Existential Phenomenology (Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series 12)

DUQUESNE STUDIES Philosophical Series 12

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY by WILLIAM A. LUIJPEN, O.S.A.,

PH.D.

Preface

by ALBERT DoNDEYNE,

PH.D.

SIXTH IMPRESSION

Pittsburgh, Editions E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain

DUQUESNE UNIVBllSITY PREss,

Pa.

"Philosophy demands: seek constant communication, risk it without reserve, renounce the defiant self-assertion which forces itself upon you in ever new disguises, live in the hope that in your very renunciation you will in some incalculable way be given back to yourself." Karl Jaspers, Ways to Wisdom, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1954, p. 124.

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE by Albert Dondeyne

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INTRODUCTION .........................................

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CHAPTER ONE-MAN, THE METAPHYSICAL BEING 1. The Authenticity of Philosophy ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2. To Be Man is to Exist. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

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a. Existence as Being-in-the-World, p. 15; b. The Meaning of the World, p. 25 ; c. The Primitive Fact of Existential Phenomenology, p. 34; d. Existence as Being-Hat" -theWorld: Labor, p. 39.

3. Technocracy and Philosophy .........................

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a. Technocracy, p. 47; h. The Metaphysical Question, p. 52. 4. Man, the Metaphysical Being ........................

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CHAPTER TWO-PHENOMENOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1. Explicitation

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2. Descartes

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3. Empiricism and Idealism ............................

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4. Critique of Phenomenology on the Traditional Prejudices Regarding the Nature of Man's Knowledge.............

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a. Intentionality, p. 92; b. Noesis and Noema, p. 95; c. Viewpoint, Profile, Unity, p. 97. 5. Sartre's Dualism and the True Immanence of Knowledge .. 103 a. "En-soi" and "Pour-soi," Being-in-Itself and Consciousness, p. 104; b. The Immanence of Knowledge, p. 112. 6. Sensitive and Spiritual Knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117 Vll

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7. The Concept

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a. The Concept is Abstract, p. 124; b. The Concept is Not a Schematic Image, p. 128; c. The Concept is Universal, p.137. 8. The Judgment ..................................... 138 9. Phenomenology of Truth ...................... " .... 142 a. Existence as "Logos," as "Natural Light," as Agent Intellect, p. 143; b. Objectivity and Objectivism, Subjectivity and Subjectivism, Relativity and Relativism, p. 146; c. Reason and Science, p. 149. 10. The Criterion of Truth ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 158 11. Reasoning and Logic ................................ 169 CHAPTER THREE-PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 1. To Exist is to Co-Exist ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 176 2. The Body as Intermediary ........................... 180 a. Reasoning by Analogy and ((Einjuhlung," p. 181; b. "My" Body is Not "a" Body, p. 186. 3. Phenomenology of Hatred ........................... 195 4. Phenomenology of Indifference ....................... 206 a. The "We" of Indifference, p. 207; b. The "He," p. 209; c. Encounter, p. 213. 5. Phenomenology of Love

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a. Love as Active Leaning, p. 215; b. The Creativity of Love, p. 223. 6. Phenomenology of Law a. Unsatisfactory Theories, p. 234; b. The Source of Rights, p. 238; c. Laws and Legal Institutions, p. 246; d. Natural Right and History, p. 253.

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CHAPTER FOUR-PHENOMENOLOGY OF FREEDOM AND ITS DESTINY PAGE

1. The Sense of the Question Regarding the Meaning of Life .............................................. 261 2. Phenomenology of Freedom ......................... 265 a. To be SUbject is to be Free, p. 266; b. Freedom as "Distance," as "Having to be," and as "Project," p. 269; c. To be Free is to be Ethical, 281 ; d. Freedom as Transcendence, p. 294; e. Freedom as History, p. 305. 3. The Atheism of Jean-Paul Sartre ..................... 313 4. Heidegger's "Being-Toward-Death" ................... 330 5. Perspectives

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INDEX OF NAMES

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INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • .•

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PREFACE Phenomenology and existential philosophy have been the subjectmatter of numerous and well-informed studies written in the Dutch language. To this we may add that perhaps nowhere else than in the Netherlands has the phenomenological method been used so expertly and with such an ingenious originality for the renewal of psychology and psychiatry. Hitherto, however, we did not possess any general philosophical treatise which was conceived and formulated in the spirit of the new philosophy. The present book very suitably fills this gap. Although it does not befit the philosopher to indulge in prophecy, I do not hesitate to predict that Dr. Luijpen's new book will meet with great success. The openness of the Dutch-speaking intellectual world for contemporary philosophical thought, the name of the author, and the scope of his work warrant the accuracy of this prediction. In his Introduction the author clearly and unambiguously formulates the intention of his work. It is not an essay ({about existentialism or phenomenology" but "a relatively independent rethinking of the eternal problems which have always occupied the thinking man." This rethinking, however, takes place in the sphere of thought proper to existentialists and phenomenologists, because of the conviction that hitherto no other way of thinking has ever been proposed which manages to express the ultimate meaning of integral reality in a better way and more in accord with life. True, it is not very likely that integral reality will ever be expressed in an exhaustive way. With Shakespeare, we will always have to admit that "there are more things in heaven and on earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Nevertheless, even this saying of a man who did not at all want to be taken for a philosopher is a philosophical statement. It teaches us, better perhaps than all school definitions, what philosophy is or at least ought to be to do justice to its name. Philosophy is no high-flown speculation, no flight from reality, no conceptual structure estranged from the world. The lover of wisdom is one who loves the truth, one who is driven by a passion for truth and veracity, one who struggles with truth to arrive at wisdom, at the veracity which makes free. Truth and reality are nearly synonymous in the prephilosophical language of the people. Thus x

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being driven by a passion for truth means that reality itself speaks to man and, as it were, invites him to give expression to this reality, to show it to the world, to make it public, to free it for the liberation of mankind, for it is only truth that makes man free. For this reason man is Logos, i.e., the capacity to be spoken-to and to speak, to partake and to impart, to receive and to give. Philosophy is at the service of Logos. What philosophy wants is to reveal man to himself. Across and above all external appearance and modes of thinking, philosophy wants to let man see the true meaning of his tendencies and deeds, the true meaning of his subjectivity as being a living tension of situation and freedom, of care of the self and concern for others, of earthbound gravitation and openness for the celestial, for "not by bread alone does man live, but by every word that comes forth from the mouth of God." Above all, however, philosophy wants to sharpen our sense of responsibility for the authenticity of our human existence itself, for being-man is at the same time a givenness and a task or, in the words of the author, a "having-to-be-in-bonds-toobjectivity" and in faithfulness to the ethical movements of conscience. [Thus we may say that, in order to be valuable, philosophical thought must be true to life and in close touch with life. Philosophy is born from closeness to reality and must lead man to a more genuine and authentic closeness to reality. In his Letter Concerning Humanism Heidegger correctly remarks that under the influence of science and technology modern man often fosters the illusion that there are no longer any distances for him. His glance penetrates ever more profoundly into man's prehistoric past as well as into the farthest corners of the universe. Nevertheless, man has never felt so lonely and abandoned on earth as in our time, he has never been so remote and estranged from all his surroundings, he is without a fatherland. It is precisely the task of philosophical thought to give us a more authentic closeness to "integral reality." Whence we may conclude that a philosophy which is true to life an, 45. 383For a simple explanation of this point see Delfgaauw, What is existentialismef, Amsterdam, 1952, pp. 74-81.

