradox. 6 To avoid this problem, he considered other pieces of information whose acceptance would make the acceptance of a given piece of information less reasonable. These competing pieces of information he now calls "objections" to the information whose acceptance is at issue. Lehrer uses this device to base his definition of justification on the notion of reasonableness while avoiding the lottery paradox. A piece of information is subjectively or "personally" justified just in case the agent has a way of dealing with all objections. 7 If the information is also true and the acceptance of it is objectively justified, it amounts to knowledge. 8 The idea that justification consists in the ability to deal with all objections has a certain appeal, especially with respect to the kind of knowledge which is the target of Lehrer's theory. Paradigmatically, knowledge is the outcome of critical inquiry; it is what emerges, or at least would emerge, from the crucible of intensive dialectical engagement with objections. 9 If an actual examination of objections is required in each case of acceptance, the range of information that is accepted, and therefore could count as knowledge would be severely limited. On Lehrer's view such an examination is not required. The act of epistemic acceptance does not require any reflection at all, so it does not require that objections be taken into account. Ordinarily, the decision to accept is based on positive evidence for the truth of the information, and objections are considered only when there is some reason to think the information is false or when one is being extra-cautious. 1o Note that from a practical standpoint, consideration of myriad objections would thwart the goal of accepting as many truths as possible. Even when reflection is called for in non-routine cases, generally not all objections are taken into account when making a decision to accept a piece of information as true to help fulfill the epistemic purpose.

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Then the question arises as to how an acceptance can be justified, given that all objections have to be dealt with. The answer is that one must have the resources to deal with objections, whether or not one has taken them into account in the evaluation leading to the act of acceptance. These resources make the acceptance "reasonable," perhaps reasonable enough to count as knowledge. This means that it can be asked post hoc to what extent an acceptance is reasonable, where the answer may involve resources that were not drawn upon in the act of acceptance. So we need to make a distinction between the act of accepting and the ongoing commitment to truth that can also be called acceptance. At one point in time, acceptance is a mental act of committing to the truth of a piece of information, in order to help fulfill the epistemic purpose. Reasonableness plays the role of a criterion for making the commitment. At a later point in time, acceptance is a commitment already made. As such, it is a candidate for knowledge. The reasonableness of already-made acceptance might be understood in terms of whether it is permissible to retain it or perhaps whether the act of acceptance would be called for given the information one has at the time. In discussing the reasonableness of acceptance, Lehrer draws on both of these aspects without clearly indicating which one is in play.

2.

REASONABLENESS

What does it mean to say that it is reasonable, to some degree, for a person to accept the information that p to fulfill the epistemic purpose of obtaining truth and avoiding error? Lehrer treats reasonableness as a primitive notion, though he does note a relation between reasonableness and the epistemic purpose. For the information thatp to be reasonable (to some degree) to be accepted, it must be subjectively probable to a certain degree, which promotes the goal of avoiding error. Conversely, accepting information that p is made more reasonable as it is more informative, which promotes the goal of obtaining truth ([6], p. 144-145). Typical of somewhat risky, but highly informative, information are "major scientific claims, those concerning galaxies, genes, and electrons" ([6], p. 145). How reasonable it is to accept epistemically a piece of information would seem on the face of it to be a complex matter, which is perhaps not easily determined. Lehrer sidesteps this issue by simply assuming that "we are able to tell, at least intuitively, when it is more reasonable to accept one thing than the other" ([6], p. 128).11 This allows him to make reasonableness the determining factor in any evaluation that results in the acceptance of the information that p to fulfill the epistemic purpose. "I confront the question of whether or not to accept some information that I receive," and I answer the question on the basis of "how reasonable it is to accept the information in comparison to other competing considerations" ([6], p. 126).

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The sole source of reasonableness, on Lehrer's account, is the agent's "evaluation system.,,12 Several components together make up the evaluation system, of which one, the "acceptance system," is relevant to the present discussion.13 This is the repository of information a person has already taken to be true for the purposes of obtaining truth and avoiding error. As the evaluation system is internal to the agent, no external factors contribute to the reasonableness of acceptance. Lehrer describes the role of the acceptance system in terms of its contribution to the reasonableness of the act of accepting. "In deciding whether to accept something or not at the present moment, reason requires the use of relevant information I have accumulated in the quest for truth. That information is contained in my acceptance system" ([6], p. 125).14 The evaluation system enables the evaluation to take place by "informing" or "telling" the agent the extent to which the information available to him is reasonable and how reasonable the information under evaluation is relative to it ([6], p. 125).15 Lehrer's account of how the evaluation system makes acceptance reasonable does not describe what makes an already-held acceptance reasonable. The account can be applied in a couple of different ways to an acceptance one has already made. The evaluation system might inform the agent about the reasonableness of retaining the acceptance, or it might inform him about how reasonable a fresh acceptance would be in light of the information he now has. When the acceptance system makes it reasonable for a person to accept some information p to fulfill the epistemic purpose, it can be described as providing evidential support for the acceptance. Because Lehrer makes the acceptance system the sole means by which support is conferred, the relation of support is mutual or reciprocal. The accepted information p is supported by the rest of the acceptance system. The reasonableness of accepting any information q contained in the rest of the acceptance system is supported by the remainder of the acceptance system, which includes the acceptance ofp. The mutual "fit" of information within an acceptance system will henceforth be referred to as "concurrence.,,16 Concurrence is not the same as what Lehrer calls "coherence." Coherence is a relation that is defined in terms of the already-established reasonableness of accepting that p in the face of objections to that acceptance, and so it is a condition of justification rather than of reasonableness. 17 Concurrence and coherence are closely related in that both are based on the evaluation system. So the acceptance ofp may be invoked to answer an objection to the acceptance of q, and vice versa. It is open to foundationalists to incorporate mutual support into their systems. Chisholm allows that concurrence can add to the reasonableness of what is in itself reasonable to some extent. 18 He illustrates the role of concurrence using Meinong's analogy of cards tilted up against one another so as to provide mutual support.

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In general, for foundationalists there are some acceptances whose reasonableness can be accounted for, but which need no other acceptances to make them reasonable. They might be made reasonable by themselves or by some external factor. As it has been described thus far, Lehrer's account of concurrence is nonfoundationalist. There appears to be nothing in it that can confer any degree of "substance and rigidity" except for other acceptances. Lehrer, as is well-known, rejects foundationalist accounts of justification. One of his central antifoundationalist arguments helps to flesh out the ways in which acceptances support each other reciprocally. The justification of particular beliefs usually rests on an appeal to general beliefs, e.g., those concerning how successful one is in making judgments based on perceptual evidence (one's "track record"). Lehrer makes the case that such general beliefs are not basic but are justified by particular beliefs about individual cases of success, and vice versa, which involves "arguing in a circle" ([6], p. 93). This suggests, contrary to the foundation theory, that the justification of both kinds of statements may be reciprocal, that each justifies the other as the result of cohering with a system of beliefs containing particular beliefs about what we experience, as well as general beliefs about our competence to discern truth from error and the frequency of our success in so doing. To concede this, however, is to give up the foundation theory and embrace the coherence theory instead. ([6], pp. 93-4) This account of coherence in justification can be straightforwardly extrapolated to the way in which acceptances are made reasonable by other acceptances through concurrence. What makes it reasonable for an epistemic agent to accept that p is what he accepts about his competence and previous success, and it is reasonable for the agent to accept this general information about himself because of what he accepts about features of himself that make him competent and about individual instances of success. There is no independent source of reasonableness, nor is any acceptance reasonable in itself. This can be called a "broad concurrence" account of reasonableness. In the balance of the paper, it will be argued that this account is preferable to another account proposed by Lehrer, one which is very suggestive offoundationalism.

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TRUSTWORTHINESS

The reasonableness of acceptance is said by Lehrer to depend on acceptances about one's competence and record of success. It is convenient to say that in that case, reasonableness depends on acceptance of one's "trustworthiness." It is more difficult to say, however, what exactly trustworthiness is for Lehrer. At times, he seems to equate it with competence in accepting information successfully. An example is the acceptance that I see a zebra. In order to be justified, the acceptance must be reasonable to some extent. For it to be reasonable to accept, "I must have reason to think that I can tell a zebra when I see one in circumstances like those I am in at the moment, and consequently that I am trustworthy in such matters" ([ 6], p. 138). If! accept that I am competent in evaluating information that I have accepted, I can be said to accept that I am trustworthy in fulfilling the epistemic purpose in the present case. Note that one need not actually be successful in the present case, or even in a large number of cases, to qualify as being competent. So trustworthiness need not be a function of "my current rate of success in obtaining truth and avoiding error" ([6], p. 139). We may grant that someone is competent in fulfilling the epistemic goal but has run into a streak of bad luck. Even if competence does not require a successful track record, success does have a role to play in making acceptance reasonable. Specifically, it provides evidential support of the acceptance of one's competence. The claim that I am trustworthy in any particular matter under any special set of circumstances may be justified on the basis of the other things that I accept; I accept that I have had success in reaching the truth about similar matters in similar circumstances in the past and that the present circumstances do not differ in any relevant way from past circumstances when I was correct. ([6], p. 138) This approach might be generalized beyond particular cases to one's competence in acceptance overall. A generalized view of one's own competence seems to be what is codified in principle (1), which states in an unqualified way that I am trustworthy in what I accept. Lehrer claims that this principle must be accepted in order for any acceptance to be justified ([6], p. 138), and it plays a crucial role in conferring reasonableness. If one did not accept that one is trustworthy in general, then one would be unable to respond to an objection that casts doubt on competence in accepting in general. And since the acceptance system is the basis for responding to objections, its use would be indefensible. By extension, since the acceptance system also supports the reasonableness of acceptance, it would