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other answer could be expected from him, because his own view of dread forces him to relegate whatever is not dread to the domain of "falling-away," of unauthentically being-man. The fact that dread is such a rare phenomenon does not trouble him in his efforts to build a metaphysics of man. On the contrary, it strengthens him in his views, because the rarity of dread demonstrates how man has always been submerged in what Pascal calls "diversion," and in this submergence the recognition of man's authentic being as dread is supposed to be implied. If, then, anyone would remark that he is not at all aware of dread in the Heideggerian sense, the German philosopher would reply: "That only proves that you have never yet been man."384 A very simple answer, of course, but it presupposes precisely what has to be proved-namely, that whatever is not dread pertains to "falling away." Is, then, the resolve to which Heidegger "concludes," if we may use this term, not really a prejudice which he wants to "prove" at any price? Is not his thinking merely a circular form of reasoning in which a certain type of authenticity is first presupposed and next "concluded" to? Heidegger himself has raised these questions 385 and replied to them without hesitation. 386 It is readily to be admitted that a certain form of authenticity is presupposed and it is quite obvious that the process of thought has a circular form. One must even say that everything is presupposed which a philosopher conceptualizes and expresses about man's being. The philosopher, however, does not have to apologize for it, he does not have to avoid it, as a logician would be obliged to do when he uses a syllogism. s87 Man is the being which in its being is concerned with its being, man's being is an understanding of being (Seinsverstiindnis) , and for this reason man is always to a certain extent "already" unconcealed for himself ;388 hence every explicit question regarding man's being is "already" prepared by man's mode of being

384Cf. R. Verneaux, "L'experience humaine et Ie Tout Ie monde," Actes du XIeme Congres International de Philosophie, Amsterdam-Louvain, 1953, vol. II, p. 173.

385"Aber liegt der durchgefiihrten ontologischen Interpretation der Existenz des Daseins nicht eine bestimmte ontische Auffassung von eigentlicher Existenz, ein faktisches Ideal des Daseins zugrunde?" Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 310. 386Heidegger, ibid., pp. 310-316. . 387Heidegger, ibid., p. 315. 388"Die forma Ie Anzeige der Existenzidee war geleitet von dem im Dasein selbst liegenden Seinsverstandnis." Heidegger, ibid., p. 132.

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itself, and the reply also is always to a certain extent "already" given. s89 But in his "understanding" (V erstehen) man is unconcealed for himself as potential being i.e., ultimately, as being-toward-death. What higher possibility could there be in man's potentiality than that of death ?S90 The so-called presuppositions in the philosophy of man are nothing else than man himself as understanding of being, and the so-called circular form of reasoning is nothing else than man himself again insofar as in his "understanding" he is unconcealed for himself with respect to his most proper potential being, i.e., his being-towarddeath. Anyone who tries to avoid this "circular form of reasoning" really attempts to set aside the fundamental structure of man as "care." But such an attempt cannot succeed. Accordingly, if from a pre-ontological awareness of the most proper mode of potential being one "concludes" that "resolve" is man's authentic being, he does not make himself guilty of a circular argument, in the sense in which such an argument must be rejected by the logician, but he simply gives expression to what man is and has to be. sn Dread is Not the Approach par Excellence to the Total Vision of Man. It is on the basis of this pre-ontological awareness, mentioned by Heidegger, which man has of himself that we refuse to see in dread the gate par excellence to an integral vision of man. Heidegger's view is very one-sided, because in his philosophy there is no room for something which lies unconcealed in man's pre-ontological self-awareness-namely, that existence always implies a kind of qualified consent. If Heidegger were fully right, man's being would have to be explicitated as a curse and there would be no r:oom for the experience of the same being of man as a grace, as a gift.892 This experience cannot be disposed of and disregarded. The "resolve," however, in which Heidegger sees the authenticity of man's being does not offer any possibility of a qualified consent-to-the-world. Moreover, an effort to make this consent fall under "falling-away" is doomed to failure, because in Heidegger "falling-away" occurs as a being-absorbed in the world. Heidegger is right when he rejects man's unauthenticity, as are Sartre and those of a kindred spirit when 389"Jede ontologisch ausdriickliche Frage nach d'em Sein des Daseins ist durch die Seinsart des Daseins schon vorbereitet." Heidegger, ibid., p. 132, s90"Hat das in-der-W elt-sein eine hahere Instanz seines Seinkannens als seinen Tod?" Heidegger, ibid., p. 313. 391Heidegger, ibid., pp. 314-316. S92Marcel, L'homme problematique, Paris, 1955, pp. 9-47.

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they speak of the "grave" man and the sub-man. Such a man misjudges his manhood, because he destroys the affective distance which bores into his affirmation of any worldly being whatsoever, and this destruction is the end of freedom as transcendent movement. It is, however, intentionally that we speak of a qualified consent and not of wonder (Cmerveillement), as is done by Vemeaux. 393 For we are aware of it that no worldly reality is worth a definitive consent and that no worldly value can be the definitive fulfilment of manhood as having to be. On the other hand, we may not deny all fulfilment and every consent. Heidegger and Sartre with his followers constantly point out that unauthenticity cannot be "lived," because it constantly denies itself in life,894 while authenticity keeps imposing itself as a demand. The same, however, has to be asserted with respect to Heidegger's "resolve." The resolve cannot be "lived," not even by Heidegger himself, because life itself constantly denies the resolve. And what else has a philosopher to do than to give expression to life? But life implies a qualified consent to the world. The things of the world are worth such a consent, because they offer man a real, albeit not definitive, fulfilment of his being as having to be. But, Heidegger asks, "is there in man's potential being any higher possibility than his death ?"895 The reply is in the negative. Does this mean that the world-as-world and being-in-the-world-as-such are radically null? Let us point out that the matter can be turned around. Man's being as being-in-the-world includes essentially an aspect of affirmation. Could death really be the highest possibility of his potential being, in view of the fact that in this supposition it is impossible to maintain the affirmation in question despite all its evidence? New perspectives suddenly arise here, which Heidegger failed to consider. Thus we are forced to conclude that Heidegger's description of man cannot be considered as the explicitation of man in an unqualified sense. 396 We do not mean that there are no human beings whom Heidegger's description fits. But it is certain that they misjudge the true character of their own manhood, because they have no eye for the affirmative aspect of their existence. With respect to them 393R. Verneaux, op. cit., p. 173. 394Cf., e.g., de Beauvoir, op. cit. (footnote 374) pp. 72-94. 395Heidegger, ibid., p. 313. 396Cf. A. de Waelhens, La philosophie de Ma,.tin Heidegge,., Louvain, 1948, pp. 179-180. -