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not be very reasonable to accept anything unless one accepted that one is trustworthy in what one accepts in general. On the interpretation of trustworthiness as competence, the principle means that in accepting what I do in general, I exercise competence in fulfilling the epistemic purpose of acceptance. In that case, the reasonableness of principle (T) would be supported by acceptances about one's overall record of one's success in everything one accepts. It is reasonable to accept that I am generally worthy of my own trust to the extent that I accept that I have earned that trust, so to speak. Lehrer has a second way of understanding trustworthiness: as a deontological notion, "an irreducible element of epistemic value" ([5], p. 138). He describes it as "a notion of what is worth accepting and what methods are worth using" ([5], p. 138). In his account of the normative dimension of trustworthiness, he divorces it entirely from considerations of actual competence and success. His purpose in so doing is to accommodate the intuition that it is reasonable to accept what one does even if one is the victim of massive deception. Though Lehrer does not make this point, it is clear that such an agent would then be completely incompetent, not merely unsuccessful, in fulfilling the epistemic purpose. Since, reasonableness requires acceptance of trustworthiness, Lehrer wants to say that a victim of deception may nonetheless be trustworthy. "I am worthy of my trust in what I accept though I am deceived. I am as trustworthy as the circumstances allow" ([6], p. 140). If worthiness of one's trust in acceptance does not require actual competence in fulfilling the epistemic purpose, what does it require? Lehrer casts himself in the role of a hypothetical demon-victim and describes himself as being deceived "through no fault of my own" ([6], p. 139). Being worthy of one's own trust, on this deontological construal, is a matter of having followed certain standards in searching for the truth. As Lehrer puts it regarding the demon case, "I seek to obtain truth and avoid error with the greatest intellectual integrity" ([6], p. 140). Similarly, one is trustworthy when one is "circumspect and seeks to detect every error" ([6], p. 192). Trustworthiness, viewed deontologically, is the result of the use of a general method of approaching acceptance, in the exercise of which one takes on objections forthrightly, meeting them when one can and changing one's view when one must. It also requires the willingness to change one's methods of getting at the truth if need be. In general, Lehrer says that his trustworthiness "rests on a dynamic process of evaluation and amalgamation of information I receive from others and from my own experience" ([6], p. 140). Lehrer's example of trustworthy but unreliable acceptance is described in a way that suggests that the agent has, in general, done her best to fulfill the epistemic purpose. But it is psychologically unrealistic to assume that there is a constant level of circumspection applied in every act of acceptance, so in general, one's acceptances will fall somewhat short of this standard. If

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acceptance is restricted to cases of taking information to be true in which one has done one's utmost to avoid error, then there is little, if anything, that people accept. We simply do not go through exercises like Descartes' Meditations in our ordinary lives. It would seem that trustworthiness in practice requires a lower standard of circumspection. Moreover, it would be extraordinary if anyone applied a single standard consistently. Given that this is the case, it is best to look at a range of degrees of circumspection, beginning with some point at which one is, so to speak, "circumspect enough" in trying to fulfill the epistemic purpose. To put it another way, one's methods for arriving at the truth are good enough as means to fulfill the epistemic purpose. Competence and methodological circumspection should be closely related in a plausible account of reasonableness. If an epistemic agent accepts that his methods for fulfilling the epistemic purpose are good enough, this seems to imply that he accepts that he is competent in accepting what he does. A method is not adequate for the fulfillment of a purpose unless it confers competence on the agent exercising it. If the virtue of the method is circumspection, then circumspection should not be divorced from competence. A good-enough method, then, is one which involves both the normative element of circumspection and the descriptive element of competence. To get a feel for why this is so, suppose the demon victim accepts that she has done her very best to fulfill the epistemic purpose. Should she, on that basis alone, accept that she is trustworthy? It would seem not, but rather that she should also accept that her most circumspect efforts are the sort of thing that will help her fulfill the epistemic goal: in short, she needs to accept that she is competent in accepting what she does. One must not isolate the acceptance of one's trustworthiness from one's other acceptances. 19 If trustworthiness requires competence as well as circumspection, we should concede, pace Lehrer, that the victim is not trustworthy but only falsely accepts that she is. This seems a superior way to handle the case, in that it accords more closely with our ordinary notion of trustworthiness. All Lehrer really needs to say is that the victim is epistemically blameless in a way that can allow her acceptance to be reasonable, if not justified. And this can be handled if it is allowed that she reasonably, albeit falsely, accepts that she is trustworthy in what she accepts. There is one further complication in understanding principle (1). The principle is simple enough on the surface, stating that I am trustworthy in what I accept to fulfill the epistemic purpose. But Lehrer considers it as "a statement ofa capacity and disposition to be trustworthy" ([6], p. 139). This qualification is due to the fact that one may fail to follow good-enough procedures in specific cases of acceptance, though one is generally disposed to follow them. In what follows, then, we shall take it that it is the disposition to be trustworthy that is supposed to account for the reasonableness of acceptance.

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How does it do so? Our original account of reasonableness was based on the "broad concurrence" approach, which regards the reasonableness of any acceptance to be a function of the reasonableness of all other acceptances. It can now be expanded to incorporate the elements that contribute to trustworthiness. A crucial class of acceptances in this regard is that of acceptances about our competence to accept all and only what is true in specific areas of investigation and in general. These acceptances about our competence are supported by acceptances about our success in fulfilling the epistemic purpose, and these in turn are supported by our particular acceptances. Another crucial class of acceptances is that of acceptances about our integrity and circumspection in accepting what we do in specific areas of investigation and in general. Such acceptances will be supported by observation of the way in which we go about accepting what we do, as well as acceptances about what constitutes the best means to fulfill the epistemic goal. Most importantly, they will be based on what we accept about the way we respond to objections and to new information. Principle (T) should be taken as summarizing these acceptances about many facets of the acceptance system. Trustworthiness helps to make other acceptances reasonable only because of its concurrence with many elements of the acceptance system. Lehrer does not, however, always describe the relation between principle (T) and reasonableness in terms of "broad concurrence." Instead, he relies mainly on what he calls the "trustworthiness argument" to make the connection in a way that appears to be more direct. This, it will be seen, leads Lehrer in the direction of foundationalism.

4.