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one can ask at most what the cause or the occasion was which made them be or become as they are. If, however, such a question is asked, we are no longer in the realm of philosophy and have to leave the reply to psychologists, characterologists, or psychiatrists. 397 One could also point to the spirit of the time and, as far as Heidegger is concerned, to the fact that during World War I he experienced the horrors of life in the trenches. 398 This experience was for him a very special revelation of man's being.

A Psychological Factor. If a psychological explanation is sought for the fact that in some human beings the affirmative aspect of their existence has been pushed completely into the background, a certain statement of St. Augustine may bring some light. In his letter to Proba, he writes: UNit homini amicum sine homine amico," nothing is lovable for a human being without a loving human being, which we may perhaps paraphrase more clearly in this way: without the love of his fellow-man, man is not capable of affectively affirming the real world. This truth has been definitely established by empirical psychology. One who is unloved always sees the harshest face of the world: the world appears to him always as resistance, as an obstacle for his having-to-be. The more a man stands alone, i.e., unloved, in the world, the more difficult it is for him to realize himself in the world and to-consent to his own being.a99 Is it a mere coincidence that love finds no place in Heidegger's works? In dread man's most proper possibility reveals itself, for in dread man stands alone, isolated, before the extreme possibility of his potential being, in dread man is eminently an "I."400 This revelation calls upon man to make the only proper reply-namely, "resolve," a radical "no" to the world. But we know that there is more in man than this dread. His authentic being-himself is not the lonely, isolated, doomed-to-death being-in-the-world, but being-together with his fellow-men in love. In love the world shows man a face that is entirely different from the one described by Heidegger, What Heidegger says may be true of the unloved, "barracks-type of man" (Marcel), but one who loves cannot speak in his way. Man cannot 897Cf. R. Le Senne, Trait; de Caracterologie, Paris, 1949, pp. 258, 288. 398Cf. R. Troisfontaines, Existentialisme et pensee chretienne, Louvain-Paris, 1948, pp. 14-16. 8D9Cf. John Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of lAue, London, 1953. 400"So sich bevorstehend sind in ihm aile Beziige zu anderem Dasein geliist. ... So enthiillt sich der Tod als die eigenste, unbeziigliche, uniiberholbare Miiglichkeit." Heid'egger, ibid., p. 250.

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live without being loved but, on the other hand, neither can he die without love. Whoever faces death alone, isolated, will curse the world-as-world and being-in-the-world-as-such. But such a man is a mutilated human being. 5.

PERSPECTIVES

Transcendent Cause. "Why is there something and why is there not rather nothing?" Following an age-old tradition, we have raised this question in our first chapter. It is the philosophical question par excellence, the metaphysical question. We conceived this question as the search for the ground, the cause, of being as being, and found as our first reply that the being of beings is the being-result of the causality of the Transcendent Being, of God. No being escapes from God's causality, not even the conscious and free being which is man. 401 Undoubtedly, man is a co-source of the world's meaning, but as such he is the "second source": through his actions man co-originates new meanings, but his initiative is a "produced initiative." With man the world begins to be in the real sense of the term, but the beginning-of-the-world which man is, is a "begun beginning."402 God is the Lord of beings in their universality. Cause and Freedom. The first chapter formulated the difficulties which arise from this thought. How can the being of man be caused by God if his being is a being-free and if God's causal influence cannot be contingent? God's causal influence may not be explicitated ill such a way that the free-being which man is can no longer be conceived as a possibility. Metaphysics must be based on the reality of beings. But the being of man cannot possibly be conceived as beingfree if God's causal influence is conceived analogously to the causality prevailing in the realm of things. A causal influence that is conceived in a thing-like or process-like way would crush man as freedom. Instead of borrowing the categories of our thinking about God from the realm of things, we must derive them from the order of intersub401"Sind wir unserer Freiheit gewiss, so wird alsbald ein zweiter Schritt zu unserer Selbsterfassung getan: der Menschist das gottbezogene Wesen. Was heisst das? Wir haben uns nicht se1bst geschaffen. Jeder kann von sich denken es sei !lloglich gewesen, dass er nicht sei. ... Wenn wir frei entscheiden und erfiillt vom Sinn unser Leben ergreifen, so sind wir uns bewusst, uns nicht uns se1bst zu verdanken. Auf der Hohe der Freiheit ... sind wir in unserer Freiheit als uns von der Transcendenz gegeben bewusst. Je mehr der Mensch eigentlich frei ist, desto gewisser ist ihm Gott." Karl Jaspers, Einfuhrung in die Philosophie, Miinchen, 1957, p. 63. . 402Brunner, La personne incarnee, p. 230.

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jectivity. In this order we know a single case in which true "causal influence" has as "effect" subjectivity, freedom. It is the case of the creative "influence" of love. Man does not conceive himself as reality unless he conceives himself as the result of divine Love. Contrary to Sartre's claim, man's freedom does not mean that man does not belong to God. For Sartre God is not the King of Mankind because man is free. As far as things are concerned, God could perhaps exercise his dominium, but if He had wanted to do the same over man, He should not have created him free. The very moment when God created man as a free being, this freedom turned against Him. As freedom, man does not belong to God, so that there is no one to give any orders to man. This Sartrian thought is very primitive. Evidently, God's kingship over man must be totally different from God's power over things. But does this difference mean that God is not the King of man? It is evident also that things "belong" to and "receive orders" from God-if these terms may still be used-in a way which is entirely different from that .of man. But must we admit, therefore, that man does not belong t.o God and d.oes not receive any orders from Him? Sartre is not capable .of conceiving the relationship of God t.o man in any .other way than the relati.on to a thing. But he is mistaken: man belongs to God in the way a subject belongs toO God.