THE TRUSTWORTHINESS ARGUMENT

The "trustworthiness argument" consists of two inferences. The first consists of two premises and a conclusion, and the second is a direct inference from the first conclusion. The first premise asserts my trustworthiness and the second my acceptance of some information as true. It runs verbatim as follows. 20

T. I am trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the objective of accepting something just in case it is true. I accept that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. Therefore, I am trustworthy in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. Therefore, I am reasonable in accepting that p with the objective of accepting thatp just in case it is true. ([6], p. 139)

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Since there is no restriction on the value ofp, the conclusion must be taken to be generalizable to all acceptances. Lehrer notes that the first inference is meant not to be deductive, but rather inductive. That is, the first premise is not intended to be a universal generalization "to the effect that I am always trustworthy in what I accept" ([6], p. 139). Instead, it is supposed to be taken as a claim to the effect that I am generally trustworthy in what I accept.

It is like the inference from the premise that my lawyer is trustworthy to the conclusion that he is trustworthy in the way he has constructed my will or from the premise that a city water supply is trustworthy to the conclusion that the water supplied in my glass is trustworthy. ([6], p. 139) This is why he understands the principle of trustworthiness to be about a capacity or disposition. His lawyer may be disposed to act in a trustworthy way but fail to do so, perhaps due to weakness of will. Similarly, epistemic agents can be subject to "doxastic akrasia" ([6], p. 142). The second inference is an enthymeme. It depends on the conditional: if I am trustworthy in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true, then I am reasonable in accepting that p with the objective of accepting that p just in case it is true. In [4], a variant of the implicit conditional is made explicit: "If I am reasonable to trust my acceptance of p, then I am reasonable to accept thatp" ([4], p. 7). Having elucidated the structure of the argument, we may now examine its premises. As already noted, the first premise is not to be taken as strictly universal, but only as a description of a "capacity and disposition to be trustworthy." In terms of the way Lehrer understands trustworthiness, to say that I am generally trustworthy is to say that in accepting what I accept, I generally, though perhaps not always, proceed according to good-enough methods. In the same way, a city's water supply might be generally trustworthy because its operators generally follow, well-enough, standard methods to keep the water safe, even though they may fail to follow those methods from time to time. The second premise, I accept that p, is ambiguous and could describe the act of accepting that p or the fact that p is already being accepted. The most plausible reading is that it describes what is already accepted. Otherwise, the argument would be limited in its scope to what is presently being accepted. Lehrer's goal in advancing the argument is clearly to provide support for the reasonableness of everything that a person has accepted. Moreover, the argument itself can apply only to what a person has already accepted, not to a person's act of accepting that p. If p has not yet been accepted, then the second premise is false.

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The premise might be taken as describing an act of acceptance because of a remark Lehrer makes in the second edition of Theory ofKnowledge, just after introducing principle (1) and before giving the "trustworthiness argument." If someone else accepts that I am trustworthy in this way, then my accepting something will be a reason for her to accept it. Similarly, if I accept that I am trustworthy in this way, then my accepting something will be a reason for my accepting it. ([6], p. 138) The most plausible construal of the description of the other person's acceptance of my trustworthiness is that she uses it, along with the fact that I accept some information, as a factor in evaluating that information and making a decision to accept it. But in that case, the analogy breaks down, since I cannot make what I already accept a factor in my deciding to accept it. My acceptance of my own trustworthiness can playa role in my deciding what to accept, in that without it, I might be disposed to withhold judgment rather than accept any information at all. It will be argued below that this generic way in which trustworthiness makes accepting reasonable is also the only way in which it makes what is already accepted reasonable. Given the interpretations ofthe two premises, the first conclusion must be read in this way: I have accepted that p on the basis of good-enough methods for obtaining truth and avoiding error in the acceptance of p. In the context of the trustworthiness argument, what those methods are is immaterial. Since I am trustworthy, the fact that I accept that p means that I have (most likely) relied on those methods I deem fit to make my acceptance a correct one. Now we can see how the first conclusion supports the second one: why trustworthiness entails reasonableness. It has been noted that Lehrer assumes that one can tell how reasonable it is to accept a given piece of information, relative to one's evaluation system. Presumably this means that one can determine how suitable its acceptance is to advance the epistemic purpose. Then the idea would be that if I use the methods I deem to be good enough for fulfilling the epistemic purpose in accepting that p, then I should regard the purpose as being fulfilled. Lehrer states the relation this way: "My trustworthiness serves the objectives of reason, and if I am trustworthy in the way I serve the objectives of reason in what I accept, then I am reasonable to accept what I do" ([5], p. 136). So the thrust of the whole argument is this. IfI am disposed generally to use good-enough methods in accepting what I do, and I accept some piece of information p, then I can conclude inductively that I have used good-enough methods in accepting that p. If I have used good-enough methods for accepting that p, then my acceptance that p is reasonable, to some degree. Ordinarily, when we evaluate the reasonableness of acceptance, we take into account the specific methods which are applicable to the specific