Man's Self-Consent. Everything is put into question when we ask about the cause of being as being.403 This applies in a very special way to man. Because man is a being which in its being is concerned with its being, man asks questions not only about the "whence" of his being but also about its "whither." Man is concerned with the "direction" of his existence. The "room for expansion" of the potentiality which is inherent in any facticitous way of existing indicates the "direction" which the subject can go. Man seeks the roads through the world which will make it possible for him to consent to himself as subjectivity-in-the-world. This consent stands in relation to the fulfilment found by his subjectivity, conceived as "natural desire." As being-conscious-in-the-world, man enters into the realms of technology, economics, art, and science, to name only a few. He experiences his entrance into these realms as meaningful to the extent that his activities in them imply a certain fulfilment with respect to his various modes of having-to-be. Thus he can consent to himself as a technologist, an economist, etc. 403Cf. Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 22.

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Nevertheless, the being which man is remains in a state of suspense. With Sartre and his school we stated that man's consent to himself as well as to his world cannot be definitive. This consent is affected by negativity in an invincible way. To deny this point is to misjudge the essence of man's being. Anyone who continues to foster illusions will find his last prop removed by Heidegger's philosophy of being-toward-death. For being-man, as being-in-theworld, death is the supreme and most decisive court of appeal. If man's being is nothing else than being-in-the-world, it is impossible to see how anyone could consent to himself unless he minimizes the meaning of death. One who sees nothing else in man than the beingin-the-world which he also is may at most say that man's greatness consists in this that he is aware of the meaninglessness of his being, for this is something which cannot be asserted of an animal. Man's being is put into a state of suspense in the most horrible way through its explicitation as being-toward-death. Seeking the ground of his being, man seeks not only his origin but also his purpose. There are many human goals, corresponding to the many possible modes of having-to-be-in-the-world. But not a single one of all these goals constitutes the proper purpose of man as "natural desire." The self-grounding project which man is and which is executed in his transcendence fails radically if it is conceived exclusively as a project-in-the-world. The "natural desire" which man is, however, must be understood as man's orientation to Transcendent Being, an orientation which is essential in man. Man does not have the desire to be God but to see God.

The Affirmation of God. For the man who understands this point the self-grounding project which he is appears in an entirely new light. Is it possible for man to consent to his existence on the basis of his affirmation of Transcendent Being? But, we must ask, what is this affirmation? Is it the one that is effected in the proof of God? At the end of the first chapter we pointed out that man does not exactly know what he affirms when he affirms Transcendent Beirig. Nevertheless, this Being must be affirmed, for otherwise no affirmation of anything is possible. Without the Transcendent Being nothing is. But there is something, there are beings, the universe is. Not everyone can be convinced that there is a Transcendent Being. The affirmation of God, prepared and made on the purely cognitive level in the proof of God, remains an idle playing with words for the

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non-religious man. The entirely new light in which the question about the possibility of consenting to life is placed by the recognition of the Transcendent Being is not the light of the affirmation of God in and through the proof of God. The affirmation of God, prepared and made on the purely cognitive level in the proof of God, itself presupposes a preparation and practice on the affective level. The purely rational proof presupposes a disposition of an affective nature, through which man detaches himself from the world and does not belong to it in a "carnal" way. The decision to become detached in this way is not an irrational decision but rather based on the rational recognition of man's most intimate essence: man is not destined-only-for-the-world. Only if this recognition is made, will there be a possibility that the Transcendent Being will really become a light. If in the proof of God man's thinking endeavors to transcend beings to attain to Being, the success of this endeavor presupposes a way of life in which this transcendence of beings is affectively executed. If life itself is not a preparation for, and the execution of the affirmation of God, then there is no possibility whatsoever that God will be affirmed in a way which has real meaning for man's life.

Transcendent Being and the World. It is undeniably true that "modern" man becomes increasingly absorbed in hedonism and utilitarianism. 404 To the extent that he falls victim to these trends, he is a mutilated human being. The world is like opium for the recognition of his most intimate essence. Nevertheless, to some extent the tide is on the turn, as appears from the fact that man no longer tries to camouflage his "sadness," even though he may not yet have found the courage to give up the attitude of life which has caused this "sadness." The philosophers, however, are far ahead of their fellow men, for they have long since given up faith in reality that is solely of this world. Accordingly, Transcendent Being can become reality for man only when the things of the world begin to mean less in his life. The man of real wisdom is aware of this. He manages to maintain himself when the world fails him.405 Heroes and saints revealed their true 404Cf. M. Sciacca, Le probteme de Dieu et de la religion dans la philosophie contemporaine, Paris, 1950. p. 261.

405"ln der Hingabe an Realitat in der Welt-das unerlassliche medium der Hingabe an Gott-wachst das Selbstsein, das sich zugleich in dem behauptet, an das es sich hingibt. Wenn aber alles Dasein eingeschmolzen wurde in die Realitat, in Familie, Volk, Beruf, Statt, in die Welt. und wenn dann die Realitat dieser Welt versagt, dann wird die Verzweiflung des Nichts nur dadurch besiegt, d"ass auch gegen alles bestimmte Weltsein die entscheidende Selbst-

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greatness in such conditions. They renounced their worldly future and their possessions and did not allow the most horrible possibilities to defeat them. They died in peace. 406 The fascination of the world has to be broken. Detaching himself from this world may be experienced by man as entering into a dark night, but it is only by entering the nothing-of-the-world that it is possible for man to enter into the "light of Being." A metaphysics which is true to life demands a metaphysical life. Only then will we have to do with a real question when it is asked whether it is possible to consent to life on the basis of the affirmation of Transcendent Being.

H ope or Despair'! This question allows also a different formulation: Is there any hope for man? So long as being-man is understood as absorption in being-in-the-world, so long as his destiny is sought solely in the possession of the world, there is no hope for man. Hope finds its source not in being-in-the-world but in the beingin-the-world-but-transcending-it (in-der-W elt-uber-die-Welt-hinaussein .. Binswanger) which is real in love. When we spoke about the possibility of an unselfish love, we pointed out the paradoxical character of human subjectivity. Love is the availability of my subjectivity for the other, the belonging to the other. But in the surrender of myself my own selfhood is revealed to me. In love I have the vague awareness that by destining myself for the other I authentically become myself, I go forward to meet my own destiny. My having-to-be as a task in the world finds a certain fulfilment in the world. But there can be no question of a definitive fulfilment of my having-to-be, and in the light of death it is even questionable whether the term "fulfilment" is still meaningful. As soon, however, as I see that my having-to-be must be understood as a having-to-be-for-the-other and I effectively undertake the execution of this task, everything becomes different. Even if I have never heard about a doctrine regarding man's destiny, I experience in love that I am on the road to the fulfilment of my manhood as having-to-be. I can say "yes" to it. We say "I am on the road ..." I cannot say "yes" definitively. True, there lies something of eternity in love, but only as a promise. Moreover, who will guarantee love to me? Do I not daily experience behaugtung vollzogen wurde, die allein vor Gott steht und aus Gott ist. Erst in der Hingabe an Gatt, nicht an die Welt, wird dieses Selbstein seiber hingegeben und als Freiheit empfangen, es in der Welt zu behaupten." Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 4oaCf. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 63.