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information in question. The statement "I am reasonable in accepting that p" can be understood in two very different ways. It can be, and ordinarily is, read as a statement about the reasonableness of accepting the specific information p. Or it can be read as a statement about accepting any information at all, regardless of its specific content. It is only the latter sense that could possibly be established by the "trustworthiness argument." It is only in this sense that Lehrer could be entitled to assert that, "A consequence of adding principle (T) to my evaluation system is that I may reason from it and the acceptance of some target acceptance that p to the conclusion that the target acceptance is reasonable" ([6], p. 139). A more specific counterpart to the generic "trustworthiness argument" might be one to the effect that one is disposed to be circumspect one's investigations and that those methods of investigation sanction the acceptance of the specific information p, so that it is reasonable to make a commitment to the truth of p. One would expect that the first premise would be established inductively. The second premise would be established by appeal to the specific evidence in favor of accepting that p. The original "trustworthiness argument," on the other hand, says nothing about what makes it reasonable specifically to accept that p rather than some other information. So whatever degree of reasonableness it establishes is minimal compared to that established by the counterpart argument. Suppose an ordinary person were to ask me why it is reasonable for me to accept that the water in my glass is safe to drink. If I were to respond, "Because it is something that I accept, and I use good-enough methods to accept what I do," my response would most likely be met with bewilderment. On the other hand, if a foundationalist like Chisholm were to ask this question in the context of his epistemological investigations, the answer would make sense, since he then would be concerned with the source of reasonableness as such. The "trustworthiness argument" is really appropriate only in the context in which Lehrer raises it, i.e. as a response to a foundationalist objection. Justification depends on the reasonableness of what one accepts, and reasonableness depends on the acceptance of trustworthiness. "The foundationalist will surely note that everything now depends on the claim that my acceptance is a trustworthy guide to truth and that I am trustworthy, as I aver. She will inquire how that claim is itself justified" ([6], p. 138). The foundationalist inquiry can be extended to the issue of reasonableness: what makes it reasonable for me to accept that I am trustworthy? What gives that acceptance what Chisholm called "substance and rigidity?" Though appeal may be made to competence and success, the following response has to be given: "when I accept something, that is a good enough reason for thinking it to be true, so that it is reasonable for me to accept it" ([6], p. 138). Again, "If! accept that I am trustworthy in this way, then my accepting something will be a reason for me to accept it" ([6], p. 138).

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This generic approach has the advantage of being able to confer reasonableness in one fell swoop, rather than requiring that each acceptance be shown to be reasonable on its own. In that case, it looks as though Lehrer is making a concession to the foundationalist by not resting with the "broad concurrence" approach outlined above. That is, he is singling out one particular acceptance as supporting the reasonableness of all the others. Moreover, he holds that principle (1) makes itself reasonable, since it applies to itself if it is accepted. This is structurally akin to self-justifYing acceptances in a foundationalist theory of justification, where there is a narrow, rather than a broad, circularity. The self-application of principle (1) draws on the foundationalist model of self-justifYing acceptances, such as "I accept something," which exploits the self-referential character of what is accepted. 2 ! Lehrer acknowledges a measure of foundationalism in his account of justification: "To be personally justified one must accept some principle of trustworthiness that is in part self-justified" ([6], p. 202). This is on the grounds that, "Part, but not all, of what makes us personally justified in accepting that we are trustworthy is that we do accept that we are" ([6], p. 202). Reasonableness is treated in a parallel way, though not explicitly. The question that remains is whether this foundationalist turn is well motivated.

5.

THE REASONABLENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

Lehrer offers two accounts of what makes principle (1) reasonable, both of which require that it contribute in some way to its own reasonableness. On one account, the contribution is indirect; on the other it is direct. The first account will not be plausible to someone who rejects all circularity in the relation of evidential support. The second account is burdened with its own variety of circularity and has additional problems of its own. In the first account, the claim that one is generally disposed to be trustworthy in acceptance is supported by an inductive generalization. The starting-point is the trustworthiness of most of one's specific acceptances and the conclusion is that one is generally disposed to be trustworthy in acceptance. What defense should [a person] offer in favor of (1) itself? She may, of course, appeal to the character of what she accepts, to the various things she accepts, and reason inductively from premises concerning the trustworthiness of individual acceptances in support of her conclusion that (1). She might reflect on what she has accepted and her fine track record of mostly accepting what was worthy of her trust to accept. This argument would establish that

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the trustworthiness of her acceptances manifests her disposition to be trustworthy in what she accepts. ([6], p. 142) The reasonableness of principle (7) in that case depends on the reasonableness of the acceptances that comprise the information invoked in the defense. For example, it must be reasonable, to some degree, for the person to accept in any given case that she has accepted what she has in a trustworthy way. What makes these acceptances reasonable to the degree they are will have to involve the acceptance of principle (7), as was noted above. Lehrer claims that it is the "trustworthiness argument" that connects (7) with the more specific acceptances. So the principle makes an indirect contribution to its own reasonableness, engendering a circle. There is obviously a circularity in the trustworthiness argument when we use the principle (7) as a premise to support the conclusion that other acceptances are reasonable and then use those acceptances and the principle itself to conclude that it is reasonable to accept it. ([6], p. 143) The circularity to which Lehrer refers is a version of "broad concurrence," with principle (7) playing a crucial role by conferring on everything one accepts the reasonableness it has. Lehrer recognizes that principle (7) cannot be used to defend its own reasonableness in the face of a skeptical objection. But to explain why it is reasonable to accept what we do, the circle may be virtuous. If we have a principle that explains why it is reasonable to accept what we do, it is a virtue rather than a vice that it should at the same time explain why it is reasonable to accept the principle itself. ([6], p. 143) The crucial difference between responding to a skeptical objection and giving an explanation is that in the latter case, the datum is taken for granted. So we assume that it is reasonable to accept principle (7) and ask why this is the case. Since it is not meant as a response to a skeptic, at most it shows to a person already committed to the reasonableness of what he accepts what it is that is supposed to make those acceptances reasonable. It does so by appeal to a notion of mutual support that many would find suspect. Perhaps the appeal to mutual support can be avoided if the reasonableness of principle (7) is explained by a direct application of (7) to itself. "If a person accepts (7), then her acceptance of (7) itself will have the result that it is reasonable for her to accept (7) by the application of the trustworthiness argument to (7) itself as the target acceptance (P)" ([6], p. 142). He takes this