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that I betray the other and that the other is unfaithful to me? Is, then, the last word that I can say as a philosopher still "despair"? How could I consent to my existence if this existence is a task which I would not be able to accomplish anyhow? Nevertheless, despair is not the last word. First of all, the realization that in love I am meaningfully man cannot be simply pushed aside, and love also is a reality in my life. Secondly, love gives rise in me to a kind of awareness of orientation, a consciousness of the "direction" which I myself am in my most intimate essence and which I must follow if I want to expect to be capable of consenting definitively to my existence. If I could believe in an Absolute Thou (Mareel), a Being in whom unfaithfulness and betrayal are impossible, if I could believe in this Being's Love for me and if I would be permitted to love this Being, then I would be able definitively to consent to myself. This awareness of orientation IS called "hope": it is the belief in Love. The man who I am is directedness to Transcendent Being, the hope in God. I may say also with Marcel that I am "invocation": my whole being is a calling-for-God. God has heard this "call" which man is and has entered history. He has made His Word speak toman. He has spoken about Himself and about man. If this is true,. then all that we have said here will be unimportant. Man's thinking has to begin all over again.

INDEX OF NAMES AndronicuB of Rhodes, 54 f., 171. Aristotle, 54 f., 57, 65, 170 f. Arntz, A., 200. Augustine, St., 74, 230, 260, 313, 349. Averroes, 114. Avicenna, 114. Bacon, Francis, 172. Beerling, R, 233, 235, 248 f. Bergson, Henri, 34, 234, 255. Biemel, W., 345. Bigot, L., 97, 154. Binswanger, L., 156 f., 179, 223 f. Blondel, Maurice, 149. Boethius, 170, 269. Bohr, Niels, 23. Bowlby, John, 349. Boyer, Charles, 117, 138, 147. Brentano, Franz, 93. Bronkhorst, c., 237. Brunner, A., 72, 78, 158, 305, 350. Brunschvicq, 34, 126, 150. Buehler, 130. Busmann, Star, 235. Buytendijk, F., 23, 41. 118, 153, 155 ff., 208, 227. Camus, 52, 261. Capreolus, Johannes. 117. Cassirer, Ernst, 133. C1aparede, 101. Claudel, Paul, 97. Collins, James, 1. Copernicus, 133. Copleston, Frederick, I, 82. Couwenberg, S., 212. De Beauvoir, Simone, 270, 272, 324, 326 f., 343, 348. De Bruin, P., 43 f. De Bivort, de la Saudee Jacques, 8, 35. De Graaff, F., 343. De Greeff, E., 227. Deledalle, G., 113. Delesalle, J., 240. Delfgaauw, B., 106, 276, 314, 345. De Lubac, 72. De Petter, D. M., 115, 145,266,268 f., 297 f.

De Raeymaeker, Louis, 55, 113, 262, 269. Descartes, Rene, 34, 45, 78, 79 ff., 85 f., 89, 131 f., 151, 161, 181 ff., 186, 191, 201. De Waehlens, Alphons, passim. Dilthey, W., 185. Dondeyne, Albert, passim. Dumas, G., 183. Duynstee, W., 238, 249, 254. Fortmann, H., 287. Foulquie, P., 96, 113. Freud, Sigmund, 167 f., 301 f. Froebes, J., 102. Galton, 129. Geiger, L. B., 124. Gits, Carlos, 232, 235 ff., 245, 248 ff., 256. Gregoire, Fr., 122. Hamaker, H., 235, 237. Hegel, Georg, 34, 85, 151, 279, 304. Heidegger, Martin, passim. Heisenberg, Werner, 23. Herbart, 127. Hobbes, 244. Hoogveld, J., 93, 236. Humanus, 295. Hume, David, 131 ff., 136. Husserl, Edmund, passim. Janssens, L., 244, 246, 258, 288. J aspers, Karl, passim. J eanson, Fr., 290, 293 f., 324, 329. Jolivet, R, 54, 66, 68, 70, 115, 129, 146, 161, 170. J iinger, Ernst, 52. Kant, Immanuel, 67, 94, 132 f., 171, 281. Kierkegaard, Soren, 1, 35, 36, 122, 149. Kohnstamm, Ph., 97, 154. Kouwer, B., 154, 155. Krabbe, H., 236. Kranenburg, R, 232 ff. Kiilpe, 130. Kwant, Remy c.. 13, 23, 33, 37, 44, 45, 122, 147, 153, 167, 226, 234, 237, 253, 284, 297, 306, 313, 315, 324.

356

Index of Names Lacroix, Jean, 42 f., 45 f., 176, 240, 249, 252, 256 f., 281 f., 291 f. Lalande, 33. Langemeyer, G., 234. Laplace, Abbe, 30. Laporte, J., 150. Leibniz, G., 53. Le Roy, Ed., 17. Le Senne, 16, 349. Levinas, E., 42 f. Linschoten, J., 154, ISS, 181. Locke, John, 83 f., 87. Madinier, G., 220 f., 230 f., 233, 239, 244, 249 f., 252 f., 287. Maine de Biran, 34. Mandonnet, 117. Marbe, 130. Marc, Andre, 126, 128, 130. Marcel, Gabriel, passim. Maritain, Jacques, 121, 127, 138. Marx, Karl, 45, 325. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, passim. Messer, 130. Molengraaf, 235. Moller, J., 344. Mounier, Emmanuel, 1, 191, 200. Nedoncelle, M., 193, 213, 218, 229, 239, 250, 252, 259. Newman, Card., 149. Nietzsche, Friedrich, 72, 326. Nuttin, J., 168, 230, 301, 303 ff. Onclin, W., 232. Paissac, H., 109, 316. Palland, B., 97, 154. Parmenides, 55 ff., 59 f. Pascal, Blaise, 67, 149 f. Perquin, N., 282. Peters, John, 159, 262. Piaget, 138. Picard, Max, 230. Pieper, Josef, 13, 193, 211 f. Plat, J., 10. Plato, 60, 121. Proudhon, 42, 45. Puchta, 234. Ramltonnet, H., 234. Reinhardt, Kurt, 1.