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direct self-application to be "natural," apparently since (T) is applicable to all other acceptances ([6], pp. 142_3).22 But the direct self-application of (T) in the "trustworthiness argument" once more opens up the issue of circularity, where the circle is now as small as it can be. As Lehrer describes them, foundationalist theories of justification appeal to self-justifying acceptances. 23 These acceptances are said by the foundationalists to guarantee their own truth. The use of principle (T) to explain its own reasonableness appears to allow a similar sort of "bootstrapping" operation. But the circularity here is different, since the acceptance of one's trustworthiness does not in any way guarantee the truth of that acceptance in the way that the acceptance of one's existence guarantees that one exists. In his 1999 article "Knowledge, Scepticism and Coherence," Lehrer gives the following account of the explanatory role played by principle (T). I accept that I am trustworthy in what I accept, and if I am trustworthy in what I accept, then I am reasonable in accepting that I am trustworthy in what I accept. My trustworthiness in what I accept explains why I am reasonable in accepting that I am trustworthy in what I accept. ([5], p. 136) He opts for this small circle over the larger circle because it allows him to avoid a regress in explanation. "I could argue for my trustworthiness by consideration of other things I accept and my success in attaining truth, but that way a regress threatens, whatever the merits of such arguments in supporting the principle" ([5], p. 136). Butthere is no regress when the other things one accepts are made reasonable in part by the acceptance of one's trustworthiness, so we are not forced to apply the principle to itself to account for the reasonableness of acceptance. Whether the small circle actually explains anything remains to be seen. In the second edition of Theory ofKnowledge, published in 2000, Lehrer does not mention the regress argument, and as seen above, he explains the reasonableness of accepting (T) by appeal to its concurrence with the whole acceptance system. Still, though Lehrer does not defend the use of principle (T) to explain its own reasonableness without appeal to any other information, he does endorse the direct application of (T) to itself. What reason is there for doing this, except as a formal exercise? Lehrer notes that the argument is "more direct" than one using an inductive argument from individual cases of trustworthy acceptance ([6], p. 142). This directness has the advantage of economy, but it gains this advantage at the expense of content. It is useful to note that Lehrer recognizes that he is not making the stronger claim that principle (T) is completely self-justifying, though "the principle of our own trustworthiness contributes to its own personaljustification" ([6], p. 202). It does not justify itself fully because it "must cohere with what we

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accept about our successes and failures in past epistemic employment" ([6], p. 202). In that case, one must ask why Lehrer restricts this requirement to justification. Can we plausibly say that it is reasonable to accept a piece of information without regard to whether it coheres (or "concurs") with information we have about our past record of success, among other things? The fact that reasonableness (to some unspecified degree) need not meet the standard of justification does not exempt it from the need for a comprehensive base of support. This consideration raises the more general question of what kind of explanation could be provided by the direct self-application of principle (1). I want to know why it is reasonable for me to accept that I am trustworthy in what I accept. In terms of the interpretation of trustworthiness developed thus far, the question is why it is reasonable for me to accept that I have a disposition to use good-enough methods in accepting what I accept. The obvious indirect explanation for this is on the basis of what I accept about how I have used goodenough methods in the past. The indirect loop is generated by adding that part of what makes those acceptances reasonable is the acceptance of my own trustworthiness. The direct explanation is simply a vastly diminished version of the indirect explanation, one which omits all the details that enlighten me as to why it is reasonable to accept that I am trustworthy. The result is hardly edifYing. Suppose I were testifYing to a jury and averred that I am trustworthy in my testimony. When asked to explain why it is reasonable to accept that I am trustworthy, I answer that my original statement that I am a trustworthy witness is what explains why it is reasonable for me to accept that I am. Would I have explained, to anyone's satisfaction, anything at all? Another way to put the point is by noting what kind of reasonableness is supposed to be explained. As was noted above, we can ask, for any given piece of information (P), whether it is reasonable to accept that (P) as having a given content, or whether it is reasonable to accept that (P) in the sense that it is reasonable to accept what we accept in general. And as has been argued earlier, the kind of reasonableness established by the "trustworthiness argument" is generic. So when principle (1) is the target acceptance, the most the application of the trustworthiness argument to (1) can explain is that it is reasonable for me to accept that (1) insofar as it is reasonable for me to accept anything at all. So the direct self-application of principle (1) does nothing to explain why it is reasonable to accept information with the specific content that I am trustworthy in what I accept. Lehrer might respond to this description ofthe thinness of the explanation by claiming that any explanation is better than none. The principle itself is part of the account of the reasonableness of any acceptance, and so if it were not reasonable to accept principle (1), there would be no explanation at all. In that case, principle (1) "should be a kind of unexplained explainer that explains why