357

Renouvier, 231. Ricoeur, Paul, I, 122. Robert, H., 268. Roels, F., 130, 183. Rogers, Carl, 230. Riimke, H., 35, 181. Rutten, F., 193. Saint-Simon, 45. Sartre, Jean-Paul, passim. Sassen, F., 93. Scheler, Max, 149, 185. Sciacca, M., 73, 353. Secretan, 231. Sertillanges, A. D., 129. Simmel, 185. Siwek, Paul, 118. Socrates, 60. Stein, Edith, 123. Strasser, Stefan, 79, 114 ff., 188. Stuart Mill, John, 172. Tellegen, F., 42 f. Thevenaz, P., 95. Thibon, G., 229. Thomas Aquinas, 55, 62, 65, 113, 115 f., 119 ff., 124, 127, 129, 139, 142, 145, 169 f., 238 f., 299, 300 Thonnard, F., 57, 121, 131. Troisfontaines, R., 49, 319, 349. Van Boxtel, J.. 252. Van Breda, Herman Leo, 2, 12. Van Dael, J., 87. Van de Hulst, H., 24. Van den Berg, T.. 119, 144, 171, 173, 181, 227. Van den Berk, J.. 153, 167. Van Lennep, D. J., 157. Van Peursen, c., 24, 51, 116. Van Riet, G., 9. 11, 124 f., 145. Van Steenberghen, Fernand, 125. Verbeke, G., 12, 13, 52 f. Verneaux, R., 314, 346, 348. Vietta, Egon, 330. Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, 255. Von Savigny, 234. Von Weissa.cker, 23. Wahl, Jean, 1. Watson, J., 184. Wylleman, A., 257 f., 263.

INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER Absence, as presence, 201 f.; from the other, 218 f. Absolute, truth, 163 f.; the essence of the, 327 £I. Abstraction, concreteness and, 103 f.; divides, 125 f.; unifies, 126 f. Abstractness of concepts, 124 £I. Act, retroverting, 114 £I. Action, norm of human, 286 f.; human, is not a process, 294 f.; facticity and human, 295 f.; animal and human, 302 £I. Active leaning, love as, 215 £I. Affection, encounter and, 211 £I.; as reply to appeal, 218 f. See also Love. Alone, I am not, 226 £I., see also CoExistence; dread and being, 349 f. Ambiguity, 6, 332. Analogy, reasoning by, 181 £I. Anonymous everybody, 331 £I. Anthropology, philosophy of law and, 237 f. Antonomies of knowledge, 129 £I. Appeal, the other's, 215 £I. Atheism, Sartre's, 313 £I. Attitude, 156; world and man's, 31 £I. Authenticity, of philosophy, 4 £I., 24 f.; of human life and legal order, 252 £I.; of being toward death, 339 £I.; dread and, 345 £I. See also Man. Authority, required by justice, 248; demands power, 248 f. Autonomy, freedom and, 268 f., 297 f.; of freedom and God, 316 £I. To Be, Transcendent, 64 £I., 353 £I.; making the other, 225 f. Being, in the world, 15 £I., 344 £I.; "at" the world, 39 £I.; mystery of, 53 f., 58; as being, 55 £I.; multiplicity and, 59 £I.; ground of, 62 £I.; "in itself" and "for itself," 104 £I., 297 f., 319 f.; consciousness and, 115 £I. ; beingfor-me, 134 £I.; of a thing, 266 f.; man's concern with his, 272 f.; Transcendent, 328 £I.; toward death, 330 £I. ; the world and Transcendent, 353 f.; man's, as bound by objectivity, 284 f. See also MUll.

Body, my, 21 £I.; as intermediary, 180 £I.; my body is not a, 186 £I.; physiology and my, 187; is not a mere instrument, 187 f.; I do not have my, 188 i is not isolated from me, 188 f.; the other's, 225 f.; as intermediary in encounter, 189 £I.; or of concealedness, 190 f. Cause, being and, 62 £I.; love and, 228 f.; transcendent, 350; freedom and 350 f. ' Choice, facticity and, 299 f. Co-Existence, 175 £I., 191 f.; levels of, 193 £I. Concept, 120 £I.; immutable, 121 f.; abstract, 124 £I.; not schematic image, 128 £I.; empiricists and abstract, 129 £I.; universal, 137 £I. Concreteness, abstractions and, 103 £I. Conscience,287 £I.; no isolated, 292 f.; being toward death and, 340 f.; guilt and, 341 f. Consciousness, 19 f.; closed, 33, 92, 103; man's being and, 38; in the world, 50; prereflective and reflective, 74 £I.; idealism, empiricism and, 84 £I.; reality and, 93 f.; not purely passive, 95 f.; as "for itself," 104 £I. ; as nihilation, 105 £I.; nothingness and, 106 f.; spatial and temporal conditions of, 118 f. See also Sel/Consciousness, Intentionality, PourSoi, Reality, World. Consent, to zu sein, 264 f.; to self, 270 f.

Copula, verbal, "is," 141 f. Creativity of love, 223 £I., 230 f. Criterion of truth, 82 £I., 158 £I. Dasein, 19, 278 f. See also, Being, in the world, Existence, Man. Death, 205 f.; being toward, 330 £I.; man's fundamental structure and, 336 £I.; authentic being toward, 339 f.

DedllCtion, 171 f. Descartes, on knowledge, 79 £I., 151; heritage of, 181 £I. Desire, man as natural, 274 f. Despair, hope or, 354 f.

358

Index of Subject Matter Destiny, phenomenology of freedom as, 260 if. Dialogue, 37, 168, 192. Disinterestedness of love, 221. Distance, consciousness and, 105 f.; freedom as, 269 if.; situated freedom and, 273 f. Doubt, Cartesian, 79 if. Dread, 332 if.; being toward death and, 334 if.; authentic being and, 345 if. Dualism, Sartre's, 103 if.; Descartes', 79 if., 181 if., 186 f. Einfiihlung, 181, 185. Empiricism, 84 if.; experience and, 87 if.; object and, 99 f.; subject and, 100 f.; and abstract concepts, 129 if. Encounter, 36 f., 97, 191 f., 207 f.; with other, 185 f., 207 if., 213 f.; and making the other be, 226 f. En-Soi, 104 if. Essence, existence and, 24 f.; phenomenology and, 122 f.; existence precedes, 296 if.; of absolute, 227 if. Ethical, freedom and being, 281 if.; bonds and freedom, 281 f., 284 f. Evidence, as criterion of truth, 165 if.; fruitfulness as, 166 if. To Exist, is to be man, 14 if.; is existentiale, 25; is to co-exist, 176 if. See also Existence, Man, Being, To Be. Existence, as being-in-the-world, 15 if.; science and, 23 f.; essence and, 24 f.; world and, 25 if.; as primitive fact of existential phenomenology, 35 f.; as being "at" the world, 39 if.; as logos, natural light, and agent intellect, 143 if.; as truth, 143 f.; precedes essence, 296 if.; as temporality, 309 f.; as place of time, 311. See also To Exist, Man, Being, To Be, World. Existentialism, phenomenology and, 1; essence and, 24 f.; legalism and atheistic, 282 f.; its deficiency, 283 f.; atheistic, 313 if.; two wings of, 314 f.; primitive fact of, 314. Existential phenomenology, 1 if.; primitive fact of, 34 if. See also Existentialism, Phenomenology. Experience, philosophy and, 6 f.; empiricism and, 87 if. Facticity, 40 if., 116; potentiality and, 157 f., 241 if., 275 f.; value of moral,

359

291 f.; and human action, 295 f.; choice and, 299 f. Faith, the bad faith of the "grave" man, 324 if. Falling away, 331 if. Fear, dread and, 333 if. Freedom, God and man's, 71 if., 316 if.; stare and, 198 f.; love as appeal to the other's, 222 f.; love and, 230 f.; phenomenology of, 260 if., 265 if.; subject and, 266 if.; as distance, having to be, and project, 269 if.; no absolute, 269 f.; situated, 273 f., 300 f.; as proj ect, 277 if.; as being ethical, 281 if.; as transcendence, 294 if.; as task, 305; as history, 305 if.; cause and, 350 if. Freudianism, 167 f., 301 if. Fr14itfulness as criterion of truth, 166 if. Future, 310 f. Geworfenheit, 314 if. Give1lness of natural law, 254 f. God, existentialism and, 38 f.; transcendent "to be," 64 f.; proof of, 65 if.; man's freedom and, 71 if.; Descartes and, 82 f.; meaning of life and, 313 if.; denied by Sartre, 326 if.; affirmation of, 352 f. See also Transcendent. Happiness, love and, 219 f. Hatred, phenomenology of, 195 if. Having to Be, freedom as, 269 if.; and being able to be, 275 f.; and history, 312 f.; meaning of, 327 if. See also Zu Sein. He, meaning of, 209 if.; as absent from me, 210 if. H eidegger, critique of, 330 if., 344 if. Historicity, of truth, 145 f., 160 if. See also History. History, facticity and, 116; natural right and. 253 if.; and legal order, 256 if.; freedom as, 305 if.; temporality and, 311 f.; and having to be, 312 f. Horizon, 99 f. Hume, critique of, 131 if., 159 f. Ideal, law and the, of the human situation, 239 f. Idealism, 84 if., 131. Ideas, Descartes on, 80 if. See also Concept.

360

Index of Subject Matter

Immanence of knowledge, 103 ff., 112 ff. Impersonal "They," 41 f., 51 f. Induction, 172. Intellect, existence as agent, 143 ff. See also Consciousness, Concept, Judgment, Reasoning. Intentionality, 22, 92 ff. See also Consciousness. Intersubjectivity, phenomenology of, 175 ff.; Sartre on, 204 f.; of rights, 238; and God, 162, 317 ff.; of consciousness, 92 ff.; of truth, 10 f., 164 f. Irrationalism, 149 f. I"ejlechi, the, 76 ff., 92, 103 f., 111, 129. Judgment, 138 ff., why many, 140 f. Justice, law, right and, 231 ff., 238 f.; love and, 243 ff.; requires authority, 248. Kant, critique of, 132 f. Knowledge, phenomenology of, 74 ff., as explicitation, 77 ff.; critique on prejudices about, 89 ff.; immanence of, 103 ff., 112 ff.; subject of, 113 ff.; sensitive and spiritual, 117 ff. Labor, 39 ff.; being man and, 45 ff. Law, phenomenology of, 231 ff.; philosophy and sciences of, 233 ff.; origin of rights, 234 ff.; and legal institutions, 246 ff.; ethics and, 284 f.; insufficiency of general, 290 ff. Legal institutions, 246 ff. Legalism, morality and, 281 f.; atheistic existentialism and, 282 f. Legal order, 250 ff.; life and, 251 ff.; and histol"'y, 255 ff. Life, and legal order, 251 ff.; meaning of, 260 ff., 278 f.; God and meaning of, 313 ff., 319 ff., 342 ff. Light, existence as natural, 143 ff. Locke, critique of, 83 f. Logic, reasoning and, 169 ff., "lived," 172 f.; philosophy and, 173 f. Logos, XI, existence as, 143 ff. Love, as standpoint of subject, 155 f.; and knowledge of the personal, 156 ff.; phenomenology of, 214 ff.; happiness and, 219 f.; disinterestedness of, 221; self-realization and, 225 f.; as appeal to the other's freedom, 222 f.; creativity of, 223 ff.;

analysis of being loved, 229 f.; and justice, 243 ff.; minimum of, 244 f., 249 f.; modifies legal order, 258 f. Man, metaphysical being, 1 ff., 65 ff.; to exist is to be for, 14 ff.; being in the world, 15 ff., 344 ff.; being "at" the world, 39 ff.; self-realization of, 41 ff.; labor and being, 45 f.; co-existence as essential aspect of, 178 ff.; as project, 40 f., 241 f.; life of, 60 ff.; is not a thing, 267; is free, 267 ff.; concern with being, 272 f.; as natural desire, 274 f.; being-able characterizes, 276 f.; as project, 277 ff.; as self-project, 279 f.; as temporality, 306 f.; wants to be God, 321 ff.; the grave, 324 ff.; directed to transcendent, 329 f.; death and fundamental structure of, 336 f.; death and unauthentic, 337 f., 346 ff.; and the transcendent, 343 ff.; dread and the being of, 345 ff.; self-consent of, 351 f. See also Existence, Having to Be, Task, Destiny, Freedom, Consciousness. Materialism, 16 f. Meaning, of meaning, 261 f.; value and, 262 f.; of life, see Life. Merleau-Ponty, on perception, 134 f. Metaphysical question, 52 ff.; its universality, 57 ff. Metaphysics, 54 f.; God and, 65 ff. Monism, 16 ff. Mood, 50 ff. Morality, legalism and, 281 f.; fundamental ought and, 285 f. Multiplicity, being and, 59 ff. Mystery of being, 53 ff., 58. Nausea, critique of, 110 ff. Necessity of freedom as project, 280 f. Nihilatio1;J, consciousness as, 105 ff. Noema,95 ff. Noesis, 95 ff. Norm, of human action, 286 f.; personal conscience and general, 288 f. Nothing, 53 ff., 58, 61 ff. Nothingness, 106 f., the I is not, 115 f.; dread and, 345. Object, empiricism and, 99 f.; subject reduced to, 196 ff. Objectivism, objectivity and, 23, 146 ff.; of law, 234 ff. Objectivity, objectivism and, 23, 146 ff.; man's having to be is bound by, 284 f.

Index of Subject Matter Orientation, proof of God and, to God, 68 fI. Other, accessibility of the, 180 ff.; encounter with the, 185 f., 206 ff.; the body as intermediary in the encounter with the, 189 f.; entering the world of the, 190; I and the stare of the, 195 ff.; presence of the, 202 ff.; appeal to me of the, 216 ff.; love as appeal to the freedom of the, 222 f.; making the other be, 225 f. Ought, fundamental, 240 ff.; of justice, 242 f.; morality and the fundamental, 285 f.