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it is reasonable for us to accept other things we accept and then falls mysteriously silent when asked why it is reasonable to accept the principle itself' ([6], pp. 143-4). Lehrer states that he seeks to maximize explanation and leave nothing unexplained ([5], p. 137). If (1) does not explain itself, then it is a "kind of explanatory surd" ([5], pp. 136-7). Preference for maximizing explanation and avoiding the surd is "one I act upon in developing my philosophy" ([5], p. 137). The surd can, however, be avoided with the broad account that explains specifically why it is reasonable to accept that I am trustworthy. It can also be said that this account provides a vastly more thorough explanation, and so it helps to maximize explanation. It explains something that would be left unexplained by the mere direct self-application of (1), namely, why my acceptance of the specific information that I am trustworthy is reasonable. As stated above, Lehrer's version of the broad account of reasonableness places principle (1) in the key role of explaining reasonableness on all acceptances. In view of the present discussion, it seems that this role is not as crucial as it first appeared. The principle can only explain the reasonableness of acceptances qua acceptances. The bulk, so to speak, of their reasonableness is explained by the specific concurring information that supports them. And as argued above, principle (1) itself is a summary of a complex of information about the methods one uses in fulfilling the epistemic purpose. All, or nearly all, of the reasonableness of accepting principle (1) itself stems from specific concurring information. So while it might be granted that (1) plays an important role in conferring reasonableness, that role is not foundational. A final consideration Lehrer advances in favor of the direct selfapplication of principle (1) is an appeal to analogies. The first of these is due to Reid: "just as light, in revealing the illuminated object, at the same time reveals itself, so the principle, in rendering the acceptance of other things reasonable, at the same time renders the acceptance of itself reasonable." ([6], p. 143). Notice that, in Reid's image, light "illuminates" other objects but "reveals" itself: it makes both other objects and itself visible. To make the analogy work, light would have to make itself visible in the same way that it makes the other objects visible. But it does not make itself visible by illuminating itself in the way it illuminates other objects. So this is not a good way of illustrating how the application of principle (1) explains its own trustworthiness. The second analogy is that of a keystone. The keystone is a triangular stone inserted in the top of an arch. It supports the arch, for the arch would collapse were it removed; at the same time, it is, of course, supported by the other stones in the arch. We may think of the stones in the arch as the acceptances in the acceptance system and the principle (1) as the keystone. ([6], p. 143)

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Lehrer might also have noted that the keystone would fall to the ground if the other stones were removed. The keystone supports itself only through its support of the other stones. A keystone is not a foundation stone. So this analogy, if it has any value at all, favors an account of the reasonableness of accepting the principle of trustworthiness in which the principle supports itself indirectly. In general, it favors the "broad concurrence" account of the reasonableness of acceptance. In summary, there seems to be nothing favoring the direct application of (T) to itself other than the fact that it can be made and that it simplifies the response to a skeptical objection to the reasonableness of what one accepts. But in fact it is no response to a skeptic, and if it explains anything at all, it explains only how it is reasonable to accept to some extent, merely as something that is accepted in general. Even this explanation is largely incomplete and can only be completed by appeal to a large number of other acceptances. Finally, there is no explanation of why the specific content of (7) is reasonable to accept. All of these deficiencies disappear when "broad concurrence" is invoked to explain what makes principle (T) reasonable to accept epistemically.24 So the direct self-application of (T) appears to be a useless exercise. It might even do some harm by engendering the illusion that the principle of trustworthiness is foundational rather than a "first among equals." Given the argument of this paper, Lehrer has no reason to make his "ecumenical" concession to foundationalism ([6], pp. 201-3).

6.

CONCLUSION

Lehrer's doctrine that reasonableness is based solely on acceptance leaves him open to a charge of broad circularity, a charge avoided by foundationalist accounts of reasonableness. It is only through a relation of mutual support that acceptances can make one another reasonable. Lehrer singles out a special acceptance, that I am trustworthy in what I accept, as playing a key role in providing that support. It has been argued here that acceptance of the principle makes the mere acceptance of a piece of information, including itself, reasonable to some extent, though in an entirely generic way. It does so in the context ofthe acceptance system as a whole. The principle of trustworthiness might also make itself reasonable by applying to itself directly, in which case it seems to be foundational and potentially to avoid the problem of broad circularity. But this direct application is narrowly circular and so holds no advantage in this respect over the indirect application. Because a direct application explains nothing that is not explained by the indirect approach, and indeed omits what ought to be included in any explanation of reasonableness, there is no reason to concede anything to the foundationalist. The essential ingredients in the explanation of reasonableness

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are to be found in the acceptance system as a whole, as is consonant with Lehrer's coherence approach to justification. The narrowly circular application of the principle of trustworthiness to itself is an aberration.* *1 am grateful to Lenny Clapp for several excellent suggestions for improving the presentation in this paper.