361

Profile, viewpoint and, 97 ff. Project, man as, 40 f., 277 ff., 321 ff.; freedom as, 265 ff. See also SelfProject, Freedom, Task, Destiny. Psychoanalysis, Sartre's, 323 ff. Question, the metaphysical, 52 ff.; its universality, 57 ff.

Reality, philosophy and, x f.; detotalization of, 16 ff.; human character of, 27; scientism and, 48 f.; knowledge and, 74 ff.; consciousness and, 93 ff.; self as non-distant from, 270 f.; and as infinitely distant from, 271; letting be of, 276 f.; of the Participation, 37. Transcendent, 328 ff. Past, the, 310 f. See also Time, TemReason, science and, 149 ff. porality. Perception, 91 ff., 118 ff.; viewpoint, Reasoning, logic and, 169 ff.; by analogy, 181 ff. profile, unity, 97 ff.; views on, 131 Reduction, phenomenological, 102 f. ff. Personal, knowledge of the strictly, Relativism, 146 ff., 160 ff. 156 ff. Relativity, relativism and, 146 ff.; of freedom as project, 280 f. Phenomenalism, 131 ff. Phenomenology, existentialism and, 1 Responsibility, situated freedom and, ff.; truth and, 24 f.; of knowledge, 301 f. 74 ff.; its critique on prejudices about Rights, law and, 231 ff., 250 ff.; oriknowledge, 89 ff.; of intentionality, gin of, 234 ff.; history and natural, 92 ff.; essence and, 122 ff.; of truth, 253 ff. 142 ff.; objectivity and, 146 ff.; Sartre, critique of, 106 ff., 134 f., 195 subjectivism and relativism of, 148 f., 289 ff., 301 ff., 313 ff. f.; irrationalism of, 150; of intersubjectivity, 175 ff.; of hatred, 195 Scepticism, 158. ff.; of indifference, 206 ff.; of love, Science, intersubjectivity and, 10 f.; 214 ff.; of law, 231 ff.; of freedom existence and, 23 f.; world without and its destiny, 260 ff., 265 ff.; man and, 30 f.; Descartes and, 80 primitive fact of, 34 ff., 314 ff. See ff.; world and, 88 f.; phenomenoloalso Philosophy, Existentialism. gy and, 89 f.; reason and, 149 ff.; Philosophy, reality and, x f.; authendaily life and, 168 f. ticity of, 4 ff., 24 f.; systems and, 4 Scientism, 15 f., 48 f., 89 f., 150 f., 153 ff.; tradition and, 7 f.; truth and, 9 ff. ff.; usefulness and, 12 ff.; psycholo- Self, as non-distant from reality, 270 gism and, 33 f.; technocracy and, 47 f.; as infinitely distant from reality, ff.; metaphysics and, 54 f.; logic and, 271 f.; -affirmation, 270 ff.; -cen173 f.; God and, 312 ff., 343 ff. teredness, 215 ff.; -consent, 351 f.; Physiology, my body and, 187. -consciousness, 20, 105 f., 114 ff.; Potentiality, the other's stare aria my, world for man and -consciousness, 199 f.; having to be and, 275 f.; es112 ff.; stare and my -ness, 198 f.; sential characteristic of man, 276 f. -project, man as, 40 f., 279 f.; -realization of man, 41 f.; love and man's Pour-Soi, 104 ff. See also Conscious-realization, 221 f. ness. Sin, 292 ff. Prepredicative knowledge, 139 f. Situation, see Facticity. Presence, the other's, 202 f. Present, the, 310 f. See also, Time, Society, labor and, 45 ff. Stare, analysis of the, 195 ff. Temporality. Primitive fact, of existential phenome- Stimulation theory of perception, 100 ff. nology, 34 ff., 314 ff.

362

Index of Subject Matter

Subject, world and, 25 H.; openness of, 39; facticity of, 40 H., 276 f.; empiricism and, 100 f.; of knowledge, 113 f.; truth and, 148 f.; love as standpoint 'of, 155 f.; of natural law, 255 f.; and freedom, 266 f.; time and, 307 H.; reduced to object, 196 H. See also Subjectivity. Subjectivism, 146 H.; of right, 236 f.; subjectivity and, 146 H. Subjectivity, 18, body and, 21 f., 25; subjectivism and, 146 H.; facticity and, 157, 277 f.; stare and, 197 f.; how to regain my, 203 f.; and love, 229 f. Substructures of conscience, 287 f. Task, man as task-in-the-world, 275; freedom as, 305. See also Man, Freedom. Technology, absolutism of, 47 H. Temporality, 306 H.; history and, 311 f. Thing, 104 H., 241 f., 266 f. Thrownness, 341 H. Time, subject and, 307 H. See also Temporality. Tradition, philosophy and, 7 f. Transcendence, freedom as, 294 ff. Transcendent, reality of the, 328 f.; man as directed to, 329 f.; man and the, 343 ff.; cause, 350. See also God. Truth, philosophy and, 9 f.; intersubjective, 10 f., 164 f., 175 f.; Descartes on, 81 ff.; phenomenology of, 142 ff.; existence as, 143 f.; historicity of, 145 ff., 160 ff.; objec-

tivity and subjectivity of, 146 ff.; criterion of, 82 ff., 158 ff.; absolute, 163 f.; evidence as criterion of, 165 ff. Unauthenticity, dread and, 333 f. See also Existence, Man. Understanding, 117 ff. Unity, 97 ff.; horizon and, 99. Universality, of metaphysical question, 57 ff.; of concept, 137 ff. Usefulness, philosophy and, 12 ff. Value, meaning and. 261 ff.; objective, 263 f. Ver/allen, 331 H. Verstehen, 276 f. Viewpoint, profile and, 97 ff.; love as the subject's, 155 f. We, forms of, 192 f.; of indifference, 207 ff. World, existence as being in the, 15 ff., 327 ff.; meaning of, 25 ff.; cultural, 26 f.; material, 27 f.; reality of the, 29 ff.; man's attitude and, 31 ff.; existence as being "at" the, 39 ff.; inhuman, 85; consciousness and, 84 ff.; science and, 88; selfconsciousness and world for man, 112 ff.; perception and, 135 ff.; my, as our, 177 ff.; love and my, 230 f.; man as task in the, 275; Transcendent Being and, 353 f. You, meaning of, 207 f.; he and, 209 ff.; meaning of, in love, 223 f. Zu Sein, 262 ff., 275 ff.; consent to, 264 f. See also Having to Be, Ought.