ENDNOTES 1 This seems to be what Lehrer calls mere belief. which "arise[s] in us naturally without our bidding and often against our will" ([6], p. 40). 2 Lehrer acknowledges in his "bear print" example that sometimes circumstances dictate a greater degree of scrutiny than in normal circumstances ([6], p. 73). Complex or highly general information would also call for reflection. ] Ifreflection is not involved, there is no "decision" strictly speaking, but a commitment must be made in a manner analogous to the making of a decision. 4 This kind of comparison was made by Chisholm in [1]. 5 It would be fortuitous from the point of view ofthe agent. There might be some sort of external factor that makes the correctness of the decision non-accidental, as in the case of a device implanted in the brain that brings about correct acceptances. See [6], p. 186-8. 6 See [2], pp. 192-197. 7 Objections must either be "answered" or "neutralized" ([6], pp. 134-136). 8 Objective justification is described in Chapter 7 of [6]. 9 The "justification game" illustrates the way in which critical objections might be handled ifthey were to arise. See [6], pp. 132-128. ]0 This feature of acceptance is highlighted by theories of prima facie justification. 11 Presumably, one would be able to tell as well whether it is more reasonable to accept than to withhold acceptance. 12 This is less evident with respect to informativeness than with respect to probability, but very general information can be completely uninformative to a person who does not have the conceptual resources to integrate it into his view of the world. 13 The other components are the "preference system" and the "reasoning system." See [6], pp. 126-127. In [5], Lehrer notes that only the acceptance system is relevant to the issues that he raises there, and these are the issues discussed in the present paper. See p. 138, note 2. 14 It appears to be psychologically unrealistic to assume that an epistemic agent can properly distinguish between what he already believes and what he has already accepted. One reason is that we often forget how we came to take a given piece of information to be true. 15 The information contained in the acceptance system is also the basis for the determination of justification. 16 This term is taken from Chisholm, who attributes the concept to the ancient academic skeptic Carneades ([1], p. 43). 17 It may be that in many, most, or all cases, concurrence involves dealing with objections, in which case it is closely related to justification. 18 See [1], Chapter 3. 19 Since following good-enough methods requires evaluation of our own competence, we will hereinafter describe trustworthiness in terms of methods only. 20 Similar versions appear in [4], pp. 6-7 (called "the acceptance argument" there) and [5], p. 136.

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Lehrer allows that it is plausible that "I believe something" is a self-justified belief. See [6], p. 54. See also p. 67-8, where he writes that "fallibility infects almost all our beliefs" (emphasis added). 22 In the first edition of Theory of Knowledge, Lehrer had called the self-application of (T) "more natural" than trying to avoid the self-application for fear of self-referential paradox (p. 123). 23 See [6], Chapter 3. 24 This is not to say that these advantages make "broad concurrence" a convincing alternative to foundationalism. 21

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REFERENCES Roderick Chisholm. Theory o/Knowledge. Prentice Hall, 1966. Keith Lehrer. Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 1974. Keith Lehrer. A Theory 0/ Knowledge. Westview Press, first edition, 1990. Keith Lehrer. Self Trust: A Study o/Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy. Oxford University Press. Keith Lehrer. Knowledge, scepticism, and coherence. Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 131-139, 1999. Keith Lehrer. Theory o/Knowledge. Westview Press, 2000.

Chapter 12 THE DIALECTICAL ILLUSION OF A VICIOUS BOOTSTRAP* Richard N. Manning Carleton University

We can take it as given that at least one ineliminable goal of epistemic justification is the acquisition of true beliefs. From this it follows that no account of justification which fails to show that justification, as conceived in that account, conduces to truth, can properly be termed epistemic. Call this issue arising from the basic idea of what epistemic practice is all about 'the truth conduciveness problem'. In this paper I will discuss Keith Lehrer's approach to the truth conduciveness problem, in the context of his coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification. Lehrer's coherentist approach centrally involves an appeal to our own self-trust, which self-trust is itself purportedly warranted in part by appeal to itself. I will, in due course, argue that Lehrer's attempt to solve the truth conduciveness problem by appeal in this way to selftrust fails, leading to logical circles, abysses and blind alleys. But this failure is highly instructive. Self-trust is indeed crucial, not just to coherentist epistemology, but to epistemic practice as such. For this reason, self-trust I will suggest, neither can or need be argued for at all. Lehrer's strategy fails, then, not by placing too much reliance on self-trust, but by seeing self-trust as a candidate for justification. The truth conduciveness problem is, in its most general form, a problem for all theories of epistemic justification. The structural strategy for solving this problem invoked by foundational accounts of justification, in both their traditional and externalist forms, is clear enough: a claim is justified via a chain of epistemically acceptable inferential relations ultimately terminating in some claim or claims with a privileged epistemic status. Such claims, in virtue of their content or relations to the world, are prima facie likely to be true, and hence do 195

E.l. Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, 195-216. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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not require justificatory support from other claims. That is, according to foundationalism, there are basic claims which are non-inferentially justified. To suppose that there are such non-inferentially justified claims is not, of course, to suppose that agents do or even could have some good reasons for believing of any particular claim, or any class of claims, that it is so justified. Indeed, the foundational status of a belief means that no such belief could owe its justificatory status to anything the agent possesses as a reason. To suppose otherwise would reinstate the impotent regress of justification that foundationalism is in part designed to avoid. On the foundationalist picture, then, not every belief that isjustified need be justified by an agent's reasons. As William Alston notes, all that is needed to stop the regress of justification is belief which is immediately justified, whether or not the agent has reason to believe that it is so justified. l Faced with the natural objection that this would mean that ajustificatory chain could terminate in a claim which the agent has no reason to hold true, that from the agent's point of view this claim would amount to a brute assumption, Alston argues that there is no bar to adding the additional requirement that the agent have a justification for supposing the foundational claim immediately justified, but that this justification need not (and cannot) itself be immediate, but must be inferential. As it is a reason for holding the putative basic claim justified, it is moreover an epistemic reason in the sense of being a second order claim about the justificatory status of a first order claim. (More generally, a claim of order n about the justificatory status of some claim or claims oflevels ml, m2, ... mi